International Encyclopedia of Human Geography, Twelve-Volume Set: Volume 5

INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY EDITORS-IN-CHIEF ROB KITCHIN National Institute of Regional and Spatial ...

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INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY EDITORS-IN-CHIEF

ROB KITCHIN National Institute of Regional and Spatial Analysis (NIRSA) John Hume Building, National University of Ireland Maynooth, County Kildare Ireland

NIGEL THRIFT University House, University of Warwick Coventry UK

AMSTERDAM BOSTON HEIDELBERG LONDON NEW YORK OXFORD PARIS SAN DIEGO SAN FRANCISCO SINGAPORE SYDNEY TOKYO

INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY

INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY EDITORS-IN-CHIEF

ROB KITCHIN National Institute of Regional and Spatial Analysis (NIRSA) John Hume Building, National University of Ireland Maynooth, County Kildare Ireland

NIGEL THRIFT University House, University of Warwick Coventry UK

AMSTERDAM BOSTON HEIDELBERG LONDON NEW YORK OXFORD PARIS SAN DIEGO SAN FRANCISCO SINGAPORE SYDNEY TOKYO

Elsevier Radarweg 29, PO Box 211, 1000 AE Amsterdam, The Netherlands Linacre House, Jordan Hill, Oxford OX2 8DP, UK First edition 2009 Copyright & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publisher Permissions may be sought directly from Elsevier’s Science & Technology Rights Department in Oxford, UK: phone (+44) (0) 1865 843830; fax (+44) (0) 1865 853333; email: [email protected]. Alternatively, you can submit your request online by visiting the Elsevier web site at http://elsevier.com/locate/permissions, and selecting Obtaining permission to use Elsevier material Notice No responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter of products liability, negligence or otherwise, or from any use or operation of any methods, products, instructions or ideas contained in the material herein. Because of rapid advances in the medical sciences, in particular, independent veriﬁcation of diagnoses and drug dosages should be made British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Catalog Number: 2007927349 ISBN: 978-0-08-044916-6 For information on all Elsevier publications visit our website at elsevierdirect.com

Printed and bound in Italy 09 10 11 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

SENIOR EDITORS Noel Castree Geography Discipline Arthur Lewis Building School of Environment and Development The University of Manchester Manchester UK Mike Crang Department of Geography Durham University Science Laboratories Durham UK Mona Domosh Department of Geography Dartmouth College Hanover, NH USA

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SECTION EDITORS Kay Anderson Centre for Cultural Research University of Western Sydney Penrith South DC, NSW, Sydney Australia Paul Cloke Department of Geography University of Exeter Exeter UK Jeremy Crampton Department of Geosciences Georgia State University Atlanta, GA USA Brian Graham University of Ulster Coleraine, N. Ireland UK Costis Hadjimichalis Department of Geography Harokopio University Athens Greece

Loretta Lees Cities Research Group Department of Geography King’s College London London UK Sara McLafferty Department of Geography University of Illinois at Urbana – Champaign Urbana, IL USA Anssi Paasi Department of Geography University of Oulu Linnanmaa Oulu Finland Chris Philo Department of Geographical and Earth Sciences University of Glasgow Glasgow UK

Phil Hubbard Department of Geography University of Loughborough Loughborough UK

James Sidaway School of Geography University of Plymouth Plymouth UK

Robin Kearns School of Geography, Geology and Environmental Sciences The University of Auckland Auckland New Zealand

Katie Willis Department of Geography Royal Holloway, University of London Egham UK

Mei-Po Kwan Department of Geography The Ohio State University Columbus, OH USA

Henry Yeung Department of Geography National University of Singapore Singapore

vii

GUIDE TO USE OF THE ENCYCLOPEDIA

Structure of the Encyclopedia The material in the Encyclopedia is arranged as a series of articles in alphabetical order. There are four features to help you easily ﬁnd the topic you’re interested in: an alphabetical contents list, a subject classiﬁcation index, cross references and a full subject index.

1. Alphabetical Contents List The alphabetical contents list, which appears at the front of the ﬁrst volume, lists the entries in the order that they appear in the Encyclopedia. It includes both the volume number and the page number of each entry.

2. Subject Classiﬁcation Index This index appears at the start of Volume 1 and groups entries under subject headings that reﬂect the broad themes of Human Geography. This index is useful for making quick connections between entries and locating the relevant entry for a topic that is covered in more than one article.

3. Cross-references All of the entries in the Encyclopedia have been exten sively cross referenced. The cross references which ap pear at the end of an entry, serve three different functions: i.

To indicate if a topic is discussed in greater detail elsewhere

ii. To draw the readers attention to parallel discussions in other entries iii. To indicate material that broadens the discussion Example The following list of cross references appears at the end of the entry IMPERIALISM, CULTURAL See also: Colonialism I; Colonialism II; Dependency; First World; Globalization, Cultural; Hegemony; Imperialistic Geographies; Neocolonialism; Orientalism; Postcolonia lism/Postcolonial Geographies; Poststructuralism/Post structuralist Geographies; Third World. Here you will ﬁnd examples of all three functions of the cross reference list: a topic discussed in greater detail elsewhere (e.g., Orientalism), parallel discussion in other entries (Imperialistic Geographies) and reference to en tries that broaden the discussion (e.g. Postcolonialism/ Postcolonial Geographies).

4. Index The index includes page numbers for quick reference to the information you’re looking for. The index entries differentiate between references to a whole entry, a part of an entry, and a table or ﬁgure.

5. Contributors At the start of each volume there is list of the authors who contributed to that volume.

ix

CONTRIBUTORS

VOLUME 1 M B Aalbers Columbia University, New York, NY, USA

J Crush University of Cape Town, Rondebosch, South Africa

G J Andrews McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada

C D’Ignazio The Institute for Inﬁnitely Small Things, Waltham, MA, USA

H Asche University of Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany J O Bærenholdt Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark J Battersby-Lennard University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa J Beall London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK

R J Das York University, Toronto, ON, Canada J Davidson Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada C Delano-Smith University of London, London, UK V Desai Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, UK

K B Beesley Brandon University, Brandon, MB, Canada

J D Dewsbury Bristol University, Bristol, UK

K Besio University of Hawaii at Hilo, Hilo, HI, USA

J Dittmer University college London, London, UK

M Brayshay University of Plymouth, Devon, UK

H Fassmann Universita¨t Wien, Vienna, Austria

M M Breitbart Hampshire College, Amherst, MA, USA

C Gibson University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

S Brentjes Universidad de Sevilla, Sevilla, Spain

J R Gold Oxford Brookes University, Oxford, UK

John R Bryson The University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK

O Groza Universitatea Al.I Cuza, Iasi, Romania

H Buller University of Exeter, Exeter, UK

S W Hardwick University of Oregon, Eugene, OR, USA

K A Butler University of Akron, Akron, OH, USA

M Harrower University of Wisconsin – Madison, Madison, WI, USA

K W Butzer University of Texas, Austin, TX, USA

H Hazen Macalester College, St Paul, MN, USA

S Chaturvedi Panjab University, Chandigarh, India

C Hughes Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada

xi

xii

Contributors

G T Jo´hannesson University of Iceland, Reykjavik, Iceland

M Pacione University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK

L Johnston University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand

C Potter Imperial College London, London, UK

R J P Kain University of Exeter, Exeter, UK

R B Potter University of Reading, Reading, UK

R B Kent California State University, Northridge, Northridge, CA, USA

G Prevelakis University of Pantheon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Paris, France

M Kurtz Open University, Ottawa, ON, Canada M Kurtz Open University, Milton Keynes, UK R W Lake Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA R Le Heron The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand A A Lehtinen University of Joensuu, Joensuu, Finland Y Leung The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, People’s Republic of China

M Purcell University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA D Ramsey Brandon University, Brandon, MB, Canada S Reimer University of Southampton, Southampton, UK J Renes Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands, and Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands V Rey Ecole Normale Supe´rieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines, Lyon, France M-C Robic CNRS, Paris, France

S Lloyd-Evans University of Reading, Reading, UK

U Rossi University of Cagliari, Cagliari, Italy

J Lossau Humboldt-Universita¨t zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany

P Routledge University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

A Malmberg Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden

J Siemer University of Regina, Regina, SK, Canada

T Marsden Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK

M W Skinner Trent University, Peterborough, ON, Canada

F Martinelli Universita` ‘Mediterranea’ di Reggio Calabria, Reggio di Calabria, Italy

T Slater University of Edinburgh, Bristol, UK

L Maxey Swansea University, Wales, UK D P McCormack Oxford University Centre for the Environment, Oxford, UK

L M Takahashi University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA A Taylor University of Canberra, Canberra, ACT, Australia

P Merlin

M E Thomas The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA

G A Myers University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, USA

T M Vowles University of Northern Colorado, Greeley, CO, USA

R P Neumann Florida International University, Miami, FL, USA

A M Warnes University of Shefﬁeld, Shefﬁeld, UK

T Oakes University of Colorado at Boulder, Boulder, CO, USA

D Wastl-Walter University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland

U Oslender University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

A Watson University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA

Contributors C Wilbert Anglia Ruskin University, Chelmsford, UK

S D Withers University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA

M Williams Oxford University, Oxford, UK

N M Yantzi Laurentian University, Sudbury, ON, Canada

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VOLUME 2 H Aay Calvin College, Grand Rapids, MI, USA

V Chouinard McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada

S C Aitken San Diego State University, San Diego, CA, USA and National Technical Norwegian University, Trondheim, Norway

H Couclelis University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA

L Albrechts Catholic University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium G J Andrews McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada N Ansell Brunel University, Uxbridge, UK D Atkinson University of Hull, Hull, UK M Batty University College London, London, UK J Baxter University of Western Ontario, London, ON, Canada M Be´dard Universite´ du Que´bec a` Montre´al, Montre´al, QC, Canada D Bell University of Leeds, Leeds, UK D Bennett Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada

A Currah Oxford University Centre for the Environment, Oxford, UK R J Das York University, Toronto, ON, Canada S Davoudi Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK E Delaney US Deparment of the Interior, National Park Service, Washington, DC, USA J Dempsey University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada S J Elliott McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada V Filippakopoulou National Technical University of Athens, Athens, Greece W Friesen The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand C Gibson University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

U Best Technische Universita¨t Chemnitz, Chemnitz, Germany

A L Grifﬁn University of New South Wales – ADFA, Canberra, ACT, Australia

J Binnie Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, UK

J W Harrington, Jr. University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA

C R Bryant Universite´ de Montre´al, Montre´al, QC, Canada

M Hassler Philipps-University Marburg, Marburg, Germany

R Capello Milan Polytechnic, Milan, Italy

G Helms University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

R Carvalho Queen Mary, University of London, London, UK

J J Holloway Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, UK

G Chapman Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK

A Hughes Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK

L Cheshire The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD, Australia

M Jay University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand

S Chilvers York University, Toronto, ON, Canada

N Kliot University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel

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Contributors

H Koskela University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland

C Philo University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

J Krygier Ohio Wesleyan University, Delaware, OH, USA

A C Pratt London School of Economics, London, UK

M S Kumar Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UK

S Punch University of Stirling, Stirling, UK

B Lambregts University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

B Ramı´rez Universidad Auto´noma Metropolitana, Mexico City, Mexico

D Leslie University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada A Lester University of Sussex, Brighton, UK N Lewis The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand K D Lilley Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UK T W Luke Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, USA L J C Ma University of Akron, Akron, OH, USA J Malczewski University of Western Ontario, London, ON, Canada D Martin University of Southampton, Southampton, UK E J McCann Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada C McIlwaine Queen Mary, University of London, London, UK K J Mee University of Newcastle, Callaghan, NSW, Australia S Millington Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, UK C J A Mitchell University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada D R Montello University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA M Morad London South Bank University, London, UK B Nakos National Technical University of Athens, Athens, Greece

G A Rice University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland K Robinson McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada R Rundstrom University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, USA S Rycroft University of Sussex, Brighton, UK N Schuurman Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada J P Sharp University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK D Sibley University of Leeds, Leeds, UK T Skelton National University of Singapore, Singapore F Smith Brunel University, Uxbridge, UK J Sundberg University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada J C Sweeney National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Republic of Ireland W S Tang Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Kowloon, Hong Kong, People’s Republic of China T Tasan-Kok Delft University of Technology, Jaffalaan, The Netherlands J-C Thill University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Charlotte, NC, USA

D O’Sullivan The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

J Tima´r Center for Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Be´ke´scsaba, Hungary

J R Oppong University of North Texas, Denton, TX, USA

P M Torrens Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA

M Phillips University of Leicester, Leicester, UK

G Waitt University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

Contributors J L Waters University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK

F Wray Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK

D Wood Raleigh, NC, USA

H van der Wusten Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

M Woods Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth, UK

C Young Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, UK

VOLUME 3 T J Barnes University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada

S Dall’erba University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA

C Barnett The Open University, Milton Keynes, UK

J Davidson Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada

J Barnett University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

A Davies Trinity College, Dublin, Republic of Ireland

C J Barrow Swansea University, Swansea, UK

C Dixon London Metropolitan University, London, UK

G de Bastion Deutsche Gesellschaft fu¨r Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH, Eschborn, Germany

R Dowling Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia

J V Beaverstock University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK S Bell University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK, Canada L D Berg University of British Columbia, Kelowna, BC, Canada L Bondi University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK A Bonnett Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK

S Eden University of Hull, Hull, UK S J Elliott McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada G A Elmes West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV, USA H Ernste Radboud University, Nijmegan, The Netherlands J Evans McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada

L A Brown Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA

J R Faulconbridge Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK

R A Butlin University of Leeds, Leeds, UK

D A Fennell Brock University, St Catharines, ON, Canada

A Cameron University of Leicester, Leicester, UK

S Gopal Boston University, Boston, MA, USA

C Cocklin James Cook University, Townsville, QLD, Australia

S Hall University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK

M P Conzen University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA

E Hartwick Framingham State College, Framingham, MA, USA

K E Corey Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA

S Healy Worcester State College, Worcester, MA, USA

T Cresswell Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, UK

M Hess University of Manchester, Manchester, UK

C D’Alessandro-Scarpari Universite´ Lumie`re Lyon 2, Lyon, France

J Holloway Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, UK

xv

xvi

Contributors

T Jazeel University of Shefﬁeld, Shefﬁeld, UK R Johnston University of Bristol, Bristol, UK O Jones CCRI, Cheltenham, UK A Kalogeressis University of Macedonia, Greece A Kavanagh National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Republic of Ireland M C Keane St Mary’s University College, Belfast, UK M Keating European University Institute, Florence, Italy J Kneale University College London, London, UK A Kobayashi Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada T Koch University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada B Korf University of Zu¨rich – Irchel, Zu¨rich, Switzerland M S Kumar Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UK M Kuus University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada L Labrianidis University of Macedonia, Greece A Latham University College London, London, UK E Laurier University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK A A Lehtinen University of Joensuu, Joensuu, Finland

M Low London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK K McCracken Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia K McKittrick Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada P McManus The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia P Meth University of Shefﬁeld, Shefﬁeld, UK J J Metz Northern Kentucky University, Highland Heights, KY, USA B E Montz Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY, USA D P Nally University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK P M O’Neill University of Western Sydney, Parramatta, NSW, Australia C Pattie University of Shefﬁeld, Shefﬁeld, UK N A Phelps University College London, London, UK D R Phillips Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong C Philo University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK A Pike Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK G H Pirie University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, South Africa P Plummer University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada

J I Leib Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, USA

M Power University of Durham, Durham, UK

N Lewis University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

P Rees University of Leeds, Leeds, UK

W Li Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA

S A Royle Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UK

D Linehan University College Cork, Cork, Republic of Ireland

A Schærstro¨m Kometva¨gen, Ta¨by, Sweden

L Lo York University, Toronto, ON Canada

R Scheyvens Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand

R Longhurst University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand

J W Scott University of Joensuu, Joensuu, Finland

Contributors D Seamon Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, USA

M Tykkyla¨inen University of Joensuu, Joensuu, Finland

E Sheppard University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA

T Unwin University of London, Egham, UK

David Simon University of London, Egham, UK

E Warwick King’s College London, London, UK

V F S Sit University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, People’s Republic of China

H D Watts University of Shefﬁeld, Shefﬁeld, UK

E Skop The University of Colorado at Colorado Springs, Colorado Springs, CO, USA L Smith Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands

D Weiner West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV, USA

C Sneddon Dartmouth College, Hanover NH, USA

J Wiles University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

H Southall University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, UK

K D Willis Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, UK

J Sowers Missouri State University, Springﬁeld, MO, USA

M I Wilson Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA

E Stam Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands

R Wilton McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada

D Storey University of Worcester, Worcester, UK

H Winlow Bath Spa University, Bath, UK

D Sui Texas A & M University, College Station, TX, USA J Sundberg University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada

K E Till Virginia Tech University, Alexandria, VA, USA G A Tobin University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, USA S W Trimble University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA S Turner McGill University, Montre´al, QC, Canada

M Webber University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia G R Webster University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY, USA

M Smith Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada

E Swyngedouw Manchester University, Manchester, UK

M Watts UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA

C W J Withers University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK F Wu Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK N Xiao The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA I Yamada University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, USA B S A Yeoh National University of Singapore, Singapore O Yiftachel Ben Gurion University, Beer-sheva, Israel E K Z Zygmunt University of Silesia, Sosnowiec, Poland

VOLUME 4 D Abbott University of Derby, Derby, UK

P Adey Keele University, Keele, UK

xvii

xviii

Contributors

P J Atkins Durham University, Durham, UK R Atkinson University of Tasmania, Hobart, TAS, Australia G Benko Universite´ Panthe´on-Sorbonne, Paris, France P Bennett University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK L D Berg University of British Columbia, Kelowna, BC, Canada M Birkin University of Leeds, Leeds, UK S Blandy University of Leeds, Leeds, UK F J Bosco San Diego State University, San Diego, CA, USA S Bowlby University of Reading, Reading, UK H Bradley Mary Immaculate College, University of Limerick, Limerick, Republic of Ireland P Breathnach National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Republic of Ireland J Briggs University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK J E Castro Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK J Chapman University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, UK O Z Chaudhry University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK G L Clark Oxford University Centre for the Environment, Oxford, UK G P Clarke University of Leeds, Leeds, UK K C Clarke University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA P Claval

´ Crowley U National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Co Kildare, Republic of Ireland C Desbiens Universite´ Laval, Que´bec City, QC, Canada P Dicken University of Manchester, Manchester, UK G Dijkink University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands I Docherty University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK M Duckham University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia M Duffy University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia S Elwood University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA M F Goodchild University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA D Goodman University of California – Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA, USA M K Goodman King’s College London, London, UK M Goodwin University of Exeter, Exeter, UK L van Grunsven Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands J Ha¨kli University of Tampere, Finland E Hall University of Dundee, Dundee, UK D J Hammel University of Toledo, Toledo, OH, USA B Hendrikx Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands M Hess University of Manchester, Manchester, UK

Universite´ de Paris-Sorbonne, Paris, France

J Hessler Library of Congress, Washington, DC, USA

N M Coe University of Manchester, Manchester, UK

R Hudson Durham University, Durham, UK

M Cope University of Vermont, Burlington, VT, USA

M Huxley University of Shefﬁeld, Shefﬁeld, UK

David Crouch University of Derby, Derby, UK

L C Johnson Deakin University, Geelong, VIC, Australia

Contributors R Kaiser University of Wisconsin – Madison, Madison, WI, USA

S M Otterstrom Brigham Young University, Provo, UT, USA

A Kealy University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

A Pa´ez McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada

M J Kraak International Institute of Geo-Information Science and Earth Observation, Enschede, The Netherlands

M Pavlovskaya Hunter College – CUNY, New York, NY, USA

A Lagendijk Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands N S Lam Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA, USA A Latham UCL, London, UK J Lee The University of Seoul, Seoul, South Korea Y Leung The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong A Leyshon University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK J Little University of Exeter, Exeter, UK J Lovering Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK C Lukinbeal Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA W A Mackaness University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK A Maddrell University of the West of England, Bristol, UK J C Marshallw University of Oxford, Oxford, UK D R Meyer Brown University, Providence, RI, USA V Miller University of Kent, Canterbury, UK C M Moreno San Diego State University, San Diego, CA, USA K M Morin Bucknell University, Lewisburg, PA, USA R Morrill University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA L Muscara` Universita` del Molise, Isernia, Campobasso, Italy T Nyerges University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA w

Deceased, 22 August 2007.

xix

Linda Peake York University, Toronto, ON, Canada M Phillips University of Leicester, Leicester, UK J Pollard Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK L Price Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UK B Pritchard University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia M Purvis University of Leeds, Leeds, UK M Raco King’s College London, London, UK K N Rankin University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada J Raper City University, London, UK L T Raynolds Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO, USA P Reuber University of Mu¨nster, Mu¨nster, Germany P Richardson University of Oxford, Oxford, UK S M Roberts University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, USA U Rossi University of Cagliari, Cagliari, Italy G Rushton The University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, USA R B Sarma Cotton College, Guwahati, India A J Secor University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, USA J Shaw University of Plymouth, Plymouth, UK T Slater University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK K Strauss Oxford University Centre for the Environment, Oxford, UK

xx

Contributors

M Taylor Mary Immaculate College, University of Limerick, Limerick, Republic of Ireland

S J Whatmore University of Oxford, Oxford, UK D C Wheeler Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA

M Taylor University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK

J Wiles University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

D Thien California State University, Long Beach, CA, USA

G Williams University of Shefﬁeld, Shefﬁeld, UK

J Tivers Nottingham Trent University, Nottingham, UK

K D Willis Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, UK

Y Underhill-Sem University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand J Wallace University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

D Wo´jcik Oxford University Centre for the Environment, Oxford, UK

F Wang Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA, USA

X Yao University of Georgia, Atlanta, GA, USA

B Warf University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, USA

H W-c Yeung National University of Singapore, Singapore

VOLUME 5 A G Aguilar Universidad Nacional Auto´noma de Me´xico, Mexico City, Mexico J Agyeman Tufts University, Medford, MA, USA K Falconer Al-Hindi University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE, USA N AlSayyad University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA G J Ashworth University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands S Asthana University of Plymouth, Plymouth, UK P Barnett University of Otago, Christchurch, New Zealand R Barnett University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand D Bell University of Leeds, Leeds, UK J D Bohland Hollins University, Roanoke, VA, USA T Brown Queen Mary, University of London, London, UK I H Burnley University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW, Australia E Cameron Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada

E P Campuzano Instituto Polite´cnico Nacional, Mexico City, Mexico F Celata University of Rome ‘‘La Sapienza’’, Rome, Italy M Chapin Center for the Support of Native Lands, Arlington, VA, USA K Chapman University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, UK S Chaturvedi Panjab University, Chandigarh, India E Clark Lund University, Lund, Sweden N Collins-Kreiner University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel J Corbett University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada G DeVerteuil University of Southampton, Southampton, UK M Dodge University of Manchester, Manchester, UK D Dorling University of Shefﬁeld, Shefﬁeld, UK P J Duffy National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, Republic of Ireland

Contributors

xxi

J Dunn St Michael’s Hospital, Toronto, ON, Canada

R Hudson University of Durham, Durham, UK

R Fish University of Exeter, Exeter, UK

J S Humphreys Monash University, Bendigo, VIC, Australia

R Flowerdew University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UK

R D Jacobson University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada

R Foley NUI Maynooth, Maynooth, Republic of Ireland

J P Jones III University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA

N Gallent University College London, London, UK

R Jones Curtin University of Technology, Perth, WA, Australia

C Gibson University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

C Kelly University of Greenwich, London, UK

L Gibson Land and People Information Sharing Society (LAPIS), Parksville, BC, Canada

A D King State University of New York at Binghamton, Binghamton, NY, USA

J Glassman University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada

S Kirsch University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, USA

A R Goetz University of Denver, Denver, CO, USA

A Kobayashi Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada

A Golan University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel

N Koch Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA

W T S Gould University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK

Z Kova´cs University of Szeged, Szeged, Hungary

M Greenwood University of Northern British Columbia, Prince George, BC, Canada

M-J Kraak ITC – International Institute of Geo-Information Science and Earth Observation, Enschede, The Netherlands

A L Grifﬁn University of New South Wales – ADFA, Canberra, ACT, Australia

S de Leeuw University of Northern British Columbia, Prince George, BC, Canada

L Guelke University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada

R Lewis University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada

E Hague DePaul University, Chicago, IL, USA

R Longhurst University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand

R Haines-Young University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK

D Mackinnon University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, UK

R Harris McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada

S P Mains University of the West Indies-Mona, Kingston, Jamaica

F Harvey University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA

J May Queen Mary, University of London, London, UK

G J D Hewings University of Illinois, Urbana, IL, USA

P Milbourne Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK

R Honey The University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, USA

C Minca Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, UK

R Howitt Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia

J Mistry University of London, Egham, UK

M Hoyler Loughborough University, Loughborough, UK

R Mitchell University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

xxii

Contributors

G Moon University of Southampton, Highﬁeld, UK

M Shaw Bristol University, Bristol, UK

S Muller Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia

D Simandan Brock University, St Catharines, ON, Canada

S Neal Open University, Milton Keynes, UK

J M Smith Texas A & M University, College Station, TX, USA

M E O’Kelly Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA

K B Smith Monash University, Bendigo, VIC, Australia

K R Olwig Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Alnarp, Sweden

M Sonis University of Illinois, Urbana, IL, USA, and Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel

S Orford Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK

M Sothern University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UK

M Pacione University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK

R Sternberg University of Hannover, Hannover, Germany

M Parnwell University of Leeds, Leeds, UK

S Suchet-Pearson Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia

B Parthasarathy International Institute of Information Technology, Bangalore, India

I Tu¨reli Brown University, Providence, RI, USA

J Patchell Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China R Peet Clark University, Worcester, MA, USA T Peil Tallinn University, Tallinn, Estonia N A Phelps University College London, London, UK J M Powell Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia P Raento University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland G Rambaldi Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation ACP-EU, Wageningen, The Netherlands C Richmond The University of Western Ontario, London, ON, Canada E J Roe Southampton University, Southampton, UK U Rossi University of Cagliari, Cagliari, Italy J Rutherford LATTS (Laboratoire Techniques, Territoires et Socie´te´s), Marne-la-Valle´e, France G Setten Department of Geography, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway

J Tima´r Center for Regional Studies, Be´ke´scsaba, Hungary D P Tolia-Kelly Durham University, Durham, UK H Tunstall University of York, York, UK D Vaiou National Technical University of Athens, Athens, Greece S M Walcott University of North Carolina, Greensboro, NC, USA J L Waters University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK G W White Frostburg State University, Frostburg, MD, USA K Wilson University of Toronto, Mississauga, ON, Canada G M Winder The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand G M Winder Ludwig-Maximilians-Universita¨t, Munich, Germany K Woodward University of Exeter, Exeter, UK R Wright Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA Y Zhou Vassar College, New York, NY, USA M Zook University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, USA

Contributors

VOLUME 6 B T Asheim Lund University, Lund, Sweden

R Edsall University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA

A Aylett University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada

F Eva Universita’ Ca’ Foscari, Venezia, Treviso Campus, Italy

A Bain York University, Toronto, ON, Canada

M Farish University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada

T J Barnes University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada

R Fincher University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

C Benner University of California, Davis, Davis, CA, USA M Brosseau University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON, Canada K Browne University of Brighton, Brighton, UK R A Butlin University of Leeds, Leeds, UK C A Calder The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA P Carmody Trinity College, Dublin, Republic of Ireland W Cartwright RMIT University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia P Collier University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, UK S Conti Universita` e Politecnico di Torino, Turin, Italy P Cooke Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK K R Cox The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA N Cressie The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA A Cumbers University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK D Delaney Amherst College, Amherst, MA, USA

S M Freundschuh National Science Foundation, Arlington, VA, USA G Garofoli Insubria University, Varese, Italy J Gaspar CEG, University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal P Giaccaria Universita` e Politecnico di Torino, Turin, Italy E Gilbert University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada J R Gold Oxford Brookes University, Oxford, UK A E Green University of Warwick, Coventry, UK M Haldrup Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark F Harvey University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA A Herod University of Georgia, Athens, GA, USA M Hesse University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg S Hoelscher The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA E Holland University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, USA

M Dodge University of Manchester, Manchester, UK

B Hooper Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands

J Dubow University of Shefﬁeld, Shefﬁeld, UK

P Hopkins Newcastle University, Newcastle, UK

C Dwyer University College London, London, UK

M W Horner The Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA

xxiii

xxiv

Contributors

B van Hoven University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands

J O’Loughlin University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, USA

R Howitt Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia

F Owusu Iowa State University, Ames, IA, USA

B Hunt Santa Barbara, CA, USA

R B Parry The University of Reading, Reading, UK

J Ja¨ger University of Applied Sciences BFI, Vienna, Austria

M W Pearce Ohio University, Athens, OH, USA

P Jackson University of Shefﬁeld, Shefﬁeld, UK A E G Jonas University of Hull, Hull, UK

C Perkins University of Manchester, Manchester, UK S Pinch University of Southampton, Southampton, UK

A Jones University of London, London, UK

´ Riain SO National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Republic of Ireland

R Jones Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth, UK

G A Rice University of Helsinki, Finland

Cristo´bal Kay Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, The Netherlands

J-P Rodrigue Hofstra University, Hempstead, NY, USA

G Kearns Virginia Polytechnic and State University, Blacksburg, VA, USA

T D Rutherford Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA A Saito National University of Singapore, Singapore

G Kearns Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA, USA

James D Sidaway School of Geography, University of Plymouth, UK

A Kerr National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Republic of Ireland

T Skelton National University of Singapore, Singapore

J Krygier Ohio Wesleyan University, Delaware, OH, USA W Li University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA E Mac Gillavry Webmapper, Utrecht, The Netherlands J Mansvelt Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand F Mizuoka Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan

A Tay University of Bristol, Bristol, UK D P Tolia-Kelly Durham University, Durham, UK B L Turner II Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA H Winlow Bath Spa University, Bath, UK S D Withers University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA D Wood Raleigh, NC, USA

K M Morin Bucknell University, Lewisburg, PA, USA

P Wood University College London, London, UK

A T Murray Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA

C Zhang University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA

C J Nash University of Brighton, Brighton, UK

M Zook University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, USA

Contributors

xxv

VOLUME 7 S C Aitken San Diego State University, San Diego, CA, USA, and National Technical University of Norway, Trondheim, Norway D H Alderman East Carolina University, Greenville, NC, USA N Argent University of New England, Armidale, NSW, Australia S Bell University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK, Canada M E Bonine University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA W M Bowen Cleveland State University, Cleveland, OH, USA P Boyle University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UK G Bridge University of Manchester, Manchester, UK K M Brown Macaulay Land Use Research Institute, Craigiebuckler, Aberdeen, UK

K M Dunn School of Social Sciences, Penrith, NSW, Australia O J Dwyer Indiana University, Indianapolis, IN, USA R Earickson University of Maryland, Baltimore, MD, USA T Edensor Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, UK C Cindy Fan University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA M Farish University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada J Flint Shefﬁeld Hallam University, Shefﬁeld, UK S Fullagar Grifﬁth University, Nathan, QLD, Australia J R Gold Oxford Brookes University, Oxford, UK G Grabher University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany

G Burgel University of Paris 10, Nanterre, France

R N Gwynne University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK

M A Busteed University of Manchester, Manchester, UK

D Hill University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand

L Cadman University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK I Casas University at Buffalo – SUNY, Buffalo, NY, USA D B Clarke Swansea University, Swansea, UK N Clarke University of Southampton, Southampton, UK P Claval Universite´ de Paris-Sorbonne, Paris, France J Clayton University of Sunderland, Sunderland, UK P Cooke Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK N Curry Countryside and Community Research Institute CCRI, Cheltenham, UK

H Hoernig Universite´ de Que´bec a` Montre´al, Montre´al, QC, Canada P Holland University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand P Hubbard Leicestershire University, Leicestershire, UK R D Jacobson University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada W Jenkins York University, Toronto, ON, Canada O Jones Countryside and Community Research Institute CCRI, Cheltenham, UK R Jones Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth, UK

xxvi

Contributors

K Kafkoula Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece D H Kaplan Kent State University, Kent, OH, USA J Kenny University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI, USA

J Penrose University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK C G Pooley Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK C Radel Utah State University, Logan, UT, USA Saraswati Raju Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India

M J Kuby Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA

S Ratick Clark University, Worcester, MA, USA

W Larner University of Bristol, Bristol, UK

T D Roberts University of Colorado at Boulder, Boulder, CO, USA

R Le Heron The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

G Schwarz Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogota, DC, Colombia

Sang-Il Lee Seoul National University, Seoul, South Korea K D Lilley Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UK D Linehan University College Cork, Cork, Republic of Ireland J Lorimer King’s College London, London, UK G MacLeod University of Durham, Durham, UK

G Setten Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway K Simonsen Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark M Sioh DePaul University, Chicago, IL, USA C J Smith University at Albany, SUNY, Albany, NY, USA

E J McCann Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada

M Tanskanen University of Joensuu, Joensuu, Finland

L McDowell University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

S Tierney University of Denver, Denver, CO, USA

S McDowell University of Ulster, Coleraine, UK

C D Upchurch University of South Carolina, Columbia, USA

A McGregor University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand

M Walton-Roberts Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, ON, Canada

J H McKendrick Glasgow Caledonian University, Glasgow, UK

M Watts UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA

P Merriman Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth, UK

A Wearing University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand

W E Murray Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand

D W Wong George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA

G Olsson Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden

R Woodward Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK

K R Olwig Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Alnarp, Sweden

Y-M Yeung The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, People’s Republic of China

Contributors

xxvii

VOLUME 8 O Ahlqvist The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA

M Dunford University of Sussex, Brighton, UK

S C Aitken San Diego State University, San Diego, CA, USA, and Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway

S Elden Durham University, Durham, UK

G Backhaus Loyola College in Maryland, Baltimore, MD, USA

R Flowerdew University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UK

A J Bailey University of Leeds, Leeds, UK

B Forest McGill University, Montre´al, QC, Canada

D Bennett Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada

A Franklin University of Tasmania, Hobart, TAS, Australia

V Berdoulay CNRS and Universite´ de Pau, Pau, France

N R Fyfe University of Dundee, Dundee, UK

L Bondi University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK

M Gren Ho´lar University College, Sauja´rkro´kur, Iceland

M Boyle National University of Ireland Maynooth, Co Kildare, Republic of Ireland E Chacko The George Washington University, Washington, DC, USA X Chen Trinity College, Hartford, CT, USA A O Chimhowu University of Manchester, Manchester, UK P Collier University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, UK D Collins University of Alberta, Alberta, Canada D Collins University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand K R Cox The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA T Cresswell Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, UK

R Flowerdew University of St Andrews, Fife, UK

M Haldrup Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark P Hall University College London, London, UK S Harrison University of Exeter, Penryn, UK S Hickey University of Manchester, Manchester, UK M Huxley University of Shefﬁeld, Shefﬁeld, UK J P Jones III University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA R Jones Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth, UK M Kesby University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UK F C Kessler Frostburg State University, Frostburg, MD, USA S Kindon Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand

E Delmelle University of North Carolina at Charlotte, NC, USA

A D King State University of New York Binghamton, Binghamton, NY, USA

J Dittmer University College London, London, UK

P T Kingsbury Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada

D P Dixon The University of Wales, Aberystwyth, UK

A Kobayashi Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada

xxviii

Contributors

L Koefoed Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark

C Perkins University of Manchester, Manchester, UK

U Kothari University of Manchester, Manchester, UK

M Perry Massey University (Wellington), Wellington, New Zealand

D M Lawrence Virginia State University and Virginia Union University, Richmond, VA, USA

J Nederveen Pieterse University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, IL, USA

R Le Heron University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand J Lea Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK J Lorimer King’s College London, London, UK D P McCormack Oxford University Centre for the Environment, Oxford, UK

J D van der Ploeg Wageningen University, Wageningen, The Netherlands Saraswati Raju Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India R Sanders Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, USA V R Savage National University of Singapore, Singapore B-M Shantz University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

C McEwan Durham University, Durham, UK

S J Smith University of Durham, Durham, UK

C Minca Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, UK

L A Staeheli University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK

D Mitchell Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA

J-F Staszak Universite´ de Gene`ve Geneva, Switzerland

F Morton Royal Scottish Academy of Music and Drama, Glasgow, UK

P E Steinberg Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA

W E Murray Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand C J Nash Brock University, St Catharines, ON, Canada

D Storey University of Worcester, Worcester, UK L Sy´kora Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic A R Tickamyer Ohio University, Athens, OH, USA

R P Neumann Florida International University, Miami, FL, USA

K Walsh University of Sussex, Brighton, UK

A Nightingale University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK

B Warf University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, USA

J O’Loughlin University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, USA

S Warren Eastern Washington University, Cheney, WA, USA

P M O’Neill University of Western Sydney, NSW, Australia

G A Wilson University of Plymouth, Plymouth, UK

A Paasi University of Oulu, Linnanmaa, Finland

M Woods Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth, UK

R Pain University of Durham, Durham, UK

K Woodward University of Exeter, Exeter, UK

E Pawson University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand

G Yeung National University of Singapore, Singapore

Contributors

xxix

VOLUME 9 M B Aalbers Columbia University, New York, NY, USA

D W Edgington University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada

M Abreu University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK

C Fox Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA

O Ahlqvist The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA

M F Goodchild University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA

J O Bærenholdt Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark

K H Halfacree Swansea University, Swansea, UK

T J Barnes University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada

L M B Harrington Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, USA

R Billen University of Liege, Liege, Belgium R Black University of Sussex, Brighton, UK J S Boggs Brock University, St Catharines, ON, Canada G Bridge University of Bristol, Bristol, UK K Browne University of Brighton, Brighton, UK T Butler King’s College London, London, UK D Carr University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA M Charlton National University of Ireland Maynooth, Maynooth, Republic of Ireland

R Hayter Simon Fraser University, Byrnaby, BC, Canada A Holden University of Durham, Durham, UK J R L Howells University of Manchester, Manchester, UK R Johnston University of Bristol, Bristol, UK J-K Jung University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, ND M Kiese Leibniz University of Hannover, Hannover, Germany A Kobayashi Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada V Kolossov Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia L Kong National University of Singapore, Singapore

J P Clark Loyola University, New Orleans, LA, USA

A Lord University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK

M Cope University of Vermont, Burlington, VT, USA

D MacKinnon University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, UK

A Cumbers University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

G MacLeod University of Durham, Durham, UK

J Cupples University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand

K A MacTavish Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR, USA

J Revilla Diez Leibniz University of Hannover, Hannover, Germany

J Mennis Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, USA

I Docherty University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

F Mizuoka Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan

M Doevenspeck University of Bayreuth, Bayreuth, Germany

A Nayak University of Newcastle, Newcastle, UK

M Dunford University of Sussex, Brighton, UK

H Neo National University of Singapore, Singapore

xxx

Contributors

P Nijkamp Free University, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

I G Simmons University of Durham, Durham, UK

E S Norman University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada

T R Slater University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK

H G Overman London School of Economics, London, UK A Paasi University of Oulu, Oulu, Finland

E W Soja University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA, and London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK

B Page University College London, London, UK

M Sokol Queen Mary, University of London, London, UK

J Pearce University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand

M Tewdwr-Jones University College London, London, UK

R Peet Clark University, Worcester, MA, USA

F To¨dtling Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration, Vienna, Austria

I M M Pires Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal V Preston York University, Toronto, ON, Canada

J Tomaney Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK, and Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

N M Rantisi Concordia University, Montre´al, QC, Canada

M Torrado Maxwell School of Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA

J M Read Maxwell School of Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA

A Treivish Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia N Van de Weghe Ghent University, Gent, Belgium

P Robbins University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA

B Werlen Friedrich-Schiller University, Jena, Germany

S Salamon University of Texas at Dallas, Dallas, TX, USA

J Winders Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA

H V Scott Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth, UK

M Woods Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth, UK

J Shaw University of Plymouth, Plymouth, UK

N Wrigley University of Southampton, Southampton, UK

N K Shortt University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK

VOLUME 10 A Albet Autonomous University of Barcelona, Bellaterra, Spain

A Bebbington University of Manchester, Manchester, UK

T A Arentze Eindhoven University of Technology, Eindhoven, The Netherlands

L Bian University at Buffalo – SUNY, Buffalo, NY, USA

R Atkinson University of Tasmania, Hobart, TAS, Australia

E Casetti Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA

M Azaryahu University of Colorado at Boulder, Boulder, CO, USA

G P Chapman Centre for Advanced Study, Oslo, Norway

M Azaryahu University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel

M Coleman The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA

Contributors T J Cooke University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA

M Jones Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth, UK

T W Crawford East Carolina University, Greenville, NC, USA

C Kim University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH, USA

M A de Souza Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo, Campinas, Brazil

R Kitchin NUI Maynooth, Maynooth, Republic of Ireland

A V Di Vittorio University of California – Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA M Duffy University of Melbourne, Carlton, VIC, Australia N Duncan University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK S Elden Durham University, Durham, UK S Engel-Di Mauro SUNY New Paltz, NY, USA R Flowerdew University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UK

xxxi

A Kobayashi Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada E W LaFary The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand N S Lam Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA, USA A Latham University College London, London, UK J Lee Kent State University, Kent, OH, USA L Lo York University, Toronto, ON, Canada

K E Foote University of Colorado at Boulder, Boulder, CO, USA

Y Lu Texas State University – San Marcos, San Marcos, TX, USA

J D Gatrell Indiana State University, Terre Haute, IN, USA

S M Manson University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA

C Gibson University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

D McCormack Oxford University Centre for the Environment, Oxford, UK

B Greenhough Queen Mary, University of London, London, UK

J McGarrigle Universidade de Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal

D A Grifﬁth University of Texas – Dallas, Richardson, TX, USA

J Mohan University of Southampton, Southampton, UK

M Haldrup Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark

K Newman Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA

A L Hansen Lund University, Lund, Sweden

M E O’Kelly The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA

R Harris Hamilton, ON, Canada

J Oldﬁeld University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

K E Haynes George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA

R Panelli University College London, London, UK

P Howell University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK

D Pinder Queen Mary, University of London, London, UK

R W Jackson West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV, USA

M F Poulsen Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia

A James Queen Mary, University of London, London, UK

M Ramutsindela University of Cape Town, Rondebosch, South Africa

B Jessop Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK

G M Robinson Kingston University, Kingston upon Thames, UK

Ron Johnston University of Bristol, Bristol, UK

S M Ruddick University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada

xxxii

Contributors

G Rushton The University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, USA

C Tiwari The University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, USA

A Saldanha University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA

D Turnbull ACSIS, Melbourne University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

N F Sayre University of California – Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA

L Twigg University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, UK D J Unwin Birkbeck, University of London, London, UK

N Schuurman Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada

A C Vias University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA

T Schwanen Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands

M Williams Oxford University, Oxford, UK

D M Scott McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada

K D Willis Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, UK

D Sibley University of Leeds, Leeds, UK A Smith Queen Mary, University of London, London, UK

A C Winstanley National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Republic of Ireland

Q Stevens University College London, London, UK

D W Wong George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA

P Sunley University of Southampton, Southampton, UK

M Yuan The University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, USA

Eric C Thompson National University of Singapore, Singapore

P Zusman University of Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina

VOLUME 11 C G Alvstam Go¨teborg University, Gothenburg, Sweden

D Delaney Amherst College, Amherst, MA, USA

D Banister University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

M Denil Washington, DC, USA

C Berndt Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universitaet Frankfurt, Frankfurt am Main, Germany

M Dijst Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands

K Button George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA M Cawley National University of Ireland, Galway, Republic of Ireland G P Chapman Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK J Connell University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia M Cope University of Vermont, Burlington, VT, USA

B Doman´ski Jagiellonian Univeristy, Krakow, Poland T Edensor Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, UK J A Elliott University of Brighton, Brighton, UK W M Gesler University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, USA V Gidwani University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA

T Cresswell Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, UK

J Glassman University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada

V J Del Casino, Jr. California State University, Long Beach, CA, USA

R Grant University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, USA

Contributors M Gren Ho´lar University College, Sauja´rkro´kur, Iceland

L Mu University of Georgia, Athens, GA, USA

J Gutie´rrez Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain

D Mustafa King’s College London, London, UK

T Hall University of Gloucestershire, Cheltenham, UK

A Nightingale University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK

M Henry Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand

G Norcliffe York University, Toronto, ON, Canada

J Hine University of Ulster, Newtownabbey, UK

K O’Connor University of Melbourne, Parkville, Australia

J-Y Hsu National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan

J O’Loughlin University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, USA

S Huang National University of Singapore, Singapore

K Olds University of Wisconsin – Madison, Madison, WI, USA

P J Hugill Texas A & M University, College Station, TX, USA P F Kelly York University, Toronto, ON, Canada A Kent University of Manchester, Manchester, UK R D Knowles University of Salford, Greater Manchester, UK M Kurtz Open University, Ottawa, ON, Canada D Ley University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada R Lippuner Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Jena, Germany S Lloyd-Evans University of Reading, Reading, UK B P Y Loo University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, People’s Republic of China A Mace University of Westminster, London, UK T Marsden Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK C McEwan Durham University, Durham, UK Nick Megoran University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK

xxxiii

D T Ory Federal Transit Administration, Washington, DC, USA U F Paleo University of Extremadura, Caceres, Spain R Phillips University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK D Pinder Queen Mary, University of London, London, UK J P H Poon University at Buffalo – SUNY, Buffalo, NY, USA R B Potter University of Reading, Reading, UK J M Powell Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia M Power University of Durham, Durham, UK J Preston University of Southampton, Southampton, UK G M Robinson Kingston University, Kingston upon Thames, UK J Round University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK T Schwanen Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands J P Sharp University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

G Mohan The Open University – Milton Keynes, UK

S-L Shaw The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, USA

P L Mokhtarian University of California – Davis, Davis, CA, USA

M Sheller Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, PA, USA

xxxiv

Contributors

F M Smith University of Dundee, Dundee, UK J M Smith Texas A & M University, College Station, TX, USA R G Smith Swansea University, Swansea, UK

C von Schilling University of Northern British Columbia, Prince George, BC, Canada B Warf Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA B Werlen Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Jena, Germany

D Straussfogel Pennsylvania State University, DuBois, PA, USA U Strohmayer National University of Ireland, Galway, Republic of Ireland

P White University of Westminster, London, UK M Whitehead Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth, UK

A Sturt University of Westminster, London, UK D Thien California State University, Long Beach, CA, USA

D Wilson University of Illinois, Urbana, IL, USA

D J Unwin University College London, London, UK

J Zhang University of Minnesota, Tacoma, WA, USA

VOLUME 12 Fiona Allon Centre for Cultural Research, University of Western Sydney, Australia S Batterbury University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia M Batty University College London, London, UK D Bell University of Leeds, Leeds, UK G Bridge University of Bristol, Bristol, UK G Brown University of Leicester, Leicester, UK A Buttimer University College Dublin, Dublin, Republic of Ireland

M Davidson University of Western Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia B Derudder Ghent University, Gent, Belgium J Dodson Grifﬁth University, Brisbane, QLD, Australia B Gleeson Grifﬁth University, Brisbane, QLD, Australia M F Goodchild University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA K H Halfacree Swansea University, Swansea, UK M G Hatvany Universite´ Laval, Quebec City, QC, Canada

J Byrne Grifﬁth University, Gold Coast, QLD, Australia

C Haylett University of Manchester, Manchester, UK

B Christophers The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

L Holt University of Reading, Reading, UK

G P Clarke University of Leeds, Leeds, UK

J Horton University of Northampton, Northampton, UK

A Cochrane The Open University, Milton Keynes, UK

R Hudson Durham University, UK

D Conradson University of Southampton, Southampton, UK

M Jayne University of Manchester, Manchester, UK

G Crow University of Southampton, Southampton, UK

N C Johnson Queen’s University, Belfast, Northern Ireland

Contributors D Kay Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth, UK

C Milligan Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK

I M Keighren University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK

M Pavlovskaya Hunter College – CUNY, New York, NY, USA

P Knox Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA, USA

L Peake York University, Toronto, ON, Canada

P Kraftl University of Leicester, Leicester, UK D Kunze Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, USA M Lauria Clemson University, Clemson, SC, USA R Lee Queen Mary, University of London, London, UK K D Lilley Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UK F MacDonald University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia S C MacKian Open University, Milton Keynes, UK V Mamadouh University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

xxxv

C Philo University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK G M Robinson Kingston University, Kingston upon Thames, UK S Rodgers The Open University, Milton Keynes, UK T R Slater University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK E Street King’s College London, London, UK K Terlouw Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands C R Warren University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UK M Watson University of Shefﬁeld, Shefﬁeld, UK R K Whelan University of Texas, Arlington, TX, USA

C Mason University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK

B Wisner Benﬁeld UCL Hazard Research Centre, London, UK

G Mercier Laval University, Quebec City, QC, Canada

J Wolch University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA

CONTENTS

Senior Editors

v

Section Editors

vii

Guide to use of the Encyclopedia

ix

Contributors

xi

Contents

xxxvii

Subject Classiﬁcation

lxiii

Foreword by Mary Robinson

lxxv

Foreword by Rob Kitchin

lxxvii

VOLUME 1 A Activism

L M Takahashi

Activist Geographies

1

P Routledge

Actor-Network Theory/Network Geographies

7 G T Jo´hannesson and J O Bærenholdt

15

Affect

J D Dewsbury

20

Africa

G A Myers

25

Ageing and Health

G J Andrews

31

A M Warnes

36

Ageing and Mobility Ageism and Age Agglomeration Agoraphobia

L Maxey

42

A Malmberg

48

J Davidson

Agrarian Transformations

54 J Renes

Agricultural Land Preservation Agriculture, Sustainable

K B Beesley and D Ramsey

T Marsden

Agri-Environmentalism and Rural Change Aid

58

70 C Potter

79

V Desai

84

Ame´nagement du Territoire: Territorial Development Americas

P Merlin

R B Kent and K A Butler

Anarchism/Anarchist Geography

C Wilbert

Animal Welfare, Agricultural

H Buller

91 99

M M Breitbart

Anglo-American/Anglophone Hegemony Animal Geographies

65

M B Aalbers and U Rossi

108 116 122 127

xxxvii

xxxviii

Contents

Antarctica

S Chaturvedi

133

Anthropogeography (After Ratzel)

J Lossau

Anthropology and Human Geography Anti-Geopolitics

U Oslender

Anti-Urbanism

Applied Geography

159 J Battersby-Lennard

M Pacione

179

M Kurtz and A Watson

Art and Cartography

184

C D’Ignazio

Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Expert Systems Asia

190 Y Leung

T Oakes

Atlases

225

M Purcell

Autoethnography

234

K Besio

Auto-Photography

240

M E Thomas

Avant-Garde/Avant-Garde Geographies Aviation

220

C Gibson

Autobiography

207 214

J Siemer and H Asche

Australasia

167 174

M Kurtz

Arctic

148 152

T Slater

Apartheid/Post-Apartheid

Archives

K W Butzer

140

244 J D Dewsbury

252

T M Vowles

257

V Rey and O Groza

265

B Balkans Barnes, T.

S Reimer

Beaujeu-Garnier, J. Becoming

273

M-C Robic

D P McCormack

Behavioral Geography Belonging

A Taylor

Berkeley School Berry, B.

J R Gold

277 282 294

M Williams

R W Lake

Biodiversity

275

300 305

R P Neumann

Biodiversity Mapping

H Hazen

308 314

Biopolitics

A A Lehtinen

320

Bobek, H.

H Fassmann

324

Body, The

L Johnston

326

Borderlands

D Wastl-Walter

332

Bowman, I.

J Dittmer

340

Brain Drain

J Crush and C Hughes

342

Brandt Commission Brown Agenda Buffer Zone

R B Potter and S Lloyd-Evans

348

J Beall

355

G Prevelakis

362

Business Services

John R Bryson

368

Contents

xxxix

C Capital and Space Capitalism

R J Das

375

R Le Heron

382

Capitalism and Division of Labor Care/Caregiving

M Brayshay

390

N M Yantzi and M W Skinner

Cartographic Animation

M Harrower

Cartography in Islamic Societies Cartography, History of

408

S Brentjes

414

C Delano-Smith and R J P Kain

Case Study Approach

402

428

S W Hardwick

441

Cassa per il Mezzogiorno

F Martinelli

446

Categorical Data Analysis

S D Withers

456

VOLUME 2 C Cellular Automata

P M Torrens

1

W Friesen

5

Census Geography Census Mapping

D Martin

Central Business District

G A Rice

Central Place Theory

18

J Malczewski

26

G Chapman

31

Chaos and Complexity Chicago School

12

D Sibley

Child Labor

40

S Punch

Children and Mapping

45 V Filippakopoulou and B Nakos

50

Children/Childhood

F Smith and N Ansell

58

Chinese Urbanism

L J C Ma

65

Chinese-Language Geography Choice Modeling

W S Tang

J-C Thill

Christaller, W.

78

R Capello

Christian Geography Chronic Disease Citation Geography Citizenship

84

H Aay

86

K Robinson and S J Elliott

92

M Batty and R Carvalho

97

V Chouinard

Citizenship and Governmentality, Rural City Marketing

72

E J McCann

107 L Cheshire and M Woods

113 119

City-Region

S Davoudi

125

Civil Society

C McIlwaine

136

Claval, P.

M Be´dard

Climate Change

J C Sweeney

142 147

xl

Contents

Cloke, P.

M Phillips

156

Cognitive Geography

D R Montello

160

Cohen, S.

N Kliot

167

Cold War

T W Luke

170

Colonialism I

A Lester

175

Colonialism II

D Atkinson

182

Colonialism, Internal Color, Mapping

R J Das and S Chilvers

189

A L Grifﬁn

Commodity Chains

195

M Hassler

202

Communicable Diseases, Globalization of

J R Oppong

209

J Tima´r

214

Communist and Post-Communist Geographies Community

S C Aitken

Competitiveness

221

N Lewis

226

Complementary and Alternative Medicine

G J Andrews

Complexity Theory, Nonlinear Dynamic Spatial Systems Computational Human Geography Concentrated Deconcentration Conservation and Ecology Consumption

234 D O’Sullivan

H Couclelis

Corbridge, S.

251

M Jay and M Morad

259 268

J Baxter

275

M S Kumar

281

B Ramı´rez

Core-Periphery Models Corporate Responsibilities

286

A Hughes and F Wray

Corridor and Axis Development Cosgrove, D.

245

B Lambregts

D Leslie

Content Analysis

239

L Albrechts and T Tasan-Kok

K D Lilley

292 298 305

Cosmopolitanism

J Binnie, J J Holloway, S Millington, and C Young

307

Counter-Mapping

R Rundstrom

314

Counterurbanization Cox, K. Creativity

C J A Mitchell and C R Bryant

H van der Wusten

319 325

A Currah

327

Crime/Fear of Crime

H Koskela

334

Critical Cartography

D Wood and J Krygier

340

Critical Geography

U Best

345

Critical Geopolitics

J P Sharp

358

Critical GIS

N Schuurman

Critical Rationalism (After Popper)

363 D Bennett

Critical Realism/Critical Realist Geographies Critical Theory (After Habermas) Cross-Cultural Research Cultural Capital Cultural Economy

M Phillips

T Skelton

J L Waters A C Pratt

Andy C Pratt

369 379 385 398 404 407

Contents

xli

Cultural Geography

C Gibson and G Waitt

411

Cultural Materialism

G Helms

425

Cultural Politics

S Rycroft

431

Cultural Studies and Human Geography Cultural Turn Culture

D Bell

437

C Philo

442

K J Mee

Culture/Natures

451 J Sundberg and J Dempsey

Cumulative Causation

458

E Delaney and J W Harrington, Jr.

Cyberspace/Cyberculture

D Bell

464 468

VOLUME 3 D Darby, H. C.

R A Butlin

1

Darwinism (and Social Darwinism) Dear, M. J. Debt

H Winlow

4

A Latham

12

David Simon

Deconstruction

16

C Barnett

Defensible Space

23

E Warwick

Deforestation

31

J J Metz

De-Industrialization De-Localization Democracy

39

A Pike

51

A Kalogeressis and L Labrianidis

60

C Barnett and M Low

70

Demography

P Rees

75

Dependency

E Hartwick

91

Desertiﬁcation

C J Barrow

96

Determinism/Environmental Determinism

H Ernste and C Philo

102

Development I

K D Willis and M S Kumar

111

Development II

B Korf

117

Developmentalism Devolution

M Watts

123

M Keating

131

Dialectical Reasoning and Dialectical Materialism Dialogism (After Bakhtin)

J Holloway and J Kneale

Diaries (Video, Audio or Written) Diaspora Dicken, P.

P Meth

K McKittrick

143 150

162 T Jazeel

L A Brown

Digital Data, Historical Geography and Digital Divide

137

156

J V Beaverstock

Difference/Politics of Difference Diffusion

E Swyngedouw

164 170

H Southall

T Unwin and G de Bastion

185 191

xlii

Contents

Digital Earth

G A Elmes, D Weiner, and C D’Alessandro-Scarpari

Disability and Chronic Illness Discourse

R Wilton and J Evans

T Cresswell

Discourse Analysis

198 205 211

L D Berg

215

Disease Diffusion

A Schærstro¨m

222

Disease Mapping

T Koch

234

Distance

G H Pirie

Dudley Stamp, L.

242

D Linehan

Dutch Human Geography Dwelling

252

H Ernste and L Smith

O Jones

255 266

E East Asian Miracle East/West

C Dixon

273

A Bonnett

280

e-Business and e-Commerce Ecological Fallacy Ecology

K E Corey and M I Wilson

D Sui

291

P McManus

Economic Crises

294

M Webber

Economic Development, Rural Economic Geography

285

304 D Storey

T J Barnes

310 315

Economic Geography, Quantitative

E Sheppard and P Plummer

328

Economics and Human Geography

J R Faulconbridge and S Hall

332

Economies, Alternative

S Healy

338

Economies, Borderland

M Tykkyla¨inen

345

H D Watts

354

Economies, Branch Plant Economies, Imagined

A Cameron

Economy, Informal

S Turner

361 367

Ecotourism

D A Fennell

372

Edge Cities

N A Phelps

377

Edge Effects

I Yamada

381

Education

N Lewis

Electoral Cartography Electoral Districts

A Kavanagh J I Leib and G R Webster

Electoral Geography Embeddedness

C Pattie and R Johnston M Hess

Embodied Knowing Emigration

B S A Yeoh

Emotional Knowing

399 405

429 434

J Davidson and M Smith L Bondi

M Power

Empowerment

396

423

R Longhurst

Emotional Geographies

Empire

389

R Scheyvens

440 446 453 464

Contents Enlightenment Geography Enterprise Discourse Entrepreneurship

C W J Withers

471

P M O’Neill

487

E Stam

492

Entropy-Maximising Models Environment

xliii

R Johnston and C Pattie

S Eden

499 505

Environment, Historical Geography of Environmental Hazards

S W Trimble, M P Conzen, and E K Z Zygmut

G A Tobin and B E Montz

517 521

Environmental Health

S J Elliott

528

Environmental Justice

A A Lehtinen

535

Environmental Policy

C Cocklin

Environmental Regulation

540

P McManus

Environmental Security

546

J Barnett

553

Environmental Studies and Human Geography Environmentalism

A Davies

Epidemiological Transition Equity

C Sneddon

565

K McCracken and D R Phillips

J Wiles and A Kobayashi

Error (Propagation and Modeling) Ethical Issues in Research Ethnic Conﬂict

580 S Gopal

586

R Dowling

595 601

L Lo

608

W Li and E Skop

615

Ethnicity and Resistance, Historical Geographies of Ethnography

Evans, E. E.

632 638

M Kuus

644 J W Scott

649

M C Keane

Evolutionary Algorithms

658

N Xiao

Existentialism/Existential Geography Experimental Design Exploration

E Laurier

J Sundberg

Europe of Regions

620 626

Ethnomethodology/Ethnomethodological Geography

Europe

D P Nally

K E Till

Eurocentrism

571

O Yiftachel

Ethnic Economies Ethnicity

558

660 D Seamon and J Sowers

S Bell

672

S A Royle

676

Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis Export Processing Zones Extended Metropolitan Region

666

S Dall’erba

683

F Wu

691

V F S Sit

697

VOLUME 4 F Factor Analysis and Principal-Components Analysis Fair Trade

L T Raynolds

F Wang

1 8

xliv

Contents

Famine

P J Atkins

14

Fatherland/Homeland

R Kaiser

Feminism and Work

21

J Pollard

Feminism, Maps and GIS

29

M Pavlovskaya

Feminism/Feminist Geography

37

L C Johnson

44

Feminist Geography, Prehistory of

S Bowlby and J Tivers

59

Feminist Groups within Geography

K M Morin

64

Feminist Methodologies

D Thien

Feminist Political Economy Fertility

R B Sarma

79

Y Underhill-Sem

Festival and Spectacle

87

M Duffy

Feudalism and Feudal Society Field Geographies

Fieldwork

91

H Bradley and M Taylor

D Abbott J Chapman

112

F J Bosco and C M Moreno

119

C Lukinbeal

125

Finance, Historical Geographies of Finance, Offshore

M Purvis

130

S M Roberts

Financial Centers, International Financial Exclusion

139 D R Meyer

146

A Leyshon

153 w

Financial Knowledge

G L Clark, J C Marshall , and K Strauss

Financial Risks and Management Firms

P Bennett

159 167

M Taylor

173

First Law of Geography First World

98 106

Field Systems and Enclosure

Film

71

M F Goodchild

179

K D Willis

183

Flaˆneur, The

A Latham

189

Fluidity–Fixity

P Adey

194

Focus Groups

A J Secor

200

Food Networks

P Richardson and S J Whatmore

Food Networks, Alternative Food Regimes Fordism

202

D Goodman and M K Goodman

B Pritchard

208 221

R Hudson

226

Fordism, Post-Fordism and Flexible Specialization Foreign Direct Investment

J Lovering

A Lagendijk and B Hendrikx

232 243

Foucauldianism

M Huxley

255

Fractal Analysis

N S Lam

263

Francophone Geography

G Benko and C Desbiens

Functionalism (Including Structural Functionalism) Fuzzy Set and Fuzzy Logic

w

Deceased, 22 August 2007.

Y Leung

J E Castro

271 277 283

Contents

xlv

G Gardens and Gardening Garrison, W.

David Crouch

R Morrill

294

Gated Communities/Privatopias Gay Geographies

R Atkinson and S Blandy

V Miller

Gender and Health

Gender in the City

302 309

J Little

315

Linda Peake

Gender, Historical Geographies of Genealogy and Family History

Generalization

L Price

328

S M Otterstrom

334 341

W A Mackaness and O Z Chaudhry E Hall

Gentriﬁcation

345 355

D J Hammel

Gentriﬁcation, Rural

360

M Phillips

Geocomputation

368

M Birkin

Geodemographics Geodesy

320

´ Crowley U

Genealogy Method

297

J Wiles

Gender and Rurality

Genetics

289

376

M Birkin and G P Clarke

382

J Hessler

390

Geographical Journals

L D Berg

394

Geographical Masking

G Rushton

402

Geographically Weighted Regression Geography, History of

A Pa´ez and D C Wheeler

A Maddrell

407 415

Geohistory

P Claval

429

Geomatics

M Duckham, A Kealy, and J Wallace

435

Geopolitics

P Reuber

441

Geopolitics and Religion

G Dijkink

453

X Yao

458

K C Clarke

466

Georeferencing, Geocoding Geospatial Intelligence Geovisualization

M J Kraak

468

German-Language Geography Gerrymandering Ghettos

M Hess

481

R Morrill

486

T Slater

492

GIS and Cartography GIS and Society

M F Goodchild

500

T Nyerges

506

GIS, Mobile and Locational Based Services

J Raper

513

GIS, Public Participation

S Elwood

520

GIScience and Systems

M F Goodchild

526

Global Commodity Chains Global Positioning/GPS Global Production Networks

L van Grunsven

539

J Lee

548

N M Coe

Globalization and Transnational Corporations

556 P Dicken

563

xlvi

Contents

Globalization, Cultural

K N Rankin

Globalization, Economic

570

H W-c Yeung

581

Golledge, R.

G Rushton

587

Gottmann, J.

L Muscara`

590

Governance

M Goodwin

593

D Wo´jcik

Governance, Corporate Governance, Good

G Williams

Governance, Transport

606

I Docherty and J Shaw

Governance, Urban

M Raco

Green Revolution

628

J Briggs

Greenﬁeld Development

634

P Breathnach

639

B Warf

Grounded Theory

615 622

J Ha¨kli

Governmentality

Gregory, D.

600

644

M Cope

Growth Poles, Growth Centers

647 U Rossi

651

VOLUME 5 H Habitus

G Setten

Hagerstrand, T. Haggett, P.

1

R Flowerdew

4

R Flowerdew

9

Haptic or Touch-Based Knowledge Harley, J. B.

N Collins-Kreiner

Hartshorne, R. Harvey, D.

R D Jacobson

19

F Harvey

21

K Woodward and J P Jones III

Health and Development

13

S Asthana

24 28

Health Geography

G Moon

35

Health Inequalities

D Dorling and R Mitchell and S Orford and M Shaw, and H Tunstall

46

Health Services Restructuring

T Brown

Health Systems and Health Services Healthcare Accessibility Hegemony Heritage

J S Humphreys and K B Smith

J Glassman

R Jones G J Ashworth

Heritage and Identity

J D Bohland and E Hague D Bell

M Hoyler

High-Tech Industry

71

91

Heritage and Economy

Heteronormativity

58

80

C Kelly

Heritage and Culture

Hettner, A.

R Barnett and P Barnett

51

Y Zhou

98 104 109 115 120 122

Contents J Tima´r and Z Kova´cs

Hinterland Development

xlvii 128

Historical Geographies, Rural

P J Duffy

136

Historical Geographies, Urban

A Golan

146

Historical Geography

G M Winder

152

Historical Geography, Evolution of

J M Powell

158

Historical-Geographical Materialism

S Kirsch

163

HIV/AIDS in Developed Countries

M Sothern

169

HIV/AIDS in Developing Countries

W T S Gould

173

Home

T Peil

180

Homelessness

J May

Homelessness, Rural Housing

185 P Milbourne

191

M Pacione

196

Housing, Neighbourhoods and Health Housing, Rural

N Gallent

Hub Network Location

Human Rights

213

C Gibson

218

R Honey

232

Humanism/Humanistic Geography Human-Nonhuman

J M Smith

E J Roe

239 251

D P Tolia-Kelly

Hypothesis Testing

201 207

M E O’Kelly

Human Geography

Hybridity

J Dunn

258

R Haines-Young and R Fish

264

I Idealism/Idealist Human Geography Identity and Otherness, Rural Identity Politics Ideology

L Guelke

J Agyeman and S Neal

A Kobayashi

271 277 282

K R Olwig

287

Immigration I

J L Waters

297

Immigration II

I H Burnley

308

Imperial Cities

A D King

317

Imperialism, Cultural

S P Mains

Imperialistic Geographies Indian Ocean Indigeneity

322

G M Winder

S Chaturvedi

344

E Cameron and S de Leeuw, and M Greenwood

Indigenous Geographies

R Howitt and S Muller, and S Suchet-Pearson

Indigenous Health and Medicine Indigenous Knowledges Indigenous Mapping Industrial City

330

K Wilson and C Richmond

J Mistry J Corbett and M Chapin and L Gibson, and G Rambaldi

R Harris

352 358 365 371 377 383

Industrial Districts

F Celata and U Rossi

389

Industrial Location

K Chapman

396

xlviii

Contents

Industrial Organization Industrial Parks

J Patchell

S M Walcott

Industrial Restructuring Industrialization

408

R Hudson

419 R Lewis

433

A G Aguilar and E P Campuzano

Informalization

D Vaiou

Information Graphics

Informational City

459

B Parthasarathy

469

J Rutherford

475

R Sternberg

Input–Output Analysis

481

G J D Hewings and M Sonis

Institutionalism/Institutional Geographies Integrated Spatial Data Infrastructure Intensive/Extensive Research Interdisciplinarity

D Mackinnon R Foley

Intermodality

K Falconer Al-Hindi

529 R Peet

Internationalization of Education Internet, Economic Geography

536

J L Waters

548

M Zook

555

M-J Kraak

Internet-Based Measurement

562

M Dodge and M Zook

Interviews: In-Depth, Semi-Structured Investment Promotion

R Longhurst

N A Phelps

598

E Clark

Italian Language Geography

580

590

N AlSayyad and I Tu¨reli

Island Development

569

585

G W White

Islamic Urbanism

512

523

A R Goetz

Internet/Web Mapping

499

517

M Parnwell

International Organizations

491

507

P Raento

Intermediate Technology

446 454

A L Grifﬁn

Information Technology

Irredentism

426

G DeVerteuil

Informal Sector

Innovation

413

D Simandan

Industry, Historical Geographies of Inequality

402

607 C Minca

Ivy League and Geography in the US

611 R Wright and N Koch

616

VOLUME 6 J Jackson, P.

C Dwyer

Japanese Geography Johnston, R. J.

1 A Saito and F Mizuoka

James D Sidaway

4 11

Contents

xlix

K Knowledge and Education, Historical Geographies of Knowledge Communities

S Pinch

Knowledge Intensive Business Services

P Wood

J O’Loughlin and E Holland

Kriging and Variogram Models Kropo´tkin, P.

15 25

´ Riain A Kerr and S O

Knowledge Economy

Kolossov, V.

R A Butlin

31 37 45

C A Calder and N Cressie

G Kearns

49 56

L Labor Control Regime Labor Flexibility

A E G Jonas

C Benner

Labor Geography

66

T D Rutherford

Labor Market

72

P Carmody

Labor Markets, Regional Labor Unionism

79

A E Green

85

A Herod

Lacoste, Y.

91

F Eva

Lamarck(ian)ism

97

H Winlow

Land Change Science

Land Rights

99

B L Turner II

107

J Ja¨ger

Land Rent Theory

112

R Howitt

Landscape

118

J Dubow

124

Landscape Iconography

S Hoelscher

Landscape Perception Language

132

K M Morin

140

R Jones

146

Language and Research

A Aylett and T J Barnes

153

Cristo´bal Kay

159

Latin American Structuralist School Law and Law Enforcement Learning Regions Leisure

D Delaney

165

B T Asheim

172

J Mansvelt

179

Lesbian Geographies Ley, D.

59

K Browne and C J Nash

P Jackson

Liberalism

193

E Gilbert

195

Life Course Approaches Literature Livelihoods

R Fincher

207

M Brosseau

212

F Owusu

219

Local Development

G Garofoli

Local Economic Development

225 S Conti and P Giaccaria

Local Economic Development, Politics of Local–Global

187

M Haldrup

K R Cox

233 239 245

l

Contents

Locality Debates

P Cooke

Location Analysis

M W Horner

Location Theory Logistics

256 263

A T Murray

270

M Hesse and J-P Rodrigue

277

Longitudinal Methods (Cohort Analysis, Life Tables) Los Angeles School of Post-Modern Urbanism Lowenthal, D.

S D Withers B Hooper

J R Gold

Lusophone Geography

285 293 298

J Gaspar

300

M Mackinder, H. J.

G Kearns

Malls/Retail Parks Map Hacking

309

G A Rice

312

E Mac Gillavry

318

R Edsall

323

Map Interactivity

Map Libraries and Archives

R B Parry

Map Perception and Cognition Map Types

S M Freundschuh

D Wood and J B Krygier

Mapping Agencies

329 334 339

C Perkins

344

Mapping, Commercial

B Hunt

351

Mapping, Cyberspace

M Zook and M Dodge

356

Mapping, Distributed

W Cartwright

Mapping, Non-Western

M W Pearce

Mapping, Philosophy

C Perkins

Mapping, Race and Ethnicity Mapping, Topographic Maps

H Winlow

P Collier

D Wood and J Krygier

Maps and Governance Maps and Protest

D Wood and J Krygier M Farish

Markov Chain Analysis

372 385 398 409 421

F Harvey

Maps and the State

368

431 436 442

W Li and C Zhang

455

Marxism/Marxist Geography I

A Cumbers

461

Marxism/Marxist Geography II

A Jones

474

Masculinism

A Bain

486

Masculinities

B van Hoven and P Hopkins

492

Massey, D. Material Culture

T Skelton D P Tolia-Kelly

497 500

Material, The

A Tay

505

McDowell, L.

A Jones

511

Contents

li

VOLUME 7 M Media

D B Clarke

1

Medical Geography

R Earickson

9

Medieval Geography

K D Lilley

21

Medieval Historical Geographies Mega-Cities

R Jones

Y-M Yeung

Meinig, D.

40

K M Dunn

48

Memorials and Monuments Memory

D H Alderman and O J Dwyer

S McDowell

Mental Health

64

S Bell

70

Me´tropole d’e´quilibre

G Burgel

Middle East and North Africa Migrant Workers Migration

76

M E Bonine

C Cindy Fan

P Boyle

96

Military and Geography Military Geographies

W Jenkins

116

R Woodward

122

J H McKendrick

P Merriman C G Pooley

J R Gold

157 R N Gwynne

Modiﬁable Areal Unit Problem Monte Carlo Simulation Moral Economies

169

S Ratick and G Schwarz

175

Multiculturalism

185

G Setten and K M Brown

Movies and Films, Analysis of Multicultural City

S C Aitken

H Hoernig and M Walton-Roberts J Clayton

Multidimensional Scaling

164

D W Wong

L McDowell

Moral Landscapes

144 150

D Linehan

Modernization Theory

128 134

Mobility, History of Everyday

Modernity

108

M Farish

Mixed and Multiple Methods

Modern City

82 89

Migration, Historical Geographies of

Mobility

51 59

C J Smith

Mental Maps

32

191 196 201 211

W M Bowen

216

N Nation

J Penrose

National Parks

223

N Curry

National Schools of Geography National Spatialities

T Edensor

229 P Claval

236 242

lii

Contents

Nationalism

D H Kaplan

248

Nationalism, Historical Geography of

M A Busteed

255

Natural Resources

G Bridge

261

Naturalistic Testing

R D Jacobson

269

Nature

K R Olwig

275

Nature, Historical Geographies of Nature, History of

P Holland and A Wearing

286

M Tanskanen

293

S Fullagar

298

Nature, Performing Nature, Social

N Argent

303

Nature-Culture

O Jones

309

Natures, Charismatic

J Lorimer

Natures, Gendered

C Radel

Natures, Postcolonial

331

M Sioh

Neighborhood Change

337

J Kenny

Neighborhood Effects

343

Sang-Il Lee

Neighborhoods and Community Neocolonialism

324

349

J Flint

354

M Watts

360

Neoliberal Economic Strategies Neoliberalism

R Le Heron

365

W Larner

374

Neoliberalism and Development Neoliberalism, Urban

W E Murray

379

W Larner

385

Network Analysis

M J Kuby and T D Roberts and C D Upchurch, and S Tierney

391

Network Regions

P Cooke

399

Networks

G Grabher

405

Networks, Urban

N Clarke

414

Neural Networks

I Casas

419

New Regionalism New Towns

G MacLeod K Kafkoula

New Urbanism NIMBY

423 428

E J McCann

438

P Hubbard

444

Nongovernmental Organizations

Saraswati Raju

Non-Representational Theory/Non-Representational Geographies Nordic Geography

K Simonsen

Nordplan and Nordregio North–South

450 L Cadman

456 464

G Olsson

469

A McGregor and D Hill

473

VOLUME 8 O Oceania

W E Murray

Oceanographic Mapping

1 D M Lawrence

14

Contents Oceans

liii

P E Steinberg

21

M Gren

27

Olsson, G. Oral History

M Boyle

30

Oral History, Ecological Orientalism

A Nightingale

34

M Haldrup and L Koefoed

37

Other/Otherness

J-F Staszak

43

Overlay (in GIS)

O Ahlqvist

48

Oxbridge Geographies

E Pawson

56

P Paasi, A.

R Jones

Paciﬁc Rim

63

X Chen

66

Parenting/Motherhood/Fatherhood Participant Observation Participation

S C Aitken

K Walsh

77

S Hickey and U Kothari

Participatory Action Research Participatory Video Patriarchy

82

S Kindon and R Pain and M Kesby

S Kindon

Peet, R.

102 J D van der Ploeg

108

A Kobayashi

People’s Geography

114

D Mitchell

Performance, Research as

116

F Morton

Performative and Embodied Mapping Performativity

120 C Perkins

D P McCormack

Philosophy and Human Geography

G Backhaus

S Elden

Photogrammetry/Aerial Photography

137 145

P Collier

R Sanders

151 157

Physical Geography and Human Geography T Cresswell

Place Names

126 133

Phenomenology/Phenomenological Geography

Photographs

90 96

C J Nash

Peasant Agriculture

Place

72

S Harrison

163 169

V R Savage

178

Place, Politics of

L A Staeheli and D Mitchell

185

Planning, Urban

M Huxley

193

Plant Geographies

A Franklin

Point Pattern Analysis Policing

199

E Delmelle

N R Fyfe

Political Boundaries Political Ecology

204 212

A Paasi

217

R P Neumann

228

Political Economy, Geographical Political Geography Political Representation

D Storey B Forest

R Le Heron

234 243 254

liv

Contents

Polycentricity

P Hall

Polyvocality

260

Saraswati Raju

Popular Culture

J Dittmer

Population Geography

269

A J Bailey

Port-Industrial Complexes

274

M Dunford and G Yeung

Positivism/Positivist Geography Possibilism

265

285

D Bennett

295

V Berdoulay

Postcolonial Cities

312

A D King

321

Postcolonialism/Postcolonial Geographies Postconﬂict Geographies Postdevelopment

C McEwan

J O’Loughlin

334

J Nederveen Pieterse

339

Posthumanism/Posthumanistic Geographies Postmodern City

J Lorimer

344

S Warren

Postmodernism/Postmodern Geography

355 C Minca

363

Post-Phenomenology/Post-Phenomenological Geographies Post-Productivist and Multifunctional Agriculture

J Lea

G A Wilson

L Sy´kora

Post-Socialist Cities

K Woodward and D P Dixon, and J P Jones, III

A O Chimhowu

Poverty, Rural

379

396 408

A R Tickamyer

Pragmatism/Pragmatist Geographies Pred, A.

373

387

Poststructuralism/Poststructuralist Geographies Poverty

327

416 S J Smith

421

B Warf

426

Pregnancy and Childbirth Private/Public Divide

E Chacko

429

D Collins

437

Privatization

P M O’Neill

442

Probabilism

R Flowerdew

448

Probability Models Projections Protest, Rural Psychoanalysis

R Flowerdew

451

F C Kessler

455

M Woods

474

P T Kingsbury

480

Psychoanalytic Theory/Psychoanalytic Geographies Psychotherapy/Psychotherapeutic Geographies

P T Kingsbury L Bondi

487 495

Public Good

K R Cox

501

Public Policy

M Perry

506

Public Space

D Mitchell and L A Staeheli

511

Public Spaces, Urban

D Collins and B-M Shantz

517

Contents

lv

VOLUME 9 Q Q Method/Analysis

P Robbins

1

Qualitative Geographic Information Systems Qualitative Spatial Reasoning Quantitative Data

M Cope and J-K Jung

R Billen and N Van de Weghe

M Charlton

Quantitative Methodologies

27

T J Barnes

Queer Theory/Queer Geographies Questionnaire Survey

12 19

M F Goodchild

Quantitative Revolution

7

33 K Browne

39

V Preston

46

R Race

J Winders

53

Racism and Antiracism

A Nayak

Radical Environmentalism Radical Geography

I G Simmons

65

R Peet

Radical Political Economy Railways

59

73

F Mizuoka

83

J Shaw and I Docherty

91

Rational Choice Theory (and Rational Choice Marxism) Reclus, E.

J P Clark T R Slater

M B Aalbers R Black

Regeneration to Renaissance

125

T Butler

130

J Tomaney

Regional Actors

136

M Tewdwr-Jones and A Lord

Regional Competition, Regional Dumping Regional Connectivity

111 117

Refugees and Displacement

Region

100 107

Redbrick University Geography in Britain Redlining

G Bridge

151

I M M Pires

M Sokol

156 165

Regional Development and Noneconomic Factors Regional Development and Technology

J O Bærenholdt

J R L Howells

181 187

Regional Development Models

M Dunford

192

Regional Development Theory

P Nijkamp and M Abreu

202

Regional Development, Endogenous

F To¨dtling

208

Regional Geography I

A Paasi

214

Regional Geography II

D MacKinnon

228

Regional Inequalities

M Dunford

Regional Innovation Systems Regional Integration

236

J Revilla Diez and M Kiese

A Cumbers

Regional Planning and Development Theories Regional Production Networks

D W Edgington

246 252

E W Soja

259 271

lvi

Contents

Regional Science

H G Overman

Regionalisations, Everyday Regionalism

279

B Werlen

286

J Tomaney

294

Regionalization/Zoning Systems

N K Shortt

298

J Pearce

302

Regression, Linear and Nonlinear Regulation

G MacLeod and A Holden

Relational Economic Geography Reliability and Validity

N M Rantisi and J S Boggs

320

L Kong

324

B Page

Remote Sensing

329

J M Read and M Torrado

Representation and Re-presentation Representation, Politics of Representation-Mapping

A Kobayashi

J Mennis

357

R Johnston

364

J Cupples

Resource Industries

370

Resource Management, Rural

Rio Summit

H Neo

R Hayter

Retail Geographies

347 351

Resource and Environmental Economics

Ritter, C.

335

H V Scott

Research Funding Bodies Resistance

314

O Ahlqvist

Religion/Spirituality/Faith Remittances

309

376 381

L M B Harrington

390

N Wrigley

398

E S Norman and D Carr

406

M Doevenspeck

River Basin Development Rural Communities

412 C Fox

414

S Salamon and K A MacTavish

423

Rural Geography

M Woods

429

Rural Populations

K H Halfacree

442

Rurality and Post-Rurality

K H Halfacree

Russian-Language Geography

449

V Kolossov and A Treivish

457

VOLUME 10 S Sampling

L Lo

Santos, M. Sauer, C. Scale

1

M A de Souza M Williams

15

N F Sayre and A V Di Vittorio

Scale Analytical

Scientiﬁc Method

19

T W Crawford

Science and Scientism, Cartography

Scott, A.

11

R Flowerdew

C Gibson

29 D Turnbull

37 43 46

Contents Second Homes

M Haldrup

Second World Segregation

lvii 50

J Oldﬁeld

56

M F Poulsen

63

Segregation Indices

D W Wong

70

Segregation, Urban

R Atkinson and J McGarrigle

76

Selection Bias

T J Cooke

81

Self-Other

D Sibley

85

Semiotics

K E Foote and M Azaryahu

89

Sense of Place

K E Foote and M Azaryahu

Sensorium

D McCormack

Services, Professional Services, Rural Sexuality

101

A James

106

A C Vias

112

P Howell

Shift-Share Analysis Simulation

119 R W Jackson and K E Haynes

S M Manson A Kobayashi

138

D Pinder

144

Situationism/Situationist Geography

Slums

Q Stevens

151

R Harris

Smith, N.

157

A L Hansen

Social Capital

163

A Bebbington

165

Social Capital, Place and Health Social Class

L Twigg and J Mohan

N Duncan

Social Geography

Social Movements

185

K Newman

195

M Ramutsindela

199

Social Studies of Scientiﬁc Knowledge

S M Ruddick

217

A Latham

Soundscapes South Asia Southeast Asia

204 212

Sound and Music

Sovereignty

B Greenhough

S Engel-Di Mauro

Society–Space Soja, E.

171 179

R Panelli

Social Justice, Urban

Socialism

125 132

Situated Knowledge, Reﬂexivity

Situationist City

96

227

M Duffy

230

A Saldanha

236

G P Chapman

241

Eric C Thompson M Coleman

248 255

Space I

S Elden

262

Space II

R Kitchin

268

Space-Time

J D Gatrell and E W LaFary

Space-Time Modeling

M Yuan

Spanish Language Geography Spatial Analysis, Critical

276 286

A Albet and P Zusman

T Schwanen

296 302

lviii

Contents

Spatial Autocorrelation

D A Grifﬁth

308

Spatial Clustering, Detection and Analysis of

Y Lu

Spatial Data Mining, Cluster and Pattern Recognition Spatial Data Mining, Geovisualization Spatial Data Models

T A Arentze

C Kim

337

A C Winstanley

Spatial Division of Labor

345

A Smith

Spatial Expansion Method

348

E Casetti

355

Spatial Filtering/Kernel Density Estimation Spatial Interaction Models Spatial Interpolation

G Rushton and C Tiwari

M E O’Kelly

369

N Schuurman

Spatial Science

377

Ron Johnston

384

Spatially Autoregressive Models Squatter Settlements

D A Grifﬁth

396

K D Willis

403

M Jones

State Theory

359 365

N S Lam

Spatial Ontologies

325 332

L Bian

Spatial Databases

State

317

409

B Jessop

Statistics, Descriptive

416

J Lee

422

Statistics, Inferential

D M Scott

429

Statistics, Overview

G M Robinson

436

Statistics, Spatial Storper, M.

D J Unwin

452

P Sunley

458

Street Names and Iconography

M Azaryahu

460

VOLUME 11 S Structural Adjustment

G Mohan

Structural Equations Models Structural Marxism

1

P L Mokhtarian and D T Ory

A Kent

18

Structuralism/Structuralist Geography Structuration Theory

R G Smith

R Lippuner and B Werlen

Structurationist Geography Subaltern

10

B Werlen

C McEwan

30 39 50 59

Subalternity

V Gidwani

65

Subjectivity

J P Sharp

72

Suburbanization Superpower

A Mace J O’Loughlin

Surrealism/Surrealist Geographies Surveillance

77

M Henry

82 D Pinder

87 95

Contents Surveying

U F Paleo

Sustainability

100

T Marsden

Sustainability, Urban

103

M Whitehead

Sustainable Development

109

J A Elliott

Symbolic Interactionism

117

V J Del Casino, Jr. and D Thien

Symbolism, Iconography Systems

132

M Denil

138

G P Chapman

Systems Theory

lix

146

D Straussfogel and C von Schilling

151

T Taylor, G.

J M Powell

159

Taylor, P.

J Glassman

162

Technological Change

G Norcliffe

165

Technology and Regional Development Technology Industries

Territory and Territoriality

183 B Doman´ski

D Delaney

Theocracy

J M Smith

215

D Wilson

220

Nick Megoran

Therapeutic Landscapes Thiessen Polygon Third World

223 W M Gesler

229

L Mu

231

J Connell

Third World Cities

237

S Lloyd-Evans and R B Potter

247

U Strohmayer

256

Time and Historical Geography Time Geographic Analysis Time Geography

M Kurtz

259

M Dijst

266

M Gren

Time Series Analysis

279

G M Robinson

Time-Space Diaries

285

T Schwanen

294

T Edensor

Tourism, Rural

301

M Cawley

Tourism, Urban

313

T Hall

318

J P H Poon

324

Trade, International

R Grant

329

Trade, Transport and Communications, Historical Geographies of Transatlantic

196 209

Text, Textual Analysis

Trade Blocs

190

D Mustafa

Text and Textuality

Tourism

177

B Warf

Territorial Production Complexes

Thrift, N.

171

C G Alvstam

Telecommunications

Terrorism

J Zhang

M Sheller

338 345

Transcripts (Coding and Analysis) Transitional Economies

P J Hugill

J Round

M Cope

350 355

lx

Contents

Translation

F M Smith

361

Transnational Corporations in Developing Countries Transnational Elites

C Berndt

K Olds

376

Transnational Ethnic Networks Transnationalism

Jinn-Yuh Hsu

383

D Ley

388

Transnationalism and Labor Geography

P F Kelly

Transnationalism and Technology Transfer Transnationality

368

J-Y Hsu

S Huang

394 400 404

Transport and Accessibility

J Gutie´rrez

410

Transport and Deregulation

P White and A Sturt

418

Transport and Globalization

K O’Connor

424

Transport and Social Exclusion Transport and Sustainability Transport Geography

J Hine

429

K Button

435

R D Knowles

441

Transport, Public

J Preston

452

Transport, Rural

D Banister

460

B P Y Loo

465

Transport, Urban

Transportation and Land Use Travel and Travel-Writing

476

D J Unwin

484

A Nightingale

Tropical Geography Tuan, Y-F

470

R Phillips

Trend Surface Models Triangulation

S-L Shaw

489

M Power

493

T Cresswell

499

VOLUME 12 U Uncertainty

M F Goodchild

1

Underclass

C Haylett

6

Uneven Development

B Christophers

Uneven Regional Development Urban Architecture Urban Design

R Hudson

P Kraftl

Urban Habitats/Nature Urban Modeling

32 S Rodgers

40

J Byrne and J Wolch

M Batty

Urban Morphologies, Historical Urban Morphology

18 24

E Street

Urban Growth Machine

Urban Order

12

46 51

T R Slater

K D Lilley

66

M Jayne and D Bell

Urban Planning and Human Geography

59

70 J Dodson and B Gleeson

77

Contents Urban Policy

A Cochrane

Urban Regimes

84

M Lauria and R K Whelan

Urban Representation/Imagination Urban Village

P Kraftl and J Horton

G Crow

Urbanism

94

106

P Knox

112

Urban–Rural Continuum Utopian Cities

89

101

G Bridge

Urbanization

lxi

K H Halfacree

G Brown

119 125

V Venture Capital

C Mason

131

Vichianism (After Vico)

D Kunze

138

Vidal de la Blache, P.

G Mercier

147

Visuality

F MacDonald

Visualization, Feminist Voluntary Sector

M Pavlovskaya C Milligan

von Humboldt, A. Vulnerability

151 157 165

A Buttimer

171

B Wisner

176

W War

V Mamadouh

183

War, Historical Geography and Waste Management Water

N C Johnson

M Watson

Fiona Allon

Water Management

D Kay M Davidson

D Conradson

S C MacKian

Wetlands and Reclamation

215 222

R Lee and C Philo

Welfare Reform Wellbeing

207

S Batterbury

Welfare Geography

195 201

Waterfront Development Watts, M. J.

189

224 230 235

M G Hatvany

241

Whiteness

L Peake

247

Wilderness

C R Warren

254

Wilson, A.

G P Clarke

World/Global Cities World-System

B Derudder K Terlouw

Wreford Watson, J. Wright, J. K.

G M Robinson

I M Keighren

260 262 269 279 281

Y Youth/Youth Cultures Index

L Holt

283 289

SUBJECT CLASSIFICATION

CARTOGRAPHY AND GIS Art and Cartography Atlases Biodiversity Mapping Cartographic Animation Cartography, History of Cartography in Islamic Societies Census Geography Census Mapping Children and Mapping Color, Mapping Computational Human Geography Counter Mapping Critical Cartography Critical GIS Digital Data, Historical Geography and Digital Earth Disease Mapping Electoral Cartography Feminism, Maps and GIS Generalization Geodemographics Geodesy Geographical Masking Geomatics Georeferencing, Geocoding Geospatial Intelligence Geovisualization GIS and Cartography GIS and Society GIS, Mobile and Locational Based Services GIS, Public Participation GIScience and Systems Global Positioning/GPS Indigenous Mapping Information Graphics Integrated Spatial Data Infrastructure Internet/Web Mapping Map Hacking Map Interactivity Map Libraries and Archives Map Perception and Cognition

Map Types Mapping Agencies Mapping, Commercial Mapping, Cyberspace Mapping, Distributed Mapping, Non Western Mapping, Philosophy Mapping, Race and Ethnicity Mapping, Topographic Maps Maps and Governance Maps and Protest Maps and the State Oceanographic Mapping Performative and Embodied Mapping Photogrammetry/Aerial Photography Projections Qualitative Geographic Information Systems Qualitative Spatial Reasoning Quantitative Revolution Representation Mapping Science and Scientism, Cartography Space Time Modeling Spatial Databases Spatial Data Mining, Geovisualization Spatial Ontologies Surveying Symbolism, Iconography DEVELOPMENT GEOGRAPHY Aid Brain Drain Brandt Commission Brown Agenda Child Labor Civil Society Colonialism I Colonialism II Colonialism, Internal Commodity Chains Debt Deforestation

lxiii

lxiv

Subject Classiﬁcation

Dependency Desertiﬁcation Developmentalism Development I Development II Digital Divide East Asian Miracle Empire Empowerment Eurocentrism Export Processing Zones Extended Metropolitan Region Fair Trade Famine First World Global Commodity Chains Governance, Good Green Revolution Health and Development HIV/AIDS in Developing Countries Imperialism, Cultural Indigenous Geographies Indigenous Knowledges Informal Sector Intermediate Technology Latin American Structuralist School Livelihoods Locality Debates Migrant Workers Modernization Theory Neocolonialism Neoliberalism and Development Nongovernmental Organizations Orientalism Participation Postcolonial Cities Postcolonialism/Postcolonial Geographies Postdevelopment Poverty Remittances Resistance Rio Summit* Second World Social Capital Squatter Settlements Structural Adjustment Sustainable Development Theocracy Third World Third World Cities Trade, International Transnational Corporations in Developing Countries Tropical Geography Vulnerability

DISCIPLINARY MATTERS Anglo American/Anglophone Hegemony Anthropology and Human Geography Chinese Language Geography Citation Geography Communist and Post Communist Geographies Critical Geography Cultural Studies and Human Geography Dutch Human Geography Economics and Human Geography Enlightenment Geography Environmental Studies and Human Geography Feminist Groups within Geography Francophone Geography Geographical Journals German Language Geography Historical Geography Human Geography Interdisciplinarity Italian Language Geography Ivy League and Geography in the US Japanese Geography Lusophone Geography Medieval Geography Military and Geography National Schools of Geography Nordic Geography Oxbridge Geographies Philosophy and Human Geography Physical Geography and Human Geography Redbrick University Geography in Britain Research Funding Bodies Russian Language Geography Spanish Language Geography Urban Planning and Human Geography ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY Agglomeration Business Services Capital and Space Capitalism Capitalism and Division of Labor Commodity Chains Competitiveness Consumption Core Periphery Models Corporate Responsibilities Corridor and Axis Development Creativity Cultural Economy Debt De Industrialization e Business and e Commerce Economic Crises

Subject Classiﬁcation

Economic Development, Rural Economic Geography Economic Geography, Quantitative Economics and Human Geography Economies, Alternative Economies, Borderland Economies, Branch Plant Economies, Imagined Economy, Informal Embeddedness Enterprise Discourse Entrepreneurship Environmental Regulation Ethnic Economies Export Processing Zones Fair Trade Feminism and Work Feminist Political Economy Finance, Historical Geographies of Finance, Offshore Financial Centers, International Financial Exclusion Financial Knowledge Financial Risks and Management Firms Food Networks Food Regimes Fordism Fordism, Post Fordism and Flexible Specialization Foreign Direct Investment Global Commodity Chains Global Production Networks Globalization and Transnational Corporations Globalization, Economic Governance, Corporate Growth Poles, Growth Centers Heritage and Economy High Tech Industry Industrial Districts Industrialization Industrial Location Industrial Organization Industrial Parks Industrial Restructuring Industry, Historical Geographies of Informal Sector Information Technology Innovation Internationalization of Education International Organizations Internet, Economic Geography Investment Promotion Knowledge and Education, Historical Geographies of Knowledge Communities Knowledge Economy

lxv

Knowledge Intensive Business Services Labor Control Regime Labor Flexibility Labor Geography Labor Market Labor Unionism Learning Regions Local Development Local Economic Development Local Economic Development, Politics of Locality Debates Location Theory Migrant Workers Modernization Theory Natural Resources Neoliberal Economic Strategies Networks Political Economy, Geographical Privatization Public Policy Radical Political Economy Regional Integration Regional Production Networks Relational Economic Geography Remittances Resource and Environmental Economics Resource Industries Retail Geographies Services, Professional Services, Rural Spatial Division of Labor State Theory Technological Change Technology and Regional Development Technology Industries Telecommunications Trade Blocs Trade, International Trade, Transport and Communications, Historical Geographies of Transitional Economies Transnational Corporations in Developing Countries Transnational Elites Transnational Ethnic Networks Transnationalism and Labor Geography Transnationalism and Technology Transfer Uneven Development Urban Growth Machine Venture Capital HEALTH AND MEDICAL GEOGRAPHY Ageing and Health Care/Caregiving Chronic Disease Communicable Diseases, Globalization of

lxvi

Subject Classiﬁcation

Complementary and Alternative Medicine Disability and Chronic Illness Disease Diffusion Environmental Health Epidemiological Transition Gender and Health Health and Development Healthcare Accessibility Health Geography Health Inequalities Health Services Restructuring Health Systems and Health Services HIV/AIDS in Developed Countries Housing, Neighbourhoods and Health Indigenous Health and Medicine Medical Geography Mental Health Pregnancy and Childbirth Social Capital, Place and Health Therapeutic Landscapes Voluntary Sector Welfare Reform Wellbeing HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY Agrarian Transformations Capitalism and Division of Labor Digital Data, Historical Geography and Environment, Historical Geography of Ethnicity and Resistance, Historical Geographies of Exploration Feminist Geography, Prehistory of Feudalism and Feudal Society Field Systems and Enclosure Finance, Historical Geographies of Gender, Historical Geographies of Genealogy and Family History Geohistory Heritage and Culture Heritage and Economy Heritage and Identity Historical Geographies, Rural Historical Geographies, Urban Historical Geography Historical Geography, Evolution of Imperial Cities Imperialistic Geographies Industry, Historical Geographies of Knowledge and Education, Historical Geographies of Medieval Historical Geographies Memory Migration, Historical Geographies of Nationalism, Historical Geography of Nature, Historical Geographies of Nature, History of

Oral History Oral History, Ecological Street Names and Iconography Time and Historical Geography Trade, Transport and Communications, Historical Geographies of Urban Morphologies, Historical War, Historical Geography and METACONCEPTS Africa Americas Antarctica Arctic Asia Australasia Balkans Community Diffusion Distance East/West Environment Europe Indian Ocean Landscape Local–Global Memory Middle East and North Africa Mobility Nature Nature Culture North–South Oceania Oceans Paciﬁc Rim Place Scale Self Other Society–Space South Asia Southeast Asia Space I Space II Space Time Territory and Territoriality Transatlantic METHODS Archives Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Expert Systems Autobiography Autoethnography Auto Photography Case Study Approach Categorical Data Analysis

Subject Classiﬁcation

Cellular Automata Census Mapping Chaos and Complexity Choice Modeling Complexity Theory, Nonlinear Dynamic Spatial Systems Content Analysis Cross Cultural Research Diaries (Video, Audio or Written) Discourse Analysis Ecological Fallacy Edge Effects Embodied Knowing Emotional Knowing Entropy Maximising Models Error (Propagation and Modeling) Ethical Issues in Research Ethnography Evolutionary Algorithms Experimental Design Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis Factor Analysis and Principal Components Analysis Feminist Methodologies Fieldwork First Law of Geography Focus Groups Fractal Analysis Fuzzy Set and Fuzzy Logic Genealogy Method Geocomputation Geographical Masking Geographically Weighted Regression Georeferencing, Geocoding Grounded Theory Haptic or Touch Based Knowledge Hub Network Location Hypothesis Testing Input–Output Analysis Intensive/Extensive Research Internet Based Measurement Interviews: In Depth, Semi Structured Kriging and Variogram Models Landscape Iconography Landscape Perception Language and Research Life Course Approaches Location Analysis Longitudinal Methods (Cohort Analysis, Life Tables) Markov Chain Analysis Masculinism Mental Maps Mixed and Multiple Methods Modiﬁable Areal Unit Problem Monte Carlo Simulation Movies and Films, Analysis of

lxvii

Multidimensional Scaling Naturalistic Testing Neighborhood Effects Network Analysis Neural Networks Oral History Oral History, Ecological Overlay (in GIS) Participant Observation Participatory Action Research Participatory Video Performance, Research as Photographs Point Pattern Analysis Polyvocality Psychoanalysis Q Method/Analysis Qualitative Geographic Information Systems Quantitative Data Quantitative Methodologies Questionnaire Survey Regionalization/Zoning Systems Regression, Linear and Nonlinear Reliability and Validity Remote Sensing Representation and Re presentation Sampling Scale Analytical Scientiﬁc Method Segregation Indices Selection Bias Semiotics Shift Share Analysis Simulation Situated Knowledge, Reﬂexivity Sound and Music Space Time Modeling Spatial Analysis, Critical Spatial Autocorrelation Spatial Clustering, Detection and Analysis of Spatial Data Mining, Cluster and Pattern Recognition Spatial Data Mining, Geovisualization Spatial Data Models Spatial Expansion Method Spatial Filtering/Kernel Density Estimation Spatial Interaction Models Spatial Interpolation Spatially Autoregressive Models Statistics, Descriptive Statistics, Inferential Statistics, Overview Statistics, Spatial Structural Equations Models Subalternity Subjectivity

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Subject Classiﬁcation

Text, Textual Analysis Thiessen Polygon Time Geographic Analysis Time Series Analysis Time Space Diaries Transcripts (Coding and Analysis) Translation Trend Surface Models Triangulation Uncertainty Visualization, Feminist NATURE/ENVIRONMENT Agrarian Transformations Agri Environmentalism and Rural Change Animal Geographies Biodiversity Biodiversity Mapping Climate Change Conservation and Ecology Culture/Natures Deforestation Desertiﬁcation Ecotourism Environment Environmental Hazards Environmental Health Environmentalism Environmental Justice Environmental Policy Environmental Regulation Environmental Security Environmental Studies and Human Geography Environment, Historical Geography of Gardens and Gardening Green Revolution Land Change Science National Parks Natural Resources Nature Nature, Historical Geographies of Nature, History of Nature, Performing Nature, Social Natures, Charismatic Natures, Gendered Natures, Postcolonial Plant Geographies Political Ecology Radical Environmentalism Resource and Environmental Economics Resource Management, Rural Sustainability Sustainable Development Urban Habitats/Nature

Waste Management Water Management Wetlands and Reclamation Wilderness PEOPLE Barnes, T. Beaujeu Garnier, J. Berry, B. Bobek, H. Bowman, I. Christaller, W. Claval, P. Cloke, P. Cohen, S. Corbridge, S. Cosgrove, D. Cox, K. Darby, H. C. Dear, M. J. Dicken, P. Dudley Stamp, L. Evans, E. E. Garrison, W. Golledge, R. Gottmann, J. Gregory, D. Hagerstrand, T. Haggett, P. Harley, J. B. Hartshorne, R. Harvey, D. Hettner, A. Jackson, P. Johnston, R. J. Kolossov, V. Kropo´tkin, P. Lacoste, Y. Ley, D. Lowenthal, D. Mackinder, H. J. Massey, D. McDowell, L. Meinig, D. Olsson, G. Paasi, A. Peet, R. Pred, A. Reclus, E. Ritter, C. Santos, M. Sauer, C. Scott, A. Smith, N. Soja, E.

Subject Classiﬁcation

Storper, M. Taylor, G. Taylor, P. Thrift, N. Tuan, Y. F. Vidal de la Blache, P. von Humboldt, A. Watts, M. J. Wilson, A. Wreford Watson, J. Wright, J. K. PHILOSOPHY AND GEOGRAPHY Activist Geographies Actor Network Theory/Network Geographies Anarchism/Anarchist Geography Anthropogeography (After Ratzel) Applied Geography Avant Garde/Avant Garde Geographies Behavioral Geography Berkeley School Chicago School Christian Geography Cognitive Geography Computational Human Geography Critical Geography Critical Rationalism (After Popper) Critical Realism/Critical Realist Geographies Critical Theory (After Habermas) Cultural Materialism Cultural Turn Darwinism (and Social Darwinism) Deconstruction Determinism/Environmental Determinism Developmentalism Dialectical Reasoning and Dialectical Materialism Dialogism (After Bakhtin) Ecology Ethnomethodology/Ethnomethodological Geography Existentialism/Existential Geography Feminism/Feminist Geography Feminist Geography, Prehistory of Feminist Political Economy Field Geographies Fluidity–Fixity Foucauldianism Functionalism (Including Structural Functionalism) Geography, History of GIS and Society Historical Geographical Materialism Humanism/Humanistic Geography Human Nonhuman Idealism/Idealist Human Geography Indigenous Geographies Institutionalism/Institutional Geographies

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Lamarck(ian)ism Local–Global Los Angeles School of Post Modern Urbanism Marxism/Marxist Geography I Marxism/Marxist Geography II Military Geographies Nature Culture Non Representational Theory/Non Representational Geographies People’s Geography Phenomenology/Phenomenological Geography Philosophy and Human Geography Physical Geography and Human Geography Political Ecology Political Economy, Geographical Positivism/Positivist Geography Possibilism Posthumanism/Posthumanistic Geographies Postmodernism/Postmodern Geography Post Phenomenology/Post Phenomenological Geographies Poststructuralism/Poststructuralist Geographies Pragmatism/Pragmatist Geographies Probabilism Probability Models Psychoanalytic Theory/Psychoanalytic Geographies Psychotherapy/Psychotherapeutic Geographies Quantitative Revolution Radical Environmentalism Radical Geography Radical Political Economy Rational Choice Theory (and Rational Choice Marxism) Regional Geography I Regional Geography II Regionalisations, Everyday Regional Science Science and Scientism, Cartography Self Other Semiotics Situationism/Situationist Geography Social Studies of Scientiﬁc Knowledge Society–Space Space Time Spatial Science Structural Marxism Structuralism/Structuralist Geography Structurationist Geography Structuration Theory Surrealism/Surrealist Geographies Symbolic Interactionism Systems Systems Theory Time Geography Vichianism (After Vico) Welfare Geography

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Subject Classiﬁcation

POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY Activism Activist Geographies Ageing and Health Anti Geopolitics Apartheid/Post Apartheid Biopolitics Borderlands Buffer Zone Citizenship Citizenship and Governmentality, Rural Cold War Colonialism I Colonialism II Communist and Post Communist Geographies Critical Geopolitics Cultural Politics Democracy Devolution Electoral Cartography Electoral Districts Electoral Geography Empire Environmental Justice Environmental Security Ethnic Conﬂict Eurocentrism Fatherland/Homeland Feudalism and Feudal Society Geopolitics Geopolitics and Religion Gerrymandering Globalization, Economic Governance Governance, Corporate Governance, Good Governance, Transport Governance, Urban Governmentality Hegemony Human Rights Ideology Imperialistic Geographies Irredentism Liberalism Maps and Governance Military and Geography Nation National Spatialities Nationalism Nationalism, Historical Geography of Neoliberalism Neoliberalism, Urban Nongovernmental Organizations

Place, Politics of Political Boundaries Political Geography Political Representation Postcolonialism/Postcolonial Geographies Postconﬂict Geographies Protest, Rural Public Good Public Policy Regionalism Regulation Representation, Politics of Socialism Social Movements Sovereignty State State Theory Superpower Territory and Territoriality Terrorism War War, Historical Geography and World System POPULATION GEOGRAPHY Ageing and Mobility Census Geography Demography Diaspora Emigration Fertility Genetics Immigration II Migration Migration, Historical Geographies of Population Geography Refugees and Displacement Rural Populations Segregation Transnationalism REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT Ame´nagement du Territoire: Territorial Development Cassa per il Mezzogiorno City Region Concentrated Deconcentration Core Periphery Models Corridor and Axis Development Cumulative Causation De Industrialization De Localization Edge Cities Europe of Regions Greenﬁeld Development Growth Poles, Growth Centers

Subject Classiﬁcation

Hinterland Development Industrial Districts Industrial Parks Informalization Island Development Labor Markets, Regional Learning Regions Local Development Me´tropole d’e´quilibre Network Regions New Regionalism New Towns Nordplan and Nordregio Polycentricity Port Industrial Complexes Region Regional Actors Regional Competition, Regional Dumping Regional Connectivity Regional Development and Noneconomic Factors Regional Development and Technology Regional Development, Endogenous Regional Development Models Regional Development Theory Regional Geography I Regional Geography II Regional Inequalities Regional Innovation Systems Regional Integration Regionalisations, Everyday Regionalism Regional Planning and Development Theories Regional Production Networks River Basin Development Territorial Production Complexes Uneven Regional Development RURAL GEOGRAPHY Agricultural Land Preservation Agriculture, Sustainable Agri Environmentalism and Rural Change Animal Welfare, Agricultural Citizenship and Governmentality, Rural Counterurbanization Economic Development, Rural Food Networks Food Networks, Alternative Food Regimes Gender and Rurality Gentriﬁcation, Rural Historical Geographies, Rural Homelessness, Rural Housing, Rural Identity and Otherness, Rural Peasant Agriculture

Post Productivist and Multifunctional Agriculture Poverty, Rural Protest, Rural Resource Management, Rural Rural Communities Rural Geography Rurality and Post Rurality Second Homes Services, Rural Tourism, Rural Transport, Rural SOCIAL & CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY Activism Affect Ageing and Mobility Ageism and Age Agoraphobia Anthropology and Human Geography Apartheid/Post Apartheid Becoming Belonging Berkeley School Body, The Care/Caregiving Child Labor Children/Childhood Citizenship Civil Society Community Consumption Cosmopolitanism Crime/Fear of Crime Cultural Capital Cultural Economy Cultural Geography Cultural Materialism Cultural Politics Cultural Studies and Human Geography Cultural Turn Culture Culture/Natures Cyberspace/Cyberculture Diaspora Difference/Politics of Difference Digital Divide Discourse Dwelling Education Embodied Knowing Emotional Geographies Emotional Knowing Empowerment Equity Ethnic Conﬂict

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Subject Classiﬁcation

Ethnic Economies Ethnicity Ethnicity and Resistance, Historical Geographies of Festival and Spectacle Film Gay Geographies Gender and Rurality Gender, Historical Geographies of Globalization, Cultural Habitus Heritage Heteronormativity Home Homelessness Homelessness, Rural Hybridity Identity and Otherness, Rural Identity Politics Immigration I Imperialism, Cultural Indigeneity Indigenous Knowledges Indigenous Mapping Inequality Land Rights Landscape Landscape Iconography Language Law and Law Enforcement Leisure Lesbian Geographies Literature Masculinism Masculinities Material Culture Material, The Media Memorials and Monuments Modernity Moral Economies Moral Landscapes Multiculturalism Nature, Social Orientalism Other/Otherness Parenting/Motherhood/Fatherhood Patriarchy Performativity Place Names Policing Popular Culture Poverty Poverty, Rural Private/Public Divide

Public Space Public Spaces, Urban Queer Theory/Queer Geographies Race Racism and Antiracism Religion/Spirituality/Faith Representation, Politics of Segregation, Urban Sense of Place Sensorium Sexuality Social Capital Social Capital, Place and Health Social Class Social Geography Social Justice, Urban Soundscapes Street Names and Iconography Subaltern Surveillance Symbolism, Iconography Text and Textuality Tourism Transnationality Travel and Travel Writing Underclass Visuality Voluntary Sector Water Welfare Geography Welfare Reform Wellbeing Whiteness Youth/Youth Cultures TRANSPORT GEOGRAPHY Aviation Ecotourism Governance, Transport Intermodality Logistics Mobility, History of Everyday Railways Regional Connectivity Tourism Tourism, Rural Tourism, Urban Transport and Accessibility Transport and Deregulation Transport and Globalization Transport and Social Exclusion Transport and Sustainability Transportation and Land Use Transport Geography Transport, Public

Subject Classiﬁcation

Transport, Rural Transport, Urban URBAN GEOGRAPHY Anti Urbanism Cellular Automata Central Business District Central Place Theory Chinese Urbanism City Marketing City Region Counterurbanization Defensible Space Edge Cities Financial Centers, International Flaˆneur, The Gated Communities/Privatopias Gender in the City Gentriﬁcation Ghettos Governance, Urban Historical Geographies, Urban Housing Imperial Cities Industrial City Informational City Islamic Urbanism Land Rent Theory Malls/Retail Parks Mega Cities Modern City Multicultural City Neighborhood Change Neighborhoods and Community Neoliberalism, Urban Networks, Urban New Towns New Urbanism NIMBY

Planning, Urban Polycentricity Postcolonial Cities Postmodern City Post Socialist Cities Public Spaces, Urban Redlining Regeneration to Renaissance Segregation Indices Segregation, Urban Situationism/Situationist Geography Situationist City Slums Social Justice, Urban Street Names and Iconography Suburbanization Sustainability, Urban Third World Cities Tourism, Urban Transport, Urban Underclass Urban Architecture Urban Design Urban Growth Machine Urban Habitats/Nature Urbanism Urbanization Urban Modeling Urban Morphologies, Historical Urban Morphology Urban Order Urban Policy Urban Regimes Urban Representation/Imagination Urban Village Urban–Rural Continuum Utopian Cities Waterfront Development World/Global Cities

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FOREWORD

We should reﬂect more on the increasingly inter connected and interdependent world we live in. Places that a century ago would have taken months to reach by boat can be reached in hours on a plane and at a price affordable to many more people. Changes in ﬁnancial markets on one side of the globe instantly ricochet around the planet. Decisions taken in one country or at a supra national scale affect jobs and well being in another. This is the world we have inherited sixty years after the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which reminds us of the work still needed to implement those shared values. For while the Earth seems to be getting smaller in space and time, the relative differences between places are often growing apace. The situation in many de veloping countries is currently regressing with falling life expectancy, rising national debts, and weakening econ omies. In the developed North there continue to be large differences in the standards of living between rich and poor, core and periphery, rural and urban areas. Con sequently, the mobility of people is increasing around the globe with millions of labour migrants and refugees on the move, seeking better lives elsewhere. In addition, humanity is beginning to recognise and address the sig niﬁcant global challenge of climate change which is in part created by the processes of development and glob alisation, but will require to be addressed with principles of climate justice. The International Encyclopedia of Human Geography documents and explains all of these issues, and many more besides. Focused through the spatial lens of a modern geography sensitive to how social, economic, political, cultural or environmental processes work within and between places, the entries cover the full spectrum of issues facing humanity today across the

planet. Together the essays provide a fascinating over view of the diverse, complex and sometimes paradoxical relationships between people, places and environments, written in a style accessible to students and interested parties. As well, the vast array of methodologies and theories employed by geographers and others is docu mented, to make sense of the developments now occur ring. Indeed, in the very fact that it contains 914 essays, written by 844 contributors from over 40 countries, it is itself a product of the way in which the geography of communication and cooperation has rapidly evolved in recent years! The challenges facing all of us, whether they concern the present global economic downturn, survival in a country at war, managing environmental change, and a host of other pressing issues, require a broad and deep knowledge of the fundamental processes shaping our future. The International Encyclopedia of Human Geography provides a comprehensive overview of that knowledge and points to the tools needed to build planetary citi zenship and to think through a more ethical version of globalisation. I hope that it will be used extensively by present and future generations so that, as the planet seemingly shrinks in size, so the problems we face and the differences between us shrink too.

Mary Robinson President of Realizing Rights: The Ethical Globalisation Initiative Honorary President of Oxfam International United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1997–2002 President of Ireland, 1990–1997

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FOREWORD

Over the past 100 hundred years or so, human geography has grown into one of the most vibrant university discip lines around the world. Expanding from its origins in the colonial pursuit of geographic knowledge, modern human geography has developed into a diverse collection of so phisticated, spatially inﬂected knowledges underpinned by a reﬁned set of theoretical concepts and methodological tools. As a result, deﬁning contemporary human geography is not an easy task, not least because what passes for geo graphic theory and praxis varies across time and space. For us, what marks the discipline from other social and natural sciences is its focus on the relationship between people and the world they inhabit, its core metaconcepts (such as space, place, landscape, nature, mobility, environment, and scale), and its use of geographically sensitive methods of data generation and analysis. Human geography, as the contents list of this encyclopedia amply demonstrates, fo cuses on key issues of the day, and opens up new and vital perspectives on questions that affect our everyday lives. It engages with and problematizes apparently unequivocal statements such as: planet is large; • the the teems with life; and • the planet planet is under threat. • Through the lens of human geography, these statements are revealed as equivocal and often paradoxical. What do we mean by ‘large’ in a period in which a scientiﬁc shift based on the discovery of fractals has expanded our perception of the length and complexity of lines at exactly the same time that transport and communications technologies shrink the world to such an extent that we can interact in real time with people on the far side of the planet and maps of the planet can be called up online by ordinary citizens and analyzed in diverse ways? What do we mean by ‘life’ in a

period in which we keep discovering more of it in more and more unlikely places, while scientiﬁc and cultural changes are continually expanding our deﬁnition of what ‘life’ consists of? What do we mean by ‘threat’ when we are unable to agree on the nature of a threat, let alone a so lution, when technologies that offer the promise of salvation all too often create new problems and when increasing populations offer new resources as well as consume them? Human geography seeks to answer such questions not only in order to understand the world but also to make practical interventions. Unlike many disciplines, it is built on unsure foundations without much in the way of a canon. Some might say that that is its attraction; that it has perennially been driven by the changing world around it. The discipline is willing to go where other disciplines fear to tread because its history is loosely connected, more like a conglomerate than a series of well deﬁned strata – it has not been wed to a single or limited theoretical approach but rather it has explored and drawn together all manner of approaches in order to address issues geographically. Equally though, it is born out of a longing for a planetary citizenship, with that longing sitting alongside a radical appreciation of how all the differences that make up the discipline both com promise and strengthen that goal. Whatever might be the case, at the heart of this endeavor has been the notion that geography matters – the spatial conﬁguration of events is not a mere add on to other somehow deeper, more abstract aspatial processes, but rather is central to how the processes unfold. These tensions between a discipline organized around understanding the world and a discipline consisting of and deﬁned by its own approaches, are manifest in how geog raphy tells its own history (and how one might organize an encyclopedia). One way would be to trace the changing approaches, epistemologies, and concerns of the discipline.

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Foreword

Thus one could track the multiple interpretations of the writing of Alexander von Humboldt, often cited as one of the key disciplinary ancestors. Alternately, one could chart the intellectual genealogies of ‘key’ texts, concepts, and places to provide counterpoints to more traditional chronological histories of various theoretical schools. Or, one could create accounts that organize the discipline via key processes and events in the world. To take other examples, there are presently attempts to write about differences in more satisfying and nuanced ways, ways that can bring about new means of living and experiencing the world through reinventing familiar categories like gender, race, and sexu ality, categories that have their own complex geographies which are a very part of the process of reinvention. There are efforts to reconceive cities taking account of the affective, the mundane, the ongoing incompleteness, fuzziness, and unpredictability that make up urban life, and there are at tempts to reimagine the economic as thoroughly infused with the cultural. Sometimes clumsy and awkward, some times plain inspired, these kinds of developments are surely worth following in a world too often characterized by div ision and despair. And follow them, this encyclopedia does.

The Encyclopedia The International Encyclopedia of Human Geography is a multinational attempt to capture and trace the state of human geography as a discipline and as a description of the world as it exists today and as it changes its shape in the future. Its ambition, in other words, is to provide a major and continually updated resource that provides an always temporary but hopefully authoritative means of answering questions of the sort posed above, and many others like them. This it does by taking on the venerable format of an encyclopedia which we can understand both in its original meaning as a course of education – in this case with the description ‘human geography’ – or in its more modern meaning as treating a particular branch of knowledge comprehensively through the medium of articles arranged alphabetically, by subject. Of course, producing an encyclopedia provides real opportunities, most especially the ability to stretch out explanations in a way not available in the more common dictionary form. Thus, our aim has not been to produce a portable, condensed summary or bite sized deﬁnitions of concepts, but rather clear, authoritative statements that set out the evolution and implications of geographic thought. Such an endeavor also produces some inevitable challenges. We want to use these challenges to explore how this encyclopedia has been put together, under standing that such challenges do not have to be under stood just as undesirable or unpleasant choices between alternatives. They can equally well be understood as producing the means to fuel productive encounters.

The ﬁrst challenge is an obvious one. There is an in evitable degree of arbitrariness about what is included and what is not. We have made an honest attempt to cover the whole range of what can possibly be treated as human geography in terms of issues on the ground and traditions within the discipline. This has been achieved through an intensive, iterative process involving all the editors, worked through at face to face meetings, conference phone calls, and e mail. Inevitably, there will be topics, methods, and thinkers considered important by some that we felt did not justify a stand alone entry. Moreover, we fully expect that as some issues grow or decline in im portance – to the world and/or the discipline – we shall have occasion in the future to expand or contract the coverage in different ﬁelds. This dilemma of selecting what to cover brings with it other issues too. Foremost among these has been how to shape the coverage of each entry and title each entry in an informative yet pithy way. There are many bodies of conceptual and substantive knowledge that cannot easily be encompassed by a single term or phrase. The result is that some of the entries have somewhat contrived titles. Better that, though, than titles that are vague or oblique, especially in these days of vo luminous information accessible across the Internet. The second challenge is an authorial one. It was a guiding principle of this encyclopedia that we would attempt to extend authorship beyond the ‘charmed circle’ of Anglophone/Western geographers, both as a response to postcolonial critiques and as a response to the critiques of scholars from outside the Euro American zone who felt disenfranchised by what is possible to perceive as an Anglophone/Western ascendancy. We have then been attentive to the geographies of the discipline of geog raphy, not least since scholars in diverse locales see the world differently in terms of what processes seem most important and what traditions of interpretation they use. We have not always been successful in achieving our goal of wide international authorship, partly because the geographical establishment is simply larger in some countries than others and partly because human geog raphy still bears some of the marks of its own history, not least as a colonial enterprise. Inevitably perhaps, the historical geography of geography kept coming home to roost. Moreover, scholars from different locales had varying abilities to contribute due to issues of time, ac cess to resources, and language. As a result, we have not been able to include some topics and perspectives. That said, entries have been solicited from 844 scholars located in over 40 countries around the world working within different traditions and we have managed to describe the different ideas and practices of geography in many countries/language groups. Again, this is a project that will be added to, over the coming years. The third challenge was to draw on the expertise of the human geographical community in ways that ensured

Foreword

some degree of diversity. In particular, we are proud that we have been able to balance the voices of established scholars with those of younger writers. This has had salutary effects. For example, we have been able to trace the history of philosophical ideas in geography both from the point of view of those that have been deeply involved in the explosion of different conceptual possibilities that took place in the discipline from the late 1960s onward, as well as the point of view of younger scholars who have set out quite different agendas. The fourth challenge was to ensure a relatively con sistent standard of scholarship for each entry and to provide a balanced content with respect to ideas and geographical coverage. To that end, each entry was ini tially refereed by a section editor who had overall re sponsibility for a selection of related entries (e.g., political, urban, regional development, quantitative methods, people) and a senior editor. Each senior editor oversaw three sections in order to ensure sections were approximately commensurate in style, content, and length. To provide breadth as well as depth, authors were asked to draw on examples and traditions from around the world and not simply rely on charting an issue with respect to their own local circumstance. The ﬁfth challenge was to use the Internet in pro ductive ways. One of the motivations for this encyclo pedia was the production of a platform upon which we might then build a future memory for human geography. It is an attempt to begin to produce a living, breathing archive which will gradually evolve, by using the powers of the Internet. Though in this ﬁrst edition, both print and Internet editions exist side by side, in later editions the Internet edition will exist singly, opening the way to a vision of geography which is in keeping with the age in which we now live. Since the articles are on the web, it will be possible to update them on a regular, rolling basis without having to wait for the revision of every other article. Equally, they will have all kinds of extra resources associated with them – illustrations of all types, including more and more videos as well as maps and diagrams, ‘active’ reference links that will take the reader straight to the listed journal article, and so on. Then, more articles will be added at regular intervals, both ﬁlling in gaps and supplementing existing articles. All articles will be left in situ – old articles will not be deleted – so that, in time, we will be able to produce a ‘timeline’ for many subjects, making it possible to see how thinking has evolved, thereby producing a real sense of historical accretion. Over time, we hope that the encyclopedia will become an institutionalized memory of human geography. The sixth challenge was to produce an encyclopedia of human geography that was relevant to issues that must concern us all. We sought an encyclopedia that espoused responsibility to the planet and its people certainly. But we also became, however awkwardly and unsuccessfully,

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involved in thinking what that responsibility might mean. A difﬁcult but ultimately productive instance of what this might entail – and how difﬁcult it can be to think through – was provided by the proposed boycott of the encyclo pedia by some authors concerned at Reed International’s (a sister company to Elsevier) involvement in the arms trade, an affair settled when Reed withdrew from these activities. Here, we saw the same concerns being aired by many participants but radically different solutions being put on offer. We hope that the encyclopedia mirrors this diversity of response. Bringing these six, and especially the last three, points together we hope and trust that this encyclopedia will be counted as a contribution to the global commons of knowledge. The production of a discipline depends on the goodwill of many who labor over ideas, who dis seminate, review, and rework them. We are painfully aware that in the current global climate of academia, when what counts as valued academic practices is nar rowing, writing authoritative and scholarly articles for publications such as this venture provides few rewards and attracts little institutional support. However, it is a vital component in the reproduction and development of a discipline. Rather than simply being understood as the creation of canonical knowledge by authorial com munities we would like to thank all those who have written and reviewed material here for an activity that may be deemed a professional service but is one that, sadly, is seen as subverting the institutional priorities of a number of universities.

By Way of Conclusion This encyclopedia is an attempt to summarize knowledge of the discipline using the encyclopedia format. In time, we hope that this encyclopedia will build into a com prehensive resource which constitutes both an archive of the discipline and, of course, of what it knows about the world. That knowledge, what facts are arraigned to support it, and what theories and methodologies are used as a means of making it credible, is, of course, a movable feast. Think of the notion of the ‘world’, which it is easy to demonstrate has changed its form many times over the course of history, as the development of the map shows all too well as Denis Cosgrove noted: There is no single map of the world, but a vast range of images that present different facets of the globe and its contents. y A map of the world is a global cultural artefact, an extraordinary human accomplishment, pro duced by contributions from many cultures. It is a highly sophisticated scientiﬁc achievement, and each advance in the various technologies that coalesce within it renders it more detailed, ﬂexible, and widely available. Google Earth is certainly not the last stage in its evolution.

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Foreword

Yet even [a] cursory survey of world mapping y re veals that science and technology are only a part of the story. Of equal importance are such affective aspects as imagination, faith, fear, and desire. We spot them im mediately in the world maps of nonmodern cultures, and even in early examples of the modern world map. For us humans, the earth is always more than its physical form and nature; it is, indeed, a world. y Today that world seems wholly visible, even transparent. y Yet today’s world maps are as hued by the contingencies of our own times as any previous ones, and we are ‘mapped’ into them as surely as Xiuhtechitli was mapped into the ﬁf teenth century Mesoamerican world. Because every ‘world’ is social and imaginative as much as it is material, our own world maps will in due course come to seem as quaint as Jain mandalas or medieval mappae mundi seem to us today. (Denis Cosgrove, 2007: 112 113)

Or, indeed, consider the idea of the encyclopedia it self. Encyclopedias are often thought to be an invention of the West. Speciﬁcally, the general purpose, widely distributed, printed encyclopedia is usually considered to have been conceived in eighteenth century Europe with Chambers’ Cyclopaedia, or Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences (1728), and the Encyclope´die of Diderot and D’Alembert (1751 onward). These volumes are often considered to be the ﬁrst to take on a recognizably

modern form, with a comprehensive list of topics, dis cussed in depth and organized in what we would consider a systematic way. But, once we take a broader view in which places and times are not necessarily weighted by particular prejudices, a very different account hoves into view in which all manner of authors in different parts of the world revealed an encyclopedic instinct, and from much earlier on. For example, a tradition of encyclo pedia like volumes can be found in China from the eleventh century onward, and these were often massive undertakings involving as many as a thousand volumes. The point that these two examples make is that all we can be certain of is that the contours of knowledge will constantly change. There can be no absolute certainty about what will be included in and what will be excluded from human geography in times to come. But with this encyclopedia, we believe we now have a tool that will be able to trace this evolution as it happens. Rob Kitchin and Nigel Thrift

Further Reading Cosgrove, D. (2007). Mapping the world. In Akerman, J. & Karrow, R. (eds.) Maps. Finding Our Place in the World, pp 65 158. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

H Habitus G. Setten, Department of Geography, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Capital The resources that actors take to the ﬁeld. The meaning of capital is not limited to the conventional economic ﬁeld, but is also applicable to resources such as status, power, knowledge, and social networks. In addition to economic capital, Bourdieu identiﬁed three forms of capital: social, cultural, and symbolic. Field The analytic deﬁnition of ﬁeld is a network, or a conﬁguration, of objective relations between positions. More simply, a ﬁeld (e.g., the economic/scientiﬁc/sport ﬁeld) is a particular social space of institutions and forces. Our practical sense is speciﬁc to the ﬁeld in which we are acting at any moment. A ﬁeld is a site of tension, contradiction, and social struggle, and hence the site where different forms of capital are produced and reproduced. Practice The act of doing something or the ongoing mix of human’s everyday activities. For Bourdieu, practices are an effect of the temporal and spatial operation of habitus and capital within different ﬁelds.

This is an abstract and formal deﬁnition of what is ultimately aimed at describing a set of embodied dis positions that are constituted in practice and are always oriented toward practical rather than cognitive functions. Bourdieu’s use of ‘open concepts’, as well as the complex nature of his writing, makes it very difﬁcult to pin down a precise meaning of habitus. His sense of meticulous empirical work suggests that a concept can only prove its use by being put to use empirically. To get a grip on what habitus might mean, then, it is useful to see it as a theoretical viewpoint of looking at and inter preting the empirical world, not limited to a conceptual map of the world that can be read off from the appli cation of the notion. Habitus is thus a theoretical attitude or belief system, which can be understood as that which links objective structures and individual action. It refers to how systems of social norms, understandings, and behavior are embodied in individual actors. Habitus does not determine action, but it ensures that individuals are more inclined to act in some ways rather than others. The Genesis of Habitus

Habitus Habitus, stemming from Latin, refers to habitual or typical condition, state, or appearance. In human geog raphy, habitus is known as one of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s (1930–2002) key terms. In The logic of practice, Bourdieu deﬁnes habitus as: systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring struc tures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a con scious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the op erations necessary in order to attain them. Objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without in any way the product of obedience to rules, they can be collectively orches trated without being the product of the organizing action of a conductor. (Bourdieu, 1990)

Underlying Bourdieu’s writing was the need to escape the unsustainable, yet widespread, Cartesian dichotomy of objectivism and subjectivism (or structure/agency, mind/body). In The logic of practice, he examines the tra ditions of objectivism and subjectivism, and positions himself against both structuralist (i.e., objectivist) ap proaches that fall into mechanical determinism, and subjectivist approaches that presuppose calculation, ra tionality, or continuous conscious decisions by actors. As a replacement Bourdieu puts forward the creative, active, and inventive capacities of agents, that is, the active side of practical knowledge, and proposes habitus as that which practices operate from. Habitus: Accounting for the Logic of Embodied Practices Habitus is a socialized subjectivity and provides a so phisticated and important perspective on complex

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processes of embodiment in that it describes our cus tomary relationship to the world shown through our embodied expressions, understandings, and actions pre sent at any time. Habitus therefore seeks to understand and explain individuals’ sense of how to act in speciﬁc situations while not making fully conscious decisions, that is, habitus accounts for people’s practical sense or their ‘feel for the game’. Habitus is a useful tool for thinking about how social relations are internalized and experienced as ‘natural’, even necessary. Habitus, being the embodiment of the social, is ‘at home’ in the ﬁeld it inhabits. Individuals, then, bring to any ﬁeld their embodied dispositions, as well as their capital or accumulated resources. Moreover an individual’s social position becomes expressed through his or her capital. Habitus thus becomes the product and the producer of the division of society into groups and classes, thus also representing the resource for social struggle, unevenness, and contestation within and across different ﬁelds. Bourdieu argues that our being in the world is largely a practical mastery of the implicit principles of the social world in general and different ﬁelds in particular. Thus habitus accounts for the logic of practice without having logic as its principle. Habitus is consequently not mere routine, it is improvisational and open to innovation. It has a mode of development through time, both indi vidually and from one generation to the next. Habitus is thus a ﬂexible and negotiable representation of oneself through practice adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation. It follows that habitus is relational and it is thus possible to state that habitus is individual, yet social; it is stable, but also dy namic; and it is action through time, being something we continually put into action when producing, constructing, and holding onto differing situations. When cultural and social situations are produced through embodied prac tices, we have them in our actional purview, that is, in our range of embodied understanding. Socially and culturally contingent situations are therefore held through body and memory, and this is how the durability of habitus is expressed: by my active holding on to a situation so as to prolong what I experience beyond the present moment. Problems with Habitus Scholars have in particular identiﬁed three interlinked problems with habitus. First, claims are made that habitus has a tendency to become deterministic. Even though Bourdieu emphasizes the generative capacities of habitus, he makes clear that it is its structured and reproductive nature that is crucial for its formation and operation. Bourdieu’s interest in habitus as a theoretical tool lies in its abilities to explain the reproduction of class relations, rather than the dynamics of organisms.

The second problem following on from the ﬁrst, concerns whether habitus is essentially static or whether it is able to change according to changing conditions and circumstances. Because Bourdieu emphasizes and ex plains the inertia of habitus, and to a lesser extent its dynamism, the temporality of habitus tends to be downplayed in his writing. The third problem concerns the question of con sciousness. The whole notion of habitus was proposed in order to reject positivism and to overcome subjectivist/ objectivist, structure/agency, mind/body relationships. It is thus ironic that Bourdieu tends to take a reductionistic view on consciousness by arguing that practical belief is not a state of mind, but a state of the body. He thus reproduces the very idea he sets out to criticize. Habitus and Human Geography Although human geographers’ engagement with habitus has been relatively limited, three different uses can be identiﬁed: ﬁrst, as a bridge between structure and agency; second, in relation to class, cultural capital, choice, and constraint; third, as a perspective on the body, embodied knowledge, practice, and performance. The use of habitus by human geographers is thus thematically wide ranging, as demonstrated by the following works: Thrift’s development of a ‘nonrepresentational’ social theory draws on the notion of habitus. According to Thrift, habitus frames practice and time, but not practice and space. In ‘nonrepresentational’ theory, habitus’ qualities in explaining practice, practical action, and time is coupled with a theory sensitive to spatial ﬂows of conduct that are embodied, social, and contextually speciﬁc. Gerber [Tsouvalis] discusses the duality of culture and nature in Western thought. She argues that in order to work across the boundaries between the physical, the mental, and the social, there is a need for a new language. Habitus is proposed as being crucial for this language: it connects the physical and the mental because of its embodied character, and because it generates and is generated through practice it is also social. Setten puts habitus to work as a ‘third term’ in order to explain how farmers, that is, bodies, and landscapes are tied together. In order to grasp the landscape practices of a farming community in southwestern Norway, she ar gues that habitus, as betweenness, is what ties farmers, their embodied practices, and the landscape together. Harvey and Jones have used habitus to argue that continuity and custom are seen as important themes in the construction of institutional legitimacy, communal identity, and memory. Examining founding legends and hagiographies of Middle Ages Wales and Cornwall, they state that at the heart of change is a concept of continuity. Habitus mediates such permanence in change.

Habitus

As Painter, another human geographer arguing for the usefulness of habitus, has noted, Bourdieu’s work has in (human) geography for the most part been referred to in passing. However, as demonstrated by the above works, the ﬂexibility of habitus as a notion offers considerable scope for human geographers to engage habitus in more depth. Habitus in Future Human Geography For human geographers pursuing a social theory that is concerned with the contextual conditions for human behavior, investigating the operation of habitus, capital, ﬁeld, and practice represent a potentially valuable ap proach. Good social theory can provide critical insight into and explanation of the nature of the conditions that work to produce and reproduce social lives. Embedded in the very notion of habitus are clues as to how certain conditions work to cement certain social lives, that is, how habitus conceals and reproduces unevenness, dom ination, and hegemony. There are also, on the other hand, clues as to how habitus can work to change such con ditions, that is, how contesting, changing, and evolving habitus(es) might lead to transformed social conditions. The nature of production and reproduction of habitus needs, however, to be subject to further scrutiny by human geographers, not least because the dual nature of habitus needs to be made spatially sensitive in order to be a relevant disciplinary concern. See also: Body, The; Embodied Knowing; Human Geography; Non-Representational Theory/NonRepresentational Geographies; Performance, Research

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as; Performativity; Structuralism/Structuralist Geography.

Further Reading Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a theory of practice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Bourdieu, P. (1985). The genesis of the concepts of habitus and of ﬁeld. Sociocriticism 1, 11 24. Bourdieu, P. (1990). The logic of practice. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Bourdieu, P. and Wacquant, L. J. D. (1992). An invitation to reﬂexive sociology. Cambridge, Oxford, UK: Polity Press. Gerber [Tsouvalis], J. (1997). Beyond dualism the social construction of nature and the social construction of human beings. Progress in Human Geography 21, 1 17. Harvey, D. C. and Jones, R. (1999). Custom and habit(us): The meaning of traditions and legends in early Medieval Western Britain. Geograﬁska Annaler 81B, 223 233. Hillier, J. and Rooksby, E. (eds.) (2005). Habitus: A sense of place (2nd edn.). Aldershot: Ashgate. King, A. (2000). Thinking with Bourdieu against Bourdieu: A ‘practical’ critique of the habitus. Sociological Theory 18, 417 433. Noble, G. and Watkins, M. (2003). So, how did Bourdieu learn to play tennis? Habitus, consciousness and habituation. Cultural Studies 17, 520 538. Painter, J. (1997). Regulation, regime and practice in urban politics. In Lauria, M. (ed.) Reconstructing urban regime theory. Regulating urban politics in a global economy, pp 122 143. London: Sage Publications. Painter, J. (2000). Pierre Bourdieu. In Crang, M. & Thrift, N. (eds.) Thinking space, pp 239 259. London: Routledge. Setten, G. (2004). The habitus, the rule and the moral landscape. Cultural Geographies 11, 389 415. Thrift, N. (1996). Spatial formations. London: Sage Publications.

Relevant Websites http://www.csc.ehess.fr Centre de Sociologic europe´enne.

Hagerstrand, T. R. Flowerdew, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, Fife, UK & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Ha¨gerstrand, Torsten (1916–2004) Stig Torsten Erik Ha¨gerstrand (Figure 1) was born in 1916, the son of a village schoolteacher, and grew up in the Swedish countryside, which he continued to love throughout his life. It is relatively easy to ﬁnd out more about the development of Ha¨gerstrand’s ideas because several of his papers contain autobiographical material, described and discussed in some detail to illustrate theoretical concepts. Most useful, perhaps, is an auto biographical essay (1983), which is accompanied by a career proﬁle chart (Figure 2). This shows that Ha¨gerstrand’s ideas were taking shape well before he matriculated at Lund University in Southern Sweden in 1937, studying geography and the history of art. In 1944 he obtained his BA, and he continued to a licentiate degree (approximately similar to a PhD), which he obtained from Lund in 1953. The length of time taken reﬂects interruption by military service, as well as the mammoth self imposed task of collecting data on everybody who

Figure 1 Torsten Ha¨gerstrand. From Buttimer (1983, p 238).

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had lived in the small settlement of Asby from 1840 to 1940. In 1953, he was given a staff appointment in the Human Geography Department at Lund. He stayed at Lund, serving as Head of Department from 1957 to 1971, being awarded a personal research chair in 1971. He at tracted many international visitors to Lund, developing links with the leaders of the quantitative movement in the United States, visiting the University of Washington in 1959. In addition to his academic work, Ha¨gerstrand became heavily involved in practical planning work for the Swedish government through the 1960s, although he was able to return to his own research after 1971. From the 1970s, he assembled an impressive group of col leagues sharing his interest in time geography. He died in Lund in May 2004. Ha¨gerstrand was initially not very keen on geography, especially regional geography, which he found boring, repetitive, and lacking intellectual challenge. His interest in the subject developed, however, especially through working with Edgar Kant, an Estonian geographer who moved to Sweden as a refugee in 1944. Kant was inter ested in the daily life of ordinary people as a valid topic for geographical research. He also had interests in lo cation theory, and introduced Ha¨gerstrand to the work of von Thunen and Christaller. In 1940, Ha¨gerstrand was asked to work on a regional monograph. He decided to concentrate on population development, noting that there had been large scale emigration to the US in the later nineteenth century. In order to investigate this, he decided to try to trace the life of every individual within the small settlement of Asby from 1840 to 1940 (10 000 lives in all). This was done using a mixture of historical research, talking to people, and environmental investigations, producing a general picture. ‘‘The arduous acquisition of this image,’’ said Ha¨gerstrand (1957), ‘‘is my single most essential experi ence as an adult geographer.’’ He continued throughout his career to use these data to illustrate a variety of concepts as his distinctive world view developed. Ha¨gerstrand’s PhD thesis was concerned with innova tion diffusion as a spatial process. He studied the dif fusion of several innovations in central Sweden, including agricultural innovations (e.g., state subsidized pastures, the control of bovine tuberculosis and soil mapping) as well as general innovations (e.g., postal checking services, the car). His work started with detailed original data collection, and proceeded to construct simulation models

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Figure 2 Career proﬁ e: Torsten Ha¨gerstrand. From Ha¨gerstrand, T. (1983). n search for the sources of concepts. n Butt mer, A. (ed.) The Practice of Geography, pp 238–256. London: Longman.

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of the spatial diffusion of the innovation. The thesis was published in Swedish in 1953, and translated into English by Allen Pred in 1967, accompanied by a postscript by Pred discussing the signiﬁcance of Ha¨gerstrand’s work. This thesis proved tremendously inﬂuential in general izing the concept of spatial diffusion, and in encouraging the use of simulation methods, based on the concept of the ‘mean information ﬁeld’. Ha¨gerstrand’s innovative use of Monte Carlo simulation techniques was based on drawing random numbers to model the spread of the innovation. Ha¨gerstrand’s approach to innovation diffusion in volved modeling the behavior of individual people, and his work was part of a reorientation of the discipline toward the study of individual rather than aggregate behavior. Some of his work explicitly argued for geog raphy to pay more attention to the individual level of analysis, asking the question ‘‘What about people in re gional science?’’ He criticized the restriction of regional science models to the study of mass aggregate effects, and complained that ‘‘we treat a population as a mass of particles, almost freely interchangeable and divisible’’ (1970: 9). Ha¨gerstrand hence insisted that people are

individuals, that they retain their identity over time, and that the life of an individual is his or her foremost project. This led to an emphasis on biography as a key concept, both as method and subject matter. At the same time, Ha¨gerstrand began to outline some of the basic principles of time geography, which he and his students developed through the 1970s. He developed the idea of time–space prisms, derived from diagrams illustrating the spatial extent of the area that can be reached in free time between two ﬁxed commitments. Time geography could depict an individual’s path through space using three dimensional diagrams, where time is the vertical axis (Figure 3 shows some of the basic ideas). This type of analysis can be especially useful in studying the temporal and spatial constraints everybody faces in carrying out their various projects. Ha¨gerstrand identiﬁed three main types of constraint: ‘capability constraints’ (referring to restrictions on distance of travel, including the necessity of sleep and of eating); ‘coupling constraints’ (concerning where and when two or more people have to meet); and ‘authority constraints’ (where a segment of time–space is under somebody’s control and hence inaccessible to other people). In a paper published

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Figure 3 Daily prisms. From Ha¨gerstrand, T. (1970). What about people in regional science? Papers of the Regional Science Association 24, 7 21.

Hagerstrand, T.

in 1982, he also advocated the idea of diorama as a way of depicting the many different activities going on in a place, because it allows analysis of the interactions be tween the activities. He illustrates his point with a de tailed discussion of the area he grew up in, including memories of his own childhood activities. In an autobiographical essay, Ha¨gerstrand in 1983 talked of his ‘‘lifelong marriage to geography’’ although he also admitted to ‘‘a state of dissatisfaction with my chosen ﬁeld of learning.’’ He liked geography partly be cause it has ‘‘very few limiting fences in its structure and content.’’ His work displayed linkages to many different approaches to human geography, not just the spatial an alysis approach taken in his spatial diffusion work. In much of Ha¨gerstrand’s later work, he discussed some wider issues – for example, the relationship of people and the landscapes they inhabit. He consistently stressed the notion of people as purposeful actors who are trying to carry out some project within the context of the human and natural environments. He also acknowledged the impact that environmental factors may have on people, based on his own experiences growing up in rural Swe den, and was willing to recognize the importance of the regional concept as a way of synthesizing individual biographies (though he was unimpressed with the idea of areal differentiation). Like Peter Haggett and Peter Gould, Ha¨gerstrand de ployed a strong graphic imagination. Throughout his work, maps and diagrams were employed to illustrate the points he was making, and many of his graphics represent original

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ways of conveying ideas to the reader. This is particularly so for his time geography work, where the ﬁeld as a whole has owed a great debt to Ha¨gerstrand’s development of novel and effective diagrams which foster new ways of thinking about movement through time and space. In summarizing Ha¨gerstrand’s geographies, Anne Buttimer in 1983 drew attention to the breadth of Ha¨gerstrand’s encounters with different traditions of scholarship, arguing he was a scholar who saw ‘‘no in trinsic conﬂict between art and science, between poetry and mathematics, who can be just as thrilled by the aesthetics of landscape and music as by the rigor and power of scientiﬁc models.’’ Despite the innovativeness of his work on diffusion and on time geography, Ha¨ger strand’s basic interests were perhaps more traditional: he claimed his ultimate aim was to try to turn human geography into a study of the conditions of life in a re gional setting. Ha¨gerstrand’s reputation was thus based originally on his painstaking and ground breaking historical study in which he plotted individual migrations for the settlement of Asby, but his subsequent innovative use of cartographic and probabilistic techniques was inﬂuential in en couraging quantitatively inclined human geographers around the world. Ha¨gerstrand’s use of an azimuthal logarithmic projection centered on Asby (see Figure 4) not only conveyed a striking image of Asby’s relationship to the rest of the world, but also encouraged the in novative use of cartography to illustrate patterns of spatial interaction. Peter Haggett hence described

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Figure 4 (a) Conventional map of Sweden. (b) Transformed to an azimuth, logarithmic-distance map based on Asby. Ha¨gerstrand, T. (1957). Migration and area. In Hannerberg, D., Ha¨gerstrand, T. & Odeving, B. (eds.) Migration in Sweden: A Symposium. Lund Studies in Geography, Series B, No. 13.

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Ha¨gerstrand as ‘‘the geographer who particularly inﬂu enced my own research.’’ The legacy of Ha¨gerstrand’s work on the diffusion of innovations was a major rise in interest in the subject and its inclusion in human geography courses and textbooks. It was developed through the application of diffusion models to other topics, such as the growth of the Seattle ghetto (by Richard Morrill) and studies of the spread of contagious diseases (especially by Peter Haggett). However, some (notably Derek Gregory) criticized Ha¨gerstrand’s approach to diffusion for ignoring struc tural constraints to the adoption of innovations, such as social class, ethnicity, and gender, and for failing to in vestigate the processes by which individuals decide whether to adopt on the basis of their social context rather than just their location. Ha¨gerstrand’s ideas on time geography have been followed up by his students and colleagues, including Bo Lenntorp, Solveig Martensson, Tommy Carlstein, and Lars Olof Olander, a group referred to as the Lund School. Their work has been taken up and applied by other geographers, including Australian geographer Don Parkes and British geographer Nigel Thrift. It has been inﬂuential too in sociology, where Anthony Giddens was to prove an enthusiastic advocate: one of the rare ex amples where ideas developed in geography have been taken on board by other social sciences. Yet Ha¨gerstrand’s time geography has also had its critics, mainly on the basis that it has little to say about attitudes, motivations, and values, and that it tends to treat people as un differentiated units, shorn of their cultural identities. Ha¨gerstrand himself has admitted the validity of some of

these arguments, recognizing that his work neglected the internal realms of experience and meaning. See also: Diffusion; Innovation; Migration; Simulation; Time Geography.

Further Reading Giddens, A. (1984). The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Gregory, D. (1985). Suspended animation: The stasis of diffusion theory. In Gregory, D. & Urry, J. (eds.) Social Relations and Spatial Structures, pp 296 336. London: Macmillan. Hagerstrand, T. (1957). Migration and area. In Hannerberg, D., Hagerstrand, T. & Odeving, B. (eds.) Migration in Sweden: A Symposium. Lund Studies in Geography, Series B, No. 13. Hagerstrand, T. (1967). Innovation Diffusion as a Spatial Process (translated by Pred, A.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hagerstrand, T. (1970). What about people in regional science? Papers of the Regional Science Association 24, 7 21. Hagerstrand, T. (1976). Geography and the study of interaction between society and nature. Geoforum 7, 329 334. Hagerstrand, T. (1978). Survival and arena: On the life history of individuals in relation to their geographical environment. In Carlstein, T., Parkes, D. & Thrift, N. (eds.) Human Activity and Time Geography, pp 122 145. London: Arnold. Hagerstrand, T. (1982). Diorama, path and project. Tijdschrift voor Economische en sociale geograﬁe 73, 323 339. Hagerstrand, T. (1983). In search for the sources of concepts. In Buttimer, A. (ed.) The Practice of Geography, pp 238 256. London: Longman. Hagerstrand, T. (1995). Action in the everyday physical environment. In Cliff, A. D., Gould, P. R., Hoare, A. G. & Thrift, N. J. (eds.) Diffusing Geography: Essays for Peter Haggett, pp 35 45. Oxford: Blackwell. Haggett, P. (2000). The Geographical Structure of Epidemics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Morrill, R. (1965). The negro ghetto: Problems and alternatives. Geographical Review 55, 339 361.

Haggett, P. R. Flowerdew, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UK & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Haggett, Peter (1933–) Haggett was born in 1933 and grew up in rural Somerset before going to St. Catherine’s College, Cambridge. He graduated in 1954 and went on to a PhD at Cambridge, completed in 1969. His thesis was concerned with for estry in southeastern Brazil, and his subsequent publi cations show that he was already applying quantitative techniques as varied as central place theory and trend surface analysis to his Brazilian data. He taught at Uni versity College London for a brief time, followed by a junior post back at Cambridge, moving up to a lecture ship there in 1962. In 1966, he became a Professor of Urban and Regional Geography at the University of Bristol, joining David Harvey to create what Jeremy Whitehand later termed the ‘Cambridge–Bristol axis’ of quantitative geography in the late 1960s. He has stayed at Bristol ever since, serving as acting vice chancellor in 1984 and 1985. As well as receiving many notable honors (e.g., Prix International de Geographie in 1991; gold medal of the Royal Geographical Society in 1986), he is one of the few professional geographers to have been awarded the title Commander of the Order of the British Empire (CBE) in 1993 for services to geography. Since retire ment, he has maintained his activity in geographical re search and publication, retaining the title of Emeritus Professor at Bristol (Figure 1). Human geography at the start of Haggett’s career was, in the United Kingdom, a low status discipline which kept itself to itself and learnt little from other subjects. It was still recovering from the determinism/possibilism debate and still thought of itself as having to focus on how environment affected human activity. Most human geographers were not prepared to cope with general ization beyond the descriptive. While geographers did use numbers to ﬁrm up population counts or measures of energy production, few were able to test relationships for signiﬁcance. In essence, it was an atheoretical discipline concentrating on description, with little serious attempt to measure the patterns observed and even less attempt to explain them. There were exceptions, of course, such as Garrison and his students at the University of Washington and Ha¨gerstrand in Sweden, and Haggett avidly read their work and ﬁtted it into his own framework. Haggett was one of the geographers most responsible for turning human geography around (perhaps the most important single inﬂuence). The changes concern the

Figure 1 Peter Haggett (1933 ).

nature of human geography, its methods, its theories, and even its subject matter. They occurred, to a considerable degree, through Haggett’s attempts to restyle geography as a modern, outward looking, scientiﬁc, and theoreti cally informed subject. This involved several distinct changes. Haggett argued for a more open outlook toward other disciplines, recognizing where they could provide useful material for geographers. His focus on spatial patterns and processes led some of his followers to deﬁne geography as a spatial science, though Haggett himself deﬁnes geography more broadly as ‘‘the study of the Earth’s surface as the space within which the human population live.’’ Regarding human geography as a sci ence, or even as a social science, brings up the question of scientiﬁc method. Haggett was interested in the role of theory, models, and paradigms, introducing geographers to these concepts in the ﬁrst chapter of Models in Geog raphy. Geography had traditionally been idiographic, concerned with individual cases; he argued that it should be nomothetic, concerned with generalization. Given his role in effecting geography’s ‘theoretical turn’, it is hard to overestimate Peter Haggett’s contri bution to human geography from the 1960s onward, both in Britain and internationally. One of the ﬁrst signs of his dissatisfaction with established descriptive and idio graphic modes of enquiry was the series of symposia he

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organized with the physical geographer Richard Chorley at Madingley Hall, outside Cambridge, resulting in the very inﬂuential coedited Frontiers in Geographical Teaching and the even more inﬂuential Models in Geography. Both books consisted of a series of chapters discussing new approaches in the different branches of geography, many of them written by the editors and their Cambridge colleagues. Not all the chapters in these books repre sented major departures from the established ways of studying the subject, but most – especially Haggett’s own – were inﬂuenced by a new and powerful set of ideas taking root in Anglo American geography, which sub sequently became known as the ‘quantitative revolution’. The term quantitative revolution, however, does scant justice to the changes that Haggett and his colleagues tried to bring about (and largely succeeded) in the way geography was studied. Certainly geographers made in creasing use of quantitative methods, measurements, and computers, rather than rely on verbal descriptions, but the changes went way beyond this. The use of statistical analysis, largely unknown in geography beforehand, be came more and more important. Geographers began to think in terms of hypotheses and how to test them, many adopting the hypothetico deductive approach regarded as typifying the scientiﬁc method. Geography also de veloped the idea of constructing theory, sometimes based on working out the consequences of a set of assumptions. Haggett did much to popularize the work of von Thunen and Christaller, little known previously in geography but highly relevant to Haggett’s concepts of spatial analysis as applied to agricultural land use and urban location, respectively. Practically, one of the most important aspects of his work was to align human geography with the social sci ences rather than the arts, and to increase its respectability as an intellectual discipline. He also related changes in the discipline to Kuhn’s concept of paradigms and paradigm shift. Most fundamentally of all, he introduced ideas, concepts, and readings from a wide range of other dis ciplines, starting the outward looking tradition that is ar guably one of geography’s greatest strengths today. For example, another very inﬂuential book, Locational Analysis in Human Geography, developed a completely new approach to human geography, organized not by region or by systematic subﬁeld, but by geometric form, typiﬁed by the chapter headings – ‘Movement’, ‘Networks’, ‘Nodes’, ‘Hierarchies’, and ‘Surfaces’. It introduced to geography a whole range of new topics and new methods, including the work of a few hitherto little known geographers, such as Christaller and Ha¨gerstrand, and many economists, such as Weber, Losch, and Isard, together with engineers, systems theorists, and philosophers of science. An ex panded second edition was produced in 1977. Network Analysis in Geography, another publication with Chorley, discussed networks in both human and physical

geography. Types of networks studied included transport networks and river systems, though the book used a classiﬁcation based on geometric form, similar to the one in Locational Analysis. Part of the agenda for this book was an attempt to ﬁnd a common ground between human and physical geography. At a time when it was no longer viable to argue that the natural environment controlled the human response, Haggett hoped that the use of similar spatial structures and models would give human and physical geography some common methodological concerns. In all these books, Haggett adopted an abstract ap proach, using mathematical, statistical, and cartographic methods to tackle a wide range of examples from all over the world. His role as a contributing editor to Geographical Analysis and Environment and Planning A also allowed him to oversee and encourage the development of quantita tive and applied work in the discipline, while his role as co founder of Progress in Geography (later Progress in Human Geography and Progress in Physical Geography) underlines his enthusiasm to develop an integrative ap proach to geography. In 1972, Haggett reached out to a new audience by publishing an introductory textbook Geography: A Modern Synthesis. Widely adopted in Britain, North America, and elsewhere (being translated into six languages, including Russian in 1979 – a rarity in Soviet times), it was less revolutionary than his other books, though some of the models discussed in Locational Analysis make another ap pearance. Haggett was keen to uphold the unity of geography at a time when many human geographers were turning their backs on physical geography (and vice versa). Even so, the physical geography in the book only extends to sections on ‘The environmental challenge’ and ‘Man’s ecological response’, with no geomorphology. Many of Haggett’s ideas ﬁltered through to school geography, especially in Britain, through this text. His use of the beach as a focus for explaining many of what he regarded as basic geographical concepts gave the book a thought provoking start, although the attempt to introduce the G scale as a way of expressing a variety of spatial scales has been unsuccessful in the longer term. In his later career, Haggett became interested in medical geography. He had long been interested in Ha¨gerstrand’s work on geographical diffusion, and in modeling economic changes at the local level, and he began to think about applying these ideas to the diffusion of infectious diseases. Much of his work on this topic has been done with colleagues, especially Andrew Cliff. On the basis of models of spatial diffusion, he developed new models appropriate for particular diseases and particular study areas, involving considerable conceptual and mathematical development. Much of his most interesting work has been based on the study of relatively small and isolated areas, such as Cornwall and Iceland. By careful

Haggett, P.

choice of disease and study area, he was able to ﬁnd out a great deal about the spread of infectious diseases, in cluding the ability to predict the return time and pro portion of population likely to be infected. With collaborators, he produced an Atlas of Disease Distributions and more recently The International Atlas of AIDS. He has also acted as a consultant to many scientiﬁc and medical bodies, including the World Health Organization. In The Geographical Structure of Epidemics, Haggett provides an excellent and well written discussion of the major themes of his work in this ﬁeld. Although much of his work has established the spatiotemporal characteristics of epi demics in small and relatively closed geographical areas, he has developed an interest in processes operating at a global scale over a long time period. He has also studied ways in which the spread of epidemics can be controlled. With Cliff et al., Haggett also studied space–time diffusion in economic systems, such as spatiotemporal changes in unemployment. His work thus stressed the practical uses of such models, with his work on the de velopment and application of spatial forecasting proving particularly inﬂuential in this regard. His applied work on spatial forecasting models, epidemiology, and rural ser vices underlined the promise and potential of spatial scientiﬁc modeling in human geography. Nevertheless, he maintained interests in many branches of the subject; indeed, Chorley described him as ‘‘a quantitative, re gional, historical, and economic geographer with bio geographical interests.’’ Haggett has been a great innovator in British human geography. His work was one of the main foundations of the deﬁnition of geography as spatial science. His adop tion of the scientiﬁc method, later pilloried as an example of positivist reductionism, was also seminal for a gener ation of geographers in Britain and elsewhere. Both no tions were poorly received by establishment geography at the time (e.g., David Stoddart provides an account of the hostile reception given to Haggett’s 1964 Royal Geo graphical Society lecture presenting a statistical model for the distribution of forest cover in Brazil). However, Haggett’s ideas were ultimately to achieve acceptance, especially among the younger generation of scholars (an unusually numerous group because the British university system was expanding rapidly at the time). Peter Taylor latterly provided an interesting perspective on the quantitative revolution, arguing that the shift of paradigm was aided by the use of language which was difﬁcult for an older generation to come to terms with (certainly true of statistical arguments) but not too difﬁcult for the younger ones to master. Similar claims may subsequently be lodged with respect to Marxist, phenomenologist, and postmodern approaches to geography, all of which have been presented in language that quantiﬁers, now the older generation, have found difﬁcult to follow.

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How did Peter Haggett manage to transform his dis cipline so quickly and so effectively? Partly because the need for change was increasingly obvious, especially to younger geographers. But the speed and success of the quantitative revolution, particularly in Britain, owed much to Haggett personally. One contributory factor may have been the breadth of his reading. Reference lists for his books and journal articles in the 1960s are full of up to date material from several other academic subjects, showing how good he was at keeping up an intelligent interest in many areas and at working out how their theories, concepts, and methods could be applied to human geography. These reference lists might also yield treasures from little known geographical journals and working papers, which Haggett found, explained, and popularized. Second, Haggett is a great synthesizer. Locational Anal ysis in Human Geography is a brilliant synthesis of lots of other studies, from geography and elsewhere, all ﬁtted into the geometric classiﬁcation of movement, networks, nodes, hierarchies, and surfaces – so the whole becomes much more than the sum of the parts. The Geographer’s Art is also a kind of synthesis, bringing together some of the same material organized in a more personal way. Of course, his textbook presents a synthesis of geography, whether ‘modern’ (in earlier editions) or ‘global’ (in later editions). Third, Haggett is an excellent communicator, both on paper and in the lecture room. Throughout his work, he has managed to make complicated or technical material accessible to students and colleagues. He makes extensive and effective use of diagrams and maps, which do not just illustrate his argument but also are a massive aid to understanding. As a speaker, he also makes copious use of visual aids. With or without their help, he has the ability to make difﬁcult concepts and analysis crystal clear. His own enthusiasm for his subject was transmitted to gen erations of students. Lastly, Haggett’s own personality may have been relevant. He is quiet and unassuming; at conference dinners, he is as happy chatting to unknown graduate students as much as to senior professors. Although early presentations of his quantitative work annoyed and threatened the traditionalists in his audience, he stuck to his guns and persevered until he had convinced a critical mass of colleagues and students. His calm, clear, and nonconfrontational manner must have helped in gaining acceptance or at least tolerance for his work. Even those who disliked his work must have found it hard to dislike the man. Yet, while positivism and spatial science dominated Anglo American human geography in the 1970s, criti cisms of positivism and quantiﬁcation began to emerge before too long. Such criticisms came from two main quarters. First, an increasingly vocal group of Marxist

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geographers, augmented by some of Haggett’s earlier followers, such as David Harvey, Allen Scott, and Peter Taylor, gained impetus from the wider critique of cap italism, the military–industrial complex, and the Vietnam War. Their belief that unobservable structures provide the basis of social and spatial formations, and their dedication to dialectic reasoning rather than scientiﬁc method, illustrates that they were signiﬁcantly opposed to the particular positivist tradition that Haggett had brought into geography. A second group of humanistic geographers also reacted against the abstract models Haggett had made fashionable in geography, stressing the importance of artistic, cultural, and historical insights into the nature of place, showing up the limitations of idealized models (such as the notion of ‘economic man’) which under pinned some attempts at modeling in human geography (e.g., in housing models, retailing catchment analyses, and migration analyses). The deﬁnition of geography as spatial science also came under attack at the same period. One element of this attack was from geographers whose interests did not lie in this area. These included people interested in the traditional geographical concern of the relationships between people and environment, and others interested in development studies grounded in speciﬁc places and their experiences. For some, the concerns of spatial sci ence seemed unimportant compared to other disciplines. More philosophically grounded objections appeared, such as Sack’s rejection of the idea that space could be a subject of study in itself. Both Marxists and humanists, not to mention feminists and postmodernists, tended to reject or at least play down the spatial perspective, either because it was unimportant in their view to the major social trends or because abstract models of spatial structure did not apply to the real people and events they were interested in. Haggett’s ideas, however, are far from dead. Geog raphy has opened itself up to other subjects and is much the better for it. Thus, Haggett may have managed to get us to engage with work in economics and operations research, while other geographers introduce us to themes in history, philosophy, and literary theory. There have also been cases where work in geography has itself had a major impact on other subjects, such as the interest across the social sciences in David Harvey’s work and Giddens’ interest in Ha¨gerstrand’s time geography. Despite the unfashionability of modeling, quantiﬁ cation, and positivism for the last two decades, work of this kind continues to ﬂourish, arguably being returned to prominence by the growth of Geographic Information

Systems (GIS), geodemographics, and spatial compu tation in the 1990s. Similarly, locational analysis remains as an important interest in contemporary human geog raphy, if only because there are many applications to commercial and public location problems. The role of space as a concept in geography has also revived in re cent years, based on the attention given to how space is constructed by social groups, and how space affects or mediates social relations and processes. Haggett himself, while unfailingly polite and respectful of the work done under new paradigms, remains consistent in his interests and approaches, and continues to be an enthusiastic and effective advocate of his ideas. Given the range and scope of Haggett’s academic and professional achievements, a short article like this can do little more than give a ﬂavor of Haggett’s contributions. Fortunately, two books have appeared which give far more information about his biography and geographical concerns. Haggett himself produced a memoir, The Geographer’s Art, intended to convey his approach to, and passion for, the subject. A few years later, Cliff et al., produced a Festschrift, which includes papers by leading geographers on most of Haggett’s major interests, and more personal memoirs by Chorley and Thrift. Both testify to the range of Haggett’s contributions to the discipline, his role as leader and mentor, and his enduring legacy as a leader of geography’s ‘quantitative revolution’. See also: Quantitative Methodologies; Quantitative Revolution; Spatial Science.

Further Reading Chorley, R. J. (1995). Haggett’s Cambridge: 1957 1966. In Cliff, A. D., Gould, P. R., Hoare, A. G. & Thrift, N. J. (eds.) Diffusing Geography: Essays for Peter Haggett, pp 355 374. Oxford: Blackwell. Chorley, R. J. and Haggett, P. (eds.) (1965). Frontiers in Geographical Teaching. London: Methuen. Chorley, R. J. and Haggett, P. (eds.) (1967). Models in Geography. London: Methuen. Cliff, A. D., Gould, P. R., Hoare, A. G. and Thrift, N. J. (eds.) (1995). Diffusing Geography: Essays for Peter Haggett. Oxford: Blackwell. Haggett, P. (1965). Locational Analysis in Human Geography. London: Arnold. Haggett, P. (1990). The Geographer’s Art. Oxford: Blackwell. Haggett, P. (2000). The Geographical Structure of Epidemics. Oxford: Clarendon. Haggett, P. (2001). Geography: A Global Synthesis. Harlow: Prentice Hall. Haggett, P. and Chorley, R. J. (1969). Network Analysis in Geography. London: Arnold. Thrift, N. J. (1995). Peter Haggett’s life in geography. In Cliff, A. D., Gould, P. R., Hoare, A. G. & Thrift, N. J. (eds.) Diffusing Geography: Essays for Peter Haggett, pp 375 395. Oxford: Blackwell.

Haptic or Touch-Based Knowledge R. D. Jacobson, University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Cognition The decision-making process of interpreting sensory information that involves remembering, recognition, association, and other highorder mental processes. Cutaneous Pertaining to the skin itself or the skin as a sensory organ, including sensations of pressure, temperature, and pain. Force Feedback The mechanical generation of haptic information used and sensed by the human kinesthic system, speciﬁcally in human–computer interaction. Haptics Relating to the sense of touch, in all forms and in its widest context. Kinesthesia It is the sense of movement through space, relating to the sensations originating in muscles, tendons, and joints. Perception The reception of information as mediated by the senses, facilitating a relationship with the world, and subsequent decision-making processes (cognition). Proprioception It is the awareness of our body’s position in space, sensory information about the state of the body, including cutaneous, vestibular, and kinesthic sensations. Tactile Relating to touch and the cutaneous skin sense, more speciﬁcally pressure rather than temperature or pain. Tactile Map A cartographic representation that is designed and constructed to be read via the sense of touch, requiring the display to be elevated in the third dimension.

Introduction Haptics is a term relating to touch, and active touch in its widest context, and how we are able to gain information about objects by manipulating them. Haptic perception involves the sensing of the movement and position of joints, limbs, and ﬁngers, and also the sensing of infor mation through the skin. The word ‘haptics’ is derived from the Greek term haptikos, from haptesthai, meaning ‘to grasp, touch, or perceive’, which is equivalent to hap(tein) to grasp, sense, or perceive. Touch is generally regarded as the most proximal of all senses available for acquiring geographic knowledge, the only exception being the sensation of taste. Touch is a binary sense, in the manner that you are either in contact

with an object or not, on or off. However, it is possible to feel a local spatial extension to this requirement for contact, to feel radiant heat, or the deep bass of heavy rock music. Just as there are extensions to other senses, to enhance them, for example, the telescope for vision, there are similar analogies of an extension in touch based sensation. These would include feeling the surface of paper through a pencil, or the undulations of a sidewalk via pushing a child in a stroller, and the proxy sensations of the road surface experienced when driving. Repre sentations of geographic information can also be pre sented in analog and digital interfaces to be explored via touch. Touch can be regarded as a mechanism to gaining geospatial knowledge about the environment from proximal information, things that we are able to touch directly, via these local extensions to touch, and through models and representations of geographic space that are designed to be experienced and interacted with through touch. This would include tactile maps, three dimensional models, and touch based representations in virtual reconstructions that can be interacted with through touch and through force feedback in haptic based virtual reality simulations. Touch is unique among the senses and that is both an input and output modality. We are able to receive in formation such as heat and pressure, and also to com municate information. Although the spatial realm of touch may appear to be small, conﬁned to areas around the body, it is a key sensory modality we use when generating spatial knowledge. To paraphrase the phil osopher Bertrand Russell, it is touch that provides us with our sense of reality, our whole conception of what exists outside us, is based upon our sense of touch. Touch is used in environmental navigation; we are able to make use of multiple kinds of touch based in formation, involved in walking, surface texture underfoot, and the sensations of inclines when walking uphill. Our stride changes in response to the surface of the en vironment, when it is icy, or snow covered, soft, or hard. Touch is a particularly resilient sense; in spite of its central importance, it is often taken for granted due to being superseded by vision, its role is often unnoticed. Although recently, touch has been used to perceive or represent reality, which previously was thought to be only accessible via vision or audition, through techno logical innovation in presenting information via vibra tion, facilitating reading, speech signals, pictures, maps, and music.

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Haptic or Touch-Based Knowledge

The Role of Touch-Based Knowledge in Geography We all generate internal constructs of our everyday and foreign geographic environments through a multitude of information sources. The role of touch with regard to generating geographic understanding requires a broad overview with details from physiology to matters of communication, cognition, and representation. Our per ception of the world is mediated through cognition, prior experience, and cultural constraints. This internal con struct is a mix of location based information, and the beliefs, attitudes, thoughts, and feelings associated with those locations. Sight is a privileged sense in gaining this information. Perception occurs only when a chain of events is complete. Seeing starts with an object in an environment and runs through the actions of an observer in the environment, and the object providing light to the retina reﬂected from a few luminous sources in the en vironment. With touch, the object provides resistance to the senses under manipulation, such as compression. The actions of the observer, in the case of vision, include adjustments of the eye and changes in the vantage point to gain more information about the object. The actions of the observer, in the case of touch, include adjustments of the hands to explore the object tactually. Touch also integrates movement as an exploration strategy. As the individual continues to explore the object, gaining more information about the object, and through movement between the object and the observers’ actions, come many sensory links to complete this chain of events. Geographic Learning The senses are geographical in the way that they facili tate and contribute to an understanding and orientation in space, either from direct environmental perception or from representations such as maps and models. The senses provide a common framework through which space and time are experienced and understood, that is, made sense of. Each sensory modality and combination of modalities have their own geographic scale range, and also the multisensory nature of interacting within a geographic environment means that experiences vary not only across space and time, between different individuals and groups, but also between cultures. Certain contexts may then lead to the role of the sense and sensation in culturally deﬁning and establishing geographic meaning. Haptic relationships are established between an in dividual and one’s environment. The relationship alters as distance is introduced, moving from communication in the most proximal to exploration, simple contact, contact via a proxy, the vibrations of a car to sense the underlying road surface, and then to separation. Much geographic learning takes place through representations of

environments, maps, and models; here, touch is able to mediate information that we could not normally grasp, such as tactile maps of the world, just as vision is used to represent information beyond our immediate sensory scope. Geographic Knowledge Construction Acquiring information from the environment or a rep resentation such as a map vision is the spatial sense par excellence, yet touch has a pivotal role in formulating our understanding of the world. Cognitive scientists, linguists, and developmental psychologists have stressed the cen tral and important foundations that touch and object manipulation play a role in facilitating our understanding of complex spatial arrangements. This early manipulation allows us to generate the cognitive foundations that are later described in language, and formally in logic and Boolean mathematics. This understanding is at the core of data manipulation in geographic information systems (GISs). The importance of touch and its centrality to our ways of thinking are illustrated in language: ‘having a good grasp’ of the subject, or ‘having a good feel’ for a complex dataset, we are able ‘to hold an idea’ hint at the power of our haptic senses for comprehending the real world. They feed our consciousness and subconscious in ways that are deep and not fully understood.

Key Components of Touch Touch is superior in some aspects of perception and functions very differently from the visual system. It is able to discern very ﬁne surface texture changes, grit in surfaces, hardness or softness, and many of these func tions are complimented via hearing or seeing information about the same objects. The potential properties of the surroundings accessed through touch do not shout at us like colors in the visual system, they are muted until we interact with them. The information gained via touch, such as viscosity, slipperiness, softness, texture, and elasticity, are so complex that they defy any ordinary language categorizing schemes. Touching is a combination of information gained from the tactile sense through the skin (cutaneous), through movement (kinesthesia), and an awareness of our body’s position in space (proprioception). During passive touch, neither the skin nor the object moves; at other times, we remain stationary as objects move past us, and during active touch an observer moves and manipulates an ob ject to gain additional insight into the properties of an object. There is intentionality in movement; different strategies are adopted, such as scanning left to right, then top to bottom, when investigating a tactile map. With new technology, objects can be moved with ﬁngers, or guided to a location in a touch interface.

Haptic or Touch-Based Knowledge

A classic illustration of the efﬁcacy of touch is the Braille system, originally developed as a system for military communication in darkness, now internationally adopted as a touch based reading mechanism for blind individuals. Raised dots in a 2 3 array are used to represent the alphabet and contractions of words. As objects are explored, we are able to explore properties through examination of the surface, the object volume, and immersion inside the object. Through this, we able to obtain information on geometry, material, location, energy, texture, spatial location, shape, extent, orientation, curvature, proportions, projections, size, symmetry, complexity, and ridges.

Social and Cultural Constructs of Touch Touch has a signiﬁcant affective and sensuous component, such as pain and pleasure; we are able to readily feel the important attributes of an object, such as hot or cold, soft or hard, rough or smooth, and many spatial attributes. Components of touch are ﬁltered via social and cultural processes, affecting our interpretations at the fundamental levels of cognition and perception. The legitimacy and importance we ascribe to this information is too culturally mediated, as are societal norms of tactile interaction, such as shaking hands, kissing on the cheek, when greeting, and notions of necessary and acceptable personal space. Touch is mediated by psychophysics – there are certain properties, thresholds, distances, beyond which we cannot sense, individual differences in our perceptual abilities (psychophysics), and of our memory and cog nitive interpretations. There is a negotiated reality where an individual has a common or similar sensory repre sentations of the world that we all share, such as social and cultural norms, of acceptable differences, and sen sations. Perception is shared, social, and our senses or responses to them may be learnt and provide a sensory ﬁlter to reality. Seeing may be believing, but feeling provides the truth. We are able to get to know things in the world through touch, rather than encountering them at a distance through an abstracted visual system.

How Touch Relates to Other Sensory Modalities The mechanisms by which touch relates to and mediates other senses are not entirely clear. Due to the ocular centric bias in the making and framing of knowledge through science, where ‘seeing’ is equated with ‘knowing’ touch is often viewed as more primitive and less im portant than vision. Historically, touch was at times re garded as dominant over vision and audition, the role of sculptors in art and the recreation of scenes, for example. Touch remains dominant in the proof of the existence of

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an object, for example, a dream, mirage, or hallucination is often sought validation via touch. During sensory il lusions, touch is often used to calibrate and verify other senses. While rowing, as an oar enters the water the re fraction of light leads to the appearance of a bent oar, yet touch conﬁrms that it is straight. Multisensory Integration There has been a long historical debate as to relation ships between different sensory modalities. Are we able to obtain the same information about geographic objects and events from vision and via touch? How does the nature of the information differ? Once we have received the information through perception and processed it through cognition, does it reside in modality speciﬁc memory that can be translated to different senses for communication? Or are originally separate, modality speciﬁc pieces of information retained in a central amodal core, independent of their sensory derivation? There are several frameworks proposed as to how the senses are able to combine, interact, and integrate. These are becoming increasingly important with the advent of novel technologies to move information from one sensory method of representation to another in multimodal computer interfaces. If sensory modalities are able to cooperate, here information is combined to be greater than the sum of its parts, substituted from one sense to another, augmented, and conﬂicts between the senses resolved. In a hierarchical framework, not all senses are equal, vision often dominates, for example. However, this varies by task, object manipulation through touch may exceed the information provided by visually surveying the object. Sequencing or an ordering of the senses offers an alternative framework, developmentally; in early in fancy, the importance of sensory information is ordered as tactile, auditory, and then visual; by adulthood, this se quence is reversed. Clearly, there are thresholds not only of stimulation for different senses based upon the psy chophysics of the sense, but also of individual differences, habituation, and the meaning and importance we ascribe, for example, esthetically to the sensory information. Certain types of information from the geographic environment are sensory speciﬁc, listening to ambient sounds, trafﬁc noise, and smelling pollution. When translating from one medium or modality to another, there is a degree of information loss (and selection classiﬁcation, etc., akin to cartography). The information gained from viewing a scene is different from using spatial language to describe the scene.

Touch-Based Representations Multiple geographic representations are accessed through touch. There are touch based (tactile and relief) maps

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designed to be read by touch, and complex virtual displays of geographic information where haptic interfaces are used to communicate spatial information. In conventional human–computer interactions with geospatial information, in a GIS, for example, employing the windows, icons, menus, and pointers (WIMPs) interface touch remains a pivotal mechanism through our manipulation of keyboards and computer mice. When touch is used in the absence of vision, there are notable differences in gathering information from a map like display. Typically, touch based information is ob tained sequentially, with a more limited ‘ﬁeld of view’. Vision is able to provide a gestalt like view of infor mation, allowing the perception of the synoptic whole and almost simultaneously its constituent parts. In static, analog, touch based systems such as a tactile map, while the ﬁngertips provide a good sensitivity to information, its shape, and spatial context in the scene, it remains a challenge to communicate contextual information. A tactile map reader may well be able to discern the outline shape of a circle, however, the context may remain un clear. Is the circle a globe, a symbol for a city, or a geometry diagram? Cartographers have developed mapping methods that incorporate single as well as multisensory input. Most commonly, the sensory input channels include visual, auditory, and haptic. Tactile maps are representations of space and are designed to be interpreted through touch. Tactile maps may be produced for the single sensory input method (touch) or may include a combination: tactile/visual such as a raised relief map, or tactile/audio and touch augmented with sound and speech. Tangible Models These are three dimensional models used for repre senting geographic environments. Simple versions in clude those using papier mache, blocks, cardboard, and so forth to represent buildings, educational campuses, cities, and other spatial concepts. Complex three dimensional models are generated to illustrate the terrain of an area and other geographic processes such as geo logic activity. Tactile Maps Tactile maps are the geographer’s traditional way of providing information to blind or visually impaired people and to all those who may have visual difﬁculties. The map is designed and constructed to be read by the sense of touch, requiring portions be elevated in the third dimension. Tactile maps and graphics are produced in a variety of forms. Reproducible tactile maps may be cre ated from molds, or by a pressing procedure using ma chines that might otherwise be used to make molds or metal plates used in the printing industry. Computer

production of tactile map has also made it possible to design, produce, and reproduce tactile maps. Maps can be printed directly from the computer through specially designed printers, such as an embosser or an inkjet that deposits polymer inks to controlled and varying heights onto a plastic substrate. Audio-Tactile Maps A combined tactile/auditory representation of geo graphic space is created by overlaying a tactile repre sentation on a touch sensitive pad attached to a personal computer (PC) or laptop. For any particular tactile graphic, key information about places on the graphic were located by keyboard input to the grid location at which it could be found when the tactile representation was placed on the touchpad. This facilitates access to tactile maps and graphics in a way not previously possible. Through fur ther manipulation, spatial relations such as distance, direction, connectivity, and conﬁguration could be ob tained by exploring the totality of the constructed system. This methodology allows an individual to get a direct touching experience of the phenomena being explored, while simultaneously accessing localized auditory infor mation tied to speciﬁc locations and activated when these locations are touched. Virtual and Haptic Interfaces to Geographic Information In human–computer interaction, a haptic device gives people a sense of touch with computer generated environments, so that when virtual objects are touched, they seem real and tangible. An example is a medical training simulator in which a user can feel a needle push through virtual tissue. Haptics is applicable across nearly all areas of computing, including video games, medical training, scientiﬁc and geographic visualization, engin eering design, remote vehicle and robot control, art, medical rehabilitation, and interfaces for the blind. The majority of haptic interfaces utilize force feed back, a user can feel forces applied to a user’s body by the movements of a haptic device, sensed by the user pri marily through musculoskeletal forces, and also through the skin that touches the physical interface to a haptic device. This is often accomplished through a user’s hand grasping a handle connected within the device to motors that generate the force and 2D haptic devices such as force feedback steering wheels and force feedback joy sticks. Vibrating motors are applied within something that is held (e.g., a game controller or a force feedback mouse). Tactile feedback is used to apply forces directly to the skin to provide a sensation of texture, or a change in temperature.

Haptic or Touch-Based Knowledge

Haptic devices have varying complexities, levels of engineering, ﬁdelity and cost, and can move in different ways. Force feedback devices are often described by their degrees of freedom (DOF). A DOF refers to a direction of movement. Common DOFs include right–left move ment (X), up–down movement (Y), forward–backward movement (Z), roll (rotation about the Z axis), pitch (rotation about the X axis), and yaw (rotation about the Y axis). The utility of haptic interfaces with geographic in formation has been explored to mitigate the effects of distance; remote users are able to interact; telepresence is used to manipulate objects at a remote or safe distance, such as nuclear operations, and undersea exploration. Several international groups of researchers are de veloping haptic interfaces to geographic information for blind and vision impaired users. The development of multisensory interfaces of par allel and complimentary information provides and pro motes ‘universal access’ through combinations of speech, sound maps, and haptic (force feedback) computer based interfaces. This facilitates access for those without vision, who need ways of exploring spatial information through maps, diagrams, and graphs that are central to education; promotes novel ways of augmenting visual displays; en ables the exploring and mining of spatial data, and other hidden properties such as uncertainty; and enhances navigation through spatial information where vision is restricted, such as within vehicle navigation systems, and hazardous environments encountered while ﬁreﬁghting. This multisensory approach can be directed to develop solutions to provide access to digital, spatial based in formation for novice and expert users, for the young and old, for people with sensory impairments, and in situ ations where vision based displays may not be optimal, due to limited screen size on mobile telephones and portable data assistants.

Future of Haptic Geographies The role of touch and haptics is increasingly important to human geography for its power to represent infor mation, connect people separated by distance, and im prove the quality of interaction and immersion with media used to represent geographic information. In sensory combinations in multimodal interfaces, the role of haptics continues to grow. It has expanded from in dustrial, military, medical and research labs to the desktop, and is now being widely disseminated in gaming systems and telephones. Researchers have been striving to develop map and information systems that are accessible to a wide range of individuals, irrespective of their skill levels, age, or sensory impairments.

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Geography has historically been predominantly visual in nature. With the emergence of haptic technologies, opportunities for exploring the role and importance of touch are increasing. The blending of the virtual and real world through representations, immersive scenarios, online communities, social networking, web mapping, and location based services are likely to lead to an in creased focus on the role of touch and presence in geography for many years to come. See also: Intermodality; Landscape Perception; Learning Regions; Map Interactivity; Map Perception and Cognition; Mental Maps; Representation and Representation; Simulation.

Further Reading Burdea, G. C. (1996). Force and Touch Feedback for Virtual Reality. Chichester: Wiley. Fisher, P. and Unwin, D. (eds.) (2002). Virtual Reality in Geography. London: Taylor and Francis. Goldstein, E. B. (2007). Sensation and Perception. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth. Golledge, R. G., Rice, M. and Jacobson, R. D. (2005). A commentary on the use of touch for accessing on screen spatial representations: The process of experiencing haptic maps and graphics. The Professional Geographer 57(3), 339 349. Golledge, R. G., Rice, M. and Jacobson, R. D. (2006). Multimodal interfaces for representing and accessing geospatial information. In Rana, S. & Sharma, J. (eds.) Frontiers of Geographic Information Technology, pp 181 208. Berlin: Springer Verlag. Hatwell, Y., Steri, A. and Gentaz, E. (eds.) (2003). Touching for Knowing: Cognitive Psychology of Haptic Manual Perception. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Heller, M. A. and Schiff, W. (1991). The Psychology of Touch. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Jacobson, R. D., Kitchin, R. M. and Golledge, R. G. (2002). Multimodal virtual reality for presenting geographic information. In Fisher, P. & Unwin, D. (eds.) Virtual Reality in Geography, pp 382 400. London: Taylor and Francis. Katz, D. and Krueger, L. E. (1989). The World of Touch. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Kennedy, J. M. (1993). Drawing and the Blind: Pictures to Touch. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Nathaniel, I. and Durlach, A. S. (eds.) (1995). Virtual Reality: Scientiﬁc and Technological Challenges. Washington, DC: National Academies Press. Rice, M., Jacobson, R. D., Golledge, R. G. and Jones, D. (2005). Design considerations for haptic and auditory map interfaces. Cartography and Geographic Information Science 32(4), 381 391. Rodaway, P. (1994). Sensuous Geographies: Body, Sense and Place. London: Routledge. Schiff, W. and Foulke, E. (1982). Tactual Perception: A Sourcebook. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Relevant Websites http://www.ggy.bris.ac.uk Haptic Spaces: How spatial cognition, the way we process and negotiate space, is mediated by touch, University of Bristol. http://haptic.mech.northwestern.edu Haptics Community website.

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Haptic or Touch-Based Knowledge

http://www.haptics e.org Haptics e: The electronic journal of haptics research. http://www.immerse.ucalgary.ca Investigating Multimodal Representations of Spatial Environments (Immerse) Lab, Ongoing research and developments in touch and haptic interfaces to geographic information.

http://touchlab.mit.edu Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) touch lab. http://www.cim.mcgill.ca McGill University Haptics Lab. http://www.sensable.com Sensable Technologies: Haptic technology hardware and software.

Harley, J. B. N. Collins-Kreiner, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Cartography It is the science that deals with the principles, construction, and use of maps (in Greek chartis=map and graphein=write).

Harley was one of the most inﬂuential and remarkable ﬁgures in the recent history of cartography. Harley began research in the Department of Geography at the University of Birmingham in 1956 under the late Professor Harry Thorpe. The subject (predictably, at that point in Thorpe’s own work) was the historical geography of medieval Warwickshire, with its contrasting regions of Arden and Feldon. It was from this that he developed his interest in maps, mapmaking, the meaning of maps, and their cultural signiﬁcance. Later on in his career he taught and conducted research at the Universities of Liverpool and Exeter where he was promoted to the Monteﬁore Readership in geography. In 1986 Harley moved to a chair in the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee and became director of the American Geo graphical Society’s map collection (Figure 1). Brian Harley produced approximately 150 publi cations, embracing many aspects of mapping. But above all he is known for a series of important methodological and epistemological papers on the nature of maps. He co edited (with David Woodward) in 1987 and 1992 the ﬁrst two volumes of The History of Cartography www. geography.wisc.edu/histcart, an unprecedented survey of the development of cartography both as a science and an art, which demonstrated the value of maps for societies worldwide. However, perhaps the most famous of Harley’s theoretical statements is ‘‘Deconstructing the Map’’ (Cartographica 26, no. 2, 1989: 1–20). It establishes modern maps as representations of life, with Harley claiming that studying the meaning of maps should go beyond the geographical and topographic features to excavate ‘‘an alternative meaning’’ which has been neglected in current literature, since maps are a product not only of ‘‘the laws of alternative order’’ but also of ‘‘the norms and values of social tradition and order’’ (Harley, 1992: 232). His research dealt with a new vocabulary in car tography and in the use of concepts which until then were rarely heard in this context, such as status, gender, race, ideology, power, knowledge, myths, images, and rites.

Harley’s particular interest was thus to criticize modern academic cartography more than to reﬂect on cartographic history. A crucial component of this article is the issue of how a mapmaker might act ethically, given the power relations inherent in the profession. One of his objectives was to suggest that an alternative epistemology, rooted in social theory rather than in scientiﬁc positivism, was more required if geographers were to reestablish cartography within a critical human geography. He therefore ‘deconstructed’ and critiqued many of the fundamental assumptions underpinning cartography, and reconceptualized cartography as implicated in pro cesses of social and cultural reproduction. He also discussed the dualisms that have structured our under standing of the history of cartography, so that, for ex ample, maps are described as either reﬂecting ‘ground truth’ or are dismissed as subjective, distorted, and biased. This ‘discourse of opposites’ is based on a series of as sumed dualisms, such as art/science, inaccurate/accurate, and subjective/objective. Harley argued that the uncritical acceptance of such dualisms is detrimental to a viable history of cartography, and that the historical origins of such dualisms should be carefully examined. Uncritical reliance on the simple dualism of true or false, or art and science may thus limit our ability to make sense of what cartography has been and what it is becoming. This was necessary in order to sever the scientiﬁc connection be tween ‘reality’ and its presentation, which dominated cartographic thought, and to present a new epistemology in which maps are seen as socially constructed. The ﬁeld of the history of cartography has been transformed in the past decades, largely because of Harley’s research. A map has been traditionally deﬁned by geographers as implying a certain level of physical correspondence. A new deﬁnition was formulated by Harley: maps were no longer a ‘‘representation of things in space’’ but ‘‘graphic representations that facilitate a spatial understanding of things, concepts, conditions, processes, or events in the human world’’ (Harley and Woodward, 1992). This deﬁnition changes one’s view of maps as objective representations of physical space to human documents with all their attendant biases and failings. Hence, such artifacts as diagrams of imaginary cosmographies, landscape paintings, and ‘mental maps’ may now be considered maps, amenable to decon struction and critical interrogation. Harley died when his career was still in its ascendancy but his publications will continue to be inﬂuential for many decades.

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Harley, J. B.

See also: Critical Cartography; Deconstruction; Historical Geography; Maps; Mapping, Philosophy.

Further Reading Harley, J. B. (1986). Imago Mundi: The ﬁrst ﬁfty years and the next ten. Cartographica 23(3), 1 15. Harley, J. B. (1987). Maps, knowledge, and power. In Cosgrove, D. & Daniels, S. (eds.) The Iconography of the Landscape: Essays on the Symbolic Representation, Design and Use of Past Environments, pp 277 312. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Harley, J. B. (1988). Silences and secrecy: The hidden agenda of cartography in early modern Europe. Imago Mundi 40, 57 76. Harley, J. B. (1989). Deconstructing the map. Cartographica 26(2), 1 20. Harley, J. B. (1989). Historical geography and the cartographic illusion. Journal of Historical Geography 15, 80 91. Harley, J. B. (1989). The myth of the divide: Art, science, and text in the history of cartography. Paper presented at the 13th International Conference on the History of Cartography, Amsterdam.

Harley, J. B. (1992). Deconstructing the map. In Barnes, T. J. & Duncan, J. S. (eds.) Writing Worlds: Discourse, Text and Metaphor in the Representation of Landscape, pp 231 247. London: P. Routledge. Harley, J. B. (1997). Power and legitimation in the English geographical atlases of the eighteenth century. In Wolter, J. A. & Grim, R. E. (eds.) Images of the World: The Atlas through History, pp 161 204. New York: McGraw Hill for the Library of Congress. Harley, J. B. and Woodward, D. (eds.) (1987). The History of Cartography, Vol. 1: Cartography in Prehistoric, Ancient, and Medieval Europe and the Mediterranean. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Harley, J. B. and Woodward, D. (1989). Why cartography needs its history. The American Cartographer 16, 5 15. Harley, J. B. and Woodward, D. (1992). The History of Cartography, Vol. 2 (pt 1): Cartography in the Traditional Islamic and South Asian Societies. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Relevant Websites http://www.geography.wisc.edu/histcart The History of Cartography Project.

Hartshorne, R. F. Harvey, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Hartshorne, Richard (1899–1992) Richard Hartshorne was renowned as one of the key Anglo American geographers of the twentieth century. Following publication in 1939 of the classical The Nature of Geography, and having served as Chief of the geography division in the US Ofﬁce of Strategic Services during World War II, Hartshorne acquired great inﬂuence on postwar American geography, especially through his signiﬁcant impact on the development of Area Studies. His work hence became the prevalent reference for many geographers in the post–World War II era. His work remains an important milestone of twentieth century geography although widely ignored over the last 20 years. Hartshorne graduated from high school in Phoenixville, Pennsylvania, moving to Princeton where he studied mathematics and entered into a graduate program in mathematics, graduating in 1920. After becoming inter ested in the ideas of Ellsworth Huntington (1876–1947) he contacted Huntington to get his advice on pursuing the study of geography. Huntington recommended studying at Columbia, Pennsylvania, or Chicago, which had viable geography programs at the time. In 1921 he entered the University of Chicago’s geography program. At Chicago, his ﬁrst advisor was Harlan Barrows, but the impact of Charles Colby and Wellington Jones were greater inﬂuence. With Wellington Jones his exchanges developed and Jones became his thesis advisor. His dissertation was titled ‘The Lake Trafﬁc of Chicago’, for which he was awarded a doctorate (magna cum laude) in August 1924. After completing his doctoral studies, he took a pos ition at the University of Minnesota in September 1924 and remained there until 1940 when he moved to the University of Wisconsin, Madison, where he remained for the rest of his life. As a professor at both universities, Hartshorne sought to consolidate the discipline of geography in the changing academic landscape. Fulﬁlling his desire for signiﬁcant and stimulating dialog in 1925, he took part in a ﬁeld conference attended by William Morris Davis, Nevin Fenneman, Mark Jefferson, Ellsworth Huntington, Vernor Finch, and other geog raphers. He took on an early role in Midwestern geo graphic ﬁeld conferences held between 1915 and 1940, both as a regular participant and organizer of ﬁeld study projects and themes, and became a primary progenitor of the Midwestern School of Geography. Delighted with the vibrant exchanges with peers, he continued his

statistically grounded economic geographic work and started to engage with ideas in political geography. His reading of Isiah Bowman and James Fairgrieve’s work paved the way for his crucial engagement with German geographic literature. With the support of the Social Science Research Council, he was able to pursue these interests and travel to Europe in 1931–32. This stay allowed him to complete research and publish political geography papers on German/Polish boundary issues as well as economic geographic papers examining upper Silesian industry and coal and iron mining. After returning to Minnesota, his interest in political geography is evident in publications on political geography for geographers and political scientists. Key works he published on political geography included ‘Recent developments in political geography’ (1935); ‘Suggestions on the terminology of political boundaries’ (1936); and ‘The Polish corridor’ (1937). These publications emphasized literature reviews of German research and were seen as more orientated to political scientists then geographers. As his concerns with the perceived lack of theory and methods in geography grew, Hartshorne began to work on The Nature of Geography while on sabbatical in Europe in 1937 and 1938, returning with a draft manuscript. Using Harvard and Clark University libraries he con cluded the work, which Derwent Whittlesey had re viewed by Russell Whitaker. Whittlesey proposed that the manuscript be published in the Annals of the Association of American Geographers to members of the AAG’s council, which agreed. It was published in 1939. The Nature of Geography is a complex work. It began as a response to Carl Sauer and John Leighly (both at the University of California, Berkeley) and grew rapidly to reﬂect Hartshorne’s sense of uncertainty regarding the place of geography among the sciences. Carl Sauer had published his views, inﬂuenced signiﬁcantly by the German von Richthofen’s work with an emphasis on environmental change and natural process, which di verged from Hartshorne’s chorological and anthropo genic understanding of geography. John Leighly’s (1937) article claimed that no theory could be found to ‘‘bring into rational order all or a large fraction of the hetero geneous elements of the landscape.’’ Hartshorne report edly was also spurred on by Carl Sauer’s purported remark, ‘‘if you can’t see it, it isn’t geography.’’ This in cendiary comment threatened to discredit the economic and political geography Hartshorne had learned at the

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Hartshorne, R.

University of Chicago and developed in the Midwestern School’s activities. Turning to German geographic lit erature, as Sauer had done, Hartshorne sought to reﬁne and purify geographic theory and methods. A few key points about Hartshorne’s system of geo graphic thought are evident in the Nature of Geography and belie signiﬁcant differences with the German geog raphers, especially Alfred Hettner: 1. Hartshorne accepted Kantian philosophy without any examination, hence with all of the Kantian assump tions; particularly that geography was seen solely as a preparatory (propadeutic) study. Hartshorne develops the chorological ordering of phenomena as the prime function of geography, which are only a small part of Kantian geography. 2. For Hartshorne, all geographic phenomena and rela tionships are causally connected. 3. The functional parts of a single whole (world) can be understood as a system, according to Hartshorne, based on the arrangement of objects in classes. 4. Hartshorne states that Ritter’s ﬁrst principle is: geography must be based on rational principles – from philosophy – or from a priori theories of general geography. However, in the Nature of Geography Hettner and other German geographers are critical to Hartshorne as icons. John Agnew (1989) subsequently suggested Hartshorne himself used German ‘authorities’ (in particular, Hettner) to justify his arguments about the nature of geography. Through a recitation of German geographer’s arguments, Hartshorne sought to quell a perceived methodological crisis and intellectual fragmentation in American geog raphy. The copious literature review presents a treatise on geography. Hartshorne presented The Nature of Geog raphy as both a distinctly American geographic contri bution and simultaneously as a re rendering of Hettner’s publications and system of geography. As Hartshorne wrote in a letter to Hettner ‘‘My conviction that it [Nature of Geography] may be of major importance for the development of geographical thought in America is based simply on the fact that it is primarily an ex position–in considerable part by literal tradition–of your studies in this ﬁeld’’ (letter sent 26 Nov 1938 from Hartshorne in Vienna to Hettner). Hartshorne hence asserted the importance of de veloping laws and principles in sciences. Windelband and Rickert, German social scientists, distinguished between nomothetical and ideographic sciences, which, for Hartshorne, conformed approximately to the division between natural sciences and social sciences. Hartshorne saw a need for both in geography, but emphasizes the importance of elaborating general principles in geog raphy, thus, ‘‘y geography may be called a generalizing or nomothetical science.’’

Hartshorne accordingly stands out as a protagonist of the functionalist and utilitarian orientation of the Mid western School’s geography. Hartshorne sought to go be yond the application of geography and formulate its essence to assure its place among the sciences. A key part of Hartshorne’s strategy rested on his translation of German geographical discourse, particularly the work of Alfred Hettner (1859–1942); however, Hartshorne’s pre sentation remains American in its orientation and out comes. Going to Austria and Germany in the 1930s, Hartshorne already had a distinct American process orientated understanding of landscape established through the works of William Morris Davis. The inﬂuence of Wellington D. Jones at the University of Chicago is also clear in The Nature of Geography. Hartshorne was successful in his ambition to establish The Nature of Geography as the key theoretical and meth odological reference for a generation of American geographers. Hartshorne was later quite clear about the intentions of his publications. Reﬂecting on the motiv ations in 1959, he wrote that he intended to establish ‘‘logically sound structure of the nature of geography’’ and ‘‘determine the actual character of geographic work.’’ The monolithic stature of this work became the center of a number of critiques, most trenchantly formulated by Neil Smith (1989) as the ‘Museum’ of geographic thought that was out of touch with later intellectual develop ments. As other critics noted, Hartshorne produced a de historicized history. As Bernie Bauer et al., write: ‘‘Sherman severely chides Hartshorne for his prescriptive proclamations about the nature of Geography, although many took comfort in his unshakeable vision. There is a tendency for people to listen to the purveyor of ﬁne shoes and to sport the latest fashions’’ (1999: p. 776). The continuing challenge for understanding Hartshorne’s geographical thought and impact on the geography re mains, however, relating the vision to the context in which it was developed and became so prevalent. Hartshorne followed the publication of The Nature of Geography with a move to the University of Wisconsin, Madison in 1940, motivated by professional interests, conﬂicts with the chair of the department at Minnesota, and a prescription against hiring of family members at the University of Minnesota that prohibited his wife from following her academic career. In 1941, he moved to Washington, DC to work as chief of the Geography Division in what later would become the Ofﬁce of Stra tegic Surveys (OSS) under William Donovan. After hir ing the necessary personnel and acquiring equipment, he took up the work of coordinating OSS research studies. Hartshorne held a key administrative position and was responsible for overseeing the publications of inter disciplinary groups’ research activities. Although he continued his work related to the OSS after 1945, he returned to the University of Wisconsin

Hartshorne, R.

and served as Chair of the department from 1950–54, retiring in 1970. During the 30 years there, he supervised 32 masters degree students and ten PhD degree students. During the 1950s he was engaged in defending academic freedom from McCarthyism and during the 1960s con tinued his strong support for academic freedom. Following his retirement in 1970 he continued to publish, travel, and participate in meetings. The publi cations included essays on William Morris Davis and a co authored essay on Carl Ritter. He traveled on lecture tours to the United Kingdom in 1973 and Japan in 1974. Until 1989 he attended annual meetings of the Associ ation of American Geographers. Hartshorne received several awards including the ‘Outstanding Achievement’ award in 1960 from the American Geographical Society, the Charles Daly Medal (1960) award from Clark Uni versity, and the Victoria Medal from the Royal Geo graphical Society in 1984. After the death of his ﬁrst wife in 1972, he married again in 1978. He passed away at home in Madison, Wisconsin in 1992. See also: Historical Geography; Ivy League and Geography in the US.

Further Reading Agnew, J. A. (1989). Sameness and difference: Hartshorne’s, The Nature of Geography and Geography as Areal Variation. In Entrikin, J. N. & Brunn, S. D. (eds.) Reﬂections on Richard Hartshorne’s The

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Nature of Geography, pp 121 139. Washington, DC: Association of American Geographers. Barnes, T. (2006). Geographical intelligence: American geographers and research and analysis in the Ofﬁce of Strategic Services 1941 1945. Journal of Historical Geography 32, 149 168. Hartshorne, R. (1935). Recent developments in political geography. American Political Science View. Hartshorne, R. (1935). Suggestions on the terminology of political boundaries. Mitteilungen des Vereins der Geographen an der Universitat Leipzig. Hartshorne, R. (1937). The Polish corridor. Journal of Geography. Hartshorne, R. (1950). The functional approach in political geography. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 40(2), 95 130. Hartshorne, R. (1954). Comment on ‘exceptionalism in geography’. Annals of the American Association of Geographers 44, 108 109. Hartshorne, R. (1956). The Nature of Geography: A Critical Survey of Current Thought in the Light of the Past (2nd edn.). Lancaster, PA: Association of American Geographers (reprinted with corrections, 1961). Hartshorne, R. (1958). The concept of geography as a science of space, from Kant and Humboldt to Hettner. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 48(2), 97 108. Hartshorne, R. (1959). Perspective on the Nature of Geography. Chicago, IL: Rand McNalley. Harvey, F. and Wardenga, U. (2006). Richard Hartshorne’s adaptation of Alfred Hettner’s system of geography. Journal of Historical Geography 32, 422 440. Martin, G. J. (1994). Memorial to Richard Hartshorne, 1899 1992. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 84(3), 480 492. Smith, N. (1989). Geography as museum: Private history and conservative idealism in The Nature of Geography. In Entrikin, J. N. & Brunn, S. D. (eds.) Reﬂections on Richard Hartshorne’s The Nature of Geography, pp 91 120. Washington, DC: Association of American Geographers.

Harvey, D. K. Woodward, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK J. P. Jones III, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Accumulation by Dispossession Processes by which capitalist expansion is accomplished through the privatization of social spaces and services. Dialectics An analytic, ontological, historical, and political system wherein two terms interactively and processually co-determine each other, constituting a third term marking the continuous, unfolding interaction of the former two. Flexible Accumulation A post-Fordist style of accumulation that is extremely malleable in terms of: (1) the labor process (utilizing a more contingent and hence cheaper work force) and (2) economic organization (with ﬁrms that are multisectoral, more dispersed and spatially nimble, and more vertically disintegrated). Militant Particularism A term that describes disconnected and narrowly focused political mobilizations that are limited by virtue of being grounded only in the localized and relatively unique experiences or characteristics of individuals. Space–Time Compression The apparent global shrinkage of distance and speed-up of temporal relations resulting from capitalist transformations in production, distribution, and consumption, all driven by ever more far ﬂung and rapidly organized accumulation processes. Spatial Fix The tendency of capitalism to remake spaces – either in new places or in the transformation of existing ones – so as to resolve contradictions and crises generated in production and overaccumulation.

industry. That early 1960s work set the stage for a long held interest in the relations between economic processes of production and the particularities through which they unfold in local contexts and at particular points in time, the ﬁrst glimmerings of a long career devoted to the development of a historical–geographical materialism. During the 1960s, however, geography was in the throes of a so called ‘quantitative revolution’, a period characterized by the search for trans contextual spatial theories and laws, and Harvey’s major work during that period, Explanation in Geography (1969), was fully im mersed in the discipline’s recent philosophical transfor mation. Explanation represented an extended philosophico methodological exploration of geographic approaches developed in spatial science. While generally sympathetic to the movement, Explanation presented both internal and external critiques of the systems that emerge through quantitative approaches. Employing analytics borrowed from positivist philosophy of science, Harvey married a concern for mathematic complexity and exactitude with the need to develop clear ontological and epistemological conceptions of the world we interrogate. In this regard, Explanation represented an attempt to combine the 1960s dream of quantitative analysis in studies of spatial differentiation with a focus upon the theoretical underpinnings that make any methodology – but especially those of spatial science – coherent and

Harvey, David (1935–) Born in Gillingham, Kent, 1935, David Harvey (Figure 1) grew up during and immediately following World War II, and was profoundly inﬂuenced by the colliding geog raphies that war brought to the shores of Britain, and by the alternating mood of patriotism and loss of empire that followed in its wake. Harvey recounts (2001, 2002) an early fascination with contemporary and historic maps and a youthful curiosity for geology, vegetation, land use, and local architecture. His training – with all three de grees coming from Cambridge – was largely historical geographic in focus, culminating in a dissertation on changes in production in Kent’s nineteenth century hops

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Figure 1 David Harvey.

Harvey, D.

rigorous. Although dated, Explanation is profoundly rig orous and analytic, and still serves as the germinal text within which the seeds of Harvey’s mature thought can clearly be witnessed. Central among these are (1) the concern for the theoretical communication between science and philosophy, particularly as it pertains to epistemology and ontology, and (2) an early inclination toward the aesthetics of precision and solvability cele brated by positivist analytics. As he was to remark to an earlier generation trained in the largely descriptive ﬁeld of regional geography: ‘‘By our theories you shall know us’’. While Explanation appears to be exhaustive in terms of its philosophical attention to the methodological ques tions associated with positivism, at no point does it at tempt to address questions regarding the political implications of geographic research. And yet, the human geography of the late 1960s and early 1970s, with its broad turn to issues of social relevance associated with the Vietnam War, imperialism, environmental degra dation, women’s rights, and racism and poverty, leveled this as a major ﬂaw inherent in quantitative studies of spatial science in general. These issues were to consume Harvey after the publication of Explanation. He moved to Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland, in 1969, arriving in wake of intense protests in that city following the 1968 assassination of Martin Luther King. Harvey found himself in a city with chronic im poverishment that jarringly contrasted with the country’s status as the world’s richest and most developed nation. He became involved in civil rights and anti war move ments, conducted studies for the city of Baltimore on housing inequality, and, in effort to better understand the conditions underlying urban deprivation, began to read Marx. In Social Justice and the City (1973), his ﬁrst major work following Explanation, Harvey interrogated several ver sions of moral and social philosophy in an effort to de velop a program for geography that brings to the forefront issues of spatial inequality and social injustice. Evolving from standard liberalist analytics to a discovery and celebration of a Marxism that retains a strongly positivist bent, this volume looks to socioeconomic dif ference in the urban setting as a device for illustrating the inseparability of social processes and spatial forms. Thus, the practices involved in the production of speciﬁc social relations (e.g., the property relation) serve to constitute speciﬁc spatialities (e.g., particular built environments and associated social welfare outcomes). At the same time, Harvey follows Karl Marx (and turns away from liberalism) by afﬁrming the collapse of the distinction between production and distribution, allowing for a conceptualization of social justice that turns upon examination of actual social processes, rather than upon the invocation of transcendental notions of justice that supercede the speciﬁcities of the situation.

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The Limits to Capital (1982) represents Harvey’s most explicit and direct immersion in Marxist theory. A lengthy and difﬁcult meditation on Marx’s Capital, Harvey spends much of the book examining Marx’s major theories regarding the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities, the processes of accumu lation, and the inherent contradictions and crises in capitalism – notions that will recur throughout the re mainder of Harvey’s oeuvre. Harvey’s major contribution to Marxist literature comes in the closing chapters of Limits, where he initiates the ﬁrst steps toward a spatia lization of Marxist production, accumulation, and im perialism. He also contributes to Marxist theory – and presages work by others on economic globalization – by highlighting the important role of ﬁnancial capital in the capitalist accumulation process. The ﬁnal chapters of Limits serve very much as a theoretical roadmap for al most all of the work that will follow. In particular, it is here that Harvey ﬁrst describes the processes by which contemporary capitalism ﬁnds a ‘spatial ﬁx’ for its own self produced crises through the exportation of devalu ation to other spaces. Harvey suggests that such man euvers ultimately tend toward the development of expanding crises in the form of imperialism and global war. It would be almost 20 years before Harvey would turn to any extended empirical explication of the nightmare visions that haunt the closing pages of Limits. Latterly, however, he has argued at length that the cur rent moment of US imperialism, the hegemony of neo liberalism, and the initiation of global warfare (the war on terror, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, etc.) are illus trative of the processes ﬁrst described in Limits. Alongside the theoretical project of describing Marx for geographers and developing a spatialized Marxist theory for leftists of all persuasions, Harvey continued to write essays in the 1970s and 1980s elaborating a framework for urban processes under capitalism. These works, together with original materials, were assembled as a pair of twin books, both published in 1985 – The Urbanization of Capital and Consciousness and the Urban Experience. Gone was the tentativeness of Harvey that peppered parts of Social Justice and the City. As assembled in book form, the articles trace an exceptionally rigorous and urban speciﬁc analysis of capitalism, redressing the historicism in traditional Marxism on two counts: (1) by showing how the space of the city is the key site for accumulation, and (2) by demonstrating beyond Limits just how much spatial transformations in built environ ments are the heart and soul of capitalist accumulation: ‘‘Capitalist development has therefore to negotiate a knife edge path between preserving the exchange values of past capital investments in the built environment and destroying the value of these investments in order to open up fresh room for accumulation’’ (Urbanization, p 25). Harvey covers the production of urban infrastructures

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(or ‘second natures’ – roads, houses factories, schools, and shops) that arise from capitalist switches among its pri mary, secondary, and tertiary circuits, as well as the complexity of several types of rents and ﬁnance markets on housing provision. The separation of home and work is shown to have implications for not only production but also social reproduction and, ﬁnally, for the uneven dis tribution of class in urban space. Chapters on urban pol itics and planning close out Urbanization. They presage later work on urban entrepreneurialism that was to be come one leg of his next major book, The Condition of Postmodernity. As another leg of that next project, Urbanization’s counterpart text, Consciousness and the Urban Experience shifts away from capital’s concrete circulation through, and objectiﬁcation in, the built environment to what he calls the more ‘speculative’ investigation of political consciousness. The urbanization of capital, then, has two sides, the second of which is a profound reorganization of social, cultural, and political relations, experiences, and meanings. In essence, this book is a description of urban modernism – as cultural phenomena, political life, and epistemology – read through the dialectic of space and society and as imprinted on the urban built environment and the minds and actions of its inhabitants. It is here, then, where one sees the cultural epistemological seeds of Harvey’s next book, The Condition of Postmodernity (discussed below). Especially noteworthy in Consciousness is Harvey’s early historical work in Paris, where he lived for a time, both researching the city’s history and wit nessing the ferment of French philosophical debate (the research would become part of a much later book, Paris, Capital of Modernity, 2003). Urbanization reprints a famous Harvey study on the Basilica of Sacre´ Coeur, where he shows a command for interpreting symbolic built en vironments that is on par with his insightful and rigorous analyses of the cold movements of capital. As mentioned above, Urbanization and Consciousness provided Harvey with the tools for his next and most well known project, The Condition of Postmodernity (1989), written while he was at Oxford University. He uses them to address post Fordist shifts in economic organization and to assess the transformation of cultural and political consciousness that had emerged under the popularization of postmodernism, an art and architecture movement that celebrated difference, depthlessness, and fragmentation. In Condition, Harvey explains that this movement was not merely the product of the celebration of culturally driven difference or changes in perspective (though it was surely this as well). In the ﬁnal analysis, the postmodern era was brought on by a series of adjustments by capitalism in the second half of the twentieth century in response to in creasingly intense competition and rapid technological change. The response – known as ﬂexible accumulation – was to speed up production and delivery by changing

labor processes (e.g., outsourcing) and reworking the ﬁrm’s technical and organizational arrangements (e.g., just in time production, branch plants, and relocations). These conditions effectively did the work of compressing space–time as the ever more rapid processes of capital accumulation – and the risks attendant to over accumulation – began to take on pervasive, global char acteristics. While postmodernity was, according to Harvey, principally the product of economic processes, the cultural/artistic, academic, and political impacts of these shifts (i.e., postmodernism) were mediated, if not produced, through the epistemological shifts – the loss of foundations – resulting from space–time compression. The most disconcerting of these changes was the pro liferation of perspectives married to a devaluation of the grounds for political mobilization. The experience of time and space has changed, the conﬁdence in the association between scientiﬁc and moral judgements has collapsed, esthetics has triumphed over ethics as a prime focus of social and intellectual concern, images dominate narratives, ephemerality and fragmentation take precedence over eternal truths and uniﬁed politics, and explanations have shifted from the realm of material and political economic groundings toward a consideration of autonomous cultural and pol itical practices. (Harvey, 1989, p 328)

Harvey’s take on post Fordism in Condition was widely celebrated and critiqued, and in addition to responding to important reviews of the book, in the early 1990s he also turned some of his attention to organizing around and writing about a car plant closure in the Oxfordshire town of Cowley, where a Rover Group factory was located. Subsequently, he returned to Hopkins where he was to write a new book, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference (1996), an extended attempt to develop a Marxist onto ethical system as a response to the chal lenges that arose from various ethics of reﬂexivity and positionality in feminism, critical race theory, post colonial theory, and from what was often characterized as an attendant nihilism or relativism in post structuralist theories. He also attempts to address a longstanding failure of Marxist theory to effectively engage environ mental issues. Justice made three key contributions to geographic thought in general and to the political de bates of the 1990s in particular: (1) it offers a dialectically articulated ontology focused upon interrelating, co constitutive processes; (2) it puts forward a political vi sion that draws upon his ontological project of collective interrelations and thus rallies against fragmented political movements; and (3) it portends the beginnings of a turn toward considerations of utopianism – something that will come to fruition in Spaces of Hope (2000) – as a

Harvey, D.

political strategy for thinking about collective political change. Militant particularism, one of the key concepts Har vey tarries with in Justice, highlights the localized, spe ciﬁc situations from which political movements emerge. There – and more speciﬁcally in Spaces of Hope – Harvey’s concern is to explicate a continuum running from the politicized speciﬁcities of the spaces of the body to the collectivized political generality of the global. At its heart, Spaces is an extended attempt to theorize routes to political subjectivities and progressive actions that cul minate in large aggregates of individuals mobilized against the spread of globalization. While Harvey clearly begins to reposition earlier dismissals of studies of the body and of the politics of positionality through the development of an analytics of the ‘body as accumulation strategy’, he nevertheless cautions against ‘body re ductionism’ that would establish the individualist per spectivalisms as the limit of political conceptualization. By contrast, Harvey proposes that projects of alliance engaged in alternative economies and collective action can be aided by returning to utopian concepts as a strategy of hope against the cynicism of global capitalism. Latterly, Harvey has dedicated himself to the devel opment of extended analyses of the rise and spread of globalization through a series of critical histories of the present that might be called the ‘neoliberalism trilogy’. While not the ﬁrst time Harvey has engaged the crises attendant to neoliberalism and globalization, nowhere else do these receive such relentless, surgical examination as in The New Imperialism (2003), A Brief History of Neoli beralism (2005), and Spaces of Global Uneven Development (2006). Together, these works look to the collusion of states (particularly the US and UK, but also notably China), the military industrial complex, and the with drawal of the left and simultaneous rise of the right, to theorize the emerging socio economico political phe nomenon of neoliberalist ‘accumulation by dispossession’, a process of creating new spaces for capitalism by dis possessing people of spaces and services to which they have certain rights. This is witnessed particularly within disenfranchisements accomplished through: (1) recent US led imperial warfare as a strategy of coercion over consent for participation in neoliberalist capitalism; (2) the withering and privatization of state based social services; (3) the spreading myth that crises in capital equal crises in the state; and (4) a growing gap between the rich and poor that is accompanied – not coincidentally – by an equally large gap between those who hold state power and those who are subject to it. Written in the current, post 9/11 era of global warfare and new Western imperialist expansion, gone are many of the utopian ideals Harvey had toyed with only a few

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years before. Here, he reads the continuing devolution of the present situation as dire enough that a more imme diate ﬁx, a (re)turn to a ‘New New Deal’, sits at the forefront of his recommendations for contemporary socio political change. Over his lifetime, the US has fallen from its former stature as the world’s producer, and is no longer in a position to claim the mantle of the world’s ﬁnancier; it can now only rely on its military strength and domestic surveillance to bear up its position in world affairs. Thus Harvey, while not denigrating the efforts of the many distinct local movements dedicated to inventing new ways to respond to these crises, none theless retains the view that widespread social transfor mation will not be achieved unless resistance is predicated upon and articulated through the common ground of class based solidarity. See also: Critical Theory (After Habermas); Entrepreneurship; Geopolitics; Historical-Geographical Materialism; Human Geography; Nature; Neoliberalism, Urban; Postmodernism/Postmodern Geography; Radical Geography; Uneven Development.

Further Reading Castree, N. and Gregory, D. (eds.) (2006). David Harvey: A Critical Reader. Oxford: Blackwell. Harvey, D. (1969). Explanation in Geography. London: Edward Arnold. Harvey, D. (1973). Social Justice and the City. London: Edward Arnold. Harvey, D. (1982). The Limits to Capital. Oxford: Blackwell. Harvey, D. (1985). Consciousness and the Urban Experience. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University. Harvey, D. (1985). The Urbanization of Capital. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University. Harvey, D. (1989). The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change. Oxford: Blackwell. Harvey, D. (1996). Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference. Oxford: Blackwell. Harvey, D. (2000). Spaces of Hope. Berkeley, CA: University of California. Harvey, D. (2001). Reinventing geography: An interview with the editors of New Left Review. Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography, pp 3 24. London: Routledge. Harvey, D. (2002). Memories and desires. In Gould, P. & Pitts, F. (eds.) Geographical Voices: Fourteen Autobiographical Essays, pp 149 188. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Harvey, D. (2003). Paris, Capital of Modernity. New York: Routledge. Harvey, D. (2003). The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University. Harvey, D. (2004). A geographer’s perspective on the new American imperialism: Conversation with David Harvey. Berkeley, CA: University of California. http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people4/ Harvey/harvey con0.html (accessed jun. 2008). Harvey, D. (2005). A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University. Harvey, D. (2006). Spaces of Global Capitalism: A Theory of Uneven Development. London: Verso. Woodward, K. and Jones III, J. P. (2008). The condition of postmodernity: David Harvey. In Hubbard, P., Kitchin, R. & Valentine, G. (eds.) Key Texts in Human Geography, (pp.125 134). London: Sage.

Health and Development S. Asthana, University of Plymouth, Plymouth, UK & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Determinants of Health A wide range of factors inﬂuence individual health outcomes, although the relative importance of different factors varies according to context. In situations of absolute poverty, poor diet and exposure to pathogens (e.g., due to lack of safe water) are key determinants of high rates of infectious disease among children. In societies where children are no longer dying from infectious disease, other factors take on greater signiﬁcance, including genetic inheritance, early-life exposures, lifestyle factors, and psychosocial stress. Development Traditionally seen as the means by which a traditional, low-technology society is changed into a modern, high-technology society, primarily through economic growth. More recently, it has been conceived in terms of the broader concept of ‘human development’ (comprising social, cultural, emotional, education, and health as well as economic dimensions). Many also argue that development should include improvements in social justice (declines in ‘relative poverty’, improvements in women’s rights and status, and so on). Globalization A complex term that captures growing global connectivity – in trade, the ﬂow of capital, the movement of people, and the diffusion of social, cultural, and political values throughout the world. Due to the global dominance of western international organizations (such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), market liberalization – and associated social and political values – has been the dominant theme of globalization over the past 30 years. Polarization The process by which the gap between the socially advantaged and disadvantaged becomes wider with respect to key measures of human development (such as income, health, and education outcomes). Social polarization tends to be greater in market-liberal societies than in countries where strong state intervention is used to redistribute wealth and other key resources. Primary Healthcare A movement initiated in the late 1970s to improve health status in the poorest countries of the world by shifting the emphasis from cure to prevention (including bringing about improvements in nutrition, education, and sanitation) and achieving universal and equitable coverage in ‘basic’ health services. It is generally agreed that, due to a change in international social and economic policies, the potential of primary healthcare was never widely tested.

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Relative Poverty A concept that is closely related to income inequality. Here, poverty is not conceived in absolute terms (and measured around a basic subsistence threshold) but relates to the prevailing income levels or living standards of a particular society. Thus, even if the incomes of the poor rise, there can still be an increase in relative poverty if the incomes of the better off rise even faster and the distribution of income becomes more unequal.

Introduction The relationship between health and economic devel opment is well established. Life expectancy is lowest in the lowest income countries where a high proportion of deaths occur among children and are due to infectious diseases associated with poor sanitation and nutrition. Due to the strong association between poverty, poor sanitation, inadequate hygiene, and unsafe drinking water, children living in the poorest communities are more likely to be exposed to infectious agents, such as the fecal–oral pathogens responsible for diarrheal disease. They are also more likely to be malnourished and suffer from micronutrient deﬁciencies. Poor nutrition weakens their immune systems making them more susceptible to and less able to ﬁght infections than well nourished children. Illness is thus more likely to be prolonged or severe, increasing risk of death. Unfortunately, mal nutrition and infection are joined in a self reinforcing cycle, infection depressing nutritional status still further and increasing the risk of future and more prolonged or severe illness episodes. Thus, child mortality in low income countries is often the result of a long series of recurrent infections and nutritional deﬁciency. As the average wealth of a country increases, there tends to be an improvement in living standards and a subsequent decline in diseases that are associated with both poverty and child mortality. Life expectancy in creases, as does the relative contribution made to the mortality burden by noncommunicable diseases such as heart disease and cancers that develop in later life. The process by which the disease proﬁle of a society changes from being dominated by infectious diseases to being characterized by noncommunicable chronic or de generative diseases is formally known as ‘epidemiological transition’, a concept that provides a useful descriptive device for contrasting the health status of countries/

Health and Development

regions at differing levels of development. According to World Health Organization (WHO) estimates for 2005, an estimated 70% of deaths in the poorest region, Africa, were due to communicable diseases and only 22% to noncommunicable diseases. This pattern reﬂects both the sizeable proportion of child mortality in the region and the impact of HIV/AIDS. In Europe, by contrast, only 6% of deaths were due to communicable diseases and 86% due to noncommunicable diseases. Here, the vast majority of deaths occurs among older people. Other regions are more economically diverse and this is re ﬂected in their mortality proﬁles. In southeast Asia, for example, 35% and 54% of deaths in 2005 were attributed respectively to communicable and noncommunicable diseases. Like early development theories, epidemiological transition is a rather simplistic and linear model. It as sumes that poorer countries will simply repeat the de velopment experience of the West and undergo an associated shift in disease burden. In the past few dec ades, however, globalization has impacted upon the de velopment trajectories of poorer countries in a way that is neither linear nor uniform or necessarily progressive. Production, consumption, trade, ﬁnance, communi cations, travel, social relations, environmental changes, political values, and systems of governance are all subject to growing global connectivity and this has important consequences for the web of factors – both local and global – that impact upon health. Understanding this connectivity – in its economic, social, environmental, and policy dimensions – is key to understanding recent trends in health and healthcare in low and low to middle income countries.

Health, Development, and Globalization: Economic Dimensions Trends in Absolute Poverty The principal way of addressing the high burden of in fectious and parasitic diseases in low income countries is to address poverty itself. Thus, it is important to examine recent trends in income and living standards. Since the early 1980s, neoliberalism has dominated macro economic policy on a global scale, reﬂecting the belief that, the more open economies become, and the more integrated with world trade, the more that they beneﬁt from economic progress. The World Bank, which has been a major proponent of the ‘openness is good for you’ school, suggests that this strategy has contributed to a signiﬁcant decline in the numbers living in absolute poverty. Using an income measure adjusted for pur chasing power parity (PPP), an approach that captures differences in domestic purchasing power, the proportion

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of the world’s population living on less than $1 a day fell from 28% in 1990 to 21% in 2001. Some care should be taken in interpreting the World Bank’s ﬁgures on poverty trends. Globally, poverty re duction is largely accounted for by the success of East Asia, particularly China. By contrast, poverty levels in Latin America and the Middle East remained fairly static between 1990 and 2001. Meanwhile, there were dramatic increases in the number of people living on less than $1 a day in sub Saharan Africa and on less than $2 a day (a more realistic threshold for extreme poverty in this re gion) in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that makes up the former Soviet Union. Both of these regions have become poorer in real terms during the period. Indeed, by 2001, real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in sub Saharan Africa (d306) and the CIS ($1312) was lower than in 1971. By raising the relative incomes of poorer countries, the World Bank’s income adjustments do not fully reveal the extent to which these regions have experienced economic stag nation or indeed disintegration. These economic trends are reﬂected in health indi cators. Sub Saharan Africa remains the only region in the world where the absolute number of child deaths is rising. Although there have been improvements in immuniza tion coverage, access to safe water and, to a lesser extent, sanitation (demonstrating some of the positive impacts that globalization can have with respect to the role played by supranational organizations and the diffusion of health technologies), high levels of poverty, and little change in the prevalence of childhood malnutrition have contributed to a very slow decline in the under ﬁve mortality rate (from 187 per 1000 in 1990 to 171 per 1000 in 2003). In the same period, life expectancy at birth has fallen from 50 to 46 years (a similar level to that of England in the 1840s). This unprecedented decline can be attributed in large part to the high prevalence of HIV/ AIDS in the region. Reversals in health status have also been observed in the CIS where a rapid transition from centrally planned socialist to market economies resulted in economic col lapse, increases in unemployment and income poverty, and the disintegration of a comprehensive system of so cial protection. Child poverty rates are particularly high in the Central Asian Republics and the Caucasus. In addition to increasing rates of child malnutrition, several countries in this part of the region have seen rises in infant and child mortality. Meanwhile, in the Russian Federation, life expectancy for males has dropped from 70 years in the late 1980s to 59 years in 2003, a decline that can be attributed to the very high incidence of cardiovascular disease, a resurgence of infectious diseases, and a rise in alcohol related problems, including homicide, suicide, and injuries. The growth of absolute poverty in this region has played a role in these

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health reversals. Trends in income inequality are signiﬁ cant too. Trends in Relative Poverty A distinction is generally made between the indirect effects of income inequality on health and the direct effects. In highly unequal societies, where wealth is concentrated in the hands of relatively few, there will be relatively large numbers of people with low incomes whose health is also poor. Thus, income inequality pro duces poorer average health outcomes through the ag gregate effects of individual poverty. In addition, it has been proposed that income inequality has a direct effect on health (over and above the aggregate effects of indi vidual incomes) due to the psychosocial effects of having a low social status in an unequal society. In addition to promoting health damaging behaviors, stress has been linked to metabolic effects relating to increased risk for coronary heart disease and to other effects such as de pression and poorer immune function. Unfortunately, globalization has been associated with an increase in income inequality. In 1960, the richest ﬁfth of the world’s population had 30 times more income than the poorest ﬁfth. Today, the average income of the top 20% is about 50 times the average income of the bottom 20%. Were it not for high growth rates in India and China, global inequality would be even higher. Thus, the gap between most developing regions and rich countries is still widening. Polarization is occurring within coun tries as well as between them. In China, inequality is now greater than before the Communists won power in 1949 (although income inequality measures for the country remain relatively low). India also remains subject to large regional, gender, and income based inequalities. Thus, although both countries have experienced signiﬁcant economic growth, this has not translated into more rapid declines in infant and child mortality. High levels of income inequality can produce a pat tern of ‘epidemiological polarization’ in which there is a double burden of pretransitional diseases among the poor and post transitional diseases among the richer sections of society. This pattern is illustrated by several Latin American countries where, although average incomes are in the middle range, income distribution is particularly skewed. Urban poverty has become a large scale problem and, like the rural poor, the residents of slum and squatter communities are at increased risk of poor nutrition and exposure to environmental health hazards. As a result, overall levels of health are low, relative to national average income. Brazil provides a good example of the health damaging effects of inequality. At PPP US$7790 per capita ($2788 in real terms), income in Brazil is considerably higher than in China and Sri Lanka. Yet, Brazil’s average life expectancy is lower than in both of

these countries. Indeed, it is equivalent to that of Vietnam which has a per capita income of PPP US$2490 ($482 in real terms). Countries such as Sri Lanka and Vietnam, where income inequality measures are signiﬁcantly lower than the Latin American average, demonstrate that high levels of health can be achieved at relatively low levels of wealth if the beneﬁts of economic development (in cluding social infrastructure and welfare provision) are distributed more evenly throughout the population. The extent to which observed associations between income inequality and health outcomes can be attributed to indirect or direct effects has been strongly debated. Perhaps the best evidence for the direct role played by psychosocial stress is provided by the CIS. Here, the difﬁculties people have had in adjusting materially and psychologically to the collapse of communism have been linked to rising stress and associated risk behaviors, a phenomenon described as ‘transition trauma’. In Russia, there has an increase in alcoholism and smoking. There has also been an explosion in the numbers of people injecting drugs. Part of this reﬂects the removal of tra ditional controls over drug misuse and the ease with which drugs can be trafﬁcked across the Russian Feder ation. However, increased psychological stress has also been implicated in risk behaviors. For young people, economic malaise has limited opportunities for economic stability. At the same time, increased travel and access to Western media via satellite television has raised their expectations of consumer lifestyles. In addition to re sponding to feelings of discontent by turning to drugs, there has been a rise in the numbers of young women and men who view commercial sex work as one of their few opportunities to make money. The rise of both injecting drug use and commercial sex is, of course, related to the rapid increase in HIV prevalence in this part of the region.

Health, Development, and Globalization: Social Dimensions Although some believe that globalization is a force for poverty reduction, others believe that its economic im pacts have been negative, with important consequences for health. Views are also polarized with respect to the social domain. On the positive side, a substantial human rights regime has emerged, supported by alliances of governmental, nongovernmental, international, and supranational organizations. Networks devoted to the promotion of women’s rights have been particularly active, giving rise to a universal understanding of the links that exist between women’s social, economic, legal, and health status. Practical progress has been in the le gislation passed by many countries to raise minimum legal age of marriage, prevent female genital mutilation,

Health and Development

promote equal legal status (e.g., with respect to marriage and divorce, child custody, and inheritance laws), and so on. Similarly, global campaigns to promote social justice for children have led to the ratiﬁcation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the passing of supportive legislation by many state governments. Such developments, which have introduced universal stand ards against which the treatment of women and children can (theoretically at least) be measured, suggest that globalization is a force for social good. Against this, questions have been raised as to whether supportive legislation can result in major improvements in the health and well being of vulnerable groups in the absence of wider socioeconomic change. For example, women’s lack of social, economic, and reproductive au tonomy is strongly shaped by poverty. The lowest rates of female school enrollment and the highest rates of child marriage and fertility are found in the poorest region, sub Saharan Africa. Here, a number of factors make high fertility desirable, including the continued importance of smallholder farming (which is reliant on family labor); high rates of infant and child mortality (thus, many births are needed to ensure an optimum family size); and the need, in the absence of wider state social security, for adult children to care for aged parents. Although many African countries have declared 18 as the legal minimum age of marriage, nearly 50% of girls in sub Saharan Africa marry before this age and, as ﬁrst time mothers, young girls face high risks in their pregnancies (girls aged l0–14 are ﬁve times more likely and girls aged 15–19 twice as likely to die in pregnancy or childbirth than women aged 20–24). In 2000, there were an estimated 940 maternal deaths per 100 000 live births in the region. For every girl or woman who dies, many times that number suffer long term damage to their health as a result of childbearing. For example, the prevalence of obstetric ﬁstula is high in areas of high maternal mor tality and the social impact of this distressing condition can be catastrophic for young women who may be os tracized or even abandoned by their families. Infertility is another long term side effect of birth complications, a tragic outcome for women in societies where a high premium continues to be placed on motherhood. In addition to pointing out the need to recognize the economic context of ‘social’ health determinants, critics of globalization note that the process does not always result in the liberalization of social attitudes or in the diffusion of values that support health and well being. Within the former Soviet Union, for example, the col lapse of a state system which, in theory at least, upheld equality between the sexes, has heralded a return to more traditional gender relationships. In Central Asia, patri archal religious traditions are reasserting themselves, social control being openly exercised over young women with respect to arranged marriage and early childbearing.

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In many parts of the region, violence against women – once condemned if largely ignored by the state – has become institutionalized. There is evidence of state complicity in the trafﬁcking of women from several transitional countries. In other parts of the world, globalization has resulted in growing cultural homogenization. The increasing internationalization and commercialization of the food trade is giving rise to a shift from simple diets with little variation to a greater reliance on processed foods, fats, and sugars. Thus, while undernutrition remains an im portant problem, poor countries are also experiencing rising rates of obesity. There are concerns, too, about the way in which cultural values and norms regarding sex are being universalized. The globalization of pornography, the increasingly sexualized imagery of global capitalism, and the rapid expansion of international travel have been linked to the growing commercialization of sex and, in turn, the transmission of sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV. As with women’s status, however, the ‘geography’ of the sex trade is not shaped by sociocultural factors alone. Political and economic changes associated with glob alization are also implicated in the rise of commercial sex. These include the removal of strong state controls and the breaking down of national borders (reﬂected in the growth of trafﬁcking of women from Russia, Ukraine, Mainland China, and Vietnam); the globalization of military activities (reﬂected in an increase in both sex work and HIV transmission in peacekeeping areas); and economic polarization. Many argue that export oriented growth has threatened rural livelihoods in sub Saharan Africa, leading to increases in labor migration and ur banization. There has been a growth in ‘survival sex’ among impoverished women. At the same time, male migrants who are away from home for extended periods of time and who are housed in crowded, all male hostels in mining settlements or commercial estates are more likely to engage in casual, unprotected sex. In Carle tonville, South Africa, the largest gold mining complex in the world, HIV rates have been found to be as high as 78% among sampled commercial sex workers and 36% among miners. When they return to their families, migrant workers carry the virus into their rural communities. Tensions thus exist between the potential of global networks to promote the social status of vulnerable groups and the practical impact of globalization on social inequalities. This extends to the way in which global ization has been associated with a retreat from state welfarism. In keeping with the wider neoliberal program of privatization and the liberalization of trade, there has been a rolling back of the state with respect to the pro vision of welfare and other public goods, arguably lead ing to an increase in women’s domestic responsibilities.

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Older people, who have increased needs for health and social care, have been particularly vulnerable to re ductions in state expenditure. Thus, although supra national organizations have played an important role in highlighting the needs of the growing numbers of older people in poorer countries, the support systems available to older people – statutory and traditional – are being steadily undermined. There is a worldwide trend toward nuclear rather than extended multigenerational families. Women’s participation in the paid labor force is growing and an ever increasing proportion of the world’s popu lation lives in urban centers, removing support for older people in rural areas. Globalization may also be pro moting cultural beliefs that undermine the security and prestige of older people within their families and communities.

Health, Development, and Globalization: Environmental Dimensions While most accounts of health, development, and glob alization focus on the implications of socioeconomic re forms, fundamental changes are also occurring to the planet’s ecosystems, with important consequences for human health. Climate change, with respect to both temperature and patterns of precipitation, has been linked to a range of potential health effects, for example in the distribution of malnutrition (through effects on yields of agricultural crops); the incidence and distri bution of waterborne, food borne, vector borne, and pollution related diseases; and deaths and injuries from natural disasters. Accelerated losses in biodiversity have important implications for global health, by threatening prospects for developing new pharmacological products. Overall, however, the effects of global climate change are likely to be heavily concentrated in poorer populations where the most important climate sensitive health out comes (malnutrition, diarrhea, and malaria) are already common and where vulnerability to climate effects is greatest. Urbanization, an integral feature of globalization, is also associated with a rise in environmental health haz ards. Air pollution is concentrated in cities due to in dustrial emissions and increased motorized transport and, in many cities, air quality falls well below international health standards. In Beijing, for example, more than 400 000 people die each year from pollution related ill nesses. The speed at which urbanization is occurring in poorer countries also contributes to environmental health problems as the supply of housing, infrastructure, and other services is not keeping pace with demand. Nearly 1 million people live in slum or squatter settlements, many of which are located in environmentally unsafe areas – steep hillsides, ﬂood plains, or near waste dumps and

polluting industries – exposing residents to natural and man made disasters. Overcrowded and poorly ventilated housing helps the spread of diseases by direct contact. Sanitation remains a major problem. Municipal supplies of safe drinking water do not tend to reach slum popu lations and communal latrines may be shared by thou sands of people. Wastewater and overﬂow from septic tanks may run down open drains and sewers which, during the rains, are subject to ﬂooding. Such factors are associated with a very high environmental load of fecal– oral pathogens. The poor environmental conditions of slum communities also provide ideal conditions for in creased transmission of rodent and vector borne dis eases, pools of standing water, water drums, discarded automobile tires, and nonbiodegradable packaging pro viding breeding sites for mosquitoes. Living conditions in urban slums present signiﬁcant health risks, even for children from higher income families who have been found to have higher rates of diarrhea than children from poor rural families because they are exposed to con taminated water and food. Increased exposure to en vironmental health hazards, together with high rates of child malnutrition (particularly in sub Saharan and South Asian cities) means that, with respect to health status, slum dwellers are as badly if not worse off than their rural counterparts.

Health, Development, and Globalization: Policy Dimensions In addition to factors impacting upon health status, globalization is affecting healthcare policy through the global diffusion of health sector reform (HSR). Reﬂecting the dominance of neoliberal thinking in international policymaking, HSR emphasizes the need to move away from state ﬁnanced and state run healthcare systems by widening the range of ﬁnancing options and institutional players who provide healthcare. With respect to ﬁnan cing, user fees, cost recovery schemes, and private health insurance schemes have been encouraged in order to increase resources available for healthcare. Increasing emphasis is also placed on the role of the private sector in delivering healthcare services, reﬂecting a belief that this promotes higher quality. The rise of a market based approach represents a signiﬁcant shift in healthcare philosophy for both low income and former communist countries. In the late 1970s, international health policy drew upon examples of socialist style health systems to propose that low income countries embraced the Primary Health Care (PHC) movement. This called for universal and equitable cov erage of basic health services and a shift in emphasis from intensive and sophisticated curative care in urban centers to prevention within the community. Underpinning the

Health and Development

movement was an understanding of the need to re distribute resources – not only for healthcare, but for nutrition, education, and sanitation – to drive up stand ards of health. However, PHC had hardly been launched, before a market philosophy came to dominate economic and public policy throughout the world. In addition to rejecting the need for redistribution, it sought to reduce the role of the state in healthcare provision. During the 1980s, structural adjustment policies sponsored by the IMF and World Bank were associated with signiﬁcant cuts in healthcare expenditure, particularly in sub Saharan Africa; and since the 1990s, low income coun tries have been called upon to embark on HSR. The potential of PHC was thus never tested, although the impact of replacing socialist style health systems with a market based approach can be assessed with respect to former communist countries. In prereform China and the former Soviet Union, strong central planning had created a hierarchy of health services with regard to the skills of practitioners and the degree of specialist care provided. Innovative use of paramedical workers such as feldshers in the USSR and barefoot doctors in Chinese rural communes played an important role in extending basic healthcare to small rural communities. The aim was thus to guarantee universal access to care with opportunities for referral to more specialist centers. Strong emphasis was also placed on public health (e.g., sanitation, immunizations, and other preventive measures). The combination of an emphasis on prevention, the use of paramedical workers, the basic simplicity of management under a highly uniﬁed system, and the relatively low salaries of healthcare workers meant that, in both countries, a highly accessible system of healthcare was achieved at relatively low cost. There were, however, important differences between the two systems, the former Soviet Union relying on state and collective funding to a far greater degree than China, which drew funds from a combination of sources, including central government, local communes, work related health insur ance schemes, and out of pocket payments. Such differences, together with China’s rising pros perity and the fact that political reform has taken place more gradually than in the CIS may account for differ ences in the impact of HSR in the two areas. While the shift away from state and collective funding has caused health systems in several parts of the CIS to deteriorate close to the point of collapse, there has been a signiﬁcant rise in health expenditure in China and a rapid devel opment of private specialist centers, particularly in the cities. However, both countries demonstrate some of the problems that can result from HSR. Direct payments from patients have become the most signiﬁcant source of healthcare ﬁnancing in China and the western states of the CIS. There is evidence that this prevents the poor from gaining access to healthcare; while those who do

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seek medical assistance may spend less on food and other basic household essentials, sell livestock, or borrow money, triggering a process of increasing debts and the loss of entitlements. There is also growing geographical inequality with respect to access to services. Rural ser vices have been particularly affected, with the deterior ation or closure of healthcare facilities and the loss of skilled personnel. Preventive services, which are signiﬁ cantly less proﬁtable than curative care, have also suffered from under investment, reversing previous successes in the control of infectious diseases, such as tuberculosis (TB), childhood infections and, in China, schistosomiasis. The experience of HSR also raises questions regarding the quality of private sector care. Because drug sellers and private practitioners have a ﬁ nancial incentive to overprescribe, private sector delivery has long been associated with excessive medication in India, where a signiﬁcant proportion of expenditure on drugs is unnecessary, irrational, or indeed hazardous. The fact that the overuse of drugs has also become a serious problem in China suggests that some care should be taken in assuming that the encouragement of a private sector in low income countries (where regulation remains a problem) automatically yields quality improvements.

Issues An understanding of the relationship between health and development must today take account of the impact of globalization on the many factors that inﬂuence human health. Diffusion studies have focused directly on the diminished importance of spatial boundaries, conceiving how negative health risks – from HIV and drug resistant forms of TB to avian ﬂu – can diffuse at speed across our shrinking world. However, many of the key aspects of globalization transcend territorial space, requiring a dif ferent understanding of the ways in which economic, social, cultural, and political relations intersect with health. With respect to the differential impacts of glob alization, territorialism remains important, the historical conditions of particular states and regions shaping their response to different globalization processes. The ‘map’ of global health has thus become a good deal more complex in recent years. This complexity has fostered considerable debate as to whether globalization is associated with continuity or change, convergence or divergence, and social progress or injustice. Some, for example, argue that globalization is a postcolonial imperialism which has heightened in equalities between the North and the South and between the rich and the poor of low income countries with deeply negative consequences for health. Others, how ever, point out that countries previously described as

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‘developing’ are doing very well in the global economy, enjoying greater wealth, a decline in inequality, and rapid improvements in health status. Perhaps ultimately, the question of whether globalization has been a force for good or a negative inﬂuence on global health depends upon one’s political point of view. See also: Disease Diffusion; Disease Mapping; Epidemiological Transition; Gender and Health; Healthcare Accessibility; Health Inequalities; HIV/AIDS in Developing Countries.

Further Reading Barnett, T. and Whiteside, A. (2002). AIDS in the Twenty First Century: Disease and Globalisation. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Cockerham, W. (1999). Health and Social Change in Russia and Eastern Europe. London: Routledge. Doyal, L. (1995). What Makes Women Sick: Gender and the Political Economy of Health. Chapel Hill, NC: Rutgers University Press.

Evans, T. (2002). A human right to health? Third World Quarterly 23, 197 215. Kawachi, I. and Kennedy, B. P. (eds.) (2002). The Health of Nations: Why Inequality/Harmful to Your Health. New York: The New Press. Leon, D. and Walt, G. (eds.) (2001). Poverty, Inequality and Health. Oxford: Oxford University Press. McMurray, C. and Smith, R. (2001). Diseases of Globalisation: Socio Economic Transitions and Health. London: Earthscan. Saker, L., Lee, K., Cannito, B., Gilmore, A. and Campbell Lendrum, D. (2004). Globalisation and Infectious Diseases: A Review of the Linkages. Geneva: WHO. Sen, G., George, A. and Ostin, P. (eds.) (2002). Engendering International Health: The Challenge of Equity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Stiglitz, J. (2000). Globalisation and Its Discontents. London: Penguin. United Nations Children Fund (2001). A decade of transition. Regional Monitoring Report No 8. United Nations. http://www.unicef irc.org/ cgi bin/unicef/download insert.sql?ProductID ¼ 313 (accessed in April 2008). United Nations Development Programme (2005). Human Development Report: International Cooperation at a Crossroads: Aid, Trade and Security in an Unequal World. New York: United Nations Development Programme. UNHABITAT (2006). The State of the World’s Cities 2006 7. Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Human Settlements Programme.

Health Geography G. Moon, University of Southampton, Highﬁeld, UK & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Biomedical Model of Health An approach to the study of health that focuses on death and disease and sees these events resulting from disturbances to the internal pathology of the human body. De-Medicalization The process of challenging the hegemony of the biomedical model of health; also associated with the rise of healthism. Healthism A shorthand term for society’s fascination with health and the emerging tendency to center human activity around health improvement. Social Model of Health An approach to the study of health that sees ill-health resulting from root causes that are located within society, particularly behavioral and structural causes.

Introduction Health geography (or the geography of health) effec tively emerged in the 1980s as a terminology describing the encounter between geography and death, disease, and related aspects of service provision. It has since coexisted with the longer established ﬁeld of medical geography with which it shares concerns about spatial variations in its subject matter and the nature of the relationship be tween health and place. In practice there is often little to distinguish work in health geography from that in med ical geography and it sometimes seems that the choice of nomenclature is a matter of semantic preference or academic tribal loyalty rather than any substantive ontological difference. Despite this fuzzy background, the dictionary of human geography has featured separate entries for health and medical geography. Programmatic statements and reviews of the ﬁeld have also continued to dwell on claimed, anticipated, and actual differences. Central to the possible distancing of health from medical geog raphy is generally the idea that the former in some way breaks away from a concern with biomedical aspects of its subject matter, embracing instead a broader, more social, model of health. Further differences are often associated with a greater propensity within health geography toward theorization and critical engagement. It is thus in the social model of health, contemporary social scientiﬁc theory, and the notion of criticality that the essence of health geography can be found. These

ideas in turn resonate with wider academic and popular engagement with health as an experiential and analytic construct.

The Turn to Health A traditional view of the subject matter of health/med ical geography would lay great emphasis on a biomedical model of health. Death and disease and its treatment are, in this model, best understood through reference to the biomedical workings of the human body. Relevant knowledge is rooted in the scientiﬁc disciplines of biol ogy and chemistry as applied to human pathology and requires extensive training in the mechanisms of the body and the pharmaceutical, surgical, and other ways in which challenges to the smooth running of that mech anism can be treated. In essence, the biomedical model focuses on bodily malfunction and body repair. Indeed, its gaze can be more than simply embodied; it is often inside the body via a concern with cells and genes. Few could deny the long term effectiveness of the biomedical model. Standard medical histories are replete with examples of great discoveries that have undoubtedly played their part in combating disease. The vast majority of people reach out for and gratefully embrace the bio medical model when confronted with disease or ill health. Medical doctors, as the key practitioners of the biomedical model, and hospitals as the most visible site of biomedical practice are accorded signiﬁcant importance in society. The biomedical model can be said to have achieved a hegemonic position in both popular and sci entiﬁc constructions of health. Yet, alongside this dom inance exist critical perspectives drawn from both ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of medicine. Internal critics of the medical model, practising doc tors, have questioned the evidence base underpinning some medical interventions and examined the temporal coincidence between improvements in human health and medical advances. Cochrane noted how signiﬁcant, well established treatments were often based on very little evidence from soundly designed research studies. His views were inﬂuential in the emergence of the concept of evidence based medicine. McKeown, in contrast, pointed out how improvements in mortality often began well before the major medical discoveries popularly linked with such improvements; he stressed the often more signiﬁcant role of population level public health inter ventions, such as clean water, and, more generally, im provements in nutrition.

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G

en

al er

s

oec oci

Work environment

Education

ic, culture, and environ men tal co nd Living and working itio conditions ns

ono m

Unemployment community n etw l and ork cia o S s s e t y f i l l e fac l idua tor v i s d In

Water and sanitation

Health care service

Agriculture and food production Age, sex, and constitutional factors

Housing

Figure 1 The Dahlgren Whitehead health model. From Dahlgren, G. and Whitehead, M. (1991). Policies and Strategies to Promote Social Equity in Health. Stockholm: Institute of Futures Studies.

Other critics of the biomedical model have worked outside medicine, sometimes in the sciences but more often from a social perspective. Dubos exempliﬁed the science critique, placing medicine and medical endeavors in an environmentalist context that resonates signiﬁcantly with the work of Jacques May, an individual often cited as central to the development of medical geography. More socially driven critiques include those of Illich, Navarro, and Foucault, all working in different ways on the con sequences of the powerful position of the biomedical model for an understanding of health and disease. In addition to challenging the claims of the bio medical model, critiques of the biomedical model also point to an alternative social model of health in which the focus of attention is outside the human body, on the social (and also geographical) context in which ill health is to be found and through which it can be understood, some would argue better understood. In this social model, the locus of interest is resolutely ‘upstream’. This ﬂuvial analogy equates the medical model with proxi mate, even superﬁcial, analyses of ill health; real under standing looks upstream beyond the immediacy of the diseased body to the more distant but more fundamental social causes of ill health. To exemplify, coronary heart disease is proximally caused (among other factors) by fat deposits in the arteries of the heart. The upstream causes cited by a social model would include diet and exercise and, yet further upstream, the poverty that may constrain choices regarding diet and exercise. Dahlgren and Whitehead cleverly captured the essence of this upstream gaze in their mandala model of the determinants of health (Figure 1). This broadening of concern, out from the body, its cells and its genes, to a more societally focussed per spective draws strength not only from the critics of the

biomedical model with their various pointers to public health interventions, environmental factors, and the embeddedness of medical power, but also from the more general social shift in attitudes to health that has taken place in recent decades. The reasons for this shift are numerous. They include reducing trust of medicine, in part a public reﬂection of the more academic critique, greater popular awareness of health matters, the growing take up of alternative and complementary medicine, and, perhaps most importantly, the increasing centrality of health in everyday life. Sometimes termed healthism, this centrality is evidenced by the way society produces and constructs human actions in terms of real or imagined effects on/of health. Manifestations of healthism include an increasing interest in body maintenance and adorn ment, the rise of the health club and associated cultures of improvement linked to diet, exercise and other health related behaviors, and the use of health as a motif in discussions on areas as diverse as urban design, workplace practices, and family relationships. In policy terms, the broadening of the health agenda away from the biomedical model toward a more social model and the accompanying rise of healthism has been reﬂected in an equivalent broadening of the networks of actors involved in the management of ill health. This network has shifted from a biomedical focus on curative treatment, largely by professionals schooled in the medical model, to one of far greater diversity embracing social care, housing, urban planning, education, and transportation among other ﬁelds. The idea of joined up policy is central, in this case with health at the centre. Another key shift has been from a reactive to a proactive position. Prevention, positive health, and health promo tion have become important means toward the objective of shifting the focus away from disease and its treatment,

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and toward the avoidance or at least limitation of ill health through social intervention. In Canada, the population health movement has been particularly in ﬂuential in placing these ideas on the policy agenda while, more generally, the notions of healthy (public) policy and healthy environments have played a part. The transition from medical to health geography is indicative of geography’s participation in these wider epistemic shifts and its disciplinary response. In this re spect, it shares similarity with other social sciences. Sociology and psychology have experienced analogous changes, as have those aspects of medicine that align most clearly with the social sciences – witness the emergence of nonclinical public health and critical ‘upstream’ work in health promotion. In all cases, the ‘cultural turn’ of the 1990s further fueled the transition as the evident ﬂexi bility and changeable nature of health was progressively deconstructed.

The Emergence of Health Geography How then did health geography emerge as a terminol ogy? Alongside the general emergence of health dis course addressed above, it is possible to identify three further necessary contexts that aided its emergence. All these center to a greater or lesser extent on the practices and concerns of medical geography in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Contexts At that time, the established paradigm within the sub discipline was that of disease ecology. This important perspective had itself emerged in the period between the two world wars and their immediate aftermath. Its focus was very much on disease and death, particularly in fectious disease. It saw disease geographies in terms of the ecologies of the locations where they were prevalent, emphasizing physical as well as social factors. Thus, cli mate and geology played a part in unraveling disease etiology alongside social organization and cultural prac tices. Speciﬁc environmental circumstances were associ ated with individual diseases and with the organisms implicated in disease causation. Given the focus on in fectious diseases, such as malaria, and the relative decline at the time in the prevalence of such diseases in the more developed world, the locus of practice of medical geog raphy tended to be in less developed countries. Undoubtedly disease ecology was and remains an effective approach to the study of disease. It places medical geography in an interesting position at the intersection of physical and human geography. With hindsight it has much to offer regarding insight into re emergent infectious disease in more developed countries while cementing an important commitment to health

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development in the global south. Recent epistemological developments in political ecology and more generally in the study of the interaction of society and nature have provided grounds for integration into mainstream geog raphy. Yet 20 or more years ago disease ecology might arguably be said to have provided one of the three con texts necessary for the emergence of health geography. The rationale for this assertion lies in the practice of disease ecology. First, though it would be unjust, a sim plistic analysis of disease ecology could easily equate it with a naive environmental determinism and an inter esting but rather repetitive mapping and cataloguing of yet more speciﬁc ecologies. Second, when practised ef fectively, disease ecology requires an increasingly un likely facility with advanced knowledge across physical and human geography and into such complex areas as parasitology; its synthetic imperative is both academi cally challenging for the individual and challenging to the increasingly specialist academy. Third, it had limited appeal for researchers conducting work on noninfectious disease; this tended in turn to limit its relevance to re searchers working in less developed settings, though there were important exceptions. Fourth, the concern with disease located the perspective clearly within the medical model despite its considerable concern with the contexts within which disease occurred. Together, these concerns meant that researchers working in human geography contexts in more developed countries, looking to conduct research more locally, and concerned to dis tance themselves from an unfashionable (and unfair) environmental determinism, sought actively to reframe the subdiscipline away from what had long been its dominant paradigm. The second necessary context for the emergence of health geography concerns the rediscovery of inequality in health. This was particularly associated in the UK with a recognition that the state funded comprehensive na tional health service (NHS), made available free at the point of use as part of the post World War II welfare settlement had not resulted in reductions in past vari ations in health status by occupation or other social divisions. Elsewhere the rediscovery was associated with similar crises in conﬁdence in healthcare systems and their health outcomes. Two aspects of the rediscovery of inequality are relevant to the emergence of health geography. First, explanations for inequality were and remain highly contested. At the risk of oversimpliﬁcation, two candidate explanations stressed individual level ex planations: a behavioral thesis linking inequality to the raised prevalence of factors like smoking and poor diet among poorer people, and a more medicalized argument emphasizing processes of social and natural selection. For health geography however, alternative structural ex planations of inequality were more important. These sought to explain health inequalities by way of structural

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divisions in society, notably the constraining effects of differential experiences of poverty on the wider upstream determinants of health. These structural arguments, es poused by most if not all health geographers, fostered an interest in the wider determinants of health; the be havioral arguments led to an interest in how health related behaviors can be affected by structural factors. The interest in health related behaviors steered the focus of interest away from a strict concentration on disease and death. This shift was also evidenced by a growing interest in the nature of health inequality in relation to self rated subjective health and other concepts less directly associ ated with particular diseases or causes of death. The third factor in the initial metamorphosis of medical geography into health geography was the grow ing body of work on healthcare. Interest in the geography of care provision had largely but not exclusively emerged in the period following World War II. The momentum of this research had increased in the late 1960s with the emerging crisis of the welfare state and geography’s rad ical turn. By the mid 1980s the general turn to health identiﬁed earlier was leading healthcare geographers away from a focus on the traditional medical elements in healthcare provision. They turned, on the one hand, toward a more generalized interest in health policy and its spatial aspects, engaging with political geography. Examples would include work on the broad sweep of English NHS policy, its increasing engagement with the private sector, and its implications for the regionalization of a national public service. Other geographers developed an increasing concern with nonmedical aspects of care provision. Examples would include work on care pro vision by volunteers and studies of the geography of complementary/alternative provision. Moments In the decade from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s a series of publications signalled the emergence of health geography and the purported transformation of medical geography into a newer, more contemporary, sub discipline aligned better with mainstream geography and social science. These ‘moments’ built upon the contexts noted above and articulated transformative claims re garding the development of health geography. Early syntheses and developments of the contextual background were evident in two important works from the mid 1980s: Eyles and Woods, The Social Geography of Medicine and Health (1983) and Jones and Moon, Health, Disease and Society (1987). The ﬁrst, essentially an extended monograph, offered a critique of existing approaches to medical geography and sought to move beyond the bio medical to a social model and thus, in accordance with its title, integrate the subdiscipline with social geography. It presented health and particularly healthcare as subject to

a series of constraints: historical, social, and reﬂective of the norms and ambitions of the medical profession. Social justice and the inequities consequent upon differential power positions in the health encounter run motifs throughout the work. Alongside these welfarist notions there was also a strong commitment to a more indi vidualized understanding drawing on experiential, be havioral, and phenomenological approaches. Health, Disease and Society addressed a broader audience and was also more direct and fundamentalist in its posi tion. It brought new ideas to a student audience as well as to researchers. Drawing often on a sometimes rather crude Marxist position, it drew attention to the social production and construction of ill health and articulated a critical perspective on both established epidemiological approaches and on the purpose and direction of health care provision and policy. In the latter case, it too es poused social justice. The key objective was the need to look outside the body and develop an alternative social and environmental perspective on health. Its reception was mixed although it subsequently sold well and con tinues to be a point of reference. For some it was naı¨ve in its radical political stance; for others it was overly se lective in its deconstruction of established perspectives. Overall however it served to introduce novel concepts to a wide audience; putting health rather than medicine at the start of its title was deliberately symbolic. With the book by Eyles and Woods, it codiﬁed the changing nature of the subdiscipline. Early texts represent the ﬁrst moment in the emer gence of health geography. The second moment was a debate in 1994 initiated by Robin Kearns in the journal The Professional Geographer. He advocated a refocusing of the subdiscipline building on a growing interest in the impact of place on health. Work at the time has sought to identify the sociological meaning of place and apply it to health matters through notions such as community or through case studies of the speciﬁcs of health in par ticular places. Kearns’ plea was to take these ideas further through a quantum shift in the focus of medical geog raphy toward a cultural/humanistic standpoint. In this respect he echoed earlier work by behavioral geog raphers and also linked the geography of health into the developments that were at the time beginning to engulf cultural geography. Kearns saw his cultural and humanistic perspective as a route that would lead to a ‘post medical geography of health’ focusing on a broad deﬁnition of health en compassing particularly the ideas of well being and wellness. His post medical challenge drew on behavioral and humanistic geographies and, for some, did not really grasp the more fundamental challenges being laid down by the cultural turn in the social sciences. It lacked a thorough going theorization in the post structuralist sense and missed the opportunity to engage with the then

Health Geography

emerging literature on the sociology of the body. Its humanistic position was certainly a potential direction for study but it carried with it its own limitations. Other critiques were more concerned that Kearns was sug gesting too radical a shift from the still prevailing orthodoxy of medical geography; the notion of a post medical geography signalled a separation from the bio medical model and a deﬁnitive relocation of health geography in the social sciences. For those coming from this more conservative position, Kearns was seeking to move the subdiscipline dangerously far from its tradi tional ground. In particular, it was suggested that his critique could be challenged by drawing on new devel opments in disease ecology and by reference to the applied utility of traditional perspectives for the under standing of disease in less developed settings. A third moment or watershed in the emergence of health geography was the launch of the journal Health and Place in 1995. Though it was always planned as an interdisciplinary journal, drawing work from public health and sociology as well as geography, geographers played the lead role in the development of the journal. The central concern of the new journal was to be studies where place matters with regard to health, healthcare, and health policy. It sought papers that embraced a wider deﬁnition of health, including ideas of wellness and non medicalized forms of healthcare. It also anticipated papers exhibiting both a greater theorization of its subject matter and also a commitment to methodological in novation. In many ways, its launch represented an ex plicit distancing from the concerns that had been traditionally the major outlet for research by medical geographers: Social Science and ‘Medicine.’ In practice the changing nature of research in health geography and in allied disciplines meant that the dis tinctiveness of Health and Place with regard to Social Sci ence and Medicine was never as clear as might have appeared possible in the mid 1990s. From the outset there were strong links between the two journals and, in effect, they came to provide alternative outlets for similar material. Social Science and Medicine opened up to more theorized and less biomedical work while Health and Place, from the outset, tempered its radical aspirations by an nouncing an intention to publish papers employing more traditional approaches alongside a commitment to newer perspectives. Papers published over the succeeding dec ade and more have thus matched a more medical, albeit public health, emphasis, with work on wellness.

The Practice of Health Geography Commentaries prepared for special editions focusing on health geography that have appeared in journals over the past 20 years have been unequivocal in their claims that

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the nature of the subdiscipline has changed and continues to evidence a process of ongoing development. These sentiments are backed by the content of the annual re views of work in the subdiscipline that appear in Progress in Human Geography. The former output has stressed a move away from the separation of health and healthcare geographies and an increased awareness that place mat ters in understanding health outcomes. They have also indicated an enhanced awareness of the impact of dif ference on health, most clearly in bringing in an in creased consideration of gender and impairment. The latter have tended to be framed as agendas for further change rather than statements of record of research conducted over the past year. They have looked outside the subdiscipline, and indeed outside geography itself, at areas in which health geography might frame knowledge or where such a framing had already begun. Examples would include early reviews of work on the epidemi ological transition noting its space–time speciﬁcity, its political implications, and its neglected complexity, and later moves to introduce health geography more effec tively to hitherto little used ideas of embodiment in order to understand better the psycho social context of disability and mental ill health and the emerging use of psycho analytic ideas in geography. Place-Awareness Beyond its concern with a broad post medical conception of health, any assessment of the practice of health geography in the aftermath of the critical moments identiﬁed in the previous section would almost certainly emphasize a focus on the construction of place. Geog raphies of health have demonstrated that a nuanced understanding of the complex nature of place is central to an effective understanding of health and its geo graphical variation. Place has been seen as an experiential construct that is negotiated, ﬂexible, contingent, and so cially constructed; research has sought to move away from seeing place as simply the location where something happens and gets recorded: an unproblematized activity container. This enhanced focus on place has sought to show that ‘places matter’ when it comes to understanding health and healthcare. Three rather different approaches to this objective can be identiﬁed. First, a set of studies have worked with a landscape metaphor. This research, borrowing from both economic and cultural geography, has demonstrated how the production of place speciﬁc landscapes of healthcare can result from an interplay of cultural and politico economic factors. There have been landscapes of despair, landscapes of restructuring, and, most notably, ther apeutic landscapes. These ideas generally refer both to literal localities and also to theorized notions of place constrained and place enabled interactions between

40

Health Geography

history, social structure, and built environment. A second form of place sensitivity is evident in studies using multilevel modeling methods. This work serves as a re minder that health geography need not be qualitative. Broad ideas of health are equally amenable to quantita tive analysis. Multilevel perspectives have been particu larly inﬂuential in the development of the debate over composition and context; they have recognized the hierarchical organization of much of the social back ground to health and enabled assessment of the relative importance of people and place characteristics in bring ing about health outcomes. Critics argue however that the ‘places’ that multilevel models capture have little sociological signiﬁcance and tell us more about data collection strategies than the realities of place effects. A ﬁnal set of place sensitive studies are those grounded in the speciﬁcs of particular localities. These locality studies include work on community responses to threats to health and studies of the place speciﬁc aspects of health service restructuring. They have places ranging in scale from the home to the region as their focus and exhibit epistemological underpinnings drawing on positivist, political–economic, and humanist traditions. Arguably the latter has allowed the most effective contributions, invoking consideration of the experience of both literal place and perceived place in the world. Landscape, multilevel, and locality approaches to place are very different. Landscape approaches come closest to the core ideas of health geography. They are cultural, theoretical, and de medicalized. In Wilbert Gesler’s therapeutic landscapes, health geography has a reasonable claim to have developed an original extension of the landscape metaphor. Multilevel perspectives are perhaps best seen as being an effective but limited quantitative methodology for addressing questions of place. Yet they too provide a clear example of an ap proach to place sensitivity where a development within health geography has had an impact on other parts of the geographical discipline. In locality studies, it is the place where the study is undertaken that is itself important. The extent to which place matters can vary yet is often limited. The evidence thus points to a situation where place, though undoubtedly a focal concept in health geography, is neither unproblematic nor coherently ap plied. Furthermore, the nature of its application has varied over time and space. Landscape approaches came late to the United Kingdom in comparison with multi level perspectives. The reverse happened in New Zea land. A strong tradition of locality studies is evident in Canada. Critical Awareness Alongside place and health, there has also been an as sumption that health geography is in some way more

critical and/or radical than medical geography. A critical perspective might be expected to involve opposition to unequal and oppressive power relations, and a commit ment to social justice. In fact such ideas are often also evident in medical geography, though perhaps less overtly so. In contemporary health geography, the op positional stance is most clearly present in the continuing stream of work on health inequality. Surveys have sug gested that around 20% of papers in Social Science and Medicine and Health and Place by health geographers over a 15 year period were on this theme. It continues as a key research theme, not least through the extension of work on relative inequalities into consideration of health related behavior and subjective health indicators. The subdiscipline’s commitment to social justice and trans formative politics is evident in the reconstruction of healthcare as consumption and patients as consumers. Work on problems of access to healthy food, and on the restructuring of healthcare in rural areas provides ex amples. Nor need a commitment to social justice be evidenced solely at a local scale. The work on health inequalities again provides exempliﬁcation: critical ana lyses of secondary data have been used to challenge discourses of progress and development by national health services. Closely connected to critical awareness has been the gradual shift in the construction of ‘the ﬁeld’ for health geographers. In this sense a subject speciﬁc criticality has been paralleled by an emerging critical methodological stance. To this end there has been a move away from seeing the ﬁeld as a place of study with the researcher as an outsider expert collecting evidence and uninvolved with the lives of those being researched. Feminist scholarship in particular has led some health geographers to recognize their positionality within in the environ ments that are being studied. Work on mental health and on disability has been particularly impacted by this turn. As a consequence, recent cultural geographies of health have less frequently been outsider accounts of the exotic and more often critical interpretations of experiential worlds. A third theme worthy of consideration under the heading of critical awareness concerns the interface of the subdiscipline with medicine. In its early days, the then Medical Geography Study Group of the IBG co opted a medical doctor to assist in building links with clinical medicine. Nowadays, the interest is no longer solely with medicine. Links with other disciplines demonstrating interests in health are seen as equally important. This can be seen as part of the process of de medicalizing health geography. Medicine now sits alongside other disciplines as an equal, not a superior. This process of change is however as much about changes in medicine as it is about changes in geography. Geographers have tended to have a rather outdated view of medicine; the social model of

Health Geography

health has had a signiﬁcant impact on medicine itself. Nor however has the distancing from the medical pro fession been complete; few health geographers would deny that the continuing power of the medical profession can make an element of collaboration a necessity. Sig niﬁcant numbers of papers continue to feature co authors drawn from both medicine and health geography. Perhaps the most appropriate verdict on the critical aspect of health geography is that it is critical lite. There is little evidence of fundamental radical work. In part this can be linked to the close association between health geography and policy. In part it also reﬂects a subversion of the original ambitions for health geography by neo liberal imperatives. The extensive policy changes of the past 20 years have been fertile ground for research and particularly for funded research at a time when public funding for curiosity driven cultural research has not always been high. The need to raise funding for research has, to an extent, driven agendas toward less critical but policy relevant areas. The continuing though reduced links between health geography and medicine can also be seen in terms of ensuring better access to research funds. In competing, often successfully, for such resources, empirical health geography has grown at the expense of criticality. Medical geography always had a strongly utilitarian orientation and the increased proﬁle of health geography in recent years is thus, to an extent a con sequence of maintaining that tradition. Theoretically Aware Disease ecology was and remains a theoretical standpoint that examines the relationship between health and en vironment. Social epidemiology is replete with theore tical assumptions on the nature of causation. There is a long established application of ideas such as central place theory in spatial analytic medical geography and much work in the geography of healthcare pursues welfarist or even Marxist theory. Yet health geography explicitly presents itself as more theoretically aware than medical geography. This claim is in large part a reﬂection of a desire to move away from established theoretical pos itions and embrace new ideas in cultural–social theory as they emerged in the early 1990s. The aim was to position health geography alongside developments elsewhere in geography and in other (social) sciences; geographies of health were, in part at least, medical geography’s cultural turn. A move to sociocultural theory was an issue in The Professional Geographer debate alluded to above and other contemporary work also commented on the relative poverty of social–theoretical engagement in the geog raphy of health. There was a need to recognize the so cial–theoretic context of health and of health related subject matter. Work taking place on the interface

41

between cultural and social geography using the land scape metaphor was particularly drawn to an engagement with theory. For example, research on the landscapes of private medicine sought to theorize consumption and create new understandings of the consumers of com modiﬁed healthcare. Similar links were also evident in research on mental health with the Foucauldian theory being particularly prominent. Other work variously used perspectives derived from interactionist sociology, illness behavior studies, ethics, and queer theory. Recently, writing by geographers working at the permeable edges of health and social geography has remedied a relative lack of engagement with the literature on the body, al though it might have been expected that a shift toward geographies of health would have been accompanied by a greater interest in healthy bodies. Such work is largely conducted outside health geography although there is now an emerging corpus of research from within the subdiscipline on the speciﬁc consequences for health of body adornment, maintenance, inscription, and manage ment. Finally there has been considerable work drawing on theories of risk. This has been evident in research on mental health and environmental health as well as in studies of health related behavior. The espousal of new directions in sociocultural theory was accompanied by substantial theoretical continuities in rather different directions. First, some health geog raphy retained a strong allegiance to positivism. A search for law like regularities was evident in work on place sensitivity using multilevel modeling as well as work on environment–health interactions. It was fostered in the UK by the impact of the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) program of research on health vari ations, which encouraged empirical if not necessarily positivist research. Second, particularly in the healthcare ﬁeld, there was a continued emphasis on welfare theory and notions of equality/inequality and exclusion/ inclusion. In summary, health geography’s engagement with theory was typically diverse but underpinned by a post positivist approach that sought to avoid universal truths. Arguably the key framework employed by health geog raphers to link together these diverse perspectives has been the structuration theory. This has the capacity to integrate people and places as well as the local and the global, and facilitates generalization outward from microlevel case studies. It can also be used to confront perhaps the key challenge facing future theorized health geographies – the incorporation of time. To confront this challenge health geography is now moving beyond snapshot studies of single periods of time toward re peated cross sections and genuinely longitudinal studies. Though the terminology is quantitative, the method ology need not be: while multilevel modeling has been used to examine self reported health over time, there

42

Health Geography

have also been studies of individual’s trajectories through care systems and their journeys to care. Case Studies Two case studies serve to exemplify current work in health geography. The ﬁrst takes a quantitative approach to a topic central to the broad de medicalized approach to health – the geography of smoking. The second is more qualitative and is arguably the focal concept within the geography of health – therapeutic landscapes.

Geographies of smoking

Smoking is a health related behavior. Few would dispute its effects on health. It exempliﬁes the move within health geography away from the study of disease and death. Its reduction is of central importance to health promotion and to the promotion of enhanced population health. It is measurable in a quantitative sense, albeit in many dif ferent ways and with variable precision and accuracy, and is thus amenable to statistical modeling. A signiﬁcant body of work has used smoking as an outcome variable in multilevel models that have sought to unpack the relative importance of composition (individual characteristics) and context (place characteristics) as factors inﬂuencing levels of smoking and the likelihood of smoking. Other work has explored the effect of ethnic segregation on smoking. Turning ﬁrst to the multilevel work, debate has cen tered on whether the character of places plays an in dependent role in shaping individual smoking behavior. Smoking behavior has to be understood not only in terms of individual characteristics, but also in relation to local cultures. To operationalize the structuration theory in a quantitative framework it is essential to recognize that places matter, and the context in which behavior takes place is important both for understanding and for sub sequent policy development. At the small area scale, particular attention has focused on whether neighbor hood deprivation can predict an individual’s smoking status independent of that person’s individual demo graphic characteristics (age, sex, etc.). Results suggest that measures of neighborhood deprivation have an in dependent effect on individual smoking status even when account is taken of a large range of individual charac teristics, both as main effects and interactions. This suggests that the character of the local neighborhood plays a role in shaping smoking behavior. Early multi level work in both the UK and Sweden challenged this conclusion but subsequent studies demonstrated that place effects, as least as revealed within an extended multilevel framework, are complex, operating at multiple scales and reﬂecting interactions between people and place characteristics. Further work extending such

analyses has enabled the calculation of small area esti mates of smoking (and drinking) behavior (Figure 2). Work on smoking and ethnic segregation in New Zealand has focused on understanding the considerable differences between Pakeha (New Zealanders of Euro pean origin) and Maori smoking prevalences. Initial work tested is a generalization of the thesis that the greater a nation’s income inequality, the poorer the average na tional health status. Analysis of Maori and Pakeha smoking rates from the 1996 New Zealand census dis aggregated by gender and rural–urban location revealed that relative social inequality between Maori and Pakeha had an independent effect on Maori smoking rates after controlling for absolute levels of inequality. Pakeha smoking rates in contrast were more sensitive to vari ations in absolute deprivation. The effect of inequality was greatest for Maori women, especially among urban residents. By contrast, among Maori men the effects were greatest in rural areas. A multilevel analysis of the same data conﬁrmed the importance of ethnicity and depriv ation but challenged crude stereotypes about the ap parent geography of smoking, suggesting that, places with high levels of smoking were less high than might be expected given the socio demographic composition of the areas concerned. Subsequent work incorporated a temporal dimension. While Maori smoking rates de clined between 1981 and 1996, the gap in smoking levels between Maori and Pakeha increased; Pakeha were more inclined to quit smoking. This suggests that levels of social inequality between Maori and Pakeha during what was a period of considerable economic decline, had an independent effect on Maori smoking rates and that communities which experienced increased social in equality during both the 1980s and 1990s were more likely to have higher Maori smoking rates. Therapeutic landscapes

The initial development of the idea of the therapeutic landscape by Wil Gesler in 1992 sought to expand the meaning of the concept of landscape as employed at the time in cultural geography. Certain places were per ceived to be beneﬁcial to health. What were in effect experiential, even spiritual, place effects built on hu manist and psychological conceptions of sense of place and the symbolic value of particular environments (Table 1). Research on therapeutic landscapes has made a signiﬁcant contribution to unpacking the role of place in health and is central to the development of health geography in its focus on positive aspects of health such as wellness and well being. A fuller entry is available elsewhere in this work. Here the basic contribution of the idea is outlined. Early work explored some of the more obvious set tings where health and place are perceived to interact in this therapeutic way. Examples would include Gesler’s

Health Geography

43

Northern Yorkshire Trent Anglia Regional health authority

NW Thames NE Thames SE Thames SW Thames Wessex Oxford South West W Midlands Mersey North West

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Figure 2 Multilevel estimates of (a) smoking and (b) drinking prevalences in England. From Twigg, L., Moon, G. and Jones, K. (2000). Predicting small-area health-related behaviour: A comparison of smoking and drinking indicators. Social Science and Medicine 50, 1109 1120.

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Health Geography

Table 1

Exemplifying the humanistic foundation of therapeutic landscapes: The case of holistic medicine

Concept

Health applications

Association with holistic medicine

Symbolic landscapes Importance of meaning, value, and experience Sense of place

Medical semiotics Medical beliefs

*Basic element in therapy, for example, the aboriginal medicine wheel *Incorporation of individual and/or cultural belief systems, for example, new age practices *Belief that environment holds meaning, signiﬁcance, and felt value, for example, planned home-birthing *Formation of environments through human networks of care, for example, aboriginal hospitals and birthing centers *Imagery used in accessing healing environments, for example, visualization *Interpretation of health conditions, for example, art therapy

Authentic and unauthentic landscapes Landscapes of the mind Hermeneutics/landscapes as text

Psychological rootedness Caring environments Fields of care Tapping into the sensory experience

From Williams, A. (1998). Therapeutic landscapes in holistic medicine. Social Science and Medicine 46, 1193 1203.

own works on Epidauros (Greece), Bath (UK), and Lourdes (France), sites of secular or spiritual pilgrimage associated with healing springs. Later work signiﬁcantly extended this focus. The home/dwelling has been pre sented as not only a dwelling space but also a place with multiple meanings: shelter, belonging, security, privacy, and so on. Informal care giving is performed in this spatial context and enhanced by it under certain con ditions. Further increases in the diversity of subject matter being constructed as a therapeutic landscape have seen studies ranging on wilderness and healthcare facil ities and reﬂection on the symbolic importance of ther apeutic landscapes, and their relevance for different social groups in terms of access, behavioral expectations, and normative deﬁnitions of therapeutic. Foucault’s no tion of governmentality has been applied in a study of an alcohol and drug addiction recovery centre, understood simultaneously as a site for recovery and for the sur veillance and governance of health related conduct. Other work has seen gardens framed as therapeutic landscapes. Gardening, it is argued, functions both as a leisure activity and as a way of harnessing the healing power of nature for emotional, physical, and spiritual renewal. Particular attention has been paid to communal gardening and gardening by older people. At the other end of the age spectrum, children’s health camps in New Zealand have been deconstructed as therapeutic land scapes where child and family welfare is enhanced but where changing understandings of health and children have been closely linked with changing perceptions of what is therapeutic. The key lesson from these last two examples is that settings are not intrinsically therapeutic; they are experienced in very different ways by different people at different stages in the life cycle and reﬂect both shared interpretations of place and personal con structions of self in place. Nor is research on therapeutic landscapes limited to developed, western settings. Research in Gambia has considered the way in which indigenous medical beliefs and practices highlight the importance of place, and cultural symbiosis between indigenous health and the

local environment is presented as a particular type of therapeutic landscape. Elsewhere the idea of the ther apeutic landscape has also been used to demonstrate the importance of places for maintaining physical, emotional, mental, and spiritual health among First Nations people in North America. Finally, a small body of research has stepped completely out of the real world and traced the therapeutic landscapes evident in ﬁction, in the tuber culosis sanatoria of Thomas Mann’s Magic Mountain, in the anti therapeutic wanderings of Holden Caulﬁeld in Salinger’s The Catcher in the Rye, and the allegorical re demptive landscapes of Balzac’s Country Doctor.

Conclusion What’s in a name? Without dwelling overly on what health/medical geographers have actually done, an en during debate has been that the name does not really matter. Health geography and medical geography are virtually indistinguishable. Some geographers prefer one name, some the other; many interchange at will without much concern for the type of work that they are doing, and several inﬂuential geographers study health (and disease) and are unimpressed by either label. Yet, as discussed above, there were clear differences in intent when health geography ﬁrst emerged as a terminology and, though it is by no means clear cut, there is a real sense in which health geography when practised in its purist form has broken away from disease and death and focused upstream on broader deﬁnitions of health and wellness. The diversity of interests within contemporary health geography is marked in comparison with the medical geography of the past with its stress on disease ecology and, more lately, disease mapping and healthcare provision. Of course medical geography has also changed and continues sitting alongside the novelties in the ongoing joint project to reinvigorate geographical studies of health and healthcare. It is tempting to conclude by seeing health geography as a project in the cultural sense of the

Health Geography

term. While some deﬁne themselves as within the project, others do not. The endeavors of all, however, contribute to the reinvention of the subdiscipline. Even those op posed to the tenets of the project, those effec tively within the old project of medical geography, beneﬁt from the enhanced visibility that the articulation of the new health geography project brings. Through innovative developments in method (e.g., multilevel modeling) and theory (e.g. therapeutic landscapes), health geography has metaphorically put itself on the map within both geog raphy and the wider health social sciences with regard to the understanding of place/health relations. What directions might future health geographies take? As yet it is clear that health geography is a work in progress. Much of the early ambition is yet to be realized and concepts require further clariﬁcation, development, and replication. The commitment to a broad upstream approach to health is the cornerstone for further work. Thus it is reasonable to expect a continued focus on health related behavior, self assessed health, and the de medicalization of care, particularly with regard to the emotions and psyche. Beyond this a small selection of issues needing further work includes: 1. the incorporation of a temporal dimension to analyses of place effects on health; 2. a thoroughgoing deconstruction of ideas of social capital and their impact on health; 3. placing health in a critical economic context, con sidering, for example, the role of the food industry in the promotion of health; and 4. seeking further sophistication in multilevel models while paying heed to data limitations and addressing the need for enhanced sociological meaning. See also: Body, The; Care/Caregiving; Disability and Chronic Illness; Disease Diffusion; Emotional

45

Geographies; Environmental Hazards; Health Inequalities; Housing, Neighborhoods and Health; Medical Geography; Mental Health; Social Capital, Place and Health; Therapeutic Landscapes; Wellbeing.

Further Reading Dorn, M. and Laws, G. (1994). Social theory, body politics, and medical geography: Extending Kearns’ invitation. The Professional Geographer 46, 106 110. Duncan, C., Jones, K. and Moon, G. (1998). Context, composition and heterogeneity: Using multilevel models in health research. Social Science and Medicine 46, 97 118. Eyles, J. and Woods, K. (1983). The Social Geography of Medicine and Health. London: Croom Helm. Gesler, W. M. (1992). Therapeutic landscapes: Medical issues in light of the new cultural geography. Social Science and Medicine 34, 735 746. Gesler, W. M. and Kearns, R. A. (2002). Culture/Place/Health. London and New York: Routledge. Jones, K. and Moon, G. (1987). Health, Disease and Society: A Critical Medical Geography. London: RKP. Kearns, R. A. (1993). Place and health: Towards a reformed medical geography. The Professional Geographer 45, 139 147. Kearns, R. A. and Moon, G. (2002). From medical to health geography: Novelty, place and theory after a decade of change. Progress in Human Geography 26, 605 625. Mayer, J. D. and Meade, M. S. (1994). A reformed medical geography reconsidered. The Professional Geographer 46, 103 106. McIntyre, S., McIver, S. and Sooman, A. (1993). Area, class and health: Should we be focussing on people or places? Journal of Social Policy 22, 213 234. McKeown, T. (1979). The Role of Medicine: Dream, Mirage or Nemesis (2nd edn.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Moon, G. (1995). (Re)placing research on health and health care. Health and Place 1, 1 4. Parr, H. (2002). Medical geography: Diagnosing the body in medical and health geography, 1999 2000. Progress in Human Geography 26, 240 251. Smith, S. and Easterlow, D. (2005). The strange geography of health inequalities. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 30, 173 190. Williams, A. (ed.) (1999). Therapeutic Landscapes: The Dynamic between Wellness and Place. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Health Inequalities D. Dorling, University of Shefﬁeld, Shefﬁeld, UK R. Mitchell, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK S. Orford, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK M. Shaw, Bristol University, Bristol, UK H. Tunstall, University of York, York, UK & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Common Identity It refers to similar residential location, occupation status, income, or similar trait of social signiﬁcance. Equality The quality of being the same in quantity, or measure, or value, or status. Health Inequalities The lack of equality between the health status of social groups of people. Home Counties Some of the most areas in Britain around Greater London where colonial ofﬁcers in the past often returned home to. Social Group A set of people that have some common identity. Social Signiﬁcance It is of importance to the organization of people that is not expressly stated but can be inferred – for instance in relation to health inequalities.

age to differences in the degrees of well being measured in social surveys.

Measurement To understand them, health inequalities need to be quantiﬁed or else they will remain a purely abstract notion. There are many ways in which health inequalities can be measured numerically. Researchers are beginning to conclude that the best way is to use the Slope Index of Inequality (SII) for measuring absolute differences be tween the status of groups and the Relative Index of Inequality (RII) for measuring relative differences. Low and Low provide more details on these measures. Note that the difference between absolute and relative is not simple when measuring health inequalities because some measures – such as life expectancy – do not lend them selves to be easily categorized. Furthermore, what is worth more: 10 years of life from age 80, or 5 years from age 40?

Introduction Health inequalities, as one government minister in Brit ain recently stated, are ‘the most important inequalities of all’. In the United States of America there remains great confusion and the rather more innocuous term ‘variation’ is often used. For instance typing ‘health in equalities deﬁnition’ into Google in May 2006 produces: This is the term commonly used in Europe to indicate the virtually universal phenomenon of variation of health by socioeconomic status, that is poorer people have poorer health. In the US, there is no single such term, and instead it is referred to as the socioeconomic status and health relationship. (http://depts.washington.edu/ eqhlth/pages/academic resources/glossary.html; accessed April 2009)

Health inequalities are essentially a lack of equality between the health status of social groups of people, where social groups have a common identity such as similar residential location, occupational status, income, ethnic group, or other similar trait of social signiﬁcance. These inequalities can be found in many types of health status ranging from the chances of dying at a particular

46

Social Inequalities Health inequalities are partly a reﬂection of social in equalities more widely deﬁned. They also greatly con tribute to those inequalities. Illness prevents millions of working age people from working in afﬂuent countries and is often the precursor to absolute destitution and premature mortality in poorer countries. Nowhere can such inequalities be justiﬁed as emphasized by the dead body of a child at the foot of Figure 1. The health inequalities suggested by this poster per sist and are found across the social hierarchy. Health inequalities are not only a reﬂection of the poor health of the most disadvantaged people but also the apparently limitless health beneﬁts associated with rising socio economic status. Most analysis of the associations be tween health and socioeconomic status suggests there is no threshold at which greater individual socioeconomic status is no longer associated with greater health. Even when people within high socioeconomic status groups in developed countries are compared, those with higher relative socioeconomic status have better health. For example, a long running analysis of British civil servants,

Health Inequalities

47

Figure 1 Pyramid of the capitalist system.

the ‘Whitehall Studies’, has found that employment grade among these professionals is a strong predictor of health outcomes across all levels of their hierarchy.

Income Inequalities One current debate concerning the causes of health in equalities in rich nations is the extent to which such inequalities are a reﬂection of income inequalities. It is argued that health inequalities are not simply reducible to income inequalities and that they may also be further exacerbated by them. (See the article by Wilkinson and Pickett in the ‘Further reading’ section and Figure 2 for an example of the possible contextual effects of income inequality.) In Figure 2, metropolitan areas of the United States are categorized by their average per capita income into four quartile groups; the relationship with mortality is such that higher income is associated with lower

mortality rates, although the relationship is not linear as the rates for the lowest income group (green) are actually higher than those for the 2nd quartile (blue). When in come inequality is also considered, we can see that within all income quartiles higher income inequality is associ ated with higher death rates. Hence, it is not only abso lute income that matters for health, but also the distribution of income within society.

Area Inequalities Stark inequalities are found when comparing health be tween different countries. See the ‘Further reading’ sec tion and especially the WHO The World Health Report and its annex for many of the statistics of inequality worldwide. A signiﬁcant amount of research from geography, epidemiology, and public health shows that where people live greatly affects their health outcomes. This work also includes comparisons of inequalities within regions of the

48

Health Inequalities Income inequality and mortality in 282 metropolitan areas of the United States 950 944.9 pulation 0 000 po te per 10 Death ra

930

925.8

910

923.7 897.5

890

879.2

895.5

870 877.3

850

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830 850.5

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829.2

790 770 750

1st (low)

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812.8

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3rd 3rd

Income inequality (quartiles)

785.9

Per capital income (quartiles)

4th (high)

2nd 1st (low)

Figure 2 Income inequality and mortality in the United States. Source: Lynch, J. W., Kaplan, G .A., Pamuk, E. R. et al. (1998) Income inequality and mortality in metropolitan areas of the United States. American Journal of Public Health 88(7), 1074 1080.

world, reports of within country inequalities in health outcomes, and inequalities in health outcomes within speciﬁc localities. Geographical studies have historically concerned themselves with the spread of infectious diseases or the possibly harmful effects of proximity to potentially health damaging sites of pollution exposure. However, in recent years more research has focused upon chronic diseases. This is mainly because chronic diseases are the main cause of premature death within afﬂuent countries and afﬂuent countries fund almost all research on chronic diseases. The key exception has been HIV/AIDS re search upon which funding was concentrated until it was realized that the pandemic was unlikely to have its worse consequences within rich nations. Geographical analysis of health has to deal with methodological uncertainties as well as social and political priorities. Methodological uncertainties are caused by issues of ecological fallacy, scale, the modiﬁable areal unit problem (MAUP), and spatial autocorrelation. The eco logical fallacy refers to problems inherent in the inference of group or area characteristics as individual. An example of this would be to assume that in an area of high levels of illness containing many teenage mothers, that teenage mothers in that area will have high levels of illness. There are also issues of scale that need to be born in mind when considering health inequalities. These are related to both the size of the units of analysis – whether

they are local, regional, or national – and to aspects of the MAUP referring to the choice of such units and how this reﬂects the relations observed. Spatial autocorrelation simply refers to the fact that many phenomena are spa tially dependent – ill people tend to be located near other ill people. All these issues can be summarized as (1) making assumptions about people given their locality, (2a) being concerned about the size of places in studies, or (2b) how places are constructed, and (3) how they are interrelated. Recently, methodological debate has revolved around research seeking to separate ‘area effects’ from those ‘compositional’ effects of simply aggregate population characteristics. The debate over the importance of in come inequalities referred to above is one example of such research. Often the statistical technique of multi level modeling has been used. Unfortunately, charac teristics of places are typically distilled in this kind of analysis to simply a few limited variables; ‘area effects’ are sometimes not obvious and when found, tend to be small. This analysis of ‘area effects’ frequently fails to conceptualize ‘area’ – is it home, street, neighborhood, workspace, society, or where? Also, what is meant by ‘effects’ is often left ambiguous – what are the causal pathways by which place effects health? Place is often considered a black box (of varying sizes and shapes) in which unidentiﬁable ‘nonindividual’ processes take place.

Health Inequalities

Spatial Sorting Geographical inequalities in health can be exacerbated by spatial sorting. That is, if the population migrates in such a way that people with better health move toward areas where better health is enjoyed and those with poor health remain, then health inequalities between areas will grow, especially over the course of many years. Figure 3 shows an image of the propensity of people to migrate by social class between different parts of Britain a generation ago. The map in Figure 3 shows all the main migratory ﬂows that occurred between the wards of England and Wales between the years 1980 and 1981. A line is drawn between any wards between which individuals and

49

families moved and the width of that line is drawn in proportion to the number of people who moved. A population cartogram is used as the base map and thus the amount of color is proportional to the numbers mi grating. The lines are colored according to the main social class of those moving: blue for afﬂuent toward red for poor. The blue lines tend to be longest – for instance, from around the Home Counties down to the Southwest of England as generally healthier afﬂuent retirement migration ﬂowed. Often the red and orange lines are constrained within the boundaries of what are local au thorities as many people moved then within what was called council housing – and did not leave their borough upon retirement if they could not afford to.

Figure 3 Yearly migration ﬂows in population space by occupation, England and Wales 1981 (color, wax crayon original, cut by computer).

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Health Inequalities

Conclusion Health inequalities are the most important inequalities of all. Inequalities are best studied through numerical measurement. Discussion of inequalities in the abstract is an interesting area of philosophy to which geographers can contribute little. A few researchers with geographical backgrounds contribute to the debate on health in equalities. Despite its importance, the vast majority of well referenced work on geographical health inequalities is not produced under the auspices of the study of geography. Thus, if you want to learn more about the geography of inequalities in health, it is important not to constrain yourself to searching the geographical literature. See also: Health and Development; Health Geography; Migration.

Further Reading Curtis, S. (2004). Health and Inequality: Geographical Perspectives. London: Sage. Davey, S. G., Dorling, D., Mitchell, R. and Shaw, M. (2002). Health inequalities in Britain: Continuing increases up to the end of the 20th century. Journal of Epidemiology Community Health 56, 434 435. Davey, S. G., Dorling, D. and Shaw, M. (2001). Poverty, Inequality and health in Britain: 1800 2000 A Reader. Bristol: Policy Press. Donkin, A., Goldblatt, P. and Lynch, K. (2002). Inequalities in life expectancy by social class, 1972 1999. Health Statistics Quarterly 15(autumn), 5 15. Dorling, D. (ed.) (2007). Health, in Compass Closer to equality? Assessing New Labour’s record on equality after 10 years in government. London: Compass. http://clients.squareeye.com/ uploads/compass/closer%20to%20equality.pdf Dorling, D., Shaw, M. and Davey, S. G. (2006). HIV and global health: Global inequality of life expectancy due to AIDS. BMJ 332, 662 664. Low, A. and Low, A. (2004). Measuring the gap: Quantifying and comparing local inequalities. Journal of Public Health 26, 388 395. Lynch, J. W., Smith, G. D., Kaplan, G. A. and House, J. S. (2000). Income inequality and mortality: Importance to health of individual income, psychosocial environment, or material conditions. BMJ 320, 1200 1204. Mackenback, J. P. (2006) Health Inequalities: Europe in Proﬁle, Independent report commissioned by the UK Presidency of the EU (http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kﬁle/HI EU Proﬁle,0.pdf).

Moser, K., Shkolnikov, V. and Leon, D. (2005). World mortality 1950 2000: Divergence replaces convergence from the late 1980s. Bulletin of the World Health Organisation 83, 202 209. Nakaya, T. and Dorling, D. (2005). Geographical inequalities of mortality by income in two developed island countries: A cross national comparison of Britain and Japan. Social Science and Medicine 60, 12, 2865 2875. Pearce, J. and Dorling, D. (2006). Increasing geographical inequalities in health in New Zealand, 1980 2001. International Journal of Epidemiology 35, 597 603. Shaw, M., Davey, S. G. and Dorling, D. (2005). Health inequalities and new labour: How the promises compare with real progress. BMJ 330, 1016 1021. Shaw, M., Dorling, D., Gordon, D. and Davey, S. G. (1999). The Widening Gap: Health Inequalities and Policy in Britain. Bristol: Policy Press. Shaw, M., Orford, S., Brimblecombe, N. et al. (2000). Widening inequality in mortality between 160 regions of 15 countries of the European Union. Social Science and Medicine 50, 1047 1058. Singh, G. K. and Siahpush, M. (2006). Widening socioeconomic inequalities in US life expectancy, 1980 2000. International Journal Epidemiology 35, 969 979. Tunstall, H. V. Z., Shaw, M. and Dorling, D. (2004). Places and health. Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 58, 6 10. Wagstaff, A., Paci, P. and Van Doorslaer, E. (1991). On the measurement of inequalities health. Social Science and Medicine 33, 545 557. Wilkinson, R. (2005). The Impact of Inequality: How to Make Sick Societies Healthier. New York: The New Press. Wilkinson, R. G. and Pickett, K. E. (2006). Income inequality and population health: A review and explanation of the evidence. Social Science and Medicine 62, 1768 1784. World Health Organization (1985). Targets for Health for All. Copenhagen: World Health Organization. World Health Organization (1998). Health in Europe 1997. Copenhagen: World Health Organization (www.euro.who.int/ document/e60594.pdf). World Health Organization (2006). The World Health Report 2006 Working Together for Health, Copenhagen: World Health Organization (http://www.who.int/whr/2006/whr06 en.pdf).

Relevant Websites www.euro.who.int The WHO; health in Europe (1997). http://www.who.int The WHO The World Health Report and its annex the statistics of inequality worldwide. depts.washington.edu UW Departments Web Server. www.worldmapper.org Worldmapper.

Health Services Restructuring T. Brown, Queen Mary University of London, London, UK & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Consumerism It refers to the commodiﬁcation of the healthcare landscape and to the recasting of patients as active consumers able to make informed choices. Determinism The idea that health service restructuring was/is determined by economic necessity, advances in bureaucratic philosophy, and/or by technological developments. Developmentalism The belief that health service restructuring is an inevitable process that occurs in evolutionary waves. Keynesianism It dominated the post-war model of welfare, offering a basic level of service provision to those unable to purchase services privately. Neoliberalism It refers to a political–economic philosophy that rejects government intervention and emphasizes the role of the individual. Sense of Place It refers both to the intrinsic characteristics of a place and to the emotional attachment/detachment that people experience in relation to a speciﬁc place. Voluntarism It refers to the role played by voluntary organizations in the provision of health and social care services.

Introduction During the twentieth century, there were several phases of health system restructuring. The ﬁrst saw the estab lishing of national healthcare and social insurance sys tems, throughout the 1940s and 1950s in the most advanced industrialized societies and somewhat later, if at all, in poorer countries. Following this was a phase of exceptional growth, both in terms of the range of healthcare services provided and the percentage of the total population covered by social insurance schemes. However, it is generally accepted that health services restructuring refers to the widespread reexamination of, and reform to, such healthcare provision following the global economic slowdown of the mid 1970s. Framed by a broader ideological debate about the relationship be tween the State, the market, and civil society, this reex amination raised questions about the sustainability of healthcare systems which were characterized by their ever increasing cost to the national economies. The latter understanding is reﬂected in the World Health Organization’s (WHO) deﬁnition of restructuring

as a process that involves a ‘‘purposive effort to improve the performance of the health care system.’’ According to this characterization, restructuring is presented as a technical response to system inefﬁciencies, the most not able of which was the inability to contain costs. While this may be the case, such a deﬁnition gives very little indi cation of the complexity that surrounds the question of health services restructuring. In particular, it does not account for the prevailing conditions that inﬂuence the organization, structure, and subsequent reform of health care systems across the globe. Given this, a much broader deﬁnition is preferred, one which recognizes restructuring as a range of economic, political, and social changes that vary across nations and have transformative effects on the people and places within which they occur.

Explanations As indicated, health services restructuring can be viewed as a response to the increased ﬁnancial pressure being placed upon national economies. A good indicator of this pressure is provided by the amount of a nation’s gross domestic product (GDP) that is consumed by healthcare. In 1948, the average total expenditure on healthcare was 3% of GDP; by 1970 many of the Organization of Eco nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries were spending nearly 5% of GDP, and by 1980 this ﬁgure had risen to over 7% (see Table 1). When set against a backdrop of global ﬁnancial slowdown in the 1970s and early 1980s, it is perhaps understandable that many na tions began to question the affordability of their health care systems. Of particular concern was the recognition that this ﬁnancial pressure was unlikely to relent: tech nological and pharmaceutical innovation, demographic changes, most notably an aging population, and the perceived inefﬁciency of the service sector economy all ﬁgured in the governmental calculations. For those employing a deterministic logic, the model of healthcare restructuring that has followed is shaped by this apparent crisis in welfare provision. In this under standing, the introduction of market oriented reforms, about which more will be said later in this article, are presented as a technical response to the problems pre sented by the rising costs of healthcare systems. Other commentators employ a developmentalist approach, suggesting that the changes that can be witnessed, not just within OECD countries but in countries as diverse as Argentina, Brazil, Russia, Tanzania, and Zambia, are more akin to a convergence of ideas, attitudes, and values

51

52

Health Services Restructuring

Table 1

Total expenditure on healthcare in OECD countries as a percent of trend GDP, 1970 2000

OECD countries Australia Austria Belgium Canada Czech Republic Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Slovak Republic Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States OECD point average

1970

1980

1990

1992

1997

2000

7.9 7.6 7.9 9.4 5.4 8.3 8.3 9.1 10.1 7.9 7.7 7.7 6.9 8.3 6.3 4.7 6.2 5.4 8.5 7.2 9.3 6.6 7.2 7.2 8.0 9.5 3.8 6.6 12.6 7.8

8.7 7.5 8.3 8.6 7.1 8.3 7.1 9.1 10.5 9.3 7.0 8.2 6.5 7.7 7.0 5.0 5.9 5.4 8.2 7.5 9.7 6.1 8.6 5.9 7.2 8.0 10.2 4.2 6.8 13.0 7.9

9.2 7.9 8.7 9.2 7.1 8.4 6.8 9.4 10.7 9.3 6.7 9.6 6.8 8.2 7.7 5.9 5.6 5.6 8.9 8.0 10.3 6.0 9.2 5.7 7.5 8.6 10.7 2.0 7.3 13.2 8.2

8.0

9.1 6.4

6.4

8.8 7.0

3.7

6.5 8.7

4.6

6.5

3.6

5.9

6.9 4.7

7.5 6.1 8.7

2.5

5.6

7.7 7.2 7.6 9.0 5.0 8.4 8.1 8.7 8.8 7.4 7.1 8.0 6.4 8.1 6.1 4.8 6.1 4.5 8.2 6.7 8.7 5.3 6.4

5.1 8.9 7.8 3.3 5.5 8.5 7.1

6.8 8.5 8.9 3.6 6.2 11.8 7.4

4.1 3.6 6.3

7.2 2.4 4.5 6.8 5.1

7.5 7.7 6.6

Source: OECD (2004). Towards High Performing Health Systems: Policy Studies. Paris: OECD.

related to the most efﬁcient and effective way of de livering and paying for healthcare. While both ap proaches reveal general patterns within countries and demonstrate the associations that exist between them, they acknowledge neither the importance of broader ideological debates nor the speciﬁc health policy arena within which change occurs. A useful illustration of the latter point can be found in the Clinton administration’s attempts to reform the US healthcare system in the early 1990s. The need for re form is demonstrated both by the proportion of the population that was uninsured, which by 1990 had reached approximately 13% or 33.4 million people, and by the total expenditure on healthcare as a percentage of GDP, which was 12.1% or $666 billion only a year later. Clinton’s Health care plan sought to remedy both issues simultaneously, by implementing a national health insur ance scheme and by introducing government structured market competition. Yet, the plan for a national insurance scheme ﬂoundered in Congress and the ensuing intro duction of managed care, which has been characterized as a form of ‘unmanaged competition’, was implemented by employers rather than the State. What this example highlights, is the need to recognize that restructuring is

not simply a technical response but one that is inﬂuenced by an array of actors operating within a particular healthcare landscape. The above illustration also reveals that such change is ideologically and politically mediated. For many com mentators, contemporary restructuring debates have been inﬂuenced by the neoliberal ideology of the New Right; according to which the once dominant Keynesian model of welfare provision is regarded as overly bur eaucratic, inﬂexible, and inefﬁcient because of its reliance on the State. Fostered under the Reaganite and Thatch erite administrations of the late 1970s and 1980s, the anticollectivist principles of neoliberalism have resulted in quite a substantial change across the healthcare sector. For example, in countries such as the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Russia, there has been a shift toward the principles of market competition as the most effective mechanism for controlling costs and delivering efﬁcient and ﬂexible healthcare services. This shift is not limited to advanced, industrial economies, for such is the dom inance of neoliberalist ideology that international or ganizations (such as the WHO) measure the performance of national healthcare systems according to the extent to which they have adopted a market oriented approach.

Health Services Restructuring

Key Features

53

Generic explanations are limited with regard to their ability to account for change taking place within indi vidual national contexts. The same argument could, of course, be made for explanations that focus entirely on ideological matters. Yet there are key features that are shared in some way by countries experiencing re structuring of their healthcare systems. This section highlights three of these: decentralization, neoliberal market reform, and consumerism.

provide more appropriate and better quality care. Al though there is some international evidence that de centralization can be closely tied to democratization, particularly in Bossert’s analysis of the ‘developing’ world, there is less evidence that it leads to better quality healthcare. Moreover, the commitment to decentral ization as a means of countering the democratic deﬁcit and bringing the decision making process ‘closer to the people’ has, in some instances, resulted in the loss of other forms of democratic accountability; most notably of locally elected individuals or bodies.

Decentralization

Neoliberal Market Reform

Decentralization is deﬁned by Rondinelli as the ‘‘transfer of authority and responsibility for public functions from the central government to subordinate or quasi independent government organizations or the private sector.’’ As might be anticipated, the rationale for such a process varies both in time and space. For example, in many Latin American countries decentralization is re garded as an essential component of democratization. This might be contrasted to the situation in the countries of the former Soviet Union where decentralization has occurred on an ad hoc basis due to the rapid decline of the previous centralized regime or to some South East Asian countries where decentralization is to some extent mo tivated by the need to improve service delivery to large populations. Whatever the rationale, the concept of de centralization has become a key feature of healthcare restructuring. Initially, decentralization was associated with the re organization of the centralized administrative functions found in many healthcare systems. In opposition to the principal tenets of Weberian bureaucracy, this form of decentralization sought to replace the apparent rigidity of such top down systems with more ﬂexible ones that foster a managerial or entrepreneurial ethos and allow for greater operational authority and responsibility at dif fering hierarchical levels. One framework for character izing the various features of this process is Rodinelli’s, which identiﬁes four different types of decentralization: de concentration – the shift of administrative authority to regional or district ofﬁces; delegation – the transfer of responsibility to semiautonomous agencies; devolution – the creation or strengthening of subnational units of government; and, privatization – the transfer of re sponsibility to the voluntary or private sectors. As noted above, such attempts to remove the ad ministrative distance that exists between the various tiers of a healthcare system and the population that it serves are also closely allied to a broader concern with dem ocratization. The argument here is that locally account able administrative structures, especially those which encourage individual and community participation,

The question of neoliberal market reform emerged as an important feature of international healthcare restructuring debates in the 1990s. Ideologically driven, the suggestion was that the introduction of healthcare markets would result in greater effectiveness and efﬁciency because of the downward economic pressures generated through com petition. Before exploring this in more detail, it is im portant to note that the market being referred to here is not the classic free market; in part, because it was widely acknowledged that the free market is not necessarily conducive to a strategy of cost containment. Rather, what emerged as an alternative to the free market was the quasi market, often used synonymously with the internal and planned markets. Such markets were created through the exercise of state power, were carefully managed, and were closely aligned with the process of decentralization. There were antecedents to the quasi market. How ever, it was the ideological commitment to neoliberalism, alongside the reforms to the management and structure of healthcare systems, which provided a platform for the more extensive introduction of the internal market in the mid 1990s. These experiments in market competition, which drew heavily on Enthoven’s notion of managed care being developed in the US, were characterized by the attempt to exert pressure on costs by introducing contracts between healthcare providers and purchasers. In New Zealand, as in the UK, this was achieved through the separation of the purchaser and provider functions, where newly established purchasing bodies contracted for care from public, private, and voluntary sector pro viders. The signiﬁcance of this maneuver is highlighted in Figures 1a and 1b, which illustrate the close associ ation between decentralization and the implementation of quasi market reforms in this period. Figure 1a reveals the organizational structure of the New Zealand healthcare system in 1989. This model was established in the mid 1980s and reﬂects the desire of the newly elected Labor government to decentralize health services through the introduction of area health boards (AHB), which were organized around at least one large district hospital and were responsible for secondary and

54

Health Services Restructuring

Minister of Health

Advisory committee

Department of Health

Entitlements

Agreements

Private providers e.g., general practitioners

Agreements

Voluntary sector

14 area health boards

(a) National Health Committee

Advice Minister of Health

Annual funding agreement

Ministry of Health

Liaison

Minister of Crown Health Enterprises

4 Regional Health Authorities Oversight Service contracts

Private/voluntary providers

Community trusts

23 Crown health enterprises

(b)

Figure 1 (a) Organizational chart of New Zealand healthcare system, 1989 and (b) organizational chart of New Zealand healthcare system, 1993.

tertiary healthcare. Though the achievements of the AHBs were acknowledged, particularly in terms of better management and tighter contracting, they were dis banded following the implementation of the Health and Disability Services Act 1993. It was at this juncture that decentralization and neoliberal market ideology came together. As Figure 1b reveals, state funds were chan neled through four newly established regional authorities who were responsible for purchasing services from pri vate and/or public providers on the basis of competitive contracting. In addition, and in contrast to the UK, existing public hospitals were renamed as Crown Health Enterprises (CHE) and were expected to function on a commercial basis. Such attempts to introduce active market competition to the healthcare landscape were relatively short lived; lasting between 1992 and 1997 in the UK, between 1992 and 1996 in New Zealand and Sweden, and less than a year in the Czech Republic. The explanations for this

vary. For example, in New Zealand the introduction of the quasi market was associated with considerable ad ministrative costs, most notably an operating deﬁcit of NZ$788 million returned by the CHEs in 1996–97, and in the United Kingdom there was a perception that the market reinforced already existing inequalities in access to care. Whatever the explanation, this does not mean that the quasi market, or at least some of its principal features, has disappeared altogether: in many countries, the purchaser/provider separation remains and health care services are still arranged on a contractual basis. Moreover, the experience of the UK especially, despite being largely negative, constituted a reference point for market based reforms throughout Southern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union. Consumerism A key feature of both decentralization and neoliberal market reform is the belief that each enables a healthcare

Health Services Restructuring

system to become more responsive to the needs and demands of its patients; whether through a more local ized and inclusive decision making process or through the provision of services that are sensitive to patient or consumer demands. The importance of this responsive ness is reﬂected in the value that many governments at tach to surveys that measure patient or consumer satisfaction with healthcare practitioners, with hospitals and other institutional providers and with the health system more generally. However, as a recent report by the OECD suggests, such surveys have revealed that, despite over two decades of healthcare restructuring, many countries have problems with patient or consumer satisfaction. For example, a 2001 survey of ﬁve countries – Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States – found that the vast majority of those surveyed agreed that fundamental changes to their health system were necessary or that it needed rebuilding entirely. Surveys such as the above provide some indication of how difﬁcult it is for governments to respond to the ever increasing demands of consumer oriented societies. This does not stop countries from designing initiatives that are shaped by this consumerist ethos. For example, recent reforms to acute sector services in the UK are framed in terms of their ability to provide patients with greater choice when it comes to both the time and space within which healthcare is delivered. To this end, the traditional model of hospital care is being replaced by a more ﬂexible system of delivery which includes online advice and diagnosis services (e.g., NHS Direct), the develop ment of alternative spaces of care (e.g., treatment centers and walk in clinics), and the increased use of technolo gies that allow for care to be delivered at a distance from the patient (e.g., telemedicine). It is possible to argue that such changes allow patients to act as ‘smart consumers’, providing them with the information they need to ex ercise independent and informed choices regarding their healthcare options. However, there are counter arguments to the devel opment of such consumer oriented services. As has been noted elsewhere, this shift toward consumerism is closely linked with the commodiﬁcation of healthcare and with the greater use of independent or private sector pro viders. While this should not be considered as necessarily problematic, there is some suggestion that it might lead to compromises in the clinical and ethical choices made by healthcare organizations operating within a com mercial environment. For example, the sociologist George Ritzer has commented on the so called ‘McDo naldization’ of the healthcare sector, arguing that the emphasis on efﬁciency and speed can lead to decisions characterized by predictability and haste. Furthermore, questions have been raised about the tendency to locate fast food restaurants within or near to hospitals.

55

Such issues sit alongside broader concerns regarding the ability of a consumer oriented model to deliver health care equitably and in a way that reﬂects the needs of patients rather than the demands of healthcare organizations.

Geographical Engagement While geographers have made a substantial contribution to the general debates surrounding health services re structuring, they have also sought to develop quite spe ciﬁc areas of knowledge and understanding. This section draws on examples to explore some of these areas in a little more detail. Symbolism and Sense of Place Health geographers have utilized the interrelated notions of symbolism and sense of place to develop an under standing of the ways in which healthcare restructuring affects the everyday attachments that people form with place. Drawing on theoretical insights from humanistic geography, this research recognizes that individuals and communities often form strong emotional attachments with commonplace elements within their local built en vironment, such as hospitals and schools. Put differently, these elements come to symbolize place and have a positive impact upon the sense of belonging and well being that individuals feel. However, this research does not rely on the promotion of a naı¨ve reading of hu manism; rather it positions these emotional attachments in relation to broader social and cultural processes. For example, in their study of restructuring in Tokanui and Hokianga, New Zealand, Kearns and Joseph locate their analysis within the context of rurality and biculturalism. The importance of this attention to context is that it provides a further explanation for the emergence of local resistance to restructuring. Returning to the example of Tokanui and Hokianga, Kearns and Joseph identify two very different responses to restructuring, with the closure of a psychiatric unit in Tokanui facing little opposition and the threat to a network of outpatient clinics in Hokianga meeting prolonged and bicultural resistance. In order to explain this variance, Kearns and Joseph point to differences in the type of institution and to the impact that restructuring would have on the locality as a whole. In particular, they highlight the fact that the outpatient clinics in Hokianga were closely interlinked with local tradition and identity and were regarded as spaces of social interaction. Therefore, by combining humanistic notions with broader social and cultural forms of ex planation, this body of research promotes a complex understanding of the everyday responses to healthcare restructuring.

56

Health Services Restructuring

Inequality and Rural Communities Geographers have displayed a longstanding interest in the dual questions of healthcare provision and access. While a broad area of activity, research on these topics has produced critical insight into inequalities within and between rural and urban areas and, perhaps most im portantly, it has pointed to the negative impact that this has on the healthcare experiences of vulnerable groups, including the elderly, minority ethnic communities, and those with limited resources (i.e., economic, transport, etc.). Of particular relevance here is research which identiﬁed the considerable effect that the market oriented reforms of the 1990s had on these patterns of inequality. For example, the introduction of general practitioner fundholding in England, following the 1991 reforms to the National Health Service, was associated with the development of a ‘two tier’ health system. As Asthana and colleagues demonstrated in their study of fundholding in southwest England, eligibility criteria discriminated against patients living in highly deprived urban areas and communities served by small rural practices. Such studies are matched by research that explores the impact of restructuring on acute sector services. Much of this research has examined the interrelated themes of rationalization (i.e., the closure of capacity), spatial relocation (i.e., shifts in the location of acute sector provision), and centralization (i.e., the concen tration provision within large regional centers). In terms of geographical focus, some of the work in this area has a distinctly urban focus, for example Sara McLafferty’s use of spatial interaction models to examine the effects of hospital closure in New York city in the 1980s. However, given the spatial characteristics of these various pro cesses, there is also considerable interest in their impact on isolated and vulnerable communities living within rural areas. In addition to focusing on issues of access, provision, and utilization, research conducted by health geographers such as Robin Kearns and Ross Barnett has provided an important insight into the emergence of health based activism through an analysis of the capacity and efﬁcacy of community resistance to acute sector re forms in rural areas. New Spaces of Care As noted earlier, gains in life expectancy and the asso ciated trend toward an aging population are key factors behind the so called crisis in welfare. While there is some uncertainty about the effect that this particular demo graphic trend will have – although the OECD predicts health costs will increase by two percentage points be tween 2000 and 2050 as a result of it – many governments have responded to the increased demands on their health and social care systems by implementing reforms to

them. It is the resultant changes to the pattern of formal and informal care that has been of interest to an in creasing number of scholars. With regards the former, health geographers have contributed to this under standing in a number of ways, including analysis of the expansion of health and social care provision, of the spatial variation in the privatization of the sector, and of the role governments have played in shifting the ﬁnancial burden of care from the State to the individual. Perhaps a much more distinctive disciplinary contri bution has been made by health geographers interested in the informal and voluntary sectors. Interest in this area builds upon research by Jennifer Wolch which identiﬁed the changing relationship between the voluntary sector and the State as a form of ‘shadow state’. More specif ically, scholars such as Christine Milligan in the UK and Allison Williams in Canada have explored how neoliberal market reforms have changed the pattern of informal and voluntary care provision. For example, Milligan points to the geographically uneven distribution of voluntary ser vices, to a reduction in the services that they provide, and to the greater burden being placed upon informal carers in the space of the home. These ﬁndings are borne out by Williams, who suggests that the majority of western countries have turned to this home based model of care as a response to ﬁnancial pressure and the ideological commitment to neoliberalism.

Summary As this chapter demonstrates, the processes associated with health services restructuring have had a consider able impact upon the organization of healthcare systems and upon the services that they provide. This impact is not uniform and is, to some extent at least, reliant upon spatial and temporal context. Clearly such differences make it difﬁcult, although not impossible, to make comparisons either within or between nations. However, while this may be the case, it is also important to rec ognize that contemporary health service restructuring has been framed by the hegemonic position achieved by neoliberalism in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Many of the principles upon which restructuring is based, within western and nonwestern countries, are linked to neo liberal philosophy; whether, consumerism, decentral ization, market competition, or privatization. The research that health geographers conduct has contributed to interdisciplinary debates through an analysis of the spatial impact of restructuring and through an awareness of its impact on people’s everyday experiences of their healthcare systems. See also: Healthcare Accessibility; Health Geography; Sense of Place; Voluntary Sector; Welfare Reform.

Health Services Restructuring

Further Reading Atkinson, S. (1995). Restructuring health care: Tracking the decentra lization debate. Progress in Human Geography 19, 486 503. Barnett, J. R. (1999). ‘Hollowing out’ the state? Some observations on the restructuring of hospital services in New Zealand. Area 31, 259 270. Barnett, J. R. and Barnett, P. (2003). Back to the future? Reﬂections on past reforms and future prospects for health services in New Zealand. Geojournal 59, 137 147. Hanlon, N. T. and Rosenberg, M. W. (1998). Not so new public management and the denial of geography: Ontario health care reform in the 1990s. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 16, 559 572. Joseph, A. E. and Kearns, R. A. (1996). Deinstitutionalization meets restructuring: The closure of a psychiatric hospital in New Zealand. Health & Place 2, 179 189. Joseph, A. E. and Knight, D. B. (1999). Social sciences and public policy in restructuring societies. In Knight, D. B. & Joseph, A. E. (eds.) Restructuring Societies: Insights from the Social Sciences, pp 1 24. Ottawa: Carleton University Press. Kearns, R. A. and Barnett, J. R. (2000). Happy meals in the Starship Enterprise: Interpreting a moral geography of health care consumption. Health and Place 6, 81 94.

57

Light, D. (2001). Cost containment and the backdraft of competition policies. Politics of Health Policy 31, 681 708. Litvack, J. and Seddon, S. (eds.) (1999). Decentralization Brieﬁng Notes. Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. Milligan, C. (1998). Pathways of dependence: The impact of health and social care restructuring the voluntary experience. Social Science and Medicine 46, 743 753. Mohan, J. (1995). A National Health Service? The Restructuring of Health Care in Britain Since 1979. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Mohan, J. (1998). Explaining geographies of health care: A critique. Health and Place 4, 113 124. OECD (2004). Towards High Performing Health Systems: Policy Studies. Paris: OECD. Panelli, R., Gallagher, L. and Kearns, R. (2006). Access to rural health services: Research as community action and policy critique. Social Science and Medicine 62, 1103 1114. Peckham, S., Exworthy, M., Greener, I. and Powell, M. (2005). Decentralizing health services: More local accountability or just more central control? Public Money & Management 25, 221 228.

Health Systems and Health Services R. Barnett and P. Barnett, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, and University of Otago, Christchurch, New Zealand & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Accessibility A condition which describes the extent of barriers, locational, ﬁnancial, or psychological to a service. Corporatization The introduction of for-proﬁt goals into public sector organizations or the presence of forproﬁt investor-owned private institutions. Devolution The transferral of government responsibilities from a higher to a lower level of government. Health System An interrelated system of public, private, and voluntary sector providers concerned with the delivery of health services. Health Services Primary, secondary, and tertiary providers who provide medical care to the population. Iatrogenesis The harmful effects of medical treatment. Internal Market Publicly established quasi-markets characterized by a funder–provider split and involving contracting relationships between funders and providers. Inverse Care Law Describes a situation where populations in greatest need for health care have the poorest access to health services. Managed Care Integrated health care organizations which provide both primary and secondary care and which contract with government or private sector funders. Neoliberalism A political philosophy which emphasises the role of individualism and market forces in preference to collective state intervention in the economy and society. Privatization The withdrawal of state involvement in the provision, funding, and regulation of services. Public Health The focus of health interventions upon populations in contrast to the individual focus of the biomedical model. Regulation Theory A metatheory which stresses the development of new organizational relationships in the economy, polity, and society as a way of responding to capitalist crises. Restructuring A process of change whereby public sector organizations alter their goals and priorities and the ways they deliver services. Roemer’s Law A situation which describes the positive relationship between the availability of hospital beds and rates of hospitalization.

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Social Exclusion A situation where certain groups in the population are discriminated against in terms of the provision of services. Supplier-Induced Demand The primary care equivalent of Roemer’s Law. Therapeutic Landscapes Particular contexts in the natural or social environment which de-medicalize space and aid the process of healing. Third Sector A term which describes voluntary sector organizations involved in the provision of health care. Third Way A new political philosophy which incorporates elements of both neoliberalism and socialism. Utilization The extent to which health services are used by different groups.

Introduction Geography as a discipline is well suited to understanding health systems and services. Geography has a ‘whole system’ way of thinking, concerned with the interactions of populations with their environment and how this varies from place to place, a perspective well suited to the analysis of health systems which tend to be hierarchical entities with diverse sets of providers, and with functions and patterns of provision that vary across space. According to the World Health Organization a health system comprises ‘‘all of the activities whose primary purpose is to promote, restore and maintain health’’ (World Health Organization, 2000). This deﬁnition has limitations since it fails to deal with the integration of the different components (e.g., public and private or primary and secondary) of the system and gives no indication of whether there is oversight of the system and the degree of public regulation. In most countries the state has a role in regulating access to, ﬁnancing, and organizing the delivery of health care to the population. In fact, in most developed countries, at least since World War II, national governments have assumed the primary responsibility for ensuring the funding, provision, and regulation of health services, although in recent years this pattern has been subject to change. Modern health systems developed from the nine teenth century when pressures of urbanization and in dustrialization resulted in the ﬁrst systematic responses

Health Systems and Health Services

by the state and voluntary agencies to emerging health issues. These responses were pragmatic, arising from concerns over the economic impact of infectious diseases, and it was not until the 1930s that social justice concerns came to the fore, with the rise of organized labor. Only after World War II did genuinely ‘national’ health sys tems begin to emerge as a result of the evolution of the Keynesian welfare state. In developed countries early examples were the provision of free hospital care in New Zealand (1938), the formation of the UK National Health Service (NHS) (1948), or the development of Medicare and Medicaid government programs in the USA (1965). More recent examples include the development of the Canada Health Act (1974) and Medicare in Australia (1975), both of which extended universal care to their populations. In recent years, health systems have come under in creasing pressure due to growth in demand arising from changes in the physical and social environment and evolving patterns of disease. This has resulted in a con tinuing search for new organizational structures to deal more effectively with the health needs of the community. An important part of health services geography is to understand not only the spatial organization of health services, but also how, where, and why such systems have changed. In the light of this, the focus of this article is twofold. First, we provide an overview of health systems and health services by focusing on the goals of modern health systems, the problems they face, their key com ponents, and some of the ways of evaluating their per formance. In the second part we focus on four issues of the geography of health systems: (1) geographical dif ferences in types of health care system, (2) geographical differences in health system restructuring, (3) how geography is important in assessing the performance of health systems, and ﬁnally (4) whether health systems matter in terms of health outcomes.

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One way in which a deﬁnition of a health system can be expanded to take these factors into account is to adopt a population or public health approach. This places the health of the population and the inﬂuences on it at the center of a health system, so that the contributions of particular policies, services, or other activities can be coordinated in the interests of improving population health status. Drawing on a classic deﬁnition of public health, therefore, we can suggest that a health system comprises all the ‘organized efforts of society’ that are designed to promote, protect, maintain, and improve health. This reference to ‘organized efforts’ suggests that health arrangements require a certain sense of purpose and a level of coordination to achieve designation of a ‘system’, implying a signiﬁcant role for the state.

Goals of health systems

Health systems have two broad sets of goals: 1. The ﬁrst goal is to improve the health status of the community. This can be done by treating illness in individuals or helping prevent disease. It can also be achieved by working with other sectors that inﬂuence determinants of health, such as education, welfare, and employment. Often this goal speciﬁcally targets in equalities in health status. 2. The second goal of health systems is to ensure the provision of appropriate, accessible, and high quality services to the community. These services may be provided by public, private, or nonproﬁt organizations and be funded through a variety of mechanisms. If they are to be directed toward an overall goal of im proving health status and reducing inequalities, they must be accessible on the basis of cost and distance and be of high quality for all.

Problems Facing Health Systems

Overview of Health Systems Health System Deﬁnition and Purpose What is a health system?

In the introduction we argued that the World Health Organization’s view of a health system is too narrow because it fails to acknowledge the important role of governments in modern health systems. Also, the concept of health systems must recognize both the contribution made to health and health services by private and vol untary organizations and that health is inﬂuenced by factors beyond the boundaries of formal health organ izations or governments. Usually the concept of a ‘system’ includes a sense of purpose, relationships between the component parts, exchange of information, and an integrated approach.

Patterns of need and demand

The patterns of need and demand for health services change according to the economic development and political and social values of a country. In rich countries many of the so called diseases of poverty have been minimized through well developed sanitation systems, environmental legislation, good nutrition, universal education, immunization, and access to medicines. More afﬂuent countries have, however, experienced an increase in other sorts of diseases, the diseases of aging and of an afﬂuent society. Diseases of aging include many cancers and degenerative diseases such as arthritis and dementia, some leading to long term disability. Diseases of afﬂu ence are those conditions caused by excessive con sumption and a Western lifestyle, including smoking and obesity related disorders, heart disease, and diabetes.

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Poorer countries generally experience poorer health status and different patterns of disease from those found in richer countries. They are more likely to experience high rates of child and maternal mortality, infectious diseases, and injury. However, these countries are also afﬂicted by increasingly high rates of so called ‘western diseases’, including those related to smoking and poor nutrition. In addition, a growing rate of HIV/AIDS places excessive demands for treatment and care on struggling health and social services, particularly in Africa. Injury rates and the lesser access to treatment also mean that long term disability rates are also high. These trends suggest that the poorest countries experience a burden of both communicable and noncommunicable disease that is well beyond their capacity to address. Within both rich and poor countries there are inequal ities in income, education, and other determinants of health that are reﬂected in inequalities in health status. Where governments intervene to moderate these in equalities, the narrower they tend to be.

cost effectiveness analysis and public consultation were used to identify those health interventions that would be made available to publicly insured patients. Other countries (e.g., New Zealand or the Netherlands) at tempted to develop comprehensive rationing approaches but more recently health technology assessment (HTA) has been used to assess the performance of individual interventions so that health authorities have better in formation for decision making. This has been matched by better efforts to assess clinical need as a basis for ra tioning individual access (e.g., via waiting times for sur gery, or establishing criteria for receipt of high cost pharmaceuticals) or community need as a basis for pri oritizing funding decisions.

Increasing costs

Inputs and structure

Health expenditure in any country depends on a mix of social, economic, and political factors and there is no ‘right’ amount to spend on health. Among western countries, the United States spends approximately 15% of GDP (from all sources) on health, compared with 9–10% in Western European countries and somewhat less (7–8%) in poorer OECD states such as the former Soviet states and satellites. These amounts have grown signiﬁcantly over the last two decades and a number of commentators question the sustainability of these trends. Growth in health expenditure is attributed to two main factors. First, there is the development of increas ingly complex technology and the ability of health ser vices to intervene more effectively (and expensively) for conditions that in the past may have remained untreated. Aging populations provide greater opportunities for such interventions. Certainly, the investment potential of health technology, particularly pharmaceuticals which is one of the most proﬁtable industries worldwide, en courages the marketing and promotion of new inter ventions. A second factor is the increasing expectations of the community for more and better services, the product of a more informed population used to searching for the best product and willing to pay for it, either individually or collectively.

The ‘inputs’ or ‘structure’ are the features that determine the overall design and philosophy of the system and the way in which resources are distributed. The ﬁrst of these is ‘governance’ which determines the extent to which governments are involved in setting direction, funding, or providing services, or whether this is left to the private sector or the medical profession. These arrangements are closely related to those for ‘ﬁnancing and resource management.’ There are four broad models of govern ance and resource management that reﬂect both histor ical trends and modern experience. The ﬁrst broad model is the centrally planned and controlled health system, characteristic of socialist states such as Cuba and North Korea. The former Soviet Union and its East European satellites were also examples of this, but since 1990 many such states have moved to more mixed, particularly social insurance, systems. The second approach is represented by predomin antly tax funded systems. These are characteristic of some western countries with a strong welfare state tra dition and a commitment to equity. These countries have moved to more decentralized systems, while still main taining a strong government policy framework, as in the UK, New Zealand, and Norway, but with more decision making devolved to lower levels of government (local or health authorities). The funding and provision of services tends to remain predominantly through public agencies but with increasing involvement of private providers. A third model is the social insurance system charac teristic of Germany, France, and other parts of contin ental Europe, reﬂecting the strong welfare tradition of those countries. Funded through social insurance, often employer contributions, rather than taxation, resources

Issues of distribution/rationing

With both need and demand increasing and the costs of health interventions rising, many countries with publicly funded systems have been forced to address the question of rationing more explicitly than in the past. Rationing experiments have occurred in a number of countries, most notably in the US state of Oregon where both

Components of a Health System A health system comprises three broad components: the inputs to the system, the services and activities of the system, and the outputs, or results.

Health Systems and Health Services

may be managed through nongovernment agencies or funds, with the government acting as regulator. Tradi tionally, there is much greater involvement of private facilities and providers, with payments on a ‘reimburse ment’ or insurance model of funding. In these countries there tends to be less direct involvement by government, with the medical profession and provider organizations exerting signiﬁcant inﬂuence. The fourth broad model can be termed the entre preneurial or market model, which is characterized by the United States. There is a strong component of private funding, largely through private insurance programs with the government acting as residual or ‘safety net’ insurer for high need members of the community and as regu lator of the system. Other countries such as Thailand and the Philippines that do not have a strong welfare tradi tion have also adopted a similar model. While these models represent certain ideas about how health systems work, in practice, few systems ﬁt the models exactly. For example, the move to social insurance arrangements in some former communist countries was also accompanied by efforts to strengthen policy lead ership by governments. Similarly, the introduction of competitive contracting has been a feature of some tax funded systems in attempts to increase efﬁciency. All models rely on adequate resourcing and some govern ment regulation for the development of a coherent sys tem. However, there are many poorer countries that do not have the resources, governance arrangements, or stability to provide the frameworks necessary for effec tive system development. These emergent systems may be dependent on international aid, but also forced to address priorities such as the consequences of conﬂict and HIV/AIDS without an established infrastructure. Activities and services

Provider organizations may be either publicly or pri vately owned, and if privately owned then either proﬁt or nonproﬁt. Despite differing ownership models, con tractual relationships with funders often permit full participation of organizations in an integrated system. The overall framework of a system and the degree of government regulation are likely to determine the extent of integration and thus the overall effectiveness and re sponsiveness of services. For a health system to be con sidered comprehensive it will include a number of core activities and services: public health, primary health care, specialist (secondary and tertiary) services, and com munity support services. Public health. Public health is concerned with the overall health status of the population rather than the health care of individuals, and has two important roles. The ﬁrst is a strategic role which requires understanding disparities in health status, contributing to policy, and monitoring the impact of interventions. The second

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involves regulation for and provision of services to pro tect the health of the community. This may include placing requirements on local government for sanitation and environmental management, border control, health and safety legislation, and the funding or management of preventive, screening, or health promotion programs. Primary care. Primary care has been deﬁned as the point of ﬁrst contract with health services and a source of family centered, comprehensive care. In western coun tries this has traditionally involved access to a primary care doctor although in recent decades the concept of the primary care team, including doctors, nurses, and other health professionals has taken hold. Internationally, thinking about primary care has evolved signiﬁcantly since the World Health Organization’s Declaration of Alma Ata in 1977. This outlined an expanded scope for primary care and its role in health systems, and identiﬁed its signiﬁcance for health improvement and development, particularly in poorer countries. The Declaration em phasizes the importance of training a local workforce, access to clean water, a healthy environment, and pre ventive services. It also promotes the involvement of communities and the central role that primary care should play in a health system. More afﬂuent countries initially paid little attention to the Alma Ata Declaration, but in recent years the importance of primary care has been more widely acknowledged, not least because it offers a less expensive approach than hospital services. Specialist secondary and tertiary services. Problems that cannot be addressed by primary care may need referral to more specialist services, normally provided through hospitals or specialist centers. Secondary care provides diagnostic and treatment services for common con ditions, whereas tertiary services represent the highly specialized care for more rare or complex conditions that requires a large population base to support it and is often located in larger town or cities. The boundary between secondary and tertiary services is contested, and depends on the expectations of the community, the wealth of a country, and the inﬂuence of interest groups. What in one context is seen as a tertiary level service in a more af ﬂuent or less regulated environment may be accessible as a secondary service. Some countries have a network of publicly owned and funded hospitals, others, notably the countries of con tinental Europe, have a strong tradition of religious and charitable hospitals, now funded largely via social in surance funds. The United States is unusual, given the high proportion of hospitals owned by private corpor ations. There are challenges to the role of hospitals. The costs of hospital care and the possibility of alternative, cheaper settings for both acute and long term care have led to efforts to relocate some services in the community. Community support services. Providing services in the community for rehabilitation and enabling people to live

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outside hospital has been a major trend of the late twentieth century. The provision of home care and support, medical and home nursing has meant that people can live at home rather than be in hospital or a nursing home. This has been of great signiﬁcance for older people, including those requiring specialist pallia tive or hospice care, and for people with a long term physical or mental disability. This trend, often called de institutionalization, has not been without its critics as often people were assigned to community care without due attention being given to the level of need, provision of resources, or the issues that might arise for families. Outputs: how do we evaluate the performance of health systems?

There is a well established tradition of service evaluation where health services research contributes to an assess ment of whether the resources (inputs) and service processes make a difference to performance and out comes of an intervention. This can be applied to indi vidual surgical procedures, immunization programs, education initiatives, for example, and provides decision makers with information on how to use resources or improve performance. At a higher level of organization, such as a hospital, primary care center, or laboratory, it is possible to develop performance indicators that are ac cepted as a way of measuring and comparing perform ance, such as re admission rates, cervical smears read correctly, or waiting times for consultations. Evaluations at a higher level, that of the system es pecially if comparing the performance of different countries, are inﬁnitely more challenging. A method ology for this developed by the World Health Organ ization in 2003 was subject to criticism both because of choice of criteria and lack of comparable data. More restricted evaluations, such as those of the Common wealth Fund in the US, that compare similar countries on a smaller number of dimensions have been more widely accepted, although there is continuing debate about the precedence given to ‘expert’ or ‘consumer’ views of health systems. While most of the international com parisons have focused on questions of affordability and access, at the national level a number of explicitly geo graphical criteria, relating to key characteristics associ ated with space and place, are also important (see section titled ‘Geographical factors in assessing health system performance’).

Geography and Health Systems Geographical Differences in Types of Health Care Systems Variations in health systems reﬂect differences in levels of economic development between places and different

political cultures across countries at similar stages of development. Among western countries three broad political traditions have inﬂuenced the development of health policy. The ﬁrst, the social democratic tradition is characteristic of the Scandinavian countries and Austria where there has been extensive welfare involvement and a commitment to universal social policies. These coun tries generally have strong labor movements, high female labor force participation, and a commitment to high taxation and income redistribution. On the other hand, the health systems in many continental European coun tries reﬂect a Christian Democratic tradition. These countries, although having a strong welfare tradition tend to be more conservative with less government involve ment and a stronger reliance on the family for the pro vision of social services particularly to the elderly, disabled people, and children. These countries tend to have weaker labor movements, lower rates of female workforce participation, more fragmented political coa litions, and lower levels of health expenditure than social democratic countries. Third, there is a group of liberal Anglo Saxon countries such as the UK, Ireland, USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand which have been characterized by more residual welfare states and a greater reliance on market mechanisms in the delivery of health services. It has been in this group of countries where recent health sector restructuring has been greatest. These international differences are also reﬂected within countries. In the United States, for example, there are substantial differences in health policy between states, with southern and western states having a much greater focus on privatization and less state involvement in health service funding and provision than have the northeastern seaboard states. Consequently, it is in these states where rates of the uninsured are highest. Similarly in other federal systems, such as Australia and Canada, different political cultures are evident in the contrasting health policy outcomes of states and provinces.

Geographical Differences in Health Sector Restructuring Searching for the right solution: ‘revolving doors’

The above typology assumes that health care systems are constant but in reality they are in a state of constant change. Many systems, particularly in Liberal countries, have undergone repeated restructurings (‘revolving doors’) since the 1970s. These shifts in health policy can be related to broader changes in the welfare state, with shifts to new modes of regulation as described by regu lation theory. Health sector restructuring can be de scribed as a new mode of regulation as key relationships change between the state, key providers, and patients.

Health Systems and Health Services

Main goals and forms of restructuring

Generally, there have been three main goals of health service restructuring: equity of outputs, efﬁciency, and effectiveness. The ﬁrst has focused upon allocating re sources more equitably between regions, the second on reducing costs via service integration and improved provider accountability, and the third by improving the impact of expenditure on health. Attempts to achieve these goals have occurred through three main forms of restructuring which may loosely be described as in volving redistributive, managerial, and market mech anisms. Redistributive forms of restructuring derive their origins from the ideas of Marx and Titmus and focus on targeting resources more effectively in response to population need. Managerial forms of restructuring in volve the transformation of public sector institutions and are heavily inﬂuenced by the new public management, focusing upon accountability and performance contracts to improve overall sector efﬁciency. Spatial components have been evident in particular managerial policies, such as devolution (the establishment of independent service providers with their own budgets), rationalization (clos ure/centralization of services), intensiﬁcation (increasing labor productivity in certain sectors/regions), ﬂex ibilization (including more ﬂexible work practices and service delivery regimes), technical change (substituting capital for labor inputs particularly in certain less skilled sectors), and proletarianization (reducing the autonomy of more skilled providers and making them more sub servient to state or private funders). Health service re structuring has also increasingly used market mechanisms both by increasing the corporatization of the public sector and through increased privatization by greater use of contracting services out to both the private and voluntary sectors. In many western countries this form of restructuring, relying on competition and con sumerism, has been heavily inﬂuenced by public choice theory and the rise of neoliberal political philosophies. Different times, different forms of restructuring

The goals of restructuring have varied in importance depending upon the type of government in power and the extent of its commitment to universal or more re sidual/market based policies. In the early years of reform many governments sought to provide equal access to care, as in the UK following the introduction of the NHS in 1948 and in New Zealand after the enactment of the Social Security legislation in 1938. However, such re forms did not necessarily improve the distribution of medical resources, with governments, by the 1970s and 1980s, becoming increasingly concerned with resource equity issues. This concern saw the introduction of population based funding for hospital care in many countries. Given that these changes often involved in creased government expenditure, they can be seen as part

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of a Keynesian/Fordist regime. By contrast, in the 1980s and 1990s, reforms reﬂected a ‘post Fordist’ regime with a more ﬂexible approach to economic management. In the public sector this meant managerialist approaches to contracting, with welfare subordinated to the needs of the economy and the devolution of government powers and responsibilities to lower levels of government or private agencies. Public sector reforms, however, were deemed insufﬁcient in themselves to produce adequate efﬁciency gains and performance improvements and the focus of reform soon shifted to the use of more market mechanisms. The adoption of neoliberal health policy in many countries and the focus on market solutions undermined the role of place and community input. This led to public disenchantment, a subsequent retreat from such policies, and the development of alternative approaches, most notably in the UK and New Zealand. Sometimes called ‘The Third Way’, this approach permits governments to steer an intermediate course between neoliberal or market policies and those dominated by centralization, public provision, and intervention. As a consequence, cooperation has increasingly replaced competition and more balanced health care goals involving efﬁciency, equity, and an increased focus on effectiveness of health expenditure have predominated. Different places, different forms of restructuring – three case studies

Although health service restructuring has been inﬂu enced by globalization and the diffusion of reform ideologies, it nevertheless has taken on different forms in different places. The explanations of these differences are complex, and relate not only to differences in political ideology, but also to the inﬂuence of other factors such as structural economic change or the power of the medical profession in inﬂuencing the process and outcomes of restructuring. The following section outlines three dif ferent types of restructuring which have occurred to varying degrees in western countries: public hospital restructuring, hospital privatization, and the emergence of new primary care led health care systems. Public hospital restructuring. In the public hospital sector perhaps the most profound policy change in the 1990s in some countries, particularly in Britain and New Zealand, was the introduction of the ‘internal market.’ Sometimes referred to as quasi markets, because they attempted to mimic private sector processes, their goal was to increase public sector performance by reducing provider capture and providing incentives for efﬁciency through com petition between services. They had four fundamental characteristics: (1) a funder–provider split whereby re gional funders or purchasers contracted with public, private, and voluntary sector providers; (2) integration of funding – one budget now covered all aspects of care;

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(3) corporatization or for proﬁt goals; (4) new forms of governance involving little or no citizen input and in creased central control. Internal markets had a number of potential advan tages: ﬁrst, integrated budgets could reduce cost shifting between different health sectors; second, there was a greater ability to emphasize health service goals and consequently a considerable degree of local innovation in contracting with different community organizations; third, ideally more coherent area wide planning was possible under larger regional funding organizations; and fourth, there was the promise of greater integration be tween primary and secondary services as a result of new contracting arrangements. However, internal markets suffered from a number of disadvantages: ﬁrst, true competition was not possible in small hospital ‘markets’; second, competition tended to increase rather than reduce health care costs, with efﬁciency gains less than expected; third, competition created a climate of distrust between different providers and a ‘clash of cultures’ (commercial vs. professional) resulted in workforce unrest; fourth, despite central government control, the result of devolution increased regional inequalities in the performance of the health system; ﬁfth, devolution resulted in a ‘hollowing out’ of the state whereby more powerful ‘agents’ (both funders and providers) devolved responsibility for both the funding and provision of hospital care. Devolution in evitably resulted in service rationalization as providers sought to cope with ﬁscal deﬁcits. It was also a means by which central governments could avoid blame for local difﬁculties. Faced with ﬁnancial deﬁcits and possible closure, public institutions sought ways to sustain themselves. Some marketed themselves to attract paying patients as a way of generating additional income. Others, such as the St Boniface Hospital in Winnipeg, Canada and the Starship Children’s Hospital in Auckland, New Zealand both permitted in house fast food franchises. Such ‘place marketing’ reﬂected the new commercial ethos of these public institutions but was at odds with their health goals. Other responses to threats of closure can be characterized as ‘geographies of resistance’, whereby communities and other affected groups resisted such changes. Some strategies involved the creative use of discourse as was the case in St Bartholomews in London, where the hospital was alternatively portrayed as a community resource, as a site of expertise, as a heritage symbol, and as a site pertinent to the identities of Lon doners. The potency of this health care facility as a symbol both of London and of medical tradition was the crucial factor in its reprieve. Similarly, in New Zealand many small rural hospitals averted closure both through community inventiveness in developing local funding bases and through the critical role of community agents

in producing legislative change which increased labor ﬂexibility in these institutions. Hospital privatization. In addition to public sector re structuring, the privatization of hospital services has been another state response in reforming health care in de veloped countries. Privatization has proceeded furthest in countries such as the United States, Greece, Switzerland, and Australia but has taken on a variety of different forms. Privatization involves changes in state involvement in the provision, funding, or regulation of services and, like public sector restructuring, is designed to improve efﬁciency by encouraging greater competition among providers and greater consumerism among patients. Given increased hybridity in health care provision where public–private–voluntary sector partnerships are in creasingly becoming the norm in the contract state, the terms public and private have less meaning than before. Two contrasting examples of hospital privatization are corporatization and co location. The former is pre dominant in the United States, whereas both forms are increasingly common in Australia. In both countries the for proﬁt sector has been the fastest growing source of care. The growth of for proﬁt hospitals can be linked to changing sources of capital. Unlike public or voluntary hospitals which relied upon philanthropy or government grants, corporate institutions rely upon debt (loan) or equity ﬁnancing (sale of stocks). Economic downturns in many western countries during the 1970s deprived gov ernments of the necessary ﬁnancing to fund public in stitutions but provided for proﬁt hospitals with ready sources of capital and an incentive to acquire or build their own hospital chains. These shifts of capital into the health sector have provided the opportunity for proﬁts far exceeding returns from traditional forms of invest ment in manufacturing and have resulted in a signiﬁcant transformation in the structure of the private hospital sector from a local industry to a signiﬁcant global enterprise. Capital focused explanations, however, ignore the fact that the growth of corporate involvement has been in ﬂuenced by two other factors: (1) the desire to constrain clinical freedom as a way of containing health care costs and (2) variations in state regulatory activity which may have encouraged or impeded corporate involvement. Variations in local state regulatory mechanisms have been important in affecting the regional development of the for proﬁt sector in both the United States and Australia. In Australia, for example, these have included the relaxation of licensing controls for new private hos pitals, the encouragement of public–private partnerships through the co location of public and private hospitals, and, as in the case of the Private Finance Initiative in Britain, the contracting of the private sector to build, own, and operate (BOO) public hospitals. These devel opments have been particularly evident in New South

Health Systems and Health Services

Wales and Victoria, the two most populous states with the greatest ﬁscal burdens. This is particularly so since state governments are responsible for hospital con struction. However, in other countries, such as Britain, the concentration of investor owned hospitals has little to do with local ﬁscal conditions and instead is more of a reﬂection of the concentration of doctors and afﬂuent consumers in the largest cities, particularly London. The growth of primary care led health systems. Until the second half of the twentieth century, primary care was a ‘cottage industry’ in which generalist doctors, working largely alone, provided a service ‘on demand’ for people in times of sickness. This model pervaded western health care, although the method of paying practitioners was diverse, often made by ‘third parties’, either governments or through social or private insurance, and on either by fee for service, an annual capitation fee, or by salary. The deﬁning features of this model were the economic and clinical autonomy of doctors who, while often practicing in groups, were not well integrated with other parts of the health system. This model began to break down toward the end of the twentieth century under pressure from funders, both public and private, to control payments and improve the accountability for use of funds. This involved restrictions on both economic and clinical autonomy through both private and public mechanisms. In the private sector, during the1970 s, corporate investment in health organ izations led to greater levels of control, in the United States, for example, through health maintenance organ izations (HMOs). This economic pressure forced primary care doctors into even larger groups where they were subject to increased controls and collective consumer pressure. In publicly funded systems, both government regulation (through payment mechanisms and fee setting, or through control of supply of doctors) and manage rialist approaches (such as treatment protocols, con tracting, or fundholding) were seen to undermine professional roles of doctors. In the late twentieth century, the Alma Ata Declar ation on Primary Health Care (1977) promoted an al ternative to the ‘independent practitioner’ model. The Alma Ata model, for which substantial research support emerged over the ensuing decades, suggested that the most effective health systems were those that had well resourced primary care services at the center of an in tegrated national health system. It deﬁned the scope of primary care service and made it clear that effective primary care is delivered by a multidisciplinary pro fessional team rather than doctors working alone, and that community involvement is essential to ensure good services. There is growing evidence that, particularly in disadvantaged populations, community involvement is an effective way to ensure the provision of services. In many developing countries, primary care is strongly

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community based, and in some western countries there is evidence of effective community participation in primary care. For example, in New Zealand, a small but important movement has emerged of community owned and run primary care in areas of high deprivation or in rural areas where local services were under threat. Although this is a small sector, it has been inﬂuential on public policy so that a national program of primary health organizations has been established to experiment with greater com munity involvement. The transformation of primary care from cottage in dustry to regulated or corporatized service, with efforts in some places to strengthen both community orientation and policy leadership, indicates the way in which local contexts combine with international trends to provide different solutions in different places. In the UK, for example, policy since the 1990s has been directed toward ‘a primary care led NHS’ and in New Zealand the New Zealand Primary Health Care Strategy has reorganized primary care along lines consistent with Alma Ata prin ciples. Many of the post Soviet states are developing stronger primary care services as the cornerstone of their health systems, which were previously dominated by hospitals.

Geographical Factors in Assessing Health System Performance Geographical Bases of Service Organization Decentralization is an inherent characteristic of most federal type health systems but even here, national governments in Australia and Canada, for example, have attempted to reduce geographical variations in health system outputs by implementing national legislation, which has aimed to provide benchmarks for minimum standards of care. However, in other countries, such as in the United States, where federal control of the health system is less strong, there are marked disparities in the provision of care between states. In particular, many southern and western states have poorer Medicare and Medicaid programs and generally higher rates of un insured people. In more centralist countries, such as New Zealand and the United Kingdom, in the early part of the twentieth century, decentralization, especially of responsibility for the provision of hospital services to local authorities and voluntary providers, also meant the evolution of wide geographical variations in the provision of care with wealthier regions inevitably having greater access to such services. However after World War II, governments as sumed greater control over the funding, provision, and regulation of services, including the development of more rational funding systems.

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However, in the 1980s and 1990s tensions between centralization and decentralization increased again with the development of internal markets and the consequent ‘hollowing out’ of responsibilities for the provision of hospital services. Despite more rational allocation sys tems, the implementation of the funder–provider split resulted in a decentralization of responsibility for pro viding services and the emergence of considerable in equalities between different places in access to services. While there were clear beneﬁts of decentralization in terms of the emergence of new sets of providers and, in some cases greater community responsiveness, the result was increased fragmentation of services, reminiscent of the early twentieth century. As a consequence, there has been yet further restructuring resulting in increased centralization and control yet retaining some of the more beneﬁcial features of the internal market. Resource Allocation in Relation to Need Most modern health systems have struggled to develop systems of allocation which target scarce resources to those most in need. Historically, the allocation of health funding was largely determined not by need but by the presence of existing medical resources, local patterns of wealth, or political factors including electoral margin ality or professional resistance to change. In the United States, for example, the distribution of federal funds to cities involved in the ‘maternal and infant health care’ program in the 1960s simply reﬂected the existing dis tribution of medical resources and was unrelated to need. Similar patterns were evident in New Zealand where the allocation of hospital funding was unrelated to need, reﬂecting the existing supply of hospital beds. However, policies for universal access to care resulted in an in creased focus both on equality of access and the ‘equit able’ access to health resources based on need, in both the primary and secondary sectors. As a consequence need based allocation formulae have been developed in most health care systems, the implementation of the ‘Resource Allocation Working Party’ (RAWP) hospital allocation formula and the Jarman index in primary care in the United Kingdom being two signiﬁcant examples. The development of need based allocation systems has posed problems, most importantly the difﬁculty of deﬁning needs for care. Need can be deﬁned in four ways: revealed needs (utilization), felt needs, objective assess ments of need using direct (mortality) and indirect (de privation) measures, and via ‘expert’ provider assessments of need. All measures pose problems, in part, because need is an inﬁnite concept, but also because each meas ure focuses on different aspects of need. Using utilization data is valid if there are no barriers to the use of health services, but this is seldom the case, with care often unavailable, inaccessible, or unaffordable. Felt needs or

‘wants’, involving individual perceptions of need, suffer from over and underestimation of the true level of need particularly where high levels of disadvantage result in low expectations of the health system. The use of mor tality data is also ﬂawed because the links between morbidity and mortality are often weak. As a con sequence, the use of indirect census derived indicators of need is often the preferred alternative. However, there are problems with the scale at which deprivation is measured, the timeliness of the data and the assumption that high levels of deprivation also mean that health services, if available, will be used. Finally ‘expert’ pro vider assessments of need, while useful in identifying at risk groups, are of limited use in practice because of the cost of developing robust measures and the high vari ability of individual estimates. The limitations of speciﬁc approaches to measuring need have led to countries developing composite meas ures involving a mixture of deprivation and mortality measures together with aspects of population structure including ethnicity and rurality. Nevertheless, there continues to be disagreement over the implementation of needs based formula especially since slight changes in the composition of such formula, can have important geographical outcomes in terms of changes in funding levels and consequent changes in access to health services. Locational Variations in the Provision of Health Services The classic geographic approach has been to describe and explain spatial patterns of health resources in terms of political, economic, and cultural processes. These are important in both the primary and secondary sectors and shape distributional outcomes. Deﬁnition of an equitable distribution of resources is often contested, but is usually demonstrated through calculating the number of doctors or hospital beds relative to the population of an area. Geographers have used a range of methods including simple population/resource ratios, location quotients (which show the extent to which an area or set of areas departs from some norm), and gravity formulations which include both population and the number of pro viders weighted by distance from a given location. GIS derived measures of travel time to the nearest surgery or hospital, weighted by road characteristics, have also been used. Using different measures reveal that inequalities in resource distribution occur at different scales, including geographic differences in the provision of resources be tween rural and urban areas and within cities themselves. These inequalities frequently reﬂect the ‘inverse care law’ whereby areas high in need have poor access to health resources. The extent to which the inverse care

Health Systems and Health Services

law persists reﬂects the extent to which governments have intervened to inﬂuence the distribution of resources. For instance, in the case of hospital care, some countries have traditionally been characterized by historical con centrations, particularly of teaching hospitals, in core regions (for example, London in the UK). Only in recent years have governments implemented more rational hospital funding systems with the aim of redistributing such facilities and encouraging other types of care. The presence of regional concentrations of hospitals was often characterized by ‘Roemer’s Law’, where a ‘built bed was a ﬁlled bed’ and, as a result, hospital use largely reﬂected inequalities in the bed supply across localities rather than any measure of population need. Different patterns of ownership also resulted in inequities between regions. In the United States, for example, initially public and nonproﬁt hospitals were the dominant providers, par ticularly in the industrial northeast, but in recent years corporate providers have become more prominent, par ticularly in Sun Belt states. In the primary sector the inverse care law has been more apparent, due both to the individualized nature of the service and resistance to any loss of professional autonomy on the part of medical practitioners. Con sequently, the inverse care law is most evident in coun tries characterized by fee for service systems and which have less regulation of primary care providers. In fee for service systems the assumption has been that market forces will produce a more equitable distribution of doctors as increased provider competition leads to the migration of some existing and new practitioners to shortage areas where competition is less. In fact, given the presence of ‘supplier induced demand’ (SID) such out comes are unlikely to occur or, if they do, will be the result of other factors such as the in migration of inter national medical graduates. In Australia, for example, despite the presence of more doctors, urban–rural dif ferences in access to care have increased. By contrast, the opposite has occurred in countries with more regulation, such as the United Kingdom where there is less evidence of such ‘patterned’ inequality. Explanations of inequalities have been threefold. Neoclassical explanations have focused on supply and demand and see policy outcomes in terms of these fac tors. By contrast, political economy approaches focus on broader structural changes in society and in medicine (such as the inﬂuence of uneven development, the effects of specialization, the ‘white collarization’ of the medical workforce, or the increased scale of medical practice) and promote policy options consistent with this view. Thus in the United States the development of family prac titioners was seen as a way of increasing health care in tegration and ameliorating the decline of health practitioners in rural areas. Third, more individualized approaches have focused on the idea of ‘place integration’

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and the important factors such as professional security, freedom, and identity that bond people to particular places. In this model problems of access and retention rates can be ameliorated by policy makers addressing such factors. Variations in Service Use While inequalities in service provision are one indicator of health system performance, perhaps more important is the actual utilization of services, which can be inﬂuenced by location. Many studies have shown a ‘distance decay’ relationship between utilization and distance from health facilities, both primary and secondary, with people who live further away from doctors or hospitals less likely to use these facilities. This relationship holds even after accounting for differences in population need. Such outcomes may result from the fact that distance, whether in terms of time or cost, deters patients from consulting their doctors. Alternatively, people may make a trade off between the costs and beneﬁts of such consultation; where the beneﬁts are perceived to be low then service use is less likely. This is particularly true for certain groups, such as the elderly or the poor for whom even small distances may be a signiﬁcant barrier. This may occur because of childbearing responsibilities, lack of access to public transport, especially for sole parents with small children, or because of insufﬁcient time due to other responsibilities. In view of such barriers, there is a need to adopt more sophisticated measures of access which incorporate the space–time constraints which may limit the use of services. However, the impact of distance on consultation rates depends upon a number of other factors. For example, patients may not always use the closest doctor. In rural areas where there is a signiﬁcant turnover of general practitioners patients may travel longer distances to urban centers for treatment by a regular doctor. In this case the beneﬁts of personal contact will tend to out weigh the costs of distance. In urban contexts patients who change residence are often likely to continue con sulting their regular doctor in preference to surgeries closer by. Alternatively, minority patients may seek out particular doctors who they feel are sympathetic to their needs. The effects of distance decay on utilization are also evident in hospital care. In the United States in the nineteenth century, in what became known as ‘Jarvis’s Law,’ patients in ‘lunatic hospitals’ were far more likely to have been committed from places near the hospital than from places further away. Such effects have also been evident in Britain in more recent times, with both de privation and travel time having a signiﬁcant effect on hospitalization rates generally. Unlike primary care, the explanation for distance decay effects in hospitalization

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is less clear because doctors rather than patients, at least in the case of public hospitals, normally choose the place of treatment. It may simply be the case that patients in remoter areas with fewer doctors and fewer consultations are less likely to be diagnosed and referred for hospital treatment. Or, it may be that certain groups who live further away from hospitals may not be referred by their doctors if the difﬁculties involved in travelling long dis tances outweigh the beneﬁts of treatment. While distance to providers has an effect upon levels of use, so does the actual concentration of doctors or hospitals. In fee for service systems an increased con centration and greater competition between providers leads to ‘supplier induced demand.’ This occurs because among doctors the incentive is to treat more not fewer patients in order to maintain income levels, and con sequently may encourage repeat visits or raising of fees. Similar trends can be seen in the private hospital sector and even in the public sector. In the latter case, given incentives to maintain high rates of occupancy, more hospital beds inevitably means higher rates of hospitalization. The role of geographic factors affecting service use, therefore, must be considered in conjunction with com positional factors. Changing levels of social deprivation may affect the ability to use services and, through social exclusion, certain groups may be disadvantaged due to gender, ethnic, and social biases operating within the health system. Important here is an understanding of how particular groups of patients cope with disadvantage and how, in turn, medical practitioners aid them or not in this coping process. The Role of Context in Health Service Provision While health services have a distinctly spatial com ponent, attention must also be focused on the role of place or contextual factors and how these inﬂuence patterns of health service delivery. Three brief examples will be considered: therapeutic landscapes, landscapes of power and social exclusion, and landscapes of inequality. Therapeutic landscapes

Geographical analysis has focused on the ways in which the places of delivery of health services can be designed according to the principles of therapeutic landscapes. The concept of therapeutic landscapes has been used to present geographical ideas about factors important for well being. It applies perspectives from cultural geog raphy to explore environmental, individual, and societal factors that come together in the healing process in both traditional and nontraditional landscapes. While tradi tional landscapes refer primarily to the beneﬁcial effects of healing processes in certain natural environments, nontraditional landscapes are situations in which healing

might take place within the health care setting such as a physician’s ofﬁce or hospital ward. These landscapes have particular meaning and symbolism for people and affect their health and social well being. Some places have at tributes which make them beneﬁcial to psychological and physical health while other environments may be detri mental to health. For example, a place may inﬂuence well being because it is a place of refuge and relaxation. On the other hand, it may be symbolically important by being linked to personal identity or it may encourage a sense of belonging through the use of certain design cues and visual symbols. Traditionally, doctors’ surgeries have been medica lized spaces with little citizen input. More recently, with the development of third sector service models and more public participation in the health system, in some in stances they have been transformed into more com munity focused spaces. This has led to a blurring of the conventional distinctions between surgery spaces and other public spaces while, at the same time, creating a sense of community ownership and control. Similarly, some hospitals, which have conventionally been places of medicalized care and highly functional elements in the urban landscape, have adopted strategies for creating therapeutic landscapes. Childrens’ hospitals, in particular, have developed more playful and relaxed interior spaces reminiscent of theme parks with the aim of providing a more appropriate environment for sick children. While such ideas are in their infancy, they represent a shift away from modernist hospital forms to postmodern hospital spaces which, while not abandoning the biomedical model, seek to allow other perspectives to be included. Such developments also represent hospitals’ attempts to create a greater uniqueness as a way of responding to funding problems created by the restructuring of public hospital systems. Social exclusion in health systems

While geographic studies of utilization have examined inequalities in access to health care, less attention has been devoted to the ‘quality’ of health services received by groups in the community. This is an important question given the need to evaluate the effectiveness of health expenditure in improving population health. There is a growing body of evidence which suggests that, although lower income groups may be heavier users of services, higher income patients are more likely to re ceive more comprehensive care from their doctors. Re searchers have found that time spent with the doctor, or the likelihood of the request or access to diagnostic tests, including follow up, varies inversely with socioeconomic status. Similar trends have been observed in the hospital system with lower income groups having shorter lengths of stay and in some cases certain minorities reported as less likely to be referred for surgery than other groups

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with comparable needs. The fact that there are both socioeconomic and ethnic biases in the way such patients are treated suggests ingrained forms of exclusion within different health systems. Whether such ﬁndings reﬂect communication barriers or the existence of active dis crimination by health professionals is uncertain, but the fact that such biases arise in a number of different areas of treatment (general practice, mental health care, car diac surgery) in different health care systems indicates that they are pervasive. Landscapes of inequality and challenges for public health

Health promotion is an important part of health systems and public health initiatives have developed in most western countries to combat lifestyle diseases particu larly those associated with smoking and obesity. These are most common among more disadvantaged groups with high levels of deprivation and are particularly pronounced among certain minority populations even after differences in socioeconomic status have been taken into account. However, the effectiveness of such interventions has been questioned especially given their limited success in changing health behaviors and reaching those most in need. For example, while smoking rates have shown a signiﬁcant decline among the middle class, the decline is less for lower income groups, thus leading to widening health gaps. Part of this lack of effectiveness in inducing behavior change relates to the vehicles through which public health promotion messages are transmitted and to the inﬂuence of poverty and inequality as constraints on behavior change. With respect to health promotion, traditionally the voluntary sector has taken the initiative in developing health promotion campaigns. However, a number of studies have indicated a discordance between the spatial distribution of voluntary sector resources and welfare needs and this also appears to be the case in terms of the membership and health impacts of such organizations. Thus while social mechanisms, such as collective so cialization or transmitting health promotion messages more effectively through community organizations may all be health promoting they can also be highly ex clusionary, especially if beneﬁts are not evenly shared among different social or ethnic groups. It is clear that poverty and growing levels of social inequality act as a constraint to behavior change, al though this is likely to be context speciﬁc. This may reﬂect not only the level of poverty and inequality and the extent to which such concerns outweigh the impact of any public health messages, but also differences in organizational structure and the ways in which such messages reach the community. For example, rural, more decentralized voluntary organizations may be more

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effective in reaching deprived groups than larger more centralized and corporate voluntary sector groups.

Do Health Systems Matter? Service Provision and Health Outcomes At the most basic level health systems matter because of the contribution they make to meeting needs for care and the positive beneﬁts to health. However, this has not al ways been true. In the nineteenth century medical mis adventure (or the idea of ‘iatrogenesis’) was common in hospitals and today some groups are more likely to ex perience adverse effects from treatment. In recent times the question of the contribution that health care makes to health outcomes has become more important as gov ernments and international agencies have increasingly formulated health outcome goals. Such moves have fo cused not only on improving life expectancy but also on the goal of reducing health, inequalities between differ ent groups. However, the contribution that health sys tems make to health is difﬁcult to judge as different kinds of evidence seem to give conﬂicting answers. At the level of interventions against particular diseases there is substantial evidence that large improvements in health can be achieved at reasonable cost such as anti malaria campaigns in many developing countries which have involved early case detection and treatment. At the level of overall progress in health, the 1999 World Health Organization World Health Report cited evidence that across a sample of 115 low and middle income countries scientiﬁc and technical progress in health care explained almost half the reduction in mortality between 1960 and 1990 in these countries. However, an important question is whether geo graphic differences in access and use of service have any effect on health outcomes. In terms of access to emer gency care, for conditions such as road accidents, there is evidence that when access is poor and response times are long then health outcomes are adversely affected. Simi larly, there is evidence from the United States which suggests that levels of infant mortality and non normal births are related to geographic differences in maternity care, particularly in rural areas. Such trends possibly reﬂect the fact that mothers have to wait longer to see their obstetrician and, without good access, patients with complications may experience delays in access to neo natal intensive care services. The declining number of doctors providing obstetrical care has also accentuated such trends. With respect to nonemergency care there is evidence that for some cancers survival rates vary geographically with patients in more deprived areas having worse sur vival rates. This may reﬂect delays in diagnosis as, for example, in the case of melanoma. Unlike most cancers,

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more afﬂuent groups are more likely to contact mela noma but are less likely to die from it due to the greater likelihood of earlier detection of the disease. Similar trends are evident for other lifestyle diseases such as diabetes where middle class patients are more likely to have been diagnosed earlier and to be involved in edu cational programs to improve their condition. While, there is evidence that geographic differences in access to and variations in the quality of services have an impact upon population health, this is countered by other evidence which suggests that health systems make little or no difference and that most of the improvements in health status can be linked to positive changes in the physical and social environment. This was certainly the case during the nineteenth century when public health initiatives, such as improved sanitation, accounted for most of the decline in mortality for conditions such as tuberculosis. This occurred before signiﬁcant medical interventions for the disease. Furthermore, comparisons across countries, while showing that per capita income is strongly related to variations in health status, have also found that there is little independent connection with speciﬁc inputs such as number of doctors or hospital beds. This conﬂicting evidence can perhaps be reconciled in two ways. First, many studies are cross sectional in na ture and therefore do not adequately test the relationship between health service inputs and health outputs because of lag effects. Second, the population health beneﬁts of particular forms of health expenditure are highly variable both between and within countries and therefore the impact of health resources upon health is far from uni form. For example, it is increasingly recognized that countries (and regions) with higher levels of primary health care expenditure tend to have better health. In the United States, for example, research has shown that among the health care variables, primary care is the most signiﬁcant variable related to better health status and correlated with both lower overall mortality and higher levels of self reported health. Similarly, countries char acterized by more universal primary health care coverage tend to have higher rates of service use and lower socioeconomic status differences in mortality. Such fac tors need to be borne in mind when assessing the impacts of health services upon health outcomes.

See also: Care/Caregiving; Healthcare Accessibility; Health Geography; Health Inequalities; Health Services Restructuring; Mental Health; Neoliberalism; Voluntary Sector; Welfare Reform.

Further Reading Barnett, J. R. and Brown, L. J. (2006). ‘Getting into hospitals in a big way’: The corporate transformation of hospital care in Australia. Environment and Planning D (Society and Space) 24, 283 310. Curtis, S. (2004). Health and Inequality: Geographical Perspectives. London: Sage. Gatrell, A. C. (2002). Geographies of Health: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell. Gesler, W. (1992). Therapeutic landscapes: Medical geographic research in the light of the new cultural geography. Social Science and Medicine 34, 735 746. Gesler, W. and Ricketts, T. (eds.) (1992). Health in Rural North America. New York: Rutgers University Press. Joseph, A. E. and Phillips, D. R. (1984). Access and Utilisation: Geographical Perspectives in Health Care Delivery. London: Harper and Row. Milligan, C. and Conradson, D. (eds.) (2006). Landscapes of Voluntarism: New Spaces of Health, Welfare and Governance. London: Policy Press. Mohan, J. (2002). Planning, Markets, and Hospitals. London: Routledge. Moon, G. and North, N. (2000). Policy and Practice: General Medical Practice in the UK. London: Macmillan. Nolte, E., McKee, M. and Wait, S. (2005). Describing and evaluating health systems. In Bowling, A. & Ebrahim, S. (eds.) Health Research Methods, pp 12 43. Maidenhead: Open University Press. Pinch, S. (1997). Worlds of Welfare: Understanding the Changing Geographies of Social Welfare Provision. London: Routledge. Ranade, W. (1997). Markets and Health Care: A Comparative Analysis. Harlow: Longman. Ricketts, T. C., Savitz, L. A., Gesler, W. M. and Osborne, D. N. (1994). Geographic Methods for Health Services Research. A Focus on the Rural Urban Continuum. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Starﬁeld, B., Shi, L. and Macinko, J. (2005). Contribution of primary care to health systems and population health. Milbank Quarterly 83, 457 502. World Health Organization. (2000). World Health Report 2000. Health systems; improving performance. Report of the World Health Organization. Geneva: WHO.

Relevant Websites http://www.commonwealthfund.org Commonwealth Fund: International Health Policy. http://www.euro.who.int/observatory European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies. http://www.who.int/topics/health systems/en/ WHO health systems website.

Healthcare Accessibility J. S. Humphreys and K. B. Smith, Monash University, Bendigo, VIC, Australia & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Access It refers to the capacity of people to obtain healthcare at the right place and right time regardless of location, socioeconomic factors, or cultural background. Availability The overall extent to which healthcare systems provide facilities and services to meet the needs of individuals and populations. Distance Decay It occurs when the rates of utilization of a particular facility diminish with increasing distance from that facility. Healthcare Accessibility The extent to which individuals and communities can easily obtain health services when needed. Primary Care It refers to the provision of ﬁrst contact, person-focused ongoing care over time that meets the health-related needs of people. Primary Healthcare (PHC) Primary care applied on a population level. Range It refers to the maximum distance people will travel to obtain healthcare services. Threshold It refers to the minimum number of people needed to support the existence of a service.

Introduction Accessibility to healthcare is recognized as a basic right by international bodies such as the United Nations and World Health Organization (WHO), and remains a guiding principle underpinning the policies for the de livery of health services throughout developed and de veloping countries. In particular, accessibility to primary healthcare services is a health priority for most countries throughout the world. Primary healthcare is usually the ﬁrst level of care for patients in terms of health pro tection, promotion, and treatment, and providers of pri mary care act as ‘gatekeepers’ to other more specialized health services. Primary healthcare is also the level of care that can be most readily and cost effectively ex tended to the greater part of the population to improve the effectiveness, efﬁciency, and equity of healthcare delivery.

Deﬁning Access and Accessibility Throughout the social sciences, medicine, and other disciplines, the concept of accessibility is often used

interchangeably with the broader concept of access. The signiﬁcance of the distinction between these concepts is often not acknowledged or fully appreciated. Access refers to the capacity of people to obtain healthcare at the right place and right time regardless of location, socioeconomic factors, or cultural background. According to Penchansky and Thomas, ﬁve interrelated dimensions are contained within the broad concept of access – availability, accessibility, accommodation, afford ability, and acceptability. Availability refers to the overall extent to which healthcare systems provide facilities and services to meet the needs of individuals and populations. The availability of services is crucial in considering ac cessibility since services must ﬁrst exist for them to be accessible. Accessibility is the relationship between the location of supply and the location of clients. The appro priateness and manner in which services are organized to meet patients’ needs come under the concept of accom modation. Affordability is the association between cost of services and the ability of clients to pay, while acceptability refers to the attitudes of clients toward service providers and provider attitudes about characteristics of their pa tients. Factors affecting ‘access’ to health services thus in clude the physical and temporal availability of services (including waiting times, choice, and appropriateness), the numerical and professional adequacy of the healthcare workforce, and the cost of service to the individual. Healthcare accessibility refers to the extent to which individuals and communities can easily obtain health services when needed. The most basic dimension of healthcare accessibility is geographical reﬂecting the spatial separation of healthcare consumers (the demand side of the concept) and the healthcare facilities and services themselves (the supply side). Measures of ac cessibility therefore quantify the relationship between obstacles arising from the geographic location of services (travel time, cost, distance) and the capacities of potential healthcare users to overcome these obstacles. Factors affecting ‘accessibility’ to health services include re moteness, travel time to services, transport (including mode, road conditions, patient mobility), socioeconomic barriers such as income, language and ethnicity, health literacy, and health status (including type or urgency of health problem, disability, and support required). A distinction can also be made between ‘locational’ and ‘effective’ accessibility, the former referring to the level of geographical proximity of services and the latter taking account of when a facility is open, whether it is

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socially and ﬁnancially available, and whether potential clients have the time to use the service. The formulation of a precise deﬁnition for healthcare accessibility is inevitably context dependent, with the concept viewed differently by providers, consumers, governments, and funding bodies. For this reason, and given the diversity of local environmental, social, cul tural, political, and organizational factors that must be taken into account, it is impossible to apply the same models of accessibility to every country. Nevertheless, throughout the world, the deﬁnition and measurement of access and accessibility is critical to the planning, funding, and implementation of programs to improve healthcare delivery, in assessing equity in healthcare provision and service utilization patterns, and in evaluating health outcomes, since spatial variations in levels of morbidity and mortality will reﬂect, among other things, differences in healthcare accessibility.

Measuring Accessibility Since the advent of computers and the ‘quantitative revolution’ of the 1960s and 1970s geographers have been able to undertake detailed spatial analysis and modeling of service locations and accessibility differences at a variety of scales from the national to the local or intra urban. In the 1980s and 1990s greater emphasis was placed on the social justice, political, economic, and cultural aspects of accessibility. Most recently geographic information systems (GISs) have transformed the way accessibility can be analyzed and displayed through the management of larger data sets. Internationally, the importance of accessibility to health services remains one of the primary concerns of medical geography, exempliﬁed in the work of such geographers as Paul Knox, David Smith, Robert Earickson, Gary Shannon, Alun Joseph, David Phillips, John Eyles, Robin Kearns, Graham Moon, Ross Barnett, Sara McLafferty, Jonathan Mayer, Sarah Curtis, and Ellen Cromley among many others. The core spatial dimension of accessibility is distance. Common measures include physical or linear distance (sometimes distinguishing between road conditions), mode of transport, travel time, travel cost, distance to nearest provider, and individual mobility. The universal tendency to use a measure of physical distance rather than travel time to measure spatial accessibility reﬂects the difﬁculties, and underplays the added complexities associated with, measuring the varying methods of jour neys, transport availability and scheduling, road con ditions, terrain, and any other natural barriers people confront when accessing services. Within any population, accessibility to and the use of health services will also differ across a range of

‘nonspatial’ considerations – ﬁnancial, behavioral, cul tural, organizational, and socioeconomic. Age, gender, education, socioeconomic status, ethnicity, and health status, for example, variously act as barriers or facilitators when accessing services. Financial barriers such as the costs of transport, childcare, or earnings foregone may affect attendance at health services. Ability to pay for services is especially challenging for the poor and may well be a critical determinant of whether care is sought. Since different measures of accessibility emphasize different aspects of the concept, the issue or question under examination should determine the choice of measure. Objective measures, such as service availability, population, socioeconomic factors, health status, distance, and geography are the most obvious factors inﬂuencing consumers’ experience of access and accessibility. How ever, measures must also be sensitive to cognitive effects on how consumers view their access to health services. Assumptions that improved accessibility results from closer or the presence of more services, that accessibility is the same for all people in a location, that the fastest and/or cheapest mode of transport will necessarily be used to access services, or that the nearest facility will always be used do not necessarily hold. For example, in Kenya it was found that where health services were closely spaced, patients were more likely to attend the facility offering higher order services. Similarly, in Australia it has been shown that choice is an important consideration in the study of geographical accessibility, with people bypassing nearer services, if they are perceived to be inappropriate or of inferior quality to those further aﬁeld, despite the higher monetary, time, and other costs involved. Because social, economic, and cultural factors, often difﬁcult to measure, may override simple proximity in determining use of services, none of the commonly used measures of accessibility is without its limitations. While simple linear distance measures and provider to popu lation ratios are commonly used in making gross com parisons of accessibility, neither allows for individual behaviors and constraints or permeations across regions or boundaries. Some attempts have been made to develop more complex version of these ratios, such as ‘ﬂoating’ catchment areas that provide provider population ratios within designated travel time catchments that can be moved around.

Role of GISs The use of GISs to measure accessibility has greatly improved the accuracy and sophistication of analyses. As with any technology, value of output depends on the quality of data regarding service availability, distance measures, travel modes, road conditions, and actual utilization of services.

Healthcare Accessibility

Commonly, GIS has been used to measure a variety of accessibility aspects, for example, proximity to healthcare facilities, or distance to nearest treatment point, to quantify relationships between road accessibility and disease prevalence, to deﬁne areas for the management of primary healthcare, to calculate population per service ratios, to measure impact of travel time, and to analyze spatial variations in clinic use patterns. Two recent examples of GIS technology for measuring accessibility to health services are WHO’s AccessMod and the Pan American Health Organisation’s (PAHO) GIS Epi (SIG Epi). These applications use travel times and distances as the geographical indicators of accessibility and incorporate data on population, landcover, transport network, elevation, administrative boundaries, and health facility location to model acces sibility to health services. The former measures physical accessibility and population coverage capacity of an existing health facility network to generate catchment areas. Nevertheless, even these two applications are limited by the assumption that access is to the nearest health service rather than incorporating actual utilization data to more accurately reﬂect patient behavior. As an example of its contribution to the analysis of accessibility in this ﬁeld, GIS technology was employed in a study of Kenyan malarial programs to deﬁne physical accessibility and utilization of health services in order to assist with healthcare planning and resource allocation based on spatial data relating to health service location and population (see Figure 1). Distance to health ser vices was measured for within each of four districts of Kenya using actual transport networks and taking into account topography, natural barriers, mode of transport (in this case primarily pedestrian), and actual use of services. Advances in GIS geocomputing capabilities enable the combination of spatial, nonspatial and temporal accessibility information in one system which, pre GIS, would have been heavily time consuming, expensive, and probably too complex. Although GIS does not change the conceptual bases of accessibility analysis, it enhances the accuracy and ﬂexibility of accessibility measures by facilitating the storage, management, and integration of very large data sets for large geographical areas. GIS also allows for the layering of information such as population distribution, location of health services and actual usage of facilities, and the mapping and visual display of the outcomes. For example, a study in South Africa utilized GIS to georeference 23 000 homesteads to analyze modal usage patterns, constructing polygons for each ﬁxed clinic and then superimposing these on to the homesteads. The value of GIS lies in its ability to present a high degree of spatial and temporal resolution of a given environment, for example, representing trafﬁc congestion at various times of day, overcoming

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Figure 1 Modeling distances to government health services in Kwale district in Kenya: Maps of Kwale showing access to government health services based on travel time (hours) for (a) the Euclidean, (b) the transport network, and (c) the adjusted transport network models. þ government health facility; catchment area; 0 0.5 h; >0.5 1 h; >1 h. All maps are at the same scale. The North direction is toward the top of the page. Reprinted with permission from Noor, A. M., Amin, A. A., Gething, P. W. et al. (2006). Modelling distances travelled to government health services in Kenya. Tropical Medicine & International Health 11(2), 188 196.

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Healthcare Accessibility

the assumption of constant travel speed or time for journeys.

Accessibility and the Spatial Organization of Health Services Accessibility to health services is dependent on the way healthcare is delivered and the resultant spatial organ ization of health services, the location of people in re lation to available facilities, physical and topographical barriers, road networks, modes of transport, as well as funding arrangements (e.g., user pays, free public service, private insurance). Clearly, there are enormous differences between de veloped and developing countries in the nature of health systems and the provision of health services. Despite these differences the concepts of service threshold and range have universal applicability when considering the delivery of and accessibility to health services. The threshold of a service refers to the minimum number of people needed to support the existence of that service. The range for a service outlet refers to the maximum distance people will travel to obtain it. Threshold and range vary according to the type of ser vice. Usually the threshold and range for primary healthcare activities such as health promotion, early intervention, immunization, screening, and some domi ciliary, rehabilitative, and supportive care, are small. In contrast, the threshold and range of specialized (higher order) and infrequently used services (such as surgery) extend appreciably, since they require signiﬁcantly more people to sustain the service. For these reasons it is often impossible for sparsely populated areas to support anything but low order ser vices locally. Nevertheless, even the smallest rural com munity will need some specialized healthcare or treatment (e.g., for farm injury or road accidents). It is therefore desirable that accessibility to the appropriate health service be facilitated by other means, for example, by the availability of emergency evacuation and transport facilities to take patients to the appropriate service (e.g., trauma center or hospital) as soon as possible and de sirably within the ﬁrst hour after injury. Nor should in dividuals requiring referral away from their community for specialist treatment be disadvantaged through barriers to accessibility such as lack of public transport or own ership of a vehicle, impassable roads, excessive cost, or poor scheduling of appointments, but this goal remains to be achieved in many parts of the developing world, as in rural and remote areas of some parts of the developed world, like Australia. In general, where the threshold of any service cannot be met within its range, that service will not normally exist locally. One way of expanding the threshold (or

catchment area) is by the use of mobile services which take the service to the people. In this way, communities (each too small by itself to sustain a full time service locally) can be serviced collectively, albeit on a periodic basis (e.g., in the case of the Flying Doctor Service clinics and outreach programs in Australia, South Africa, and Malaysia). One problem for communities that are served only by periodic mobile services is that the occurrence of health problems often cannot be timetabled to meet the service schedule. Under such circumstances the availability of appropriate transport to the appro priate healthcare service at the time of need is therefore critical.

Patterns of Healthcare Accessibility Organizational and institutional arrangements under pinning the provision of health services, such as health policies, methods of payment for services, and cross border arrangements in the case of federal countries like Canada and Australia impact profoundly on healthcare accessibility. Nonetheless, distance, and the density and dispersal of population, remain key elements in the an alysis of health service accessibility. In countries such as Australia, Canada, Brazil, and Russia, with large land masses and dispersed populations, distance is particularly salient for residents of rural and remote areas not only due to the higher costs of providing services to them but also because of difﬁculties associated with recruiting qualiﬁed staff. In smaller countries distances to services tend to be less so that accessibility is generally perceived as less problematic. However, even in countries such as Scot land, Norway, and New Zealand, problems of accessi bility are signiﬁcant for some services and populations, particularly where the impact of extreme climatic conditions impact upon transport. Other accessibility problems can arise in unstable environments such as situations of political conﬂict which restrict population movement or alternatively generate mass migration, or lead to the loss of facilities providing care. This is evident in places such as Palestine, Sudan, and Iraq, where violent political conﬂict severely limits the physical accessibility of the population to primary healthcare. In all societies signiﬁcant differences in accessibility to health services exist between urban and rural areas (see Figure 2). In general, accessibility issues are most acute in rural and remote areas characterized by low popu lation densities and shortage or dispersal of health ser vices. Shortages of doctors and other healthcare workers and the uneven distribution of providers contribute to differing levels of accessibility in rural areas. For ex ample, in Australia, people in rural and remote areas

Healthcare Accessibility

Legend Spatial accessibility score

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Rockford

0.003876−0.004886 Chicago 0.003218−0.003875 0.002464−0.003217 0.001727−0.002463 0.000986−0.001726

Rock Island

0.000000−0.000985 Kankakee

Country boundary PeorÍa

Bloomington Normal

Champaign Urbana Decatur Springfield

East St. Louis

0

25

50

75 Miles

Figure 2 Rural urban differences in accessibility to primary healthcare in Chicago and Illinois, USA using two-step ﬂoating catchment methodology. Reprinted with permission from Wang, F. and Luo, W. (2005). Assessing spatial and nonspatial factors for healthcare access: Towards an integrated approach to deﬁning health professional shortage areas. Health & Place 11(2), 131 146.

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Healthcare Accessibility

often experience greater difﬁculty in accessing healthcare than those living in metropolitan or other major urban areas (see Figure 3). Because urban populations are typically less dispersed than rural populations it is usually easier to provide readily accessible services. Nevertheless, intra urban ac cessibility differentials can still be signiﬁcant for mar ginalized population groups characterized, for example, by high numbers of transport poor elderly or disabled citizens, or by low socioeconomic status. Other access disadvantaged groups commonly include young families living in outer metropolitan areas or urban fringes where there is often minimal public transport, or those without access to private transport (see Figure 4).

The Changing Patterns of Accessibility and Health Services

and conditions may all affect the time taken to access primary healthcare services; mobile services and home based care may improve accessibility by bringing services to those who have difﬁculty accessing ﬁxed clinics, as may the new telehealth technology. The perception of telemedicine as the panacea for overcoming the tyranny of distance is yet to be realized, however, with its greatest success to date being in information transfer, education, and training rather than in the sustained delivery of clinical services to remote communities. It should by now be clear that accessibility is a relative and certainly not static concept for it changes according to individual circumstances, such as the resource avail ability, health status, the level of support needed, stage in the lifecycle, or the availability of transport.

Accessibility and the Utilization of Health Services

The impact of globalization may be seen in changing patterns of healthcare accessibility. In Western countries ﬁscal concerns with the escalating costs of providing health services to aging populations, problems of work force supply and recruitment, increased use of technol ogy and consumer expectations have all led to the rationalization or closure of many existing local services in rural areas. Economies of scale coupled with increas ingly expensive modes of treatment have resulted in in creasing centralization of services in larger centers. Centralization of health services in larger centers has further exacerbated the difﬁculties confronting rural and remote populations in accessing health services, a case in point being the current reduction in obstetric services in rural regions of many Western countries. The nature of transportation systems also impacts on accessibility to health services. Private transport avail ability can signiﬁcantly increase accessibility to services relative to public transport. Road networks, road type,

Evaluation of healthcare accessibility is often achieved by examining service utilization rates. Utilization is seen as a record of ‘revealed’ accessibility. Some caution is re quired here, however, since service utilization will not necessarily occur even under optimal service distribution and proximity conditions. Accessibility should not be conﬂated with the utilization of health services, because patterns of utilization alone will not reﬂect the extent to which services are not accessed at times of need due to their nonavailability or other intervening barriers. In Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country, for example, the WHO found that the overall availability, accessibility, quality, and utilization of health services has been stag nating or even decreasing signiﬁcantly during the past decade due to being poorly equipped, and lacking in essential supplies and qualiﬁed staff. Nonetheless, in aggregate terms there does appear to be a direct relationship between accessibility, health

1.2 Major city baseline 1

Ratio

0.8

General practice Specialist medical services Nurses Dental services

0.6 0.4

Physiotherapy services 0.2 0 Major cities

Inner regional

Outer Remote Very regional remote Region

Figure 3 Practitioner to population ratios according to rurality in Australia. Reprinted with permission from Productivity Commission (2005). Australia’s Health Workforce. Canberra: Productivity Commission.

Healthcare Accessibility

(a)

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(b)

Quintiles of population by distance from renal unit 1 - Closest 2 3 4 5 - Furthest 0

50 kilometres

(c)

Figure 4 Intra-urban differences in accessibility to renal replacement therapy in England. (a) Crow-ﬂy distance, (b) road travel distance, and (c) road travel time. Reprinted with permission from Martin, D., Roderick, P., Diamond, I., Clements, S. and Stone, N. (1998). Geographical aspects of the uptake of renal replacement therapy in England. International Journal of Population Geography 4(3), 227 242.

service utilization, and health outcomes. Distance to a health service impacts on utilization, with people closer to a health provider more likely to seek care when ill than those at a greater distance. This ‘distance decay’ phenomenon, where the rates of utilization of a particular facility diminish with increasing distance from that fa cility, is evident in both developed and developing countries (see Figure 5). In South African rural communities this distance decay is evident at just under 5 km, while in Papua New Guinea the point at which 50% of potential attendees were lost was only 3.5 km compared with 3.2 km in Uganda and 3.4 km in Nigeria. In Kenya, it was found that usage peaked at 2–3 km from facilities. In Zambia how ever, the impact of distance on healthcare utilization was more pronounced for those living more than 40 km from a health provider.

Differences between developing and developed countries in their burdens of disease and resource ability generate enormous differences in their capacities to provide health services. In developing countries with large proportions of their population living below the poverty line, where the infrastructure is lacking and distances to health facilities can be large, ﬁnancial ac cessibility is likely to be a critical determinant of whether care is sought. In such circumstances public health fa cilities are often concentrated in hospitals in urban centers, to the disadvantage of accessibility among and thus the health status of rural populations. In 2004, for example, it was noted by the Director of the Pan American Health Organization that 107 million people in Latin America and the Caribbean lacked access to healthcare for geographic reasons and a further 120 million for economic reasons.

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Healthcare Accessibility 35

Percentage usage

30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1

2 3

4 5

6 7

8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Distance (km)

Figure 5 Distance-decay when accessing clinical services in four districts of Kenya. Cumulative health services use against traveled represents Greater Kisii, to government health facility where treatment was sought for the four districts. The line represents Bondo, represents Kwale, and represents Makueni. The y-axis shows the cumulative percentage of patients in each district who traveled to a health facility at the distance (km) value shown on the x-axis. The cumulative percentages were computed by summing all patients who went in a district and used a facility at each distance on an 11-point scale (0 1, 1 2, 2 3, 3 4, 4 5, 5 6, 6 7, 7 8, 8 9, 9 10, and >10 km). Eighty-four percent in Bondo and 80, 64, and 62% of patients in Greater Kissi, Kwale, and Makueni used health facilities within 5 km, respectively. Reprinted with permission from Noor, A. M., Zurovac, D., Hay, I. S., Ochola, S. A. and Snow, R. W. (2003). Deﬁning equity in physical access to clinical services using geographical information systems as part of malaria planning and monitoring in Kenya. Tropical Medicine & International Health 8(10), 917 926.

Accessibility and Health Outcomes

Conclusion

Measures of health status and improvement in health outcomes are contingent upon access to health services and interventions. Accessibility to healthcare services impacts both on life chances (in terms of promotion of health and on the burden of disease) and also survival because of the delays involved in obtaining care. In Western countries, studies have shown that the variations in accessibility to healthcare services between rural and remote areas are reﬂected in lower rates of cancer sur vival, signiﬁcantly higher levels of displacement and so cial disruption for pregnant women, and higher death rates from coronary heart disease. Accessibility is also an important indicator of equity in health systems. While a rural location does not always translate into health disadvantage, equity differences do tend to parallel accessibility differentials. End stage renal disease in Indigenous Australians is higher in remote areas than urban regions, highlighting inequitable accessibility to treatment facilities for remote patients. It has also been shown that centralization of facilities has impeded rural people’s accessibility to radiotherapy services, generated signiﬁcant geographical inequities in rural women’s ac cessibility to bulk billing and obstetric services, and in creased their out of pocket expenses relative to women in urban areas. Where healthcare funding is tied to the provision of health services, inequity can result from lack of accessibility to available services and is usually reﬂected in underutilization of health services at times of need.

The concept of healthcare accessibility is central to en suring that the provision of healthcare services meets the health needs of individuals and populations. The core dimension of accessibility to healthcare services is un doubtedly geographical. However, the interrelationships between the spatial dimensions and other aspects of so cietal organization ensure that the existence of, or proximity to, healthcare services within a geographical location does not of itself ensure accessibility to those services. While the physical accessibility of services may play a major role in inﬂuencing patient choice of health facility and therefore the use of a service, health consumers do not necessarily use the nearest health service. Regardless of location, accessibility differs from individual to indi vidual since choice of facility reﬂects a host of other socioeconomic, cultural, perceptual, and organization factors in addition to the importance of ease of accessi bility. Overcoming the friction of distance also has dif ferent implications for individuals, for example, those with mobility problems or lacking private transport. Moreover, the nearest facilities may not be accessible to poor people if payment for services is required. In gen eral, however, geographical distance is closely related to travel time and transport costs, with longer distances involving greater time and costs. Accessibility to healthcare has a direct impact on the burden of disease and is an important indicator of the

Healthcare Accessibility

performance of any national health system. Geo graphical, ﬁnancial, sociocultural, and temporal accessi bility are key dimensions of effective, integrated, and equitable health systems.

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See also: Health Services Restructuring; Regional Inequalities; Rural Populations.

Starﬁeld, B. (2006). State of the art in research on equity in health. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 31(1), 11 32. Tanser, F. and le Sueur, D. (2002). The application of geographical information systems to important public health problems in Africa. International Journal of Health Geographics 1(1), 4. Wang, F. and Luo, W. (2005). Assessing spatial and nonspatial factors for healthcare access: Towards an integrated approach to deﬁning health professional shortage areas. Health & Place 11(2), 131 146.

Further Reading

Relevant Websites

Campbell, S., Roland, M. and Buetow, S. (2000). Deﬁning quality of care. Social Science & Medicine 51(11), 1611 1625. Guagliardo, M. (2004). Spatial accessibility of primary care: Concepts, methods and challenges. International Journal of Health Geographics 3(1), 3 16. Humphreys, J. S., Mathews Cowey, S. and Weinand, H. C. (1997). Factors in accessibility of general practice in rural Australia. Medical Journal of Australia 166(11), 577 580. Joseph, A. E. and Phillips, D. R. (1984). Accessibility and utilization: Geographical perspectives on health care delivery. London: Harper & Row. Noor A. M., Amin A. A., Gething P. W. et al. (2006). Modelling distances travelled to government health services in Kenya. Tropical Medicine & International Health 11(2), 188 196. Noor, A. M., Zurovac, D., Hay, I. S., Ochola, S. A. and Snow, R. W. (2003). Deﬁning equity in physical access to clinical services using geographical information systems as part of malaria planning and monitoring in Kenya. Tropical Medicine & International Health 8(10), 917 926. Penchansky, R. and Thomas, J. (1981). The concept of access: Deﬁnition and relationship to consumer satisfaction. Medical Care 14(2), 127 140. Productivity Commission (2005). Australia’s Health Workforce. Canberra: Productivity Commission.

GIS websites http://www.csiss.org/GISPopSci/ Centre for Socially Integrated Social Science. GIS and Population Science. http://www.amro.who.int/English/sha/be v22n3 SIGEpi.htm Pan American Health Organization (PAHO): PAHO SIGEpi. Geographic Information System in Epidemiology and Public Health. http://www.who.int/kms/initiatives/accessmod/en/index.html WHO Modelling Physical Accessibility to Health Care (AccessMod).

Rural websites http://www.amref.org/ African Medical and Research Foundation (AMREF) Flying Doctors. http://www.aihw.gov.au/indigenous/health/access.cfm Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), Indigenous Australians access to health services. http://www.abdn.ac.uk/crh/about.shtml Centre for Rural Health, University of Aberdeen. http://www.ruralhealthresearch.org/ Rural Health Research Gateway.

Hegemony J. Glassman, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Articulation A term that refers simultaneously to connections between two entities or processes and to the ability of one entity or process to give expression to another. Authoritarian Populism A political project that has evolved in a context where there is intensive state control over all spheres of socioeconomic life, in which the populist dimension of the political project deﬂects criticism from major forms of class power and redirects them to an abstracted notion of the state itself. Geopolitical Realism An approach to international relations that regards states, for analytical purposes, as individual actors that pursue their own interests (typically wealth and power), within an anarchic global arena. National-Popular It is a term referring to processes and social struggles that transcend a simple workingclass base, and involve alliances between a variety of social groups, organized on a national basis, and typically involving peasants and other agrarian groups. Neoliberalism It is a doctrine, based loosely on an updating of classic nineteenth-century liberalism and emerging in the 1970s and 1980s, according to which the best political and economic outcomes can be procured through minimizing the role of states and allowing market activities considerable scope, including through encouragement of global free trade. Organic Intellectuals In the writings of Antonio Gramsci, a term referring to speciﬁc groups of intellectuals whose activities are associated with the interests of a particular class or social group, and who help that class or social group to form a stronger sense of cohesion, group identity, and strategic purpose. World-Systems Analysis A form of analysis developed by historical sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein in the 1970s, built around the claim that contemporary societies can only be understood if they are analyzed as part of a global capitalist system, one that has developed through very long-term historical processes, and is inherently hierarchical.

Introduction Hegemony is a word with a long history, deriving from an ancient Greek term referring to domination or leader ship, especially the leadership of a state or nation in a confederation. In this usage, the degree to which

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hegemony implies leadership by coercion, consent, or some combination of the two is most often left unspeci ﬁed. In geopolitical literature up to the twentieth century, where the term hegemony occurred, it was typically used to refer to relations between states, in this underspeciﬁed sense, and in some contemporary discussions similar notions of hegemony are still common. The concept of hegemony was substantially transformed, however, by the writings of Antonio Gramsci, becoming a term used to refer to features of class relations and to specify a par ticular relationship between domination and leadership. This article examines Gramsci’s adaptation of hegemony, surveys varied interpretations of Gramsci in both social theory and international relations/international political economy, then notes speciﬁc geographical themes related to Gramscian notions of hegemony, and concludes with a discussion of the variety of both Gramscian and non Gramsican conceptions of hegemony, noting the signiﬁ cance of the concept in contemporary political debates.

Gramsci’s Adaptation of the Notion of Hegemony With the publication in 1971 of the ﬁrst English language translation of extensive selections from Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks, less differentiated uses of the term hegemony were increasingly displaced in Marxist discourse by uses associated with this text. Gramsci, the leader of the Italian Communist Party in the 1920s before he was imprisoned by Mussolini’s regime, wrote proliﬁcally from his prison cell about the development of political strug gles in Italy, including the rise of fascism. In elaborating an account of the limits and failures of working class struggles in Italy, Gramsci revised and redeployed the notion of hegemony, developing it as a concept for an alysis of class relations within capitalist societies of the West. Gramsci did not simply invent this conception of hegemony from whole cloth or effect by himself the transformation of the concept into one centered on class. Much of the groundwork for the conceptualization Gramsci developed had been laid by previous debates within the Russian Left. However, Gramsci deployed hegemony in a comparatively unique fashion, using it to analyze the relationship between capitalists and workers within a developed capitalist society. Precisely what Gramsci meant in his various uses of the term has been a topic of considerable debate, at least since the publication of the 1971 English translation of excerpts from the

Hegemony

Prison Notebooks. Nonetheless, virtually all commentators agree that Gramsci gave special impetus to certain as pects of the conception of hegemony, including, in par ticular, a focus on political and cultural dimensions of class rule and revolutionary struggle. Class and International Relations in Gramsci Gramsci’s use of the term hegemony as a concept cen tered on class rather than on relations between states followed directly from his conception of social power and the basis of international relations. In ‘The modern prince’, one of the writings included within the 1971 excerpts from the Prison Notebooks, he asked whether international relations logically precede or follow from domestic social relations, and answered that they follow. Changes in the social structure, expressed militarily, modify international relations, including the geo graphical positions of national states. Gramsci did allow that international relations reacted back on domestic social structures and political relations, both passively and actively, but he was clearly articulating a position antagonistic to the geopolitical realist con struct of national states as uniﬁed individual actors in an anarchic global arena. In contrast, Gramsci derived the international behavior of states, at least to a signiﬁcant degree, from the social relations and struggles within those states – conceived, it should be added, in largely national–territorial terms. This allowed Gramsci to maintain a focus on class relations within societies – predominantly though not exclusively, in his analyses, Italy – and, thus, on the political struggles in which he was a direct participant. Gramsci’s Nonreductionist Approach to Class While Gramsci thus reasserted the primacy of class re lations, he did not do so in a way that was economically reductionist. As for many Marxist social theorists, class for Gramsci was simultaneously an economic, political, and sociocultural phenomenon. While this view was not unique to Gramsci, the strength of his writings lies in the ways they draw out the political and sociocultural (in cluding ideological) dimensions of class relations. Here, the concept of hegemony is central. In Gramsci’s writings, hegemony refers to a speciﬁc rela tionship between domination and leadership, and co ercion and consent. Gramsci differentiated between these terms, and identiﬁed hegemony more with leadership/ consent than with domination/coercion. Domination and leadership do not, however, exist in a mutually exclusive relationship. As Gramsci put it in his ‘Notes on Italian history’, another text included in the 1971 collection, a social group dominates antagonistic groups, eliminating them or subjugating them by armed force if necessary, while it leads kindred and allied groups. Hegemony is

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central to leadership, in that it refers to the process by which varied social groups consent to the leading role played by a particular class, class fraction, or political group. This consent is not based narrowly on ideological power or political persuasion, but rather on the broader powers which enable certain groups to lead. As Gramsci puts it in his notes on ‘The intellectuals’, in the 1971 collection, the apparently spontaneous consent given by the majority of the population to the trajectories imposed on social life by the dominant group is generated by the prestige this group enjoys because of its power within the world of production. At the same time, as Gramsci noted, the coercive power of the state is still crucial, and im poses discipline on those who do not consent, either actively or passively, to the dominant group. As such, just as with domination and leadership, consent and coercion do not exist for Gramsci in a mu tually exclusive relationship. Instead, as he put it in the ‘Notes on Italian history’, the ‘normal’ exercise of he gemony within parliamentary systems is characterized by a combination of force and consent. These tend to bal ance each other ‘reciprocally’, without force predomin ating excessively. Moreover, Gramsci insisted, attempts are always made to ensure that any use of force will appear to be based on the consent of the majority, as articulated in organs of public opinion, such as newspapers. Hegemony, then, does not refer to a situation in which leadership is maintained solely by consent, but rather to a situation in which both consent and coercion are at work, albeit without force predominating and with the exercise of force made to appear as having popular legitimacy. This balancing of consent and coercion, for Gramsci, hinges on a combination of economic, political, and sociocultural practices. Gramsci’s extended discussion of the role of intellectuals in the construction of hegemony (including via newspapers and the like) pointed in the direction of politics and ideology, but at the same time Gramsci grounded this discussion in an understanding of the relationship of intellectuals to class power and pol itical economic processes. In discussing intellectuals, Gramsci rarely focused narrowly on academics, but instead showed special interest in what he called the ‘organic intellectuals’ of a particular social group. As he put it in the writings on ‘The intellectuals’, every social group, existing on the basis of its relationship to economic production, creates along with itself various kinds of intellectuals, who give the group a greater sense of identity and awareness of its economic, social, and political functions. As an example, Gramsci suggested that capitalist entrepreneurs create alongside themselves such organic intellectuals as in dustrial technicians, political economists, cultural pro ducers, and legal experts. Since hegemony did not imply, for Gramsci, the absence of opposition, organic

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Hegemony

intellectuals are not only those who represent the interests of capitalists and ruling groups. Working class parties also develop their own organic intellectuals, and indeed Gramsci went so far as to characterize all mem bers of political parties, whether working class or not, as intellectuals, reﬂecting the role of parties in consciously organizing and elaborating the struggles of particular groups. This view corresponded to Gramsci’s more general perspective on human intellectual activity. Gramsci saw all humans as being intellectuals, even if not all humans have the social function of working as intellectuals. In tellectual and ideological activity, for Gramsci, is char acteristic of all humans, and is intimately bound up with labor and other forms of social activity. In ‘The intel lectuals’, Gramsci put it that the creation of a new stratum of intellectuals involves critical elaboration of the intel lectual activity ‘‘that exists in everyone at a certain degree of development,’’ while modifying its relationship with human muscular nervous activity. This occurs in such a way as to ensure that muscular nervous activity, which is central to the vital practical efforts through which humans alter the physical and social worlds in which they live, becomes ‘‘the foundation of a new and integral conception of the world.’’ The formation of organic intellectuals, and indeed intellectual activity in general, is thus a dimension of the broader social process that involves biophysical activities such as production. From this perspective, Gramsci articulated a notion of hegemony – and the activity of intellectuals in helping generate it – that was not merely cultural or based on intellectual persuasion but based on the relationship of intellectual and cultural activity to speciﬁc forms of class power. The Geography of Hegemony in Gramsci Though Gramsci was not formally a geographer – in deed, he was not a traditional, institutional intellectual of any sort – there is a very important geography to his arguments. First, Gramsci’s arguments were built around an insistence on the speciﬁcity – geographical and his torical – of situations like those in Italy. Rather than simply adopt existing Marxist conventions, Gramsci adapted and transformed them in relationship to the realities he encountered in the political struggles of early twentieth century Italy. These realities included, crucially, the failure of the Italian working class to launch a sustained, effective, and transformative attack on the Italian capitalist state, and much of his discussion of hegemony is in fact designed to explain how, in such a context, some workers could end up consenting to cap italist leadership. In addition, there is a more ﬁne tuned geography in Gramsci, one focused on uneven development within Italy and the differing roles of intellectuals in different

regions of the country. Gramsci, himself from Sardinia, had begun to understand the potential of working class organizations after moving to Turin for studies. He be came keenly aware of the political differences between the more industrialized, working class centers of north ern Italy, like Turin, and rural, agricultural regions, particularly in the south – the so called Southern Question. To these differences in forms of political economic development, corresponded differences in the kinds of intellectuals who helped organize hegemonic projects. In the south, and in rural areas more generally, the predominant organic intellectual strata were com prised of actors such as lawyers and priests, while in the north a larger role was played by the factory technician. Much of Gramsci’s nuanced analysis of Italian politics and the Southern Question is built around an awareness of these regional differences, the roles of differing kinds of intellectuals and social groups, and the efforts of leading political actors and intellectuals (Bendetto Croce is especially important for Gramsci) to create an effective national leadership in this context. For Gramsci’s own political project, this backdrop of uneven development required an adaptation of Marxist theory, so that rather than being based narrowly on working class struggle it could accommodate ‘national popular’ struggle, inclusive of both working class and peasant politics.

Interpretations and Uses of Gramsci in Social Theory Gramsci’s thought has been of interest to a broad range of social theorists with quite diverse perspectives on his work. The philosophically broad fashion in which Gramsci couched certain of his political arguments has left them open to a wide range of interpretations, in cluding their reassimilation to the major ontological categories of liberal social science, in which politics is constructed as a realm autonomous from economics. Such a reading has been enabled, to some extent, by the form in which Gramsci’s writings emerged. The various tracts that were included in the 1971 translation of selections from the Prison Notebooks tended to be those that focus very directly on issues of political strategy and ideology. In 1995, however, a larger collection of writings from Gramsci’s notebooks was published in English translation, including a signiﬁcant number that deal more directly with economic issues. These were not entirely separate writings from those comprising the tracts pub lished in the 1971 selections from the Prison Notebooks and would thus call into question any notion that Gramsci was an analyst of politics, culture, or ideology in ab straction from economics. But even within the 1971 selections from the Prison Notebooks, there are numerous passages that would argue

Hegemony

against such a reading. For example, in a discussion of political reform and national popular projects in ‘The modern prince’, Gramsci argues that intellectual and moral reforms have to be linked with a program of economic reforms – indeed, he states, ‘‘the program of economic reform is precisely the concrete form in which every intellectual and moral reform presents itself.’’ In an especially pertinent passage from the same text, Gramsci argues that the ideas of the free trade movement are based on a theoretical error that involves turning a purely methodological distinction between political and civil society into an ‘organic’ (ontological) distinction. Based on this error, the partisans of free trade assert that ‘‘economic activity belongs to civil society, and that the State must not intervene to regulate it.’’ But, for Gramsci, civil society and the state are in reality two faces of the same entity, and so laissez faire is itself a form of state ‘regulation’, which is ‘‘introduced and maintained by le gislative and coercive means.’’ As such, laissez faire or free trade ‘‘is a deliberate policy, conscious of its own ends, and not the spontaneous, automatic expression of eco nomic facts.’’ It is, moreover, a political program designed to change a state’s leading personnel, its economic policies, and outcomes, such as the distribution of the national income. Here again, Gramsci clearly saw economics, politics, and ideology as being of one piece, integrated through class relations. Yet, even where there has been agreement among Gramscian scholars regarding this general issue, a fairly substantial amount of disagreement has remained re garding more speciﬁc implications of the concept of hegemony and other aspects of Gramscian thought. Three debates that developed in the 1980s and 1990s can be used to provide a sense of the range of interpretations of Gramsci and the different ways in which the concept of hegemony has evolved. Hall’s Use of Gramci In the 1970s and 1980s, Stuart Hall developed a critique of Thatcherism, the neoliberal policies implemented in Great Britain with the rise of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the late 1970s. In this critique, reviewed concisely and further articulated in Hall’s 1988 collection, The Hard Road to Renewal, Hall borrowed from Gramsci to develop an analysis that could help explain the ability of neoliberals to gain some degree of consent for their pol icies from various British working class groups. Hall suggested that Thatcherism constituted a variety of ‘au thoritarian populism’ – a term he adopted from Nicos Poulantzas – and that its populist dimension reﬂected the conscious deployment of anti statist ideology by Thatche rites. This anti statism played to popular frustrations with various aspects of state inertia and trade union privilege to garner popular support for rolling back the Keynesian

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welfare state. Thatcherism, as Hall put it, was able to stigmatize ‘‘statism, bureaucracy, social democracy, and ‘creeping collectivism’,’’ counterposing to these such posi tive traits as ‘‘possessive individualism, personal initiative, ‘Thatcherism’ and freedom.’’ Moreover, Thatcherism de veloped its populist ideological agenda in part through moralistic appeals to working class insecurity over crime and ‘law and order’. As such, it was able to construct a new popular ‘common sense’ that pulled a certain amount of labor support away from social democracy. This analysis was contested by other British scholars, including Bob Jessop, Kevin Bonnett, Simon Bromley, and Tom Ling. Writing in New Left Review, Jessop, Bonnett, Bromley, and Ling not only challenged a number of Hall’s speciﬁc contentions regarding Thatch erism, but they also challenged the fashion in which Hall used the concept of hegemony, accusing him of ‘ideolo gism’ for the way in which he foregrounded ideological dimensions of Thatcherism. Both Hall and his critics, as became clear in subsequent exchanges, agreed in prin ciple with the Gramscian notion that economics, politics, and ideology are all interconnected phenomena, and that ideological phenomena cannot be analyzed as if they refer to processes playing out in domains separate from economics. Yet, methodologically, Hall championed the legitimacy of foregrounding the ideological dimensions of Thatcherism. He argued that while hegemony is not an exclusively ideological phenomenon, it was important to focus on the ideological dimensions, because, among other reasons, these constituted a distinct level of analysis and had too frequently been neglected by the Left. In reply, Jessop, Bonnett, Bromley, and Ling argued that the abstraction of ideological moments of Thatcherism from issues such as the speciﬁc groups of capitalists whose projects enabled and shaped its political and ideological content led to a misleading view of the fashion in which Thatcherism operated. Indeed, Hall’s critics did not ex empt Gramsci himself from criticism on this score, ar guing that Gramsci focused on the politics and ideology of class leadership, while too frequently neglecting structural dimensions of hegemony. Not surprisingly, this was not a debate that led to any simple resolution. It, nonetheless, highlighted some signiﬁcant issues regarding the ways in which ideological dimensions of hegemony were to be conceived and analyzed, and these issues were to reemerge in several other debates. Said’s Use of Gramsci A second example of a debate around the concept of hegemony was occasioned by Edward Said’s deployment of Gramsci’s thought in works such as Orientalism, one of the founding texts of contemporary postcolonial studies. Said indicated early in this work his debt to Gramsci, when he said that it was particularly cultural hegemony

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that gave Orientalism durability and strength. As Said developed this argument, his point was that the cultural dimensions of European colonizing ventures in the Near East, exempliﬁed by the scholarly projects constituting the ﬁeld of Orientalism, were a crucial dimension of imperialism, functioning in conjunction with – and even enabling – the deployment of military and economic forces. Moreover, Said’s project directly invoked a Gramscian strategy for analyzing this hegemony when he noted that in the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci called on critical intellectuals to understand themselves as prod ucts of historical processes, which have ‘‘deposited in you an inﬁnity of traces, without leaving an inventory.’’ It was imperative at the outset, then, to compile such an in ventory. The special signiﬁcance of this passage for Said, as he pointed out, related to his own experiences as a Palestinian growing up in the British colonies of Palestine and Egypt, which inspired him to understand Oriental ism as part of understanding his own life. But the passage also pointed toward Said’s approach to the interpretation of Orientalism, which focused on compiling an inventory of the traces left in the perceptions of Westerners by the products of Orientalist discourse – speciﬁcally, the major literary texts about the Orient which comprise the cen terpiece of Said’s analysis. Rather like Hall, himself a major ﬁgure in postcolonial studies, Said was to come under criticism for speciﬁc aspects of this methodological approach. Said’s general project in Orientalism, and his use of Gramsci in par ticular, was criticized by Aijaz Ahmad, in his book, In Theory. Ahmad took Said to task for a number of speciﬁc aspects of his interpretive approach, many of these cen tering on the fact that Said was fundamentally non Marxist and theoretically eclectic, mixing Gramscian ideas that originally had a Leftist orientation with ideas that were decidedly more nonradical. But a more general point of his book was to critique postcolonial studies for, in his view, failing to adequately interrogate phenomena such as internal social divisions within colonized societies. In his critique of Said, he makes this point via direct reference to Gramsci, noting that the original Gramscian idea of an inventory of traces presumes that there is a cultural location upon which those traces are inscribed, including ‘other’ traces, with all of these traces being historically interwoven in com plex fashion. Ahmad argues that Said neglects those traces that have to do with the social structures of postcolonial societies. Orientalism, for Ahmad, examines the history of Western textualities about the non West ‘‘in isolation from how these textualities might have been received, accepted, modiﬁed, challenged, overthrown or reproduced by the intelligentsias of the colonized countries.’’ These intelligentsias, for Ahmad, need to be analyzed as ‘‘situated social agents’’ impelled by their own ‘‘conﬂicts, contradictions, distinct social and political

locations, of class, gender, religious afﬁliation, and so on.’’ Said’s failure to do this, according to Ahmad, marks a major lapse in the analysis of hegemony. This criticism of Said, moreover, informed Ahmad’s analysis of con temporary Indian politics. For example, in an essay en titled ‘Fascism and national culture’, in his book Lineages of the Present, Ahmad read Gramsci’s analysis of the rise of fascism in Italy against his own analysis of the rise of right wing politics in India, using the concept of he gemony to emphasize cultural dimensions of the Right’s class projects. In Ahmad’s critique of Said, as in Jessop, Bonnett, and Bromley’s critique of Hall, it became clear that part of the issue was the degree to which it is methodologically le gitimate to investigate hegemony by ﬁrst abstracting its political ideological dimensions and then reassimilating them to their broader socioeconomic context. This was the approach taken by Hall and Said, as well as a number of other scholars in the postcolonial and literary criticism camps. Authors like Jessop and Ahmad, by contrast, seemed to insist on foregrounding political economic dimensions of hegemony, even within the discussion of issues such as ideology. This methodological disagree ment was overdetermined and impinged on factors ran ging from disciplinary politics and personal differences to tactically competing political afﬁliations. In the case of Ahmad’s criticism of Said, this kind of disagreement also impinged directly on the issue of how one interprets the role of intellectuals in constructing or challenging particular hegemonies. Ahmad was harshly critical not only of Said but also of postcolonial theorists within the West in general, citing their privileged class positions within Western academies as producing sub stantial limits to their own strategies of intervention, which were based predominantly on critical reading and analysis of academic texts. Ahmad’s criticism was not without its self contradictory features, given his own one time position as a visiting scholar at Rutgers Uni versity and his seeming intent to at least partly address a Western intellectual audience with his writings. None theless, Ahmad’s criticism did raise a signiﬁcant issue regarding precisely how one reads the role of intel lectuals in the construction and challenging of hegemony, including whether or not contemporary professional scholars should be seen as involved in the sorts of pro jects that Gramsci identiﬁed with organic intellectuals. Laclau and Mouffe’s Adaptation of Gramsci The book which drew the most attention to the post Marxist possibilities of the concept of hegemony was Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s Hegemony and So cialist Strategy. More than any other such reading of Gramsci, moreover, Laclau and Mouffe’s book made clear the contention that hegemony could be used in

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ways that enabled an analysis of social struggle that moved beyond Gramsci’s focus on class politics in the direction of what they term ‘radical democracy’. For Laclau and Mouffe, hegemony referred to the fact that political strategies can never be simply read off of economic realities. Rather, as they argued in surveying the history of early twentieth century Marxist debates, what emerged through the notion of hegemony was a ‘logic of the contingent’. Contingency reﬂected the fact that European working classes turned out to be more fragmented and less revolutionary, in various contexts, than Marxists had originally envisioned them to be. As such, there was no uniﬁed proletariat to carry forward the tasks of the revolution. Instead, difﬁcult choices between political reforms, without revolution, and revolutionary struggles based on heterogeneous political assemblages, were the order of the day for early twentieth century Marxists. Laclau and Mouffe saw Gramsci as having introduced hegemony, an antireductionist concept, in the context of these dilemmas. They argued that Gramsci pushed the logic of contingency, through the concept of hegemony, as far as it can go – within a Marxist framework. Their own project, then, was to push this logic further – namely, in post Marxist directions – by developing a notion of radical democratic politics that no longer centered revolutionary struggle on class. Hegemony, throughout their text, was thus used to refer to a context in which class subjects are no longer accorded any particular privilege as social actors. Laclau and Mouffe summarized these post Marxist implications by referring to three consequences of fol lowing out the logic of contingency and the implications of hegemony. The ﬁrst of these is that there is no necessary relation ‘‘between socialist objectives and the positions of social agents in the relations of production y their articulation must be regarded as a hegemonic relation.’’ The second, discussed directly in relation to the new social movements seen by some as displacing working class movements, is that ‘‘there are no privileged points for the unleashing of a socialist political practice.’’ Instead, socialist political practice involves constructing a collect ive will by organizing a number of dissimilar groups. The third consequence is what Laclau and Mouffe referred to as a ‘decentering’ of subject positions, so that rather than being seen as already fully constituted and separate, the different struggles posing the possibility of radical dem ocracy are always being constituted through their various forms of articulation. This opens Laclau and Mouffe’s analysis in the direction of the discursive processes through which subjectivities are constituted. From this conceptual ground, then, Laclau and Mouffe constructed an account of processes of articulation, an account de signed to illustrate the salience of their particular concept of hegemony and radical contingency.

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As with the previously mentioned debates – indeed, perhaps more sharply – Laclau and Mouffe’s overt call for a radical democratic politics that transcends tradi tional class struggles generated substantial criticism. Predictably, some of the most heated exchanges were with authors antagonistic to Laclau and Mouffe’s use of Marxist terminology for post Marxist purposes. Even commentators less hostile to post Marxism critiqued Laclau and Mouffe, however, for their abandonment of class and their assertion of the radical character of con tingency in hegemonic contexts. Geographers Gillian Hart, Alan Pred, and Michael Watts, for example, argued that Laclau and Mouffe produced an impoverished concept of articulation. As Hart put it in her book Dis abling Globalization, Laclau and Mouffe’s conception ‘‘abstracts from historically and geographically speciﬁc processes, material conditions, and forms of power that set the conditions for articulatory practices.’’ Hart ar gued, like Pred and Watts, that instead of the retreat from class signaled by Laclau and Mouffe’s use of hegemony what is needed is ‘‘to retheorize where class has gone to, and to rethink, and reassert it in nonessentialist ways’’ (Hart, 2002). In debates around Laclau and Mouffe’s work, as in those around Hall’s and Said’s works, the positions of in tellectuals and the relative autonomy of culture – or, in Laclau and Mouffe’s case, discourse – were central. In this sense, such debates came to appear for many as variants on debates between postmodernists or post structuralists and their critics. However, Laclau and Mouffe did not claim allegiance to postmodernism, and such generalizations about their debates with their critics likely obscure the more speciﬁc issues regarding hegemony that were being raised. What the three interpretations of Gramsci dis cussed here – along with the criticisms of them – might better be seen as doing is developing a terrain of ideas surrounding political practice in capitalist societies, and the roles of class forces and varied kinds of intellectuals in maintaining a social order based in part on the consent of the led. If there was no agreement about precisely how this worked, there was nonetheless agreement that polit ical–ideological factors – in some sort of contested relation to class forces and economic processes – were crucial. In this general sense, there clearly came to be a Gramscian notion of hegemony.

Cox and Neo-Gramscian International Relations/International Political Economy At the same time as social theorists were rediscovering Gramsci’s writings, Gramscian notions of hegemony also came to play a signiﬁcant role within international re lations (IR) theory and international political economy (IPE). Some of the major works deploying Gramscian

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conceptions in these ﬁelds was carried out by Robert Cox. In a series of journal articles reﬂecting on the signiﬁcance of the concept of hegemony within IR and IPE, and in a 1987 book, Production, Power, and World Order, applying the concept of hegemony to a broad analysis of global re lations, Cox helped give birth to what has come to be known as neo Gramscian IPE. Cox reinvoked the notion of hegemony as a relation between states, but he both speciﬁed this relation in Gramscian terms and also pro vided a Gramscian inﬂection by building class analysis directly into the account, thus moving beyond geo political realism’s methodological approach to states. Cox foregrounded his particular conception of hegemony at the beginning of Production, Power, and World Order by noting that the term ‘hegemony’ means more than the dominance of a single world power. For Cox, hegemony denotes an arrangement where the dominant state ‘‘cre ates an order based ideologically on a broad measure of consent,’’ and where this order functions in ways that ensure the continuing supremacy of the leading state or states, as well as the leading social classes within those states, while at the same time offering ‘‘some measure or prospect of satisfaction to the less powerful.’’ This con ception of hegemony, then, involves articulating the no tion of class leadership within a given society and the notion of global leadership in a given world order. Cox referred to the former as ‘social hegemony’ and made it a precondition for the latter form of hegemony. As he put it, ‘‘a world hegemonic order can only be founded by a country in which social hegemony has been or is being achieved’’ (Cox, 1987). In this approach, Cox hewed closely to Gramsci’s original conception of class as the basis for hegemony, while building outward from this to international relations. This conforms to Gramsci’s own antigeopolitical realist conception of the nature of international relations, cited above, but Cox also engaged fully with international relations rather than leaving them outside the scope of his inquiry. Cox on Productive Power, World Hegemony, and Historic Blocs While Cox, like Gramsci, emphasized the role of ideol ogy in consolidating hegemony, he nonetheless built his account of hegemony on productive power. The leading global hegemons, in Cox’s account, were those who marshaled the greatest productive capacity, and much of their ability to offer ‘‘some measure or prospect of sat isfaction to the less powerful’’ (Cox, 1987) was grounded in this capacity. Here, Cox emphasized phenomena such as the changes in production processes and social or ganization that underpinned the transition from a nine teenth century period of British hegemony, through an early twentieth century period of imperial rivalry, to a post World War II period of US hegemony. What

prevented this from becoming a very conventional geo political realist account of competition between leading states in an anarchic global arena is the way Cox linked this transition to transformations in class relations and production processes. Cox built this synthesis of class processes and inter national relations by analyzing the role of leading forces in hegemonic states in consolidating ‘historic blocs’ – Gramsci’s term for, as Cox put it in Production, Power, and World Order, ‘‘the particular conﬁguration of social classes and ideology that gives content to a historical state.’’ These historic blocs are grounded in class relations within societies – and thus in social hegemony – but extend outward to encompass leading groups within states around the world. Crucially, Cox’s account of this process emphasized the internally variegated character of states, rather than seeing them as uniﬁed actors. This allowed for particular classes and class fractions to be active within the state, pursuing hegemonic projects, without the state being reduced to a terrain of uniﬁed, classless, national interests. This kind of historic bloc, for Cox, made struggles around hegemony inherently transnational, even if global hegemony had to be secured in the ﬁrst instance through social hegemony in the globally hegemonic state. In his discussion of post World War II US hegemony, for ex ample, Cox noted how this hegemony developed in the international arena through a process of consensus for mation in the leading states. In this process, the central agencies of these states, such as prime ministers ofﬁces, treasuries, and central banks, interact with each other, sometimes through international ﬁnancial institutions, sometimes through various kinds of multilateral forums, and sometimes in a complex of bilateral relationships. Cox argued that, within this process, agencies of the US state have a dominant but not necessarily determining role. Cox on First and Third World Relations and the Role of Intellectuals This kind of hegemonic consensus building made clear the terrain on which organic intellectuals and ideology have power, for Cox. The role of ideology and organic intellectuals was spelled out even more directly, in re lation to First World–Third World relations within the historic bloc. As Cox saw it, the ‘top level countries’ jointly limit the developmental options of the late in dustrializing countries. Elites from Third World coun tries participate in the historic bloc, but they ‘‘do not participate with the same effective status as top level elites in the formation of the consensus.’’ Nonetheless, this consensus gains ideological support within the Third World, and the process leads to ‘ideologically con ditioned agents’ being placed in key positions within

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Third World states. International ﬁnance, for example, ﬂows into Third World countries via institutions (e.g., central banks and ﬁnance ministries) that are staffed ‘‘by people who have been socialized to the norms of the consensus and of its professional cadres.’’ Such Third World participants in the historic bloc are often ‘‘graduates of major advanced capitalist country uni versities,’’ and many have done stints at places like the IMF institute, which ‘‘bring Third World technical ﬁ nancial personnel into personal contact with the milieu of international ﬁnance’’ (Cox, 1987). Even while emphasizing consensus building, however, Cox pursued a very Gramscian line in articulating the relationship between consensus and coercion within the historic bloc. In line with Gramsci’s claim that a ruling group dominates antagonistic groups while exercising hegemony vis a` vis its allies, Cox argued that the transformation in Third World states required as part of their integration into the historic bloc ‘‘is more openly induced by external pressures’’ than the international izing of advanced capitalist states. It thus generates more resentment, so that organizations like the IMF have come to be seen as political enemies by nationalist and popular forces in the Third World. As a consequence, relations between First and Third World countries remain marked by signiﬁcant levels of coercion, as Cox noted throughout his study.

Themes in Neo-Gramscian IR/IPE Cox’s writings became part of a broad tendency within IR and IPE known as neo Gramscian. As with Gramscian social and political theory, there is no one, singular Gramscian line of analysis that has unequivocally emerged in neo Gramscian IPE. Here too, though de bates have seemingly been less heated, there have de veloped a variety of lines that build from a broadly shared Gramscian core. Two projects in neo Gramscian IPE can be cited to indicate the directions that dis cussions of hegemony have taken. Rupert on Popular ‘Common Sense’ Mark Rupert, in his book Producing Hegemony, followed Cox’s lead in emphasizing the importance of productive power to hegemony. Rupert developed a very speciﬁc account of the social hegemony of US capitalists in the post World War II period, deploying a Gramscian con ception of popular ‘common sense’ to explain how these capitalists were able to exercise leadership in relation to major elements of the US working class. The productive power of US capitalism was such that it enabled substantial material gains for US workers, under the condition of limited trade union power. The US workers, support for the projects of leading US

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capitalists, for Rupert, was consolidated – on these foundations – through the development of a conception of what it was to be an American, a conception that linked this very tightly to worker prosperity and par ticipation in consumerism. In a sense, the organic intel lectuals who helped to forge this popular common sense ‘Americanism’ included conservative union leaders themselves, though Rupert does not use this terminology to describe them. Their success in this regard helped to produce a US working class – or at least a segment of that class, comprised especially of white, male, industrial workers – for whom Americanism came to be associated with support for a capitalist system that enabled sub stantial consumption possibilities at home while being aggressively anticommunist abroad. In this sense, the popular common sense ‘Americanism’ pulled US workers into a historic bloc through which leading US elites combated communism throughout the Cold War period. Rupert carried this sort of Gramscian analysis further in a subsequent book, Ideologies of Globalization, which addressed the different forms taken by antiglobalization politics, particularly within the United States. Recog nizing that antiglobalization politics are not necessarily progressive, Rupert interrogated how in speciﬁc contexts the kind of popular common sense Americanism that prevailed in the United States during the Cold War era has evolved into an antagonism toward neoliberal glob alization that is sometimes racist and xenophobic. Some of the foundations of this phenomenon have to do with the basic material insecurities of workers, who are facing downward mobility as a result of new global economic forces. But the phenomenon also expresses the conscious construction of a right wing nationalist ideology by forces intent on politically tapping this discontent. Rupert’s study thus showed how shifting global patterns of productive power have been politically and ideo logically worked through by concrete social actors, within a speciﬁc national context. Taylor on Prime Modernities Peter J. Taylor, in his books The Way the Modern World Works and Modernities, developed some of the ideas of neo Gramscian IPE within a world systems framework. World systems approaches, in the work of Taylor, Im manuel Wallerstein, and others, conceived the global political economy to be comprised of global commodity chains and national, territorial states. Class relations are central to the functioning of both commodity chains and states, but in Taylor’s analyses of states he focused es pecially on interstate dynamics. As such, he deployed the notion of hegemony in a rather classic sense, but this did not devolve into a pre Gramscian usage insofar as he foregrounded the Gramscian claim that hegemonic re lations are based more on consensus than on coercion,

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while still allowing, as per Cox’s argument, that relations between core and peripheral countries are mediated to a greater extent by force. Taylor discussed world hegemony speciﬁcally in re lation to the global dominance of Great Britain and the United States in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, respectively. In The Way the Modern World Works, he argued that both Britain and the United States can be seen as having provided ‘‘intellectual and moral leadership,’’ in a Gramsican sense, ‘‘based upon their respective economic, political, and cultural preeminence.’’ He argued, moreover, that the concept of hegemony could easily be translated from Gramsci’s usage into one appropriate for discussions of international relations by regarding states as subjects and power within the wider world as their objective, rather than focusing on social classes and their attempts to con trol power within states. Whether or not the translation is indeed quite so straightforward could be contested, given that from the kind of perspective developed by Cox and others opposed to geopolitical realism, states should not be seen as uniﬁed actors. Nonetheless, Taylor did deploy a basically Gramscian notion of the exercise of hegemony through ideological and cultural projects. Taylor elaborated this notion of cultural hegemony in Modernities, where he argued that three hegemonic powers, the seventeenth century Dutch state, the nine teenth century British state, and the twentieth century US state, each produced some of the consensus for the leadership that they achieved through the spread of ideas about modernity. Taylor identiﬁed three speciﬁc ideas with these three hegemonies: mercantilism with the Dutch, industrialism with the British, and consumerism with the United States, and called these ‘prime mod ernities’. Taylor argued that the hegemonic states achieved world leadership during the periods in question in part because their power and prosperity led others to try to emulate them.

Geographies of Hegemony The development of Gramscian and neo Gramscian conceptions of hegemony has led to the development of varied senses of the spatiality of hegemony, ranging from those focused on uneven national development and the particularity of speciﬁc national contexts to those focused on global power relations. These varied geographies of hegemony have been drawn out explicitly by a number of Gramscian and neo Gramscian scholars. Two examples can be used to illustrate some of the spatial complexity this has lent to contemporary understandings of hegemony. Hart on Globalization In her study of post apartheid South Africa, Disabling Globalization, Hart discussed geographies of hegemony in

a fashion that draws on Gramsci, Hall, Henri Lefebvre, and others, to emphasize interconnections between pro cesses at scales ranging from the local to the global. She discussed these interconnections as hegemonic articu lations and drew them out in complex and creative ways, including examining both the roles of Taiwanese capit alists in South African rural industrialization and the signiﬁcance in this context of South Africa and East Asia’s very different histories of agrarian transformation. Hart’s objective in analyzing these articulations was to produce a middle ground between the radical contingency of hegemony suggested by Laclau and Mouffe, and ac counts of social power that, in contrast, seem to allow little space for local agency. Toward this end, she discussed speciﬁc histories of hegemony in different local contexts as being central to an account of the differing political trajectories of two neighboring South African localities. At the same time, she showed how these local histories are linked to and productive of broader realities, including those referred to under the headings of ‘globalization’ and ‘neoliberalism’. This sort of analysis was meant to disrupt globalization narratives that see neoliberal globalization as being constructed over the heads of local actors and de veloping in such a way as to compel their acquiescence. As such, it suggested local activities that might alter or re construct certain features of globalization and enable the production of different hegemonies. Agnew on Globalization John Agnew used a Gramscian notion of hegemony in a broad attack on what he called the ‘territorial trap’ – the tendency of social scientists and policymakers to think of political economic processes as if they take place within territorial containers (states) and only act on each other externally through international relations. Neo liberal globalization, Agnew pointed out, has eroded the conception of states as political economic containers. In his book Hegemony, Agnew argued, however, that neo liberal globalization has also eroded the position of the US state as a leading hegemon, creating complexities and instabilities in the global system. Agnew suggested that as the hegemonic power most responsible for contemporary globalization the United States has given a particular form to globalization – that of a marketplace society in which consumerism is a central ideal. Yet, the very success of this project has depended upon the development of broad, deterritor ialized, global networks into which people around the world are enrolled, and as they have become so enrolled the shared ideals of the marketplace society have taken on a global life that transcends control by the US state. Thus, the global political economy is increasingly glob alized without there existing any center of imperial control – US government attempts to exercise such control notwithstanding.

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At the same time, Agnew argued that while US hegemonic decline might have been expected to be as sociated with increasing international disorder, this has not necessarily occurred. As he put it in his book Geo politics, ‘‘a transnational liberalism sponsored by governing elites around the world seems to offer an emerging ideological hegemony without a single hege mon (or dominant state)’’ (Angew, 1998). Rather, this hegemony is based to a greater extent on consensus about principles of free trade and comparative advantage, in cluding the sense that they will work to the beneﬁt of global transnational economic elites. The existence of this hegemony, Agnew argued, ‘‘calls into question many of the established tenets of the modern geopolitical im agination,’’ (Angew, 1998), but this does not signal the ‘‘end of geopolitics.’’ Instead, it signals an increased focus on other transnationally interconnected entities such as ﬁrms and cities, to which states must now cede more power and control. In short, the hegemony of global neoliberalism is an ideological phenomenon in a truly Gramscian sense, but one in which the leading classes are no longer territorially bound in the fashion of the Italian leadership that Gramsci analyzed.

A Family of Gramscian Uses? In spite of the varied uses to which Gramscian notions of hegemony have been put, a certain family resemblance has come into view with most such uses, whether those of Marxist, post Marxist, or non Marxist scholars drawing on Gramsci. These resemblances center around the im portance of consent and leadership, as opposed to mere reliance on coercion and domination, and on the fact that such consent is seen as established via cultural, political, and ideological practices, even insofar as it is seen to be grounded in political economic processes. Disagreement has not centered on these basics but on issues such as the degree to which class forces need to be foregrounded in discussing hegemony (whether as a methodological or a theoretical matter), the degree to which ideology and culture can be usefully abstracted from political economic forces as a site of hegemonic practice, and the precise roles of intellectuals in constructing or decon structing hegemony (including the kinds of intellectuals whose activities are emphasized). There has also evolved a creative tension regarding the different geographical scales at which hegemony can be seen to operate and the degree to which there exists an overarching global he gemony of neoliberalism.

Non-Marxist Conceptions of Hegemony Gramscian conceptions of hegemony became preeminent in much academic discourse by the end of the twentieth

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century, but pre and non Gramscian uses of the term, that largely fail to differentiate dominance and leader ship, and consent and coercion, have remained prevalent outside of academic debates, as well as within some ﬁelds of academic inquiry. This has especially been the case in geopolitical discourse, whether in mainstream IR theory or in public policy discussions. Hegemony in such ana lyses has largely been conﬂated with dominance, and this has been the case whether the analyses in question are largely critical or largely supportive of such dominance. Thus, for example, Noam Chomsky’s critique of Bush II administration’s foreign policy was entitled Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance. The terms hegemony and dominance are not discussed in the book, and it is clear that the two are equated in Chomsky’s broad critique of US imperialism. Similarly, but from a conservative geopolitical realist perspective, Zbigniew Brzezinski’s reﬂections on the US foreign policy issues in the post Cold War era, in his book The Grand Chessboard, addressed what he called, in the ﬁrst chapter of the book, ‘‘hegemony of a new type.’’ Brzezinski did in fact discuss different aspects of the US leadership, including what he called its ‘cultural appeal’ and the ‘imitation of American ways’, thus calling at tention to some of the phenomena highlighted by Taylor. But in referring to this as hegemony of a new type, Brzezinski contrasted it with other hegemonies – those of Rome, China, Great Britain, and so on – that did not all have the combined military, technological, political, economic, and cultural dimensions of leadership char acteristic of the United States. Thus, hegemony was still for Brzezinski a more generic term, that may or may not include cultural leadership of the sort he saw the United States as exercising. Such uses of hegemony are perfectly intelligible on their own terms, and are likely to remain part of the theoretical landscape, if for no other reason than the fact that a number of non Marxist analysts are likely to bridle at the prospect of using Gramscian terminology to de scribe contemporary political situations. This practice has certain costs, however. For example, with the resurgent US militarism of the Bush II regime, many analysts of different stripes began to more intensively discuss empire, US imperialism, US militarism, and US hegemony. These terms have often been run together rather indiscrimin ately, as Agnew noted in his book Hegemony. Such im precision has the consequence that it becomes more difﬁcult to consider important matters such as whether the increased US militarism and even global military dominance could actually be exercised in ways that lead to declining US hegemony, as Agnew suggested is the case. The fact that this matter itself is an important topic of analysis suggests that Gramscian notions of hegemony are likely to show increased utility, even if they them selves remain in part a terrain of interpretive struggle.

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See also: Ideology; Taylor, P.

Further Reading Agnew, J. (1998). Geopolitics: Re visioning World Politics. London: Routledge. Agnew, J. (2005). Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. Ahmad, A. (1991). In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures. London: Verso. Ahmad, A. (2000). Lineages of the Present: Ideology and Politics in Contemporary South Asia. London: Verso. Anderson, P. (1977). The antinomies of Antonio Gramsci. New Left Review I/100, 5 78. Boggs, C. (1984). The Two Revolutions: Antonio Gramsci and the Dilemmas of Western Marxism. Boston, MA: South End Press. Brzezinski, Z. (1997). The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives. New York: Basic Books. Chomsky, N. (2003). Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance. New York: Metropolitan Books. Cox, R. (1983). Gramsci, hegemony, and international relations: An essay in method. Millenium: Journal of International Studies 12, 162 175. Cox, R. (1987). Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History. New York: Columbia University Press. Geras, N. (1987). Post Marxism? New Left Review I/163, 40 82. Gill, S. (1993). Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gramsci, A. (1971). In House, Q. & Smith, G. N. (eds. and transl.). Selections from the Prison Notebook. New York: International Publishers.

Gramsci, A. (1995). In Boothman, D. (ed. and transl.). Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Hall, S. (1988). The Hard Road to Renewal: Thatcherism and the Crisis of the Left. London: Verso. Hart, G. (2002). Disabling Globalization: Places of Power in Post Apartheid South Africa. Berekely: University of California Press. Jessop, B., Bonnett, K., Bromley, S. and Ling, T. (1984). Authoritarian populism, two nations, and Thatcherism. New Left Review I/147, 32 60. Jessop, B., Bonnett, K., Bromley, S. and Ling, T. (1985). Thatche rism and the politics of hegemony. New Left Review I/153, 87 101. Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (1985). Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. London: Verso. Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (1987). Post Marxism without apologies. New Left Review I/166, 79 106. Rupert, M. (1995). Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rupert, M. (2000). Ideologies of Globalization. New York: Routledge. Said, E. (1978). Orientalism. New York: Random House. Taylor, P. J. (1996). The Way the Modern World Works: World Hegemony to World Impasse. Chichester: Wiley. Taylor, P. J. (1999). Modernities: A Geo Historical Interpretation. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Relevant Websites http://www.marxists.org Antonio Gramsci page, Marxist Internet Archive. http://www.internationalgramscisociety.org International Gramsci Society web site.

Heritage C. Kelly, University of Greenwich, London, UK & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Authenticity The extent to which a heritage item, artifact, or event is seen to be valid, genuine, real, or legitimate by an individual or an organization. Commodiﬁcation The manner in which heritage rawmaterials are utilized by other industries, for example tourism, for economic purposes. Contestation Negotiation, often between groups of people in local, national, or international spaces, in search of legitimate versions of authentic heritage. Governance The state structures at local, national, and/or international levels that organize, legislate, or fund heritage-related activities. Heritage Buildings, artifacts, landscapes, cultures, and traditions deemed to be of importance to past, present, and future populations. Intangible That which cannot be physically touched; in a heritage context, this often refers to a cultural tradition such as a song, a language-dialect, or superstition particular to a local area.

Introduction Heritage is an elusive concept, to both deﬁne and discuss, as it means many things to most people. Indeed, in basic chronological terms, it is often exclusively regarded as an idea that is set in the past. This notion has been chal lenged in recent years as various economic, environ mental, and sociocultural activities have become concerned with heritage in a contemporary context. Many national and international organizations have in corporated the term heritage into departmental titles and functions. The scope of heritage is broad insofar as it may singularly or simultaneously be taken to refer to aspects of people and culture, the built environment, or natural landscapes. In this respect, it can therefore be manipu lated by power structures in society to create subjective or partial narratives of the past (or present) for particular cultural, economic, environmental, and/or political purposes.

Deﬁning Heritage Semantically speaking, the word ‘heritage’ has existed for centuries, with most dictionaries unanimously deﬁning it as something inherited at birth, handed down, or a legacy

of some kind which links the past, through the present, to the future, at an individual or collective level. This legacy involves people, events, cultural landscapes, and objects deemed to be important at local, national, and/or inter national geographical scales. There is a multitude of ideas, both tangible and intangible, that the word has been applied to within the cultural sector and outside of it. European Architectural Heritage Year, 1975, is re garded by some as a benchmark for the inception of ‘heritage’ as a public forum concept. Thus, ‘heritage’ was a term that came to the fore in the 1970s, in Europe, and throughout the 1980s expanded increasingly to en compass other developments such as the establishment of heritage visitor centers by both the public and private sectors. Amalgamations of deﬁnitional discussions from the literature suggest that heritage includes (but not ex clusively): buildings, archaeology, cultural artifacts, nat ural landscapes and landforms, wildlife, historical events or characters, cultural traditions, dress, language, and customs. Arguably, an object or event can become heritage because a person or organization deems it to be of im portance, and therein lies the crux of the situation – heritage can be anything that is valued – from a family photograph to a national monument. Therefore, if indi viduals construct their own framework within which to deﬁne heritage, seeing it as a plural concept is of little value or consequence. Conversely, meanings can be de liberately constructed by the state, or economically dri ven organizations who select aspects of heritage for mass consumption, which can play a role in identity con struction, the tourism industry, or creating a collective sense of belonging. The United Nations Educational, Scientiﬁc, and Cul tural Organization (UNESCO) also categorizes heritage into three main subdivisions: built heritage, natural heri tage, and intangible heritage, and these groupings affect the way in which global heritage sites are designated and conserved at an international scale (see section on ‘Policy and Governance’ later in this article). The United King dom, for example, has specially designated ‘heritage coasts’, representing valued natural landscapes. The European Union has also designated ‘natural heritage areas’ to protect special natural environments in certain member states. The United States designates ‘national heritage areas’ through its national parks service, repre senting both built and natural heritage in its aim to ‘tell America’s story’. As shown in Table 1 above, UNESCO’s

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Table 1

Classifying heritage

Nation/Region Area

Site/Activities

‘Built’ heritage

‘Natural’ heritage

‘Living’ heritage

Buildings/cities Historic towns Seaside resorts Conservation areas Museums Art galleries Historic buildings Historic sites/monuments Heritage centers Heritage theme parks Archaeological sites Transport

Landscapes/environment National parks Coastlines Designated/protected landscapes Geological features Town/country parks Botanic gardens Historic gardens Nature reserves Countryside centers Country parks Forest Ecomuseums Archaeological sites

Communities/people Traditional food and costumes Festivals Markets Folklore, folklife houses/cafes Craft centers Farms Ecomuseums Everyday spaces Communities Historic events and characters Language Song and dance Religious practices/beliefs

groupings reﬂect a wide variety of spaces, objects, and activities at various scales. Intangible heritage – that which cannot be touched – interestingly, was only added recently in response to criticisms that ‘real people’ felt more afﬁnity to everyday aspects of heritage such as language, customs, oral histories, and so on than to grand stately homes or ancient monuments, for example. For many urban dwellers, there is often little opportunity to engage with natural heritage on any kind of a regular basis, which can lead to a disassociation with or disregard for it.

Policy and Governance Heritage can take a variety of ofﬁcial (state validated) and unofﬁcial forms; the latter often conﬂicts with, or is resistant to, the former. To consider this further, we can reiterate that ‘heritage’ is an enormously diverse concept – there are multiple heritages, the contents and meanings of which change through time and across space. Interestingly, heritage policy has mainly focused on the built heritage in many nations, followed to a lesser extent by natural heritage (usually the domain of separate, en vironmental government agencies), and lastly, intangible heritage. This emphasis is accounted for through the obvious visibility of the built environment, consisting of townscapes, buildings, monuments (see Table 1), and other man made infrastructures, which is easier to identify, quantify, and therefore monitor. Many countries have policies and organizations that are concerned with creating inventories of buildings of particular types of architecture, quantifying and classifying ancient monu ments and archaeological ruins, and managing or con serving such heritage. At an international level, the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICO MOS, a subcommittee of UNESCO) collates and moni tors national registers. Effects of the tangibility of this type of heritage leads to greater attention in policy terms, and therefore, often also in funding terms.

Landscape based natural heritage holds a fond place in the hearts and imaginations of many people. En vironmental legislation usually serves to protect and manage nonurban spaces, and global, European, and national regulations are in place to enforce a plethora of policies. Global Earth Summits which discuss inter national aspects of the natural environment have gener ated extreme responses as the planet faces a variety of environmental threats. Our global heritage could there fore be considered at a very basic level, in terms of natural heritage and all that it entails. Values related to the natural are also important at an individual level, where a person’s sense of identity or heritage can be heightened as they gaze at the Grand Canyon, the white cliffs of Dover, the lavender ﬁelds of Provence, Uluru, or other iconic landscapes. Policy provision for this is, however, much more difﬁcult to formulate. Such cultural landscapes have long been the focus of geographers who attempt to discover the uniqueness of relationships be tween people and their environments. UNESCO has now recognized the importance of in tangible heritage, such as endangered languages and oral heritage; placing as much importance and protection on these aspects as the tangible heritage they also safeguard. Thus, values of cultural expressions and practice and the recognition of communities/groups as those who identify, enact, re create, and transmit the intangible or living heritage are also part of UNESCO’s policy remit. At national and local levels, many groups are engaged in cultural forms which can be classiﬁed as intangible heritage. The difﬁculty in creating policies and funding structures around these, lie in the complexity of deciding how to place value and merit on cultural, essentially qualitative issues? Tackling the question of how to fund local heritage sites and events, it can be argued that governments cannot avoid making value judgements when allocating funding but the requirement to be accessible to every possible community group has meant that many institutions are now facing enormous

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difﬁculties. One impact has been that many community organizations, for example, follow funding led heritage agendas and themes, for ﬁnancial survival, which results in a heritage dictated by state policy structures rather than being directed by the people to whom, arguably, it matters most. Many heritage organizations emphasize the need to measure cultural value, often to justify state funding mechanisms. However, many do not have any ‘robust indicators’ to measure the beneﬁts of heritage to society or how people ascribe values to their local heritage in return. This may be because such a process requires in depth qualitative research – something that many gov ernment agencies have shied away from in favor of quantitative or ‘hard’ data, which is immensely easier to collect and analyze. Organizations such as the American Museums Association devise performance indicators, for their members, which allow the progress of such formal heritage spaces to be monitored. Festivals and other transitory cultural events gauge visitor numbers as measures of success. A major challenge for the heritage sector is to ﬁnd ways in which to equally account for, manage, and value built, natural, and intangible heritage.

Commodiﬁcation Commodiﬁcation is a term used to describe how heritage is utilized as a commercial product and mass produced, often at the cost of authenticity. If we see heritage in terms of a spectrum – at one end heritage has its own intrinsic cultural value, where it matters to individuals, communities, and nations, in its own right, or for its own sake; at the other end, heritage can be seen to have a utilitarian or economic use value. In other words, it can be manipulated and selected somehow as a ‘product’ which can be presented, interpreted, and/or sold. The main sector that engages somehow with this commodi ﬁcation is the tourism industry (although some reference has been made in the literature to the ‘heritage industry’ itself, referring to the widest possible scope of agencies and activities involved in commodiﬁcation). The ex ploitation of particular resources for the creation of heritage products inevitably affects the nature of these resources, leading to fears that they will be subject to damage, distortion, or just depletion. There are, however, both positive and negative aspects to tourism’s engagement with heritage.

Heritage Tourism It could be argued that there are few better ways than tourism to promote understanding between peoples – by inspiring admiration for shared natural and cultural heritages. Heritage sites have always attracted travellers.

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Masterpieces of humankind and nature prompt in us a sense of wonder that is in itself a unique form of trans portation. Heritage tourism attractions are diverse, re ﬂecting earlier discussions on deﬁnitional classiﬁcations (see Table 2). Heritage assets allow for national and local areas to capitalize on tourism development and this can be enormously important in places where other forms of economic activity are scarce. However, uncontrolled tourism and ill planned development can cause ir reversible physical and social damage not only to heri tage sites but also to the communities surrounding them. The physical impacts of tourism on natural and built heritage landscapes are the easiest to see, and therefore, to manage. Assessing and monitoring the way in which tourism affects intangible heritage and culture is rather more complex. Concepts of sustainability are important in the management of tourism, since heritage itself forms the very resource upon which the sector depends. The market does not always care for the ﬁner nuances of cultural integrity, requiring state interventionism for conservation purposes.

Heritage Interpretation and Representation Given the breadth of meaning and conceptualization involved in the term ‘heritage’, the task of bringing heritage to an audience, be it domestic or overseas, is enormously challenging. Not all heritage, not all stories, and not all perspectives can be adequately displayed or told. Where heritage is engaged with in public spaces, such as tourism sites, heritage centers, museums, and galleries, a process is undertaken by those charged with it, to select, interpret, and present that heritage. This pro cess involves a commodiﬁcation of the past, of objects and events, in such a way that interest is raised, and in some cases, entertainment provided. In some instances, that ‘interest’ has proﬁt driven objectives (e.g., the economic viability of a local heritage site), and as such, must ensure that visitors are engaged and satisﬁed. In this very pro cess, heritage becomes a product which can be used by consumers/visitors, and therefore, conveys particular messages. These messages come from the deliberate se lection of resources, products, and packaging. These, in turn, are chosen on the basis of sets of subjective values (consciously or not) of those exercising these choices and the functional imperative for the selection (economic, educational, entertainment). The ways in which heritage objects are selected, put together, and written or spoken about have particular effects. These effects are not those of the objects per se; it is the use made of these objects and interpretive frame works that can open up or close down historical, social,

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Table 2

Heritage tourism attractions

Heritage tourism category

Examples and sample sites

Built-heritage attractions

Historic townscapes, architecture, archaeological sites, monuments, historic buildings Sites: Dubrovnik, Croatia; The Winter Palace, St. Petersburgh; Stonehenge, England National parks, cultural landscapes, coastlines, caves, geological features Sites: Kakadu National Park, Australia; Mount Fujiama, Japan; the Grand Canyon, USA; the Amazon Rainforest, Brazil; Okavango Delta, Botswana Arts, crafts, festivals, traditional events, folk-history museums Sites: Carnival, Rio de Janeiro; Cannes Film Festival, France; Chinese New Year Festivals; Robben Island, South Africa Mines, factories, breweries, shipyards, Sites: Ironbridge Gorge, England; New Lanark, Scotland; Rhine Valley, Germany Cathedrals, abbeys, mosques, shrines, pilgrimage routes, and cities Sites: Taj Mahal, India; Angkor Wat, Cambodia; Sistene Chapel, the Vatican; Uluru, Australia; Santiago De Compostela, Spain Castles, battleﬁelds, concentration camps, military museums Sites: Normandy, France; Hiroshima, Japan; Auschwitz, Poland Houses, gardens, or landscapes associated with artists and writers Sites: Wordsworth: The Lake District, England; Dickens: London; Van Gogh: French Landscapes, African Cave Art; Aboriginal Nature Art: Australia

Natural-heritage attractions

Cultural-heritage attractions

Industrial heritage attractions

Religious sites and attractions

Military heritage attractions

Literary or artistic heritage attractions

and cultural possibilities. The importance of insightful and inclusive representation–interpretation that ac knowledges such legitimization of difference is crucial in spaces of contested identity and multiple heritage(s). There are many such spaces in an increasing number of global zones of conﬂict where concepts of ‘heritage and national cultural identity’ have become fragmented, blurred, and often violently challenged. Most First Nations territories, former colonies, and countries with contested borders face challenging negotiations of heri tage representation and interpretation. Museums in Jerusalem for example, must assess Jewish and Palestinian claims to different histories in shifting territorial space. Similar obstacles are being faced by heritage

professionals narrating the ongoing histories of Repub lican Catholics–Unionist Protestants in Northern Ire land, Maori–Pakehas in New Zealand, and Shiites– Sunis–Christians in Iraq, to name a few. As tourism in creasingly seeks out new products with the growth of cultural heritage tourism, the politics of representation ‘for self ’ (local/national communities as part of identity building) versus ‘for others’ (tourists, as part of enter tainment/visitation) becomes much more loaded. It is important to acknowledge the importance of heritage as an economic resource, but it can also be used to help examine the meanings of culture and power, thereby giving it a vital sociopolitical function. On a micro level, the politics of representation be comes crucial for the practicalities of heritage site / museum exhibition design and layout. The process of heritage interpretation should be simply about moving knowledge from specialists to the general public in a clear and effective way. What is and what is not said, in complex settings, becomes important, and (more im portantly) ‘how’ messages are portrayed takes on added signiﬁcance. The task – for curators, educators, and ex hibition developers – is to provide experiences that invite visitors to interpret meaning through deploying and ex tending their existing interpretive strategies and reper toires, using their prior knowledge and their preferred learning styles, and testing their own hypotheses against those of others, including experts!

Authenticity Much debate exists as to whether tourists or indeed, people in general are concerned with engaging in an authentic heritage experience, or more simply, ‘whether the truth matters’. For some, a visit to a heritage tourism site provides a sense of pleasant escapism, for others, it may be a quest for knowledge, or a complex matrix of many other social, cultural, or leisure oriented motivations. Nonproﬁt, public spaces concerned with the representation of heritage (e.g., free admission national museums) have arguably more leeway in their quest for authenticity. Other economically oriented tourism sites may allow for more nostalgic, stereotyped, or partial versions of the past, events, histories, traditions, and so on, in a bid to excite, entertain, or simply to keep visitors within their comfort zones. Heritage spaces are sometimes seen as safe places, where visitors can indulge themselves looking for the lost meanings of the present in an idealized past. Yesterday is presented as a time where there is no responsibility or discord. Such nostalgic and sentimental views of the past as a ‘golden age’ are what makes it such a dangerous place for the escapist to inhabit. Much of our ‘heritage’ is in terpreted to stimulate nostalgia, idealize the past, and

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leads to a selective understanding of the past that has more to do with fantasy than truth. Many tourism oriented sites construct heritage interpretation very se lectively and portray only the lighter side of history in an attempt to exploit the public’s appetite for reconstructed, comforting, and nostalgic images of the past. For some, however, heritage interpretation is about education and challenge while encouraging visitors to question their values and attitudes. The idea of authenticity as a sociological discourse was initiated in the 1970s where it was discussed within the broader framework of a debate about the relationship between tourism and modernity. Commentators saw modern people as alienated from their own society, and therefore, reality and authenticity were thought to be elsewhere: in other historical periods and other cultures, in purer, simpler lifestyles. This builds upon the notion of nostalgia for the past representing dissatisfaction with the present. As the gaps between truth and ﬁction become more blurred, tourism engages in what has been termed ‘staged authenticity’ – where the sector knowingly pre sents heritage almost as theme park like parodies of it self, and in some cases, tourists are happily complicit in such a process.

The Politics of Heritage and Identity In any nation, a multiplicity of quite different ideologies exist and can be conveyed through the same heritage, rather than any speciﬁc, coherent political program in tended to support a distinctive prevailing view of society. Whether national conﬂicts are reconcilable through proactive, inclusive cultural heritage policy is arguable and remains to be seen in many places. Questions of identity and difference are common in the landscape of contemporary political theory. Problems of diverse heritage identities and representation are not exclusive to divided states such as Israel, Palestine, and Ireland, for example. Indeed, this notion of an internal national homogeneity (which draws inevitably upon a particular representation of heritage and a mythology of the past for its coherency and legitimization) – has conditioned western conceptualizations of political space for more than two centuries. Many writers have examined the interconnection between heritage, identity, and place. Some argue that without being connected to a place, people begin to lose their identity and their heritage. They suggest that the past is integral to our identity and that staying connected to natal or long inhabited locales is a natural inclination. This view is increasingly being challenged as global ization grows in momentum and the role of virtual, cyber based communities who share common interest bases, rather than shared place identities, rises.

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A common theme of some heritage literature is the concentration on the local nature of identity and the role of heritage, in times of uncertainty or upheaval. The urge to preserve the past can be viewed as an effort by people to preserve a part of themselves, and those feel ings of nostalgia are often strongest when national identity is somehow threatened. Confusion about iden tity and loss of conﬁdence is often seen in immigrant communities who have no natural or historical con nection to their new place of residence. The mass movement of Central and Eastern European migrants in the ﬁrst decade of the new millennium has seen new cultural compositions emerge in the West of the con tinent. Poland in particular, has experienced extreme population shift. America has a long history of multi culturalism and its speciﬁc heritage challenges range from the authentic representation of native American Indian peoples to the proposed primacy of Spanish as a legal language in California (to reﬂect the large Mexican/central American population composition). However, if it is culture and heritage, above all else, that are (as research suggests) fundamental to identity, their inclusive representation remains a charged political issue. Where heritage is displaced (or even misplaced), questions of ownership arise and the heritage of the in digenous population can no longer be promoted as un ambiguously universal or necessarily dominant. Concepts of hegemony (supremacy) and ownership are relevant here insofar as the creation of any heritage actively (or potentially) disinherits or excludes those who do not subscribe to the terms of meaning deﬁning that heritage. The term ‘dissonant heritage’ is used to describe heritage which is embedded in discord and conﬂicting versions of the past or present. Contestation refers to negotiation, often between groups of people in local, national, or international spaces, in the search for legitimate versions of their own authentic heritage. Heritage is therefore simultaneously: knowledge; a cultural product; and a political resource. Key questions include why a particular interpretation of heritage is promoted, and whose inter ests are advanced or retarded by such versions of the past, or present? If heritage knowledge is situated in particular contexts of understanding or power relations, it is time speciﬁc and thus its meaning(s) can be altered as socio cultural and political situations change. Consequently, it is inevitable that heritage is contested and challenged in a dynamic manner. The question ‘whose heritage?’ is an increasingly complex one for many nations and localities. Heritage also plays a crucial social function in terms of identity construction, at personal, local, regional, and national scales where it can be seen as the primary in strument in the discovery, creation, and subsequent nurturing of a national identity. Heritage can be framed as activities and events that establish or symbolize social cohesion. Therefore, heritage undoubtedly has cohesive

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as well as separatist potential. The psychological con tinuity and identity of such cohesive groups is a primary ingredient which acts as a cultural frame of reference. This function of heritage is important in periods of social transition or major national reorientation, for preserving hegemonic equilibrium and momentum.

World Heritage Conservation and Management Attempts to construct a concept of heritage at a global level are conceptually problematic. However, given in creasing levels of interdependency between people and places, practical attempts have been made to inventorize value and apply international conservation strategies. The World Heritage Convention of 1972 was a landmark global gathering where it was stated for the ﬁrst time, internationally, that parts of our cultural and nat ural heritage are of outstanding interest, and need to be preserved for humanity as a whole. It established criteria and procedures for the inclu sion, on a single World Heritage List, of properties constituting cultural and natural heritage worthy of preservation. UNESCO’s World Heritage Mission is to encourage countries to sign the Convention and ensure the pro tection of their natural and cultural heritage through the nomination of sites within their national territories for inclusion in the world heritage list. At the time of writing, over 700 world heritage sites (WHSs) existed in more than 120 countries, and the number increases annually. There are three possible categories for inscription onto the WHS list – (1) cultural heritage, which includes monuments, groups of buildings, and sites, and this is the largest category representing almost two thirds of the entire list; (2) natural heritage, which includes natural features, geological and physiographical formations; natural sites; and (3) mixed properties or cultural land scapes, representing combinations of the above and in cludes aspects of intangible heritage, which is by far the smallest WHS list category, reﬂecting classiﬁcational and deﬁnitional debates in previous sections above. No two WHSs are (by deﬁnition) alike but all share common problems such as the need for a delicate balance between visitation and conservation. All are national ﬂag carriers, symbols in some way of national culture and character. Most are major cultural tourism attractions of their country and some (such as Machu Pichu, the Eiffel Tower, the Great Wall of China) are powerfully evocative symbols of national identity and are universally recog nized. World Heritage is a fragile nonrenewable resource which needs to be safeguarded, both to maintain its authenticity and to preserve it for future generations. Visiting a WHS should be a special experience, on

a different scale from visiting other tourist sites. The majority of visitors to such places are, predictably, motivated by an interest in heritage and culture, although this motivation may not be matched by any prior knowledge of the site concerned making the provision of appropriate and meaningful interpretation even more important. In terms of management and conservation, UNESCO aims to preserve for the present and the future the monuments that bear witness to the creative nature of humanity, and to make these treasures available to the widest possible public. In this light, there are speciﬁc WHS operational guidelines which designated sites must adhere to. Monitoring is conducted by speciﬁc commit tees, and WHS listing may be withdrawn if guidelines are not adhered to. General guiding principles include: (1) sites should be seen as integral parts of local and regional conservation, tourist and development plans, and not as ‘intrusive islands of conservation’, (2) good integration of site preservation, conservation, and pre sentation strategies, (3) the need for the development of suitable management plans, and (4) advanced recognition of threats to sites (e.g., pollution, tourism, farming, building development). Naturally, these issues differ depending on the ‘type’ of site (e.g., natural or cultural), the ‘location’ (e.g., urban or rural, developed or de veloping world), the organizations who own and/or manage the site (e.g., private, public, or voluntary bodies; single or multiple ownership/management). All WHSs must have effective visitor management strategies, thereby ensuring the sustainability of the sites themselves for future generations’ appreciation. Heritage not considered to be World Heritage in UNSECO’s classiﬁcation terms, is nonetheless of enor mous value at multiple scales, and worthy of conservation for its own sake. In a changing world, new constructs of heritage, identity, authenticity, and representation will continue to emerge as meanings are constantly re negotiated over time and space. See also: Memorials and Monuments; National Spatialities; Tourism.

Further Reading Ashworth, G. J. and Larkham, P. J. (1994). Building a New Heritage: Tourism, Culture and Identity in the New Europe. London: Routledge. Cohen, E. (2002). Authenticity, equity and sustainability in tourism. Journal of Sustainable Tourism 10(4), 267 276. Cosgrove, D. (1998). Social Formation and the Symbolic Landscape (2nd edn.). London: Croom Helm. Graham, B., Ashworth, G. J. and Tunbridge, J. E. (2000). A Geography of Heritage: Power, Culture and Economy. London: Arnold. Graham, B., Ashworth, G. J. and Tunbridge, J. E. (2005). The uses and abuses of Heritage. In Corsane, G. (ed.) Heritage, Museums and Galleries: An Introductory Reader, pp 26 37. London: Routledge.

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Hardy, D. (1988). Historical geography and heritage studies. Area 20, 333 338. Harvey, D. C. (2001). Heritage pasts and heritage presents: Temporality, meaning and the scope of heritage studies. International Journal of Heritage Studies 7(4), 319 338. Herbert, D. T. (ed.) (1991). Heritage, Tourism and Society. London: Mansell. Hewison, R. (1987). The Heritage Industry: Britain in a Climate of Decline. London: Methuen. Hewison, R. (1989). Heritage: An interpretation. In Uzzell, D. (ed.) Heritage Interpretation vol. 1, London: Belhaven Press. Howard, P. (2003). Heritage: Management, Interpretation, Identity. London: Continuum. Johnson, N. (1999). Framing the past: Time, space and politics of heritage tourism in Ireland. Political Geography 19, 187 207. Lowenthal, D. (1985). The Past is a Foreign Country. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Palang, H. and Fry, G. (2003). Landscape Interfaces: Cultural Heritage in Changeing Landscapes. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

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Shaw, B. J. and Jones, R. (eds.) (1997). Contested Urban Heritage: Voices from the Periphery. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. Smith, L. (2006). The Uses of Heritage. London: Routledge. Tilden, F. (1957). Interpreting Our Heritage. North Carolina: Chapel Hill Books. Uzzell, D. (1998). Interpreting our heritage: A theoretical interpretation. In Uzzell, D. & Ballantyne, R. (eds.) Contemporary Issues in Heritage and Environmental Interpretation, pp 11 25. London: The Stationery Ofﬁce.

Relevant Websites http://www.unesco.org United Nations Educational, Scientiﬁc and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) website this lists World Heritage Sites and explains the tangible/intangible dimensions to heritage.

Heritage and Culture R. Jones, Curtin University of Technology, Perth, WA, Australia & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Cultural Landscape A physical landscape modiﬁed, over time, by human action. Dissonant or Contested Heritage Objects, places, or behaviors which are regarded and valued in different ways by different cultural groups. Environmental Determinism The belief that the local nature of the physical environment is the key factor controlling human behavior. Iconography The study of landscapes, artworks, and other heritage objects in order to understand their symbolic meanings. Social Darwinism The application of Darwin’s views on biological evolution and natural selection to socioeconomic and political affairs. Time–Space Compression The growing ease of interaction across space as a result of advances in transport and communications technology. Universal Religion A faith which its adherents believe to be applicable to all human beings.

Introduction One of the central concerns of historical geography is the study of the physical and social manifestations of culture in time and space. Cultures are manifested physically as people transform their landscapes in distinctive ways through, for example: agricultural techniques, such as terraced rice paddies; building styles, such as Alpine chalets; and even through language, since this dominates the myriad signs and advertisements that are so prom inent in contemporary landscapes. They are expressed socially in the ways in which people behave and interact, for example, in the manner by and extent to which the different gender, ethnic, or religious groups are segre gated – or segregate themselves – particularly in public spaces. When certain cultural landscapes and cultural be havior patterns become valued, particularly by powerful and/or majority groups within a society they can come to be seen as part of that society’s heritage (literally, as something that has been inherited from that society’s ancestors) and thus as something that needs to be pre served, maintained, and revered. In landscape terms, this valorization is characteristically applied to things created by humans, such as temples or patterns of ﬁelds and

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hedgerows. However, particularly for societies with a recent history of hunting and gathering, the (predomi nantly) natural landscapes which supplied their basic needs are also viewed in heritage and, indeed, spiritual terms as something to which their society owes a stew ardship responsibility. In the modern world too, there is a growing concern for natural heritage, for the preservation of, frequently familiar, animal and plant species and, therefore, of at least remnants of the natural habitats and landscapes in which these species can survive. Heritage/inherited patterns of social behavior are perhaps most clearly associated with the success of powerful groups in imposing and perpetuating these norms. This is most obvious in the context of those re ligions which have become locally dominant and where behavioral norms of entire societies are (at least claimed to be) governed by texts that have been handed down from previous millennia or through even more ancient oral traditions. Even though nation states are largely a creation of the last few centuries, their governments often invoke more ancient heritages to justify some of their policies and thus to inﬂuence the behavior (and thereby the cultural practices) of their citizens, be this by refer ence to glories of the monarchs in contemporary re publican France, of the Romans in modern Italy, or the precolonial Asian values praised by the former Prime Minister of Singapore. These characteristics of heritage and culture present historical geographers and the wider society with chal lenges in temporal, spatial, and social terms. Temporally, appeals for the maintenance of heritage(s) and culture(s) would appear to inhibit changes to landscapes and be havior patterns. Yet technological, economic, and demo graphic changes are among the major driving forces of human history. The results of these changes include the transformations of landscapes (e.g., the disappearance of the open (strip farmed) ﬁelds of pre enclosure rural England, or the growth of industrial cities worldwide) and of behavior patterns (e.g., the disappearance of most hunter gatherer lifestyles and of many so called tribal languages). Neither cultures nor heritages are stable and, like the technologies and economies to which they are linked, they are therefore becoming increasingly dynamic. Spatially, landscapes, whether cultural or natural, are inherently local and unique. For much of human history the same could be said of cultures. Until the urban revolution some 6000 years ago, humans lived in small subsistence groups and had limited outside social contact. Their religions, languages, economies, and behavior

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patterns were therefore highly localized. However, since then, the economic, demographic, and technological changes referred to above have also transformed the geographies of cultural behaviors as religions, languages, and other cultural traits, such as music, dress, and gas tronomy, have become national, continental, and even global in their distributions. An idealized view of a cul ture and of its accompanying heritage, particularly from the viewpoints of those who see themselves as the guardians of these cultures and heritages, would be of a set of behaviors and artefacts built up in a speciﬁc place and remaining relatively unchanged over a long period of time. However, cultures and heritages are now becoming less rooted in place but more ﬁxed, indeed fossilized, in speciﬁc time periods. In Australia, before European conquest, there were many indigenous cultural groups, speaking several hundred languages and practicing local cultures that had remained largely unchanged for mil lennia. For a brief period in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a hegemonic Anglo Celtic Australian national culture appeared to be developing but, in the post war era, migration and other economic and cultural inﬂuences from Asia, America, and continental Europe have created a much more complex and dynamic society with far more diverse heritages. The interrelated phenomena of change and global ization present us with the third challenge to the study, and the practice and preservation, of culture and heri tage. Even in a dynamic and interconnected world, some landscape features and some behavioral traits endure and, indeed, are being actively preserved. The social challenge therefore relates to what is being preserved (in both concrete and social terms), to who decides what will be preserved, and to which aspects of whose heritages and cultures are being privileged in the course of these de cisions. Contestations over whose cultures and heritages prevail lead to history wars which are being fought out on the ground, in the courts, and through political systems as various pressure groups (for example) oppose freeway construction, protect historic buildings, obtain indigen ous land rights, and defend or attack linguistic or re ligious pluralism – or even foxhunting or bullﬁghting – in the name of heritage and/or culture.

Traditional Geographical Approaches to the Study of Heritage and Culture In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries several intellectual and political trends and fashions led most Western geographers to focus on the study of those heritages and cultures which they saw as being localized, relatively unchanging, and unique. First, European geography and anthropology (disciplines which were linked in several universities) had a political and

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economic value in that their practitioners could provide the imperial authorities with useful information on the places and peoples of their empires. Most cultural geographers and anthropologists therefore conducted their research on peoples whose cultures were localized and slow to change – factors which may well have con tributed to their incorporation into colonial empires in the ﬁrst place. Second, a central concern within geography was to integrate the studies of natural and human phenomena. While there was considerable disagreement between the determinists, who sought to explain human, cultural, and economic development in terms of (social) Darwinian adaptations to the physical environment, and the possi bilists of the French Annales and the American Berkeley Schools, who depicted how different social groups de veloped distinctive cultural landscapes over time in speciﬁc places, both groups found local, long settled rural areas most suited to their researches. Finally, as geography sought to deﬁne a distinctive identity for itself, the region became an important in tellectual focus for many of its scholars. This ‘highest form of the geographer’s art’ was seen to be the synthesis of all the available information – physiographic, climatic, biological, historical, demographic, social, economic, and political – on a single area. The areas studied in this way tended to be small, given the diversity of information required, and, once again, to be rural, since it was here that the relationships between these various types of in formation could be most readily demonstrated. In the early years of geography’s modern period, therefore, the discipline’s practitioners tended to focus on the study of rural and traditional cultures and to con centrate on the nature and the evolution of distinctive cultural landscapes. Frequently, they would describe processes of sequent occupance whereby several different cultural groups (e.g., Celtic, Roman, Saxon, Scandinavian, and Norman in Britain) had occupied the same area over a long time period. However, at least where these changeovers had occurred in the distant past, the current occupants could often see all these components as part of a heritage landscape with which they could identify be cause it was ‘familiar and well loved’. These early scholars therefore tended to describe areas and peoples where the economies and cultures were uniform and where change was slow, focusing on rural, rather than urbanizing, areas in the developed world and on cultural groups as yet little affected by processes of colonization and modernization in the Americas, Africa, and the Asia Paciﬁc region. For many of these earlier scholars in cultural geography and its related disciplines any change to these relatively stable and localized phe nomena presented a threat to both the cultures and the heritages of their objects of study. As late as 1955 this view was summed up by England’s ﬁrst professor of local

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history as ‘‘since the year 1914 every single change in the English landscape has either ugliﬁed it or destroyed its meaning or both.’’ Since that time, however, historical geographers and their academic colleagues have in creasingly turned their attention to the study of the forces of change acting upon the world’s cultures and the increasingly complex challenges for these cultures’ heritages that have resulted from these forces.

Processes of Cultural and Heritage Change While change is virtually the only constant in human history, the rate of change has accelerated signiﬁcantly over the last half millennium. The global population, which had barely doubled over the previous 1500 years, increased more than tenfold over the last 500. The factors that made this population growth possible are primarily technological, but they have had a profound impact on both cultures per se and on the geographies of these cultures and, in the process, they have added immensely to the complexities of heritage creation, obliteration, and transformation. On a global scale, improvements in ship design and navigation, in weapons technology, and in administrative and political organizational systems between 1500 and 1900 enabled a range of European powers to colonize most of the rest of the planet and, notably in the case of China, to dominate in economic and trading terms, those areas which they did not control politically and militarily. In the Americas and Australasia, European emigrants also came to dominate these areas demographically and, in the process, to marginalize and subordinate a vast num ber of indigenous cultures and heritages. While most Asian, African, and Paciﬁc colonies were administered, rather than settled, by Europeans, the colonizing powers nevertheless sought to impose many of their cultural values on the colonial populations. Not only did conquest in itself convey a sense of cultural superiority to the European colonizers who could thereby regard the col onized populations as savages to be civilized to European ways but, as the colonial era progressed, pseudoscientiﬁc rationalizations of European/white so called racial su periority and notions of a social Darwinism which favored the survival of the ﬁttest were used to provide justiﬁcations for the near extermination of native peoples, the suppression of their languages, religions, and other cultural practices, and their co option into indentured labor contracts or a burgeoning slave trade on an inter continental scale. A further rationalization, if not motivation, for both political and cultural imperialism over the last millen nium and a half has been the development and spread of the universal, proselytizing religions of Christianity and

Islam. Just as the imperialist powers could view the in habitants of weaker countries as potential subjects and workers and, eventually, as speakers of imperial lan guages, so could the adherents of these universal religions see the same people as potential converts and co re ligionists. The Islamization of an area from North Africa to Southeast Asia and the Christianization of most of Europe and then of the Americas, Australasia, and the Paciﬁc and Sub Saharan Africa remain some of the most signiﬁcant cultural geographic shifts of the last 2000 years. Following and overlapping with the Age of Discovery (i.e., the period in which Europe discovered the rest of the planet), the Industrial Revolution also impacted on cultural geographies and heritages worldwide. Pre industrial societies were largely rural, with the majority of the workforce being locally focused and involved in primary production. From the early nineteenth century onward, the Industrial Revolution and the resultant mechanization of agriculture, ﬁshing, forestry, and min ing displaced an increasing number of former rural workers and obliged them to seek employment in the growing towns and cities. Insofar as culture and heritage are bound up with a way of life, this urbanization process (which has recently seen urban dwellers form the ma jority of the world’s population and shows few signs of abating in the foreseeable future) is a cultural, as well as a physical uprooting of the individuals involved. Cities became, as Barthes put it, ‘‘the place of our meeting with the other.’’ People from different rural areas moved into cities looking for work or a better life. As the Industrial Revolution progressed, people also moved from town to town and even country to country as industries and businesses rose and fell in increasingly dynamic indus trial economies. From the Irish in Boston to the Greeks in Melbourne or the Chinese (in themselves culturally di verse) in San Francisco, migrants to the world’s urban areas have brought and continue to bring a range of different cultures and heritages to the cities that they populate. A ﬁnal impact of technological change on the geog raphy of cultures results from some of the most recent advances in transport and communications. Transconti nental rail and road systems, super tankers and container ships, and jet airliners have facilitated long distance migration and trade, contributed to a globalization of the economy, and allowed the development of global brands, such as Toyota, Guinness, and Hilton Hotels. However, the globalization of culture (insofar as it exists) requires that these global brands are globally demanded and consumed and it is here that the globalization of the media and recent advances in telecommunications tech nology come into play. Major sporting events, such as the (Soccer) World Cup, can be televised globally, major brands can be advertised globally, ﬁlms and television

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programs can be distributed and shown globally. ‘Mac Donaldization’ may not be as traumatic as invasion, re ligious conversion at sword point, or economically forced migration, but it does change behaviors, causing people in different parts of the world to consume the same (physical or media) products and to aspire to the same lifestyles. It can thus produce ‘nonplace urban realm’ landscapes where the relative lack of any cultural or heritage markers in a city center or shopping mall are such that they could be almost anywhere in the world. These relatively recent processes of technological, economic, and demographic change have produced two, apparently divergent cultural and heritage effects. On the one hand, they have produced greater cultural uni formity as local languages (a central component of local heritages) are replaced by imperial ones or, in the case of English, potentially by a global language, as local and tribal religions are replaced by universal ones and as a more standardized urban way of life replaces a variety of predominantly rural folkways. But on the other hand, modernity has created much greater cultural complexity as migration processes have mixed up cultural groups to an increasing extent and as advances in transport and communications have allowed the members of these cultural groups to remain in contact with one another and thus to maintain their heritages and cultural iden tities to a degree that was formerly impossible.

Forces for the Maintenance of Heritage(s) and Culture(s) While the forces of modernization discussed above have wrought profound changes on the geographies of the world’s heritages and cultures, this has by no means led to the creation of heritage or culture free zones. A whole range of social, economic, and political forces continue to differentiate, sustain, and even invent heritages and cul tures worldwide. An inevitable corollary to the diffusion of cultural traits, such as the global spread of religions and languages mentioned above, is their subsequent adaptation to local conditions. The universal religions are perhaps doubly prone to fragmentation, either for speciﬁcally doctrinal reasons (e.g., the debates over transubstantiation and predestination that led to the separation of the Lutheran and Calvinist churches from Roman Catholicism) or for more local ones (e.g., Henry VIII’s desire for a divorce/a male heir and the resultant establishment of the Church of England or the development of a Dutch Reformed Church which sought to justify South African apartheid in a Christian context). In a wired modern world, it is unlikely that languages will split in the way that French, Italian, and Spanish evolved as local variants of Latin, though English is still evolving on slightly different lines

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in Britain, North America, the Caribbean, South Asia, Africa, and Austral(as)ia. Even minor cultural traits may bring about some differentiation. Singapore airport’s ﬁrst terminal was built to a global set of speciﬁcations. However, when it was noted that more family members than had been anticipated were accompanying passen gers, more meeting space was added in the designs for terminal two. Any attempt to establish cultural uni formity nationally or globally is likely to be met by local resistance as people seek to retain dialects, recipes, and iconic buildings and landscapes to which they are at tached and thereby to at least retain, if not create, heri tages from below. Just as an icon of globalization, such as an airport terminal can be modiﬁed locally for social reasons so, for economic reasons, do global ﬁrms modify their products for different markets, for example, using halal or kosher products in their food chains and conducting market research on local consumer preferences. But perhaps the main economic driver for the preservation of local cul tures and heritages is the world’s largest industry, tour ism. While countries, regions, cities, and industries will seek to emphasize the international standard of their service, their tourism marketing is fundamentally place marketing. It stresses what is unique, different, and spe cial about their localities and their peoples. Both natural and cultural heritages are stressed in this context and it is therefore in the interests of the localities which are de pendant on this industry to see that both are preserved, though this may involve some compromises. It is hoped that highly regulated and highly priced big game hunting in Africa will bring economic gains and limit poaching in a way that would be impossible if this activity were totally banned. Many traditional dance and music per formances are shortened and modiﬁed for tourist con sumption, but equally the cultural groups involved acknowledge that many of these traditional cultural practices only survive because of tourist interest. It is through such compromises that a heritage industry has developed. The heritage industry seeks to preserve, replicate, and even fabricate aspects of local and national history and culture at stately homes, historical theme parks, and shops attached to major religious buildings, archaeo logical sites, museums, and art galleries. The primary aim of such ventures is economic, though the proﬁts may be used for the preservation of cultural landscapes and artefacts. Interestingly, with the accelerating pace of change, the heritage industry has diversiﬁed to include the preservation of relatively recent (but disappearing, or at least changing beyond recognition) phenomena. These can include industrial sites, sporting venues, and ex amples of superseded architectural styles. However, just as the marketers of tourist destinations seek to emphasize the distinctiveness of their heritages

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and cultures so too do political leaders. In premodern times, it was taken for granted that these leaders could and would impose their will on their subjects (a telling term in itself). In the modern world, however, citizens of nation states need to be persuaded to support their leaders and their countries. Contemporary leaders therefore invoke the distinctiveness and, implicitly, the superiority of their nations’ cultures and heritages in order to obtain popular support. Governments designate national languages and, frequently, national religions; they regulate school curricula and fund the preservation of national ‘treasures’, such as buildings, monuments, and national parks. They also develop national iconographies consisting of ﬂags, anthems, and notable holidays and ceremonies. In doing so, they frequently contribute to what Hobsbawm and Ranger term the invention of tra dition whereby (particularly new) nations can use these symbols to develop a national identity. The speed with which the Anzac legend and its associated rituals became a central part of the national heritages of Australia and New Zealand following World War I is a reﬂection of the power of this process. Inhabitants of the contemporary world therefore per form their cultures and valorize their heritages in highly complex ways. Within their communities, they conform to local cultural norms and seek to protect what they see as heritage features of their local landscapes. At the national level they are frequently exhorted to respect their nation’s heritage as this is perceived by government and required to adhere to the cultural frameworks set down for them in legal and constitutional terms. At the same time they can experience an inﬁnite number of other cultures and heritages, directly through travel or indirectly through the media, not only on a global scale but often within their own countries and cities.

Conclusion: Contemporary Heritage and Cultural Challenges Dissonant or contested heritage eventuates when differ ent cultural groups occupying the same locality view the landscapes and social practices which result from that locality’s history in different ways. Colonial buildings, monuments, and rituals may resonate positively for a settler population, but negatively for a country’s in digenous inhabitants for whom they might symbolize dispossession and oppression. More generally, in any region or country containing diverse cultural groups, the cultural practices of one group may tend to be favored over the others. The restrictions on the use of Chinese signage in Jakarta or English signage in Montreal were put in place when the Indonesian and French Canadian groups, which had hitherto been subordinate, gained greater political power.

Most of the world’s countries and cities now contain complex cultural mixes within their populations. For those outside Europe, these consist of varying proportions of the indigenous peoples (often with varying cultural backgrounds since imperial boundaries rarely reﬂected preexisting cultural divisions), settlers from one or more or Europe’s imperial powers, and other migrants imported forcibly (i.e., slaves from Af rica), induced (indentured laborers, such as the Indian populations of Fiji and the Caribbean) or attracted (e.g., the Chinese in the Paciﬁc rim) to countries whose economies and societies were experiencing transfor mations. Within Europe, both the frequent shifting of political boundaries over centuries of conﬂict and more recent migration from their former colonies to the ex imperial powers have also resulted in growing cultural complexity. In such circumstances countries such as Japan, with a relatively uniform culture and heritage, are acknowledged as exceptional. Most nations face the task of dealing with both cultural pluralism and cultural dynamism, both of which can result in heritage conﬂicts. In addition to the rise in both legal and illegal international migration, many indigenous groups, such as the Maori, who were thought to be in danger of dying out a century ago are now ex periencing rapid growth rates and make up a growing proportion of their countries’ populations. In democratic states at least, national governments characteristically seek a politically acceptable balance between a range of cultural groups who may see themselves as deserving of special consideration by reason of: prior occupance (e.g., in digenous groups); historical control (e.g., settler groups); population numbers (e.g., the Chinese majority in Singa pore); prior injustice (e.g., the Black population of the US); or any number of more idiosyncratic, local factors. Policy responses may include positive discrimination (e.g., for Bumiputras (Malays) in Malaysia), deliberate reconcili ation (as in South Africa), antiracism moves (as legally enacted by most European governments), and culturally speciﬁc land rights policies (e.g., for the Sami (Lapps), Maori, and Native (North) Americans). Many of these policies have had beneﬁcial results, but in many cases the granting of cultural rights or the ac knowledgment of the cultural heritages of one group may conﬂict with the cultural heritages of others. The prac tices of some strict adherents of Islam conﬂict with the principles of gender equity espoused by many Western nations. Genital mutilation of the kind practiced in parts of Africa is illegal in most countries outside that region. Even though Christianity can be said to have taken over many components of pagan winter solstice celebrations, many Christians see contemporary attempts to rename Christmas as Winterval or to change the ‘Happy Christmas’ greeting to ‘Happy Holidays’ as an attack on their Christian heritage.

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In these circumstances national governments are ob liged to act as intermediaries in two ways. First, in spatial and hierarchical terms, between global bodies, who proclaim a Universal Declaration of Human Rights or designate World Heritage sites, and local groupings, who disagree either with these decrees or with their govern ment’s response to them. Indigenous groups in Norway and the Northern Territory of Australia have appealed to the United Nations on heritage grounds over the actions of their national governments. Second, national govern ments have to deal with different cultural groups within their borders who may ﬁnd themselves unwilling or un able to conform to national norms, as in the dispute over the wearing of the hijab in French state schools or even, as with nationalist right wing parties in Europe or funda mentalist parties in the Islamic world, to tolerate cultural difference or to acknowledge the heritages of others. The question of who decides which (or whose) heri tages and cultures prevail or survive and in which ways they do so is therefore highly vexed. Clearly those with the power to make and to enforce decisions on issues of religion, language, and nationality play a major role. However, many decisions made in the contexts of plan ning, health, environmental protection, censorship, labor conditions, tourism, sport, and recreation also have sig niﬁcant cultural and heritage related impacts. The study of heritage and culture within geography is therefore no longer conducted in a rural and historical backwater. It is central to a much wider range of contemporary political, environmental, and economic issues. See also: Diaspora; Globalization and Transnational Corporations; Heritage; Heritage and Economy; Heritage and Identity; Identity Politics; Imperialism, Cultural; Imperialistic Geographies; Modernity; Trade, Transport and Communications, Historical Geographies of.

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Further Reading Dewailly, J. M. (1997). Images of heritage in rural regions. In Butler, R., Hall, C. M. & Jenkins, J. (eds.) Tourism and recreation in rural regions, pp 123 137. Chichester and New York: Wiley. Graham, B. and Howard, P. (eds.) (2008). The Ashgate research companion to heritage and identity. Aldershot: Ashgate. Graham, B., Ashworth, G. J. and Tunbridge, J. E. (2000). A geography of heritage: Power, culture and economy. London: Arnold. Hewison, R. (1987). The heritage industry: Britain in a climate of decline. London: Methuen. Hobsbawm, E. and Ranger, T. (eds.) (1983). The invention of tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hoskins, W. G. (1970). The making of the English landscape. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Johnston, R. J., Taylor, P. J. and Watts, M. J. (eds.) (2002). Geographies of global change (2nd edn.). Oxford: Blackwell. Schama, S. (1995). Landscape and memory. London: HarperCollins. Short, J. R. (2005). Imagined country; environment, culture, and society. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. Taylor, P. J. and Flint, C. (2000). Political geography; world economy, nation state and locality (4th edn.). Harlow and New York: Prentice Hall. Tatham, G. (1957). Environmentalism and possibilism. In Taylor, G. (ed.) Geography in the 20th century (3rd edn.). pp 128 162. London: Methuen. Tunbridge, J. E. and Ashworth, G. J. (1996). Dissonant heritage; the management of the past as a resource in conﬂict. Chichester and New York: Wiley.

Relevant Websites http://www.icomos.org ICOMOS International Council on Monuments and Sites. http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/routledge/13527258.html International Journal of Heritage Studies. http://www.multilingual matters.com/multi/ journals jht.asp?TAG=&CID= Journal of Heritage Tourism. http://whc.unesco.org World Heritage Centre.

Heritage and Economy G. J. Ashworth, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Bequest Value The value placed on the continued existence of a resource for the user of future generations. Contingent Pricing The price of a nonmarket resource in a hypothetical market in which individuals are questioned as to their willingness to pay to maintain the resource. Existence Value The value placed on the continued existence rather than the immediate use of a resource. Free-Riding The beneﬁts gained from a resource whose costs are paid by another. Hedonic Pricing The use of a parallel market to determine the value of a nonmarket product. Option Value The value an individual attaches to keeping open the option to use. Opportunity Cost The beneﬁts forgone when resources are devoted to another alternative purpose. Public Good A good that is nonexcludable and nonrival: it is available without individual cost to all without excluding anyone. Travel-Cost Pricing The use of the willingness to pay the costs of travel to a resource in determining its price. Total Economic Value The total of direct and indirect use values together with other nonuse values. Use Value The value placed on a site or resources by its users.

On Heritage and Economies: An Inevitable Ambivalence Heritage, as the contemporary use of pasts, has been created to serve many cultural, social, political, and psychological uses – both individual and collective. As such it has become endowed with many policy expectations. Economic uses have generally been sub sequent and secondary. They have often been a barely tolerated extra use for monuments, sites, collections, and places that have been identiﬁed, selected, designated, maintained, and interpreted for quite other purposes. Some marginal income or political justiﬁcation may be obtained from visitors but economic considerations were not decisive in the creation of most existing heri tage and, if the economic function disappeared, most would continue to exist to serve other purposes. Indeed many institutions and individuals involved in

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the heritage creation and management process regard the economics of their endeavors as, at best a dista steful necessity to be tolerated, and, at worst, a distra cting and even degrading commercialization of their endeavors. However, the simple reality is that heritage costs money but also earns money. Although, to many heritage consumers public statuary, museums, conserved city scapes, and landscapes appear to be freely accessible and with zero, or near zero, priced facilities, to their pro ducers they are costly to create and maintain. A pro tective heritage designation may appear to cost nothing: it is in reality a moral commitment to restore and maintain into inﬁnity. As important as the direct costs of maintenance, are the indirect costs of the development opportunities forgone, often in urban settings on the most valuable spaces, and the associated restrictions placed on the adaption of buildings, neighborhoods, and landscapes to changing circumstances. This locking up of economic resources and acquisition of ﬁnancial commitment into the future, the so called ‘heritage time bomb’, can be seen as a form of economic mortgage upon future gen erations in the service of the perceived heritage needs of the present. However, in compensation, heritage may earn money in numerous ways directly and indirectly as discussed below. Indeed heritage is being increasingly relied upon as an instrument for the attainment of eco nomic objectives at all spatial scales. Whereas tradition ally heritage, like culture in general, was seen as a ‘merit good’ to be acquired from the surplus of economic de velopment once more essential needs had been met, now the position has been reversed as heritage is enlisted to serve economic objectives alongside its many other uses. Once a result and beneﬁciary of wealth, heritage is now expected to be a wealth generator. Given the economic contexts in which heritage must inevitably exist, the failure to develop an economics of heritage is remarkable. With a few notable exceptions, such as the pioneering work of Lichﬁeld and the founding of the Journal of Cultural Economics in 1973, there has been a reluctance among heritage ‘professionals’ to think in economic terms, which are often unfamiliar to them. Similarly among economists, the intrinsic dif ﬁculties in applying economic concepts to the heritage experience seem to have dissuaded many of them from the attempt. The shaping of an economics of heritage is, however, a necessity if the multiple uses of heritage are to be reconciled and heritage is to compete for resources with other functions.

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The Economics of Heritage

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The construction of such an economics of heritage would need to consider three main elements.

Finally, the market in which producers and consumers come together to exchange values according to their different strategies of proﬁt maximization is as difﬁcult to deﬁne and as varied as heritage itself.

The Components of the Heritage Process

The Valuation and Pricing of Heritage

The four main components of any economic production system – namely products, producers, consumers, and markets – each have distinctive characteristics when ap plied to heritage. These differences, from most other economic activities or industries, complicate the analysis but do not render it impossible. The heritage product is not only highly diverse; it is also vaguely demarcated. Almost any natural or human creation, whether tangible or intangible, can become heritage. The product is the packaged interpretation, and not the resources from which it may be composed: the same resources may contribute to many different heritage products. It may even be a geographical location, site, or place, giving rise to place products that remain places as much as products. Producers of heritage products are as diverse as the products themselves. It may be a public sector agency, operating in a certain collective public interest, or a commercial proﬁt seeking enterprise. The ‘industry’ is highly ‘vertically disintegrated’ in that those who create and manage the resources, package and interpret the products, transmit it to the market and manage its con sumption, are likely to be quite different agencies, with different approaches, working methods, and, most im portant, objectives. Not only do those marketing and managing the consumption often have little control over the resources they are using, many of those concerned with the resources have little knowledge, or even interest, in how they are ultimately consumed. This fragmented production system – in which resource creation, product shaping, transmission, and consumption are performed by separate agencies – is a potential source of not only economic inefﬁciencies but also conﬂict between the different parts of the system. The consumer is equally difﬁcult to isolate and identify. It is, often, not clear who the heritage consumers are and indeed what they are actually consuming. If the heritage product is ultimately an experience, whether educational, aesthetic, spiritual, or just recreational, then each individual consumer can be assumed to be con suming a separate product. Similarly, we all as citizens, residents, and tourists consume heritage in some way, to some extent. The difﬁculties of demarcating, let alone segmenting and targeting, the market are compounded by the idea of each individual constructing a necessarily individual product from what is made available. The fundamental economic distinction between producer and consumer becomes blurred in the concept of ‘prosumer’.

If heritage is to be considered as neither valueless nor priceless, then methods must be found for valuing heritage products and resources and applying some form of pricing to their consumption. Such thinking may be anathema to many who cannot or will not put a price on art, beauty, or historicity, but if heritage is regarded as priceless then it is also valueless in economic arenas when a heritage use must compete with other commercial users for scarce resources or for its very continued existence. Only values and prices allow markets to operate, and even heritage created in the public sector exists within a market context of alternative use of resources. Heritage acquires economic value in a number of ways which are more diverse than with most products, a condition which in turn determines how a price can be calculated. Heritage demand may be for its immediate use or only for its continued existence. There is also a demand for uses that may be deferred into the future, for an option to use, which will never be realized or for bequest to an imagined future user. This compound evaluation of the value of heritage can be expressed in the equation: Use value ðdirect þ indirectÞ þ existence value þ option value þ bequest value ¼ Total value

The logic is both correct and useful, insofar as it estab lishes that heritage has values in addition to those of its immediate use, but the task of calibrating such an equation is formidable. However, heritage is not unique in this re spect and many methods have been determined for esti mating values in addition to use values for commodities not, generally, directly traded, such as environmental quality and safety assessments. There is ‘hedonic pricing’ which attempts to place a real estate value, through comparison with similar cases, on the additional ‘hedonic’ value above its use value that is conferred by the heritage status of buildings or landscapes. There is ‘travel cost pricing’ which implies that the costs of visiting a heritage site represents its added value, which can be aggregated for all visitors. ‘Contingent pricing’ that imagines a demolition auction in which individuals may bid to save a heritage site or structure that has become popular in planning participation in environmental impact assess ments effecting large numbers of individuals. All these, and many more, such as the ‘Delphi methods’ for con sulting experts or stakeholders, produce incomplete and disputable results. They are, however, a considerable

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improvement on the alternative of inaction, which leaves heritage resources to compete in market places with much of its value unexpressed.

outlined. This can be approached through a number of overlapping models. Windfall Gain Model

Investment and the Allocation of Proﬁts Investment in heritage might be viewed as any other economic investment – namely a building, area, or land scape is preserved and renovated by an owner who then reaps the proﬁts from the enhanced value of the property. However, this straightforward relationship between in vestment and return is complicated, in heritage, by three considerations. First, both costs and beneﬁts accrue more widely than just to those who own or use heritage. The economic externalities accruing to a wider society are often more important, and indeed, may be the justiﬁcation for the investment, rather than the internalities. Second, much heritage is produced and consumed as a public merit good. Consumption cannot be conﬁned to those who pay for it, in addition, it may actually be compulsory in the sense that the individual cannot opt out of ex periencing heritage environments. Third, the costs of preservation, renovation, and restoration are ‘front loa ded’, that is, the investment must be made substantially long before any returns are obtained and may only be repaid over many years or even centuries. Incremental investment to partially save or restore is rarely possible. These characteristics are evident in the rational pro cess of deciding to invest illustrated in the ‘neighbor’s dilemma’ model. Here two neighbors, A and B, can choose to invest in renovation. If one does and the other does not, then the external beneﬁts and costs determine that the investor fails to receive a sufﬁcient return, bearing the external cost of a neighboring nonrestored property, while the noninvestor receives a free beneﬁt from the restored neighboring property. The third party, the wider community, receives a positive externality from either neighbor investing. Although a proﬁtable strategy for the individual must always be ‘not to invest but hope your neighbor will’, return on investment is maximized if both invest simultaneously. Also, the returns to the community are highest if both invest as this justiﬁes community encouragement, and even investment, to initiate the process. Public intervention is thus needed to redress market failure and combine private and public economic interests and to distinguish between individual and collective costs, beneﬁts, and responsibilities. This dilemma lies at the core of area development and re generation issues and there are numerous ways in which it is manifested and managed at the local level.

Heritage in Economics Having considered the economics of heritage, the various roles of heritage in economies must now be brieﬂy

There is a widespread assumption that heritage has been created and is maintained in the service of noneconomic purposes. Its economic use can, therefore, be viewed as a windfall gain. This presupposes that the additional eco nomic demands can be accommodated alongside other demands without competing with, displacing, or reducing the value to other consumers. It also assumes that the additional marginal use does not diminish or alter the resource upon which other uses depend. Third, it is in ferred that the addition of the economic use is con ditional upon the acceptance of other priority uses, and may be monitored and regulated. This model also as sumes free ridership, although who is riding free depends upon how the model is interpreted in a given situation. An economic enterprise may freely use a heritage facility created and maintained for other purposes: alternatively, a heritage enterprise may generate returns that maintain a facility in existence for free use by others. Turnstile Model At the level of the individual heritage facility, it may not appear to matter much as to who consumes or why they are consuming the experience. Visitor numbers or ex penditures become the critical variables. However it is dangerous to assume that it is the same product that is being consumed by each customer and much public heritage is a freely accessible public good which thus has no turnstiles. Industrial Assembly Model Commodiﬁcation – the process for creating a tradable product from what was previously not tradable – can be viewed as a form of industrial assembly in which re sources, products, and markets are combined. There are three processes: namely, resource activation and main tenance, product assembly through selection and pack aging, and delivery to consumer markets. These processes are undertaken by three groups of actors: the resource caretakers, the product assemblers, and the market managers. Such a model reveals some of the signiﬁcant characteristics of heritage, such as the disintegration of different stages in the process, and also that the model is essentially market rather than resource driven. It re mains, however, something of an abstraction for the same reasons. There is in reality no such integrated assembly system: those operating at different stages of the process often have little interest in, or even awareness of, each other. The demand side of the model is certainly market driven but the supply side is usually not, with the re source providers using intrinsic object based values

Heritage and Economy

rather than ascribed market values. From this stems much of the lack of understanding, and often friction, between the two sides of the model. Economic Systems Model The distinction between internal and external pro duction systems allows an examination of internalities/ externalities and of ‘sustainability’ as an economic policy option. This, as in the management of many similar en vironmental systems, will need to take into consideration the following variables. The methods of resource use valuation; output equity (whether spatial, sectoral, and especially, generational); carrying capacity (for whatever objective); and the devising of self balancing economic systems. The application of such a model depends upon the understanding and manipulation of the characteristic components of the heritage process, as described earlier.

Heritage in Economic Development Strategies Heritage is called upon to play diverse instrumental roles within development strategies for economic goals at different spatial scales. This can be approached from a variety of directions. Heritage as Culture Industry Heritage can be treated as an economic enterprise, as part of a wider set of cultural industries, with a distinctive geography of production. It has identiﬁable spatial lo cation factors, distinctive industrial structures of pro duction, patterns of employment and traceable interﬁrm linkages, and networks. Heritage enterprises can thus be planned and managed similar to other cultural enterprises in the public interest by using its distinctive industrial characteristics of small ﬁrms, vertical disinte gration, spatial clustering, a dependence on specialized labor pools and the like, all of which have strong geo graphical dimensions.

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place products are consumed selectively, rapidly, and fashionably by tourists, which necessitates a constant extension and differentiation of the product line. Suc cessful heritage tourism places are in a process of con tinuous reinvention of their imagined pasts in response to their changing markets. The appreciation of the issue of tourism as support and justiﬁcation for heritage or, con versely, as parasitical exploiter and potential despoiler of resources they have not created, do not manage, and are not the sole or even most important user, depends largely on the viewpoint of the observer and its resolution de pends mostly on the priorities set by governments and place managers. Heritage as Location Factor Heritage may be a variable, whether positive or negative, in the location decision of other economic activities. The existence of conserved districts and landscapes, of mu seums and heritage centers, and even just the idea that a place is historic may be attractive to residents as an en vironmental amenity or to economic enterprises that can capitalize upon the place association with historicity. Equally, the restrictions on use and adaption imposed by conservational designations upon structures and areas are a cost to residents and enterprises and the heritage place associations may not be appropriate and proﬁtably transferable to the ﬁrm. Heritage and Place-Product Promotion Related to the above is the practice of using heritage within wider place marketing strategies or as an instru ment of place branding. The essentially unique nature of local pasts, as well as the ﬂexibility of heritage as an imagined construction, renders it ideal for place–product differentiation in search of unique selling point, or unique associations, of the place product or place brand. Historic events, personalities, mythologies, folk lore, and customs are thus widely used in the construction of place images for place product marketing, imaging, and branding as a means of differentiating one place from another.

Heritage as Tourism Industry Heritage tourism is not only a special case of a heritage industry but its numerical and economic importance has generated special management and scientiﬁc and political attention. Tourism treats much heritage as a zero cost, freely accessible, ﬂexible, and inexhaustible resource. The resource providers are likely to see it as costly, multiused and in danger of damage or depletion. The ubiquity and ﬂexibility of the heritage resource renders it ideal for the creation of tourism products, many of which are linked speciﬁcally to places. The urban geography of heritage tourism is considered elsewhere, in the concept and management of the ‘tourist historic city’. These

Heritage in Area Economic Regeneration Finally in this list of strategic economic uses of heritage, there is economic regeneration policy at various spatial scales. There are a few cases where heritage has been used to fundamentally reshape the economy of a place through becoming in itself the dominant economic sector. The Oberammergau ‘Passion Plays’, the Chemainus, British Columbia, heritage murals or the Stratford, On tario, Shakespeare festival are notable for both their success and their rarity. Much more widespread is the use of heritage indirectly, through its contribution to a broad based amenity and environmental quality.

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Heritage in the form of conserved and adapted buildings, promoted associations with historic events and person alities, and major museums and galleries, which them selves may be new but which house heritage art and artifacts, may all contribute to area regeneration even when economic development has little directly to do with heritage. Waterfront regeneration strategies (from Boston to Bristol), in particular, have used heritage in this way but always in combination with other place management instruments, such as land use measures, area development investments, and place management more generally.

Limits and Possibilities Both the economics of heritage and the roles of heritage in economies offer many possibilities, but are also con strained by many limits. Only rarely are economic con siderations paramount in the selection and management of heritage and heritage the main support or justiﬁcation for economic development. Heritage possesses many economic dimensions and plays many roles in develop ment strategies. It offers ubiquitous, ﬂexible, and mutable resources and is, therefore, in many ways an ideal in strument of development, most usually, in combination with other management instruments. However, the Hewison school of thought argues, conversely, that heritage is intrinsically an obstacle to development though the restrictions on change it imposes, the re sources it consumes and fossilizes, and above all, the backward looking mentality it engenders amongst those who seek refuge in the past from the challenges of the present and the future. Heritage is inevitably about choice: economics provides some guidance in the making of these choices. Equally, economic development and the regeneration of areas involves choices of objectives and instruments. Heritage may, but equally does not

have to, be chosen to be among the goals or the instruments. See also: Cultural Economy; Heritage and Culture; Tourism.

Further Reading Ashworth, G. J. (2001). Conservation designation and the revaluation of property: The risk of heritage innovation. International Journal of Heritage Studies 8(1), 9 23. Baer, W. C. (1995). When old buildings ripen for historic preservation: A predictive approach to planning. Journal of American Planning Association 61(6), 82 94. Bedate, A., Herrero, L. C. and Sanz, J. A. (2004). Economic valuation of the cultural heritage: Application to four case studies in Spain. Journal of Cultural Heritage 4, 1101 1111. Bianchini, F. and Parkinson, M. (1994). Cultural policy and urban regeneration. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Evans, G. (2001). Cultural Planning: An urban renaissance? London: Routledge. Hewison, R. (1987). The heritage industry: Britain in a climate of decline. London: Methuen. Lichﬁeld, N. (1988). Economics in urban conservation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lichﬁeld, N. (1997). Achieving the beneﬁts of conservation. Built Environment 22, 103 110. McLoughlin, J., Sodagar, B. and Kaminski, J. (2006). Heritage impact 2005: Proceedings of the ﬁrst international symposium on socio economic impact of cultural heritage. Budapest: Archaeolingua. Mason, R. (1999). Economics and heritage conservation: Concepts, values and agenda for research. Los Angeles, CA: Getty Conservation Institute. Navrud, S. and Ready, R. C. (eds.) (2002). Valuing cultural heritage: Applying environmental evaluation techniques to historic building, monuments and artefacts. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. Stabler, M. (1996). Are heritage conservation and tourism compatible? An economic evaluation of their role in urban regeneration. In Robinson, M. (ed.) Tourism and culture, pp 417 446. Newcastle, UK: Centre for Travel and Tourism University of Northumberland. Timothy, D. J. and Boyd, S. (2002). Heritage tourism. London: Prentice Hall. Weiler, J. (1998). Dollars and sense: The economics of conserving built heritage. Heritage 1, 17 20. Wynne, D. (ed.) (1992). The culture industry: The arts in urban regeneration. Avebury: Aldershot.

Heritage and Identity J. D. Bohland, and E. Hague, Hollins University, Roanoke, VA, USA, and DePaul University, Chicago, IL, USA & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Collective Memory A collection of highly constructed and often mythologized beliefs about the past held in common by a particular group of people. Diaspora An ethnic or national population dispersed over multiple locations, most commonly associated with Jewish people. Ethnicity A personal identity derived from membership in a national or subnational group believed to share a common culture. Hate Crime A premeditated crime, such as an assault, pursued by the proponent on the basis of a victim’s identity, most commonly her or his race, sexuality, or ethnicity. Identity Politics A practice whereby an individual or group pursues an agenda based on their identity (e.g., sexuality, gender, ethnicity) rather than on political party or socioeconomic class. Multiculturalism The recognition that members of a society exhibit a diverse range of personal and group identities, and advocacy that these should be respected without prejudice. Nationalism The political belief that a nation has a right to self-determination, governance, and independent territory. Nativism The political belief that the interests of the native population should be primary and take priority over those of immigrants. Roots to Routes An understanding that identities and cultures are not unchanging and deterministic (roots) but are multiple, ﬂuid, and continuously being remade as people travel through life (routes).

The concepts of heritage and identity have come to the fore in the current era of globalization, a period which has seen the growth of identity politics, multiculturalism, immigrant and diaspora populations, and signiﬁcant in creases in the number of heritage tourist sites. Although much scholarship on these topics focuses on examples from Western society, this is a burgeoning global phe nomenon with many people in postcolonial societies now reinterpreting their pasts and articulating their identities. These processes are complicating traditional notions of the relationship between nation and identity that often simplistically imagined ethnically homogeneous national populations and assumed that an ethnic or national group occupied a distinct territory.

Introducing Heritage The term ‘heritage’ gained new resonance in the late twentieth century. It has become a crucial element in the construction of personal and group identities as people seek to locate themselves within speciﬁc historical tra jectories and understandings of the past. Heritage is most commonly understood to mean that which is inherited from one’s ancestors and is most often invoked on a na tional scale, typically referring to the presentation and articulation of a national past in the present. Other uses of the term include references to agricultural heritage, industrial heritage, and architectural heritage, demon strating the breadth of the concept and its application. Often nostalgic, historically partial, and simplistically rendered, many invocations of heritage are necessarily spatial, appealing to cultural and historical geographies to engender authenticity and legitimacy. In general, heritage is understood as something to be protected, preserved, and celebrated. Although many assertions of heritage assume that such practices are both beneﬁcial and politically neutral, conﬂicts over the meaning of heritage and what or who should and should not be commemorated demonstrate that heritages are contested and often one sided depictions of the past. In the late twentieth and early twenty ﬁrst centuries, ap peals to heritage have increasingly become a focus for political organizations seeking to advance the fortunes of speciﬁc ethnic and cultural groups. Through these pro cesses, heritage becomes an important aspect of indi vidual and group identities, having deﬁnitional power and providing a political focus for garnering support. These post–World War II incarnations of heritage and identity are concomitant with changing population pat terns that have resulted from events such as the decline of the European empires, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the advancement of civil rights in the United States. The arrival of Afro Caribbean immigrants in the United Kingdom in signiﬁcant numbers after 1948 ush ered in a new era of postcolonial migration in Europe with people moving from former colonies to the colonial core. Similar processes were observed in locations such as France and the Netherlands. Coinciding with economic changes and processes of industrial restructuring which decreased working class employment in traditional manufacturing jobs, the residence of non white immi grants in Europe helped to generate a reassessment of the meaning of white, national, and European heritages and identities. One reaction was the rise of far right political

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parties such as the National Front in France and the British National Party (BNP) in the UK whose leaders claimed to represent an authentic national heritage and identity, one that was considered to be under threat from demographic and economic change. In the United States, the emergence of identity politics based on gender, race, and sexuality in the 1960s, most notably the African American struggle for civil rights, saw the concept of an assimilative melting pot challenged by a doctrine of multiculturalism. Simultaneously, white people in the southern United States opposed to racial desegregation began to use the Confederate ﬂag as a ‘heritage symbol’ as part of their efforts to reassert white hegemony in the region. By the 1970s and 1980s two trends could be observed that belied traditional notions of nation and identity. First, greater public display of and awareness about the multiple identities that people exhibit, as evidenced at ethnic festivals, in gay pride parades, and by immigrants’ rights organizations and through antidiscrimination le gislation. Second, a reaction against these trends and their accommodation through campaigns and policies promoting a single national language, mandating tradi tional school curricula and celebrations of a singular national identity. Some reactions were and are violent, for example, race riots, gay bashing, the intimidation of immigrant groups, and hate crimes. As these demographic changes challenged extant meanings of nations and identities, some locations be came heritage sites; sacred places revered by people as repositories of a group’s essential identity and understood to be critical to the past and future of a certain popu lation. Such heritage sites both construct and are con structed by collective memories and identities. Although these occurrences are most commonly seen at the na tional scale, local and global invocations of heritage and identity at certain iconic locations are also common. On a global scale, many places have gained international and institutional recognition through the United Nations Educational, Scientiﬁc and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and its establishment of world heritage sites. Under UNESCO guidelines established in 1972 both cultural heritage (buildings, landscapes, and historic sites) and natural heritage (areas of unique fauna and ﬂora) sites are identiﬁed as of importance to everyone and requiring protection and preservation. UNESCO world heritage sites include locations such as Australia’s Great Barrier Reef, areas of architectural innovation including Brasilia in Brazil and the old and new towns of central Edinburgh in Scotland, and places of archaeological interest like ancient Troy in modern day Turkey and the Egyptian pyramids. At a national scale, museums, memorials, monuments, historic buildings, and tourist sites such as castles, pal aces, and battleﬁelds often act as warehouses and

exemplars of national heritage and identity, places where we learn about ourselves from particular rubrics re garding the national past. This has often resulted in museums presenting ‘happy history’ exhibits, positive and partial accounts of the past that forward nationalist ver sions of heritage. These exclusive narratives omit un comfortable events and avoid competing interpretations of history. When museum displays challenge revered national myths, curators and exhibits can be viliﬁed as betraying the national heritage. In the United States, for example, public controversy erupted in 1995 when vet erans’ groups complained that a Smithsonian Institute World War II exhibition had been stripped of its patriotic message as a result of external pressure from Japanese Americans and peace activists. Elsewhere, museum cur ators in the American South who have devised exhib itions that contest the Anglo Southern nationalist myth of the nineteenth century Confederacy or have publicly criticized the apologetic Lost Cause interpretation of the 1861–65 US Civil War have faced pressure and intimi dation from regional heritage groups such as the United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC) and the Sons of Confederate Veterans (SCV) to revise their museum displays and interpretations to present a pro Confederate version. George Ewert, Director of the Museum of Mobile (Alabama), was nearly dismissed from his position by the city council in 2003 after writing a negative review of the feature ﬁlm Gods and Generals, a movie that pre sented a pro Confederate nationalist narrative of US history. People such as Ewert are often denounced on neo Confederate websites, message boards, and in group publications as ‘heritage violators’ for their efforts to challenge sacred myths of Confederate heritage. Memorials and monuments are among the most studied of heritage landscapes, due in no small part to the important symbolic and political meanings associated with these sites. By erecting a public monument, groups seek to permanently instill their own particular version of the past in the cultural landscape, and thus embed their sense of identity and heritage as the authoritative version. The erection of monuments and memorials began during the classical period in Western Europe where Greeks and Romans built ornate ediﬁces to cele brate victories and pay respect to the Gods that granted them success. Monument building enjoyed a resurgence following the Renaissance, as newly formed nations used monuments as powerful public tools to establish their political legitimacy. Monuments became national semi otic markers, symbolically justifying new nationalist discourses with seemingly permanent reminders of a supposedly real and eternal national past. National monuments nearly always present a highly militaristic version of heritage and identity, most typi cally honoring heroic male ﬁgures from the past. Soldiers or political leaders are commonly depicted as national

Heritage and Identity

archetypes and these usually male ﬁgures often stand alongside females who ﬁguratively represent the nation and its virtues. Real women and less martial versions of masculinity are rendered invisible and silenced by such memorial landscapes. Monuments dedicated to the an onymous male soldier, for example, began to appear in the United States in the aftermath of the Civil War and in Europe following World War I. These monuments were often funded by subscriptions organized by local women’s or veterans’ groups and dedicated by these heritage or ganizations. In the US, for example, the UDC erected hundreds of statues to the Confederate dead between 1894 and 1914, peaking with around 35 unveilings in 1910 alone. These local efforts to commemorate the heroic sacriﬁce of soldiers present future generations with a model of heroic masculinity and nationalist pol itics to emulate, as nearly every Southern town features one of these statues outside their courthouse. Another commemorative effort that has become a way to entrench as particular version of heritage in a cultural landscape is through street naming. In the United States, many cities renamed streets after the civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. following his 1968 assassination. In Eastern Europe, Soviet era street names have also been changed and often replaced with monikers that invoke a national heritage that refers to the pre communist period. The issue of whose heritage is com memorated by street naming is often controversial. In 2006 the City of Chicago stalled an effort to name a section of road in honor of Black Panthers leader Fred Hampton (1948–69) yet the city’s landscape still contains Balbo Drive, formerly Seventh Street, which was re named in the 1930s to honor the Italian fascist leader Italo Balbo (1896–1940). Another controversial street name in Chicago is Pulaski Road. A source of controversy between the 1930s and 1950s, Polish Americans lobbied to change the name of Crawford Avenue to Pulaski in part to celebrate their heritage and honor a Polish hero of the American Revolution, Casimir Pulaski (1747–79). Other residents did not want to be associated with Poland, believing that such an ethnic identity for the street would damage local business and the image of the city. In the United States since the mid 1970s, recognition of distinct ethnic heritages has largely replaced the as similationist idea of the melting pot. Magazines, festivals, catalogs, and days of celebration have become com monplace among different ethnic groups in the United States as a way to celebrate heritage. Such assertions of heritage are one manner through which members of the diverse US population publicly announce the presence of their ethnic identities. The 1990s, for example, saw an upsurge in interest in Scottish heritage and ancestry in the United States. Stimulated by movies such as Brave heart (1995) and political support from prominent

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senators such as Trent Lott, National Tartan Day (6 April) was established in the United States in 1998 as a date to celebrate Scottish identity and heritage among the Scottish American diaspora. During the decade, around 100 new Scottish heritage festivals were in augurated in the United States and numerous Scottish themed magazines, retailers, and Internet websites catered to an audience keen to engage with its Scottish heritage. In Scotland, these developments were treated with a degree of disdain and derision by commentators who understood American invocations of Scottish heri tage to be replete with nostalgia for a mythical and somewhat kitsch old country, stereotypically bedecked in tartan and awash in purple blooming heather. These developments echoed similar celebrations of Irish heri tage which in the United States culminate in an annual party on St. Patrick’s Day (17 March) which is frequently an occasion for drunken revelry, often to the frustration of more recent Irish e´migre´s who lament that their Irish identities are overwhelmed by what they consider inappropriate depictions of Irish heritage by Irish Americans. Yet, such festivities of Irish heritage in the United States are not without contention among the celebrants themselves. In 1994 in south Boston, an area of Irish American population, the St. Patrick’s Day parade was canceled due to a dispute between the organizers and a group of gay and lesbian participants. In nearby New York City, the Ancient Order of Hibernians has repeat edly denied gay and lesbian participation in their city parade. After the US Supreme Court unanimously ruled in 1995 that the free speech of parade organizers would be impinged upon by the presence of gay and lesbian participants, the Irish heritage on display at both St. Patrick’s Day parades has been deﬁned as much by sexuality as national heritage or ethnic identity.

Heritage and National Identity Heritage and identity are closely connected to places, landscapes, and collective memories. These connections can occur at all scales, although they are most frequently seen at the national level. National heritage is often framed as a story of progress and struggle replete with patriotic heroes and epic battles fought for freedom and territorial sovereignty. Accounts of national heritage that can be used to press political claims to power and territory are crucial components in the development of national ism. As individuals and communities seek respite from what can seem the chaos of the globalizing, postcolonial world, many do so by looking to the past, imagining a simpler time of secure and homogeneous national iden tities. Accompanying this vision is an understanding that national identities can be stable and uniﬁed, rooted in a speciﬁc place, and having consistent characteristics. Rural

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landscapes are often revered as resonant with the au thentic meanings of a nation and national identity. Battleﬁelds, for example, are heritage sites where national invocations of blood and soil are particularly powerful. They become sacred spaces, landscapes for future gen erations to visit in order to learn of the sacriﬁces made by past generations and to inculcate future potential soldiers into the importance of ﬁghting for nation, heritage, and identity. Battleﬁelds themselves are monuments of a type, landscapes that serve to honor the fallen that paradoxic ally provide salient lessons regarding the cost of warfare and its importance for the sustained protection of national values and homeland territory. Many nations have estab lished heritage sites at locations where a nation has seemingly been forged through warfare, for example, the Israeli site of Masada which commemorates the mass suicide of Jews when surrounded by the Romans in AD 73 or the Culloden battleﬁeld in Scotland where British government troops defeated the Jacobites in 1746. In the United States, civil war battleﬁelds like Gettysburg and Shiloh are remembered and represented to visitors as bloody sites where Americans from both armies fought gallantly in a heroic struggle that ultimately covered all participants with honor and valor. The preservation of battleﬁeld sites in the United States is a particularly contentious issue as local real estate developers and heritage groups often clash when past battleﬁelds become threatened by modern development plans. Perhaps the most infamous battleﬁeld site in recent history is Kosovo Polje. In Yugoslavia in the 1980s and 1990s Serbian nationalists envisioned a past in which the region of Kosovo was central to the deﬁnition of the Serbian nation. The Kosovo area had been part of a medieval Serbian kingdom before occupation by Ottomans. Twentieth century Serbian nationalists argued that this region was integral to Serbian heritage, territory, and identity. To emphasize this connection, in 1989 fu ture Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic held a mass rally on the Kosovo Polje site of a 1389 battle between Serbs and Ottomans. It was at this battle that invading Ottoman forces defeated the army of the Serbian King Lazar. This loss ensured Ottoman hegemony in the region for over 500 years and it brought about great political and cultural change to the region, most notably the introduction of Islam. Milosevic’s speech was designed to appeal to the affective national identity of the Serbian Orthodox community, and he called for the Serbian people to be reuniﬁed in order to restore their glorious national heritage after centuries of outside domination. During that same period, Croat nationalist leader Franjo Tudj man made similar appeals for Croats to reclaim their cultural heritage, an effort that included the state in vention of new ‘Croatian’ words as part of an effort to claim a cultural and linguistic distinction from their Serb and Bosniak neighbors. Ultimately, the use of heritage to

fan the ﬂames of ethnonationalism in the region served to underpin the genocidal wars fought in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s, a conﬂict which left the country politically divided and the Bosniak community devastated. Historical descriptions of events at heritage sites such as battleﬁelds vary considerably in their accuracy and partisanship. Heritage sites usually present ‘ofﬁcial his tory’, leading to omissions and forgetting of particular past events which do not ﬁt in the dominant versions of memory. In each of the above cases, visitors to the battleﬁeld sites are encouraged to imagine the sacriﬁces made by the mythical heroes of the past. Heritage tra velers may also seek to visit memory sites out of a desire to learn about the past at the place where it happened, as the ‘sacred soil’ of a particular memory site affords it a particular normative authority and power for tourists to gaze upon and soak in at the places where ‘history really happened’. Appeals to a distinctive and often monolithic national heritage have been utilized by conservative political leaders to argue against current processes of migration and the establishment of multicultural diaspora popu lations, particularly in the West. The political recognition of multiculturalism has led to a change in how both immigrant and native populations envision their genea logical ancestries, heritages, and identities. Communities have often seen a resurgence of fundamentalism and belief in the immutability of ethnic identity, in this sense understood to be genetic and inherited rather than constructed and performed. This identity is often linked to discredited biological notions, such as those once pertaining to race, in contrast to the perception that identities are in a continuous process of formation, so cially constructed, and able to be manipulated based on context and expediency. These polarized notions of identity often lead to very different beliefs about na tionality, heritage, and ethnicity. For some, identity is rooted in ancient ancestries and cannot change and thus an immigrant and her or his descendents can never be fully a part of the nation in which they reside. For others, identity is ﬂexible and people can simultaneously cele brate their ethnicity and ascribe to new national and cultural circumstances. These competing imaginations of national identity and heritage are often understood to be ‘culture wars’ in which challenges to often simplistic renderings are decried as disturbing long held and cherished traditional versions of heritage. In reality, many of the most cherished heritage tra ditions are ‘invented’, devised in the last 200 years as a way of indoctrinating citizens into highly speciﬁc, sani tized, and sanctiﬁed versions of the past. Since the start of the twentieth century, television programs and feature ﬁlms have increasingly played a signiﬁcant role in the establishment of normative versions of national heritage

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and identity. Neo Confederate forms of nationalism in the American South have, for example, been engendered by Hollywood renderings of the American Civil War. Sweeping romantic epics such as Gone with the Wind (1939) imagined the South as an idyllic fantasy world of moonlight and magnolias, hoop skirts and ballroom dances, while conveniently excluding the harsh realities of African American slavery and racism of the period. In India, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), once a small and rather insigniﬁcant political party, rose to national prominence following a revival of Hindu nationalism which was in part sparked by the airing of a serialized version of the Hindu epic Ramayana on Indian state television in 1987. Lastly, educational institutions are crucial sites for the dissemination of normative versions of national heritage and identity to children. Elementary and secondary school textbooks often explain history in an overly sim plistic fashion, focusing on heroic stories and leaders at the expense of more diverse narratives. In Northern Ireland, a majority of students continue to attend primary and secondary school in religiously segregated settings. As such, these young students may not learn about ‘The Troubles’ and the history of violence and segregation in Northern Ireland from any perspective outside of their own religious group. Students in many American schools begin their school day with the Pledge of Allegiance, an oath ﬁrst written in 1892 by a Baptist minister as a way of marking the 400th anniversary of Christopher Columbus’ landing in the Western Hemisphere. The Pledge is a ritualistic promise of allegiance by each school child to the nation, a daily afﬁrmation of nationalism, and a re minder of past sacriﬁces. Following pressure from the Catholic group The Knights of Columbus, the words ‘under God’ were added to the Pledge in 1951 as part of an effort to separate the United States from their ‘God less’ communist enemies.

Heritage Dissonance and Contested Identities The past is always open to a variety of interpretations which means it is rarely possible to contain all possible understandings within the dominant versions of heritage. These are most often forwarded by government agencies or historical societies at speciﬁc sites and as a result, certain groups of people and their pasts are omitted from heritage narratives. In addition, current processes of globalization are increasingly producing hybrid and diasporic heritages as people seek to explore the possi bilities of multiple identities that transcend borders and stand in contradistinction to narrow conceptualizations of monolithic national identities and heritage. Groups marginalized by or excluded from powerful narratives

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about national and local history due to their race, class, gender, sexuality, or other identities, may offer competing interpretations or countermemories that delegitimize and complicate accounts of a glorious and progressive past. The issue thus becomes whose heritage is worthy of commemoration. When ofﬁcial recognition is commonly accompanied by ﬁnancial and other resources which enable speciﬁc heritages and identities to be preserved and promoted, marginalized groups often struggle to assert their own heritages and identities, be this in pol itics or through monument building. Many national memorial and heritage landscapes are distinctively masculine, and in the United States and Europe they are often overwhelmingly white, ignoring the contributions to national society of non white groups or denigrating non whites as inferior. Similar processes en sure that bourgeois hegemony is sustained and working class heritages and identities remain marginalized and the sexual identities of those who do not conform to hetero sexual norms are obscured. To challenge these narratives, groups as diverse as New York City gay rights activists, Welsh coal miners, and indigenous people in Australia have erected their own museums and monuments and engaged in their own heritage projects. In doing so, they reveal histories of resistance or struggle that are excluded by dominant nationalist versions of heritage. The trend of marginalized groups reclaiming their heritage narratives has also enabled white people to press their claims for recognition of their ancestries and identities. In many instances this is largely benign, such as the growing interest in Scottish ancestry among North Americans and Irish bars in the United States, but other examples have seen white Americans and Europeans calling for recognition of their heritage, using the language of multiculturalism and respect for diversity, while pursuing a nativist agenda that positions whites as a nation’s true citizens. For example, late 1990s and early 2000s neo Confederates in the USA have claimed that people of Anglo Celtic ancestry are the guardians of a ‘true’ Southern culture, one developed by their white ancestors since the slave holdings days of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This supposedly authentic Celtic heritage, one that easily conﬂates in neo Confederate literature with a celebration of white southern nationalism, is understood by advocates to be under attack by federal authorities and other groups whose actions have promulgated the end to legalized racial segregation and continue to challenge the cele bration of the slave holding Confederacy as expressed through monuments, memorials and, most potently, dis play of the Confederate Battle Flag. Aware of the po tential to be criticized as racists and white supremacists, many neo Confederates in heritage organizations such as the Sons of Confederate Veterans have adopted the slogan ‘‘Heritage Not Hate’’ to articulate that their

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celebration is one of ancestry and genealogy rather than the white supremacist political beliefs of the nineteenth century Confederacy. Such assertions were thin when proponents launch vitriolic campaigns to reassert their Confederate heritage, for example, denouncing those who proposed adding a statue of African American tennis star and humanitarian Arthur Ashe to Monument Avenue in Richmond (Virginia) in the mid 1990s, a road on which previously only white, Confederate leaders had been commemorated. See also: Citizenship; Cultural Politics; Difference/Politics of Difference; Emigration; Empire; Ethnic Conﬂict; Ethnicity; Ethnicity and Resistance, Historical Geographies of; Globalization, Economic; Heritage; Heritage and Culture; Identity Politics; Immigration I; Immigration II; Imperialistic Geographies; Lowenthal, D.; Memorials and Monuments; Memory; Multiculturalism; Nation; National Spatialities; Nationalism; Other/ Otherness; Race; Sovereignty; Transnational Ethnic Networks; Whiteness.

Foucault, M. (1977). Language, counter memory, practice: Selected essays and interviews, Bouchard, D.F. and Simon, S. (trans.), Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Hall, S. (1991). The local and the global: Globalization and ethnicity, and, Old and new identities, old and new ethnicities. In King, A. D. (ed.) Culture, globalization and the world system: Contemporary conditions for the representation of identity, pp 19 39 and 40 68. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Hague, E., Giordano, B. and Sebesta, E. H. (2005). Whiteness, multiculturalism and nationalist appropriation of Celtic culture: The case of the League of the South and the Lega Nord. Cultural Geographies 12, 151 173. Hewison, R. (1987). The heritage industry: Britain in a climate of decline. London: Methuen. Hobsbawm, E. and Ranger, T. (eds.) (1983). The invention of tradition. New York: Cambridge University Press. Ingram, G. B., Bouthilette, A. M. and Retter, Y. (eds.) (1997). Queers in space: Communities, public places, sites of resistance. Seattle, PNW: Bay Press. Lowenthal, D. (1985). The Past is a foreign country. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schein, R. H. (ed.) (2006). Landscape and race in the United States. New York: Routledge. Seligman, A. I. (2001). The street formerly known as Crawford, pp 36 51. Chicago History Magazine Spring. Southern Poverty Law Center (2004). Confederates in the Museum. Intelligence Report 116, 32 39. Winberry, J. J. (1983). ‘Lest we forget’: The confederate monument and the Southern town landscape. Southeastern Geographer 23, 107 121.

Further Reading

Relevant Websites

Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined communities: Reﬂections on the origin and spread of nationalism (rev. edn). London: Verso. Billig, M. (1995). Banal nationalism. London: Sage. Gilroy, P. (1987). ‘There ain’t no black in the Union Jack’: The cultural politics of race and nation. London: Hutchinson. Graham, B., Ashworth, G. J. and Tunbridge, J. E. (2000). A geography of heritage: Power, culture and economy. London: Hodder Arnold.

http://www.splcenter.org Southern Poverty Law Center. http://whc.unesco.org UNESCO World Heritage and Identity Site. http://whc.unesco.org United Nations Education, Scientiﬁc and Cultural Organization: World Heritage site.

Heteronormativity D. Bell, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Cruising The practice of giving and receiving often ﬂeeting indications of sexual attraction between passers-by, using nonverbal communication, such as eye contact or posing. Cruising has a long history in gay male culture, and is widely practiced in public space as well as in commercial venues. There have been debates about whether similar practices between lesbians, and between heterosexual people, can also be regarded as cruising. Quest Romance A common narrative form utilized in literary texts and other popular culture forms, such as ﬁlms and pop songs, the quest romance has a story arc focused on the (usually ultimately successful) search for (heterosexual) love, often using fantasy themes, emphasizing the centrality of romantic (and sexual) fulﬁllment as a powerful cultural norm.

Introduction Heteronormativity is a portmanteau word which borrows the ‘hetero ’ from ‘heterosexuality’ and bolts this onto ‘normativity’, derived from ‘normative’, meaning the es tablishment of a norm, that is, a standard or type. The term is used in discussions of sexuality, in gender studies and queer studies, where it describes the ways in which social institutions and forms of behavior reinforce – or indeed produce – belief that certain things are normal; in this case, obviously, that heterosexuality is the norm. This normalizing of heterosexuality implies, of course, that anything different from this is not normal, even ab normal. Heteronormativity, then, is a powerful but often unmarked set of assumptions, practices, and beliefs that constantly reinforce the normalness and naturalness of heterosexuality as the only normal, natural form of sexuality. So, to understand heteronormativity, we need ﬁrst to understand heterosexuality. Heterosexuality or, perhaps more appropriately, het erosexualities combine a multitude of behaviors, beliefs, rituals, and institutions. At one level, of course, hetero sexuality is about sex: about sex between two bodies (or two people) deﬁned as ‘opposite’ on the grounds of cer tain characteristics, such as their genital anatomy, their chromosomes, or their genders. But heterosexuality is not just sexual practice between two opposite sexed subjects. It invokes what is sometimes referred to as the ‘hetero sexual matrix’ – and in contemporary Western societies

this matrix equates gender, sex, and desire, and binds these together through rituals, assumptions, and socio spatial practices. So the male sex maps onto masculine gender, and maps onto desire for female sex and feminine gender. The condensation of this matrix is the hetero sexual couple – perhaps most notably the married couple. This is a romantic, sexual, (potentially) reproductive, monogamous, lifelong union of two oppositely sexed subjects, ritualized through religious or civil ceremony and supported by countless institutions (government, religion, family, etc.) and practices (displaying affection, having children, commemorating anniversaries, etc.). So heterosexuality is at once a sexual orientation or identity – embedded socially as the only legitimate, normal, natural form – and also much more than this. Such is the weight of ‘normativizing’ that surrounds heterosexuality, that some feminist and queer scholars talk of ‘compulsory heterosexuality’; it is the sexuality which you cannot be. Rather than seeking to expose irrational prejudices, such as homophobia, work on heteronormativity focuses instead on the prescription of certain identities, practices, and institutions, and the concomitant prohibition of others. The term as it is currently utilized was allegedly ﬁrst coined by US queer critic Michael Warner in 1991, and since then it has come to be increasingly common in discussions about the politics of sexuality – though the term is not uncontested. Part of the task of the term is to remind readers of the sheer weight of this ‘normativiz ing’, and therefore the difﬁculty of living a life outside of heterosexual norms. Its association with queer theory means it is often discussed in terms that draw on psy choanalysis, but it is also deployed in more sociological discussions, such as those which seek to expose the em bedding and reproduction of heteronormativity in social structures and social relations. Relatedly, geographers have also explored how space and place are implicated in heteronormativity. Spaces of Heteronormativity Work on geographies of sexuality has developed signiﬁ cantly in human geography, mainly since the late 1980s and 1990s, yet the overwhelming focus of research has been on nonheterosexual identities and spaces, from early work on gay bars and gay gentriﬁcation, to work on lesbian home making or transgender activism. As we shall see further, the trajectory of this work is revealing of the heteronormativity of geography as a site of know ledge production. This key point aside, much work on geographies of sexuality has implicitly (and sometimes

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explicitly) discussed heteronormativity, through its focus on the spatial practices on non normative sexual cultures (most usually those lumped together using the acronym LGBT – lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender – though we should note non normative heterosexualities, too). This work explores how space and place are part of the heterosexual matrix in all kinds of ways, and how they are deeply implicated in heteronormativizing processes. Here the focus is on ﬁve spaces of heteronormativity: home space, work space, social space, public space, and nation space. Home Space ‘Home’ as a geographical concept has been a relative newcomer, though the infrastructures and institutions of home – such as housing – have long been a core interest of geographers. More recently, home has been researched not just as bricks and mortar, but also as ideology and discourse, as metaphor and as experience: what does it mean to be at home, to feel at home? Where is home? Even if we do take ‘home’ and ‘house’ as synonymous, we can see ways in which home is a powerful space of het eronormativity, for example, through the emphasis in housing design and building on the ‘family home’. ‘Home’ is a key site where the idea of family is produced, then home space is family space. But the idea (or ideal) of family here is very particular: in many white, Western cultures it means the nuclear family, the family made up of two opposite sexed adults, who have a romantic and sexual relationship (and are also bonded through insti tutions such as marriage, taxation, legal rights, etc.) and who, through sexual reproduction, have had children, themselves assumed to be heterosexual, who are in turn nurtured into heterosexual adulthood in the space of the home (and related spaces such as school). Anyone who lives outside of this ‘norm’ can be viewed with suspicion, or pity – or at least as having ‘not yet settled down’. So being at home is implicated in a distinct set of intimate behaviors, too – ‘settling down’, or ‘living together’ – and these are markers of maturity, of adult hood. The ubiquitous sociosexual story of our culture, the quest romance, is a parable of this process, em phasizing the compulsory nature of making ‘home’ the space of the romantic heterosexual couple or family unit. Children growing up with nonheterosexual identities or desires may therefore experience home as a site of op pression and even exclusion, as countless ‘coming out’ narratives attest. (At the same time, one of the ways in which homosexuality is rendered abnormal is due to its decoupling of sex from reproduction.) The idea of home also contains within it particular notions of privacy – the space of the home is private, intimate space, in distinction to public spaces such as streets (see ahead). Home is therefore coded as the

‘proper’ space for certain kinds of private, intimate be havior, including sex acts (often tellingly euphemized as ‘making love’). In the legislation of sexual practice, for example, sex which takes place in the home is often af forded greater protection than sex which takes place elsewhere, whether in a commercial sex venue or in public space. But this idea of what counts as private – and what counts as sex – is also overwritten by hetero normativity, for example, in the legal deﬁnition of ‘priv acy’ meaning that there can be no more than two people present when a private sex act is being engaged in, even in the home. None of this is to say that other ways of living are not accommodated under the idea of home, nor that other life courses are impossible. It is rather to re member the many ways that the idea of home is powerfully coded, closely bound to the idea of family, and to reiterate that home and family are arguably the most concentrated spaces of heteronormativity. Work Space Geographies of work have explored how issues of identity – whether individual or collective – relate to experiences of and paths to and through paid employment. Work is seen as an important site of identity formation, but also as a key institution through which norms are produced and reinforced, for example, in relation to gender identities and ideas about ‘men’s work’ and ‘women’s work’, or in terms of class identities and occupational hierarchies. Workplaces are also sites of heteronormativity, whether through practices of discrimination, hostile workplace cultures, or sexualized assumptions about appropriately gendered work roles (which presume that, for instance, any man entering what is coded as a ‘female’ occupation must be homosexual, given the matrixial equating of male effeminacy and male homosexuality). One key and often reported response to the hetero normativity of workplaces is nondisclosure of non normative sexual identities, sometimes referred to as ‘closeting’. Work functions as a ‘closet space’, to use Michael Brown’s term, for those workers unwilling or unable to disclose non normative identities, practices, or desires, who choose (or are forced) to maintain a silence around their sexuality. Given the implicit and explicit heterosexualizing of many workplaces – heterosexualiz ing endlessly produced and reinforced through formal and informal practices, ranging from sexualized banter between co workers to the display of photos of partners and children at work stations – closeting is for many workers an unavoidable strategy, in spite of anti homophobic legislation in many countries. Stereotypical and commonly held views about ‘male’ and ‘female’ occupational sectors also reproduce work as a space of heteronormativity, such that male ﬂorists are coded as gay while women plumbers are coded as lesbian – codings

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which affect individual career choices, among other things. (Debates in recent years about ‘gays in the mili tary’ provided a particularly vivid example of this.) The relationship between the gendering of work and hetero normativity also plays out through workplace policies around maternity and paternity leave, through dress codes, and through work based socializing, all reminding us of the bleeding between home family space and work space.

Social Space As noted, some contexts for socializing, such as those revolving around work relationships, or indeed family relationships, may import work based or home based heteronormativity into social space: a drink after work with colleagues is ambivalently at once work and not work, and so may not afford ‘de closeting’ possibilities. Yet the possibility of separating work life and family life from social life might also mean that social spaces offer opportunities to act differently. Certainly, in the more recent history of gay cultures in the West, social spaces have been seen to provide certain kinds of opportunity to escape from prevailing ‘heteronorms’ – the development of bars, discos, clubs, commercial sex venues, and so on provides plentiful evidence of the potential for com mercial social spaces as spaces apart from hetero normativity. Of course, there are costs to producing this space apart: not just the entry costs of commercial spaces, but the cost of bracketing off such spaces from all other spaces. The production of ‘gay space’, to use the most accessible example, does little to challenge the status of everywhere else as ‘straight space’. Yet using spending power to assert the right to claim space has been a very signiﬁcant strategy – though not an uncontested one – used by ‘non normative’ sexual cultures excluded from other kinds of space. In capitalist societies, this possibility of ‘buying space to be different’ has been manifest in the development of ‘gay villages’, notably in larger metro politan centers. But, as already noted, bounding one part of the city as ‘gay space’ has ambivalent effects. No city feels the need to designate a ‘straight village’, since everywhere outside the bounded gay space is unreﬂexively coded as heterosexualized. Social space is therefore heavily het eronormative, perhaps especially since social space ac knowledges and accommodates ‘sexual difference’. Selling social space to non normative sexual cultures represents a strategy of containment, too – the remaining space can be safely assumed to be straight, since all the gays are in their village together. And it also commodiﬁes ‘gayness’ as a spectacle of multiculturalism, something to be displayed as a sign of the tolerant climate of a place. Tolerance is of course a key tactic of heteronormativity, because

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tolerance reinstates a hierarchy of difference: ‘we’ (the normal) tolerate ‘you’ (the abnormal). Social space extends beyond bars and clubs, of course, to encompass a whole range of sites of leisure and recreation. The list is potentially endless: sports venues, holiday destinations, performance venues (cinemas, theatres, concert halls), consumption spaces of all kinds. Most of these involve a monetary transaction, and here is a key issue: consumer capitalism is also hetero normative, based on (even exploiting) the heterosexual matrix. While much has been made about the ‘pink economy’ – about how the spending power of gay men has made them a key target market for lifestyle com modities – the volume of discussion around this phe nomenon reminds us of a much louder silence: that myriad routine consumption practices reinforce the heterosexual couple/family as the norm. The weekly ‘family shop’ to the supermarket, piling the trolley with ‘family packs’ of goods, is a good illustration of this. Public Space Of course, a social space like a gay village is not made up of just bars and clubs; it also includes the public spaces around those venues – the streets, alleyways, car parks, taxi ranks, etc. Public space has come under increasing scrutiny from geographers concerned with its perceived privatization by commercial interests. At the same time, there has been considerable interest in exploring what goes on in public spaces – how members of the ‘public’ interact there. In histories and geographies of non nor mative sexual cultures, this focus on public space has been echoed, for example, in discussions of the use of streets, parks, and other public spaces as sites of inter personal intimacy, as in the (mainly) gay practice known as ‘cruising’. Accounts of the generative role of cruising in the formation of gay culture emphasize that, in the telling words of historian George Chauncey, privacy could only be had in public, given the heteronormativity of nominally ‘private’ spaces such as the home. Of course, public space is heavily regulated, and also subject to the informal social ‘policing’ that permits some acts while prohibiting others. A key concern in this regard is the possibility of displaying affection or attraction in public. Taken for granted actions like holding hands or kissing have therefore taken on political meanings for non normative sexual cultures excluded from their rou tine practice in public space. Queer activist groups in the 1990s, for example, staged ‘kiss ins’ to bring attention to the iniquities around a seemingly mundane act. Not feeling able to engage in public displays of affection due to the pressures of heteronormativity, therefore, marks public space as another potential closet space. But public space is also political space, the site for protest, hence the kiss ins. Since the birth of the modern

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gay rights movements in the 1960s, heavy stress has been placed on claiming the right to occupy public space and to resist heteronormativity there. The development of Pride marches or Mardi Gras parades in many countries is the most visible and longstanding manifestation of the politicized use of public space, with the idea of ‘pride’ itself serving to challenge the supposed ‘shame’ of non normative sexuality. Again, of course, there are tensions here, as public space is routinely, mundanely heterosexualized, a fact arguably reinforced rather than undermined by any challenges. Nevertheless, this pol iticized use of public space remains a central tactic in antiheteronormative struggles. Nation Space The nation is embedded in and productive of hetero normativity in many ways, not least since family and nation are ideologically wedded, with the family the bedrock of the nation and the nation imagined as one big (happy) family. So, for example, defense of so called ‘family values’ is a key project of governments of all political orientations, since they could hardly stand as antifamily; while the state maintains a regulative role in issues around reproduction, such as assisted conception or parenting roles and responsibilities. At the national scale, too, the footloose cosmopolite can be labeled as potentially traitorous, or morally suspect, for their failure to express ﬁdelity to nationhood – such ‘promiscuity’ has, in times of geopolitical tension, been ideologically con nected to sexual impropriety, for example, during the Cold War. National citizenship – with its bundle of rights and responsibilities – is also a key site of heteronormativity, as debates over the right of non heterosexuals to join the armed forces illustrate. Homo sexuality is here coded as a threat to national defense, just as the cosmopolite’s lack of national(ist) allegiance equaled a threat to national security. Lastly, the rela tionship between the national and the international scale can also bring to light the heteronormativity of nation space, as seen in the contest between European states and the European Union over the legal recognition of LGBT rights.

Challenging Heteronormativity The discussion of public space earlier raises a bigger issue, therefore: the issue of how to ‘challenge’ hetero normativity. Once the reality of heteronorms is ac knowledged and made visible, how best can those who dis identify with those norms effect social and political change? One key strategy is to make claims for equal rights – this has been, in fact, a popular and effective

platform for challenging the inequalities that hetero normativity promotes. Arguably the most notable rights claim at the present moment surrounds the contentious issue of marriage. In a number of countries around the world, mostly those where marriage has long been constructed as the romantic, reproductive union of two opposite sexed adult subjects and also as the only le gitimate mode of adult living, the issue of ‘gay marriage’ has become a hot political topic, and in some countries variations of civil partnership (a ‘marriage like’ con tract) have been legalized. While there have been vo ciferous protests to this, from groups representing some organized religions for instance, civil partnerships are becoming recognized, bringing state deﬁned beneﬁts and also, in some cases at least, a degree of recognition for same sex relationships. However, critics argue that civil partnerships reinforce heteronormativity by granting same sex couples some of the same rights as opposite sex couples, on condition that they live in the same couple formats. This leaves no room for alternative forms of intimate relationship, effectively reinstating marriage as the only legitimate bonding (even while actually denying marriage per se, granting only something that is ‘marriage like’). The discourse of ‘families of choice’, used by some LGBT groups, simi larly maintains the centrality of the idea of family, even as it attempts to rewrite kinship away from biological and afﬁnal lines. The harmonizing of normative and non normative relationship forms in this way has been discussed by critics in terms of promoting a new ‘homonormativity’ that replicates and therefore reproduces heteronormativity. (Of course, this leaves unquestioned any other non normative sexualities and relationship forms, such as nondyadic relationships, bisexuality, etc.) Pitched against this new homonormativity are various forms of ‘queer’ sexual cultures, where queer is used to signal opposition to norms and normalizing. Rejection of heteronormativity is performed by queer subjects and groups through, among other things, political tactics which disrupt the ‘naturalness’ of heterosexuality, for example, by parodying it (as in forms of cross dressing). Critics of queer theory and politics argue that its sup posed transgressive quality is often little more than empty posing or postmodern posturing, yet there is a rich vein of work exploring how tactics like parody can be utilized in heteronormative spaces as a political provo cation, and this provocation has been widely used by activists to bring to visibility the many ways that het eronormativity does violence to non normative subjects. Whether such performances represent ‘better progress’ in sexual politics than achieving civil partnership rights is certainly a contentious question. To end, one more key site of heteronormativity is considered: the discipline of geography itself.

Heteronormativity

The Heteronormativity of Geography Heteronormativity also frames knowledge, shaping the questions that get asked and the ideas that are taken seriously. As such, it is produced and reproduced by academics who, in their role as ‘experts’, have (more or less) unchallenged authority to think and talk intel lectually about the world around them. But academics are not insulated from that world, and their cultures are also part of the broader cultures of which they ﬁnd themselves a part. The same assumptions and norms shape the production of academic knowledge – even as academia is sometimes a key site from which challenges to norms are mounted (the development of queer theory, for instance). But such challenges are often marginal to the mainstream operations of academic disciplines, op erations performed in the classroom and the common room, in the pages of text books and in conference pre sentations – and let us not forget that academia is a workplace, too, so the comments made earlier about heternormativity at work apply here. Geography as a discipline, a site of knowledge pro duction and dissemination, has wittingly and unwittingly perpetuated heteronormative knowledges, despite intel lectual challenges from, among others, feminist and queer geographers. Taken for granted assumptions about the family, for example, or about gender roles and relations, have been resoundingly critiqued in some circles, but persist in more recalcitrant parts of the discipline. As noted earlier, for example, the tag ‘geographies of sexu ality’ has, until comparatively recently, been seen to in dicate studies of non normative sexualities (mainly gay and lesbian). Leaving heterosexuality unmarked, un researched, is a clear representation of the weight of heteronormativity in the discipline: heterosexuality simply isn’t legible as sexuality. Recent work with a ‘critical heterosexuality studies’ angle is beginning to redress this – a good example is work by Mary Thomas on how teenage girls perform straight identities and spaces – but that work has yet to ﬁlter through to the heartland of geography. Working harder to expose and

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counter the heteronormativity of geography is a chal lenge that still lies ahead. See also: Feminism/Feminist Geography; Gay Geographies; Gender, Historical Geographies of; Lesbian Geographies; Patriarchy; Queer Theory/Queer Geographies.

Further Reading Ahmed, S. (2004). The cultural politics of emotion. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Bell, D., Binnie, J., Cream, J. and Valentine, G. (1994). All hyped up and no place to go. Gender, Place and Culture 1, 31 47. Binnie, J. (1997). Coming out of geography: Notes towards a queer epistemology. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 15, 223 238. Binnie, J. and Valentine, G. (1999). Geographies of sexuality A review of progress. Progress in Human Geography 23, 175 187. Brown, M. (2000). Closet space. London: Routledge. Chauncey, G. (1996). Privacy could only be had in public: Gay uses of the streets. In Sanders, J. (ed.) Stud: Architectures of masculinity, pp 224 267. New York: Princeton Architectural Press. Cowen, D. (2004). From the American lebensraum to the American living room: Class, sexuality, and the scaled production of ‘domestic’ intimacy. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 22, 755 771. Kitchin, R. and Lysaght, K. (2003). Heterosexism and the geographies of everyday life in Belfast, Northern Ireland. Environment and Planning A 35, 489 510. Richardson, D. (1996). Heterosexuality and social theory. In Richardson, D. (ed.) Theorising heterosexuality, pp 1 20. Buckingham: Open University Press. Valentine, G. (1996). (Re)negotiating the ‘heterosexual street’: Lesbian productions of space. In Duncan, N. (ed.) Body/space: Destabilizing geographies of gender and sexuality, pp 146 155. London: Routledge. Warner, M. (1991). Introduction: Fear of a queer planet. Social Text 9, 3 17. Warner, M. (1999). The trouble with normal: Sex, politics, and the ethics of queer life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Relevant Websites http://www.leeds.ac.uk/gender studies/index.htm Centre for Interdisciplinary Gender Studies. http://www.uky.edu/StudentOrgs/QueerInfo/qstudy.htm Resources and links for queer studies. http://www.queertheory.com Resources and links on queer theory.

Hettner, A. M. Hoyler, Loughborough University, Loughborough, UK & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Geographische Zeitschrift Leading German geography journal founded in 1895 by Alfred Hettner, who, as its sole editor for 40 years, exerted considerable inﬂuence on the development of the discipline through his editorial policy. La¨nderkunde German term for regional geography.

Hettner, Alfred (1859–1941) Alfred Hettner was born in Dresden on 6 August 1859 to Hermann Hettner, art and literary historian and his second wife, Anna Grahl, daughter of a Dresden art dealer (Figure 1). As one of ten children Hettner grew up in an economically and intellectually privileged middle class environment. He attended the

Figure 1 Alfred Hettner. Source: Department of Geography, University of Heidelburg.

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Vitzthumsche Gymnasium in Dresden between 1868 and 1877, a private grammar school for the Protestant no bility and wealthy middle classes that provided him with a classical education rooted in humanist values. His early geographical education was primarily topographical and rather uninspiring, but Hettner soon developed an en thusiasm for geography and exploration through an en gagement with travel writings, the attendance of scholarly lectures, and a ﬁeld trip to the Ore Mountains. He took up the study of geography at the University of Halle in 1877 under Alfred Kirchhoff but left a year later to continue his studies in Bonn, disappointed by the focus on teacher training rather than research that he had ex perienced in Halle. After a year in Bonn, Hettner moved to the University of Strassburg in 1879 to study under the leading geographer Georg Gerland. Hettner gained his doctorate in Strassburg in 1881 with a thesis on the cli mate of Chile and West Patagonia and returned to Bonn in the same year to work with Ferdinand von Richthofen, the eminent geomorphologist and expert on China. However, when offered the opportunity to work as a private tutor in Colombia after his father’s death in 1882, the young Hettner embarked on the ﬁrst of two major journeys through South America. Between 1882 and 1884, Hettner extensively studied the morphology of the Cordilleras of Bogota´, before returning to Leipzig, the new workplace of von Richthofen. Rather than de veloping the material he had collected in Colombia for his habilitation thesis, Hettner undertook a detailed study of the geomorphology of Saxon Switzerland, which he completed in 1887 under the supervision of Friedrich Ratzel A second journey to South America, from 1888 to 1890, was again devoted primarily to geomorphological observations, but Hettner’s encounter with the varied landscapes of South America, and his engagement with Alexander von Humboldt’s writings, led him to increas ingly focus his research on the methodological foun dation of the discipline, an early interest since his student days. Hettner resumed his teaching position at Leipzig on his return and was made associate professor in 1894. Only a year later, he became the founding editor of the new journal Geographische Zeitschrift, which he was to steer as sole editor for the next 40 years, a role that gave Hettner considerable inﬂuence over the development of the subject in Germany. His career took off quickly from then on; in 1897 Hettner accepted a position as associate professor in Tu¨bingen before ﬁnally moving to the University of Heidelberg in 1899 as its ﬁrst professor of

Hettner, A.

geography, initially as associate and from 1906 as full professor. From early on in his career, Hettner showed a keen interest in the methodological foundation of geography. He was taught by a generation of scholars who had come to geography from a variety of disciplines when the subject became institutionalized at German uni versities during the 1870s, and who lacked a uniﬁed methodological and theoretical approach. Hettner was critical of the prevalent notion of geography as general earth science that had emerged in response to Carl Ritter’s earlier historical and teleological perspective. In order to move beyond the fragmentation of the general earth science approach and with the intention to de velop a credible scientiﬁc identity for the subject, Hettner argued for a chorological foundation of geog raphy and placed regional synthesis at the heart of a uniﬁed methodological framework. He distinguished between comparative regional geography (Vergleichende La¨nderkunde), the study of individual geographical fac tors across the globe, and regional geography (La¨nd erkunde), the study of the interplay of various geographical factors in a given location. Central to his conceptualization of geography as chorology was the analysis of regional differences at various scales. For Hettner, regions were analytical constructs produced by the geographer rather than pregiven real world entities. By turning geography into a science of regions, Hettner aimed to retain the unity of the subject in terms of its physical and human aspects through the identiﬁcation of a common epistemological core. Hettner attempted to apply his ideas in two major research initiatives during the 1890s, a 50 volume handbook of regional geography, and a global population map, both of which failed to generate sufﬁcient support. From the early 1900s, he focused on his methodological writings (summarized in Die Geographie, ihre Geschichte, ihr Wesen und ihre Methoden, 1927) and on the production of a series of popular textbooks, all of which appeared in several editions (e.g., Das europa¨ische RuXland, 1905; Eng lands Weltherrschaft und der Krieg, 1915; Grundzu¨ge der La¨nderkunde, Vol. 1 Europa, 1907; Vol. 2 Die auXereuropa¨ischen Erdteile, 1924). In this context, Hettner’s system of geog raphy, including his use of the established la¨nderkundliche Schema (a template for the sequential presentation of geographical information that proceeded from the physical environment to aspects of human geography) has to be understood as a means for organizing geo graphical knowledge rather than a framework for em pirical research.

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Hettner’s universalistic approach to geography led him into a series of controversies with those who did not subscribe to his vision of the discipline, notably with Otto Schlu¨ter, who rejected Hettner’s all encompassing chorological geography and instead placed the visible landscape at the center of geographical research in his landscape morphology. Similarly, Hettner bitterly op posed the deductive reasoning of William Morris Davis’ cycle of erosion model (arguments collated in Die Ober ﬂa¨chenformen des Festlandes, ihre Untersuchung und Dar stellung, 1921). Hettner’s ideas were increasingly challenged in his later years, especially by proponents of a holistic landscape concept that gained inﬂuence in the 1920s and 1930s. He was forced into a defensive position and became intellectually isolated after the takeover of power by the National Socialist (Nazi) party. After his retirement in 1928, Hettner’s long planned comparative regional geography was ﬁnally published in four volumes in the early 1930s (Vergleichende La¨nderkunde, 1933–35), but he failed to complete his general human geography (published posthumously). Alfred Hettner died in Heidelberg on 31 August 1941. Both in Germany and internationally, Hettner’s work continued to be discussed and adapted (most notably by Richard Hartshorne in the US) but a serious historio graphical evaluation of his ideas only started in the 1980s. In 1997 the University of Heidelberg established an an nual international lecture series in his memory. See also: Anthropogeography (After Ratzel); GermanLanguage Geography; Hartshorne, R.; Regional Geography I; Regional Geography II; Ritter, C.

Further Reading Harvey, F. and Wardenga, U. (2006). Richard Hartshorne’s adaptation of Alfred Hettner’s system of geography. Journal of Historical Geography 32, 422 440. Livingstone, D. N. (1992). The geographical tradition: Episodes in the history of a contested enterprise. Oxford: Blackwell. Plewe, E. (1982). Alfred Hettner 1859 1941. Geographers: Biobibliographical Studies 6, 55 63. Wardenga, U. (1995). Geographie als Chorologie. Zur Genese und Struktur von Alfred Hettners Konstrukt der Geographie. Stuttgart: Steiner. Wardenga, U. (2000). Deﬁning geography The structure and development of Alfred Hettner’s methodological construct. In Watts, M. Struggles over geography: Violence, freedom and development at the millennium (Hettner Lectures, 3), pp 113 126 Heidelberg: Department of Geography, University of Heidelberg. Wardenga, U. (2005). Die Erde im Buch: Geographische Landerkunde um 1900. In Schroder, I. & Hohler, S. (eds.) Welt Ra¨ume: Geschichte, Geographie und Globalisierung seit 1900, pp 120 144. Frankfurt: Campus.

High-Tech Industry Y. Zhou, Vassar College, New York, NY, USA & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Core Nations Typically indicates developed countries of Europe, North America, and Japan. Newly Industrialized Economies Typically refer to some countries in East and Southeast Asia, and Latin America that experienced rapid economic growth in the last 20 years. Peripheral Nations Indicate less-developed countries in the periphery of the global economy, such as some countries in Africa, Central America, and Central and South Asia. Post-Fordism The term refers to the industrial landscape constituted by mostly vertically disintegrated corporations with company headquarters, marketing, and research and development functions located in the core countries and subcontracting production functions in semiperipheral or peripheral countries. Semiperipheral Nations Indicate newly industrialized countries such as some countries in East and Southeast Asia, and Latin America.

The high tech industry has become an area of intensive geographical inquiry since the late 1970s. There is no clear academic consensus on what constitutes the high tech industry. However, the conventional deﬁnition in cludes those sectors that are spurred by new innovation or enabled by highly complex and rapidly changing technology. The most commonly studied high tech sec tors are information technology, telecommunications, biotechnology, the medical and pharmaceutical indus tries, aerospace, and digital media Table 1. These in dustries are viewed as different from traditional resource dependent industries such as oil, or long standing manufacturing industries like automobile production. Contrast is also drawn with low tech industries like textile manufacturing, which depend on an ample supply of unskilled labor. Differentiation can be rather am biguous, however, given that traditional or low tech in dustries are also affected by technological changes. Certain segments of these industries may show dynamism similar to high tech sectors, for instance, the changes driven by new materials in the textile industry and the use of complex electronic equipment in traditional manufacturing. Long standing industries such as auto manufacturing, while not seen as the technological frontier in developed countries, are considered high tech industries in developing countries. Generally speaking,

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high tech sectors are distinguished by their reliance on a highly skilled professional workforce and a strong em phasis on research and development (R&D) as the central element of corporate competitiveness. In the industrial ized countries, high tech industries are among the main sources of economic growth. They also are the primary sponsors of, or ﬁelds for, technological innovation.

Background: Impetuses of Geographical Research into the High-Tech Industry Information technology and biotechnology have only started to attract academic attention since the late 1970s, so the interest in the high tech industry as a distinct analytical category is relatively recent in economic geography. The surge of interest is closely linked to the economic restructuring process in industrialized coun tries characterized by the global diffusion of manu facturing activities and corporate restructuring toward a post Fordist production regime. It also reﬂects the dis cipline wide search for new theories of ﬁrm location, spatial organization, and regional development in the context of globalization.

Table 1 SIC

High-tech industrial sectors

Industry deﬁnition

High-tech manufacturing industries 283 Drugs 357 Computer and ofﬁce equipment 366 Communications equipment 367 Electronic components and accessories 372 Aircraft and parts 376 Guided missiles, space vehicles, and parts 381 Search, detection, navigation, guidance, aeronautical nautical systems, instruments, and equipment 382 Laboratory apparatus and analytical, optical, measuring, and controlling instruments 384 Surgical, medical, and dental instruments and supplies High-tech service industries 481 Telephone communications services 737 Computer programming, data processing, and other computer-related services 781 Motion picture production and allied services 871 Engineering, architectural, and surveying services 873 Research, development, and testing services Source: DeVol, R.C. (1999). America’s high tech economy: Growth, development, and risks for metropolitan areas. Miken Institute Report, 13 July 1999, http://www.milkeninstitute.org/publications/ publications.taf?function ¼ detail&ID ¼ 15&cat ¼ ResRep (accessed on Nov 2007).

High-Tech Industry

Starting in the 1960s, labor intensive manufacturing sectors such as textile and low end electronics pro duction have gradually relocated from industrialized nations to developing nations in Southeast Asia and Latin America. This global shift of the manufacturing core away from Western Europe and North America has progessively intensiﬁed and has spread to many sectors in manufacturing and services. The resultant de indus trialization of North America, Europe, and (to a lesser degree) Japan has generated mounting problems in these regions. They include unemployment, wage depression, and the contraction of public services due to a long term decline in manufacturing job opportunities and tax rev enues in once booming industrial regions. In the mean time, however, rapid and occasionally explosive job growth and business activity have been found in services and high tech industries that depend on market prox imity and highly skilled workforces. A Miken Institute report published in 1999 found that after the recession in 1990–91, the growth in high tech sectors in the United States was four times as large as the aggregated economy. A thriving high tech industry is thus viewed as crucial for the continued prosperity and economic competitiveness of industrialized nations. Inﬂuential theories of globalization have also provided theoretical support for this particular pattern of late capitalism industrialization. New International Division of Labor theory, for example, conceptualizes the global economy as a two tiered system. The global core, re ferring mostly to industrialized nations, is the source of advanced technology, organizational leadership, and the main consumer markets. In contrast, peripheral and semiperipheral nations, referring mostly to developing nations, participate by providing low cost human re sources (in the form of both skilled and unskilled labor) in a system that is designed to beneﬁt the core nations disproportionately. Other inﬂuential theories, including the world system theory of Immanuel Wallerstein and the product cycle theory of Vernon, also predict the continued specialization of high tech industries in de veloped regions. Concurrent with the global shift of manufacturing industries is the corporate reorganization in advanced nations, made possible in part by technological progress. Since the 1960s, the world has seen an amazing string of advances in microelectronics, digital telecommunication, robotics, biotechnology, and others. This new technology has spurred the rise of new industries like the information technology (IT) industry. It has also transformed many existing industries through the adoption of new technol ogies, and has helped to reinvent organizational and production protocols of corporations in diverse sectors. The use of the Internet, for example, has touched upon almost every manufacturing and service sector. While new information and communication technologies have

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facilitated the spatial dispersion of corporate functions, they also have created new possibilities for convergence and concentration. In particular, some scholars argue that the Fordist model of production, characterized by ver tically integrated companies, mass production, and de skilled labor, has evolved into a post Fordist regime of production with vertically disintegrated companies, small batch production, ﬂexible specialization, programmable technology, and variable labor. Doubts have been raised, however, about how recent and prevailing these transi tions are. Pollert has argued that mass production has long coexisted with ﬂexible production and will continue to do so. Despite this argument, the prevailing wisdom in both the academic and business worlds seems to be that in dustrial organization in advanced economies is changing or will have to change in order to remain competitive within the global economy. Companies in the post Fordist era are striving for a lean model that emphasizes focused core competency and out sources associated activities to related companies or abroad. As a result of corporate restructuring, the economic activities remaining in de veloped nations are increasingly concentrated in and around high value added sectors such as R&D and mar keting, as well as services that require substantial know ledge accumulation, long professional training, intimate connections to the market, and/or emphasis in innovation. Post Fordist evolution can be found in both high and low tech industries. Labor intensive sectors such as the garment industry, have displayed some of the key char acteristics of the post Fordist process such as detailed division of labor, intense interﬁrm networks, and a ﬂex ible labor force from the very beginning. The automobile industry, the archetype of mass production under Fordism, also adopted the just in time system that is cha racteristic of post Fordist organization. However, it is the high tech industries that best exemplify the post Fordist regime of production, by combining rapid technological changes with a professional labor force, extensive R&D, and ﬂexible organization. Given both the global eco nomic shift and the rise of post Fordist production, it is not surprising that the high tech industry has received considerable academic attention. Beyond societal dynamics, another impetus for high tech industry studies in geography is the disciplinary search for contemporary theories of industrial location and regional development. In economic geography, the 1960s was the period of ‘quantitative revolution’. Con siderable studies were performed to apply or test quan titative models such as Weber’s theory of industrial location and the Central Place Theory for retail centers. Most of the classic location theories, however, rely on transportation cost as the key variable in the analysis of geographical decisions. As the transportation cost de clines precipitously with new technology, and with global diffusion of the manufacturing and service industries

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accelerating, it is clear that geography needs to search for a different set of variables to explain the location choices of enterprises. The development of high tech industry, with its emphasis on human resources and R&D, proved to be a rich empirical ground on which to search for strategies and rationales for location choices that were unaccounted for in the classic transportation based the ories. The analysis of spatial patterns of high tech in dustry therefore became a springboard for new ideas and theories in economic geography under a post Fordist industrial landscape. Initially, interests in high tech industry were mainly conﬁned to the developed world. Since the 1980s, how ever, the high tech fever has spread to developing coun tries, especially in newly industrialized economies (NIEs). This is in part because some of the most successful NIEs such as South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan have made signiﬁcant advances in industrial and technological sectors and are now prominent players in the high tech indus tries. Their experiences have become textbook cases of how technological upgrade occurs in developing contexts. The NIEs also serve as inspirations for less developed nations to explore technology related paths of economic expansion. Large developing nations such as India, China, and Brazil have vast human resources and a large do mestic market, and have long aspired to achieve techno logical independence from the Western nations. Since the 1990s, India has become a prominent player in computer software and tech services exporting to developed na tions. China has experienced rapid economic develop ment since the 1980s and is currently ranked as one of the world’s largest high tech producers and markets. And Brazil has long had some of the most technologically sophisticated manufacturing industries in the developing world, such as automobile manufacturing and aerospace. Many in developing nations believe that although they may have little chance to catch up with the West in tra ditional industries where the West is dominant, the newer high tech industries may offer opportunities to make major leaps in technology and gain a more level playing ﬁeld with developed nations. Regardless of whether this belief is true, developing nations are investing increas ingly in high tech areas. As a result, although most con temporary research in high tech industry concentrates on North America, Western Europe, and/or Japan, NIEs such as Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, India, and China also provide a growing body of empirical cases.

Locations and Spatial Patterns of HighTech Industry With the rise of the information and telecommunication industry, there have been popular claims that geography will become increasingly irrelevant. However, this has

not proven to be the case. On the contrary, it has become clear to geographers, economists, and business observers that both ‘centripetal’ and ‘centrifugal’ forces are oper ating simultaneously in high tech industries, leading not only to a general diffusion at the global level, but also concentrations at the regional level. Certain regions, such as Silicon Valley in California, have become more prominent nodes of R&D and innovation in the world economy, even though globally, more regions have par ticipated in the high tech industries. Traditional location theories are too static and restrictive to explain such patterns. Thus, new approaches have been developed regarding the spatial distribution of high tech industries. The ﬁrst approach emphasizes the presence of human resources: given that high tech industry requires a pro fessional labor force, it can be expected that regions with good universities, corporate R&D centers, or features attractive to a highly skilled workforce would be favored locations for high tech industry. Kotkin, for example, argues that the thriving cities of today are no longer sites of traditional manufacturing activities or corporate headquarters, but are magnets for intelligence and talents. Geographical studies have documented that high tech centers tend to be close to large metropolitan areas that have both higher educational opportunities and urban amenities. Florida used the ‘Bohemian Index’ to measure urban creativity and found a strong positive correlation between the concentration of high tech in dustry and the bohemian population. Florida reasons that the bohemian concentration signals an environment open to innovation and creativity, and is thus attractive to high tech industry as a location choice. While these studies have highlighted some important rationales for high tech concentrations, their explanatory power and capacity for prediction are limited. It is true that successful technology centers typically have uni versities nearby, such as Stanford in Silicon Valley and Harvard and MIT in Boston. It is not true, however, that places with excellent universities will naturally become technological centers. Large and creative metropolitan areas do attract high tech industry. However, each lo cation seems to attract different sets of high tech industry. In short, the presence of human resources is necessary for high tech industry but does not offer sufﬁcient causal explanation for the spatial patterns of such industries. Other geographical processes must be taken into account. The second approach links high tech development with the clustering effect of industrial sectors. The lit erature has moved beyond looking at the presence of major factors such as human resources, universities, and corporate R&D facilities to appreciating the unique re gional institutional environments that foster the social, cultural, and organizational synergy underlying sustained technological dynamism. Proliﬁc literature can be found in this area, ranging from economic analysis by Krugman,

High-Tech Industry

transaction cost theory by Scott, regional innovation system by Brazyk, to the innovative milieu theory by the Groupe de Recherche Europeen sur les Milieux Inno vateurs (GREMI) group. Overall, this approach em phasizes the role of highly developed interorganizational linkages, as well as the social values and institutions that facilitate the proliferation of such linkages. Exemplary scholarship in this area includes the new industrial space thesis, originally proposed by Allen J. Scott, who regards networks of ‘‘extremely malleable external linkages and labor market relations’’ as an efﬁcient organizational structure that reduces transaction costs; Saxenian’s comparative study of regional network based industrial systems in Silicon Valley versus vertically integrated corporations along Route 128 in Boston suggests that the decentralized interﬁrm networks of Silicon Valley pro vide a superior form of organization for sustaining in novation. Castells and Hall stress the importance of networks and synergy between government, R&D insti tutions, and enterprises to the success of technopoles: metropolitan areas with successful high tech sectors. Studies of knowledge based economies also stress the role of tacit knowledge in innovation. Tacit knowledge is the knowledge that cannot be easily codiﬁed and it is transmitted by training, or personal communication and experience. Given that communication of tacit know ledge depends to a great extent on the local context and intensity of interactions, innovation is likely to occur only in selected regions. Storper succinctly states that inte grated territorial economies should be redeﬁned as ‘‘stocks of relational assets.’’ It is these ‘relational assets’ that form the institutional base for regional success. In short, this second approach argues not only that high tech industries and innovation have a tendency to create spatial clusters, but also that spatial concentration may promote synergy and technological dynamism. Some writers of the above approach depend heavily on analysis of ﬁrm and market activities, giving limited weight to public policy decisions. In contrast, the third approach toward explaining growth patterns of high tech industry stresses the role of government. This approach focuses on the development of science parks, or tech nopoles, and examines how public policies and state investment may trigger or induce high tech development. Ann Markusen, for example, emphasizes the roles of defense industry in creating high tech regions in the United States. Other studies focus on regions successfully combine universities and private ventures to provide magnets for growth within large regions. Considerable studies have been done on technopoles around the world; these studies have shown that public policy can indeed play a role in planting the seeds of high tech growth. However, they also have made it clear that public sector involvement does not always lead to the creation of successful high tech clusters.

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High-Tech Industry and Regional Development Rapid growth, high salaries, and the tendency toward clustering make high tech industry sought after sectors for anchoring regional development. This attraction holds for both developed and developing nations. Global efforts to clone California’s Silicon Valley have been seen in many different settings: Silicon Alley in New York City, Silicon Glen in Scotland, Hsinchu in Taiwan, Zhongguancun in China, Bangalore in India, etc. In all of these places, governments provide various incentives for high tech development both to attract existing high tech ﬁrms and to cultivate new ones. These measures can go far beyond providing infrastructure. Enterprising local governments have fought one another to create prefer ential policies such as land and tax deals, cash incentives to attract talents and companies locations, educational grants for local universities, targeted industrial policies, tariff reduction, environmental regulation exemptions, etc. in the hope of generating favorable conditions for high tech industry. Furious interregional competition no doubt sweetens the prospects for high tech companies, but it is not clear whether these policies can achieve the desired effect of leading the development of a larger region. In less favored regions in both developed and developing nations, attempts to attract high tech com panies often fail. Those that succeed have too often amounted to attracting low tech assembly operations that take advantage of low land and labor costs but generate little spillover effect in technological learning for other enterprises in the region. In some cases, regions also suffer negative environmental consequences as a result of industrial location. Moreover, it can be argued that by channeling public funds to private high tech companies, many of which are nonlocal, governments ignore or marginalize the capital needs of local enter prises. This is very common for the developing regions. Such neglect is unfortunate in that most successful high tech regions tend to be those that are anchored by locally grown companies. External companies can certainly contribute to local growth, but they can also move away once the temporary local beneﬁts were fully exploited or exhausted. While it is undeniable that, in selected cases, the development of high tech com panies by multinational corporations has provided role models for aspiring local ﬁrms and a fertile training ground for experienced managers and engineers, regions where this is the case tend to be those with already developed human resources and enterprising cultures that can beneﬁt more immediately from technological transfer by multinational corporations. Other regions that do not meet these preconditions may beneﬁt much less from, or even be negatively affected by, high tech industry.

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High-Tech Industry

High-Tech Industry and Internationalization of Intellectual Property Rights

Critique of Literature on High-Tech Industry

misleading. Many scholars argue that ﬂexible production systems and innovative milieu are too rare so far to have broad theoretical implications. More nuanced studies of high tech industry have also pointed out that spatial dynamics in high tech sectors can be rather diverse. Kenney and Patton, for example, found that the geog raphy of the biotechnology supporting network is far less spatially concentrated than the semiconductor industry and telecommunication equipment industry; thus the pattern of new biotechnology ﬁrms can be more dis persed than it is in other industries. In another example, high tech clusters are often thought to be more stable and sustainable than traditional industrial cities in that they have the ability to regenerate via innovation. However, recent evidence suggests that they are as vul nerable to the ﬂuctuation of the new economy as tradi tional industrial cities were to the ‘old economy’. In fact, high tech ﬁrms’ heavy reliance on venture capital may even exacerbate the ﬂuctuation. All of these studies suggest that careful examination of speciﬁc industries’ dynamics over a longer historical time span will be ne cessary to test many of the celebrated theories of high tech industry. In contrast to the proliﬁc literature on high tech in dustry in the developed world, empirical studies of high tech industry in developing nations are few and far be tween. Scholars have suggested that insights derived from industrialized nations can also be useful for understanding technological change in developing nations. However, in the developing world context, the role of external players is extremely important, so it is critical that such studies incorporate both regional and external players. Last but not least, discussion of high tech industry has largely been limited to the manufacturing sector, al though many of its components, such as the Internet and digital media, are increasingly deﬁned as a part of the service industry. Even within manufacturing, the activ ities that are the most prominent in developed nations tend to be in the areas of marketing, management, ﬁnance, and design; all of which have a strong service orientation. Miken Institute’s report explicitly deﬁned services as a part of high tech sectors. However, empir ical research targeting the service sectors is still rare, especially in comparison to manufacturing industries. Geographical research thus needs to explicitly bring the service sectors into the center of high tech studies, to enable us to have a more comprehensive theorization on how the development of technology and the changes of global economy are reshaping the new geography of high tech industries.

The high tech industry has emerged as a hotbed for empirical research and theory formation in geography since the 1970s. However, the tendency toward over generalization in high tech studies is common and can be

See also: Fordism; Global Production Networks; Industrial Location; Industrial Organization; Information Technology; Innovation; Knowledge Economy; Spatial Division of Labor; Technological Change; Technology and

In economics and economic geography, it is common for the data on patents and investment in R&D to be used to identify regions of innovation. However, the geographical literature has said little thus far on the relationship be tween high tech industry and intellectual property rights (IPR). In other disciplines, there has been extensive discussion of the implications of IPR and national com petitiveness of the high tech sector. Over the last 20 years, we have seen a proliferation of IPR and its in creasingly internationalized enforcement, represented for example, by the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement within the World Trade Organization (WTO) framework. The step up of enforcement of IPR globally has raised many social, economical, political, and ethical questions. On the one hand, IPR is designed and justiﬁed on the ground that protection of IPR will encourage innovation as know ledge creators respond to economic incentives. On the other hand, the sharp increase in IPR claims by large corporations in advanced nations can also be said to serve as a tool for technological monopoly and may hinder the global diffusion of knowledge and technology, particularly from developed to developing nations. Some scholars argue that the international IPR regime was promoted to beneﬁt established corporate giants in the advanced nations. In the areas of biotechnology and healthcare, prominent ethical questions have also been raised about the enforcement of IPR. In some cases, biotech companies in developed nations have patented strains of species found in developing nations. As a result, farmers in developing nations who raise these species traditionally have been required to pay IPR royalties to biotech companies in rich nations. In other cases, IPR has made treatments for global epidemics such as AIDS unaffordable in poor nations. Overall, the effect of the rather recent internationalized IPR regime is profound but not well understood. It seems likely that it reinforces the technology and knowledge dominance of advanced nations over the developing nations. A balance must be achieved that will provide incentives for innovation while also encouraging the diffusion of technology to beneﬁt the global population.

High-Tech Industry Regional Development; Transnationalism and Technological Transfer.

Further Reading Bell, M. and Albu, M. (1999). Knowledge systems and technological dynamism in industrial clusters in developing nations. World Development 27, 1715 1734. Benko, G. (2000). Technopoles, high tech industries and regional development: A critical review. GeoJournal 51, 157 167. Braczyk, H. J., Cooke, P. and Heidenreich, M. (eds.) (1998). Regional innovation systems. London: UCL Press. Cairncross, F. (1997). The death of distance. Boston: HBS Press. Castells, M. and Hall, P. (1994). Technopoles of the world: The making of 21 century industrial complexes. New York: Routledge. Cook, I. and Joseph, R. (2001). Rethinking Silicon Valley: New perspectives on regional development. Prometheus 19, 377 393. Corptech (2000). Corptech directory of technology companies (15th US edn). Woburn, MN: Corporate technology information services. Crevoisier, O. and Maillat, D. (1991). Milieu, industrial organization and territorial production system: Towards a new theory of spatial development. In Camagni, R. (ed.) Innovation networks: Spatial perspectives, pp 13 34. London: Belhaven Press. DeVol, R. C. (1999). America’s high tech economy: Growth, development and risks for metropolitan areas. Miken Institute Report, 13 July 1999, http://www.milkeninstitute.org/publications/ publications.taf?function ¼ detail&ID ¼ 15&cat ¼ ResRep (accessed on Nov 2007). Ernst, D. (2006). Innovation offshoring: Asia’s emerging role in global innovation networks. East West Center Special Reports 10. Feldman, M. (1994). The geography of innovation. Amsterdam: Kluwer. Florida, R. (2002). Bohemia and economic geography. Journal of Economic Geography 2, 55 69. Foray, D. and Lundvall, B. A. (1996). The knowledge based economy: From the economics of knowledge to the learning. In OECD (ed.) Employment and growth in the knowledge based economy, pp 11 32. Paris: OECD. Fromhold Eisebith, M. (2002). Regional cycles of learning: Foreign multinationals as agents of technological upgrading in less developed nations. Environment and Planning A 34, 2155 2173. Gittell, R. and Sohl, J. (2005). Technology centres during the economic downturn: What have we learned? Entrepreneurship and Regional Development 17(4), 293 312. Graham, S. (1998). The end of geography or the explosion of place? Conceptualizing space, place and information technology. Progress in Human Geography 22(2), 165 186. Harrison, B. (1994). Lean & mean: Why large corporations will continue to dominate the global economy. New York: The Guilford Press. Hart, J. A. and Kim, S. (2002). Explaining the resurgence of US competitiveness: The rise of Wintelism. The Information Society 18, 1 12. Henry, N. (1995). The new industrial spaces: Locational logic of a new production era? International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 16(3), 375 396. Kenney, M. and Patton, D. (2005). Entrepreneurial geographies: Support networks in three high technology industries. Economic Geography 81(2), 201 228. Knox, P. J. and McCarthy, L. (2003). The geography of the world economy. New York: Arnold. Koo, J. (2005). Knowledge based industry clusters: Evidenced by geographical patterns of patents in manufacturing. Urban Studies 42(9), 1487 1505. Kotkin, J. (2001). The new geography: How the digital revolution is reshaping the American landscape. New York: Random House.

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Krugman, P. (1991). Geography and trade. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Malmberg, A. (1997). Industrial geography: Location and learning. Progress in Human Geography 21, 573 582. Markusen, A., Hall, P., Campbell, S. and Deitrick, S. (1991). The rise of the gunbelt: The military remapping of industrial America. New York: Oxford University Press. Martin, P. (1996). The death of geography. Financial Times, 22 February. Morgan, K. (2004). The exaggerated death of geography: Learning, proximity and territorial innovation systems. Journal of Economic Geography 4(1), 3 21. Morgan, K. and Nauwelaers, C. (eds.) (1999). Regional innovation strategies: The challenge for less favoured regions. London: Routledge. Nonaka, I. and Takeuchi, H. (1995). The knowledge creating company. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pavitt, K. and Patel, P. (1991). Large ﬁrms in the production of the world’s technology: An important case of non globalisation. Journal of International Business Studies 22, 1 21. Piore, M. J. and Sabel, C. F. (1984). The second industrial divide: Possibility for prosperity. New York: Basic Books. Polanyi, M. (1966). The tacit dimension. London: Routledge. Pollert, A. (1999). Dismantling ﬂexibility. In Bryson, J., Henry, N., Keeble, D. & Martin, R. (eds.) The economic geography reader, pp 349 356. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Porter, M. (1998). Clusters and the new economics of competition. Harvard Business Review November December, 77 90. Preer, R. W. (1992). The emergence of technopoles. New York: Praeger. Rees, J. (1991). Regional development and policy. Progress in Human Geography 15, 576 588. Sayer, A. and Walker, R. (1992). The new social economy: Reworking the division of labor. Oxford: Blackwell. Schmitz, H. and Nadvi, K. (1999). Clustering and industrialization: Introduction. World Development 27(9), 1503 1514. Schoenberger, E. (1988). From Fordism to ﬂexible accumulation: Technology, competitive strategies, and international location. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 6, 245 262. Scott, A. J. (1988). New industrial spaces: Flexible production organization and regional development in North America and Western Europe. London: Pion. Shiva, V. (2000). Stolen harvest: The hijacking of the global food supply. Cambridge, MN: South end Press. Sternberg, R. (1996). Regional growth theories and high tech regions. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 20(3), 518 538. Teece, D. (1981). The market for know how and the efﬁcient international transfer of technology. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 458, 81 96. Thompson, C. (1989). High technology theories and public policy. Environment and Planning C 7, 121 152. Vernon, R. (1979). The product cycle hypothesis in a new international environment. Oxford Bulletin of Economic and Statistics 41, 255 268. Wallerstein, I. (1974). The rise and future demise of the world capitalist system: Concepts for comparative analysis. Comparative Studies in Society and History 16, 390 392; 399 406. Zhou, Y. (2005). The making of an innovative region from a centrally planned economy: Institutional evolution in Zhongguancun Science Park in Beijing. Environment and Planning A 37, 1113 1134. Zhou, Y. and Xin, T. (2003). Interaction between multinational corporations and domestic ﬁrms in a high tech service cluster in Beijing. Economic Geography 79(2), 129 152.

Hinterland Development J. Tima´r, Center for Regional Studies, Be´ke´scsaba, Hungary Z. Kova´cs, University of Szeged, Szeged, Hungary & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Exurb A loose zone lying beyond the suburbs and within the commuting zone of a metropolitan area. Exurbs are usually residential in character, presenting a diverse mixture of land uses. Gravity Model A mathematical model to predict ﬂows of people, commodity etc. The initial application of the model in human geography drew on the relationship formalized by Newton in his law of universal gravitation. Later the model was ﬁtted by regression methods or exponential model. It is widely used in planning, among others, for measuring the relative attractiveness of settlements as centers. Rural-Urban Fringe A zone of transition at the edge of a continuously built-up urban area. It is characterized by a changing mix of rural and urban land uses and often seen as a zone of potential social conﬂicts.

Deﬁnitions

The Origin of the Term

Hinterland is a German word, originally used in colonial law that constituted part of international public law in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to denote such areas over which the conquering country had already been exercising power, where, however, its own laws had not yet been enforced. Hinterland usually meant inland areas behind the coastal zones which were the ﬁrst to be conquered. The origin of the term is closely related to the fact that expeditions to discover remote continents set off from river estuaries; therefore, for a long time, it was used to refer to the areas, stretching from the occupied estuary to inland regions, to which the conquering country laid claim. For instance, Portugal, which, under international public law, possessed the estuary of the River Congo, laid claim to all the areas along the river even in the nine teenth century. Pursuant to the contemporary interpret ation of international public law, only where a state was, in effect, able to exercise its power (via public ofﬁces, the military, etc.) could we speak of colonial territories. In contrast, areas which are although not under state control but in the sphere of the conquerors’ inﬂuence were of ﬁcially considered to be hinterland. The term also reﬂects the fact that in the late ﬁfteenth century, that is, the era of discoveries, the exploration and conquest of continents, islands, or peninsulas were a gradual process, often with a place, for example, a port,

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taken into possession and serving as a starting point. Such ports were often hubs of colonial commerce: they were where ships arrived and set sail in the course of trading with the homeland. They were where the neighboring areas, strongly dependent on the home port, started to become settled. The term was later also used to refer to relationships between settlements, hinterland came to mean rural areas which surrounded and which were economically strongly dependent on larger cities/towns. The use of the German word hinterland gradually gained currency in non German speaking countries as well. In Northern Italy, for instance, as a relic of the Austro Hungarian Monarchy, the rural areas surrounding Milan are still referred to as hinterland. In Australia, it refers to regions a long way away from the coastal areas as opposed to the vast expanses of land inside the country (outback). In the English language literature on human geography, it means a tributary area of a port, where exports are collected and which is also the destination of imports. Hinterland is also used in a much broader sense, meaning the sphere of inﬂuence of any (mainly urban) settlement. Several synonyms of the word hinterland in this boarder sense exist in technical literature, for example, catchment area, exurb, urban–rural fringe, and peri urban zone. Hinterlands can be interpreted at several different scales and represent a wide variety of geo graphic places. In addition, they are also linked to dif ferent complementary areas. Generally referred to as foreland or heartland, these strategically, economically, or militarily vital complementary areas are central re gions, ports, metropolises cities, or small towns. It is no coincidence that adjectives, for example, rural, urban, or commuting, are often used to clarify (i.e., narrow) the meaning of hinterland.

Hinterlands in a Context of Sociospatial Relations The structural and functional characteristics of hinter lands are generally described in the context of socio spatial relations. The land use pattern, settlement structure, or the distribution of population of a city’s hinterland, each used frequently to characterize the pe culiarities of the hinterland, is deﬁned as different from that of the city. So much so that, for example, theories arguing for the cyclicity of urbanization differentiate between the individual phases of urbanization mostly on

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the basis of trends in the population change in the ring, delimited as a commuting hinterland in the functional urban region, relative to the population change in the core. The evaluation/perception in human geographical literature of the relationship between the city/town/ heartland and the hinterland, embodied in production, consumption, exchange, and communication, reﬂects a variety of social theoretical approaches. What follows highlights a few major components of the differences between them.

level lower in the settlement hierarchy, are the apexes of hexagons, constituting the hinterland of the central place. Lo¨sch analyzed the regularity of the spatial arrange ments of various economic activities and the manner in which economic supply areas had evolved in an idealized perfectly ﬂat space. He did research in the USA, where the agricultural settlements that surround goods manu facturing cities had a uniform and the highest possible density. Lo¨sch concluded that there emerged six city rich and six city poor corridors or sectors in the hinterland of any given city as a result of the existence of major radial transport routes or corridors. Both Christaller and Lo¨sch agree that the hexagonal arrangements of market areas around a central place represent the optimal spatial organization for a single good, under the assumption of uniform densities on an unbounded plain with equal access in all directions. These theories, though they agree that the central place needs the functionally linked hinterland for its growth, assign the latter the role of a mere consumer in a closed, hierarchically structured system without external trade linkages or dialectics. Nevertheless, these two theories featured prominently in geographical studies conducted within the framework of quantitative revolution in several countries. Christaller himself participated in the preparation of putting his theory into practice. As an employee at Himmler’s Planning and Soil Ofﬁce in the Nazi Germany, he worked out integration and public administration related reform plans for the areas occupied during World War II. Focusing primarily on Poland, he planned a system of inferior and superior spatial units, cities, and their re spective hinterlands, which was envisaged to be an ‘efﬁ cient’ part of the Third Reich. The theory of the central place – though not necessarily linked to Christaller due to the above political role he had – was applied in several countries. Thus, it can be detected in the planning

Hinterlands in the Central Place Theory The relationship between the city/town and the hinter land is a major component in central place theories. The basis for these theories is the simple realization according to which settlements develop in space in a manner that there are strong ties between them. Some settlements – central places – stand out in the settlement network because they have such functions (e.g., commerce, edu cation, health care, and public administration) that neighboring areas do not. As neighboring settlements – constituting the hinterland – lack the institutions that perform central functions or if they do not, the standard of the functions performed is not satisfactory, these settlements depend on the central place, of which they become the supplied areas. Based on the weight of the presence of central functions, a peculiar settlement hierarchy evolves. A classic theoretician of this issue is Christaller, who – studying the spatial location of the central places sup plying their neighborhood, while performing empirical observations in southern Germany – found that, ideally, central places of differing ranks were in the centers of hexagons linked to each other. Central functions are concentrated here, in the centers of hexagons, which ﬁll the space perfectly, while subordinate settlements, at a Lemmer

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2. Rank

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Figure 2 The hierarchical order of the urban network in Hungary. The hierarchical levels were classiﬁed according to the annual turnover of the specialist shops in 1961. At the right bottom there is the Christaller model applied to the territory of Hungary. Source: Major, J. (1964). A magyar va´rosha´lo´zatro´l. Telepu¨le´studoma´nyi Ko¨zleme´nyek 16, 32 65, p 57.

of settlements in the North East Polder in Holland (Figure 1). It was easy to adjust to the policy of centrally planned settlements and the practice of settlement de velopment in state socialist countries. For instance, in Hungary, it featured, in addition to geographical theories (Figure 2), in settlement development plans in as early as the late 1940s. Under the public administration reform in 1984, the ‘zones of inﬂuence’ of cities became ofﬁcial categories of spatial planning. In several countries, the strengthening of the economy and supplying institutions of the central place is still considered to be a sine qua non of (or even a key to) the regional development of the rural hinterland, especially in the case of hinterlands around small settlements. ‘Interdependency’ Approaches to Hinterland Development In studying the relationship between the hinterland and the town/city/metropolis, several researchers focus on the interaction between them, considering mutual de pendence and support to be the essence of such rela tionship. One of the reasons for such a standpoint is an ecological approach represented, for example, by Gras’s oeuvre, inspired by the Chicago School of Sociology in the pre World War II era. According to his analysis of eco nomic history, ‘metropolitan economy’ is the last stage of

the development that has been going on since prehistory, during which society as a whole and individual com munities developed into more complex organisms. At that stage the urban system was characterized with high interdependence, which materialized through special ization and the division of labor between communities. Metropolises became the nodal points of basic urban functions (commerce, industry, transportation, and ﬁ nance) which had evolved gradually. As a result, me tropolises came to dominate their regions. Gras, however, used the word ‘dominance’ in accordance with the eco logical concept of the Chicago School of Sociology, that is, it did not mean power relation; rather, it was used to denote coordination function. In this context metro politan dominance meant the function of organizing business for a wide metropolitan area as well as the role of an intermediary in respect of the external relations of the individual hinterland towns. That is to say, the rela tionship between a metropolitan city and its hinterland can be compared to that between the human brain and other integrated parts of the body, where inter dependence is evident. Emphasis on mutual dependence can be attributed to empirical studies, carried out in the Third World, of the relationship between small towns and their rural hinterlands. This approach is adopted by Titus and Hinderink who in agreement with a number of

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researchers argue that the diversity and quality of the functions of small centers depend on the developments in their hinterland rather than the other way round. They claim that a fundamentally unequal rural–urban rela tionship can be made more equal. Toward this end, rural economy should be integrated into national and inter national market economy in a manner that this leads to some net increase in rural surplus production, part of which should remain in the region; in a manner that there is an emerging modern middle class which reinforces small town functions, while creating more efﬁcient hin terland relations. Such conditions may enable rural pro ducers to achieve certain bargaining power in both the private and the public spheres, while small towns may act as intermediaries in addressing any conﬂict that may arise. In an increasing competition for the purchasing power of rural areas with more efﬁcient higher order centers, small towns ‘cannot afford’ extremely exploitative relations with their hinterlands. Any rural policy relying on the foregoing and aiming at selective support for small regional centers means a fundamentally different attitude and brings different re sults in terms of hinterland development from an urban biased growth center policy based on the central place theory. ‘Dependency’ and ‘Exploitation’ Approaches to Hinterland Development Several approaches perceive the development of hinter lands, interpreted at various geographical scales, as dependent on and controlled, subordinated and exploited by the heartland/metropolis/city. Some views lack strong theoretical foundation. Others are complex bodies of thoughts, such as the dependency theory, the core– periphery model, or the theory of uneven development. In contrast to the exchange based core–periphery model, some consider the geography of production to be the engine of the increasing development gap between the core and its hinterland. According to the dependency theory, deeply rooted in Latin America, ‘metropole’ uses economic surplus from its satellite (hinterland) for its own development. The hinterland (i.e., in this context, the Third World) supplied the First World with primary products and low technology manufactures in exchange for high value added goods. The economic dependency that had thus evolved was also reﬂected in political and cultural neocolonialism. While some claim that concentration in the metrop olis of the power facilitating the exploitation of the hinterland is a universal and timeless phenomenon, others blame centralized control and bureaucratic structures, not speciﬁc to any particular political and economic order, for the exploitation of the hinterland, which is considered to be the place of a local action and

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self reliance. By contrast, dependence theorist Frank (supported by Marxist theoreticians of the uneven de velopment) claims that the underdevelopment of pe ripheral satellites or hinterlands similarly to the development of the metropolitan center is generated by the development of capitalism itself. It is no coinci dence, therefore, that under this approach, neither the decentralization of planning and decision making nor the reinforcement of grass roots participation at the local level, recommended by the advocates of the former view, can be considered to be ‘a ﬁnal solution’. Only a radical change in the existing political and economic order is likely to bring true successes.

Geography of Hinterland Development Depending on the geographical scale, the place and the political economic and cultural context, etc., hinterlands have differing characteristics, with their relationship with the core/heartland/central place changing in space and time. Such changes led to the emergence of an increasing number of versions of the above theoretical approaches. For instance, Vance did not ﬁnd the rather closed system modeled by Christaller and Lo¨sch suitable for studying such settlement patterns where the emergence and the development of the cities and their hinterlands are driven mainly by external forces. Studying the history of US settlements, he tried adapting the Christaller model to the early (preindustrial) settlement system of the con tinent. Going beyond Christaller’s theses, he sought to set up a new theory which was able to provide an explana tion for the development of settlement patterns not only in Northern America, but also in colonies outside Europe in general as well as the evolvement of an early settle ment hierarchy. Under Vance’s ‘mercantile’ model, the settlement hierarchy in North America evolved through trading between the motherland and the colonies. The settlement network in North America evolved into a hierarchical system, with evolution starting at the ports along the Eastern Coast and settlements gradually dif fusing into the inland. First, the highest levels of the settlement hierarchy evolved, then gradually through the remaining four stages the settlements at the lower levels of the hierarchy did, which, thus, was just the opposite of how the settlement network in Europe evolved. The towns established on the seaside in the ﬁrst phase became the most important trade centers. The extension of their hinterland along the waterways (rivers, lakes, and canals) made easier and more efﬁcient the collection of inland staples for export. In his model, Vance cites examples of a settlement network that was brought into existence by external forces (trading across the Atlantic) rather than one that came into being as a result of endemic bottom up development (Figure 3).

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Hinterland Development Vance’s mercantile model based on exogenic forces introducing basic structure

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Figure 3 The Vance mercantile model of settlement evolution. Five stages in the evolution of settlement under the mercantile model (left) and the central-place model (right). The term ‘exogenic’ refers to external, and ‘endogenic’ to internal forces. The term ‘entrepot’ is the French word for storehouse and means a commercial center for the import and export, collection and distribution of goods. From Hagett, P. (1983). Geography. A Modern Synthesis (Revised 3rd edn.). HarperCollins Series in Geography. D.W. Meining Advisor., Figure 15 15, p 379. New York: HarperCollins.

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Current empirical studies also highlight the import ance of external relations in developing countries, though in a different context. Series of case studies attest that rural hinterland development around small towns derives its impetus and resources from macro policies and macroeconomic processes at the national level, rather than from impulses from their own local centers. In Latin America, externally induced forms of rural hinterland incorporation in national and international market economies are often related to agricultural colonization areas. Their coming into existence owes nothing to the intermediation of local service centers similarly to what the case is in the densely populated and commercialized rural areas of South and Southeast Asia where increasing marketing and employment opportunities in higher order centers and other regions by means of improved communications and labor mobility led to hinterland development. Although rural–urban relations at several places in sub Saharan Africa are much less developed (due to higher degrees of rural self sufﬁciency and lower level of productivity), research provides evidence for cases of externally induced rural hinterland development. The rural–urban relations also lie at the heart of re cent studies on hinterland development in Europe. Ac cording to some research carried out in the EU, generating development, while also exerting pressure, new demands for rural areas (i.e., for quality food pro duction, public amenity space, space for housing, and environment protection) can be experienced. These studies claim that – after a relationship based on the consumption of agricultural produce, followed, after the era of the industrial revolution, by the dependence of rural areas on urban economies – today hinterlands are shaped by more complex rural–urban relationships which can be characterized with increasing interdependencies. The reality of some principles of the EU policies aimed at supporting such a relationship is called into question by the comparative studies conducted by Hoggart et al. in Germany, France, Spain, and England. Rather than promising hinterland functional heterogeneity and im proved city region environmental sustainability, current trends point toward more homogeneity (mainly of resi dential functions) and increasing travel distances for work, leisure, and services. However, instead of the ex pected social diversity, through the ‘invasion of new population’, social heterogeneity and segregation prevail; a change in social composition which creates a distinctive social proﬁle in hinterland settlements. In addition, related to both central place and core periphery theories, the concept of hinterland is still pre sent in regional policies across the world. It is perhaps the development pole theory, ﬁrst evolved and conceived in an abstract economic space by French economist Perroux, that has gained the widest currency. Credit for trans forming it into an operational tool for regional planning

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goes to Boudeville. This concept, linked to theories on modernization, diffusion, and innovation, was put to practice in some developed countries mainly in the 1960s and in the developing ones in the 1970s. Development was interpreted as economic growth to which innovation, technological progress, and industrialization were keys. Development (growth) poles with economies of scale and agglomeration as their leverage were expected to coun terbalance congested metropolitan areas, support, the integration of backward areas, and generate beneﬁcial spread effects to the hinterlands in their immediate vicinity. The fulﬁllment of the objectives was, however, challenged, due to, among other things, the rather limited beneﬁcial impact on hinterland areas.

Critiques, Challenges The chaotic usage of the term calls the usability of the concept of hinterland into question. Its meaning ranges from bounded spaces and separate territories to a sym bolic meaning of urban inﬂuence sphere in literature on human geography. What makes orientation rather dif ﬁcult is that the meaning of word ‘inﬂuence’ under the functional geographic approach differs from, for example, that under the cultural geographic approach. The issue of the trickiness of the hinterland concept is mainly raised by researchers conducting international empirical stud ies. For them, the fact that the interpretation of this term varies from one country to the next makes comparison difﬁcult. Furthermore, very often, the hinterland is, at best, the site rather than the subject of research. No ‘comprehensive’ history of research in the evolvement of hinterlands is available either. Therefore, it is especially important that critique leveled at hinterland concepts should be studied and evaluated in the given social, political, cultural, and institutional context. The hinterland concept has been and is still used in con nection with the widest possible use (and even testing) of the central place theory. Though with differing intensity, the boundaries of hinterlands as discrete regions are still being drawn around cities, in the course of which the mapping of the spatial changes in these regions describes the development of hinterlands. Cities can serve as a starting point for the surveys needed for such mapping. These surveys can identify the settlements that use, for example, certain institutions in the city or the targets of supply. In contrast, rural areas can also serve as starting points for surveys that can identify the places where rural residents use urban services. For delimitation, quantitative methods and models (e.g., the gravity model) are applied. However, while the approach of locational analysis, a school of thought under the aegis of which hinterland studies are also conducted, were severely criticized from various directions (e.g., humanistic and radical geography)

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in the USA and Great Britain in the 1970s for its posi tivism, and because it was thought to serve the interest of the capital, this approach and similar studies were per ceived as progressive in East Central Europe. The geo graphic studies that employed this approach revealed that during state socialism centrally designated catchment areas (e.g., those for health care services and schools), which were mandatory places for the provision of services for the population existed side by side with hinterlands (e.g., the retail hinterland) spontaneously evolving as a result of free choice of population. Using this realization as their starting point, many researchers managed to point out the difﬁculties that the differences in the various hinterlands and their location from mass transportation networks caused in people’s daily life. In contrast to the above, the studies that apply the political economy approach to hinterland development in order to understand the nature of the heartland/city/

town–hinterland relationship focus on economic relations, the ﬂow of people, products, capital, technology, and in formation. However, for this purpose they often ﬁnd the core–periphery or the urban–rural concept more suitable. Applying the global–local framework also raised further issues. Early studies pointed out that hinterlands over lapped each other (Figure 4). However, under conditions of contemporary globalization in the ‘world city network formation’, every city’s hinterland overlaps with every other city’s hinterland. The service provision of world cities is of global proportions; therefore, as Taylor puts it, these cities already have ‘hinterworlds’. Today the tradi tional concept of hinterland, he claims, can only be in terpreted at the level of local catchment areas (e.g., the zones of the circulation area of local newspapers or those where rural people do their shopping in local cities). Research focusing on power relations rather than adopting the functional approach drew attention to, for

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4 Delivery area of a retail firm

2 Advertisement zone for Wrexham cinemas 5 Wrexham district of an insurance company 3 Head Post Office area

Figure 4 The zones of inﬂuence of Wrexham. Source: Johnson, J. H. (1968). Urban Geography. An Introductory Analysis. Fig. 22, p 82. Oxford, London, Edinburgh, New York, Toronto, Sydney, Paris, Braunschweig: Pergamon Press.

Hinterland Development

example, the ﬁght that hinterland communities fought with administrative centers at higher levels of the hierarchy. That having said, however, advocates of this approach (like the ones of the functional concept) conﬁne themselves to the heartland/city–hinterland dichotomy, which may easily divert attention from power relations within hinterlands and paper over social–cultural differences and inequalities. Criticism regarding certain applications of the hinterland concept in regional policies point to similar concerns. It highlights the problems arising from the top down nature of the development pole strategies, among them to the way political regimes can use these strategies to serve their economic interests to the detriment of the poorest social strata in the hinterlands and at the expense of environ mental development.

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See also: Capitalism; Central Place Theory; Chicago School; Christaller, W.; Colonialism I; Colonialism II; Core-Periphery Models; Cultural Geography; Diffusion; First World; Growth Poles, Growth Centers; Humanism/ Humanistic Geography; Innovation; Marxism/Marxist Geography II; Modernization Theory; Neocolonialism; Political Economy, Geographical; Positivism/Positivist Geography; Quantitative Revolution; Radical Geography; Segregation; Space II; Sustainability; Third World; Uneven Development; Urbanization.

the Great Hungarian Plain, pp 165 181. Budapest: Akade´miai Kiado´. Berry, B. J. L. (1967). Geography of Market Centers and Retail Distribution. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Boudeville, J. R. (1966). Problems of Regional Economic Planning. Edinburgh: University Press. Christaller, W. (1933). Die zentralen Orte in Su¨ddeutschland. Eine O¨konomisch Geographische Untersuchung U¨ber die Gesetzma¨Xigkeit der Verbreitung und Entwicklung der Siedlungen Mit Sta¨dtischen Funktionen (English transl. 1967, Central Places in Southern Germany. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall). Jena: G. Fischer. Davis, D. F. (1985). The ‘metropolitan thesis’ and the writing of Canadian urban history. Urban History Review 14(2), 95 113. Frank, A. G. (1967). Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. New York: Monthly Review Press. Gras, N. S. B. (1922). An Introduction to Economic History. New York: Harper and Brothers. Hoggart, K. (ed.) (2005). The City’s Hinterland Dynamism and Divergence in Europe’s Peri Urban Territories. Aldershot: Ashgate. Losch, A. (1944). Die Ra¨umliche Ordnung der Wirtschaft (English transl. 1954, The Economics of Location. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press). Jena: G. Fischer. Perroux, F. (1955). Note sur la notion de poˆle de croissance. E´conomie Applique´e 7, 307 320. Serra, M. A. (2003). Development pole theory and the Brazilian Amazon. Estudos Econoˆmicos 33(1), 71 113. Taylor, P. (2001). Urban hinterworlds. Geography 86(1), 51 60. Titus, M. and Hinderink, J. (eds.) (1998). Town and Hinterland in Developing Countries. Amsterdam: Thela Thesis. Vance, J. E. (1970). The Merchant’s World: The Geography of Wholesaling. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Further Reading

Relevant Websites

Beluszky, P. (1971). Central places developing in county Szabolcs Szatma´r. In Sa´rfalvi, B. (ed.) The Changing Face of

http://www.espon.eu ESPON.

Historical Geographies, Rural P. J. Duffy, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, Republic of Ireland & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Geographical Inertia Resistance to change and dominance of continuity in the material characteristics of rural settlements. Land Reform Spatial reorganization, consolidation, or redistribution of inherited farm structures, usually also associated also with migration of farm families. Morphogenesis Early studies concerned with the historical origins of rural settlement as evidenced in the form and morphology of the settlement. Open-Field Landscape Unenclosed agricultural lands usually associated with nucleated villages and, historically in Europe, with crop rotation by ﬁelds. Rundale A term for traditional farming of open ﬁelds in western parts of the British Isles where individual portions of land were periodically redistributed among families of the kingroup. Territorialization The development of a hierarchy of rural territorial units usually reﬂecting landholding histories, or administrative efﬁciency in the modern era. Toponymy The study of place-names and landscape history. Vernacular Buildings Erected in traditional manner using local construction materials, thus closely reﬂecting local environments and cultures. Volkerwanderung Migrations of Germanic tribes following the collapse of the Roman empire.

Introduction Much of historical geography has traditionally been concerned with rural areas and rural societies. Rural historical studies have revolved around the historical evolution of the landscape, the nature of change in rural landscapes and societies, and the role of continuity in the emergence of modern ruralities. Studies have been dominated by a Eurocentric discourse in which European rural society and environment have been the benchmarks for historical studies in other parts of the world. Until recently, the principal legacy of this scholarship has been a preoccupation with empirical geographies of settlement morphologies and material practice in land holding, agricultural husbandry, social and demographic change.

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Approaches Rural historical geographies have in the main been concerned with the facts and artifacts of land, landscape and settlement, and associated socioeconomic and cul tural contexts. Rural landscapes comprise the most ex tensive material record of humanity–environment relations. Past generations have inscribed the rural with the marks of their passage leaving geographers with a richly layered landscape legacy which has often been characterized as a palimpsest, or series of horizons of settlement extending back in time. Historical continuity in rural landscapes and societies has been one of the traditional themes in rural geo graphical studies. They have also often been infected with a modicum of nostalgia for a disappearing, often idyllic rural, of small scale largely local communities, in opposition to more rapidly changing larger scale urban society. In a rural context, there has been signiﬁcant overlap between historical and cultural geography. Cul tural geography originally had a greater historical em phasis, especially evident in the works of early cultural geographers like Carl Sauer, though cultural geography today is more focused on issues in contemporary rural societies (Figure 1). Two principal approaches to rural historical geog raphies may be discerned. The earliest and most en during approach was concerned with the ‘making of the rural’, the nuts and bolts of landscape history. This largely empirical approach emphasizes the material and morphological characteristics of rural landscapes and culture and the transition from natural environments to humanized landscapes. Early settlement studies in Eur ope were concerned with morphogenesis which focused on pattern and process in the evolution of settlement forms, for example, the roles of continuity, change, and modernization, and the impact of geographical inertia in rural landscape and social morphologies. The con straining or inhibiting inﬂuence on subsequent develop ments of inherited shapes, boundaries, and structures, as well as the conservative impact of institutional structures in society and culture (such as family, kinship, and tra dition) have been important. Interrelations between culture, landscape, and place were manifested in material practices of landownership and landholding structures, farming and husbandry regimes, community and kinship patterns, migration and industrial transitions. A more recent approach reﬂecting broader changes in cultural geography focuses on the ‘meaning of the rural’

Historical Geographies, Rural

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and how it was perceived and imagined. This sees a greater emphasis on theorization through the use of metaphor and allegory, and how we approach past soci eties and landscapes in terms of ideology and represen tation. It also engages a more questioning assessment of narratives of societal dominance of nature and the transformation of rural environments and ecologies. The most frequent application of this approach has been in former European colonized lands which have been in terpreted through the prism of European traditions of scholarship seeking to examine colonial rural landscapes in terms of their similarity to the rurals of Europe. In the postcolonial world, however, such singular interpretation is being reappraised. Both approaches are interwoven throughout the following discussion.

Themes in Rural Historical Geographies

enclosure of ﬁelds with hedges and fencing; and accom panying socioeconomic transitions from tribal to chief dom, to feudal and modern state structures. North America, New Zealand, Australia, and other colonized lands beyond Europe followed similar per spectives, except that the process was foreshortened in time. The focus of study was the more recent and rapid reclamation of savannah, forest, and bush – ‘ecological shocks’ which saw the ‘breaking in’ of wild places for commercial crop or livestock production, in themes not only of material transformation (often recorded by camera in the nineteenth century) but of colonial dis possession and erasure of indigenous cultural and land scape signatures. Some of these new world environments have more recently provided a platform for a revision in attitudes which de center society from its dominant cultural position in rural landscape history and restore parity with Nature and native societies.

Claiming/Reclaiming the Land Deforestation has been the great symbol of expansion of human settlement – the retreat of forest darkness before the light of (European) civilization. One of the earliest interests in rural historical geographies related to the evolution and modernization of the landscape, and an thropogenic impacts and reclamation of natural wilder ness. A decidedly Eurocentric emphasis on ‘taming’ nature was highlighted in the removal of forest and woodlands; in reclamation of marshes and wetlands, moors and peatlands by fuel harvesting and grazing; ex pansion of cultivated agriculture and grasslands;

Colonization and Settlement A major concern of European rural geographies has been the reconstruction of the colonization of lowland, forest, wilderness, moors and heath as well as the abandonment of settlement landscapes from the neolithic and bronze ages. The discovery of extensive landscapes of ﬁelds and settlement under the peatlands in the west of Ireland is typical of many such features also found throughout Northern Europe. Very early settlement is most com monly marked by burial monuments which have outlived most of the other marks of human habitation.

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The settlement history of rural Europe shows legacies from the Roman empire reﬂected in landholding tenure and landscape morphologies in southern France and the Mediterranean, and road networks and settlement sites throughout Western Europe. The Volkerwanderung which followed the collapse of Roman power from the ﬁfth century initially slotted into the settlement landscapes of Roman Gaul. From the early medieval period there were waves of colonization usually by communal tribal soci eties of the wilderness in Northern and Western Euro pean lands. Scandinavians from Denmark, Sweden, and Norway moved across Northern Europe in all directions, remembered most as raiders and pillagers. While they colonized the islands and lands of the Atlantic fringe, they also expanded rural settlements within Scandinavia itself. In the high Middle Ages population expansion drove the clearance of woodland and establishment of culti vated ﬁelds in more marginal and upland regions in a process of internal and frontier expansion: in Germanic lands eastward beyond regions of the earlier Roman empire, and westward in the British Isles by Anglo Normans and southward in the reconquest of Iberia from Moors. Planned settlements from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries into Slav lands beyond the Oder were laid down in surveyed landscapes of regular land holding units of hufen, overseen by a ‘locator’, who managed the migrations of settlers and the clearance of woodland to accommodate Waldhufendorf planned vil lages, for example. Much of this colonization was undertaken under the aegis of powerful lords, or wealthy institutions such as monasteries which operated within the feudal world. The onset of bubonic plague in 1348 and subsequent crises in fourteenth century agriculture led to contraction of rural settlement throughout Europe, still marked today by many deserted medieval sites. Much of this settlement process in the later Middle Ages set precedents for later colonization and expansion into what became the ‘New World’: there were parallels, for instance, with colonial settlement schemes in Ireland and America in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In contrast to medieval precedents, however, newly modernizing states and agrarian and merchant capital provided the impetus and structural contexts for the early modern incorporation of new rural worlds overseas. Traditional empirical settlement studies in general have been replaced by more recent interest in the structural/political/cultural contexts of settlement ex pansion, such as the roles of lords, kings, and states and the transition from feudalism to capitalism. Settlement Patterns and Typologies Historic rural settlement patterns occur in many differ ent forms, from single dispersed farmsteads, through a

range of agglomerations of simple farm clusters and hamlets to much more complex nucleations around greens, churches, or castles. Village settlements reﬂected widely variable plan structures, which German geog raphers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries attempted to classify on ethnic or environmental lines. There are innumerable geometric possibilities relating to local terrain and location (such as road, canal, riverbank, or spring line settlements), political conditions, or gen esis of the settlements: colonial villages often had de fensive functions expressed in linear or circular forms (Figure 2). The simpler hamlet clusters which charac terized settlement in poorer more difﬁcult agricultural environments were often associated with kinship groups, organic growth of settlements over long periods of time, as well as tribal roots of landownership in the early Middle Ages. Buildings form, plan, and structure have also com prised a traditional aspect of rural historical settlement landscapes. As a consequence of the greater resistance to change in rural communities, vernacular settlements are characteristic. Vernacular building traditions have sur vived throughout many parts of rural Europe, for in stance, which in combination with morphological layouts of settlements lent distinctiveness to much of the rural landscape and provided the initial stimulus to French rural geography in the late nineteenth and early twen tieth centuries. Vernacular buildings mirror local culture and environment in terms of building traditions, styles, and construction materials. Rural villages in lowland England and France contain many substantial farmhouses and ancillary buildings extending back to the 1600s and earlier. The long houses and courtyard farmsteads of Northern Europe are typical examples. In the poorer margins of northwestern Europe, however, many of the traditional houses have been replaced by more modern structures. Landscapes of Field Systems Historically the arrangement of rural ﬁeldscapes had an enormous impact on settlement landscape. Agrarian landscapes existed in a symbiotic relationship with the habitations of the rural settlements. While the principal characteristics of rural landscape typologies have long been deﬁned in European terms, the geographies and socioeconomic processes underlying the management of the land are universal, though there is a considerable degree of local diversity within Europe which adds to the landscape variety (Figure 2). The historic operation, management, and territorial expression of agricultural land was inﬂuenced by the nature of agriculture (in terms of the balance between crops and livestock), modes of cultivation, landholding tenures, demographic trends, and cultural practices such

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as communal cooperation. Throughout extensive parts of medieval lowland Europe, open ﬁeld agrarian landscapes were the norm, where rotations ranged from one ﬁeld, through three ﬁeld to four and ﬁve ﬁeld rotations of crops. These represented increasingly intensive uses of land (with from half to a quarter or a ﬁfth of the land being left fallow in any one year). ‘Fields’ in this sense were the lands associated with the clustered or nucleated settlements, often permanently or temporarily enclosed with a fence. In the oceanic margins of Europe where extensive tillage gave way to more pastoral agricultural regimes, a simpler one ﬁeld rundale (or runrig) system was identiﬁed in which the ‘inﬁeld’ nearest the settlement cluster was continuously cultivated, and the ‘outﬁeld’ was grazed and periodically cultivated. Apart from such open ﬁeld systems, early instances of single dispersed farm steads, often in outlying parts of the community’s land, on the edge of parishes or in uplands, were associated with early enclosure of the land into smaller individually worked ﬁelds. The more comprehensive ‘enclosure movement’ which reached its zenith in the eighteenth century, resulted in the systematic fencing of the open ﬁelds into smaller, often hedged enclosures which gives much of Britain and Ireland their distinctive patchwork quilt like landscapes today. Open ﬁeld systems were also associated with other communal strategies to manage economic resources – such as common meadow lands, marsh, ﬁshing, forest and woodland, moor, bogland, and mountain. In the western, northern, and Mediterranean peripheral regions of Eur ope seasonal transhumance was signiﬁcant, where village livestock were moved en masse for grazing to temporary settlements on summer pastures. Open ﬁelds in medieval Europe were spatially allo cated to tenants or farmers in a variety of ways: in well endowed agricultural lowland soils such as the north European plain, usually in regular strips ploughed by draught animals; in more western pastoral regimes smaller cultivated irregular blocks in the inﬁeld were hand worked and subdivided as population increased. The planned colonizations in Eastern Europe usually had regular geometric land divisions arranged in large open ﬁeld rotations or long linear lots extending into the forest. Although ﬁeld and settlement typologies are pre dominantly the result of European scholarship and classiﬁcation systems, in many cases the historic patterns and processes at work are repeated in African and Asian rural landscapes. In many of these overseas regions, however, European colonial settlement from the early modern period resulted in the insertion of European patterns which often obliterated preexisting native structures. Because most of the colonial settlements took place in the past couple of centuries, they exhibit many of the inﬂuences of the agricultural age of improvement and

modernization. Combined with a largely individualized settlement strategy in government surveyed lands, this resulted in suites of dispersed farmsteads in geometric ﬁeldscapes, most dramatically exempliﬁed in the west and mid west of the US and Canada. Newer geographies have attempted to break away from the intellectual aridity of settlement classiﬁcations of ﬁxed and immutable explanation to focus more on the ways in which rural landscapes and buildings were experienced and invested with different meanings by contemporary societies. The texts of landscape can be re read for insights into the lives and social practice of individual communities. Rural places were socially con structed, not simply regulated space and geometric order within generic models of feudal or plantation economies. Estate Landscapes and Land Reform Much of the morphology and practice of rural landscapes occurred within the parameters of estate landscapes. Across Europe such landscapes have their roots mainly in the medieval feudal period whereby manorial lands were held under the lord by a range of tenantry. Under standing this landownership system is fundamental to explaining many of the features of the historical geog raphies of rural settlement: the delegation of ownership to powerful local landowners resulted in some degree of homogeneity in many of the settlement structures which emerged across Europe. This landowning gentry system continued with regional modiﬁcations into the modern era but, except for Spanish America’s latifundia, was never replicated in the rural landscapes of the new world. Tenant and peasant populations and their rural settlements of buildings and ﬁelds were controlled to a greater or lesser extent by tenurial conditions. These varied from classical large estates of small fragmented peasant plots of the Mediterranean regions, which con tinued in many cases into the twentieth century, to the gentry estates of Northern Europe. These had been largely transformed by merchant and agrarian capitalism and overseas colonialism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The earliest and classic example of these changing estate landscapes was in England where im provements from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were the drivers for a transformation of rural society and landscape – leading ultimately to emergence of a strong yeoman farmer class and enclosure of medieval ﬁelds (Figure 3). By the eighteenth century, a common culture of landowning elites throughout Europe, grounded in social institutions like the Grand Tour, displayed its power and privilege in great houses and mansions, elaborate or namental gardens and parklands, and in many cases regulated farmscapes, ﬁeldscapes, and regimented populations of tenantry.

Figure 3 Estate andscape, V rg n a, re and.

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The characterization of a revolution in agriculture reverberating across Northern Europe from the eight eenth century as an ‘age of improvement’ is particularly appropriate to discussion of rural geographical change. It might be seen as the working out of early modern cap italism in various landscapes of Northern Europe through the agency of landed estates. Much of what happened might be characterized in modern parlance as land reform. The emphasis was on ‘improvement’ in technical, infrastructural, agricultural, and social senses, where the processes at work in the countryside mirrored the economic transformation of the Industrial Revolution. One major consequence was the modiﬁcation of older medieval rural landscapes which became increasingly obsolete in the new commercial agrarianism. The most signiﬁcant ‘improvement’ was the obliteration of open ﬁeld countrysides, to be replaced in a couple of gener ations by carpets of rectilinear hedged enclosures. Wri ters have been important agents in the interpretation of changes taking place in rural (and urban) landscapes and society. Poets John Clare and Oliver Goldsmith com mented on the revolutionary effect in eighteenth century England of parliamentary enclosure of ﬁelds and com mons and the creation of large parks. Goldsmith’s Des erted Village railed against the obliteration of ancient ﬁelds and communities by powerful elites in the eighteenth century: ‘‘y. If to some common’s fenceless limits strayed,/ He drives his ﬂock to pick the scanty blade,/ Those fenceless ﬁelds the sons of wealth divide,/ And even the bare worn common is denied.’’ Demographic expansion in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe also witnessed reclamation of wasteland and expansion of settlement into former uninhabited lands, classically re ﬂected in the reclamation of heathlands in Denmark and north Germany, and breakup of many older village settlements to be replaced by more efﬁcient single farm dispersal (Figure 4). Accompanying this process was the gradual elimin ation of the peasant farmer in the face of expanding agrarian capitalism, ﬁrst in England, and later in the peripheral and poorer regions of Europe. The progress of the Industrial Revolution had fundamental implications for rural society and landscape. From the late eighteenth century, there was a fairly radical decline in the agri cultural labor force. In Ireland, as well as other parts of Northern Europe, voluntary and assisted emigration from rural areas in the nineteenth century was often associated with reconstruction and modernization of outmoded farmscapes. Proto industrialization reﬂected in domestic crafts, textile spinning and weaving was a feature of much of Northern Europe and a precursor to urban based in dustrialization. Often encouraged by improving land owning elites, it was driven mainly by town merchants

Figure 4 Land reform: replacement of the older medieval landscape. From King, R. and Burton, S. (1983). Structural change in agriculture: The geography of land consolidation. Progress in Human Geography 7, 474.

subcontracting production to the rural population. Sub sequent demographic expansion was unsustainable in the family farm matrix in the north of England and Ireland as factory made textiles undercut the rural craft economy, impelling migration overseas and to towns. Ireland witnessed one of the earliest state inter ventions in land reform when the Congested Districts Board and the Land Commission were established in the late nineteenth century to solve a landholding crisis in western regions. Soon afterward, Ireland also experienced a radical elimination of landowning gentry and estab lishment of tenant proprietorship in one of the ﬁrst state sponsored ‘nationalizations’ of landownership in Europe. Subsequently in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century land reform programs were undertaken in France, Italy, Greece, and Germany to faciltitate a rationalization of the legacy of antiquated landholding structures. Boundaries and Territorialization Territorialization and the evolution of spatial order in the landscape was a fundamental phase in the social and economic morphology of rural space. This embraced organic development of territorial structures from a very early period reﬂecting exigencies of local culture, society, and landholding. Administrative divisions were delib erately created from the early modern period in a process of social and political order – exempliﬁed in the shiring

Historical Geographies, Rural

of older territories in Wales and Ireland by the expanding British state in the sixteenth century, the communes and cantons of revolutionary France, or the Poor Law Unions of nineteenth century Ireland. Such territorial geog raphies are an important component in the vocabulary of rural settlement landscapes. The role of historical continuity is best demonstrated by the manner in which rural landscape development was constrained by earlier boundaries and territorial morphologies. Phases of colonization and settlement throughout Europe often ﬁtted into preexisting territorial parameters: in some cases the Germanic colonizations in Eastern Europe adapted to earlier Slav geographies; British colonizations in sixteenth and seventeenth century Ireland slotted into earlier Gaelic structures. Some farms in the midlands and southeast of England can be traced back to the eleventh century Domesday Book. Apart from some Roman legacies, in general, these older structures grew out of medieval tribal and lordship regimes. Much of Europe was ﬁssured with a variety of local territorial units to do with landholding and land assessment, most universally based on tribal assessments of hundreds (lands which could notionally provide one hundred soldiers): in Ireland the tricha ce´t (or thirty hundreds) was an ancient territorial designation arising out of this system which ultimately formed the basis of baronies. Local hundred courts endured in England into the Middle Ages. The most ubiquitous landholding structures were reﬂected, for example, in Irish townlands, Scottish and English townships (Figure 5). Throughout Christian Europe, parishes were the most universal ad ministrative territories, providing pastoral care, collecting taxes from the faithful, and usually exhibiting a spatial synchronicity with local secular territories of tribes, lords, and kings. The process of administrative control of rural space was replicated in what was perceived as a tabula rasa in the New World. Most of its rural territorial designations were products of the modern age, with very little con tinuity from preexisting native landscapes. These units were deliberately planned spatial constructions con trasting with the more organic antiquity of territorial divisions in the ‘Old World’, though the nomenclature often reﬂected European origins, in counties, parishes, and townships of the US and Canada. Rural settlement landscapes in America, Australia, and New Zealand, re ﬂect the consequences of land surveys which rectangu larized the landscape with new lines and rational geometries that were discordant with anything that went before. Rural Cultural Geographies Carl Sauer in the University of California, Berkeley, encapsulated the scope of culture in the totality of rural

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historical studies when he asserted in the 1920s that ‘‘Culture is the agent, the natural area is the medium, the cultural landscape is the result.’’ Patterns, morphologies, and material legacies of rural settlement are frequently a manifestation of local cultural practice, custom, and tradition which in premodern societies often overrode economic or environmental constraints. Field layouts and management or redistribution of allotments were often linked to seniority of landholders in the kingroup. Rights to land shares in the commons, or fertile or sunny lo cations, or the disposition of houses, as well as the actual construction and size of houses, also reﬂected local considerations of family, kin, custom, and communal working arrangements. House construction in parts of rural Ireland or Scandinavia or the Mediterranean re gion, in Huron and Iroqouian communities of Ontario, or in Zulu kraals, all shared in a variety of cultural im peratives inﬂuencing their material expression in the landscape. Place names as illuminators of rural landscape evo lution are one of the earliest preoccupations of rural cultural geography. Toponymy and microtoponymy are the ultimate languages of landscape which have been used to track the expansion of rural settlement in Europe from the early medieval period. Danish settlement in England, Germanic colonizations in Central Europe, Anglo Norman settlements in Ireland, have all resulted in territorial naming patterns which commemorate the language of the colonist. In the absence of documentary records, place names can also illuminate settlement sequences and settlement processes: names with wald in central Europe, or weald in England, or cill in Ireland reﬂect previously forested lands. Names from the Middle Ages such as Brentwood, or Burntfurze, or Blackditch clearly refer to a pioneering stage in rural settlement. Ireland has many tens of thousands of place names, re corded by colonial settlement schemes from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which assist in reconstruction of past rural geographies. Naming practices also played an important role in New World colonies as symbols of hegemony over native cultural landscapes. Postcolonialism and the Rural Past European inﬂuence and heritage have been especially strong in relation to rural historical geography – con taining the oldest places and landscapes to be recorded and described but more importantly written about by historical geographers, and many of these rural land scapes were replicated in the new world – as in New England’s townships, or the seigneuries of Quebec. Much rural historical research elsewhere in the world has been strongly inﬂuenced by a Eurocentric scholarship imbued with a naive empiricism which represented rural landscape and communities as passive receptors of social

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Figure 5 Townlands in county Wicklow, Ireland.

change. More recent cultural geographies of the rural have highlighted the fact that perspectives on past landscapes have been deeply embedded in relations of power and knowledge. Enclosure, one of the iconic re ﬂections of the age of improvement in the eighteenth century was driven by agrarian capitalism to produce a transformed and regulated land. Social relations which

stood in the way of modernization at home and abroad were at times ruthlessly obliterated. Studies of such landscapes cannot be described in terms of an innocent transformation but as assertions of power over nature and society – ordering, taming, even torturing a disordered nature or displaying wealth and regulating behavior. Reading past landscapes produces different perspectives

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on the consumption of landscape: to see and classify countryside, as in a painting (picturesque), is only pos sible for the privileged perspective of the well off e´lite: described by Donald Meinig as ‘‘the difference between looking at a landscape and living in it.’’ In many ways the past rurals of many colonized re gions in the world have been obliterated or radically modiﬁed by colonial European settlement. Native soci eties were often pushed to the margins beyond settler frontiers. Previously overlooked in classic studies of rural societies, postcolonial studies have focused attention on ways in which earlier Eurocentric scholarship was com plicit in the dispossession and silencing of the indigenous societies and cultures and on the material and symbolic representation of colonial power, control, and regulation on the colonized. The symbolism of the march of British/ European place names across the rural landscapes of many parts of the world cannot be overlooked. More recent studies also highlight the previously unacknowledged role of resistance by native peasantry to colonial regulation and surveillance of their lives, spaces, traditional rights, and resources – in many ways paral leling earlier resistances by European peasantry to the modernization of their lands and societies. They also focus on the role of colonial societies in the ecological destruction of environments which resulted from con tested evaluations of the meaning of nature and wilder ness in these overseas lands, where indigenous peoples and natures were collectively characterized as inferior, in need of ‘discovery’, civilization, and moral order. Some of these trends see a return to an earlier cultural geo graphical interest in ordinary, peasant landscapes re ﬂected in ethnographic studies by Sauer, Estyn Evans (in Ireland), de la Blache (in France), and Scandinavian geographers working in the early twentieth century. Our understanding of past ruralities is shaped to a great extent by extant documentary evidence which embed particular meanings in our reading. These rep resent records of elites in the main, the powerful in communities or civil society: bureaucrats, writers, artists, mapmakers. These minorities have shaped the historical past as we come to know it and so it is necessary to critically evaluate the record in recovering past rural geographies. Archaeological ﬁeld evidence, as well as folklore, songs, and ballads, can sometimes help to illu minate the lives and landscapes of our rural predecessors. In looking back at their settlement landscapes, it is im portant to realize that our perspectives are also shaped not only by the scholarship of more than a century, but

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by technologies such as aerial photography, Geographic Information Systems (GIS), and Remote Sensing which are especially inﬂuential in rural geographies. We can bring to bear perspectives on patterns and morphologies which impose meanings and explanations that were beyond the range of knowledge of our ancestors. In this sense, therefore, the past is very much a foreign country. See also: Cultural Geography; Evans, E. E.; Field Systems and Enclosure; Landscape; Postcolonialism/ Postcolonial Geographies; Sauer, C.

Further Reading Aalen, F. H., Whelan, K. and Stout, M. (1997). Atlas of the Irish Rural Landscape. Cork: Cork University Press. Atkins, P., Simmons, I. and Roberts, B. (1998). People, Land and Time: An Historical Introduction to the Relations between Landscape, Culture and Environment. London: Arnold. Butlin, R. A. (1993). Historical Geography: Through the Gates of Space and Time. London: Edward Arnold. Clarke, H. B., Prunty, J. and Hennessy, M. (eds.) (2004). Surveying Ireland’s Past. Dublin: Geography Publications. Dodgshon, R. A. (1987). The European Past: Social Evolution and Spatial Order. London: Macmillan. Dodgshon, R. A. and Butlin, R. A. (1990). An Historical Geography of England and Wales. London: Academic Press. Duffy, P. J. (2007). Exploring the History and Heritage of Irish Landscapes. Dublin: Four Courts. Harris, R. C. (ed.) (1987). Historical Atlas of Canada, vol. 1. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Helmfrid, S. (ed.) (1994). Landscape and Settlements. Stockholm: National Atlas of Sweden. Hoskins, W. G. (1970). The Making of the English Landscape. London: Hodder and Stoughton. King, R. and Burton, S. (1983). Structural change in agriculture: The geography of land consolidation. Progress in Human Geography 7, 474. Muir, R. (2000). The New Reading the Landscape: Fieldwork in Landscape History. Exeter: University of Exeter Press. Proudfoot, L. J. and Roche, M. (eds.) (2005). (Dis)placing Empire: Renegotiating British Colonial Geographies. Aldershot: Ashgate. Roberts, B. K. (ed.) (1983). Villages, Fields and Frontiers: Studies in European Settlement in the Medieval and Early Modern Periods. Oxford: BAR. Roberts, B. K. (1996). Landscapes of Settlement: Prehistory to the Present. London: Routledge. Smith, C. T. (1978). An Historical Geography of Western Europe before 1800. London: Longman.

Relevant Websites http://www.suffolk.gov.uk http://www.enfo.ie Rural Settlement in Medieval Ireland.

Historical Geographies, Urban A. Golan, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Chicago School A group of Chicago-based sociologists whose model of the ecological theory of the city had initiated during the 1920s the development of urban studies. Cultural Turn in Geography The reemergence of cultural geography in the 1980s that marked the emergence of a postmodern geography. Histoire totale Total history. Formed by the school of the annale, a post-World-War-I group of French historians that adhered to a research of all aspects, activities, and strata of past human societies. Liberal Eclecticism in Historical Geography A point of view suggesting that no particular dogma about the nature of historical geography was to be promoted: the study of no problem, period, or place in the past was to be prohibited. Regionalism A fundamental concept in geography regarding the core of the discipline as the study of areas in their total composition or complexity. Regional geography dominated among geographers in the second half of the nineteenth and ﬁrst half of the twentieth centuries. Synthetic Approach in Urban Historical Geography An approach intended at the integration of different concepts, theories, and methodologies into a coherent method of research of urban past geographies. Urban History A subdiscipline in history concentrating on different social, economic, cultural, and political aspects of urban areas in the past. Urban Morphology A concept developed by the British geographers, Michael Conzen and Jeremy Whitehand, that approached urban settlements as the outcome of an unconscious production process of builtup areas that took place over long periods. Urban Studies An integrated discipline including researchers from all ﬁelds of social sciences that focus on the research of the urban phenomenon.

Introduction ‘‘Urban historical geography is no longer a fanciful label on an empty shelf in the geographer’s library.’’ This was Peter Goheen’s opening of a review published in 1984 on Harold Carter’s book titled An Introduction to Urban Historical Geography that was published about a year before. Following more than ﬁve decades of modern

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historical–geographical research, such an assertion im plies a fault of a subdiscipline that intends to study, as deﬁned by Robin Butlin, ‘‘ythe geographies of past times.’’ If that was true, it raises the question whether there was no research previous to the 1980s taken on the past of urban areas. Actually much has been written on different aspects of past urban areas by scholars from different academic disciplines. First among them were urban his torians, as well as economic and social historians that were also involved in the research of past urban areas. While history is the default discipline for researching the past, scholars from other disciplines were also involved in the research of past urban areas such as sociologists, architects, and urban planners, as well as scholars from several subdisciplines of geography: urban geographers, cultural geographers, social geographers, and economic geographers. Historical geographers avoided the research of urban areas for a long time. This was due to the dominance of the regionalism in geography during the time of the formation of modern historical geography in the 1920s and 1930s. The founding fathers of the subdiscipline concentrated on the research of rural areas especially of the pre Industrial Revolution British Isles, in which towns were considered as part of the regional system while their inner structure was not yet considered a subject of research. Urban studies were inaugurated in the United States in the 1910s and 1920s. This was mostly the endeavor of sociologists whose research concentrated on the evo lution and development of Midwestern American cities, especially Chicago. The growing interest in urban areas at that time followed the large scale nineteenth century Industrial Revolution that formed the modern world. Urban centers formed the hub of modernity and the urbanization process has fundamentally changed human geographies of Europe, North America, and on a smaller scale was transforming those of South America, Asia, and Africa. Robert Park, a Chicago based sociologist, was the leading ﬁgure among the founders of modern urban studies. He and his associates endeavored to form a model of city structure, epitomized by the well known zonal diagram presenting the concentric zone model of urban development and structure presented by Ernest Burgess in his introduction to the 1925 collection of essays titled The City, edited by Park himself and Roderick McKenzie. Renowned as the model of the

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ecological theory of the city, it suggested a format for urban growth and nature based on the experience of the American Midwest. The work of the so called Chicago school and followers in the 1930s and 1940s, most of which have been trained as sociologists and economists, developed different theoretical and methodological frames and insights for the apprehension of the urban phenomenon. These effected the formation of a new and integrated scholarship of urban studies that concentrated on different aspects of urban forms: physical, social, economic, and others. Their main interest was recent Western (i.e., European and North American) cities and towns. The question of the origins of cities seemed less signiﬁcant within the research of urbanity although not totally neglected. The research of the urban past: the history of cities, towns, and urban systems, emerged in Europe. European urban tradition was much longer than that of the Americas. Ancient and medieval towns attracted the interest of late nineteenth and early twentieth century scholars, mainly historians and social scientists researching a long time span urban evolution process. Different from the American urban ecology theory, Europeans developed an institutional theory of the city based on peculiar order and historical primacy of urban institutions. Max Weber, one of the founding fathers of sociology, took the effort in his work titled The City, ﬁrst published in 1921, to inte grate theories related to different institutions into one theory. His theory of urban community intended to form an integrated frame for conceiving the development of urban areas since early historical times. Both American and European sociologies played a major role in the formation of a research of urban areas in general and of urban history in particular. Nevertheless, sociologists’ aims and methods were not historical in essence. Research of different aspects of past urban areas took place in the ﬁrst decades of the twentieth century. The study of different aspects of classical cities had taken place already in the nineteenth century. Pierre Laven dan’s work on history of urban planning in the classical world and Henri Pirenne’s on medieval cities were published in parallel with the emergence of Park, Bur gess, and McKenzie’s ecological theory of the city. Yet, urban history did not form a subdiscipline until the early 1960s. Josef Konvitz regards the publication of four seminal works: Jean Gottmann’s Megalopolis, Lewis Mumford’s The City in History, Jane Jacobs’s The Death and Life of American Cities, and Daniel Burstin’s The Image, as a landmark in the formation of urban history in America. All four books proclaimed the relevance of urban history for the understanding of contemporaneous trends and planning a better future for cities. In the other side of the Atlantic it was the British historian, James Dyos, that initiated the formation of urban history as an academic subdiscipline. Dyos’s approach to urban history was in

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the tradition of the French school of histoire totale. He regarded urban history’s totality in terms of an integra tive scholarship embracing all aspects of urbanity: polit ical, economic, cultural, social, spatial, and demographic. The inauguration of two journals in the mid 1970s: the Journal of Urban History in the United States and Urban History in Great Britain mark the growing interest in different aspects of the past of urban areas. The research of history of urban areas was also the interest of scholars from other ﬁelds such as urban sociologists, economic historians and geographers, urban geographers, historians of architecture, and historians of town planning. The effort to form an integrated schol arship such as urban history attracted much criticism from other scholars interested in the urban past that ranged from deﬁning urban historians as no more than a clique based on Dyos and disciples to more evident criticism such as the lack of use of theory, over frag mentation, and being no more than a form of social history. Such intellectual debates had been persistent as geographers turned in the 1960s and 1970s to the re search of the history of urban areas.

Urban Historical Geography, the Beginnings In his seminal work on historical geography Robin Butlin detects the origins of historical geographical study to the early eighteenth century. Since then and until the 1950s, including the time of formation of modern historical geography, between the 1920s and the 1950s, urban settlements did not get much attention from historical geographers. Geography in those years adhered to the regional imperative that formed the outline and frame of research. Historical geographers’ main concern was re gional settlement history in the regional rather than in local or global scales. The research of urban areas was left to social and economic geographers and to a growing group of urban geographers. The post World War II Quantitative Revolution and rise of applied geography during the 1950s and 1960s brought about an increasing interest in contemporaneous geographies in which the urban phenomenon dominated. Geographers studying the evolution and growth of urban areas turned to the use of theories and methods developed mainly by social scientists. Historical geographers could not have avoided this turn in geography for long. Paul Wheatley, a student of Clifford Darby – the founding father of British modern historical geography, was among the ﬁrst that turned al ready in the 1960s to the research of historical urban geography. His work was based on a comparative and meticulous research of the historical geography of ur banism in East and Southeast Asia. Wheatley considered

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all early urban traditions as sharing an astrobiological paradigm of cosmological speculation that sought to demonstrate the unity of existence by invoking the re gularity of celestial understanding with the reality of biological irregularity on Earth. James Vance was another among the progenitors of urban historical geography. His doctoral thesis submitted in 1952 was on the suburban ization of Boston, and during the 1960s and 1970s, he turned to a broader research of the development of ur banization in Western civilization. He asserted the de velopment of modern urbanization as based on the link between capitalist development and formation of new transportation systems. Another group of geographers that researched the urban past were the scholars from the materialist school of urban morphology led by the British geographers, Michael Conzen and Jeremy Whitehand, that approached urban settlements as the outcome of an unconscious production process of built up areas that took place over long periods. They considered the morphology of urban areas as the product of the work of subsequent building activity of successive generations that leave their traces in the urban environment. Tracing and analyzing these layers reveals the origins and de velopment of urban areas. Scope and interests of historical and other geog raphers researching the urban past can be found in the Journal of Historical Geography that was inaugurated in 1975. Among the ﬁrst articles published in the journal was David Ward’s discussion of modernity and urban development in Victorian Britain. Ward had previously edited a volume discussing different aspects of nine teenth century American cities. Most articles published in the ﬁrst 5 years of the journal on urban subjects were reviews of books on urban history and morphology. American and British cities and towns have been the main foci of interest, although other areas were con sidered such as in the article of Kent Mathewson’s work on the evolution of Mayan cities of South America re ﬂecting the Saurian tradition of cultural and historical American geography or in that of Yehoshua Ben Arieh, the founding father of Israeli historical geography, on the role of Christian missions in the development of nine teenth century Jerusalem.

Deﬁnitions, Methodology, and Theory: Forming the Contours of Urban Historical Geography Growing number of publications on urban historical geography during the 1970s and early 1980s resulted in a debate over deﬁning and dividing historical geographers from other scholars specializing in the history of urban areas such as urban historians; social, economic, and urban geographers; and historians of architecture.

Richard Dennis’s introduction to his book on nine teenth century English cities published in 1984 provides an analysis of different views on the research of the past of urban areas. At the center was the debate between social scientists: urban sociologists, geographers, and economists that used either quantitative or structuralist theories and methods on the one hand, and the more eclectic urban, social, and economic historians relying on the research of case studies for drawing general conclu sions, on the other hand. The synthesis adopted by Dennis for his research of the urban historical geography of English nineteenth century towns was based on methods used by social historians and urban geographers. In the middle of his research stands the human agent and different aspects of the formation of urban space by human societies, rendering a thorough and inclusive analysis of urban life in the Victorian period. Different from Denis’s interpretative approach, Har old Carter presented in 1983 a positivist deductive method for forming a synthetic approach to urban his torical geography. The ﬁrst part of his research is dedi cated to the deﬁnition of cities, review of theories of urbanization, and to the history of the urban phenom enon since the beginning of history and its diffusion in ancient and medieval times. The second concentrates on urban population on functions of cities and on the evo lution of urban systems. The third deals with the evo lution of town planning and the last, with the internal functional and social structures of the city. Different from Dennis, who wished to form a method for urban histor ical–geographical research depicted in nineteenth cen tury British cities, Carter presented a historical overview of urbanism from which he aspired to draw a methodo logical inclusive framework. Nevertheless, the scope of his work, spare the ﬁrst part, is also limited to the European and North American cities. The rise of critical Marxist theory among geographers in the 1970s, whose main protagonist, David Harvey, concentrated on the urbanization process of the nine teenth and twentieth centuries, presented a major chal lenge to urban historical–geographical research. The ambitious attempt to use Marxist theory to form a holi stic view of the city and rapid transformation of modern urban areas seems to be a major challenge for both Dennis and Carter in forming an alternative view and method for the research of urban historical geography. The interpretative approach such as that of Richard Dennis attempted at a study of contemporaneous con cepts of cities on the one hand, and modern researchers’ concepts on these cities, on the other hand. In this sense the interpretative approach was a predecessor of the postmodern turn to social and cultural–historical geographies. Harold Carter seems to preserve a more positivist–conservative tradition of urban historical– geographical research that follows the school of

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materialist urban morphology, concentrating on the evolution of the morphology and functions of cities and towns from antiquity to the nineteenth century. The widening interest in urban historical geography in 1980s resulted in the evolution of an Anglo German group of urban historical geographers, following two seminars held in (West) Germany and Britain suc cessively in 1982 and 1983. The publication in 1988 of a volume edited by Dietrich Denecke and Gareth Shaw titled Urban Historical Geography: Recent Progress in Britain and Germany was the outcome of both seminars. Ac cording to the editors’ introduction, the main aim of the seminars was to initiate the formation of international cooperation in urban geographical–historical research and an international terminology of urban history and urban historical geography. Despite this, it seems as the forming of this venture was not intended to form a subdiscipline within historical geography but to form an interdiscipline group of urban historical geographers and urban historians. It seems rather obvious that the initiators of both seminars did not wish to form a methodological frame work for a school of historical geography. The volume edited by Denecke and Shaw provided a cross section of the work of contemporaneous urban historical geog raphers, at least those located in Britain and Germany. It ranged from more traditional research of urban morph ology, structure, and functions to social–historical geog raphy of cities and towns, from evolution of European towns in the Middle Ages to the formation of modern cities in the nineteenth century. Preservation of historical cites was also in the scope of this volume. The multi faceted quality of urban historical geography was also evident in the chapter titled ‘Historical geographies of urbanization’ included in Butlin’s work on historical geography that was published in 1993. The aim to form a supranational discussion group of urban historical geographers seemed to correspond to the views presented in 1992 by Richard Rodger, a British economic and urban historian and the editor of Urban History. Rodger considered the aim of the journal as embracing methodological, historiographical, and ana lytical contributions that would enable intertemporal and interdisciplinary interests to coalesce, united by a common interest in the town or city. Accordingly, urban history was the subdiscipline in which urban historical geographers should be operating among sociologists; political scientists; art, cultural, economic, and social historians; and architectural and planning historians interested in the study of urban history. Submerging into urban history and becoming partners in a wide interdisciplinary group may have been luring, but it also meant relinquishing the identity of geographers, which was not in the interest of urban historical geographers.

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Urban Historical Geography and the Cultural Turn in Geography The rise of a new cultural geography afforded historical geographers as a whole the opportunity to redesign their place within the discipline of geography. The cultural turn in geography was simultaneous to the endeavor to formulate a thematic group of urban historical geographers that took place in the 1980s. Similar to historical geography, cultural geography seemed also to be marginalized following the rise of quantitative methods followed by that of Marxist theories that placed economic and social geographies at the center of the discipline. Through the 1970s and 1980s historical geographers including those interested in urban areas strove to locate themselves, in the theoretical and methodological realms, among historical research, on the one hand, and theories and methods employed by main currents of geography, on the other hand. The subdiscipline was situated as regarded by Carville Earle ‘‘yin midstride, between empirical tradition and epistemological innovation, be tween the rock ribbed world of materiality and the elu sive worlds of representations’’ (Earle, 1995: 455–459). No wonder he considered ‘‘yhistorical geography is anything but uniﬁedy’’ and historical geographers as those whose research interests ‘‘yspan the spectrum of geographical researchy’’ (Earle, 1995: 455–459). These efforts hampered the attempt to form a well distinct group of urban historical geographers, forming a multifaced group among which some inclined to follow conservative methodologies while others tended to adopt theories and methods of social and economic geographies. Different from the invigoration of historical geog raphy, the Sauerian tradition that dominated cultural geography for decades seemed to be losing its appeal in the 1960s and 1970s. The rise of the humanistic school in geography and domination of Marxist theories, both as responses to dominant quantitative and systematic ap proaches, gave birth in the 1980s to a new cultural geography. By the late 1980s geography underwent a cultural turn that reformulated not only cultural geog raphy but other subdisciplines as well, including histor ical geography. Moreover, it was not geography alone that was affected by the cultural turn. All human sciences had to consider postcolonial critique that questioned the dominance of Western political and cultural concepts, as well as post structural critique raised by Continental philosophy on the relevance of Western models of soci ety. In short, the turn from modernism to a post modernism formed the fundamentals of the cultural turn in geography. Postmodernism has contested intellectual hierarchies and afforded the legitimization of plural views of the world. Many geographers adopted the use of

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the plural form ‘geographies’, rather than singular ‘geography’, to present a world of multiple identities and views that form different concepts of space and especially of places. The cultural turn among historical geographers in general and urban historical geographers in particular is evident through scrutinizing reports of historical geog raphy sessions that took place in different conferences since the early 1990s. Representations, identities, icon ographies, and discourses were frequently present in titles of presentations, side by side with older historical geographical traditions that concentrated on assimilation and settlement of immigrants in North America and development of industries and rural areas. In such an intellectual climate of epistemological, theoretical, and methodological transformations that blurred interdiscipline and subdiscipline lines of de marcation, the effort to deﬁne and articulate a group of urban historical geographers seemed irrelevant. This is reﬂected by Miles Ogborn’s discussion in Progress in Human Geography on the work of historical geographers in 1997. Relating to different categories of research he re gards the debate on relations between history and geography, in themes such as geography and empire, environmental history, memory, and heritage, and social and cultural histories. Works on cities and towns are mentioned in both latter categories, but not as a separate theme of research. Michael Heffernan, the former editor of the Journal of Historical Geography deﬁned the journal in his 1997 edi torial note as ‘‘ya haven of intelligent eclecticismy.’’ He followed the spirit of his predecessor, Alan Baker’s expansive vision of historical geography as ‘‘eclectic and liberal: no particular dogma about the nature of historical geography was to be promoted: the study of no problem, period or place in the past was to be prohibitedythe concern of the journal ought not to be the precise def inition and rigorous policing of historical geography’s borders.’’ The liberal and eclectic spirit of the journal reﬂected and inspired an intellectual climate that did not encourage the formation of subgroups concerned on one facet of historical–geographical research such as urban historical geography. The liberal and eclectic nature of historical geography is evident, sustained in the variety of publications on the subdiscipline and those published in both its stages: Journal of Historical Geography and Historical Geography. This is also true concerning edited volumes on historical geography such as that edited by Brian Graham and Catherine Nash titled Modern Historical Geographies published in 2000. Their use of the plural form ‘geog raphies’ presents the multifaced character of historical– geographical research and its liberal and eclectic nature. This is well articulated by Deryck Holdsworth in a paper titled ‘Historical geography: the ancients and the

moderns – generational vitality’ published in 2002 in Progress in Human Geography. He quotes Graham and Nash’s introduction regarding modern historical geog raphies ‘‘that signal new directions informed by femi nism, post structuralism, anti racism and post colonial perspectives sharing concerns about questions of power and meaning with other researchers more readily located within the traditional subdisciplines of economic, cul tural, political and social geography’’ (Holdsworth, 2002: 671–678). And notice the use of singular while referring to other subdisciplines of geography. The celebration of a modern historical geography does not imply the for mation of a ‘new’ historical geography but rather main tenance of the tradition of liberal eclecticism. This is also true regarding geographical–historical research of urban areas. A scrutiny of papers published on the urban phenomenon in The Journal of Historical Geography since the mid 1990s reveals a diversity of re search methods and subjects. Some trends of research could be, of course noted, as the almost total avoidance of ancient, medieval, and early modern cities and towns in favor of the research of modern urbanization that is of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Nevertheless, the effort to deﬁne borders and limits of urban historical geography seems to be neglected. Liberal eclecticism affords the recent urban historical geographer to easily mingle, in the academic sense, with urban historians and other practitioners of the urban past, becoming a part of a postmodern interdisciplinary scholarship whose interests are the search of the history of urbanism. See also: Industry, Historical Geographies of; Street Names and Iconography; Urban Morphologies, Historical.

Further Reading Basset, K. (2005). Marxian theory and the writing of urban history: On David Harvey’s Paris, capital of modernity. Journal of Historical Geography 31, 568 582. Butlin, R. A. (1993). Historical Geography: Through the Gates of Time and Space. London: Edward Arnold. Carter, H. (1983). An Introduction to Urban Historical Geography. London: Edward Arnold. Denecke, D. and Shaw, G. (eds.) (1988). Urban Historical Geography. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dennis, R. (1984). English Industrial Cities of the Nineteenth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Earle, C. (1995). Historical geography in extremis? Splitting personalities on the postmodern turn. Journal of Historical Geography 21, 455 459. Goheen, P. G. (1984). Book review on an introduction to urban historical geography by Harold Carter. The Geographical Review 74, 376 377. Graham, B. and Nash, C. (eds.) (2000). Modern Historical Geographies. London: Longman. Heffernan, M. (1997). Editorial: The future of historical geography. Journal of Historical Geography 23, 1 2. Holdsworth, D. W. (2002). Historical geography: The ancients and the moderns generational vitality. Progress in Human Geography 26, 671 678.

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Konvitz, J. W. (1993). Introduction. Journal of Urban History 19, 3 10. Ogborn, M. (1999). The realities between geography and history: Work in historical geography in 1997. Progress in Human Geography 23, 97 108. Rodger, R. (1992). Urban history: Prospect and retrospect. Urban History 19, 1 22.

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Vance, J. (1990). The Continuing City. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Wheatley, P. (1977). The suspended pelt. Reﬂections on a discarded model of spatial structure. In Deskins, D. R., Kish, G., Nyusten, J. D. & Olsson, G. (eds.) Geographic Humanism, Analysis and Social Action: A Half Century of Geography at Michigan, pp 47 108. Ann Arbor MI: Department of Geography, University of Michigan.

Historical Geography G. M. Winder, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universita¨t, Munich, Germany & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Cross-Sectional Analysis In parallel with the pattern of explanation in geomorphology current before 1950, Derwent Whittlesey organized his research around a series of reconstructions of past geographies. While this approach might highlight change over time, the explanatory power of his ‘sequent occupance’ approach remained at best weak and at worst mystifying. Detailed reconstructions of past geographies became associated with the work of many historical geographers, including H. C. Derby, and remain an important tool, as is illustrated in the many historical atlases published toward the end of the twentieth century. Geographical History This term has been used in different ways within debates over the scope and content of historical geography. Generally, the term was used either as a synonym for historical geography, or as a descriptor of the special case of the use of geographic factors to explain historical phenomenon. Thus, for example, Carville Earle argued for a revised historical geography, one that focused on geographical explanation of historical problems.

Introduction Geography and history overlap and the relations between them are complex and made more so by the many projects that expand and contract within and around the two ﬁelds as social science has been refashioned. As we work to understand and explain spatial distributions, landscape features, human–environment relationships, and ideas about space, place, and territory, geographers often require historical explanations, and need to theo rize processes and to establish which events, patterns, and changes were signiﬁcant. Similarly, historians often seek to understand the geographical contexts for the action they study, and to write histories of cities, regions, na tions, environments, environmental knowledge, and landscape features. Historians, like social scientists, have embraced new theorizations of place and space, mobility, and identity. As in all subject areas, approaches, methods, questions, and ideas arise and are abandoned, so that there is a history of changing ideas and projects. Par ticularly in the last two decades, researchers in the ﬁelds of history and geography have experienced an intense and dynamic period of exchange and development. However, while the academic ﬁeld of historical

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geography continues to expand and has become more and more a site for interdisciplinary research, the insti tutional support for the subdiscipline has narrowed, as geography departments favor appointments of geog raphers with thematic specializations, albeit with histor ical research interests. This situation could be read as a sign of the long term success of historical geography: it has helped to establish a permanent place for history within geography. The origins of historical geography lie in efforts to incorporate historical research at the regional scale on landscape change and past geographies into geography. The scope of this early work is outlined below. Regional historical geographies and work to reconstruct past geographies continue to be important matters of re search, but historical geography now embraces many other research foci. Studies of capitalism and its trans formative effects, research on environmental change and human–environment relations, and work interpreting the meanings of historical landscapes and landscape change are three other main constitutive areas of study. However, the ﬁeld of historical geography is rapidly expanding around new themes, such as postcolonial reinterpret ations of the history of empires, historical geographies of the colonized world, the connections between identity formation, and the spaces and places of nationalism, ethnicity, and gender. These and other new themes are outlined below. Historical geography is now a broad interdisciplinary ﬁeld of inquiry and not a narrowly de ﬁned subdiscipline of geography. This is a cause of some adjustment within geography, and the concerns of his torical geographers for their endeavor are discussed.

Setting a Place for History within Geography During the mid twentieth century, historical geographers struggled to assert historical methodologies and research questions ‘within’ geography, which at the time tended to emphasize spatial relationships in a geography of regions. Historical geographers such as H. C. Darby in the UK and Derwent Whittlesey in the USA focused on land scape change and process. Both cultivated the core practice of researching past geographies using forms of cross sectional analysis. Similarly, Carl Sauer in Los Angeles promoted studies of the diffusion of cultural objects and practices, borrowing from German geography as well as biology and anthropology. At Wisconsin, An drew Hill Clark fostered historical geographic work

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inside North America emphasizing regions and econ omies. After World War II, a new generation of historical geographers confronted the challenges of the quantitative revolution – is history needed for geography if geography is spatial science? – and the conservative politics of the Cold War decades – can historical explanation be in formed by Marxism? Cole Harris argued for geography as a project of regional–historical synthesis, as he and other geographers struggled against the growth of spatial science at the expense of humanistic geographies. Growing numbers of historical geographers met in an internationalizing but loosely organized conference. Human geography in general began to embrace and discuss historical explanation in new ways in the 1980s and 1990s. Spurred on by debates in the social sciences and history over historical materialism and structuralism, and by feminist theory and phenomenology, many human geographers looked for alternatives to positivist social science. Historical geographers drew inspiration from a wide range of social theory, and humanistic and feminist approaches. They researched diverse archival sources and wrestled with how these could be interpreted and what it meant to work in the archives. They brought new con cepts, frames of reference, subjectivities, questions, and topics as well as new quantitative methods, cartographic technologies, and forms of textual analysis to their desks, as they pursued new and alternative forms of historical explanation. At the same time, other geographers called for critical inquiry into the subjectivities of geography and their histories. Already by 1990, David Harvey conﬁdently argued that analysis of the production of space, the geographical imagination, and the historical geography of concepts of space and time were central to any critical enquiry into the contemporary world. He pushed for both a critical historical geography of capitalist trans formations of the world and a critical inquiry into the ways in which geographers framed time, change, and development. Simultaneously, Brian Harley challenged conventional histories of cartography, and mapping practices within historical geography, by drawing out the ways in which cartography had been structured to serve various state purposes. Dennis Cosgrove interrogated the concept of landscape in its historical European uses and found similar issues with geographers’ studies of land scape change. It seemed that historical geography would be central to a human geography that was moving beyond positivist framings of knowledge, but the distinctive ap proaches that emerged cut across earlier framings of historical geography as a subdiscipline of geography or ganized around inquiries into regional and landscape change and the analysis of past geographies, even as such research reached a high point of sophistication. The re sult has been a proliﬁc growth of historical geography but in a skein of divergent but entangled strands of research

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rather than a subdiscipline narrowly focused on land scape change and past geographies at the regional scale.

Research Foci within the Broad Field of Historical Geography Regional geographies and histories have continued as one thick braid of research. In North America, Donald Meinig and the many students of Andrew Clark were very active over several decades in research and com mentary in and around this approach. Their projects emphasized the dilemmas of (re)settlement and human– environment relations. Perhaps their efforts reached an apogee with the publication of Donald Meinig’s four volume The Shaping of America, Carville Earle’s Geo graphical Inquiry and American Historical Problems, Cole Harris’ The Resettlement of British Columbia, and the three volume Historical Atlas of Canada. Thematic mapping has an important place in this research, which drew on and contributed to theory and debates in economic, agri cultural, and urban history, and the work of the Annales School. North American regional historical geographers have contributed two key organizing ideas: the geo graphical personality of particular regions and the for mation of culture areas. This regional or area studies approach was not conﬁned to rural landscape change, but included important work on the appropriation of ‘new’ lands through colonialism, on urban systems and indus try. Nor was it conﬁned to North America or to ‘national’ projects. Historical geographers have written of a kalei doscopic array of regions and areas. Generally, these are synthetic works that draw together research on diverse phenomena and at many scales. Such research is now of considerable interest to those historians who are rescaling their research either to world, empire, regional, or even micro scales. A second braid of research brings together work on the historical geography of capitalism and its transfor mative effects through history. This historical geography research is now more substantial than the regional studies stream. It involves interest not only in how capital works and acts to construct and destroy speciﬁc landscapes, work rules, economies, and social identities, but also in the everyday life worlds, responses, resistances, and life chances of those living in a transforming, modernizing world. It ranges from the complex situated montages of the spaces and experiences of world’s fairs and dock work by Alan Pred, through Robert Lewis’ analyses of the remaking of North America’s metropolitan industrial spaces, Richard Harris’ unmasking of North American suburban development processes and experiences, Rich ard Dennis’ survey of English industrial cities, and M. Overton’s study of agrarian transformation in Eng land, to Richard Walker’s work on the capitalist framings

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and constructions of nature. In Montreal, Sheri Olson and Pat Thorndon led research into a wide range of urban experiences of the industrial city, including re search designed to identify and interpret the adaptive strategies and experiences of individuals in demographic and household economy terms and by class, ethnicity, gender, age, and family status. The construction of new spaces of consumption and segregated ethnic residential neighborhoods, and the contestation of public space have been other important areas for historical geographic re search, but there is a fantastic array of related studies. For example, in The Ride to Modernity, economic geographer Glen Norcliffe explored Canadians’ peculiar encounter with the bicycle and its spatial ramiﬁcations and social meanings as one of the ﬁrst mass produced consumer luxuries. Historical geographers working in this area have developed synergies and alliances with economic geog raphers; social and urban historians; demographers; labor, economic, and business historians; and cultural geog raphers; among others. Their research has broken with long held historical narratives summarizing spatial pro cesses under industrial capitalism. Such research also challenges many accepted ideas, theories, and foun dational concepts used to understand and represent the signiﬁcance of present reconﬁgurations of uneven de velopment under capitalist processes. Together, environmental transformations and human– environment relations comprise another plait within historical geography. This is a research area with an illustrious pedigree: there are ancient scholarly works on these subjects; modern scholarship is associated with Alexander von Humboldt, George Perkins Marsh, Vidal de la Blache, and E´lise´e Reclus. Alan Baker identiﬁes an entanglement of roots with historical ecology as practiced in anthropology and biogeography. Pierre Gourou’s groundbreaking research into laterization in tropical environments is also part of this legacy. Midway through the twentieth century, Man’s Role in Changing the Face of the Earth, an encyclopedic survey on the subject edited by William Thomas, drew together an interdisciplinary who’s who of the ﬁeld. This feat was echoed in 1990 with another edited volume The Earth as Transformed by Human Action. These themes remain important foci for research within historical geography. One consistent interest has been in the reconstruction of past natural environments. Another focus of attention is on human impact on natural environments. Here, historical geographers such as Donald Meinig who worked out the historical environ mental limits of the American Great Plains and the South Australian wheat belt, J. M. Powell who evaluated water management in Victoria, Australia, and Michael Wil liams, Graeme Wynn, and Michael Roche who each wrote on forests (mis)management, have made sub stantive contributions. Andrew Goudie has penned an introduction to the subject that has served the purpose

for a long time now. This is a subject that requires con tributions from physical geographers, and some, such as Stanley Trimble, have obliged. There is also a need for further research on another related strand: the history of perceptions of natural environments. These efforts of historical geographers are now aug mented by a burgeoning literature in environmental history from the pens of such as Donald Worster, Richard White, Alfred Crosby, William Cronon, Caroline Mer chant, and Richard Grove. Environmental history sprouted in the USA but has now been set to work in many lands. Its practitioners have tended to embrace environmentalist values and write critically of past human interactions with environments. Their research projects are pitched at diverse scales from global patterns of species diffusion to local studies of dams and wetlands. In particular, environmental historians have picked up on the study of urban environments, on animal histories, and on the history of perceptions of the environment and of science networks related to environmental knowledge. There is a growing trafﬁc in ideas and practices between historical geographers researching environmental trans formations and human–environment relations and en vironmental historians. However, there are multiple, entangled strands of research in this thriving ﬁeld of interdisciplinary research. Landscape interpretation and landscape change are further key themes for historical geographers. Generally, the foundational work in historical geography focused on the making of landscapes. Carl Sauer, W. G. Hoskins, and J. B. Jackson (founding editor of the American journal Landscape) were major mid twentieth century ﬁgures writing to understand the making of national and re gional landscapes. Their interests have been taken up inside historical geography in the subsequent works of Wilbur Zelinsky, Pierce Lewis, Fred Kniffen, Yi Fu Tuan, Michael Conzen, Derek Holdsworth, and many others in North America, and of Della Hooke, Hugh Prince, and others in the UK. This tradition emphasizes landscape design, environmental awareness, and their manifestation in, especially, vernacular landscapes. Nevertheless, its subject matter ranges from urban and suburban street scapes, through public and religious buildings and monuments, factories, ofﬁce towers and banks, to back yards, public gardens, cemeteries, and national parks. Particular attention has been paid to non Western land scape design as, for example, in Hong key Yoon’s publi cations on geomancy. Historical geographers share their interests in these topics with professionals in archi tectural history, folk studies, anthropology, and archae ology and in museum studies among other specializations. The meanings of landscape constitute a second main, but not necessarily separate, theme of landscape studies. Indeed, historical and cultural geographers writing on the

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making of landscapes were equally interested in the meanings of landscape, especially in the structures and practices of landscape design and also in terms of his tories of landscape styles, and cultural interpretations of speciﬁc landscapes. Nevertheless, the emergence in the 1980s of the new cultural geography transformed writing in historical geography on the meanings of landscape. By asserting that a landscape is a material object that manifests many discourses, the new cultural geography fostered a burgeoning, critical literature on the meanings of landscape. This literature, heralded by Denis Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels’ edited collection The Iconography of Landscape, emphasizes symbolic landscape representation in the past, the power relations manifest in such repre sentations, and their work in forming identity, memory, and heritage. Attention has turned to many forms of landscape representation that were not the main foci for earlier research, including landscape painting, travel writing, literature, money, and exhibitions. Cultural geographers such as Denis Cosgrove, Stephen Daniels, Brian Osborne, James Duncan, Jeanne Kay Guelke, Pyrs Gruffudd, Emily Gilbert, Mona Domosh, and Suzanne Seymour have delighted in studying the representational systems and meanings of the past, so that their work has added multiple new strands of research to the broad ﬁeld of historical geography. There are many other subjects that could be proﬁtably included in this review, but a full account of historical geography’s tangled web is really beyond the scope of this article. Geographers are interrogating imperialism as part of postcolonial reinterpretations and critiques of the history of empires and are writing historical geographies of the colonized world. Historical geographies of identity probe the connections between nationalism, transna tionalism, ethnicity, identity, globalization, and place. Geography as a scientiﬁc and educational practice has a historiography that is being critically reviewed. There are collaborative projects in geographic information system (GIS) and remote sensing to recreate and reinterpret past geographies. The roles of geographers in past imperial ism, cartography, land survey, and Orientalism are properly the subjects of critical enquiry. There are new historical geographies of the present which analyze the use of aids to memory and nostalgia as active forces in today’s landscapes. Brian Graham and Catherine Nash identiﬁed one major interest in the study of modernity, but even the title of their reader, Modern Historical Geographies, asserts an array of approaches, concepts, and perspectives. Attention continues to be directed to many other eras, and historical geographers write from many perspectives and pursue an array of approaches. Different contexts have inﬂected speciﬁc ‘national’ foci for historical geography research, and this means that it is problematic to read off the content of historical geography from trends in the UK and USA alone. In New

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Zealand and Australia, historical geography has long been identiﬁed with research into environmental man agement, land use change, colonial land alienation and resettlement, and now with interpretation of colonial cultural landscapes. By contrast, in Canada, urban, in dustrial, and cultural landscape foci are each equally as important as environmental history or colonialism. In Japan, pre nineteenth century geographies have been a main focus of interest, but there is new research on more recent periods, and especially in Japan’s engagement with modernity and imperialism. In both Singapore and Israel, historical geographers have been directly confronting the colonial and postcolonial policies that have shaped their countries. In Germany and Eastern Europe, environ mental and land use change has emerged as the main spring of historical geography, but in each case, it is problematic to make more than these cursory comments, since the ﬁeld is in ﬂux and ‘national’ styles of historical geography are inherently problematic. Fluidity is also true of the institutional frameworks for historical geography. As governments transform their research funding opportunities, geographical research is increasingly organized in research groups and teams and the institutional contexts for historical geography morph. As individual geography departments refocus their pro grams, there is often no room for a dedicated ‘historical geographer’, and few such positions are advertised, but it is also expected that geographers of all kinds will be historically informed and inquiring. This means that many departments are homes to excellent historical geographic research but that this is seldom organized under the framework of a department of geography with a chair in the historical geography of a particular region. Colleagues appointed in GIS, physical, cultural, eco nomic, social, or urban geography turn their attentions to historical problems and research. Some historians are housed in geography departments, and there is also movement the other way. In these changed circum stances, knowledge of regional geographies and histories, the historical geography of capitalism, environmental transformations, human–environment relations, past landscapes, archival resources, and historical research methods remain crucial to much research.

Historical Geography in Review The ways in which historical geographers conceive of their ﬁeld of study have changed considerably over the last 50 years. Contrasting three reviews of historical geography illustrates the point. In his 1962 classiﬁcation, H. C. Darby framed historical geography as a sub discipline of geography which comprised research into geographies of the past, changing landscapes, the role of the past in the present, and the role of

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geographical factors and explanations in historical re search, or geographical history. Darby’s seemingly programmatic statement reﬂected the struggles of mid twentieth century historical geographers within geography and has been criticized from many quarters in subsequent years. Nevertheless, his review was meant to open a general ﬁeld of inquiry rather than to constrain research. When deﬁning historical geography for The Dictionary of Human Geography in 2000, Daniel Clayton declared that ‘‘geographical work on the past has become eclectic and no new orthodoxy for historical geography is likely to emerge.’’ Such work is self consciously interdisciplinary or without disciplinary label. Clayton leaves the im pression that ‘historical geography’ is a label attached to a modernist project of academic disciplines that has less and less purchase as critiques of the foundational narra tives of modernity have intensiﬁed. However, for Clay ton, the legacy of the subdiscipline continues to make its ﬂagship Journal of Historical Geography a valuable arena for research and debate. By way of contrast, in a review of the relations be tween history and geography published in 2003, Alan Baker acknowledges no old orthodoxy for historical geography and instead identiﬁes three general ap proaches within a broad interdisciplinary ﬁeld of his torical geography – locational geographies and histories, environmental histories and geographies, and landscape studies – and a fourth, integrative approach that em phasizes region and area. He argues that regional geog raphies and histories have a claim to be at the center of historical geographic research because they are integra tive in an explicitly geographic way and might draw from any of the other three approaches. Nevertheless, Baker is at pains to highlight ‘‘the diversity, the coherence and the relevance of historical geography’’ and ‘‘to reconcile some of the oppositions perceived within it and also between historical geography and history’’ (Baker, 2003). While he unabashedly seeks to discern order in the de velopment of historical geography and rules of engage ment in discourse, he welcomes experiment, dialog and encounter and denies that there ever was a narrowly deﬁned historical geography concerned only with the reconstruction of past geographies and their changes over time. Historical geography is, as ever, evolving. There are discernible trajectories but just how these are evaluated depends a great deal upon one’s point of view. Many historical geographers express concern over the prospects for their subdiscipline and discipline. Their concern seldom arises from any sense of seeing their subject area ‘invaded’ by other interests, whether by cultural geog raphers or environmental historians. Instead, they express the belief that critical geographers represent historical geography as stuck in positivist, cross sectional, and

regional practices, while ignoring most of the substantive research in the ﬁeld. These historical geographers con tend that, as other interesting and productive foci have emerged and present challenging and inspirational ﬁnd ings, there is now too little attention to region, urban system, ecosystem, or watershed in (historical) geo graphic research. They perceive a danger that the sweep of regional and systems change will be missed and his torical explanation eschewed. At the same time, many historical geographers inter pret the same developments in a different way: they celebrate the continued growth and expansion of a dy namic ﬁeld of interdisciplinary research with many new and interesting concepts, theories, and frameworks for research. Historical geographers are in dialog with his torians of all kinds: economic, social and cultural geog raphers, geographical information scientists, even physical geographers. Theorizing space, place, landscape, maps, populations, cities, and environment is increasingly important in history. This is seen in the many col laborative projects and teams of researchers that have emerged in environmental history, urban history, social science history, history of cartography, landscape and cultural studies, and historical demography. For example, some new works in New Zealand history have featured teams of geographers, historians, and other social scien tists. These include not only the Bateman Historical Atlas of New Zealand but also Tom Brooking and Eric Pawson’s Environmental Histories of New Zealand, and Barbara Brookes, Anne Cooper, and Robin Law’s Sites of Gender. Indeed, the authors publishing in the pages of The Journal of Historical Geography have increasingly diverse backgrounds. Within geography, time, memory, and the past have proved to be of continuing interest as geographers seek to research uneven development in space just as the world seems more intimately wired and networked than ever before. In each and every the matic subdiscipline, geographers need to develop suitable historical geographies relevant to their subject matter. Historical geography is open to new approaches and is currently expanding as critical geographical work on the past proliferates. The subdiscipline’s borders are open, and bridges across the ‘divide’ with history are multi plying. Historical geography is now more eclectic and more experimental than ever before. Simultaneously, historical geographical research has never been more relevant as social scientists and historians try to work out what aspects of the twenty ﬁrst century world are new, and how they are signiﬁcant: after all, the twentieth century is history. It is most certainly the best time yet to be doing historical geography. See also: Landscape; Phenomenology/Phenomenological Geography; Regional Geography II.

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Further Reading Baker, A. R. H. (2003). Geography and History: Bridging the Divide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Baker, A. R. H. (2007). Classifying geographical history. The Professional Geographer 59(3), 344 356. Brookes, B., Cooper, A. and Law, R. (eds.) (2003). Sites of Gender: Women, Men and Modernity in Southern Dunedin, 1890 1939. Auckland: Auckland University Press. Butlin, R. A. (ed.) (1993). Historical Geography: Through the Gates of Space and Time. London: Edward Arnold. Conzen, M. (ed.) (1990). The Making of the American Landscape. Oxford: Routledge. Cosgrove, D. and Daniels, S. (eds.) (1988). The Iconography of Landscape: Essays on the Symbolic Representation, Design and Use of Past Environments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gentilcore, R. L., Measner, D., Walder, R. H., Matthews, G. J. and Moldofsky, B. (eds.) (1993). Historical Atlas of Canada, Vol. II: The Land Transformed. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press. Goudie, A. (1981). The Human Impact on the Natural Environment. Oxford: Blackwell. Graham, B. and Nash, C. (2000). Modern Historical Geographies. Harlow: Pearson Education. Harris, R. C. (1971). Theory and synthesis in historical geography. Canadian Geographer 15, 157 172. Harris, R. C. (1997). The Resettlement of British Columbia: Essays on Colonialism and Geographical Change. Vancouver, BC: UBC Press.

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Harris, R. C. and Matthews, G. J. (eds.) (1987). Historical Atlas of Canada, Vol. I: From the Beginning to 1800. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press. Harvey, D. (1990). Between space and time: Reﬂections on the geographical imagination. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 80, 418 434. Hoskins, W. G. (1995). The Making of the English Landscape. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Kerr, D., Holdsworth, D. W., Laskin, S. L. and Matthews, G. J. (eds.) (1990). Historical Atlas of Canada, Vol III: Addressing the Twentieth Century 1891 1961. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press. McKinnon, M., Bradley, B. and Kirkpatrick, R. (1997). Bateman New Zealand Historical. Atlas Ko Papatuanuku e Takoto Nei. Albany: David Bateman and Department of Internal Affairs. Meinig, D. (1988 2004). The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Norcliffe, G. (2001). The Ride to Modernity: The Bicycle in Canada, 1869 1900. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press. Pawson, E. and Brooking, T. (eds.) (2002). Environmental Histories of New Zealand. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Philo, C. (1994). History, geography and the ‘still greater mystery’ of historical geography. In Gregory, D., Martin, R. & Smith, G. (eds.) Human Geography: Society, Space and Social Science, pp 252 281. Basingstoke: MacMillan.

Historical Geography, Evolution of J. M. Powell, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Cultural Landscape Initially, those elements in the landscape which have been fashioned (from a supposedly ‘natural’ landscape) by human agency, implying potential for change under the impress of succeeding ‘cultures’; later, the notion of foundational, wholly pristine blank slates was disputed, but the underlying idealization was not abandoned. Domesday Book A detailed administrative survey of the resources of the bulk of England, compiled in 1086 on the orders of William the Conqueror; famously employed by H.C. Darby and his associates in interpretative reconstructions of the human geography of the eleventh-century England. Enlightenment Traditionally, an eighteenth-century philosophical movement animated by a resolute faith in human reason and linked with portentous developments within and beyond Europe; recent reformulations variously reject and qualify aspects of deﬁnition, timing, and location. Historiography In the context of this article, the study of the development over time of research and writing, contributing to the evolution of a discipline or subdiscipline. Postmodernism Characterized broadly, in the context of this article, by a skepticism toward the status and claims made for earlier theorizing; it lends itself to styles of interpretation that show how the location (in culture, class, etc.) of authors and readers inﬂuences how a text (document, data, map) is produced and used.

Nurturing Interface, to World War I As noted in the several inﬂuential overviews on which this summary draws, key Western European origins can be traced to intellectual and vernacular understandings of the interaction between human communities and their physical environments – including humanities style preoccupations and scientiﬁc or proto scientiﬁc apprais als of the ‘classical’ worlds of Greece, Rome, and Egypt in English, French, and German writings. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, evolving inter relationships between geography and history favored the analysis of contemporary cartographic evidence and adaptations of mapping techniques in the study of underlying territorial themes. To some extent, that also applies to reﬂections upon the development of

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environmental concepts and attitudes, and the inﬂuence of environmental conditions on human affairs. Imaginative responses to the increasing pace and complexity of change underpinned a progressive reﬁne ment of scholarship during the nineteenth century. Pre miums on ‘place’ and ‘space’ were enhanced by direct and vicarious experience of global tumult: collisions between bustling nation states; expanding frontiers of settlement in a so called New World; the spread of European im perialism; political, racial, and social friction; revo lutionary innovations in transport and communication; and vastly augmented opportunities for commercial trade. Confronting displacement attended deep seated transformations at every scale. From today’s vantage point, the sum of those pressures seems to invite the urgent engagement of specialist academic geographers. But university geography seldom attained freestanding status before the early years of the twentieth century, and that helps to explain why early allusions to ‘historical geography’ have been so readily dismissed as con ventional acknowledgments of the value of environ mental and locational ‘backgrounding’ to mainstream history. In fact, they may also be seen as modest antici pators of an independent initiative.

Distinctive Emergence, to c. 1960 There was less equivocation after the foundation of au tonomous departments of geography in the universities of the Western world. In that novel setting, neophyte brands of historical geography attracted sojourners and immigrants from other branches of human geography, and from economic and other corners of history. Con tinuity was similarly apparent in histories of exploration and cartography, and in sorties into the history and philosophy of science. During the ﬁrst three decades of the twentieth century, a growing number of British practitioners created a robust hub of activity. Impressions of contemporary German work on the genesis of cultural landscapes, and on the potential utility of historical geography’s intermediate position between geography and history for interpretative regional analyses, may have done something to prepare the way. Awareness of the interdisciplinary work of French historians may have contributed toward a greater receptivity. Initially, British geographers seemed generally content with the argument that, insofar as an interest in the antecedents of the present was relatively common to the subject at large, the adjective ‘historical’ could be safely

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applied across the board. A minority strove instead to deﬁne a new subdisciplinary area characterized by a cul tivation of expertise in the handling of preferred types of evidence. H.C. Darby’s edited collection of essays on the historical geography of England suggested a useful pre cedent. Its cross sectional studies of the prehistoric, Roman, and Scandinavian periods employed an enter prising mixture of source materials; depictions of other, later Britains were selectively compiled from the re connaissance accounts of contemporary travelers. These ambitious ‘slices’ or period samples were complemented by essays on evolutionary (‘vertical’) themes – develop ments in trade; century long panoramas – and by more concentrated analyses of regional change, both rural and urban. Devised as avowedly methodological compromises, they would be seen nonetheless as exemplars of ‘classical’ historical geography. Precisely dated reconstructions often facilitated manageable projects and staked out new terri tory – disciplinary allegiance being disclosed in linkages (of familiar content or focus) with interpretative geog raphies of the present. ‘Slicing’ was seldom rigidly con ﬁned, however, and the narrative or connecting essays built conﬁdence, credibility, and interdisciplinary exposure. An impressive body of pioneering work was com pleted between the 1930s and 1950s. American ap proaches reﬂected differences in institutional history, intellectual legacies and perceptions of civic responsi bilities, and perhaps greater susceptibilities to the pre dilections of foundation scholars. To some extent there was also a greater interest in tracing the inﬂuence of locational and environmental factors on the course of history, together with an identiﬁably ‘new world’ interest in environment–community relationships and the mak ing of regional distinctiveness. On the other hand, Ralph Brown produced an innova tive cross section of the Eastern seaboard of the United States in 1810; indeed, he tried to reproduce the writing style of an imagined contemporary author, restricting the reconstruction to materials conceivably available to that author. Brown in 1948 followed up with a nationwide historical geography, the structure of which has been de scribed as an American version of Darby’s successful ex empliﬁcation. In contrast, Carl Sauer’s research school focused upon long term human–environment relation ships, particularly in the Americas. Its strongest historical geographical themes promoted regional approaches to the production of ‘cultural’ (or human modiﬁed) landscapes, the early domestication of plant and animal species, and induced or accelerated environmental deterioration. Commentators on this school have discerned a respect for traditional German scholarship and the effects of formative encounters with American frontier settlement. Convenient anthologies underline a markedly liberal outlook cultivated in the company of colleagues in anthropology, archaeology, botany, ecology, and physical geography.

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In the light of the rather more conservative inter disciplinarity embraced by his British and European counterparts, Sauer’s writings could be made to appear hazardously idiosyncratic, but there is no doubt that he inspired generations of talented researchers. In any event, national contrasts were (and are) exaggerated. For ex ample, Darby’s expertise on wetland reclamation con tributed an important linking essay in his ﬁrst edited collection on England; his later publications included a book on the same theme and several broader pieces on the changing English landscape, the making of English agricultural regions, and the clearing of Europe’s wood lands. In the interim, British economic historians had picked up the landscape theme. National differences notwithstanding, by the later 1950s the reservoir of his torical geographical material was already emphatically international and widely accessible: in practice, large numbers of scholars and students were introduced to its full range of approaches and content. Given those de velopments, the contribution of Andrew Clark, one of Sauer’s most distinguished students, is not satisfactorily described as ‘American’, ‘European’, or ‘British’. His major books and appeals for the closer interdisciplinary study of regional and environmental change sketched out an inviting middle ground on both sides of the Atlantic, and indeed in both hemispheres.

Core Elaborations, from c. 1960 By the 1960s historical geography’s widened purview broadly echoed the expanding project of human geog raphy and drew some of its readership and material from geography and history at large. In the process, the sin gular appeal of classical reconstruction was diluted. Ab sorbed within a vastly augmented international academy, historical geography became caught up in the swirling interchanges that enlivened the burgeoning humanities and social sciences. It remained theoretically feasible, documentation permitting, to shadow any major enter prise within present orientated human geography with an historical counterpart, but it was seldom possible or proﬁtable to establish either points of origin or modes of diffusion. Some historical geographers remained more comfortable with co options of modern geographical techniques to clarify questions posed by historians. As in other ﬁelds, however, older scholarly goals proved quite resilient. They repeatedly surfaced in the form of the connoisseurial essay or keynote monograph directed to the cognoscenti, or as an ambitiously ‘accessible’ book espousing civic engagement. By 1962 Darby was espousing an elementary tax onomy for the growing ﬁeld: ‘past geographies’, ‘changing landscapes’, ‘the past in the present’, and ‘geographical histories’. In practice, as explained in Baker, 2003, the ﬁrst

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of these categories remained the most inclusive because it subsumed all forms of geographical enquiry related to the past. Impressive studies of medieval England by Darby and his associates illustrated a potential for greater sophistication in the special uses made of the celebrated Domesday Book, various taxation assessments, and other monumental data banks. Updated essays edited by Darby advertised the progressively expanding scope of geo graphical investigations into the past and produced sturdier combinations of ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ ap proaches. A seven volume Domesday series delivered about 800 maps illustrating aspects of the geography of England in some AD 1086. Cumulatively, these analyses demonstrated the emergence of an area of intellectual inquiry in which hitherto underused technical and statistical materials were being brought into sharper relief alongside continuing resort to older ‘qualitative’ emphases. The trend continued into the 1980s and beyond, partly in tandem with developments in ‘cultural’, ‘economic’, ‘environmental’, ‘political’, and ‘social’ approaches within human geography at large, but without sacriﬁcing the links with history and certainly not at the expense of an entrenched, humanities style regard for individualistic essays. A prodigious literary output conﬁrmed historical geography’s status as an established scholarly ﬁeld that deﬁed simplistic characterization. Baker’s persuasive overview ﬁnds four overlapping modern discourses: ‘lo cation’, ‘environment’, ‘landscape’, and ‘region’. His clas siﬁcation serves to emphasize that, to date, human geography has generally supplied the critical connections. It also recognizes that varieties of ‘overlapping’ may apply to the interests of individual practitioners as well as to the content of pertinent undergraduate programs. Several of the works already mentioned are conveni ently accommodated under the ‘location’ heading, toge ther with later reﬁnements on nineteenth century distributions. Good cases were also made for undeniably ‘geographical’ quantiﬁcations. But the interface was also enriched by discoveries or rediscoveries of ‘space’ and ‘place’ by Western historians and social scientists. Under ‘environment’, most indicative bibliographies include a number of national atlases and Glacken’s elegant treatise on early ideas on human–environment relationships. As with every other category, historical geographies of the environment have also been embedded in broader geo graphical works, and resonate with companion works from other disciplinary homes. Baker’s ‘landscape’ division conﬁrms that observation. Convergences on landscape perception and appreciation, landscape heritage preser vation, public memory, and the formation of regional and national identity gave abundant openings for cross dis ciplinary work. Geography’s participation produced nu merous books and a host of articles and unpublished theses.

The works of historical geography’s early pioneers ﬁt well enough into the main groupings, but continuity is perhaps most evident in Baker’s ﬁnal category, insofar as ‘region’ designates a core concept for geography as a whole. Yet in this instance the problematical impact of variations in scholarly contexts becomes particularly signiﬁcant – diverse legacies of formal and informal learning traditions; the changing interplay between international and national research networks; inherent opportunities and constraints in speciﬁc archival en dowments; anxieties and enthusiasms stimulated by dis crete economic, environmental, political, social, and political imperatives; and so on. The category warrants as much art as science, and indeed positively invites strongly expressed opinion as well as methodology and mode of presentation. Similarly, exercises in national and international synthesis have covered a wide spectrum of issues and themes – concerning either urban develop ment, say, or agriculture, industry, transportation and trade, banking, communication, or all of those and more, as outlined in Butlin’s Historical Geography. Given such embarrassment of choice even the most provocative essays may be tolerated, welcomed, and occasionally prized. One outcome is better seen as a more reﬁned eluci dation of the complexities of large scale geographical differentiation than as a resumption of geography’s oldest and boldest ideal of ‘comprehensive’ regional synthesis: ‘selective’ being more accurate. Perhaps it reﬂects dis passionate scholarship, deeply personal commitment, and civic engagement, in equal measures. In the Northern Hemisphere, for instance, Sauer’s early identiﬁcation of ‘culture areas’ based upon the evolution of patterns of living was adapted between the 1960s and 1990s, when the nature of arguably distinctive American regions was busily revisited and ethnicity and landscape were repeatedly emphasized. For the later years the most prominent overview is Meinig’s courageously individualistic per spective on 500 years of American history. It testiﬁes to the author’s profoundly geographical conceptualization of his own country – as a special or ‘particular’ system or structure of places that had been created by people en gaged with particular locations, and with particular physical environments, at home and abroad. Elsewhere, Dodgshon and Butlin edited process orientated alternatives to Darby’s synthesis on England and timely accounts for Europe; and geopolitics informed several panoramic narratives, including ‘spatial stories’ on the legacies of Western opportunism in the Middle East. In the Southern Hemisphere, disputatious dialog be tween popular and ofﬁcial land appraisals, inspections of trial and error testing on settlement frontiers, and in terpretations of evolving government policy for resource management, were central to Australian regional studies. Cultural transactions between Europeans and colonized

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communities underpinned new historical geographies of South Africa. Trans hemisphere studies included a cul tural historical geography of the inﬂuences of political and social idealism, environmental imagery, and utopian notions in regional settlement processes, and a three volume interpretation of the historical geography of the oceanic realm of the Paciﬁc. Geographers also became more concerned with con temporary formations of national identity, cultural geographical perspectives on the unfolding ‘moral geog raphy’ of the times, representations of cities as types of performance space, and the changing cultural topography and perceived resource endowments of the British Empire in its representation as a spatial system. These trends were accompanied by an imaginative harnessing of new and revisited sources and ﬁnely textured interrogations of more recent periods. As Butlin explains, the increasing penetration of nineteenth and twentieth century con texts called for more sophisticated consultations with census data and other statistical materials; newspapers, personal diaries, and business, school, institutional, and municipal records commanded commensurately higher premiums, but so did contemporary art, literature, music, and oral evidence. Cliff and others produced an enter prising statistical account of global epidemiology; Harley and others warned against casual reliance on con temporary maps; Ryan established that contemporary photography offered a neglected imperial archive. Un fortunately, venerable links with physical geography were commonly allowed to atrophy, and historical geographers with strong environmental interests were drawn toward the burgeoning, late arrived counterpart, ‘environmental history’. Intensifying interest in the modern era also justiﬁed an organizing focus on the very question of ‘modernity’ or modernism. Inevitably, many researchers have felt obliged to re examine the contemporary scholarly and civic engagements of the leaders and followers in their own subject, and where relevant to incorporate an ad justed coming to terms into their reconstructions of their own national territories in past periods. In turn, ‘post modernism’ reacted against all manner of alleged pre sumption by the modernists, subject specialisms included. Our ﬁnal section takes the point a little further.

Histories of Geographical Thought Geographical historiography simultaneously proclaims a stand alone, unfettered pursuit, and nourishment for the very conscience of the discipline at large. At the outset its kinship with historical geography exhibited shared skills and scholarly predilections, and commonalities of at traction to certain past periods. Later, increasing spe cialization threatened the relationship, but it endures.

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One international journal, Geographers: Biobibliographical Studies, has published a large number of succinct studies of the contributions made by individuals to geographical thought. Its rubric does not exclude nonacademic pro ﬁles, and to some extent recognizes proto scientiﬁc contributions. Furthermore, it is already considered a modest entry point for understandings of the evolution of geographical thought in a few national communities. For example, in the case of notionally ‘new’ countries like Australia, the journal already offers a ﬁrst port of call – with prompts on the engagements of a sizable group of explorers, writers, statesmen, independent environmental scientists, and others in governmental agencies, as well as on professionally designated geographers and other university personnel. The study of the history of geographical thought has been reinvigorated by a surprisingly small number of researchers over recent decades. While the traditional relationship with historical geography is afﬁrmed, several of the group’s most noted writings quite properly engage with the larger gatherings convened under the ‘history and philosophy of science’ banner. Research abstracting services, the Journal of Historical Geography, Progress in Human Geography, and geography’s leading ‘mixed’ international periodicals, record an increasingly lively presence which challenges not only mainstream historical geography but all branches of academic geography. A few examples must sufﬁce. ‘Modern’ geography commonly located its origins in a period of famously empirical learning – in an elevated regard for ‘observation’, ‘rationality’, and ‘order’; in heroic oceanic explorations and advances in cartography; and in the works of towering individuals such as Humboldt and Ritter – in short, in an era known as ‘the Enlightenment’, routinely conﬁned to the eighteenth century. Recent writings have disputed the assumptions of universality and chronology in this conceptualization. For fellow travelers in historical geography, Livingstone in 1992 built a bridge toward circumspection, and Liv ingstone and Withers in 1999 introduced the rapidly diversifying terrain of science history. Students and tea chers alike became more prepared to reconsider the taken for granted titles applied to academic special izations and long entrenched ‘eras’ or periods of change: it seemed perfectly feasible to discuss, for instance, ‘Enlightenment’s geographies’ and ‘geography’s en lightenments’. Subsequent consolidations took British narrators well beyond commonly preferred boundaries, and challenged deep seated prejudices against geography’s prescientiﬁc lineage. Venturing further still, Livingstone in 2003 pointed out that ‘place’ has in fact been rather critical in the evolution of science. Histories of scientiﬁc practice might therefore supply yet another focus for reconstructions of the geographies of the past.

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Issues As its particular scholarly tradition discloses, historical geography’s original roots had been repeatedly acknow ledged before the two decades or so preceding the new millennium, when there were perceptible intensiﬁcations of ‘interdisciplinary’ activity. As with so many other es tablished ﬁelds, despite built in recognitions of debts owed to initial allegiances, latent centrifugal tendencies have probably been strengthened. Historiography’s most elementary lesson cautions that, when entailed obli gations are readily overlooked, it is at some cost to intergenerational transfers of knowledge and to the very retention of disciplinary identity. See also: Cultural Geography; Darby, H. C.; Diaspora; Enlightenment Geography; Geohistory; Heritage; Historical Geography; Modernity; Moral Landscapes; Postmodernism/Postmodern Geography; Region; Ritter, C.; Sauer, C.; von Humboldt, A.

Further Reading Baker, A. R. H. (2003). Geography and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bassin, M. (1999). Imperial Visions. Nationalist Imagination and Geographical Expansion in the Russian Far East, 1840 1865. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brown, H. C. (1948). Historical Geography of the United States. New York: Harcourt Brace. Brown, R. H. (1943). Mirror for Americans: The Likeness of the Eastern Seaboard, 1810. New York: American Geographical Society. Butlin, R. A. (1993). Historical Geography: Through the Gates of Space and Time. London: Arnold. Butlin, R. A. and Roberts, N. (eds.) (1995). Ecological Relations in Historical Times. Oxford: Blackwell. Cliff, A., Haggett, P. and Smallman Raynor, M. (1998). Deciphering Global Epidemics: Analytical Approaches to the Disease Records of World Cities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Conzen, M. P. (ed.) (1990). The Making of the American Landscape. London: Unwin Hyman. Conzen, M. P., Rumney, T. A. and Wynn, G. (eds.) (1993). A Scholar’s Guide to Geographical Writing on the American and Canadian Past. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Dodgshon, R. A. and Butlin, R. A. (eds.) (1990). A Historical Geography of England and Wales. London: Academic Press. Earle, C. (2003). The American Way: A Geographical History of Crisis and Recovery. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littleﬁeld. Gilbert, D., Matless, D. and Shorts, B. (2003). Geographies of British Modernity: Space and Society in the Twentieth Century. Oxford: Blackwell.

Glacken, C. J. (1967). Traces on the Rhodian Shore. Nature and Culture in Western Thought from Ancient Times to the End of the Eighteenth Century. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Gregory, D. (2004). The Colonial Present. Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq. Oxford: Blackwell. Harley, B. J. (2001). The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Harris, R. C. (2002). Making Native Space: Colonialism, Resistance, and Reserves in British Columbia. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. Heathcote, R. L. (1965). Back of Bourke. A Study of Land Appraisal and Settlement in Semi Arid Australia. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. Leighly, J. (ed.) (1963). Land and Life: A Selection of the Writings of Carl Ortwin Sauer. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Lester, A. (2001). Imperial Networks: Creating Identities in Nineteenth Century South Africa and Britain. Hoboken, NJ: Taylor and Francis. Livingstone, D. N. (1992). The Geographical Tradition: Episodes in the History of a Contested Enterprise. Oxford: Blackwell. Livingstone, D. N. (2003). Putting Science in Its Place: Geographies of Scientiﬁc Knowledge. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Livingstone, D. N. and Withers, C. W. J. (eds.) (1999). Geography and Enlightenment. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Livingstone, D. N. and Withers, C. W. J. (eds.) (2005). Geography and Revolution. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Meinig, D. W. (1962). On the Margins of the Good Earth: The South Australian Frontier, 1869 84. Chicago, IL: Association of American Geographers. Meinig, D. W. (1986, 1993, 1998, 2004). The Shaping of America. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Ogborn, M. (1998). Spaces of Modernity: London’s Geographies 1680 1780. New York: Guildford Press. Powell, J. M. (1978). Mirrors of the New World: Images and Image Makers in the Settlement Process. Canberra: Australian National University Press. Powell, J. M. (1991). A Historical Geography of Modern Australia: The Restive Fringe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ryan, J. R. (1997). Picturing Empire: Photography and the Visualization of the British Empire. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Spate, O. H. K. (1979, 1983, 1988). The Paciﬁc Since Magellan. Canberra: Australian National University Press. Williams, M. (1974). The Making of the South Australian Landscape A Study in the Historical Geography of Australia. London: Academic Press. Williams, M. (2003). Deforesting the Earth. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Wishart, D. J. (1994). An Unspeakable Sadness. The Disposse ssion of the Nebraska Indians. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press. Withers, C. W. J. (2001). Geography, Science and National Identity: Scotland Since 1520. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Relevant Websites http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jhg Journal of Historical Geography. http://www.historical geography.net/ http://www.h net.org/histgeog

Historical-Geographical Materialism S. Kirsch, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, USA & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Capital Value created and reinvested in the production of market commodities. Capital travels through different circuits in processes of production and exchange, and takes form as the ability to purchase or invest in labor power, machinery, and raw materials. Capitalism A speciﬁc mode of production, or economic organization, in which labor becomes a commodity and workers are separated from ownership of the means of production. Surplus value created by labor accrues not to the laborers but to the capitalist class. Dialectics/Dialectical A mode of thought or inquiry, characterized by mutually constitutive subject/object relationships, which takes contradiction as its starting point. Marx’s dialectical materialism focuses on the social contradictions arising from material conditions. Divisions of Labor How tasks are divided among workers. Spatial divisions of labor describe the ways in which different forms of labor are divided across spaces and regions, creating, for example, a coal mining region or a region in which services predominate. The distribution of work by gender, in households as well as places of industry and commerce, deﬁnes the gendered division of labor. Social Reproduction The everyday maintenance of the formal and informal social institutions that make the material reproduction of a given society possible over time. Struggles over social reproduction serve to reproduce and also to transform the legal, political, social, and economic structures of societies. Totality A (complex) whole to which different parts (complexly) relate. In Marxist thought the mode of production constitutes a rich totality that is, for now, irreducibly capitalist.

Introduction Historical geographical materialism describes the intel lectual project of creating a Marxist science of geography and, simultaneously, of infusing the broader currents of historical and dialectical materialism with explicitly geographical concepts and sensibilities. Though historical geographical materialism did not emerge concretely in anglophone human geography until the 1970s and 1980s, the term taps into the deeper roots of materialism in Western intellectual history, an

explanatory approach which gives ontological priority to the material conditions of existence – the immediate physical world – over spiritual and metaphysical notions of causation. Grounded in the rejection of nonmaterial prime causes, materialism instead deﬁnes its own cat egories on the basis of demonstrable investigations. Ma terialist frameworks for engagement with the physical world, often arising in opposition to (or in tension with) spiritualism and theocratic domination, were revo lutionary in this sense, and have had profound impli cations for the making and legitimation of knowledge in modern societies, and for the politics of that authority. From Galileo’s sunspots to Darwin’s ﬁnches to Marx’s class formations to contemporary debates over global climate change and the genetic body, strains of materialist thought continue to animate public discourse and the unfolding of human relations with, and as part of, the material world. In popular usage, materialism (and materialist) have for centuries been mobilized as pejoratives, especially by spiritualists in the effort to disparage those possessing insufﬁciently religious worldviews. In the humanities and social sciences, materialism has, since the late nineteenth century, been strongly associated with the historical ma terialism of Karl Marx and scholars working in the Marxist tradition. Historical materialism (as Marx’s ap proach to analyzing historical change later came to be called) proposes that historical events and processes – notably, historical transformations, such as that from feudalism to capitalism in Europe – were, at least in principle, no less understandable in terms of demon strable material causes than are those that constitute the solar system or evolutionary processes. In this analysis, the roots of social change were to be found in the material conditions of social existence, or being. As Marx described this approach in an oft quoted passage from the preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy: The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political, and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. (Marx, 1970: 20 21)

Thus it is not the idea or spirit which produced the world, as Hegel’s dialectic had it, but the world which produced the idea, and Marx stressed in particular the relationship between the forces and requirements of the production process, on the one hand, and the social

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relations of production, on the other, including the legal and political arrangements of civil society which make the mode of production possible. Turning Hegel on his head, in this sense, had important political as well as philosophical implications. Freedom from the oppressive conditions of modern life, Marx argued, would require not only a transformation of consciousness, but also revolutionary changes in the material conditions of social existence. For Marx, these conditions were to be understood as historical, not universal or timeless. Historical material ism thus presents itself, in part, as a general theory of historical development, through which large scale his torical transformations could be understood, in dialectical terms, to have arisen from contradictions embedded – materially – in a mode of production, or in successive modes of production. While capitalism was itself revo lutionary, remarkably so, in its mechanisms for continu ally revolutionizing the forces of production, it also produced new contradictions, always setting the stage for future historical transformations: capitalism produced wage labor and pauperization, but it also produced con ditions that made plausible the formation of the working class. Marx’s construction of the working class – as a scientiﬁc category, imagined community, and new his torical subject – illustrates the complexity, and rhetorical power, of the dialectic of human agency in historical materialism, that people make history but not under conditions of their own choosing. We confront a world that is already constituted, structured by powerful forces beyond the control of any individual or social group, but it is a world still ‘actively’ constituted; we enter history as its participants. Of course, the manner and degree to which the social, political, and intellectual are shaped ‘‘in the last instance’’ by the requirements of production, in a world wherein, as Louis Althusser remarked, ‘‘the lonely hour of the ‘last instance’ never comes,’’ continues to be a matter of re search and debate (1969: 113). The mode of production itself, for example, can be read in narrow economic terms and also much more openly in its dialectical relations with social, political, and cultural forms and processes. For Marx, working out the implications of materialism was a means of challenging, on the one hand, the idealism of Hegelian political philosophy and, on the other, the presumed truths of political economy. Political economy, as Marx’s critique illustrated, provided scientiﬁc justiﬁ cation for treating the capitalist system, and the speciﬁc forms of inequality that it produced, as natural. Marx’s trenchant analysis of political economy and its logics in the ﬁrst volume of Capital, which included close attention to then contemporary debates over abstract theories of market equilibrium, as well as struggles over the regu lation of child labor and the working day, strongly reﬂects this materialist approach. The most radical lessons of

historical materialism, however, concerned the future, not the past. For if historical transitions between modes of production could be rationally understood, their causes identiﬁed, then perhaps so too, as Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote in the Communist Manifesto, could the tran sition to a more just, equitable, and rational society be envisaged for – and realized in – the future. Historical materialism, with its priority of matter over mind, thus presented a host of new epistemological, political, and moral–ethical problems; no longer, Marx insisted, could science itself be seen as an enterprise detached from the earthly world of its investigations. The implications of these developments for geographical thought and prac tice are explored in the next sections.

Historical Materialism and Geography Geographers share a long history of engagement with materialism as a practical philosophy. For the navigators, natural philosophers, cartographers, engineers, explorers, cosmographers, surveyors, social scientists, social theor ists, and other historic and contemporary authors of geographical knowledge, the work of observing, re cording, mapping, and analyzing the immediate physical world has been a fundamental concern. It is hardly sur prising that the geographical language of discovery, for example, would diffuse so widely into the physical and mathematical sciences, for the ongoing reconﬁguration of relations among observation, experience, authority, and truth was indeed evocatively framed in terms of the new planetary geographical knowledge produced amid Europe’s colonial and imperial ventures. From a materialist perspective, the centrality and value of geographical knowledge in the work of empire building, natural resource exploitation, and the expansion of legal, economic, and territorial systems, raises ques tions about the material basis of geographical knowledge itself, that is, the conditions that make it possible. We can look back, in this sense, to the emergence and insti tutionalization of modern scientiﬁc geography in im perial Western states (and to some extent, Japan) during the late nineteenth century and discern the strong role of imperial states in the formation of geographical know ledge and the modern discipline of geography. While geography was in some ways a materialist Enlightenment science par excellence, its development, in this milieu, was thus tied closely to expansion of territorial power and global commerce, and the justiﬁcation of such pro cesses as natural; the new discipline of geography, far from picking up on the radical implications of Marx’s materialist philosophy, was largely a conservative one. But to emphasize that geographical knowledge cannot be understood independently of its material conditions is not to reduce scientiﬁc thought to the horizons of its

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social origins. The commingling of geography with an archism and values of mutual aid and respect in the work of Pyotr Kropotkin and E´lise´e Reclu¯s, amidst the ﬂour ishing of imperial geography in European capitals, sug gested the possibility of a more radical, and politically engaged, geographical materialism. Geographers’ record of engagement with historical materialism has been brief but transformative, both inside and outside the discipline. In anglophone human geog raphy, the rise of radical geography in the late 1960s and 1970s has been strongly associated with the rise of anti (Vietnam) war, anti imperialist, feminist, antiracist and other social movements. Geographers took notice of so cially and spatially uneven distributions of poverty, wealth and power, at local, regional, and global scales, and vigorously critiqued their discipline’s seeming in ability to meaningfully address them, even in the world’s wealthiest countries. While the efforts to turn geography into a rigorous (and especially, quantitative) science during the decades following World War II had been animated partly by liberal and progressive impulses, some geographers, best known among them, the once leading theoretician of quantitative geography, David Harvey, would turn to historical materialism as a means of rethinking geography and political economy so as to better understand and address social conditions. For Harvey, materialism was fundamental to geo graphical science, or at least it had the potential to be. Geographical knowledge, as Harvey deﬁned it in a 1984 ‘historical materialist manifesto’: records, analyzes and stores information about the spatial distribution and organization of those conditions (both naturally occurring and humanly created) that provide the material basis for the reproduction of social life. At the same time it promotes conscious awareness of how such conditions are subject to continuous transformation through human action. (Harvey, 1984: 1)

Harvey’s brief manifesto, published in a forum of the Association of American Geographers, thus sought to orient geography around process and dialectics. He also sought to liberate geography from a rising positivism in the ﬁeld which, for Harvey, undermined ‘‘its own virtues of objective materialism by spurious claims to neutrality.’’ In a world unjustly structured by capitalism and its im perialist and geopolitical logics, Harvey argued, ‘‘Geog raphers cannot remain neutral. But they can strive towards scientiﬁc rigor, integrity, and honesty. The dif ference between the two commitments must be under stood’’ (Harvey, 1984: 7). The challenge of articulating historical materialism with geography – and in some ways the premise of the project – was that Marx, among a long line of social theorists, was inadequately geographical: Marxian theory

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had yet to overcome its emphasis on time and transfor mation, deal with the spatiality of the processes it ana lyzed, develop an adequately spatial vocabulary. Although Marx had closely investigated what we might call local contexts, and a range of locally and nationally speciﬁc social conditions, their signiﬁcance, and the problem of geographical variation more generally, had not been sys tematically integrated into his theoretical formulations. Geography may have been implicit to Marx’s critique of political economy, in other words, but in a world pro foundly structured by patterns of uneven geographical development, it had to be made explicit. While the work of Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg on imperialism had ex panded knowledge of capitalism’s spatial dynamics, there was clearly far more to be learned. By the early to mid 1980s, building on institutional resources created in the previous decade, including the radical geography journal Antipode, geographers had begun to seriously rework elements of Marxist theory through explicitly spatial frames. Key works included Harvey’s Limits to Capital, Doreen Massey’s Spatial Div isions of Labor, Neil Smith’s Uneven Development, and Social Relations and Spatial Structures, a multidisciplinary edited volume, among others. Carried out alongside (and as part of) a more general spatial turn in social theory, geog raphers, drawing on diverse inﬂuences, brought historical materialism into contact with a range of disciplinary concerns and subﬁelds, from urban studies of ghetto formation, suburbanization, and gentriﬁcation to agri culture and ecology to international development, industrial and economic geography, political geography and geopolitics. Terrain as diverse as landscape and culture, political movements and public space, labor, migration, commodiﬁcation and consumption, technol ogy, and the body have been investigated using historical geographical materialist frameworks. The next section proceeds by sketching the still emerging contours of historical geographical materialism, but stresses that, in the present, highly eclectic domain of human geography, theoretical frameworks do not tend to be seen as dog matic or as requiring a singular conceptual agenda. Ra ther, and beﬁtting a broadly materialist approach to science, different forms of materialism (and Marxism) persist, and they are often integrated with other theore tical resources.

Contours of Historical-Geographical Materialism In his historical materialist manifesto, Harvey promoted the emergence of a new agenda for geographers which could be organized around the ‘‘study of the active construction and transformation of material environ ments (both physical and social) together with critical

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reﬂection on the production and use of geographical knowledge within the context of that activity’’ (1984: 6). The ﬁrst part of this agenda matches closely with the Marxist dialectic of labor and nature through which the human species being can be understood as both (1) act ing on nature (i.e., the material world), chieﬂy through variegated forms of labor, to produce the conditions of its own survival and reproduction; and (2) at the same time, is itself a part of nature, and subject to natural forces (such as hunger). Transforming nature through work, then, the nature of the species being itself is transformed, and human societies have been made and remade. A clearer understanding of the spatial relations and pro cesses through which capitalist societies, as historically speciﬁc modes of production, have been constituted, and a richer knowledge of the geography of capital’s circuitry, and capitalism’s requisite demands for human (and ma chine) labor, could thus be achieved through the devel opment of more adequate geographical concepts, and through empirically engaged historical geographical studies. Rethinking the dynamics of capitalism as they articulate with local, regional, and planetary transfor mations has been, thus far, the most active area of research with an intellectual basis in historical geographical materialism. Following the work of the French Marxist theorist Henri Lefebvre, geographers have, along related lines, sought to understand how the production and appropriation of nature, space, and landscapes have made possible the reproduction of cap italist societies over time. The second part of Harvey’s agenda – with its em phasis on the production and use of geographical knowledge, broadly conceived – similarly underscores the materialist philosophical basis of the project. For if knowledge, even that which is authorized as scientiﬁc, is always shaped in terms of the perspectives and contexts in which it is developed, then surely there are many different kinds of geographical knowledges, for example, those produced by military strategists, multinational in dustrial site selection analysts, real estate agents, metro politan police, and so forth, for speciﬁc practical purposes, or, along other lines, in the atlases and gazet teers produced for consumption by schoolchildren in different national and regional contexts. Prioritizing matter over mind, again, requires acknowledging that the conditions of material existence shape even our ability to understand and explain these conditions to ourselves. Grasping this positionality can also help to clarify the dialectical relations between the production and use of geographical knowledges and the reshaping of social and physical environments. Harvey grants little in the way of disciplinary privilege to geographers in the making of geographical knowledges, but he does envision a special role for historical geographical materialists – precisely because they are conscious of the problematic

of the positioned or situated nature of geographical knowledge – in making sense of the complex, dialectical relations among the worlds we know, the worlds we in habit, and the ones that we build or hope to build. Critical to Marxist dialectical methodology is the emphasis on ‘process’: an object (e.g., a nail, a book, or an ear of corn) is constituted relationally, and thus cannot be understood separately from the processes and relations through which it is produced. Historical geographical materialism, in this sense, ‘‘turns all geography into a historical geography y not just of the past but also of the present and future.’’ For Erik Swyngedouw: Historical geographical materialism starts from the premise that things exist, but these things are the em bodiment of (they interiorise) relationships; things be come the outcome of processes that have themselves ontological priority. In other words, everything ﬂows; the ﬂow or the process constitutes the things. (Swyngedouw, 2001: 94)

In both physical and cultural geography, the method of working backwards from the object to the processes which produced it has for long been a favored method in morphological approaches. The dialectical approach of historical geographical materialism was not the ﬁrst which sought to understand geography – the occupied earth, at least – as a product of human activity, but it did open new vistas. Although, unlike a nail or an ear of corn, the production of geographical environments is never complete, per se, but rather an open and contested pro cess, historical geographical materialism nevertheless requires an approach that begins with speciﬁc material geographies, past or present, and seeks to understand how they were produced, and under what conditions. By insisting that any geographical arrangement be seen as both a reﬂection and a constitutive element of an ongoing process (and interrelated, complex, and conﬂicting sets of processes), we sharpen our understandings of historical geographical change, and open knowledge of these dy namics to alternative possibilities. Seeing geographical forms – for example, the spatial variation of land rent values and housing markets, the location of technological innovation, or the landscape of a migrant labor camp – as part of a process, existing in relation to all manner of other processes and structured by what can be described as a capitalist totality, has signiﬁcantly renewed and complicated Marxist thought by introducing a range of geographical concerns. These concerns have been pur sued in a number of different ways, from Harvey’s efforts to spatialize Marx’s theory to work developed more ex plicitly around structuralist, structurationist, regulation theory, and post structuralist Marxist traditions. Geog raphers, in other words, have adopted a multiplicity of Marxisms and, so not surprisingly, debates persist over

Historical-Geographical Materialism

the explanatory power granted to capitalism and speciﬁc capitalist institutional structures as agents of change in relation to the agency of individuals, social groups, and nature itself. For Harvey, theorizing the geography of capitalist accumulation – most explicitly in The Limits to Capital – meant focusing, in particular, on the tensions between capital’s need for spatial ﬁxity, on the one hand (e.g., in production facilities, technological investment, state so cial expenditures to ensure social reproduction of labor), and its demand for spatial mobility and new ‘spatial ﬁxes’, on the other, that is, the geographical movement of production processes as a strategy for lowering labor and land costs, in the context of unending competition over relative surplus value. In enunciating a historical geographical materialist theory of crisis, Harvey also develops a materialist spatial ontology rooted in multiple and intervening spatialities: geographical space is medi ated abstractly, atomized by markets and policed by state regulation; it is dialectical, a product of social and pol itical contest; and, as articulated in subsequent works like The Urbanisation of Consciousness (1985) and The Condition of Postmodernity (1989), it is experienced and refracted culturally in complex ways. Limits to Capital, is not only still being widely read, it is still being written, published in its third revised edition in 2006. But it may be in Harvey’s cultivation of a broad sensibility of space as relative to material processes, as compared to the precise lines of philosophical and economic argumentation worked through in Limits to Capital, that he continues to shape the historical geographical materialist imagination most actively. Harvey’s more recent works (including Justice, Nature, and the Geography of Difference, Spaces of Hope; The New Imperialism; and A Brief History of Neo Liberalism) have expanded the scope of his historical geographical materialism by drawing connections among a range of cultural, political and geopolitical, natural and environ mental dynamics. While Harvey’s concepts of the spatial ﬁx, creative destruction, the annihilation of space through time, and accumulation by dispossession, among others, have gained considerable traction both inside and outside disciplinary geography, different strains of historical geographical materialism have also contributed sub stantially to Marxist thought and practice and to the spatial turn in social theory more broadly. Among the most inﬂuential have been Doreen Massey’s formulations of spatial and gendered divisions of labor which, along with her work on relational con ceptions of place, scale, and space time, have drawn signiﬁcantly on structural Marxism, while also serving to bring geographical thought into closer contact with interdisciplinary cultural studies. Structural Marxism has too often been caricatured as a structural determinism, and interpreted through crude readings of the base– superstructure relation between the economy and civil

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society. It is better understood, following the work of theorists such as Althusser, Antonio Gramsci, and, in the context of British cultural studies, Raymond Williams and Stuart Hall, as a means of assessing the signiﬁcance of culture, politics, ideology, and the state – all related to, but not necessarily determined by, capital – in the re production of capitalist societies over time. The work of Massey and her colleagues on spatial divisions of labor, which explores the sedimentation or layering of local social patterns in relation to the changing historical geographies of production in Britain, thus added considerable social and geographical nuance to the historical geographical materialist analysis of capitalism and its modes of production and reproduction, while also raising questions about that which may lie beyond capi tal’s logics. Another strain of historical materialism enters geo graphic thought from landscape studies. Denis Cosgrove’s reworking of the landscape tradition in cultural geog raphy in Social Formation and Symbolic Landscape, for ex ample, imported a more contextualized sense of historical materialism, in particular from the art histories of John Barrell, John Berger, and others, one in which it is the relations between landscape as material and cultural symbolic form, that are given ontological priority. Pick ing up on the implications of this representational turn for situated studies of social struggle, Don Mitchell’s research on the landscapes of migrant agricultural labor in California, and on the spaces of homelessness and free speech across US cities, has thus worked partly by holding material form in tension with representation, allowing for the creation of nuanced critiques of capitalist ideologies in spatial representations and the built en vironment. For Mitchell, though, it is the question posed, in different ways, by Harvey, Neil Smith, and Henri Lefebvre, about how the production of nature, space, and landscapes contributes to the survival of capitalism over time that continues to frame much of the analysis. To answer these questions, however, as with Cosgrove’s im mersion in the history of landscape painting and per spective, required a deep engagement with labor history, housing studies, legal studies, and other discourses lo cated at speciﬁc contextual conjunctures. In this sense, the historical geographical materialist imagination re mains a vibrant one in contemporary geographic writing and research more broadly, its analytical resources widely employed, because its critical engagement remains – as it must – an ongoing process. Recent work on urban nature and the metabolism of cities, though not always Marxist in stricto sensu, stands out as one active node of research wherein the interplay of materialism with ecology and urban studies, and also with science studies, feminist theory, art and architecture, to name just a few key areas, has helped to reinvigorate questions around the urban ization of nature and the problems of reiﬁcation and

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agency in human–nature–technology relations (see Gandy, 2002; Heynen et al., 2006; Kaika, 2005; Kirsch and Mitchell, 2004; Loftus, 2006; Swyngedouw, 2004), and contributed to a more general rethinking of materiality in environmental and resource geography (Bakker and Bridge, 2006). ‘‘Meanwhile, and for a start,’’ asked Williams (1980: 121) a generation ago, ‘‘how is Materialism?’’ The answer, increasingly, is geographical; no longer can the spatiality of modes of production and social reproduction be taken for granted as neutral settings where historical processes occur. Historical geographical materialism is not a sub ﬁeld or province of geography but really a set of onto logical commitments that have been conjoined with political and scholarly traditions, the uses of which have been anything but uniform. Nor will they be. Although there are dangers, in the eclectic theoretical atmosphere of the contemporary humanities and social sciences, that historical geographical materialism may serve, at times, as a kind of shorthand for providing an economic bottom line, it remains, at its best, an ambitiously open intel lectual tradition. For as Williams argued, The special character of materialism, and that which alone gives it value, is its rigorous openness to physical evidence. We cannot know in advance, as a test of ﬁdelity, the changing materialist content of materialism. (Williams, 1980: 122)

As part of an ongoing, dialectical interchange between ideas and the material world, historical geographical materialism is indeed still evolving. A Marxist science of geography, and geographical Marxism, could not aspire to less. See also: Capitalism and Division of Labor; Critical Geography; Geography, History of; Harvey, D.; Marxism/ Marxist Geography I; Marxism/Marxist Geography II; Radical Geography; Radical Political Economy; Regulation; Spatial Division of Labor; Uneven Development.

Further Reading Althusser, L. (1969). For Marx. Brewster, B. (trans.). Middlesex: Penguin Books. Bakker, K. and Bridge, G. (2006). Material worlds? Resource geographies and the ‘matter of nature’. Progress in Human Geography 30, 5 27. Be´rube´, M. (2005). Materialism. In Grossberg, L., Morris, M. & Bennett, T. (eds.) New Keywords (revised edn.), pp 209 211. Oxford: Blackwell. Castree, N. and Gregory, D. (eds.) (2006). David Harvey. Oxford: Blackwell.

Castree, N., Essletzbichler, J. and Brenner, N. (eds.) (2004). Symposium: David Harvey’s The Limits to Capital: Two decades on. Antipode 36(3), 357 554. Cosgrove, D. (1998). Social Formation and Symbolic Landscape (2nd edn.). Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. Gandy, M. (2002). Concrete and Clay: Reworking Nature in New York City. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Gregory, D. and Urry, J. (eds.) (1985). Social Relations and Spatial Structures. London: Macmillan. Harvey, D. (1984). On the history and present condition of geography: An historical materialist manifesto. The Professional Geographer 36, 1 11. Harvey, D. (1985). The Urbanization of Consciousness. Oxford: Blackwell. Harvey, D. (1989). The Condition of Postmodernity. Oxford: Blackwell. Harvey, D. (1996). Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference. Oxford: Blackwell. Harvey, D. (2000). Spaces of Hope. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Harvey, D. (2003). The New Imperialism. New York: Oxford University Press. Harvey, D. (2005). A Brief History of Neoliberalism. New York: Oxford University Press. Harvey, D. (2006). Limits to Capital (3rd revised edn.). London: Verso. Henderson, G. (1999). California and the Fictions of Capital. New York: Oxford University Press. Heynen, N., Kaika, M. and Swyngedouw, E. (eds.) (2006). In the Nature of Cities: Urban Political Ecology and the Politics of Metabolism. London: Routledge. Kaika, M. (2005). City of Flows: Modernity, Nature, and the City. London: Routledge. Kirsch, S. and Mitchell, D. (2004). The nature of things: Dead labor, nonhuman actors, and the persistence of Marxism. Antipode 36, 687 705. Lefebvre, H. (1991). The Production of Space. Nicholson Smith, D. (trans.). Oxford: Blackwell. Loftus, A. (2006). Reiﬁcation and the dictatorship of the water meter. Antipode 38, 1023 1045. Marx, K. (1970). A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. New York: International Publishers. Marx, K. (1992). Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1, Fowkes, B. (trans.). New York: Penguin. Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1967). Communist Manifesto. New York: Penguin. Massey, D. (1984). Spatial Divisions of Labour. London: Macmillan. Mitchell, D. (1996). The Lie of the Land. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Mitchell, D. (2000). Cultural Geography: A Critical Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell. Mitchell, D. (2003). The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for Public Space. New York: Guilford. Peet, R. (1998). Modern Geographical Thought. Oxford: Blackwell. Smith, N. (1990). Uneven Development: Nature, Capital and the Production of Space (2nd edn.). Oxford: Blackwell. Swyngedouw, E. (2001). Marxism and historical geographical materialism: A spectre is haunting geography. Scottish Geographical Journal 115, 91 102. Swyngedouw, E. (2004). Social Power and the Urbanization of Water: Flows of Power. New York: Oxford University Press. Williams, R. (1980). Culture and Materialism. London: Verso.

Relevant Websites http://www.marxists.org/ Marxists Internet Archive. http://davidharvey.org/ Reading Marx’s Capital with David Harvey.

HIV/AIDS in Developed Countries M. Sothern, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, UK & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary GRID An acronym for Gay-Related Immune Deﬁciency, an early term used to describe what is now AIDS when it was understood to solely afﬂict gay men. AIDS An acronym for Acquired Immune Deﬁciency Syndrome or acquired immunodeﬁciency syndrome, a collection of symptoms and infections arising from a compromised immune system as a result of HIV infection. Variations exist in the way AIDS is diagnosed – some countries diagnose AIDS when the CD4 þ T-cell count drops below an established threshold, whereas others require the co-presence of one or more opportunistic illnesses. HAART An acronym for Highly Active Antireteroviral Therapy, a combination of antiretroviral drugs used to treat HIV since 1996. HAART has been responsible for prolonging life expectancy and for delaying the onset of AIDS. HIV Acronym for Human Immunodeﬁciency Virus, the retrovirus that can cause AIDS, was isolated in 1983. There are two types of the HIV virus: HIV-1 is the most common and is found throughout much of the world; and HIV-2 is largely concentrated in West Africa. HIV-2 is less easily transmitted and the period between infection and illness is also usually longer. PLWHA An acronym for Person(s) Living with HIV/ AIDS.

Introduction Acquired immune deﬁciency syndrome (AIDS) is com monly understood as the most tragic of the global pan demics. Metaphors of its global ubiquity, however, disguise its very real geographies. AIDS is neither evenly distributed nor does it take the same form everywhere. Because 95% of the estimated 39.5 million person(s) living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) are in developing countries, it is understandable that contemporary geo graphic research has an emphasis on the tragedy of the pandemic in Africa, Asia, and the countries of the former Soviet block. Geographic accounts emphasize that human immunodeﬁciency virus (HIV), like many pre ventable diseases, continues to diffuse along the fault lines of vulnerability: this is demonstrated in the work of people like Paul Farmer and Peter Gould where em phasis is placed on gender inequity, heteronormativity, racism, and the uneven geographies of development and

poverty as explanatory variables in the diffusion of HIV. Clearly the geographies of vulnerability are uneven and this is especially signiﬁcant for AIDS because AIDS is not itself a disease but a syndrome. It is usually diagnosed in an HIV seropositive person marked by the presence of an opportunistic AIDS related illness. Because the HIV virus compromises the ability of the body’s immune system to ﬁght off infection, it leaves it vulnerable to bacterium and other viral agents encountered in the environment. Thus, in a developed country, an AIDS sufferer is likely to die of an AIDS related pneumonia or AIDS related cancer whereas in sub Saharan Africa the opportunistic infection is more likely to be tuberculosis. While HIV seropositivity may be the necessary and common prerequisite for AIDS, HIV does not itself de termine AIDS either biomedically, in terms of the op portunistic infections that mark AIDS, or socioculturally, in respect of the distribution of vulnerability to HIV infection in the ﬁrst instance. Viewed this way, AIDS is fundamentally a question of ‘geography’. The centrality of geography to understand ing the mechanisms of diffusion of HIV and patterns of the emergence of AIDS has resulted in a rich tradition of scholarship in medical and health geography.

A Brief History of AIDS in Developed Countries In 1981, ﬁve unexplained cases of Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP) were reported to the Centre for Dis ease Control (CDC) in Atlanta. These cases were iden tiﬁed among previously healthy young gay men in Los Angeles; this report drew attention because while the microorganism that causes PCP is common, a func tioning immune system is usually capable of warding off its attack. These reports of PCP in Los Angeles were soon followed by details of some 26 cases of Kaposi’s sarcoma (KS) among young gay men in San Francisco and New York. KS is a rare cancer usually associated with elderly men. Of these 26 cases, four were also found to have PCP. While the CDC insisted that the etiology of these cases was yet unexplained, it surmised that the ‘‘fact that these patients were all homosexuals suggests an as sociation between some aspect of a homosexual lifestyle or disease acquired through sexual contact.’’ Thus from these ﬁrst documented incidences of what was to become known as AIDS the disease was intimately associated with the ‘lifestyles’ and sexual practices of homosexual men. Media and scientiﬁc coverage of the

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‘gay cancer’ and ‘GRID’ (gay related immune deﬁciency) ﬁrmly established the perceived link between sexual deviance and AIDS. This association became the prin cipal mechanism for organizing risk categories, a heur istic device mobilized in the continued search for the cause of AIDS. While debates about the cause of AIDS raged in the early 1980s between theories of its viral or ‘lifestyle’ origins, the understanding, common both to popular accounts and the scientiﬁc community was that in some way homosexual practice must be to blame. This was because homosexuality was the common factor linking these otherwise disparate cases. Epidemiological studies, by focusing on this speciﬁc social group, worked in the broader cultural ﬁeld both to sensationalize aspects of the so called ‘gay lifestyle’ and to obfuscate similar signs of immune suppression among the nongay popu lation. Histories reconstructing the early period of the AIDS crisis provided by Paula Treichler, Steven Epstein, Michelle Cochrane, and others argue – in what must now be seen as ‘the’ example of the normalizing function of the medical gaze – that medical science worked to re inforce unexamined assumptions about sexual normality and actively discounted signs of illness in intravenous (IV) drug users, women, hemophiliacs, and children. By 1982, the framing of AIDS as a sexually trans mitted disease of gay men allowed for similar immuno suppression related illnesses to be identiﬁed among gay communities throughout much of the developed world. By the time the HIV virus was isolated and established as the necessary causal agent of the disease in 1983, AIDS both rhetorically and politically ‘belonged’ to the gay community. While it was now clear that it was the transmission of the HIV virus not the gay lifestyle that caused AIDS, the association of the disease with polit ically and socially marginal gay men was to prove dev astating. In the United States, for example, by 1986 there were over 16 000 conﬁrmed AIDS cases over half of which had already died and yet, 5 years into the pan demic. President Reagan had not spoken of AIDS in a publicly signiﬁcant way; when he ﬁnally did, it was to assure his television audience that there was no need for panic as it had not entered ‘the general population’. The politics of AIDS therefore served to reinforce the dif ferentiation, stigma, and marginalization of infected groups – as epidemiological studies began to expand the focus on ‘risk groups’ beyond gay men to include IV drug users, commercial sex workers, and new immigrants (notably Haitians in the United States and African im migrants in Western Europe), AIDS continued to be a very visible index of race, class, and sexual preference. However, this abjection that was attached to AIDS’ early association with homosexuality proved an import ant resource for responding to the epidemic. It was in communities of gay men in the context of post 1970s sexual liberation movements that the cultural and

political resources existed to agitate for research, or ganize against discrimination, invent new safer sexual practices, and to begin to disseminate these through the ﬁrst HIV education campaigns. Indeed, while the political situation differed markedly between developed countries in terms of the politics of sexuality and the state pro vision of public health, the roots of many AIDS service organizations is to be located in these early responses by the gay community. AIDS served as a mechanism for constituting a broad based gay identity politics move ment in many developed countries; as Douglas Crimp repeatedly argued, AIDS shone an unprecedented media attention that helped to provide ‘legitimation through disaster’ for the struggle against homophobia in many parts of the world. The ﬁrst treatments for HIV emerged in 1988 but the most spectacular successes at staving off the onset of AIDS were seen with the wide adoption of highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART) around 1996. For those fortunate enough to have access to these treatments HIV diagnosis no longer promised a swift death but, rather, has begun to be considered by some to be more on the order of a chronic disease (effective HAART has only been around for little more than a decade and thus its ‘long term’ effectiveness has not been established). As a result, there are now a burgeoning number of PLWHA and thus there is more empirical opportunity for contact with and contraction of HIV; moreover, the geography of the spectacular representations of AIDS deaths has largely shifted from the bodies of the developed onto the bodies of Africa – and thus, for many in developed countries, AIDS has become not just a disease of ‘them’ rather than ‘us’ but of ‘over there’ not ‘here’. AIDS, in short, has become less frightening. As a consequence many developed countries including Canada, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Australia, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand have reported increases in HIV in fection since 2000. Furthermore, AIDS is no longer ex clusively located in the ‘risk groups’ of gay men, injecting drug users, and commercial sex workers but has become particularly acute in many immigrant communities and especially in prison populations, populations for which explicit and targeted prevention education are still being developed.

Medical Geography of AIDS Early medical geography work focused on the spatial diffusion of the virus. As with medical geography ap proaches to other communicable diseases, geographers set about mapping the movement of the HIV virus from urban centers outward and across various global, na tional, and subnational scales. Because HIV is transmitted through the exchange of certain body ﬂuids, the

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cartographies of HIV diffusion have always been more complex than those studies working with simple disease ecology models. Traditional concerns with distance and contagion models that were developed in response to inﬂuenza or measles, for example, have had to be re thought to account both for the long asymptomatic period of HIV infection and to allow for the cultural constructs of sexuality and stigma accompanying any discussion of AIDS. Moreover, because AIDS emerged at a time of increased mobility and ubiquity of transporta tion technologies, as Robin Kearns suggested in one of the few sustained reviews of geographic literature on AIDS ‘‘[t]he reality for geographers grappling with the AIDS era is that the most important vector may well be the 747,’’ the geometries of the spread of HIV charted by medical geographers have had to become increasingly complex as is witnessed in the classic work of Peter Gould and Shannon, Pyle and Bashur from the early 1990s. Indeed, new geographic information system (GIS) visualization techniques have allowed for the ever more sophisticated correlations between incidences of HIV and structural issues of poverty, race, gender, sexual in equality, and comorbidity factors. The mapping of the geographies of HIV has provided powerful evidence of the ongoing purchase of health inequalities and testi mony to the importance of medical geography to public health interventions.

Health Geography of AIDS While medical geography approaches mapped the dis tribution and diffusion of the HIV virus, those working in health geography have interrogated the experiential di mension of living with HIV and have focused explicitly on the cultural and political geographies of AIDS. The starting point for much of the health geography response to AIDS has not been the HIV itself but rather the communities most affected by AIDS. Given the history of the emergence of AIDS in developed countries it is not surprising that a focus on AIDS was a common feature of the emergent geographies of sexuality literature that began in earnest in the mid 1990s. Health geographers working on AIDS, in both developed and developing countries, have stressed that an adequate response to the AIDS crisis requires confronting medical geographies erstwhile disease with sexual practice, and in particular those sexual practices that are most culturally marginal (e.g., commercial sex, public sex, and homo sex). Health geographers, as well as others informed by Queer The ory, have stressed the need to center the experiences of AIDS sufferers not only to deconstruct the stigmatizing categories of risk groups but also to foreground and empower the communities of those most affected. Thus health geography approaches to AIDS have tended to

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focus not on HIV but on the politics of epidemiological surveillance, the ongoing purchase of structural in equality with respect to access to healthcare and explicit prevention knowledge, and to the new relationships to space and place opened by PLWHA.

Future These characterizations of the broad differences between medical and heath geography approaches to HIV revolve largely around issues of scale and method. Yet, despite their differences, each tradition conﬁrms that AIDS continues to index social exclusion and political mar ginalization. While AIDS is no longer a disease ex clusively associated with male homosexuality, this early association continues to inform the stigma attached to HIV infection and to hamper HIV prevention efforts and the provision of health services to PLWHA. Further more, the increase in the number of PLWHA means new challenges both for the provision of care and for the ongoing efforts toward HIV prevention. Most AIDS service organizations engage in substantial programs designed to overcome discrimination against PLWHA. These programs aim to integrate PLWHA as productive members of the broader society and as such necessitate the overcoming the stigmatized image of PLWHA as Other. Insofar as this politics of inclusion surrounding PLWHA is new – because it is the outcome of effective HAART – it presents as yet unexamined challenges for ongoing efforts of HIV prevention. HIV prevention strategies have always relied on an Othering of the PLWHA. Within the representational logics of pre vention the PLWHA must be seen as a space of differ ence, fear, and death and thus as a space to be avoided. Indeed, the oscillation between representations of PLWHA as a site around which arguments to inclusion and sameness, ‘and’ as a site around which exclusion and Othering are mobilized has taken on a particular urgency since the turn of the millennium as is evidenced in the increasing ubiquity of the criminal prosecution of those found to be knowingly spreading HIV. Indeed, one can witness in many developed countries increased biopoli tical regulation and surveillance of PLWHA. To some extent AIDS has always been about the temporal; on the one hand it has been about the tragic loss of life and on the other hand it has generated new relationships to the future and to the time at hand. As Rob Wilton and Michael Brown’s work on living with HIV demonstrated, AIDS portended something like what Queer Theorists Judith Halberstam and Lee Edelman call Queer Time; a new modality of existence between present and past, where the here and the now assumes a fullness of possibility. However, in the context of developed countries these new temporal relationships

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signal a profound impasse between the politics of in clusion and the politics of HIV prevention. The future challenge for geographers remains ‘‘to ﬁnd ways to integrate the global, national and state level analyses of viral distribution and diffusion with the local speciﬁcity of org[a]nizational response and of individual life experience’’ (Kearns 1996: 129). See also: Gay Geographies; Health Geography; Identity Politics; Medical Geography; Queer Theory/Queer Geographies; Sexuality.

Further Reading Brown, M. (1995). Ironies of distance: An ongoing critique of the geographies of AIDS. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 13, 159 183. Brown, M. (1997). Replacing Citizenship: AIDS Activism and Radical Democracy. New York: Guilford. Cochrane, M. (2004). When AIDS Began: San Francisco and the Making of an Epidemic. New York: Routledge. Crimp, D. (2002). Melancholia and Moralism: Essays on AIDS and Queer Politics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Edelman, L. (2004). No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Epstein, S. (1996). Impure Science: AIDS Activism, and the Politics of Knowledge. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Farmer, P. (2001). Infections and Inequalities: The Modern Plagues. Berkeley: University of California Press. Fee, E. and Fox, D. (eds.) (1992). AIDS: The Making of a Chronic Disease. Berkeley: University of California Press. Gould, P. (1993). The Slow Plague: Geography of the AIDS Pandemic. Oxford: Blackwell. Halberstam, J. (2005). In a Queer Time and Place: Transgender Bodies, Subcultural Lives. New York: New York University Press. Kearns, R. A. (1996). AIDS and medical geography: Embracing the other? Progress in Human Geography 20(1), 123 131. Shannon, G. W., Pyle, G. F. and Bashur, R. L. (1991). The Geography of AIDS. New York: Guilford. Stoller, N. E. (1998). Lessons from the Damned: Queers, Whores and Junkies Respond to AIDS. New York: Routledge. Takahashi, L. M. (1997). Stigmatization, HIV/AIDS and communities of color: Exploring response to human service facilities. Health and Place 3(3), 187 199. Treitcher, P. (1999). How to Have Theory in an Epidemic: Cultural Chronicles of AIDS. Durham NC: Duke University Press. Wilton, R. (1996). Diminished Worlds? The geography of everyday life with HIV/AIDS. Health and Place 2, 1 17.

Relevant Websites www.kff.org Kaiser Foundation HIV/AIDS timeline. www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/aids The Age of AIDS. www.unaids.org United Nations AIDS Organization. Uniting the world against AIDS.

HIV/AIDS in Developing Countries W. T. S. Gould, The University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Acquired Immunodeﬁciency Syndrome (AIDS) The ‘A’ means that the virus is acquired through a person’s action rather than being spread through casual or inadvertent contact. ‘I’ and ‘D’ (immunodeﬁciency) identify that the virus attacks a person’s immune system and makes it less capable of ﬁghting other infections. ‘S’ identiﬁes a syndrome, several medical conditions that come about as a result of immunodeﬁciency, rather than a speciﬁc disease. Antiretroviral Therapies (ARVs) AIDS has no cure, though there is the long-term possibility of creating a vaccine. Current medical therapies involve a drug regime of ARVs to directly attack the virus. Since the virus mutates quickly, a range of ARVs is available to deal with different stages in the progress of the virus. ARVs have proved to be very effective in controlling the effects of the disease. Demographic and Health Surveys (DHSs) A global program of national population surveys, ﬁnanced by USAID and begun in the 1980s, to undertake national and comparative studies of demographic change. Since 2002, many national surveys have taken a blood sample to identify the sero-status of the national sample. Epidemic Occurs when the prevalence of a disease reaches unexpectedly high levels in a short time. A disease is endemic where it is continuously present in a population, and is described as a pandemic where the epidemic assumes global dimensions, as with contemporary HIV/AIDS. Epidemiology The scientiﬁc study of the distribution and spread of disease based on statistical analysis of medical data. Human Immunodeﬁciency Virus (HIV) Member of a family of retroviruses, with several substrains, all developing slowly to affect the immune system. It is a retrovirus which destroys CD4 cells that protect humans from a range of pathogens – that is, infections that can be viral, bacterial, or fungal. When the CD4 cell count falls as a result of being HIV+, the body loses immunity and is therefore more prone to infections brought by other diseases. Mainstreaming The approach in government planning for HIV/AIDS in which the care and cure of those infected, and the educational and support needs of those affected are explicit and become central to all sectors of activity and associated funding. UNAIDS Founded in 1996 and with its headquarters in Geneva, this is a joint coordinating body for ten UN

agencies, providing funding and leadership in tackling HIV/AIDS.

Introduction HIV/AIDS is a global issue. Not only does it have a global distribution, however uneven, but it also has an entire UN agency devoted to it, UNAIDS. It is the focus of one of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (no. 6: ‘‘to halt and reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS by 2015’’), and billions of dollars have been allocated to its potential cure and to more immediate alleviation of its effects. HIV/AIDS is a new disease, known to science only since 1981. However, it has now been diagnosed in nearly every country of the world. Its causes are known and effects felt by a large proportion of the world’s people, although to a very variable extent. AIDS is a ‘syndrome’ caused by the presence of the HIV virus in the blood, rather than a speciﬁc condition, but the presence of that virus can have a range of primary causes: through heterosexual vaginal sex, the dominant cause, but also through male–male intercourse. The latter had been a dominant cause at the beginning of the epidemic in developed countries. However, even in developed countries, as the epidemic has developed, heterosexual transmission has become much more important. In some countries, particularly in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the growth in HIV/AIDS is associated with intravenous needle use (but even here the relative importance of needle use origins is falling relative to the growth in sexually transmitted origins). In China, some major outbreaks have been attributed to infected blood products. HIV/AIDS is a very different disease from those diseases that are more familiarly the focus of traditional geographies of disease, where there are major environmental controls on the distribution and prevalence – as in the case of malaria – or there are major poverty controls and correlates – as in the case of cholera. Though the fundamental biomedical etiology of HIV/AIDS is now clear, its distribution, prevalence, and spread are primarily behavioral, related to culture and human relationships as much as, or even rather than, to environment or poverty. On the global scale, however, there is at ﬁrst glance a clear relationship with poverty and the disease environ ment. Africa south of the Sahara, with 11% of the global population, had 63% of the estimated 36.9 million people

173

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globally who are HIV+, and accounted for 70% of the 2.6 million AIDS deaths in 2006 (Table 1). Africa’s estimated adult prevalence rate of 6%, overwhelmingly attributed to heterosexual intercourse, greatly exceeds that of any other region, the next largest being the Caribbean region at 1.2%, but with a very small population in gross terms, and all other world regions have rates of less than 1%. Most rapid recent growth in numbers affected has been in the two demographic giants, China and India, but prevalence rates in these countries remain below 1%, and there is a general consensus that an epidemic on the scale of eastern and southern Africa is unlikely in these countries. India now has an estimated over 5 million people with HIV, the highest number in any country, estimated to have over taken South Africa in 2006, but it remains distinctly urban in its distribution and focused on sex workers, truckers, and other high risk groups, and rural society remains distinctly narrow and conﬁned in its family and sexual relations. Absolute numbers in China have been lower and outbreaks more localized, but there may be greater po tential than in India in such a rapidly changing and ur banizing society for a more generalized epidemic. In other developing countries where there is relatively high prevalence, the growth in numbers has stabilized. In Brazil, for example, there has been a great effort at control through increased use of condoms and wide spread availability of ARVs. In Thailand and Cambodia, the relatively high rate of over 2% has been associated with high rates of commercial sex and a large number of sex workers. Falling rates to below 2% in both countries by 2005 have been largely associated with greatly in creased use of condoms in commercial sex transactions, led by major public information campaigns. Not only is Africa very poor, but it also has the highest overall disease burden, partly for environmental reasons of high bacterial growth in hot and at least seasonally moist climates. While the disease burden certainly con tributes to the high rates in Africa, it is clearly not wholly responsible, for within Africa there is a wide range in

Table 1

HIV prevalence (Figure 1). Highest rates by far are in southern Africa, rising to over 30% in Botswana and Swaziland and to B20% in South Africa, countries that are neither the poorest nor the most environmentally hazardous – largely upland plateaux rather than hot/wet coasts. In West Africa, by contrast, where the overall disease burden is very high, HIV prevalence rates are generally below 4% (only Cote d’Ivoire is over 4%), and these rates are below 1% in North Africa. Within most African countries, urban rates typically tend to be approximately double those of rural rates, and socially AIDS is not particularly a disease of the poor: indeed in the early phases of the epidemic, it had been associated with the elite – the wealthy and mobile were, and to some extent still are, the highest risk groups. The 2003/4 HIV/AIDS Indicator Survey in Tanzania, for example, identiﬁed national prevalence rates of 7.7% for women and 6.3% for men. However, the rate for women in the lowest wealth quintile was 2.5% but 11.8% for the richest quintile; rates for men in the two quintiles were 4.1% and 9.4%, respectively. As the disease has general ized from the initial high risk groups to whole popu lations in the worst affected countries, inevitably the poor have become more affected: as a result of their chronic poverty and associated high general disease burden and often open sores, they are less able to resist infections. Once infected, they are unable to access appropriate therapies, either because they are simply not available in their area, or else, and increasingly likely, access is ra tioned by price in impoverished public health systems. Since spatial patterns of HIV/AIDS infection and prevalence are highly differentiated and strongly skewed, on whatever scale, any overview of the geography of HIV/ AIDS in developing countries must start with issues of difference, not only in terms of rates and patterns, but also in terms of causes, management, and implications. This article therefore considers HIV/AIDS in developing countries under four conceptual issues of broad concern to analysts, including geographers: diffusion and spread;

HIV and AIDS levels by World Region, 2006

Sub-Saharan Africa Middle East and North Africa South and SE Asia East Asia Latin America Caribbean E. Europe and Central Asia Western and Central Europe North America Oceania Total Source: UNAIDS (2007).

Adults and children living with HIV

Adults and children newly infected with HIV

Adult (15 49) HIV prevalence (%)

Adult and child deaths due to AIDS

24 700 000 460 000 7 800 000 750 000 1 700 000 250 000 1 700 000 740 000 1 400 000 81 000 39 500 000

2 800 000 68 000 860 000 100 000 140 000 27 000 270 000 22 000 43 000 7100 4 300 000

5.9 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.5 1.2 0.9 0.3 0.8 0.4 1.0

2 100 000 36 000 590 000 43 000 65 000 19 000 84 000 12 000 18 000 4000 2 900 000

175

Tunisia

HIV/AIDS in Developing Countries

co

roc

Mo

Egypt

Libya

W es te

rn

Sa

ha

ra

Algeria

Mauritania Mali

Niger

Eritrea

Chad

Senegal

Sudan

Gambia

Sierra leone

Djibouti

Burkina faso

Guinea

Lib er ia

Ivory coast

Ghana

Togo Benin

Guinea bissau

Somalia

Nigeria

Ethiopia

Equatorial guinea

Gabon

Uganda

Kenya Democratic republic of the Congo

Over 30

wa nd

R

Estimated percentage of adults age 15−49 years who are HIV+, 2006

Central African republic

Re po f th eC ong o

Cameroon

a

Burundi Tanzania

20.0−29.9 Angola Zambia

ar

z

Zimbabwe Mo

No data Namibia km

asc

0.0−1.9

0

ue

biq

am

Botswana

dag

5.0−9.9 2.0−4.9

Ma

10.0−19.9

1000 Swaziland

Source: UNAIDS, 2006

South Africa Lesotho

Figure 1 HIV prevalence estimates for Africa, 2006.

exceptionalism and moral panic; development impacts; and management. An analysis of each of these issues for developing countries needs to be aware of technical problems of data. Being HIV+ is generally asymptomatic – in the early stage of the infection, carriers will not know that they are affected, normally for several years, and not until the onset of AIDS, with its fevers, skin rashes, and weight loss and lethargy, will individuals recognize they are ill and should seek treatment. Even then the stigma of the dis ease is such that, even if healthcare is available, it may not be accessed. Sure case identiﬁcation is only possible with a blood test. This had in the past been gathered in clinics, with numbers and prevalence estimates based on tests given to pregnant mothers in antenatal clinics and to other clinic patients. Clinic based recording of HIV prevalence was important in the early years of the epi demic in establishing when the epidemic was growing,

especially in sub Saharan Africa, and UNAIDS national estimates and comparisons of national prevalence have, in the past, been based on these clinic sources. These are now being superseded in many countries by population based sources which are intrinsically more accurate, based as they are on the whole population (or a systematic representative sample of it) and not a biased sample of those who attend clinics and hospitals. Population based HIV data have been pioneered as part of the Demographic and Health Survey global program, where those in the sample are offered a blood test at the time of interview. Population based data are not only more reliable, but have generally demonstrated that prevalence rates are rather lower than previous clinic based data had estimated. These are now being integrated into UNAIDS national data and projections, and the previously patchy and ﬂawed data systems are now rapidly improving. Nevertheless, UNAIDS still cautions

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care on reliability of HIV/AIDS estimates and typically provides ranges of possible values for numbers and rates.

Diffusion and Spread: ‘Beyond Epidemiology’ A primary analytical tool of established geographies of disease has been epidemiological models rooted in spatial diffusion theory, with major studies of measles, inﬂuenza, and cholera, among others, using models that con ceptualized the disease in question being spread con tagiously, whether by water (as in cholera), by air (as in tuberculosis), or by a vector (such as the anopheles mosquito and malaria or rats and plague). Early work on diffusion of AIDS followed in this epistemological mould with models of the hierarchical spread of the disease in USA, and elsewhere. The work of Peter Gould in the 1990s epitomized this approach. There were certainly constraints to direct contagious diffusion of the virus that could be contracted only through contact with infected blood, normally as a result of sexual intercourse, but such modeling at the time led to grossly inﬂated predictions of the likely extent and patterns of spread, and particularly in Africa where, with highest current prevalence rates, the probabilities for a general spread, ‘like ripples in a pool’, were greatest. We now know that such modeling greatly exaggerated the potential for and patterns of spread even in the highest prevalence countries. The work of the Australian dem ographer Jack Caldwell and colleagues in Africa clearly showed the patterns of the disease to be not only skewed and focused, but showed them to be much affected by cultural and social variables, including sexual networking and male circumcision. The number of sexual partners, varying culturally and over time within any one culture, will clearly affect patterns and rates of spread, and can be responsible for substantial variation locally between households. High risk groups are those with multiple sexual partners, such as sex workers, truck drivers and migrants generally. These groups have typically been tar gets both for popular resentment against the carriers of the disease in a culture of blame, but also, and more benignly, for education programs in safe sex, especially condom use. Male circumcision seems, surprisingly, to have the effect of raising immunity to HIV infection, and ethnic differences in prevalence rates often reﬂect this cultural practice in Africa (e.g., between the higher rates for the non circumcising Luo men of Western Kenya compared with those of their circumcising Luhya neighbors). Even in the highest prevalence countries of eastern and southern Africa, from Ethiopia southwards, where the epidemic has spread from a strong focus within high risk groups into the population more generally, that spread remains spatially differentiated. There is a distinctive

urban bias that, despite the persistence of circular migra tion and continuous interaction between rural and urban areas that might have been expected to promote a spread of the virus into rural areas, shows little sign of narrowing. In Uganda, where national prevalence rates famously more than halved during the 1990s, the urban prevalence re mains at approximately double the rural. There were de clines in both rural and urban areas, associated largely with a sharp reduction in the number of sexual partners. It is clear that understanding the geography of HIV/ AIDS in developing countries needs to go ‘beyond epi demiology’. Established epidemiological modeling, roo ted as it is in a biomedical model of disease transmission and control, seems inadequate for a disease that is largely behavioral in its incidence – who is affected and who is not? Vulnerability to HIV/AIDS is not merely a matter of exposure and distance, but must relate to broader issues of culture and society, of power relations and historical experience, of entitlements and economic relations within and between households.

Exceptionalism and Moral Panic It is partly as a result of that failure of established medical practice to deal fully with HIV/AIDS that it has been elevated to the level of a moral panic for global as well as national societies. It is a disease that as yet has no cure, but everyone seems at risk, not only the poor or speciﬁcally exposed. Exposure is as a direct result of normal adult behavior – sexual activity, an integral component of human relations in all societies. Absolute avoidance would require lifetime abstinence even within marriage! In the absence of a medical cure, behavior change seems necessary. Current therapies are those of control rather than cure, largely ARVs, that can suppress the effects of the virus to allow people to continue in deﬁnitely with their normal activities in the best case scenario, but they do not destroy it. ARVs also need to be complemented by behavior change for long term survival and to avoid resurgence of the debilitating effects of the virus. The standard behavioral message, associated in particular with USAID rhetoric and associated programs, is for ABC programs – ‘abstinence’, ‘be faithful’, and use a ‘condom’. Such messages have limited effectiveness, and need to be directed mostly to the adolescent, as yet un married population. For them, abstinence is more of an option than it is for married couples, and reducing the number of sexual partners and remaining monogamously faithful certainly helps. Although increasing condom use has become a necessary component of programs funded by USAID, there are problems in using condoms that are not merely about availability and cost – major issues in rural Africa – but also about their social acceptability where their use in the past has been very much associated

HIV/AIDS in Developing Countries

with prostitutes and transactional sex, and these are not the norm for most people. Gould and Woods have argued that HIV/AIDS is a ‘‘wholly exceptional disease’’ in medical, demographic, and behavioral terms. Medically it is not a single disease, not a single cause of death or illness, unlike the more familiar diseases of developing countries such as malaria or tuberculosis. People with AIDS do not die of this condition directly, but are likely to die of tuberculosis, pneumonia, or other infections, and would be recorded as such where the death is in the domain of formal medical care. Furthermore, because being HIV+ is asymptomatic for most of its course, typically for several years, it is not normally felt by carriers to be a problem, even if they know their sero status. Demographically, HIV/AIDS is fundamentally dif ferent in its effects from most other major diseases in developing countries, in that it causes illness and death primarily in adults; in most countries in more women than men; in the sexually active, rather than in children. Since there is an immediate link to the economic and productivity declines as a result of the loss of labor through morbidity (illness) as well as mortality (death), HIV/AIDS has been of much greater concern to gov ernments and international agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF than more established, but less im mediately economically important yet nevertheless so cially devastating, diseases. AIDS has attracted much more direct funding and international attention than any disease previously. However, this demographic effect is felt most immediately at the level of the household, in farm and other economic activities, and in the human and other resources needed for caring for the long term sick. The exceptional behavioral dimensions of the disease have been identiﬁed above. Short of total sexual abstin ence, risk cannot be avoided, as it can with the other main diseases whether directly with vaccinations (e.g., for polio or measles or TB) or in other avoidance behavior (e.g., use of bed nets to prevent mosquito bites for mal aria), or public health measures (e.g., ensuring clean water supplies). Many traditional behaviors (e.g., re peated use of cutting instruments in cleansing rituals, sexual access to widows) seem to encourage infection and spread of HIV/AIDS, and because the condition and its effects are still new, coping mechanisms to mitigate the effect of these behaviors are not yet sufﬁciently in place. In Malawi, for example, not only does HIV/AIDS ex acerbate rural impoverishment, but rural impoverishment in its turn exacerbates HIV/AIDS through encouraging more risky sexual behavior, for different reasons, among men and women. In Eastern Zimbabwe, by contrast, in a context of sharply deteriorating economic and health conditions, there is evidence of behavioral change re sulting in lower prevalence rates.

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Together, these amount to a powerful case for seeing the epidemic as really exceptional rather than yet an other development problem. The most powerful pro ponent of the exceptionalist argument is Peter Piot, Executive Director of UNAIDS. He sees the epidemic essentially as a Malthusian event, one that can lead to major regional or even global collapse of the economic system as a result of production failures and demographic collapse, but one that needs to be reversed as a major priority of the global community. In these terms, it is unprecedented as a disease epidemic, well beyond the effects of the Great Plague of the fourteenth century in Europe, and ranks with climate change and global warming as a medium as well as a long term threat to human survival, but one that can and needs to be man aged to minimize that threat. For others, notably Alan Whiteside, the leading South African social scientist of AIDS, its exceptional importance can be characterized as a long term and Darwinian event – one which will re quire and ill induce a fundamental change in economy and society if it is to be managed at all successfully. By contrast, however, many of those affected at the household level have perceived HIV/AIDS as yet an other development constraint, but one that needs to be ‘mainstreamed’ into development thinking and develop ment planning, as ‘gender’ and ‘environment’ have been. They are all cross cutting issues that affect all sectors of economy, society, and government activity on all scales. The effects of the disease need to be explicitly con sidered in such matters as demand for schooling and healthcare, as well as in estimating labor force deﬁcien cies and requirements. The impacts of HIV/AIDS have to be managed by the state as well as by households and communities, and this is best done by incorporating them explicitly into the established structures and processes of governance. In these terms, HIV/AIDS is not so ex ceptional that it needs to be treated differently from other major issues and concerns. Here the contrast between Uganda and South Africa is most instructive. In Uganda, President Museveni and the whole political process from the late 1980s, when Uganda had the highest prevalence rates in the world, gave HIV/ AIDS special and overwhelming prominence in govern ment activities and public statements, with frank and explicit public education campaigns on the need for safe sex and to reduce the number of sexual partners. Public knowledge and public discussion were greatly enhanced and the effect was the unprecedented experience of sharp falls in prevalence rates by the mid 1990s. These have remained low. Ugandans, in rural and urban areas, have changed their behavior in response to what was seen and accepted as a severe threat to the established social order, and this is in sharp contrast to rising rates in neighboring Kenya at the same time. In South Africa, by contrast, where the epidemic since 2000 has greatly exceeded anything

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experienced in Uganda, political support, led by President Mbeki, has been distinctly lukewarm about conceptual izing HIV/AIDS as anything other than yet another problem that is a byproduct of poverty, inequality and a history of oppression and repression, and will be overcome through progress to the elimination of poverty and in equality. Turning moral panic into a learning opportunity, as in Uganda, needs explicit political commitment.

Impact on Development Cynically, HIV/AIDS might be identiﬁed in the poorest countries of Africa as a resource generating event. There has been a massive resource input from international public (multilateral and bilateral aid programs) and pri vate funds (from NGOs and such organizations as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation) into AIDS associated research, treatment and care, to the extent that there is some discussion of the level of resources going into the disease causing some macroeconomic instability as a re sult of imbalance in productive and social allocations. For poor and ﬁnancially stressed countries, such resource streams represent not only major new lifelines for direct mitigation of the effects of HIV/AIDS, but they are also a source of much needed infrastructural expenditure in health and social services, and often channeled through newly created agencies under direct central govern mental control, such as TACAIDS in Tanzania, and then ‘mainstreamed’ into sectoral ministries. There is an in centive to encourage AIDS related activity as a source of funding, bringing funding into a wider range of activities where there is some AIDS relevant aspect, such as into development of school curriculum and production of learning materials where there is an AIDS awareness program for young people. There is little doubt that HIV/AIDS has a major adverse effect on levels of economic activity on the na tional scale. There is a loss of scarce manpower as, dis proportionately, it is the educated and skilled workers, including in the key mining sector in southern Africa, that have been most affected. There have also been major impacts on teachers and health service personnel, espe cially vulnerable in the earliest phases of the epidemic, but these are the groups most likely to be inﬂuenced by public education messages to change their behavior. As the epidemic progresses, infection rates for teachers, for example, tend to equal or even fall below the rates for the general population. What is clear is the need for in creased training budgets of government and private agencies to replace these workers. However, it is on the household scale that the eco nomic effects are most immediately apparent with the loss of the labor of men and women, on the farm, in off farm economic activities, and in domestic life, due to

prolonged illness as well as death. This loss of labor has had two sorts of effects. One is a commensurate fall in production and income and often immediate im poverishment as crops cannot be planted, weeded, har vested, or marketed, with land then reverting to bush or else taken over by other less affected households with surplus labor. The other, and the more common but less noticed effect, is that there is a reallocation of labor demands within the household, with additional demands for the labor of children and older people who might otherwise have been less directly active. The effects on children have been well documented, and particularly on AIDS orphans, who are more likely than other chil dren to drop out of school in order to provide farm labor or to care for sick adults, to have lower levels of edu cational attainment, and generally conﬁrm the longer term impoverishment of the household as they are less able to become involved directly in income generating activity. HIV/AIDS cannot be realistically separated or measured as an independent development force, but it is completely pervasive in exacerbating household and also national economic and social deterioration. The AIDS epidemic will add to the problems of any international efforts to rejuvenate African economies, and will further exacerbate the widening development gap between Africa and other regions of the developing world.

Management Despite the difﬁculties associated with the exceptional nature of HIV/AIDS, it does need to be managed dir ectly, on all scales. At the local level, there is a traditional coping mechanism that works – high mortality is not new, though with AIDS its scale is well above normal risk levels – and traditional coping can, as a minimum, mean struggling to making the best of a bad job as the household descends, often very quickly, into poverty as labor is withdrawn, directly due to illness and indirectly to care for those who are ill. Assets, including land, may be sold to pay for the costs of care or for food that might have been previously grown on the farm, and a downward spiral of impoverishment sets in. More positively, coping mechanisms may involve ensuring additional labor is made available to sustain economic activity. This may be by the younger or the older members of the household or else other kin, for there is a tendency for increased household dissolution and increased fostering of ﬁt young adults into affected households. There is evidence that households on average get larger, but that there are fewer of them, as larger households seem more able to with stand the production and income shocks associated with sudden and long term labor loss. As Rugalema pointedly asks, ‘‘is this coping or struggling?’’.

HIV/AIDS in Developing Countries

On the national scale, management of the disease as a health problem requires greatly additional resources in the health sector, but in the worst affected countries health systems are overwhelmed with often over 50% of hospital beds occupied by AIDS sufferers. Even the minimum palliative care that can be offered to them imposes high burdens on public provision; little wonder that minimal care at home seems to be the preferable option for many. Since the early 2000s antiretroviral therapies have become increasingly available – both in gross quantities, but, more importantly, with sharply falling prices, as a result of global political action and support eventually through WHO. ARVs offer no cure, and there are medical prob lems about their complexity for those who have access to them, but they can make, and have made, a great differ ence to many people in poor countries, as they have in the global North. In some other richer developing countries with relatively low prevalence, ARVs are available to all AIDS sufferers and have become a prime mechanism of management. Brazil was the ﬁrst developing country to offer universal access to ARV treatment, as well as pre vention and diagnosis services, to anyone with advanced HIV infection. Only in Botswana, among African coun tries, however, are ARVs available free to those who need them, but even here there are problems of stigma and reporting that prevent their universal uptake by those who need them. In most African countries, there needs to be rationing as supply greatly outstrips demand, and the ra tioning process in an open market becomes one of en titlements where the urban and afﬂuent are more able to command better access than the rural poor. In the international community, and particularly within UNAIDS and its advocacy, HIV/AIDS has to be seen as a development problem perhaps even more than as a health problem. There is now a direct and systematic concern for scaling up, as in the relatively successful campaign to have 3 million people in Africa with access to treatment by the end of 2005, and more generally to move ‘from crisis management to sustained strategic response’. This is evident, for example, in UNAIDS identifying three scenarios for the states of HIV/AIDS in Africa by 2025, and the need for positive and systematic response to minimize the number of infections and deaths. There are clearly three major dimensions of the management system that are needed: more resources, in billions rather than millions of • dollars, on a scale that is unlikely by itself to manage

•

the disease, whether through increased use and ef fectiveness of ARVs or resources allocated to ﬁnding a cure or vaccine; political commitment, as in the Ugandan case, raising awareness of the scale of the problem and individual responsibility through behavior change in tackling it; and

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behavioral change, whether from above, from political • pressure and the provision of the state, or from below, by changing norms for levels and patterns of sexual activity. See also: Africa; Aid; Disease Diffusion; Disease Mapping; Health and Development; Poverty; Vulnerability.

Further Reading Agyei Mensah, S. (2005). The HIV/AIDS epidemic in sub Saharan Africa: Homogeneity or heterogeneity? Norwegian Journal of Geography 59, 14 25. Barnett, T. and Clement, C. (2005). HIV/AIDS impact: So where have we got to and where next? Progress in Development Studies 5, 237 247. Barnett, T. and Whiteside, A. (2002). AIDS in the twenty ﬁrst century: Disease and globalization. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave. Caldwell, J. C. (2006). Will HIV/AIDS levels in Asia reach the level of sub Saharan Africa? Asia Paciﬁc Population Journal 21, 3 9. Caldwell, J. C. and Caldwell, P. (1994). The nature and limits of the sub Saharan African AIDS epidemic: Evidence from geographic and other patterns. Population and Development Review 19, 817 848. De Waal, A. (2003). How will HIV/AIDS transform African governance? African Affairs 102, 1 23. Dyson, T. (2003). HIV/AIDS and urbanisation. Population and Development Review 29, 427 442. Gould, W. T. S. (2005). Vulnerability and HIV/AIDS in Africa: From demography to development. Population, Place and Space 11, 473 484. Gould, W. T. S. and Woods, R. I. (2003). Population geography and HIV/AIDS: The challenge of a ‘wholly exceptional disease’. Scottish Geographical Journal 119, 265 281. Kalipeni, E., Craddock, S., Oppong, J. R. and Ghosh, J. (eds.) (2004). HIV and AIDS in Africa: Beyond epidemiology. Oxford: Blackwell. Piot, P. (2006). AIDS: From crisis management to sustained strategic response. The Lancet 368, 526 530. Rugalema, G. (2000). Coping or struggling? A journey into the impact of HIV/AIDS in southern Africa. Review of African Political Economy 86, 537 545. UNAIDS (2005). AIDS in Africa: Three scenarios to 2025. Geneva: UNAIDS. Zhang, H. (2004). The gathering storm: AIDS policy in China. Journal of International Development 16, 1155 1168.

Relevant Websites http://www.tanzania.go.tz Tanzanian AIDS Commission (TACAIDS) http://www.tasouganda.org The AIDS Support Organisation, Uganda. http://www.aidsuganda.org Uganda AIDS Commission. http://www.unaids.org UNAIDS. http://www.liv.ac.uk Understanding Epidemics. http://web.worldbank.org World Bank. http://www.who.int World Health Organisation.

Home T. Peil, Tallinn University, Tallinn, Estonia & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Dwelling The capacity to achieve spiritual unity between humans and things; dwelling expressed in repeated encounters and complex associations with a place, including practical work; also identiﬁed as one way to think spatially about culture. Family It is deﬁned in various ways from a primary social unit (household) to kinship ties; some have argued that the ties between home and family are so strong that the terms are interchangeable (as in birth family, family of origin). Critics argue that traditional nuclear family is limiting and ideologically laden and other household forms are pertinent to the construction of home. Habitation It is connected to ‘rootedness’ and sense of place; demonstrates geographical subject’s commitment to place by considering one place as home. Home A material and an affective space, real or imagined, that is formative of personal and national identity, shaped by everyday practices, lived experiences, social relations, memories, and emotions. Homelessness It is the condition and societal category of people who lack a regular, safe, and adequate shelter; the term also stands for a condition of abjection, of detachment from society characterized by the lack of afﬁliative bonds. Housework The work that ensures the smooth running of the domestic economy. Private Sphere The space where one has the capacity to establish and control personal boundaries. Rootedness An unself-conscious feeling of belonging (of being ‘at home’); denotes home as a source of identity and meaning in the world. Topophilia A notion coined by Yi-Fu Tuan indicating ‘love of place’ or the idea that a place can bring into being deep feelings of value and caring, that is, not only an affective response to place but also a practice that can produce places for people, conscious appreciation of place.

Introduction Home or its equivalent can be considered one of the most powerful words in any language; the etymology of the word (from the origin of ‘kei’ or ‘ham’) indicates its common roots in many European languages. A person’s

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home is, in Western culture, usually understood to be situated in space and time, a place to lay one’s head, but it becomes ‘home’ when it is inscribed with (social, psy chological, and emotive) meaning for individuals and groups. The meaning is, however, personal, and therefore different people are likely to understand ‘home’ to mean different things at different times. Home is thus a highly ﬂuid and a contested site of human existence that reﬂects and reiﬁes identities and values. Researchers have been weary of the use of the term exactly because of the weight of the meaning in everyday life and the ambiguity. Since the home is interconnected with many, if not all, major concerns in many research ﬁelds, no one speciﬁc deﬁnition is agreed upon. In fact, some academics warn against narrowing the usage in the name of intellectual rigor for the fear of losing much of the social meaning. Some have dismissed the home as private, trivial, and mundane compared to the public realm, but increasingly research is dedicated to the critical understanding of the domestic sphere. The wide range of ﬁelds includes an thropology, architecture, environmental and gender studies, ethnography, history, human geography, literary study, philosophy, and sociology. Research traditions and main approaches for examining the home include hous ing studies; home and gender; phenomenological studies of the meanings of home and place attachment; and architectural and environmental design, material culture, considering the notions of being at home, creating or making home, and the ideal home. Thinking about home can be argued to be basically geographic, highlighting relations between place, space, scale, identity, and power. The home becomes a central concern for geography when the argument is adopted that the primary way in which the geographical subject realizes the commitment to place is by means of habi tation, and the home is interpreted as a place where social relations are acted out. Nevertheless, geographers have focused on the home only recently, for instance, while the fourth edition of the Dictionary of Human Geography does not include ‘home’ as a term, the last decade has witnessed an explosion of interest evident in the amount of published literature. Research of the home in geography has been spurred along by increased interest in the everyday, in the production of space in a globalizing world, in the body, as well as by queer geography and feminist understandings of the private and public, and by the analysis of economic and social power relations informed by the postcolonial theory, especially in discussing travel and domestication and the political

Home

signiﬁcance of the home. Domestic space has also interested geographers in an attempt to rematerialize geography and interest in material cultures of objects and their use, display, and meanings. Analysis of the home has turned to include a study of continuous processes rather than isolated actions. In cultural and social geog raphy, the home is usually understood in spatial and political terms with three overlapping components: home as material and imaginative; the nexus between home, power, and identity; and the multiscalarity of home.

Material Home Traditionally, geographers have been more interested in the notion of the home as the house (residence) or homeplace (dwelling) and the notions of home as one’s nation, or place of origin. Home is seen as located in space but not necessarily ﬁxed in space, although the conceptions of home have tended to privilege a physical structure or dwelling, such as a house, ﬂat, institution, or caravan that is bounded in space with certain functional, economic, esthetic, and moral structure. The critics argue that this approach is reductionist, highlighting only one aspect of home. Research on home ownership and more generally on the economic signiﬁcance of housing and home econ omies (consumption patterns) emphasizes the inter connected issue of the relationship of home to property and boundaries. Ownership has long been closely iden tiﬁed with dominant notions of home as those buying a house are presumed to be properly capable of making a home – a place that is secure, comforting, and welcoming. Patterns in housing tenure, especially the signiﬁcance of private house ownership, are related to social divisions in society and have cultural purchase in Western capitalist system. The signiﬁcance of home ownership in personal life and public policy attempts also to bridge the di chotomy between the public and the private sphere. Economic analysis of labor, including housework, paid domestic work within the home, and the intersections of production and consumption, have also challenged the somewhat narrow view of home as a private, domestic, and female realm. The gendering of both ideals and materialities of home informed by feminist theory has formed a prominent ﬁeld in the home research since the 1970s focusing on issues of housework, house design, and house as an expression of status. Feminist theory is used to challenge the idea of the home as a bounded place of security and retreat, and criticizes the public–private dichotomy. Lived experiences, social relations, and emotional signiﬁcance form the home as a site of per sonal history and memory, but the feminists have pointed out that the home also has political implications and agenda within the family and society at large. Arguments

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about home can have an ideological agenda to resist change or to promote speciﬁc views. Home spaces are seen as shaped by inclusions, exclusions, and power re lations. Geographical work in this tradition also covers examining the use of space, for example, the spatial separation of men, women, and children at home, and discussing the implications of gendered spaces, such as the kitchen, or suburbia, or home as work and its impact on national economy. More recent research therefore views house and home as related but not conﬂated. In an attempt to elucidate the relationship between house and home, the latter is seen as a spatial and social unit of interaction between the indi vidual and society; a residence inhabited by family, people, things, and belongings; and a space where particular ac tivities and relationships are lived. This spatial and re lational realm is created by family, gender relations, stability, security, and dwelling ownership. Research ap proaches include studies of environmental design, archi tecture, and landscape architecture alongside material cultures of home adopting ethnographic perspective and examining the objects at home, especially paying attention to art and other forms of visual culture. Many researchers have analyzed the ways in which design and artifacts as well as other possessions/objects inﬂuence the historical and cultural ideas of home. Ideas about privacy, domes ticity, intimacy, and comfort are asserted to be the or ganizing principles for the design and use of domestic spaces. The notion of the ideal home or house in various cultural contexts and historic periods has gained con siderable attention. It tends to focus on physical structures, but has touched upon the marketing techniques employed by the developers, familial experiences, and social change shaping perceptions. People are increasingly moving away from an experience of unself conscious rootedness and toward an (image conscious) sense of place, which again has economic effects as more actors are prepared to invest in the ‘right image’ of home and place.

Imaginative Home The home is the place of greatest personal signiﬁca nce and the primary site around which identities are produced and performed. Many see the link between the home and the identity as permeable: a self constitutive practice embedded in a spatial context that is constituted by social practices, while it is equally constitutive of them. Whereas the majority of authors writing about the home tends to view it as a special place; some, especially in feminist approach, argue that it is one space among many. This plurality is, nevertheless, seen to have con sequences for personal identiﬁcation, and thus indicates that the home has crucial and essential meanings; that it is fundamental to being.

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The home is directly experienced, a state of being, and that is argued to give home its power to elicit strong emotional response. The home is identiﬁed as an emo tional warehouse connected to the individual psycho logical experiences and the feelings of security and well being. In this view, people are seen to feel at home when what they do has some effect and what they say carries some weight, that is, they have control and power to decide for themselves and inﬂuence others. By focusing on the home as a site of constancy, forming a spatial context in which day to day routines are performed, and a site where people feel in control, the emotive aspect of home is closely connected with power: the home starts by bringing some space under control. Phenomenological approach focuses on the individual’s feelings of value, caring, and security; and memories and dreams. Here, the home is usually seen as a place that offers security, familiarity, and nurture – a bounded space beyond which lies the unknown into where people venture but hope to return to the safe haven. The social constructionist school claims that home is not just a matter of feelings and lived experiences but also of cognition and intellectual construction. Key signiﬁers of home are identiﬁed as shelter, hearth, heart, privacy, roots (constancy), abode, and (possibly) paradise. The authors writing in these traditions thus highlight the positive experiences and evoked emotions of home. The critique terms such approach as simplistic and naı¨ve, since it ignores the variety of experiences at home and meanings of home. Simultaneously, the object of the most profound feelings and the subject of the greatest nostalgia, the home is not simply recalled and experi enced in positive ways. Issues of gender, ethnic or racial inequality, injustice, displacement, domestic violence, and homelessness are highlighted in pointing out the failure to recognize the politics of the domestic realm or consider the social and discursive ﬁelds that frame the experience. The critique is delivered from different an gles, such as historical studies focusing on the changes in the meaning of home and feminist ones questioning the adequacy and even accuracy of the representations. Feminists ﬁrst identiﬁed home as a site of oppression, where women are consigned to a life of reproductive and domestic labor with no economic control over its man agement. More recent research has introduced plurality and examines home as a site of resistance where re pressed groups in family (women, girls) or society (mi norities) can gain control over certain aspects of their lives, and thus the home is potentially a site for radical subversive activity. This can, for example, be the case in autocratic society where the home becomes a center for opposition. Discussions held at home or activities inside the home, undertaken in private, may have an effect on the public life, thus confusing the division into private and public spheres.

The meanings of home in various cultures and times have been studied with the help of ﬁction. Textual rep resentations of the home in novels, magazines, and household guides have been important in writings by, for, and about women, and as such tell the story of creative containment and liberation possible within the home.

Homeland The assumptions of linking the nation and its territory and of creating a nation’s imaginary home are connected to the notion of home as homeland. Identities produced in and through places, especially home places, are de ﬁned not only in terms of attachment, but also in a large part in contrast to and against an outside world, real or imagined. The idea of the home is thus closely connected to the idea of the foreign and reﬂects the narratives of nation and empire. For instance, informed by post colonial theory, novels have been studied to explore the ways in which the home in domestic scale is bound to national and imperial geographies of home. Interconnectedness of landscape and national identity has been a subject for a rapidly increasing body of aca demic literature on its representations in text, ﬁlm, and art, and in political and ideological discourses. In fact, the emergence of geography as a scholarly discipline in many European countries can in itself be interpreted as an expression of Romantic nationalism connecting people with their natural home. Both in the development of the nation and its geography, imaginations turned to the local environments of the homeland, where landscapes were read as indices of cultural belonging. A certain body of stereotypes – the ideal home and the home ideal – thus becomes signiﬁcant in the collective mind of the nation internally, as well as externally. The imaginary homeland obtains deep signiﬁcance when left behind, either when growing up or moving away: the landscapes of childhood and home are remembered with nostalgia and idealized. The image may become real in the domestication of the exotic, and may involve the transference of a whole range of objects and ideas, including property laws, renaming space, and material restructuring. The widespread home improvement campaigns of the nation building era aimed at achieving a uniﬁed imagery of the homeland. Trans ferring space into a landscape of home was supposed to make it simultaneously useful and esthetically pleasing, as well as to promote a more efﬁcient use of resources and elimination of waste. In this context, the efﬁcient organization of the home at home, the domestic setting is understood as a model for society that can be replicated especially in nation building or imperial efforts. In con trast to examining ideal homes in a house as home frame, the idealized home in this context refers to the symbolic potency of the homeland and is often discussed

Home

in romantic terms and replicated in popular images (the pastoral or the wild as in the Norwegian mountains farm, the German forest, the English lawn, or the cricket ﬁeld). Recently, as environmental sustainability has gained more attention, the home is used to explore the domestic entanglements of nature and culture and to ﬁnd ways to loosen the hold of the wild–domesticated dualism. The relationships between the home and nature are explored through the material and constructed boundaries. Other themes include the ethics of the domesticated environ ment, private and public gardens, the embodied practice of gardening and landscaping, that is, domesticating nature. Metaphors such as the household of nature are used to discuss people’s inhabiting, or, in fact, cohabitation on the planet Earth regarding human and nonhuman relations.

Spatiality and Temporality of Home The home has a spatial dimension, it is located in space and is meaningful in a way particular to here and now. The home can be seen as unique. At the same time, the home can be studied at many levels. The multiscalarity of homes becomes evident in transnational domestic forms, such as the high rise building or the bungalow. The home is grounded in the activity that occurs in a place, but in recent research the home is rather deﬁned as open and constructed out of movement and communication. Re cent geographical research on the home focuses, thus, primarily on practice. The home is seen as the result of a complex, ﬂuid, and contested process, which remains embodied, and is always expressed in literal and material ways. For example, the photographs taken of family members and displayed within the home, or taken of homes for various purposes provide abundant material in the study of identity and belonging. Interest is thus in the dialectical relationship between the self and the object in the intentional production of home. Social relations and attached meanings stretch beyond the physical space into the symbolic and the virtual. Spatially, the home can be understood as a mental state, a house, a neighborhood, a country (or nation), or the world as real or virtual. Examining the meaning of home and being at home in cyberspace and chat rooms, of homepages, and the use of the Internet at home has only started. It remains to be seen what consequences for identiﬁcation and belonging virtual space will have. Temporally, the focus in the research about the home has foremost been on the changing meanings of home in history and on personal and public narratives of home. Geographical and societal position, that is, residential segregation and mobility, gentriﬁcation, and zoning prac tices are central themes in current geographical studies, considering the home as residence in time and space. Mobility in space and over time has been a long term

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concern for geography, including themes such as volun tary and forced migration on temporary or permanent basis. Examples of recent research include writing house biographies that tell the story of a house as home through the lives of its past and present inhabitants. Describing the housing career of an individual or a household over time can be used to discuss physical or social mobility; the latter including the adoption of new values. Ideas about staying, leaving, and journeying are inte grally associated with notions of home. The home can be understood as the place of origin as well as a point of destination, as searching for a home is seen as a basic trait in human nature. The relationship between home and away is often represented as oppositional, but home can encompass strangers and encounters with newcomers and it is not merely the familiar base to start the journeying. It has also been argued that when one moves away from home, the movement occurs in relation to home, and as such is part of the constitution of home. Leaving home is not always about choice, and a wide range of geo graphical literature focus on the change made under duress, on emplacement and displacement; the loss of home due to domicile or old age that can have equally shattering consequences for a person who has lost control over the organization of their own life. Increasing at tention in the global world is therefore given to trans national homes, that incorporate embodied memories of past landscapes and relationships with premigratory lives; to living in several places in a physical sense (commuting to work, second homes, and caravans), or mentally feeling or not feeling at home at your current place of residence, or feeling homeless.

In Conclusion The home is seen to be at once concrete and abstract; it is a multidimensional concept interpreted in terms of place, feelings and emotions, practices, as a state of being, or sense of place. Rejecting the binary oppositions that were long used to deﬁne the home, the home is seen as porous and contested rather than viewed as a ﬁxed, bounded, and static location. Like any term or experience, the home begets its own negation and a self constitutive practice. Contemporary social and cultural geography examines the home critically as produced and recast through a range of homemaking practices that exist over a range of scales. Abandoning simple spatial deﬁnitions of home as house or collection of houses and associated social amenities, home research currently includes analysis of lived experiences, social relations, and emotional sig niﬁcance, and traverses scales from the domestic to the global in both material and symbolic ways. The issues of space, place, and residence, virtual home on the Internet, scale and mobility, power and control, identity;

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landscapes of home and memory, homeland, and en vironmental sustainability have been examined related to the research on the home. See also: Belonging; Dwelling; Emotional Geographies; Private/Public Divide.

Further Reading Benjamin, D. N., Stea, D. and Saile, D. (eds.) (1995). The Home: Words, Interpretations, Meanings and Environments. London: Avebury. Bennett, T. (2002). Home and everyday life. In Bennett, T. & Watson, S. (eds.) Understanding Everyday Life, pp 1 50. Oxford: Blackwell. Blunt, A. (2005). Cultural geography: Cultural geographies of home. Progress in Human Geography 29, 505 515. Blunt, A. and Dowling, R. (2006). Home. London: Routledge. Chapman, T. and Hockey, J. (eds.) (1999). Ideal Homes? Social Change and Domestic Life. London: Routledge. Cieraad, I. (ed.) (1999). At Home: An Anthropology of Domestic Space. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Domosh, M. (1998). Geography and gender: Home again? Progress in Human Geography 22, 276 282. Duncan, J. S. and Lambert, D. (2003). Landscapes of home. In Duncan, J. S., Johnson, N. C. & Schein, R. H. (eds.) A Companion to Cultural Geography, pp 382 403. Oxford: Blackwell. Easthope, H. (2004). A place called home. Housing, Theory and Society 21, 128 138. Gabriel, M. and Jacobs, K. (2008). The post social turn: Challenges for housing research. Housing Studies 23, 527 540. Gathorne Hardy, F. (1999). Home. In McDowell, L. & Sharp, J. P. (eds.) A Feminist Glossary of Human Geography, pp 124 125. London: Arnold. Hareven, T. (1993). The home and the family in historical perspective. In Mack, A. (ed.) Home: A Place in the World, pp 253 285. New York: New York University Press.

Hinchliffe, S. (2003). ‘Inhabiting’ landscapes and natures. In Anderson, K., Domosh, M., Pile, S. & Thrift, N. (eds.) Handbook of Cultural Geography, pp 207 225. London: Sage. Massey, D. (1992). A place called home. New Formations 17, 3 15. Mezei, K. and Briganti, C. (2002). Reading the house: A literary perspective. Signs 27, 837 846. Miller, D. (ed.) (2001). Home Possessions: Material Culture behind Closed Doors. Oxford: Berg. Painter, C. (ed.) (2002). Contemporary Art and the Home. Oxford: Berg. Porteous, J. D. and Smith, S. E. (2001). Domicide: The Global Destruction of Home. Montreal: McGill Queen’s University Press. Rybczynski, W. (1986). Home: A Short History of an Idea. New York: Penguin Books. Tuan, Y. F. (2004). Home. In Harrison, S., Pile, S. & Thrift, N. (eds.) Patterned Ground: The Entanglements of Nature and Culture, pp 164 165. London: Reaktion Books.

Relevant Websites http://www.enhr.ibf.uu.se European Network for Housing Research. http://hearth.library.cornell.edu Home Economics Archive, Cornell University, USA. http://www.york.ac.uk Housing Studies Association, UK. http://www.jchs.harvard.edu Joint Center for Housing Studies, Harvard University, USA. http://www.massobs.org.uk Mass Observation Archive, University of Sussex, UK. http://www.indivisible.org Stories of American community, the Center for Documentary Studies at Duke University in partnership with the Center for Creative Photography, The University of Arizona. http://www.artscene.org Stories of home, Lincoln Arts Council.

Homelessness J. May, Queen Mary, University of London, London, UK & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Hidden Homeless Those experiencing forms of homelessness that are not immediately evident to others – for example, staying in ‘single-room occupancy/ bed and breakfast’ hotels, in vehicles, or squats, living unwillingly with friends or relatives, ‘hot bedding’ or ‘sofa surﬁng’. Homelessness A continuum of accommodation need stretching from a state of absolute rooﬂessness to severe housing stress or ‘proto/incipient’ homelessness. It may also usefully be deﬁned along an emotional/ experiential register, according to whether a person enjoys the feelings of emotional attachment, safety, and security (more usually) associated with a sense of ‘home’. Poverty Management The organized response by the state and elites to manage and contain potentially disruptive populations, including the mentally disabled, criminals, and homeless people. Shelter/s Accommodation set aside speciﬁcally for homeless people on a temporary basis. The form and quality of shelter accommodation varies widely – ranging from large, dormitory-style establishments to single rooms or family units. In North America and Western Europe, most shelters are provided by voluntary sector/not-for-proﬁt organizations and funded through a combination of state funding and public donation. Skid Row A distinctive district in which accommodation and services for homeless people are concentrated. Found mainly in North America, where skid row districts have come under severe pressure from central-city redevelopment and gentriﬁcation in recent years, such concentrations are less evident in European cities. Stigma A social process leading to the devaluation of an individual or groups who come to be identiﬁed as embodying negative traits. Human geographers are especially interested in the role that spatial metaphors play in demarcating stigmatized groups, and the spatial practices by which such groups come to be separated from mainstream society. Visible Homelessness Those experiencing absolute rooﬂessness or making use of accommodation facilities (shelters and hostels) provided speciﬁcally for homeless people – and who are hence ‘visible’ to members of the housed public, social service agencies, and others.

Introduction Following a dramatic rise in levels of homelessness through the 1980s and 1990s, the last 20 years or so have seen a steady proliferation of work exploring the geog raphies of homelessness. The majority of this work has focused on the problems of street homelessness, usually in urban settings, almost all of it in an Anglo American context. Early work in this ﬁeld examined the causes of homelessness, the politics of shelter location, and street survival strategies. More recently, homelessness has emerged as a favored lens through which to examine broader themes in contemporary urban geography. Thus, ever more punitive responses to street homelessness have been used to illustrate wider trends of urban revanchism and the changing politics of public space, for example. Though such work has brought the problems of home lessness to a much wider audience, other responses to homelessness and the experiences of homeless people themselves are not always well speciﬁed in such accounts. As a result, despite a growing body of work by geog raphers ‘on’ homelessness, the problems of homelessness itself are still not always well understood by geographers.

Understanding Homelessness Problems of Deﬁnition When people think of homelessness, they tend to think of people living on the streets. Certainly, this rather narrow deﬁnition has shaped much of the work by geographers on this topic. In fact, street homelessness is only one form of a much broader problem. When seeking to deﬁne homelessness, it is most useful to think in terms of a continuum of accommodation need. Such a continuum stretches from the street homeless population at one end, through other forms of ‘visible’ homelessness (those staying in emergency shelters and hostels) to a variety of forms of ‘hidden homelessness’ at the other end (those living in overcrowded and insecure accommodation, or staying unwillingly with friends or relatives). One prob lem with such deﬁnitions is that it reduces homelessness to issues of accommodation and may, in practice, work to reproduce normative understandings that conﬂate par ticular forms of accommodation with the experience of ‘home’ or ‘homelessness’. An alternative is to try and capture something of these experiences themselves: de ﬁning homelessness in relation to the absence of those feelings of emotional attachment, security, and control (usually) associated with a sense of ‘home’. The best work

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by geographers on these issues has sought to give voice to homeless people’s own understandings, tracing the dif ferent forms of accommodation (including street en campments, or mobile homes, for example) that for them may equate to a sense of ‘home’. Overlaying these conceptual debates are important legislative constructions that deﬁne and divide different homeless populations. In the United States, the services used by homeless people (e.g., emergency shelters, transitional housing, drop in centers, and soup kitchens) are almost wholly provided by voluntary sector organ izations supported by a mix of competitive contract funding and indirect state subsidies in the form of wel fare beneﬁt transfers. In the UK, the situation is more complex. While the local state has legal responsibility for the emergency accommodation and rehousing of those considered in ‘priority need’ (mainly families with dependent children, the very elderly, or ill), childless couples and other single, homeless people must rely on the much more basic services provided by a wide variety of voluntary organizations and charities. Because served mainly by voluntary sector organizations these latter groups are often not included in ofﬁcial, government statistics on the ‘homeless’ population. Such differences should not be overemphasized. Work by geographers has demonstrated that even in the United States different homeless people are often treated very differently, accessing different services in different parts of the city. Hence, while single, homeless men especially may have few options but to turn to a (declining) stock of ‘single room occupancy’ (SRO) hotels and traditional dormitory style shelters in ‘skid row’, for example, homeless women and families are increasingly likely be found in one of a new generation of ‘designer’ shelters that tend to be located in suburban rather than central city locations. Though physical conditions in such shelters are much improved on the old style shelters of skid row, they often require residents to submit to highly invasive pro grams of ‘welfare and rehabilitation’ (budgeting classes, compulsory job searches, and so on) designed to facilitate homeless people’s ‘reentry’ into ‘normal’ society. Over laying and complicating this gender divide are divisions of race and ethnicity, with the distribution of different homeless groups tending to mirror the wider distribution of ethnic minority communities across the city, but with a marked overrepresentation of African American men, in particular, in traditional skid row neighborhoods. As should be clear, differing conceptualizations of homelessness make it extremely difﬁcult to gain an ac curate picture of the size of the homeless population, because it must ﬁrst be determined how ‘homelessness’ is being deﬁned. Because of the differing legislative contexts shaping deﬁnitions of and responses to homelessness in different places, cross national comparisons are even more problematic. What is clear is that street homeless people

make up only a small proportion of the wider homeless population in any one place. In the UK, for example, even when at its peak in the early 1990s, the number of people ‘sleeping rough’ on London’s streets never rose above about 3000. In contrast, an estimated 15 000 people are currently housed in London’s emergency shelters, with a further 67 000 households (equating to approximately 167 500 people) accepted as homeless and in ‘priority need’ by London’s local authorities. Though it is the US experience that continues to prove of most interest to geographers working in this ﬁeld, levels of homelessness in US cities, in fact, appear much lower: with recent esti mates putting the total number of shelter beds in New York at just 30 000, and with as few as 8 602 in Los Angeles – where levels of street homelessness are, not surprisingly perhaps, much higher. The Social Production of Stigma That homeless people must so often continue to rely on the help of voluntary organizations and charities rather than the state is a sign of the stigma still associated with homelessness. Three main roots to this stigma can be traced. First, insofar as they are usually under or un employed, homeless people tend to be viewed as ‘un productive’. In a society that accords a privileged status to economic productivity, homeless people are at best afforded a marginal position and at worst may be viewed as a drain on collective resources. Indeed, the work that those on the streets sometimes engage in, such as pan handling, are themselves often considered as further undermining normative constructions of both work and welfare. Second, having apparently lost contact with friends and family, homeless people are commonly per ceived as ‘disafﬁliated’ – as existing outside the comforts and constraints of mainstream society and its values. Third, whether because of their own habits or because of stereotyping, homeless people often come to be associ ated with other stigmatized, and threatening, groups: drug addicts, alcoholics, and the mentally ill, for example. As geographers have shown, the stigma suffered by homeless people is inherently geographical. Most obviously, eating, bathing, and sleeping on the streets contravenes deep rooted and fundamental distinctions between public and private space, and a sense of the appropriate behavior associated with each. This sense of ‘rupture’ is especially powerful in the case of homeless women, whose presence on the streets undermines tra ditional understandings of femininity rooted in the pri vate sphere. At the same time, traditional responses to homelessness – and homeless shelters in particular – work to maintain and reproduce this stigma, as people become ‘tainted’ by their use of services located in poor and marginalized neighborhoods and must take on the label of ‘homeless’ in order to qualify for such services.

Homelessness

But it is also clear that reactions to homeless people and their plight differs, with some more liable to attract sympathy than others. Important to such differentiation is the extent to which a person might be understood as responsible for the circumstances in which they ﬁnd themselves, or capable of effecting their own ‘escape’ from the streets. Hence, while a homeless woman with children might be afforded considerable sympathy, a single, homeless man with an addiction is likely to en gender a far less charitable response. Reanimating older divisions between the ‘deserving’ and the ‘undeserving’ poor, exactly these divisions can be seen in the dis tinctions drawn in the British legislative system between those in ‘priority need’ and others, and in the US between those provided access to a ‘designer shelter’ and those consigned to skid row.

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this area by geographers has sought to trace the impact of broader structural changes operating across a variety of scales and at different ‘speeds’ (from processes of global economic restructuring to changes to state welfare regimes and urban labor markets) on changing levels of home lessness, and on the groups most affected by homelessness, in different locales.

The Geographies of Homelessness With a better understanding of how homelessness can be deﬁned and of its causes, and of why homeless people continue to be so viliﬁed, we can trace a clearer picture of work by geographers on this issue. Three main bodies of work can be identiﬁed.

Explaining Homelessness

Shelter Location, Survival Strategies, and the Politics of ‘Malign Neglect’

Explanations of homelessness vary, and have been driven as much by changes in the homeless population as by intellectual currents within the academy. In the 1960s and 1970s, a period of relatively high or ‘full’ employ ment saw the (visibly) homeless population limited to a relatively small number of older, single, homeless men living within the conﬁnes of clearly bounded skid row districts. Under such conditions, analysts tended toward individualized explanations. Thus, homelessness came to be understood as a result either of individual pathology (a result of alcoholism, an inherent ‘wanderlust’, or social disafﬁliation, for example) or as an expression of indi vidual vulnerability (relating to a person’s ill health, or mental incapacity, for example). By the late 1970s, however, the growing numbers of mentally ill people on the streets as a result of deinsti tutionalization and (the failure of) ‘community care’ pro grams, led analysts to begin to examine the various structural changes that seemed to be ‘producing’ a change in the homeless population. Such a move was given renewed impetus in the 1980s, as the traditional homeless population was ﬁrst supplemented and ﬁnally surpassed by growing numbers of what came to be referred to as the ‘new homeless’. At a time when geographers and other social scientists were exploring the relations between ‘structure’ and ‘agency’, the rising numbers of younger people, women, and families appearing in drop in centers and shelters led to the emergence of a new academic orthodoxy that remains largely intact to this day. Within this frame, homelessness tends to be explained with ref erence to the ways in which recent changes to the econ omy and state welfare regimes have impacted especially hard on exactly those groups most vulnerable to such changes, and who are increasingly to be found among a newly expanded homeless population. The best work in

From the late 1970s through to the early 1990s, studies of homelessness focused on three main themes: the causes of homelessness, the politics of shelter location, and homeless people’s own survival strategies. Under the ﬁrst of these, as we have seen, by the mid 1980s, a new orthodoxy had emerged that explained an increase in levels of homelessness, and changes in the homeless population, with regard to the differential impact of broader structural processes on different groups in the city. Under the second, geographers explored a range of issues around shelter location. Hence, studies mapped the distribution of homeless services, for example, or explored land use conﬂicts and community opposition around the siting of homeless facilities. In the best of such work, scholars sought to deploy the insights of a wider sociospatial dialectic: tracing the ways in which services ﬁrst followed then reenforced the growing concentration of homeless people and other poor and marginalized groups within traditional skid row districts. Underpinned by a belief that homeless people were ill served by this concentration of services in central city, ‘service dependent ghettos’, geographers sought to explain why services tended to concentrate in such areas rather than being more evenly dispersed across the city (whether in poor or middle class neighborhoods), and the effects of such concentrations on homeless people themselves. For most, though the 1970s and 1980s were widely under stood as an era of ‘malign neglect’ – with city authorities and the state seemingly happy to leave the ‘management’ of homeless people and other ‘troublesome’ populations to the voluntary sector – such concentrations were read as a form of ‘containment’. Hence, geographers examined the ways in which urban managers, local business con sortiums, and community groups used the urban plan ning system to restrict (street) homeless people and

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homeless services to strictly delimited areas of the city, out of the public eye. Though some of this work was conducted in Britain, it should be noted that the vast majority of these studies were concerned with the geographies of homelessness and homeless service facilities in North American cities. In the absence of a more developed comparative litera ture, it is therefore very hard to know whether or not the patterns and processes traced in North America were in play in the UK or elsewhere in Europe at this time. Nor were scholars necessarily in agreement as to the impact of such processes. While most argued that the location of services in skid row tended to further stigmatize service users, others suggested that the concentration of SROs, shelters, and other services in tightly deﬁned areas offered an important focus around which homeless peo ple’s own support networks could develop. Indeed, by the early 1990s, geographers were in creasingly interested in the survival strategies adopted by homeless people when on the streets and in the role that homeless people’s own street networks played in these strategies. Deploying the insights of time geography, workers began to map the daily life paths of street homeless people. Though such pathways were indeed often focused around the institutional spaces (of shelters, drop in centers, and soup kitchens) that provide a focus for homeless people’s daily routines, other spaces and other pathways too were recognized as important. Thus, studies began to explore people’s earning strategies, for example, or the possibilities that homeless people’s own temporary encampments offered for establishing some sense of ‘home’ among those unable or unwilling to ac cess the strictly regulated spaces of the formal shelter system. Crucial here was the attention paid to gender relations and to the very different roles that homeless men and women often took on when on the streets and in their relationships with one another. Broadly speaking, scholars recognized that such partnerships and wider street networks were often crucial to an individual’s survival, and to homeless women in particular, as they enabled a pooling of resources and a more effective al location of the tasks essential to day to day survival. At the same time, it was clear that as people became more adept at surviving on the streets so too they often in ternalized a powerfully negative sense of themselves as ‘homeless’, and experienced a further worsening of their material circumstances. Urban Revanchism and the Puriﬁcation of Public Space In the mid to late 1990s, a new and more punitive re sponse to the problems of street homelessness emerged. Rather than seeking simply to contain homeless people within the conﬁnes of skid row, the past decade has seen

sustained attempts to clear homeless people from the prime spaces of the city. A key part of such campaigns has been the criminalization of the activities that those on the streets must engage in to survive. Hence, in numerous cities across the United States, it is now a criminal of fence to eat, sleep, or bath in public, for example. Else where, there have been increased attempts to hide the evidence of street homelessness through the use of new architectural forms that work either to obscure a city’s homeless facilities, or to ‘defend’ newly redeveloped sites from incursions by homeless people and the poor through the use of hard and soft landscaping, closed circuit television (CCTV), and private security. For some, such a shift signals the end of an era of the ‘malign neglect’ of homeless people and the birth of a new ‘post justice’ or ‘revanchist’ city. Within such a city, the pres ence of homeless people is no longer tolerated in newly ‘puriﬁed’ public spaces designed to foster upmarket consumption and a revitalized public life. Skid row itself is also under increasing pressure from gentriﬁcation: leaving homeless people literally nowhere to go. Explanations for such a shift differ. For those working within the perspectives of political economy, such de velopments are best understood with reference to at tempts by city managers to attract and retain capital investment and middle class workers, residents, and consumers in an era of intensiﬁed interurban com petition. Certainly, there would appear to be a distinctive geography to the post justice city, with street clearance campaigns most evident in those cities with a heavy re liance upon the ﬁnancial and creative industries, tourism, and the convention trade. Within such cities, antihome less practices seem to be most focused upon sites within or immediately adjacent to the ﬁnancial district and downtown core. Others have stressed instead the sym bolic work of such campaigns, suggesting that attempts to clear homeless people from the streets are best under stood as an attempt to constitute and secure a new urban ‘public’ against a reviled and unproductive ‘Other’. Rather less attention has been paid to the ways in which homeless people have sought to negotiate, or re sist, such changes. Where geographers have considered such issues, they have perhaps too often focused upon the high proﬁle demonstrations and legal actions that have occasionally been organized and led by advocacy groups on behalf of homeless people. In fact, it may be more proﬁtable to examine the numerous but more subtle ways in which homeless people themselves seek to resist such pressures: attempting to ‘pass’ as customers when shel tering in public libraries or making use of restrooms in stations and restaurants, for example, or restricting their movements to the more marginal spaces of the city. Such work is vital to restore a sense of agency to accounts of homelessness in which homeless people’s own under standing and experiences are too often ignored.

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Beyond Revanchism?

Conclusions and Further Study

Many of the developments traced in the previous section are indeed increasingly evident in cities across both North America and Western Europe. Nonetheless, not all are convinced by arguments that recent years have wit nessed a wholesale shift from an earlier ‘malign neglect’ of homeless people to something more punitive, or by the conceptual frame used to explore such a shift. Most ob viously, perhaps, recent work by geographers has made plain that talk of the breakup of skid row is premature. In Los Angeles, for example, skid row still houses the single greatest concentration of shelter beds within the region. More signiﬁcantly, perhaps, far from declining, the number of emergency shelters has in fact increased in recent years in both the United States and Britain – even in those cities held up as most obviously articulating a ‘revanchist’ turn. While such an increase many of course be read as a new attempt to better contain the problems of homelessness, it is difﬁcult to understand how it might be seen as articulating an obviously ‘vengeful’ disavowal of homeless people by city managers and the wider public. Not least, the vast majority of such shelters are provided by voluntary organizations and charities, many of which are reliant upon often substantial state subsidies, public donations, and the work of signiﬁcant pools of volunteer labor. Rather than any simple or straight forward shift in responses to homelessness in recent years, it therefore seems that homeless people often continue to enjoy considerable public sympathy, with a deep rooted and powerful charitable impulse existing alongside (and frequently undermining) more punitive responses to street homelessness. This more complex picture is not easily captured by the conceptual apparatus deployed in accounts of urban revanchism or of the ‘post justice’ city. Not least, with attempts to ‘reclaim’ the city framed in terms of the needs of city managers to maintain the image of a prosperous and competitive city – that is, by the needs of capital – such accounts leave little room for other actors: most notably, the state. In fact, in both the United States and Britain, the local and central state have taken an increasingly active role in the management of street homelessness: using new systems of funding and regu lation to shape the activities of the voluntary sector organizations working with homeless people, and seeking to inﬂuence public responses to street homelessness through various ‘educational’ and ‘diverted giving’ campaigns, for example. In an effort to give proper space to the variety of actors shaping responses to homeless ness in the contemporary city, and the complex rela tionships between them, scholars have therefore recently turned to a variety of alternative conceptual frames – ranging from neoliberal welfare restructuring ‘poverty management’.

The last 20 years or so have seen an increasing body of work by geographers on the problems of homelessness. Accounts of the revanchist or ‘post justice’ city in par ticular have brought the problems of homelessness to a much wider audience, both within and beyond the dis cipline, and have raised fundamental questions not only about homelessness and responses to it but also about changing constructions of the ‘public’, public space, and different people’s rights to the city. Nonetheless, both earlier and more recent works by geographers on the problems of homelessness remain curiously delimited. Most obviously, the vast majority of such work has been concerned with questions of street homelessness within an Anglo American urban context. While there is certainly evidence of a broad (neoliberal) consensus with regard to the most effective ways of managing homeless people and other ‘troublesome’ populations in Britain and the United States, recent re sponses to street homelessness in Britain and the US have by no means been exactly the same. Such differences will be even more marked in other countries, where quite different traditions of social welfare provision and urban policy are evident. One area where geographers can obviously make a contribution to debates on homeless ness is therefore through more comparative work that seeks to think beyond existing Anglo American metrics of knowledge. But geographers interested in homelessness must also step beyond the city. A rich vein of work is now emerging on the geographies of rural homelessness, with scholars exploring the quite different problems faced by those who disturb deep rooted constructions of the rural idyll. Yet, there remains little work exploring the geographies of homelessness beyond these two extremes. Rather than continue to limit a consideration of the geographies of homelessness to either rural areas or metropolitan cen ters, there is a need to consider issues pertaining to homelessness in the ‘ordinary city’ where both the ex periences of homelessness, and responses to it, may be quite different. In light of the quite different ways in which home lessness can be deﬁned, and the variety of responses that different groups may experience from policymakers, service providers, and the public, geographers must also move beyond their obsession with the problems of visible homelessness. Instead, scholars should seek to build upon the small but growing body of work by geographers ex ploring other spaces – family shelters and women’s ref uges, for example – to give proper consideration to other forms of homelessness and the experiences of different groups. Such a call is also, in part at least, a call to pay more attention to the ways in which homelessness is imagined

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and deﬁned, whether by policymakers, the public, or geographers themselves. As studies of the discursive construction of homelessness make clear, the ways in which the problems of homelessness, homeless people, and the geographies of homelessness are represented in newspapers, novels and ﬁlms, textbooks, census materials, and legislative systems is of vital importance to the ways in which problems of homelessness are addressed. See also: Public Space.

Further Reading Cloke, P., Milbourne, P. and Widdowﬁeld, R. (2002). Rural Homelessness: Issues, Experiences and Policy Responses. Bristol: Policy Press. Deverteuil, G., May, J. and Von Mahs, J. (forthcoming) ‘Complexity not collapse: reframing geographies of homelessness in a punitive age’, Progress in Human Geography. Johnsen, S., Cloke, P. and May, J. (2005). Day centres for homeless people: Spaces of care or fear? Social and Cultural Geography 6(6), 787 811. May, J., Johnsen, S. and Cloke, P. (2005). Re phasing neo liberalism: New labour and Britain’s crisis of street homelessness. Antipode 37(4), 703 730. Mitchell, D. (2003). The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for Public Space. New York: The Guilford Press.

Rowe, S. and Wolch, J. (1990). Social networks in time and space: Homeless women in skid row, Los Angeles. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 80, 184 204. Ruddick, S. (1996). Young and Homeless in Hollywood. New York: Routledge. Takahashi, L. (1996). A decade of understanding homelessness in the USA: From characterization to representation. Progress in Human Geography 20(3), 291 310. Veness, A. R. (1994). Designer shelters as models and makers of home: New responses to homelessness in urban America. Urban Geography 15(2), 150 167. Wolch, J. (1996). From global to local: The rise of homelessness in Los Angeles during the 1980s. In Scott, A. & Soja, E. (eds.) The City: Los Angeles and Urban Theory at the End of the Twentieth Century, pp 390 425. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Wolch, J. and DeVerteuil, G. (2001). New landscapes of urban poverty management. In May, J. & Thrift, N. (eds.) TimeSpace: Geographies of Temporality, pp 149 168. London: Routledge.

Relevant Websites http://www.crisis.org.uk Crisis. http://www.homeless.org.uk Homeless Link. http://www.lacehh.org Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and Homelessness. http://www.ris.org.uk Resource Information Service.

Homelessness, Rural P. Milbourne, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction Homelessness is generally assumed to be an urban problem in most ‘developed’ countries. Academic, pol icy, and media discussions of homelessness tend to focus on its occurrence in particular parts of the city, with its presence in other places often understated and sometimes denied all together. This is particularly the case with small town and rural spaces where relatively little research or policy attention has been directed toward homelessness. Given that homelessness repre sents a social phenomenon, that is, something that im pacts on (particular) social groups regardless of where they live, the spatialized nature of discussions about it raises some important questions for human geographers. Perhaps the most signiﬁcant of these is why ‘the urban’ should have captured so much of the coverage of homelessness. The importance attached to homelessness as a re search and policy issue largely relates to its increased visibilities in certain places and spaces at particular moments in time. In some cases, these visibilities concern direct observations of homeless groups in speciﬁc spaces; in other cases, they result from media discussions of homelessness. In recent decades, it has been the increased presence and reporting of people sleeping rough, and particularly young rough sleepers, in public spaces within major cities that has led to academic, policy, and media attention being directed toward homelessness. Instead of acting as a springboard for broader discussions of the sociospatial features of contemporary homeless ness; however, these discussions have remained largely ﬁxed on these particular forms of literal homelessness present in urban places. As well as being the most visible form of homeless ness, rough sleeping is the type of homelessness that is most obviously associated with the city. Not only are those sleeping rough most numerous in urban places, they are also highly visible in particular spaces within these places, such as shop doorways and public parks, which are passed by many thousands of workers and shoppers on a daily basis. It is also the case that a broad range of support services for the homeless – hostels, shelters, soup kitchens, drop in centers and so on – exist in the city, which act as important sites, sights, and symbols of homelessness in these spaces. Geographers and other social scientists interested in homelessness have, therefore, been drawn to these urban

spaces in order to research different aspects of home lessness. Consequently, the key research and writings on homelessness have utilized the city as a research laboratory. While this focus on the city as the dominant space for homelessness research has produced important evidence on the sociospatial dimensions of homelessness, it has also directed critical attention away from other forms and other spaces of homelessness. Homelessness is not just associated with a lack of physical shelter; it also involves people living in insecure or inadequate forms of housing and in properties that do not constitute ‘home’. These broader deﬁnitions of homelessness, however, are subject to debate among academic researchers and policymakers, not least because there exists little agreement about what constitutes housing security and home. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to construct homelessness as a continuum of situations of housing need, ranging from a lack of phys ical shelter, through institutional forms of living, in volving hostels and shelters, to precarious housing situations that jeopardize the physical and emotional well being of occupants. Examples of this last category of homelessness include people living in unﬁt, crowded, or unaffordable accommodation, and those experiencing domestic violence. Considered in these terms, rough sleeping constitutes an extremely small proportion of homeless cases, with most homelessness occurring in the largely hidden spaces of the ‘home’. The domination of city based homelessness research has also downplayed the signiﬁcance of homelessness in small town and rural spaces. Homelessness has long been a feature of living in rural areas, linked to processes of urbanization, agricultural depressions, land clearances, inadequate housing conditions and poorly developed local welfare infrastructures, and passing references to tramps, hobos, and wayfarers can be found in various publications on historical rural welfare issues. It has only been during the last couple of decades, though, that re searchers have turned their attention speciﬁcally to problems of ‘rural’ homelessness. Despite this late start, rural researchers have done much to highlight the sig niﬁcant and, in several countries, increasing presence of homelessness in rural areas. This work has pointed to important similarities between the causes and types of homelessness in rural and urban places; it has also indi cated some distinctive elements of homelessness in rural areas, particularly the reduced visibilities of homeless people and the restricted provision of welfare services for homeless people.

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Researching Rural Homelessness Rural homelessness ﬁrst began to be studied in the United States and the United Kingdom in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Initial work sought to develop statistical proﬁles of rural homelessness and to compare these with the situations in urban areas. Early attention focused on the numerical signiﬁcance, social proﬁles, and causes of homelessness in rural and urban spaces, with some at tention also given to the spatial distribution of home lessness within rural areas. Research in the United States drew on rough sleeper counts undertaken as part of the population census, as well as specially commissioned surveys of the homeless population in particular rural states. In the United Kingdom, ofﬁcial statistical data on the changing incidence of homelessness was analyzed at the local level to compare the shifting rural and urban situations. The volume of research undertaken on rural home lessness in these two countries has increased since the early 1990s, as has the breadth of methodological ap proaches utilized to examine the issue. Statistical ac counts of the (changing) scales, geographies, and features of homelessness in rural areas have continued, based on analyses of ofﬁcial data and also a growing body of evi dence from surveys of the rural homeless. Such analyses have played an important role in demonstrating the nu merical signiﬁcance of homelessness in rural areas, as well as some of its distinctive features, to the research and policy communities. Qualitative methodologies have also been employed to explore the nature and experiences of homelessness in particular rural places. Utilizing depth interviews with local welfare agencies and homeless or recently homeless people, and ethnographic techniques, these studies have highlighted the previously hidden dimensions of homelessness and the complex coping strategies employed by homeless people to negotiate rural spaces. Signiﬁcant within this body of work has been a qualitative study of homelessness in two case study counties in rural England undertaken in the mid 1990s. Most recently, the publication of the ﬁrst inter national book on rural homelessness in 2006 has not only provided discussions of the academic and policy neglects of rural homelessness in other ‘developed’ countries – Australia, New Zealand, Spain, Ireland, Finland, and Canada – but also offered valuable narratives of the ex tent, experiences, and welfare contexts of rural home lessness in a broad range of rural places.

Restricted Visibilities of Rural Homelessness Homelessness remains largely hidden within the phys ical, sociocultural, and political fabric of rural space.

Rural areas are characterized by low population densities, meaning that homeless people tend to be dispersed across quite large spaces. In addition, the most obvious sites and sights of homelessness, such as retail centers, public parks, and welfare support facilities, tend to be absent from most rural areas, denying rural homelessness a similar level of visibility and legitimacy to that present in urban spaces. Consequently, homelessness is more difﬁcult to research in rural areas. Literal homelessness is both difﬁcult to practice and when it does occur is found in less obvious spaces, such as woods and abandoned agricultural buildings, while the bulk of homelessness remains hidden within private households and a range of precarious housing situations. It is extremely problem atic, then, to count homeless people in rural areas; it is also far from easy to undertake place based depth studies when the rural homeless are not concentrated in par ticular spaces. Such difﬁculties have led to calls for the development of broader conceptions of rural homelessness, which are capable of revealing the wider spectrum of homeless situations in rural areas. In addition to its literal and institutional forms, it is claimed that rural homelessness should be understood as a series of precarious housing situations, involving people living ‘on the edge of homelessness’ or at risk of homelessness. Such situations may include people pushed into properties deemed to be inadequate on account of their poor physical conditions, unaffordable housing costs or insecurity of tenure, as well as those forced to live in the homes of family members or friends in order to fend off situations of rooﬂessness. These broader forms of homelessness tend to involve long periods of housing insecurity and ‘near homeless ness’ and relatively short periods of literal or institutional homelessness, which means that they rarely come to the attention of welfare agencies and may not be recognized as homelessness by the people experiencing these situ ations. It is also the case that these broader forms of homelessness represent difﬁcult research subjects as they are characterized by considerable spatial and temporal dynamism. The presence of homelessness in rural spaces is also downplayed by important sociocultural processes. Dom inant discourses of rurality in most developed countries are bound up with notions of community cohesion, self sufﬁciency, privacy, and the ownership of property. Given that homelessness transgresses these ‘norms’ of rural living, it tends to be constructed as ‘out of place’ or recognized in other ways, as poverty or housing needs, within rural space. In some countries, such as the UK, discourses of rurality are also bound up with notions of idyll, which construct rural areas as places devoid of social disadvantage and thus deny the presence of homelessness within them. Such national discourses of rurality are actively imposed on to local rural space by

Homelessness, Rural

ex urban middle class groups who continue to move to rural areas in search of idyllized lifestyles. The restricted provision of welfare services and fa cilities for homeless groups in rural areas compounds the out of place nature of rural homelessness and accentuates the otherness experienced by homeless people. The limited presence of these important signs of homelessness within the rural landscape results from a series of prac tical difﬁculties associated with identifying and meeting the needs of homeless people in rural areas. However, it also relates to the negative attitudes and (non)actions of local government and other elite groups within rural society toward homelessness. For sets of political, ﬁscal, and economic reasons, it has been in the interests of these groups to ignore the needs of the rural homeless, allowing them to deal with their own problems or to move to other areas, rather than to provide the types of support services and facilities that have been developed in urban spaces. While such attitudes and actions were mostly associated with the past, the consequences of these historical political and policy denials of local homelessness have, as we will be shown later, carried forward into the present.

Statistical Assessments of Rural Homelessness Quantifying the extent of homelessness in rural areas is fraught with difﬁculty. Homelessness data in most coun tries are generally restricted to counts of rough sleepers. These counts are generally based on snapshot surveys of sleepers in the known sites of the homeless, which tend to be located in the cities and large towns, and, as such, provide a rather partial and geographically biased indi cation of the extent of the problem. It is hardly surprising to learn then that rough sleeper counts highlight that this type of homelessness is most signiﬁcant in metropolitan areas. When more sensitive counting methods are em ployed, involving surveys in a broader range of spaces and over longer time periods, the gap between the size of the rough sleeper population in urban and rural places re duces but generally remains, for reasons discussed earlier. In a small number of countries, levels of homelessness are routinely recorded by the state as a part of their welfare systems. In the United Kingdom, for example, the government has published local data on the incidence, proﬁle, and causes of homelessness since the 1970s. While these data are based on a rather narrow deﬁnition of homelessness, they do provide a useful indication of the changing scales, geographies, and characteristics of homelessness in rural areas. Analyses of these ofﬁcial statistics indicate an increased signiﬁcance of homeless ness in rural areas since the early 1990s, although standardized rates of rural homelessness, which take into

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account population totals, have been broadly static across this period. In addition, the standardized level of rural homelessness remains below that recorded for urban areas. This urban–rural differential is also evident from specially commissioned surveys of homelessness in se lected states in the United States and Finland. Efforts have also been made to examine the spatial distribution of homelessness within rural areas, with these analyses revealing that rural homelessness is characterized by a great deal of spatial unevenness. Studies in the United States and Australia, for example, point to highest rates of rural homelessness in those re mote areas which also record high levels of persistent poverty. By contrast, recent research in England high lights that while homeless rates in the remoter rural areas have grown at a faster rate than all other areas since the early 1990s, it is in the more accessible rural places, lo cated close to major metropolitan centers and subject to acute housing pressures from in migrants, where highest levels of homelessness exist. While homelessness is something that potentially af fects all groups within rural society, research reveals that particular types of households are at greater risk of be coming homeless than others. Not surprisingly, house holds living in poverty are shown to be particularly prone to entering periods of homelessness. Indeed, much of the literature on rural homelessness in the United States highlights strong causal linkages between poverty and homelessness. Indigenous peoples are also identiﬁed as an important group of the rural homeless population in certain countries – the United States and New Zealand, for example – while the growing number of migrant workers engaged in agriculture and food processing are shown to be particularly vulnerable to homelessness on an episodic basis. Beyond these speciﬁc groups, the social proﬁle of homelessness in rural and urban areas appears to be broadly similar, although research in the United States suggests that the rural homeless are more likely to be female, white, and in employment than their urban counterparts. The factors that lead individuals and households to become homeless in rural areas are extremely diverse, and concern a complex mixture of structural and per sonal problems. In terms of structural problems, low in comes, unemployment, poverty, and inequitable housing systems associated with particular rural places are shown to be important causal factors. In relation to personal factors, relationship breakdowns, illness, and alcohol or drugs dependencies are identiﬁed as signiﬁcant. Of course, these structural and personal factors interconnect and it is often difﬁcult to isolate one speciﬁc factor that leads to homelessness. That said, research evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom would seem to indicate an increased signiﬁcance of housing as a causal factor in rural areas.

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Coping with Homelessness in Rural Spaces Perhaps the most interesting material to emerge on the geographies of rural homelessness has been that derived from in depth qualitative studies, which have explored the experiences of homelessness among different groups of the homeless population and in different rural places. Up until quite recently, the small number of studies examining local experiences of homelessness in rural areas were restricted to the United Kingdom and the United States. However, new experiential accounts of rural homelessness in other countries are beginning to emerge. Based on extended periods of ﬁeldwork, these studies have sought to develop accounts of homelessness from the perspectives of local welfare agencies working with homeless groups, and homeless or recently homeless people themselves. Attention has been given to the ex periences of different homeless groups, in particular, rural places and spaces, as well as the experiences of speciﬁc groups, such as young people, indigenous groups (Native Americans and Maori in New Zealand), seasonal or migrant workers, and trailer park residents. These studies illustrate a series of everyday difﬁculties that homeless people face living in rural places which are largely devoid of support services and the coping strat egies that they are forced to adopt in order to remain sheltered in these places. One of the most signiﬁcant problems faced by homeless people in rural areas is the lack of local recognition of their problems. Their reduced number, spatial dispersal, and restricted access to places of support and congregation deny homeless people any sense of legitimacy within rural space. In addition, many of the precarious housing situations occupied by home less people are discussed by local agencies, communities, and the homeless themselves in rural areas with refer ence to terms other than homelessness. In certain cir cumstances, though, homelessness can constitute a highly visible phenomenon in rural areas as the small scale and close knit nature of rural living leads to unwanted public exposure of private problems and the accentuation of feelings of otherness among the homeless. Rural space thus presents a series of physical and sociocultural obstacles to the existence of homelessness that require the development of coping strategies on the part of homeless people. Those facing homelessness are often required to travel considerable distances across rural spaces, and between rural and urban spaces, in order to access welfare advice and support services. The fact that welfare support provision and emergency accommodation for the homeless in rural areas is mainly located in the larger settlements leaves homeless people the ‘choice’ of remaining local and dealing with their own situations or moving out of their communities to be assisted by welfare agencies. Both options create additional problems for the

rural homeless. Moving away creates new forms of sociospatial isolation at times of considerable stress for homeless households, as well as reinforcing the invisibility of homelessness in the smaller rural settlements. Re maining local necessitates the employment of complex coping strategies, which often involve frequent movements between different precarious housing situations, including sharing temporarily with family or friends and moving into property that is inadequate in terms of its physical condition, size, location, or cost. While these housing situations may be interspersed by brief spells of literal homelessness, they are largely played out in the private sphere and thus rarely come to the attention of welfare ofﬁcials or others in the rural community. Recent research in England suggests that rural homelessness also involves nonlocal people. For some homeless or near homeless people, rural areas may provide increased or improved housing options. For ex ample, rural housing costs in most countries tend to be lower than in the cities and some rural places offer particular types of low cost housing options, such as in trailer parks. Others may be seeking the increased priv acy and environmental beneﬁts associated with rural living and an escape from problems linked to homeless ness in the city. Others still may be stopping off in rural spaces as they travel to and from other places, visit friends, or have a break from city living. Not only are these nonlocal homeless people more visible than their local counterparts in rural settlements, they tend to be treated with less compassion, invariably viewed as threatening community cohesion and undeserving of local welfare assistance. Their presence may also allow homelessness to be constructed by some local groups as a nonlocal and nonrural problem, reinforcing other denials of rural homelessness.

Rural Homelessness and Welfare Homelessness is generally addressed indirectly as part of broader national welfare, antipoverty, and housing pol icies. This makes the task of identifying approaches to dealing with homelessness in different countries ex tremely difﬁcult. The exception is the United Kingdom, where homelessness is recognized within national legis lation as a welfare problem deserving of speciﬁc policy intervention. Here, national guidance exists to ensure that particular categories of homelessness are dealt with consistently at the local level. While these national sys tems of provision are intended to deal with homelessness in urban and rural areas, it is clear that they have placed much more emphasis on urban problems, with recent homelessness initiatives in different countries largely geared toward tackling problems of rough sleeping in major cities.

Homelessness, Rural

By contrast, very little policy attention has been given to the rural dimensions of homelessness. In some coun tries, such as the United Kingdom and the United States, there is now at least recognition by the government of the presence of homelessness in rural areas, but it is difﬁcult to claim that any speciﬁc policy initiatives have been developed to deal with its features. The hiddenness of rural homelessness again plays a signiﬁcant role in this policy neglect. Without robust evidence on its statistical signiﬁcance and the particular problems faced by homeless people in rural areas, it is difﬁcult to convince government and other welfare agencies to develop spe ciﬁc initiatives to deal with homelessness in rural areas. Unfortunately, the absence of advice and support services for homeless groups in rural areas, which act as physical, statistical, and symbolic markers of homelessness, means that the task of making known homelessness in these spaces becomes extremely problematic. Thus, rural areas are faced with a vicious circle of nonintervention and invisibility in relation to welfare and homelessness. Much of the welfare support for homeless groups in rural areas is therefore provided by the voluntary sector, with projects generally small scale and locally based. Recent studies undertaken in different countries indicate that these types of initiatives play a valuable role in meeting the needs of speciﬁc homeless groups in par ticular rural places. However, a series of practical dif ﬁculties encountered by welfare agencies working in rural areas are highlighted, including identifying home less people, resistance from local elites and communities to the provision of welfare assistance to the homeless, and additional ﬁnancial costs associated with providing such assistance in rural areas. In addition, the small scale na ture of many of these welfare projects means that they are better able to deal with the personal consequences of homelessness, for example, securing short term accom modation for homeless people, than the broader struc tural factors, such as low wage economies, poverty, and housing shortages, which result in people becoming homeless in rural areas.

195

Welfare provision for the rural homeless is also characterized by spatial unevenness in two senses. First, welfare projects tend to be based in the larger rural settlements, which not only creates access difﬁculties for homeless people in the rural hinterlands but also awards an increased visibility to homelessness in these small town urban spaces. Second, as individual projects are designed and implemented by different constellations of welfare actors to deal with particular aspects of home lessness in speciﬁc rural places, the provision of welfare support varies according to the nature of homelessness and the presence of different mixes of welfare agencies in different places. This means that people’s experiences of homelessness and their ability to gain assistance for their problems can vary considerably from place to place. Where welfare facilities and services do exist locally it is likely that homeless people will make use of them; in other places, more informal and less satisfactory local support systems will need to be relied upon. See also: Homelessness.

Further Reading Cloke, P., Milbourne, P. and Widdowﬁeld, R. (2000). Homelessness and rurality: ‘Out of place’ in puriﬁed space. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 18(6), 715 735. Cloke, P., Milbourne, P. and Widdowﬁeld, R. (2000). The hidden and emerging spaces of rural homelessness. Environment and Planning A 32, 77 90. Cloke, P., Milbourne, P. and Widdowﬁeld, R. (2001). The local spaces of welfare provision: Responding to homelessness in rural England. Political Geography 20(4), 493 512. Cloke, P., Milbourne, P. and Widdowﬁeld, R. (2002). Rural Homelessness: Issues, Experiences and Policy Responses. Bristol: The Policy Press. Fitchen, J. (1991). Homelessness in rural places: Perspectives from upstate New York. Urban Anthropology 20(2), 177 210. Lawrence, M. (1995). Rural homelessness: A geography without a geography. Journal of Rural Studies 11, 297 308. Milbourne, P. and Cloke, P. (eds.) (2006). International Perspectives on Rural Homelessness. London: Routledge.

Housing M. Pacione, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Affordable Housing Dwellings built speciﬁcally for those on incomes that deny them the opportunity to purchase or rent on the open market. Gentriﬁcation The process of neighborhood upgrading by relatively afﬂuent incomers who move into a poorer neighborhood in sufﬁcient numbers to displace lower-income groups and transform its social identity. Housing Association An independent, nonproﬁt making organization funded primarily by government to build, improve, and manage affordable housing for sale or rent. Negative Equity A situation in which the value represented by the market price of a house is insufﬁcient to cover the cost of repayment of the mortgage taken on to purchase the property. Socialist City A city that is planned and designed according to the principles of socialism and that operates as part of the command economy. Slum An area of overcrowded and dilapidated, usually old, housing occupied by people who can afford only the cheapest dwellings available in the urban area, generally in or close to the inner city. Squatter Settlement An illegal urban development, usually predominantly residential, on land neither owned nor rented by its occupants.

Housing Markets In market societies private housing is a commodity produced and exchanged for proﬁt. Outside the social or public housing sector where housing may be allocated on the basis of some criterion of need or at a below market price, the residential choices available to urban house holds depend primarily on their ability to compete in the housing market which comprises housing providers, fa cilitators, and consumers. While the wealthy can compete in the market for the most attractive and expensive housing in the best areas, those with low incomes or the long term unemployed are unlikely to be able to gain access to the private housing market except at the lowest levels. Those unable to buy must rent from either a private landlord or in the public social rented sector. In British cities generally, a major distinction is between the housing markets for owner occupied dwellings and for public social housing. In the US city, ethnicity may be substituted for tenure class, with the housing market for

196

African Americans commonly representing a separate submarket with its own distinctive spatial arrangement. In addition to, and often overlapping with, class and ethnicity based housing markets, submarkets also operate within cities to accommodate the needs and preferences of particular groups differentiated on the basis of age, religion, or lifestyle.

Housing Tenure Over the course of the twentieth century a major trans formation was effected in the tenure balance of housing in the UK. Prior to World War I almost 90% of British households rented their accommodation from private landlords, 2% rented from local authorities and the re mainder were owner occupiers. By 2001 the position had been largely reversed, with only 11% of households still renting privately compared with 74% owner occupation and 15% who were council tenants. Most of the trans formation occurred during the post World War II period (Table 1). The Growth of Owner-Occupation During the 1920s, owner occupation was not the pre ferred housing option of most people. Most households occupied privately rented accommodation, and council houses produced under the 1923 Housing Act (Cham berlain Act). The latter, because of the high standards of construction and consequently of rent, were reserved primarily for better off members of the working class. As Table 1 shows, during the postwar period owner occu pation grew to become the largest sector of the UK housing stock. This was encouraged by several factors, including government policy; expansion of specialist ﬁ nancial institutions such as building societies and banks into the mortgage business; an investment climate that has generally been favorable to property development; and households’ increasing difﬁculty in ﬁnding alter native accommodation due to the decline in the privately rented and local authority sectors. The growth of owner occupation has been particularly marked since 1979, following the election of a Conservative government committed to the creation of a ‘property owning democracy’. In addition to the stimulus provided by government housing policies, the growth of home ownership in Britain reﬂected a belief that ownership of a house rep resents a sound ﬁnancial investment. This assumes that

Housing

Table 1 Year

1914 1944 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001

197

Housing tenure and dwelling stock (in millions) in Great Britain, 1914 2001 Rented from local authority or New Town

Privately rented

Owner occupied

No.

%

No.

%

No.

%

0.1 1.6 2.5 4.4 5.8 6.6 5.7 3.6

1.8 12.4 17.9 26.8 30.6 31.0 24.8 15.4

7.5 8.0 7.3 5.0 3.6 2.7 1.7 2.4

88.2 62.0 52.5 30.5 18.9 12.6 7.4 10.6

0.9 3.3 4.1 7.0 9.6 11.9 15.6 17.1

10.0 25.6 29.6 42.7 50.5 56.4 67.7 74.0

over the long term, house prices will rise at least as fast as and probably faster than general inﬂation. Accordingly, it is better to pay mortgage interest on a loan of ﬁxed capital value that results in the acquisition of an asset at diminishing real cost than to pay rent, probably at a similar level, but escalating over time and with no asset to show for it. This argument has proved to be generally correct. However, it is also predicated on the continuing ability of the mortgagee to service repayments. In a period of recession, unemployment combined with high debt/equity ratios can result in people’s homes being repossessed for nonpayment of loan installments. In the early 1990s in the UK, rising unemployment with the onset of recession (following a government rise in interest rates to control inﬂation) meant that 1.8 million people who had taken on large mortgages to purchase houses during the boom of the late 1980s found them selves in a position of negative equity, where the ex change value of their house had fallen below the amount of their outstanding loan. In general, however, the ad vantages of owner occupation have ensured that, since 1971, the majority of the UK housing stock is under this tenure.

The Decline of Private Renting As Table 1 shows, from a dominant position in the housing stock prior to World War I that the privately rented sector has diminished in importance. Although it accounted for half of UK housing in 1951, by 1991 its share had fallen to less than 10% of the total stock, al though there was a small recovery by 2001. The principal factors underlying this decline are slum clearance of the oldest and poorest dwellings, many of which were in the private rental sector; housing rehabilitation, aided by improvement grants, was often followed by tenant dis placement and the sale of properties for owner occu pation, particularly in gentrifying neighborhoods; the comparatively poor rate of return from investment in private rented housing; and the ethic of home ownership.

Total number of dwellings

8.5 12.9 13.9 16.4 19.0 21.2 23.1 24.7

The Development of Public-Sector Housing The decline of private rented housing, the traditional source of shelter for those denied access to the owner occupied sector, led to direct government intervention in the provision of housing. By 1939, 1.18 million houses had been constructed by the public sector, amounting to 10.3% of total stock. The growth of municipal housing also stemmed from the failure of nineteenth century housing associations to demonstrate that it was possible to provide decent dwellings in sufﬁcient numbers at a rent affordable by the low paid; increased working class militancy over housing conditions, vividly displayed in the Glasgow rent strikes of 1915; the shortage of housing in the post World War I era; and a gradual shift away from the Victorian ideology of self help and the per vading belief in the efﬁciency of the market mechanism. By the 1970s the crude housing shortage had been resolved, at least in national terms, although regional shortages remained. Nevertheless, despite signiﬁcant progress towards the goal of ‘a decent home for every family at a price within their means’, by the late 1970s a number of criticisms were directed at the UK housing stock. These including the view that the social housing sector was too large and expensive to support; the sub sidized rents were not sufﬁciently well targeted and beneﬁted many who did not need this level of support; the below market level of rents contributed to low levels of maintenance undertaken by many local authorities, which stored up problems for the future; novel building methods employed in the 1960s and 1970s had given rise to structural problems in some estates; the large, homo geneous council estates lacked a mix of social classes and were often constructed without social amenities; and as unemployment rose, problems relating to poverty and deprivation began to concentrate in many estates. All these factors contributed to a reexamination of national housing policy in Britain. The greatest force for change, however, was the ideological conviction of an incoming Conservative government committed to re ducing public expenditure. With reference to local

198

Housing

authority housing, a major divide opened between the government’s view of council housing as a ‘welfare ser vice’, assisting households unable to afford other types of housing, and the Labour Party’s belief that the public sector should supply housing for ‘general needs’ (i.e., should satisfy the demand from all households who wish to rent rather than buy). The new government’s housing policy set out to increase owner occupation; provide a wider choice of landlords in the social rented sector; revive the privately rented sector; and reduce the role of local authorities as direct housing providers. A key component of the Conservatives’ housing policy, intro duced in the 1980 Housing Act, was the right of council tenants to buy their homes at a discount price that re ﬂected length of tenancy Between 1980 and 1991, 1.46 million sales had been completed and the Treasury had received over d20 bil lion, making the ‘right to buy’ (RTB) scheme one of the largest privatization initiatives of the Thatcher era. The Conservative view of local authorities as ‘enablers’ fa cilitating action by other bodies, rather than direct pro viders of social housing, is evident in the reducing role of council house building and the growing importance of the housing association sector as an alternative source of rented accommodation. Housing associations obtain their loan ﬁnance for investment in new house con struction and rehabilitation from the Housing Corpor ation (which oversees their activities) and, since the 1988 Housing Act, from private sector institutions. By 1998 housing associations accounted for 1.2 million dwellings or 5% of total housing stock. As a consequence of RTB and estate transfers, the public rented sector in the UK is becoming increasingly residualized and there is an in creasing possibility that the future role of council hous ing in Britain will be to provide shelter of last resort to those unable to go elsewhere.

Public Housing in the USA The restricted role envisaged for council housing by the political Right in Britain ﬁnds an echo in the history of US attempts to enact a program of public housing. A fundamental reason for the failure of the US public housing initiative was that it did not have widespread political support, being alien to the dominant market philosophy. Even the initial rationale behind the program was multifaceted: it was seen as a way of simultaneously reducing the high levels of unemployment and assisting the housing industry in the New Deal era of the 1930s, as well as a means of eliminating slums and increasing the supply of cheap, decent housing to the poor. Weak federal controls over development costs and housing quality inevitably led to major difﬁculties. In particular, local housing authorities received no operating subsidy from

federal government, their sole source of income being rental payments. As costs rose, minimum and average rents increased steadily. Prior to the 1974 Housing and Urban Development Act, which introduced a degree of control, rent payments equivalent to half a tenant’s gross income were common. The 1974 Act marked a major switch of emphasis away from conventional public housing towards the use of leased housing. However, signs of the increased privatization of public housing had emerged during the 1960s with the 1965 Housing Act authorization of turnkey housing, the sale of public housing to tenants, and the contracting out of manage ment services to private ﬁrms. By the mid 1970s, con struction of public housing projects had fallen signiﬁcantly and some of the most deteriorated schemes had been demolished. The switch of emphasis in social housing policy from supply side to demand side intervention was reﬂected in Section 8 of the 1974 Housing and Urban Development Act, which introduced a housing allowance program for the lower income households. Rather than making pay ments directly to needy tenants, the program consisted of long term contracts between the Department of Housing and Urban Development and private developers, land lords or public housing agencies designating speciﬁc apartments for Section 8 subsidies. Approved apartments could be existing units or units to be constructed or re habilitated. Rental payments for tenants were on a par with those for public housing, amounting to between 15% and 25% of their total income. Housing owners received, from Section 8 funds, the difference between the tenant’s contribution and a ‘fair market’ rent based on prevailing private rents in the locality. Section 8 subsidies have been successful in that tenants have a degree of choice of housing unit, and the scheme helped to reduce the over concentration of low income tenants in ‘pro jects’, many of which have been razed. The residualiza tion of public housing is well advanced in the USA, with the sector catering for a dependent population charac terized by low income, unemployment, reliance on public assistance, and a high concentration of the very old, very young, and minorities, often occupying a deteriorating physical environment.

Housing Affordability Housing affordability is measured by the proportion of household income spent on obtaining housing. An ex penditure of more than 30% of income in the USA and over 20% in the UK has been taken to indicate an af fordability problem. Such measures are rather crude, however, since the same proportion of household income has a different impact for those at different ends of the social scale. Neither does it take account of the

Housing

subjectivity of affordability. Nevertheless, despite def initional problems there is evidence of a growing af fordability problem in both rented and owner occupied housing, particularly in overheated housing markets. In the UK evidence of the growing unaffordability of housing for some social groups is found in the 400 000 households in mortgage arrears in 1995 and the re possession of 250 000 houses between 1991 and 1994. In the USA between 1997–99 while inﬂation rose by 6.1% house rents increased by 9.9% and house prices by 16.0%. In 1997, 5.4 million very low income families, (those with incomes below 50% of the local MSA me dian), paid more than half their income for housing or lived in severely inadequate housing, a situation classiﬁed by the Department of Housing and Urban Development as ‘worst case needs’. This represented an increase of 12% in worst case needs housing since 1991. A growing proportion of these families are working households. In 2002, in no jurisdiction in the USA would a minimum wage job (at $5.15 per hour) provide enough income for a household to afford the ‘fair market rent’ (FMR) for a two bedroom home. Many low income earners must work two or three jobs to pay their rent. Between 1991– 97, the number of housing units affordable to extremely low income families, (those with incomes below 30% of median MSA income), fell by 5% or 370 000 units. In New York City an extremely low income household could afford a monthly rent of not more than $471, while the FMR for a two bedroom unit was $1031. Housing affordability is a problem for places as well as for people. Many people cannot ﬁnd housing near their workplace or ﬁnd work at a reasonable distance from where they can afford to live. In many areas workers critical to the local economy, such as teachers and police cannot afford to live in the communities they serve. The problem is particularly severe in cities with overheated housing markets. These include high tech hot spots in places like Boston, Denver, and San Francisco where rents increased by more than 20% in the late 1990s, and global cities such as London. The starkest indication of an affordability crisis, however, is represented by the growing incidence of homelessness, which is most visible in the inner areas of large cities, where the sight of people sleeping in doorways and living in cardboard shelters is redolent of conditions in the Third World city.

Homelessness Homelessness is an extreme form of social exclusion, caused by a combination of personal and structural fac tors. Most homeless people leave their home either be cause parents or friends are no longer willing to accommodate them or because of the breakdown of a relationship. Structural factors underlying homelessness

199

include insufﬁcient construction of affordable housing, gentriﬁcation, cutbacks in welfare budgets, stagnating and falling real incomes, and the rise of part time and in secure employment. Discriminatory practices can also contribute to the problem for some social groups. Those most at risk of homelessness include unemployed people, single mothers, disabled people and frail elderly indi viduals, runaway youths, battered women and children, immigrants and refugees, substance abusers, and de institutionalized mental patients. While many of the homeless are highly visible, (e.g., beggars and rough sleepers), most are not noticeably different from other citizens. The invisible homeless have to cope with the day to day strain of living in temporary accommodation, hostels, bed and breakfast hotels, or in cramped con ditions with friends and relatives

Housing in Socialist Societies Under state socialism, urban land and housing markets did not exist. Before the transition to capitalism almost all housing was state owned and city governments restricted residential mobility as a way to tackle housing shortages. People lived in the same place for long periods and neighborhood change was slow. Planners located stores and services according to the demographic proﬁles of neighborhoods and once located, urban functions re mained in place for decades. In the transition period since 1989, privatization and replacement of central planning with the free market, together with postindustrial restructuring has catapulted cities such as Moscow from industrial socialism to post industrial capitalism in a short period. In the post Soviet city, capitalist tendencies such as suburbanization and counterurbanization are in evidence, and social differ entiation in housing and quality of life are increasingly apparent. In Moscow between 1990 and 1994 the level of private ownership of housing increased from 9.3% to 49.1%. This tenure change and the reintroduction of market mechanisms have been accompanied by increased residential mobility that has enabled some individual citizens to improve their living conditions. As well as suburbanization, gentriﬁcation has appeared in central city redevelopment schemes while, more generally, there is a trend towards a ‘European’ urban residential struc ture characterized by an afﬂuent inner core and poor periphery. Nevertheless, while individual choice has been enhanced for those able to participate in the housing market, state planning control of zoning regulations and real estate taxes (coupled with a limited private mortgage system and declining real incomes for the majority) en sure that in the short to medium term at least, the social geography of Russian cities will continue to be inﬂuenced strongly by the local government. As in the former Soviet

200

Housing

Union, in China the declining role of state enterprises in the economy, the introduction of land and housing markets, and the opening up of cities to foreign invest ment has meant that the state and centrally planned economy have a much reduced inﬂuence on urban de velopment. Just as in the post Soviet city, ‘Western’ processes of urban sprawl, spatial segregation, and social polarization are being reproduced in Chinese cities as well as in other ‘transitional societies’ such as Vietnam.

Housing in Third World Cities In most large cities of the Third World much of the population occupies the most rudimentary forms of shelter. The failure of government housing programs to provide affordable housing has forced the mass of the Third World urban population into cheaper alternative forms of shelter, which range from inner city slum tenements and peripheral squatter settlements to the pavements (sidewalks) of major cities. The shortage of adequate housing is exacerbated by high rates of popu lation growth. The majority of the poor live in slums or squatter settlements. Squatting refers to either the occupation of land without the permission of the owner or the erection or occupation of a building in contravention of existing legislation. The illegal status of squatter settlements provides government with complete legal justiﬁcation for any ‘remedial’ actions against squatters. It also generates insecurity among squatters which inhibits their partici pation in city life, including access to services and amenities to which they are legally entitled, and may encourage clandestine occupations that further compli cate the squatters’ relationship with the urban authority. Slums are deﬁned as legal permanent dwellings that have become substandard through age, neglect, and/or sub division into smaller occupational units such as rooms or

cubicles. Slums can develop either as a result of in adequate maintenance by a landlord, often prompted by rent control legislation, or by the internal subdivision of buildings by residents in order to accommodate new ar rivals or newly created households. Slum dwellings shelter large numbers of the urban poor in the Third World. See also: Chinese Urbanism; Edge Cities; Gated Communities/Privatopias; Gentriﬁcation; Ghettos; Homelessness; Housing, Rural; Slums; Squatter Settlements.

Further Reading Andrusz, G., Harloe, M. and Szelenyi, I. (1996). Cities After Socialism. Oxford: Blackwell. Harriot, S. and Matthews, L. (1998). Social Housing: An Introduction. London: Longman. Keivania, R. and Werna, E. (2001). Modes of Housing Provision in Developing Countries. Progress in Planning 55, 65 118. Kennett, P. and Marsh, A. (1999). Homelessness. Bristol: Policy Press. Lowe, S. (2004). Housing Policy Analysis. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Ma, L. (2002). Urban Transformation in China, 1949 2000. Environment and Planning A 34, 1545 1569. Malpass, P. (2001). The Restructuring of Social Cented Housing in Britain. European Journal of Housing Policy 1(1), 1 16. McCrone, G. and Stephens, M. (1995). Housing Policy in Britain and Europe. London: UCL Press. McDonnell, J. (1997). The Role of Race in the Likelihood of City Participation in the United States Public and Section 8 Existing Housing Programmes. Housing Studies 12(2), 231 245. Ravetz, A. (2001). Council Housing and Culture. London: Routledge. Smith, J. (1999). Youth Homelessness in the UK: A European Perspective. Habitat International 23(1), 63 77. Smith, D. and Scarpaci, J. (2000). Urbanization in Transitional Societies. Urban Geography 21(8), 745 757. Takahashi, L. (1996). A Decade of Understanding Homelessness in the USA. Progress in Human Geography 20(3), 291 310. van Vliet, W. (1990). International Handbook of Housing Policies and Practices. New York: Greenwood. Varady, D., Presier, W. and Russell, F. (1998). New Directions in Urban Public Housing. New Brunswick: CUPR Press.

Housing, Neighbourhoods and Health J. Dunn, St. Michael’s Hospital, Toronto, ON, Canada & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Community Group of people having common interests, who may also share a common geographical area of residence. Deprivation Index A statistic calculated from widely available data about small geographic areas (usually census data) to represent the level of social and economic deprivation of a given area. Home An environment, often a house, which people invest with meaning; often it offers security, refuge, and happiness. Home may also refer to a place of origin, either for one’s daily activities or one’s life. House A fairly permanent structure serving as a regular dwelling or residence for one or more persons; these persons form a household. Multi-Level Modeling A statistical method for analyzing data that has a nested structure, for example, individuals within geographical regions. It allows inferences to be drawn about the effects of region-level factors on individual outcomes, while controlling for individual-level effects. Neighborhood A geographically bounded area, at least partially residential, whose inhabitants may share a common set of identity and daily activity patterns and resources.

Introduction Over the past several years there has been an increasing interest in the so called ‘social determinants of health’, and a signiﬁcant amount of research on the effects that experiences of everyday environments have on health and inequalities in health between social and economic groups. Although initially much of this research focused on characteristics of the workplace and its effect on health, there is a growing interest in the effect of housing on health and now quite a large literature on the effect of neighborhood environments on health. These develop ments have their roots in research that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, showing large inequalities in health status by socioeconomic status (SES). It is widely rec ognized that these inequalities in health status are the result of the cumulative, life long impact of differences in everyday living conditions, which manifest in health differences through identiﬁable biological processes re lated to maladaptive stress responses. In geography and a number of other social sciences, a great deal of emphasis

has been placed on understanding the important di mensions of housing and neighborhoods for health in recent years.

The Social Gradient in Health and Everyday Living Conditions There is an increasing recognition in research in the social and health sciences that the everyday environments in which we live exert a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on human health and well being. This perspective, widely known as the ‘social determinants of health’, has its roots in research that shows large and persistent inequalities in health status by socioeconomic status. Although the term ‘determinants of health’ is widely used, it is an imprecise name for the phenomenon, which might be more accurately called ‘identiﬁable patterns of factors that inﬂuence health’. Numerous studies, largely in the discipline of epi demiology, have demonstrated that there is a so called ‘social gradient in health’ whereby individuals of greater socioeconomic status have better health status. Figure 1 shows an example of a social gradient in health, in this instance showing the relationship between occupational grade in the UK’s civil service and the 10 year risk of dying of coronary heart disease. It shows that people in the lowest occupational grade (‘Other’) have a 4 times greater chance of dying of coronary heart disease than people in the highest occupational grade (‘Administrative’) and that these differences cannot be explained away by known behavioral risk factors for coronary heart disease. In addition, the relationship between socioeconomic status and health is one that spans all social strata; it is not merely a function of extreme deprivation, the differences exist even among people who live well above subsistence and afﬂuent people. Social gradients exist for most major causes of illness and death in the afﬂuent societies of the world and have persisted for more than a century. Many researchers believe that the social gradient in health reﬂects the fact that SES is a marker for signiﬁ cantly different conditions of everyday life experienced across the life course. Some suggest that the more important of these everyday living conditions are ‘psy cho social’ in nature, that is, they concern the meanings attached to their material circumstances and the negative health effects occur as a result of social comparisons with others who have more enviable situations. Many other researchers, however, focus on how material conditions of everyday life cause differential distribution of every day stress by SES. In other words, the lower one’s

201

202

Housing, Neighbourhoods and Health 4.0

4.0

Cholesterol Smoking Blood pressure

Relative risk (log scale)

3.0

3.2

Others Unexplained

2.6 2.3

2.1

2.0

1.8 1.5

er O

th

al ric le C

e tiv tra is in m Ad

Pr o ex fes ec sio ut na iv l/ e

1.0

1.0

Figure 1 Social gradient in health: as example.

socioeconomic status, the greater the stress experienced and the fewer resources (e.g., economic, personal, social) to respond to the experience of relatively low socio economic status and its attendant stresses. Because housing and neighborhood conditions are such important spaces in the geographies of everyday life, and can be conceptualized both as sources of stress and as resources, it follows that attributes of housing and neighborhoods should be important inﬂuences on health.

Housing as a Determinant of Health Given that housing is a social phenomenon with multiple dimensions it behoves us to identify the attributes of housing that have the potential to inﬂuence health. This kind of knowledge is necessary to inform empirical re search investigating the relationship between housing and health, and ultimately to inform successful housing interventions, like subsidized housing and public housing redevelopment. Theoretical and empirical research has shown that the following dimensions of housing may impact upon health either directly or indirectly: physical hazards, physical design, psychological dimensions, social dimensions, ﬁnancial dimensions, and location of hous ing. Each is discussed in turn. Physical Hazards There are clearly well founded concerns about housing disrepair and exposure to toxins and hazards (molds,

dampness, dust mites, falls, etc.) that substandard housing may entail. Figure 2 shows the wide variety of biological, chemical, and physical hazards within the home that may threaten health. Molds, bacteria, dust mites, and pet dander are examples of indoor pollutants that can cause respiratory symptoms. Radon is a naturally occurring gas that is released from the Earth and can enter into houses through the basement. It has a strong link with lung cancer. There are a number of chemicals used in the home for cleaning and other purposes, as well as chem icals that are released from carpets and furniture. Phys ical hazards include improper or dangerous stairs, handrails, and other physical aspects of the home. Not withstanding the importance of bio physical hazards on health, there is evidence that social and economic factors may mediate the experience of health impacts even in the presence of empirically veriﬁable exposures. One study has shown that the experience of respiratory symptoms among households exposed to molds was signiﬁcantly mediated by worry about mold. Physical Design Aspects of physical design can contribute to health status in a variety of ways. Disrepair of stairs, ﬂoors, safety equipment, etc., may create the possibility of falls and other accidents, particularly for people who are frail. Similarly, the absence of specialized adaptive equipment (e.g., handrails) or inadequate ﬁre escape routes may also be threats. The second way in which physical design may affect health is through a psychological pathway. Archi tectural design may provide high levels of complexity, for example, which may result in an overabundance of stimulation and cause stress. For example, design features, like inadequate differentiation of space or long, narrow corridors, may enhance the user’s sense of control (mani fested as privacy or the inability to regulate exposure to one’s surroundings). Design features such as the amount of available space, visual exposure, structural depth, openness of the perimeter, and extent of view have all been shown to moderate effects of crowding on human behavior. Psychological Dimensions The key psychological dimensions of housing, namely the importance of the home as a site for the expression of identity, social status, and prestige, on the one hand, and control on the other hand, have emerged from the dis ciplines of environmental psychology and geography. Analyses of real estate advertising show that adverts are selling an identity as much as they are selling the physical structure of the house. A recent advertisement for a housing subdivision in Canada tells the reader that they can ‘‘live life perfectly’’ in the ‘‘Picket Fences’’ sub division. There is no mention of the quality of the building materials or the builder. Instead, the sales pitch

Housing, Neighbourhoods and Health

Chemicals released from modern building & furnishing materials

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Outdoor air pollutants

Mold & Bacteria Chemicals from cleaning products

Combustion gases from fireplaces & woodburning stoves Animal Hair & Dander

Chemical fumes from paints & solvents

Carbon monoxide fumes from attached garage

Gases including radon seeping through foundation

Cigarrette smoke contains some 4000 chemicals

Figure 2 Biological, chemical, and physical hazards of housing.

is focused entirely on enticing the reader to identify with the description of the development. The advertisement describes how the owner will feel as a resident in the community of ‘‘fully built’’ condominiums, urging read ers to get on the "priority" buyers list. The identiﬁcation of the meaning invested in the home as a determinant of health is consistent with arguments that the social gra dient in health is partly a product of the meanings people attach to their material circumstances. Regarding housing and control, the literature on job strain and health indicates that lack of control at work can be inﬂuential on the development of heart disease risk factors and can undermine mental health. It follows control is also important outside of the workplace and within the home. There is some empirical evidence to support the proposition that control at home is associated with health. As described above, physical design is one way in which control is manifested in housing, but ﬁ nancial aspects of housing are also important for pro viding control, as described below. Social Dimensions There is great sociological signiﬁcance attributed to the boundary between the inside of the home and the outside world and this is common to almost all cultures. To invite someone into your home as a guest is a symbol of es calating a relationship, making it closer. The home is an important site for the development and maintenance of social relationships, both with household members and others. The importance of social support is already very well established in the health literature as a signiﬁcant

determinant of health. It follows that the adequacy of one’s home both for making and maintaining social ties is an important health issue, although the direct research on this question is still underdeveloped. Financial Dimensions Housing costs are the single largest item in most households’ monthly budgets and one of the largest assets in their investment portfolio. It follows that ﬁnancial dimensions of housing interact strongly with socio economic status. There are several ways in which housing markets work to redistribute wealth and income in a regressive fashion (i.e., to the disadvantage of lower in come households). In Anglo American society, much of this regressive redistribution hinges on the distinction between owners and renters. In most Anglo American countries, the main tax advantage that fuels the regressive redistribution from owners to renters is the capital gains tax exemption for the primary residence. In such coun tries, capital gains (i.e., the difference between the price one pays for a property for and the price one sells it for) are tax exempt, subject to certain caps. Some countries have a lifetime maximum of exempt capital gains, some have a per transaction cap, but nevertheless, in call cases, this offers owner occupier the opportunity to accrue a great deal of wealth, tax free. This represents foregone revenue for the governments of these countries, and some have questioned the fairness of offering such signiﬁcant indirect subsidies to homeowners at the same time that governments are disinvesting in publicly funded housing for low income households.

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While numerous studies point to the relationship between income and health, it is likely that wealth is also an important indicator of a household’s socioeconomic status, and if so, this would underscore the importance of housing given that it is commonly the single most im portant asset of most households. There is some evidence that inequalities in housing wealth are associated with health inequalities. Location The locational dimensions of housing are potentially important to health because the home acts as a focal point for everyday activity and offers relative proximity to both health risks and resources, as well as being the site for relationships with neighbors and members of a geographically deﬁned community, who arguably have a number of common interests. Also important to the lo cational dimensions of housing are the meanings that are attributed to the neighborhood of residence, either by people living there, or by outsiders. The locational di mensions of housing, in other words, provide the gateway to an examination of the inﬂuence of neighborhoods on health.

Neighborhoods and Health Over the last several years there has been an increased interest in the effect that attributes of the residential nei ghborhood in which one lives may have an impact upon health over and above the individual’s socioeconomic status. By neighborhood, most scholars refer to a geo graphically bounded area around a person’s home that carries some common meaning to its residents. The effect of neighborhood attributes on health is particularly rele vant to understanding health inequalities, because as Sally Macintyre, a leading scholar in this area, has argued, the added effect of neighborhoods over and above individual SES may represent a case of ‘deprivation ampliﬁcation’. Another line of reasoning in the neighborhoods and health literature is that health behaviors are signiﬁcantly con ditioned by attributes of the local environment, or the ‘health opportunity structures’ a term also coined by Macintyre. A person living in a neighborhood without sidewalks or recreational facilities, for example, lives in an area that structurally lacks opportunities for physical activity. The implications of these perspectives on neighbor hoods and health are that one’s home and its immediate environment is likely to be the setting for exposure to a mix of positive and negative inﬂuences on health. One example of the importance of the locational dimensions of housing can be seen by considering the location of the home relative to services and amenities such as schools, public recreation facilities, health services, and job

opportunities. This may also explain part of the so called neighborhood effects on health and human development seen in the research literature. Another important aspect of the spatial dimensions of home is the social environ ment it places one in, particularly with respect to social norms. Moreover, housing market dynamics confer sig niﬁcant locational advantages upon households in ways that systematically disadvantage households of lower SES. A location in space, a place to base one’s activities and existence, a place that provides access to goods, services, work, and recreation are important functions of housing – location matters. Roots of Neighborhoods and Health Research Research on neighborhoods dates back to the early work of the Chicago School of Sociology working in Chicago in the 1920s and 1930s. Some of the notable members of the School included Robert Park, Ernest Burgess, George Herbert Mead, and Roderick McKenzie. These scholars studied the rapid changes going on around them in Chicago during this time, which was a period of rapid urban growth and high levels of immigration. They de veloped a concentric zone model to explain the typical residential location and relocation pattern of households new to the city and to explain the spatial differentiation of social conditions of the time. Several years later, Social Area Analysis became a popular approach to the study of neighborhoods and other geographic regions. After this initial popularity, however, research on neighborhoods diminished in popularity. A signiﬁcant milestone in the decline in interest in neighborhoods was work that suggested that the territorial basis for com munity life had been eclipsed by social networks. Key ﬁgures here include Barry Wellman and Melvin Webber. No longer important for people’s social relationships and their ‘community’, the argument goes, was the immediate geographical space around one’s residence, but instead, it was their social networks that mattered. What mattered, in the words of Webber, was ‘community without pro pinquity’. This proposition opened up whole new areas of social inquiry, but led to the temporary disappearance of neighborhoods research. In the 1990s, however, a series of factors led to the re birth of neighborhoods research in geography and other ﬁelds, and research on neighborhoods and health has been a leader in these developments. The increasing availability of geo coded data on small areas from census and other sources as well as geo coded survey data from a number of sources made it possible to download enough data to conduct sophisticated statistical analyses on the ‘effect’ of neighborhoods on health or other outcomes. In geography, the ﬁrst users of a new class of statistical techniques, multilevel models, were scholars studying the effects of area of residence on voting behaviors. Much of

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this research that people’s voting behavior is very similar to that of the people they live near. This method has been adopted widely in social epidemiology, geography, and sociology to study the effects of neighborhood factors on health, while controlling for individual attributes. The technique requires quite large samples of individuals and neighborhoods, combined in a database where individuals are ‘nested’ in their neighborhood of residence. Coupled with the widespread availability of powerful desktop computers, these data and sophisticated statistical tech niques led to a proliferation of studies examining the effect of neighborhood on health. Conceptualizing Neighborhoods and Health One way of conceptualizing the speciﬁc health oppor tunity structures that underlie neighborhood factors that have been demonstrated or hypothesized to affect health is by categorizing them as one of four ‘R’s’: risks, re sources, relationships, and representations. These four R’s tend to demonstrate signiﬁcant spatial variation, meaning that people living in different neighborhoods have different levels or types of exposure. There are a wide variety of health risks that can vary by neighborhood and have an effect on health. Examples include environmental contaminants, crime, violence, noise, and dangerous roadways or pedestrian pathways or crossings. Resources that may affect health and also vary by neighborhood include health and social services, commercial services like stores that sell healthy foods, schools, recreational opportunities, libraries, public transportation, and a built environment that allows for physical activity. A large number of studies of neighborhood effects on health have investigated neigh borhood relationships. Analogous to the large literature demonstrating a relationship between an individual’s level of social support and their health (i.e., with close friends and family), research has demonstrated relation ships between neighborhood social relationships and health. One of the most popular concepts to be employed in such studies is ‘social capital’, which refers to actual or potential resources one can access as a result of having relatively durable network of relationships with others. In a health context, this research expands upon the evidence on social support and health to consider the effects of ‘weak ties’ on health, a term famously coined by soci ologist Mark Granovetter. Others have shown a rela tionship between ‘collective efﬁcacy’ and health. This is a concept somewhat similar to social capital, but is more focused on how residents of the same community can (or cannot) work together to solve problems and confront threats to their community, especially with respect to youth deviance and crime. An in depth study of the reasons why one poor neighborhood had more deaths in the Chicago heat wave of 1996 than a comparable

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neighborhood showed that neighborhood social capital was a major factor in avoiding deaths from the heat. Similar results have been shown for a number of health outcomes. Finally, representation of neighborhoods is concerned with the way the neighborhood is represented both by its resi dents and by outsiders. There is evidence that the repu tation of a neighborhood is associated with health status, and this may be the result of both direct and indirect ef fects. Residents may internalize the poor reputation of their neighborhood resulting in poor self worth and/or mental health. Indirectly, the reputation of a neighborhood may have a self fulﬁlling effect, whereby services, infrastructure, investment, and migration reinforce and reproduce the negative features of a neighborhood. These developments clearly signal an exciting future for neighborhoods and health research and policies in formed by such research. Decision makers in several jurisdictions around the world have already embraced place based policies and area based initiatives, although these have not been fully informed by research evidence. One challenge to providing such evidence is that there is no clear answer to the question ‘do neighborhoods affect health?’. The answer is that some attributes of neigh borhoods may affect some health outcomes for some population subgroups in some places some of the time. This implies the need for better theory about the speciﬁc pathways linking neighborhood attributes and health, and more empirical research to investigate those theories. See also: Health Inequalities; Wellbeing.

Further Reading Badcock, B. (1984). Unfairly Structured Cities. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Curtis, S. E. (2004). Health and Inequality: Geographical Perspectives. London: Sage Publications. Despres, C. (1991). The meaning of home: Literature review and directions for future research and theoretical development. Journal of Architectural and Planning Research 8(2), 96 115. Dunn, J. R., Frohlich, K., Ross, N. A., Curtis, L. and Sanmartin, C. (2005). Role of geography in inequalities in health and human development. In Heymann, J., Hertzman, C., Barer, M. & Evans R. G. (eds.) Healthier Societies: From Analysis to Action, pp 237 266. New York: Oxford University Press. Evans, G. W. (2003). The built environment and mental health. Journal of Urban Health 80(4), 536 555. Evans, G. W. and McCoy, J. M. (1998). When buildings don’t work: The role of architecture in human health. Journal of Environmental Psychology 18, 85 94. Evans, R. G. (2002). Interpreting and Addressing Inequalities in Health: From Black to Acheson to Blair toy? London: Ofﬁce of Health Economics. Gatrell, A. C. (2001). Geographies of Health: An Introduction. London: Blackwell. Granovetter, M. S. (1973). The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology 78(6), 1360 1380. Klinenberg, E. (2003). Heat Wave: A Social Autopsy of Disaster. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Macintyre, S., Ellaway, A. and Cummins, S. (2002). Place effects on health: How can we conceptualise, operationalise and measure them? Social Science and Medicine 55, 125 139.

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Marmot, M. (2004). The Status Syndrome: How Social Standing Affects Our Health and Longevity. New York: Times Books. Park, R. E., Burgess, E. and McKenzie, R. (1925). The City. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Sapolsky, R. M. (1998). Why Zebras Don’t Get Ulcers. New York: W.H. Freeman. Wilkinson, R. G. (1996). Unhealthy Societies: The Afﬂictions of Inequality. London: Routledge. Wilkinson, R. G. (2005). The Impact of Inequality: How to Make Sick Societies Healthier. New York: The New Press.

Relevant Websites http://secure.cihi.ca/cihiweb/dispPage.jsp ?cw page= PG 284 E &cw topic=284&cw rel=AR 1129 E http://www03.cmhc schl.gc.ca/b2c/b2c/init.do?language=en&shop= Z01EN&areaID=0000000043&productID= 00000000430000000025 www.euro.who.int/Housing www.ncceh.ca/en/non ncceh reviews/other/housing health

Housing, Rural N. Gallent, University College London, London, UK & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction At ﬁrst glance, the housing problems confronting people and communities in the countryside – at least in the developed world – seem to pale against those afﬂicting urban areas and especially inner cities. The association of housing shortages and low housing quality with crime and safety, unemployment, and a variety of forms of so cial exclusion has often been viewed as a largely urban phenomenon. This was certainly the case, across Europe and North America, at least until the late 1970s, with this view being driven by academic interest and assumed political priority. But the last 20–30 years have seen an awakening across these continents to the social, eco nomic, and political challenges posed within the ﬁeld of rural housing. In the UK, government statistics in the 1980s revealed startling evidence of sometimes atrocious housing con ditions facing the residents of rural areas, compounded by endemic housing shortages, low wages and un employment, and geographical inaccessibility. Similar observations were made concurrently or subsequently around the developed world: the countryside was not immune from the economic and social pressures bearing down on Western society, nor was it a safe haven from crime and social exclusion. The ‘rural idyll’ – a previ ously popular image of a countryside inhabited by contented workers living in thatched cottages or the vernacular equivalent – was discredited, and a new generation of researchers found a rich vein of social malaise and inequality to explore outside of major towns and cities. New pressures on rural society had been highlighted by scholars since the 1930s. The economic crisis of 1929– 32 hit rural America particularly hard, leading to a sudden depopulation in many agricultural areas and the disintegration of communities, leaving abandonment and dereliction in its wake. Social issues ﬂowing from less dramatic, but no less difﬁcult, ‘rural restructuring’ else where once again attracted the attention of rural soci ologists and policymakers in the 1950s and 1960s. In many parts of Europe, the depopulation attendant to changing economic circumstances was accelerated in the post war period by new investment in mechanized farming which aimed to achieve ‘food security’ and protect European agriculture from global competition. At the same time, an emergent nostalgia for the countryside in many developed countries contributed to a process of

counterurbanization. Researchers began to highlight the decline of traditional ‘farming communities’, arguing that the social structure of rural areas was now subject to revolutionary change: communities comprising people sharing the common experience of a land based occu pation were being supplanted by mixed communities dominated by middle class incomers who hoped to ﬁnd respite from urban living, or who simply took advantage of cheaper housing opportunities in the villages cum commuter towns that were now being sucked into larger urban conurbations across North America and Western Europe through motorway, autobahn, or freeway development. Across the developed world, studies charted the ar rival of commuters and the subsequent growth of once isolated villages and market towns. At the same time, post war economic prosperity fueled demand for second and retirement homes within both urban hinterlands and more remote rural locations. In the UK, commentators began to talk about the ‘consumption’ of the countryside and planning regulations were tightened to preserve the country’s ‘rural resource’. Elsewhere, this investment in rural areas was often welcomed and encouraged, being seen as the antidote to rural decline with consumption bringing much needed investment to areas that had suffered decades of abandonment. The historic practice of maintaining a rural second home was rediscovered in many parts of Europe, especially in the south and in Scandinavia, bringing an economic lifeline to many areas. In Canada and the US, rural resort development was actively encouraged, with second home and ‘vacation cottage’ ownership becoming a feature of local economic strategies. But these social and economic changes – expressed in a restructuring of rural society – have placed new pres sures on housing markets. The arrival of afﬂuent new comers has also concealed a concomitant rise in rural poverty. The rich have often moved in and bought up land and homes, but remnants of the old farming com munities remain: these have often been labeled ‘local households’, who suffer disadvantage relative to the economic power of newcomers. The new rural afﬂuence associated with counterurbanization (both domestic and international) has been balanced by a new rural poverty affecting some sections of this restructured society. In some areas, commentators have argued that this is be cause the arrival of newcomers has triggered intolerance to land use change as planners try to protect the

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countryside from further development. Hence, the sup ply of homes has decreased while demand has acceler ated. Afﬂuent incomers compete ever more aggressively for land and property, while poorer sections of rural communities struggle to secure affordable homes, held back by low rural wages and frustrated by the way in which some planning systems seem to prioritize en vironmental goals over social ones. These pressures have been most acute in countries where nostalgia for the countryside – expressed in strong demand for rural homes – has prompted the development of ever more restrictive planning policies: Great Britain is the classic example. On the other hand, restrictions on rural de velopment have been less rigid where there is a culture of tolerance toward rural families meeting their own needs through self build. This tolerance has been manifest in sporadic rural development in southern Europe (espe cially in Italy) and in the Republic of Ireland. Elsewhere, development pressure has been less acute either because of the inaccessibility of rural areas (as in the case of Norway or Denmark) or because the stock of vacant rural housing is so great that it has not yet been exhausted, as in France. Four themes have, to varying degrees, shaped the nature of the ‘rural housing question’ in different coun tries. These have all been alluded to in the above intro duction, but are now examined systematically. The ﬁrst is counterurbanization and the degree of interest in rural housing markets; the second is the extent to which local populations can face this incursion on ‘equal terms’ with incomers, having secure incomes that enable them to compete in stronger markets; the third (and consequen tial theme) is the social exclusions that may result from economic change and counterurbanization; and the fourth is the planning or general policy response and whether this accommodates the ‘rhythms of rural re structuring’ or simply creates unnecessary difﬁculties for some sections of rural society.

Increased Interest in Rural Markets Second homes symbolize the growing interest in rural housing markets since 1945. Though not a new phe nomenon, there has been a ‘social democratization’ of second home ownership over the last 60 years: more people own them and they are no longer the preserve of the conspicuously wealthy. In Europe, levels of second home ownership among the general population vary from around 5% in Britain and Ireland to more than 20% in Scandinavia. They are indicative of the fact that housing in rural areas is not only consumed by people who live and work in these areas, but also by those who recognize a recreational potential in the countryside. The rise of second home ownership since the war, particularly from

the 1960s onward, sits in marked contrast to the ﬂight from many rural areas in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century. In most countries, second home investment is seen as an opportunity rather than a problem, with many rural areas dependent on the money spent by seasonal residents on rural goods and services. But second homes represent the ‘luxury’ component of a much wider in vestment in rural housing. Road building and increased mobility, across Western societies, have opened up the countryside to populations who were previously far more constrained in their residential location choices. Families, who were once tied to inner urban locations because of work commitments, have snapped up the opportunity to move to growing commuter towns in large numbers. This has sometimes had a ‘suburbanizing’ effect on near urban countryside (as in the case of the Netherlands) or has resulted in a car dependent sprawl (as in the US). Else where, this growth has been tightly contained within key or ‘holding’ settlements, which have swelled with the arrival of post war commuters, but which have retained ﬁxed planning boundaries, often being contained within some form of statutory green belt. These two broadly different experiences have each produced their own problems. In Europe and North America, countries and states have grappled with the basic ‘problem’ of more people moving to rural areas: second home buyers, holiday home investors, retiring households, commuters, teleworkers, or lifestyle ‘down shifters’. Some responses build on the premise that the countryside can accommodate more people, that people have the right to live where they wish, and that devel opment is an intrinsically good thing. Elsewhere, policy development reﬂects a different attitude: that the coun tryside is an ‘environmental good’, that openness needs to be preserved, that development is not intrinsically posi tive, and that there should be a broad presumption against housing and associated land use change in rural areas. Different ‘representations’ of the countryside tend to steer policy development: competing views on what the countryside is ‘for’ – a context for peaceful enjoyment versus a place for people to work and live – is reﬂected in national planning frameworks, in attitudes toward de velopment, and in local plan making and implementation. Two countries that stand in stark contrast to one an other in terms of the treatment of their respective coun trysides, and in terms of their consequent rural housing issues, are the Republic of Ireland and Great Britain. Since breaking away from the United Kingdom, Irish planning policy has come to reﬂect a very different attitude to land and property rights and to the ‘function’ of rural areas. A ‘working countryside’ view has prevailed, with housing built where it is needed or where there is a demand. Local landowners have a right to proﬁt from their landholdings, which has resulted in a proliferation of single dwelling developments across the Irish countryside. Many

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commentators have decried the environmental cost of this attitude toward Ireland’s rural areas and the development free for all that has ensued, ostensibly designed not only to serve an economic agenda but also grounded in a belief in local development rights. In Great Britain, on the other hand, these rights were nationalized in 1947 and both pre war planning debate and post war legislation focused on the inappropriateness of development in open country side. An ‘environmental’ view has prevailed, and since the 1960s, some villages (with tight settlement boundaries) have seen almost no growth whatsoever, while the growth that has been permitted elsewhere has been conﬁned to ‘key settlements’ or market towns. The upland landscapes of Scotland and Wales have been largely preserved, while the agricultural landscapes of lowland England have been transformed by factory farming rather than sporadic housing development. But the number of disgruntled environmentalists in Ireland is at least matched in Great Britain by the army of researchers pointing to the unaf fordability of housing in many rural areas. Ofﬁcial stat istics have shown that, taken as a ratio of median local incomes to mean local house prices, housing is less af fordable in English villages and hamlets than in cities. While a majority of people could afford to purchase a home in rural England if they so wished, a signiﬁcant rural minority could not. Hence, these two attitudes – and two policy responses – underpin two different outcomes: development with a heavy environmental cost or protection at the price of social exclusion. Some middle road approach would seem sensible, but in neither the Republic of Ireland or in Great Britain has this been possible owing to the dogged defense of entrenched positions (i.e., a fundamentalist view on property rights versus an equally fundamentalist view on ‘rural conservation’). Elsewhere, responses have been more balanced, but wherever planning plays a part in controlling development there remains a possibility that the cost of buying or renting a home will move be yond the reach of some households. Planning can create a scarcity in land supply that causes an elevation in prop erty prices, which may be problematic for some local households because of the weakness of rural economies relative to the urban economies from which new residents derive their income. This problem is often associated with Britain and the housing supply and demand imbalances that can arise from development constraint, and which concurrently affects rural economic development. But many other countries have laggard rural economies, creating a rural underclass locked out of formal rural housing markets, and forced to occupy substandard housing or engage in illegal building. In areas of high ‘recreational’ demand – and subsequent planning con straints which aim to maintain the environmental qual ities which attract tourists and investors to the countryside – low wages in land based or service sector

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occupations may not provide local people with the means to access local housing.

Rural Economies and Ineffective Demand ‘Ineffective demand’ is a phrase that has been coined to refer to a situation where the power of local households to compete in a housing market is either nulliﬁed by external competition or eroded by a weakening rural economy, which may result in farm wages – in particular – being unable to keep pace with wage levels elsewhere. In the early 1980s, it was observed that the ‘‘the essence of the housing problem in rural areas is that those who work there tend to receive low incomes, and are thus unable to compete with more afﬂuent ‘adventitious’ purchasers from elsewhere in a market where supply is restricted.’’ This observation was borne out with evidence from the English Lake District, but it can apply in any context where these three basic ingredients – planning constraint, low rural wages, and strong migration pressure – are combined. The poorer and more afﬂuent sections of rural society occupy different ‘domestic property classes’. In many rural areas, in Europe and North America, the rural poor have his torically been tenant farmers or farm laborers. Because they tended to rent their homes, they had little accumu lated wealth, and because they were generally unskilled, their incomes were limited. These two characteristics – limited wealth and limited income – placed them in a disadvantaged domestic property class relative to many incomers, who had both wealth and substantial income. This is of course a generalization as the expansion of the European Union in the 2000s has generated a wave of low wealth and low income migrants who have moved west ward to take up unskilled laboring jobs. But this in itself has compounded the plight of many existing rural resi dents who have seen their incomes fall in response to labor oversupply. The same economic disadvantage is experi enced by those in the service sector, especially unskilled workers who serve the tourist economy. Like the farm workers in the previous generation, they rent their homes, receive low incomes, and because they occupy the bottom rung of the labor market ladder, may ﬁnd themselves in direct competition for jobs with migrants from poorer countries. In the southern US, Mexican migrants – legal and illegal – compete with US citizens for unskilled farming and service jobs. In Western Europe, migrants from the A8 accession states have arrived in large num bers. The majority have headed to the major cities, but hundreds of thousands have taken up rural jobs in farming and in construction. But it is the combination of low wages with housing demand from external purchasers and planning con straints that may lock sections of rural communities out of the market for rural homes, causing a range of housing

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stresses: overcrowding, homelessness, or the occupation of unﬁt dwellings. In an open economy, no market is free from external interest: people move in and move out, producing a ‘churn’ which, alongside land and housing supply, affects house prices. The imbalances that occur in rural areas are not unique. In an ‘urban system’, those with less income may be forced to move to a less expensive neighborhood, resulting in patterns of socio economic segregation. But in the countryside, more limited housing opportunities (and a critical difference in scale) are more likely to cause wholesale displacement ‘from’ some settlements (especially villages) than segre gation ‘within’ settlements. There are many well known and well documented rural ‘hotspots’ across Europe where the gentriﬁcation of villages and small towns has been spectacular, causing a near total displacement of existing residents in favor of both domestic and international migrants: established examples include the Dordogne, Province, and Courchevel in France; Tuscany and the Costa Smeralda in Italy; parts of the Austrian Alps, especially around Kitzbuhel; and Cornwall, the Cotswolds, and the Lake District in England; emerging examples can be found in Bulgaria and Romania. Further aﬁeld, there are now emergent second home markets across Central America, though these tend to be con centrated in the Paciﬁc resorts (including Puerto Vallarta in Mexico) rather than in the rural interior. But the principles driving social change are the same: the arrival of afﬂuent incomers who wield considerable economic power relative to local residents, and a plan ning system that prioritizes incoming consumption interests above the broader economic needs of the existing population.

New Social Exclusions Social change has created new tensions and strains in the countryside, particularly between the ‘new com munities’ of commuters, retiring households, holiday makers, down shifters, and investors and the ‘residual communities’ comprising the remnants of what might be considered the ‘traditional’ land based class. It has been argued that today’s rural communities are ‘encapsulated’ in the sense that a residual group (what’s left of the old land based occupational class) is encapsulated within an increasingly dominant community of ‘newcomers’ and that the underlying threat of conﬂict is now a key feature of rural life. The potential for new social exclusions (from services and from wider opportunities – especially education and employment opportunities – as well as homes) is central to this conﬂict, often because the needs of newcomers and locals diverge, and communities can no longer build consensus around any shared vision of future development.

For example, incoming groups may believe that their own needs are best served by preserving the community as it is – by ‘freezing it in aspic’ – and advance an ‘en vironmental’ representation of the countryside. They have no need for new economic development or add itional housing and consequently oppose new develop ment proposals. Investors, second home buyers, retiring households, and commuters will wish to preserve the rural setting of their homes, maintaining open country side and ensuring that the quintessential French, English (or New England), Italian, or Austrian village remains quintessential. This is easier to achieve where incomers are able to inﬂuence local planning decisions directly and in contexts which already strongly favor the pre servation of ‘rural character’; hence, Great Britain is often held up as the country with one of the seemingly most intractable rural housing questions. Differences in the needs of ‘local’ and ‘newcomer’ groups may account for mixed reactions to development proposals, or the weight of support behind particular community projects. The desire to maintain a local bus service will be greater where more residents rely on that service and weaker where the majority are commuters or second home owners. Support for local schools is more likely to be found in villages where many people have young children, but will diminish where communities have become dominated by elderly and seasonal resi dents. Local shops, surgeries, leisure facilities, or postal services will only survive where they are regularly pat ronized, but cease operating when a high enough pro portion of villagers shop on the way back from work (or via the Internet), prefer to open a bottle of wine at home, or no longer use post ofﬁces. As needs change, the re sidual community may ﬁnd itself increasingly marginal ized and disadvantaged: unable to access employment without a car (and unable to buy and service a car because of low wages), unable to send children to the now closed local school, and unable to ﬁnd secure and affordable accommodation in the local area. This com munity may be squeezed on several fronts and ultimately displaced, with villages becoming dominated by more afﬂuent groups. Relative priorities determine the im portance attached to particular services, including new housing provision, though economies of scale (concen trating housing or school provision in key settlements), lower population densities (creating less proﬁtable mar kets for bus companies or retailers), and a more re strictive approach to planning all of these contribute to social disadvantage in the countryside. But housing is often seen as the key battleground: the reconﬁguration of communities which is central to social exclusion is the product of a snowballing interest in rural housing markets since the 1960s. This form of housing demand is transforming many parts of the European and North American countryside and presenting

Housing, Rural

policymakers with an apparently simple choice. Should this pattern of change be allowed to continue, or should stronger measures be taken to ensure more balanced communities in rural areas? Planning systems and dif ferent approaches to housing supply are likely to play a major part in shaping rural housing issues in the future.

Planning Systems and the Supply of Land for Development Intervention is a key component of rural housing debate, playing a part in the formation of particular tensions, possibly by releasing too much land for development or too little and causing a range of environmental or socioeconomic stresses. Planning systems, underpinned by different values and attitudes toward the countryside, vary greatly, making it extremely difﬁcult to identify a single mode of intervention that might ease tension or produce ostensibly better results (however these are de ﬁned). For some observers, the restrictive planning sys tems of the UK produce broadly desirable outcomes: the preservation of rural character at a tolerable social and economic cost. For others, these systems preside over a disaster, bleeding the countryside of its economic vitality and denying thousands of families the chance of a decent home. In Ireland, what some see as an environmental catastrophe, others view as simple common sense: allowing landowners and communities to develop freely without undue hindrance from government or from local bureaucrats. These two contrasting approaches operate under broadly similar conditions: the rural populations are growing in absolute terms, though interest in par ticular rural markets varies depending on environmental qualities, accessibility, and proximity to major centers of population. Other countries have different or more variable experiences: the US, for example, has its at tractive rural communities in the New England states which have seen a steady inﬂux of commuters during recent decades. But these areas contrast markedly with the mid west and the southern states, which have ex pansive rural areas that continue to experience de population. Likewise, many less accessible parts of Europe – for example, in northern Scandinavia, parts of the Spanish interior, or Italy’s Mezzogiorno – have seen little of the investment interest experienced elsewhere in rural Europe, and when it does occur, it is actively encouraged. Therefore, it is impossible to highlight a single mode of intervention that would suit all circumstances, but it is possible to note approaches that might be applicable depending on context. Building stronger and more re silient rural economies is regularly touted as favorite, and this can mean many things: improving regional infra structure in order to link rural hinterlands to urban

211

economies; relaxing planning constraints (where they exist) to encourage investment and enterprise (as well as diversiﬁcation away from farming); and actively en couraging consumption investment, of which holiday home development and second home buying might be seen as a part. Next to the economic dimension, there has been inevitable interest in speciﬁc policies designed to increase housing access where this is limited. The most obvious is concerned with mounting a challenge to the culture of rural protectionism, opening up more land for development and establishing a new balance between housing demand and supply: basically, building more homes in an attempt to bring down prices, making homes affordable to low income, low wealth groups. Countries with rigid constraint policies tend to con tinually debate this option. Recent analysis for the UK has shown that house price increases over the last three decades have been more than double those experienced in the rest of Europe, resulting in a call to relax planning constraint, build more homes, and seek ‘improved market affordability’. The counter position is to argue that more house building will generate more investment long be fore it helps poorer households: therefore, far too high an environmental price would have to be paid in order to achieve this market affordability. Where more housing is needed, it should be contained within existing settlement boundaries. This very British view – grounded in a context of nationalized development rights – maintains that the countryside is simply not the right context for house building and if more homes are needed, they must be achieved through more efﬁcient use of previously developed land: hence development densities should be increased, not only in urban areas but also in villages and market towns where development is permitted. Of course, this view is not universally shared: rather than developing ‘rabbit hutches on postage stamps’, rural development elsewhere in Europe is characterized by single dwellings on large plots (Spain, Italy, and Ireland all display this tendency) and, moreover, by a freedom in building design and style that does not exist in the UK. Again, the contrast hinges on rights and on culture: the rights that individuals have to use and proﬁt from private land holdings, and the culture of representation; of a countryside to be protected (arguably for the beneﬁt of a select few) versus a countryside that comprises exploit able private and community assets. Protectionism and development intolerance in the UK have meant that at tempts to increase the affordability of rural homes have been ‘piecemeal’ or ‘innovative’ depending on one’s perspective: requiring landowners and developers to in clude low cost housing in developments where these are permitted, granting very exceptional planning permis sions on land where housing would not normally be allowed, and working with quasi public bodies to provide cheaper homes for key workers or households with an

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accepted ‘local need’. Such interventions have been ne cessary because of the extent to which planning con straint forces up land values and subsequent housing costs: the market price of a developable plot of land in southern England, for example, can be many hundreds of times the price of an agricultural plot of equivalent size. While rural households elsewhere in Europe and North America worry about the rising cost of labor and ma terials (and moot the beneﬁts of ﬂat packed, prefabri cated, or timber framed homes as solutions to their rural housing problems), these issues are of less concern in parts of England where build costs are dwarfed by the cost of buying land for housing.

view that planning systems must deliver for ‘man and the biosphere’, and avoid prioritizing one over the other. This means not only ﬁnding a place for development and change in rural landscapes, avoiding irreparable eco logical damage, but also accepting the need to deliver living and working countrysides, with viable economies, decent services, and sufﬁcient homes to meet need and demand. Delivering green development strategies, and green housing at the highest environmental standards, is seen as the way forward. See also: Counterurbanization; Gentriﬁcation, Rural; Homelessness, Rural; Rural Communities; Second Homes.

Concluding Remarks There are many facets to the rural housing problems facing Western societies, and many contexts – geo graphical, environmental, sociocultural, economic, and political – in which these are played out. Yet a number of themes are conspicuous: the strongest is that of ‘man versus nature’, with rural housing debate in many countries centering on the balance that should be struck between development in the countryside and the pro tection of ‘landscape resources’. But in recent years, there has been a move away – at least in reasoned debate – from presenting the rural housing question as one of stark choices: homes or landscape quality; jobs or openness; development or nature; concrete or trees. Sustainable development has been viewed, for a long time now, as a means of avoiding these dichotomous choices. Unfortu nately, it can also become a banner for interests wishing to halt development in largely rural areas, or for the promoters of discredited development forms rebranded as ‘eco towns’ or ‘eco settlements’, being ‘eco’ in name only. However, consensus is now mustering around the

Further Reading Belden, J. N. and Weiner, R. J. (eds.) (1999). Housing in Rural America. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Evans, A. W. (1991). ‘Rabbit hutches on postage stamps’: Planning, development and political economy. Urban Studies 28(6), 853 870. Gallent, N., Shucksmith, M. and Tewdwr Jones, M. (2003). Housing in the European Countryside. London: Routledge. Murdoch, J. and Abram, S. (2002). Rationalities of Planning: Development Versus Environment in Planning for Housing. Ashgate: Aldershot. Scott, M. (2007). Rural housing: Politics, public policy and planning. In Norris, M. & Redmond, D. (eds.) Housing Contemporary Ireland: Policy, Society and Shelter, pp 344 363. London: Springer. Shucksmith, M. (1981). No Homes for Locals. Farnborough: Gower Publishing.

Relevant Websites http://www.ruralcommunities.gov.uk Commission for Rural Communities (United Kingdom). http://www.rurdev.usda.gov USDA Rural Development (United States).

Hub Network Location M. E. O’Kelly, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Flow Economies-of-Scale A reduction in costs of operation per unit in response to higher levels of ﬂow activity. Hub A central facility serving as a switching point in a network; characteristic of the hub is a set of ﬂows from and to origins and destinations and these connect via the switching points. Hub-and-Spoke System In contrast to a directly connected point-to-point interaction system, a hub-andspoke system channels ﬂows from origins to destinations via central switching locations; typical journeys involve one or more intermediate stops. Median A centrally located facility that serves as a distribution center or a warehouse without necessarily permitting transshipment or throughput at the central facility. Network Optimization Specially structured optimization problems that aim to ﬁnd the lowest costs of operations in complex network ﬂow situations, often subject to numerous constraints that limit the ﬂexibility of the decision maker. Nonconvexity A type of objective function shape that tends to occur in hub models, and which does not readily yield a globally minimal transport cost. NP-Hard A technical measure of the computational complexity of a problem. Origin and Destination (OD) Flows occur between origins and destinations in a set of interacting systems; examples of such ﬂows can include passengers, information, packets, and supplies. Most origins may have spoke-like links to one or more hubs. Spoke A link joining an origin or a destination to a hub.

Background Hubs are facilities that serve as switching points for ﬂows in interaction systems with many origins and destinations; they are common in passenger and freight transportation systems as well as in telecommunication networks. Hubs are commonly used in distribution sys tems as a means of spatial organization. In such net works, many types of optimization problems arise: some that minimize communication costs (p hub medians) and some that optimize access and coverage (p hub centers).

While these models bear a close resemblance to well studied classical problems in location theory, the special feature of the hub network design is that interactions between pairs of nodes give rise to interdependence in the systems of facilities. In the hub and spoke systems considered here, facilities must be placed not just with regard to single ﬂows (as in ﬂows to or from a factory or warehouse) but with reference to throughputs that de rive from the ﬂows between origins and destinations. It is worth noting that in the absence of some kind of facility throughput, the analysis collapses to the comparatively simple ‘median’ family of problems. This is an important distinction because the term hub is occasionally em ployed rather loosely as a synonym for a central depot of some kind; such cases are adequately and more properly handled as medians. The focus in this article is on the hub location and network design problem where the pre deﬁned ﬂows between origins (I) and destinations (J) are routed through one or more central switching points known as ‘hubs’. It is clear that the number, location, and routing protocols employed have signiﬁcant consequences for the cost of operation of a particular proposed network. In turn, these decisions become imbedded in optimization formulations that attempt to generate efﬁcient networks within the framework of some particular network protocol. One such formulation is to pick facilities (denoted say by selecting some subset of p locations from n candidates) so as to minimize the sum of costs of routing the ﬂows; clearly, the objective must add up the routing cost over all origin–destination pairs (i.e., over all I and J pairs) as shown in the following computational formula: T¼

XX i

j

W ij

XX k

Rijkm ½Cik þ a Ckm þ Cjm

m

where Wij is the ﬂow between i and j, and Rijkm is the variable that denotes the routing and the Cik, Ckm, and Cjm terms (which are constants or ‘coefﬁcients’) measure the link costs per unit of ﬂow. A notable idea is that the interhub portion of the trip might operate at some dis counted fraction (ao1) of the prevailing costs, due say to some extra capacity infrastructure. For example, wide body aircrafts can be used on busy interhub routes. The correct formulation of this effect is the topic of some ongoing research into economies of scale, as discussed further below. The decision variable Rijkm (typically an integer variable that is set to either one or zero) is clearly governed by the decision about which hub facilities to open, as well as the allowable ﬂexibility in allocating nodes to facilities. One particular version of the objective function and

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Hub Network Location

constraints leading to a quadratic integer programming formulation was set out in a seminal paper by O’Kelly. A characteristic feature of hub and spoke networks is the bundling of ﬂows on the interhub links. The ag glomeration of ﬂows leads to reduced average travel costs across the interhub links. Providers of transporta tion services may reduce their average unit costs by bundling ﬂows and channeling them between hubs (also known as concentrators or routers). This aspect of the problem has a number of consequences: introducing ﬂow related discounts into transportation costs, for ex ample, and focusing on the entire system of ﬂows. This feature contrasts with the traditional ‘transportation problem’ of linear programming where the ﬂows are charged a rate that is independent of the amount of ﬂow. The hub location problem has been a fruitful one for current methodological research (e.g., in operations management) precisely because of the inherent pro gramming difﬁculties posed by this interdependence. As a result of this interdependence, the objective function and/or the number of variables in the models need to be modiﬁed from the comparable standard lo cation models. Speciﬁcally, some hub location models have quadratic rather than linear objective functions and others retain linear objective functions but require large numbers of variables (compare, for example, using Rijkm vs. use of the product of Xik and Xjm). Initial research focused on the special case where each origin/destination is allocated to a ‘single’ one of the fully interconnected hubs. An important insight into this hub location problem is that in contrast to ‘medians’, which possess a ‘nearest is best’ allocation property, the hub problem cannot assume that allocation to the nearest hub is best because the bulk of a node’s interactions may actually lean toward rela tively faraway subsets of the destinations. As an extension, observe that a broad range of con nection protocols can be envisaged including cases where the nodes interact with more than one of the hub lo cations. A tension occurs between the desire to provide optimal linkages for every pair (leading to a tendency for nodes to have many direct connections), trading off against the resultant dilution of the ﬂows. In other words, the more heavily the network can concentrate ﬂow, the more the network ﬂows on the hub to hub links can beneﬁt from economies of scale. A model might employ a concave cost function to favor the assembly of ﬂows. Such a formulation, apart from being a more realistic repre sentation of the costs of ﬂow, produces some useful mathematical properties by providing an incentive to agglomerate transportation infrastructure.

Optimization and Solutions The strategic optimization problem for hub and spoke networks involves a host of interrelated decisions: the

location of the facilities; the assignment or allocation of the demand nodes to these facilities; the modes to be used on the links (e.g., truck vs. air); and the protocols for routing the ﬂows. Such high level strategic decisions are sufﬁciently complex that they are often broken down into simple components. For major sorting centers, the ‘lo cation decision’ is probably the most critical because of the high cost of ﬁxed infrastructure; such decisions also occur rather infrequently in a company’s life cycle. Once the system location is selected, however, there remain a large number of operational or routine daily decisions: handling exceptional conditions, rerouting ﬂows around broken links, and even substitution of backup coverage. Eventually hub systems may outgrow their initial lo cation conﬁguration and either choose to close facilities, or to designate satellite minihubs to skim off some of the regional interactions. Many aspects of these decisions depend on the underlying geographical regionalization, as hubs tend to serve particular clusters of interactions. Scale may also be seen to play a role, in that hub like phenomena occur in global, regional, and local con ﬁgurations. One way to see this is to note the special centrality of Anchorage, Alaska, in terms of connections between US, Europe, and Asia. Dubai also has notable accessibility advantages in terms of its ability to serve as a base for nonstop connections to virtually all parts of the globe. A single hub can be optimally located by using a variant on a single facility median; the weights used for the problem in that case are simply the sums of inﬂows and outﬂows to each of the basic nodes. The problem becomes more complex once there are two hubs to be located, because the nodes need to be divided into ser vice clusters. The two hub system, nevertheless, still has ‘polynomial time’ algorithms. However, Sohn and Park show that the single allocation problem is NP hard as soon as the number of hubs is three. The general location problem of p hubs may be set up in planar and discrete versions, in common with the general classiﬁcation of location modeling tasks. The full suite of modern computational techniques has been directed to many aspects of the hub location program and its variants. All standard techniques have found useful application and are frequently the topic of new research papers in operations research; the fol lowing example titles are indicative: genetic algorithms, tabu search, Lagrangian relaxation, neural networks, Benders decomposition, and ﬁnally, new mixed integer formulations based on shortest paths. The fundamental problem in location models (whether hubs or regular medians) is obviously that there is an indivisibility of the decisions (a hub is either located or not, requiring a one– zero decision variable). Because of the peculiarities of the hub location objective, one can ﬁnd that a nonconvex objective function might lead to fractional facilities being

Hub Network Location

located in the absence of special care to enforce in divisibility (this is related to a fundamental, nonconvexity result in optimization devised by Koopmans and Beck man). Much of the challenge in hub facility location is that of incorporating both indivisible facilities, in the presence of a nonconvex objective function. The work of Klincewicz, in particular, should be mentioned as it exploits the structure and draws insights from the plant location literature and the network design problem. The analytical approach is to use various ex change heuristics; these work with an existing set of hubs and systematically substitute other nodes for the in cumbents based on local improvement measures (so called dual ascent). Again, such a strategy is common in the broad location literature where it might be seen as an example of an exchange heuristic, but the particularities for the hub model require some careful adaptation, in part because the models tend to produce very large in teger programs. As well as insights arising from plant location and so called dual ascent, one can also see that the complexity of the hub models calls for improved linear programming relaxations (in other words, tem porarily dropping some particular integrality constraints, solving the relaxed problem, and then adding back carefully chosen conditions to logically isolate the best solution). In cases with fractional solutions, integrality was achieved by adding a small set of integrality con straints. The best practices point to either tabu search or specially structured models that exploit insights to im bedded routing or assignment problems. Promising work exploiting polyhedral results have also begun to appear. Hub locations have high relevance for the provision of infrastructure and network design such as might occur in telecommunications, freight, logistics, and air passenger systems. They are also seen as a variant on a classic transshipment node, and these nodes have special rele vance for supply chain management. The problem also has applications in the design of postal delivery networks, particularly in the location of capacitated mail sorting and distribution centers. These will be discussed further below.

Telecommunications Applications Many of the variants on network design problem occur in the telecommunications ﬁeld. Space does not permit more than a provisional listing of applications, but it is clear that hub and spoke networks play a key role in the decision support for planning telecommunication net works. The assignment of cells to switches in cellular networks also opens a host of network conﬁguration, layout, and connection problems, many of which have the same important ingredients of ‘interdependence’ alluded to in the introduction to hub systems. One typical design in a two level network has a fully meshed backbone

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subnet, and each of the nodes is connected to two dif ferent backbone nodes. Typically, these models describe cost minimization over three types of decisions: locating hub facilities, positioning conduits, and installing com munication lines. The problem is usually formulated as a variant on a network design problem, using the dual ascent solution strategy. The size and complexity of these applications is such that one necessarily needs to deploy heuristics or other special decompositions.

Freight Applications The application of hub and spoke systems in freight transportation and logistics opens up interesting issues of network design and operational planning, including the extent to which some direct transportation can take place outside the hub network. In other words, freight systems are likely to combine elements from hub and spoke de sign, and also reveal additional side arrangements that might handle some freight ‘ofﬂine’ on special multimodal carriers, or involve considerations such as assembling less than truckload ﬂows into standard transportation containers. Geographers, especially those with training in operations research and optimization, have made im portant linkages between classical descriptive models of freight systems (tending to emphasize transshipment and optimal capacity) to develop planning applications of the hub network model to provide efﬁcient multimodal sys tems for regional economies. The location of such transshipment facilities is critical to the ‘competitiveness’ of a regional economy. Perhaps the best example of this marriage of opti mization and regional transportation organization is in the intermodal coordination involved in distribution and supply chain management. A particularly interesting variant on this problem occurs in less than truckload transportation whereby the collection of many small freight ﬂows occurs through a series of intermediate transshipment locations. Similarly, the recent explosion of demand for timely delivery of materials ordered from re mote retailers has prompted a close coupling of the air and ground systems operated by freight carriers such as UPS and FedEx. The many trade offs between time sensitivity, customers’ price sensitivity, and the potential to make on time deliveries using cheaper modes (truck) have pro duced a major application for optimal network planners.

Applications Air Passenger Systems The hub and spoke network is much maligned in the sphere of air passenger transportation, as it gives rise to necessary plane changes and stopovers, and the apparent increased possibility of missed connections and mis handled baggage. In fact, these troubles were sufﬁciently

216

Hub Network Location

well documented for hub carriers that the air industry took note of the success of regional carriers such as Southwest Air in the US, a system that uses a point to point network. Southwest, compared to the major carriers, achieves higher percentages for on time de partures and has fewer problems with missed connections and lost baggage, leading some to speculate that its net work structure gives it an advantage. Clearly this ad vantage has somewhat of a spatial angle, in that the ability to run a point to point system effectively hinges on the regional foci and specialization that are not pos sible in carriers determined to provide trunk, local, and international service. So while nonhub networks have prospered, hub systems persevere, and attempt to operate more satisfactorily by developing better spacing and ‘choreography’ between waves of interconnecting ﬂights at major peaks. The option of better connections and the possibility of a convenient stopover at a major retail hub (as some airports have become) exploits the connection step of air passenger travel. Descriptive work that deﬁnes the scope of hubbing in networks examines the choice of particular city con ﬁgurations by airlines, the emergence of hubs in sec ondary airports near to main markets, and the potential for air carriers to change their conﬁgurations, including closure of hubs. The network chosen has a notable im pact on the ultimate success or failure of the carriers. Research in this area has examined network conﬁguration in the presence of competitive and regulatory forces with an emphasis on the ability of one carrier to gain advan tage, or indeed stymie the efforts of its competitors through macrospatial strategy. Adler uses a game theo retic approach (a two stage Nash best response game), to evaluate the most proﬁtable hub and spoke network for an airline to survive in a de regulated environment. Among the class of related problems, one ﬁnds concern with selection of international gateway airports, and se lection of equipment and routing strategies across various scales and lengths of haul. Such problems are increas ingly relevant as the structures from ‘developed’ air networks grow toward integration of newly emerging air markets. The selection of a major international gateway or indeed a regional hub frequently makes news in na tional press and knowledge of these networks spreads rapidly through internet trade and technology news groups. Related model issues are reviewed in Bryan and O’Kelly. Such hub network ramiﬁcations have also spread to the manufacturing sector. One of the major airframe manufacturers (Airbus) has made its ﬂeet offerings mesh well with the high scale ﬂows on interhub connections, recognizing that as global travel expands the interaction between major international gateways is likely to require higher capacity long haul jets. The increasing set of internationally identiﬁed major hubs is likely to reinforce these choices.

Extensions Signiﬁcant variants on the standard model include the hub network design problem with stopovers and feeders. In the network used by the Federal Express Co., some ﬂights to and from the hub make one or more stopovers, and many smaller cities are served by feeder aircraft which connect to other nonhub cities. The paper by Kuby and Gray explores the trade offs and savings involved with stopovers and feeders, and develops a mixed integer program to design the least cost, single hub air network for a ﬁxed hub location. Variants on the basic model are evident in the active research literature, including consideration of virtually the entire gamut of design decisions that arise in the hub system: macrolocation and structural organization (a high level strategic decision); the division of the network into levels; the operational or daily optimization of the network (operational decision); and of course, the methodological angles that arise as extensions of the hub concept to other nontransport environs. Examples in clude: the routing protocols (e.g., how many stops are allowed?); topological design of a hierarchical two level network; capacity, thresholds, and ﬂow dependent costs; cost allocation to impute the cost of a shared hub to hub journey to the original origin to destination path; hub and cluster assignment models; and, last but not least, the impact of queues on the effective handling of such large systems of ﬂows. Finally, no review of the hub problem would be complete without mention of the myriad ways in which ‘hub’ like terminology pervades other transport sectors. Hubs are used as a means of contrasting the typically major airline carrier’s network with a more ﬂexible point to point network that has performed so well for those niche carriers exploiting gaps in hub network coverage. Precisely because there are fewer intermediate inter change points, a point to point carrier such as Southwest Airlines in the US is capable of keeping its ﬂeet in the air for a higher proportion of the working day and typically has better on time and baggage handling results than those airlines that use an interchange at a busy hub. (Denver, for example, is home to a much criticized ex periment in highly automated baggage handling necessi tated in part by the major hub interchange trafﬁc at that location.) The hub idea is a major point of national pride in the organization of airline systems and frequently the importance of the primary hub in a system is such that it becomes a rallying point for both political and economic development causes. The hub is also the basis for the idea that there are certain locational ‘centrality’ beneﬁts that arise in the organization of networks. These become places that gain insurmountable advantages in some air line networks (the ‘too big to fail’ argument that was once heard in the context of manufacturing industry).

Hub Network Location

Periodically however, these arrangements are destabilized by the acquisition or merger of networks, and it is a measure of the importance of hubs that certain mergers or acquisition are deemed more or less likely to succeed because of the complementarities of their hub network systems. See also: Location Analysis; Network Analysis; Spatial Interaction Models.

Further Reading Adler, N. (2001). Competition in a deregulated air transportation market. European Journal of Operational Research 129(2), 337 345. Bryan, D. L. and O’Kelly, M. E. (1999). Hub and spoke networks in air transportation: An analytical review. Journal of Regional Science 39(2), 275 295. Campbell, J. F. (1996). Hub location and the p hub median problem. Operations Research 44(6), 923 935. Ernst, A. T. and Krishnamoorthy, M. (1998). Exact and heuristic algorithms for the uncapacitated multiple allocation p hub median problem. European Journal of Operational Research 104(1), 100 112. Fortz, B. and Labbe, M. (2002). Polyhedral results for two connected networks with bounded rings. Mathematical Programming 93(1), 27 54. Groothedde, B. (2005). Collaborative Logistics and Transportation Networks: A Modeling Approach to Hub Network Design. The Netherlands: TRAIL Research School.

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Klincewicz, J. G. (1991). Heuristics for the p hub location problem. European Journal of Operational Research 53(1), 25 37. Klincewicz, J. G. (1998). Hub location in backbone/tributary network design: A review. Location Science 6(1), 307 335. Koopmans, T. C. and Beckmann, M. (1957). Assignment problems and the location of economic activities. Econometrica 25, 53 76. Kuby, M. J. and Gray, R. (1993). The hub network design problem with stopovers and feeders the case of Federal Express. Transportation Research Part A Policy and Practice 27(1), 1 12. O’Kelly, M. E. (1987). A quadratic integer program for the location of interacting hub facilities. European Journal of Operational Research 32, 393 404. O’Kelly, M. E. (1998). A geographer’s analysis of hub and spoke networks. Journal of Transport Geography 6(3), 171 186. O’Kelly, M. E. and Bryan, D. (1998). Hub location with ﬂow economies of scale. Transportation Research Part B Methodological 32(8), 605 616. O’Kelly, M. E. and Miller, H. (1994). The hub network design problem: A review and synthesis. Journal of Transport Geography 2(1), 31 4034. Reynolds Feighan, A. (2001). Trafﬁc distribution in low cost and full service carrier networks in the US air transportation market. Journal of Air Transport Management 7(5), 265 275. Skorin Kapov, D. (2001). On cost allocation in hub like networks. Annals of Operations Research 106, 63 78. Skorin Kapov, D. and Skorin Kapov, J. (1994). On tabu search for the location of interacting hub facilities. European Journal of Operational Research 73(3), 501 509. Sohn, J. and Park, S. (2000). The single allocation problem in the interacting three hub network. Networks 35(1), 17 25.

Human Geography C. Gibson, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Human geography is a major subdiscipline within the wider subject ﬁeld of geography. Traditionally, geography is considered the study of the Earth’s environments and peoples, and the interactions between them. ‘Geography’ comes from ancient Greek origins (Eratosthenes was the ﬁrst to use it), literally translating as ‘to write or describe the world’. In classical and Enlightenment geography, humans and the ‘natural’ world were usually described in conjunction, often in a regional fashion, as Europeans encountered unfamiliar places in exploration and empire. Since the late nineteenth century, this conjoint under standing of geography – as describing the natural and human world, region by region – has gradually been augmented by more precise subdisciplinary pursuits and identities. The most basic of these describes geography as consisting two fundamental halves: physical and human geography. Physical geography generally means the sci ence of the Earth’s surface, while human geography usually refers to the study of its peoples, and geo graphical interpretations of economies, cultural iden tities, political territories, and societies. Physical geographers classify and analyze landforms and eco systems, explain hydrological, geomorphological, and coastal processes, and examine problems such as erosion, pollution, and climatic variability. Human geographers analyze population trends, theorize social and cultural change, interpret geopolitical conﬂict, and seek to explain the geography of human economic activities around the world. How exactly this division of labor came to be is a most pivotal story of contemporary geography. It is a story about twentieth century scientiﬁc fragmentation, and about different theories on the status of humans vis a` vis nonhuman nature. It is also a more slippery and difﬁcult story about how academic knowledges are pro duced, mutate, and travel (and how this happens in particular places), how knowledges ﬁnd popularity, fade away, or are challenged in time and across space. The central division of labor in geography – produced by these means over more than a hundred years – has es tablished and deﬁned the space within which most human geographical practice now occurs. This article is an introductory overview of contemporary human geography and the stories underlying it. An outsider could be forgiven for thinking that human geography was the study of the existence and distribution of humans on Earth – of Homo sapiens as a distinct species. Literally, human geography could be interpreted as the study of the geography of humans: when, where, and how

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humans evolved, developed strategies for survival, and dispersed to other parts of the world. Some within geog raphy would indeed consider such themes important to geography. They invite analysis of how humans inhabited and related to physical environments, how humans used (and abused) resources, adapted to different climates, and developed distinct regional cultures. When prominent geographer Halfred Mackinder presented his ideas on the scope and purpose of geography to the Royal Geo graphical Society in 1887, this idea of geography as ‘‘tra c[ing] the interaction of man [sic] in society and so much of his environment as varies locally’’ proved immensely popular and would shape future interpretations. However, for most human geographers in the current era such questions have fallen from favor because of ethical and intellectual concerns (see discussion below), while more contemporaneous themes have grown popular, ﬁrmly on the human side of geography. The science of human evolution and geographical dispersal has instead become the purview of other disciplines such as archeology, paleontology, and anthropology. Most contemporary academic geographers hold some nominal allegiance to either of geography’s ‘halves’ (human or physical), although for important intellectual and philosophical reasons (discussed below) some do re sist this division and instead prefer to regard geography as a disciplinary whole, or insist on troubling the conceptual distinction between ‘the human’ and ‘nonhuman’ parts of the world. Some commentators have criticized a per ceived widening of the gulf between geography’s two halves. Others see human geography as merely a con venient badge for its diverse contents, while still adhering to the principle of a wider, umbrella discipline of geog raphy (including physical geography). Regardless, con temporary human geography has taken on a particular character. Human geographers tend to explore social, economic, cultural, political, and demographic dimen sions of human existence, and situate analysis in geo graphical space (conceptualized across and between scales from the body to the city, nation, and globe). While di versity deﬁnes contemporary human geography, there are common questions of geographical scale, causality, agency and structure, interrelationships and networks, place and movements. Human geographers are concerned with observed distributions and analytical explanation. They invariably focus on the spatial and, whether implicit or explicit, have a great deal to say about the moral and political dimensions of human activity.

Human Geography

This article is structured in anticipation of the more pertinent questions an outsider might ask of a human geographer: ‘what is human geography?’; ‘when did human geography emerge as a discipline and how has it changed over time?’; ‘what is the character of contemporary human geographical practice?’; and ‘how is it practiced in different places?’. At the outset it is worth clarifying the approach taken here. Reﬂecting current thinking, a single, linear story about canonical development of ideas in human geography is sought to be avoided. Such stories only re inforce the dominant narrative at the expense of less powerful ones, and are invariably Eurocentric. This article also tries, where possible, to show that geographical knowledges are produced by a range of actors in different ways and for different audiences. However, the manner in which such knowledges are produced, and what those knowledges mean, is contin gent on the degree of formal academic practice, on the political, institutional, and cultural circumstances whence they came, and on the perspective of the onlooker or interpreter. Certain actors and institutions beneﬁted (sometimes enormously) from the production of par ticular kinds of human geographical knowledges, while others suffered. In this article, the author hopes to give some sense of the ‘effect’ of human geographical know ledges for people, institutions, and places. In short, this article tries to situate human geography in the times and places in which it has been produced. The author is cognizant that this is one academic’s per spective. This article seeks not to deﬁne core agendas, but to provide explanation and context. It necessarily cannot do adequate justice to all subthemes, topics, and per spectives. Part of the problem is that most of the dis ciplinary histories written in English have come from Britain and America. This has subsequently given the impression of an Anglo American axis of academics ‘creating’ the history of the discipline – a history to which others from elsewhere occasionally contribute, but not to shape in any fundamental way. Alas, probably more than a whiff of such a bias seeps into this story too. There are attempts below to decenter the sense of an Anglo American dominance, but ﬁnding and fully surveying the mass of non Anglo American explanations of human geography is beyond my capacity. As Sidaway (1997: 74) argued, ‘‘no single author could ever do justice to all traditions of geography, everywhere in the world.’’ Human geography exists as a formal academic discipline in tens, if not over a hundred, different countries and languages, with diverse meanings and contexts. Only a fraction of those stories have been properly documented. Instead, the reader is recommended to treat this article as an entry point, and to explore the subdiscipline’s various trails from it. The author hopes it will become apparent as the reader progresses that the development and dif fusion of human geography has been dynamic and

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context dependent – and amidst signiﬁcant advances, has often been far from straightforward.

What Is ‘Human Geography’? Deﬁning human geography is especially difﬁcult because of complicating factors like the relationship between human geography and geography (the former to many considered a mere subdiscipline of the latter); the rather late professionalization of the discipline; variations in human geography written in different languages; and the difﬁculty (indeed, sheer dubiousness) of being able to identify deﬁnitive research questions, sequential para digms, or key thinkers. It is tempting to deﬁne a common ground for human geography’s intellectual core (as Hartshorne attempted), and wish to enforce this. Such a common ground might provide human geography with a sense of unity. But the reality of how human geography is practiced simply cannot sustain this. As David Living stone so powerfully put it in The Geographical Tradition (1992: 28), ‘‘The idea that there is some eternal meta physical core to geography independent of historical circumstances will simply have to go.’’ Indeed, human geography has not had a linear tra jectory of intellectual advances accompanied by more or less parallel diffusions as the subject was established and pursued around the world. Human geography has been energized and replenished in a more decentered manner by multiple authors asking very different questions within the same subdisciplinary space. Some, like Alex ander Von Humboldt, are seen as forbearers, but others, such as Friedrich Ratzel and Ellsworth Huntingdon are remembered more for how subsequent geographers dis owned their ideas. Somewhat an exception to this is Paul Vidal de la Blache, who took up the chair of geography at the Sorbonne in 1898 and whose students became pro fessors of geography at most of France’s (then) 16 other universities. In this instance one could argue that a single leading ﬁgure established the terrain and direction of a national geographical tradition – at least for several subsequent generations. Of course there have been highly inﬂuential theorists and practitioners in every era, but human geography has been a remarkably open ﬁeld, particularly since the 1960s, when especially diverse ideas and political prac tices found traction, and when links were made to an thropology, sociology, cultural studies, economics, and philosophy. This perspective helps explain how con temporary human geography has emerged as a complex and differentiated grouping of scholars and students, institutions and analytical sites, technologies and meth odologies, journals and conferences, arguments and audiences – evidenced by the very diversity of entries covered in this encyclopedia.

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Human Geography

For what it is worth, and before discussing some rather more entangled stories about the discipline, it is worth brieﬂy surveying current human geography – at least in a surface scan of its various themes as they are represented in English language academic publishing. Table 1 sum marizes the contents of one leading journal in the ﬁeld, Progress in Human Geography, sorted by the themes of human geography written within its pages. Progress was chosen for this exercise not because it was deemed to be superior to other journals – it is not a representative sample because Progress has been Anglo American dominated – but because above all other journals its aims Table 1

Contents of Progress in Human Geography, 1978 2007; numbers of articles by subdisciplinary themea

Economic geography Social geography Cultural geography Spatial science Political geography Philosophy and the practice of human geography Urban geography Regional geography Historical geography Population geography Environmentalism Rural geography Development geography Human/environment relations Agriculture and food Statistical techniques Industrial geography Behavioral geography Health geography Feminist geography Moral and ethical geographies Methodology in geography Transport geography Indigenous and postcolonial geographies Tourism geographies Cultural economy Humanism a

most suited this exercise: to ‘offer a genuinely com prehensive survey of geographical studies’, covering all human geography (rather than just parts of it), with re gional reviews and commissioned progress reports on areas of research concentration. Unlike older journals (often published by national geography associations) it is exclusively centered on human geography (with its sister publication, Progress in Physical Geography, covering the other ‘half ’ of the discipline). Every article between 1978 and 2007 has been counted in Table 1. What it reveals is that contemporary human geography is indeed diverse. Some subdisciplines have had a constant presence (e.g.,

1978 1982

1983 1987

1988 1992

1993 1997

1998 2002

2003 2007 b

Total

10 9 6 19 4 5 15 16 7 12 12 10 6 7 4 6 6 10 3 1 0 0 8 1 0 0 0

14 10 8 12 11 2 13 18 11 8 10 5 4 4 7 6 4 3 2 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 2

16 10 9 17 13 16 6 9 11 10 7 1 9 3 4 3 4 5 7 2 1 0 1 0 1 1 1

16 15 18 6 8 16 4 2 6 8 3 4 3 2 2 2 4 2 3 6 2 1 0 0 2 0 0

26 18 18 11 15 15 10 5 6 4 5 6 4 6 3 5 4 2 4 6 5 6 1 2 1 0 0

22 22 25 16 19 15 9 6 13 5 0 7 3 6 8 4 2 0 3 1 7 8 1 2 0 3 0

104 84 84 81 70 69 57 56 54 47 37 33 29 28 28 26 24 22 22 16 15 15 12 7 4 4 3

Commonly accepted monikers were used for themes (e.g., economic, urban). More were added when articles did not seem to be adequately covered otherwise (e.g., health geographies). A subtree of themes was also used. For example, Marxist geographies were included in economic geography. Some theoretical perspectives that human geographers would consider a distinct theme were included, even though strictly they are a particular perspective that could apply more broadly across subjects (e.g., feminist geography). Others were not considered distinct themes because their theories, though important, are not normally associated with separate subdisciplinary identities (e.g., post structuralism, actor network theory). In these cases articles were classiﬁed according to the theme of the case study or other subdisciplinary identity (e.g., post structuralist geopolitics within political geography; actor network interpretation of cities in urban geography). Major themes such as geographical scale, GIS, and global ization were also subsumed within categories to aid in reducing the number of categories (in those instances, articles on scale were classiﬁed as ‘philosophy and practice of geography’; GIS as spatial science, and globalization as economic or cultural (or other), depending on subject matter and theoretical perspective). Where articles clearly covered two listed themes, they were counted twice. Therefore totals do not exactly equate the total numbers of articles actually published in PiHG from 1978 2007. Articles on the history of geography were counted in historical geography unless their abstract overtly mentioned philosophy and geographical practice (in which case the article would be included in both categories). Articles on sexuality and gender identities were counted in cultural geography, unless feminist theories were discussed in the text (in which case they were counted in both cultural and feminist geographies). Articles on statistical methods were counted separately from those providing progress reports on methodologies in geography. Some may quibble at the chosen categories (any act of classiﬁcation involves at least some arbitrariness), but the author proceeded in using these estimations regardless, for they illustrate at least reasonably well an overall sense of English language geographical publishing in the past three decades. b At the time of writing, only two issues for 2007 had been published, and were thus used in these statistics.

Human Geography

urban, economic), some have seen declining number of articles published since the 1990s (e.g., regional geog raphy), while others came to prominence (cultural). Some have ebbed and ﬂowed (e.g., rural) and others have remained constant even though according to some commentators and historians of the discipline their fall from theoretical favor had been presumed complete (e.g., spatial science, statistical techniques). Meanwhile, a more self reﬂexive element is evident especially since the mid 1990s, focused on the philosophy and practice of human geography, ethics, methods, and links to nature.

When Did Human Geography Emerge as a Discipline? Geography’s ‘early modern period’ is thought to have begun with the Renaissance in the 1600s and ended with the formalization of geography as a school and university discipline in the late nineteenth century. In this period, ‘‘geography was ‘precisely deﬁned’ as a scale of inquiry, that of the earth as a whole’’ (Withers, 2006: 712), which distinguished it from cosmography at the larger scale of the universe, and topography and chorography which dealt with regional and national scales. Geographers dealt with locations upon the Earth and described the phenomena to be found in those locations. Human geography was a constituent part of this, rather than a discrete endeavor. Geography was ‘‘a coherent body of knowledge about a clearly deﬁned object, namely the situation of places on the earth and the content of those places in natural and human terms’’ (Mayhew, 1998: 391). That human geography might be something separate from or a distinct part of geography is a recent conceit. Most professional ‘human geographers’ work in uni versity geography departments that cover the whole discipline, and most would probably pledge some alle giance to a conception of geography as an entirety that needs both human and physical parts. This nominal unity explains why in many forums – from journal publishing to conferences – the discipline of geography as a whole has been sustained. On the other hand, there is much evidence that human and physical geography are now effectively separate. Both have specialist journals (with subdisciplinary aims); deﬁnitive publications that suggest whole of discipline integrity (like this one); and confer ences. Joint teaching programs across human and phys ical geography are more common than genuinely collaborative research projects. Tracing when and how human geography became recognized as distinct is no easy task. One can trace the term itself, its use, and the manner in which ‘human’ came to preface ‘geography’. According to Livingstone (1992: 198), the term owes its existence to German evolutionary geographer, Friedrich Ratzel, who in

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Anthropogeographie ‘‘sought to lay out the conceptual foundations of a new discipline – human geography.’’ In Britain, The Royal Geographical Society was established in 1831, and started The Geographical Journal in 1893, but it was not until 1909 that the ﬁrst article appeared with ‘human geography’ in its title – a review essay by H. J. Fleure, of Elise´e Re´clus’ six volume L’Homme et La Terre. In French geography the term ﬁrst appeared in the title of Paul Vidal de la Blache’s Principes de ge´ographie humaine. The discipline deﬁning journal Progress in Human Geog raphy was itself only established in 1977. Standard geography textbooks used in the English speaking world at the turn of the twentieth century did not use the term at all. In 1893, Hughes divided A Class Book of Modern Geography into ‘mathematical or astronomical geography’, ‘physical geography’, and ‘political and com mercial geography’. The latter category most neatly ﬁts today’s human geography – although Hughes’ further description of it, as that part of geography ‘‘that treats of the political divisions of the earth, and the condition and industrial pursuits of mankind [sic]’’ is hardly com prehensive. Similarly, Lionel Lyde, in his 1895 textbook Man on the Earth: A Course in Geography, dealt separately with ‘population’, ‘commercial’, ‘political’, and ‘historical’ geography – without using the term ‘human geography’. In contrast, the formal use of ‘physical geography’ can be traced back to examples such as Mary Somerville’s Physical Geography, Guyot’s The Earth and Man: Lectures on Comparative Physical Geography, and Emmanuel Kant’s Lec tures in Physical Geography (1756–96) – although none of these ﬁts perfectly with contemporary meanings either: for Somerville humans were considered part of physical geography; for Guyot (who was heavily inﬂuenced by the theological geography of German Carl Ritter), ‘‘the whole universe is a thought of God’’; and in the case of Kant, not only were humans included, but physical geography was considered the foundation ‘‘for ‘other geographies’ in cluding political, commercial, moral (in the sense of mores), and theological geography’’ (Hartshorne, 1939: 36). In English, ‘human geography’ only really started to be used in articles and textbooks in the 1920s and 1930s, usually when describing environmental determinist anthropogeography (after Ratzel), or when used as a container term for related debates about nature/human inﬂuence and causality. The term did not generally apply to political, historical, or commercial (economic) geog raphy. Human geography as an umbrella term for the half of the discipline that dealt with human affairs was not commonly used until well into the 1950s and 1960s.

‘The Human’ in ‘Human Geography’ At this point – and in lieu of a neat story of disciplinary beginnings – it helps to consider how the separation of

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Human Geography

geography into its ‘human’ and ‘physical’ parts reﬂected a particularly European intellectual heritage – with Bib lical origins but gaining pace in the Enlightenment – of separating out concepts of ‘the human’ and ‘nonhuman nature’. While ‘human geography’ has its particular ety mology (spanning a century at best), the intellectual conditions from which separate agendas for ‘human’ and ‘physical’ geography could manifest were already ap parent – and had been building consistently because of the inﬂuence of key thinkers both inside and outside geography – well before the twentieth century. As Anderson argued, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries European intellectuals struggled to come to terms with what it meant to be ‘human’ in contrast to that part of the world deemed ‘nonhuman’. Geographers were important public intellectuals developing theories on this problem. Geographers variously argued that humans were distinct and unique from nonhuman nature; con versely, that humans were an innate part of nature, sub ject to its universal laws; that humans could be classiﬁed into different types (e.g., into ‘races’) and their ‘humanity’ ranked (as ‘less human’ savages, or ‘children’ in a stage of civilizing development); and that nonhuman nature (in cluding the distribution of soil, landform, climate, and geological types) inﬂuenced the geography and manner of human social development. Before Charles Darwin’s Origin of the Species, tele ological theories dominated. These argued for some kind of grand design at work (usually at the hand of God), or emphasized that nature and humans changed in stages or movements toward preordained destinies. ‘Stadial’ the ories, typically inﬂuenced by Locke’s famous theory of ascent from a ‘state of nature’, saw humans as ‘‘shar[ing] a potential to lift themselves above other life forms which – so it was assumed – merely lived’’ (Anderson, 2005: 273). For premodern geographers, ‘‘imagined humanity sat on the scale of human variationy savagery was something that could be and, on the continent of America, had been surpassed. Only the circumstances of people’s mode of living, adapted to speciﬁc environments of soil and cli mate, held them back’’ (Anderson, 2005: 273). Europeans saw themselves as having successfully arisen from nature, as civilized and rational. Encounters of explorers and geographers on colonial voyages seemed to conﬁrm that other humans were ‘savage’, ‘closer to nature’, or in need of civilizing through missionary Christianization. Darwin’s theories of natural selection and evolution would shape the intellectual climate of all the sciences, including geography. So called ‘social Darwinists’ sought to directly apply his laws of evolution and ‘survival of the ﬁttest’ to human populations, attempting to more thor oughly theorize the relationship between humans and the environment, rather than just catalog and describe places. It is worth noting that many so called ‘social Darwinist’ theories were more accurately neo Lamarckian, because

they drew inspiration from Jean Baptiste Lamarck’s earlier evolutionary theories. These emphasized more speedy, direct evolutionary adaptations by successive generations, and accounted for distinctions in a population ‘‘attrib utable to environment and will in mutual cooperation rather than to the vagaries of some capricious variation’’ (Livingstone, 1992: 187–189). Whatever the source of inspiration, social Darwinists commonly sought to explain human traits and behaviors as a result of environmental variation. In an illustrative example, in his 1923 address to the AAG, William Morris Davis – a major American proponent – showered warm praise on studies of the Seri Indians, which revealed ‘‘the many ways in which physiographic factors have inﬂuenced the human in habitants of the regiony by reason of the dry climate, the open surface, the small food supply and the scanty population, the Seri have become exceptionally ﬂeet and enduring as runners; they can capture deer by pursuing them on foot and exhausting them; one of the tribe overtook a running horse.’’ Such ideas were not entirely new – both Hippocrates and Aristotle had philosophized on the links between climate, habitability, and charac teristics of people, and before Darwin, Montesquieu’s ideas of how climate governed cultural traits and the ‘degeneration’ of humans were highly inﬂuential. But in this era, such ideas found a renewed vigor, frequently resulting in presumptuous and judgmental typecasting of racial types. Many geographers bought into it, particularly in English speaking geography: notably James Bryce, Ellsworth Huntingdon, and Grifﬁth Taylor. Fantastical leaps of (il)logic were common. As late as 1931 Austin Miller argued in Climatology that ‘‘The enervating mon otonous climates of much of the tropical zone, together with the abundant and easily obtained food supply, pro duce a lazy and indolent people, indisposed to labour for hire and therefore in the past subjected to coercion cul minating in slavery.’’ Huntingdon and Taylor both made maps of climatic and racial distributions and sought to schematize races of peoples further along spectrums of civilization and mental development: tropical climates, for instance, produced ‘inertias’ that eroded the will to work and degraded morals. In craniology the skull sizes of humans from the different races were measured, and a more fully ‘innatist’ – and thoroughly racist – view of the geography of humanity was proffered, based on the ‘‘preposterous contrivance that the world’s people could actually be differentiated and calibrated on a scale of distance’ from nature’’ (Anderson, 2005: 276), with white, temperate Europe at its center, and the other continents further from it (and thus closer to the tropics, and to nature). Darwin’s ideas of evolutionary survival would be ap propriated and applied to theories about nations and territorial expansion, in turn informing statecraft and practical foreign policy. In Mackinder’s 1904 famous

Human Geography

geopolitical treatise, ‘The geographical pivot of history’, one zone in Eastern Europe – the Heartland – was seen to occupy a location key to ultimate global territorial control. The national or racial group that emerged from the struggle for survival to control that space thence controlled Europe, the wider landmasses connected to it, and effectively then the whole world. In Politische Geo graphie, Ratzel would argue that as populations grow, states, like biological organisms, must expand their ter ritorial interests to create lebensraum, or ‘living space’, in which to endure. He provided a convenient rationale for European colonial expansion (then well underway in Africa) as a quest for living space and, literally, an out come of the struggle of peoples to survive. Moreover, the ideal aim of states was to progress toward grossraum (large space) as a reﬂection of higher levels of civility. Here was, according to Livingstone (1992: 201), ‘‘a naturalistic theodicy that justiﬁed the imperial order in the language of scientiﬁc geography.’’ In hindsight it is easy to argue, as Johnston (1987: 36) did, that ‘‘the environmental inﬂuences adduced were grossy it is hard to believe that they could have been written and taken seriously.’’ Certainly there were critics and reactions. The arguments of ‘possibilist’ authors such as Vidal de la Blache gave agency to individual humans to select from a range of uses of the environment. In another of the more well known reactions to environ mental determinism, Carl Sauer, at the University of California, Berkeley, sought to reinstate humans as active agents in the production of landscapes. In his Morphology of Landscape, it was humans ‘‘who possessed the uniquely controlling capacity to modify landscapes for better and worse’’ (Anderson, 2005: 269), as ‘world altering beings’ impacting on pre human, natural places. The subsequent ‘Berkeley tradition’ of cultural geography, led by Sauer and his disciples, became more interested in the diffusion of culture traits (rather than evolutionist generalizations of their origins), the identiﬁcation of culture regions (in both material and nonmaterial terms), and the role of culture in conditioning human perceptions of nature and the environment. Sauer was inﬂuenced by the German Otto Schlu¨ter, who distinguished natural landscape (naturlandschaft) from cultural landscape (kulturlandschaft); a distinction underpinning the conceptual separation of human and nonhuman nature, and by extension the formal interests of human and physical geography. In some parts, debates about environmental deter minism lingered on into the mid twentieth century. Grifﬁth Taylor scoffed at suggestions that the Australian landmass could support white populations in the hun dreds of millions because of unsuitable climate, lack of rainfall, and productive soil capacity. Against the grain of the then white only immigration policy, he promoted Chinese immigration – because according to him they were of the brachycephalic race and thus ‘more suited’ to

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the prevailing environment. So much was the Australian government horriﬁed by Taylor’s ideas that he was de nied promotion, his texts were banned by education au thorities and university senates (because of his pessimistic use of words like ‘arid’ and ‘desert’ rather than any racist assumptions), and he eventually left in 1928 to take up the chair in geography at the University of Chicago. By and large, geographers had by the 1940s felt a loss of face from their detour into debates about human– environment relations. Such efforts had been largely discredited, or in the case of Taylor, were so against imperial and nationalist sentiments as to fall from insti tutional favor. That which had deﬁned ‘human geog raphy’ in the ﬁrst decades of the century – questions of the causal relationship between humans and nonhuman nature – faded into obscurity. Human geography would ‘let go’ of nature from its theoretical purview, leaving behind an era that harbored inherent racism, excused colonial violence, lacked theoretical muscle, and simply suffered the inaccuracy of overgeneralization. And so, human geography in the second half of the twentieth century became further deﬁned against non human nature, which physical geographers would come to examine using an increasingly scientiﬁc positivist paradigm (quickly developing in parallel). Further sep aration of human and physical geography was perhaps inevitable. Advancement of the discipline was thought to come from segmentation into fractions that could be manageably examined and theorized to more sustainable and defendable ends. Although enabling subsequent generations to evade the dangers of environmental determinism, post war human geography did not overturn the human/nonhu man dualism on which environmental determinism so ﬁrmly rested. It merely shifted focus, to concern itself with just one side of that dualism. Indeed, in retrospect it has only become ‘common sense’ to talk about human geography as different to ‘physical geography’ because geographers have come to accept that division. This relatively recent separation has been both useful and unhelpful. On the one hand it established intellectual grounds within geography where engagements with nonhuman nature were merely optional – in turn en abling human geographers to lead theoretical debate in the wider social sciences (without needing to somehow ‘bridge’ back to the physical side). On the other hand, many would argue that a wedge was driven between great strands of knowledge, artiﬁcially dividing the human and nonhuman parts of our world. For some, this divide created practical, institutional, and political risks. With common purpose, human and physical geographers would be otherwise more strategically positioned to contribute to debates about sustainability, inequality, and our ecological future. For others the divide was

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Human Geography

analytically poor, because it left assumptions about the distinctions between humans and nonhuman nature in tact and untested: ‘‘Geography, like history, becomes the story of exclusively human activity and invention played out over, and through, an inert bedrock of matter and objects made up of everything else’’ (Whatmore, 1999: 4). Only in the last decade or so have geographers sought to properly question the very category of ‘the human’ on which ‘human geography’ rests. This has seen inward ﬂows of inﬂuence from gender and science and tech nology studies, and new theories in which human and nonhuman entities are all seen as active agents in wider technosocial assemblages. The point is to em phasize that The ‘humanness’ of human beings is not pre given in any absolute contrast with animalsy The species speciﬁcity of people is not disputedy there is no shrill naturalism at work here which wants to remind us, after Darwin, that essentially ‘we are all animals’y Instead, post humanism’s point of departurey is to refuse the hu manist account of living things which begins by assuming a radical or pure break between humanity and animality. (Anderson, 2005: 271)

In this way – at least for some – the very distinction that the identity of human geography rests upon has been brought into fundamental question.

Modern Geography, Human Geographies Between 1950 and 2000, human geography became more diverse, and spread across university systems and lan guages. It also more wholly engaged with theoretical and epistemological turns across the humanities, sciences, and social sciences. There are different ways to portray this development and diversiﬁcation. One explanation is that growth and further specialization merely continued to unfurl as ever more themes, subjects, and places were incorporated into geographical analysis. Further parts were simply added as subdisciplinary specialisms de veloped and became normalized. This rings true for certain places and subdisciplines: urban geography, rural geography, and population geography became fully co alesced specialisms as critical masses of researchers and teachers were reached, as university subjects were pro posed and approved, and as academic journals gained publishers and readerships. This doesn’t however reﬂect the way other sub disciplinary areas emerged from political impetuses, or in reaction to the perceived intellectual poverty of existing orthodoxies. This was certainly how the so called ‘quantitative revolution’ transformed academic geog raphy in the 1960s. According to Allen Scott, it was

a period of great intellectual and professional struggle in geography between traditionalists and reformers, with the latter seeking to push geography out of its perceived idiographic torpor and on the basis of quantitative methodologies and formal modelling into a more forthright engagement with theoretical ideas. (2004: 481)

While pre war geographers speculated about en vironmental determinism, or retreated to regionalism and areal differentiation, other competing academic disciplines had proceeded ahead with conceptual and statistical advances. This triggered reactions in a new generation of geographers with a shared desire to develop a thorough, mathematically justiﬁable geographical sci ence that could be taken seriously by other disciplines. Geographers created the ﬁeld of spatial science in the 1960s – with new journals and readerships – attempting to develop general theories of space and human activity using inferential statistical techniques and abstract modeling. The emphasis was on techniques of locational analysis – often inspired by other disciplines such as physics, mathematics, economics, and sociology – but also on developing more defendable theories. Common themes included the geography of land rent in cities; geographical diffusion over time; networks (particularly transport); and the locational decision making behavior and distribution of economic activities. In turn, radical geography would emerge from the 1970s when geographers would become dissatisﬁed with quantitative geography, which was perceived as socially irrelevant and apolitical. Quantitative geographers ap peared to have much to say about how human economic and social activities were structured across hypothetical, abstract space, but were silent on the worrying problems of poverty, war, and racism afﬂicting the world at that time. Indeed, radical geographers became concerned that (whether willingly or not) the discipline may in fact contribute these problems rather than provide explan ations or solutions. As Harvey explained, the radical and Marxist thrust in geography in the late 1960s concentrated on a critique of ideology and practice within the positivism that then reigned supreme. It sought to penetrate the positivist shield and uncover the hidden assumptions and class biases that lurked therein. It increasingly viewed positivism as a manifestation of bourgeois managerial consciousness given over at worst to manipulation and control of people as objects and at best capable of expressing a paternalistic benevolence. It attacked the role of geographers in imperial endeavors, in urban and regional planning procedures designed to facilitate social control and capital accumulation. It called into question the racism, sexism, ethnocentrism, and plain political prejudice communicated in many geographical texts. (Harvey, 1984: 5)

Human Geography

Various liberation movements of the 1960s and 1970s would exert a political inﬂuence on the development of new strands of human geography concerned with in justice: the women’s movement would inform a new cri tique of the embedded masculinist and patriarchal power axes in geography (and in society more generally); the civil rights and union movements would inspire young radical social geographers concerned with issues of race, class, exclusion, and inequality in the city; international movements for the recognition of the treatment and rights of indigenous peoples would lay the foundation for new postcolonial geographical critiques of empire and Euro pean cartography; and poverty, capitalism, and uneven development were examined in more critical light. Eco nomic geography in particular would be transformed, with new interests in the role of transnational corpor ations, the politics of trade and foreign direct investment, and international and gendered divisions of labor. New journals emerged (notably Antipode, in 1969, and Gender, Place and Culture, in 1994) and study groups emerged from within geographical associations to provide more focused arenas for radical discourse. These reactionary voices would have a substantial legacy for contemporary human geography. In addition to the shifting of its topics and themes, they opened up the discipline to political exi gency, and to broad critical shifts energizing the social sciences and humanities. In time, postmodern and post structuralist theoretical perspectives (as well as those from more speciﬁc ﬁelds such as queer theory, governmentality, science and technology studies, and psychoanalysis) would become incorporated into human geographical praxis and be debated for their merits in advancing meaningful, theoretically robust and relevant research. Engagements with philosophy would take human geog raphy even further into metaphysical and ontological ruminations on the nature of place and space. Intellectual and political ‘turns’ were thus vital in replenishing the discipline. However, linguistic and national differences complicated this: even between English and American geography the uptake of new specialisms and inﬂuences varied. Lingering legacies of older practitioners were present in one country but not another, as were channels of inﬂuence on government and the wider social sciences. The enthusiasm for paradigmatic revolutions from the 1960s onwards also belied historical continuities with earlier approaches. Quantiﬁers, for instance, did reject description and re gional parochialism in a revolutionary manner, but they also reconnected geography with a much earlier legacy of Renaissance mathematical geography. Quantitative geography also secured a more formal role for theory in human geography, which subsequent phases of the dis cipline would rely upon – even if their theoretical and political inﬂuences were different. Certain types of human geography developed consistently without

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necessarily falling from favor, as in the case of social geography. Similarly, although cultural geography bloomed in the 1980s after the ‘postmodern turn’ (to the chagrin of some commentators), certain continuities would exist with much earlier traditions (e.g., its focus on landscape). Political geography too would be written for over a hundred years – even though it would have its own internal radical and post structuralist ‘turns’. In addition, new areas with their own journals would emerge not from paradigm shifts but in relation to real world cultural and economic changes (e.g., tourism geography), from observations of research gaps (e.g., children’s geography), or from the continued needs of the state for certain kinds of geographical knowledge. It is because of this mix of continuities, overturnings and absorptions that it is now possible – perhaps even more appropriate – to talk about human geographies, rather than a single disciplinary corpus. Pluralizing the term human geography is both a linguistic convenience (one which more accurately depicts current practice) and an intellectual imperative for the discipline aimed at cele brating difference.

How Are Human Geographical Knowledges Produced? Human geography is ‘‘an irredeemably situated, pos itioned system of knowledge’’ (Gregory, 1994: 76). How knowledge has been produced, distributed, and con sumed matters a great deal in how we interpret its impact and meaning. As already mentioned, human geography existed well before it became a formal academic enter prise. In addition to at universities, human geographical knowledges have been produced in a multitude of con texts. ‘‘All societies,’’ wrote David Harvey (1984: 2) ‘‘possess a distinctive ‘geographical lore’, a working knowledge of their territory, of the spatial conﬁguration of use values relevant to them.’’ Human geographical knowledges are found on university campuses beyond geography departments (for example, researchers work ing from history departments on colonial mapping), and where knowledges are produced about people and place in nonacademic, populist ways. Cultural expressions like art, ﬁlm, music, or literature all in one way or another ‘write or describe the world’ (as do postcards, television nature documentaries, and tourist brochures) and in that way form legitimate and rich sources of geographical knowledge. In cultural and political geography in par ticular, popular culture has become an important source of material for analysis of geographical imagery and meaning. Conceptualizing human geographical knowledges as the manner in which peoples and places have been im agined, written, or spoken about enables one to reveal a

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Human Geography

plural, diffuse, and ingrained vintage for the discipline. In a very basic way, human geography has been practiced throughout human existence on Earth – or at least as long as humans have made cartographic representations of space and their habitation within them. In Africa rock art depicts topographical features and animals, and people and dwellings are arranged in relation to them; in Australia, aboriginal rock art is part of a living and dy namic history of human geographical representation spanning thousands of years. In Native American art across the southwest, and in varied traditional cultures elsewhere, oral traditions were recorded and transmitted via cartographic techniques, where knowledge of topo graphical and cultural sites and routes of travel were necessary. Such knowledge was, and still is, at its most fundamental, a human geographical representation of a deﬁned social space. Before the development of universities, scholarly societies, or printing presses, geographers were em ployed by royal courts to discover parts of the world and report back on them. Exploration and discovery funded premodern geography. Geographical knowledges dis persed via the commercial trade in maps and globes. This was not a set of activities purely conﬁned to what we now call Europe, indeed it preexisted the age of European exploration. Trade enabled exchanges be tween ‘the West’ and various parts of the Ottoman Empire, the Indian Ocean, and Asia that had already been mapped. Additionally, as Sidaway argued, in digenous human geographical knowledges provided the basis for European geographical knowledges, when Europeans, during the Renaissance and later centuries, expanded empires and inﬂuence across the globe. Europeans gained advice, traveled over already worn paths and routes, exchanged maps and charts, and built a geographical tradition that hybridized – rather than ig nored or replaced – already existing indigenous knowledges. Prior to the 1400s, written geographical records were hardly scientiﬁc – they were often ‘‘travel accounts of the weird and wonderful’’ designed to ‘‘titillate readers’’ (Livingstone, 1992: 34). Writing only became more idealistic and methodical from the late 1400s onwards, after the Renaissance had begun. But the format and popularity of ‘travel’ geographies persisted. Most people writing geography in the 1700s and 1800s were not ‘geographers’ in the sense that we understand it, instead being historians, botanists, or ‘Grub Street journalists’ – the name given to hack writers associated with cheap publications, stemming from the London street of the same name (Mayhew, 1998: 402). These were compilers and collators of others’ works, not ﬁeld scientists, and they published populist books rich with fanciful description that went into numerous successive editions: ‘‘Truths were not demonstrated as would be demanded by scientiﬁc

method; they were simply copied and repeated’’ (May hew, 1998: 405). In a similar manner, for over 400 years a genre of book publishing called ‘special geography’ sought to describe every country of the world. Written for the US and Britain and most popular from the 1780s to the 1820s, they were prose works rather than encyclopedia, con taining secondhand information gleaned from reports of exploration. Their intention was for ‘‘pleasure and utility’’ (Withers, 2006: 713); their readers engaging in ‘‘voluntary self enlightenment’’ (Sitwell, 1993: 9). Not coincidentally, they were most popular at exactly the time that reports of the travels of Cook, Flinders, La Pe´rouse, and other ex plorers reached Europe. Consumers not only read books. In Britain, the Royal Geographical Society’s lectures were heavily patronized by ‘the dining club set’, frequently people of military afﬁliation, for whom geography ‘‘centred on regional description and reportage, and the advancement of Britain’s colonial exploits overseas’’ (Livingstone, 1992: 175). Nowadays academic geographers distance themselves greatly from early precedents, although it would be naı¨ve in the extreme to suggest that the output of current re search efforts is somehow more independent or more intellectually ‘pure’ (in the sense of ideas written for their own sake, irrespective of expectations, pressures, or perceptions of their various audiences). Alongside other kinds of knowledge production, academic human geog raphy is complicit in the continued expansion and power of corporate dominated publishing, events, and intel lectual property industries. Geographical research output is increasingly reimagined as ‘content’ for corporate en tities that have bought and amalgamated publishers, and oligopolized academic print outlets. Indeed, only re cently are implications of the nesting of geographical pursuits in the corporate knowledge economy becoming more fully apparent. A recent example was the debate surrounding connections between Elsevier, the publisher of this encyclopedia, and a subsidiary company who among other activities were the organizers of defense industry fairs where military related arms contracts and deals were brokered. Geographers raised a range of direct and related concerns about how academic publishing is enmeshed with capitalist social relations; how close aca demia might be to global trade in the machines of warfare and torture (not just through Elsevier, but through the substantial shares that universities such as Cambridge and Oxford own in arms exporting corporations) and about the tactics academics could use in protest. After pressure from researchers Elsevier would eventually sever links through subsidiaries to the defense industry in order to improve its image of independence. Such dialogs have refreshingly opened up debate about research and the embeddedness of academic pursuits within and be yond geography in the apparatuses of capitalism and state control.

Human Geography

Who Has Beneﬁted and Suffered from the Production of Human Geographical Knowledges? Recent debates about academic publishing and links to corporations and the military echo earlier critiques of the connections between geography and the imperial inter ests of the state. They share a focus on who has beneﬁted and suffered from the production of geographical knowledges. Geography was ‘‘the science of imperialism par excellence’’ (Livingstone, 1992: 170). From the 1500s up until World War II, geographers mapped places and environments that would become part of European co lonial empires, they identiﬁed resources that would be plundered, they described cultural practices that were to be ‘civilized’, races to be ‘saved’. But colonial geography was also a means through which European nationalism was cemented, because through it conceptions of Euro pean nationhood were forged: expeditions and sub sequent geographical writings described other places, environments, and cultures in the eye of the beholder, and reinforced what it meant by contrast to be European, to be Western, to be British, or German. Cultural rep resentations also had material effects. Colonial geo graphical maps and writings would support actual imperial expansions that made and remade those territories. In Jeffersonian America, geography proved central to nation building, buttressing attempts to foster patriotism and a sense of independence in a newly colonizing na tion. Jefferson himself was a vocal advocate for geog raphy, funding the inland explorations of Lewis and Clarke, and even penning his own geographical (and rather boosterish) text on his home state, Notes on the State of Virginia. France’s geography was reorganized after the Revolution, not just to change administrative boundaries and the like, but to create ‘‘locales wherein a revo lutionary political culture was made, challenged and re made after 1789’’ (Heffernan, 2005: 277). One key exponent, Edme Mentelle, wrote explicitly Republican geographies ‘‘to mould new citizens’’ (Withers, 2006: 716). Elsewhere in Europe, geographical characterization of national populations increasingly showed the imprint of contemporary political concerns. In Greece, ‘‘Meletios, Archbishop of Athens, sketched a geography of European civility in his Geography, Old and New, praising the French for their culture, the Swiss for their struggles for political freedom and the English for being the ‘most civil and tame’’’ (Withers, 2006: 716), while in Nikiphoros’ Elements of Geography ‘‘Holland is singled out for its religious tol erance, the Swiss and the Swedes for their liberty, the English for their seriousness of character and scientiﬁc disposition.’’ These human geographical writings were not born of scientiﬁc impulse; instead they intended to diplomatically ‘‘reassociate Greece, an ancient centre of

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classical learning, with modern centres of learning in western Europe’’ (Withers, 2006: 716). Other interests have been furthered by human geo graphical praxis – some subtly contributing to the maintenance of systems of oppression; others contrib uting more destructively to outright tyranny. Religious maps of the medieval era were deliberately moralizing, and often depicted a world with Jerusalem or Rome as the rightful centers of religious power. The ﬁrst Greek map of the world, dated at around 500 BC, was ‘a dip lomatic device’, displayed in Miletus in an attempt to persuade Greek states to take up arms against Persia. It showed a world dominated by a vast Europe, towering over diminutive Asia and Africa. Writing about the transition from feudal to capitalist society in Europe, David Harvey described geographical knowledge pro duction as pivotal. Geographers contributed exploration, cartographic survey, regional inventory, geopolitical taxonomy, and resource compilation – all central to im perial manipulation, management, and exploitation. In deed, mapping in the contemporary world of geographic information systems (GISs) has not ceased to be a tech nology used in the governing and control of populations. Motivations for geographers have included the idealistic, the selﬁsh (fame and fortune), and the evan gelical. Geographical societies had close links to mis sionaries and produced knowledges of the savage ‘Other’ that supported intentions to convert them. Such know ledges enabled immense and often destructive cultural change, although this was often complex in moments of colonial contact. Ratzel, like Mackinder, produced geo political knowledges that were meant to be read by for eign policymakers and shape state military actions. Although it is strictly incorrect to claim that Ratzel provided intellectual justiﬁcation for Nazism, as is often thought the case (his philosophy promoted racial mixing as survival strategy – more accurately it was Karl Haushofer’s work that was most used by the Nazis), Ratzel nonetheless justiﬁed German colonial activities, just as Mackinder supported Britain’s fragmenting of post war Eastern Europe in order to create a buffer be tween Germany and Russia, thus averting their control of the Heartland, and protecting Britain’s dominance. In recent decades, geographers concerned with these pasts, and with ethics and justice, have thought more deeply about self reﬂexivity and positionality in research, and about how dubious agendas or questionable goals can be smuggled into academic enterprises. Many have re deﬁned themes and research questions, and the manner in which research is carried out. In contrast to geo graphy’s deeply imperial past, research can now be a catalyst for addressing difﬁcult moral and ethical ques tions, or a vehicle for empowerment and liberation. Re search can give voice to marginalized groups, can relate to activist causes, encourage participation of subjects in

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research design and management, or be imagined ‘for’, rather than ‘on’, the poor or marginalized. Even geo graphical information systems (critiqued by some as throwbacks to positivism or as technologies of state control) have been increasingly explored as a tool for critical and participatory research.

Where Have Human Geographical Knowledges Been Produced? Human geography has its own differentiated geography. It has addressed different intents, and has taken place in diverse institutional contexts that all shape its character, orientation, and reception. In some academic disciplines a strong sense prevails of truly international debates and paradigms. This is not necessarily the case in human geography. Ironically, even though human geography has global aspirations and an international presence, a sense of global uniformity or consensus is remarkably absent. Perhaps it is a marker of the respect geographers pay to the crucial roles of place, context, and geographical speciﬁcity that the very notion of global consensus is unpopular. Even by the late 1700s the idea of a coherent and universal explanation of world geography had been challenged. Jedidiah Morse was so incensed by the Anglocentrism of British geography books that he in verted the usual practice of describing Europe ﬁrst in his The American Geography, and dedicated 90% of its 536 pages to the New World. Similarly, William Guthrie, a Scottish writer, sought to expose how English assump tions had pervaded eighteenth century geography, and rewrote it using concepts from the Scottish Enlighten ment instead. Most recently, and perhaps most fundamentally, any sense of a canonical, universal story of human geography has been unsettled by critical geographers both within and beyond the English language sphere. Concern has been raised about the Anglo American and English language dominance of the academic publishing industry (see Table 2), and the assumption of universality in much Anglo American geography. American and British writers, it is argued, often assume global relevance for their work, yet are silent on their own particularity and inward gaze, reluctant to engage in comparative research in a truly international sense. Referees and editors of English language journals published from Britain or the United States have demanded that papers from ‘the periphery’ justify their interest to northern audiences or else face rejection. Such attitudes valorize Anglo American geographies as ‘unlimited’, and depict other geographies as ‘limited’. For Minca (2000: 287), ‘‘there is a widespread conviction both among many Italian geog raphers as well as among many of my European

colleagues that these journals’ implicit claims of being ‘international’ y are patently absurd if not downright pretentious.’’ It is perhaps no coincidence that this has occurred in an era when English increasingly became a global lingua franca of business, science and the internet. But just as Livingstone (1992: 142) cautioned against interpreting American geography in the 1800s as ‘‘a mere epiphenomenon, a pale shadow, of its European coun terpart,’’ so too it is similarly naı¨ve – nay offensive – to presume that the dynamic centers of geographical de velopment since the 1960s have been England or the United States. Most English language geographers would not even be aware there are over 270 geography journals in Spanish and Portuguese, published from Spain and throughout Latin America. Meanwhile, in Japan quanti tative geographers adopted and debated Western ideas quickly, and critical geographers were as early as the 1920s incorporating German Marxist ideas into their work on poverty (some 50 years before Marxism rose to prominence in English language geography). If Anglo American myopia is true, it runs counter to a history of international exchanges in past phases of geography. Italian geographical scholarship was not just an ‘‘impli citly peripheral national variation’’ but instead spoke ‘‘to a fundamental political moment in the genesis of European geography’’ (Minca, 2007: 181). During the quantitative revolution of the 1960s origins and inspiration came from geographers in Germany, Sweden, and Finland. In the case of the concept of cultural landscape, it was trafﬁcked from German (Landschaft, in Humboldt) into French ( pays, in Vidal de la Blache), and into English (Sauer). British and American geography has never only just been British or American. The ‘‘suggestion of a self generating (western) geographical tradition smacks of a fetishisation of the westy western geographical knowledge did not develop in some kind of vacuum, away from prior non western geographies. It depended upon them’’ (Sidaway, 1997: 74–75). In light of these contrasting stories of myopia and cross cultural diffusion, it is fruitful to recast our image of the geography of human geographical knowledge production and dissemination not as some simple linear diffusion model – of centers and diffusions into margins – but as a more complex and hybrid set of ﬂows. Geog raphers are sometimes connected with one another (and at other times not) across different countries and lan guages. Human geographical knowledge production and distribution occurs through ‘scenes’, made up of re searchers and readers, much as one might imagine music scenes, artistic scenes, or political communities being organized within and across cities and nations. Fall (2007: 195) argued that the content of geography in languages differs less than the manner in which their texts circulate, shaped by ‘‘institutional structure, the nature of the academy and styles of debate.’’

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Table 2 articles

Nationalities of authors in Progress in Human Geography, 1978 2007; nation of institutional afﬁliation of each author on all

UK USA Canada Australia Aotearoa New Zealand Singapore Ireland Germany Netherlands France Israel Sweden Finland Japan China South Africa Poland India Austria Nigeria Portugal Brazil Italy Argentina Swaziland Hungary Palestine Spain Denmark Taiwan a

1978 1982

1983 1987

1988 1992

1993 1997

1998 2002

2003 2007 a

Total

% of Total

100 28 13 5

79 29 10 6

70 53 8 2

64 38 14 6

98 47 10 2

121 65 15 6

532 260 70 27

53.2 26 7 2.7

2 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

1 0 1 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0

5 0 1 0 3 1 2 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0

5 2 0 1 1 0 0 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

7 8 3 0 1 1 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0

4 1 4 8 0 2 1 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

24 11 9 9 8 7 7 6 6 4 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2.4 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1

At the time of writing, only two issues for 2007 had been published, and were thus used in these statistics.

Human geography must therefore be understood in place and the institutional context within which it is produced. Geography departments can be very large, such as at Universitas Gadja Mada in Indonesia, but house only some of the subdisciplinary areas expected in Britain. Indeed, Gadja Mada has probably the largest academic geography unit in the world, constituting an entire faculty of the university, separated further into departments of physical geography and environment, human geography, cartography and remote sensing, and regional development. Little known outside Southeast Asia, Gadja Mada’s teaching and research is focused on what is necessary and required by government, and by local communities with most pressing humanitarian needs (hence foci on agricultural development and rural poverty). In that institution, too, subscription to Western geographical journals is virtually impossible because of funding and departmental space limitations. Their understandable preference to teach and research in Bahasa Indonesia rather than English (which only some staff speak) mediates adoption of outside vernaculars. Even in the Global North, conditions of academic labor vary enormously, as do pressures to produce certain kinds

of research and to conform to research impact assessment exercises; all these translate into variegated geographies of human geographical research across universities and cities. More accurately, the geography of human geography has become hybrid. Editorial boards of most geography journals are now ‘‘genuinely committed to trying to deal with the politics of publishing’’ (Laurie, 2004: 142), al though for many this is still a ‘work in progress’. Strategies to internationalize and democratize human geography have made some headway, and debates have intensiﬁed about the pluralism of geography, the hegemony of English as a lingua franca in international publishing, and methods that could be explored to break this down or to use English for cross cultural dialog. Language barriers are never absolute. Some English language journals such as Social and Cultural Geography and Tourism Geographies translate all abstracts into at least two other languages, and many geographers (particularly from the non Eng lish speaking world) publish and work in more than one. Some journals publish in two or more languages (such as the Canadian Geographer, the Finnish Nordia Geographical Publications, the Rivista Geograﬁca Italiana, and Geographische

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Zeitschrift). Others (such as Geograﬁska Annaler and Tijds chrift voor Economische en Sociale Geograﬁe) are from coun tries and regions that have national languages other than English, but nonetheless publish in English and have become ‘‘much more inclusive of alternative traditions’’ (Rodrı´guez Pose, 2004: 2). Changing political economic circumstances as well as growing diasporic academic networks have broadened and diversiﬁed Chinese human geographical output, even while China is woefully neg lected in Anglo American publishing. In the case of Arab World Geographer, it has become a journal for a genuinely international mix of scholars from a range of political and epistemological perspectives. In has proved an important arena for debate and dissent over recent global conﬂicts, having commissioned symposia following the 2000 al Aqsa intifada, the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center towers in Manhattan, and the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. Although efforts to speak across lin guistic, cultural, and epistemological traditions always entail much hard work for those involved, journals that attempt it are more likely to publish genuinely inter national viewpoints. Greater reﬂexivity over research production is thus gradually altering the geography of human geographical activity.

Contemporary Human Geographies Whereas this article began with an uncomplicated de scription of what is commonly understood to be human geography, it concludes here by arguing that the main tenance of the subdiscipline as discrete and internally coherent is far from straightforward. When most people talk about human geography, they refer to a type of academic pursuit undertaken in the modern era, and particularly from the latter half of the twentieth century onwards, which encompasses a diversity of ways of examining the presence and actions of humans in geo graphical space. But because of this, human geography is necessarily an interdisciplinary pursuit, one that evades precise deﬁnition and intellectual closure. How human geographies are done also varies from place to place and in different linguistic traditions, although trafﬁc of ideas and methods across and between these has also been apparent. Contemporary human geographies are hybrid formations in which multiple paradigmatic viewpoints, drawn from multiple historical and spatial contexts, co exist and jostle within the same institutional and sub disciplinary spaces. See also: Cartography, History of; Colonialism I; Colonialism II; Cultural Geography; Darwinism (and Social Darwinism); Ethnicity and Resistance, Historical Geographies of; Feminism/Feminist Geography; Feminist Geography, Prehistory of; Geographical Journals;

Geography, History of; Geopolitics; Human-Nonhuman; Indigenous Geographies; Marxism/Marxist Geography I; Marxism/Marxist Geography II; Physical Geography and Human Geography; Postmodernism/Postmodern Geography; Poststructuralism/Poststructuralist Geographies; Quantitative Revolution; Radical Geography; Taylor, G.

Further Reading Anderson, K. (2005). Grifﬁth Taylor lecture, Geographical Society of New South Wales, 2004: Australia and the ‘state of nature/native’. Australian Geographer 36, 267 282. Anderson, K. (2007). Race and the Crisis of Humanism. New York: Routledge. Fall, J. (2007). Lost geographers: Power games and the circulation of ideas within Francophone political geographies. Progress in Human Geography 31, 195 216. Gibson, C. and Klocker, N. (2004). Academic publishing as ‘creative’ industry, and recent discourses of ‘creative economies’: Some critical reﬂections. Area 36, 423 434. Gregory, D. (1994). Geographical Imaginations. Oxford: Blackwell. Gutie´rrez, J. and Lo´pez Nieva, P. (2001). Are international journals of human geography really international? Progress in Human Geography 25, 53 69. Hartshorne, R. (1939). The Nature of Geography: A Critical Survey of Current Thought in the Light of the Past. Lancaster, PA: Association of American Geographers. Harvey, D. (1984). On the history and present condition of geography: An historical materialist manifesto. Professional Geographer 36, 1 10. Heffernan, M. (2005). Edme Mentelle’s geographies and the French Revolution. In Livingstone, D. N. & Withers, C. W. J. (eds.) Geography and Revolution, pp 273 303. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Johnston, R. J. (1987). Geography and Geographers: Anglo American Human Geography since 1945. London: Edward Arnold. Laurie, N. (2004). The politics of publishing and print. Geoforum 35, 141 142. Livingstone, D. (1992). The Geographical Tradition. Oxford: Blackwell. Mayhew, R. (1998). The character of English geography, c. 1660 1800: A textual approach. Journal of Historical Geography 24, 385 412. Minca, C. (2000). Venetian geographical praxis. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 18, 285 289. Minca, C. (2007). Humboldt’s compromise, or the forgotten geographies of landscape. Progress in Human Geography 31, 179 193. Mizuoka, F., Mizuuchi, T., Hisatake, T., Tsutsumi, K. and Fujita, T. (2005). The critical heritage of Japanese geography: Its tortured trajectory for eight decades. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 23, 453 473. Nishioka, H. (1975). Location theory in Japan. Progress in Geography 7, 133 199. Rodrı´guez Pose, A. (2004). On English as a vehicle to preserve geographical diversity. Progress in Human Geography 28, 1 4. Rose, G. (1993). Feminism and Geography. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Scott, A. J. (2004). A perspective of economic geography. Journal of Economic Geography 4, 479 499. Sidaway, J. (1997). The (re)making of the western ‘geographical tradition’: Some missing links. Area 29, 72 80. Sitwell, O. F. G. (1993). Four Centuries of Special Geography. Vancouver, BC: UBC Press. Tapiador, F. J. and Martı´ Henneberg, J. (2007). Best of times, worst of times: A tale of two (Spanish) geographies. Journal of Geography in Higher Education 31, 81 96.

Human Geography

Whatmore, S. (1999). Culture nature. In Cloke, P., Crang, P. & Goodwin, M. (eds.) Introducing Human Geographies, pp 4 11. London: Arnold. Withers, C. W. J. (2006). Eighteenth century geography: texts, practices, sites. Progress in Human Geography 30, 711 729.

Relevant Websites http://www.antipode online.net Antipode online forum. http://age.ieg.csic.es Asociacio´n de Geo´grafos Espan˜oles. http://www.aag.org Association of American Geographers. http://www.soc.nii.ac.jp Association of Japanese Geographers. http://www.cag acg.ca Canadian Association of Geographers/L’Association Canadienne des Ge´ographes. http://cnfg.univ paris1.fr Comite´ National Franc¸ais de Ge´ographie. http://www.geographie.de Deutsche Gesellschaft fu¨r Geographie. http://www.ugm.ac.id Gadja Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. http://www.helsinki.ﬁ Geographical Society of Finland.

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http://www.ucd.ie Geographical Society of Ireland. http://www.library.uu.nl Geosource web directory. http://www.iag.org.au Institute of Australian Geographers. http://www.igu net.org International Geographical Union. http://www.nzgs.co.nz New Zealand Geographical Society. http://www.ipgh.org Pan American Institute of Geography and History. http://www.geogr.ku.dk Royal Danish Geographical Society. http://www.geography.nl Royal Dutch Geographical Society/Koninklijk Nederlands Aardrijkskundig Genootschap. http://www.rgs.org Royal Geographical Society with the Institute of British Geographers. http://www.societageograﬁca.it Societa` Geograﬁca Italiana. http://www.ssag.co.za Society of South African Geographers. http://www.ssag.se Swedish Society for Anthropology and Geography. http://wwwsoc.nii.ac.jp The Human Geographical Society of Japan.

Human Rights R. Honey, The University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, USA & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Civil Rights Rights to participate in the civil life of a society, without restriction by race, religion, or other contestable categories. Cultural Rights Right to express one’s culture, including language, religion, and patterns of social engagement. Cultural Struggles Struggles over the norms of a culture or over the adjudication of different norms when the norms of different cultures are in conﬂict. Economic Rights The right to participate in an economy, as well as to have basic needs met. Human Rights The protections and privileges one has as part of the shared heritage of humanity. Political Rights The right to participate in the political system, including such rights as to expression as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the right to assemble. Social Rights The right to participate in the daily life of a society, as in the right to marry and form a family. Universality The applicability of all rights to all people under all circumstances.

Introduction Human rights, in the time since World War II, have become widely recognized as protections for people against the oppressive actions of states and other actors. Human rights are important in several ways, most sig niﬁcantly in that they have come to take on constitutional status as protections for people and as claims to having basic needs met. In theory, human rights are those rights held by all individuals simply as a consequence of their status as people, part of the common heritage and en dowment of human kind. Human rights have come to be regarded as inalienable in that they can neither be taken away nor given way. They are not subject to the powers of class or on the basis of classiﬁcations by gender, race, religion, or political ideology. In theory, human rights are universal, applying to all people, independent of where those people are. Human rights reality, however, differs from human rights theory. Though several international agreements hail human rights and afﬁrm their status before the law, the protection of rights on the one hand and their vio lation on the other, vary over space and through time as people struggle to deﬁne and redeﬁne rights, struggle

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over interpretations of rights, and struggle to rein in human rights abuses. Though the global human rights movement claims that rights codiﬁed in international agreements are ‘universal’ in that they apply to all people in all places, human rights are the product of political processes and hence have their own political geography. The ‘political geography’ of human rights involves: Where various human rights are protected and, con • versely, violated; The extent to which societies and polities have bought • into competing conceptualizations of human rights;

•

and Cultural struggles over human rights at three dis cernable scales: – struggles with a culture over what should be con sidered rights; – struggles between cultures over whose conception of rights should be enforced or how differing conceptions should be adjudicated and practiced; and – struggles between a culture and global forces, ei ther resisting widely accepted human rights or resisting global forces that violate rights deemed as important by the culture.

An explanation of the meaning and history of human rights is followed by a discussion of essential debates about human rights, and then an explication of the various political geographies of human rights.

History From the Magna Carta to the twenty ﬁrst century, rights have been construed as: individual privileges recognized by the state; protections from state interference in a list of individual or group activities; and claims that individuals or groups could make for gaining the necessities of life. Toward the end of the second Millennium, human rights came to be regarded as protections from any potential oppressor, not just a state. Though the emergence of a global human rights re gime only transpired in the twentieth century, the claim for rights, whether logically or legally, can be recognized as far back as the ancient Greeks. The idea of rights gained major momentum with the American and French Revolutions late in the eighteenth century. Most signiﬁcantly, they challenged the traditional concept of sovereignty, changing it from something held by a

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monarch (or other ruler) and thus giving that ruler un questioned, unchallengeable power over the people, to a concept in which the basic root of power was the sover eignty of the people who were empowered to delegate control over the machinery of governance to states or other entities that would then act in accordance with the interests of the people. Neither of these revolutions of course succeeded in establishing a human rights regime. The French Revolution succumbed to its own excesses and the military might of those beneﬁting from the pre vious conception of sovereignty. The American Revo lution codiﬁed the rights of white men of property, not all people. Indeed, the constitution of the United States thrice mentions slavery, the epitome of a political and economic system with the most fundamental violations of what later came to be construed as human rights. Slaves were to be counted as three ﬁfths of a person in two ways, one for taxation purposes, the other when allocating by population the number of seats a state would have in the House of Representatives. As part of the historic com promise between northern and southern delegates, the constitution also precluded prohibition of the slave trade for 40 years after the ratiﬁcation of the constitution. Legalized systems of chattel slavery were of course largely abolished in the nineteenth century, in some ways, setting the stage for the attainment of a fully ﬂedged human rights regime in the twentieth century. That re gime, though, came to the fore only after the excesses of two world wars and the global economic upheaval of the inter war period. Heretofore, states so jealously protected their sovereign rights – particularly the right to do any thing within their own borders with impunity from ex ternal sanction – that they rebuffed any efforts to interfere with the power of states in the territories they ruled. The emerging body of international law had not penetrated the control of a sovereign state over the people residing within its recognized boundaries. Woodrow Wilson and others tried to create global institutions, or at least in stitutions representing the major global powers, in the years immediately following World War I. Their failure to do so, along with the burdens placed on defeated Germany, eventually came to be seen as signiﬁcant factors in two ensuing disasters: ﬁrst, the Great Depression that devastated the global economy in the 1920s and 1930s; and second, the rise of fascism, particularly in Germany, that not only led to World War II but also to the most egregious violations of human rights by any state in the history of the world – the Holocaust. After World War II, the newly formed United Nations set into motion a process that resulted on 10 December 1948 in the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The UDHR is a remarkable document not only in its delimitation of a set of 26 art icles deﬁning rights but also given the highly politicized nature of the process leading to its adoption. The process

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almost foundered on a Cold War confrontation between the emphasis of the United States and its western European allies on political and civil rights and the emphasis of the Soviet Union and its eastern European allies on economic rights. Furthermore, people from much of the world had no voice in the deliberations over the UDHR. Living in colonies without UN membership, they were not directly represented in the deliberations deﬁning what their fundamental rights were to be. The adoption of the UDHR, however contentious its gener ation, marked the ﬁrst in a series of achievements that created a global human rights regime. Other agreements followed, though with considerable struggle, even rancor. They included two major agreements adopted in 1966, the Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the Convention on Political and Civil Rights. Subsequent global agreements include: the Convention on the Elimination of All Discrimination Against Women in 1979, the Declaration of the Right to Development in 1986, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989. The United Nations human rights apparatus also provided for a High Commission on Human Rights and regional entities. In time, the regional entities produced their own human rights declarations, among them the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in 1950, the American Convention on Human Rights in 1969, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 1981. Signiﬁcantly, the claims of human rights have been accompanied by arguments that they should be protected against violations by any actor, certainly states but not just states. Otherwise major twenty ﬁrst century forces such as large corporations, nongovernmental political entities (including military organizations challenging states), international governing bodies (including those consisting of representatives of states, e.g., The World Trade Organization), and nongovernment organizations would be able to violate the rights of people without challenge.

Universality The logic of human rights requires that they apply to everyone, that is, ‘universally’. The argument basically is that only when a right is so broadly recognized and ac cepted, without exceptions, can it be protective against the onslaught of recalcitrant states or other potential oppressors. ‘Universality’ in terms of applicability and enforcement, however, does not correspond with ‘uni versality’ in terms of agreement. This is true both for the rights adopted by international agreement and for cam paigns to get additional ‘rights’ recognized. Arguments for universality typically call upon some notion of ‘nat ural law’, whether from the philosopher Christopher

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Brown (in Patman) or the geographer David Harvey. Both Brown and Harvey, after reviewing other ways out of the logical dilemma, conclude that some human pro tections and claims are so fundamental – so ‘‘natural’’ – that they constitute universal human rights claims based on the common humanity of all people. Universality does not, however, connote universal acceptance. African and Asian critics have argued for ‘exceptions’ based on their cultures. The Banjul Charter, as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights is known because it was agreed in the Gambian capital city of that name, calls for two very signiﬁcant caveats. One limits rights unless a person has met responsibilities. Rather than simply recognizing an inherent right to food, for example, the Banjul Charter conditions the right to food on one’s contribution of labor, more generally conditioning ‘‘. . . the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms . . . (on) the performance of duties . . . .’’ The other protects the rights of families and ‘‘peoples’’ from claims of individual rights. This call for African ex ceptions to what is seen as Western overemphasis on individual rights is matched by similar claims for Asian exceptions. Even with the challenges to universality, the concept is extremely important in human rights law because once human rights documents gain international approval, they become more important than laws and even con stitutions, ‘trumping’ other legal standards and other legal positions. As alluded to above, gaining international agreements in the years immediately after World War II turned on competition over the preeminence of civil and political rights on the one hand versus economic, social, and cultural rights on the other. This distinction is often explained as a generational distinction among types of rights, as explained next.

Generations of Rights As suffrage expanded over the centuries, and as the rights of citizens to challenge the state progressed, rights be came identiﬁed with what now are known as political and civil rights. These rights are designed to assure the freedom of individuals to petition their government and to express themselves even in ways unpopular, whether to the government, in particular, or the society at large, more generally. They include most fundamentally the right of the people to choose their governments through regularly scheduled, fair elections. They also include the communication freedoms – speech, press, assembly – as well as freedom to practice the religion of one’s choice. The United States and its western European allies em phasized ﬁrst generation rights when the UDHR was being crafted. The rights central to them were clariﬁed in the Covenant on Political and Civil Rights.

The second generation of rights involves not just freedoms but more. These rights include several codiﬁed in the UDHR. These and some additional ones are de ﬁned more precisely in the Covenant on Economic, So cial, and Cultural Rights. In the economic arena, they include the right to have one’s basic needs met, including education, healthcare, housing, and nutrition, as well as the right to employment. In the social arena, they include the right to be treated fairly without regard to one’s race or ethnic background, class, or caste. In the cultural arena, they include the right to a culture, including one’s lan guage. The Soviet Union emphasized these rights in the UDHR proceedings, setting up a position distinctive from that of the Western advocates of civil and political rights. By the end of the twentieth century, human rights activists and scholars identiﬁed a third set of rights with characteristics somewhat different from the other two. These are survival rights, including one’s right to stop others from threatening one’s survival, whether through behavior that damages health, the environment, or the sustainability of the global system. Given the traditional focus of geography on human–environment interactions, these rights are inherently geographical.

Cultural Struggles Over Human Rights Arguments for universality of rights aside, human rights are, in truth, socially constructed and the consequence of profound struggle. Indeed, there are three readily iden tiﬁable scales of these struggles: struggles within a culture over the deﬁnition of a just society; struggles between cultures as each tries to dominate the other or at min imum achieve a resolution recognizing the legitimacy of that culture’s values and preferences; and struggles of a culture against global forces, both defense against what is perceived as interference by the global human rights movement and struggles of a culture against the op pression of global forces, whether economic or political. A consideration of struggles at each scale follows. Human Rights Struggles within a Culture Human rights struggles have been central to the debates of most societies in the years since adoption of the UDHR as those societies have reconsidered their own conceptualizations of right and wrong, their own senses of how society should be organized, and their own senses of justice. Some of those struggles have involved imple mentation of the UDHR. The American civil rights movement exempliﬁes struggle over political and civil rights in the Global North. The United States’ criticism of lack of freedoms in the USSR appeared hollow given the use of Jim Crow Laws to disenfranchise the African American community of the United States. These laws

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limited the basic freedoms of African Americans in 34 of the then 48 states, the exceptions mainly being Mid western and Northeastern states. A major element of the American debate over civil rights had to do with whether each of the member states of the Union could determine for itself issues of fundamental rights or whether these should be defended by the federal government over the objection of individual states. All three branches of the US federal government were theaters of struggle as the people of the country reconsidered the historic jus tiﬁcations for de jure, or legal, discrimination on the basis of race. The struggle soon swung to de facto discrimin ation based on social and economic distinctions. A Global South example of struggle over political and civil rights is the struggle over ending the caste system in India. Though the caste system is illegal, it remains the social norm within the country. Mahatma Gandhi, whose philosophy of resistance through nonviolent civil dis obedience not only hastened an end to British colonial ism in India but also provided the foundation for a similar movement led by Martin Luther King to promote civil rights in the United States, argued strenuously against maintenance of India’s caste system. As in the US, de jure segregation by caste has largely been shunted to history. Even more than in the US, however, de facto discrimination permeates daily life in India. These two examples – the civil rights movement in the United States and the similar movement against the dis crimination inherent in the caste system in India – ex emplify struggles within a culture over recognition of rights in the UDHR. Struggles also occur within cultures over the codiﬁcation of new rights – rights not widely recognized in the ratiﬁed international agreements – as those cultures reconsider for themselves what it means to be a just society. Two areas of considerable debate over the recognition of new rights in recent decades have been the campaigns against the death penalty and for gay rights. When the UN adopted the UDHR, almost all countries had the death penalty and almost none protected gays, lesbians, and transgendered people from discrimination. The tide against the death penalty has been strong in recent years. From 1985 through 2006, 50 countries abolished the death penalty with only four adopting it, reducing the number of countries with legal executions to 68. Latin America has long eschewed the death penalty, the major exception being Cuba. Almost all European countries have moved away from the death penalty, mainly because of a consensus that it is in humane but also because it is a requirement for joining the European Union. Most Muslim and African countries retain the death penalty, but China is easily the champion of the death penalty. Of the 1591 people ofﬁcially exe cuted in 2006, China executed 1010, followed in order by Iran with 177, Pakistan 82, Iraq and Sudan each 65, and the United States 53, leaving 139 executions in the other

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19 countries. Though 38 of the US’s 50 states retain the death penalty, in 2006 only 14 executed anybody, Texas being far and away the leader with 23 executions. Clearly in the 60 years since adoption of the UDHR, the death penalty has become exceptional rather than routine and the prohibition of the death penalty has become a broadly accepted human right not only by such advocacy groups as Amnesty International but widely though, not unanimously, across the globe. In many cultures the struggle against the death penalty has basically been won. In others, with the United States as the major example, the struggle is ongoing. Elsewhere, particularly in Asia and Africa, the struggle has hardly begun with the death penalty widely accepted. Though not nearly as successful as the antideath penalty campaign, the movement for gay rights has in historical terms made dramatic progress since adoption of the UDHR. With arguments based on scripture, many Muslims and Christians continue to reject gay rights out of hand. Elsewhere, including much of Europe and North America, the struggle is on. In a few places, among them New Zealand, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries, national legislation provides protection against discrimination for those who are gay, a reality hardly conceivable when the UDHR was adopted in 1948. Human Rights Struggles between Cultures Clearly cultures struggle over human rights as they consider and reconsider how to deﬁne a just society and how they want their own lives to be structured. These struggles are compounded when people with quite dif ferent cultures live together in the some country. A poignant example of human rights struggles be tween cultures is the ongoing struggle for political power in Fiji, a country fairly evenly divided between in digenous Fijians and Fijians of Indian ancestry whose ancestors moved from South Asia to Fiji when Britain ruled both during colonial times. Not only is there the predictable conﬂict for political advantage between people with two quite different cultures, there is also a claim that the indigenous Fijians, by right, should maintain control over their ancestral lands, their claims trumping the one person/one vote claims of normal democracy. Brieﬂy put, the argument is that an external power (Britain) usurped the power of indigenous Fijians by inserting an alien population. Justice, in accordance with this argument, requires that the indigenous Fijians be allowed to maintain control over their territory. The counter argument is that a person is a person so that everyone should have an opportunity to participate equally in the political process. Furthermore, the Indo Fijian population had no voice in going to Fiji, rather being descendants of people who moved there with questionable degrees of inﬂuence over their own

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migration. These people should not be punished because their ancestors chose to move or were moved over their own objections. Since 1987, Fiji has had three military coups, each time the key issue being the continued dominance of the indigenous Fijians. The ﬁrst time New Zealand considered a military response to return power to the duly elected government. In addition, members of the British Commonwealth expelled Fiji. This is an ex ample with a clear conﬂict between principles: the rights of indigenous peoples versus free and fair elections based on genuine democracy. The indigenous Fijians have maintained power in the face of external pressure be cause that pressure has never risen to the level of military intervention or sufﬁciently serious economic sanctions to threaten the Fijian economy. The struggle continues. A second kind of human rights struggle between cultures stems from colonial histories that created twentieth century sovereign states from areas that had been convenient for the colonial masters rather than a consequence of a political process that included agree ments of people to be part of the same country. This problem is most serious in Africa, though not limited to that continent. Nigeria provides an instructive example. The internally generated difference is that before colo nialism the area that became Nigeria had, literally, hundreds of cultures, the great majority having their own polities. The largest was the Sokoto Caliphate which had gained control over most of the north in an Islamic jihad that had begun in the early years of the nineteenth century. The smallest included several very small lan guage groupings of a few thousand people each in the southeast. In addition to the ethnic divide, the Chris tianity that came with colonialism created a religious divide – with missionaries moving inland from the coast and Islam spreading from the Sokoto Caliphate in the north. Two hundred years after Dan Fodio began the jihad, the modern sovereign state of Nigeria is divided both by language and religion. These divisions permeate all realms of Nigerian life, including cultural struggles over human rights. One struggle has been over the im plementation of shari’a law in several northern states, though southern Christians interpret the federal consti tution as banning it. Accommodations to recognize dif ferences in family structure and tradition even among people living as neighbors have been successful. Family laws, for example, are enforced on a sectarian basis with Muslims following Muslim tradition, Christians their own traditions, and those practicing only traditional re ligions whatever their traditions call for. Violent clashes among competing groups are all too common, however, with the clashes stemming from such disparate origins as land claims among ethnic/language groups to perceived slights along the religious divide. Nigeria continues to struggle to ﬁnd mechanisms to allow its very different cultures to live peacefully in each other’s midst.

A third kind of human rights struggle between cul tures is of much more recent vintage with massive mi grations of people from the Global South to work in the Global North, whether Latin Americans in North America or Africans or Asians in Europe. A number of European countries, for example, have to deal with the paradoxes of maintaining their cultures and being sen sitive to the need of their immigrant populations, par ticularly when the immigrants practice different religions and have signiﬁcantly different marriage practices. Similar tensions exist in the oil countries of the Middle East when workers with very different cultures out number the citizens of several sovereign states. Human Rights Struggles between a Culture and Global Forces Two kinds of cultural struggles over human rights exist at the global scale. One is the resistance of a culture, however small or large, to the global human rights movement. The other is resistance to global forces that violate human rights. Before the UDHR and subsequent human rights in struments became available as part of the global human rights movement, oppressors could stand behind the shield of sovereignty to prevent external intervention when the oppressors violated the rights of the people under their control. Oppressors – whether Pinochet, Kim, Mugabe, or any of a number of others, recent and current – still claim immunity, and the world may be either insufﬁciently organized or committed to do any thing about it. At minimum, a signiﬁcant share of world opinion brings opprobrium down upon recalcitrant tyr ants. In addition, some human rights claims to universal applicability can be challenged if for no other reason than that rights can sometimes be in conﬂict, however much advocates of rights want to claim otherwise. Consider, for example, the inherent conﬂict between freedom of the press and the right to a fair trial. Britain and New Zealand tend to fall on the side of the right to a fair trial, preventing disclosure by the media of certain facts, in cluding in some cases the identity of the accused, until a decision is rendered. The argument is that identifying a person charged with a crime would tar that person’s reputation permanently, even if the person were even tually acquitted. In the United States, the bias falls the other way with very little restriction on coverage in hopes that a fair jury can be found and then be quaran tined from the media for the duration of the trial. The fear on the US side, that a nefarious government could control the press inappropriately if given the opportunity to limit coverage – including, for example, preventing the disclosure of information that could be damaging to public ofﬁcials. Rulers may have some room to maneuver as they resist the global human rights movement.

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The African and Asian claims for exceptions to global human rights standards were introduced above. Problems occur when these are merely smokescreens, calling upon tradition to justify female genital cutting or child brides, for example, or to justify inhumane living or working conditions. Whenever an exception to global standards is sought, the onus should be on those seeking the ex ception to show that it will not subject others to vio lations of their dignity, rights, and freedoms, to paraphrase the Banjul Charter. As clear as the potential for exploitation is in the case of cultures asking to be relieved from the pressures of the global human rights movement, the evidence is over whelming when cultures ask for protection so their human rights are not violated by the operation of the global political economy. The case of Kil Soo Lee is instructive. A South Korean businessman working in cahoots with local functionaries, Lee was able to establish a shirt manufacturing factory in American Samoa. Lee and his organization attracted Vietnamese workers to his facility. He was convicted of human trafﬁcking for basically holding the workers as slaves in his sweatshop and was sentenced to 30 years in a US prison for his offenses. The Lee case is an example of what Kevin Bales calls the new slavery which in some ways is worse than chattel slavery because the enslaver has no reason to maintain the health of the slave. People are trafﬁcked, meaning moved surreptitiously from one place to another for the purpose of illegal employment under the control of another, on all the inhabited continents. Critics such as Bales berate the global political economy for doing little to trace the trafﬁcked people or hold the perpetrators responsible for their actions. This is part of why the Lee case stands out, given its successful prosecution. Other areas of local jeopardy – and human rights violations – given the operation of the global political economy include the diminution of education in Africa as a consequence of Structural Adjustment Programs, movement of toxic materials from the Global North to the Global South, and the proliferation of arms through regions with weak governments and people with the ability to pay.

The Political Geography of Human Rights The introduction above distinguished among three pol itical geographies of human rights: Where various human rights are protected and, conversely, violated; the extent to which societies and polities have bought into com peting conceptualizations of human rights; and cultural struggles over human rights at three discernable scales: The third having been addressed at length, focus turns to the ﬁrst two – the distribution of rights and con ceptualizations of rights.

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Establishing whether places are better or worse in terms of human rights violations can be addressed in several important ways. One is to take as a gauge the reports of such organizations as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, two of the most respected human rights organizations. Each, annually, reports to the world about the status of human rights across the globe, paying particular attention to the behavior of national governments. Rare is the country found to be committing no human rights violations. Sadly, all too common are the countries that heavily violate the rights of their citizens and others under their inﬂuence. These tend to be the less democratic and less open countries, particularly those of Africa and both Southeast and Southwest Asia. The United States and, to a lesser extent, Britain have been cited for violations encompassing the war in Iraq. China, continuing its traditional opaque administration even while opening up its economy, is also found wanting. The limitations, particularly with Amnesty, stem from an overwhelming emphasis on ﬁrst generation rights. Second generation rights are amenable to other types of analysis. Sometimes very direct measures can be met. The UDHR says that all children of appropriate age have a right to a free education. Is it so? Are all children of appropriate age in school, and are they required to pay? Being in school does not prove that anything was learned, so surrogate measures may be employed to infer the degree to which rights are met. If, for example, all chil dren in the last generation were indeed educated, then a country should have a high literacy rate among its young adults. Furthermore, if girls are being educated as well as boys, the literacy rates for men and women should be similar. The data on these issues are troubling. Thanks to the reduction in educational expenditures forced on poor countries by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank from the 1970s through the 1990s, a lower per centage of African children are in school in the ﬁrst decade of the Third Millennium than was the case 30 years ago. Likewise, female literacy rates lag woefully in the countries of the Middle East. The provision of healthcare can also be measured both directly and indirectly. Direct measures include such things as the percentage of children receiving im munizations or the percentage of pregnant women re ceiving prenatal care. Indirect or outcome measures include such things as rates of diseases or infant mor tality. An interesting trend is that though the gap in infant mortality remains, almost all countries have achieved long term reductions in infant mortality. Northern and Western European countries have the lowest infant mortality rates, as they did a generation ago. A number of countries with midlevel economic development actually have infant mortality rates comparable to those of the best countries a generation ago. This good news is offset by increasing problems with infectious diseases,

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particularly HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, and such vec tor borne diseases as malaria and encephalitis.

The Political Geography of Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century Examining the distribution of human rights shows that the degree of human rights violations is strongly related to the political geography of commitment to rights. The globalization that has dominated the world over the last generation not only brought with it economic pene tration that allowed the development of Bales’ new slavery, it also brought with it a commitment to demo cratically elected governments and transparency. This is not to argue that governments are truly democratic in their electoral system or, in fact, transparent in their operations. It is to argue that democracy and transpar ency have been global expectations. The places with the strongest human rights records are the places with commitments to open government on the one hand and

protection of those who need protection on the other. They are the places in effect with commitments to both ﬁrst and second generation human rights. See also: Civil Society; Cultural Studies and Human Geography; Population Geography.

Further Reading Bales, K. (2000). Disposable people: New slavery in the global economy. Berkeley: University of California Press. Brysk, A. (2004). Globalization and human rights. Berkeley: University of California Press. Harvey, D. (1996). Justice, nature and the geography of difference. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers. Lauren, P. G. (1998). The evolution of international human rights. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Lee, R. and David, M. S. (2004). Geographies and moralities. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishing. Patman, R. (ed.) (2000). Universal human rights? New York: St. Martin’s Press. Santoro, M. A. (2000). Proﬁts and principles: Global capitalism and human rights in China. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Humanism/Humanistic Geography J. M. Smith, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Humanities Forms of scholarship that seek to achieve or enable understanding of the world as it appears to another person, particularly persons of other periods, places, and social roles. Intention The aim or purpose that gives shape and meaning to a human action; unlike predictions of human behavior, which are supported by evidence, intended acts are justiﬁed by reasons. Interpretation The act of understanding of another person’s intentions, whether practiced spontaneously as a natural aspect of social psychology or self-consciously in conformity with an explicit hermeneutic. Place (Lebenswelt, Habitus) A locality psychically and materially ordered after a worldview; such a locality understood as intelligible and reasonable (offers reasons to act); such a locality understood with strong feelings of personal afﬁnity. Understanding (Verstehen) To imaginatively grasp the intended object of another person’s actions and the assumptions within which those actions are a reasonable means to that end. Worldview An interpretation of reality, originating in practices, which organizes experience into natural kinds and functional categories, assigns these intentional objects value, and sees in them reasons to act, think, and feel in a particular way.

Introduction Humanistic geography is the conventional title of a loosely organized school of thought that rose to promin ence after 1970, ﬂourished for nearly two decades, and then combined with neo Marxism and postmodernism to form the ‘new cultural geography’. This movement was important, and properly styled humanistic, but should not be taken as having begun, or completed, humanistic though in the ﬁeld. Genuine humanistic geographers have been at work in the ﬁeld for a very long time, still are at work, and hopefully always will be. This is because some geographers will always ﬁnd their fuglemen in the hu manities, not in the sciences, and because some geog raphers will always see the point of trying to understand the world as it appears to particular human actors. Before detailing the history and doctrine of human istic geography, broadly or narrowly conceived, it is ne cessary to consider its source and wider context, the

doctrine of humanism. Humanism presupposes that hu manity possesses a natural dignity, and that this dignity is evident in human individuals, human interests, and human works. Humanism elaborates this dogma of human dignity in four important ways: metaphysical humanism, topical humanism, methodological human ism, and philanthropic humanism. When humanism ﬁrst appeared in the fourteenth century, it was in the context of a Christian culture that made similar claims for human dignity and transcendence over the natural order. Christianity taught that men and women were made in the image of God, and set apart from other creatures in a unique spiritual predicament. Chris tianity also looked upon the human world as meaningful, beautiful, and good, and set its face against nihilism and Gnostic contemptus mundi. At the same time, however, Christianity qualiﬁed these afﬁrmations with the aspersion that humans and the human world are, for the present, bent and perverted by original sin: that we are fallen men and women living in a fallen world, with no prospect of redemption apart from that afforded by the atoning self sacriﬁce of Jesus Christ. Humanism may, therefore, be reasonably described as Christianity shorn of the fall, original sin, and the need for supernatural redemption. (Christian humanism is possible because, to many Chris tians, humanism appears true, but incomplete.) The ﬁrst humanists were medieval scholars who studied classical texts of Roman, and later Greek, phil osophy, poetry, history, and rhetoric. They were by these secular studies distinguished from divines, who read Holy Scripture and theology. Petrarch is often named as the ﬁrst humanist, remembered today for his love of the belles lettres of the classical world, and as the ﬁrst man to climb a hill simply to admire the view. Although un doubtedly Christian, Petrarch thereby marks the begin ning of a shift in the attention of the best minds in Europe, from Holy Scripture and heaven to secular lit erature and the visible face of the mundane world. It was not impious or futile, humanist scholars believed, to set aside the lamp of revelation and examine humans and human affairs with natural reason alone. Humans were, after all, possessed of a dignity that, however inferior to the dignity of God, nevertheless merited such study, and as an aspect of this dignity, humanist scholars were possessed of rational powers sufﬁcient to undertake this study unaided. Begun as a palliation of the Christian doctrine of fallen humans in a fallen world, humanism became in time an increasingly assertive repudiation of these

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unﬂattering imputations. Thus, although the earliest humanists had seen secular knowledge as a supplement to theology, some of their successors were epistemo logical chauvinists hostile to theology. These humanists pronounced natural reason and the example of nature sufﬁcient to human needs, and theology not only dubious to natural reason, but also demeaning to human dignity. Consequently, the title humanism came in some instances to denote metaphysical deism, agnosticism, or even dogmatic atheism. In the last instance the title humanism was intended to emphasize the positive content of the atheistic doctrine (unwilling to surrender the term, Christian humanists describe this metaphysic as secular humanism). Not all geographers are inﬁdels, of course, but almost all of modern geography is written as if metaphysical humanism is true. (Curiously, however, ‘humanistic’ geographers have written every testimony to religious faith the author has encountered in the geo graphic literature.) Whatever their metaphysical and religious prejudices, the early humanists were fascinated by the thoughts of Roman authors, particularly when these thoughts were expressed with unusual eloquence. A writer like Cicero had for them an attractive mind and an attractive voice. Along with other classical authors like Livy, Seneca, Virgil, Ovid, and Catullus, his way of ‘seeing’ or ‘im agining’ the world had, for the humanists, a life afﬁrming human quality that, in their opinion, contrasted favorably with the grim and ‘gothic’ imagination of their late medieval contemporaries. Topical humanism is this deep interest in the way that people, especially extraordinary people, ‘see’ the world. It is delighted by the human imagination, drawn to examine the inside of human ex perience, the subjective ethical and esthetic lives of in dividuals — particularly those with a gift to convey in writing some sense of that inner life. The modern hu manities are, of course, far more democratic than the early humanists, but nevertheless continue this interest in imagination, the inner life of a person, and the curious connection of imagination to language and other media of expression. Topical humanism, as we shall see, is central to humanistic geography. The medieval humanist employed a particular meth odology in his research. He mastered ancient languages, compared and edited surviving texts, and wrote inter pretive commentaries. In this he differed little, meth odologically speaking, from theologians and biblical scholars, who were also engaged in the recovery, pre servation, and exegesis of texts. The humanist became methodologically distinctive only in the seventeenth century, when experimental science appeared with its novel method and deﬁnition of research. Humanists were thereafter confronted with a powerful epistemological rival, and were before long subject to contumely not unlike that which some humanists had heaped on

theologians. Some scientists have always asserted what the geographer Fred Schaefer called ‘methodological monism’, or the opinion that the scientiﬁc method is the only road to knowledge. Humanists have, however, gen erally succeeded in denouncing these epistemological pretensions as ‘scientism’ or ‘positivism’, and afﬁrming the reliability of humanistic methodologies. Humanists argued, plausibly, that the experimental scientist may be able to explain the objective world, and even human consciousness, but that only the humanist, using the humanistic tools of empathy, interpretation, and critical judgment, can hope to ‘understand’ these things as they appear, from the inside, to human actors. And the dignity of human consciousness and the human world demands a recognition that comes only by its being understood. This methodological dualism between the experimental sci ences and the interpretive humanities runs, as we shall see, right through geography. Given that a methodological humanist is antipositivist, it is ironic to ﬁnd that in its fourth sense the word hu manist is very often closely related to positivism and science. Indeed, positivist geographers very likely think of themselves as humanists in what we call the philan thropic sense. Philanthropic humanism is primarily a product of the eighteenth century Enlightenment, when metaphysical humanism is combined with experimental science. Human dignity seemed to demand an improved standard of living, or ‘progress’, and the natural and social sciences promised to deliver these improvements. This is why, throughout the nineteenth century, the word hu manist was often synonymous with humanitarian, and denoted anyone who worked to ameliorate the human condition. Under this construction the experimental scientist was arguably much more of a humanist than the scholar who labored over old books.

‘Humanistic’ Geography before 1970 As part of the intellectual project of the modern age, all of modern geography has probably understood itself to be humanistic in the philanthropic sense of contributing to the advancement of human welfare. The author knows some misanthropic geographers, but no intentionally misanthropic geography. However, until the 1970s, when the title took on much narrower connotations, the title humanistic geography was often understood to denote that portion of geography that pursued applied rather than pure research. This is what V. C. Finch meant when he described regional geography as a ‘‘humanistic earth science’’ in 1939, and what Donald W. Fryer and William Bunge meant three decades later when they wrote that a humanist is simply a ‘‘partisan for Homo Sapiens.’’ Phil anthropic humanism has by no means disappeared from geography, but since the 1970s one could not describe all

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such geography as humanistic with any hope of being understood. Because overtly teleological and theistic geography largely disappeared in the nineteenth century, there has been no need for geographers to use the phrase hu manistic in its metaphysical sense. Whatever the private religious sensibilities of individual geographers, the great bulk of geographic discourse has, for more than a century, wedded an astringent naturalism to a sometimes bump tious anthropocentrism. The virtual absence in geog raphy of a recognized minority tradition of theistic or speciﬁcally Christian scholarship is probably due to the origins of the modern ﬁeld in geology and biology. Such minority traditions are a recognized presence in all of the humanities, most notably philosophy, literary studies, and history. Yet in geography metaphysical humanism is so much taken for granted that the virtual absence of a vocal minority of metaphysical dissidents is seldom if ever noticed. Beginning in the late nineteenth century geographers were also using the words humanist, humanism, and hu manistic more narrowly, to indicate human geography. For instance, the 1893 ‘Report of the committee of ten on secondary school studies’ described geography as con sisting of natural and ‘‘humanistic geography,’’ meaning by this later term anthropogenic landscape features such as ‘‘streets, railways, wharves, harbors, parks, plots, wards, etc.’’ All of human geography was part of what H. J. Fleure in 1944 called the ‘‘new humanism,’’ a phrase that indi cated all scientiﬁc and historical investigations into the nature and development of humans and human society. As early as 1906 geographers were using the term humanistic in an even narrower sense still, to describe that portion of geography that was not only topically different from physical geography, but also methodo logically different from science. J. K. Wright, who had bruited the idea since the 1920s, may have written the ﬁrst fully developed description of this difference in his 1946 presidential address to the Association of American Geographers. Here Wright called for geographers who were ‘‘scholars in the humanistic sense,’’ by which he meant ‘‘widely read,’’ ‘‘masters of [literary] style,’’ and hungry to explore ‘‘the most fascinating terrae incognitae of all . . . those that lie within the minds and hearts of men.’’ Here we see very clearly expressed the themes of topical and methodological humanism. Provided that these ‘geosophers’ did not grow too numerous or assertive, Wright concluded, there was no reason to fear that they would ‘‘retard the advancement or diminish the prestige of scientiﬁc geography.’’ Several geographers were, indeed, already working on geosophy and the geographic imagination, or were about to begin doing so. Ralph Brown’s Mirror for Americans: Likeness of the American Seaboard, 1810 and His torical geography of the United States embodied all of the

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elements of Wright’s scholarship in the humanistic sense. In his 1941 address to the Association of American Geographers, Carl Sauer deﬁned culture as very largely consisting of a learned way of imagining or interpreting environment. By the early 1960s David Lowenthal was developing Wright’s basic themes, with far less deference to science. In 1967 Clarence Glacken published Traces on the Rhodian Shore, perhaps the greatest example of topical and methodological humanism ever written by a geog rapher. Subtitled ‘Nature and culture in Western thought from ancient times to the end of the eighteenth century’, Glacken’s book was decisive proof that the progress and prestige of geography need not be embarrassed by hu manistic scholarship. Not long after Wright delivered his address, there appeared in geography harbingers of a new mode of inquiry. This was quantitative, nomothetic, highly for malized, and concerned above all else with scientiﬁc explanation of spatial location and covariance, as well as spatial structure, interaction, and organization. These spatial scientists assertively promoted a new, ‘positivist’ geography, and in so doing frightened a large number of regional, historical, and cultural geographers, as well as some old style economic geographers, into self conscious awareness of their identity as methodological humanists. Thus, a regional geographer like Robert S. Platt was by 1957 drawing a methodological division between geog raphers who undertook ‘‘scientiﬁc analysis’’ and geog raphers who undertook ‘‘artistic synthesis’’ using ‘‘humanistic tools of rational inference and intuitive judgment.’’ The same methodological division was ac knowledged in J. M. Broek’s Geography : It’s Scope and Spirit. At about the same time Gordon Lewthwaite and O. H. K. Spate distinguished humanistic geography from the new, quantitative geography, objecting that the later, due to its nomothetic aspirations, obscured the signiﬁcance of the idiographic and the radical indeterminacy occasioned by human freedom. Some of these antipositivists were older men, but others like D. W. Meinig, John Frasier Hart, Cole Harris, and Wilbur Zelinsky were rising scholars whose best work was yet to come. It would not be correct to describe the somewhat motley assembly that gathered under the banner of humanistic geography at this time as anti positivist, if positivism is taken simply as science by the hypothetico deductive method. What they opposed was complete usurpation of the ﬁeld of geography by posi tivists waving the red ﬂag of what Schaefer, their hero, had called ‘‘methodological monism.’’ Geography was, therefore, well before 1970 split between what C. P. Snow had called ‘‘two cultures.’’ An impartial spectator at the time would likely have bet on the eventual victory of the positivists, who were young, coordinated, and zealous; but a change in the zeitgeist was about to favor humanistic geography for close to 20 years.

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The New Humanistic Geography, 1970–89 James Parsons was among the ﬁrst to recognize that the social unrest of the late 1960s would bring much needed reinforcements to the ranks of the humanistic geog raphers. ‘‘The generation we are teaching,’’ he wrote from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1969, ‘‘gives indication of being more concerned with esthetics, human values, and something they call ‘lifestyle’ than with social ‘laws’ or mechanistic analysis of make believe or model worlds.’’ Thus, a ‘‘humanistic approach’’ ‘‘may prove more congenial to the coming generation,’’ and ‘‘the slide rule and the computer may well be loosing ground to the heart’’ in the struggle for the soul of geography. Students of the sort Parsons describes did eventually mature and come to dominate humanistic geography, but through the 1970s most prominent proponents of the approach were middle aged men, not long haired rebels. Wilbur Zelinsky is an outstanding example of this gen eration, and in the ﬁercely polemical essays that he wrote between 1970 and 1975 we ﬁnd many of the major themes of the new humanistic movement. The ﬁrst of these themes is Zelinsky’s millenarianism. The end of the world seemed to be at hand, the new horsemen of the apocalypse being militarism, atomic weapons, environ mental degradation, and the ‘population explosion’. Ac cording to Zelinsky, each of these perils issued from the logic of civilization itself, a logic that had for thousands of years demanded incessant growth in human popu lation, power, and productivity. The world that the agricultural revolution had brought into being was now about to collapse under the weight of these endless engrossments. Grim as this prospect was, however, the time for despair was not at hand: for the death of civil ization opened the way for a new age that would differ from the disastrous order of civilization no less than civilization had differed from the prehistoric world of hunter gatherers. Zelinsky’s second theme was, therefore, utopianism. Beyond the time of troubles in which he unquestionably lived, Zelinsky descried a new, desirable, and attainable world in which the contradictions of civilization were resolved and the crimes of civilization in some sense redeemed. Following the economist Kenneth Boulding, he interpreted the violence and upheavals of the twen tieth century as part of the ‘‘Great Transition’’ from civilization to post civilization. Boulding had seen post civilization in conventional utopian terms, as an era of peace, stable populations, economic and social justice, and environmental conservation. Likewise, Zelinsky envisioned a ‘‘Great Leap Forward from our current malaise and confusion into the promised land of post industrial harmony and plenty.’’ And not only would the objective problems of politics and economics be resolved

in this new Age of Aquarius; men and women would be emancipated from the self alienation engendered by the repressive modern superego, and thereby freed to ‘‘get on with the serious business of becoming completely human and explore the full range of our emotional, moral, in tellectual, and spiritual capacities.’’ Zelinsky’s third theme was that this Great Leap would be accomplished, not by science or revolutionary politics as conventionally understood, but by ‘‘radical reappraisal of our value systems,’’ a ‘‘radical reordering of priorities,’’ and a ‘‘radically altered vision of the world.’’ In his 1975 presidential address to the Association of American Geographers, Zelinsky argued that science, while not without value, was but one of the sources of ‘‘insights into the nature of the real world.’’ And it manifestly delivered much that humanity did not desire, while failing to de liver much that humanity did desire. Taken alone, for instance, ‘‘the spiritual vacuity of the scientiﬁc creed’’ seemed to ratify only nihilism and existential despair. Science was, moreover, vitiated by philosophical, meth odological, and institutional defects that were especially damaging when an ‘‘outmoded mechanistic natural sci ence model’’ was applied to questions of social science. This potent mix of foreboding and hope animated the new humanistic geography, and removed from it the appearance of a stance that was, at bottom, reactionary and obstructionist. Humanistic geography was no longer in the position of a threatened minority defensively pleading for epistemological pluralism: it now assailed positivism with accusations of complicity, if not collusion, in producing the general crisis. It not only afﬁrmed topical and methodological humanism as models of inquiry that deserved toleration because they were un likely to bring geography into disrepute; it trumpeted them as proper and effective instruments of philanthropic humanism. Positivist science, according to the new humanistic geographers, dehumanized humans by representing them as passive agents of social, psychological, and economic forces. These forces, according to science, caused humans to behave in predictable ways, and a progressive and rational society would seek to control human behavior indirectly, through modulation of these forces. Against this view humanistic geographers raised an alternative image of humans as deliberately acting on the basis of reasons that they considered in the light of their own intentions, interests, and values. A progressive and ra tional society (and social science) would, therefore, rec ognize and respect the dignity of the individual actor, and induce change by offering the individual reasons to undertake what Zelinsky described as a ‘‘radical re ordering of priorities’’ and a ‘‘radical reappraisal of our value systems.’’ The concept of a reason has three characteristics that would greatly affect the new humanistic geography. First

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of all, a reason comes to us as a symbol, a signiﬁer as sociated in our minds with some signiﬁed. If a bull chases us across a ﬁeld and, eventually, catches and tosses us over the fence with his horns, our forward motion has two explanations. So long as we are running, we are running from a reason, a symbol of danger. Once the bull has hooked us with his horns, we are mechanically caused to ﬂy through the air. Zelinsky and the other humanistic geographers believed that humans were as often running away from bulls as they were tossed by horns. Second, there is in our response to a reason a presumption of freedom and choice. As the room grows warm we are caused to sweat, and we are given a reason, which we may not under the circumstances judge to be an adequate reason, to remove our jacket. Humanistic geographers insisted that humans are free, decision making beings, in part because this ﬁt more closely to the ﬁrst person perspective of the humanities, but also because it gave them reason to hope that people could choose to change. Finally, if we wish to make sense of the behavior of a human responding to reasons, we must understand how those reasons appear to that person. Here, the inquiry is not a scientiﬁc inquiry into causal explanation, but an interpretive or hermeneutic inquiry that seeks what philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) and soci ologist Max Weber (1864–1920) had called Verstehen, understanding. Thus Zelinsky ended his presidential address calling upon geographers to set aside their sci entiﬁc prejudices and attempt ‘‘unconventional modes of attaining genuine understanding.’’ And this is precisely what a growing number of geographers began to do. In their attempt to understand the reasons for human behavior, the new humanistic geography continued in the geosophical tradition that J. K. Wright had begun; but more than a decade of positivism had left geographers far more methodologically self conscious than they had been before. The humanistic geographers therefore turned to philosophy for arguments to justify and enlarge their humanistic intuitions. Most were drawn to a species of speculation that philosopher Alvin Plantinga calls creative antirealism. Whatever their differences, the neo Kantian philosophers that fall under this heading agree that humans do not simply see the real world as it is, but rather participate in the creation or construction of the world by their sensory, cognitive, and noetic activity. Most humanistic geographers were drawn to continental phenomenology, although many mixed this with ideal ism, pragmatism, existentialism, and the sociological theory of symbolic interaction. Geographers’ readings of these philosophers were often idiosyncratic, and some times arguably erroneous, but their labors yielded some general concepts, ideas, and methods of lasting import ance for the ﬁeld. Below the article discusses three es pecially important contributions of the new humanistic geography, which roughly align with the three aspects of

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the concept of the reason given above: the concept of life world, the idea of human agency and action, and the method of interpretation. Life-World and Place In 1976 Anne Buttimer and Nicholas Entrikin separately introduced geographers to the concept of life world (the German Lebenswelt and French habitus). They understood life world in two ways. First, a life world is the world as it appears to a person unreﬂectively engaged in a par ticular form or way of life; it is the world as it is inter preted, given meaning and value, by what German sociologists called a relativ natu¨rlich Weltanschauung (a worldview natural to that way of life). As Buttimer put it, life world is ‘‘the prereﬂective, taken for granted di mensions of experience, the unquestioned meanings, and routinized determinants of behavior.’’ A hiker who in tends to reach a certain campsite before nightfall, and who has an interest in doing so with the least possible effort, will, for instance, see in the terrain before him meanings that are in fact reasons to take one trail rather than another. Unlike the geomorphologist, he is not concerned with explaining the ridges and valleys. He is concerned with understanding whether the nature of the trail before him is a reason to turn left or right, walk fast or slow, and feel anxious or assured. This sort of fully interpreted life world has sometimes been criticized as alien to the true meaning of phenomenology, but it has nevertheless had the greatest impact on humanistic geography and its successors. Drawing on Edmund Husserl, Buttimer and Entrikin also presented life world as a means to criticize positivist science. The way that the world actually appears to an impartial observer, so the argument goes, is nothing like the world reported as objective and real by empirical science. One does not, for instance, see ‘the Sun’. One encounters, rather, a bright and burning disk, and then, if one has learned to do so, conceptualizes or theorizes that this phenomenon is something called the Sun. The phenomenal world is not, in other words, or at least not originally, the array of objects imagined by physical sci ence; nor is it the world spontaneously interpreted by a form of life. To that most impartial of observers, the infant, it is, rather, what William James in The Principles of Psychology described as ‘‘one great blooming, buzzing confusion’’ that assails the infant’s ‘‘eyes, ears, nose, skin, and entrails at once . . . coalesced together in one and the same space.’’ Taken empirically, as ‘pure sensation’, the universe appears as ‘one confused fact’. The upshot of this for critics of positivist science is that scientists do not begin with experience or objective reality; they begin with a representation that is, as deconstructionists like to say, ‘always already’ theorized and interpreted. Or as Alfred North Whitehead put it in The Organization of

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Thought, ‘‘neither common sense nor science can proceed without departing from the strict consideration of what is actual in experience.’’ The apparent difference between these two views of the phenomenological life world has often confused geographers. By phenomenological life world do we mean the meaningful, interpreted world of the ﬁrst de scription, or the ‘‘one great blooming, buzzing confusion’’ of the second? The answer is that we mean both, for the former is simply a development of the latter. As William James stated it, making the point of greatest importance for humanistic geographers, ‘‘infants must go through a long education of the eye and ear before they can per ceive the realities which adults perceive.’’ This long education comes through experience and the imposition of culture by the child’s family, political community, and peers. In this education the growing child learns ‘ideas which the sensation suggests’, or ‘farther facts associated with the object of the sensation’. Thus, by the time she reaches maturity, her ‘every perception is an acquired perception’. The humanistic geographer Yi fu Tuan made much the same point throughout his long and proliﬁc career, and stated the matter succinctly in a 1979 essay. ‘‘Landscape [i.e. interpreted lifeworld] is not a given, a piece of reality that is simply there,’’ he wrote. ‘‘What is given is an environment to which we respond in automatic and subconscious ways’’ that we have learned through habit, indoctrination, and experience. ‘‘Land scape,’’ on the other hand, ‘‘appears to us through an effort of the imagination’’ and is ‘‘an achievement of the mature mind.’’ The movement from environment to landscape, from the ‘one confused fact’ of infant sensation to the tem porally ordered, spatially extensive, objectively discrete life world of adult perception, is, of course, complex as human life itself. But perhaps the most basic aspect of this movement is carving the one confused fact into discrete categories of things connected to concepts. This is why phenomenology is also called analysis of concepts: for what appears to a mature mind is a world ordered according to concepts. Some of these concepts denote natural kinds, objects we group together because they share the same nature. Cats, for instance, are a natural kind. Other concepts denote practical kinds or functional categories, objects we group together because they serve the same purpose. Pets do not have a common nature, for instance, but a common relation to human beings, and so are a functional category or practical kind. Practical kinds or functional categories are the most interesting to humanistic geographers (some of whom dispute the existence of natural kinds). This is because the functional categories that order our life world ori ginate in what phenomenologists call our intentions, lit erally our aims. We know this because the appearance of our life world changes when our aims change. To give a

simple example, when we play hide and seek with our small children, our intention is to hide, or ﬁnd one who is hidden. Consequently we ‘see’ in the back yard instances of a kind of location that will serve as a hiding place. These hiding places are ‘intentional objects’, which is to say objects constituted by our state of mind when we form the intention to hide. As such they are not ‘given’, which is to say apparent as phenomena, to persons who do not aim to hide or to discover another person in hiding. Intentions not only divide the world, they also evaluate the world. There are, after all, good hiding places and poor hiding places. They also cause the world to appear to a human as reasons, which is to say as possible motives to action. To stay with the above simple example: in the context of a game of hide and seek, the absence of bushes from this side of the house is a reason for us to run round to the other side. Our most important intentions work in much the same way to order an environment into a landscape, to carve our sensations into functional categories, assign value, and ﬁnd in the resulting interpretation of the world reasons to act, feel, and think. We are less likely to be conscious of this relativ natu¨rlich Weltanschauung, or of the constructed quality of the life world it makes apparent, because it endures for prolonged periods, and so comes to seem absolutely natural. The intention of the child is to play, for instance, and so for years and years the world appears to her largely as divided into the playworthy, the unplayworthy, and the play forbidding. As this intention is replaced in adolescence by, say, an intention to com pete and succeed in the world, the landscape and life world of the child disappears. Parenthood brings new intentions, and an altogether new life world in which partly revived functional categories of childhood are supplemented by functional categories unique to par enthood, such as dangerous things and dangerous places, both of which are made apparent by the state of mind known as anxiety and the intention to protect. The dis appearance of long established functional categories and life world at the end of a protracted project, such as raising children, a marriage, or a career, is ordinarily experienced as a ‘crisis’ and is sometimes aptly described with the phrase, ‘‘my world fell to pieces.’’ If we can ﬁnd signiﬁcantly different life worlds in the different stages of an individual life, we must expect to ﬁnd even greater differences in the life worlds of persons engaged in highly dissimilar forms of life. Thus, when humanistic geographers undertook ﬁeldwork, a major goal was to understand the worldview and life world of their subjects. This is why the humanistic geographer John Western made such extensive use of interviews in his books Outcast Capetown and Passage to England: he hoped to discover how the world appeared to his subjects. Others used participant observation, taking up the roles

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and daily practices and intentions of their subjects. Sev eral humanistic geographers, for instance, worked as street vendors in South American cities in the hope of obtaining ﬁrst hand experience of what it was like to view the world through the eyes of a poor street vendor. The term ‘place’ very soon replaced the term ‘life world’ among humanistic geographers, place being more clearly geographical, and life world, perhaps, bringing with it too much philosophical baggage. But place was for humanistic geographers a technical term with a meaning that was closer to the meaning of life world than to lo cation. A ‘place’ was, rather, a location rendered mean ingful by human imagination. A location is rendered meaningful when it appears to say something in addition to itself. It says something in addition to itself because it is ﬁlled with symbols, or perhaps is itself a symbol, and it is the nature of a symbol always to points to something other than itself. A stone is, for example, only a stone; but a tombstone is a symbol that points beyond itself, to a man, a memory, a life, and an idea. This is the way with every symbol, for the function of a symbol is to take something that is absent and make it present. It may be absent because in conspicuous, intangible, imaginary, or far removed in time and space. Humans represent absent things sym bolically to make themselves mindful of those things, and thereby give themselves motives and reasons to act, think, or feel in a particular way. A location therefore becomes, for me, a place when I see in it something more than the objects of which it is composed, when these objects ap pear to point beyond themselves, perhaps to an in conspicuous hazard, an intangible boundary, a popular fantasy, or an event that happened long ago or far away. It becomes a place as its buildings and streets are trans formed from mere buildings and streets into reminders of people, events, emotions, and acts. Humanistic geographers studied this concept of place in two ways. The ﬁrst asked what it was like to be inside an intelligible place, to have, as was often said, a ‘sense of place’. To have a sense of a place is simply to ﬁnd it intelligible: to understand what the symbols point to and what it is ‘like’ to be in among them. But the slightly different phrase ‘sense of place’ implies, on top of this, an existential afﬁnity with the place, a feeling that, in ‘this’ place, one truly is ‘in place’ or where one belongs. Geographers such as Yi fu Tuan, Edward Relph, David Seamon, and Robert Mugerauer wrote extensively on this topic. It is, perhaps, best understood as the way that geographers have framed classic questions of topical humanism about modern alienation (what Relph called placelessness), our ambivalent feelings about home (which Tuan described as an oscillation between cosmos and hearth), and the appalling loneliness to which humans are subject in the face of a seemingly mute and unsympathetic cosmos.

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The second way humanistic geographers studied place looked not at the subjective experience of place, but at the symbols themselves, and the messages they conveyed. Humanistic geographers who asked how the symbols worked turned ﬁrst to semiotics and the sociological theory of symbolic interactionism. Kenneth Foote’s Sha dowed Ground, for instance, examined landscape symbols that point back to deeply disturbing acts of gruesome violence, and the decisions communities make whether or not to install such symbols, whether or not to sustain such a memory. Patrick McGreevy’s Imagining Niagara described how Victorian tourists projected their pre occupations onto the waterfall and transformed it into a symbol pointing beyond the here and now to primeval nature, the afterlife, or a future of limitless productive power. Finally, in The Past Is a Foreign Country David Lowenthal exhaustively documents symbols that point to the past, the uses to which they are put, and the various degrees to which they imply that the past is radically discontinuous with the present. Action and Agency Science describes the universe as a great, unbroken chain of causes and effects, each cause following on its effect with a very high rate of probability, or even with absolute certainty. In such a universe there appears to be no room for freedom of action, no possibility that a human being could cause something to happen without having been caused to do so. A human might transform an impulse, as when, say, hunger is transformed into riot; but such transformations are predictable, automatic, perhaps de terministic, and not fundamentally different from the transformation of sunlight into sugar by photosynthesis. In the eyes of science, in other words, our behavior is our genetically determined response to a perhaps contingent environment, possibly as modiﬁed by our education (culture) and experience of operant conditioning. This description of human behavior was well estab lished in human geography from its inception. Around the turn of the nineteenth century Darwinian environ mentalists taught a severe form, in which human behavior was not even trained through positive reinforcement. Behavior was simply selected by an environment that eliminated every individual who was physically, psychic ally, socially, or technically unﬁt. Carl Sauer’s famous and inﬂuential criticism of Darwinian environmentalism merely allowed that humans respond to the positive re inforcement of successful behavior, and imitate the be havior of other, successful humans. Guided by economics, spatial science and location analysis described humans as passive utility maximizers whose decisions are limited to calculation of the most efﬁcient means to satisfy unchosen ends. This automatism was taken to its logical extreme in the spatial mechanics of social physics.

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It was this sort of scientiﬁc geographic explanation that Anne Buttimer had in mind when she expostulated with human geographers to describe in their work something ‘‘more than the danse macabre of material istically motivated robots.’’ Her statement is hyperbolic, since all geographers recognize that humans possess a capacity for change that robots do not, but correct about unchanging materialistic motivation. The capacity for change that these geographers recognized was a capacity for technical change—a change in how utilitarian goals of comfort and security were realized. Conforming to David Hume’s ‘subjectivist’ or ‘noncognitivist’ account of prac tical reason, they assumed that human goals remained constant. Each of us is motivated solely by our environ mentally triggered passions, and exercise reason and choice only to calculate and choose the most efﬁcient means to these unchosen ends. This sort of instrumental rationality was not what humanistic geographers meant by ‘getting on with the serious business of becoming completely human’. David Ley and James Duncan were, perhaps, the hu manistic geographers most acutely critical of this ten dency to describe individual humans as ‘‘agents’’ blindly executing the orders of some supra individual or super organic entity. The environmentalists had made indi viduals mere agents of their ‘race’. Sauerian geographers moved directive power to ‘culture’, and attributed to this hypostatized abstraction, as Duncan famously argued, a superorganic will that animated all individuals who bore that culture. Regional geographers and spatial scientists, likewise, depicted individuals as instruments of ‘eco nomic forces’. In the 1970s structural Marxism arose as a new sort of philosophic holism in geography, and like its predecessors, structural Marxism reduced humans to passive agents of reiﬁed theoretical entities like capital ism, the mode of production, or the proﬁt motive. In an important, controversial, but highly inﬂuential 1981 paper, Duncan and Ley exposed the logical and empirical fallacies of structural Marxism and, by impli cation, all other social science that pretended to explain change as the result of actions by theoretical structures. They did not dispute the existence of structures, but insisted (as argued in Humanistic Geography: Problems and Prospects, which Ley edited with Marwyn Samuels in 1978) that these were properly understood as the ‘‘con text’’ within which ‘humans’ acted. A structure such as social class may forbid some acts, and encourage others, but is itself inert and does not act. To say that it does is akin to saying, not that I walk to the bottom of the hill, but that the hill walks me to the bottom. Duncan and Ley concluded that geographers ought to conduct their re search much more in the manner of historians, with far more attention to individuals, context, choice, and con tingency, and far less deference to the logical demands of theoretical and historical necessity. They were not

proposing abandonment of theory, as we can see in their empirical studies of gentriﬁcation and elite suburbs, but insisting that theory should be used to illuminate facts, and facts should not be used only to illustrate theory. In Duncan and Ley’s account, as in all of the volu minous literature that followed (especially important work by Derek Gregory), human agency is opposed to ‘‘structure’’ (a confusing locution, since structures direct ‘‘agents’’). This way of thinking about agency was useful at the time, for many geographers were then invoking structures; but in our ‘post structural’ present it may well obscure the central questions of human ‘action’. As we have seen, a structure was something theorized as a component in a macro historical process, itself theorized as an ‘engine of history’. All talk of structures therefore implied historicism, the idea that history is governed by some fundamental ‘logic’ or plan. Hegelianism, social Darwinism, Marxism, Comtean positivism: all of these are structural and historicist–secular reworkings, in fact, of the Christian concept of ‘providence’. If we suppose, as these theories do, that history is in the hands of God, or Geist, or the mode of production, or natural selection, or progress, it will make little difference if any of us chooses to act. Talk of human action arose, in part, because geographers lost faith in the automatic operation of macro historical processes, or what Jean Franc¸ois Lyotard called grand historical metanarratives. But it also arose for two additional reasons that remain important to humanistic geography. First, humanistic geographers recognized that struc tural, historicist theories encourage fatalism and political passivity. Although such theories permit social scientists to predict, or imagine they can predict, future events, just like natural scientists, they also affront human dignity by seeing the human future, individual or collective, purely under the aspect of prediction. Yet human beings do not normally, or properly, limit themselves to prediction of their future behavior, or simply offering evidence in support of these predictions. Humans, unless utterly demoralized, express intentions, which are in fact choices about what future ‘they’ (individually or as a group) will work to bring about. And they justify these intentions with reasons, not evidence. Structural, historicist theories are dehumanizing, and antihumanist, because, when popularized, they discourage action. To the political right this has the undesirable effect of undermining personal responsibility; to the political left it has the undesirable effect of discouraging political activism. The second reason humanistic geographers wished to represent human as actors who deliberately carry out intentions is that this permitted them to ask ethical questions, for moral judgments are possible only when it is granted that a human has the dignity of acting. An act is a special kind of behavior or event. It is the kind of event that appears properly attributable, not to some

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prior event, but to a person. If it is not a natural kind, it is surely a functional kind that ‘appears’ to almost anyone not rendered insensible by structural thinking. If we say, ‘‘He hit me!’’ we assign responsibility for the blow to a person, and in that assignment of responsibility deﬁne the blow as an act. We also judge the blow unjustiﬁed and demand that the agent answer for his action. The man we accuse might answer, ‘‘I’m sorry, I did not hit you on purpose. My hand hit you because my wife screamed and I turned suddenly.’’ With this answer he refuses re sponsibility, describes the blow as predictable behavior caused by environmental factors (the scream) and the centrifugal force of a twisting body. The blow was not an act. Or, imagine him accepting responsibility, and in so doing agreeing to my description of the blow as an act. He might say, ‘‘Yes, I did hit you,’’ and would then justify his act, not explain it. He would offer a reason, let us say: ‘‘I saw you ogling my wife and thought a punch in the eye would make you stop.’’ Notice that his reason consists of a motive (my ogling), his choice to respond to this mo tive, his intention (to make me stop), and a calculation that a blow would be warranted and effective. I might then, of course, protest that I had not been ogling his wife with lustful longing, but only staring with concerned alarm because a large spidery. To take this picaresque scenario one step further, imagine that the jealous and pugnacious husband, upon consulting with his wife, discovers that a spider had in deed invaded her undergarments. Being just and honest (as well as temperamental), he would thereupon recant his reason, retract his accusation, and accept my reason for my action. Now recognizing and acknowledging his blow as an unjust injury, for which ‘he’ is responsible, he might offer me the symbolic restitution of a concilia tory drink. Accepting this atonement, I might shake his hand. Such is the character of interpersonal relations be tween beings who act. This sort of morality (honesty) and sense of justice make no sense unless events are taken out from under the description of causality and behavior and placed under the description of intentionality and action. When a scientist asks ‘‘Why?,’’ he wishes to learn the cause, and he ﬁnds this in some prior event, often in the ‘environment’. When a person asks another person ‘‘Why?,’’ more often than not she wishes to know the reason. Humanistic geography recognized that inter personal relations require us to place some human be havior under the description of intentionality, not causation, as it is only under this description that a vast range of functional categories appear: categories like person, responsibility, blame, praise, shame, indignation, answerability, reasons, motives, and intentions. And only under this description are we capable of feeling in any meaningful way social emotions like gratitude, love, hate, contempt, or even equanimity. Until we recognize the

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functional category of acts, in other words, we cannot begin to understand humans or the human life world. Interpretation When we say that we understand an action, we mean that we see its end, or purpose, as well as why the actor, intending that end, has judged the means she is em ploying likely to succeed. When we say that we do not understand an action, we may mean that we do not understand the end intended – we do not ‘see the point’ – or that we do not see why the actor expects the means she has chosen to succeed. Unless the actor is utterly deranged, and perhaps even then, our inability to understand is, in other words, an inability to imagina tively enter into the life world of the actor. For to understand another person is quite literally to ‘stand’ in their place and see the world from their point of view. Any point of view is what we have already called a relativ natu¨rlich Weltanschauung, or a worldview natural to a form of life, and, as we have seen, a worldview carves the world up into the life world (lebenswelt, habitus) of that form of life. This point of view, or worldview, is an in terpretation, a way of conceptually organizing what Yi fu Tuan called ‘‘environment.’’ As we saw in the discussion of life world, every child comes to understand the world by seeing it from the point of view of her educators and peers. Thus, if we say, ‘‘I now understand that the world is a dangerous place,’’ we really mean ‘‘I now stand in the position (actually, or vicariously through imagina tion) of a being for whom the world is dangerous.’’ This sort of interpretation we might call primary inter pretation (the poet and critic Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772–34) called it primary imagination). Primary inter pretation makes things (intentional objects) by carving environment into functional categories, producing a life world. (Some humanistic geographers describe this construction of reality as ‘representation’, others call it ‘imagination’.) Efforts to vicariously enter into the life world of another person and imagine what the world looks like from their point of view, can be called secondary interpretation. Humanistic geographers have sometimes reﬂected on their own primary imagination. Autobiographical work such as Yi fu Tuan’s Who Am I?, Richard Francaviglia’s Believing in Place, and Edmund Bunkse’s Geography and the Art of Life are good examples. But humanistic geographers far more frequently employed secondary interpretation (or imagination) to enter the life worlds of other people. The ﬁrst thing to observe about secondary interpret ation is that it is not an esoteric skill. As social creatures, humans naturally seek to understand other humans; and as psychologist Michael Tomasello has argued, their ability to understand is the basis of human culture. Children at a very young age begin to interpret the

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behavior of other humans by imaginatively entering into the intention that guides the action. My baby girl, for instance, does not simply observe me doing something, such as picking up toys and putting them in a basket; she observes me trying to accomplish something, in this case trying to clean up the room. As Michael Tomasello ob serves, we know this because she doesn’t simply mimic my behavior; she tries to help me reach the end I have in mind (a clean room), which she has interpreted from my behavior (which she correctly describes as an action). Throughout her life she will continue to interpret the external signs of other people’s mental states and inten tions. This is why, although one may speak of the in vention of the scientiﬁc method, and say with truth that there are peoples without science, one cannot say the same of the interpretive method. Interpretation that follows formal rules is hermen eutics, a method of understanding ﬁrst developed to permit systematic exegesis of the Bible and later ex tended to cover other verbal and nonverbal artifacts. Humanistic geography developed in the hermeneutic tradition begun by Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768 1834). Unlike earlier hermeneutics, where the goal had been to discover the objective meaning of words in an cient texts (written in dead languages and dialects), Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics said that interpreters must seek to understand the context in which the word was originally written and had its original sense. As Wilhelm Dilthey put it in 1900, understanding is the ‘‘process by which an inside is conferred on a complex of external sensory signs,’’ this ‘‘inside’’ being ‘‘that psychic reality’’ of which ‘‘the signs given to our senses’’ are ‘‘the expression.’’ This idea of secondary interpretation as a means to understand, or vicariously inhabit, an alien life world is at the heart of the work of the great culture historian, Jacob Burckhardt (1818–97); of Dilthey’s Geisteswissenschaften, or science of the spirit; and of Weber’s interpretive sociology. Humanistic geographers followed these thinkers in the belief that scholarship consists of what the anthropologist Clifford Geertz famously described as ‘‘our constructions of other people’s constructions.’’ There are two reasons why humanistic scholars be lieve that we should exercise secondary interpretation and attempt imaginative entry into the life world of alien people. The ﬁrst is that understanding is a prerequisite to explaining ‘human’ behavior. Because humans act ‘with something in mind’, it behooves the scholar to ﬁnd out just what it is they have in mind. (Some scientists of course believe behavior can be more than adequately explained without reference to unobservable entities like ‘belief ’ and ‘mind’.) Among humanistic geographers, Leonard Guelke may have made this point most clearly in his argument for ‘idealist’ explanations of rational human behavior. Guelke’s idealism was epistemological,

not ontological, for his idealist approach proposed a method to explain human actions, and to choose from among all possible interpretations of an act the inter pretation that is most probably correct. Guelke proposed that we have explained an action ‘‘when the thought behind the action has been understood.’’ And this thought behind the action has been understood when we see ‘‘the sense of an action,’’ when we grasp ‘‘the intention of the agent’’ and ‘‘the theoretical ideas that were em ployed by the agent in the interpretation of his situation.’’ This is secondary interpretation, as described above. But this alone is not enough, for any discrete action will admit to multiple interpretations. When confronted with more than one interpretation of an act, Guelke stated that we should choose the one that is most plausible because most consistent with the general character and known overall intentions of the actor. Unless there is strong objective evidence indicating that the actor, in this instance, acted out of character or contrary to his normal interests, the interpretation con sistent with ‘a large number of actions’ is to be preferred. For example, in a 1988 article Wilbur Zelinsky inter preted the welcome signs that stand beside the highway on the outskirts of so many American small towns as gestures intended to afﬁrm the individuality and signiﬁ cance of the town in the face of homogenizing mass so ciety. He then argued that this interpretation was plausible because consistent with other contemporary legible artifacts, such tee shirts, pins, and bumper stick ers, all of which made sense as expressions of fear and resentment in the face of dehumanizing anonymity. The second reason humanistic scholars believe that one should exercise secondary interpretation, and at tempt imaginative entry into the life world of alien people, is that this is a humanizing exercise that quite literally ‘broadens the mind’. The basic notion is this. Any particular person represents a possible way of being human, one possible primary interpretation of what it means to be human. This interpretation may, in unusual cases, be unique to the individual, but is in most cases characteristic of the individual’s period, place, and social role. In any such interpretation certain human possi bilities, of activity, character, emotion, and intellect, are realized in a very high degree, while others are atrophied or absent. Thus, every way of human being (every period, every culture, etc.) has its excellences and its defects. Some are energetic, some contemplative, some courage ous, some benevolent, etc. By vicariously entering into the life world of another person, particularly another person from another period, place, or social role, an in dividual becomes, as Dilthey put it, more ‘rounded’, more conscious of his or her full ‘humanity’. Continuing with the theme of humanistic education as a means to soften the excesses and supply the defects of one’s own age (place, social role, personality), Dilthey continued:

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‘‘inasmuch as the exegete [interpreter] projects his own sense of life into another historical milieu, he is able within that perspective to strengthen and emphasize certain spiritual processes in himself and to minimize others.’’ The classic defense of a humanities education is this broadening of the mind by imaginative entry into alien life worlds, by way of history, literature, or hu manistic anthropology and geography. Such an education is also called liberal because it promises to liberate the individual from the narrow conﬁnes of one life world, and grant her something closer to the full range of human experience. Dilthey stated that we approach the inside of an alien life world by way of ‘external sensory signs’ that are ‘given to our senses’. These signs are, like any symbols, pointers, in this case pointing to an invisible ‘psychic reality’. Humanistic geographers ﬁrst found such signs in the cultural landscape. As Pierce Lewis stated it in a famous attempt at a landscape hermeneutic, written in 1979, everything in the human landscape has ‘cultural meaning’ (culture here equivalent to relativ natu¨rlich Weltanschauung). Landscape is, indeed, ‘‘our unwitting autobiography, reﬂecting our tastes, our values, our as pirations, and even our fears in tangible, visible form.’’ To interpret a landscape was imaginatively to enter this psychic reality, this life world of tastes, values, aspi rations, and fears. Humanistic geographers also interpreted represen tations of landscapes and places that they found in lit erature, paintings, and other media, once again seeking imaginative entry into the world of the author or artist who produced the work. As Douglas Pocock expressed it in 1981, ‘‘the novelist has the gift of articulating our own articulations,’’ and of deepening our ‘‘insight into place.’’ They are particularly skilled, not so much in vivid world paintings of the visible scene, as in evocation of place in ‘experiential terms’ such as ‘security, stability, and belonging’ and ‘boredom, drudgery, and entrapment’.

life worlds that humans have experienced worthy of imaginative re experience. The dignity of humanity makes this sort of secondary interpretation intrinsically good, whether or not is good for anything else. Under standing of this sort is not a powerful instrument like scientiﬁc knowledge. Being able to imagine (however imperfectly) what it was like to be a Franciscan Friar in the thirteenth century no doubt remedies a defect in most modern personalities, and is conducive to a more ‘rounded’ human being, but it does not help one to ma nipulate genetic material, computer code, election re turns, public opinion, or anything else that people wish to manipulate in the world today. Humanistic study is not, in other words, a means to power; and as any student of humanity knows, the appetite for power is much stronger than the appetite for understanding. This is why humanistic geography will normally be a minor theme in the ﬁeld, secondary to instrumental geographies that work, philanthropically or misan thropically, to enhance the power of some segment of humanity. And humanistic geography itself will, for this same reason, tend to devolve to mere social science, theorizing, explaining, and manipulating the life worlds that the humanistic geographer hopes only to understand. By the end of the 1990s the interpretive methods of humanistic geography began to loose ground to the in strumental rationality of applied geography and geoin formatics. Humanistic geography itself was touched by this will to (political) power, and evolved into the ‘new cultural geography’. The legacy of humanistic geography remains, nevertheless, everywhere apparent, in a wide spread recognition of the importance of meaning, the individual, the particular, and interpretive method ologies. And there are more than a few humanistic geographers at work today, as can be seen in books such as Textures of Place: Exploring Humanist Geographies.

Humanistic Geography Today

Humanism places humanity in the position an earlier age (and contemporary theists) reserve for God. It asserts that humans should praise, study, and serve humanity, not God. Christian critics of secular humanism have always condemned this apotheosis as idolatry (however much they valued and served human beings on other grounds), but with rare exception the major currents of Western through for the past two centuries have honored and gloriﬁed the human spirit, or labored to ameliorate the human condition. Recently, however, there has been talk of post humanism. As is the case with most titles that begin with the preﬁx ‘post’, post humanism is not a uniﬁed movement but a set of movements that repudiate humanism, albeit for different reasons and without

The purpose of the humanities is to aid us in what has been called secondary interpretation, so that we may become more fully human by imagining what it is like to see the world through alien eyes. The humanities are our means to know what it is like to be someone other than ourselves, to look out upon the world from a time, place, or social position other than our own. When this is the purpose of geographic teaching and writing, geography is properly a humanity, or humanistic geography. Such an exercise is worth our effort if we presume that humans are possessed of a certain incorrigible dignity, since it is this dignity that makes the endlessly varied

Post-Humanism? Post-Humanistic Geography?

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agreeing on much else. Three such movements are es pecially important. The ﬁrst might be called neo Augustinian thought, for like the bishop of Hippo it has a very low opinion of the natural moral character of human beings. Pointing to the horriﬁc barbarity of the twentieth century, as well as contemporary examples, it observes that there is nothing particularly praiseworthy or digniﬁed in these exhibitions of ‘humanity’ and ‘the human spirit’. Humanism, they as sert, is a delusion of the liberal’s imagination. Humans are worse than half beasts; they are also, evidently, half devils. Deep ecology and radical environmentalism offer a different reason to repudiate humanism. They condemn humanism for grossly exaggerating the difference be tween humans and other species, and for privileging human needs, to the detriment of other species and the environment as a whole. Just as humanists replaced the theocentric universe with an anthropocentric universe, so these environmentalists propose to replace the anthro pocentric universe with an ecocentric universe. Antiessentialism is the third major position from which humanism is today criticized. This is because humanism sought to overcome the particularities of creed and culture with an appeal to universal human values. Antiessentialists condemn this cosmopolitanism as cultural imperialism, and dispute the premise of a uni versal human nature on which it rests. The concept of the human is, for these critics, something imposed on the autonomous and self creating members of our protean species as a discipline, and not some essence or re mainder that persists after all accidents of history and culture have been removed. Obviously, the character of any post humanistic geo graphy will depend on the reason the author of that geography has repudiated humanism. Neo Augustinian geography would, presumably, jettison all talk of moral progress as historicist myth, and peer pessimistically into a bleak future where human half devils prey upon one another with ever more lethal technology. Environ mentalist geography of a post humanist sort will have to rationalize abandonment of amelioration of the human condition as the overriding goal of human inquiry, and develop misanthropic doctrines to undermine anthro pocentrism. Antiessentialists are already at work in geography, but have ahead of them the formidable challenge of explaining why, if difference is truly radical, anyone is obliged to respect or tolerate that difference (how, in other words, if there is no human there can be a human right). Post humanism is not ﬂattering or at tractive, but this should not surprise us: it is hardly

pleasant to be pulled from the throne of God just as we were growing accustomed to it. See also: Affect; Christian Geography; Cosgrove, D.; Cultural Studies and Human Geography; Culture; Diaries (Video, Audio or Written); Dwelling; Emotional Knowing; Existentialism/Existential Geography; Film; Habitus; Home; Jackson, P.; Landscape; Landscape Iconography; Landscape Perception; Literature; Meinig, D.; Memorials and Monuments; Memory; Movies and Films, Analysis of; Oral History; Participant Observation; Philosophy and Human Geography; Place; Poverty; Semiotics; Space I; Structurationist Geography; Subjectivity; Symbolic Interactionism; Text and Textuality; Tuan, Y.-F.; Urban Representation/Imagination; Wright, J. K.

Further Reading Adams, P. C., Hoelscher, S. and Till, K. E. (eds.) (2001). Textures of Place: Exploring Humanist Geographies. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Buttimer, A. (1991). Geography, humanism, and global concern. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 80(1), 1 33. Buttimer, A. (1993). Geography and the Human Spirit. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Cosgrove, D. and Daniels, S. (eds.) (1988). The Iconography of Landscape: Essays on the Symbolic Representation, Design, and Use of Past Environments. New York: Cambridge University Press. Cresswell, T. (2004). Place: A Short Introduction. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Guelke, L. (1982). Historical Understanding in Geography. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Harris, C. (1971). Theory and synthesis in historical geography. Canadian Geographer 15, 157 172. Ley, D. and Samuels, M. (eds.) (1978). Humanistic Geography: Prospects and Problems. Chicago, IL: Maaroufa Press. Livingstone, D. N. and Harrison, R. T. (1981). Immanuel Kant, subjectivism, and human geography: A preliminary investigation. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 6, 374 395. Meinig, D. W. (ed.) (1979). The Interpretation of Ordinary Landscapes: Geographical Essays. New York: Oxford University Press. Meinig, D. W. (1983). Geography as art. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 8, 314 328. Mugerauer, R. (1995). Interpreting Environments: Tradition, Deconstruction, Hermeneutics. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. Pocock, D. C. D. (1981). Humanistic Geography and Literature. Totowa, NJ: Barnes and Noble. Tuan, Y. (1977). Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Western, J. (1992). A Passage to England: Barbadian Londoners Speak of Home. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Wright, J. K. (1966). Human Nature in Geography. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Zelinsky, W. (1970). Beyond the exponentials: The role of geography in the great transition. Economic Geography 46, 498 535. Zelinsky, W. (1975). The demigod’s dilemma. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 65, 123 143.

Human-Nonhuman E. J. Roe, Southampton University, Southampton, UK & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Assemblages The entanglement of relations that knit together the human and nonhuman. Hybridity It is to recognize that entities straddle modernist divisions of nature and society. Nonhuman It is everything we know to be not human. Ontology It is a term philosophers use to consider the nature of reality. Post-Structural Theory The theories that critique a structural understanding of society, and the categories that were established by structural thought. Relational Ontology It is understanding the world as produced through a state of relations.

Introducing the Human-Nonhuman in ‘Human’ Geography Human nonhuman: an awkward term but in its ‘hyphen’ contains the theoretical and empirical challenge to think about how humans are dependent in numerous ways upon the group of ‘things’ we know to be ‘not’ human or nonhuman. So this term is not about an opposition be tween human and nonhuman but rather about human and nonhuman relations. What is the relationship be tween human and nonhumans like? In thinking about this relationship we start to recognize that complex con nections between humans and nonhumans exist; these connections necessitate a need to recognize the for mation of hybrid entities, for these connections are fun damental to how an entity is known and what is done with it. Hybrid entities in this human geography context straddle any division between human and nonhuman, like the politically signiﬁcant entity produced when a human is driving a car, the ethically signiﬁcant entity produced when an African elephant lives in a British zoo, and the elephant is no longer ‘in the wild’ but living in a human fashioned world. These hybrids are working collectives, or the term we will use – assemblages. Human nonhu man assemblages co constitute each other. Consequently, these human nonhuman assemblages indicate a critical rethinking of the category ‘human’. In human geography the study of ‘human nonhuman’ attends to how living with nonhumans conﬁgures the human, but equally about how living with humans con ﬁgures the nonhuman. Nonhumans include every non human ‘thing’ in the spectrum from nature through to technology – from carrots, chickens, and trees to

prosthetic limbs, autopoetic processes (self creating processes), and microbes. The nonhuman category is thus very broad, which means the potential for conceiving of human nonhuman assemblages is equally broad and ex pansive. The term ‘assemblages’ is shorthand for the entity conceived when one takes seriously the nonhuman challenge to the category of human. For what results is an assemblage of human and nonhuman things that col lectively perform a role. Underpinning the studies of human nonhuman assemblages is relational thinking, or what can be termed a relational ontology. Ontology is a term philosophers use to consider the nature of reality; here it is used to understand the world as the production of a set of relations. Thus, the critical analysis of the human within a relational ontology goes as far as to recognize the agency of nonhumans in the world, chal lenging human supremacy and relinquishing human au tonomy, and consequently human rationality as a range of nonhuman actors, such as mobile phones, adverts, and white line road markings appear intrinsic for how we communicate with our family and friends; seduce us to buy one top designer brand over another; and order our driving behavior to the extent that our embeddedness within this world of nonhuman also deﬁnes who we are and how we perform ourselves. The world without these nonhuman objects and signs would be quite different, arguably could never exist; and yet for a long time, the signiﬁcance to the relationships humans make with them has been overlooked, leaving them out of social analysis. Authors within human geography have drawn upon a range of philosophical thinkers to help them think about human relations with nonhuman things. A particularly popular approach has been to conceive the politics of how realities are made by working off from a non hierarchical, thus ﬂattened world of socionatural messi ness, as opposed to studying things in themselves or the social construction of nature. This ﬂattened world puts nonhumans and humans on the same plane, that is, not conceiving humans as dominating nonhumans or vice versa. Importantly, this relational thinking has con sequences for how we understand the process of knowl edge creation and activities that go with this. The interest is in how, if one assumes no hierarchy, one can aware of how through practice relations humans and nonhumans become ‘made and stabilized’; it offers a way to explain how ‘hierarchies’ become guidelines about how to act in particular contexts. Human nonhuman assemblages co produce knowledge of the world within all spheres of life from the scientiﬁc to the everyday; in which case there is

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always more to know and understand about the world, but that process of human knowledge creation moves with humans’, animals’, and insects’ investigative poten tial and inert nonhumans changing abilities to facilitate this process as human techniques and nonhuman cap acities co evolve. Human geography’s prime interest in studying human nonhuman assemblages is driven by three con cerns: ﬁrst, attention to human/environment relations; second, to human/technical relations, including that of the biotechnological; and third (which relates to the other two), post structuralist theorizations of nature/society relations that breakdown the modernist division between the stuff of nature and the stuff of society and associated divisions, such as the mind and the body. The article discusses each of these areas in further detail. Geography has historically always been attentive to human/environment relations, both in physical geog raphy and human geography. Until recently, the Berkeley School of cultural geography is perhaps the exception to Western geography’s exclusion of the study of nonhu mans in human geography. Carl Sauer’s 1927 work on the cultural production of landscapes, positioned among the disciplines of archaeology, anthropology, and traditional cultural geography, was interested in the domestication of plants and animals. Although these studies adopted a very different tack to the study of nonhumans than the one on which this article is focused upon. In short, the current attention to human nonhuman can be seen as a consequence of a three stage shift of focus to Western geographical studies of relationships humans make with the natural environment, from initially, one based on the study of humans in different environments to secondly, one of a study of the human impact on the environment to thirdly, one of a study of how human’s co constitute environments (more involved than physical geography’s interest in interactions). Environments consist of non human things such as trees, tower blocks, and ants, and processes such as soil and water erosion, ageing bodies, and metabolism. So, for example, if we consider livestock or food animals as nonhumans, the question has shifted away from how do humans farm food animals in different places? The question instead becomes how do humans breed food animals (or in other words genetically select along a technological spectrum of increasing genetic precision) to be suitable for different environments within commercial requirements? This question leads us to consider how this question overlaps with another geographical interest pertinent to the study of human nonhuman assemblages, the study of humans’ relationship with technology, including the biotechnological. Sociologists of science and technology have been particularly inﬂuential in turning to human nonhuman assemblages as explanatory devices. Arguably, the most inﬂuential have been the actor network theo

rists (see section below for further details) who have argued that the capacity for a human to perform a role, for example, like being an academic, is reliant upon being part of a network of a range of human and nonhuman actors. If you took away colleagues, ofﬁce, computer, telephone, books, and desk, an academic wouldn’t be an academic writing papers, delivering lectures, and pro ducing ‘knowledge’. In the current age, our dependence on the mobile phone is perhaps a reminder that what we do and how we feel and communicate is mediated through technology, which appears increasingly embed ded into how we know others and ourselves. Also, there are those whose mobility is facilitated through having a prosthetic limb or whose life can be understood as a consequence of a human egg being fertilized in vitro, where being a human nonhuman is perhaps more starkly apparent. The third area of geographical concern in human nonhuman is in the development of post structuralist theorizations of the stuff of nature and the stuff of society which works to break down modernist binary divisions, strongly inﬂuenced by the Enlightenment values that underpinned what was known by placing them in strict nature and society categories. Margaret Fitzsimmon’s argument for the ‘matter of nature’ to be taken seriously has been very inﬂuential on the various directions non human geographies of nature have taken onboard and developed post structural thinking. Her work initiated greater analytic attention to the material qualities of the nonhuman, and the consequent material relations and material connectivities generated with humans, and has since become one of the more popular approaches for understanding human nonhuman assemblages. Some materialists taking what has been termed a neo Marxist perspective have approached nature as (re) constituted by humans, consequently casting nonhumans as social nature. This has allowed them to differentiate the category of nonhumans into those modernity would categorize as natural, such as plants and animals, and those deemed never to have been of nature, such as computers. However, this approach perhaps runs into problems as technological advances produce unfathom able assemblages that seem so unnatural, yet also re semble the ‘natural’ at some level: for example, Petri dish grown meat – is it natural or unnatural? Maybe it de pends upon the context in which you are being shown the meat. Deﬁning this meat, as social nature, does not help to explain the implications of what has been created; so how can it be named and categorized? It is these types of problems that have driven another group of materialists to argue that the term ‘nature’ has become analytically outdated as it is appreciated that what is nature is culturally speciﬁc and this has always been so. The term ‘naturecultures’ has been developed in recognition of this insight. This group has grappled with

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the ‘materiality’ of nonhumans to conceive of human nonhuman material connectivities in what has been termed a ‘post natural’ world; this has included a revival of biogeography as a subdiscipline that potentially could engage both cultural human and physical geographies. Yet, a criticism of this group is perhaps that it delves and pokes its way through layers of materialities and assem blages, and yet will only declare speciﬁcities. For it stepping back, leaving the event, and presenting a general picture will always be an impossibility – the world is too messy for reporting such imprecision. Without doubt for both neo Marxist writers and naturecultures writers, the contribution of a symmetrical relation between the nat ural and the social, by actor network theorists, has held much promise in reconceiving the world in nonhuman, materialist terms, and has offered thought provoking analytical takes on human nonhuman assemblages.

Key Theorists of the Human-Nonhuman The following section summarizes some important the orists for human geography’s study of human nonhuman assemblages. Sociologists of science, Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, and John Law, developed actor network theory (ANT), a set of methodological habits, a toolkit rather than a theory, with the intention to write the world anew by rewriting the ‘constitution’ of Western knowledge. For geographers, this theory has been particularly interesting because it breaks down the modernist distinctions be tween humans and nonhumans, and nature and culture, through conceiving materially heterogeneous associ ations between human and nonhuman entities to produce a network constituted through the links rather than the nodes of its making. Agency in the world is operated through the durability of these actor networks found in the links, the associations rather than the nodes. The durability of these actor networks is strengthened in the circulation of ‘immutable mobiles’ – devices, types of people, animals, money, and so on, which make these networks last. ANT has enabled geographers to study the nonhuman without falling back on its representations, instead by studying the practices that mobilize it, that enact it. For actor network theorists’, space is conceived topologically as opposed to topographically, or in other words, geometric space is collapsed and folded by the agency of technology. Technologies such as mobile phones, televisions, and satellites bring the previously distant places near; consequently, a topological map would look very different from a topographical map. Science studies provoked much of the development of ANT. Bruno Latour begun by discussing the work of Louis Pasteur to show how scientists build heterogeneous (the opposite of homogenous) networks made up of

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different entities and resources that combine in a way to spread scientiﬁc facts and artifacts. Latour indicated how Pasteur became the spokesperson for a crowd of invisible, dangerous forces able to strike anywhere – namely, the microbes – through interpreting their behavior and knowing how to control them. He goes on to consider in his book We have never been modern the impact of scientiﬁc methods and how they have rationalized and puriﬁed how we understand the world through the dominance of science, consequently separating culture from nature and humans from other things (see Figure 1). Indeed, Latour observed that alongside these purifying processes is the creation of hybrids where science and policy, and nature and culture are mixed together; the presence of hybrids, make it increasingly difﬁcult to keep up the purifying demands of modernity. He moves to look toward how we can accept the connections between nature and culture in his book The Politics of Nature, where he explains how to bring the sciences into democracy, or in other words for the ‘authority’ of science to be challenged by arguing for cultural speciﬁcity, for the hybrid entities produced, and thus for the crisis of objectivity that ensues in scientiﬁc practice. He sees this as a way for social scientists to be better equipped for critically engaging with scientiﬁc practice, and more to the point asserting the view ‘we have never been modern’, through indicating how, behind the scientiﬁc puriﬁcation machine, there are many con nections between humans and nonhumans that illustrate a range of cultures within scientiﬁc practice. These ideas have been extremely inﬂuential in sup porting the development of ideas in geography around human nonhuman, initiating studies of scientiﬁc practice, and a range of other research areas such as food and agriculture to acknowledge an entanglement between nature and society. The clumsy and imprecise attempts to diagnose bovine tuberculosis in cattle is one such ex ample of a nonhuman geography where the playfulness of nonhuman materialities in the form of the Myco bacterium bovis virus continues to object to scientists’ at tempts to develop a conclusive test for the disease; not forgetting the governments, industry, farmers, cattle, and badgers who are held in a dance of trade restrictions, compensation payments, mass culls, and increased public concern in the meantime. Donna Haraways’s conceptualization of human non human is located within embodied, human subjectivities that lead her to ask ‘what counts as human?’: this is a question examined in her work on the cyborg and on companion species. Notably, as a feminist science writer, she engages more fully with the bodily dimensions than Bruno Latour; she infuses her reading of technoscience – her term that politicizes the techniques of making science – with an eye for how the borders of bodies are being challenged. For example, Donna Haraway’s cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a fusion of the organic and the

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Human-Nonhuman Nonhumans nature

Humans culture

Work of purification

Work of translation

Hybrids networks

Figure 1 Latour’s ‘puriﬁcation and translation’. Redrawn from Latour, B. (1993). We Have Never Been Modern (trans. Porter, C.), 11p. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

machinic forged within particular historical and cultural practices, for example, working on a computer or talking to a friend through a mobile phone. What emerges from Haraway’s work is a close working of the pathways that enmesh humans and nonhumans together through the technobiological, boundaries are poorly deﬁned, and this challenges the assumptions of what is a subject and what is an object. She has a vision of connection for everything. More recently, she has turned her attention to com panion species, namely, the dog, as she has conceived of a ﬂeshy, biological entanglement of connections between human and nonhuman animals. This point moves the discussion on to consider other authors who have been inﬂuential in how to understand embodied human non humans in less scientiﬁc and rather more everyday engagements. von Uexku¨ll’s ‘umwelt’ still continues to be a resource for conceiving ethologically the relations between lively, animate nonhumans and the environment, or more spe ciﬁcally the world of the animal. Reacting against the mechanistic biology of the day, von Uexku¨ll argued that to treat the animal as a mere assemblage of sensory and motor organs is to leave out the subject who uses these organs as tools, respectively, of perception and action. The animal is conceived as a living being in active re lations with their lifeworld; or in other words, each living thing inhabits sensorially a world constituted by the speciﬁc life of that animal. Tim Ingold has elaborated von Uexku¨ll’s work to apply this thinking to studies of human worlds, which following this line of thinking become human nonhuman assemblages, as humans through sen sation and movement perceive and act in relation to what is meaningful around them. Consequently, Ingold’s en vironment is alive, interactive, and world making; em bodied life forms with speciﬁc capacities enmesh with features of the environment to form speciﬁc worlds. This work has given geography the opportunity to explore

how the speciﬁcities of embodiment in particular places enact subjectivities in particular ways; a variety of em bodied performances equaling multiple worlds can be witnessed as you move between the activities of people, animals, plants, and insects in a given space. Each body is in the process of making and responding to what is sig niﬁcant for it in that place. von Uexku¨ll and Ingold are not so interested in materiality but more focused on sensate, moving bodies. In contrast, there are other writers who have focused on materiality as the meta physical bind between humans and nonhumans. This work appreciates materiality as the stuff that animates and enchants, dismissing the puriﬁcation and rational ization processes of science, like the materialities affected and affecting the M. Bovis virus which still evades rational scientistic techniques for capturing it. The political theorist Jane Bennett, one of these writers, writes of a matter that has a liveliness, resilience, unpredictability, or recalcitrance that in itself is a source of wonder for us. This enchanted materialism ﬁnds its ancient counterpart in the atomism of Epicurus and Lucretius. Lucretian physics described a universe of atoms forever falling in a void of space; these primordial materialities, at unpredictable times and in unpredictable directions, ‘swerve’ slightly from their downward paths and bump into each other. The Lucretian ‘swerve’ or clinamen, in contemporary writing, stands as a meta physical ﬁgure for the unruly, surprising, exciting un predictability of the world of materialities. This rainfall of atoms weaves unusual connections and molds unusual events in and among humans and nonhumans. Michel Serres offers new prepositions and motifs like – the angel, the parasite – that conjure up the liminal spacings be tween human and nonhuman – to grasp these complex conﬁgurations and alliances between humans and non humans. Jane Bennett’s work gives us the opportunity to become familiar again with a nonmodern world, a world

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which bursts with creativity and unlikely alliances through the chance of the swerve. Jane Bennett draws on the philosophies of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari to sketch out the processes that draw humans and nonhumans to make new futures, new becomings. The vitalist philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari has offered not only a way to grasp the processes that bind humans and nonhumans together, but also the signiﬁcance of spatiality and temporality to the mode of interaction that they conceptualize as a ‘becoming’. Their concept of ‘becoming’ facilitates an engagement with this world ever in a state of ﬂux, ﬂows, and insubstantial borders. These ﬂimsy, less tenuous, and unstable con nections between things in the world and humans be come more accessible through their philosophy; attention can then be paid to how human nonhuman assemblages appear to have a degree of permanence, for example, a building. For, in fact, a building is always on a trajectory of becoming derelict as overtime a building materially decays from changing weather conditions and day to day use, but human intervention in the form of constant re pair and maintenance enables an appearance of stability and constancy, by intervening in the tendency to decay. In a different expression of becoming, human gestures can take on a ‘becoming animal’ as the sensibility of a human improvises dog friendliness by letting a dog lick their face. Lastly, Deleuze and Guattari’s contribution of the rhizome metaphor is an antidote to the arboreal enlightenment ﬁgure. The rhizome is not as strictly ﬂattening as the Latourian ‘ﬂat ontology’, yet still it does not support a vertiginous hierarchy but instead em phasizing horizontal depths between humans and humans, nonhumans and nonhumans, and nonhumans and humans, thereby offering a way to giving a rich texture to what lies between these entities. One way to explain this is: the rhizome like a potato has nodules growing out on all sides that enables it to spread rapidly horizontally, not vertically (like the enlightenment ‘tree’ motif).

The Human-Nonhuman in Recent Geographical Writing Both human geographical and physical geographical re search programs often straddle the modernist worlds of nature and society. The animal and other nonhuman geography research that has emerged lately has worked off from these critical intellectual post structuralist im pulses (discussed above) and the broader shifts in the social and political landscape associated with post modernity. A consistent theme through this work is the greater consideration for the ethics and politics of the treatment of the human nonhuman in everyday, regu latory, and commercial contexts. The autonomous human

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self in various contexts becomes increasingly tenuous as human nonhuman assemblages or entities take on new political and ethical meaning. Indeed, the new realities, or constellations, of humans and nonhumans force new ways of thinking in a range of spheres of everyday life. Geographers have offered theoretical approaches for reconﬁguring politics and ethics in the entanglement of human, environment, and animal relations to help understand and support these challenges. With this has come the innovation of methodologies to support the study of the nonhuman, with the aim to remain faithful to a relational world. Geographers have made a signiﬁcant contribution to the theories previously discussed by subjecting them to spatial analysis. Jonathan Murdoch outlined the impli cations for geography’s conceptualization of space and time if one studied space through drawing upon ANT. For him, space and spacings become a networked achievement through heterogeneous associations be tween humans and nonhumans, whether technology or life forms. Geography thus becomes the study of asso ciations or networks since ANT is less interested in time and space, but more in the unique acts of ‘spacing’ and ‘timing’, acts that are conducted through associations of various kinds. The challenge for geographers becomes to not only take a relational view of space but also that spatial relations are seen as network relations. Within the network domain, spatial scale is reconceptualized as a network achievement, while networks are reconceptua lized as ‘heterogeneous engineering’ – that is, processes of network building in which entities of various kinds are assembled in ways that allow networks to undertake certain functions. Geographical analysis responds through taking on board the following methodological points: follow the actors as they stitch networks together, observe what is linked to what, and assess how power ﬂows up and down from centers to peripheries and back again. Another geographer, Sarah Whatmore, in her book Hybrid Geographies ﬂeshes out precisely what the ‘ethical political’ might mean in a world of actor networks. Criticizing anthropocentric traditions of political rea soning, she argues for how prions, cows, microchips, prosthetics, growth hormones, and elephants and other ‘actants’ might ﬁgure as political subjects. In effect, she seeks to recast bordered distinctions as the contingent outcome of networks of relations among the hetero geneous actors of a more than human world. Moving beyond a Latourian ANT framing, she draws upon con ceptual resources including, of those already discussed, the biophilosophical resources of Deleuze and Guattari and Donna Haraway to try to energize through bodily material fashioning human nonhuman assemblages. Through this conceptual work, ‘lively geographies’ are mapped out that bring organic life into human geographical study at such a

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level that a new meaning of the term ‘biogeography’ starts to ﬁnd new currency in geographical thought. Bio geography reaches into the realm of physical geography study and indicates how the subject of physical geography and human geography can overlap, if not quite in meth odological terms. Bruce Braun, David Demeritt, and Noel Castree’s work seeks to understand nature as inescapably and in trinsically social. These authors write extensively about the epistemological conundrum of the term ‘nature’, but give much less attention to the human nonhuman, as their studies have focused more on human relations with social nature, whether in terms of temperate rainforests, climate, or following Marxist nature as a resource. Interestingly, human nonhuman has been mobilized conceptually more by geographical writers who have faced methodological and ontological crises as they have tried to study non human geographies. When faced with one’s own glaring humanness, it has become a way to engage more satisfy ingly with nonhumans, by recognizing that we humans are always with them. The conclusion mentions some examples of empirical studies in which theories of human nonhuman have been pursued in response to methodological challenges. The nonhumans discussed below do not reside only in what would be known as social nature, but equally include nonhuman technology such as cars. Geographical studies of nonhuman animals have ranged through different types of animals, from do mesticated pets to animals reared for commercial reasons to animals living in the world. Chris Philo and Chris Wilbert’s book Animal Spaces, Beastly Places seeks to treat animals as another social group. This has been ap proached in various ways through a study of the social practices and meanings which shape relationships with animals, the wider social concern about the treatment of animals as new political movements have developed, and the inclusion of animals within the wider set of social actors in the practical business of everyday social life. Animal geography has become another force to critically open up the human in human geography for critical scrutiny. Jamie Lorimer’s work on the charisma of nonhuman animals (from the stag beetle to the Corncrake bird) conﬁgures in different ways the cultural practices of modern conservation networks. Steve Hinchliffe asks what is the space for nonhumans? What is the nonhuman space? His argument for an ecologized politics (as op posed to a politicized ecology which he has argued has representational credentials) provides scope for a cos mopolitics, which moves away from an undifferentiated ﬂow between humans and nonhumans, and instead seeks to look for entanglements between humans and nonhu mans to make the nonhuman multiple in an ecologized politics of difference. He examines how the water vole is

enacted into the world through vole writing – how we know the water vole – and the struggle for the world of water vole to be included politically in conservation debates. This is part of a larger argument about cosmo politics. Cosmopolitics means directly letting in the dynamism of political subjectivities rather than having organizational bodies do the representing for them. This requires an ability to listen to the vagueness of the epi stemic thing (whether the water vole or the M. Bovis virus) in science and politics: Hinchliffe following phi losopher, Isabelle Stengers, argues that this is what makes good science. Through listening to the nonhuman as colleagues in the process of producing knowledge, new knowledges are made possible. If we do this, Hinchliffe argues, it becomes possible to learn how things matter to humans and nonhumans by working with an ontological politics that enables them to object to our ways of knowing them, to intervene in our processes as much as we intervene in their processes. Nick Bingham’s work focuses on the plurality of nonhumans. He calls on us to focus on being bodies that are in the midst of things like bees, butterﬂies, and bac teria, and that humans and nonhumans collectively have a capacity to be threatened by events like genetic modiﬁ cation. He criticizes those who recognize entities as linked, and instead calls for conceiving human and non human beings as open to and with others. For Bingham, the human nonhuman becomes a motif for a cosmopoli tical position of being with others and asking questions like ‘how many are we?’ Moving onto non animal nonhumans, other geog raphers are engaging more closely with the material and the bodily in apprehending human nonhuman assem blages. Emma Roe has explored human nonhuman in the context of embodied food consumption practices. Like Sarah Whatmore, by engaging in the material ﬂows that move through human and nonhuman bodies in the agro food network, she has found a way to engage with the metabolic, intimacy that is intrinsic to shared, corporeal material ﬂows. This has methodologically led to a focus on embodied practices rather than discourse analysis, and to grasp the spacings and timings of the material ﬂows of nonhuman foodstuff as it is prepared, consumed, and digested by humans. Russell Hitching reveals the agency of plants in the garden as forces of enchantment, bringing about a shift to a different kind of gardening practice and ethical attachment to nature. Moving toward the technological, Gail Davies has developed hybrid geographies as a concept for investi gating and intervening in the cultures of nature, exper tise, and ethical debate, which accompany changing practices in the life sciences. Her work on xeno transplantation has illustrated how human nonhumans entities, produced by scientiﬁc knowledges, provoke a range of responses from humor to alarm in the general

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public. She argues that these lay or nonexpert knowl edges engage with the implications of emerging bio technologies at a sophisticated and complex level. How ever, human nonhuman entities in contemporary times do not necessarily take such immediately alarming forms. Pete Merriman has shown how different nonhuman media and technical devices articulate particular programs of governance through the agency they hold within human nonhuman networks. Cars, the contents of the Highway Code, and road markings and signs are just some non humans with whom humans are very frequently forming assemblages. Today, humans have become so used to forming human nonhuman assemblages with cars that there is no humor or horror about the prospect of car travel anymore.

Prospects This overview of how the human nonhuman has become a signiﬁcant area of study for human geographers indi cates its wider relevance both to understandings of human/environment relations and human/technological relations, and approaches for theorizing what happens when the borders between the natural and the social are removed and human nonhuman assemblages loom into view. As commented at the outset, tackling the category of the human nonhuman assemblage is not only a way for thinking critically about studying the nonhuman but also equally challenges ways of studying humans, thus it continually demands theoretical and empirical con sideration in a number of research arenas, and not only those in human geography but also equally for physical geographers and the wider realm of natural science and engineering. Indeed, examples are increasing of natural scientists acknowledging how their accounts of the ‘nat ural’ world can be democratized by including the methodologies and insights from human geographers specializing in human/environment relations to ﬁnd a new way of doing science together. For example, ﬂood risk modeling research is being tackled using cosmopo litical apparatus as the narratives of nonscientists who experience ﬂooding are heard by hydrologists; the etho logical study of egg laying hen welfare problems is turning to social scientiﬁc approaches to reﬂect appre ciation that hen–stockperson interaction is just as rele vant as hen–hen activity in understanding how welfare problems are manifested; and there is interest in com paring humans and animals as experimental research subjects as a way to raise questions about human welfare in clinical drug trials. Both of these examples illustrate the different questions that are being asked as the borders of nature and society falter, and interdisciplinary ap proaches appear necessary to study the politics, ethics, and existence of human nonhuman assemblages, whether

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the nonhuman is an animal, an alien gene, a vegetable, a human organ, a robot, or an environmental process. See also: Actor-Network Theory/Network Geographies; Animal Geographies.

Further Reading Bennett, J. (2001). The Enchantment of Modern Life. Attachments, Crossings, Ethics. Chicago, IL: Princeton Press. Bingham, N. (2006). Bees, butterﬂies, and bacteria: Biotechnology and the politics of nonhuman friendship. Environment and Planning A 38, 483 498. Braun, B. and Castree, N. (1997). Remaking Reality. Routledge: London. Castree, N. (2003). Environmental issues: Relational ontologies and hybrid politics. Progress in Human Geography 27, 203 211. Davies, G. (2006). The scared and the profane: Biotechnology, rationality and public debate. Environment and Planning A 38(3), 423 444. Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (1986). A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Translation and foreword by Massumi, B.). London: Athlone Press. Fitzsimmons, M. (1989). The matter of nature. Antipode 21, 106 120. Haraway, D. (1996). Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. London: Free Association Books. Haraway, D. (2003). The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People and Signiﬁcant Otherness. Chicago, IL: Prickly Paradigm Press. Hinchliffe, S. (2007). Geographies of Nature. Sage: London. Hinchliffe, S., Degen, M., Kearnes, M. and Whatmore, S. (2005). Urban wild things: A cosmopolitical experiment. Environment and Planning D 23, 643 658. Ingold, T. (2000). The Perception of the Environment: Essays in Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill. London: Routledge. Latour, B. (1993). We Have Never Been Modern (trans. Porter, C.). Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Laurier, E. and Philo, C. (1999). X morphising: Review essay of Bruno Latour’s Aramis, or the love of technology. Environment and Planning A 31(6), 1047 1107. Law, J. (2004). After Method. Mess in Social Science Research. London: Routledge. Lorimer, J. (2007). Nonhuman charisma. Environment and Planning D 25, 911 932. Merriman, P. (2006). ‘Mirror, signal, manoeuvre’: Assembling and governing the motorway driver in late ﬁfties Britain. The Sociological Review 54(supplement 1), 75 92. Murdoch, J. (2006). Post Structuralist Geographies. A Guide to Relational Space. London: Sage. Philo, C. and Wilbert, C. (eds.) (2000). Animal Spaces, Beastly Places. London: Routledge. Roe, E. (2006). Things becoming food and the embodied, material practices of an organic food consumer. Sociologia Ruralis 46, 104 121. Whatmore, S. (1997). Dissecting the autonomous self: Hybrid cartographies for a relational ethics. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 15, 37 53. Whatmore, S. (2002). Hybrid Geographies. London: Sage.

Relevant Websites http://www.lancs.ac.uk/fass/sociology/research/respapers.htm Lancaster University, Sociology Department, Online Papers. http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/habitable cities Open University, Faculty of Social Sciences.

Hybridity D. P. Tolia-Kelly, Durham University, Durham, UK & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Cosmopolitanism It is a way of thinking about people and places, cultural identities, and differences without deferring to ‘national’ categories of cultural identity. Mobility, transnationalism, and translocalness are accepted as part of modern notions of cosmopolitan identity. Cosmopolitanism, as a theory, seeks to disrupt hegemonic ‘nationalisms’ within social science thinking, aiming for an internationalist or postnationalist approach to theory and research. Culture Systems of values and practices which reﬂect collective ways of living. Culture reﬂects relations between humans and nature, economy, and land. Culture is a contested realm of reference in geography, for Marxist geographies culture reﬂects the values of dominant groups within society and for poststructuralists culture is unbounded temporally, geographically, and economically. It operates as a body of thought, performance, or as a singular moment or event. Ethnicity Ethnicity is a way of thinking about cultural difference without deferring to singular notions of culture. Ethnicity is a way of framing categories of human cultures without racial reference, but with an acknowledgement of difference. Ethnicity recognizes geographical, social, and cultural difference as developed through geographical, historical, and economic contexts. Phenotype These are different ‘species’ within colonial taxonomies of racial difference. Each phenotype recorded has a related system of measurements and deﬁnitions, such as shape of skull, skin tone, and sometimes psychological characteristics linked to geography. Race It is a set of culturally signiﬁed categories of human beings differentiated by skin color, bone structure, geographical origin, and more recently genetic science. Categories of racial types have changed in human history, largely reﬂecting the dominant theories of human culture based in the ‘West’.

racial mixing and species miscegenation (namely, the notion of a pure racial group being deﬁled or diluted through interracial intercourse); these fears continue in contemporary society. The assertion of race hierarchy and difference has enabled the exploitation of racial differences for social, cultural, and economic gain, within societies and within frameworks of colonial and imperial governance. The notion of ‘race’ has been challenged in science and cultural theory as being a culturally deter mined category and not a scientiﬁc one. The species of ‘man’ is now regarded as one species, one race, and dif ferentiation in skin tone, skeletal, or other epidemi ological factors are secondary to the acceptance of a singular category of ‘human’. This biological fact however was disputed in medical text books right up until the late 1960s, again as a sign of cultural values rather than sci entiﬁc truth. In contemporary society, although science and evolutionary theory are reconciled, the cultural sphere is loaded with notions of biological difference as being evidence of hierarchies of cultural and social value; a belief in the hierarchies of race is embedded in much economic, social, and cultural laws of governance in both the ‘West’ and ‘other’ regimes of rule, at various scales. Because of the endurance of racism and a belief in hierarchies of difference in the value of differently formed bodies, ‘hybridity’ continues to have resonance for both racist thought and the counter narratives that form part of antiracist strategies, and postcolonial polit ics, including those of scholar Homi Bhabha. ‘Hybrid geographies’ has come to incorporate a raft of new theories and practices within the social and cultural realms, beyond questions of representation and racial identities. These involve new frameworks of thinking through human–nature relationships, in landscape, geo politics, and the evolution of geographical epistemol ogies. The section entitled ‘Productive hybridity’ outlines the ways in which Bhabha’s notions of hybridity have inﬂuenced the conceptual frameworks of thinking. It also considers the subjects that have been engaged with ‘hy bridity’ through attention to questions of overlap between nature and culture divide (including posthuman accounts).

Introduction The Roots of Hybridity The origin of the term hybridity lies in historical scholarship on race and evolutionary theory. It has been used in identifying racial categories and used to assert differentiation between categories of human species. Biological notions of hybrid species have led to fears of

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Hybridity has historical roots in the legacy of colonial science; it has had a signiﬁcant effect on cultural theory and postcolonial theory; however, its meaning has shifted over time. Hybridity has been positioned within recent

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cultural theory as a conceptual device that seeks to dis rupt and critically implode the bases upon which ‘dif ference’ has been articulated in colonial times as well as in the current political, economic, social, and cultural narratives dominant in the everyday. This article’s aim is to trace the genealogy of the term hybridity and work through its value in modern social science thinking. As with much modern geography the textual bases for thinking through hybridity lay in disciplines beyond geography, including the foundations of anthropology, Darwin’s evolutionary science, and cultural studies. However, the theories of hybridity since Enlightenment thinking, as of now, have been operative within the technoscientiﬁc geographical projects of the Royal Geo graphical Society and its militant past.

Human Categorizations of Man and Others In material terms, the effects of the schema employed for the categorization of man and others have been manifold. In the ﬁrst instance, the distinction between white from his other enabled the justiﬁcation of the slave economy. The reasoning here was that if humans were not once singular species of Biblical origins, those others could not be saved. This account was in conﬂict with a Godly ex planation of the world and the species of man and has continued to be a source of contention within scientiﬁc circles. Subsequent processes of dehumanization were faced by these other men racialized and supported by scientiﬁc theory and the technologies of measuring phenotype and cultural savagery. Theodor Waitz, a key anthropologist, claimed in 1859 that ‘‘Wherever the lower races prove useless for the service of white man, they must be abandoned y All wars of extermination, whenever the lower species are in the way of the white man, are not only excusable, but fully justiﬁable.’’ Waitz’s argument exempliﬁes the question of the singularity of the species of man. Hybridity in the eighteenth century was a mode of conceptualizing the biological hybrid, a mixture of two human types (termed species); this is where the notion of a human hybrid emerged. The ‘hybrid’ test was one used to determine whether different race groups were indeed separate species of man. Cultural historian, Robert Young (1995), has argued that ‘‘The use of the term ‘hybridity’ to describe the offspring of humans of different races implied, by contrast, that different races were different species.’’ In biological terms an infertile coupling be tween two ‘races’ was evidence of the incompatibility of different races of White’ and Black human beings. Any evidence or anomalies to this ‘hybridity’ test evidenced that all the species of man was a singular group; as a result, race discourse routed in science was weakened. To

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overcome this, scientists acknowledged that, if there was successful reproduction over several generations, then these deﬁned as separate ‘races’ or ‘species’ were not hybrid at all, but variations of man. In Darwin’s Origins of Species, published in 1859, his chapter on ‘Hybridism’ challenged the infertility rule as not being conclusive, thus reasserting the fact that hu manity may indeed be one single species. This scientiﬁc claim supported the values and beliefs of the antislavery movement. Also central to Darwin’s thesis was a notion of the mobility and dynamism of species as being at the core of evolutionary theory; species evolution rested on or ganisms, including humans being geographically mobile and biologically dynamic in ecological timescales. These ﬁndings challenge much of today’s thinking about bounded identities located in territories that form na tional identities and cultures. In these realms of thought, ‘hybridity’ is a disturbing occurrence, biologically, so cially, and culturally.

Psychoanalytical Theories of Cultural Hybridity In the early twentieth century, theories of the hybrid in Europe and the US could no longer ‘prove’ any differ ence between ‘types’ or categories of race; therefore, arguments about ‘difference’ moved into the realms of racial intellectual and psychological characteristics. Black African writers, such as Frantz Fanon, considered the psychological and sociological consequences of scientiﬁc categories that led to circumstances of colonization and the psyche of the colonized. Both Fanon and W.E.B. Du Bois argue that the colonial stratiﬁcation of humankind into the notion of species in variation effectively dis rupted the psyche and psychological welfare of those classiﬁed as Black or Other. Fanon wanted acknow ledgement and recognition of the deliberate alienation and suppression of self conscious autonomy of the col onized. These factors were believed by Fanon to be in strumental to the aims of racial, scientiﬁc, cultural, and political facets of the colonial project. This suppression was through a subjugation of physical, intellectual, and psychological processes of positive identiﬁcation and expression. As a consequence of his theorization, Fanon advocated the celebration of the essence of other identity as a positive enfranchising and liberating sense of being. This was a political project of Blackness. Fanon fought against Black disenfranchisement from a universal human consciousness. Imperialism had ensured a rupture in the Black subjective and expressive consciousness. The ‘other’ was conceptualized as ‘inferior’, and the hybrid ‘inferior’ still continues to be positioned as ‘lower’ in pseudoscientiﬁc categories whether through biological science or cultural prejudice.

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In the twenty ﬁrst century, post Imperial geographies have resulted in migration of peoples across continents, thus creating new communities of sociality. At the heart of Empire, Britain, the questions of ‘hybridity’ have been relocated within the cultural realm; for writers such as Paul Gilroy and Stuart Hall, this shift represents a trans posing of racist values of difference into the cultural sphere. It is here that notions of ‘essential’ cultural char acteristics are linked to cultural categories, usurping those formerly based around biological categorizations. In this sphere, ‘cultural hybridity’ has been used to contemplate the merging of cultures to create new hybrid musical forms, dance, and visual cultures. Within racialized com munities ‘hybridity’ has been embraced both positively and as a necessity. For Black youth experiencing racism these expressive cultures have been the source of expression of alienation from British society and a simultaneous alien ation from their cultural roots in the Caribbean, Africa, and South Asia. As postcolonial bodies that represent ‘hybrid’ cultures through their language, and cultural practices, their presence reﬂects the productivity and dif ﬁculties of being postcolonial in a world still embroiled in notions of essential identities and national cultures. The body of work entitled Postcolonial Theory emerged in the 1970s in the writings of postcolonial academics, and a body of cultural theory has emerged. The aim is to consider identity, beyond essential understandings of the concepts of self and other located in concepts of ‘East’ and ‘West’. One trope of this challenge is linked to understanding the psychological complexities experi enced by the oppressed, marginalized, other rooted in the writings of Fanon, Wright, Douglas, and W.E. Dubois. The most important scholarship in the psychoanalytical theories of cultural hybridity is by Homi Bhabha. He challenges a universal notion of culture and cultural es sentialism by presenting a theory based on the very particular psychosis of the ‘other’ as situated in the ‘West’ and the identity of ‘other’ within modernity, against earlier notions of delineating the ‘other’ as savage, primitive, and thus outside modernity. Bhabha in The Location of Culture argues that ‘‘The representation of difference must not be hastily read as a reﬂection of a pre given ethnic or cultural traits set in a ﬁxed tablet of tra dition. The social articulation of difference, from the minority perspective, is a complex, on going negotiation that seeks to authorise cultural hybridities that emerge in moments of historical transformation. The ‘right’ to sig nify from the periphery of authorised power and privil ege does not depend on the persistence of tradition; it is resourced by the power of tradition to be reinscribed through the conditions of contingency and contradict oriness that attend upon the lives of those who are ‘in the minority’.’’ Here, Bhabha deﬁnes the nature of cultural hybridities which for him are a moment of resistance to essential

understandings of ‘identity’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘race’, and ‘creed’. There are three points to be made here. First, cultural hybridities are temporally situated; the ‘hybrid’ chal lenges a notion of a linear historical development of cultures and their structures of formation. For example, a notion of English national culture for Bhabha is one that is ‘relational’ to those deemed ‘not English’, including those cultures of the colonized under Empire within and beyond the now British Isles. Second, cultures are not ﬁxed or in stasis, they fold through past and present (dystopian and utopian, imagined identities) and are continually dynamic. Third, Bhabha clearly states that ‘‘‘hybrid’ cultures rely on tradition as a cultural source of tension from which they form; cultural hybridity is formed and indeed made possible through a persistence of discourses of domination, power, and tradition’’. Tra dition for Bhabha is the articulation of the dominant narratives of identity and culture, which continues to be, in E.P. Thompson’s terms, ‘‘reinvented and reformed’’. This philosophy of the means of producing culture is embedded in a notion that cultures are in continual emergence and can only emerge from the position of being in between, emergent, and formed by a ‘collective’ minority. Understanding culture for Bhabha is achieved through a psychoanalytical process, where political movements for ethnically pure nations and identity movements are evidence of the ‘psychosis of patriotic fervor’. This an alysis is made through diagnosis of psychological states of ‘folk’, and not through biological deﬁnitions through skin, phenotype and matters of land ownership, and land cultures (as within the disciplines of archaeology and anthropology). The emergence of cultures in Bhabha’s thesis is based on psychological alienation from a sense of ‘homelyness’. However, Bhabha is keen not to deﬁne, describe, or to afﬁrm ﬁxed delineations for cultural identities; instead, Bhabha considers the process of the enunciation of group identity as one which is reductive (temporally and spatially) and thus one which mis represents these cultures which are continually in for mation. A notion of ‘third space’ is introduced here as a space where the misrepresentation of cultural identities can occur and be engaged with, without risk of (mis) representation. The productivity of third space has been phenomenal for postcolonial writers; it posits the possi bilities that free those constrained by the forces of ‘tra dition’, the colonial frameworks of the West and other dominant ﬁgurations of identity. Third Space allows the possibility of the emergence of unalienated free ex pressionism of people with ‘different’ cultural identities and practices: unbounded, dynamic, and truly post colonial. Third Space allows the tools of enunciation to be controlled by those representing ‘hybrid’ cultures and is not a space where deﬁnitions are imposed. By exploring Third Space, Bhabha hoped that we may elude the politics

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of polarity and emerge as unconstrained, without the constraints of taxonomies of biology and culture that had gone before. Thus, for Bhabha, ‘hybridity’ is a productive space for political action. Bhabha’s ‘hybridity’ is a dis ruptive category, and thus offers a progressive conceptual space; an opportunity to ‘be’ and ‘belong’ within mod ernity – biologically, psychologically, and geographically.

The Limitations of Cultural Hybridity Bhabha’s embracing of ‘hybridity’ as a productive and opportunistic theory is not always supported. For post colonial theorist such as Gayatri Spivak, it is difﬁcult to understand cultural identity, or accept new hybrid cul tural formations of those previously colonized, as the power to speak and the ‘voice’ of those peoples them selves has been so ruptured that now these peoples can only speak of their experience in the voice of the col onized. The inscriptions of imperialism have scarred the very processes of expressive cultures because of this legacy and regimes of subjugation. Thus, expressive cul tures and their ‘producers’ are locked into colonial frameworks, grammars, and vocabularies of ‘modern’ culture; racial identity is continually employed in these. ‘Hybridity’ rests on notions of ‘purity’ and also on notions of singular bounded and recognizable categories, how can these be achieved if the psychosociological, linguistic, and the very ‘structures of feeling’ of a social group have been erased and reworked within the tools, grammars, and vocabularies of the colonizer? Power is also an issue in this conceptualization. Edward Said in his thesis on Orientalism ﬁgures identity, knowledge, and representation as being bound up with colonial regimes of power and exploitation. These re gimes of colonialism justiﬁed slavery. These ‘regimes of truth’ have shaped the nature of knowledge and its use in the disempowerment and subjugation not only of colonial bodies, but also of the development of psychological consciousness and creative practice. These ‘regimes of truth’ ﬁx other subjectivities, bodies, and cultural expression as something beyond (usually before) modernity, and spatially outside of the occidental space of Western Europe and North America. A con sciousness of what it is to be a modern subject has evolved with these prejudicial histories and scientiﬁc discourses embedded within them. The inﬂuence of modern consciousness has extended beyond deﬁnitions of peoples, but its ‘regime of truth’ has ensured a ‘process of subjectiﬁcation’. These regimes of truth continue to be enlivened in contemporary discourses on ‘ﬁrst peoples’, for example, and ‘aboriginal’ communities. The power to dissolve the links between ‘racial types’ and the threat of ‘hybridization’ continues to be differently accessible

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between humans identiﬁed as modern and ‘other’ in modern cultural taxonomies of being.

‘Hybridity’ and Geography Cultural Identity In contemporary geographical thought, cultural identity and racial theory remain important to understanding ‘man’ and environment relations. This postmodern the orization of subjectivity accurately describes the experi ence of many postcolonial peoples and has been taken up as a point from which to critique modernity and its ﬁs sured taxonomies which have framed and informed questions of humankind, national identity, and cultural expression. However, the freedom from essential iden tities and partial anthropological histories offers only a temporary consolation from a deﬁnition of identity as essential and bounded. National Identity National identity is a means by which culture is deﬁned through these bounded, essentialized notions of ‘being’. Being is linked to ‘belonging’ in notions of citizenship. For example, the position of Black identity in relation to belonging in the North (Australia, US, UK, and Europe) often results in a mutual exclusivity between being Black, and being English. Cultural theorist, Iain Chambers, has argued that even radical critics and historians such as Raymond Williams, E. P. Thompson, and Eric Hobsbawm have ‘‘in their appeals to the continuities of native tradi tions and experiences, perhaps inadvertently conceded the ethical and racial pretensions of a national (ist) mythology.’’ The Black English have been considered as ‘non native’ to the English landscape as a result of the envisioning of England and ‘Englishness’ – morally, biologically, culturally, and textually being an ex clusionary discourse of cultural identity. Historically, this is not limited to the nation state of England alone, his torian Simon Schama has argued that ‘‘Arcadia as the site of protected indigenous culture, roots and biological store of authenticity is part of a longer historical tradition in England and other European states.’’ This argument has resonance in North America, New Zealand, Europe, and Australia.

Hybridity, Time, and Nature The existence of racialized peoples in England has been recorded since Roman times (ﬁrst century AD). Despite this, however, there is a continual articulation of cultural ‘difference’ which locates them outside of Englishness itself, threatening to make Englishness ‘hybrid’ and ‘de ﬁled’. The ‘newness’ of their presence, their urban

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settlement, and their assumed racial category is dis cordant with the Englishness of the pastoral scene. These resonate with ecological theories of ‘native’ landscape being invaded by the ‘non native’. These arguments can be traced back to the practices of Imperial governance and the cultural logic of colonial taxonomies and deﬁn itions of aboriginal peoples of every continent. In eco logical terms, arguments are raging about which plants contribute to a notion of ‘native’ and ‘non native’ species. Central to these deﬁnitions are questions of time. At which point do circulatory and mobile plant species be come ‘native’? A well known example of ‘nativization’ is the walnut tree, which is now deﬁned by the Royal Horticultural Society as ‘native’ to Britain, but historic ally its ‘origin’ was the Americas, arriving in Britain in the 1700s. Despite Darwin’s thesis on the nature of nature to be dynamic and mobile, ecologists, botanists, and landscape historians have all contributed to the debates about how ‘non native’ species are invading, exhausting resources, and utilizing space traditionally occupied by ‘native’ plants and thus native cultural landscapes. Paul Gilroy describes this renewed currency of discourses of ‘alien’ and ‘native’ as evidence of the reemergence of biological essentialism that is embedded in genetic science and which feeds into cultural racism. For Gilroy, this is termed an age of the ‘rebirth of biologism’, which fosters biologically located evidence of race difference and no tions of purity of genetic stock. These moves ultimately serve to bolster political discourses that seek to deﬁne and reassert notions of ‘native peoples’ and ‘native cul tural values’ and thus conﬂate with issues of ‘cultural belonging’. These arguments are troublesome, especially because of ‘‘the assumption that identity derives from deep rooted association with territory has come to be seen as the key pathology of the modern nation state; the root of its intolerance to foreign bodies. This also signiﬁes a return to pre Darwinian hierarchies of ‘species.’’

Cosmopolitanism Cultural narratives that deﬁne ‘native’, ‘non native’, and ‘hybrid’ are contrary to our embracing of notions of ‘cosmopolitanism’. There is a recognizable discordancy between our acceptances of the ‘hybrid’ spaces of glob alization produced through the mobility of bodies as a result of global communication networks. Nigel Clark further challenges these categories from a posthuman perspective. Reﬂecting on the new acceptance of ‘cosmopolitanism’, that is, that globalization has led to the creation of spaces and cultures that reﬂect the mixing, merging, and easing proximities allowable on the global scale as a result of networks of ‘globalization’ of humans. He has recently argued that within cultural theory there

is segregation between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’. He argues that what is important is that the social and cultural di mensions of the global process cannot be severed from the ‘nonhuman’ and that ultimately, we need to recognize that hybridization is endemic to the living world. We should not demonize ‘non natives’ as this distinction is an anthropocentric cultural classiﬁcation imposed onto na tures culture. Thus, ‘‘if it is the nature of ‘life’ to stick to it’s own ‘turf ’ then why are so many species from the taxonomic spectrum so eager for relocation and so well disposed to it?’’ The ‘hybrid’ for Clarke is not a threat to national purity of genetic stock or to ‘native’ natures, but simply a reﬂection of what has always occurred in nature – mo bility, hybridization, relocation, and newly emergent biological structures of species and variants – nature is hybrid in Clark’s embracing of a taxonomy of species based on ‘cosmopolitanism’. For theorists working in this realm, cosmopolitanism challenges the need for bounded notions of ‘native’ natures and ‘native’ citizens, disabling the racialized arguments against ‘hybridization’ located in racial prejudice. The call for a ‘cosmopolitan turn’ in the social sciences is a new way of thinking beyond ‘hybridity’. For postcolonial populations and in the geog raphy of the ‘occidental’ world, mobility and hybridiza tion have been constant; ‘cosmopolitanism’ acknowledges that racial purity is a mythological notion, for man and nature. ‘Cosmopolitanism’ as a discourse and deﬁnition is an appropriate term for deﬁning the political positioning of racialized diasporic populations internationally, with out being reductive to their identity – biologically, cul turally, and socially. Embedded in this conceptualization is a notion of mobility and temporal ﬂexibility.

Against Hybridity: For ‘Ecological’ Thinking Much of the literature on hybridity has been about the struggles against racialized taxonomies, and the sub sequent struggles against oppression by the racialized other, both within and without colonial space time. These taxonomies reveal the cultural and historical ‘ways of seeing’ the world and its peoples. As social scientists, it is important to learn the lessons of these universalist ways of thinking and to embrace new forms, which are sensi tive to ‘difference’ in an epoch where hybridity has been critical to postcolonial thinking. The philosopher, Lorraine Code, has argued for ecological thinking in respect of our ethical and social approaches to research with the other. In particular, it is important to acknow ledge the historical and ethnocentric nature of the epis temologies we use in social sciences research and research dissemination. In advocating responsible taxo nomies, there is an emphasis on the importance of the

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researcher to acknowledge the historical and ethno centric nature of the epistemologies that we use in social sciences research and research dissemination. An ap proach advocated by Code, within the discourses of ‘hybridity, would have long ago debunked the notion of taxonomies being linked to racial phenotypes, cultural, or national characteristics and ‘native and non native’ spe cies as well as developing categories of thought which are truly against ‘race’. By using taxonomies reﬂexively, and in a situated framework, Bhabha’s quest for ‘homelyness’ would be satiated; responsible taxonomies rely on acknowledging difference and ethnicity, without hierarchy. This ‘ecol ogy’ of thought, within frames of space and time, delivers possibilities for engaging with ethnic differences across the globe in the terms that, Stuart Hall has long stated, are necessary for a politically enlivened and sensitive cultural theory of race. The term ‘ethnicity’ acknow ledges the place of history, language, and culture in the construction of subjectivity and identity, as well as the fact that all discourse is placed, positioned, situated, and all knowledge is contextual. The effect of using respon sible taxonomies is that there is a displacement of the discourses of the West from the Center, and puts into question its Universalist claims. This new frame relieves us of the need for thinking along notions of identity that are singular, and without geographies or indeed a mer ging of two distinct sociogeographical identities in the form of ‘hybrids’. See also: Darwinism (and Social Darwinism); Race.

Further Reading Agyeman, J. (1990). Black people in a white landscape: Social and environmental Justice. Built Environment 16, 232 236. Ahmed, S. (1999). She’ll wake up one of these days and ﬁnd she’s turned into a nigger: Passing through hybridity. Theory Culture Society 16, 87. Anderson, K. (2007). Race and the Crisis of Humanism. London: Routledge. Anthias, F. (2001). New hybridities, old concepts: The limits of ‘culture’. Ethnic and Racial Studies 24, 619 641. Appadurai, A. (1996). Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalisation. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

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Back, L. and Solomos, J. (eds.) (2000). Theories of Race and Racism. London: Routledge. Baumann, Z. (1998). Globalisation: The Human Consequences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Castree, N. (2003). Environmental issues: Relational ontologies and hybrid politics. Progress in Human Geography 27, 203 211. Chambers, I. (1993). Narratives in nationalism: Being British. In Carter, E., Donald, J. & Squires, J. (eds.) Space and Place: Theories of Identity and Location, pp 145 164. London: Lawrence and Wishart. Clark, N. (2002). The Demon seed: Bio invasion as the unsettling of environmental cosmopolitanism. Theory, Culture and Society 19, 101 125. Clifford, J. (1997). Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century. London: Harvard University Press. Code, L. (2006). Ecological Thinking. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Crosby, A. (2004). Ecological Imperialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Demeritt, D. (2005). Hybrid geographies, related ontologies and situated knowledges. Antipode 37, 818 823. Fanon, F. (1992). The fact of blackness. In Donald, J. & Rattasani, A. (eds.) ‘Race’, Culture and Difference, pp 220 240. London: Sage. Gilroy, P. (1987). There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack. London: Routledge. Gilroy, P. (2000). Against Race. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hall, S. (1996). New Ethnicities. In Morley, D. & Chen, K. H. (eds.) Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies, pp 441 449. London: Routledge. Hutnyk, J. (2005). Hybridity. Ethnic and Racial Studies 28, 79 102. Kwan, M. P. (2004). Beyond difference: From canonical geography to hybrid geographies. Annals of the AAG 94, 756 763. Lemire, E. (2002). Miscegination: Making race in America. Pennsylvania, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Livingstone, D. (1992). The Geographical Tradition: Episodes in the History of a Contested Enterprise. London: Blackwell. Mitchell, K. (1997). Different diasporas and the hype of hybridity. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 15, 532 553. Nash, C. (2002). Genealogical identities. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 20, 27 52. Nash, C. (2003). Cultural geography: Anti racist geographies. Progress in Human Geography 27, 637 648. Nava, M. (2002). Cosmopolitan modernity: Everyday imaginaries and the register of difference. Theory, Culture and Society 19, 81 99. Swyngedouw, E. (1999). Modernity and hybridity: Nature, Regeneracionismo, and the production of the Spanish waterscape, 1890 1930. Annals of the AAG 89, 443 469. Turner, B. (2002). Cosmopolitan virtue, globalization and patriotism. Theory, Culture and Society 4, 45 63. Werbner, P. (2001). The limits of cultural hybridity: On ritual monsters, poetic license and contested postcolonial puriﬁcations. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 7, 133 152. Whatmore, S. (2002). Hybrid Geographies: Natures, Cultures, Spaces. London: Sage. Young, R. J. C. (1995). Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race. London: Routledge. Young, R. J. C. (2007). The Idea of English Ethnicity. London: Blackwell.

Hypothesis Testing R. Haines-Young, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK R. Fish, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Asymmetry between Proof and Refutation The proposition that while no number of observations that are consistent with a theory or hypothesis prove that the theory is true, one counter observation can show the theory is false. Epistemology The methods by which we are able to ‘gain’ knowledge about something; epistemology is the study of the principles and practices of enquiry. Hypothesis A logical consequence of a theory that can be tested in some way. Ideographic The term used to describe the research tradition in geography that emphasized the study of areal differentiation and the uniqueness of place, as in regional geography. Nomothetic The term used to describe the research tradition in geography that emphasized the need to search for regularities and generalities that are expressed in theories that link geographical phenomena. Null Hypothesis A device used in statistical hypothesis testing. The null hypothesis is set up as a competing hypothesis to the one the research seeks to explore. The null hypothesis usually asserts that there is no difference between observed and expected outcomes in some sampling process. Ontology The basis upon which we recognize something as knowledge; ontology is the study of what kinds of things exist and therefore what kinds of things can be known about. Theory A set of beliefs or assumptions that we hold about the structure of the world and the way it behaves. Type I and Type II Errors The distinction made in statistics between the mistakes made by rejecting a hypothesis when it is true, compared to accepting a hypothesis when it is false.

Introduction To test a hypothesis is one of the most important things a researcher can do. Indeed so important is it that many would claim that it is the thing that distinguishes scien tiﬁc research from other forms of academic inquiry. Certainly hypothesis testing is one of the ways that human geographers have sought to understand their discipline as a science. Perhaps not surprisingly then, it is a technique that is not without controversy, for its

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use registers with wider debates about the nature and purposes of geographical knowledge. This article discusses the logical framework in which all types of hypothesis testing within human geography can be viewed and, through this, reviews some of the statistical tools available to those working with quantitative data. We then inspect some of the wider philosophical and practical complexities surrounding the process of hy pothesis testing in geographical research, and what these issues share with more qualitative approaches to the production of geographical knowledge.

Historical Context Hypothesis testing emerged in the 1950s as part of de bates about the scientiﬁc bases of geographical research. To be understood as a scientiﬁc enterprise, it was claimed that geography should create knowledge applicable to a range of conditions and circumstances. At that time, ‘anglophone geography’ had been wedded to the idea of regional analysis, a process of inquiry that emphasized areal differentiation and uniqueness. For some geog raphers, one of the consequences of this interest in spe ciﬁcity – in idiographic study – was that geography was weak when it came to the generation of models about how the world in general operated. Although the rich accounts of regional character and distinctiveness were interesting, it was argued that the explanatory potential of geography should rest on uncovering regularities and communalities in how social processes came to function across space. In contrast, hypothesis testing emerged as part of an ap proach to geographical research expressly designed to inform, and be informed by, theory; one that would seek to put its work on a more scientiﬁc footing through a concern with generalization – or nomothetic study. The process by which this argument about general ization was accepted by many geographers and with it the development of hypothesis testing as a key feature of human geography, has been termed the quantitative revolution. This transformation in approach was the basis for understanding geographical endeavor as a spatial science. The development was one whose possibilities and limits have since been subject to great critical com ment by human geographers. Hypothesis testing is more than simply a research ‘technique’ in this respect. It is part of the changing history of ideas concerning what geographical knowledge should look like, and the claims we should seek to make of it.

Hypothesis Testing

Hypothesis Testing: The Logical Framework Put simply, to test a hypothesis is to confront a theory with some kind of data. Theories and hypotheses are often regarded the same kind of thing – they represent our beliefs or guesses about the way the world works. However, it is useful to make a distinction between them. It is a difference that is clearly brought out through the act of testing. To confront a theory with data means to take some logical consequence of an idea and try to ﬁnd out whe ther it is supported by the observations that we make about the real world. A logical consequence is something that must be the case if the theory is true. For example, it is widely accepted that human activities are funda mentally affecting the atmospheric system, and that this will lead to long term changes in climate. If this is indeed the case, then a number of things follow logically from this theory. Detectable changes to the concentration of atmospheric carbon should track growth in use of fossil fuels by people. Future human action to reduce our carbon footprint should result in a reversal of the warming trend. These logical consequences are best re garded as hypotheses. They are speciﬁc propositions that we can in principle check out by collecting some evi dence. This checking process is what hypothesis testing is all about. As the twentieth century philosopher Karl Popper pointed out, the important thing to note about the situ ation we face when evidence conﬂicts with our hypoth esis is that, providing we judge the evidence to be correct, we must reject the hypothesis and the theory from which it was derived. Of course, evidence can be ambiguous or difﬁcult to interpret, and so we must not be too quick to refute the theory. Nevertheless, if we ultimately feel that the data are reliable, then the hypothesis must be con sidered wrong. As researchers we are not prepared to accept theories and data about the world that conﬂict with each other, and still assert that we understand or have explained something. Finding ourselves in this situation we must redesign our theories so that different logical consequences follow which are supported by the data. Alternatively, we must try to think up altogether different theories to explain the world around us which are better supported by the evidence. Popper placed particular emphasis on the act of conjecturing theories or hypotheses and then attempting to refute them because of what he called the ‘‘asymmetry between proof and refutation.’’ This is the logical prin ciple that while no number of observations consistent with a theory or hypothesis can prove it to be true, just one counter observation can show it to be false. He used this idea to describe what he thought was the essential characteristic that distinguished science from all other

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activities – namely, the act of developing theories that are testable in the sense that they have consequences that can be checked out by observations, and the willingness to reject them if we ﬁnd them wanting. Whether we regard ourselves as scientists or not, the idea is also relevant to other areas of research, in that we try to resolve the conﬂicts between our general ideas about the way we think the world works and the evidence we gain from our experience about it. Either our general ideas are mis taken, or the evidence is misleading. Hypothesis testing is one of the ways we try to eliminate such ambiguity.

Hypothesis Testing and Quantiﬁcation The desire to measure or to quantify is not something that is unique to science, but it is one of the character istics most often associated with it. The reason why sci entists and indeed other researchers try to measure things is that it sometimes allows them to test hypotheses more easily by expressing ideas precisely. This is perhaps best illustrated by looking at some of the tools that are available for testing hypotheses using statistical methods. Hypothesis testing belongs to that part of statistics called ‘inferential statistics’, which is concerned with the grounds on which one might accept or reject a prop osition. Most statistical tests operate in the same way, in that they try, in the simplest situations, to pose two op posing or counter ideas against each other and look for evidence that might suggest that one should be rejected. The procedure is rather like ‘trial by jury’, in which we begin by assuming the innocence of the accused. The prosecution makes its case, and we are only prepared to reject our assumption of innocence if the evidence against them is ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. In hypothesis testing in statistics, the initial proposition is called the null hypothesis and the strategy is to see if there are any good grounds for rejecting it in favor of some alternative idea. For example, suppose that we are interested in the knowledge farmers have about diffuse pollution problems and the contribution that their farms might make. We might be interested in this because as environmental managers or policy makers, we want to decide if there is a case for making better information available to farmers to help them minimize their environmental impacts. Dairy farming is often thought to be a major source of pollution and so as decision makers we may want to investigate if the views and beliefs of dairy farmers are different to those of other farmers. Box 1 shows the analysis of some data collected from 75 farms in South West England, in an area of high conservation importance that is dominated by dairy, beef, and mixed farms. The data were collected by interviewing farmers and coding up some of the questionnaire material

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Box 1 Analysis of knowledge of pollution sources among farmers using cross tabulation These data were collected through interviews with farmers from 75 farms in South West England. The area is of high conservation importance and is dominated by dairy, beef, and mixed farms. A contingency test was used to examine the frequency (counts) with which different types of farmers recognize different types of pollution as potentially arising from their farm. These tables show the responses for dairy farms versus nondairy units for the pollution sources ‘sediment’ and ‘nitrates’. In both cases our null hypothesis is that there is no difference between dairy farmers and other farmers in the extent to which they recognize the different types of pollutants potentially arising from their land.

Hypothesis test: The expected counts are those that would arise if dairy farmers had the same responses as other types of farmers in the sample. The Pearson Chi-Square statistic (w2) which compares observed and expected frequencies has a value of 6.04, with one degree of freedom, the probability of exceeding this value by chance is less than 0.014 (i.e., 1.4 times out of 100). Thus, we reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between dairy farmers and other farmers in the extent to which they recognize that sediment runoff might potentially be arising from their land.

Hypothesis test: In this case the null hypothesis is that there is no difference between dairy farmers and other farmers in the extent to which they recognize nitrates as a potential pollutant arising from their land. For these data, the differences between the observed and expected counts are much smaller. The Pearson Chi-Square statistic (w2) is equal to 1.131, and with one degree of freedom, we would exceed this value to be exceeded by chance with a probability of about 0.29 (i.e., 29 times out of 100). Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. Dairy farmers appear to be no different to other farmers with respect to nitrates.

so that it could be analyzed quantitatively. The farmers were asked about the types of pollution they recognized might be coming from their farm; these included sedi ment, nitrates, phosphates, pesticides, herbicides, and

plastics. In areas where dairy and beef farming is wide spread, nutrient problems may arise through poor man agement of slurry and manures, or as a result of dirty water running off from farm buildings and yards; it is

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particularly a problem in dairy units where animals are gathered frequently. Disinfectants in dairy units may also be a source of phosphorus. Sediment runoff may be as sociated with dairy and beef farming but we might expect it to be less likely to be a problem in areas such as these where grassland is the main cover type. In Box 1 we have tabulated the frequency with which dairy farmers thought that the different types of pol lution might be generated from their farm compared to all the other types of farmers interviewed. Our initial or null hypothesis is that dairy farmers are no different to other farmers. As decision makers we want to see if there is any evidence that might cause us to reject this idea in favor of one that suggests that the dairy farmers have a different level of awareness about the pollution that might be arising from their farms. In Box 1, the statistical test that is being used (Chi squared, or w2) simply compares for each pollutant category, whether the dif ference between the number of times (frequency) with which the dairy farmers recognized that they possibly caused pollution was different to that recorded for the other farm types. The logic behind the test is that we are trying to see if a difference between the 18 dairy farms and the others was likely to be due to chance alone, that is, the kind of variation that would arise if we drew a subsample of 18 farms from the group of 75 at random. If the difference in frequencies is large enough, then we might suspect that the dairy farmers are behaving differently. The analysis in Box 1 suggests that dairy farmers are no different from other types of farmers in the extent to which they believe their operations generate the types of pollution they were asked about, such as nitrate, except in the case of sediment, where dairy farmers more fre quently cited this possibility than other types of farmers. In the case of sediment, the difference between the two groups was much larger than we might expect by chance alone. The statistical tools used for hypothesis testing nor mally give us an estimate of the chance or probability associated with any difference we observe between groups. In the case of the responses to the question about sediment, the size of the difference observed is only likely to have come about 1.4 times in 100 if we had repeatedly sampled sets of 18 farms at random from the group of 75. On the grounds that such a difference in frequency of response as that observed is unlikely, we might be prepared to reject our null hypothesis that in their response to the sediment question, dairy farmers are no different to other farmers, in favor of the alter native hypothesis that they are not responding in the same way. If we are to fully understand the nature of hypothesis testing in statistics, we need to consider further the logic that underlies the tools being used. What would be better

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for a decision maker to do – to reject a null hypothesis when it is true, or to accept it when it is false? Statis ticians refer to these two possibilities in terms of making ‘type I’ and ‘type II’ errors, respectively. In terms of our analogy between hypothesis testing and trial by jury, the ﬁrst type of mistake is equivalent to ﬁnding an innocent person guilty, while the second represents the situation in which a guilty person goes free. Just as we think it better to risk letting guilty people go free in order to minimize the chances of an innocent person being wrongly con victed, so statisticians argue that we should exercise caution in our hypothesis testing. They suggest we should try to avoid making a type I error, by only rejecting a null hypothesis if there are ‘good grounds’ for doing so. In our example concerning dairy farmers, we can minimize the chances of making a type I error if we are only prepared to reject the idea that they are no different to others if the chances of ﬁnding such a large difference between frequencies are small. Often people use the convention that we should be more than 95% certain, that is, the difference should arise no more than 5 times in 100. However, if it is really important that we avoid this type of error, then there is no reason why we cannot make the decision criteria much tougher – by being prepared to reject the null hypothesis if we are 99%, or even 99.9%, certain. The example of statistical hypothesis testing pre sented here is a very simple one, and there are many more sophisticated tools available to test hypothesis using other types of data. For example, in our farm study, if we had measured sediment loss to rivers on the different types of farm, then a t test could be used to investigate whether there was a difference in the mean levels ob served between types (Box 2). Alternatively, if we had data on sediment loss over time following some aware ness raising program, we might ask whether there was any evidence of a decline in the rate of loss over time (Box 3). In each case, however, the approach is the same, the null hypothesis is set up to challenge the idea that we are putting forward, and we only reject it if there are good grounds for doing so. Moreover, when we do reject the null hypothesis we never claim that the alternative is true. Rather, we simply judge that there is reasonable evidence to investigate that alternative further.

Contextualizing the Hypothesis-Testing Process As the example shows, the process of hypothesis testing allows the researcher to start making some tentative claims about how the world operates. It also provides a framework in which the logic and assumptions under lying the reasoning process can be seen. Yet the act of hypothesis testing carries with it a wider set of

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Box 2 Testing the differences between potential levels of sediment runoff between farm types Is the difference in mean values for sediment runoff larger than we would expect by chance alone?

Mean1 Frequency of observations

Mean2

Distribution of values observed for nondairy farms Distribution of values observed for dairy farms Low

Levels of sediment runoff

High

In this situation, a statistical technique called a t-test could be used to test the null hypothesis that there was no difference in the means of the daily sediment runoff values observed over, say one year, between dairy and nondairy farms. Only if the difference is larger than we would expect by chance alone would we reject the null hypothesis.

philosophical, practical, and ethical issues that affect how we evaluate it as a way of doing human geography research. A good way of distinguishing between the issues at stake is to examine the process of hypothesis testing through the ideas of epistemology and ontology. By epistemology we mean the methods by which we are able to ‘gain’ knowledge about something. In this sense the use of hypothesis testing is an epistemological strategy. It is a technique by which the human geographer can begin to render the world meaningful in a certain kind of way, such as by exploring the association between farming sectors and attitudes toward diffuse pollution. In contrast, by ontology we mean the basis upon which we recognize something as ‘knowledge’ in the ﬁrst place. In this sense hypothesis testing is not just a technique to produce knowledge about the world, but a means by which we explore ‘what can be known’. This is true of any research process, whether based on hypothesis testing or not. Whichever epistemological strategy researchers have chosen to employ, they have already accepted, by im plication, an ontological position. For those employing hypothesis testing, a very speciﬁc ontological claim is being made: namely that there are underlying patterns to the world that exist independently of our research into them, such as a potential relationship between farming

sector and understandings of diffuse pollution. Hypoth esis testing therefore works on the promise that our ef forts may begin to uncover these hidden regularities. Confronting the act of hypothesis testing with the idea of epistemology raises interesting questions about how and why we go about researching the world in particular ways, and to what extent researching social processes can provide us with the type of information demanded by hypothesis testing techniques. Central to these is the epistemological assumption of objectivity. It is suggested that the creation of knowledge under hypothesis testing involves the researcher performing his or her task in a neutral or disinterested fashion. After all, if the world has regularities and patterns that exist independently of human observation, then it might be argued that the assumptions or values of the researcher are largely un important. Arguably anyone could arrive at identical conclusions if the same hypothesis testing procedure is followed. The point we wish to emphasize here is that, as an epistemological strategy, hypothesis testing is part of an active human process involving judgments about the se lection and framing of hypotheses, the assigning of sig niﬁcance to them, and the drawing of conclusions from results. Indeed, hypothesis testing must be understood as an instrument of research through which a range of

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Box 3 Testing hypotheses about changes in the levels of sediment runoff over time 120

Relative sediment concentrations

100

80

60

40

20

0

0

1

2

3

4

6

5

7

8

9

10

11

Year

In this situation, a statistical technique called regression could be used to test the null hypothesis that there was no association between the yearly means of daily sediment runoff generated by dairy farms. Only if the slope of the line differed signiﬁcantly from zero (that is the slope that we would expect if there is no association between the two variables) would we reject the null hypothesis of no change over time.

assumptions about the world can ﬂow. This is apparent in a number of ways. At one level, judgments arise when a researcher is faced with formulating a hypothesis. If it is one thing to set up a hypothesis that tests the relationship between farmer sectors and understandings of diffuse pollution, it is quite another to explain why the researcher would choose to pursue this hypothesis in the ﬁrst instance. One answer to this is to say that these choices are logical consequences of a wider universe of hypotheses that contextualize the aims of a given piece of research (e.g., dairy farmers have different beliefs about pollution than other sectors). However, such a rationale does not explain why we choose to assign importance to diffuse pollution and agricultural sectors as a research issue. Nor is the way we frame a hypothesis ‘given’ within a particular problem context. Even if the researcher could make a case for exploring the relationship between farming practices and pollution, this does not settle why the researcher would choose to examine attitudes as an important aspect of that debate. Researchers may choose to create and test hypotheses around a variety of equally plausible concerns, such as the market organization of different agricultural sectors, or the level of state assist ance afforded to them. While it may be argued that the process of selecting and pursuing a given hypothesis is precisely designed to start discriminating between

contrary, yet plausible, understandings of given problem (i.e., to work with multiple hypotheses), it is nonetheless the case that by choosing one hypothesis over another a particular problem context tends to be emphasized as the way in which we think about research issues (e.g., ‘atti tudes rather than money are important to overcoming diffuse pollution’). Realistically, not all hypotheses will be explored and not all associations between relevant vari ables will be discerned. Like any other research pro cesses, then, the researcher who employs hypotheses has to be very explicit about why and on what terms the questions are being framed. There is nothing objective about hypothesis testing in this respect. Even in the de cisions about the level of statistical signiﬁcance that we will apply in our hypothesis testing we make a moral judgment: how much certainty do we need before we start regulating the dairy farming sector? Issues of epistemology and hypothesis testing also concern the terms on which data are collected and used to make claims about the world with some degree of conﬁdence. The example we have used in this article is instructive for it uses a data gathering technique widely employed by human geographers: that of the standard ized, closed, and face to face interview. Thus, before we even start to look at associations between variables in the data set, we have to accept the notion that data we re quire will be both robust and collectable. Principally,

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when conducting a survey like this we assume that interviewees understand what is meant by a particular question; answer a question when it is addressed to them; say what they mean when they respond to a question; say what they believe when offering responses; and respond in the terms that are expected. Researching humans as the basis for hypothesis testing is like any other research strategy in this respect: it comes with few guarantees. In the example data set we draw upon, we were fortunate to have 75 complete survey returns. But these returns in no way carry with them the certainty that we have com prehension, clarity, and frankness when making sense of the data. For example, why is it that dairy farmers rec ognized sediment as a problem but not the other types of pollution? Is it simply that it is more obvious or is sediment really an issue? Alternatively are farmers really telling us what they know about the other sources? Thinking about such issues is least one of the reasons why geographers researching human attitudes and values often emphasize the need to employ mixed method ologies, that link hypothesis testing to more probing and qualitative forms of investigation. What the example of dairy farmers shows, is that while superﬁcially we appear to be testing only some simple, quantitative hypothesis, we are in fact confronting a whole network of hypotheses and assumptions that all need to be looked at critically before any ﬁnal judgment can be made.

ontological assumptions that guide its use per se are not being questioned. From the perspective of ontology, hy pothesis testing has often been set apart from other arenas of human geography. Indeed, in light of its en trance into human geography under the quantitative revolution, many have since argued that the search for underlying patterns is problematical in the context of social systems, for human attitudes and behavior are like a moving target. That is to say, there is no amount of available data that can make these kinds of systems stable to the degree that hypothesis testing seems to aspire to. One response to this has been to suggest that the onto logical claims underlying hypothesis testing need, at the very least, to be remodiﬁed to suit the human conditions they seek to account and speak for. Instead of regarding the world as a set of social processes whose rules can be progressively tamed and revealed, insights should instead aim to be ‘soft’ assessments, based on a more iterative understanding of what appears to ‘work’ in any given moment or circumstance. The extent to which such a situation precludes any requirement of researchers to test their social understandings in a critical way is a debate that must be had elsewhere. See also: Critical Rationalism (After Popper); Philosophy and Human Geography; Physical Geography and Human Geography; Redbrick University Geography in Britain; Scientiﬁc Method.

Conclusion Although many human geographers do not consider discussions of scientiﬁc methods to be relevant, or the use of statistical methods as being appropriate (to the kind of geography they do), whenever we seek to examine a case for something by reference to evidence, we are involved in the act of hypothesis testing – whether we formally acknowledge it or not. It can be argued that hypothesis testing in its broadest sense is therefore relevant to a very large part of what human geography does and we ought to be aware of what it involves. At the same time, at the epistemological level, those who test hypotheses as part of the research process can learn usefully from other, more qualitative and interpretative, forms of human geography inquiry that have encouraged researchers to consider more explicitly their positionality when choosing, applying, and drawing conclusions from hy potheses, and in developing research strategies that rec ognize the limits of the data collection process. One way to address these limits, and therefore build conﬁdence in the research process, is to use hypothesis testing and quantitative inquiry as part of a larger, more pluralistic, research methodology. Even so, it must be recognized that dealing with these epistemological dimensions of hypothesis testing the

Further Reading Chalmers, A. F. (2004). What’s This Thing Called Science? (3rd edn.). Buckingham: Open University Press. Harvey, D. (1969). Explanation in Geography. London: Edward Arnold. Johnston, R. and Sidaway, J. (2004). Geography and Geographers Anglo American Geography Since 1945. London: Hodder. McGee, B. (1973). Karl Popper (Modern Masters). New York: Penguin (Non Classics). Peet, R. (1998). Modern Geographical Thought. Oxford: Blackwell. Policy Hub (2008). How research and evaluation evidence contributes to policy making. http://www.policyhub.gov.uk/evaluating policy/ how res eval evid.asp#philosophical. (updated 12/2/2008) Popper, K. R. (1972). The Logic of Scientiﬁc Enquiry (Sixth Impression). London: Hutchinson. Rogerson, P. A. (2001). Statistical Methods for Geography. London: Sage. Sayer, A. (1992). Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach. London: Routledge.

Relevant Websites http://ccnmtl.columbia.edu Quantitative methods in the social sciences, QMSS e lessons, Columbia Center for New Media Teaching and Learning. http://www.eeng.dcu.ie/Btkpw The Karl Popper Web.

I Idealism/Idealist Human Geography L. Guelke, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Dualism A philosophical position in which the world is seen as encompassing both mind and matter. Humanistic Geography A component of human geography emphasizing the centrality of human consciousness for an understanding of human geographical activities. Idealism A philosophy of knowledge in which preeminence is given to mind in the understanding of the human condition. Inside (of an Event) The Collingwoodian notion that one understands the observable or physical dimensions of a human event by getting inside the minds of the participants or actors involved in the event under study. Mind A philosophical term for the locus of human thought and the center of consciousness. Monism A philosophical position in which the world is seen as being comprised of a single entity or substance, usually mind or matter. Nature A general term for the world of phenomena not created or inﬂuenced by human minds. Outside (of an Event) The Collingwoodian term for the observable or physical dimensions of a human event (see the entry ‘inside’). Rethinking or Reenacting Thought – the key method adopted by Collingwoodian idealists of getting inside the minds of human agents.

Philosophical Introduction There have been several great philosophers, among them Plato, Berkeley, Kant, and Hegel, who have propounded distinctive idealist philosophies. At the most general level a philosophy merits the designation ‘idealist’ if it em phasizes the centrality of mind or spirit as the basis of reality and the foundation of human existence. Idealism can be contrasted with materialism, which holds that all things have a physical or material basis. On this position the mind and spirit have no independent existence and

are merely manifestations of physical processes. The materialist, one might think, has an advantage here in adopting a single substance or monistic philosophy, but many idealists such as Hegel are monists, claiming that ideas have a life of their own with the power to change and transform society. This is not the variety of idealism advocated here. There have also been a number of philosophers in the idealist tradition, who have advanced middle of the road or dualistic positions. The philosophers such as Kant do not deny the reality of a material world that exists in dependently of mind, but argue that this world is un knowable until it has been interpreted by mind. The Italian philosopher, Giambattista Vico, presented an early case for an idealist sociology and history arguing that one could only understand things one had made oneself. On this position, nature was knowable only to God (His creation), but one could understand human society as the creation of human beings just like ourselves. Later, philosophers, including Benedetto Croce and R. G. Collingwood, sought to build on the work of Vico and others in their efforts to produce philosophies of human action that were founded on the idea that people have created their own societies as thinking beings.

Idealism in the Collingwood Tradition The English philosopher and historian R. G. Colling wood had a particular interpretation of idealism, which he developed in several major scholarly works. Among these works was the Idea of History, in which Collingwood set out a comprehensive philosophy of history in the idealist tradition. This work has been widely studied by historians and philosophers of history, and is also relevant for human and cultural geographers, who are concerned with the distinctive landscapes and regions of the earth. In The Idea of History Collingwood developed an approach to understanding people as historical agents by focusing on their thought. The fundamental assumption here is that people have the capacity to think, and, in fact, have

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used this capacity to construct intellectual models of themselves and the world around them, which become, in turn, the basis on which they devise strategies to ma nipulate situations for whatever objectives they might happen to value in speciﬁc historical contexts. The human geographer in adopting a Collingwoodian position is committed in similar vein to the historian to discovering why people acted as they did by probing the thought that is assumed to be imbedded in all deliberate human actions. In human geography there is no need to pay much attention to the irrational (conceived here as random, incoherent thought), because the overwhelming majority of human actions having to do with spatial movement or the use of the Earth are in fact the result of the deliberate thoughts of millions of people seeking to support themselves and/or to live their lives in some culturally meaningful way. In establishing a model that emphasized thought as the basis on which human societies were built, Colling wood did not ignore the physical dimensions of people and their surroundings. He was quite favorably disposed to science which sought to understand the workings of nature by developing classiﬁcation systems and to dis cover laws and theories that connected the elements of the systems it had deﬁned. The scientiﬁc approach was also applicable to human beings to the extent that human beings could be treated as natural phenomena. Colling wood used the term ‘outside’ to refer to the physical dimensions of human existence, which were fully part of nature and controlled by natural laws. The human being, according to Collingwood, was unique among natural organisms in having the ability to think and reason to the point of creating a historical life for itself. This life was not a response to conditioning stimuli, but a creation of human thought, which took over from biological evo lution as the driving mechanism of human transforma tion. The study of thought involved, in Collingwood’s terminology, the ‘inside’ of human actions, which were not amenable to study using scientiﬁc methods. The mental achievements of human beings were governed by its own rules of thought and reasoning that transcended the physical foundations of mind and body that made such achievements possible. In Collingwood we have a dualistic system in which the appropriateness of the approach one adopts depends on the domain of its application. Thus, for Collingwood, there is an appropriate domain of science where its methods are applicable and the tested knowledge gained using such methods is valid. In acknowledging the value of science, Collingwood is able to use the full arsenal of scientiﬁc tools in seeking to discover what happened in speciﬁc historical situations. In geography, this position means that all available scientiﬁc knowledge of physical phenomena can be incorporated in the study of human activity in geographical space. The objective of an idealist

geographer would be to nail down what happened in terms of bodies and their movements as carefully as possible, using every scientiﬁc tool and dataset available. It is in the domain of explanation that involves human activity that the idealist diverges sharply from the ap proach of the scientist. This point is at the core of idealism and needs full elaboration. The idealist constructs the human being as a part of nature subject, as a physical organism to nature’s laws. People are trapped in their bodies and have no power to escape the materiality and impulses of their bodily ex istence. However, people also have minds, which the idealist argues, are capable of controlling the agenda of the physical bodies in which they are lodged. The em bodied mind is situated in a speciﬁc time and place and develops its power in a growing organism in the context of a speciﬁc society or social milieu. The individual mind, however, is not simply ﬁlled up with knowledge as a glass is with water, individuals must grasp and understand the ideas presented to them. They can no more escape the social context of their intellectual developments than they can escape their physical bodies, but once learning has been achieved within a speciﬁc context, the indi vidual, depending on his or her mental resources and intellectual disposition, can build on, reject, or indeed transcend the knowledge acquired from the social en vironment in which he or she is located. In afﬁrming that individual human beings are physical entities, one also acknowledges that they have an exist ence as living organisms subject to all the natural and biological forces that might apply. Most obviously, people have built in needs for food, water, and shelter, and they go through predictable life stages from birth to death. They are also social and emotional beings with a variety of psychological attributes and needs. The embodied thinking mind, however, is not the mind of passion or emotion, although often in their service, but the mind of self conscious reﬂection, seeking to make sense of the world, in all its apparent irrationality, in which it ﬁnds itself. This mind is the historical mind that has evolved over generations. Each generation is confronted with speciﬁc problems it seeks to solve, leaving a legacy of its accomplishments for the next generation to adopt, modify, or reject as it seeks to solve problems of its own times. The central point about the reasoning mind is that it is the author of all things intellectual from culture to constitutions. In the British American colonies of 1776 there were many angry colonists, who felt that Great Britain had not governed them well, but anger did not write the Declaration of Independence. This document was written for political purposes and involved speciﬁc individuals with speciﬁc aims setting down in writing a reasoned political agenda. The modern scholar under stands this document by putting it in its historical context

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and understanding the various inﬂuences that shaped the way its authors had gone about their work. Was the case well made? Were the grievances it alleged supported by the colonial realities it purported to represent? Was there a hidden agenda here that masked more dubious moti vations? Any or all of these questions would be part of an analysis of this particular document. However, the key point is that the analysis is not in the realm of psych ology, but in the realm of reason and intelligibility be cause it is the realm that has governed human societies ever since people established historical societies based on intellectual principles. The term ‘reason’ is not used in any absolute sense here, but rather as a synonym for a reasoning process that people employ in order to justify their actions to themselves and others in particular his torical situations. The above paragraphs focus on the critical importance of understanding human activity as an expression of reasoning and intellectual activity. Emotions might drive people to do things, but strategies for achieving par ticular goals are the products of analysis and reasoning. Thus, an individual might be driven to succeed, but success must be earned in the context of a social order, and the ambitious individual needs a strategic plan to realize what might be emotionally desired. Precisely because emotions need not be articulated and are often disguised, the question that arises is how can we know what a person’s reasons for doing something or saying something really are? At this point we are in difﬁcult terrain, and the idealist position requires careful and logical explanation. The way one understands another person or group involves, according to Collingwood, rethinking or reenacting their thought in one’s own mind. Before this assertion is dismissed out of hand, some ex planation is necessary, because the claim is not as absurd as it might seem.

Thought and Action If one asks the question: ‘‘Why did Christopher Columbus sail west across the Atlantic Ocean in 1492?’’ the answer in a very real sense involves understanding what was in his mind. Columbus believed the Earth to be round, but greatly underestimated its size. He also believed that there were good trade prospects in China. Putting these two pieces of information together, he devised a plan to sail west across the Atlantic with the intention of reaching China. An idealist explanation establishes that there was a logic connecting what Columbus thought with what Columbus did. This procedure involves getting inside the mind of Columbus, and rethinking the thoughts that motivated him to set out on his historic voyage. In the above example some critical observations need to be made. First, the focus of attention is only on those

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ideas that are relevant to an understanding of why Col umbus sailed west in search of China. The idealist has no power and no interest in rethinking every thought Col umbus ever had. The focus is on those thoughts that help us understand speciﬁc actions that are deemed important in the context of the particular study being undertaken. Second, the idealist is not given carte blanche to invent thought willy nilly to explain a particular action or set of actions. When a speciﬁc action is explained with refer ence to an individual’s ideas, these ideas must be based on evidence that is open to scholarly inspection. The idea that Columbus believed the world to be round and much smaller than it is needs to be veriﬁed by careful historical research of his geographical knowledge. One would try to establish the intellectual climate in which Columbus lived and endeavor to establish his beliefs from his journals, letters, and any other written sources that might be available. Third, in seeking to establish what a person or group might have thought, the idealist will adopt a critical, probing approach, in the knowledge that people will often mask their intentions in what they say, but reveal their true objectives in their actions. The scholar involved in discovering what an indi vidual might have been thinking in taking a particular, or set of, actions does not relinquish the independence of his or her own mind. The quest to enter the mindset of individuals of another time or culture is an imaginative, critical undertaking requiring both empathy and de tachment. The goal is not only to discover what people thought, but also to gain some sense of why they thought as they did within the mental universe of which they were part. For example, the mindsets of slaveholders in the antebellum American south are far removed from our contemporary ideas of social justice, human rights, and racial equality, yet the historian of this period needs to have some sense of the slaveholder’s mentality if he or she is to make any sense of how such a regime was possible. This task is accomplished by reading what the slaveholders had to say for themselves and gathering whatever evidence is available that could provide clues about how they understood what they were doing and justiﬁed their actions to their own satisfaction. In presenting an interpretation of human activities that is grounded in the ideas of the individuals under study, the idealist aims at making such action intelligible by connecting thought and action in a sequence of logical or understandable steps. The outcome of any speciﬁc human episode as it unfolds as a spectacle of human activities is a function of the thought that is imbedded in the actions and reactions of the participants. Collingwood famously stated: ‘‘All history is the history of thought.’’ He was not denying the existence of a physical or emotional world, but merely insisting that human beings acted in the world in terms of how they perceived and understood each other and the world around them. The

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universe might not change in its materiality, but because people can only interpret or model it in terms of their intellectual concepts and theories it exists as a human reality subject to change. In modern terminology one would say that reality is a social construction dependent on the ideas people have employed in constructing it. The Collingwoodian idealist seeks to provide an ac curate account of the topics investigated by providing explanations that are supported by appropriate evidence. In the same way a physicist tries to develop theories that are consistent with empirical data, the idealist scholar is at pains to ensure that interpretations dealing with the thought imbedded in human actions are consistent with the available evidence. The idealist model of scholarship is one of openness and debate. Contending interpre tations need to be pitted against each other in an arena in which the coherence of argument and the quality of evidence would ideally determine acceptability. Idealist scholars, one could say, have scientiﬁc aspirations in the broad sense that they aim to provide objective explan ations of human behavior, supported by evidence open to all. However, idealism is not concerned with prediction and relies on the quality of argument, inference, and evidence to convince other scholars of the value of its approach.

Idealism in Geography The idealist philosophy has not been widely adopted as an explicit philosophy of explanation among geographers. Some time ago, a geographer referred to positivism as the hidden philosophy of geography, because it was implicitly adopted by many geographers with no special interest in philosophy. In some ways idealism has also been the hidden philosophy of many cultural, human, and histor ical geographers in the sense that they have given pri mary importance to human ideas. Geographers in these ﬁelds are familiar enough with the importance of per ceptions, belief systems, and regional and ethnic customs in their efforts to understand the distinctiveness of in dividual societies. They are far more apt to rely on in terpretative descriptions rather than theories or laws in trying to convey the essential attributes of a regional landscape. Yet, notwithstanding such interests, few such geographers would actually describe themselves as idealists. The lack of a clear commitment to idealism among geographers who rejected a social science approach is to some degree a function of the way the discipline of geography developed. In the period before the 1970s, practically all geographers were wedded to science as the only respectable paradigm for any kind of empirical work. A ﬁrst response to the failure of early models of spatial behavior to connect closely with empirical

evidence was behavioral and perception geography. The notion was that people viewed their situations and sur roundings subjectively, and it was assumed this subject ivity could be measured, analyzed, and incorporated in more accurate models of human geographical activity. This approach made more accurate assumptions about human behavior, but it retained a commitment to the scientiﬁc method seeking to discover general principles and laws that accounted for particular kinds of spatial and environmental behavior. The real challenge to the scientiﬁc paradigm emerged in the 1970s. A number of philosophically inclined geographers produced an array of alternatives, from Marxism to phenomenology, with a view to providing geographers with new approaches more suited to their discipline than the strict adherence to the scientiﬁc method had allowed. Later, feminism and postmodernism and other approaches were added. Many human geog raphers had no inclination to worry about the speciﬁcs of the various philosophies that challenged the appropri ateness of scientiﬁc methods in the study of human so cieties and worked within the broad umbrella paradigm of humanistic geography. Humanistic geography in corporated elements of a wide range of philosophical positions that emphasized human agency, and provided a working, if imprecise, home for many geographers seeking alternative approaches to those offered by social science. Although it would be stretching things to claim many or even most humanist geographers were in fact idealists, such geographers have clearly tilted their work in the direction of idealism to the extent they focused on so cieties as human creations and sought to make sense of human activities by locating them in their cultural and historical contexts. A great many cultural geographers studied places and landscapes as embodiments of the distinctive peoples and cultures responsible for their creation. The emphasis here was on the uniqueness of place, region, or landscape and how this uniqueness was connected to the values and ideas of the people who had forged a livelihood in applying these values and ideas to speciﬁc geographical spaces. The notion that idealism provides a solid philosophy for humanistic geography needs to be elaborated in a stronger way. First, one needs to show that many hu manistic geographers would be in a stronger position to achieve their basic goals by adopting idealist principles. Second, one needs to demonstrate that the philosophy of idealism has more to offer than that of its possible rivals in terms of what it is capable of delivering when it is consistently and rigorously applied. The claims that will be made for idealism as a philosophy of humanistic geography are closely related to my view of the objectives of humanistic geography, which will be clariﬁed before assessing alternative approaches.

Idealism/Idealist Human Geography

It is assumed that humanistic geography is concerned with the worlds people have made for themselves. It is sharply focused on what people have made of their lives in a wide variety of physical and social settings. People are seen as the authors of their lives, not helpless victims of forces they cannot control. Yet, many people do con tend with situations that are difﬁcult and ones in which power imbalances are severe. In these situations people can show amazing resilience, and the humanist geog rapher is at pains to show that even in these cases people can be creative and skillful in making their lives bearable and meaningful. Humanistic geography gives emphasis to the culture, consciousness, and values of the world’s peoples, investigates what people have done to and on Earth, at a variety of scales with a view to gaining greater insight into what it means to be human. If such studies are to be about real people in real situations, the hu manistic geography must transcend the subjective: it is not competing in the literary domain and its products are not intended to be ﬁction. Why is Collingwoodian idealism a strong contender as the foundational philosophy for humanistic geography? In the ﬁrst place, this philosophy avoids the extremes, unnecessary assumptions and unrealistic goals of con tending philosophies, and can be shown to be applicable to the broad objectives of humanistic geography. The idealist philosophy not only provides scope for individual geographers to be creative and imaginative in studying human situations, but also insists that all interpretations should be grounded and supported with empirical evidence. Idealism, it will be argued below, differs from and is more suited to humanistic geography than the following alternative philosophies: social science, phe nomenology, Marxism, and postmodernism, and is fully capable of addressing the challenges of feminist geography.

Alternative Approaches The social scientist like the scientist adopts a model of explanation in which all phenomena are seen as objects to be understood using laws and theories. The scientist categorizes, measures, generalizes, and theorizes using prediction as a means to test the validity of his or her knowledge. In geography this approach has been most successful in general models such as central place theory, but the key problem for those pursuing a scientiﬁc ap proach has been the difﬁculty in ﬁnding laws of human behavior. The complexity and range of individual human societies has not been amenable to the development of the comprehensive laws needed for scientiﬁc explanation. This problem did not escape those geographers seeking to construct models of human behavior based on per ception. The cultural context of human perceptions has

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prevented scientiﬁc geographers from developing general laws that would support a perception based scientiﬁc geography allowing for the accurate modeling of human behavior. The philosophy of phenomenology has, of all alter native paradigms, the most in common with idealism and certainly provides a viable philosophical grounding for a range of humanistic studies. The phenomenologist fo cuses on human experience and is concerned to provide a detailed description of how an individual or group might experience a particular environment or physical event. This goal is approached by the individual immersing him or herself in the rigorous reﬂection and introspection of experience, and the successful outcome is a rich de scription of the essence of the experience or object being described. This kind of approach has produced some valuable studies on topics dealing with the experiences of a rural landscape and urban neighborhoods. Yet, not withstanding the disclaimers of phenomenologist them selves, phenomenology as actually practiced veers toward the subjective. The individual descriptions stand on their own and lack clear, operational veriﬁcation procedures. In a nutshell, phenomenology purports to support a humanistic geography that provides a foundation for the rigorous description of place, but in reality has often sanctioned a highly subjective poetry of experience. Idealism is more focused on human geographical activ ities, seeking to understand the strategies people have employed to make livelihoods for themselves and to give meaning to their lives as cultural and historical beings. There is little that connects Collingwoodian idealism and Marxism apart from their common concern with human societies in their historical contexts. Marx was intent on producing a scientiﬁc theory of history which gave little freedom to the historical participants in a drama that might have been titled The Rise and Fall of Capitalism. The idealist shares with the Marxist an interest in the role of class to the extent that people in a given society might have understood their situations in terms of class categories. The historical agenda, however, is open and there is no attempt at predicting future historical states of society. It is assumed in idealism that the individual is a free agent, but not necessarily a reckless one. People are quite capable of assessing their situations in terms of their life chances, and will normally adapt their actions in terms of what they regard as realistically achievable. The oppressed classes have often participated in their own oppression by accepting class rules that were detrimental to their interests. This situ ation occurs where people in inferior roles see no way of changing the power structure within which they are embedded. Revolution is also a possibility, but revo lutionaries as much as conformists need to map out strategies that will bring about desired changes in the face of vested interests. In both these cases the idealist

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will seek to understand how people understood their worlds and calculated their futures based on their values and beliefs. Postmodernists have not only adopted certain key ideas that have long been associated with idealism, but have also added elements that the idealist ﬁnds un acceptable. The postmodern notion that human societies are social constructions not amenable to scientiﬁc an alysis is also a key idealist principle as it is the idea that people behave in the world as they represent it. Idealism begins to diverge from postmodernism on the issues re lating to the status of scholarly interpretations. The idealist scholar is intent on providing an accurate account of the topics studied, and believes that people act for reasons that need to be discovered and explicated. There is no authorization for a scholar to interpret an indi vidual’s actions, utterances, or writings in any way apart from seeking to provide an accurate elucidation of what the individual actually thought and meant. Any inter pretation must be open to scholarly criticism and the grounds on which it is based is available for inspection. There are, in other words, solid rules of scholarly en gagement associated with Collingwood’s position aimed at separating ﬁction from nonﬁction, and trying to ensure as accurate a portrayal of the intellectual side of human activities as it is possible to achieve. The idealist scholar is also aware that power relations shape human inter actions, but is convinced that such relations can be ac commodated within a model of explanation that focuses on how people think about and assess their situations, including any considerations of power that might be taken into account. Idealism has not received much attention from femi nist and others who emphasize the psychoanalytical world of unconscious desires and impulses as providing the basis for an understanding human activity. In focusing on what people think, the idealist might appear to neglect the nonrational aspects of human existence, but this is not the case. The idealist deals with all phenomena as they are understood by the individuals of a given society. The key issue is not to ﬁnd ultimate causes of speciﬁc activity, but to understand how individuals express their un conscious, or indeed conscious, desires and needs in

concrete circumstances. The attainment of any particular goal in any human society requires a strategy or plan that lies in the realm of thought, and such plans are accessible to the idealist method of rethinking. The goal itself is simply taken as given, and not considered as requiring an explanation by a scholar concerned with what people have made of their lives as the creators of their own social customs and traditions. Thus, the idealist is not con cerned with human sexuality as a biological and psy chological phenomenon, but focuses on the myriad of ways different societies have understood the phenom enon and created cultural rules to which men and women are expected to conform and need to take into account in ﬁnding ways of expressing their sexual identities. The central question for the idealist is how do people understand themselves and others in a social world in which all the phenomena (including a variety of bio logically grounded sexual differences) with which they are content are subsumed within intellectual categories and models generated within the minds of the individuals concerned. See also: Human Geography; Humanism/Humanistic Geography.

Further Reading Collingwood, R. G. (1916). Speculum Mentis or the Map of Knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Collingwood, R. G. (1946). The Idea of History. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dray, W. H. (1995). History as Re Enactment: R. G. Collingwood’s Idea of History. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Goldstein, L. J. (1976). Historical Knowing. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. Guelke, L. T. (1983). Historical Understanding in Geography. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Guelke, L. T. (1997). The relations between geography and history reconsidered. History and Theory 36, 216 234. Johnson, P. (1998). R. G. Collingwood: An Introduction. Bristol: Thoemmes Press. Mink, L. O. (1969). Mind, History and Dialectic: The Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Van der Dussen, W. J. (1981). History as a Science: The Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Vico, G. (1968). The New Science (transl. Bergin, T. G. and Fisch, M. H., 1744). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Identity and Otherness, Rural J. Agyeman, Tufts University, Medford, MA, USA S. Neal, Open University, Milton Keynes, UK & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction What does ‘rural’ mean and what meanings have been at tached to the concept of ‘the rural’ Who does live in rural places and who is assumed to live in rural places? How are rural places changing? Such apparently straightforward questions belie their complexity and their scale. They are questions which apply locally, regionally, nationally, trans nationally, and globally. They are both current questions and historical questions. Any response to these questions sooner or later – and usually sooner – involves a discussion of processes of social inclusion and exclusion. Let’s look at an example of these points. Mike Davis begins Planet of Slums – his indictment of neoliberal, global industrial capitalism – with a startling observation: In the imminent future the unstoppable trends in human birth rates in slum areas combined with increasing rural to urban migration will mean that ‘for the ﬁrst time the urban population of the earth will outnumber the rural. Indeed this epochal transition has probably already oc curred’ (M Davis, 2006: 1).

On a global scale, what Davis is describing here is the continuation of a transition that began in the nineteenth century with the Industrial Revolution and the rise of cities like Manchester in Northern England. This nine teenth century rural to urban transition was driven by industrializing processes. These included the ‘enclosure movement’ which saw rural populations evicted from their small holdings and plots as the common land on which they were settled was seized and fenced off by local political elites and land owners. The ‘enclosure movement’ was itself a forerunner of the ‘clearance movement’ in the Highlands and Islands of Scotland in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that saw Scottish crofters often forcibly removed and evicted from their small tenancies as Scottish and English landowners in creasingly turned the land over to sheep grazing. The scale of urbanization that Davis comments on is however primarily a phenomenon of the poor, de veloping, majority Global South where megacities such as Sao Paulo, Mexico City, and Mumbai exceed 17 mil lion inhabitants. Rural de population is then no longer the dominant internal migration trend in the afﬂuent countries of the Global North. In contemporary Britain, for example, the rural to urban population has grown at a far smaller rate than the urban to rural population

reﬂecting an increase in counterurbanization ﬂows. In the Global North, the counterurbanization phenomenon has tended (but not always) to involve more afﬂuent and older populations. This not only balances any rural de population, it far exceeds the numbers of those who leave rural areas. In the US, the dominant trend has also been away from urban environments but has veered toward suburbanization rather than toward a rurally based, counterurbanization. More than anything, these historical moments and seismic settlement transitions illuminate the absence of any notion of a settled or ﬁxed rural population, despite the dominant imagery of timeless, unchanging countrysides. Clearly, across time and space, notions of ‘who’ lives in rural areas have shifted and changed. Of course, these shifts and changes in human settlement patterns represent and in corporate large scale socioeconomic structural processes and transformations, but they also represent micro patterns of individual agency, desires, and motivations. Rural popu lations and places, like urban populations and places, are turbulently constituted, unsettled, and not ﬁxed. However, in governmental and popular thinking there are very ﬁxed ideas as to ‘who is’ rural and who ‘legit imately’ inhabits rural spaces. It is precisely the con testations between these two positions that have provided a focus in debates on rural identity and rural otherness. This focus itself reﬂects something of a shift in rural studies approaches to the analysis of the ‘concept’ of rurality and the range of cultural and sociological meanings attached to rurality. These interrogations have involved an emphasis on those populations considered not ‘of ’ the rural or as having contentious claims to a place within rural spaces. It is in the UK and the English context in particular – a nation described as having ‘a cult of the countryside’ – that rural otherness has become a key arena for research and discussion. This is not to suggest that rural otherness debates are not transnational ones but rather to note that they are unevenly emergent. In the US context, the research of the rural sociologist Sergio Chavez which documents the hostilities and ten sions between Mexican migrants and white North American residents in the rural Californian town of Yodoy offers a glimpse of contested, exclusionary and racialized rural social relations in the contemporary US when he notes that ‘‘almost no [white] resident I spoke with considered Mexicans as contributing members of the town [...rather] Mexicans were seen as creating com munity in ways that promoted their ethnic and class

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differences which some white residents saw as threatening to the agrarian culture of the town and to American values.’’ Again in the US context, it is possible to see that rural otherness debates have coalesced in connected but rather more diverse directions – for example, the en vironmental justice/racism has received much more at tention than rural racism and rural leisure and recreation has been a focus for issues of exclusion. In many ways, the discussion here does have an Anglocentric bias to it. This can be seen as a reﬂection of the peculiarly dominant place the rural takes up in the UK’s national story and the corresponding theoretical interest in this. However, in acknowledging this bias, the discussion explicitly addresses the question as to the extent to which the rural otherness debates examined below are nationally bounded or whether these debates, or parts of them, are more globally applicable.

British Rural Studies and the Cultural Turn By the beginning of the 1990s, rural studies began to move away from a focus on positivistic measurements of the countryside. The tendency to approach rural spaces through quantitative, objective indicators and deﬁnitions such as population size, types of land use, agricultural economies, and rural policy formations and interventions increasingly began to give way to cultural deﬁnitions and subjective and qualitative indicators. In short, the study of ‘the rural’ moved from an easily deﬁnable and measurable premise and emphasized the rural as a much messier, more slippery, socially and culturally constructed phe nomenon. This shift was inﬂected by and reﬂective of a series of relational changes in the British countryside – a rural economy based less and less on agricultural pro duction and an emergence of what has been termed a postproductivist countryside; an increasing commodiﬁ cation of the countryside by tourist and heritage indus tries; signiﬁcant middle class urban to rural migration; a less distinct set of distinctions between the rural and urban binary; and, in the 1980s and 1990s, the high proﬁle insertions of problematized, ‘nonrural’ ﬁgures in rural spaces, most notably, for example, ‘New Age’ travelers’. These types of changes and the opportunities that they have afforded in rethinking rurality have given rise to questions such as ‘what is the rural; what types of representational labor does it do and for whom, and who constitutes rural populations’? Questions such as these emerged as central not only to academic, but also popular and governmental agendas. This is not to say that such questions had been previously absent – they had not. The ‘right to roam’ protest movements of the 1920s and 1930s and even the Diggers movement in the seventeenth century testify to the longevity of struggles as to who

could be in the rural (see below). Rather, it is to note how, in the early 1990s, as the cultural turn in geography and the social sciences more broadly, took hold, it became a moment for retheorizing rural spaces and their popu lations. In particular, it was the hegemonic discourse of rurality and within this the obscured heterogeneity of rural populations and the cultural and representational work that occupied academic and research approaches to rurality. This hegemonic discourse was one that repre sented rural spaces as picturesque, unchanging sites of social order and deference, community sameness and familiarity, and part of this was a representation of the countryside as a ‘white space’. In this way, the country side was collapsed into a discursive tool of social re assurance. It is the antithesis of the unruly city with its plethora of problems, conﬂicts, and tensions, and its multiculture. Within the rural reassurance discourse, it was of course necessary to marginalize, invisibilize, and subordinate those populations and issues that did not sustain it. In this way, dissident and alternative rural dwellers and a range of social problems from poverty, homelessness, racism, unemployment, drug abuse, isol ation, and inadequate social welfare resources were un accounted for in notions of what the rural was. Such populations and social problems were effectively hidden and/or neglected in academic, popular, and govern mental approaches to the rural and the countryside. Rural studies scholars’ focus on this ‘hiddenness’ rep resented a conceptual and methodological embrace of conversations taking place across the social sciences. In particular, the concept of ‘otherness’ has been used as an appropriate framing device for understanding some of the contestation over rural identity and meaning. In uncovering the more concealed aspects of rurality and the countryside, rural studies scholars were arguing for the recognition of those other countrysides and other rural identities. Developed out of psychoanalysis and the work of Lacan, postcolonial theorists such as Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak, and Homi Bhabba have used the concepts of others (those threatening, outcast subjects deﬁned in relation to the center/the Empire/the West) and the dialectical process of othering (the discursive and material ways in which othered subjects become deﬁned by and simultaneously deﬁne the center or dominant identity) to analyze colonial and post colonial racisms and racialized difference, subordination, and exclusion. It is possible to identify notions of others and processes of othering in the debates about rural identity. Marginalized, subaltern, silenced, undesirable rural ﬁgures – gypsies, travelers, tinkers, tramps, those leading alternative lifestyles, the poor, can be understood as rural others. The social and cultural construction of problem rural popu lations and ‘difﬁcult’ and unruly urban rural ﬁgures who do not belong can be understood as part of a process of othering which simultaneously deﬁnes what/who is deﬁned as rurally desirable and conventional and what/who is not.

Identity and Otherness, Rural

Filtering concerns about rural identity through no tions of otherness meant that rural studies was able to avoid a simplistic focus on hidden rurals and invisibilized or problematized rural presences through a relational scrutiny of hegemonic discourses and narratives of the rural and the countryside. In short, issues of power, politics, and representation have shaped rural study inquiry and theorization. This turn was variously cap tured in a number of edited collections and monographs published in Britain in the mid 1990s which addressed a range of neglected and marginalized rural identities and the cultural and social meanings attached to the category ‘rural’. These edited collections included chapters on radical environmental protestors; women and gendered experiences of the rural; lesbian communes; children and young people; black and minority ethnic rural residents, workers, and visitors; race and ethnicity; migrant agri cultural workers, rural poverty, and gentriﬁcation. Ethnographic research explored New Age travelers’ identities, lifestyles, rural attachments, and their (often violently) contested and problematized presence in the English countryside. The theoretical deliberations emphasized the di vergent, interdisciplinary routes through which much more ‘liminal’ rural geographies could be conceived. In the postmodern de coupling of the concept of rurality from the conventional measures and markers of what the countryside is and does, the central theorization was the way in which socially and culturally constructed notions of rurality created the rural as a puriﬁed and sanctiﬁed space requiring (governmental) protection from perceived threats. It is arguments about geographies of puriﬁcation and exclusion which resonate with a number of the con testations over claims to be in rural spaces. Recent ex amples of such contestations in the British context have been young people and the free party movement and New Age travelers; but these problematized presences are im printed with the ghosts of earlier struggles of urban working class claims to the countryside and the ‘right to roam’ movement in England in the 1920s and 1930s. Between the two World Wars there was a vibrant and popular movement that demanded access to the coun tryside for leisure pursuits, especially for the growing activity of rambling, for the urban based working classes. As access to rural areas was regularly and often forcibly denied by landowners despite ancient rights of way and footpaths, the right to roam became increasingly politi cized as ramblers used the tactic of mass trespass to pro test. The ﬁrst and best known of these mass trespasses was on Kinder Scout in the Derbyshire Peak District during the 1920s and 1930s. It has been observed that the Peak District’s location in Northern England, surrounded by large industrial towns and cities such as Manchester, Shefﬁeld, and Derby, helps explain it as a site of intense political activity. In 1928, 3000 people took part in a

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trespass and in April 1932, 400 trespassing ramblers were confronted by gamekeepers and county police. Six trespass leaders were arrested and charged and ﬁve were jailed. Anti Semitism (a number of the protestors were Jewish), fused with accusations of communist plots, featured in the trail that received widespread newspaper coverage. Despite the entrenchment of the landowning elites, the mass trespasses and the Kinder Scout protests played a partial role in the eventual legislative reform and the creation of national parks in the immediate post war period of ‘high’ social citizenship in Britain. The National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act (1949) oversaw the establishment of ten national parks during the 1950s including the Peak District National Park.

Rural Identities and National Identity The right to roam movement is one example of an older struggle for entitlements to exclusionary rural spaces. There are other, older stories too of course – the en closure and clearance movements mentioned earlier and of course the protests of the Diggers in the seventeenth century; but of these, the right to roam protests capture the particular sanctiﬁcation of rural space. The protests and their legislative settlement also demonstrated the place of the rural in narratives of national identity. As was noted above, the intimacy between notions of the rural and the popular and political, national imaginary can be understood as a particularly English phenomenon. However, rural spaces do occupy a central place in other narratives of other nations in Europe, in North America, and in other Anglophone countries. However, it is im portant to note that ﬁrst, these countryside/nation en tanglements are differently constructed when compared to the English situation and second, that the English rural was a colonial export recreated in the rural spaces of the colonized landscapes in Africa and on the Indian sub continent. For example, it is not unusual, in a routine drive through the countryside surrounding the South African cities of Durban and Cape Town, to pass 1930s mock Tudor rural buildings (often pubs and country clubs) and signs advertising Devonshire cream teas. Similar colonial exports of ‘the English rural’ have been noted in Australia and India too. We return to the question of a more global context in terms of how and in what ways rural spaces relate to national imaginaries. The relationship between English rural spaces and national identity and sanctiﬁcation has emerged a key ﬁeld of theoretical and empirical inquiry within rural identity and otherness debates. The scrutiny of the represen tational work that rurality does in constructing the dom inant (if anodyne) markers of Englishness have tended to cluster around issues of ethnicity and race and the examination of the countryside as a de racialized landscape.

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The term de racialized is used very purposely to refer to a dual process by which race is denied as a key driver in a discourse that is very much about race. In dominant rural imaginaries and rural spaces, the notion of race is deemed irrelevant as the spaces become hyper whitened as black and other minority ethnic ﬁgures and populations are as sumed as an absence, as distant, or as uninterested. The attempt to extract or write out race from popular concepts of rurality reveals the extent to which race is not only relevant but actively shapes popular nostalgic narratives as to what the countryside is – an inert, culturally homo genous ‘forever England’ place. Some of the rural other ness and ethnicity debate has also been concerned with the extent to which black and minority ethnic rural residents and rural visitors experience racism and racialized mar ginalization and the extent to which rural spaces are underused and perceived as not easily accessible or wel coming to black and minority ethnic populations. The de racialized rural discourse performs a number of concerning tasks: it denies and invisiblizes the small, scattered but signiﬁcant and increasing numbers of black and minority ethnic residents, workers, and visitors in rural areas; it severely limits the multicultural sensibility of rural policymakers, service deliverers, and those re sponsible for rural well being; and it sweeps under the historical carpet the longevity of the colonial–country side relation – the stately homes built with colonial wealth, their interiors inﬂuenced by a ‘colonial aesthetic’, and their huge grounds planted with exotic trees, ﬂowers, and shrubs brought from colonized countries, and the rural villages and public houses whose names testify to a colonial familarism and, ﬁnally it sets up a potent and reiterative narrative in which a dangerous spatialization of ethnicity and multiculture occurs – ethnicity and multiculture ‘belong to’ and ‘are of ’ urban environments and do not ‘belong to’ and are ‘not of ’ rural environ ments. While there are of course constant challenges as well as quantitative and qualitative evidence which counter and disrupt this narrative, it retains a populist and political tenacity in Britain. There is clearly, from a policy perspective among others, a need to rethink the de racialized rural discourse for two reasons. First, it is a discourse which denies and conceals rural multiculture. Second, the whitening of rural spaces has not been about whiteness per se. The whiteness that has been imagined in rural areas is hier archically constructed as to its social and political de sirability. As the discussions above show, whiteness has never simply equated to belonging in racialized narra tives. In rural spaces Gypsies, New Age travelers, and the urban working classes have been problematized, outcast, white presences in both historical and contemporary countryside environments and met with local and na tional hostility which, at times, has culminated in re strictive legislation.

Alongside a privileging of cultural sameness, the Eng lish rural discourse has, in particular, been about social order. The countryside idyll and ‘village England’ repre sent a highly regulated, socially deferential space. It re ﬂects control: the country house, the immaculate lawn, ‘exotic’ plants from distant (more dis orderly) places, land ownership, and the country seat as the base of the tradi tionalist, hierarchical political system of England. Despite the radical and dramatic political changes that have taken place in the governance of rural populations over the centuries, it is the idea of the rural as an orderly and stable space that is called on in times of political crisis and anxiety. During World War II, posters with views across the English South Downs rallied the population to defend the nation; in the early 1980s, the former Conservative government’s Home Secretary William Whitelaw, in famously looked to the rural view from his garden for reassurance as urban unrest spread across inner city areas of Britain. Even in the early 1990s, the former Con servative Prime Minister John Major evoked a ruralist set of images as those which would be able to deﬁne a Britain in ‘50 years time’. Conversely, more recent attempts to deﬁne Britain through a more urbanist ‘cool Britannia’ frame have been troubled. In the 2000s, the new Labour Government, with its metropolitan associations, has had a particularly turbulent relationship with the countryside played out, for example, in the hunting ban legislation and the emergence of the conservative Countryside Alliance. This particular and necessarily narrow imagining of the rural has held a long appeal for the political right – not only for those with conservative tendencies but also for those on the extreme right in Britain. The latter have, with a passing nod to the rurally focused racialized terror activities of the Ku Klux Klan in the United States, in creasingly been concerned with attempting to organize around and disseminate via their newsletter ‘Land and People’, a notion of rural Britain as the last outpost of an imagined Englishness and the need for it to be ‘defended’ as such. This has been a strategy which has delivered the British National Party some political successes notably winning councilor seats in Worsthorne, a rural village in Northern England, in local elections in the early 2000s. This de racing of the British countryside presents a set of processes which are unlikely, if not impossible, to transfer to other national settings. In the United States, for example, the history of the Deep South and the history of Native American Indians mean that rural landscapes are deeply entangled with African American culture, racial violence, segregation, and racial inequality. In Australia too, the rural base of Aboriginal settlement, culture, and struggles funda mentally recasts the rural others debates. In postcolonial Zimbabwe and Kenya and post apartheid South Africa, the high proﬁle contestations over white owned farms and land rights again prohibits the sanitization and puriﬁcation of rural spaces.

Identity and Otherness, Rural

Rural Others – A Very British Story? Much of the rural identity and rural otherness debates have been situated within a very British and sometimes very English context. In many ways, this ‘parochialness’ is based on the cultural, social, and political cornerstone that the concept of rurality has taken up in the dominant narratives and formations of national identity. The sanc tiﬁcation, puriﬁcation, and associated regulation of rural spaces have been about the cultural representations and social constructions of Englishness and, at various mo ments, Britishness. It is both historical and contemporary. The country house was integral to class and political systems in Britain. In Britain, the imagined and material distinction between country and city has been ﬁrmly maintained with the help of the Green Belt policy which aimed to protect the countryside and stop the urban and suburban sprawl. At a moment of afﬂuent counter urbanization and rural repopulation, the contestations over rural space in Britain are as intense as ever. Nevertheless, the speciﬁcity of the British case does not mean that rural spaces do not shape and inﬂuence other nations’ narratives and signiﬁers of national identity – France may be Paris, but it is also Provence; Scandi navia is particularly understood through a rural esthetic in part derived from the Allemansra¨tten (Swedish) right to roam; the Outback rural spaces of Australia feature highly in its popular representations; and the mid west prairies, the southwestern deserts, and the New England fall foliage are immediate signiﬁers of the United States. So it is not that other narratives of national identity do not, and have not, incorporated and mobilized rural spaces as representational markers and signiﬁers. Nor is this to suggest that such narratives do not contain rural folk devils and rural others (as the hostility and animosity toward Gypsies in Eastern Europe and travelers in the Irish Republic evidence). Rather, it is to suggest that those narratives have not constructed sanctiﬁed, puriﬁed, and regulated rural spaces to the same totalizing extent. Rural poverty (for example in the Dust Bowl of the 1930s; in the photographs of Dorothea Lange; in the John Steinbeck novels The Grapes of Wrath and Of Mice and Men; and in the Appalachian Mountains) has not been erased from the US national story – indeed to some extent, it is integral to it. However, what does remain absent from the (dominant) transcendentalist ‘natural environment’ metanarrative is an African American perspective, a nonessentialized/ing identity grounded ﬁrmly in the African American rural experience. Again, reﬂecting the diversity of rural debates and the politics of rurality, rural researchers have argued that if the New Age traveler controversy has died down in the context of the British countryside it is because many New Age travelers have moved to continental European rural countries. Although these countries are not without

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trespass laws, policing, and regulation, New Age travelers have not been viewed through the same lens of anxiety nor seen as presenting a level of threat to countrysides that requires legislation and draconian policing.

Conclusion A focus on rural identity and rural others involves seeking more ‘broken’ narratives of rural spaces. By this, we mean that the dominant rural imaginaries, hooked around ideas of sameness and stability and conditional inclusion, require theoretical and empirical challenge and disruption. Broken narratives of rurality recognize the ﬂuidity, ambiguity, and heterogeneity of rural spaces. It is important that not only are countrysides of diversity and difference more easily and readily acknowledged, but that this plurality is also appro priately responded to in political and policy terms. It is important to remember that constructions of others and processes of otherness are part of a dialectic deﬁning of not only the different, problem, transgressive subject but also the hegemonic center. A focus on rural identity and otherness involves not only the visibilization of the hidden, contested, and marginalized rural populations and issues, but also the scrutiny of ‘uncontested’, ‘mainstream’ rural populations and dominant discourses. See also: Ethnicity and Resistance, Historical Geographies of; Nation; National Parks; Rural Geography; Rurality and Post-Rurality.

Further Reading Agyeman, J. and Spooner, R. (1997). ‘Ethnicity and the rural environment’. In Cloke, P. & Little, J. (eds.) Contested Countryside Cultures, pp 197 217. London: Routledge. Bell, M. (1994). Childerley: Nature and Morality in a Country Village. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press. Bunce, M. (1994). The Countryside Ideal: Anglo American Images of Landscape. London: Routledge. Cloke, P., Doel, M., Matless, D., Phillips, M. and Thrift, N. (1994). Writing the Rural, Five Cultural Geographies. London: Chapman. Cloke, P. and Little, J. (eds.) (1997). Contested Countryside Cultures: Otherness, Marginalization and Rurality. London: Routledge. Davis, M. (2006). Planet of Slums. London: Verso. Dwyer, O. J. (1997). Geographical research about African Americans: A survey of journals, 1911 1995. Professional Geographer 49(4), 441 451. Floyd, M. F. (1998). Getting beyond marginality and ethnicity: The challenge for race and ethnic studies in leisure research. Journal of Leisure Research 30(1), 3 22. Hetherington, K. (2000). New Age Travelers: Vanloads of Uproarious Humanity. London: Cassell. Neal, S. and Agyeman, J. (eds.) (2006). The New Countryside? Ethnicity, Nation and Exclusion in Contemporary Rural Britain. Bristol: The Policy Press. Sibley, D. (1996). Geographies of Exclusion. London: Routledge.

Identity Politics A. Kobayashi, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Identity A set of socially constructed traits around which members of a group organize a sense of belonging. Identity Politics The political mobilization of a group to achieve recognition and redress of historical oppression on the basis of group identity. Irredentism A movement on the part of the nationstate to incorporate within its boundaries all territory to which it has once held claim, often involving the attempt to incorporate minority ethnocultural groups who claim a separate national identity. Multiculturalism State recognition of group identities as a basis for plural, as opposed to monocultural, societies. Politics of Difference A contested term that for rightsseeking groups refers to political movements that use recognition of shared historical experiences as a basis for social recognition; conversely, assimilationists view the politics of difference as the basis for separatism.

Early Interest in Identity Politics among Geographers The ideologically laden term ‘identity politics’ refers to social movements to gain recognition of historically oppressed ethnocultural or racialized groups. Some theorists also refer to such movements as a ‘politics of difference’. Geographers’ interest in identity politics began with the development of ‘radical’ geography during the 1960s, at the height of the American Civil Rights Movement. Radical geography was (and is) mainly a cri tique of established theories of the state and economy; but William Bunge took radical geography to the streets by initiating the Detroit Geographical Expedition in col laboration with local organizers from the African American community. Although the collaboration lasted only about a year, it focused attention on the possibilities for geographers to work with local activists in advocating for social change. Several similar projects developed throughout the US and Canada, although they tended to be much more strongly focused on issues of antipoverty movements and activism around the deﬁnition of public space (both important) than on questions of racial and ethnocultural equality. Despite the strong potential of such early work, radical geography approaches inﬂu enced by structural Marxism did not materialize into

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widespread analysis or involvement at the local scale; and humanistic geographers of the 1970s and 1980s tended to emphasize either individual experience or the creation of symbolic cultural landscapes. Neither approach made issues of identity politics a priority, despite the extremely important place of identity politics in the contemporary world. Over the past two decades, however, there has been renewed and enthusiastic interest both for understanding identity politics and for encouraging research and aca demic activism in local communities.

The Development of Politics of Identity since the Civil Rights Movement The politics of identity was an issue of major public concern through the 1970s and 1980s, particularly in white settler societies such as Canada and the United States. These decades saw the emergence of movements to obtain redress for historical oppression across a huge range of issues mobilized using many political positions and strategies, but they fall into two major categories: those that seek a radical separation from the dominant society, and those that seek recognition within dominant society. The ﬁrst group aims to establish alternate forms of nationalism, while the second appeals to a range of meanings of multiculturalism. The Politics of Radical Separatism Radical separatism depends on a sense of identity that is fundamentally irreconcilable with the larger nation. While such movements vary (both by group and histor ically) over the degree of autonomy sought and in the extent to which they are willing to use violence when other means are unsuccessful, they have in common a belief that the only means of overcoming oppression is removal from the hegemony of the oppressor. They occur in historical situations of colonialism, territorial annex ation, or wholesale movements of peoples (e.g., through slavery). They also vary in the extent to which separatism is a means to an end or an end in itself, and in the extent to which separatism involves territorial claims. The geographical, spatial context for radical separatist movements, therefore, is crucial to an understanding of the possibilities for addressing their claims. The geography of radical separatism based on terri torial claims is extremely mutable and varied. Some historic movements, such as Quebecois separatism or republicanism in Northern Ireland, have shifted over

Identity Politics

time from the blunt politics of opposition to a practice of transformation from within. While no less adamant in their claims to national identity, such groups have ex panded their strategic actions to use more conventional political means, such as party politics, to achieve their ends. Quebecois separatists, for example, refer to the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s as the trans formation to a secular nationalist society in which insti tution building – language, cultural practices, the arts, the emergence of a national political party, the Bloc Quebecois – is the basis for cultural autonomy within Quebec borders. Such territorially based identities are seldom hege monic, however, and are often internally contested. For example, in the case of Basque groups in Spain, identity based institution building is the basis for an autonomous region in which a number of Basque political groups now compete for power. The Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), however, shuns those institutions, still espouses radical separation, and is willing to use violence to achieve it. In other regions, such as the former Yugoslavia, politics of identity taken to their furthest ends resulted in wide spread violence and radical separation and dismantling of a former national polity. There are many other examples throughout the globe – the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, the Tamils in Sri Lanka, Palestinians in Israel, and indigen ous groups in both developed and lesser developed na tion states – where ongoing violence deﬁnes attempts by historically oppressed groups to establish separatist states based on ethnocultural identity, and where ofﬁcial state violence to suppress such movements takes a range of irredentist practices, from genocide and ethnic cleansing to the imposition of strict policing regimes and the denial of human rights. Geographers have struggled to develop adequate theories for understanding the politics of identity around radical separatism, especially in situations of extreme violence. Historical materialist accounts of the conditions of oppression under which separatist movements have arisen can explain the desperation of nationalist groups in the face of brutal colonial practices and ongoing denial of the most fundamental human rights (which have oc curred to one degree or another in all of the cases cited above). They can also explain the liberating power of resistance to oppression, whether through violence or through more conventional political strategies. But they do not condone violence as a means of liberation. Recent attempts to assess the most entrenched and violent irre dentisms, by geographers such as David Delaney, Deryk Gregory, and David Harvey, have stressed the import ance of going beyond territorial oppression, of recog nizing the extent to which contemporary identity based territories are implicated in global formations of capital, global redistribution of resources, and global political coalitions, and of reimagining the meaning of the nation

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in light of colonial and other hegemonic forms of dom ination. While several geographers have cautioned about the danger of romanticizing separatist groups ‘just be cause’ they have occupied a historic position of margin ality, we still face the question of whether it is a radical politics of identity (whether of the dominant or sub ordinate group), or only a ‘violent’ politics of identity that needs to be overcome in situations of conﬂict. Not all forms of radical identity politics are territo rially based. A major example is that of the Black Panthers, who emerged in the 1960s to advocate for African Americans’ right to form their own destiny in order to overcome poverty and gain access to education, health, and other basic needs. The movement failed within a decade due, among other things, to the death or imprisonment of its leaders, internal ideological conﬂicts, and the actions of law enforcement to restrain its activ ities. Recent resurgence of interest in the Black Panther movement on the part of academics, including geog raphers, raises questions about the possibility for non territorial nationalist movements to establish a sense of collective identity sufﬁcient to effect change, and about the logistics of scale in organizing identity based claims when traditional notions of territory are not the basis for mobilization. Strategies for political organization, as well as the rationale for claiming human rights, change dra matically when not territorially based. The memory of the Black Panthers is also linked to emerging forms of radical identity claims. In the US, several social movement groups, seeing a failure over the past four decades to improve the position of African Americans, are claiming a revival of the Black Panther organization premised on peaceful mechanisms for social change. Moreover, similar claims, especially among Isla micist movements, are increasingly diasporic, transna tional, and global against the global gathering of strength of Islamophobia, which is also often violent. These movements are by and large premised on a concept of peaceful activism, although some are willing to resort to violence. Diasporic identity politics are considerably more ideologically varied than are movements that lay claim to speciﬁc territories. Paradoxically, they are both more potentially powerful because of their global scale, and more difﬁcult to organize because of their spatial diffusion. Surely, there has never been a more important or compelling challenge to political geographers than to understand the implications of emerging diasporic identity politics. Identity Politics in a Context of Multiculturalism Identity politics set within a pluralist, or multicultural, context seek recognition of human rights rather than separation. Although they are usually much less likely to occur in violent situations, this does not mean that they

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are any less fervently sought, or that the acts of op pression against which they seek redress are any less oppressive. They include, for example, most of the American Civil Rights Movement, including the move ment for slavery compensation, the movements of Japanese Americans and Japanese Canadians for redress for human rights abuses during the 1940s, organizations against Islamophobia, organizations of urban indigenous peoples, and struggles for the rights of Latino/Latina migrant workers. In almost every case they occur against a historic background of colonialism that involved the migration of people to places where they could not ex ercise territorial claims. Most racialized minorities in advanced industrial countries, for example, ﬁrst arrived (and continue to arrive) in those countries as slaves, in dentured, or very cheap labor. It is ironic that their presence has created the conditions of pluralism that have led many states to adopt policies of multicultural ism. Moreover, nonterritorial claims of (dis)placed cul tural minorities are often set against the territorial claims of nationalist or indigenous communities, especially in the white settler societies such as the US, Canada, Aus tralia, and New Zealand. The challenge of reconciling the liberal notion of individual multicultural rights with group rights in such settings is one that has yet to be met by policymakers, political philosophers, or social move ment groups themselves. As state policy, the idea of multiculturalism ﬁrst emerged in Canada in the 1960s and became ofﬁcial government policy in that country in 1971. Australia followed suit in 1973, and several European states, such as Sweden and the Netherlands, subsequently adopted similar state policies. The concept is a liberal democratic one of encouraging individual identity as a member of a particular ethnocultural group, and in advancing public institutions to foster equality. Many policymakers have advocated multiculturalism as a means of overcoming the practice of assimilation, particularly of recently arrived immigrant groups, but without thereby hindering the ability of such groups to achieve full and equitable social participation. Critics of multiculturalism have been less sanguine over the power of multiculturalism to achieve social cohesion, but for very different reasons. Critics have generally taken one of two polarized positions. The illiberal, monoculturalist position holds that nations should maintain a dominant cultural identity to which Others should adapt or assimilate. For them, identity politics around multiculturalism are disparaged as addressing the needs of ‘special interests’, rather than those of the dominant society. Such critics also fear that regimes of ascriptive primordialism on the part of eth nocultural groups will entrench difference and encourage fundamentalism, extremism, and antimodernism. They maintain that only assimilation to a dominant culture will overcome primordialism. This position is currently

gaining strength in a number of advanced industrial countries of Europe and North America. The contrary view opposes multiculturalism on the grounds that it is by deﬁnition separatist and as such prevents marginalized groups from accessing full equality rights enjoyed by members of the dominant group. These critics fear that group identities will be ‘Balkanized’ in relation to the dominant group. They are skeptical of the willingness or ability of the state to address any but the most general of claims to equal recognition, but they also caution against the coercive power of the group to en force a singular identity at the expense of other facets of subject positioning such as gender or class. Both positions, however, rely on an essentialized understanding of ethnocultural identity as Other, and often depict culture as static, immobile, and necessarily conservative. Ethnocultural groups themselves have also resorted to essentialized concepts of identity – whence the term ‘identity politics’ – in their struggles to attain social justice through recognition. Many writers have pointed out the paradox of identity politics: that making claims based on historical injustice reinscribes the state of difference that was the original basis of injustice, thus preparing the ground for further oppression. Using the liberal democratic concept of multiculturalism as a basis for equality, therefore, runs the risk of reproducing this fundamental tension between identity and difference in irreconcilable ways. Nowhere is this tension more pronounced than in contemporary debates over the expression of Muslim identity now occurring in various ways throughout tradi tionally non Islamic world. In some advanced capitalist countries such as France and the Netherlands, secular multiculturalism has provided the ironic and somewhat disingenuous rationale for curtailing certain public Islamic expressions, such as female dress. In other places, such as Canada and Australia, while there has been no ofﬁcial pulling back of the concept of multiculturalism, Muslim identity is under increasing public attack, and discourses of ascriptive premordialism are increasingly dominant. In the province of Quebec, for example, where territorial identity claims to cultural separatism are often at loggerheads with claims for multicultural recognition on the part of racialized and religious minorities, there is currently underway a public commission on religious accommodation. Public discourse around accommodation overwhelmingly asserts a dominant, normative view of Quebecois culture, with de bate occurring over how far the dominant group is willing to go to accommodate difference. Nonetheless, ethnocultural mobilization has often used the concept of multiculturalism to transcend, rather than reinforce, notions of cultural separation, and such movements can involve considerable negotiation of the terms of cultural identiﬁcation within groups. Most dia sporic groups, within which there inevitably operate a

Identity Politics

range of political views, are themselves sites of lively debate over what their collective identity consists of, over the meaning of cultural change that is often accelerated by the very experience of diasporic movement, and over the means by which human rights, including the rights of women, can be achieved in a wide variety of national contexts. In many Western countries, the minority groups asserting their own identity have pushed for human rights that affect all citizens. In some cases, coalitions of minority group movements that may at other times seemed odd partners have advocated for social change and, in so doing, have established a basis for reimagining multicultural societies in which ethnocultural identities are not silos of isolation, but expressions of vibrant social interaction. One example of recent trends is the increasing inci dence of transnationalism. Whereas transnationalism as a set of practices that retain links between one or more disaporic generations and a country of origin is by no means a new phenomenon, it is widely believed that in the context of globalization, including global communi cation and transportation, globalized consumption prac tices, and related increases in international migration, ongoing interactions between migrants and their places of origin have become stronger since the latter part of the twentieth century. There is now a burgeoning literature on the topic that includes a variety of transnational forms among temporary labor migrants, permanent settlers, and subsequent generations. These connections are culturally, demographically, economically, and politically complex. But what they show in part is that the complexities of negotiating individual and family lives across transnational ﬁelds are strongly connected to those of negotiating conditions of citizenship. Contemporary transnationals, many of whom are also very cosmopolitan, have the capacity to participate in social movements that address issues of human rights and social identity and, further, the conception of human rights and social identity is subject to considerable change within the ﬂuid social dynamics of transnationalism, transcending static or primordial notions of citizenship rights. The increasing practice of holding dual or multiple citizenships also affects the ways in which social identities are transformed and emphasizes the extent to which questions of citizenship have become globalized. For example, when violence erupted in Lebanon in 2006, many dual nationals from countries such as Canada and Australia that recognize multiple citizenship were as sisted by their governments to evacuate. The evacuations sparked ﬁerce debates in a number of countries about the value of dual citizenship, the rights of citizens, loyalty to more than one national identity, and the obligations of states to serve the needs of their citizens outside national borders. These debates bring out many geographical issues, not only about the changing relationship between

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cultural/political identities and territory, but also about the ways in which changing ways of being citizens can transcend older notions of multiculturalism. Many dual nationals feel that their allegiance to both countries is strengthened by an expanded concept of place of resi dence, and that their experiences contribute to a rich cultural diversity in both places, especially when children born with rights to more than one citizenship exercise those rights through their own international activities. Dual citizenship, and attendant transnational activities, thus works to counteract cultural primordialism. Such citizens are increasingly involved in social movements that transcend national borders. Transna tional social movements (TSMs) have been a major feature of globalization, and transnational identity pol itics are no exception. Diasporic cultural groups, more than ever, connected by electronic communication as well as the ability to move with greater ease between international destinations, address issues of citizenship at a number of scales, linking national and international citizenship issues. Such social movements organized around identity politics range from movements to bring peace to areas torn by violent conﬂict, to democratic movements to shift autocratic state apparatuses or to protect minority groups subject to state oppression, to smaller scale projects that include international adoption programs or participatory development projects. Critics will point out that transnational identity pol itics also include groups mobilized to effect violence, especially since 11 September 2001. It is important to recognize that the power to effect all kinds of social outcomes transcends borders. The geography of social movements is such that the political outcomes are con tingent, and very much rooted in the historical conditions that produce in some cases violence and in others posi tive social change. The suppression of minority groups is also ongoing and involves the mobilization of state apparatuses capable of delivering widespread violence. Furthermore, while armed violence is only one form of suppressing social movements, the violence of normative ideologies, in the form of racialized and colonial ideas and practices, is a major aspect of the politics of differ ence. We need to understand, therefore, not only the variety of ways in which social movements work in plural societies, but also the variety of ways in which states address their concerns.

Overcoming the Paradox: Imagining Identity Politics Beyond Identity Geographers began to direct their interests toward ques tions of identity politics during the early 1990s through a renewed interest in studying the geography of racism through a post structural lens. While notions of a biological

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basis to the concept of ‘race’, and primordial deﬁnitions of culture, have been increasingly discredited, post structur alism allows an understanding of the ways in which essen tialist beliefs are constructed, or imagined, through the deployment of dominant discourses that normalize the dominant (white) body and invest power in white cultural formations. All identities are thus already constructed through a historical process such as racialization. Social constructionism portrays the ontologically unstable status of social categories, but it does not in itself provide insight on the ‘politics’ of recognition. The study of identity politics in different forms and in different parts of the world has led geographers to a number of insights about understanding political strug gles. The politics of identity almost always originate in conditions of colonialism or territorial conquest and involve the historic displacement of minorities or the subjugation of minorities in place. Contemporary at tempts to overcome historic oppression, whether waged through violent means or through accomodationist practices, such as multiculturalism, invariably run the paradoxical risk of reinscribing difference and the iden tity of the irremediable other. Overcoming essentialism is not simply an academic exercise. That is, it is not only essentialism as a theoreti cally inadequate – and inaccurate – explanatory frame work that is troubling, it is the political, ideological use of essentialism to mobilize discourses of domination. It is about the imagination of sameness and difference, and about the lengths that human beings are willing to go to reinforce such normative visions. Recently, geographers and others have begun to theorize ways of reimagining human relations so that dominant groups and minority groups alike can get past the trap of essentialized thinking.

By doing so, they also theorize the extent to which social change is possible. But if the refutation of essentialism is old news academically, it is certainly very much a part of political movements, not only because ideas are slow to change but also because certain ideas retain huge, indeed hegemonic, political power. It is, above all, against such hegemonic power that identity politics have emerged and social movements of all sorts have resisted. See also: Activism; Cosmopolitanism; Cultural Politics; Difference/Politics of Difference; Ethnicity; Human Rights; Multiculturalism; People’s Geography; Race; Racism and Antiracism; Resistance; Transnationality; Whiteness.

Further Reading Cohen, R. (1998). Transnational social movements: An assessment. Working Paper 98 10. Oxford: Transnational Communities Research Programme. http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/ cohen.pdf (accessed in June 2008). Fossam, J. E. (n.d.). Identity Politics in the European Union. ARENA Working Papers 01/17. http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/ wp01 17.htm (accessed in July 2008). Harvey, D. (1996). Justice, Nature, and the Geography of Difference. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Heyes, C. (2007). Identity politics. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2007 edn.) Zalta, E. N. (2nd.), forthcoming. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2007/entries/identity politics (accessed in June 2008). Jordan, G. and Weedon, C. (1995). Cultural Politics: Class, Gender, Race and the Postmodern World. Oxford: Blackwell. Pulido, L. (2006). Black, Brown, Yellow and Left: Radical Activism in Los Angeles. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Pecora, V. P. (ed.) (2001). Nations and Identities. Oxford: Blackwell. Young, I. M. (1990). Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Young, I. M. (2000). Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ideology K. R. Olwig, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Alnarp, Sweden & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Anarchism Anarchism, like ‘ideology’ and ‘romanticism’, often carries negative connotations. In this case anarchy is often understood to be a total lack of control, and anarchists are seen to be bomb-throwing terrorists. Anarchy, however, simply means lack of a formal system of government, such as a state, and anarchism is a political ideology, opposed to state coercion, that advocates the free economic and political cooperation of individuals in communities. It has signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced the development of the cooperative and labor movements. Some adherents of anarchism have been exposed to violence, others as in the case of many other activists, have advocated violence in response, but the basic thrust of anarchist thought is that peaceful cooperation is the normal mode of human organization, and many anarchists have been paciﬁsts. Anarchist geographers have thus advocated education as an alternative to coercion as a means of fostering social development through cooperative endeavors rooted in an understanding of the geographical environment’s potentialities. Ancien Re´gime It is the name speciﬁcally given to France’s political and social system before the 1789 revolution. It also refers, by extension, to any outmoded system or administration, and it thus can be applied more generally to regimes similar to that overthrown in France. The connotation of outmodedness that adheres to this term reﬂects the negative position of the ‘moderns’ toward the ‘ancients’ (see entry ‘ancient’). Ancient The term ‘ancient’ was counterposed to the ‘modern’ in an inﬂuential late seventeenth century literary ‘quarrel’ taking place in France and England between, on the one hand, proponents of the belief that the ideas expressed in ancient Greek and Roman classics were the ideal source of literary inspiration, and, on the other hand, the thinkers who believed that the development of the human mind, as evidenced by the progress of science, made contemporary works superior to those of the ancients. This debate foreshadowed the ‘modern’ notion of science-based progress that developed during the ‘Enlightenment’. Enlightenment An eighteenth-century Western European intellectual movement emphasizing the ?‘light’ of reason, rationality, and science in the understanding of human culture and the natural ?world, and in encouraging its progress. Proponents of the Enlightenment were thus critical of Europe’s ?ancien re´gimes as dominated by the aristocracy and

justiﬁed by ideologies rooted in metaphysics and religion. Modern (See entries ‘ancient’ and ‘ancien re´gime’. ) Romantic Movement This was a late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century movement in philosophy and the arts. It opposed classicism’s cultivation of general, formal, rational, and unchanging models derived from the ancient literary classics and the ﬁxed geometry of classical architecture, which it identiﬁed with the ancien re´gimes of Europe’s aristocratic courts in capital cities. The romantics looked, instead, for inspiration from cultures and societies seen to be more natural because they lived at some distance from the cosmopolitan core, as in the mountains of Switzerland or Scotland, or were distant in historical time, as in medieval Europe. Instead of the rationality of geometric models, the romantics emphasized the esthetics of organic growth and progress, and individual sensibility, identiﬁed with nature.

Ideology Geography might be described either as a discipline en gaged in the constructive production of ideology in the form of geographical ideas, or as a discipline that seeks to promulgate, critique, or even transcend ideology as a politicized form of consciousness. The difference depends upon changing approaches to geography and how one de ﬁnes ideology. This article will begin with an examination of the discipline during the formative early stages of its modern history at the beginning of the nineteenth century, when geography was positively engaged in the production of ideology in a broad educational sense. It will then examine how geography, in the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth century became engaged with political ideologies, such as nationalism, liberalism, imperialism, anarchism, and Marxism, giving rise in the process to what is now known as political geography. At this time, pro ponents of a particular ideology, such as Marxism, might be critical of another ideology, such as that of imperialism, but it was not until the mid twentieth century that geographers sought to transcend ideology entirely by replacing it with a supposedly ‘objective’, ‘spatial science’. The late twentieth and early twenty ﬁrst century, however, has witnessed a return to a broad engagement with ideological issues. Political geography has particularly enjoyed a renaissance rooted in a critical understanding of geography’s past and present ideological uses and misuses that is rooted in

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postcolonial theory, critical Marxism, post structural phil osophy, and a renewed understanding of the ideological role of landscape. The Enlightenment Origin of Ideology and Geography Modern geography grew out of the same Enlightenment impulses that produced the discipline of ‘ideology’ as a branch of knowledge concerned both with the origin and nature of ideas and the role of such ideas in transforming society. Destutt de Tracy (1754–1836), and his circle of French Enlightenment philosophers, who pioneered the science of ideology, thus believed in the power of ideas not just to explain the world, but to change it – especially through education. Ideological knowledge is therefore not neutral and this makes it open to controversy, both if it is seen to inﬂuence behavior (making it potentially dangerous) and when it is not seen to do so (making it superﬂuous). The resultant divided opinion of ideology is evident in the contradictory deﬁnitions typically given in dictionaries, which shift abruptly from the matter of fact: ‘a manner or the content of thinking characteristic of an individual, group, or culture’ (such as that of the medical profession or a social class), to the depreciating: ‘vision ary speculation – idle theorizing; often: an impractical theory or system of theories’. They likewise can shift from the neutral ‘integrated assertions, theories, and aims that constitute a sociopolitical program’, to damning as ‘an extremist sociopolitical program or philosophy con structed wholly or in part on factitious or hypothetical ideational bases’. Finally, one also ﬁnds academic deﬁn itions, such as ‘a systematic scheme or coordinated body of ideas or concepts especially about human life or culture’ – a ﬁtting description of a discipline such as geography! Because ideology is deﬁned in so many, contradictory, ways, the meaning of ideology must be understood in the context of the praxis in which it is used. Geography as Ideological Praxis The French Enlightenment ideologist philosophers put their knowledge of ideology into practice through edu cation about the time of the 1789 French Revolution, when the ancien re´gime was waning. They were particu larly interested in the relationship between ideas and sensory experience, and thus, more broadly in the rela tionship between the ideational and the material realms, particularly as revealed through science. Modern geog raphy grew out of the Enlightenment’s broad concern with ideology and education as pioneered by the ideologists, and geographers shared their overarching interest in the link between ideas, empirical knowledge of the material world, and human progress. At this time, education in the sciences and technology was ‘modern’,

progressive, and controversial, in contrast to traditional conservative Latin school education, which privileged the ideas found in the Bible and the ‘ancient’ Greek and Roman classics. Encyclopedic Geography

The foundational geographical works of the early nine teenth century were encyclopedic in character, in the tradition of the eighteenth century French Enlighten ment ‘philosophes’ whose monumental Encyclopaedia, or Classiﬁed Dictionary of Sciences, Arts, and Trades inspired the ideologist philosophers. The sufﬁx, ‘graphy’, comes from the Greek graphein, meaning ‘to write’, and these geographers were, by and large, ‘writers’ more than sci entists. Geographers produced geography, as a form of knowledge, through their writing praxis. An example of a writer who literally helped produce the discipline of geography through his writing would be Conrad Malte Brun (1775–1826). This Danish aristocrat and poet ﬂed in 1799 into exile in France as a con sequence of his satiric writing in the spirit of the French Revolution’s critique of the ancien re´gime, and because he was linked through his pamphleteering to an early, con troversial, strike by craftsmen. In France he worked as a journalist and became one of the literati associated with Madame Germaine de Stae¨l (1766–1817) who helped set in motion the French Romantic Movement. ‘Romanti cism’, like ‘ideology’, is often identiﬁed with the visionary and the impractical, but at this time its revolutionary impetus lay in its almost sociological concern with his torical and social reality, and its cultivation of the culture, language, and landscapes of the common people of dif ferent regions, as opposed to the language and values of the court and nobility of the capital (Figure 1). This movement, in turn, helped provide the ideological foundation for the nation state, whose geography was seen to be rooted in the culture of the land and people, as opposed to the dynastic identities of the monarchs. There was thus an ideological line of development from Malte Brun’s literary and social concerns to his pioneering work as writer and editor of the ﬁrst six volumes of the vividly written encyclopedic Pre´cis of World Geography (1810–29) and his engagement as founder and ﬁrst secretary of the Socie´te´ de Ge´ographie de Paris (1821). Ideology as Worldview

The German geographer Alexander von Humboldt (1769–1859) became well known as a natural scientist and explorer. As a geographer, however, his world fame lay in his writing, as exempliﬁed by his ﬁve volume Cosmos: A Sketch of a Physical Description of the Universe. The title Cosmos harks back to a Renaissance word for geography, ‘cosmography’. A cosmography is essentially a ‘worldview’, and Humboldt and his geographer colleagues were lit erally working to produce a global, scientiﬁcally informed

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‘idea’, which is traceable back to the ancient Greek word idein, meaning ‘to see’. Throughout Europe, at this time, education and picturing were linked, but this was par ticularly the case in Germany, where the word for pic ture, Bild, and that for education, Bildung, resembled one another. Geography was therefore not just engaged in education, it embodied education through its emphasis upon graphic, pictorial languages of representation. Education and language, furthermore, were major con cerns of Alexander’s brother and conﬁdant, Wilhelm (1767–1835), a linguist and educational reformer who helped found the modern research university. The con cern with the foundation of knowledge is particularly notable in the work of another contemporary German geographer, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), who is better known for his philosophical concern with ‘epistemology’, or the study of how we know the world. Geography and the Politics of Ideology Geography and Anarchist Ideology

Figure 1 Swiss landscape: This cover from a 1911 Danish elementary school geography textbook shows a landscape with a Swiss village, surrounded by mountains and glaciers, with a woman and man doing farm chores while another man is perched on a cliff with a riﬂe. Though close to nature, these Swiss also have constructed a modern railroad that climbs daringly up a steep mountain, over a bridge, and through a tunnel. The text tells us that the Swiss are ‘‘spirited and daring people, who love their land and their freedom, which they have defended with great bravery.’’ Switzerland had roughly the same population as Denmark, and was a microcosm of Europe with its multiple languages. Europe in general, with its cool, mild climate, is described as ‘the most important continent’ and ‘the center point for active human life’ with the greatest concentration of people.

view of the world. The idea of the worldview was related to the notion of picturing, by which the world is viewed as a picture or ‘sketch’ in which the differing elements of the landscape scene are framed and organized according to a particular perspective, such as that of science. Humboldt took this notion literally by bringing artists as well as cartographers with him on his scientiﬁc expeditions, and by using pictorial language. Another word for worldview is ideology, and picturing is especially tied to ideology through the concept of the

The French polymath geographer Elise Reclus (1830– 1905) was engaged with ideology as one of the world’s leading anarchists. He produced the 19 volume The Earth and Its Inhabitants in which he was particularly concerned with how people adapted the environment to their col lective needs, thereby transforming both the environ ment, their spatial horizons, and themselves – for example, by turning riverine barriers into highways for physical and social communication. Reclus focused, therefore, not upon ‘nature’, with its unchanging laws, but upon what he termed the ‘geographical environment’ which changed through time as communities learned to work together to develop the environment’s potentiality. This idea was of ideological importance because it sug gested that the barriers to free community organization, constituted by the contemporary coercive state, might someday be replaced by freer cooperative forms of or ganization. Reclus’ ideology was supplemented by that of the Russian geographer and leading anarchist, Peter Kropotkin (1842–1921), who argued that even in nature, biotic communities tend to cooperate in the use of par ticular habitats, rather than engage in a Darwinian struggle for the survival of the ﬁttest. Like Malte Brun, both Reclus and Kropotkin spent years in exile due to their political ideologies. Ideological Delusion

Napole´on Bonaparte (1769–1821) was apparently the ﬁrst to use the term ideology in the negative senses of impractical theory and an extremist sociopolitical pro gram. Napole´on, a man of action, tired of the ideologists whose philosophizing, in his opinion, favored demands for liberal democracy, crippling the military will in the process. The positive and negative images of ideology,

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like those of Romanticism, are thus two sides of the same coin, depending upon the point of view. One man who joined Napole´on’s cause, after some hesitation, was Malte Brun, who put his skills to use producing a geo graphical basis, as in his work on Poland, for the national political consolidation of Europe within Napole´on’s empire, making him a scientist in Napole´on’s eyes. Today, Malte Bruun has come to be regarded as Napo le´on’s ideologue. This Janus like character of ideology, by which one person’s science becomes another’s ideology (and vice versa), is particularly apparent in the critical approach of Karl Marx (1818–83) and Friedrich Engels (1820–95), the founders of Marxist or communist ideol ogy. It is important to dwell upon their ideas because it is largely via Marxism that the concept of ideology per se plays a role in contemporary geography. Marxism and Ideology

Marx and Engels were, like the French ideologues, both theoreticians and socially engaged activists, and like them, they were also interested in the relationship between the ideational and the material realm in the context of a will to not just study the world, but change it. For them, ideology was not simply an abstract concept, but the product of a political practice. They stamped anarchist ideology as utopian idealism because they be lieved that the state would be necessary to the transition to communism. Some of the most virulent ideologies of the time, to which both anarchism and Marxism were opposed, were those of nationalism, imperialism, and liberalism. The proponents of these ideologies anchored them in apparently timeless principles of nature, binding individuals by blood and race to their nation and its territory, and engaging them and their nation in a ceaseless Darwinian struggle with other individuals and other nations and races. To Marx and Engels, however, these ideologies were the outcome of developments in the material basis of society (e.g., industrial production) that facilitated the triumph of the bourgeoisie capitalists over the nobility. These ideologies were thus reﬂections of bourgeois interests, forming an ideological super structure to the material base of society that was the ultimate motor of change. For Marxism, it is not the ideas and values of liber alism, drawing inspiration from a Darwinian nature or a Protestant God, that created the basis for industrial capitalism, but changes in the mode of production. To believe otherwise is to become the victim of ‘false con sciousness’. Ideology becomes a particularly insidious form of false consciousness, from the Marxist point of view, when it is not recognized as being an ideology, but rather regarded as some form of objective, natural, sci entiﬁc truth, transcending time and history. Practicing Marxists thus tend to be conscious of their ideology, which they hotly debate among themselves, whereas

others in their view have an ideology, but are not con scious of it. Marxist ideology is not false consciousness in the Marxist view, because it sees itself as a body of ideas that is dialectically engaged in a historical and material process transforming both the mode of production and its ideas. Education and ‘Natural’ Ideology

The ideological character of geography is exempliﬁed by the importance of education for its growth as an aca demic discipline at the universities. The nineteenth century emergence of public primary and secondary education typically included geography as a core subject, and the need for teachers and competent school texts stimulated the growth of university geography. Geog raphy was important to the ideal of creating a general, educated citizenry capable of taking on the responsibility of representative democratic government. Education is by no means a neutral activity, and the educational systems that developed in the various nation states were intended to foster a loyal, patriotic national citizenry that shared national antipathies to foreign en emies and supported national and European imperial and colonial activities. The geography textbooks of nine teenth and early twentieth century thus often included blatant examples of nationalistic and imperialistic ideol ogy, supported by ideologies arguing for European social and/or racial superiority (Figure 2). The hidden ideo logical power of the texts lay especially in their structure, reinforced by maps and landscape drawings. The foun dation of each nation is the theory of ‘environmental determinism’ in which it is the physical landscape of a particular territory, which then provides the ‘natural’ framework determining the culture and economy of the nation (thereby making diasporic peoples, like the Romany or Jews, seem unnatural) (Figure 3). Textbooks throughout Europe and America often included the baldest of national and racial stereotypes. Dark skinned people from warm countries were described as hot blooded, lazy, and easy to subjugate, whereas pale skin ned people from colder northern, or mountain, climes were depicted as cool minded, diligent, and freedom loving. Like any other natural organism, the nation was presented as requiring Lebensraum (‘living space’). Indeed, the more vital a nation was, the more space it required in imperial competition with neighboring nations (Fig ure 4). Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellen, and Halford Mackinder are among the geographers who played an important role in shaping the discourse of political geography at this time. Carl Sauer (1889–1975), who founded the department of geography at Berkeley, California, in 1923, became a leading critic of environmental determinism. He was inspired, in part, by the American geographer and phil ologist George Perkins Marsh (1801–1882), who argued

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mid twentieth century environmental movement. Sauer’s broad cultural geography, however, was eclipsed to some degree by a post World War II effort to narrow geog raphy to a social science of space and regions (Figure 6). Space and the ‘End’ of Ideology

Figure 2 ‘Savage’ with boomerangs: The section on Australia, from the 1911 Danish textbook, informs us that the expansive European population makes up the majority of its 5 million people. The interior, however, is hot, ﬂat, and dry, and here live 60 000 native ‘Austral negroes’, like the man with boomerangs shown in the photo. According to the text they are ‘‘very inferior and raw people. They use neither clothes nor permanent dwellings. The wife is won by predation, and she is the man’s slave; and as a symbol of this the man bites a ﬁnger joint from her left hand. Many children are born, but only 2 3 of them are allowed to live. The others are killed while they are babies, and devoured.’’ Without mentioning imperialism and colonialism, which was both national and pan-European (Danes were among the settlers in British Australia), the ‘facts’ and illustrations in the text nevertheless provide ample justiﬁcation for imperialism’s civilizing mission. The quoted text appears to be based largely on an 1885 handbook in geography that was written by the ﬁrst professor of the geography department at the University of Copenhagen, Ernst Løfﬂer, who espoused environmental determinism.

that society was not determined by nature, but rather both transformed and destroyed nature (Figure 5). Marsh helped provide the ideological underpinnings for a ‘turn of the century’ conservation movement in America and Europe with his 1864 book Man and Nature: Or, Physical Geography as Modiﬁed by Human Action. By furthering Marsh’s concern with the role of culture and ideas in shaping the landscape, Sauer, in turn, helped foster the

World War II was also a war of ideologies, including nationalism, fascism, and communism, and the reaction against war stimulated a reaction against ideology, par ticularly in America. Geography’s theoreticians, such as Richard Hartshorne, became academic discipline build ers, advocating the elimination of the historical study of society/nature relations and, with it, the study of land scape, both of which lay at the heart of pre war ideo logical debate. They argued instead for a geographical science of regions and space. A new generation of sci entiﬁcally oriented geographers called for a ‘quantitative revolution’ in which geography would be based on the ‘spatial analysis’ of ‘locations’ in space deﬁned as in physics. This new geography was geared to social physics and functionalist spatial planning, and was, hence, highly academic and technocratic in orientation, and based on the ‘scientiﬁc’ principles of positivism. In this new geography, vivid and pictorial writing for a broad public and for educational purposes was down played in favor of mathematical language. These geog raphers concentrated on making quantiﬁed analyses for a narrow circle of academics, technocrats, and planners. This new orientation created a wedge between academic geography and general education that weakened the position of geography in the schools. It also distanced academic geography from the various national geo graphical societies that cultivated a broad contact with nonacademic segments of society. John K. Wright (1891– 1969), at the American Geographical Society, reacted against this tendency, countering specialization with a call to establish a subdiscipline called ‘geosophy’ that would deal with the geographical knowledge of all manner of people, past and present.

The Return of Ideological Consciousness to Geography Back to Nature (and to Gender): The Legacy of the Environmental Movement

By the end of the 1960s criticism of geography as spatial science began to mount in part due to the growing en vironmental movement, which led geographers to widen the constricted discourse of spatial science to encompass the environment more generally. This generated interest in the long history of geographical engagement with ideas concerning the relationship between society and nature, and, hence, with geography as a means to both study and change environmental ideas, including

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Figure 3 Textbook cover with map: This textbook cover from a 1901 Danish elementary school textbook, shows how railway and shipping links from all over Europe converge on Copenhagen. It places Denmark squarely in the center of the pupil’s world-picture. Every nation’s school maps, no matter how small and peripheral the nation, tend to place their nation at the center, thereby reinforcing ethnocentricity. The book was published in Copenhagen by Det Nordiske Forlag (The Nordic Publisher). The cover map has the effect of making Copenhagen the pivotal point between Norden (Norway, Sweden, and Finland) and the rest of Europe, and the projection makes Norden seem inordinately large. Note that the name of the capital of Norway, then united with Sweden, is called ‘Christiania’ on the map. This is the name given to it by the seventeenth-century Danish king, Christian IV, when Norway was under Danish rule. After Norwegian independence from Sweden in 1905, the name was changed back to its original Norwegian name, Oslo. A great deal of imperialist and nationalist ideology is expressed through the names on school maps like this helps explain why the Norwegians later changed the name of their capital.

gendered ideas. Wright’s geosophy inﬂuenced important humanities oriented Berkeley geographers such as Clar ence Glacken, Yi Fu Tuan, and David Lowenthal, who studied both the history of geographical ideas and the ideological role of these ideas in shaping the geographic

environment and landscape. The writing of geography on environmental topics for a broad, educated public has subsequently gained in importance and polymath writers, such as Kate Sopher, Sarah Whatmore, Jared Diamond, and William Cronon, have continued this tradition to the

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Figure 4 Shaded map of Denmark’s historical extent: This map from the 1901 textbook shows the area dwelled in by the Danishspeaking ‘folk’ in times past. The striated area to the east shows Halland, Skaane (Scania), and Bleking; areas lost to the Swedes in 1648. The striated area to the south of Jutland shows the southern part of the Duchy of Schleswig (as it is spelled today in German). The area immediately above it, which is labeled ‘Sønder Jylland’, and which is shaded the same as the remainder of Denmark, shows the area where Danish is still spoken in the northern part of the Duchy of Schleswig, which was lost in war to the Germans in 1864. Much nationalist ideology, key to several wars and many deaths, is concealed by the apparently innocuous facts on this map. The fact that the map is based on the presence of a ‘folk’, speaking a speciﬁc language, reﬂects the ideology of the time that language was key to national folk identity, and that such folk naturally belong together in a single nation. The map thus expresses a hidden claim to Danish sovereignty over the northern part of Schleswig, which has been given the Danish name of ‘Sønder Jylland’ (Southern Jutland) on the map. This is the ancient name of the area that was used prior to the Middle Ages, after which the area gradually was Germanicized, and came to be known as Schleswig. After World War I, in 1920, this area was returned to Denmark after a plebiscite.

present. The humanities oriented tradition also inspired a new generation of ideologically conscious landscape geographers such as Stephen Daniels, Denis Cosgrove, and Kenneth Olwig whose work began to gain attention in the 1980s. The renewed interest in landscape also drew inspir ation from the work of critical Marxists, such as the cultural theoretician Raymond Williams and the work of the historical cartographer J.B. Harley who drew heavily upon the ideas of Michel Foucault. From a Marxist perspective, ideology, cartography, and landscape could be seen to belong to the material base of society because of the role they played in the structuring and planning of land use and ownership. They also, however, played a signiﬁcant role in shaping consciousness of the land as an object of exploitation, and as a source of social status. The idea of landscape, however, was also important to the ideological superstructure, legitimating the power of private property ownership (an important tenant of lib eralism), nationalism, and imperial expansion. The

contemporary ideological role of landscape in generating ‘false consciousness’ has been explored by Gillian Rose in terms of gender relations, Don Mitchell in terms of class relations, and James Duncan and Sharon Zukin in terms of power relations. Marxism, Education, and Spatial Ideology

The quantitative revolution in geography was rooted in America. It never gained the same foothold in European geography, where geography’s educational and, hence, ideological role remained relatively strong, and where political parties tended to have a stronger ideological grounding in, for example, Marxism or liberalism. The 1968 student revolts in the United States and Europe against autocratic university systems, and university sci ence’s complicity in the military–industrial complex, raised questions about the objectivity of academic sci ence. It was in this context that ‘spatial scientists’ also began to question the scientiﬁc premises of their en deavor, and that geographers of European background, in

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Figure 5 Picture of bombed-out city: The message of the shaded map of the historical spatial extent of the Danish-speaking folk (Figure 4), is reinforced by this ﬁgure from the same 1901 textbook showing the bombed-out ruins of Sønderborg, Sønderjylland, during the 1864 war. The illustrations from Denmark show thriving, modernizing environments, whereas the image of Sønderjylland is one of unnatural ruin.

particular, began to look to Marxism as a source of critical inspiration. The Marxist inspired ideological critique of spatial science emanated largely from the work of ‘radical’ British geographers, many of whom worked in America, but maintained intellectual ties to Europe, especially France. They critiqued spatial models for creating the impression that urban spatial structure was a function of scientiﬁc laws, such as the ‘gravitational’ effect of distance, while they in fact derived from conditions generated by social inequality. The spatial models thus created the false con sciousness that social inequality in urban land use was given by space as a form of nature, rather than by social processes. Center–periphery spatial models likewise were seen to literally naturalize uneven development by giving credence to the idea that peripheral areas of the world were underdeveloped because they were ‘naturally’ wild. The Marxist critique of the ideological role of center– periphery spatial models in legitimating the under development of peripheral areas in the Third World thereby became a theme in developmental geography. In Scandinavia, where geography long played an instru mental role in regional and spatial planning, geographers were likewise able to show how the language of space and region worked to obscure the technocratic, and even na tionalistic, ideologies driving this planning. Spatially ori ented geography, however, has tended to prefer to generate new, socially implicated concepts of space such as ‘relational space’ (deriving from the philosophy of Gott fried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716)) or ‘third space’ (de riving from the philosophy of Henri Lefebvre), rather than undertake a critique of the ideological history of the concept of space itself, which would parallel the work

done by other geographers on the concepts of nature and landscape. Key geographical writers engaged with the ideology of spatial and regional geography are David Harvey, Richard Peet, Neil Smith, Edward Soja, Paul Claval, Anssi Paasi, and Gunnar Olsson. The continued ideological dimension of geography as a broadly educational praxis is particularly notable in Britain, where geography remains relatively important at all levels of education, and there is a powerful market for textbooks and lexica. Britain thus produced some of the earliest cri tiques of spatial science, such as that of Derek Gregory, treating the issue of ideology in depth and introducing the neo Marxist ‘critical theory’ of Ju¨rgen Habermas and oth ers. For critical theory, an important task was to expose the way positive science generated instrumentalist discourses and practices that undermine democratic participation in society’s governance. This was relevant both to the ongoing ideological critique of spatial science and to the defense of education’s role in fostering civil society. A problem with traditional Marxist approaches is that by privileging the material base of society, they seem to discount the ability of people to consciously change society through their own actions. British geographers, in particular, found a solution to this problem in the ideas of the English sociologist An thony Giddens. Drawing upon the time geographical the ory of the Swedish geographer Torsten Ha¨gerstrand and the sociology of the French theorist, Pierre Bourdieu, Giddens emphasized the role of individual social actors in the ‘structuration’ of society and space. The ideological potency of Giddens’ theories were made manifest when Giddens became a chief ideologist for Britain’s ‘New La bour’ political movement, which gave greater weight to the individual than did traditional socialism. Derek Gregory,

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Figure 6 Topographical map of Denmark: A later 1911 Danish school textbook includes a statement and a verse that make clear the nationalistic ideological import of such a map: A 1901 Danish school textbook (see Figure 3) includes this map, where the lost Duchy of Schleswig (or Slesvig in Danish), south of the Jutland border, is represented by empty white space. Denmark is one of Europe’s smallest countries, but it is our fatherland; in it we are born, and it is here we have our home, and we therefore ought to value it higher than other lands. Therefore: ‘Friends, look at Denmark’s map; look, so you never forget, until every spot has been given voices, for this fatherland is ours! Measured against the world it is little therefore not a spot to waste! Measured by the heart it is great this is where Denmark’s saga is made!’ The source of the verse is not given, but it is taken from a popular 1889 poem and song, Our Land, a geographical poem, by Christian Richardt. It concludes with a demand that the provinces Denmark lost in the past be returned to their rightful place on the map no doubt a reference to Sønderjylland, the ancient Danish name for Schleswig, which was lost to the Germans in 1864. The poem’s reference to ‘voices’ may be an oblique way of suggesting that all the land be given a vote, since the Danish word for voice and vote (stemme) is the same, and the right to vote was a controversial topic at the time. It may also be a call for the Danish speakers of Sønderjylland to be given a voice in their own national destiny and this actually happened in 1920 when they voted to be united with Denmark. There are thus many potential layers of ideology in a map!

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Ron Johnston, Nigel Thrift, and Doreen Massey exemplify the broad British, education driven engagement with ideology.

Theory; Structurationist Geography; Time and Historical Geography; Wright, J. K.; von Humboldt, A.

Further Reading Conclusion The concept of ideology provides a useful key to understanding the praxis of geographical writing and graphic communication, especially in relation to edu cation. Through their ideological praxis, geographers have also become involved in the development of speciﬁc political ideologies ranging from anarchism and Marxism to nationalism, liberalism, imperialism, and with it, ra cism. Geography has historically made important con tributions to ideological debate in relation to the ideas of nature, environment, landscape, and space. Geography as spatial science sought to be nonideological, but for this reason it may have been all the more ideologically po tent. The concern with ideology, brought about by the environmental and feminist movements, and the critique of spatial science, led to important contributions to the understanding of the ideological dimensions of the con cepts of nature and landscape. The ideological critique of space, on the other hand, has tended to focus on speciﬁc concepts of space, rather than the notion of space per se. The identity of geography, not the least political geog raphy as a discipline broadly concerned with ideology, has, if anything, been strengthened by the contemporary geographical concern with ideas and concepts, as ex empliﬁed by this encyclopedia. Geography has thereby become an important ideational source for the turn toward landscape, space, and place that has occurred in many other areas of study, including anthropology, archaeology, and sociology. See also: Determinism/Environmental Determinism; Hagerstrand, T.; Quantitative Revolution; Radical Geography; Spatial Analysis, Critical; Structuration

Blunt, A. and Wills, J. (2000). Dissident Geographies: An Introduction to Radical Ideas and Practice. Harlow: Prentice Hall. Cosgrove, D. and Daniels, S. (eds.) (1988). The Iconography of Landscape. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cronon, W. (ed.) (1996). Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature. New York: Norton. Duncan, J. S. (1990). The City as Text: The Politics of Landscape Interpretation in the Kandyan Kingdom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Glacken, C. J. (1967). Traces on the Rhodian Shore: Nature and Culture in Western Thought from Ancient Times to the End of the Eighteenth Century. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Godlewska, A. and Smith, N. (eds.) (1994). Geography and Empire. Oxford: Blackwell. Gregory, D. (1978). Ideology, Science and Human Geography. London: Hutchinson. Harvey, D. (1973). Social Justice and the City. London: Edward Arnold. Jones, M., Michael, W. and Rhys, J. (2004). An Introduction to Political Geography: Space, Place and Politics. London: Routledge. Mitchell, D. (1996). The Lie of the Land: Migrant Workers in the Californian Landscape. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Olwig, K. R. (1984). Nature’s Ideological Landscape: A Literary and Geographic Perspective on Its Development and Preservation on Denmark’s Jutland Heath. London: George Allen & Unwin. Olwig, K. R. (2002). The duplicity of space: Germanic ‘Raum’ and Swedish ‘Rum’ in English language geographical discourse. Geograﬁska Annaler B 84(1), 29 45. Olwig, K. R. (2002). Landscape, Nature and the Body Politic. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. Peet, R. (1998). Modern Geographical Thought. Oxford: Blackwell. Rose, G. (1993). Feminism and Geography: The Limits of Geographical Knowledge. Cambridge: Polity Press. Smith, N. (1984). Uneven Development: Nature, Capital and the Production of Space. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Whatmore, S. (2002). Hybrid Geographies: Natures, Cultures, Spaces. London: Sage.

Relevant Websites http://encyclopedia.jrank.org/ALM ANC/ANARCHISM from the Gr av and Ip.html Entry on Anarchism by Prince Peter Kropotkin in the Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th Edition (1911).

Immigration I J. L. Waters, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Assimilation Based on the assumption that new immigrants are culturally and socially distinct from the host society. Assimilation is an ideology for the incorporation of immigrants. It involves the gradual cultural, social, and economic adaptation and adjustment of immigrants over time so that they become more similar to and indistinguishable from mainstream society. Diaspora Refers either to particular historically displaced groups of people, or indicates a wide variety of phenomena including the emergence of transnational communities, new kinds of ‘deterritorialized’ identity formations and representations, the displacement of traditional disciplinary boundaries and categorizations, and the cultural implications of globalization. Both deﬁnitions are concerned with representing population groups that are no longer primarily anchored (territorially or ideologically) in any one nation-state, although they maintain the memory or ‘myth’ of a homeland. Home Country/Society Usually describes the last place of residence or country of birth of immigrants. Host Country/Society Describes immigrants’ destination country. Multiculturalism An ideology that recognizes and ascribes value to the cultural and social distinctiveness of immigrant or ethnocultural groups. The concept has its roots in the colonial notion of plural societies. Nation-State System A political and territorial system for social and economic organization, it denotes a series of legally deﬁned and sovereign territories (countries). Came into being with the French Revolution in 1789, after which an international system of nation-states gradually took shape. Native Population Commonly used in the literature to describe the nonimmigrant population of a country/ society. This may or may not include second- or thirdgeneration immigrants. OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, comprising thirty member countries. 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees The key legal document deﬁning who is a refugee, their rights, and the legal obligations of states toward asylum seekers and refugees.

borders (usually indicating a long distance movement) undertaken by an individual or group. Second, it denotes the direction of that movement, that is, ‘in’ to (as opposed to out of) a country. Third, immigration is a political act, and is often discussed in terms of immigration control, and the legal status of migrants. Fourth, immigration is also a social and cultural process, involving adjustment, adap tation, communication, and negotiation. It affects both immigrants and host societies in different ways. Finally, immigration is invariably a highly emotive subject, provoking strong reactions (particularly within Western states), both favorable and negative. In what follows, some of the more signiﬁcant dimensions of contemporary immigration are discussed, drawing on a wide range of examples. The article examines, ﬁrst, the geography of recent patterns of immigration and provides a discussion of different immigrant types. Second, it describes changing perspectives on immigration, starting with early research by the Chicago School on immigrant settlement patterns and integration in the US. It considers the impacts of immigration at the level of the metropolis, recognizing that the vast majority of immigrants locate in a relatively small number of major urban areas. These are discussed in terms of economic, social, cultural, and political impacts as well as the visible impacts on the urban landscape. It then turns to examine more recent ideas about return migration, circular mobility, and transnationalism. The nation state system remains centrally important to understanding con temporary immigration ﬂows; the third section of the article therefore focuses on different aspects of immigration in relation to the nation state. This includes a discussion of: immigration policy; the economy; ideologies of immigrant incorporation (assimilation and multiculturalism); citizen ship; and illegal immigration. The article then considers what can be termed migrant centered perspectives on im migration. Rather than examining large scale ﬂows and impacts of immigration, migrant centered approaches choose to focus on the experiences and objectives of the immigrants themselves and those of their families. Finally, the article offers some tentative conclusions regarding the future importance of immigration for geography and for society.

Contemporary Patterns and Types of Immigration Introduction Immigration has a number of key distinctive dimensions. First, it involves the deliberate crossing of nation state

Geographies of Immigration There is a distinctive and differentiated geography to patterns of immigration, which can be observed at

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different spatial scales (global, regional, and metro politan). Typically, immigrants move from the ‘north’ to the ‘south’ and from poorer to wealthier nation states. Countries with the highest inﬂows of migrants are to be found in North America, Oceania, and Western Europe: Germany, Japan, Spain, Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Korea, Turkey, the UK and the US receive more than 100 000 immigrants annually. The US has by far the largest foreign born population in the world. As well as these broader global patterns, it is also possible to discern regional immigration ﬂows, represented by, for example, a Southeast Asian migration system or an Oceanian mi gration system. These regional systems have persisted for hundreds of years and are represented by the presence of substantial diaspora populations. Signiﬁcantly, most immigrants choose to locate within a relatively small number of major cities in any one host country. In the UK, for example, the vast majority of new immigrants chose a location (at least initially) in and around greater London; in Canada immigrants dis proportionably live in one of three major cities (Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal); while in the US, New York and Los Angeles are highly attractive migrant destin ations. This concentration of immigrants in particular cities has a number of implications, both positive and negative. Immigrants’ needs – in terms of housing, edu cation, employment, medical and health care, translation services, and language classes – must be met, placing disproportionate strain and burden on the services of a few cities. At the same time, however, immigrants provide cities with much needed labor – many cities (particularly their manufacturing and service sectors) are increasingly dependent upon immigrant labor. The Age of Migration Castles and Miller famously described the contemporary period as the ‘age of migration’. Since the end of World War II, international migration has grown in volume and changed in character, they argue, in two main stages: 1945 to 1973 (the end of this ﬁrst period was marked by the global oil crisis) and 1974 to the present. The ﬁrst stage of global, international migration was characterized by the migration of workers from the European periphery to Western Europe (such as through the ‘guest worker’ systems described below); the migration of ‘colonial workers’ to their former colonial powers (such as the migration of Algerians to France and Jamaicans to Brit ain); and a pattern of permanent migration to North America and Australia from Europe (initially) and after the mid 1960s from Asia and Latin America. The second stage of post war migration has been characterized, in contrast, by a decline of labor migration to Western Europe. This stage has also seen family reuniﬁcation among former foreign and colonial workers (leading to

the creation of new ethnic minority communities within particular cities); the continuation of economically mo tivated migration to immigration regions within North America and Australasia (but with a signiﬁcant change in the source countries of these immigrants); mass movements of refugees and asylum seekers; and the international mobility of highly skilled migrants (both temporary and permanent). To this list should be added the signiﬁcant recent increase in economic migration between European Union (EU) member states, as a consequence of recent EU expansion (such as the sub stantial migration from Poland to the UK). Categories of Immigrants Immigrants can be categorized (both formally and in formally) by type or class, depending on the immigration policy within the country in question. Immigration usu ally falls into one of several different categories (the precise nature of these categories will differ between countries). These include economic, family, and refugee categories. The ﬁrst of these, known as economic class immigration, describes individuals who are granted entry to a country on the basis of employment skills, qualiﬁ cations, or experience. These can include entrepreneurs, the self employed, investors, and the highly skilled. It is widely assumed (by the host nation state) that the host country will gain direct economic beneﬁts (including human capital) from this type of immigration. Con versely, immigrants’ home countries will lose out (a process known as ‘brain drain’). Recently, global ﬂows of skilled immigration have signiﬁcantly increased, largely as a consequence of the widespread implementation of skilled migration programs throughout the West (the UK, for example, recently introduced a Highly Skilled Migration Program). Family class immigration refers either to the reuniting of family members within the host country, known as ‘family reuniﬁcation’, or to sponsorship, whereby a per son already permanently resident in the host country ﬁnancially sponsors the immigration of another family member. Family reuniﬁcation usually occurs as a result of an earlier immigration stream (where other family members follow some time after the original migration). Sponsorship requires that a resident of the host country prove that they are able to support, ﬁnancially, the family member following their immigration. Refugees represent the third major category of im migrants. Under this class, persons can apply for refugee status (i.e., submit an application for asylum based on the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees) either at special offshore processing sites within their home country, or after entering the host country. Their case will then be heard by a committee or board, which will decide whether or not they have a legitimate case for

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asylum and can therefore be given refugee status. If they are found not to have a case for asylum, then they are (in theory) subsequently deported to the country of origin. If, on the other hand, they are granted refugee status, then in most cases they are given indeﬁnite leave to re main and can apply for citizenship after the required length of time.

Changing Perspectives on Immigration Understandings of immigration have changed over time, as a result of shifting theoretical approaches. Tradition ally, immigration was seen as a discrete move from one country to another – from the home to the host society. It was generally assumed that immigrants were making a long term commitment (economically, socially, and ﬁ nancially) to the host society, and that this would include permanent relocation. As a consequence of this, immi grants would adjust over time to their new surroundings, assimilating according to various measures (such as economic success, language ability, and intermarriage) to the host society. Milton Gordon’s classic work, Assimi lation in American Life, captures this perspective on im migration and the process of gradual assimilation among minority groups. On the whole (and this is particularly true of early work), research has tended to focus on immigration from the perspective of the host society. Two strands of this work can be identiﬁed. First, it has examined the rela tionship between immigration and host nation state policy; policy is used to control and direct immigrant ﬂows (this strand of work is described in detail below). Second, research has been concerned with the variable impacts of immigration upon the host society and par ticularly upon urban areas. These include, for example, the consequences of cultural and social diversity, labor market outcomes related to immigration, or the spatial distribution of immigrant groups vis a` vis the native population. Both of these strands of scholarship continue to be vibrant, attracting a great deal of new research. Recently, however, it is possible to identify a change in the way in which immigration is conceived (theoretically) and, related to this, changes in the foci of research (i.e., changes in the kinds of empirical questions that re searchers are asking). Increasingly, immigration is no longer seen as a permanent relocation from one country to another but as a far more ﬂuid and ongoing process that has no deﬁnite, identiﬁable beginning and end point. Many immigrants continue to move between the home and host societies, even after the acquisition of citizenship in the new country. Many do not display the signs of assimilation over time. As a result of this changing per spective on immigration (and what immigration means in practice), research has begun to focus on the immigrants

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themselves (their experiences and motivations) as well as on the impacts of migration upon immigrants’ home so cieties. Perhaps most signiﬁcantly, new research examines the ongoing relations between the home and host society. In what follows, these different perspectives on, and conceptions of, immigration are discussed. Immigration and the Metropolis: The Spatial Distribution of Immigrants Early work on immigration is widely associated with the Chicago school of sociologists, which studied the impact of immigration on the urban form of US cities in the early to mid twentieth century. An important aspect of this work involved an examination of the spatial distri bution of immigrant groups, and related this to levels of assimilation. This perspective is exempliﬁed in Louis Wirth’s study of Chicago’s Jewish community in The Ghetto. Massey and Denton’s famous examination of racial segregation in major US cities during the 1980s was also extremely inﬂuential for later scholarship on immi gration and the social geography of urban areas. Particularly since the 1980s, research in geography has used census data to map and describe the spatial distri bution of ethnic minority populations (including ﬁrst , second , and third generation immigrants) in the UK, North America, and Australasia. Researchers have been particularly concerned with identifying the existence of segregation. Segregation is often measured statistically, applying different indices (such as the index of dis similarity) to census statistics; the distribution of different ethnic groups can be represented through maps and shading, indicating the degree of separation or the density of settlement. The signiﬁcance of this work lies in the implications of segregation for social cohesion and ex clusion and the assumption that spatial distance is a strong indication of social distance. The spatial separation of groups in the urban landscape can be indicative of more profound social problems (such as isolation, discrimin ation, and the inability to access necessary resources). Impacts of Immigration on Urban Areas and Communities While immigration is generally controlled and directed at the level of national governments, arguably its greatest impacts are felt at the urban scale. Immigrants generally choose to live and work in major metropolitan areas and, frequently, congregate within particular districts of these cities – concentrations of immigrants can be observed at several spatial scales. They may also be concentrated in particular employment sectors. As observed by Saskia Sassen in her work on global cities, immigrants are often found working in the low skilled, low waged sectors of the service industry. Put succinctly, immigration has

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transformed the sociocultural makeup and economies of many cities, including transforming the physical, built environment. In what follows, the most signiﬁcant im pacts of immigration on urban areas are discussed. Immigrants bring with them a diverse set of social and cultural traits and practices, knowledge, and under standings. Sometimes these may broadly differ with those of the host society. In reality, host societies are rarely socially and culturally homogenous but are themselves highly diverse spaces, created through, and exhibiting the legacy of, numerous past immigrations. Perhaps one of the biggest and most explicit markers of cultural difference between immigrant and nonimmigrant com munities, however, is language. Many immigrants, on migrating, do not speak the ofﬁcial language(s) of the host society, and this may impact the ability of these indi viduals (and their families) to access resources, including suitable (and desirable) employment, health care and emergency medical treatment, education, transportation, and welfare entitlements. In the most severe cases, this inability to access resources may lead to social exclusion. Immigrants’ wages postmigration have been strongly linked to language ability, and social and spatial segre gation among immigrant groups is frequently related to language use within the family. Language difﬁculties can also result in social isolation and feelings of loneliness among immigrants. Interestingly, age at migration has a strong bearing on the ability and willingness of immi grants to learn a new language. Very often, children will become ﬂuent in the host language before older family members, and act as cultural go betweens for parents and grandparents, helping them with everything from day to day chores to interpreting employment law and even school reports. There are many other forms of cultural difference and markers of social and cultural diversity. The difference between immigrants and the host society is often inter preted and discussed in terms of race. While racial diversity can have a positive inﬂuence on the host com munity, most research and writing on race and immi gration emphasizes the negative, focusing on the stereotyping of immigrant groups, discrimination, and in the worst cases, explicit racism. New theoretical per spectives on race, highlighting the socially constructed nature of racial identities, underline that these identities are frequently imposed on groups by the host society, and are invariably indicative of highly unequal power re lations. Other forms of identity are also socially con structed and imposed on immigrant groups. In the past, immigrants have generally been characterized as poor and associated with a social underclass, resulting in stigmatization and in some cases ghettoization. Often, race and class are seen to intersect in complex ways, conﬁning immigrant groups to marginalized spaces in the city. This is evidenced, for example, by the growth of

Chinatowns within cities in Europe and North America during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, which grew out of practices of discrimination and racism by host societies. Although today many Chinatowns play a largely symbolic role in the cultural life of cities, present day versions of conﬁned and restricted immigrant spaces are apparent. In the US, much academic work has fo cused on the contemporary ghetto. Often, such mani festations of segregation in the physical landscape are thought to indicate a lack of integration within main stream society, while also at the same time actually in hibiting integration, by restricting the ability of immigrants to access the resources needed to enhance life chances and enable social mobility. On the other hand, the development of what have been termed ethnic enclaves or ethnic villages can be seen as a positive manifestation, reﬂecting immigrants’ adaptation strat egies and the spatial concentration of social capital often leading to economic success. Wealth can also be a marker of social difference, separating immigrants from the rest of society. Research on expatriates working in Southeast Asia describes the circumscribed social worlds of professional, wealthy businessmen, involving little interaction with people outside their particular exclusive social spaces. In Can ada, wealthy immigrants from Hong Kong have built what have been locally termed ‘monster houses’ – large, million dollar boxlike structures that exemplify con spicuous consumption. These houses have provoked hostility among the local population, perceiving them as inhospitable and out of character with the rest of the neighborhood. On a larger scale, wealthy immigrants may invest in real estate and property development, transforming the physical landscape of some cities (such as Vancouver). During the late 1980s and 1990s up to one ﬁfth of what is now the downtown area of Vancouver was purchased and subsequently redeveloped by Hong Kong property developer Li Ka shing. Many condomin iums were marketed and sold exclusively in Hong Kong to prospective immigrants. Return Migration, Circular Migration, and Transnationality In a great deal of writing on the topic, immigration is no longer seen as a permanent and discrete movement from one country of residence to another, whereby ties to the country of origin are effectively severed or gradually diminish in importance over time. Instead, many scholars are sensitive to the ways in which immigrants continue to maintain signiﬁcant, persistent links (emotional, cultural, social, economic, and political) with their country of origin after immigration, greatly facilitated by develop ments in technology and ease of transportation. Import antly, these links appear to be sustained over time. This

Immigration I

type of migration has been widely termed transnation alism, and there is now a substantial and continually expanding body of work within geography and the social sciences speciﬁcally examining transnational processes (where previously the focus of such research would have been immigration). Empirically, work on transnational migration has focused on a number of themes, such as the importance of remittances, split family formations, transnational identities and diaspora, multiple political and social allegiances, translocal ties, cosmopolitanism, religious afﬁliations, and dual citizenship. In addition to (and not unrelated to) transnationalism, researchers and governments are increasingly recognizing the circularity of many contemporary international migrations and the high incidence, among some immigrant groups, of return to the country of origin. Both circular migration and return migration challenge traditional conceptions of immigration, which focus on permanent residence and settlement in the new country and the severing of ties with the old. Temporary Immigration: International Students and Skilled Workers Increasingly, a proportion of immigration is ofﬁcially classiﬁed as ‘temporary,’ as seen with the rise in numbers of international students and highly skilled workers. Research is only beginning to acknowledge the important role that students play in contemporary international population ﬂows. Current estimates suggest that there are between two and three million international students in tertiary education worldwide. These ﬁgures have doubled between 1980 and 2000 and are predicted to increase substantially over the next decade. Like other forms of migration, international student mobility has a distinctive geography – the most popular destination countries are Australia, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, the UK, and the US. The majority of international students derive from East, South, and Southeast Asian countries, particularly the People’s Republic of China, South Korea, India, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. While inter national students are expected eventually to return to their country of origin, some remain in the host country (both legally and illegally). Perceiving international stu dents as a valuable asset, countries are increasingly making it easier for foreign graduates, educated locally, to obtain work permits or permanent residency status after the completion of their studies. Much recent skilled migration is also temporary in nature, and is particularly apparent among IT workers, scientists, researchers and academics, business executives, and managers. The majority of these workers can be found in a relatively small number of countries: Australia, Canada, Japan, the UK, the US, Germany, and France. The OECD has been responsible for commissioning a

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large survey on skilled migration. According to this survey, an estimated 900 000 skilled workers entered the US between 1990 and 2000 under the so called H 1B visa program, which was set up to facilitate the tem porary entry of skilled professionals. It estimates that temporary workers accounted for one sixth of the total US IT work force during this period. Multinationals have a signiﬁcant role to play in this process – the transfer of staff within these large organizations has contributed signiﬁcantly to the increase in numbers of temporary workers. In the mid 1990s, intracompany transfers ac counted for as much as ten percent of total ﬂows of skilled workers from Canada to the US.

Immigration and the Nation-State Despite recent challenges posed by globalization and transnationalism, the nation state continues to exert a high degree of control over global population mobility. The concept of immigration would, in fact, be meaningless without the continuing salience of nation state boundaries restricting population movements, and a formalized global system of sovereign territorial divisions. Nation states as a global mode of political and social organization have not always existed, however. Prior to the ﬁfteenth century, feudal societies dominated the Western world. These societies emphasized locality and their populations were relatively immobile. As Yasmin Soysal notes, only certain categories of people – artists, artisans, scholars, clergy, the military, and the merchant class – were permitted to move freely, while all other members of the population had restricted movement. It was not until the late eighteenth century that the concept of the nation state came to prominence, with the French Revolution and the establishment of a republic. The population of France (and then later the same became true for other territories) began, for the ﬁrst time, to be re garded as an economic and military resource. Con sequently, territorial boundaries were constructed to keep people in (and thereby contain this resource). Initially, then, nation state boundaries (and the early manifestations of immigration policy) were more concerned with con taining people than with excluding them – quite the op posite of the situation in most nation states today. Immigration Policy One of the key means by which nation states inﬂuence immigration is through government policy. Most states in the world have some sort of immigration policy, designed to control and direct ﬂows of immigrants across their borders. As noted, in the past many states (such as France and China) used policy to contain their populations – to prevent their outward movement (and the consequent loss of human resources). Today, policy is overwhelmingly

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concerned with controlling inﬂows of migrants – accepting and embracing some people while actively excluding others. Different countries adopt different stances when it comes to immigration policy. Some are seen as countries of immigration, displaying a generally favorable attitude toward immigration and the beneﬁts it can bestow. These countries include Canada, the US, New Zealand, and Australia. Other countries have a far more cautious ap proach to immigration, usually favoring exclusion over active recruitment (such as the UK and, until recently, Japan). Most countries fall somewhere in the middle of these two stances, with variable histories of, and recent trends in, immigration. Historically, many now liberal democratic states used immigration policy to exclude groups of people on the basis of their country or region of origin. The Com monwealth Immigrants Bill (1962), followed by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act (1968), sought to end immigration to the UK from commonwealth countries. From the early twentieth century to the 1970s, a White Australia Policy restricted the immigration of people of non white (non European) heritage to Australia. Be tween 1923 and 1947, Canada implemented a Chinese Exclusion Act, prohibiting the immigration of Chinese people. The earliest attempts by the Canadian state to exclude persons of Chinese origin, however, came in 1885, in the form of a head tax. These policies are today seen as inherently racist. Between 1945 and 1973, a number of Western states implemented guest worker systems, involving the tem porary recruitment of labor from overseas. These countries included Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland. Under these new systems, large numbers of foreign na tionals (and their dependents) were admitted as so called guest workers to provide a temporary boost to economies suffering post war labor shortages. The source countries of this labor included Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Morocco. Most of these jobs were tied to speciﬁc industries, and workers had no right to stay permanently within their host country. Despite this, many workers did remain, as exempliﬁed in the case of Turkish guest workers in Germany. Outside Europe, other post war changes in immi gration policy can be observed. Policy in the US changed signiﬁcantly in 1965, when a quota system based on the national origins of immigrants was replaced by a system whereby immigrants were selected according to other (nonracist) criteria, such as education and skills and family status. The US has had, as it sees it, a long standing issue of illegal immigration, particularly over the US–Mexican border. In 1986, specially implemented legislation attempted to address this, granting amnesty to three million illegal immigrants that had been living

illegally in the US since 1982. Any employers found employing illegal Mexican immigrants after this date would suffer severe penalties. Immigration policy in other immigrant countries, including Canada, Australia, and New Zealand similarly changed in the 1960s, aban doning selection criterion based on country of origin and implementing in its place a points system. The Immi gration Act of 1976 is described by Citizenship and Immigration Canada (Canada’s federal immigration de partment) as the cornerstone of present day immigration policy. It came into force in 1978 and represented the ﬁrst time that the principles and objectives of Canadian im migration policy were explicitly stated. Among the Act’s most innovative demands is the requirement that the government ‘plan’ immigration (i.e., set target numbers for different classiﬁcations of immigrants and suggest the ways in which these targets can be met). Planning im migration involved consultation with the provinces about their own particular demographic and economic needs. Refugees are recognized as a special case, selected and admitted separately from other immigrants (another in novation of the Act). The Act recognizes four basic cat egories of individuals eligible for permanent residency: (1) family class (which includes the immediate family and dependent children, as well as parents and grandparents over 60); (2) humanitarian class (which includes (a) refugees as deﬁned in the 1951 United Nations Con vention relating to refugees and (b) persecuted and dis placed persons who do not qualify as refugees under the rigid UN deﬁnition but who are members of a specially designated humanitarian class); (3) independent class (which comprises applicants selected on the basis of the points system); and (4) assisted relatives, that is, more distant relatives who are sponsored by a family member in Canada and who meet some of the selection criteria of the independent class. The UK, which has traditionally been seen as a zero immigration country, on the basis of its attempts to pre vent all forms of immigration, has recently introduced new categories of desired immigrant under the Highly Skilled Migration Program (HSMP), the Innovator program and the Investor program. For the HSMP, immigrants are admitted to the UK on the basis of a points system. Points are scored in four main areas: qualiﬁcations; past earnings; age; and UK experience. Applicants are also required to demonstrate speciﬁc proﬁciency in English. Applicants to the Innovator program need to demonstrate entre preneurial ability, technical skills, and a good business plan. A points system also applies in this case. Applicants to the Investor program must have the funds to invest at least one million pounds in the UK economy. As these examples suggest, immigration policy is frequently tied to the perceived needs of the national economy. The rela tionship between immigration and the economy is dis cussed in more detail in the next section.

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Immigration policy is usually implemented by the central or federal government. In some cases, however, regions within nation states may have some say over immigration. In Canada, an agreement was recently signed between the federal government and the prov inces, known as the Provincial Nominee Program, to allow the provinces some measure of control over im migration to their territories (in line with their own perceived needs). Under the Canada–Quebec Accord on Immigration, the province of Quebec is able make its own decisions on immigration. In 1994, voters in Cali fornia (the US state with the largest share of foreign born persons) passed legislation to exclude illegal migrants from the receipt of all public beneﬁts with the exception of emergency health care.

regardless of prior levels of experience/qualiﬁcations. The costs of retraining are often prohibitive. Clearly, this situation is in the best interests of neither the immigrant nor the host society. Related to these observations, work in economic geography has also examined the relation ship between immigration and segmented labor markets. It is now well known that many immigrants are in advertently channeled into a very narrow range of oc cupations, working in low skilled and low paid jobs that lack union protection and basic beneﬁts (sick pay, paid holidays, health insurance, and so on).

Immigration and the Economy

Nation states are culturally diverse, and immigration has undoubtedly played a major role in the ongoing trans formation of their ethnocultural makeup. It is no longer possible, if it ever was, to talk about nation states in terms of homogenous cultural spaces. What is interesting, however, is the ways in which nation states – Western liberal democracies in particular – have responded to diversity and continuous change. In various ways, states attempt to incorporate immigrants into the broader na tional community. This incorporation can have a number of different dimensions: social, cultural, political, and economic. Broadly, these dimensions can be classiﬁed under one of two dominant ideologies: assimilation and multiculturalism (Table 1). Prior to the 1970s, Western liberal democratic nation states favored the assimilation of immigrants. They up held a Rawlsian notion of individual justice, whereby the state sought to be neutral on matters of culture. Liberal democracies are committed, at least in principle, to representing the needs of ‘all’ their citizens. Equality could be best achieved, it was believed, through the erasure of social and cultural difference.

There is often a strong and direct link between a nation state’s immigration policy and its economic policy, and the relationship between immigrants and economic per formance has been widely examined. In many countries, such as Canada and Australia, immigration is perceived as a key means of bolstering a declining working age population and attracting human capital from overseas. These countries set annual minimum immigration targets (usually of several hundred thousand people) and are especially keen to attract business immigrants, with an eye on securing their human and economic capital. Business immigration programs exemplify attempts by the state to align immigration and the economy, and are increasingly widespread among immigrant receiving countries. In Canada, the Business Immigration Program is designed to admit immigrants who fall into one of three categories: entrepreneur, investor, and self em ployed. Prospective immigrants have to fulﬁll a number of criteria in order to be granted landed immigrant or permanent residency status. The success of economically motivated immigration policy, however, is equivocal. In the case of Canada’s Business Immigration Program, David Ley has shown that the level of achievement of business immigrants admitted under this program is frequently far lower than anticipated, and lower than ofﬁcial government claims suggest. Most of those businesses examined lost money or were barely proﬁtable, and a similar situation has been observed for both Australia and New Zealand. More generally, the issue of accreditation highlights the fact that the transfer of skills from one country to another can be problematic; many skilled immigrants are unable to secure work, following migration, at a level com mensurate with their qualiﬁcations and/or experience, and are often forced to take unskilled employment. Employers and employment organizations may require that new immigrants retrain in their chosen occupation,

Changing Ideologies of Immigrant Incorporation: Assimilation and Multiculturalism

Table 1

A comparison of assimilation and multiculturalism

Assimilation

Multiculturalism

Tries to erase ethnocultural differences.

Tries to maintain and even enhance ethnocultural differences. Believes that everyone has the ‘right’ to maintain their cultural heritage and that depriving them of it negates the possibility of equality. Builds a nation-state in a way that conceives the state as a ‘mosaic’ of different cultures. The nation-state is characterized by difference within its territorial boundaries.

Believes that making everyone ‘the same’ will promote equality in all aspects of life.

Builds a nation-state around the concept of cultural and territorial convergence.

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By the 1970s, however, the failure of the assimi lationist project (the endurance of sociocultural diversity and the myth of the culturally homogenous nation state) was becoming increasingly apparent. In countries such as Australia, Canada, and the UK, politicians began to talk about cultural mosaics (as opposed to the US notion of a cultural melting pot) and multicultural societies. Multi cultural Britain became a widely used phrase. In Canada and Australia, multiculturalism became ofﬁcial govern ment policy. In Canada, multicultural policy was implemented in October 1971, beginning with a statement by PM Pierre Trudeau. As observed by Audrey Kobayashi, this policy encouraged diversity in the arts and leisure, through the celebration of cultural festivals, of ethnic restaurants, of different national dress, and folk dancing. The ﬁrst Min ister of State for Multiculturalism was appointed in 1972 and in the following year the government spent $2.7 million on multicultural programs. This money included giving grants to cultural or ethnic communities, the de velopment of a ‘Canadian identities’ program to support the arts, folk festivals and ethnic history programs, multicultural teaching aids as well as money for academic research into multiculturalism and related conferences. The government also established a Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism made up of representatives from various ethnocultural backgrounds, which imple mented a program to monitor the multicultural content of Canadian broadcasting. This celebration of cultural di versity – what Kobayashi calls ‘symbolic’ multiculturalism – was not generally seen, however, as a tool for promoting equality among different cultural groups, placing more emphasis upon what has been described by David Ley and others as ‘museum culture’ than on anything more meaningful (such as experiences of inequality, discrimin ation, and racism in society). The policy lacked speciﬁc objectives. By the 1980s, calls for a Multiculturalism Act, which would include the legal mechanisms for addressing issues such as access to services, education, employment opportunities, and so on for ethnic minority groups, as well as allowing them to celebrate their cultural heritage, were increasingly widespread. Subsequently, a Department of Multiculturalism was created and the budget for spending on multicultural programs was increased by over US$62 million. Katharyne Mitchell offers a particular perspective on Canadian multiculturalism. Mitchell argues that the Canadian state’s interest in multiculturalism arose from strategic – particularly economic – considerations, mak ing the link between Canada’s need for export markets and increased trading opportunities. A more openly multicultural government would, it was assumed, im prove relations with Canada’s substantial immigrant populations, thereby tapping into their international business networks.

Australia has a similar immigration history to that of Canada, having experienced high levels of immigration from Asia since the late 1960s. Multiculturalism in Australia has been described as a government policy for managing difference. It has evolved in a number of stages since it was ﬁrst implemented, two years after Canada’s policy, in 1973. In 1989, the National Agenda for a Multi cultural Australia was published, outlining a working def inition of Australian multiculturalism. However, the agenda makes it clear that these dimensions will not undermine the unity of the nation state – there are clear cultural ‘limits’ to multiculturalism. Multiculturalism has not indicated an end to the nation state but rather it has demonstrated how nation states have responded to cul tural and social diversity as a consequence of immi gration, and attempted to incorporate that diversity. The unity of the nation state is of overriding importance within these multicultural policies.

Reemergence of Assimilation? Recently, and particularly since the events of 11 Sep tember 2001, multiculturalism has lost some of its political appeal. There is a general sense in which gov ernment sanctioned multiculturalism has ‘failed’ as a policy and as a project – it has ‘exhausted itself ’. Several writers and commentators, including Katharyne Mitchell and chairperson of the UK Commission for Equality and Human Rights Trevor Phillips, have observed this de cline. In many Western states, government led multi cultural programs have ceased or noticeably declined. At the same time, both the discourses and practices related to immigrant integration and incorporation within liberal nation states are changing. There has been a renewed call for immigrant assimilation – what Rogers Brubaker has called ‘the return of assimilation’ – and the focus has shifted away from emphasizing and celebrating difference to stressing commonalities and a concern with civic in tegration. In Australia, the retreat of multiculturalism has been stark – the government Ofﬁce for Multicultural Affairs was abolished in 1996. In the US, following 11 September 2001, patriotism legislation was passed in many states and in Western Europe (most notably in France) debates have centered on religious dress and other expressions of religious difference. Citizenship The relationship between immigrants and the nation state is partly mediated through citizenship. Citizenship may be conferred upon immigrants after a minimum period of residence and after meeting a range of re quirements, which vary from country to country (e.g., in the UK an immigrant must be resident for ﬁve years, while for Canada the minimum residency requirement is

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three years). Immigrants usually have to ‘apply’ for citi zenship – it is not conferred automatically. Once immi grants receive citizenship status, they lose (at least ofﬁcially) their immigrant status. After the French Revolution, the population became redeﬁned as citizens, and a deliberate effort was made by the authorities to create a nation within the boundaries of the political state – to create a sense of nationhood. As Yasmin Soysal notes, it is no coincidence that the ﬁrst statistics on international migration were collected after the Napoleonic wars, a period characterized by intense efforts by the French state to construct a national polity. It was not, however, until the early twentieth century that passports and national identity cards formalized the status of citizen and alien/foreigner. As the nation state system became gradually solidiﬁed, so increasing inter national restrictions on movement were introduced – immigration laws were established throughout the West, designed to police the boundaries and control the bor ders of the nation state. In his book The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State, John Torpey examines the his torical development of passport controls as a way of highlighting the institutionalization of the idea of the nation state as an ostensibly homogenous ethnocultural unit. This historical study has signiﬁcant implications for contemporary attempts to control the movement of people across borders and within countries – such as recent debates in the UK surrounding the implemen tation of ID cards. Through the monopolization of what he calls the ‘legitimate means of movement’ (i.e., ac ceptable and unacceptable forms of border crossing), the nation state is able to embrace its citizens and extract from them the resources needed to reproduce itself over time. This hinges on the ability of nation states to tell the difference between a citizen and a noncitizen, and this is where the passport enters as an extremely useful tool in the controlling of borders and, thereby, immigrants. The meaning of citizenship and its relationship to the international movement of people has been challenged, to a certain extent, by the recent extension of dual citi zenship/nationality. Seventy nation states, including Canada, Italy, Israel, South Africa, New Zealand, the UK, and the US, allow their emigrants to retain their citi zenship after having become citizens of another country. Some countries are even extending citizenship rights to second and third generation e´migre´s. Today, more and more countries around the world perceive the beneﬁts of extending citizenship rights to ex residents. For example, since January 2005, all Indians acquiring citizenship of another state are entitled to retain their Indian citizen ship. Not only that, all overseas Indians who migrated from the country after 26 January 1950 will be able to apply for dual citizenship, as long as their host countries permit this. Through the granting of dual citizenship to

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overseas nationals, countries are changing the meaning of immigration and what it is to be an immigrant. The notion of immigration as a permanent move from one country to another is being redeﬁned to incorporate transnational forms of identity and political allegiance. Illegal Immigration One of the biggest and most politically contentious issues facing Western governments today is that of illegal (sometimes called undocumented) immigration. The media are heavily implicated in setting the terms of debate around illegal immigration, often accused by academics of causing a moral panic about its extent and implications. Recent, high proﬁle examples of the dangers of illegal migration (such as the death of 58 Chinese immigrants, found suffocated in a truck entering the port of Dover in 2000 and the death of 18 cockle pickers in Morecambe Bay, England, found to be illegal immigrants working in highly precarious conditions) have highlighted the severity of the issue. Illegal immigrants are frequently blamed (by the media) for a host of social ills, from pressure on welfare services, to unemployment, to increased crime levels, to terrorism. Much of this debate is fueled by speculation – the undocumented nature of illegal immigration means that it is impossible to quantify and very difﬁcult even to estimate. Tackling illegal immigration has become an important political platform for many politicians in Western liberal democracies. The media debate frequently confuses the legal deﬁnition of different terms, especially refugee, asylum seeker, and illegal immigrant.

Migrant-Centered Perspectives Census and other statistical data continue to provide an important insight into immigration and its effects of immigration. In the last few decades, however, more at tempts have been made to study immigration from the perspective of immigrants and their families, utilizing qualitative research techniques. These are known as mi grant centered perspectives, and a number of themes relating to this research can be identiﬁed, including immigrant identities and family relations. These perspectives have led to a signiﬁcantly increased under standing of the motives for immigration from the mi grants’ own point of view. These may be very different from ofﬁcial assumptions, involving complex personal negotiations and the balancing of different social inter ests, underlining the fact that people do not always act in predictable ways. Immigrant Identities Immigration clearly impacts the identities of migrants as they are forced to confront and adjust to a new and

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unfamiliar environment. Immigration is commonly ini tially associated with culture shock and feelings of home sickness and the desire to return to the country of origin. Qualitative data incorporating interviews with immi grants reveal the complexity of immigrant identities. In some cases, identiﬁcation with the home country will fade over time as immigrants become increasingly assimilated into the new culture. Immigrants’ identities change through interaction with members of the host society. Some immigrants acquire hybrid identities, which involve elements of both home and host society cultures, and arise as a consequence of movement. This is especially true when immigrants are transnational, maintaining various ties with their home country after migration. Constant engagement with people, ideas, and cultural artifacts from the home country allow immigrants to maintain a strong identiﬁcation with that country. Immigrants may also ac tively attempt to renew and reproduce their old identity, through the repetition of cultural acts and rituals (lan guage, dress, food, religious practices, and music), and the consumption of cultural commodities and artifacts. These may be passed down to their children (second and even third generation immigrants).

Immigrant Households and Family Relations Traditionally, households have been an important unit of analysis in studies of migration – many immigrants do not travel alone, but are accompanied by members of their immediate family. However, the family/household has often been represented as an undifferentiated unit, with little or no reference to relationships within it. In reality, immigration can have signiﬁcant impacts upon relations within the family unit, as well as affecting family members in very different ways. This omission has been addressed, more recently, through migrant centered perspectives, which have highlighted the need to examine intrafamily relationships in the context of immigration. Frequently, expected gender roles and expectations are challenged through migration, sometimes leading to con ﬂict between partners. When migration from a more to a less patriarchal society occurs, women are faced with an increased range of opportunities. These opportunities may, in some cases, lead to a greater sense of freedom. On the other hand, they may result in dissatisfaction with existing relationships and family/work roles. Women are often depicted in the literature on migration as the ‘trailing spouse’ – the assumption being that, during migration, their career is sacriﬁced for that of their husband. In fact, many men ﬁnd that they are unable to secure suitable or desirable employment following immigration, and are forced to take a lower skilled, lower waged, and lower status job. Both their authority within the family and their self esteem may suffer as a result.

As well as gender roles and relations, immigration can also impact upon intergenerational relationships within the family – most notably the relationship between parents and children. Children frequently adjust to the post migration environment far quicker than their parents – through schooling their language ability improves and they make new friends. As a result of exposure to a new cultural environment, children may challenge the au thority of older relatives. Parents, ﬁnding their own ad justment a difﬁcult process, may be less able to assert their authority over children. Research also shows that older people ﬁnd the experience of immigration much harder to deal with than their younger relatives, especially if they are retired. Elderly people can ﬁnd immigration isolating and sometimes unnerving. Some families are separated through migration, leading to spatially dispersed (transnational) households. Often this is done for strategic reasons; different pro ductive and socially reproductive functions are carried out at different sites (even on different continents). In the case of so called astronaut families (recently observed among immigrants from East Asia in North America and Australasia), the husband/father of the family will return to the country of origin to work, leaving his wife and children behind in the new country. In a different case, through the feminization of some migration streams (where immigration is largely female led), wives and mothers are deﬁned as the principle applicant in immi gration. This has been particularly recorded among Fi lipina women immigrants who live and work overseas as nurses, housekeepers, and nannies. Women must fulﬁll their own familial caring roles at a distance, employing various strategies in the quest to maintain their intimate social relations from afar.

Conclusion Immigration is a major feature of the contemporary world and has undoubtedly transformed societies across the globe. Its impacts will continue to be felt into the foreseeable future, as countries with declining birth rates and aging populations turn to immigration as the solution to demographic problems. Temporary forms of labor migration (both skilled and unskilled) are likely to in crease, as are numbers of international students, as more and more educational institutions internationalize their student body and curricula, obtaining (through inter national tuition fees) substantial additional funding. Immigration is a complex process, implicating immi grants, their families, home societies, and host states in different ways. Traditionally, research has generally fo cused on the various impacts of immigration upon the host society. In the past, immigration has been conceived as a decisive and invariably permanent move, from one

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country to another. More recently, new theoretical conceptions have led to a shift in the overall focus of work on migration. While studies of the impact of immigration continue to be important, they have broadened their focus to incorporate an understanding of the home society. Concepts such as transnationalism and circular migration emphasize the fact that many immigrants maintain signiﬁcant ties with their home country after migration and that some migrants will return to the home country at some point (immigration is no longer seen as necessarily permanent). Despite this, the nation state (and particularly the host country) continues to be of central importance in directing contemporary immigration. Through immigration policies and the granting of citizenship, states retain signiﬁcant control over who they chose to include and who they chose to exclude. Dominant ideologies of im migrant incorporation (assimilation and multicultural ism) change over time, but continue to reinforce the legitimacy of the nation state. Illegal immigration offers the most potent challenge to this order, and is a major political preoccupation of governments in many Western states.

Boyd, M. (1989). Family and personal networks in international migration: Recent developments and new agendas. International Migration Review xxiii(3), 638 670. Castles, S. and Miller, M. J. (2003). The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World (2nd edn.). New York: Guilford Press. Cornelius, W. A., Martin, P. L. and Holliﬁeld, J. H. (1994). Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. Frey, W. (1996). Immigration, domestic migration and demographic balkanization in America: New evidence for the 1990s. Population and Development Review 22, 741 763. Jacobson, D. (1997). Rights Across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of the Citizenship. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press. Joppke, C. (1999). Immigration and the Nation State: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ley, D. (1999). Myths and meanings of immigration and the metropolis. Canadian Geographer 43, 2 19. Ong, A. (1999). Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality. Durham: Duke University Press. Preston, V., McLafferty, S. and Liu, X. F. (1998). Geographical barriers to employment for American born and immigrant workers. Urban Studies 35(3), 529 545. Sassen, S. (2000). Regulating immigration in a global age: A new policy landscape. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 570, 65 77. Soysal, Y. (1994). Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

See also: Multiculturalism; Segregation; Transnationalism.

Relevant Websites

Further Reading Baubock, R. (1991). Migration and citizenship. New Community 18(1), 27 48.

http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ Migration Policy Institute. http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/ The Centre on Migration, Policy and Society. http://www.canada.metropolis.net/ The Metropolis Project.

Immigration II I. H. Burnley, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW, Australia & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Acculturation The process whereby an immigrant group adopts many of the social norms and values of the receiving society while maintaining some traditional cultural patterns. Assimilation The process whereby immigrants adapt to and merge with the receiving society in residence, language acquisition, and social and economic characteristics. As originally used by Park, in 1925, in his inﬂuential ‘race relations cycle’, assimilation also involved the receiving society adjusting to immigrants. Career Cycle Migration A process wherein persons in the workforce move internationally to further their career prospects by moving up professional and managerial hierarchies, sometimes within transnational corporations or organizations which have branches in several countries. Ethnoburb A term used by recent authors to designate an outer suburban area of a metropolis in which ehnic entrepreneurship, concentration and cultural mix often occur, and where settlement can be associated with socioeconomic advantage. Gravitation Migration A form of internal migration within receiving countries when immigrants move interregionally or within a city to be closer to compatriots for communal support. Migration Cohort Networks Social networks of immigrants who arrived in a country in the span of a few months or years, who may share common experiences of social dislocation and adjustment, and who may form speciﬁc in-group networks. Pull Factors The factors in a receiving country, including economic opportunities, higher living standards, the presence of relatives and friends, and relative political/personal freedom which attract immigrants to settle in a given country rather than another. Push Factors The factors that inﬂuence persons to leave countries of origin, which may include poverty, discrimination, or political oppression. Reductionist Interpretations Views of migration processes and settlement which oversimplify the complexities involved in community relations and in immigrant geographies. Replacement Migration A process where international migration takes place and/or is sought by receiving countries because of labor shortages commonly resulting from population fertility decline, and sometimes emigration.

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Sojourners A term applied to manual labor migrants – commonly males – who moved internationally in the nineteenth century, usually short term, and who often remitted money to relatives in home countries. Examples were the Chinese gold miners in California, western Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The term ‘new sojourners’ has been applied to short- and medium-term skilled and contract workers in contemporary times. Spatial Assimilation It is the process of, or a measure of, the dispersion of an immigrant origin group and its geographic merging with the wider population distribution. Transnational Processes The processes whereby immigrants may relate to broader international institutions and economic relations so that a one-way adaptation to a given receiving country or its society is not the dominant issue for the immigrants. The short- or long-term immigrants may relate to each of the sending and receiving societies and other societies and networks at the same time.

Background Once modern humans emerged in Africa 150 000 years ago, their descendents spread across the world, although constrained by economic, technological, and environmental factors. Few political boundaries existed to deter move ment, for the nation state, with its customs barriers, pass port, and border patrols, did not evolve until the late sixteenth century, and then mostly in Western Europe. Until the late twentieth century, there were notable em pires across which people moved. In the Ottoman and Roman Empires, Istanbul (Constantinople) and Rome be came large cities, as people of many cultures migrated to these imperial capitals for social and economic gain. Later, Paris, London, Madrid, Lisbon, and Vienna attracted mi grants from their imperial lands, and when empires dis solved, cultural connections remained. Examples are Bangladeshi and Pakistani immigrants in London; Al gerians in Paris, Lyon, and Marseilles; and Brazilians in Lisbon (the South American colonies became independent in the nineteenth century; those of Britain and France after 1950). When the great empires began formal colonization, local peoples were pushed back or subjugated and ex sol diers given land in conquered territories to control in digenous communities. Slave migration was involved in

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several early modern empires and continued in the USA until 1860. Migrants moved within empires, for example, persons from India to Eastern and Southern Africa and Fiji where many became small proprietors. There were signiﬁcant migrations of ‘sojourners’ from China in the nineteenth century – particularly to Can ada, the USA, and Australia. There were constraints later in movements from Asia, particularly with the rise of racist sentiments in immigration countries during the late nineteenth century. Legislation limited migrations from India to Australia; Japan to California; and from China to Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the USA, so that ‘mass’ migrations from Asia to Western countries did not occur. However, signiﬁcant minority communities formed in the late nineteenth century, for example, Chinese in Vancouver, San Francisco, and Sydney and Gujaratis from India in London and in Wellington, New Zealand.

Immigration in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries Had it not been for emigration from Europe to North and South America and Australasia (Australia and New Zealand) – when population growth in Europe was rapid between 1850 and 1920 – population pressures in parts of Europe might have been calamitous. Table 1 shows immigration in the Americas, Australia, and New Zea land from 1820 to 2006 based on estimates, secondary sources, and arrival and departure statistics where avail able. These great ﬂows took place as the supposedly unpopulated New Worlds were opened for European exploitation, and transformed from subsistence pro duction to export pastoral and mineral based economies while the urbanization ideal was transplanted. The strong push factors in Europe included crowded towns resulting from industrialization, land clearances, technological change in agriculture, inequality, population pressure, and sometimes oppression. Pull factors included per ceived economic opportunities and space in the New World, and as families became established, these social units became migration magnets for others. While much immigration to New World rural areas occurred in the nineteenth century, increasingly, international migration became associated with urbanization and particularly, metropolitanization. There were relatively few government restrictions on immigration to the USA in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Self selectivity took place: immi grants tended to be healthier young adults, often with children, although males commonly migrated ﬁrst and sent for their wives and children later. International mi gration in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a great personal sacriﬁce – 3 weeks by ship to the USA and Canada, and months in the case of South

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Table 1 Estimated immigration in the Americas, Australia, and New Zealand (1820 2006)a Region

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United States Canada South America Australia New Zealand

70 000 000 16 000 000 45 000 000 11 000 000 2 000 000

a

Temporary and short term migrants excluded. Adapted from: Burnley, I. H. (2001). The Impact of Immigration on Australia: Demographic Approaches. Melbourne: Oxford University Press. Handlin, O. (1960). The Uprooted. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Jupp, J. (2000). Encyclopaedia of the Australian People (Second Edition). Melbourne: Cambridge University Press. SC (Statistics Canada), 2001, Population Census, Canada, Ottawa. ABS Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006 census, Birthplace by Dur ation of Residence Tables. USA Bureau of the Census (1971). Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1971. Washington: US Government Printing Ofﬁce. USA Bureau of the Census (2000). Population Census, USA., Washington. USA Bureau of the Census (2003). Data sources on the Foreign Born and International Migration at the US Census Bureau, Washington, DC., January 1. UN (United Nations) Demographic Yearbooks, 1978; 1990, 2000.

America, Australia, and New Zealand. Many who did not reestablish families in the countries of immigration never saw their relatives again because of the cost and time involved in returning. Contemporary international mi gration is mostly by airplane, is more rapid, and less costly, although ﬁnancial costs are still signiﬁcant. Perhaps the relatively greatest migration ﬂow from any country was the movement of 4 million from Ireland to the USA after the 1840s famine in which 1 million died. Emi gration was so strong that today, the population of Northern and Southern Ireland (Eire) is 5 million instead of the almost 9 million at the beginning of the nineteenth century. All told, 15 million migrated from England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland during the reign of Queen Victoria, 1837–1901. Most preferred America for it was only weeks away and much cheaper than Australasia although over 2 million settled in Australasia and numbers in South Africa. Almost 4 million migrated to the USA from Italy, as many from Germany, hundreds of thousands from each of Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, and Greece, and several million from Poland, Russia, and other parts of Eastern Europe. These migrations had major impacts on the growth of large US cities (New York, Boston, Chicago, and Pitts burgh). The Jewish migration to New York was very strong, and there were over 2 million there at the 2000 census; in the 1920s, there had been a million Irish and Italians in New York and large numbers in Boston. More than 100 years on, speciﬁc neighborhoods can still be considered as Irish American or Italian American, al though American English, with dialect inﬂuences is

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spoken, and many descendents have been residentially and socially mobile. In 1924, the US government instituted the Quota Acts, which limited immigration from Southern, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. With the exception of refugee movements, international migration fell in the 1930s and did not revive until after World War II (WWII). Within Europe, members of many ethnic groups migrated to countries speaking their language after boundary changes in Eastern Europe and Asia Minor as the result of World War I (WWI) – for example, Ger mans moving Westward: at the end of WWI, 13 million Germans were left outside the Reich boundaries and many suffered from national chauvinism in East Europe. In 1923, over a million Greeks were forced out of Ana tolia and Thrace by a renascent Turkey, most having to be absorbed in Greece with a population base of only 8 million. Many Poles moved into former areas of Prussia in the early 1920s as the newly independent Poland ex panded its territories. There were many other related movements and after WWII, over 2 million Germans migrated from Bohemia to Germany and many persons from Greek communities in Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia moved to Greece or into the wider Greek diaspora around the world. Many of these movements in Europe have had lasting social impacts. After WWII, America wished to attract immigrants for economic reasons, and Canada and Australia for labor force and population building reasons. While there were liberal immigration targets, the state in the receiving countries exercised more control over immigration than hitherto. There were refugee waves as the result of WWII itself and the Cold War conﬂicts: the Korean War with Korean inﬂuxes in the western USA, including inner Los Angeles; the Hungarian revolution (1956); the Cuban revolution with immigration impacts on Miami, Florida; the Prague Spring repression (1968); the Vietnam War; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1980s); the Balkan conﬂicts of the 1990s; oppression of dissidents in the Middle East; civil wars in Africa; and repression in parts of South and Central America. Refugees were taken in adjacent countries and also de veloped countries such as the USA, Canada, Australia, and more latterly, Britain and New Zealand, and north west and northern Europe. Economically motivated migration from poor, war devastated countries of Europe was stronger to North America, Canada, Australia, and after the fall of com munism, from east to northwest Europe. Over 1.8 million people moved from Britain to Australia and more to Canada. Many Jewish survivors from the Holocaust mi grated to Israel, as well as over a million Jews from the former Soviet Union, augmented from members of the Jewish diaspora in northern Africa, and the Middle East.

Western Europe had labor shortages post war due to the low fertility of the depression era, war casualties, and emigration, and West Germany imported ‘guest workers’ from Turkey who found difﬁculty in obtaining citizen ship, more especially when their preferences were to remain rather than to return to more poverty stricken conditions. Many remitted money to relatives at home. Other migrations occurred to France and northwest Europe from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. With the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC), labor ﬂows between member states occurred, especially with the induction of several former Soviet bloc countries into the EEC. Migration from Poland and Russia to the UK, for example, has become substantial. Many of these immigrants have found employment in the service economy. Globalization inﬂuenced the migration of skilled persons between developed countries, between de veloping and developed countries, and more recently, to some developing states, including oil rich Middle East countries. Such migrations have impacted particular ‘global cities’, notably New York, London, Los Angeles (30% born overseas in 2000); Toronto, Canada (42%); and Sydney, Australia (31%). In these cities, cultural diversity became a criterion for locational decision making and the attraction of entrepreneurs and the highly skilled, although some global cities such as Frankfurt (Germany) and Tokyo (Japan) have had small immigrant populations. Rising real incomes and global economic organizational change not only generated movement of highly skilled persons who diversiﬁed middle class areas in many Western cities, but also at tracted less well paid service workers, some from de veloping countries, for example, the migration from the Philippines to Australia, parts of Southeast Asia, oil rich Middle East states, and more recently, to Japan. Many of the women migrants from the Philippines have had ter tiary education but often have not found commensurate employment in the receiving country. Globalization also gave rise to a large expansion in short term working visa holder movements which might be followed by permanent residence, return migration, or movement onward to another country. Sharp birthrate declines in many Western countries from the 1960s generated contracting workforces later so that ‘replace ment migration’ (immigration) became crucial to prod uctivity. Several developed countries became competitors for professional, information technology, and skilled trades’ workers. Most competing countries, nevertheless, became selective in their immigration intakes, with points accumulated for relative youth (under age 35–45), edu cation, qualiﬁcations, occupations needed, relational ties, and health. Another aspect of economic globalization is growing movement between immigrant receiving developed

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countries. By 2006, over 1 million Australia born (5%) and 850 000 New Zealand born (18%) resided overseas. Almost 200 000 Australia born lived in East Asia (con tract workers) and in rapidly developing Southeast Asia, with more in the USA, continental Europe, and Britain. Some of this involved return migration of second gen eration members. In 2005, the former emigration country, Eire, through prosperity resulting from its European Commission (EC) membership embarked on an immi gration target of 100 000 a year. Global dispersion of people with common cultural identities – diaspora – has become an important area of enquiry. This includes people who have been eco nomically mobile but who have suffered discrimination, for example, Jews, Armenians, and Romanys, or migra tory groups such as the Chinese in Southeast Asia and beyond and persons from India, Ireland, Greece, and Italy. Some studies focus on identities of people in diaspora, or their economic, social, and cultural networks.

A Typology of Immigrant Flows Table 2 outlines a typology of immigration, focusing on the last two centuries. While it refers more to Western countries, some categories have relevance to non West ern countries, notably chain migration, refugee, and some economic aspirational movements. The categories are generic rather than visa types, for visa categories and nomenclatures vary between countries. Some ‘perma nent’ migration was not intended as such by the indi viduals involved, and some migration intended to be permanent becomes short term because of migrant dis satisfaction or other factors. Permanent Migration ‘Chain migration’ occurs when individuals, usually men have migrated ﬁrst, established themselves, and sent money for ﬁance´s, wives, and children to migrate. In the USA before the Quota Acts (1924), and in Australia and Canada post WWII, wider family networks were involved: these partly reﬂected the close bonded nature of rural sending societies and sometimes as with Greeks and Southern Italians in the USA, Canada, and Australia, substantial components of small village and town popu lations migrated over decades. Chain migrations strongly inﬂuenced group settlement with Italians in inner western Toronto, in Boston, and east side New York, Buenos Aires (Argentina), and Sydney and Melbourne. In Melbourne, for example, a community formed of over 1000 persons from the Italian town of Viggiano in the inner city. Chain migration has recently been important, with migration of Indians from Fiji to Australia and to New Zealand, par ticularly Sydney and Auckland. Chain migration has been widely involved in migration from former colonies and

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former League of Nations mandated states such as the Cook Islands and Western Samoa to New Zealand. Chain migration was historically involved with rural group settlements, as with Swiss, Germans, and Danes in the USA Midwest; Japanese in rural Brazil; Germans in South Australia; and Ukrainians in Alberta and Sas katchewan, Canada. Religion had been a factor when persons were discriminated against at origin – as with Evangelical Lutherans in Prussia and Hutterites and Mennonites in East and Central Europe – and who mi grated to the Midwestern USA and Canada to form new rural communities and preserve ways of life under threat. ‘Independent (aspirational) migration’ typically in cludes economically motivated skilled migrants, and al though some may be part of transnational elites, many migrate as individuals or nuclear families for aspirational reasons and may not form local ethnocultural links. Others may assist relatives to migrate so that chain mi gration results. Like chain migrants, they may send re mittances to home communities – a process which is very important in the Southwest Paciﬁc. Sponsored relatives of independent skilled migrants may have lesser education because family reunion criteria may not emphasize skills. ‘Refugee migration’, unlike chain migration which continues over a long period, occurs in peaks as conﬂicts emerge. Great conﬂicts, such as the world wars resulted in major displacements of population with national boundary changes. Substantial numbers of displaced persons after WWII were settled in France and Britain, and especially the USA, Australia, and Canada. These refugee intakes did not seed chain migrations because the Communist countries restricted emigration. The Vietnam War resulted in refugee waves of over 150 000 in each of France, Canada, and Australia and many more in the USA. Agreements between the new govern ment of Vietnam and some of these countries allowed subsequent and orderly transfers of relatives of the ﬁrst refugees. Throughout 1980–2005, there was an annual average of 20 million persons housed in refugee camps globally, mostly in Africa, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia, and the UN goal has been to resettle refugees in their home countries when circumstances normalize. This is often impossible and some countries have annual refugee quotas, for example, Australia with 12 000 a year. ‘Illegal immigration’ occurs because many refugees cannot be ofﬁcially settled overseas, some have journeyed to receiving countries as ‘the new boat people’ and asy lum seekers, landing unannounced on remote coasts, for example, in Western Australia. A newer phenomenon has been ‘people smuggling’ in which asylum seekers under threat from repressive authorities have given their life savings to criminal groups to transport them by boat (or plane) via intervening countries to Western Europe, the USA, and Canada. Illegal migration of Hispanic migrants from the Caribbean and Mexico to the USA has taken

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this form, and many have died en route, while others made their way across the relatively porous border of Mexico. In 2006, Federal legislation restricted the latter by erecting barrier fences but granted amnesties to some of the estimated 15 million illegal immigrants in the USA, many of whom were absorbed into urban localities where other Hispanic persons settled. ‘Ofﬁcially assisted migration’ occurred to only a few countries, notably from Britain to Australia and New Zealand. This was necessary because of the cost involved for migrants, in the colonial period and up to the early 1980s (although many migrated independently). Both countries had population building policies, but before the 1970s they preferred ‘Anglo Celtic’ people; although post WWII, Australia signed bilateral agreements with Malta, West Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and Greece, and later, Turkey and the former Yugoslavia, the latter being the only European communist country to allow substantial emigration. ‘Situational change migration’ occurs when onshore visa change takes place and foreign tertiary students obtain permanent residence. Previously, states such as Australia and Canada required overseas students to return to their home country for a period before they could apply to migrate. Since the late 1990s, Australia has allowed student graduates to apply for permanent residence, with add itional incentives (lower entry point scores or higher weightings) if they contracted to live outside the main cities for a period. These onshore conversions were allowed because of skill shortages and international com petition for professional and technical workers. Temporary Migration Increasingly, the distinction between permanent ‘settler’ migration and ‘temporary migration’ is blurred and the Table 2

distinction between Tables 2 and 3 is somewhat forced. Many post WWII permanent immigrants – once living standards rose in sending and receiving countries – re turned to their home countries to live (almost a third of the Greece born in Australia, for example). Canada and Australia signed bilateral agreements, whereby the country of origin and the receiving country contributed to age pensions, provided the immigrant had been in the country of immigration’s workforce for 20 or so years. More latterly, many permanent residents have moved on to third countries, particularly if they have qualiﬁcations which are internationally recognized. Such movements increased the diaspora of ethnocultural groups in a transnational context. Guest-worker migration

Post war, West Germany and some other European countries offered ‘guest worker’ status to migrants from countries with poorer living standards, such as Turkey, for there were low income jobs which the native born would not do. An intrinsic problem was that permanent residence, and particularly, formal citizenship, of the country of residence was difﬁcult to obtain. This raised conﬂicting issues of assimilation, institutional and struc tural maintenance of segmented labor forces, and resi dential segregation in low socioeconomic status areas. Working holiday makers and backpackers

Several British Commonwealth nations negotiated agreements allowing young adults to move between countries to work and travel. This and the wider ‘back packer’ phenomenon have transformed rental neighbor hoods in London, Paris, Toronto, Vancouver, Sydney, and Melbourne. In sizeable cities, investors have taken ad vantage of this cheaper rental housing, often intermixed with overseas born student accommodation. Temporary

Typology of ‘permanent’ immigration

Migration category

Motivation and circumstances

Characteristics

Slave, indentured

Forced; slave movement abolished in Americas in nineteenth century.

Young persons.

Chain Independent Ofﬁcially assisted Refugee Illegal

Situational change

Economic push factors; movement to join relatives. Remittances. Economic push pull factors; aspirational and individualistic motives. Remittances. Poorer immigrants: state assistance with transport costs. Skilled assisted by private ﬁrms. Political and religious oppression at origin. Willingness of receiving country to accept. (a) Poverty at origin. (b) Poverty and discrimination at origin; people smuggling. On-shore visa change; overseas students obtaining residence because of skills.

Indentured persons in some imperial colonies to 1900. Men, women, and children meeting relatives in country of settlement. Higher occupation status; skilled manual workers. Migration as part of life course. Families; persons in workforce ages; contractual obligations earlier (Australasia). Families, parts of families; individuals. Young adults, accepting low-paid work (Europe; USA). Individuals and families: Europe, USA; Australia. Young adults with skills and higher education; developed countries.

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Table 3

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Typology of ‘Temporary’ Immigration

Migration category

Motivation/circumstances

Characteristics

Sojourners Seasonal migration

Economic push factors; opportunities in nineteenth-century resource industries. (a) Transhumance.

Guest-worker migration Working holiday migrants

(b) Sports and tourism workers. Poverty at origin. Remittances. Varying afﬂuence.

Short-term skilled migrants.

(a) Career cycle movers.

Primarily men; workers on goldﬁelds, agriculture, unskilled urban work. North America, Australia. Central Asia and parts of Africa. Nomadic males and families following seasonal resources. Mostly young adults between developed countries. Europe: unskilled; problems of legal citizenship. Young adults moving between developed nations, and from some rapidly developing countries. Young and mature workforce; some families. Developed nations. Several developing and resource-rich states.

(b) Contract workers.

immigrant employment in seasonal harvesting has be come critical because of labor shortages. In 2007, an agreement between the USA and Australia made it pos sible for high school leavers to spend their ‘gap year’ in the respective countries and obtain temporary work there. Some backpackers and working holiday makers eventually return as ‘permanent’ immigrants. Medium-term skilled visa holders

This form of 1–5 year migration involves individuals rather than families and is of growing importance be cause of skilled labor shortages in many Western coun tries. In Australia, between 1997 and 2003, short term movers outnumbered permanent ‘settler’ migrants by 2.5:1. Some obtain permanent residence later. For some professionals and managers, short medium term visa migration is primarily international career cycle migra tion: persons move within multibranched transnational organization ofﬁces in global cities and young scientists, engineers, and academics obtain contract employment with universities, research institutions, and corporations. A problem which has emerged, however, that numbers on skilled visas may be employed in the immigration country in lower skill levels and poorer rates of pay despite the illegality of this practice. Forms of contract skilled migration occurs from de veloped countries to emerging resource rich states in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia and Dubai, notably involving engineers, doctors, nurses, teachers, and tech nicians. This form of short term movement seldom leads to permanent residence or formal citizenship, as in the case of businessmen and professionals and aid workers in postcolonial African states. Seasonal international migrations

Seasonal international migrations occur across national borders in traditional regions where nomadic, herd keeping, and harvesting movements take place in Central Asia and some parts of Africa. Other seasonal migrations between developed countries in different hemispheres occur in professional and alpine sports and with tourism. Seasonal and other short term migrations occur between

poorer Southeast Asian countries and resource rich Middle East countries. Migration processes inﬂuence residential patterns of immigrants and also the cultural geographies of cities and regions. These processes may be more important than group characteristics in adjustment.

Immigration and Residence In the 1920s, the Chicago School of sociology had a marked inﬂuence on social geography, notably the con centric zone model of cities and Park’s ‘race relations’ cycle which incorporated the relationship between spatial residence patterns and assimilation. With the concentric zone model, immigrants settled in zones ‘of transition’ and ‘working mens’ homes’. Inner city residence of low income immigrants in US cities took place because cheap housing and industrial employment were located there. Whereas low income immigrant communities tended (and sometimes continue) to settle in the inner city areas of US cities; in Australian cities, more recently, most members of such communities settled in low mixed in come outer suburbs. The ‘Dissimilarist’ Approach In the 1950s and 1960s, quantitative researchers applied indexes of dissimilarity, segregation, and concentration to immigrant groups and African American populations in US cities, and this approach spread elsewhere. The ‘index of dissimilarity’ summed the percent differences between two populations by spatial units within a metropolis and divided the difference by two. The ‘index of segregation’ compared the distribution of a given group with that of the rest of the population. An index over 80 implied that a group approached segregation. There were (and are) several problems with these indexes. First, the reductionist notion that spatial distance is equal to social distance and that spatial concentration means less ‘assimilation’. Recent studies have shown that there can be positive beneﬁts to the

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immigrant community and wider society from ethnic residential concentration. Second, the indexes did not allow direct inferences as to which group was segregated from which. Third, the indexes allow little interpretation of processes of residential adaptation. Fourth, the mag nitude of the index values is inﬂuenced by the number of spatial units which limits comparative analysis between cities and in the same city at different times. Fifth, residential areas commonly vary by socioeconomic sta tus, and the index value may simply reﬂect the occu pational status proﬁle of the immigrant group (although with appropriate data this can be statistically controlled). Sixth, other factors may inﬂuence residence: a population pattern may reﬂect structural rental housing factors in relation to status and income, rather than cultural choi ces. Seventh, the index is a summary value: in reality, part of an immigrant group may be strongly segregated, part moderately dissimilar, and the remainder dispersed. Eighth, a conceptual danger is that the observer might conclude that one immigrant group is more concentrated than another and ipso facto less assimilated than the other. Negative policy ramiﬁcations could result. Ninth, strong spatial dissimilarity does not necessarily mean limited integration: in areas of strongest concentration of persons born in Greece, Italy, Lebanon, and the former Yugo slavia, in Sydney, for example, considerable ‘accultur ation’ to Australian norms took place. Notwithstanding these caveats, the indexes can be useful. Newer Threshold and Related Approaches The newer ‘threshold’ statistical approaches address some of the issues raised above. Threshold approaches use multiple indicators. Proportions of immigrant or ethnic groups comprise determined percentages of area popu lations within cities or regions. The percentage of given birthplace or ethnocultural groups at given levels of concentration – in areas where they are less than 10%, 10–29%, 30–39%, 40–50%, or higher – is determined. This allows conclusions about the proportions of eth nocultural groups which contribute a majority of the population or signiﬁcant sections of the population in a metropolis, and permit more balanced perspectives on ‘segregation’ or ‘ghettoization’. At this point, the term ‘ghetto’ is reviewed. Adapted from the label applied to areas of Jewish concentration enforced in some European cities, it was applied by Chicago School researchers to areas of US cities where strong majorities of Afro American people settled: descendents of slaves in the south were forced to reside in speciﬁc districts because of unconstitutional state segregation laws. Before the 1960s Civil Rights legisla tion, there were restrictive covenants precluding Afro Americans (and Jews) from residing in particular northern USA city districts.

Taking Peach’s dual criteria that most of a group within a metropolis must reside in a particular area and comprise a strong majority of the population there for it to be termed a ghetto, recent studies using threshold approaches have found that few immigrant ghettos exist in British, American, or Australian cities, although immigrant con centrations exist. In Australia, at least, immigrant con centrations seldom persist over more than one generation and much residential mobility occurs within ﬁrst gener ations when employment levels are high. A dynamic variant of the social distance hypothesis is Boal’s theory of ethnic concentrations: individuals form residential clusters for social support when they do not speak the host society language, when individuals face discrimination and racism, and where they develop a more organized defense of the group against overt racism, particularly recent arrivals. Four adjustment types were suggested: ‘assimilation’ – difference reduces and spatial boundaries dissolve; ‘pluralism’ – group boundaries are maintained although members participate in the wider society; ‘segmentation’ – much sharper divides occur because of group antagonisms; and ‘fragmentation’ (ex treme segmentation or hypersegregation) in which the social environment is fractured, involving exclusion and ghettos. It has been argued that hypersegregation occurs in several large US cities, particularly among persons of Afro American and Hispanic origin. Some migration processes can have direct residential and social adjustment outcomes. Chain migration can result in distinctive group settlement as family networks coalesce over time. Examples were Portuguese and Ita lian settlement in inner western Toronto, Sicilians in inner Boston, and Calabrians in western Sydney (Aus tralia). Often it is networks from a subregion that come to the fore, rather than nation of origin. Indeed, in Aus tralian cities, kinship and family have often much more importance in residence of persons from Asia than eth nicity. Of course, the existence of a multiplicity of kin ship groups speaking a common language or dialect attracts institutions, small business, local associations, and churches, temples, mosques, or synagogues. Refugee migration can also lead to group settlement and as with chain migration, housing costs and socio economic status are inﬂuential. Immigration hostels can affect later refugee residence because adjacent areas be come familiar during hostel residence; migration cohort networks become important, in the absence of previous institutional structures and without longer established familial networks such as with chain migration; gravi tation migration to particular cities from dispersed initial employment locations may occur for communal support although dispersion to other residential areas often takes place; entrepreneurial opportunities in ethnoculturally identiﬁed areas can occur, and this in turn can attract employees; groupings can also occur in social housing

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estates for reasons of poverty and special familial cir cumstances, such as in social housing in outer parts of London and Paris.

Factors Inﬂuencing Admixture Persons from cultural and religious groups in diaspora before migration often form mixed communities of resi dence afterward, reinforced by the presence of relatives, services, and religious institutions. These can be skilled, business, or family reunion migrants among whom varying origins, dialects, and housing amenity can be important. Rather than forming homogeneous concentrations, the communities may have diverse origins within the same linguistic group as with Cantonese speaking immigrants in middle and higher income suburbs of Sydney, where persons from Hong Kong, Taiwan, southern China, Ma laysia, Singapore, and Indonesia settled in new apartments or in established houses but often intermixed with Aus tralian born and other immigrants. Immigrant entrepreneurship can transform poorer areas of immigrant concentration, as with Caribbean and African migrants in Brixton in South London, Chinese and Vietnamese immigrants in Cabramatta in western Sydney, and Chinese immigrants in higher income areas in Rich mond, Vancouver. Terms such as ‘ethnoburbs’ have been used for instances where new suburban growth, re development, and residential concentration go hand in hand. This raises again the terms used for immigrant concentrations, including mixed local populations. The terms ‘ghetto’ and ‘enclave’ are not appropriate in a Western city context. ‘Enclave’ normally involves a largely culturally distinct and homogeneous population within prescribed areas with separate laws and sometimes ad ministration, as in parts of the Balkans and in some of the former Soviet Central Asian republics. In these cases, the ethnic communities often predated the formation of nation states in which they are situated. In developed Western cities, ethnocultural concentrations abide under the same law as the wider population, so the term is misleading. Other terms such as ethnic ‘precincts’, ‘quar ters’, or ‘colonies’ can also imply homogeneity or entities with barriers even if this is not intentionally the case. Changing factors within receiving societies alter spatial adjustments. Social networks often spread widely, once immigrants have cars, for they do not have to live in the same local areas to have face to face contact with relatives and friends. ‘Heterolocalism’ may occur when the ease of mobility in modern cities allows dispersion ‘and’ the maintenance of contacts within dispersed communities. Changing expectations within newer streams of highly educated migrants mean that permanent settlement may not be contemplated even if the immigrants have per manent residence or formal citizenship, and they may

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have no desire for residential cohesion within their origin group. Furthermore, such immigrant networks and the associated social capital are often no longer conﬁned to the same city or society. Indeed, the growth of transna tional communities through migration may mean persons being ‘at home’ in several places simultaneously without needing to form clusters for support. In addition, trans national social spaces may represent different modes of incorporation in the wider social system than have been interpreted from traditional settlement studies. See also: Demography; Emigration; Migration; Population Geography; Refugees and Displacement; Transnationalism.

Further Reading Anderson, K. (1991). Vancouver’s Chinatown, Racial Discourse in Canada 1875 1980. Montreal, QC: McGill Queens University Press. Bedford, R. D. (1994). Paciﬁc islanders in New Zealand. Espace, Population, Societies 18, 187 200. Bedford, R. D. and Levick, B. (1998). Recent migration from Fiji to New Zealand. New Zealand Population Review 14, 69 81. Birrell, B. (1992). The Chains That Bind. Canberra: Bureau of Immigration and Population Research, Australian government Publishing Service. Boal, F. W. (1999). From undivided cities to undivided cities: Assimilation to ethnic cleansing. Housing Studies 14, 545 600. Burgess, E. W. (1925). The growth of the city: An introduction to a research project. In Park, R. E., Burgess, E. W. & Mc Kenzie, E. (eds.) The City. University of Chicago Press: Chicago. Burnley, I. H. (2000). Diversity and difference: Immigration and the multicultural city. In Connell, J. (ed.) Sydney, the Emergence of a World City. Oxford University Press: Melbourne. Burnley, I. H. (2005). Generations, mobility and community: Geographies of three generations of Greek and Italian ancestry in Sydney. Geographical Research 43(4), 279 392. Burnley, I. H. and Hiebert, D. (2001). Emerging patterns of immigrant settlement at the metropolitan scale: The need for new concepts and models. Progress in Planning 55(3), 127 140. Castles, S., Booth, H. and Wallace, T. (1984). Here for Good: Western Europe’s New Ethnic Minorities. London: Pluto Press. Chen, Y. (2000). Chinese San Francisco 1850 1943: A Trans Paciﬁc Community. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Conradson, D. and Latham, A. (2005). Transnational urbanism: Attending to the everyday practices and mobilities. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 32(2), 227 233. Dinnerstein, L., Nichols, R. L. and Reimers, D. M. (1979). Natives and Strangers: Ethnic Groups and the Building of America. New York: Oxford University Press. Dunn, K. M. (1998). Rethinking ethnic concentrations: The case of Cabramatta, Sydney. Urban Studies 35, 503 527. Dunn, K. M. (2005). A paradigm of transnationalism for migration studies. New Zealand Population Review 31(2), 15 31. Faist, J. (1998). Transnational social spaces of international migration: Evolution, signiﬁcance and future prospects. Archive European Sociologique 39, 213 247. Ferguson, N. (2006). The War of The World: Twentieth Century Conﬂict and the Decline of the West. London: Penguin. Friedman, J. (2002). The Prospect of Cities. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Handlin, O. (1960). The Uprooted. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Heisler, B. S. (2000). The sociology of migration. In Brettell, C. B. & Holliﬁeld, J. (eds.) Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines, pp 77 96. Routledge: New York.

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Hugo, G. J. (ed.) (1989 98). Atlas of the Australian People: State Volumes Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service. Hugo, G. J., (2003). Temporary migration to Australia: Trends and implications, Keynote Paper Presented to the 22nd Conference of the New Zealand Geographical Society. Auckland, New Zealand, July. Iredale, R., Hawksley, C. and Castles, S. (eds.) (2003). Migration in the Asia Paciﬁc: Population, Settlement and Citizenship Issues. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Johnson, H. B. (1940). German settlement in the mid west of the United States. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 16(2), 235 260. Johnston, R. J., Forrest, J. and Poulsen, M. (2001). Sydney’s ethnic geography New approaches in analyzing patterns of residential concentration. Australian Geographer 32(2), 149 164. Johnston, R. J., Forrest, J. and Poulsen, M. (2002). From modern to post modern? Contemporary ethnic residential segregation in four US metropolitan areas. Cities 19, 161 172. Johnston, R. J., Poulsen, M. and Forrest, J. (2002). Are there ethnic enclaves/ghettos in English cities? Urban Studies 39, 591 618. Kaplan, D. and Holloway, S. (1998). Segregation Geography. Washington, DC: The Association of American Geographers. Keely, D. B. (2000). Demography and international migration. In Brettell, C. B. & Holliﬁeld, J. (eds.) Migration Theory; Talking Across Disciplines, pp 98 122. Routledge: New York. Laurence, J. and Vaisse, J. (2006). Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France. New York: Brookings Institution Press. Lee, E. S. (1966). A theory of migration. Demography 3, 47 57. Ley, D. and Kobayashi, A. (2005). Back to Hong Kong? Return migration or transnational sojourn? Global Networks 5(2), 111 127. Lieberson, S. (1963). Ethnic Patterns in American Cities. New York: Glencoe Free Press. Lochore, R. A. (1949). From Europe to New Zealand, an Account of Our Continental European Settlers. Wellington: Department of Internal Affairs. Mac Donald, P. (2006). Exiles and Emigrants: Epic Journeys to Australia in the Victorian Era. Canberra: National Museum of Australia. Massey, D. S. (1999). Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the end of the Millennium. New York: Oxford University Press. Massey, D. S. and Denton, N. A. (1989). Hypersegregation in United states metropolitan areas black and Hispanic segregation across ﬁve dimensions. Demography 26, 373 391.

Peach, C. (1996). Does Britain have ghettos? Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers. New Series 22(1), 216 235. Poulsen, M. and Johnston, R. J. (2000). Ethnic enclaves in New Zealand? International Journal of Population Geography 6, 325 347. Poulsen, M. and Johnston, R. J. (2000). The ghetto model and ethnic concentration in Australian cities. Urban Geography 21, 26 44. Poulsen, M., Johnston, R. J. and Forrest, J. (2000). Intra urban ethnic enclaves; introducing a knowledge based classiﬁcation method. Environment and Planning A 33, 2071 2082. Price, C. A. (1960). Immigration and group settlement. In Borrie, W. D. (ed.) The Cultural Integration of Immigrants, pp 250 273. UNESCO: Paris. Price, C. A. (1963). From Southern Europe to Australia. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. Price, C. A. (1974). The Great White Walls Are Built: Restrictive Immigration to North America and Australasia 1836 1888. Canberra: Australian Institute of International Affairs and Australian National University Press. Samers, M. (2002). Immigration and the global city hypothesis: Towards an alternative research agenda. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 26(2), 389 402. Sassen, S. (1991). The Global City; New York, London, Tokyo. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Sassen, S. (1995). On concentration and centrality in the global city. In Knox, P. & Taylor, P. (eds.) World Cities in a World System. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. Smith, M. (2001). Transnational Urbanism: Locating Globalisation. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. Stanwix, C. C. and Connell, J. (1995). To the islands: The remittances of Fijians in Sydney. Asia and Paciﬁc Migration Journal 4(1), 69 88. Voigt Graf, C. (2005). The construction of transnational spaces by Indian migrants in Australia. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 35(2), 365 384. Yeoh, B. and Willis, K. (2005). Singaporean and British transmigrants in China and the cultural politics of ‘contact zones’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31(2), 269 285. Zang, X. and Hassan, R. (1996). Residential choices of immigrants in Australia. International Migration 34, 362 382. Zelinsky, W. and Lee, B. (1998). Heterolocalism: An alternative model of the socio spatial behaviour of immigrant ethnic communities. International Journal of Population Geography 4, 281 298.

Imperial Cities A. D. King, State University of New York at Binghamton, Binghamton, NY, USA & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Deﬁnitions An empire is a form of polity where one state extends its dominion, usually by military power, over the territories and populations of others, generally ethnically and cul turally different. In this context, imperial city can refer to both the capital and seat of the emperor and also to other major cities in the empire. Interest in imperial cities (more of a historical than contemporary phenomenon) is likely to have been generated in recent years following the emergence in urban studies of the category of the world or global city and, in cases, of the historical origins of that status in an earlier role as imperial city. An additional explanation may be the formal demise of European colonial empires in the mid twentieth century and the subsequent appearance of postimperial eco nomic, cultural, and especially demographic features in what were previously Europe’s imperial cities such as Paris, London, or Lisbon.

Empires, Nations, and Cities From a long term historical perspective, the dominance of the nation state as a form of polity is relatively recent. Currently, the United Nations Organization recognizes almost 200 independent states, each with its own national capital city. Yet at the end of the eighteenth century, there were only some 20 of what today would be ac cepted as nation states. The increase has occurred mainly in the nineteenth and especially the twentieth century. Between 1945 and 1990, for example, the number of in dependent states tripled, from 67 to 186, following the collapse of European imperial regimes, especially in Asia and Africa. As recently as the late nineteenth century, the world had been dominated by some 16 empires, each with their imperial capitals and other important imperial cities. That the six ofﬁcial languages of the United Nations Organization are the languages of what were historically once the world’s largest empires (British, Russian, Spanish, Arabic, Qing Chinese, and French) is sufﬁcient comment on the past and continuing import ance of previous empires and their principal cities in disseminating their languages, forms of law and govern ance, and religions and cultures. From the most ancient to the most modern, over 80 different empires have been recognized over the last two millennia, their realms, regimes, and ideologies physically demarcated in both

space and stone. For example, in the second century BC, Qin Shi Huang, ﬁrst Chinese Emperor and founder of the Qing dynasty, united the majority of the Han Chinese under a government based in what is now the modern city of Xi’an, from here introducing a uniﬁed legal code, a common currency, and a written language. From this central imperial capital, the spatial extent of the Em peror’s rule was marked by the ﬁrst stages of China’s Great Wall, a massive defensive and symbolic ediﬁce, later to be extended under the Ming and other dynasties. Subsequently, in the tenth century, China’s imperial capital was moved to Peking (modern Beijing), where the Imperial Palace was situated at the heart of multiple layers of walls and gates, enclosing the Forbidden City, an ingenious spatial mechanism simultaneously projecting and also concealing imperial power. Simply expressed, towns and cities were historically ﬁrst created by the dominance of some social groups over others and their ability to appropriate from the less powerful an agricultural surplus; in return the more powerful urban faction might provide different services for the rural populace. If, by the same logic, national capital cities exist by commanding a surplus from the resources and territory of the nation state and providing services in return, imperial capitals grow even larger, richer, and stronger by appropriating the resources and territories of an expanding empire. For these reasons, imperial cities have, at various periods throughout history, and especially in the nineteenth century, frequently become the largest, in terms of population and often the richest, as centers of consumption, of all cities in the world. Moreover, long after the empire itself has disappeared, in some if not every case, the accumulated resources, institutions, infra structure, transportation networks, as well as cultural at tributes of the earlier imperial regime have continued to exist in the one time imperial city. These may include banks, institutions of government and law, universities, museums, libraries, military installations, docks, shipping, road, and in the modern era, rail and airline transport routes, as well as the ofﬁces, symbols and practices of empire, including languages, attitudes, and beliefs. To different degrees, therefore, this might be true of the im perial regimes and cities of Rome, Istanbul, Peking, Cairo, Venice, London, Madrid, Lisbon, Amsterdam, Moscow, Vienna, among others. In this way, many one time imperial cities of the late nineteenth century have, at the close of the twentieth, mutated into what urbanists have, since the 1990s, increasingly called world or global cities.

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Economically, imperial cities have been able to ap propriate and assemble resources, whether grain, pre cious metals, fuel, labor, building materials, food, looted treasures, and science and knowledge from the far cor ners of the empire. Ancient empires have assembled slave labor to build massive pyramids, such as those at Luxor (Egypt) or Teotihuacan (Mexico); in modern ones, such as that of Britain, slavery was used to build up vast plantation economies in the Caribbean, generating cap ital for industrialization and urban development in the metropole. In imperial cities such as Delhi and Agra in the Moghul Empire (1526–1857) or Madrid and Seville in the empire of Spain (1492–1975), spectacular palaces, public works, and exotic gardens have been funded from the proceeds of imperial conquest. In the modern era, in the brief but singularly violent history of the Belgian Empire (1901–62), proﬁts from rubber extraction in the Congo Free State under the rule of Leopold II, a period of gross exploitation and murderous atrocities, were used to build and equip the spectacular Muse´e du Congo in imperial Brussels (later, the Royal Museum for Central Africa) as well as other monuments. Under the Second French Colonial Empire (1830–1960), territorially the largest after the British Empire, and extending into north and west Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Oce´ana, Paris added to its existing imperial features, including Napoleon’s tomb in the Invalides and the spectacular Arc de Triomphe celebrating his many campaigns. In the twentieth century, the resplendent tomb of colonial general, Herbert Lyautey, was located close to that of Napoleon. Not far away, an imposing bust of his army colleague, General Joseph Simon Gallieni, rests on the shoulders of four Asian and African women, natives of the various countries where he had served. Following postwar decolonization, the museum estab lished for the 1931 international colonial exhibition in Paris was transformed into the Muse´e National des Arts d’Afrique et d’Oce´anie. Both historically and in the contemporary world, ethnically and culturally different peoples have brought, or have traveled, to what are inherently multicultural cities. Whether deﬁned by the cultural diversity of its peoples or the extent of its trade, the imperial city is, by default, the forerunner of the international city. Imperial trade, imperial wars, and the exploits of imperial armies not only add wealth, knowledge, and economic and political power to the city but generate much of its symbolic capital, the monumental arches, ceremonial ways, obelisks, commemorative parks, equestrian statues, gardens and vistas, war memorials, busts of imperial warriors, and thoroughfares named for faraway places. The imperial city is a site for impressive monuments, arenas, and stadiums to mount spectacular displays, whether exhibitions, sporting contests, or demonstrations of political power.

Imperial cities can be divided into two classes: those designed from scratch and purposely built to function as an imperial capital and others, usually national capitals, which have grown on the basis of centralized regal power and then acquire imperial features as the empire expands over time. Most of the large European capitals ﬁt into the second type. India, while providing historical examples of both, also offers, in the case of New Delhi, a uniquely modern version of the ﬁrst type. In the early twentieth century, the imperial government, anxious to escape the growing nationalist movement in Calcutta, moved the capital of the British Raj to a less volatile, more geo graphically central location. The relocated capital was planned on spectacular beaux arts principles: vast pro cessional thoroughfares, endless vistas, the viceroy’s monumental house of gigantic proportions, the vast iconic statue of the King Emperor sheltered by a soaring canopy, and the residential areas for the imperial bur eaucracy laid out according to a rigid social and spatial hierarchy. Of all ancient imperial cities, however, it is Rome and the cities founded by the Roman Empire that best il lustrate the structural characteristics and political pro cesses which distinguish imperial from other types of cities.

Imperial Rome and Imperial Cities As an imperial city and the center of a vast multiethnic, multicultural empire spreading out from the Mediterra nean shores into Northern Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa, Rome and the Roman Empire provide an example of the centrifugal and centripetal movements that inﬂuence imperial capitals and the principal cities in its colonies (or provinces). As the empire expanded be tween 27 BC and AD 330, new cities were founded from which the new provinces were governed and adminis tered. Though inﬂuenced by local geographical and cultural conditions, the cities of the empire, by their location on land and seaborne trading routes, were to become part of a new urban network. They carried the Latin language and culture of the metropole to the col ony, but also brought back local knowledge and culture from the periphery to the metropolitan core. Carefully planned, Roman Empire cities were generally walled, for both defense and administrative purposes, and in most cases laid out on a grid, a spatial device for colonizing new lands and peoples that was to have immense sig niﬁcance, not only for the Romans but also for later empires, such as that of the Spanish in South and Central America. As Roman rule expanded through Italy, the Eastern Mediterranean, and into Gaul and Spain, cities were established in which the conquering armies were garrisoned and from which Roman rule was extended

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over the surrounding province. Similar institutions meant that similar spaces and built forms were found in dif ferent Roman cities. In Pompei or Trier, where the grid plan dates from the ﬁrst century, the forum or market place was the center of public activity. Other public buildings included baths, a gymnasium, temples dedi cated to different deities, occasionally a circus or race track, and a basilica or audience hall. An amphitheatre provided the setting for gladiatorial displays. As with the massive Porta Nigra at Trier, imposing gateways often marked the entrance. Founded after the invasion of Britain in CE 43, London was located at an important river crossing. In addition to a forum, basilica, and temples, London, as the capital of a new province, was also the site of a governor’s palace. Ephesus, in what is now the southeast corner of Turkey, was the main city of the eastern Aegean and capital of the province of Asia. A busy port, exporting goods back to the imperial capital, in the second century CE it had extensive cultural facilities, including a mag niﬁcent library, built to commemorate an earlier gov ernor of the province, Tiberius Julius Celsus. Fronted with huge marble columns and statues dedicated to wisdom, knowledge, intelligence, and virtue, the library had facilities to store up to 12 000 scrolls. In addition, there was a girls’ gymnasium, theater, baths, stadium, and temples to the Goddess Artemis, a destination point for pilgrims. Rome itself was built up especially in the ﬁrst two centuries CE. At the end of the ﬁrst, it had a population of some one million people, and under Augustus, em peror for 40 years (BCE 27–CE 14), it became the greatest city in the Western world. Augustus drew on the extensive new wealth coming into Italy from the colonies and spent immense sums on the city. Grain was shipped to Rome from its province of Egypt; olive oil for lamps, cooking, and food came from the Roman settlement in Carthage, North Africa. With his friends and lieutenants, Augustus added some of the city’s most spectacular buildings, such as the original Pantheon, the Baths of Agrippa, and the Horologium, an enormous sundial, with an obelisk, imported from Egypt, used as a pointer. The Rome of Augustus was a Golden Age for Latin and the legacy was measured not only in buildings but also in literature and architectural treatises including, during the ﬁrst century, the Ten Books on Architecture by Vitruvius, to become of immense signiﬁcance for architects in the European Renaissance. The Colosseum, the largest amphitheatre in the Roman world, was dedicated in CE 80. Emperor Trajan (98–117), extending the empire’s boundaries with his victories in Dacia (present day Ro mania) and later conquests in Mesopotamia, returned to Rome with cohorts of slaves and huge spoils of war. His deeds were commemorated in the huge column named after him, erected in a prominent place in the Roman

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Forum. On this, an intricately sculpted frieze provides a narrative account of his exploits. Along with the grid plan, the Romans brought peace, trade and governance, street layouts, classical temples, municipal baths, huge aqueducts which brought water into cities, as at Nimes in France and Segovia in Spain. The artiﬁcial harbor at Ostia, the port of Rome, was critical in extending trade and shipping facilities. In all the provinces, newly built roads helped to link the provinces together. In CE 122, Emperor Hadrian (117– 38) marked the northern limits of the empire in England with the wall named after him. Everywhere, victories abroad were signiﬁed by triumphal arches or com memorative columns. The signiﬁcance of the Roman Empire for the devel opment of imperial cities is not limited to the founding of many cities, nor to the archaeological ruins which its decline left behind. With interest in the architecture of the ancient world revived by the Renaissance, the Roman Empire was to bequeath to modern Europe and its col onies, including North America, innumerable models of architecture and urban design. In terms of building typologies, architectural styles, or spatial forms, Roman models (incorporating the Greek) were to be spread by European colonialism all over the world.

Imperial London, Empire Cities In the modern era, the reciprocal nature of the growth of the imperial city and its overseas empire is well illus trated by the symbiotic development of London and the colonial port cities of the British Empire. Beginning with the conquest of Ireland and the earliest settlements in North America in the late sixteenth century, the sub sequent expansion of British military, naval, and trading power in the Caribbean, North America, South Asia, Australasia, and Africa, was to have a major impact on the physical growth and economic prosperity of London. As well as the violence, proﬁts from the trade in slavery, and the plantation economies of sugar, tobacco, and indigo in the Caribbean and the American South were behind the setting up of the infrastructure for an overseas trading economy in the late seventeenth century. Merchants in this overseas trade helped in the founding of Lloyd’s in surance (1687–88), a stock exchange of sorts (1670s), and the Bank of England (1691), boosting an already thriving European economy. Trade with the East was stimulated by the East India Company (founded in 1600), whose impressive new headquarters were opened near the Bank of England two centuries later. By the mid eighteenth century, colonial conquests in India, North America, and the Caribbean and a boom in the Atlantic economy had made London the largest center of international trade and its merchants the most prosperous in Europe. In

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terms of population, for over a century and a half, be tween 1750 and the height of British imperial power in 1910, London remained by far the largest city in the world, the population having grown from almost 1 mil lion to 7 million during the nineteenth century. Reﬂecting the territorial expansion of this seaborne empire was a completely new system of docks constructed between 1799 and 1828, and their names (West India, East India, and London) linking their distant and local destinations. Collectively, they could hold over 1400 merchant vessels. As the trading infrastructure grew, it greatly increased the importance of the city economy so that, by 1815, London was already a world ﬁnancial center. During the nine teenth century, the City of London, boosted by Britain’s lead in the Industrial Revolution, further enhanced its commercial and ﬁnancial resources and moved increas ingly into overseas investment, in both the British colo nial empire and the informal colonies of Latin America. The centrifugal ﬂow of capital was accompanied by the centrifugal ﬂow of people. From 1815 to 1925, over 25 million emigrated from the British Isles, 10 million to British possessions round the world, especially Canada, Australasia, and South Africa, taking institutions and cultural attributes with them, and also retaining economic and social links with people at home. Back in the imperial city, their places in the labor market were, in some cases, ﬁlled by the inﬂow of labor from the oldest colony, Ire land. Even in the early years of the twentieth century, there was a small cosmopolitan population in London, not only from Europe but also from the Middle East, India, China, and Africa. London, along with other major ports in Britain (Glasgow, Liverpool, and Bristol), was part of a much larger imperial trading system that linked all the major port cities of the empire together. While some of these had developed from indigenous settlements existing prior to colonial contact, many developed especially in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to become the major cities of the empire. In India, Calcutta was long known as the ‘second city of the empire’. With Bombay and Madras, it had been built up and developed from the seventeenth century. Elsewhere, other cities were part of the network – in Southeast Asia, Singapore and Hong Kong; in South Africa, Cape Town, Durban, and East London; in Jamaica, Kingston; in Australia, Sydney, Melbourne, and Perth; and in Canada, Montreal and Halifax. These cities were not only the sites of trade which, in the nineteenth century, in most cases consisted in raw materials shipped to the metropole for processing, in return for industrial products sent back to the colony, but also, as in the Roman Empire, they were the places where new hybrid cultures developed, and as new in dustrially made products were introduced by the im perial power, indigenous craft production was forced into decline.

Colonial port cities, as well as other inlands also hosted the institutions and buildings of government, ad ministration, education, technology, and the imperial architecture in which they were built. From the mid nineteenth century in India, much of the colonial ad ministration and engineering works were housed by the public works department (PWD), a vast administrative and technical bureaucracy, functioning under the super vision of British imperial engineers. PWD personnel established a network of civil and military stations all over the country, along with barracks, institutional buildings, ofﬁces, canals, roads, and railways, linked to the major cities, and enabling the imperial government to maintain control over the country. During the frequent famines in India, brought on by climate failure and the government’s policy of replacing subsistence farming by cash crops, such public works were used to help alleviate poverty, but this was never enough to prevent millions of deaths from famine. As with the Roman Empire centuries before, new ideas about town and city planning, developed in the metropole in response to the urban chaos of industrial ization, were exported to the empire’s rapidly growing cities in the early twentieth century. In many European colonial cities in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, ideologies about health, race, and culture had resulted in the founding of ‘dual cities’, the native town and the European settlement. The new ‘science’ of town planning was applied principally to the latter. Noting the rapidly growing cities and consumer markets, metropolitan cor porate as well as indigenous interests were quick to es tablish shops, businesses, and factories. Along with the capital and businesses went the urban typologies of the metropole, often drawing for their architecture on Roman models, and also generating hybrid forms. By the twentieth century, the built and spatial environments of these empire cities often had more in common with each other than each had with the culturally and economically different vernacular environments where they existed. Imperial expansion outside the metropolitan center generated spatial expansion inside it. In the later years of the nineteenth century, Britain extended its empire by a third, with new colonies in Southeast Asia; Southern, Central, and Western Africa; South America; and South Asia and Hong Kong. In London, new buildings for the Foreign Ofﬁce, Colonial Ofﬁce, and India Ofﬁce were established in Whitehall. The Imperial Institute of the United Kingdom, the Colonies and India was set up in Kensington in the 1880s in order to exhibit the Empire’s products and raw materials, to disseminate information on emigration, industries, and trades, and to promote further colonization and commercial and technical edu cation in the interests of the Empire. The Imperial College of Science and Technology was established in the early years of the twentieth century. In other parts of

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the imperial city, colonial agencies provided information to the 8.5 million British people who migrated to British imperial territories in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, and the Americas between 1881 and 1910. The growing consciousness of empire in London at this time combined with an increasingly competitive aware ness of the new urban improvements being constructed in other European imperial cities such as Paris, Vienna, Seville, and Rome. It became apparent that London lacked a speciﬁcally imperial space, providing an im posing vista and site for celebration. Following the death of the Queen Empress Victoria in 1901, a plan for Im perial London was proposed, leading to the building of the Victoria Memorial, fronting Buckingham Palace, ‘‘a great imperial and national ideal wrought in marble,’’ according to the Illustrated London News. The mall was remodeled as a processional way with a wide vista fo cused on the new Admiralty Arch in Whitehall. The expansion of empire involved new peoples, terri tories, languages, and cultures as well as health hazards, presenting challenges to existing states of knowledge. To meet these challenges, innovative schools and institutions were established at the University of London. Scientiﬁc and medical needs were accommodated in the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, set up in 1899. The School of Oriental Studies, established in 1916, trained British administrators across the empire, offering language instruction and cultural knowledge of older and newer colonies; the School’s motto, ‘‘Knowledge is power.’’ Africa was later added to its remit. After 1918, the eco nomic signiﬁcance of the empire increased. In the na tionally symbolic space of Trafalgar Square and the adjoining Strand, the most signiﬁcant imperial territories were soon to be represented by imposing administrative and diplomatic premises: after Australia House (1914), came India House (1924), Canada House (1925), Africa House (1928), and South Africa House (1933). With the British Empire Exhibition taking place at Wembley in 1924, London was provided with its ﬁrst major national sports stadium. The event also extended imperial topo nymy to some of West London’s prominent thoroughfares. These visible signs of empire did not of course stand alone but became part of a larger cosmopolitan totality.

Postimperial City In the twenty ﬁrst century, postimperial London is as present as was once the Imperial City. Over half a century after the demise of empire, citizens originating in the one time colonies and their descendants have transformed the ethnic composition of the city. Almost half of the country’s ethnic minority population lives in London where it forms a substantial ﬁfth of the city’s population. While London’s cosmopolitan and multicultural society consists of citizens

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originating from all over the world, speaking over 300 languages, the roots of most of them can be described, according to different perspectives, as either postcolonial or postimperial. What was once the infrastructure for maintaining an empire has become an infrastructure for maintaining, at least in part, a world economy of capital ism: the ﬁnancial services industry, including banking, insurance, law, and real estate; international institutions and multinational corporate headquarters; cosmopolitan educational and cultural sectors: museums, universities, libraries, theaters, and research institutes. Like others of its kind, this is a postimperial global city. See also: Urban Architecture; Urban Design; World/ Global Cities.

Further Reading Atkinson, D., Cosgrove, D. and Notaro, A. (1999). Empire in modern Rome: Shaping and remembering an imperial city, 1870 1911. In Driver, F. & Gilbert, D. (eds.) Imperial Cities: Landscape, Display and Identity, pp 40 63. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Chase Dunn, C. K. (1985). The system of world cities, AD 800 1975. In Timberlake, M. (ed.) Urbanization in the World Economy, pp 269 292. New York: Academic Press. Darwin, J. (2007). After Tamerlane: The Rise and Fall of Global Empires. London: Allen Lane. Driver, F. and Gilbert, D. (eds.) (1999). Imperial cities: Overlapping territories, intertwined histories. In Imperial Cities: Landscape, Display and Identity, pp 1 20. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Fuller, M. (2006). Moderns Abroad: Architecture, Cities and Italian Imperialism. London: Routledge. Gillem, M. L. (2007). America Town: Building the Outposts of Empire. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press. Hall, P. (1993). The changing role of capital cities: Six types of capital city. In Taylor, P., Lengelle, J. G. & Andrew, C. (eds.) Capital Cities: International Perspectives, pp 69 84. Ottawa, ON: Carleton University Press. Hochschild, A. (1998). King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror and Heroism in Central Africa. New York: Houghton Mifﬂin. Hopkins, K. (ed.) (2001). Globalization in World History. London: Pimlico. King, A. D. (1990). Global Cities: Postimperialism and the Internationalization of London. London: Routledge. Metcalf, T. (1989). An Imperial Vision: Indian Architecture and Britain’s Raj. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Said, E. (1993). Culture and Imperialism. London: Vintage. Scarr, C. (1995). The Penguin Historical Atlas of Ancient Rome. London: Penguin Books. Scriver, P. (2007). Empire building and thinking in the Public Works Department of British India. In Scriver, P. & Prakash, V. (eds.) Colonial Modernities: Building, Dwelling and Architecture in British India and Ceylon. London: Routledge. Skinner, G. W. (1977). The City in Late Imperial China. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Smith, T. (1999). ‘A grand work of noble conception’: The Victoria Memorial and imperial London. In Driver, F. & Gilbert, D. (eds.) Imperial Cities: Landscape, Display and Identity, pp 21 39. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Steinhardt, N. R. S. (1999). Chinese Imperial City Planning. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. Wright, G. (1991). The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Imperialism, Cultural S. P. Mains, University of the West Indies-Mona, Kingston, Jamaica & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary All-Inclusive Resort A tourist development (often including a large hotel on extensive grounds), which includes the (relatively) unlimited provision of meals, leisure facilities, and entertainment on-site, as well as taxes and service charges, as part of the total package price. Cultural Landscape The combination of social and physical characteristics in a speciﬁc locale, which help to create a distinctive sense of place. Discourse A system of representation and discussion through which language is given meaning. Ethnocentrism A way of thinking and acting in which a speciﬁc ethnic group is privileged and believed to be superior over others. Free Trade Zone A physical area designated for the location of foreign-owned companies who are usually provided with incentives such as tax exemptions, the provision of basic infrastructure, and the availability of inexpensive labor. Global North Generally, high-income countries located in the Northern Hemisphere. Global South Generally, low- and middle-income countries located in the Southern Hemisphere. Remittances Money sent back by international migrants to their countries of origin – often as a regular (and signiﬁcant) form of ﬁnancial support to friends and family members.

Introduction Cultural imperialism is a process of disproportionate inﬂuence over social practices and ideologies by one sociopolitical group (quite often a nation state), over a politically weaker and less wealthy group. This is a term that encapsulates a range of complex spatial and temporal relationships. These relationships reﬂect and inﬂuence differential access to power, space, and the ability to produce or challenge dominant ideas about people and places. It is perhaps helpful to break down the separate cat egories that make up the term cultural imperialism in order to outline central characteristics of this concept (as opposed to the more general term of imperialism). Examining the latter term ﬁrst helps to narrow the focus: imperialism refers to a process of domination of one

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social group over another (usually a state authority in ﬂuencing another foreign power), and may be combined with efforts to establish colonial relationships, including territories. Imperialism may occur through the exertion of indirect and/or direct forces, and does not assume a written policy or formal control of foreign territories, such as those experienced as part of colonialism and the establishment of foreign annexes to colonial authorities. Imperialism involves a dominant inﬂuence by a particular authority through cultural, economic, and political practices, which facilitate the creation of hegemonic geographic powers. Although imperialism and colonial ism have increasingly been used interchangeably, im perialism can exist without colonialism – although some geographers refer to this newer form of inequality as neocolonialism – whereas all colonial projects have been infused with imperial ideologies. The territorial or ma terial product of imperialism and colonialism has been the establishment of empires and colonies, and more recently these spatial manifestations have been extended to include a broad range of places such as the creation of foreign run free trade zones, sites of military conﬂict and state oppression (e.g., state boundaries, prisons, schools, refugee camps), and sites of anti imperialism resistance (e.g., street protests, documentary ﬁlms, community centers). Geographic research exploring imperialism has in cluded examinations of colonial explorations and the ‘age of discovery’, globalization, dependency, and economic inequalities, the disproportionate presence of Global North commodities and media representations in Global South states; environmental conﬂicts linked to Western oriented technological and educational policies; and architectural and planning inﬂuences in urban centers. Studies in human geography examining understand ings of culture have also encompassed a very broad variety of topics. Culture itself is a term that refers to a broad area of social practices and identities and, as such, can be seen as very amorphous and slippery. Culture is everywhere, but attempts to deﬁne and list its key char acteristics become very difﬁcult to produce! Despite these difﬁculties human geographers have explored culture as social practices and relations that are dynamic, and with the ability to travel and transform in different periods and contexts. Culture has been broadly described by human geographers as the contexts in which people exist in space, and the sense of place that these different set tings provide. Consisting of the amalgamation of several factors, culture has been viewed as including: language,

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arts, economic livelihoods, emotional ties to place, social attitudes, conﬂicts, religious practices, political milieu, built environments, educational systems, and physical landscapes, to name just a few. In order to understand cultural imperialism, therefore, the inclusion of a broad range of practices and contexts is crucial. A combination of imperialism and culture provides a concept that integrates some of the processes introduced above: cultural imperialism is a speciﬁc form of broader imperialistic practices, and again, refers to the uneven inﬂuence of a speciﬁc dominant power (or powers) over the social, material, and economic context of another lo cale. This inﬂuence is usually regarded as a negative force because it refers to a process through which cultural identities and practices of a dominant social group or authority (such as a particularly powerful state or ethnic group) are reinforced by limiting and/or undermining the existence of other less powerful and politically inﬂuential groups (such as smaller and less economically wealthy nation states or ethnic groups). This process of domination is not necessarily accompanied by the use of force – such as military campaigns – but may be part of an indirect process of establishing hegemonic (or overarching) inﬂu ences over a particular social context through implied pressures such as the threat of military intervention, the marginalization of certain cultural practices, the removal of foreign economic support, political sanctions, or wide spread negative media attention. In some contexts this can be referred to as ‘soft imperialism’, since it refers to a process of dominant outside inﬂuences that are not fo cused on the use of violence, but may involve more subtle ways of shaping a cultural landscape. For example, the US and some EU states are viewed by certain social groups in small Caribbean states as having too large an inﬂuence over the types of lifestyle choices that are viewed as desirable by island residents (e.g., through overseas produced advertising and programming that is broadcast in mainstream Caribbean media), as limiting sustainable economic trade opportunities (through pricing, the use of outsourcing to areas of cheap labor, a reliance on foreign tourists as an income generator), and limited political representation in regional and inter national decision making processes (e.g., through limited inclusion of Caribbean based representatives in inter national organizations whose policies affect the region). Each of these concerns combined has resulted in the cri tique that smaller less wealthy states are involved in a very difﬁcult struggle in order to compete culturally and eco nomically with outside inﬂuences that turn their territories into landscapes of consumption (particularly in relation to absorbing overseas ideas and goods) rather than production (e.g., nurturing and promoting indigenous ideas and pro jects). While some researchers have suggested that outside inﬂuences and the exchange of ideas are inevitable and often positive experiences (and, as such, would not be

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labeled as culturally imperialist), what earmarks the Caribbean example mentioned above is the unevenness of a process through which smaller island states have a more limited say in the process of exchange and often ﬁnd themselves in a less favorable dependent relationship. Through the use of speciﬁc case studies, the discussion below brieﬂy examines in more detail some of the key areas through which human geographers have examined cultural imperialism, and the varied ways in which we can contextualize the concept further. The ﬁrst section is historical in focus, and explores the relationship between cultural imperialism and colonialism, and their links to other ideological perspectives and built environments. This is followed by an examination of more recent eco nomic and social dimensions of cultural imperialism ex plored by human geographers. This second section discusses the examples of multinational corporations and consumption, tourism, and media representations of place.

Cultural Imperialism and Colonialism Although sometimes used interchangeably, as noted in the previous section, cultural imperialism and colonialism are parallel components of interconnected systems of dom ination. Metropolitan centers of power – for example, elite groups based in places such as London, Paris, Washington, DC, and Madrid – sought to concretize their imperialist (or empire building) aspirations through colonialism and the establishment of colonial territories (or foreign an nexes), over which they aimed to have unchallenged control. The formal establishment of expanded territories through force and coercion, combined with the promotion of certain cultural, economic, and political values and practices in places that were considered to be unclaimed landscapes – that is, not yet under Western control – was an important historical process in terms of manifesting cultural imperialism through space, and in speciﬁc locales. Examining the ways in which colonialist practices relied on the promotion of overgeneralized concepts of place and identity, the postcolonial theorist, Edward Said, illustrates that cultural imperialism was a key part of this process of domination of foreign lands and that it was shaped by a perspective he terms Orientalism. Orientalism reﬂects a Eurocentric viewpoint – that is, one that views Europeans and European viewpoints as superior to those of other peoples and places – and as such, relies on Western stereotypes of non Western cultures. Indeed, Said points out that despite their pervasiveness in academic discussions and popular culture, even the notion of Western/non Western, or West/East, is problematic. Despite their depictions as natural and neutral, these spatial (and ideological) divisions are subjective representations of the ways in which the world has been arbitrarily divided for academic, political, and economic purposes, usually serving the needs of wealthy

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nations such as the UK, France, Germany, and the US. In describing European depictions of an Orient, for example, Said notes that this latter region emerges in French and British nineteenth century writings as an exotic culture and region of intrigue. This depiction of a cultural landscape of mystery and curiosity was used to situate the idea of an Orient directly in relation to an Occident (including, for example, France and Britain), and was as much about how Europeans viewed European culture as it was about ex ploring an Oriental identity. This binary, over generalized, and uneven system of representation became a process – and way of discussing (or discourse) – through which the idea of European superiority was reinforced. The process and practice of cultural imperialism took place (and, many human geographers would argue, continues to do so espe cially in current debates about terrorism, migration, and conﬂict in the Middle East) through the construction of non European identities and places (e.g., Egypt or the Arab) that were narrowly bounded social, spatial, and physical stereo types framed by a European viewpoint. Based on this perspective the Oriental was clever, but unsophisticated; passionate, but overemotional; archetypal and static. As such, this Orientalist discourse – which was intrinsically about intersections of space, representation, and identity – pro duced through novels, academic institutions, art, foreign policy, and military activities – had a signiﬁcant impact (both discursively and materially) in the reinforcement and re production of European cultural and political activities in non Western contexts. Cultural imperialism and colonialism have, therefore, been interwoven through a diverse range of spatial rep resentations and built environments, including travel writing, art, religion, education, language, and archi tecture. Human geographers have pointed out that colonial accounts of overseas territories through ex ploratory journals or travel writing, which were later published in Europe, usually produced depictions of landscapes and cultures that were framed by a series of class, gender, and racial assumptions and relations, which set these ‘newly discovered’ places in direct comparison to those of the colonial home, and usually in a manner that reafﬁrmed the superiority of imperial centers of control. Artistic representations of colonies (as well as domestic rural settings), utilized approaches that ideal ized marginalized locations (e.g., through nostalgic and utopian representations of rural landscapes), and gen dered imagery that depicted primitive and/or passive cultures that required taming, management (and ex ploitation). Religious, educational, and linguistic dimen sions of cultural imperialism can be noted in the present day prevalence of European inﬂuenced practices in many locations throughout the world, for example, the preva lence of Catholicism and Protestantism in Latin America and the Anglophonic Caribbean, respectively; Euro centric educational curricula; and the dominance of

forcibly introduced European languages, such as Portu guese in Brazil, English and Afrikaans in South Africa, Dutch in Suriname, and French in Cameroon. Such practices of cultural domination, often accompanied with the outright banning of indigenous languages and re ligious practices, were undertaken as a means of com bining and extending physical coercion and control with the use of social practices that permeated everyday life, and as such became more complicated to challenge. As is noted in the following case studies, the combination of these cultural impositions with changes to the built en vironment, has produced numerous cultural landscapes imbued with culturally imperialist ideologies. Cultural Imperialism, Colonialism, and the Built Environment World’s Fairs exhibitions provide an additional case study of cultural imperialism in social and physical landscapes. Preceded by national exhibitions held in France, and initiated in 1851 as the Great Exhibition at The Crystal Palace in London’s Hyde park, international World’s Fairs provided a showcase of all that was considered to be innovative and productive in relation to the exhibitors’ economic (and cultural) gains. Occurring on average every year to 4 years (continuing to the present day, and now every 5 years), and initially rotating between a range of largely European and US cities, the exhibitions pro vided the opportunity to bolster distinctive urban and national notions of identity, while selling an idea of internationalism that – particularly from the nineteenth to the mid twentieth century – was largely framed by speciﬁc European and US interests. A key attraction of these early exhibitions was the pavilion displays staged by each participant country as part of a project to illustrate the industriousness as well as cultural wealth of Western nations and their empires. These displays – often housed in striking purpose built structures – included examples of inventions related to technology, art and design, and, combined with special ized amusement zones, were designed to entertain the large numbers of visitors who traveled to the exposition sites. As events that were linked to cultural imperialism, the World’s Fairs were important because they reinforced and celebrated a notion of culture and commerce that was being imposed in overseas territories (and do mestically in factories and schools) – often accompanied by a signiﬁcant degree of force – in a manner that portrayed Western industrialization and capitalism (including a sanitized portrayal of slavery) as noble, progressive, and inherently egalitarian. For example, ethnocentrism and racism prevailed in anthropological exhibits where many display tableaus included the in corporation of people from respective regions as part of a so called naturalistic system of representation (e.g., while

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depicting an archetypal African village or Paciﬁc Island dress). Although providing the opportunity for a broader population to virtually travel to distant lands, such dis plays did little to represent the viewpoints of those they purported to represent: Western perspectives of non Western cultures were viewed as more informed and objective than those provided by inhabitants of the various locales themselves. Colonial territories and a range of locales in the Global South became the objects of a white masculinist Eurocentric gaze that depicted intriguing, but eccentric cultural landscapes set in the past awaiting the catalyst of US or European intervention and innovation to bring them into the modern era. Although many technological developments, including health, transportation, and sanitary innovations, may have been appreciated by the contemporary populace, those involved in anti colonial movements and labor organ izations ﬁghting for fair wages, improved working conditions, access to housing, and greater political rep resentation – both in exhibition host countries and co lonial territories – disagreed with the triumphalist narratives that were promoted by those ofﬁcial, and usually socially elite, groups administering international Fairs. These challenges, however, were usually margin alized in popular discussions about exhibitions (e.g., in print news media), and caricatures of anti imperialist or socialist activists as extremists or as anti progress were not uncommon. The impacts of cultural imperialism in the built en vironment can be extended beyond the World’s Fairs to the everyday landscapes of towns and cities globally. In an effort to create satellite versions of London, Paris, and Berlin, during the nineteenth and early twentieth cen turies, building designs – for example, those inspired by Victorian or Georgian architecture – were copied and transplanted to railway stations (e.g., in central rail sta tions such as, the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus, formerly the Victoria Terminus, in Mumbai, India), court houses, schools (e.g., Jamaica College in Kingston, Jamaica), and public monuments (e.g., sculptures dedicated to Euro pean explorers and military ofﬁcers). This practice of redesigning and incorporating an imperially inspired aesthetic was another process through which European designs and ideologies were reiﬁed by colonialists, while indigenous architecture – with a few exceptions – was frequently viewed as quaint, but inferior and dispensable. Similar processes of architectural and political priv ileging (and discrimination) can be seen in earlier periods of imperialist practices, such as those during the Aztec and Spanish settlement and domination of areas within Mexico (and particularly the latter, in various regions of Latin America). Mexico City’s main square, or zo´calo – Plaza de la Constitucio´n (Constitution Plaza) – houses perhaps some of the most, and diverse examples of efforts to manifest imperialism physically and symbolically in an

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urban setting over many centuries. Currently one of the largest main squares in the world, this central location within Mexico’s capital emerged during the fourteenth century as the physical and ceremonial center of the indigenous Aztec empire. The city that grew in this site, Tlatelolco – which later became part of the larger Tenochtitla´n – was then the site of violence and dom ination by Spanish colonialists in the sixteenth century. During the seventeenth century, the latter group built the Church of Santiago on top of ceremonial structures constructed by the Aztecs as part of the Templo Mayor and by doing so symbolically and physically reinforced a process of undermining and disempowering of the few remaining indigenous representations in the landscape. Today the Plaza de las Tres Culturas (Plaza of Three Cultures), which partially overlies where the center of Tlatelolco was based, has been ofﬁcially assigned im portance as a site commemorating three key cultures in Mexico City’s history: Aztec (or pre Colombian), Span ish (colonial), and Mestizo (a mixture of Spanish and indigenous cultures) – the latter being described as symbolizing the populace of the modern post colonial Mexico. The plaza lies in the vicinity of the excavated ruins of the Templo Mayor (see Figure 1) – now part of a museum exploring indigenous cultures and as such providing a resurfacing counter (Spanish) imperialist landscape (with Aztec inspired dancers also attracting many tourists in the plaza area). The seventeenth cen tury Church of Santiago de Tlatelolco, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and modern apartments also bound the plaza – depicting shifts in dominant national and inter national identities over many centuries. Signiﬁcantly, the Plaza of the Three Cultures has also become an im portant memorial site for those who were killed during a 1968 massacre, during which government authorities violently halted anti government student protests just prior to the Olympic Games that were held in the city. Following the public availability of previously conﬁden tial documents, US intelligence agencies have since been implicated in the dramatic actions taken by the Mexican authorities during 1968. This foreign intervention in a domestic political context could also be viewed as illus trating the ways in which dominant political values, and events that challenge them, from within and beyond nation state boundaries emerge in both discursive and material form. Mexican painter, Diego Rivera, who was particularly renowned for his large scale murals (or frescoes) – and married to another important painter, Frida Kahlo, who also contributed signiﬁcantly to a post independence artistic identity – has provided a counter imperialist presence in the nearby landscape, having created several murals depicting pivotal moments in Mexican history on the walls of the key legislative building, the National Palace (facing onto Constitution Plaza). Painted from the

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Figure 1 Excavated ruins of the Aztec ceremonial center, the Templo Mayor, in Mexico City.

1920s to the 1950s, Rivera’s murals critique the exploit ative nature of capitalism and corruption, and attempt to reclaim the importance of indigenous histories and the necessity of an active labor movement. Carrying on this tradition the main zo´calo itself has been the focal point of numerous protests, rallies, and concerts in efforts to re claim a social and physical space for large sections of a populace that have often felt marginalized. Human geographers argue that such socio spatial narratives found in places like Mexico City (and many settings throughout the world) illustrate how cultural imperialism can be manifested in various aspects of urban landscapes (from bodies, to plazas, to policies and protests), and that ideologies can (literally) be cemented into the built environment.

Contemporary Cultural Imperialism and Representation: Consumption, Tourism, and Media During the last 50 years, cultural imperialism has im pacted human geographies at the local, national, and international scales. Although now less likely to occur as part of a formal process of domination, such as coloni alism, it is viewed as an important means of indirect inﬂuence and inequitable control in the social and eco nomic practices shaping places. The economic dimen sions of cultural imperialism have attracted a growing body of research in human geography, with particular attention being focused on processes of consumption.

Consumption refers to the acquisition and utilization of goods, ideas, and services. Geographers highlight that practices involving the consumption of products, and even lifestyles, are often reﬂective of relationships that are politically and economically uneven. This means, for example, that particularly wealthy and publicly visible nation states, private corporations, social groups, or in dividuals may be able to encourage the selling and purchasing of particular goods (e.g., clothes, cars, or music) or ways of living (e.g., a particular kind of neighborhood, health practice, or voting preference) through the promotion of advertising imagery and public debate that privileges certain ideals over others, and through which material objects become symbolic of broader cultural identities and social values. When the consumption of identiﬁable goods or trademarks is undertaken in an obvious manner – that is, the consumer is actively making an explicit statement about what kind of material objects and lifestyle practices they prefer – this is referred to as conspicuous consumption. Human geographers, and other cultural theorists and social sci entists, point out that problems emerge when the objects and practices that are promoted and desired are in sensitive to the cultural context to which they are introduced and – particularly in economically chal lenged areas – that they may symbolize a tension and inaccessibility between more widespread or indigenous goods and practices, and those that are viewed as ex clusive or fashionably foreign. It has been argued, for example, that a shift in diets toward imported and/or fast foods as well as a push for individual rather than collective wealth in countries of the Global South has

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reduced nutrient diversity in daily food consumption, undermined local food producers, negatively impacted environmental conditions due to large scale agro busi nesses and waste production, increased the homogen ization of restaurant design and the expansion of low paid jobs (with limited skill transfers), and encouraged an emphasis on private automobile transportation, while also undermining cooperative and locally based com munity driven business initiatives (especially if viewed as direct competition). This shift in economic and social practices could be viewed as a demonstration of cultural imperialism by corporations based in the Global North because of the disproportionate economic power and advertising presence that they exhibit, both in domestic markets and in the Global South. Similar criticisms have been made of large retail corporations, such as the US based company Wal Mart, which has expanded inter nationally in recent years and has been described as undercutting the prices of locally owned businesses while beneﬁting from the production of goods in over seas locations that utilize cheap labor in places such as free trade zones. Figure 2 illustrates a satirical – and counter hegemonic – comment on the ubiquitous (and almost inevitable) nature of Wal Mart developments. The handmade structure shown in the image is a small Rastafarian business along a main tourist routeway on the Jamaican North Coast; many members of this aforementioned religious community have been critical of the substantial inﬂuence of US economic and political practices in the island.

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Tourism provides another case study of possible cul tural imperialism – again in relation to inequalities in decision making, economics, and design. The inequalities found in relation to tourist policies and developments, and the dependent nature of the relationship between certain tourist destinations and the investors and tourists they rely on, have led to this practice being described as neo colonial. For example, small island developing states in the Caribbean (also known as SIDS) rely heavily on international tourism and remittances as steady sources of foreign exchange income. Despite – and partly because of – the signiﬁcance of tourism as an economic con tributor to the region, Caribbean residents and non governmental organizations (as well as geographers) have stated that island residents and governments have been pushed to sell a form of tourism that caters more to the needs and expectations of overseas tourists and investors than to the desires of local residents. In some Caribbean contexts, this has resulted in the commodiﬁcation of stereotyped ideas of island life, based on non island perceptions, and has often been far removed from the daily, lived experiences of the resident population. Add itionally, large scale tourist developments (such as all inclusive resorts) have been criticized for exacerbating environmental problems along coastlines, promoting lifestyles that may be insensitive to local cultural values, offering limited opportunities for interactions between visitors and locals outside of resort spaces, and en couraging a culture of dependency shadowing that of the former colonial era, in which predominantly black

Figure 2 Resisting cultural imperialism: A locally made Rastafarian structure on the Jamaican North Coast where much of the recent large-scale tourist development has occurred critiquing the ubiquity of large-scale corporations, such as the US-owned business, Wal-Mart.

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islanders continue to service the needs of a relatively wealthy, and largely white foreign population. The role of mainstream media is central to the ex amples of consumption and tourism discussed above, and during the last 30 years has been attracting increasing attention by geographers examining the various forums through which dominant images of place and identity have been (re)produced and challenged. Media formats such as television, radio, ﬁlm, print newspapers, and online publications can have a considerable inﬂuence in the reinforcement of ideologies and the ways in which these become (socially and physically) mapped onto people and places. Geographers suggest that in order to understand media images of places and cultures we have to interrogate who has the power to produce represen tations – or the power to tell stories – and in what way these images can reinforce dominant and/or exclusionary discourses (such as anti immigrant sentiments, racist stereotypes, place misrepresentation, nationalism, and sexist imagery). At the same time, media representations can provide challenges to status quo narratives and visual imagery, and thus a growing body of literature has been exploring the use of audio–visual materials and elec tronic formats as a means of producing anticulturally imperialist texts (e.g., through activist based media and independent ﬁlm). The shifting and diversifying roles of documentary ﬁlm provides an example of the way in which the same medium can have varied purposes. During the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, documentary ﬁlms played an im portant pedagogical (and paternalistic) role in informing European audiences about colonial territories and in attempting to socialize newly arrived immigrant popu lations in their destination country (e.g., as can be seen in ﬁlms produced by the British Colonial Film Unit). In the pre and post World War II period, while still providing a format for traditional images of popular culture, docu mentary (and ﬁctional drama) ﬁlm increasingly became a forum for providing critically engaged cinema that sought to challenge imperialist and socially conservative representations while attempting to capture the diverse experiences of a broader range of the populace in a variety of locations (e.g., as can be noted in twentieth century British social realist ﬁlms). Therefore, even within a setting that can be viewed as part of an imperial center, challenges to imperialist representations were present. More recent – and ongoing – developments in digital video technology and internet based media pose signiﬁ cant areas for future human geography research and explorations into the interrelationships between systems of representation, power, culture, and identity. For, al though cultural imperialism may still exist in a range of media representations, there is always the possibility that those same media may provide a range of alternative

visions: hegemony can never be completely sealed up, thus, cultural imperialism remains a sailable, but leaky boat. See also: Colonialism I; Colonialism II; Dependency; First World; Globalization, Cultural; Hegemony; Imperialistic Geographies; Neocolonialism; Orientalism; Postcolonialism/Postcolonial Geographies; Poststructuralism/Poststructuralist Geographies; Third World.

Further Reading Blaut, J. (1993). The Colonizer’s Model of the World: Geographical Diffusion and Eurocentric History. New York: Guilford Press. Blunt, A. (1994). Travel, Gender, and Imperialism: Mary Kingsley and West Africa. New York: The Guilford Press. Escobar, A. (1995). Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Gilmartin, M. (2004). Language, education and the new South Africa. Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geograﬁe 95(4), 405 418. Gregory, D. (2004). The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, and Iraq. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Harvey, D. (2003). The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jacobs, J. M. (1996). Edge of Empire: Postcolonialism and the City. New York: Routledge. Kincaid, A. (2006). Postcolonial Dublin: Imperial Legacies and the Built Environment. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Klein, N. (2000). No Logo. New York: Picador. Klein, N. (2007). The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. New York: Metropolitan Books. Mains, S. (2004). Teaching transnationalism in the Caribbean: Toward an understanding of representation and neo colonialism in human geography. Journal of Geography in Higher Education 28(2), 315 330. Said, E. W. (1978). Orientalism. New York: Pantheon Books. Said, E. W. (1993). Culture and Imperialism. New York: Knopf. Staszak, J. F. (2004). Primitivism and the other: History of art and cultural geography. GeoJournal 60(4), 353 364. Thiong’o, N. W. (1986). Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature. London: James Currey.

Relevant Websites http://www.bﬁ.org.uk British Film Institute: The British Film Institute website provides a range of links to educational and archival material that is preserved and/or held by this national institution dedicated to maintaining the diversity of moving image media available in the UK. Selected sections of the archive can be accessed via the website (particularly through the Screen Online section), and further information regarding accessing archive materials and public screenings is provided. http://expomuseum.com ExpoMuseum: ExpoMuseum is a web based museum related to past and upcoming World’s Fairs (or World Expositions). This site has a range of historical information and contains links to other sites, such as museum archives, which contain detailed pictorial and textual materials related to the Fairs. http://www.indymedia.org Independent Media Center: The Independent Media Center or IndyMedia Center as it is popularly referred to is a website based collective of activists, writers, journalists, and observers who aim to

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provide alternative sources of information to mainstream news outlets. The website is available in several languages and provides links to current news items, articles, upcoming events, and related media websites. http://econgeog.misc.hit u.ac.jp International Critical Geography Group: The International Critical Geography Group is a network of scholars and activists seeking to actively address issues of inequality and poverty through geographic research and organizing. The website provides information on the goals of the Group, upcoming conferences, and related Internet mailing lists. http://www.peoplesgeography.org People’s Geography Network: The People’s Geography Network is a network of geographers, interdisciplinary researchers, and

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community activists who seek to broaden the scope of human geography and to increase its accessibility to a cross section of the general public. The website contains materials that can be accessed online, including seminar papers, working papers, upcoming events, and links to related websites. http://www.forumsocialmundial.org World Social Forum: The World Social Forum (WSF) is a multilingual website that acts as main clearinghouse and source of information in relation to the activities of community organizations and activists working as part of the WSF. It provides information about upcoming regional and international meetings, organization committees, proposals for challenging indebtedness and the existing process of payments for countries in the Global South, and related news links.

Imperialistic Geographies G. M. Winder, The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Border Region Borders are sites in which difference is produced and disrupted. The region on either side of the border is broadly constituted by the presence and contestation of a border, whether between or within states. Border construction, border crossing, and the identities that are formed and dissolved in such acts, seldom make for simple geographies of identity, belonging, or state control. Instead, we might think of border regions (or borderlands) as generating hybrid identities, and weakened or partial state effectiveness. Colonialism The establishment and maintenance of rule by a sovereign power over subordinate, alien people. The term implies a policy of establishing and maintaining colonies through a series of exploitative practices and relationships, especially with ‘backward’ or ‘colonial’ peoples. Such policies may be backed by racist ideologies. The term also implies a subordinate territory geographically separate from the ‘home’ territory of the ruling power. Contact Zones These are the sites for contact between peoples. Such zones may be identiﬁed at varying scales from border regions to speciﬁc locales. Their principal feature is the form of the contact between peoples. The term directs attention to the complex interactions between cultures including the development of hybrid identities and practices, efforts at translation and intermediation, as well as patterns of domination, subordination, and resistance. Postcolonial scholarship points to the ambiguities, mistranslations, hybridities, tensions, and conﬂicts that manifest in the contact zones of empires. Cultural Imperialism The process whereby ideas, beliefs, and practices of certain groups come to dominate and thus subordinate the norms of others. It is commonly associated with colonialism and the domination of indigenous peoples by settlers and colonizers with different cultural backgrounds. It is also associated with the colonization of cultures by cultural products emanating from global media. Domain This term is used by Donald Meinig to refer to the core territory of an empire. Such a territory will beneﬁt from its relations with various (colonial) peripheries and will have a coherent landscape, culture, politics, and economy, most likely characterized by a relatively high density and with the core functions of the empire and its economy. Thus, for much of the period 1870–1970, Meinig identiﬁes the US Manufacturing Belt as the US ‘domain’. Curiously, in this case, Canadian

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geographers regard the manufacturing complexes in southern Ontario and Quebec as extensions of the US Manufacturing Belt, a ﬁnding that conﬁrms the economic domination of the North American space economy by US interests. Enclave A territory lying within a state that does not fall within its jurisdiction. Free cities, and free ports with special treaty rights and tariff regulations, are good examples. The term is also used to name complex localities within a city that have a separate identity and an identiﬁable zone of activities, such as a ghetto. Formal and Informal Empire Politically empires expand through various means so that only some territories and peoples are directly governed by imperial authorities as parts of a formal empire. Other territories and peoples may be colonized through various forms of informal empire, including, for example, treaties that establish special rights and limit sovereign power, treaties offering protection and the secondment of military forces giving de facto military occupation, declarations of spheres of inﬂuence, or direct intervention in the administration of state ﬁnances, notably after states get into ﬁnancial difﬁculties and are unable to pay back loans. Note that formal empire status need not entail direct rule in all matters from the metropolitan capital. This could be compromised by the election of a settler government or by recognition of a local government or traditional authorities. Hegemony The domination of one group over another through ideological rather than military means. Here the power to control arises out of the acquiescence of citizens when they accept and reinforce their subordinate status through taken-for-granted practices of everyday life. Imperialism This term refers to the power relations involved when one group of people occupies the territory of another, subjugating its people. Imperialism implies the existence and perpetuation of an empire and its colonies. It also implies a culture and ideology of empire that transcends the borders of any given territory within the empire. As a term ‘imperialism’ arose out of Marxist critiques of the economic relationships between corporations, states, and trade and out of Marxist theorization of the reasons for clashes between empires under capitalism. Internal Colony Since colonialism usually implies a subordinate territory geographically separate from the ‘home’ territory of the ruling power, the idea of an internal colony extends the sphere over which the practices of

Imperialistic Geographies colonialism can be exercised to include territories and peoples that are somehow internal to the nation-state or the core territory of the imperial power. Thus, by the late nineteenth century Ireland could be regarded as an internal colony of England, lying as it did within the core territories of the United Kingdom. Similarly, Indian reservations remain internal colonies of the United States. Locale A setting or context for social interaction. Organizations and institutions commonly create and occupy deﬁned locales of operation: the ofﬁce for bureaucracies; the classroom or lecture theater for educators; the football ﬁeld for football matches; the shop for retailers; the factory work room for manufacturers; the house as residence. Such physical settings for activities are usually carefully designed to facilitate typical interactions and thus to make irregular behavior identiﬁable and to encourage self-policing. Locales may, for example, be highly gendered, as with speciﬁc work rooms within the factory. When situated in close proximity, several distinct locales may constitute a locality – such as the ofﬁce district, school, stadium, retail district, factory, or suburb – which may or may not comprise a neat and orderly ensemble of related activities. Neocolonialism New forms of colonialism in which a formally independent state is nevertheless subject to domination and exploitation by a foreign nation. Unequal terms of trade, indebtedness, forms of administrative or ﬁnancial control, reliance on outside experts, and domination of the economy by transnational corporations all play roles in neocolonialism. Key institutions in neocolonial relations include the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Often neocolonialism builds upon legacies of former periods of colonialism. Treaty Port Many ports, for example, Hamburg today, operate under special treaties that facilitate their operations by compromising national government control of the port or part of it. Often the port authorities operate under special tax, customs, or company registration laws that beneﬁt foreign traders. The classic examples are the Chinese ports opened to foreign traders and ofﬁcials through the ‘unequal treaties’ signed between aggressive foreign powers and China. Under these arrangements, foreign nationals were entitled to live and work in enclaves within the port city administered by local authorities appointed by foreign powers. There they were subject to local administration but were immune from Chinese law.

Introduction Historical geographers are engaged in critical geographical enquiries into the bounds of empire. At the very heart of empire and imperialism lies the power to dominate people

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and territory, so the effort to map and remap the historical and geographical forms of imperialism and their effects remains central to any understanding of patterns of dom ination, terror, enslavement, and resistance, even in the early twenty ﬁrst century. It is crucial to an understanding of the modes and spaces of liberation and encounter that are bound up with imperialisms. In recent decades the historical geography of imperialism and empire has often been an explicitly postcolonial endeavor but even in the past it has often been critical rather than celebratory or apologist. Historical geographers’ accounts of colonial encounter de velop understanding of empire and colonialism as complex lived geographical regimes, with colonial authority and the relations between colonizer and colonized often ambigu ously muddled by diverse views about difference, su periority, belonging, and identity. Establishing the bounds of empire is notoriously dif ﬁcult. It is deceptive to think of any empire as coincident with an easily identiﬁable territorial unit. The territories that ofﬁcially comprise an empire are diverse, ranging from metropolitan center and domain, iconic symbolic sites and military compounds, to all manner of peripheral entities: internal colonies, self governing dominions or protectorates, jointly administered territories, enclaves, chiefdoms, and principalities where unequal treaties secure special rights, to ships and aircraft, or the communications equipment atop rocky islets or orbiting satellite stations. Cultures of imperialism extend well beyond borders yet link identities and lives to imperial projects, whether in support, opposition, or some am bivalent accommodation. They do so through the cultural imperialism associated with trade, media, mission, and scientiﬁc exploration. Empire is buttressed by geo graphical imaginaries that ﬂy far and wide. News reports and editorials build empire. Hymns, novels, and cere mony can supply its atmosphere and generate a frame work for identiﬁcation. Images of all kinds portray it, including imaginaries of others who are sometimes not even inside empire but are encountered through it, and imaginaries of the imperialists composed by those sub jected to or outside their dominion. Behind these discursive modes of colonization and promotion lurk brutal and material power relations. Crossing the bounds of empire can be lethal since they are stalked by terror and violence. The locales of empire are constituted not only by modes of domination, hegemony, enslavement, conquest, appropriation, and alienation, but also by cooperation and collaboration as people try to access power. Imperialists project power through violence and the threat of violence, often, but not always, sanctioned by the state. However, even military and police action, survey, regulations, and im prisonment can be opposed through dissidence, ﬂight, reform, resistance, rebellion, and revolt. Empires wax and empires wane. There were premodern empires and

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non European empires and there have been develop ments in the technologies of empire. Empire did not begin with the expansion of Europe overseas but it is the 500 years of European expansion abroad that has been most closely related to historical geographic research. Ofﬁcially, the ‘age of European empires’ ended in the mid twentieth century but imperialism continued on under the Cold War’s Pax Americana and now under new names including globalization and neocolonialism. In all of these ways the bounds of empire are complex and difﬁcult entities.

Approaches Historical geographers have written about the geographies created by imperialism and colonialism by using many different research frames at many different scales. Writing of the eighteenth century Atlantic world, Miles Ogborn sketches three such geographical approaches: survey, net work, and trace. Where surveys offer synoptic overviews by drawing places together for comparative and connective purpose (Figure 1), work on networks emphasizes the changing webs of relations and material connections be tween people, places, and objects (Figure 2). Alternatively, by tracing individual journeys and life journeys historical geographers may capture not only moments of movement,

but also the character of encounter and negotiation with their residual effects (Box 1). This latter approach em phasises cross cultural negotiation and hybridization, mis understanding, and transformation. Individual traces can be related to time geographies of the everyday experiences of people and their mobility, as well as to the narrative codes and scripts often associated with such personal journeys. Yet, other work focuses attention on contact zones in which the forces and structural properties of imperialism can be apprehended through the contact between people (Fig ure 3). Other work concentrates on the analysis of the texts and images used to construct imperialism, its imaginaries, and the species, race, gender, and class identities associated with it (Figure 4). Thus historical geographers analyze, among other texts, the geography books of Victorian high schools, the scientiﬁc publishing of geographical societies, travel writing, industrialists’ advertisements and exhibitions, and commercial atlases to sharpen understanding of the geographical imaginaries, discourses, and identities of past empires. The approaches outlined here may appear as distinct and incompatible, but historical geographers are aware that combinations and comparisons are crucial if their work is to amount to something more than a series of probes. In what follows, the spaces, texts, and technologies of empire that are foci for research have been surveyed brieﬂy. Donald Meinig’s critical survey of the historical geography of the

Figure 1 Survey: American Empire 1867 1919. The ‘bounds’ of the US Empire can be surveyed but only by using a variety of different classes of territories and nodes differentiated by the type of American power inscribed in them. This map surveys forms of political domination exercised from Washington DC from 1867 to 1919. It emphasizes the expansion of the US by military action and purchase from other imperial powers, as well as the policing of internal colonies. Arguably, a survey of New York’s economic domination through the ‘dollar imperialism’ practiced before and after World War I would reveal a much wider and rather different geography of domination, including cultural domination of the world’s ﬁlm screens, direct ﬁnancial administration of the Dominican Republic, and corporate domination of Columbia, the ﬁrst ‘banana republic’, and of Canada, the ﬁrst ‘branch plant economy’, through foreign direct investment. Source: Adapted from various ﬁgures in Meinig, D. (1988 2004). The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History. New Haven: Yale University Press.

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Figure 2 Network: Buyer’s address book (1899). McPherson bought linen and damask products for the Toronto department store of T. Eaton and Company. His annual buying trips took him to suppliers in Europe and the US, as he developed an extensive network of suppliers; nevertheless, imperial ties dominated McPherson’s commercial network. The patriarch of his ﬁrm was Scots-Irish and Presbyterian and gained his early training, experience, and capital in Antrim, Ireland. Eaton and McPherson sought Continental producers to supply damask (silk) products and other fancy goods, while sourcing toweling and linen from factories in Manchester, Lowland Scotland, and Belfast. UK suppliers had advantages in the trade because of ‘Empire loyalism’ in Canada, the scale of the market established through Empire, restrictions on the production and export of textiles in India, and the cultures of the commercial infrastructure of the imperial linen trade. Source: Eaton’s Collection, Ontario Provincial Archives, Toronto, Canada; Photo Winder, G. (2006). Webs of enterprise 1850 1914: Applying a broad deﬁnition of FDI. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 96(4), 788 806.

United States has developed the survey as an approach to imperialism. Other historical geographers have sought to provincialize Europe, to understand the experiences of those who have been colonized, to understand the historical economies of imperialism, and to understand the spaces of imperial heritage in terms of memory and amnesia. His torical geographers research many spaces of empire and in challenging and critical ways.

Surveying the Spaces of American Imperialism Donald Meinig’s four volume historical geography The shaping of America may serve as an entry point to historical

geographical research into the spaces of imperialism. The historical spaces of the US as nation state can only be interpreted through the lenses of imperialistic geog raphies and by working at nested scales from districts within the contiguous states, through regions within the continent, to the Americas as a whole, and to the world scale. As a nation state, the US was forged from terri tories that were once colonies of Spain, Mexico, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Russia, or England. The Revolutionary War grew out of smuggling and contra band, and constituted national identities in both the US and Canada through rebellion against and loyalty to the British Crown. A breakaway settler colonialism took hold in the newly independent Thirteen Colonies which morphed into an imperialist project of its own, one

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Box 1 Trace: The New Zealand Native Team tours the United Kingdom 1888–1889 The New Zealand Native football representatives undertook a 14-month long, 107-match tour. The team was dogged by controversy, treated as something of a circus, and purposely forgotten by New Zealand rugby authorities. Independent entrepreneurs conceived this as a money-making proposition. They knew that ‘natives’ were exotic in the UK, that a tour could be a commercial success, and that the standard of UK rugby was not that high. They selected a team of semiprofessional players, only a few of whom were fully ‘Maori’ or even experienced rugby players. They settled for the name ‘New Zealand Native Team’ when the New Zealand rugby unions objected to the use of ‘Maori’. Their team ran headlong into tensions between the conservative forces of gentlemanly amateurism and working-class pragmatism that subsequently sundered English rugby as 150 northern clubs broke away to form Rugby League. On tour the Native Team were charged with lack of professionalism, unsporting conduct, drunkenness, and not being Maori enough. Crucially, the image of the colonists was at stake, since any poor showing by a purely Maori team could be dismissed as not reﬂecting the standards of the colony. In the UK the team was treated as a colonial team: there were to be no excuses. The tour, when treated as trace, highlights the renegotiation of national, ethnic, and class identities in key locales of the British Empire: the playing ﬁelds of elite schools and clubs. The Native Team’s enviable record also reveals the complexities of center periphery relations: UK rugby really was not that good compared with colonial rugby. The tour also reminds us that some contemporary patterns of international sporting encounters update identities and relations established through the transnational projects of imperial sport. Sources: Lewis, N. and Winder, G.M. (2007). Sporting narratives and globalisation: Making links between the All Black tours of 1905 and 2005. New Zealand Geographer 63(3), 202 215; Ryan, G. (1993). Forerunners of the All Blacks: The 1888 89 New Zealand Native Football Team in Britain, Australia and New Zealand. Christchurch: Canterbury University Press.

emulated by Ottawa. The acquisition and management of internal colonies became Washington’s mode of imperi alism and state formation. Peoples in North America experienced imperialist campaigns of violence as First Nations were subjugated, Mexican and Canadian neigh bours were attacked, and the US imperial project temporarily dissolved into civil war. Out of disparate experiences of American imperialism emerged new na tional, regional, class, gender, and ethnic identities. Meinig maps a diverse and fragmented human world coerced through speciﬁc imperial projects, many of which were cast as formative of the nation. Meinig surveys the emerging internal geography of the United States with its capitals, core, domain, colonies, and peripheral enclaves. Washington DC, the political and military capital, and New York, the ﬁnancial center, net worked the ﬂedgling empire. Compared with analyses of London’s role in the British Empire urban system The

shaping of America only hints at the transnational spaces and circuits of Washington and New York as imperial and commercial centers. For instance, by 1919, ﬁlms made in and distributed from Los Angeles and New York already dominated world cinema screens in a form of cultural imperialism. Similarly, Meinig perhaps downplays the growing assertion of American imperial power abroad. For example, President Theodore Roosevelt staged a spec tacular projection of US naval power by sending the Great White Fleet on a round the world voyage (Figure 5). Meinig turns instead to the edges of the US Empire: to the border regions with Canada and Mexico, the states of the Caribbean dominated by American military and com mercial interventions; and the contact zones of cattle ranching, for instance. Washington DC worked to control other parts of North America, and later parts of Latin America, Oceania, and Southeast Asia. In these ways Meinig surveys the formation of the United States as national entity as a narrative inseparable from aspects of the historical geography of the United States as empire (Figure 1).

Provincializing Europe Historical geographers’ tactics of critical enquiry include provincializing Europe: that is, de centering the metro politan centers from the focus of enquiry and breaking up Europe as a category. This is partly done in an effort to critique and step beyond the global imaginaries of imperialisms, with their picturing of the world as for mulated and exhibited in European capitals. It also leads to study of the effects of Empire on Europe. Europeans imposed identities and relations on the rest of the world through discourses about civilization, race, and environment, and developed their own self identity through this mirror. In these ways experience of empire remade Europe yet, intriguingly, much of Europe was subject to imperial rule, and all of it was transformed by it. Europe is the product of conquest, colonization, and attendant cultural transformation. Historical geographers are beginning to provincialize other imperial hegemons – The shaping of America is a step in that direction – but this strategy can best be illustrated with Europe in mind. Historical geographers acknowledge that Europe was in large part made overseas. Colonial categories and discourses helped to frame politics within Europe. The campaign for home rule for Ireland with its related terror incident of the Phoenix Park murders is but one such manifestation. Indeed, the question of Irish nationalism was constitutive of identity politics, migration, labor strife, and as an international phenomenon associated with the Irish diaspora. British politics is hardly under standable without reference to issues of empire and the communications and relations with the colonies.

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Figure 3 Contact zone: Vancouver’s ‘Chinatown’. A Chinese-origin community emerged in Vancouver, Canada, in the ﬁrst decades of the twentieth century. Kay Anderson argues that the ‘Chinatown’ most Vancouver Chinese occupied was not only a marginal territory from which to launch contested claims to Canadian life but also a racial category constructed by and for European Canadians that was used to deﬁne and disempower Chinese in the city. The enclave was overwhelmingly home to men, because of Canada’s restrictive immigration laws. These boarding house residents found seasonal work in the city’s timber mills and canneries or worked in tailoring and laundry ﬁrms, or as cooks, cleaners, pedlars, brick workers, or market gardeners. The enclave was a platform for Chinese businesses (over 230 in 1911) ranging from diversiﬁed merchant enterprises through rice millers, silk retailers and labor contractors, to lodging house owners. Although Chinese owned much of the land in this district, ‘Chinatown’ was above all a racial category imposed from outside. Politicians, police, inspectors, and reformers deﬁned the enclave as an ‘unsanitary sink’ and a ‘nest of vice’. City ofﬁcials strove to conﬁne Chinese laundries to ‘Chinatown’, to extinguish licenses to Chinese enterprises, to clear away dwellings under sanitation regulations, to segregate schools, and to apprehend ‘gamblers’ and ‘opium traders’ in police raids. Residents fought these intrusions with court action and disrupted the imaginaries forced upon them. This immigrant enclave was a contact zone dominated by the racial stereotypes of Europe and China that framed Vancouver City politics at the time. Source: Adapted from Anderson, K. (1991). Vancouver’s Chinatown: Racial Discourse in Canada, 1875 1980. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, Maps 2 and 3; and McDonald, R. A. J. (1996). Making Vancouver, 1863 1913. Vancouver: UBC Press, Map 7.1.

European politics were framed by imperialism in terms of colonial crises, imperial scandals, moral campaigns against slavery or for imperial expansion, and debates over the costs of empire. Interactions with other cultures and environments remade European culture both in media and on the ground. European literature developed tropes and ima ginaries of the world drawn out of imperial desires. The European imaginary of the South Seas islands was formed through imperialism and its narrative tropes continue to frame inquiries into and reactions to small and distant islands. Other imperial imaginaries – Africa as a ‘dark continent’, the Middle East as an Oriental other, the Tropics, a transformative ‘passage to India’ – haunt our ways of thinking about the world. At the level of everyday words, Europe’s engagement with empire en tailed a reconstitution of language. Travel writer Jan Morris identiﬁes ‘far ﬂung’, ‘posh’, ‘sea route’, ‘sea port’, and ‘The Lifeline of Empire’ (soubriquet for the Suez Canal), not to mention ‘bungalow’ or ‘veranda’ as terms

conjured up through experience to express geographical aspects of British Empire. By exhibiting exotic others in museums, galleries, lecture halls, and trade shows, Europeans suffused their own cultures with ideas, nar ratives, and images constructed out of imperialistic re lations and in turn conﬁrmed and directed relations through discourses of domination. On the ground, Europe not only remade environments abroad through 500 years of the export of European plants and animals but was also transformed by the circulation and import of biota from other environments. Botanic and zoological gardens served as key nodes in the redistri bution of plants and animals. European ideas were them selves transformed through encounter with the New World. Indeed, both the Enlightenment and Darwin’s Theory of Evolution were charged by exploration of the New World. Historical geographers survey the circulation of ideas and the production of knowledge in Europe. European geographers themselves have played knowing roles in imperialisms through the geographical

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Figure 4 Geographic imaginary of Empire. Imperialist geographical imaginaries were often adopted by companies for advertising purposes, whether they sold at home or abroad. In this lithograph cover illustration on the McCormick Harvesting Machine Company catalog for 1889, the artist shows a Persian horseman looking down upon a caravan of farm machinery with the caption ‘Seeking New Fields to Conquer’. Here McCormick advertised machinery to American farmers by wrapping its products in the racist imagery of a peaceful, civilized conquest of backward, foreign lands. Even though he dominates the scene, the ‘traditional’ Persian warrior’s position is perilous: he is outﬂanked, his riﬂe useless against this peaceful, modern invading column. McCormick’s products, a civilizing force made in Chicago, advance unopposed into the heart of this imagined foreign land. There their work will be revolutionary, ‘freeing’ peasants from labor, ushering in an age of plenty for some independent, modern farmers. McCormick’s reaper is thus portrayed as provident but destined to sweep aside entire ways of life. Such an imaginary bolstered the self-image of American farmers as propertied, productive, and modern, the very backbone of an independent, civilized, and prosperous United States. Sources: Seeking New Fields to Conquer, in McCormick Harvesting Machine Co., 1889, McCormick 1889, McCormick Harvesting Machine Company Papers, Advertising leaﬂets and brochures (printed), McC Mss 5X, Box 3, McCormick Collection, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, Image ID: 4412. See also Winder, G. (2007). A trans-national machine on the world stage: Representing McCormick’s Reaper through world’s fairs, 1851 1902. Journal of Historical Geography 33, 352 376.

knowledge we have generated (Box 2). This is a matter of continuing enquiry among historical geographers as we seek to further provincialize Europe by acknowledging and understanding the ways in which past geographic practices formed knowledge of the world and aided

imperial projects. These range from the exploratory ex peditions of members of geographical societies, through geographers as cartographers and compilers of infor mation on other regions for military and spy agencies, to science used to justify and extend imperial missions and ideas. Particular attention has been paid to land sur veying, cartography, landscape painting, description and analysis, and climate science as practices framing and enabling imperial projects. Shifts in rhetoric are traced, for example, from biological to cultural racism. In these cases the geographical discourses published by geog raphers performed the work of empire. We also acknowledge that Europe was not a cohesive entity. New regional geographies of growth, transforma tion, and connectivity were generated as some regions within Europe gained more than others from coloniza tion of overseas empires, and different regions were engaged in different ways with Empire. Some parts of Europe (like Ireland) became regions of persistent out migration. Soldier recruitment dominated parts of Scot land, Brunswick, or Kassel, while industrial production for export stimulated developments in Birmingham, Glasgow, and Manchester. Some cities ﬂourished as metropolitan commercial centers, ports, and ﬁnancial hubs, but rural areas like Hesse, Lincolnshire, or rural Denmark, struggled to compete with colonial producers of grain, wool, meat, dairy products, timber, or precious metals. Generally western and northern coastal regions of Europe boomed but there was an intricate internal geography of growth, urbanization, and regional decline associated with European imperialism. Historical geographers devote attention to outposts of empire, their networks, their function as contact zones, and their inﬂuence back on the metropolitan centers. An archipelago of forts, naval bases, telegraph stations, post ofﬁces, hill stations, work camps, plantations, missions, consular and diplomatic ofﬁces, enclaves, and treaty ports grounded imperial projects. These constituted crucial contact points between imperial agents and indigenous peoples. By analyzing the framings of indigenous others, as well as those of their own identities, made and shared by explorers, missionaries, settlers, and other imperial agents, historical geographers demonstrate that the pol itical, journalistic, scientiﬁc, and religious texts ﬂying back to imperial centers from the diverse agents located in imperial outposts worked to reform imperial policy.

Experiences of the Colonized Recovering the experiences of the colonized remains a major problem for historical geographies of imperialism. Colonizers and colonized were all infected (colonized) by imperial practices, discourses, effects, power relations, and oppositions, as well as collaborations. In rebellion

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Figure 5 Geopolitics: The cruise of the US’ Great White Fleet 1907 08. Brainchild of President Roosevelt, who sought to project US power and prestige abroad, this 14-month round the world cruise of 16 US battleships, their escorts, and 14 000-strong crew, was a promotional coup. Roosevelt had two principal strategic objectives. With the Japanese Navy newly dominant in the Paciﬁc following the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, Roosevelt planned to demonstrate US naval power in the Paciﬁc and thus pave the way for a treaty to curb Japanese imperial expansion. The Root-Takahira Agreement followed hard on the heels of the returning ﬂeet and secured mutual Japanese and US respect for each others’ territories, for China’s independence and territorial integrity, and for the established ‘Open Door’ policy in China. Roosevelt also sought to increase the prestige and popularity of the navy at home as he fought for appropriations to pay for four more battleships. Pitched as a successful good-will mission, the cruise revealed a fatal dependence of the US Navy in any effort it might make to project its military power around the globe: it would have to rely on foreign coaling stations. Source: http:// www.history.navy.mil/library/online/gwf cruise.htm.

Box 2 In Russian and French prisons Among past geographers it is perhaps Prince Peter Kropotkin who held the most problematic relation to empire. Having renounced his estates, title, and allegiance to the Russian Tsar following his service in a Cossack regiment, Kropotkin used one hand to print books and articles promoting cooperation, mutualism, and the alleviation of poverty in the names of ﬁrst nihilism, then anarchism, while the other hand published encouragement to those anarchists seeking to overthrow tyrants by throwing bombs. In Russian and French prisons, penned by Kropotkin out of his own experience of imprisonment, might direct our attention to historical geographies of the spatial apparatus of state terror and incarceration, as penal colonies, mental asylums, and concentration camps modernized imperial technologies of domination. Sources: Kropotkin, P. (1887). In Russian and French Prisons. London: Ward and Downey; Kropotkin, P. (1927). Prisons and their moral inﬂuence on prisoners. In Baldwin, R.N. (ed.) Kropotkin’s Revolutionary Pamphlets: A Collection of Writings by Peter Kropotkin, pp 219 235. New York: Dover Publications.

and resistance there was often a coupling of colonial and anticolonial discourses. Some of the colonized mimicked the imperialists. The practices of colonization partially erased other ways of knowing. Historical geographers are keenly aware that hybrid spaces and identities emerged in all parts of empires and beyond. Research focuses on the processes forming and curtailing them and on the interactions associated with them. Many people beneﬁted not only from colonization but from being colonized. They may have been marginal before and could claim power through colonial projects. Colonial governance often required collaboration with local allies, including members of the colonized society. Imperial power was often precarious whether expressed in terms of acquiring territories or holding onto them. How indeed could the puny British military forces in the subcontinent dominate and defeat the much larger ar mies of the Indian princes? As elsewhere the secret lay in collaboration with powerful local allies and not merely in

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superior weaponry. Spanish imperialism produced dra matic impacts in Latin America not just through the draconian laws of the Indies with their regulations to incorporate colonized peoples into pueblos, missions, and forts and thus to control their lives and relations, but through the Spanish settlers who facilitated colonization. Ironically such settlers could not hold administrative ofﬁce in the colonies, and this facet of the imperial structure itself fostered rebellion and the sweeping in dependence wars of 1830. European power was spread thinly and aided and abetted by many settlers and non Europeans. Historical geographers investigate resistance to im perialism in all its many forms, from disrupting the survey pegs and parties, through peaceful protests and various forms of ﬂight, to revolt, revolution, and terror campaigns, and to the envisioning of utopian communities. Under standing and evaluating these often spatial tactics and strategies of opposition remains a challenging task. Historical geographies of the Toheroa Wars, a century of conﬂict over shellﬁsh, reveal the New Zealand foreshore as a cultural and political area in which Maori continue to struggle with the buried epistemologies of domination set in place in the colonial past. In another context, the proponents of Irish republicanism have been shown to have mobilized in networks that crisscrossed the Atlantic and featured many of the spatial practices reminiscent of Cold War liberation struggles: fund raising overseas, arms deals, armed struggle, terror campaigns, and espionage. Revolutionary war was a spasmodic feature of ongoing Irish resistance to British imperialism. Other practices earned English names inspired from Irish experience: boycott and moonlighting. A micro politics of cultural afﬁliation to the spaces of recreation and sports charac terized the struggle and, as in other countries, has left a legacy of conﬂict on the ground in place names, rituals, and segregated spaces. Historical geographers develop a lexicon of the spatial tactics of resistance to imperialism. Even under direct imperial control, local and in digenous practices and regulations continued in the face of imperial reform campaigns and efforts to impose new regulations. Collaboration led to hybrid and local regu latory frames and to the persistence or perhaps modern ization of existing practices and spaces. The Treaty of Waitangi signed by British representatives and Maori chiefs in 1840 made New Zealand part of the British Empire but also guaranteed customary practices, in cluding resource rights, to chiefs. New Zealand’s sub sequent history is marked to this day by settler efforts to extinguish Maori rights and of Maori to reassert them. By the mid nineteenth century the British Empire featured multiple places, identities, practices, and discourses of prostitution, an array at variance with and often beyond the control of metropolitan discourses against prostitution. Authorities in India modernized the spaces of prostitution

by placing brothels in compounds under direct police surveillance. In other jurisdictions British administrators launched raids on brothels in order to police them. The activities of prostitutes, the soldiers, and sailors of the British Army and Royal Navy, and the campaigns of British and colonial reformers shaped a changing geog raphy of locales for prostitution around the Empire. Similarly Britain’s parliament declared slavery illegal everywhere in the Empire, but authorities in some col onies, like the Sudan, had neither the resources to eradi cate slavery nor the interest: it would simply make labor relations and expenses impossible. Race categories were often used, along with gender and class, to establish varied regulatory regimes and norms of behavior. An extreme case is the formation of segregated spaces and identities in South Africa, elaborated to its fullest extent under apart heid, but similar practices were deployed in other cir cumstances such as in the delineation of Chinatowns (Figure 3) or Indian reserves in Canada. The spatial and discursive practices of such racially based exclusions have been a focus of historical geographic research. The spaces of women’s lives were deeply shaped by imperialisms. Historically, imperialisms have framed women within patriarchal relations so the transformative power of encounter, imperialist desires, and the new spaces of expanding empires offered only limited op portunities for women’s agency. In some parts of empire, especially ones where gender ratios were highly skewed, women gained measures of independence and wealth as proprietors of boarding houses, taverns, and other es tablishments. Empire offered opportunities for some women to travel and thus for travel writing and other modes of expression within the circuits of imperial representation, but few women gained independence through travel from patterns of domination in patriarchal societies. Nevertheless, these are matters of renewed enquiry. Historical geographers have turned to the con cept of contact zones as we try to elucidate the ways in which women were constituted through interaction and co presence with others, rather than through separation. Thus the diaries of the Vicereine of India, Lady Curzon, reveal her frustration with a daily routine of conﬁne ments and public performances but also her contact with an array of people in diverse settings. Churches might also serve as interethnic contact zones, where middle class women evangelized immigrant Chinese men as they learned English in Sunday school rooms. The cultural dynamics of such contact zones are not straightforward. The experiences of women under empire were varied and hybrid as were the spaces of empires. Historically, many societies were subject to imperial power but not as formal colonies. Instead they may have experienced imperialism through occasional military incursions, or unequal treaties that promised protection, ﬂags of convenience for trade, or technical advice.

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European colonization was often only a passing phase for many peoples and territories. Neither Egyptian nor British imperialists were able to control the territory delineated on maps called the Sudan. At any time be tween 1850 and 1950 parts of that territory and its peo ples lay outside their administrative control. The core of the Ottoman Empire avoided European rule but its vast empire was broken up by European imperialists. The coming of the Europeans was not always a transcendental event, but was often cast as such by European imperialists who sought to substantiate claims to European su periority. In such territories, European imperialism found limited expression: usually as enclaves of European housing and business. For some, it was Japanese or American imperialism, or the aggressive interventions of sub imperialists like New Zealand, Argentina, or the Zulu that proved to have the most impact. Imperialisms set in train forced migration, resettlement, and increased mobility, forces that worked to build trans national networks, sometimes through diasporic com munity formation, and to spread their related landscape features. Thus, hybrid work gangs ﬂoated on the Atlantic Ocean and washed ashore at ports featuring taverns, sea men’s missions, and union halls. Singapore’s shop houses and camps featured as locales in one prominent node in the transnational movement of Chinese to Paciﬁc Ocean port cities and their Chinatowns. Relations in Singapore, San Francisco, and Victoria, or in Saint John, Boston, and New York, were made more interesting through the arrivals of multiple others mobilized through the agencies of im perialism and not simply the presence of colonizers. They also made possible new identities and networks within empire. Some colonized subjects acted as factors and agents in imperial trade, others as administrators, soldiers, ex hibits, or servants. Intermarriage and a diverse array of sexualized relations formed households that did not con form to discourses of the norm circulated through metro politan centers. They created speciﬁc social strata and mixed identities, for example, as Mestizos and Mulattos in Latin American contexts, Coloureds in South Africa, Me´tis in Western Canada, or Pa¯keha Maori in New Zealand. The big houses of Montreal’s Protestant Anglo elite might contain an ageing patriarch, his younger wife and offspring, and numerous, especially female and Catholic servants whether of Irish or French Canadian ethnicity. The lived terrain of identity was marked almost everywhere and at every scale by increased migration and mobility. In this context, ‘nation’ is a subsequent category to ‘empire’ and is often formed out of the peculiar cir cumstances of empire. Independent minded neo Britons and new Spaniards claimed to be progressive and thus justiﬁed the formation of new ‘nations’ out of colonial settlement. Whether we think of Serbs subjugated by the Austro Hungarian Empire or Indians colonized by the British, ethnic groups seized upon ethnic nationalism as a

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counter to the imperialisms of others. Often the nation states that emerged out of experiences of imperialism were fraught affairs. In Singapore, national identity is produced around conceptions of a multiethnic state and the dominance of Singaporeans of Chinese ethnicity. India’s independence produced four nation states and other nationalist movements including those of Sikhs and Tamils whose dreams have not been fulﬁlled. Nation states, legitimized by the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919, have fractured existing empires and produced new imperialisms of their own.

Ecological Imperialism The relations between imperialism, environmental change, and conservation are complex. Work in historical geography has been stimulated by Alfred Crosby’s use of the term ecological imperialism to draw attention to the increased trade and transfer of animals, plants, and dis eases through European imperialism and mercantilism, and their devastating ecological impacts. The recent work of environmental historian, Robert Grove has highlighted the growing ecological awareness of imperi alists, especially those who encountered environmental catastrophes in their experience of encounters with small island ecosystems. Historical geographers have turned their attention to the constructions used by scientists, explorers, and others to frame and understand other environments. Two focal points for this mode of research are tropicality and insularity, which emerged historically as forms of landscape Orientalism, in both cases heavily inﬂected by gendered associations with a female nature awaiting discovery and encounter. Historical geographers have launched enquiries into the networks of imperial science dedicated to environmental transformation. For example, a team of researchers is currently mapping historical geographies of the imperial networks behind the intensiﬁcation of production on New Zealand’s grasslands. The contradictory intentions and results of wildlife conservation, notably in the national parks sys tems of African countries, have been the subject of other research. In each case the researchers seek to understand the interplay of imperial and local forces and resistances around imperial projects, as well as the ecological and social impacts of these imperial technologies of en vironmental management. Historical geographers write environmental histories of land alienation, resource ex traction, development, modernization, and their attend ant impacts, social injustices, crises, and catastrophes.

Historical Economies of Imperialism The relations between the commercial world and empire are also important to imperialistic geographies. Although

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most historical geographies of economy have been efforts to establish or critique narratives of national economic progress, modernization, and development, the growth and changing geography of world trade, telecommuni cations systems, and transnational corporations have been sketched in synoptic terms. Particular attention has been paid to surveying and tracing aspects of the eighteenth century world economy. Other research conﬁrms ﬁndings from business history that hybrid organisation – cartels, joint ventures, strategic alliances, arrangements with compradors and indigenous entrepreneurs, networks of merchants or licensed producers, regional business groups – ﬂourished in the historical spaces and interstices of empires in the second half of the nineteenth century (Figure 2). Less attention has been paid to the systematic destruction of indigenous economies by imperialists, in the contexts of indigenous incorporation into European dominated resource extraction economies during early phases of colonization, as in Canada or New Zealand. Even less attention has been directed to the destruction of competitive economies by imperialists. Indeed non European economies and commercial networks seldom feature and the networks and traces of smuggling, piracy and illicit production, and trade are underdeveloped within historical geography, as they are within economic geography. Historical geographers take a long term view and seek to compare and contrast contemporary modes of inte gration within the world economy with those of former, explicitly imperial, times. In this work it is crucial to establish the historical and geographic links between commercial activity and political and military power, if we are to understand the roots of the unequal trading relations under contemporary globalization. Thus, the origins and life of the Manchester free trade doctrine have been sketched within economic geography, but the main accounts of protectionist and market regulations remain those of economic history. Neil Smith argues that, under a rhetoric of ‘imperialism without colonies’, Washington copied existing and developed new forms of domination after 1918, especially in the realms of com mercial and ﬁnancial relations, in order to extend its imperial inﬂuence while circumscribing the power of other imperialist powers. Economic geographers have rejoined old debates over how best to frame imperialism in economic terms. It has long been thought that Lenin’s theory of imperialism as interimperialist commercial and territorial competition lacked relevance in the post colonial, Cold War world. Attention is now redirected to Kautsky’s conception of ultra imperialism, marked by cooperation among leading powers to govern the per iphery. Economic geographers point to the emergence of a phantom state of transnational governance in production, ﬁnance, and other services, and regulatory structures such as the International Monetary Fund,

World Bank, and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Historical economic geographies of empire need to pay more attention to the historical crises of empires and their economic impacts, and to the commercial practices of empires, including the cultures and identities of economic agents.

Empire as Heritage: Remembering and Forgetting Historical geographers share a focus on interpreting the landscapes of both precolonial and colonial times. It is a mistake to think of imperialism as an annihilating and overwhelming force in all circumstances. Erasure was possible in some places but precolonial landscapes persist in many other places, and palimpsests emerge through the remaking of landscapes. Empires are remembered, erased, and forgotten. For travel writer Jan Morris most of us remember [the British Empire] less vividly now as a political organism than as a sort of gigantic exhibition. We have forgotten its statistics, even its ex tent, but we can see the theatre of it still. (Jan Morris)

Empires and their others create and are constituted through monuments and commemorative spaces. Indeed the rituals associated with such memorials continue to be used to shape public behavior. Sites of memorial can be turned to new purposes, protested, or forgotten. Korean symbolic space was remade during and after Japanese imperial rule. One former Japanese prime minister proved highly controversial because of his politically charged visits to Japanese war graves. By replicating or not the imagery of empire, including its heroes and heroines in place names, monuments, chapels, and signs – like those commemorating Queen Victoria or nurse Edith Cavell – colonial subjects embraced or abandoned imperial discourses of morality, belonging, and identity (Figure 6). Not all geographical imaginaries of empire were made in the center and circulated outward. Thus the Anchor Butter brand was made in New Zealand and exported to the UK as an icon of the ties that bind the far ﬂung British Empire. Nor are the memorials always sited within imperial territory. Allied war graves and the rituals associated with them are spread around the globe thanks to two world wars. However, the politics of im perial heritage are necessarily tied up with the historical geographies of imperialism.

Critical Review: Historical Geographies of Imperialisms Historical geographies of imperialism emphasize the complexity of imperialism in space. By exploring colonial

Imperialistic Geographies

encounters, recent research reveals imperialism as a complex lived event and colonial authority as ambiguous. Diverse views about difference, superiority, belonging, and identity complicated encounters and relations among people. By increasing mobility and migration, and thus throwing peoples together in new ways, imperialisms developed hybrid identities, contested spaces, and net work connectivity. Imperial projects generated new

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locales inscribed as expressions of power and domination but often these formed within localities where imperial authorities competed with other forms of governance so that their power was negotiated and challenged. Even the racist and sexist representations that imagined and sus tained empires were themselves resisted and reworked, whether in the metropolitan centers or the imperial peripheries. By researching the contact zones, networks,

Figure 6 Ambiguous imperial memorial. This statue of Sir George Grey, successively British Governor General of South Australia, New Zealand, Natal, and New Zealand, was originally erected outside Auckland’s Town Hall in the city’s main commercial avenue, Queen Street. Grey turned to colonial politics and became a lightning rod for radical dissent against the policies of powerful settler politicians. The widower Grey’s domestic arrangements became subject to opprobrium as he took up residence on a coastal island with his niece. His statue became the focal point for political demonstrations, including those of trade union activists at the head of a General Strike in the city in 1908. The City Council subsequently declared Grey’s statue a trafﬁc hazard and retired it to a position near the statue of Queen Victoria in sedate Albert Park, a Victorian recreation ground. There, Sir George lost his head in an attack by Maori land activists in the 1990s. Today he has regained his poise but Grey’s association with the Empire remains deeply ambivalent. He was seen at various times as an agent of land alienation and a friend to Maori, as a promoter of Empire, but also colonial self-government and radical settler politics.

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traces, and surveys of imperial encounters historical geographers are remapping the bounds of empire and challenging synoptic views of empires as homogenous territories. Nevertheless, historical geographers wrestle with a problem of introversion: European knowledge tends to be at the center of all enquiries and was itself usually framed within imperial and colonial discourses and practices. If we rely on such data sets then it is difﬁcult to apprehend the activities of the colonized or those who lived outside colonial administration and rule. A postcolonial historical geography of imperialism must confront this problem by researching imperialism from the vantage points offered by alternative texts. This also means that researchers must confront the many legacies of imperialism and its discontents that serve as mental blocks or containers: the nation state as frame of reference; the language of the imperialists; settler guilt and the anger of social and environmental injustice. By developing intersubjectivity as a key aspect of their projects historical geographers hope to further postcolonial research into imperialism. Charting the course, problems, and achievements of al ternatives to empire and imperialism is thus another issue for historical geographies of empire. Attention has increasingly shifted to the discursive modes that constituted empires: to imperialistic geog raphies. This remains a matter of debate in terms of em phasis. While recent attention to travel narratives, spaces of colonial encounter, the exhibition, cartography and exploration of empire, and the geographical imaginaries at play has deepened geographical enquiry there is concern in some quarters that we may be neglecting research into the physical and material forces at work in empires. Any study of imperialism must take power relations seriously. To do so we must pay attention to both the discursive or epistemic violence of colonization, as ﬁrst formulated by Edward Said, and the modes of conquest, appropriation, domination, and alienation that Cole Harris reminds us are at the bloody edge of imperialism. The geographic technologies of dispossession and domination now stock a formidable arsenal: imaginaries and discourses of im perialism, racism, and difference; the roles of European knowledge in domination, including the work of explorers, cartographers, colonial governors, imperial armies, navies, botanical and zoological gardens, settler governments, missionaries, scientiﬁc theories of climate, race, species extinctions, and conservation; the threat of violence and the exercise of bodily domination in many forms from military conquest to state terror. Historical geographers will be stretched if we are to do justice to the spatial practices of imperialism. What is the current name of empire? If historical geographers are to draw out parallels and comparisons with past imperialisms then we must engage with debates over the contemporary faces of imperialism and their

others. Placing the US Empire and its modes of operation in the second half of the twentieth century at the focal point of research must be a priority. Equally, the chan ging technologies of domination must be charted over the long history of imperialisms. The roles of geographers vis a` vis empire remain at issue as both the United Na tions and military and spy agencies demand up to the minute geographical expertise. Arguably, we now witness intensiﬁed colonialisms with perhaps new or reinvented forms of domination, and with revived or new ideologies of imperialism, but we cannot know this without reliable historical geographies of past imperialisms. Without further enquiry into the historical geography of empire, there is a danger that geographers may underestimate the features of classical European imperialism, thinking of it as coloring the world map red, blue, or green. It is equally easy to underestimate the US as empire by reading its projects through the lens of its own rhetoric of an end to colonialism. Caricatures of historical imperialisms will not aid us as we seek to interpret the patterns and implications of the intensifying imperialisms emerging around us. See also: Critical Geography; Diaspora; Feminism/ Feminist Geography; Globalization and Transnational Corporations; Hybridity; Landscape; Orientalism; Utopian Cities.

Further Reading Anderson, K. (1991). Vancouver’s Chinatown: Racial Discourse in Canada, 1875 1980. Montreal and Kingston: McGill Queen’s University Press. Blunt, A. and Rose, G. (eds.) (1994). Writing Women and Space: Colonial and Postcolonial Geographies. New York: Guilford. Clayton, D. (2000). Islands of Truth: The Imperial Fashioning of Vancouver Island. Vancouver: UBC Press. Clayton, D. (2003). Critical imperial and colonial geogreaphies. In Anderson, K., Domosh, M., Pile, S. & Thrift, N. (eds.) Handbook of Cultural Geography, pp 254 367. London: Sage. Connell, J. (2003). Island dreaming: The contemplation of Paciﬁc Paradise. Journal of Historical Geography 29(4), 554 581. Driver, F. and Gilbert, D. (eds.) (1999). Imperial Cities: Landscape, Display and Identity. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Driver, F. and Martins, L. (2006). Tropical Visions in an Age of Empire. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Graham, B. and Nash, C. (eds.) (2000). Modern Historical Geographies. Edinburgh: Pearson Education. Gregory, D. (1994). Geographical Imaginations. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishing. Gregory, D. (2004). The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine and Iraq. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. Harris, R. C. (1997). The Resettlement of British Columbia: Essays on Colonialism and Geographical Change. Vancouver: UBC Press. Harris, R. C. (2004). How did colonialism dispossess? Comments from an edge of empire. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 94(1), 165 182. Kropotkin, P. (1887). In Russian and French Prisons. London: Ward and Downey. Kropotkin, P. (1927). Prisons and their moral inﬂuence on prisoners. In Baldwin, R. N. (ed.) Kropotkin’s Revolutionary Pamphlets: A

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Collection of Writings by Peter Kropotkin, pp 219 235. New York: Dover Publications. Lewis, N. and Winder, G. N. (2007). Sporting narratives and globalization: Making links between the All Black tours of 1905 and 2007. New Zealand Geographer 63(3), 202 215. McDonald, R. A. J. (1996). Making Vancouver, 1863 1913. Vancouver: UBC Press. Meinig, D. (1988 2004). The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History. New Haven: Yale University Press. Mitchell, T. (2002). Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techo politics, modernity. Berkeley: University of California Press. Morris, J. (1982). The Spectacle of Empire: Style, Effect and the Pax Britannica. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company. Ogborn, M. (2005). Atlantic geographies. Social and Cultural Geographies 6(3), 379 385. Pawson, E. and Brooking, T. (eds.) (2002). Environmental Histories of New Zealand. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Proudfoot, L. and Roche, M. (eds.) (2005). (Dis)placing Empire: Renegotiating British Colonial Geographies. Aldershot: Ashgate. Ryan, G. (1993). Forerunners of the All Blacks: The 1888 89 New Zealand Native Football Team in Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. Christchurch: Canterbury University Press.

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Sheppard, E. (2005). Constructing free trade: From Manchester boosterism to global management. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers NS 30, 151 172. Sidaway, J. (2000). Postcolonial geographies: An exploratory essay. Progress in Human Geography 24(4), 591 612. Smith, N. (2005). The Endgame of Globalization. New York: Routledge. Smith, N. and Godlewska, A. (1994). Geography and Empire. Oxford: Blackwell. Winder, G. (2006). Webs of enterprise 1850 1914: Applying a broad deﬁnition of FDI. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 96(4), 788 806. Winder, G. (2007). A trans national machine on the world stage: Representing McCormick’s Reaper through world’s fairs, 1851 1902. Journal of Historical Geography 33, 352 376.

Relevant Websites http://www.history.navy.mil The Cruise of the Great White Fleet, Naval Historical Center.

Indian Ocean S. Chaturvedi, Panjab University, Chandigarh, India & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction With approximately 74 million sq km and roughly 20% of the global ocean, the Indian Ocean is the third largest ocean after the Paciﬁc and the Atlantic (Figure 1). It serves as a natural ‘transit lounge’ for most of the trafﬁc from the At lantic to the Paciﬁc and vice versa. Two key characteristics distinguish the Indian Ocean from the Atlantic and the Paciﬁc. First, only one ﬁfth of the total trade is conducted among the countries of the Indian Ocean themselves. About 80% of the trade is extraregional; for example, crude oil to Europe, the USA, and Japan. In the Atlantic and the Paciﬁc,

the proportion is exactly vice versa. Second, contrary to the Atlantic and the Paciﬁc as ‘open’ oceans, the Indian Ocean can only be accessed through several ‘choke points’: From the West via Cape of Good Hope and the Straits of Madagascar, from the North via the Bab el Mandeb at the end of the Red Sea and the Straits of Hormuz at the exit of the Persian Gulf, from the East via the Straits of Malacca, the Sunda and Lombok Straits, and the Ombai–Wetar Straits (Figure 2). A decision in early 2000 by the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) to delimit a ﬁfth world ocean from the southern portions of the Atlantic

The Indian Ocean Region Indian Ocean Coastal States Landlocked States linked to the IO and Central Asia Landlocked States Jordan Iraq

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Figure 1 The Indian ocean region. Source: Christian, B. (2007). France and United Kingdom as the 37th and 38th Indian Ocean Coastal States. Indian Ocean Survey (A Journal of Indian Ocean Research Group) 3(1&2), 28.

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Sea Lanes of Communication and Choke Points

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Figure 2 Sea lanes of communication and chocke points.

Ocean, Indian Ocean, and the Paciﬁc Ocean, has reduced the surface area of the third largest of the world’s ﬁve oceans (after the Paciﬁc and Atlantic Oceans, but larger than the Southern and Arctic Oceans). The revised area of the Indian Ocean basin is about 68 560 million sq km. It includes the Andaman Sea, Arabian Sea, Arafura Sea, Bay of Bengal, Great Australian Bight, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Mozambique Channel, Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Timor Sea, and Straits of Malacca and Singapore, and other interconnecting tributary water bodies. There are at least ﬁve interrelated reasons why Western observers generally tend to undermine the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). First, since some commentators see the Region as pri marily comprising the Third World states, by association the Region has been accorded a lower level of signiﬁ cance compared with other oceans, especially the Atlantic and the Paciﬁc Oceans. Second, the Northern centric primarily English based system of global know ledge contributes to a generalized level of ignorance about the Region and other regional states. Northern– Western resources are unlikely to support Indian Ocean educational programs when better economic returns are perceived to exist elsewhere. Third, since the Region is a former arena of European colonial competition, to some

degree, residual core–periphery values of social, eco nomic, and political superiority and security dependency continue to prevail. Fourth, there is relative paucity of reliable writing from students of international affairs on the geostrategic importance of the IOR. Finally, the geopolitical orientation of many Indian Ocean regional states has tended to be away from the Ocean and has been directed internally or toward states and regions of perceived greater geoeconomic signiﬁcance.

Mapping the ‘Indian Ocean’: Histories, Categories, and Connections A rather strict and static delimitation of the Indian Ocean (such as the one attempted above) has been contested by a number of historians and for good reasons. Before the European power projection began in the late ﬁfteenth century, Indian Ocean populations were bonded by large scale maritime trading systems and outside inﬂuences were minimal. The so called pre Vasco de Gama period (before 1497–98), was characterized by regional self sufﬁciency and autonomy. The IOR has been recognized by some researchers as a communication hub for civil izations established well before the rise of Europe. Others

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would say that in precolonial times the Indian Ocean was a ‘crucible’ for the ﬁrst global economy involving Chi nese, South Asian, and Middle Eastern trade. As pointed out by Kenneth McPherson in The Indian Ocean: A History of People and the Sea, the IOR was the center of the ﬁrst sophisticated commercial and maritime activities and the home of the world’s ﬁrst urban civil ization. The Indian Ocean enabled the peoples on its shore to share and exchange a range of cultural values and economic activities. What Braudel called, the longue dure’e or the long term rhythms of long distance mari time trade formed the basis of the essential unity of the Indian Ocean ‘world’. An enormous range of cultural and economic practices ably supported by a unique maritime trading system marked the Indian Ocean space. This web of intimate interactions provided the peoples of that ‘world’ with an economic unity and certain cultural commonalties, which set them apart from the peoples of contiguous ‘worlds’ such as the Mediterranean and East Asia. Maritime trade induced linkages facilitated the diffusion of religious and cultural systems such as Hin duism, Buddhism, and Islam across the Ocean and gave rise to cultural commonalities. Sugata Bose in A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire argues that in order to explore the richness of the Indian Ocean in its rich mega diversity, we need to deterritorialize our imaginations of the Indian Ocean and approach its ‘hundred horizons’ (or frontiers) in terms of the fuzzy and ﬂuctuating boundaries of its basin and maritime regions or subregions. Kirti N. Chaudhuri reminds us through his Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean: History from the Rise of Islam to 1750 that even though the Indian Ocean did not share a ‘common destiny’, it reﬂected a sense of its own unity for certain kinds of analyses – for example, means of travel, movement of peoples, economic exchanges, and climate. Whereas fac tors such as religion, social systems, and cultural traditions, on the other hand, provided a contrast and challenged its conceptualization as a single unit of space. This ‘Indian Ocean world’ with its ‘deep structure’ (that provided some ‘elements of continuity’ to its littoral societies) was gradually penetrated (but, according to some historians, not incorporated) by the colonial order, characterized by European economic and political con trol, which began after 1500 and culminated in the sec ond half of the nineteenth and ﬁrst half of the twentieth centuries. By and large, the Europeans were compelled to adjust or accommodate themselves to preexisting struc tures. Michael Pearson in his seminal work The Indian Ocean sees this as a turning point from the history ‘of ’ the Indian Ocean to a history ‘in’ the Indian Ocean, deeply inﬂuenced by wider forces emanating from outside its otherwise ﬂexible boundaries. For the most part of modern history, the Indian Ocean remained a ‘British lake’, the security of which was

guaranteed by the Royal Navy until the termination of all security commitments ‘East of Suez’ in 1971. The Indian Ocean was a region of huge signiﬁcance for the British imperial world economy and its strategic integrity for two centuries. It encompassed key sea routes and ocean annexes like the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Bay of Bengal, and kept the eastern empire in touch with the European heartland. It united Africa, Asia, Australia, and the Middle East and contained within these land borders was a galaxy of islands and atolls. War between Britain and other European powers was a major impetus for an imperial presence, and for imperial conquest, in the In dian Ocean. Victory over European rivals in the wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries left Britain master of the Indian Ocean and the foremost European power in India and the Far East. Since World War II, the IOR has witnessed tre mendous geopolitical change as almost every littoral state gained its independence, and then saw its international relations subordinated by Cold War geopolitical con straints. From the mid 1960s onward, a steady increase of superpower presence, paralleling the decrease of British presence, was noticeable.

Growing Militarization of the Indian Ocean: The Great Base Race Military strongholds often have played a major role in the shaping of the destiny of the Indian Ocean and its littoral. The Indian Ocean, after nearly a decade long strategic low proﬁle and invisibility is once again becoming an area of geostrategic rivalry among a number of major powers and littoral states. The social construction of the Indian Ocean space as a force ﬁeld or battleﬁeld is being cur rently reinforced by the great base race in the region. The ‘Indian Oceanic arc of militarization’ stretches from Egypt to Indonesia and Australia. A number of military–naval infrastructure projects of various dimen sions are being undertaken by India, Pakistan, Burma, and Malaysia, among others. Many of these new facilities are aiming at power projection and this strategic dyna mism reﬂects the new wealth and conﬁdence of some of these states, besides the increased importance of mobility and connectivity in this era of globalization, the presence in the Indian Ocean of strategic natural resources (es pecially oil and gas), and the ‘rise’ of India. According to some analysts, the identity and coherence of the Indian Ocean as a geostrategic region is likely to be deepened due to new naval bases being established in the area. Also, this new ‘great base race’ will make war, at least among the ocean’s littoral states, a more practicable option than previously. Moreover, it may not be easy for Western powers, including the United States, to block or moderate the power of Asian states.

Indian Ocean

Against the backdrop of the facts that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has considerably enhanced the destructive capacity of the Indian Ocean states, and their strategic space (so far largely conﬁned to the land) is now widening to include the sea, air, and even outer space, regional conﬂicts might become even more dangerous and further complicate the maneuvers of foreign militaries in the region.

Growing Focus on the Maritime Geopolitical Economy: Development of Ports and the Shipping Sector in the Indian Ocean Rim As far as the issues of international geopolitical economy are concerned, the IOR clearly appears to be multipolar. The geopolitical economy of this region is essentially characterized by a very large disparity among national economies, the signiﬁcance of natural resources, and the weakness of intraregional trade. The regional economic powers are India, Australia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thai land, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Iran. Together, these nine countries represent 72.9% of the total regional gross national product (GNP) and 78.0% of regional exports. The economic geography of the re gion is dominated by oil production in the Persian Gulf and the related maritime oil ﬂuxes; the industrial pro duction of the Southeast Asian tigers that is intended to serve world markets; important commercial and ﬁnancial crossroads such as Singapore; the mineral resources of Southern Africa, Australia (especially uranium), and Indonesia (oil and gas included); the diversiﬁed economy of India and the size of its national market; as well as a great variety and the large volume of tropical products exported to the developed countries of the North. The increasing importance of the Indian Ocean as a global maritime trade facilitator is reinforced by the fact that the bulk of the world’s shipping passes through the region. Against the backdrop of trade liberalization, and as a result of the export–import orientation of many trading countries and their energy imports, maritime trade passing through the ocean has dramatically in creased. The Indian Ocean provides maritime advantages to several of its littoral states in terms of their strategic location along the Ocean. The overall growth in global trade has further heightened the importance of this vital ocean – with its strategic waterways and links with major maritime trade routes – in linking the trade of countries and economic regions. The tremendous growth of ports and the ship ping sector in the IOR is a testimony to the regional and global trade explosion. Several maritime infrastructures such as ports and shipping facilities have been built and upgraded along the Indian Ocean rim. A number of

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important harbors and seaports dotted along the Region’s shores, stretching from Durban in South Africa to Mel bourne in Australia, are critical trade facilitators to the economies of the respective countries and to the IOR. With an increasing number of Indian Ocean countries engaging in international trade with distant neighbors, increasing volume of the world goods will be transported via the Ocean. In fact, trade volumes have already been increasing steadily in the IOR. Over US$100 billion of China’s trade alone passes through the Indian Ocean an nually, and this ﬁgure is projected to grow rapidly. Bilateral trade between China and India, two of the world’s emer ging economic powerhouses, stood at US$13 billion in 2004, representing 1% of China’s global trade and 9% of India’s. There has also been a signiﬁcant rise in trade volumes moving between post apartheid South Africa and other Indian Ocean states such as India, Malaysia, Singa pore, and Australia, and there is substantial potential for future growth. Following the far reaching changes in South Africa’s economic, social, and political policies, the country is poised to become a powerful engine for growth among countries in sub Saharan Africa and the island states along the traditional Cape route. India’s emergence as an economic power, with a population of more than a billion, provides another tre mendous opportunity for further economic and trade growth in the IOR. It is expected that these developments will have tremendous spillover effects on the growth of the maritime sector across the IOR to support trade expansion. Regional initiatives such as the formation of Association of Shipping and Port Authorities in the In dian Ocean by the Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Co operation (IOMAC) will further boost efforts to promote port and shipping development in the region. The demand for new ships, as a result of booming global trade and mandatory phasing out of ageing tankers by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), has resulted in a huge number of building orders. The crisis and collapse of European shipyards and the cost com petitiveness of Asian shipyards have resulted in a dra matic shift of the shipbuilding industry from the West to East. This has had a positive effect in the development of shipping in the IOR, to a certain extent. Although the shipbuilding industry is dominated by yards from the ‘big three’ shipbuilding giants of Asia – China, Japan, and South Korea – several Indian Ocean states have also got into the act. The combined share of the world’s orders from yards in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh stood at nearly 4% in 2004. India has taken a cue from China to embark on a major shipbuilding program by promoting new shipyards and upgrading existing ones. Looking ahead, much enhanced investment in port facilities and upgrading shipping infrastructure in the IOR would signiﬁcantly boost regional trade. The projected upward trend in cargo trafﬁc worldwide will require

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massive investments for developing and improving port and shipping facilities in the region to cope with the growth. Trading states in the Indian Ocean rim will be compelled to upgrade their national lines to meet in creasing demand for shipping services and to capitalize on container trafﬁc growth. A more modern maritime sector would provide a catalyst to higher trade volume and brighter economic prospects for many Indian Ocean countries, which are economically dependent on the Ocean.

Security of the Indian Ocean Sea Lanes of Communication In view of increasing transnational commerce, the ship ping lanes of the Indian Ocean (Hormuz, Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Suez) have assumed a pivotal sig niﬁcance. A large volume of international long haul maritime cargo from the Persian Gulf, Africa, the Asia Paciﬁc, and Europe transits through its waters. Com prehensive sea lane security requires a shift from gov ernmental, unilateral, and bilateral approaches to system wide arrangements that consider the supply chain in totality. A steady increase in the number of ships passing through the straits has increased the risk of threat to environmental security. Ship based pollution, although relatively easier to tackle than land based pollution, is more resource intensive. To catch a polluting ship while transiting the straits – carrying out either tank cleaning or ballasting operations – requires much more enforce ment capability at sea. Then, there is the ever increasing risk of pollution by discharges of oil or other noxious substances caused by accidents as the straits get more congested. Loss of biodiversity and the damage to eco systems in the straits will have devastating effects not only on the ﬁshing industry but also the marine tourism industry. The Strait of Hormuz Hormuz lies between Oman and Iran. It is strategically important to most countries in the world. The Strait of Hormuz forms a strategic link between the oil ﬁelds of the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, and the Indian Ocean. It has a width between 48 and 80 km, but navi gation is limited to two 3 km wide channels, each ex clusively used for inbound or outbound trafﬁc. Circulation in and out of the Persian Gulf is thus highly constrained, because the sizable amount of tanker trafﬁc makes navigation difﬁcult along the narrow channels. In addition, islands that insure the control of the Strait are contested by Iran and the United Arab Emirates. Ques tion marks over the security of the Strait have been raised from time to time.

Between 1984 and 1987 the ‘Tanker War’ took place between Iran and Iraq, where each belligerent (Iran–Iraq War of 1980–88) began ﬁring on tankers, even neutrals, bound for their respective ports. Shipping in the Persian Gulf dropped by 25%, forcing the intervention of the United States to help secure the oil shipping lanes. About 88% of all the petroleum exported from the Persian Gulf transits through the Strait of Hormuz, bound to Asia, Western Europe, and the United States. Its importance in global oil circulation cannot be overstated. For instance, 75% of all Japanese oil imports transit through the Strait. There are thus very few alternative outlets to oil exports from the Persian Gulf if the trafﬁc of about 14 Mb d 1 going through Hormuz was compromised. In addition, a no notice closure of the Strait would trap about 7–10% of the global very large crude carrier (VLCC) ﬂeet in the Persian Gulf. Straits of Malacca The Strait of Malacca is the longest international navi gational route through a strait, where it connects the Indian Ocean via Andaman Sea on the north with South China Sea in the south via the Straits of Singapore. Nevertheless, the Strait provides the shortest route for ships between East Asia and Europe. With an average width between 11 and 200 nautical miles, the seaway in this Strait is not always wide as at certain parts of the Strait, the navigable route is less than 1 nautical mile, and at certain parts its navigable area is less than 30 m deep. At a particular point on the Strait, the maximum draught recommended by the IMO for passing ships is 19.8 m. Certain ‘unfriendly’ navigational features notwith standing, the Strait of Malacca is still an attractive and preferred navigational route for international shippers compared to other alternative routes like Sunda or Lombok–Makassar Straits. The 50 mi long Sunda Strait is 15 mi wide on its northeastern entrance but the strong currents and limited depth has prevented deep draftships of over 100 000 deadweight tonnes (DWT) from tran siting this Strait. What makes the Sunda Strait relatively less suitable to oil tankers are features such as a tricky channel, depth limitations, and a live volcano. Moreover, highly irregular bottom topography of the Straits and the presence of rip tides render it further unsuitable for vessels drawing over 18 m of water to use the Straits. In addition, there are hazards posed by the numerous oil drilling platforms to the north of western Java. The Sunda Straits have as yet no available detailed navigation charts. With a minimum passage width of 11.5 mi and depth of more than 150 m, the Lombok Strait, on the other hand is the safest route for supertankers because it is wider, deeper, and less congested than the Strait of Ma lacca. Both Lombok and Makassar Straits do not feature

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serious navigational hazards along the navigational channel but the routes require an additional of 31/2 days navigating at full commercial speed of 14–16 kn, an extra mileage of 1600 nautical miles, which add to transpor tation cost where in the long term operation it is not proﬁtable to the tanker operators. From the Persian Gulf, the sea lanes transit through the Indian Ocean almost hugging the Indian coast toward the Straits of Malacca. Malacca is the busiest with over 600 vessels transiting through it every day. Virtually all ships destined for East Asia carrying liqueﬁed natural gas (LNG) and liqueﬁed petroleum gas (LPG) pass through Malacca and the issue of safety is likely to grow in im portance as East and Southeast Asia’s energy imports grow. It is estimated that the number of tankers transiting through Malacca would increase to 59 per day in 2010 from 45 per day in 2000. Similarly, the LPG tanker trafﬁc is expected to rise to 12 per day from about 8 in 2000. Because the Malacca–Singapore Straits are territorial seas of the coastal states, these states (Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore) have very strong interests in the safety of navigation through them. On this basis, Malaysia and Indonesia have expressed serious reservations about any proposal aiming at the ‘internationalization’ of these Straits. Despite increasing optimism in sea based commerce, Indian Ocean sea lanes continue to be vulnerable to disruption, increasingly threatened by piracy, drug traf ﬁcking, gun running, human smuggling, and pollution. The specter of maritime terrorism has acquired addi tional visibility and urgency after 9/11.

Energy Security and Indian Ocean Nuclear Trade In the future, the IOR will become increasingly im portant to any discussion of energy security, not only because of the critical importance of regional states as energy suppliers, but also because of the essential role of the Ocean as an energy route. In the IOR, while some regional states are ‘energy dependent’ – for example, India (coal) and Singapore (oil) – on the other hand, several Indian Ocean states are net energy exporters and, on a global scale, the region contains some very signiﬁ cant ‘resource holders’. Apart from the Gulf states for oil and natural gas, these include India, Australia, and South Africa for coal, and Australia and South Africa for ura nium. However, in terms of the signiﬁcance of energy in their overall trade proﬁle, ﬁve regional states – Australia, Iran, UAE, Indonesia, and Oman – could be regarded as ‘energy niche economies’. The increasing demand for nuclear energy includes those states which are energy dependent (e.g., India), those which are industrializing (e.g., China), and those involved in the development of nuclear technology (e.g.,

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Iran). Growing regional and global interest in nuclear energy is also being propelled by a belief in its ‘green house friendly’ status. In 2006, in the IOR, the number of planned or proposed nuclear reactors in ﬁve states (India, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, and South Africa) represented 39% of the global total. Australia is still debating its position on nuclear energy. Nonetheless, the proposed rapid regional and global growth in the production of nuclear energy in turn places pressure on regional ur anium supply states which are ‘uranium rich’ but are currently ‘underproducing’. The question of the storage and movement of nuclear waste is probably the most difﬁcult and controversial issue in the Indian Ocean nuclear trade and Australia is still seen by many as po tentially the most suitable global waste repository.

Marine Biodiversity, Fisheries, and Climate Change The IOR contains a remarkably diverse coastal and marine environment that is highly vulnerable to devel opment pressures. Mangroves, as well as sea grass beds, serving as critical habitats for a range of species, are found around the Region. In many parts of the Region, developmental projects on the coastline and shoreline changes (such as loss of arable land; damages to coastal property and infrastructure; and destruction of habitats such as mangroves and coastal forests) have led to de struction of mangroves. Maziwi Island was one of the most important nesting sites in the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) region for three species of marine turtles, namely olive ridley, green, and hawksbill turtle. The Island dis appeared in 1978 apparently due to erosion. The IOR contains a range of coral reefs that provide an important source of food for local communities and are of major commercial importance for ﬁsheries and tourism. Destructive practices such as excavations of coral and coral sand, sand mining, illegal ﬁshing practices, including the use of explosives and poisons, have damaged these reef systems. It has been estimated that 20% of coral reefs and 5% of sea grass beds have been destroyed; yet there is little documentary evidence of the extent of this damage. Environmental degradation is exacerbated by rapidly increasing coastal populations, widespread poverty that in turn promotes the unsustainable use of coastal re sources, poorly planned economic development, under resourced government institutions, and weak implemen tation of existing laws and policies. Coastal development poses challenges even for de veloped countries within the region such as Australia that have, relatively speaking, effective governance arrange ments. As for other developing Indian Ocean states coastal management is clearly even more of a challenge. The Maldives – an archipelago on the North Indian

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Ocean – comprises 1190 islands and 26 atolls stretching over 870 km in roughly a north–south orientation. The islands are low in elevation, many rising less than a meter above sea level, making them vulnerable to extreme events – as shown in the case of Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004. India, in contrast, has a coastline of 8129 km and an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) (de clared in 1976) of approximately 2 million sq km, with its coastal zone heavily populated and the location of major industry. On the WIO, Kenya has a coastline of 600 km, with its coastal zone supporting 9% of the country’s population. South Africa has a coastline of 3000 km, with the western coast highly productive from an upwelling ecosystem. An estimated 30% of South Africa’s popu lation lives within 60 km of the coast, with the additional challenge of the unprecedented growth of informal settlements in the coastal zone. Fishing is a major activity in the IOR (Indian Ocean has the second largest ﬁshing ﬂeet in the world after the Paciﬁc Ocean) with artisanal or small scale commercial ﬁsheries being important sources of food and protein for communities around the region. Fishing remains critical for both food security and export income for Indian Ocean states. In the case of the Maldives, for example, ﬁshing is a mainstay of the economy, with 70% of export earnings being derived from ﬁshing and related activities. The presence of high numbers of local and foreign ﬁshing vessels have contributed to the steady increase in the total ﬁsh catch in the western and eastern IOR which has in creased from 1.2 million to 3.9 million t and from 1 million to 4.7 million t, respectively, between 1970 and 2000. This has created tremendous pressure on the ﬁsheries resource with the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) ex pressing concern over the status of tuna resources and ﬁsheries resources in the deep waters of the Indian Ocean. The pressure of overﬁshing is also felt by noncommercial and endangered marine species. One disturbing feature of the Indian Ocean ﬁshery is the high level of discards amounting to approximately 4.3 million t in 2002. Within the IOR, the southwest subregion appears to be most adversely affected by overﬁshing, with 75% of ﬁsh eries resources being exploited at the maximum biological productivity level, mostly by external ﬁshing vessels from Spain, Taiwan, Japan, and Uruguay. This has prompted the establishment of the South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission (SWIOFC) with the objective of assisting countries to manage the resources in a sustainable manner and to complement the work of existing bodies such as the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (ICTC). The establish ment of such a body, however, needs to be complemented by an overall improvement in the capacity of Indian Ocean states to manage their ﬁsheries resources to ensure sus tainability and safeguarding the interests of coastal ﬁshing communities, who depend on the Indian Ocean for sus tenance and livelihood.

The Indian Ocean Tsunami caused massive human and economic destruction. Fishing communities along the coastal regions were among the most severely af fected. There are certain lessons to be learnt here. In the long run, the local and traditional institutions should be strengthened, after assessing their roles, potentials, and limitations. Protection and restoration of coastal habitats and biodiversity should be undertaken on a priority basis and should not be conﬁned to tsunami affected areas. It is necessary to implement/put in place measures to regu late activities that can pollute, degrade, or otherwise harm the coastal environment and its capacity to protect coastal communities from future natural disasters. These restoration programs in tsunami affected areas should be undertaken in participatory ways. According to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the time for doubt has already passed and there is no denying the fact that our climate system is warming and is directly linked to human activity. Rate of global average sea level rise has risen from 1.8 to 3.1 mm yr 1 from 1961 to 1991. Projected sea level rise (due to thermal expansion, melting glaciers and ice caps and the polar ice sheets) at the end of the twenty ﬁrst century will be 18–59 cm. Obviously, coastal communities, along with low lying island communities, are also most at risk from climate change. Originally, climate change was considered as a classic environmental security issue in Northern terms. As aforesaid, the North came to comprehend that it had to share the same atmosphere and oceans with the South, and a continued policy of laissez faire would be detrimental for the more afﬂuent world. Also, climate change was a classic environmental issue portrayed as a natural ‘force’, rather than one, which directly related to people. Consequently, climate change has not traditionally been seen as a key issue in the South. In recent times, however, it has assumed greater prominence among majority world environ mentalists, due to the fact that some of the biggest state polluters and/or consumers of fossil fuels have not signed the climate change protocols in Kyoto and Johannesburg. Further tensions have emerged, due to the fact that both island states in the Indian Ocean, as well as poorer dwellers and coastal ﬁsh workers on coastlines, will be the principal victims in global climate change. In this manner, climate change has metamorphosed from an elite, scien tiﬁc, Northern issue into one, which can usefully ﬁt into the environmental justice agenda of the South.

Revisiting ‘Indian Ocean Studies’: Looking Back and Forth More contemporary factors and forces such as the ones analyzed above demand a critical reassessment of what constitutes (or should constitute) the ‘Indian Ocean

Indian Ocean

studies’. As pointed out earlier in this article, a number of studies have interrogated Eurocentric historiography and assumptions that marginalized Asian trading activity as socially insigniﬁcant, economically limited, and cultur ally incapable of resisting the might of Western guns, law, and technology. ‘Historicizing the ocean’ is a welcome step because it helps bring to attention large scale his torical processes of commercial, biological, and cultural exchange that other geographical constructs and im aginations often obscure. Markus P. M. Vink in his seminal article ‘‘Indian Ocean studies and the ‘new thalassology’ ’’ forcefully argues in favor of acknowledging the imperative to lo calize and historicize Indian Ocean studies. In his view it is absolutely crucial to focus deterritorialized concepts emphasizing interaction, movement, and migration, as well as the key terms like porousness, permeability, connectedness, ﬂexibility, and openness of spatial, as well as temporal boundaries and borders. This article has further identiﬁed a number of themes of considerable present and futuristic signiﬁcance that demand and deserve to be brought within the purview of Indian Ocean studies.

Conclusions Looking to the future, it appears that the ‘great void’ construction and the perceived (constructed) placeless ness of the Indian Ocean, will persist in some form. In such a geoeconomic vision, the Indian Ocean would continue to be idealized as a space of energy and trans port ﬂows, devoid of nature, society, or geographical differentiation. As Philip E. Steinberg describes so suc cinctly in Social Constructions of Ocean Space (2001), the great void visualization of ocean space as essentially a transportation space, is likely to be reinforced due to the growth and diversiﬁcation of container ships and auto mated, internodal container ports. Once the movement of trade by sea, rail, and truck is constructed as one con tinuous ﬂow, the unique sociocultural features of the environments through which the containers move are likely to be conveniently pushed into oblivion. The crucial point here is that beyond the elitist, capitalist, and statist imaginations of maritime life exists an empirically rich world of Indian Ocean communities and individuals (e.g., ﬁshing communities, maritime workers) whose everyday lives, experiences, and world views revolve around entirely different encounters with the ocean. In India, for example, there are around 3638 ﬁshing villages all along the Indian coastline and the total population of marine ﬁshers is about 3 million, out of

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which 1 million are actively involved in the said activity; for example, ﬁshers whose lives revolve around knowl edge of distinct ﬁsh rich places within the ocean. How ever, the existence of such communities and their alternate constructions of the ocean as a space of rep resentation are denied by the representations of ocean space that emanate from postmodern capitalism’s dom inant spatial practices on the one hand, and the ascending geostrategic visualizations focused on warships, choke points, and naval power projections. The future of Indian Ocean studies looks both interesting and challenging. See also: Military Geographies; Oceans; South Asia.

Further Reading Berlin, D. (2004). The ‘great base race’ in the Indian Ocean littoral: Conﬂict prevention or stimulation. Contemporary South Asia 13(3), 239 255. Bose, S. (2006). A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Chandra, S. (ed.) (1987). The Indian Ocean: Explorations in History, Commerce and Politics. New Delhi: Sage. Chaturvedi, S. (1998). Common security? Geopolitics, development, South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Third World Quarterly 19(4), 701 724. Doyle, T. and Risely, M. (eds.) (2008). Crucible for Survival: Environmental Security and Justice in the Indian Ocean Region. Chapel Hill, NC: Rutger University Press. House, J. (1984). War, peace and conﬂict resolution: Towards an Indian Ocean model. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 9(1), 3 21. Ong Webb, G. G. (ed.) (2006). Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Straits of Malacca. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Rumley, D., Chaturvedi, S. and Taib, M. (eds.) (2007). Security of the Sea Lanes of Communication in the Indian Ocean Region. Kuala Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia. Rumley, D. and Chaturvedi, S. (eds.) (2004). Geopolitical Orientations, Regionalism and Security in the Indian Ocean. New Delhi: South Asian Publishers. Rumley, D. and Chaturvedi, S. (eds.) (2006). Energy Security in the Indian Ocean Region. New Delhi: South Asian Publishers. Steinberg, P. (2001). Social Constructions of the Ocean. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McPherson, K. (1993). The Indian Ocean: A History of People and the Sea. New York: Oxford University Press. Pearson, M. (2003). The Indian Ocean. London: Routledge. Pearson, M. (2005). The World of the Indian Ocean, 1500 1800: Studies in Economic, Social and Cultural History. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. Vink, M. P. M. (2007). Indian Ocean studies and the ‘new thalassology’. Journal of Global History 2, 41 62.

Relevant Websites http://www.iotc.org Indian Ocean Tuna Commission. http://www.sidsnet.org Small Island Developing States Network.

Indigeneity E. Cameron, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada S. de Leeuw and M. Greenwood, University of Northern British Columbia, Prince George, BC, Canada & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Binary Dualism A view that postulates two things or ideas as opposed and mutually exclusive. For example, the notion that mind and body, man and woman, and nature and culture are separate and opposed realms. In a binary dualism, the meaning of each ‘pole’ is constructed in reference to its ‘other’; the terms have no meaning except in relation to each other. Constructivism A belief that the world is composed of theories and practices, and is not independent of them. In other words, nothing is knowable outside the categories and imaginings that are placed upon them. Constructivism may be a form of relativism in that it suggests there is no way of judging reality separately from how we theorize it. Deconstruction A process of exposing the contradictions and contingencies embedded in language, ideas, and concepts. Based on the premise that all knowledge is socially constructed from particular vantage points, and through the operation of power, deconstruction aims to take apart such constructions and to challenge their apparent rationality, stability, and sense. Environmental Determinism A theory proposing that the physical environment, including climate, elevation, and geology, deﬁnes the basic characteristics of human bodies, cultures, and societies. Essentialism The notion that a person or thing has certain qualities that are essential to it, without which it would no longer ‘be’ that thing. For example, the belief that Indigenous peoples must live in harmony with nature in order to properly ‘be’ Indigenous is essentialist. Fourth World A term employed to characterize highly marginalized Indigenous groups who are dominated by other groups or by state bureaucracies. It signals both the variability of social and economic well-being within the so-called First World countries, as well as the shared political interests of Indigenous peoples who have been dispossessed of the lands that comprise various nationstates. Naming Indigenous Peoples The nomenclature relating to Indigenous peoples is neither straightforward nor depoliticized. Indigenous peoples are called, and name themselves with, a wide variety of words, many of which are unstable and shift over time. For instance, in both Canada and the United States, the term ‘Indian’ has been supplanted, respectively, by the terms ‘First Nations’ and ‘Native American’. In Canada, however,

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‘First Nations’ does not include Inuit (formally Eskimo) peoples, nor does the term denote Me´tis peoples, although all three (First Nations, Inuit, and Me´tis) are constitutionally recognized under the terms Aboriginal and Indigenous. Other names for Indigenous peoples have also transformed over time (e.g., the Sami people were once widely referred to as Laplanders) and within large groupings of ‘Indigenous’ peoples there are often distinct and particular tribes, communities, families, or lineages with individual names. Even the collective term ‘Indigenous’ is unﬁxed and in some contexts is displaced by terms such as ‘First Peoples’ and ‘Fourth World Peoples’. When writing about indigeneity and Indigenous peoples, most Indigenous peoples recommend the use of speciﬁc and local names; for instance, the Zapatistas are the Indigenous Mayans of Mexico, while the Haida are a First Nation of northwest coastal British Columbia in Canada. Postcolonial A condition of existing after colonization, or in the wake of colonial practices and domination. Also, the long process whereby a dominant colonizing power transfers the power to control cultural, economic, and political institutions to a colonized people. Post-Structuralism A set of theories positing that language (and therefore knowledge) is given meaning in relation to other words, rather than referencing some extra-linguistic reality, and therefore directing attention to the role of power in constructing and maintaining particular kinds of knowledges. Power The ability of a person or object to produce an effect upon, to control or to exercise authority over, other persons or objects. Racialization The processes by which ‘race’ (a constructed, invented category) is given material and ideological ﬁxity, such that it appears to be a natural and rational means of understanding human differentiation. This often involves the assignation of certain qualities, characteristics, and life chances to particular groups of people. Realism A belief that there is an absolute and knowable objective reality or truth. The term carries connotations of practicality and factuality in which entities are knowable and separable from the categories and theories that are placed upon them. Settler Colonialism A kind of colonialism in which settlers from a colonial nation establish permanent settlements in a colony. These are not temporary occupations, but are rather concerted efforts to establish

Indigeneity lasting control over a territory and to outnumber Indigenous peoples with a dominant community of settlers. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are all settler colonies.

Introduction Within geography, as in other disciplines, ‘indigeneity’ is a protean, contested, and relatively recently considered term. Although geographic engagement with the term is rather limited, the term does have historical roots within the discipline and, however, tentatively, is developing an increasing contemporary purchase among human geog raphers. Broadly speaking, human geography’s engage ment with the concept of indigeneity might be divided into two temporal domains which encompass four streams, or pillars, of thought. Historically, early and mid twentieth century human geography tended to conﬂate Indigenous peoples with the natural environ ment and relied on essentialized understandings of culture and identity. By the late twentieth century, and increasingly within the twenty ﬁrst century, critical human geographers have destabilized the concept of indigeneity. This destabilization takes the form of post structural critiques, postcolonial interventions into the concept, and a politicization of indigeneity both as a descriptor and as a state of being. Notwithstanding the temporal shift, however, there remains within human geography a divide between scholars operating within constructivist parameters and proponents of realist philosophies; it can be argued that research into indi geneity by human geographers is divided along this philosophical line. On the one hand are researchers sympathetic with post structuralist challenges to essen tial identities and truths and with postcolonial challenges to ‘pure’ Indigenous ﬁgures. These scholars tend to challenge and deconstruct invocations of indigeneity. On the other hand are researchers who either identify as engaging in social justice projects or as feeling compelled by the moral rightness and political necessity of claims to ‘being’ Indigenous. Human geographers in this latter grouping are more inclined to address the social, cultural, economic, and political concerns of Indigenous peoples than to devote their energies to more theoretical ques tions of just what ‘Indigenous’ might mean. This is a rough and simplifying sketch of geographical research, of course, and few human geographers would argue that theoretical inquiry is distinct from political or ‘everyday’ concerns. Nevertheless, we would argue that geographical research on indigeneity tends to adopt one stance over the other. As geographers are certainly aware, moreover, the breadth and depth of academic work on a given topic does not represent the scope of ‘reality’, and

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we submit that, to the extent that Indigenous peoples have been excluded from the production of geographical knowledge about indigeneity (and it is to a rather great extent), that knowledge remains partial, both in the sense of being incomplete, and also in the sense of being sat urated by the partiality of (largely) non Aboriginal re searchers. Accordingly, while we endeavor to provide an overview of past and current geographical research into indigeneity, we also present the words of Indigenous scholars and writers in an effort to sketch out some of the difﬁculties and gaps inherent in that research. Con sequently, in this article we proﬁle the evolution of the term indigeneity in geographic thinking and discuss al ternative formulations of what indigeneity might mean, as expressed by Indigenous peoples themselves.

Historical Approaches to Indigeneity It is not surprising that geographers have taken an interest in the concept of indigeneity, for it is a thor oughly geographic notion. Etymologically, the term ‘indigeneity’ comes from the Latin indu meaning ‘in, within’ and gen (root of gignere) meaning ‘beget’ or ‘pro duce’. Indigeneity refers, in that sense, to that which is produced or begotten from within a given place. Indeed, as Marie Battiste, a Mi’kmaq educator from the Potlo’tek First Nation, and James Sa’ke’j Youngblood Henderson of the Bear Clan of the Chickasaw Nation and Cheyenne Tribe in Oklahoma, write in Protecting Indigenous Know ledge: A Global Challenge, ‘‘the ecologies in which In digenous peoples live are more to us than settings or places: they are more than homelands or promised homelands. Ecologies do not surround Indigenous peo ples; we are an integral part of them and we inherently belong to them. As Indigenous peoplesywe unfold our structure of Indigenous life and thought from ecologies.’’ Indigeneity is not only about geographic origins, then, but it also involves an ongoing interdigitation with place and ecology. Notwithstanding Indigenous peoples’ assertions con cerning a deep interconnectivity with the natural en vironment, such assertions unfortunately resonate with the essentializing and reductionistic conceptualizations of indigeneity made by early human geographers. A number of signiﬁcant geographic texts, for instance, are anchored in conceptualizations of indigeneity as a foil to modernity and contemporaneity; indigeneity is made to stand for the past, the premodern, and the lost. Yi Fu Tuan’s work on topophilia, homescapes, and connection to place positions Indigenous peoples as existing in harmonious and close connection with nature, in an tithesis to the industrial and modernized existences of often urban dwelling people. Tuan offers ‘Indians’, ‘Es kimos’, ‘Mongoloid peoples’, and ‘Aborigines’ as clear

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models of peoples who, because of their close connection to nature, displayed particular characteristics determined by their environments. This conceptualization of In digenous peoples is in some ways informed by theories of environmental determinism. Similarly, in Human Terri toriality, Robert Sack presents the territorial practices of the Chippewa as opposite to, and less developed than, the European territorial practices that superceded them in time and space. Here, indigeneity is a conceptual foil against which theories of territoriality are elaborated. Finally, Carl Sauer’s foundational work on cultural landscapes aimed at uncovering traces of past inhabit ation in place and posited successive cycles of cultural landscape formation, where one formation would climax and recede as a subsequent culture made its imprint on the land. This model tended to relegate Indigenous presence in the landscape to history and ‘tradition’, eliding the ongoing presence of Indigenous peoples in contemporary places. Over the past several decades, geographers have begun to reevaluate their disciplinary heritage and have challenged the assumptions and ideas outlined above. In reworking these problematic approaches to indigeneity within the discipline, however, a tension has arisen be tween (1) validating and respecting Indigenous peoples’ claims of identity and connection with nature and tra ditions of the past and (2) recognizing that connectivity to nature and tradition, within European discursive constructs, is synonymous with primitivism and tends to overlook the lives of Indigenous peoples in the con temporary world.

Contemporary Approaches to Indigeneity Conscious of the problems with the work of their pre decessors, critical human geographers have set about challenging past ideas about indigeneity and developing new modes of engaging with the concept. We consider in particular the impact of post structuralism, post colonialism, and political geography in reconﬁguring geographic scholarship on indigeneity. Post-Structuralism Over the past several decades, the discipline of geography has been heavily inﬂuenced by post structuralist theories and modes of inquiry. Post structuralist inquiry often in volves the deconstruction of ‘essentialist’ concepts and claims, and an uncovering of the ways in which knowledge is structured. Thus, geographers interested in troubling and destabilizing concepts of indigeneity are motivated by a desire to understand, if not to overturn, discursive constructs that foreground and privilege some subjects in binary opposition to ‘other’, marginalized, subjects. To the extent that indigeneity is understood as an essentialist

claim – that is, grounded in the belief that certain qualities are inherently and essentially Indigenous – post struc turalist geographers are more inclined to challenge and ‘trouble’ such claims than to accept them as ‘true’. Many of the bases upon which indigeneity is asserted have been deconstructed in recent years, as critical cultural geog raphers have adopted post structuralist, postcolonial, and politicized stances toward concepts such as ‘race’, identity, and place. Alongside efforts to destabilize essentializing categories, however, some geographers warn that decon struction can result in the very real and ongoing mar ginalization of Indigenous peoples through a denial that they have distinct ways of life. Geographers interested in processes of racialization have pointed out that hierarchies of difference are often articu lated through an imagined separation between nature and culture and are perpetuated by buttressing social con structions with claims of objective or scientiﬁc authenticity. They explain that the conﬂation of Indigenous peoples with the ancient past and with nature is a social construction designed to perpetuate European differentiations between civility and savagery and to rationalize the colonization of Indigenous lands. In these binary discourses, it was precisely the imagined closeness of Indigenous peoples with nature that deﬁned them as savage and primitive, whereas Euro pean interest in ‘transcending’ and manipulating nature through technology and reason was held up as a hallmark of a progressive and civilized culture. ‘Scientiﬁc’ theories of race were developed through the lens of European superiority, as were moral imperatives to resettle and ‘improve’ lands held by Indigenous peoples. A great deal of recent geographic research has been directed toward deconstructing the network of ideas and practices impli cated in such racialized constructions. In an effort to develop new ways of thinking about identity and difference, some critical human geographers have begun to emphasize movement, disconnection, and hybridity over notions of rootedness, belonging, and es sential identity. This theoretical and empirical shift in the discipline has led to a certain suspicion of claims to indi geneity, and an interest in troubling and destabilizing the ‘truth claims’ of any group. Notions of movement, hybridity, and partiality sit uneasily with some Indigenous peoples, and indeed, such notions run the risk of undercutting both the existential and political claims of Indigenous peoples to ‘being’. For others, however, this work dismantles restrictive expectations about ‘authenticity’ and ‘tradition’ in the constitution of indigeneity and accounts for the multiple and ﬂuid axes of identity through which Indigenous peoples position themselves in the world. It provides an important vantage point from which to query the terms of belonging within Indigenous communities and has also been useful both in reconstructing the continued presence of Indigen ous peoples throughout the modern era and in revising histories that have, until now, not acknowledged this

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presence. Indigenous peoples themselves have clearly as serted their presence in the modern world and insist that no culture is static. Indigenous peoples insist, for example, that their stories, like their orators, change gradually from teller to teller and generation to generation. Similarly, Inuit cul tural educator Peter Irniq describes the change and adap tation strategies of Inuit peoples in A Will to Survive as follows: ‘‘Changes have taken place in our language in re cent years. Our language is a living language. New words are being developed to handle modern concepts and pos sessionsy. our culture as well is evolving, [yet] it is still there y Yes, I am thousands of years old but 54 years in the 21st century.’’ By asserting their dynamic presence in con temporary societies, Indigenous peoples are in some way insisting that the modern world account for them, and particularly for their ongoing marginalization. Postcolonialism Human geographers’ recent turn toward postcolonialism has had a marked impact on disciplinary conceptualizations of indigeneity. Indeed, the very concept of ‘post’colonial in reference to Indigenous peoples is contentious because, as many Indigenous peoples argue, colonial interventions into their lives and lands have not abated nor retreated. This argument is not overlooked by critical human geographers, many of whom observe that postcolonial geographies are not limited to those ‘after’ colonial rule but include geog raphies ‘in the knowledge’ of colonialism. This realization very much reﬂects Indigenous peoples’ position that their lives and lands are not sufﬁciently conceptualized through a (post)colonial lens. More speciﬁcally, however, postcolonial attention to indigeneity and the concerns of Indigenous peoples emphasize expressions and materializations of power, particularly as those expressions and materializations inform relationships between colonial subjects and In digenous peoples. For postcolonial geographers, many of whom draw on the inﬂuential works of Edward Said and his contemporaries Gayatri Spivak and Homi Bhabha, indi geneity is intimately linked with practices and processes of colonization. Colonial control over land, for example, relied upon processes of ideological and discursive ‘othering’, in which Indigenous peoples were constructed as opposed and inferior to Euro colonial peoples. English language post colonial geographers conducting research on Indigenous peoples have tended to focus on the former colonies of Britain, speciﬁcally New Zealand, Australia, and Canada. Consequently, these nations dominate the literature on indigeneity and postcolonialism, often eclipsing inquiries into other regions with signiﬁcant populations of peoples who identify themselves as Indigenous. Most postcolonial geographic concerns with indi geneity identify material and intellectual tools of dis possessing Indigenous peoples from lands and culture. In Canada, postcolonial engagement with indigeneity has

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resulted in considerable geographic focus on Indigenous peoples of British Columbia, particularly as colonization resulted in the production of spaces (‘Indian’ reserves) which contained and conﬁned Indigenous peoples. The production of reserves, however, is understood as in separable from the colonial apparatuses which ﬁrst im agined, and then legitimated, Euro colonial visions of their right to dominance. Following this logic, material objects like maps, trading posts, missionary schools, and state agents are all implicit to and inextricable from the ‘grounded’ geographies of ‘Indian’ reserves; in other words, within colonial practices and processes, the ontological and material cannot be extricated from the epistemological and discursive. The connectivity be tween culture and power, and an attendant inscription onto land and territory of colonial culture and power, have also been the focus of postcolonial geographers who are investigating indigeneity in Australia and New Zea land. Here geographers have observed that memor ialization and the construction of public spaces on landscapes have often resulted in heroic displays of co lonial dominance while simultaneously erasing Indigen ous precontact presences. Furthermore, there exist ongoing tensions between Indigenous and non Indigen ous peoples over boundaries, land claims, and the own ership and allocation of resources. Tensions of representation and display are not conﬁned to inscription on landscape but instead encompass a broad range of nonmaterial spatialities in which Indigenous and non Indigenous peoples are implicated. For instance, post colonial geographers argue that the very production of knowledge about Indigenous peoples is a practice fraught with constellations of power which in turn affects re search methodology, the positionalities of the researcher, and the purpose and outcomes of the research conducted. For postcolonial human geographers interested in the epistemological nuances of research concerning indi geneity, there remains a tension between the knowledge that is produced about Indigenous peoples and those who are engaged in the production of that knowledge. Geographers are increasingly aware of their role in sus taining ideas about Indigenous peoples they had hitherto purported only to mirror, a situation that is inextricable from the fact that the production and dissemination of academic geography remains largely under the control of the non Aboriginal peoples. Addressing these schisms in knowledge production remains an important task of postcolonial human geographers. It is perhaps not surprising that, just as non In digenous postcolonial human geographers problematize their roles in producing geographic knowledge about Indigenous peoples, Indigenous peoples themselves are questioning what many suggest is an ongoing coloniza tion of Indigenous knowledges. In other words, while critical human geographers work out the implications of

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producing knowledge about Indigenous peoples from a (primarily) non Aboriginal perspective, Indigenous peoples themselves are questioning the beneﬁt (or lack there of) of non Aboriginals producing research on ‘othered’ peoples from an outsider position. For instance, in responding to non Aboriginal researchers’ focus on the nuances and ﬁne distinctions inherent to the concept of indigeneity, Sharon Venne of the Cree Nation ob serves in an essay in A Will to Survive, that ‘‘colonizers spend so much time trying to determine who is an ‘In digenous’ persony[because] it gives a false sense of security for the colonizer trying to control their en vironment.’’ From a postcolonial perspective then, there is the very real question of how to (de)colonize post colonial research focused on Indigenous peoples, as op posed to perpetuating ways of thinking and knowing which, in the past and within colonial discourses, often served to legitimize and authenticate non Aboriginal claims to territories and lands occupied by Indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples are not the only peoples with connections and claims to place, of course, and post colonial struggles to reclaim stolen lands inevitably encounter resistance from those who have developed their own connections as settlers. In fact, some argue that settler colonialism requires the generation of a sense of indigeneity among settlers in order both to rationalize the dispossession of Indigenous lands and to develop a sense of belonging and comfort in the settler nation. What separates settler indigeneity from the indigeneity of its ﬁrst inhabitants is a matter of dispute in many settler colonies, but scholars like Linda Tuhiwai Smith insist that, at base, what distinguishes the claims of Indigenous peoples is the fact that they have no ‘other’ homeland to return to. Geographers have been particularly attentive to the fraught politics of de col onizing nations with long standing immigrant popu lations, and have argued that it is not just a desire to maintain control over land and resources that frustrates redistributive processes in de colonizing nations, but also a longing on the part of settlers for the kind of ‘ancestral’ relationship with place asserted by Indigenous peoples, a longing more broadly associated with mod ernity. It is in such contexts that a certain desire for the perceived ‘beneﬁts’ of indigeneity emerges, a desire that is at odds with the ongoing social and economic mar ginalization of Indigenous peoples and is symptomatic of the continued presence of the colonial imagination in settler colonies. Political Geography Indigeneity has also been an abiding theme in political geography, particularly among political ecologists. One of the main premises of political ecological research is that

Indigenous peoples experience a disproportionate share of ecological harm wrought by globalized capitalist de velopment. To be Indigenous, in that sense, is to have diminished access to the world’s resources, to the polit ical and economic networks of power that manage and distribute those resources, and to be more vulnerable to ecological problems such as drought, erosion, pollution, natural hazards, deforestation, and so on. Similarly, pol itical ecologists have also documented the ways in which Indigenous peoples are excluded from the economic beneﬁts of resource extraction and development, and the ways in which government policy and bureaucracy both facilitate and naturalize unjust divisions of wealth. Underlying this argument is the recognition that social, cultural, and economic well being are structured by thoroughly racialized, gendered, and classed networks of power. Far from naturalizing this inequity, geographers insist that control over land, resources, and capital is an ongoing accomplishment rather than an isolated act, a kind of ‘enactment’ requiring massive mobilizations of power, aided by discourses and technologies, to sustain it. Political ecologists are particularly sensitive to the ways in which environment, ecology, and nature have been embroiled in processes of racializing, marginalizing, and oppressing Indigenous peoples. Political geographers have also addressed indigeneity through studies of territorial conﬂict, law, and geographic scale, considering the plight of Indigenous peoples ad vocating for national and territorial independence within and across political boundaries that they do not recognize as legitimate, as well as the transnational spaces in which Indigenous identities are produced and reproduced. Indeed, the term ‘Indigenous’ means nothing to a great number of people who might be described as such. In many cases, moreover, Indigenous peoples have de veloped a consciousness and identity as ‘Indigenous’ because of the political necessity of employing this term. The term ‘Indigenous peoples’ itself emerged from the collaboration of the American Indian Movement (AIM) and the Canadian Indian Brotherhood in the 1970s, and their shared interest in internationalizing the issues and struggles experienced by the world’s colonized peoples. Today, multiple, transnational Indigenous movements link speciﬁc Indigenous groups with a globalized agenda, movements that are not so much grounded in a single, common, territorialized identity (however much In digenous peoples might mobilize universal, pan In digenous discourses) but rather in a shared interest in advancing politically similar causes. Indigeneity ‘is’ pol itical, according to Roger Maaka and Augie Fleras, because so many Indigenous peoples are engaged in struggles to reclaim their ancestral rights, and because Indigenous peoples continue to live in a world with di minished access to the rights and resources enjoyed by others.

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Looking to the Future

Further Reading

If anything, recent geographic engagement with indi geneity and Indigenous peoples has conﬁrmed that knowledge is thoroughly contingent and contested. It is not surprising, then, that Indigenous peoples have placed a great deal of emphasis upon how, why, and by whom knowledge is produced about them, and have insisted that non Indigenous researchers critically evaluate the assumptions, research aims, and methodologies employed in the study of indigeneity. Linda Tuhiwai Smith argues that every step of the research process, from the for mulation of research questions to the interpretation and articulation of ﬁndings, must be considered as an im portant venue for de colonization; that is, Indigenous peoples should play an active and directive role in setting research agendas, determining research protocols, carrying out research methodologies, storing and inter preting data, and communicating research ﬁndings. In cases where this is not possible, non Indigenous scholars should seriously evaluate the partiality and ethical im plications of proceeding without Indigenous involve ment. To be sure, both Indigenous and non Indigenous peoples have an interest in the places, histories, and so cieties they share, and Indigenous peoples are not calling for a stop to all research relating to them. Instead, they are working to radically alter the terms under which such research proceeds, and to ensure that knowledges pro duced about Indigenous peoples serve, ﬁrst and foremost, the interests and aspirations of Indigenous communities around the world.

Battiste, M. and Henderson, J. S. Y. (2000). Protecting Indigenous Knowledge and Heritage: A Global Challenge. Saskatoon: Purich Publishing. Bhabha, H. (1990). Nation and Narration. London: Routledge. Castree, N. (2004). Differential geographies: Place, indigenous rights, and ‘local’ resources. Political Geography 23, 133 167. Castree, N. and Braun, B. (eds.) (2001). Social Nature: Theory, Practice, and Politics. Oxford: Blackwell. Delaney, D. (2005). Territory: A Short Introduction. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Gelder, K. and Jacobs, J. (1998). Uncanny Australia: Sacredness and Identity in a Postcolonial Nation. Melbourne, VIC: Melbourne University Press. Greymorning, S. (ed.) (2004). A Will to Survive: Indigenous Essays on the Politics of Culture, Language, and Identity. New York: McGraw Hill Press. Harris, C. (2002). Making Native Space: Colonialism, Resistance, and Reserves in British Columbia. Vancouver, BC: UBC Press. Maaka, R. and Fleras, A. (2005). The Politics of Indigeneity: Challenging the State in Canada and Aotearoa New Zealand. Dunedin: University of Otago Press. Peet, R. and Watts, M. (eds.) (2004). Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development, Social Movements (2nd edn.). London: Routledge. Peters, E. (2000). Aboriginal people and Canadian geography: A review of the recent literature. Canadian Geographer 44(1), 44 55. Sack, R. (1986). Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Said, E. (1978). Orientalism. New York: Pantheon. Sauer, C. (1975). Man in Nature. Berkeley, CA: Turtle Island Foundation. Spivak, G. (1987). In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics. New York: Methuen. Smith, L. T. (1999). Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples. London: Zed Books. Tuan, Y. (1974). Topophilia: A Study of Environmental Perception, Attitudes, and Values. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

See also: Colonialism I; Colonialism II; Critical Realism/ Critical Realist Geographies; Imperialism, Cultural; Indigenous Geographies; Inequality; Modernity; Nature; Nature-Culture; Postcolonialism/Postcolonial Geographies; Poststructuralism/Poststructuralist Geographies; Racism and Antiracism; Whiteness.

Relevant Websites http://www.un.org United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. This international advisory body has a mandate to discuss indigenous issues related to economic and social development, culture, the environment, education, health, and human rights. The Forum has been instrumental in developing a Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, also available from the website.

Indigenous Geographies R. Howitt, S. Muller, and S. Suchet-Pearson, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Colonialism The policy of forced occupation in new territories imposing the practices and assumptions of the colonizing cultures. Country An aboriginal English term used to deﬁne one’s relationship to an area (can be land, sea, rivers, or sky) embedded within a cosmological connection through customary law. Cultural Landscapes A landscapes’ perspective that recognizes the inﬂuence of people and their cultural practices in shaping and deﬁning the land. Customary Law Laws that govern Indigenous societies based on cosmologically deﬁned connections between ancestors, country, and people. Eurocentrism Practices derived from and focused upon European culture to the exclusion of other ontological perspectives. Indigeneity A controversial term used to describe the state of being Indigenous. Indigenous Peoples The ﬁrst peoples to live in an area with customary ties and relationship to particular areas of country. Native Title Formal recognition of Indigenous people’s property rights through their customary connections to the country. Ontological Pluralism Equitable recognition of multiple ontological perspectives (ways of being and constructing knowledge). Postcolonialism Movements or studies that investigate, correct, and mitigate the complex impacts of colonialism.

Introduction Geographical expansion of European and other imperi alist economies brought, and continues to bring, the property systems of colonial powers into juxtaposition and often conﬂicts with Indigenous peoples’ ways of knowing and relating to the world. Disruption of In digenous peoples’ familiar cultural landscapes and juris dictions challenges their ways of relating to social and environmental relationships by imposing new patterns of power, control, and value. Colonizing mobilities and spatialities, and invasive claims and technologies, impose new property rights and grant access to land, resources, and wealth to newcomers and outsiders in ways that

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subjugate and marginalize Indigenous geographies. In digenous knowledges and geographies and their charac teristic attention to process, relationship, ﬂuidity, context, and speciﬁcity contrast with more globally dominant developmentalist, Eurocentric, or Western concerns with property, outcome, intervention, and universalism. For geographers, the key challenges this situation presents are to be more aware of, responsive to, and supportive of cultural diversity and the ontological pluralism that In digenous peoples bring to contemporary settings. Over the course of the late twentieth century, In digenous identity became a powerful, and often con tested, political, legal, and cultural issue. Problematizing the term, and interrogating the assumptions which can underlie it, is one of the major challenges of Indigenous geographies. The discussion here examines the idea of Indigenous geographies, not simply in terms of the dis tribution or location of Indigenous peoples, but more complexly in terms of its challenges for human geog raphy. It focuses on the experiences of Indigenous peo ples in the context of colonial (predominantly European) encounters and the postcolonial nation state, but with powerful implications and relevance beyond this and into a range of other relations. In the context of dominant motifs of contemporary geographical theory such as globalization and terror, it would be easy to relegate experiences of Indigenous peoples to the status of an interesting anachronism, un fortunate collateral damage, or a market opportunity for heritage or eco tourism. The reality, however, is that Indigenous peoples’ persistent presence in the cultural landscapes of contemporary postcolonial nation states offers an important double take on the idea of indi genous geographies. These persistent geographies sim ultaneously require geographers to consider the ways in which historical and contemporary practices of genocide, dispossession, denial, erasure, cooptation, and manage ment have failed to silence or remove Indigenous peoples and to acknowledge the signiﬁcance of Indigenous peo ples’ representations of their own geographies. Inverting the dominant representations of Indigeneity by states and scholars to conform with more Indigenous centered ideas of society, culture, and environment provides a powerful Indigenous critique of many key themes in human geography. Not only do Indigenous critiques often contribute actively to postcolonial, post structur alist, feminist, and increasingly postdevelopmentalist theoretical debates, but they often also challenge the terms of such debates, and the implicit assumption of a

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singular core underpinning the ‘posts’ as if local diversity and speciﬁcity were reducible to a single dimension of signiﬁcant difference, such as class, gender, or relation ship to the so called ‘global’. Practical engagement with Indigenous rights, knowledges, and geographies inevit ably challenges such reductionist assumptions and also offers valuable lessons for areas of practice, such as nat ural resource management, geographical education and research, politics, and the future of globalization. The persistent presence of Indigenous geographies among the ‘a geographical’ level playing ﬁelds of globalization, therefore, offers a powerful challenge to geographers’ understanding of and contribution to contemporary social and environmental relations. For example, these diverse geographies often decenter the conventional regional narratives of geographers’ accounts of social change. Indeed, in writing of Maori geographies in Aotearoa, New Zealand, the Maori geographer Dame Evelyn Stokes noted that a Maori analysis of housing would conceptualize housing differently to urban geog raphers interested in service provision or ethnic segre gation. Indeed, for many Indigenous groups marginalized from high cost housing markets, housing becomes a verb rather than a noun – an issue of power and privilege rather than an object for analysis. In Anglo American geography, the dominance of Eurocentricism persists, despite the critique of scholars such as Jim Blaut and Eric Wolf. The risk of a Euro centric focus on the colonial, the economic, and the cultural is that it reduces human diversity to a singular ‘Other,’ to be benchmarked only against the imaginary of the dominant culture(s) of white, male, heterosexual, capitalist relations. Such simplistic Eurocentricism, for example, lumps diverse Indigenous interests together as a singularity, as the ‘Indigenous other’. Yet, in an In digenous centric framework, one necessarily starts with diversity rather than singularity. There is no singular Indigenous people, but a multiplicity of Indigenous peoples. While the colonial encounter and its con sequences might provide a common experience within the framework of both Eurocentric and much post colonial scholarship, the colonial encounter was different in every place, with every people, and in every era. However, it is neither the colonial experiences of In digenous peoples that are not reducible to a singular representation of Indigenous. Nor are Indigenous peo ples’ relationships with place, environmental knowledges, structures of governance, or their particular values re ducible to a singular, all encompassing notion of an ‘Indigenous other’. To conﬂate this diverse cultural ex perience into a single category that is held against a Eurocentric singular runs the very danger of reinforcing Eurocentric power structures and colonial relationships. It risks pigeonholing Indigenous peoples’ active agency and their ﬂuid, ever changing engagement with their

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contemporary worlds into naı¨ve and offensive categories such as noble savage or primitive native. Indigenous diversity and speciﬁcity needs to be en gaged with in terms of particularities rather than a sin gularity. This perspective challenges how one might usefully discuss the notion of ‘Indigenous geographies’ without silencing that diversity and without implying a reductionist singularity. In our experience, that is the paradox of coming to terms with the signiﬁcance of In digenous geographies in contemporary geographic dis courses. The resolution of that paradox needs to be secured through ‘developing relationships’ rather than developing theory, or at least as a basis for theory, and focusing on ‘process’ rather than outcomes. Focusing on relationship and process reorients the discourse toward the ethics of engagement and the speciﬁcity of context. Many geographers engaged with Indigenous geog raphies have also engaged with Indigenous particularity. While their practice may involve engaging with rela tionships between speciﬁc Indigenous groups and par ticular administrative landscapes, or the way multiple groups are marginalized in similar ways by structures in a transnational sense, the strength of this ‘Indigenist’ work in geography has been in the framing of their work around ‘particular relationships’ rather than theoretical generalizations. This process of engagement has con fronted many geographers involved with questions of ethics, methods, and practices in diverse places from Nepal to Morocco, Costa Rica to Taiwan, and Israel to Malaysia. It has cast academic and applied research into new light as when viewed from Indigenous centered positions, rather than institutionally centered Eurocentric positions, the expectations, experiences, and ambitions regarding research in Indigenous settings are often very different to those formed by dominant cultures and academic disciplines. Much of the academic discussion of Indigenous geographies based on speciﬁcity and relationship build ing is framed by a series of binaries around notions of presence/absence, possession/dispossession, and rights/ charity.

Presence/Absence: The Paradox of Indigenous Geographies There is a dominant discourse that is theoretical, polit ical, and administrative and represents and imagines In digenous geographies in terms of absence, placing Indigenous peoples into an ahistorical past or into exotic (and distant, remote) places – anywhere but the con temporary Eurocentric here and now. At the same time, we have a discourse within Indigenous groups which offers an afﬁrmation of ongoing engagement, active agency, and contemporary presence. It is in how the

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discipline engages with this challenge that we might judge the contribution geographers might make in this ﬁeld. The founding work of key ﬁgures in Indigenous geographies, including Fay Gale, Jan Monk, Evelyn Stokes, Brian Murton, Elspeth Young, Peter Usher, Cole Harris, Bob Galois, Bill Jonas, Ben Wisner, Jonathan Briggs, Garth Cant, and Evelyn Peters, all contributed to research frameworks in which Indigenous people are engaged with as part of the experienced, everyday landscape. For these researchers, unlike those working in more colonial or salvage style frameworks, their In digenous collaborators and participants were people who were present in diverse cultural settings in rural, urban, and remote locations. In that sense, these geographers could not frame research with Indigenous groups in terms of their absence or their loss of culture, language, well being, or identity. Their work accepted that people were there and worked with them as part of the cultural landscapes that they were interested in as geographers. More recently, Indigenous scholars within geography have begun challenging disciplinary conventions in their applications of geographical tools to community based research, the development of Indigenous methodologies and philosophies, and the orientation of academic accountability to Indigenous values and understanding. The development of this work in geography can be glimpsed in a series of edited collections since the early 1980s, including special issues in Antipode, New Zealand Geographer, Geograﬁska Annaler B, Geographical Research, and GeoJournal, the edited collection from the Common wealth Geographical Bureau, and the establishment of the International Geographical Union (IGU) Indigenous peoples’ Knowledges and Rights Commission under the leadership of Jay Johnston in 2006. Geography was often implicated in the colonizing process by rendering people as absent from the land scape, emptying the landscape of Indigenous presences, and making space for colonial (and postcolonial) claims of ownership, settlement, and domination. In many of the cultural landscapes that geographers work in, the In digenous presence is persistent and uncanny. This feeling of simultaneously being in and out of place, of be longing and being alienated, of recognizing and denying the presence of others underpins the practical challenges of negotiating the coexistence of Indigenous and settler geographies in the same landscapes. Even where it is asserted that those relationships have been settled by treaty and there is some formal acknowledgement of coexistence, relationships of denial and domination per sist. For example, in the United States, where reservations were established and bounded within a long established legal tradition of accepting a level of Native American sovereignty, there has been non Native settlement into those reservations under terms prescribed by the Federal Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 and the provision for

sale of reservation lands to dominant society settlers. This creates strange and fragile geographies of coexist ence, where neither settler nor Indigenous society is able to deal comfortably with an almost ghostly co presence from the other. Thus, geographies of Indigenous absence and colonial presence have been literally and metaphorically impli cated in the construction of dominant metaphors of dispossession. In Australian landscapes, for example, dominant discourses imagine aboriginal people as being dispossessed by colonial occupation – even where there was no colonial settlement. It is one of the themes of Australian social justice movements to address aboriginal dispossession. Yet, in practice, aboriginal people are often very much in possession of their own country. Often there is no theft or settlement presence other than an administrative presence, and it is this institutional framework that incorporates Indigenous groups into particular sorts of relationships with the state and other bodies. Even where settlement has occurred, Indigenous groups continue to relate to and possess country in multiple ways. They continue to assert their presence and their ways of being and unsettle, challenge, and recon ﬁgure dominant systems, structures, and knowledges. It becomes crucial, therefore, to ask in what sense have people ceased to possess their country?

Possession/Dispossession: Challenging Erasure of Indigenous Geographies Within many societies, the Indigenous rights movement has often focused more on legal than social relationships, emphasizing the political importance of legal questions that arise within dominant state structures and the legal structures and institutions they authorize. This has meant, for example, that the legal technicalities of land tenure have often been mistaken for the realities of possession or dispossession and the realities of presence or absence. It is such inversions that have misdirected the native title debate in Australia where the courts represent a lack of continuous presence in country as a loss of connection to country, and therefore an extin guishment of Native title – even where people have continued to be engaged with their country and to embed their identity through their relationships with kin and country. Even where the act of disruption was a product of forced relocation, locked gates, frontier vio lence, or disease, what we see as the end product of this trope of dispossession is an erasure of Indigenous geographies in the administrative geographies of the settler state. This produces a legal imaginary, reinforced by state power, in which the state and those who are the beneﬁciaries of state presence no longer have to deal with Indigenous people’s rights and concerns, even when

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there is a clear coexistence in time and space. The imaginary suggests that there are no rights attached to the Indigenous presence in the landscape because the dominant society can only understand the idea of rights in terms of the structures, systems, and institutions that are authorized within its own worldview. That is the essence of the dominance that is constructed by the dominant settler society. The continued presence and signiﬁcance of Indigenous societies, governance insti tutions, knowledges, and practices simply does not need to be acknowledged, because the dominant society constructs a self referential claim to territorial sover eignty and self authorizing power. These imaginaries also reinforce dominant discourses which represent Indigenous people as being possessed by, rather than in possession of, their country. It represents Indigenous relationships with country not as a property right but as a (romanticized) dependency. Such mis representations not only erase the capacity of the dominant system to recognize coexistence and the sig niﬁcance of Indigenous peoples’ prior and persistent rights, but also the capacity of Indigenous people to ex ercise the rights and responsibilities that are constructed within the jurisdictions of customary law. Perversely, it is precisely that erasure which subsequently provides jus tiﬁcation for the dominant society to intervene ad ministratively as the ‘protector’ of Indigenous interests, or the patronizing senior partner in the process of civil ization. The process of domination thus creates a dis possession and absence that the dominant society needs to possess through charity and its own self assured presence. This authorizes settler governments and insti tutions to deﬁne indigeneity in terms of loss and lack. Engaging with Indigenous geographies and with lived experiences of presence, persistence, possession, and rights challenges this long tradition of deﬁning Indigen ous people in terms of absence, erasure, and disposses sion. The signiﬁcant features of Indigenous geographies are not adequately encompassed by focusing on the lack of the dominant language, nor people’s lack of the dominant culture, their lack of numeracy or literacy, their loss of their land, or their apparent loss of their own culture. Engaging with Indigenous geographies chal lenges those processes and their role in constructing Indigenous people as somehow missing from modernity and postmodernity, of always being in an anachronism – of being always out of time and out of place. It challenges the discourses of authenticity which dismiss current In digenous claims as not being able to reﬂect an authentic indigeneity because the things that the dominant society authorizes as authentically Indigenous are, by deﬁnition, things that can only exist in a past time and other place than the here and now. The authenticity discourse also renders people as objects of charity and sympathy rather than partners in terms of rights.

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Rights/Charity: Representation of Indigenous Geographies The assertion of Indigenous rights that belong to people as collectives as a result of their self deﬁned Indigenous identity is a big issue in human rights discourses that foreground individual rather than collective rights. The debate between collective and individual rights and the ways that different jurisdictions mediate the rights of groups and the rights of individuals has advanced con siderably, and the tortuous passage of the United Nations Declaration on the rights of Indigenous peoples has framed a strong response in favor of recognizing and responding to Indigenous rights. This fosters a shift from notions of charity based engagement being the dominant mode of states’ and settler institution’s intervention in Indigenous communities toward rights based engage ments. In terms of policies and practices, however, it remains a very live issue in many jurisdictions. For ex ample, reducing Indigenous state relations to what the Australian Government characterized as an agenda for ‘practical reconciliation’ or bridging the gap between statistical representations of health, education, employ ment, and poverty and so on, to bring Indigenous people to a statistical equality, the same life expectancy, and levels of morbidity and mortality, while addressing im portant issues of equity and justice, misses key issues raised by the rights based claims of Indigenous groups. Such approaches position the foundation of policy of Indigenous state relations in terms of the dispossession discourse, assuming also that the appropriate policy tar get is to reproduce the characteristics of the dominant society in the Indigenous population. In terms of representation, those key issues include difﬁcult questions of how people represent themselves, and how they exercise governance, including questions of social control and dissent, and what constitutes the complex geographical totalities of Indigenous peoples’ geographies, including Indigenous peoples’ multiple, ﬂuid ways of knowing what are categorized as time and space, and nature and environment, in Western world views. This also confronts questions of power, autonomy, and sovereignty in relations within Indigenous social formations, and between Indigenous, state, and other jurisdictions. This question of power inevitably frames questions of Indigenous geographies and state policies, including responses to contested claims to territory and rights to dispose of territory and its resources. For ex ample, in the ﬁeld of resource and environmental man agement, states claim to be able to dispose of Indigenous territories to advance the national interest and contribute to nation building. This should be seen not only in terms of exploitation of forest, mineral, energy, water, or wildlife resources in Indigenous domains, but also in terms of policies that exploit Indigenous geographies in

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other ways such as nuclear waste disposal, weapons testing, and tourism based development. In many juris dictions, state policies on such matters represent an ac tive continuation of frontier settlement and primitive accumulation. In the case, for example, of the politics of water, we ﬁnd states insisting on national control of water resources and framing environmental, economic, and development agendas as if Indigenous rights in the water, and the cultural landscapes in which it is embedded, were in conceivable. Even concepts such as ‘cultural ﬂows’ are treated as problematic and reduced from Indigenous conceptions of complex, sustainable, and just relations in cultural landscapes to engineered amounts of water into intensely ‘managed’ water delivery systems. Similar issues arise in relation to climate change, where one sees state responses to questions of Indigenous vulnerability in terms of the state’s right (even obligation) to intervene in ways that preempt and marginalize Indigenous gov ernance structures. Thus, states assume a right to move people if the state deﬁnes them as vulnerable to climate change risks. States assume a right to intervene, rather than constructing the state’s relationship with Indigenous peoples as one of partnership and negotiation.

Identity, Scale, Place, and Culture: Lessons and Challenges from Indigenous Geographies Indigenous geographies present the discipline with some important lessons and challenges. Many Indigenous cultures and their diverse ways of knowing themselves and their worlds offer exemplars of speciﬁc relationships with particular environmental circumstances and rela tionships to place that have proven themselves sustain able and viable. One of the consequences of globalization has been increasing pressure to subsume this human diversity into singular systems of environmental governance, of authoritative state administration, and of predeﬁned or universally deﬁned rights. Yet to lose the human diversity represented by Indigenous experiences and responses to human–environmental relations is not simply unjust and unjustiﬁable, but it is also to risk re ducing the capacity of peoples to continue to live lives that are deﬁned by themselves rather than deﬁned by the state or by the multinational superstate apparatus. In the context of widely perceived environmental and social risk, there is also much to be learned from Indigenous experiences of the ontological risk that has accompanied the threats and damage to the connections and balance between cosmological elements as a result of various intrusions into, claims upon and theft, marginalization and pauperization of Indigenous geographies. The real ization of diverse Indigenous geographies; the practices;

and experiences of Indigenous place making; Indigenous governance; Indigenous ways of thinking, doing, and being continues to contribute a fundamental element of cultural and human diversity to the challenges of human–environmental relations. In these discussions of Indigenous experience across the globe, the questions of power and the capacity of people to respond to power are raised again. In exercising their presence through dugong and turtle management in northern Australia, whale and seal hunting in the Can adian arctic, or reindeer herding in northern Europe, and so on, Indigenous groups’ social practices confront Eurocentric societies with challenges that reveal not only fundamentally different ways of knowing the world but also the dimensions of power that are contained within dominant administrative structures. Academic and Eurocentric political discourses tend to take for granted the right of states to exercise power in relation to en vironmental management. They tend to assume (in direct contradiction of the evidence as understood by many Indigenous peoples) that the state is a neutral player acting in the wider national interest or public interest or human interest. Indeed, it is very easy to forget that the state is an agent of power acting on its own behalf. In Indigenous geographies, that power is often laid bare and ﬁerce in response to Indigenous groups trying to effect ively challenge that power, just by their presence, by their persistence in activities and practices that do not ﬁt the morays and norms of the dominant culture and the dominant administrative structures. The scales at which Indigenous geographies are embodied, enacted, and governed, for example, are often in contrast to the formal jurisdictions of state power. The intimacy of environ mental and social knowledge, for example, often insists on governance structures that combine responsibilities for both oversight and governance of systems and their daily use and management. In contrast, state sponsored and commercially oriented systems often separate re search, use, and governance functions into separate structures and fragment, diminish, and marginalize In digenous interests in integrated systems in the process.

Conclusion Clearly, Indigenous geographies provide a powerful and challenging window on contemporary issues for geog raphy as a discipline and geographers as practitioners in a variety of ﬁelds. For the discipline, engaging with the rights of Indigenous peoples to maintain their identity, maintain their autonomy, and beneﬁt from the new United Nations Convention will reveal some of the hard edges of state administrative structures, private and other institutional frameworks that are too often taken for granted as being neutral or well intentioned. Indigenous

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geographies offer a window on the state and the exercise of power, which is very different from the window that is offered by more conventional economic and cultural geographies because the state is so much an element of what seeks to overwhelm Indigenous rights. In responding to these windows on diversity and the challenges of human–environment relationships, there is a mismatch in scales between Indigenous autonomy, which is often exercised at a much smaller geographical scale than state autonomy, and globalization of environ mental governance, economic regulation, and other matters of human affairs. This mismatch risks swamping Indigenous peoples’ knowledges, their notions of part nership, of relationships between equals, and of govern ance with powerful and authoritative solutions that are alien to the geographies that allow the world to be. While these matters are challenges equally to the state, to state sanctioned institutions, and to Indigenous groups, many aspects of Indigenous geographies actually challenge the identity of the state itself, and state centric conceptions of human–environment relation. One of the important insights is that Indigenous peoples are not reducible to a simple equality with other stakeholders. In the fragmentation that often character izes reductionist representations of Indigenous identity, or the essentialist representations of identity which fail to deal with critical issues of connections among people and between people and their environments, we open tremendously challenging questions about how to understand, for example, water in rivers in more than environmental management terms and more in terms of environment and culture. So in Indigenous geographies, a cultural ﬂow is not reducible to an amount of water. It has to be conceptualized as an intervention which cre ates, maintains, or manages connections. It reconnects things that are disconnected through periods of drought or through mismanagement of water. In different land scapes and different geographies, notions of connection will be conceptualized and managed in different ways. But, responding to this insight will involve challenging the dominant binaries that characterize state–Indigenous relations in terms of presence/absence, and possession/ dispossession. Until dominant societies can reframe their relations with both Indigenous and environmental ‘oth ers’ in terms that accept Indigenous presence, posses sion, and rights, then the assumption of superiority over, and therefore power to govern, will continue to con struct unjust and unsustainable human–environment relations. In terms of geographical realities, it is not appropriate to assume that states and other Eurocentric institutions will be able to articulate a shift toward new ways of relating to human and environmental diversity. Rather, it is the persistent presence of Indigenous peoples who articulate their continuing presence in and possession of

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their relationships with their geographies and who insist on recognition within a rights based discourse that re spects the fragile and dynamic geographies of coexistence between Indigenous peoples and others. Even in areas of long settlement, for example, in urban areas, where Eurocentric legal tenure issues have been well and truly settled, Indigenous peoples maintain a presence and a cultural relationship that creates a persistent coexistence of an Indigenous cultural geography with the settled legal tenure geography. Developing formal recognition of that coexistence provides an opportunity to shift re lations from an assumed and enforced absence and dispossession to relations characterized by continuing presence and partnership based on rights. Focusing on presence and partnership encourages a shift to process and relationship, rather than intervention and outcomes, with respect to postcolonial relations. In such a reshaping of our shared geographical imaginaries, we open the prospect for reconﬁguring the social, cultural, political, economic, and environmental responses to those geog raphies of coexistence as fundamental contemporary challenges, both to society and to the discipline of geography. This leaves us asking the question of just how the discipline may contribute to both understanding and nurturing those pluralist coexisting geographies. That is, in many ways, the challenge for both the writers and readers of this work. See also: Indigeneity; Land Rights; Postcolonialism/ Postcolonial Geographies.

Further Reading Berg, L. D. and Kearns, R. A. (1997). (Re)Formations: Cultural geographies of Aotearoa/New Zealand. New Zealand Geographer 53(2), 1 2. Briggs, J. A. (2005). The use of Indigenous knowledge in development: Problems and challenges. Progress in Development Studies 5, 99 114. Cant, G., Goodall, A. and Inns, J. (eds.) (2005). Discourses and Silences: Indigenous Peoples, Risks and Resistance. Christchurch: Department of Geography, University of Canterbury. Cant, G., Overton, J. and Pawson, E. (eds.) (1993). Indigenous Land Rights in Commonwealth Countries: Dispossession, Negotiation and Community Action. Christchurch: Department of Geography, University of Canterbury and the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board for the Commonwealth Geographical Bureau. David, S. and Wisner, B. (1984). The fourth world: A geography of Indigenous struggles. Antipode 16(2), 3 13. GeoJournal (in press) Geography for and with Indigenous peoples: Indigenous geographies as challenge and invitation. Harris, C. (2002). Making Native Space: Colonialism, Resistance and Reserves in British Columbia. Vacouver, BC: UBC Press. Howitt, R. and Jackson, S. (1998). Some things do change: Indigenous rights, geographers and geography in Australia. Australian Geographer 29(2), 155 173. Johnson, J. T., Cant, G., Howitt, R. and Peters, E. (eds.) (2007). Special Issue: Indigenous peoples Knowledges and Rights Geographical Research 45(2). New Zealand Geographer (2005) 61(2).

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Shaw, W. S., Herman, R. D. K. and Dobbs, G. R. (2006). Encountering indigeneity: Re imaging and decolonising geography. Geograﬁska Annaler B 88(3), 267 276. Starn, O. and de la Cadena, M. (eds.) (2007). Indigenous Experience Today. Oxford: Berg. Stea, D. and Wisner, B. (1984). Introduction to the Fourth World, a geography of Indigenous struggles. Antipode 16, 3 12. Stokes, E. (1987). Maori geography or geography of Maoris? New Zealand Geographer 43, 118 123.

Relevant Websites http://www.unl.edu IPKRC, The Indigenous Peoples’ Knowledges and Rights Commission of the International Geographical Union, Anthropology and Geography Department of University of Nebraska Lincoln. http://www.iwgia.org UN declaration of Indigenous rights, IWGIA.

Indigenous Health and Medicine K. Wilson, University of Toronto, Mississauga, ON, Canada C. Richmond, The University of Western Ontario, London, ON, Canada & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Community-Based Research It takes place in community settings and involves community members at all stages of the research program, from the design and implementation of the research projects through to dissemination of the ﬁndings. Community-based research builds on and engages in methodologies that empower and legitimize the knowledge, experience, perspectives and voices of communities, and works to make positive change within the communities involved. Infant Mortality The number of infants who die before the age of 1 (expressed as a rate per 1000 live births). Life Expectancy The number of years a person is expected to live from birth. Mother Earth Term that reﬂects the belief of many Indigenous populations that the Earth provides all things necessary for survival and represents a female entity. Population Pyramids Graphic representation of the age and sex composition of a population. The proportion of males and females for different age cohorts (usually in 5-year increments) are displayed as a series of horizontally stacked bars. Pyramids can be created for the total population of a country or geographic area or subsets of the total population to demonstrate how the age and sex structure of subsets of the population may differ from the total population. Self-Determination The right for Indigenous populations to develop and protect their own lifestyles, economies, and sacred traditions. This includes the right to determine what their future and the destiny of their land shall be.

Introduction The term ‘Indigenous peoples’ is generally used to refer to those people who descend from the original populations who inhabited a country or region before the period of colonization and the creation of modern states/territories. Oftentimes the term ‘Indigenous’ is used interchangeably with Aboriginal, First Peoples, or Native, and the term used often reﬂects the geographic positioning and lan guage of the Indigenous group. For instance in Canada, the Indigenous population is legally deﬁned as ‘Aboriginal’ peoples of Canada, and they are recognized as three groups: First Nations, Me´tis, and Inuit. In Australia, the Indigenous population is deﬁned as the Aboriginal and

Torres Strait Islanders, while in New Zealand they are deﬁned as Maori. Within Scandinavian countries, the term Sami is often used to refer to Indigenous peoples. Each of these deﬁnitions is determined in acute ways by the geo graphic regions within which these Indigenous peoples have lived in historic and contemporary times. It is estimated that Indigenous peoples number over 300 million representing 5% of the world’s total population. Indigenous peoples can be found in over 70 countries throughout the world ranging from the circumpolar north, South Central, and North America, across regions of Africa, Asia and also Australia, and the Paciﬁc regions. Overall, the world’s Indigenous population is much younger, and growing at a much faster rate than the non Indigenous population. In some regions throughout the world, between 30% and 50% of the Indigenous population is less than 15 years of age. Population pyramids for most Indigenous populations are characterized by a very broad base that narrows quite sharply toward the top due to very high levels of fertility and mortality. Indigenous peoples hold strong ties to their ancestral lands and generally share a worldview characterized by harmonious relationships with the natural environment, and in fact, various creation stories of Indigenous peoples link them to both natural and spiritual worlds, often symbolically understood as ‘mother earth.’ Indigenous peoples represent a diversity of languages, cultures, and traditions, and were historically governed by sophisti cated cultural, economic, social, and political institutions. Among the Kwakiutl people of coastal British Columbia, for instance, the potlatch (i.e., the recognition of social status though commodity exchange) formed the insti tution through which Kwakiutl social structure was most vividly displayed, reinforced, and modiﬁed. The potlatch maintained an effective management of human, en vironmental, and cultural resources, acting as a fully in tegrated monitoring and public accountability system. Precisely because of the important connection be tween Indigenous people and the land, geographers have long studied the spatial processes tying Indigenous peoples to their environments. However, it is only in the past few decades that health geographers have turned their interests to issues of Indigenous peoples.

Indigenous Concepts of Health Concepts of health among Indigenous societies around the globe place signiﬁcant importance on the larger

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system within which the individual lives, and incorporate concepts including holism, balance, and interconnected ness. In New Zealand, the Maori Public Health Action Plan summarizes three Maori models of health: Te Pae Mahutonga (Southern Star Cross constellation), Whare Tapa Wha¯ (health as a house), and Te Wheke (the octopus). Of these three models, Whare Tapa Wha¯ provides a multidimensional concept of Maori health and well being that extends beyond physical health to recognize the dependence of health on a balance of four main di mensions – taha wairua (the spiritual side); taha hinengaro (thoughts and feelings); taha tinana (the physical side); and taha whanau (family). Represented by four walls of a house, this metaphor holds that if one of these walls should fall, the house will collapse. From Australia, the National Aboriginal Health Strategy Working Party de ﬁnes health as not just the physical well being of the individual, but the social, emotional, and cultural well being of the whole community. This deﬁnition in corporates a ‘whole life’ view, including the cyclical concept of life–death–life. The concept of holism is central to ideas of health and wellness among native Hawaiians, as are dimensions of spirituality and culture. Traditional native Hawaiian concepts of health en compass cultural values of lokahi (balance), pono (doing the right thing), and kokua (working without expecting reward), and aim to strengthen and protect the family (extended family) or ohara and larger community, thereby conceptualizing health not as a personal burden, but one that is shared by the whole community. Among native people of North America, the concept of health is explained through the medicine wheel, which is a wide conceptual understanding of life and the interrelatedness of all its functions (i.e., life, time, seasons, cosmology, birth, and womb). The medicine wheel rep resents a circle divided into four sections that represent the four directions: north, east, south, and west. Ac cording to beliefs, all four elements of life – the physical, emotional, mental, and spiritual – are represented in the four directions of the medicine wheel. If one element within the wheel is neglected or receives too much at tention, then health suffers in all four areas. One of the main teachings of the medicine wheel is that balance between all four elements is essential for maintaining and supporting good health. Balance extends beyond the in dividual such that health and healing also requires an individual to live in harmony with others, their com munity, the environment, and the spirit worlds. Among Inuit peoples of Northern Canada, these concepts are captured within inuuqatigiittiarniq, which depends on the balance and harmony of economic, cultural, environ mental, and biological factors. A careful balance of fac tors manifests as inummarik – a most genuine person – in a continuous lifelong process of developing interaction with people and animals, community, and environment.

Current Patterns of Health and Well-Being Through the combined processes of colonialism and neocolonialism, the health and well being of Indigenous populations have fallen ‘out of balance’ as they have been displaced from their ancestral lands. Though Indigenous peoples are a diverse group, they share a common history of oppression and marginalization as early colonial policies aimed at assimilating Indigenous peoples into the dom inant (i.e., colonizing) population. With colonialism came loss of ancestral land for Indigenous peoples, and forced migration to isolated regions, wherein the truncated lands were often insufﬁcient to support a familiar way of life. For example, Canada’s First Nations live on reserved lands that total 0.20% of Canada’s total landmass. The loss of land, as well as numerous policies aimed at assimilation (e.g., residential schools, through which the Canadian and Australian governments forcibly removed children from their communities), served to disrupt the sociocultural and economic activities that had tied Indigenous peoples so intimately to their physical environments, thereby upset ting the balance upon which good health rests. These assimilationist policies have contributed to the ongoing legacy of social and health inequalities that we witness among Indigenous peoples today. A clear distinction can be drawn between biomedical approaches to health and Indigenous approaches to health and well being. Biomedical models constitute linear ap proaches to knowledge in which disease is seen as a discrete (isolated) event that is treatable by the intervention of healthcare. In contrast, Indigenous perspectives of health, as earlier reviewed, constitute a much more holistic approach that emphasizes the interconnectedness of people, com munity, their spirit worlds, and perhaps most importantly, their physical environments. Despite this difference, bio medical indicators are important for highlighting the stark inequalities in health between Indigenous and non In digenous peoples. Although it is often difﬁcult to collect data on the health of Indigenous populations, available biomedical indicators demonstrate that Indigenous peoples suffer from much higher levels of morbidity and mortality than non In digenous populations throughout the world. While differ ences in life expectancy between Indigenous and non Indigenous populations have decreased over time, gaps still remain with variations across the world. In the United States the gap in life expectancy is 4 –5 years, in Canada 5– 8 years, in South/Central America 4 years, in New Zealand 8 years, and in Australia 17 years. The gaps in rates of infant mortality are especially large for Indigenous peoples living in Australia and South/Central America. Indigenous populations have undergone an ‘epide miologic transition’, characterized by the decline in in cidence of infectious diseases, followed by the rise of

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chronic, noncommunicable diseases, accidents, and violence. Chronic conditions such as diabetes, cardio vascular disease, and cancer are also increasing at a much higher rate than among the non Indigenous population. Today, Indigenous peoples experience the kinds of health problems most closely associated with poverty, and also suffer from problems linked to a marginal position within their respective nation states. Levels of education and workforce participation of Indigenous peoples lags far behind that of their non Indigenous counterpart, and the paradox for many Indigenous peoples is that their home communities often offer little employment opportunity, thereby reﬂecting elevated rates of under and un employment. In Canada, less than 50% of the Indigenous population has completed high school (in comparison to almost 70% of the total population) while in Australia less than 20% of the Indigenous population has com pleted high school. Given the strong connection between level of education and employment, it is not surprising that unemployment rates are three times higher among the Indigenous populations living in Australia and Can ada as compared to their non Indigenous counterparts. Inadequate and insufﬁcient housing is also a serious problem across Indigenous populations, as remote and rural communities lack basic sanitary infrastructure. Crowded housing, among other health determinants, is responsible for numerous health problems including high rates of infectious diseases such as otitis media and tuberculosis. Among First Nations in Canada, for in stance, the incidence rate of tuberculosis is 10 times higher than the national average. Indigenous peoples are also exposed to high rates of other infectious diseases such as pertussis, meningitis, hepatitis, pneumonia, sexually transmitted diseases, and HIV/AIDS, all of which are linked to poverty, under and unemployment, unstable housing, homelessness, sexual/physical abuse, and a concomitant lack of self worth. Rates of morbidity and mortality due to suicide, in jury, accidents, and violence are also much higher in Indigenous populations. Current patterns of health and social suffering reﬂect the combined effects of colonial oppression, systemic racism, and discrimination as well as unequal access to human, social, and environmental re sources. Such inequalities in health and well being have been attributed to the ongoing legacies of colonialism. Indeed, research has shown that among Indigenous populations that have experienced lower rates of as similation and acculturation, rates of chronic conditions, and the presence of risk factors (e.g., smoking, drinking, and solvent abuse) are also lower. Indigenous Medicines and Healthcare There are signiﬁcant differences in approaches to medicine embraced by Indigenous peoples and those who

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identify with biomedical models of healthcare. Tradi tional medicine refers to a diverse range of health and healing practices used by Indigenous peoples that in corporate plants, animals, and the spiritual realm for the diagnosis and treatment of illness, or maintenance of health and well being. A key distinction between tradi tional medicine and biomedicine is that traditional medicine embraces a holistic approach for the promotion of physical, emotional, mental, and spiritual well being. Unlike biomedicine, traditional medicine does not treat illness in isolation, but rather seeks to restore balance. Research conducted in various parts of Africa and India demonstrates the use of plants and herbal medi cines to treat such afﬂictions as gastrointestinal disorders, malaria, and weak blood. Food is also a very important component of Indigenous health and medicine. The Navajo rely on four sacred plants (corn, beans, squash, and tobacco) for both food and medicinal purposes. The Inuit of Bafﬁn Island hold the belief that health is achieved when the body is warm, and that sickness occurs when the body becomes cold. Such belief holds that one’s body can be ‘warmed’ through the consumption of country food, in particular seal. The blood of the seal is thought to be warm and therefore it is consumed not just for dietary reasons, but also for treating illnesses. The use of food and plants as medicines for maintaining a balance between hot and cold bodily states has been documented among Indigenous cultures in Latin America, Trinidad and Tobago, the American Southwest, Philippines, Haiti, and Puerto Rico. Today, the impact of traditional medicine reaches far beyond Indigenous populations. In many countries throughout the world, non Indigenous people are adopting the use of traditional medicine (often referred to as alternative or complementary medicine), and in fact, Indigenous peoples often combine con ventional healthcare with traditional healing practices.

Access to Contemporary and Traditional Healing Practices Access to traditional and conventional healthcare is an es pecially salient issue for Indigenous populations and rep resents an interesting research topic for health geographers. From a geographic perspective, physical access to con ventional health services such as family doctors, emergency care, and specialized technologies is limited for Indigenous peoples living in remote and isolated areas that are a far distance from major urban centers where these services tend to be concentrated. However, even when healthcare services are geographically accessible, other barriers can limit access for Indigenous peoples including language, cultural difference, and discrimination. Access to traditional healing systems is particularly difﬁcult for Indigenous populations living in an urban

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context, where they may be far removed from the healing traditions of their families and communities. Decreased access to traditional healing systems is, however, not limited only to Indigenous people in urban areas. In many Indigenous communities, healing traditions have been lost or severely hampered due to colonial policies that forbade the practice of traditional medicine and ceremonies. Colonial governments saw it necessary to prohibit Indigenous peoples from using and practicing traditional medicines and other activities that ran counter to the assimilation effort. Perhaps, the most extreme colonial measure taken resulted in the forced attendance at residential/boarding schools by generations of In digenous children in Canada, the United States, Aus tralia, and New Zealand, wherein they were deprived of their families, languages, and cultural traditions. While Indigenous populations experience lower levels of access to healthcare than non Indigenous populations, in many instances access to care can be improved through the process of self determination in healthcare. And in fact, there are a growing number of cases wherein Indigenous communities are implementing traditional healing centers in their own communities, as well as in major metropolitan areas. Such centers provide In digenous peoples with access to a range of healing practices and services that are geographically and cul turally accessible, including traditional healers, doctors, nurses, dieticians and nutritionists, and counselors.

Geography and the Health of Indigenous Peoples An important issue that needs to be addressed within health geography is the lack of researchers working in the area of Indigenous health – this is so despite changes in the discipline that encourage alternative views of health and place. The relationship between health and place has culturally speciﬁc dimensions, yet these tend to be overlooked, particularly in the context of Indigenous health. Given what we know about Indigenous concepts of health, research around the connections between health and place is an important avenue through which health geographers may be able to contribute to a decline in the health and social inequalities endured by In digenous populations. In Box 1, we identify important research directions for geographers. While it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss each component in the list we feel that it is important to acknowledge the po tential links between land and health, as land remains at the heart of Indigenous cultures and crosscuts the re search directions we have identiﬁed. Given its level of signiﬁcance in all aspects of In digenous culture, the land is an important issue to con sider in conjunction with Indigenous health. Historically,

Box 1 Research directions for health geographers * * * * * * * * * * * *

Indigenous peoples’ sense of place and culture Economic opportunities/limitations for Indigenous peoples Indigenous peoples’ social institutions Healthcare access for Indigenous peoples (traditional and contemporary) Access to environmental resources Changing social environments of Indigenous communities Impacts of environmental degradation on Indigenous communities Incidence of chronic/infectious disease among Indigenous peoples Indigenous concepts of health Traditional Indigenous knowledge Everyday living in Indigenous communities Changing way of life among Indigenous populations

the land has been a very important component of In digenous culture. Before colonization, most Indigenous societies could be described as subsistence cultures. Whether by hunting, trapping, planting crops, ﬁshing, or gathering, the diet and daily nourishment of these groups were provided by the land. Indigenous cultures vary widely in their beliefs, traditions, and approaches to health, however, a common theme is a belief in the im portance of the land and a life based on stewardship and harmony with the earth. Indigenous people contend that the relationship they have with the land shapes all aspects of their lives: the cultural, spiritual, emotional, physical, and social lives of individuals and communities. In the contemporary context, many Indigenous peoples can no longer live off the land as they once did; however, they assert that access to the land remains an essential com ponent of their culture. Attachment to the land is health promoting, as demonstrated in the ability to practice a traditional way of life, to hunt and ﬁsh, to collect berries and fruits, to gather roots and herbs for medicines, and perhaps most importantly, to pass this knowledge and culture to the next generation. Because of their close ties to the land, environmental degradation can have devastating effects on the well being of Indigenous peoples. Contamination from industrial development and urban growth and sprawl disrupts wildlife habitats and reduces the purity of traditional foods and medicines, all of which impact upon the physical and spiritual health of Indigenous peoples. Numerous studies conducted in circumpolar regions reveal that due to an thropogenic activities, environmental contaminants (e.g., mercury and PCBs) are entering the traditional food systems (ﬁsh, game, and plants) of Indigenous populations. Research conducted among populations in warmer climates also reveals that Indigenous peoples are exposed to contaminants through the food chain. Indigenous

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populations are more likely to be exposed to bioaccu mulating contaminants than non Indigenous populations due to their high consumption of traditional foods (e.g., ﬁsh and wildlife). Since the consumption of traditional foods is often an economic necessity, contamination raises issues that extend beyond nutritional and health problems. Due to the poor economic conditions that exist among many Indigenous populations, the consumption of tradi tional foods is an inexpensive and ideal alternative to store bought food. Therefore, within the contemporary context, contamination is not just a physical health issue but also an economic one. Through colonial processes, Indigenous people have experienced physical displacement from their traditional territories. Culture stress is usually visible in individuals or groups that have experienced massive or forced change in their lives and can manifest itself in both physical and psychological health problems. Hearings from the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples in Canada illustrated that aboriginal peoples forced to relocate experienced psychological health problems, ranging from homesickness to severe depression; these conditions were brought upon by the mourning for lost homelands, culture, and traditional ways of life. Loss of land is also associated with the destruction of traditional ways of life and a lack of access to traditional foods and medicines. In many cases, Indigenous peoples are no longer able to partake in the hunting and gathering of traditional foods thus becoming dependent upon store bought foods. The combined effects of a decrease in hunting and the consumption of traditional foods (and increased consumption of carbohydrates and reﬁned sugars) have resulted in cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and an epidemic of obesity, particularly among In digenous populations in North America.

Decolonizing Methodologies and Community-Based Approaches to Understanding Health Though geographers have only recently begun to explore Indigenous health issues, there is a long history of research on Indigenous peoples. In the past few decades however, Indigenous communities have raised signiﬁcant critiques about the way research has been done in their com munities, highlighting signiﬁcant moral and ethical con cerns about the motivations and implications of such research. Many purport that such approaches serve to perpetuate the colonial agenda of the nation state, which seeks to control and regulate the well being of Indigenous peoples. Indeed, Indigenous communities often speak about being ‘researched to death’, as they participate in numerous studies, yet see little beneﬁt from the numerous reports, theses, and journal articles that are produced. An

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important paradox emerges: Indigenous peoples are among the most studied population in the world, yet they continue to bear a disproportionate burden of health and social disparity. Indeed, the history of research from many Indigenous perspectives is so deeply embedded in colon ization that it has been regarded as a tool only of colon ization and not as a potential tool for self determination, development, or autonomy for Indigenous communities. In the past few decades, there has been a strong movement from within Indigenous populations to engage with, and in come cases, take full control over research done in their communities. Indigenous researchers have been active in seeking ways to dispel such ‘colonizing’ methods, and focus efforts instead on building and en gaging in methodologies that empower and legitimize the knowledge, experience, perspectives, and voices of In digenous peoples and their communities. This approach has been labeled by some as ‘indigenist’, as it is formed around three principles of resistance, political integrity, and the privileging of Indigenous voices. Although In digenous approaches to knowledge and learning may challenge Western orthodoxy, there is growing evidence of the value of investing in speciﬁc research projects and in capacity building for researchers of Indigenous origin. In fact, in 2002, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand signed a tripartite memorandum of understanding on health research for Indigenous health. All three countries fund research centrally through contestable grant rounds that seeks to develop sectors of Indigenous researchers alongside Western oriented researchers.

Indigenous Health Research: The Way Forward for Geographers In terms of their health and social conditions, Indigenous populations continue to fare among the worst in the world. Such inequalities undoubtedly reﬂect the colonial legacy that continues to shadow Indigenous peoples’ health. Indeed, the most consequential impact of coloni alism is the broad disconnect between Indigenous peoples and their ancestral place in the world. Perhaps the most pivotal determinant of Indigenous health is place. In the years ahead, geographers can therefore play a central role in exploring some of the key issues explored in this art icle, as well as others that are yet to be explored (see Box 1). Ultimately, improving quality of life among Indigenous populations requires research programs and health policy that are community based, and informed by holistic models that recognize the multiple, interacting dimen sions of Indigenous people’s health. See also: Complementary and Alternative Medicine; Environmental Health; Healthcare Accessibility; Health Geography; Health Inequalities; Medical Geography.

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Further Reading Alderete, E. (1999). The Health of Indigenous Peoples. Geneva: World Health Organization. Bartlett, J. G. (2003). Involuntary cultural change, stress phenomenon and aboriginal health status. Canadian Journal of Public Health 94, 165 167. Berry, J. W. (1990). Acculturation and adaptation: Healthy consequences of culture contact among circumpolar peoples. Arctic Medical Research 49, 142 150. Buckley, P. (1997). Indigenous Peoples’ Health: Issues and Care in Rural and Remote Areas of the World. An Annotated Bibliography with International Coverage. Bendigo: Australian Rural Health Research Institute. Couzos, S., Lea, T., Murray, R. and Culbong, M. (2005). ‘We are not just participants We are in charge’: The NACCHO ear trial and the process for aboriginal community controlled health research. Ethnicity and Health 10, 91 111. Cunningham, C., Reading, J. and Eades, S. (2003). Health research and Indigenous peoples. BMJ 327, 445 447. Durie, M. (2004). Understanding health and illness: Research at the interface between science and Indigenous knowledge. International Journal of Epidemiology 33, 1138 1143. Hogg, R. S. (1992). Indigenous mortality: Placing Australian aboriginal mortality within a broader context. Social Science and Medicine 35, 335 346.

Smallwood, G., White, C. and Kotiw, M. (1997). The relevance of human rights to health status in Australian aboriginal and Torres Strait islander communities. Health and Human Rights 2, 127 136. Smith, L. T. (1999). Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples. Dunedin: University of Otago Press. Van Oostdam, J., Donaldson, S. G., Feeley, M. et al. (2005). Human health implications of environmental contaminants in Arctic Canada: A review. Science of the Total Environment 351 352, 165 246. Waldram, J. (2004). Revenge of the Windigo: Construction of the Mind and Mental Health of North American Aboriginal Peoples. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Zechetmayr, M. (1997). Native Americans: A neglected health care crisis and a solution. Journal of Health and Social Policy 9, 29 47.

Relevant Websites http://www.healthinfonet.ecu.edu.au/ Australian Indigenous Health web resource. http://www.maorihealth.govt.nz/ Maori Indigenous Health web resource. http://www.naho.ca/english/ National Aboriginal Health Organization. http://www.who.int/hhr/activities/indigenous/en/ WHO Health and Human Rights of Indigenous People.

Indigenous Knowledges J. Mistry, University of London, Egham, UK & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Conceptual Framework A theoretical model comprising a set of interrelated concepts or abstract ideas. Constructivism An approach based on the idea that knowledge is constructed by the knower based on mental activity. Equilibrium Paradigm Within ecology it is the idea of the ‘balance of nature’ and stability, which, within an ecosystem, would be internally driven. Ethnodevelopment This approach to development aims to build on the positive qualities of indigenous cultures and societies, including their sense of ethnic identity, close attachment to ancestral land, and capacity to mobilize resources for shared goals. Nonequilibrium Paradigm Within ecology this is the idea that ecosystems are driven by external factors such as climate, and as such are constantly responding to changing conditions. Participatory Action Research The emphasis of participatory action research is on generating knowledge from the perspective of those being researched, not from the perspective of the researcher. It entails collective and self-reﬂective enquiry with the aim to make some positive change. Positivism An approach that emphasizes observable facts and scientiﬁc knowledge. Reductionism An approach that asserts that the nature of complex things can always be reduced to (explained by) simpler or more fundamental things.

Introduction: Deﬁning Indigenous Knowledge Interest in indigenous knowledge has been growing rapidly in recent years. Discourses on development and environment extol the beneﬁts of incorporating in digenous knowledge into policy development, as well as on the ground interventions. There are greater numbers of reports in the popular media of indigenous peoples and their specialized knowledge of their localities, particularly in the face of changing environmental con ditions. Whether it be the Inuit people of Canada’s High Artic or the San people of Botswana, these microcosmic narratives of the intimate knowledge of these groups on

various aspects of natural resource use and management are increasingly portrayed as the possible answers to global environmental problems. This is in contrast to modern Western detachment from nature which is seen as the main cause of these problems. However, what is indigenous knowledge? This is in no way clear. Various terms are used interchangeably and include ‘indigenous knowledge’, ‘indigenous techni cal knowledge’, ‘ethnoecology’, ‘local knowledge’, ‘folk knowledge’, traditional knowledge’, and ‘traditional environmental knowledge or ecological knowledge’. Although these all share a common meaning and understanding which can be useful for a mutual space of engagement, there is a fundamental problem in that we are assuming that all people who hold indigenous knowledge are indigenous people. However, deﬁning ‘indigenous’ is a highly contested issue and the word comes with a multiplex of cultural, moral, and political connotations. For example, people have used criteria such as prior occupancy of land, length of occupancy, and capacity to remain unchanged to identify themselves as indigenous in order to establish rights and to protect their interests. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) including Survival International and Cultural Survival have been established to support and lobby for these indigenous groups. However, at the same time, many governments claim that there is nothing indigenous about groups of people whom they view as another minority group under their jurisdiction. With such conﬂicts over ‘indigenousness’ it would seem better to ﬁnd another word to describe a particular kind of knowledge. Of the terms mentioned above, ‘local’ sounds more neutral but it fails to indicate key qualitative differences in the char acter of the knowledge usually alluded to, while ‘tradi tional’ implicates something ‘out of its time’ with long term cultural stasis. Debate on the term ‘indigenous’ will continue, yet it is useful to have some commonly asserted characteristics of indigenous knowledge: 1. Local – indigenous knowledge is context speciﬁc in that it has roots in a particular place and in the ex periences of the people that live in that location. Transferring that knowledge to another location quite literally makes it meaningless. 2. Oral transmission or through imitation and demon stration – whether it be through stories, myths, songs, or through accompanying other people and observing and learning, indigenous knowledge is rarely written down. In fact, writing it down can change some of the fundamental properties of the knowledge.

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3. Adaptive capacity – over time and through everyday life experiences, indigenous knowledge is adapted through repetition, learning, experimentation, and adoption of novel solutions. It is therefore not static but constantly changing. 4. Social memory – indigenous knowledge is shared to a much greater extent compared to other forms of knowledge. This shared understanding and know ledge is important as it helps to establish a long term communal understanding of people’s environment and the transmission of pertinent experience. However, the distribution of this knowledge can still be socially differentiated, for example, by age and gender, and preserved in the memories of particular individuals by virtue of their spiritual or political status. 5. Holistic – indigenous knowledge is situated within numerous interlinked facets of people’s lives. It is therefore difﬁcult and impractical to separate, for example, the cultural from the ecological, or the ra tional from the nonrational. Now that we have a basic checklist of some of the characteristics of indigenous knowledge, we can look at the position of indigenous knowledge within the devel opment ﬁeld over time.

The Place of Indigenous Knowledge in Development Up until the mid 1960s, indigenous knowledge was commonly viewed as something backward, nonsensical, superstitious, and un modern. These ‘traditional’ ideas were treated as something to be undermined and over come, and their legitimacy was rarely questioned. In many developing countries, development ‘experts’ and organizations were brought in to deal with natural re source management and extraction issues, yet the con ceptual fameworks they brought with them were developed back in their own worlds; a far distance from the realities of the local situations and within a positivist and reductionist framework. In some cases, these scien tiﬁc models were considered superior to indigenous knowledge, whereas in other cases indigenous knowledge was just not acknowledged to be worth noting. This la beling of indigenous knowledge as ‘unscientiﬁc’ was re inforced by the perception that indigenous peoples often used inappropriate and damaging land use and resource management practices. A case in point has been widespread belief that in many semiarid lands, wide scale and irreversible land degrad ation has taken place as a result of overuse of natural resources. Local pastoralists have invariably been regarded as the culprits, and development efforts have been aimed at changing their management strategies, and ultimately their way of life. Little effort at understanding how these

pastoralists may have used their knowledge to manage their resources took place. However, recent evidence in dicates that in fact many of these semiarid ecosystems are inherently dynamic in response to rainfall, and that so called ‘land degradation’ may in fact be a temporary transition stage governed by the variable rainfall, as well as other ecosystem ‘disturbances’, including ﬁre. It has been found that pastoralists living in these environments know exactly how and when to tap different resources in a sustainable and dynamic way through a long term understanding of environmental change. The process of reversing the marginalization of in digenous knowledge began in earnest in the 1960s. This arose out of the Western environmental movements of the day which were looking for symbolic representations of environmental ‘wisdom’ to further promote the al ready decreasing support for modern science and tech nology. These movements coincided and arose from the publication of books such as Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring. Indigenous peoples and the romantic notion that they lived in harmony with nature through their specialized knowledge were viewed as the pinnacle principles of what modern society should strive for, although the as sociated realities of these people, such as poverty, were rarely discussed. Nevertheless, out of this global ac knowledgment of the existence of indigenous knowledge emerged the vehicle with which development workers could make indigenous knowledge more acceptable to technocrats and managers. During this same period, new buzz words such as ‘participation’, ‘bottom up,’ and ‘empowerment’ became popular within the development ﬁeld and the important role of indigenous knowledge began to be disseminated as part of this rhetoric. However, the way in which indigenous knowledge has been used by Western science in development is not without its critics. When Western trained scientiﬁc managers ﬁnally began to acknowledge the worth of in digenous knowledge, it was still not considered on par or as ‘real’ as Western scientiﬁc knowledge. As a result, there was little or no legal protection for this knowledge through copyrights or patents. The case in point has been the numerous patents owned by pharmaceutical com panies of medicinal plant properties long disseminated through indigenous knowledge. In addition, Western science has tried to ﬁt indigenous knowledge into boxes within ordered conceptual frame works that fail to recognize the inherent contextual ization of indigenous knowledge. By ignoring or undervaluing the circumstances in which indigenous knowledge is constructed, you take away one of the most important characteristics of indigenous knowledge, namely that it is unique to a locality and group. Even just placing a speciﬁc knowledge system under the umbrella term ‘indigenous knowledge’ removes the context in which that particular knowledge system was established.

Indigenous Knowledges

Indigenous knowledge is inherently complex – it is embedded within the ecological, cultural, and spiritual realities of indigenous peoples. Trying to put boundaries on this knowledge – namely by using Western scientiﬁc knowledge based criteria – is wrought with difﬁculties and cannot truly represent the intricate nature of that know ledge. In addition, comparing indigenous knowledge with Western scientiﬁc based categories may undervalue or ignore certain aspects of indigenous knowledge that do not or cannot have an equivalent Western category. Therefore, although indigenous knowledge is a major concept within the development discourse, once appropri ated by development experts, some may view it as de contextualized knowledge that has been broken down into parts that can be ﬁtted into Western scientiﬁc analytical paradigms. As with other facets of development theory and practice, it has problems of looking for global, general so lutions rather than focusing on local, speciﬁc experiences.

Recording Indigenous Knowledge Realizing the important contribution indigenous know ledge could have to contemporary natural resource management issues, researchers and development work ers have been documenting and recording indigenous knowledge with the aim to produce a bank of knowledge which could be incorporated into development projects. Codifying and documenting indigenous knowledge has involved recording ways in which people use and manage natural resources with little contextual analysis, and presenting results in the form of a ‘blueprint’ of in digenous knowledge which can be packaged and trans ferred to other localities. Ethnobotanical studies are a good example and the recording of so called ‘useful’ plants. Many studies did not address the deﬁnition of ‘useful’, the context in which plants were useful and to whom these plants were useful. However, as has been mentioned before, indigenous knowledge is normally transmitted orally or through imitation and demonstration, and is deeply implicated in people’s everyday lives. So can it be recorded through writing, or is this a contradiction in terms? By making it ‘portable’ are we not falling into the same traps that Western science is criticized for – namely of being nonspeciﬁc and unconscious to local needs? Also, we again come back to the question of what is ‘local’ – if we take knowledge from one group of people and then take this to another group, how will this latter group use the knowledge, considering that they themselves will have their own indigenous knowledge? The holistic nature of indigenous knowledge also means that trying to isolate pieces of knowledge, for example, knowledge of different species, knowledge of different practices, fails to capture the entirety of the situation in which activities occur.

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Another important point to consider when recording indigenous knowledge is that it is adaptive over space and time. It is the amalgamation of experiences that occur in different geographical locations within varying points in time. As such, there are many difﬁculties in applying in digenous knowledge recorded in one place to another, or even the same place in another year. Therefore, when recording indigenous knowledge, it is vital to recognize its constantly interactive and changing nature, as well as the individual and collective skills and practices that produced the knowledge. However, it is also imperative to remember that writing and documenting indigenous knowledge will to some degree transform it and that it will never repre sent the true reality in which it is constructed. The conclusion we come to is that if the points out lined above are not carefully thought out when recording indigenous knowledge, it leads to the overall de con textualization of knowledge. The subsequent problem of this de contextualization has been the appropriation of indigenous knowledge by nonlocal agents. This has come in the form of ‘top down’ development which is generally ineffective and contradicts the participatory and em powering aspirations which an indigenous knowledge approach expounds. Further, if indigenous knowledge loses its agency and efﬁcacy through this ‘top down’ development, indigenous peoples will continue to be regarded as backward and in need of aid by development bodies, ensuring little future political change. Another way in which indigenous knowledge has been appropriated is through legal means. As the world knows, indigenous people have sophisticated knowledge of a vast number of plant and animal species, their interrelated ecology and their management. This biodiversity in cludes undomesticated, semidomesticated (wild species promoted by human management), and domesticated varieties. However, there is little protection for indigen ous peoples against ‘bioprospecting’. For example, in the international Convention for Biological Diversity (1992), rights over resources and associated knowledge are at tributed to nation states, not individuals, communities, or indigenous groups. In addition, within the Convention, intellectual property rights are provided as the only means for ‘equitable sharing’ and protection of resources. However, intellectual property rights are problematic for indigenous knowledge systems for a number of reasons. Firstly, they are intended to beneﬁt society by grant ing rights to ‘natural’ and ‘juridical’ persons or ‘creative individuals’, not collectives like indigenous groups. In tellectual property rights can only protect information that results from a speciﬁc act of discovery. Indigenous knowledge is an accumulation of generations of experi ences and communication through culturally unique means, is freely and communally shared, and is in the public domain, so cannot be protected. Indigenous sys tems have non Western forms of ownership, tenure, and

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access that cannot be attributed to a single person or body. Intellectual property rights stimulate commercial ization and distribution, which is the antithesis of in digenous knowledge which is communal and free, and they only really recognize the market economic value of knowledge but fail to recognize the cultural, spiritual, and local economic values. Intellectual property rights are expensive, complicated, and time consuming to ob tain and defend, but subject to manipulation by those with economic or political power. All these reasons indicate that at present, indigenous knowledge is un protected once taken out of the system in which it was perceived, and that in fact, intellectual property rights have become a code for the unethical and unsustainable exploitation of local communities and their resources.

Indigenous Knowledge in Development and Conservation Policy As has been mentioned above, Western science has been increasingly recognizing the importance of indigenous knowledge in areas such as natural resource management, health, nutrition, education and community and social organization. Together with the shift from top down management to participatory, community based manage ment, indigenous knowledge is becoming central to de velopment projects. However, the current popularity of ethnodevelopment, which embraces a wide set of under standings and divergent views about how to make devel opment sensitive to indigenous people’s needs, also reﬂects donor interests in enhancing indigenous social capital under neoliberal visions of development. Many ethnode velopment programs aim to take indigenous knowledge from the local level to the large scale dissemination. So, for example, the World Bank’s ‘Indigenous Knowledge for Development’ program, United Nations Educational, Scientiﬁc and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)’s ‘Best Practice of Indigenous Knowledge’ and United Nations Development Program (UNDP)’s ‘Indigenous Knowledge Program’ initiatives all seek to transfer indigenous know ledge for adaptation to other contexts. ‘Best practice’ that can be moved from one locale to another is sought and in this way, indigenous knowledge is only valued if it has more general importance. In addition, ethnodevelopment or development with identity responds to the demands of indigenous social movements and key advocates working within NGOs, government, and multilateral institutions. Many in digenous social movements have used the dichotomy between Western science based knowledge and in digenous knowledge as part of a political platform in order to gain control over how their knowledge is rep resented and valued in development. Some indigenous leaders, for example, have emphasized how indigenous

knowledge has global signiﬁcance and cannot just be seen as empirical and local. As such, indigenous activists are claiming that their knowledge speaks both to, and be yond, their reality, therefore advocating a governing position where indigenous knowledge is central and ‘normal’, with general rather than empirical development application. However, as has been discussed above, most of the emerging academic literature on indigenous knowledge links it to a speciﬁc territory and/or a par ticular group. Within the development context, policy understandings of indigenous knowledge have been successfully shaped by indigenous movements’ emphases on modes of thinking. Such approaches focus on the di verse ways of knowing and processes of learning, rather than on the acquisition of speciﬁc knowledge bases themselves. Indigenous knowledge is thus deﬁned in so cial cultural, relational terms by indigenous movements engaged in political struggle, rather than by spatial par ameters that ﬁx particular knowledges in speciﬁc places. Some of the conservation and natural resource man agement practices based on indigenous knowledge, in cluding monitoring resource abundance and change, total protection of certain species, protection of vulnerable life history stages, protection of speciﬁc habitats, and tem poral restrictions of harvest, are also practiced within conventional Western science based management sys tems. However, there are other practices based on in digenous knowledge that have been largely abandoned by conventional resource management systems. These include: multiple species management, for example, through integrated farming and cultivation systems; re source rotation, for example, nomadic herding strategies; and succession management, exempliﬁed by the shifting cultivation system that make multiple use of cleared and regenerating vegetation. In addition, there are some management practices based on indigenous knowledge that are seldom found in conventional resource management. These include management of landscape patchiness, for example, through the use of management tools such as ﬁre watershed based management managing ecological processes at multiple scales, for example, having different sets of practices and rules for larger scale and smaller scale resources; responding to and managing pulses and surprises through reserve areas such as sacred groves; nurturing sources of ecosystem renewal such as ﬁre and forest gap creation.

Indigenous Knowledge and Emerging Approaches to Natural Resource Management Within the sphere of conservation and natural resource management, theories and approaches to management and practice largely focused on single issues or resources

Indigenous Knowledges

and were based on the equilibrium view of process dy namics, where change was viewed as a ‘disturbance’ and interactions across time and space were ignored. How ever, with the emergence of the nonequilibrium para digm and the realization that many of the ecosystems and natural resources are vulnerable to change, there has been a growing focus on change itself and mechanisms such as adaptation and resilience to cope with the inevitable change. Many indigenous peoples are still heavily dependent on natural resources for their survival, and have, over time, developed social and cultural mechanisms that reﬂect the very real dynamics of natural systems. A growing recognition of this has led to an emerging body of academic literature in conservation and natural resource management which is focused on the lessons that can be learnt from indigenous knowledge systems. Using these indigenous knowledge characteristics, new approaches to conservation and natural resource management are being advocated. Central to these are adaptive management and adaptive governance – this entails holistic and detailed understanding or knowledge of the situation, and learning, so that one is able to re spond constructively to any future unpredictable events. Recent work presents indigenous knowledge systems as holistic ‘cultural–ecological’ systems – human in nature systems where the human and the ecological are tightly integrated, and where interactions between the two do mains over a range of scales sustain the coupled systems over space and time. Sustainability of these cultural– ecological systems largely depend on the adaptive cap acity of knowledge; an aspect of resilience that reﬂects learning, ﬂexibility to experiment, and adoption of novel solutions. The collective ‘social memory’ of knowledge allows long term communal understanding of the dy namics of environmental change, and the transmission of pertinent experience. As the cultural–ecological system evolves over time in response to both biophysical and social changes, so does the social memory, usually re sulting in adaptive and resilient systems. The important practical aspect of this new approach to natural resource management is that it uses the processes through which indigenous knowledge is created as the ways in which natural resources should be managed, for example, responsive to change, through learning, through partici pation, and through action. The methodological impli cation for implementing this new form of natural resource management is that it has to involve what we now call participatory action research. Although these approaches to natural resource management sound ideal, there has as yet been little application of these ideas to practical management on the ground. It is also debatable to what extent techniques such as participatory action research will be taken up by research projects funded by development managers and large donors.

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Conclusion As will be obvious from the discussions above, within the indigenous knowledge debate, de contextualization is viewed as a major problem, namely the separation of knowledge from its human agents and the situations in which it is produced, reproduced, transformed, and is effective. Although the importance of culture in indigen ous societies is widely recognized, within development and conservation, indigenous knowledge is largely separ ated from the cultures in which it originates. Reference might be made to certain rituals or spiritual beliefs, but ultimately indigenous knowledge is placed outside culture so that it becomes more of an ‘indigenous science’ where what is ‘useful’ can be separated from what is not. This approach has the effect of deﬁning ‘useful’ in a non indigenous purposeful way, which in turn externalizes the culture from which that knowledge came and/or labeling the culture as an impediment to successful development. As media and communications expand, global–local distinctions are becoming ever more blurred. Is it therefore possible to regard local indigenous knowledge as something discrete, or are we trapped by represen tations of ‘indigenousness’ by the global (Western) media and the indigenous peoples who have learnt to use it to raise awareness of their issues? Should we try to separate local knowledge from global knowledge on the assump tion that one is superior to the other, or give preference to the mixture of local and global knowledge that in digenous peoples now rely on? Many indigenous peoples want to engage with a public beyond their doorsteps, so perhaps a better approach is to embrace the construct ivist processes upon which their knowledge is based ra ther than the context speciﬁc nature of that knowledge. ‘Indigenous knowledge’ may be the buzz phrase to guarantee research, funding, and development projects. Nevertheless, some caution is needed. Although there is a global growing recognition of the cultural–ecological indigenous system and the link between cultural and biological diversity, the law still does not protect in digenous knowledge. Ensuring the rights of indigenous peoples to deﬁne themselves, their knowledge, and our access to it is a fundamental challenge for social justice in the ﬁeld of development today. See also: Development I; Development II; Empowerment; Participation; Sustainable Development.

Further Reading Agrawal, A. (1995). Dismantling the divide between indigenous and scientiﬁc knowledge. Development and Change 26, 413 439. Berkes, F., Colding, J. and Folke, C. (2000). Rediscovery of traditional ecological knowledge as adaptive management. Ecological Applications 10, 1251 1262.

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Briggs, J. and Sharp, J. (2004). Indigenous knowledges and development: A postcolonial caution. Third World Quarterly 25, 661 676. Brown, M. F. (1998). Can culture be copyrighted? Current Anthropology 39, 193 222. Ellen, R. and Harris, H. (2000). Introduction. In Ellen, R., Parkes, P. & Bicker, A. (eds.) Indigenous environmental knowledge and its transformations. Critical anthrological perspectives, pp 1 33. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers. Escobar, A. (1995). Encountering development: The making and unmaking of the third world. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Laurie, N., Andolina, R. and Radcliffe, S. (2005). Ethnodevelopment: Social movements, creating experts and professionalizing indigenous knowledge in Ecuador. Antipode 37, 470 496. Mauro, F. and Hardison, P. D. (2000). Traditional knowledge of indigenous and local communities: International debate and policy initiatives. Ecological Applications 10, 1263 1269. Posey, D. A. (2000). Ethnobiology and ethnoecology in the context of national laws and international agreements affecting indigenous and local knowledge, traditional resources and intellectual property rights. In Ellen, R., Parkes, P. & Bicker, A. (eds.) Indigenous environmental knowledge and its transformations. Critical anthrological perspectives, pp 35 54. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers. Sillitoe, P. (1998). The development of indigenous knowledge. A new applied anthropology. Current Anthropology 39, 223 252.

Relevant Websites http://www.cs.org Cultural Survival A US Based Organization that Fights for the Rights of Indigenous Peoples around the World. http://www.survival international.org Survival International A UK Based Organization that Fights for the Rights of Indigenous Peoples around the World. http://www.cbd.int The Convention for Biological Diversity This Website Outlines the Protocols, Programs, and Mechanisms of the Convention. http://www.undp.org UNDP ‘Indigenous Knowledge Program’ Follow Links to Indigenous Knowledge for Information on Indigenous Knowledge Programs. http://www.unesco.org UNESCO ‘Best Practice of Indigenous Knowledge’ Follow Links to Indigenous Knowledge for Information on Best Practice on Using Indigenous Knowledge. http://web.worldbank.org World Bank ‘Indigenous Knowledge for Development’ Follow Links to Indigenous Knowledge for Development Approaches and Information Focused on Traditional Knowledge Systems and How They Can Help to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals.

Indigenous Mapping J. Corbett, University of British Columbia-Okanagan, Kelowna, BC, Canada M. Chapin, Center for the Support of Native Lands, Arlington, VA, USA L. Gibson, Land and People Information Sharing Society (LAPIS), Parksville, BC, Canada G. Rambaldi, Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation ACP-EU, Wageningen, The Netherlands & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Geographic Information Systems (GISs) A computer-based system designed to collect, store, manage, and analyze digital georeferenced information and associated attribute data. Global Positioning Systems (GPSs) An array of space-based satellites and ground units that enable a user with a portable receiver to determine their absolute location on the Earth using known coordinates. Indigenous Mapping The mapping of indigenous lands, by indigenous people, to secure tenure, manage natural resources, and promote cultural awareness. Map Biography A data collection approach used in indigenous mapping in which individuals are asked to identify areas on a map used for harvesting-related activities. Participatory Action Research (PAR) Research that involves all relevant parties in actively examining issues in order to change and improve them. Participatory Development A development approach that supports and promotes community engagement in decision-making through the creation and use of a range of participatory methodologies that gather, analyze, and communicate community information. Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) A development approach that seeks to incorporate the knowledge and opinions of rural people into the planning and management of development initiatives. Public Participation GIS (PPGIS) It is the intersection of participatory planning and geographic information systems. Remote Sensing The process of gathering information about the Earth from a distance. Such data are commonly gathered by satellite or air (aerial) photography. Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) A series of swift, costeffective social survey techniques used by outsiders to learn about rural communities in order that development initiatives can be tailored by those outsiders to meet local issues. Traditional Land Use and Occupancy Studies An often map-based system commonly used in Canada to identify where indigenous people hunt, ﬁsh, and trap. Information contained in a TUS can inform resource management decision-making and identify areas of land-related conﬂict.

Introduction Throughout recent history, cartography has been used by governments and elites to apportion and claim land and resources. However, whereas maps have historically been used to delineate and control territories inhabited by in digenous peoples, indigenous peoples are now using West ern cartographic methods to reclaim and defend their ancestral lands and resources. Indigenous mapping thus represents a shift in the notion that cartography only reﬂects and shapes the interests of the powerful. Indigenous groups in Canada and the United States have been mapping their territories since the 1960s, and more recently the practice has been adopted in other parts of the world. The mapping process and products help to communicate indigenous land related knowledge to the state and external agencies, to assist in land use planning and resource management, to strengthen community organization and capacity, and to promote cultural awareness. The power of maps is reﬂected in the political, legal, economic, and cultural sensitivities evoked by indigenous mapping attempts, especially in states with repressive policies toward indigenous people. This article discusses how indigenous mapping has developed in North America and in other parts of the world. Due to different legal structures, land use traditions, and political and economic realities, approaches and methods vary among projects and geographic regions. This article discusses how recent attempts to combine indigenous knowledge with spatial technologies have highlighted issues concerning the collection, storage, and representation of data. There is a need to develop clear protocols governing community held data, and to address deeper epistemological issues that arise when Western style maps are used to represent culturally nuanced information. In addition, there can be unforeseen impacts after maps are created and disseminated, which may be either positive or negative for indigenous communities. These issues will have to be addressed as mapping tech nologies become increasingly accessible and mapping be comes more widely adopted by indigenous communities.

Indigenous People and Indigenous Knowledge Indigenous communities, peoples, and nations have often been oppressed and marginalized by dominant populations.

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This article assumes the deﬁnition of indigenous com munities, peoples, and nations proposed by the UN Sec retariat of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, which states that the basis of indigenous communities in cludes the continued connection to and occupation of their ancestral territories. This working deﬁnition reﬂects an in creasingly politicized understanding of the term ‘indigen ous’ and is closely linked to issues of power inequality. Many contemporary issues related to indigenous peoples, their knowledge, and future are directly related to their immediate geography, in particular their access to and relationship with their traditional lands. Thus, mapping indigenous spaces has become a valuable tool in con temporary indigenous struggles over land and resources.

a means for documenting such knowledge, which can be in the form of mental maps and storytelling.

Purposes of Mapping Indigenous mapping initiatives are undertaken for a number of purposes: to delineate and claim ancestral lands; to ar ticulate and communicate indigenous spatial knowledge to external agencies; to record and archive traditional know ledge for future generations; to assist indigenous com munities in land use planning and resource management; to help plan economic development; to increase institutional and organizational capacity within communities; and to promote cultural awareness and cultural identity.

Indigenous Mapping in North America Indigenous Mapping and Western Cartography Maps and diagrams seen through the perspective of the occupiers, in most cases European settlers, have historically represented indigenous spaces. These maps have purveyed social and cultural values through their content, for ex ample, by replacing European place names for indigenous ones, and through their symbolization, for example, by depicting populated indigenous spaces as ‘empty’. Western cartography’s relationship to indigenous peoples exempliﬁes Brian Harley’s notion of maps as value laden images that reﬂect and inﬂuence social and spatial relations. Maps have played a role as providers of graphic inventories of land and property in colonial agendas of social control and territorial annexation. They are implicated throughout history in the enclosure of common property and indigenous resource regimes, and concurrent transformations of property rela tionships. Contemporary indigenous mapping is thus an attempt to democratize mapping tools and address the legacy of these colonial agendas. Indigenous mapping practitioners attempt to make the association between land and local communities visible to outsiders by using the commonly understood and recognized language of cartography. The documentation of place names, land management techniques, rituals, sacred sites, histories, and multiple other features, when recorded on maps, can contribute to the preservation and renewal of languages and culture. Documenting infor mation such as traditional place names is of great cultural importance, as indigenous toponomies often contain and transmit valuable information about speciﬁc places. Peter Brosius’s research with the Penan Gang of Sarawak showed that in indigenous communities, orally trans mitted place names are powerful mnemonics not only for way ﬁnding, resource management, and other activities, but also as historical and spatial records of generations of occupancy and attachment to the land. Mapping provides

Studies in the 1950s in the Inupiat region of the North Slope Barrows were the ﬁrst notable application of in digenous mapping in North America. These studies ad dressed issues of public policy and conﬂicting land and resource use. In the late 1960s, mapping was used to portray aboriginal people’s land use and occupancy in response to large development proposals on their terri tories, such as the James Bay Hydroelectric Project in Quebec and the Mackenzie Valley Gas Pipeline in the Northwest Territories. During the 1970s indigenous mapping became a standard component of land use and occupancy studies designed to inform land claim nego tiations in the context of new policies that recognized aboriginal rights to land had not been extinguished. In Canada and Alaska the primary method of docu mentation has been the ‘map biography’. This method charts the subsistence regimen of individuals spatially through time. This method was reﬁned in the 1970s with the Inuit Land Use and Occupancy Project in the Northwest Territories, which documented past and present hunting, ﬁshing, trapping, and gathering patterns from an Inuit perspective. It recorded Inuit perceptions of their relationship to the land, compiling extensive data on history, place names, linguistics, subsistence techni ques, campsites, and other cultural information. Abo riginal hunters were asked to map the areas they used for harvesting related activities (such as hunting, ﬁshing, berry picking, and camp locations) during their adult lives. A proﬁle of an entire community was then con structed by aggregating map biography information. The map biography method is tailored to the circumstances of each region and variations have been applied by hun dreds of indigenous communities in Canada. Another noteworthy example of indigenous mapping in Canada is the Delgamuukw versus British Columbia aboriginal title court case (decided by the Supreme Court of Canada on 11 December 1997). Several maps

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documenting the land use and oral history of Gitksan and We’etsuwet’en people were presented as evidence in this landmark case that ultimately ruled that the concept of aboriginal title to traditional lands existed. The tribes of the lower 48 United States have been strongly inﬂuenced by advanced geospatial tech nologies. A number of tribes are using advanced GIS technologies for (among other things) environmental protection through identifying sites of environmental signiﬁcance, generating a better understanding of the tribe’s holdings and thus guiding tribal development and planning, creating resource inventories to help manage natural and infrastructural resources, as well as facili tating cultural/historical research. In 1990, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) established the Geographic Data Service Center (GDSC) in Lake wood, Colorado, with the mission of providing technical resources and training to interested tribes. Later in the 1990s, GIS capacity among tribes began expanding and several were utilizing the digital databases offered by the BIA’s GDSC. The Intertribal GIS Council was founded in 1993 with assistance from the First Nations Devel opment Institute, ESRI, NASA, and the USGS. The Hopi, the Blackfeet, the Leech Lake Band of Chippewa, and many others have used GIS, Global Positioning System (GPS), and remote sensing based technologies.

Indigenous Mapping in Asia, Africa, and Latin America In Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America in digenous mapping has focused primarily on forest dwelling, hunting/ﬁshing, and agricultural communities and groups. Despite geographic differences, these ini tiatives have been used to address similar issues to those facing indigenous peoples in Canada and Alaska. In these regions, other terms have been used interchangeably with ‘indigenous mapping’, including ‘ethnocartography’, ‘counter mapping’, ‘self demarcation’, a term used in Venezuela, and ‘ancestral domain delineation and self determination’, used in the Philippines. Initially, mapping work with indigenous groups in these areas was inﬂuenced strongly by Rapid Rural Ap praisal (RRA), Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), and Participatory Action Research (PAR) approaches that are embedded in the broader paradigm of ‘participatory de velopment’. These mapping initiatives were commonly initiated and undertaken by development workers to in corporate indigenous groups’ spatial knowledge into planning and development initiatives. The data were often removed from the community and used to address the agendas of outsiders. The initial focus of these techniques saw practitioners adopting straightforward mapping approaches, such as the use of community

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sketch maps (freehand sketches drawn on large pieces of paper from memory) and mapping on the ground (often referred to as ‘ephemeral mapping’, which involves using any available materials, such as soil, plants, rocks, or household tools to construct the map). In some instances, practitioners added survey oriented cartographic tech niques such as transects, compass readings, and modeling, and sought to produce maps that were both rich with local knowledge as well as being georeferenced. In the 1990s, the focus of indigenous mapping in Asia, Africa, and Latin America dramatically changed as the techniques that had initially been used in an extractive manner were adapted to suit the political agendas of indigenous communities and grassroots nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) representing indigenous peoples. In Southeast Asia, for example, NGO practitioners identify a regional workshop held in Manila by the Philippine Association for Intercultural Development (PAFID) in March 1995 as a key event that was instru mental in spreading indigenous mapping throughout the region. This workshop introduced mapping into Indo nesia where the period from 1995 until 2007 saw 2.5 million hectares of land mapped by indigenous com munities – often with technical assistance from NGOs such as Jaringan Kerja Pemetaan Partisipatif ( JKPP) and Pembinaan Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Alam Kemasyar akatan (PPSDAK). Indigenous mapping was thus trans formed from an outsider driven initiative into a political tool used by indigenous groups to delineate traditional territories and ultimately pressure outsiders, including government and corporations, for formal recognition of traditional territories (Figure 1). Since this change of focus in indigenous mapping in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, community control of the map making process, including determination of the information contained on the map, is increasingly em phasized. In addition, indigenous mapping projects have begun to incorporate geo spatial technologies and sys tems such as GPS, GISs, and remote sensing. These combinations have led to indigenous mapping variants such as participatory GIS (PGIS), ‘participatory 3 D modeling’ (P3DM) and ‘participatory photo mapping’ (Figures 2 and 3).

Issues GIS and Participatory Approaches Many indigenous mapping practitioners have attempted to combine participatory approaches and GIS. This has led to discussions regarding the compatibility of tradi tional knowledge and digital technologies. In the late 1980s, when development practitioners introduced PRA approaches such as sketch mapping there was little input from professional cartographers. The primary purpose of

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Figure 1 Dayak people making scale maps in East Kalimantan, Indonesia. Photo credit: J. Corbett (2002).

Figure 2 Ogiek people in Kenya working on aerial photographs, Nessuit, Kenya. Photo credit: G. Rambaldi (2005).

this mapping was to document local spatial knowledge and to promote community based capacity building. GIS was introduced when accurate maps were needed for land tenure and legal battles and to communicate with pol icymakers. The declining cost and increasingly user friendly interfaces of digital spatial technologies, as well as a greater public availability of data facilitated this movement. One of the goals of the Public Participatory GIS (PPGIS) movement is to determine how spatial

technologies can be used by communities, including in digenous ones, in a genuinely participatory manner. However, the combination of high tech and participatory approaches has been uneasy, as GIS and other digital information technologies are viewed by some as capital intensive, complex to use, and expert driven. Further more, some GIS practitioners believe that spatial tech nologies have the potential to represent indigenous views of the environment better than conventional mapping,

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Figure 3 Ogiek people using a participatory 3-D model, Nessuit, Kenya. Photo credit: G. Rambaldi (2006).

whereas others suggest that GIS technology is rife with epistemological issues of representation and can lead to assimilation of indigenous views by Western paradigms. The role of technology intermediaries is a key ques tion, especially if they come from outside of the com munities – as, at present, they overwhelmingly do. There has been some concern, especially among indigenous people, that GIS lends primacy to a Western scientiﬁc approach at the expense of indigenous worldviews. In addition, GIS data structures, as they are presently con ﬁgured, tend to prioritize certain types of information over others. Basic implementation is also an issue, as rural areas frequently lack access to electricity, the Internet, and a supportive infrastructure. This can lead to the technological aspects of the projects being controlled outside of the communities and run counter to the goal of true participation. Unforeseen Impacts of Indigenous Mapping Indigenous mapping can result in unanticipated con sequences. For example, maps cannot always adequately portray the nuances of indigenous resource and property regimes, which can cause conﬂict when boundaries, re sources, and property are delineated. Also, failure to implement clear protocols regarding ownership of in formation can lead to infringement of the intellectual property rights of indigenous people. Finally, introducing mapping technology can contribute to deepening divisions within communities along gender, economic, or other lines, as some groups prove more capable of adopting the technologies than others.

Conclusion In recent times indigenous mapping has become a valuable tool for indigenous peoples around the world to delineate and claim their ancestral lands and to promote cultural awareness. It has also been applied to resource management, communication with external agencies, legal struggles, economic planning, capacity building, conﬂict management, identity building, and cultural awareness. It occurs in a variety of political, economic, and cultural contexts that compel careful thought before, during, and after project implementation, as mapping may serve both to empower and to marginalize in digenous peoples. There are social as well as epistemo logical issues associated with representing indigenous knowledge in a Western cartographic format, which are further complicated when combined with digital spatial information technologies. Challenges remain in deter mining how indigenous communities can be supported in adopting mapping and spatial information technology under favorable terms including autonomy over mapping processes and protection of community held data. Fi nally, the beneﬁts of systematically mapping indigenous lands, whether using participatory methods, spatial technologies, or some combination of these two ap proaches, are not currently available to all indigenous peoples throughout the world. Discussion needs to con tinue as to ways to further democratize and disseminate participatory mapping methodologies and appropriate technologies. There is also a pressing need to confront the matter of securing ﬁnancial resources for carrying out indigenous mapping projects on a large scale.

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See also: Counter-Mapping.

Further Reading Alcorn, J. B. (2001). Borders, Rules and Governance: Mapping to Catalyze Changes in Policy and Management. London: International Institute for Environment and Development. Brealey, K. (1995). Mapping them ‘out’: Euro Canadian cartography and the appropriation of the Nuxalk and Ts’ilhqot’in First Nations’ territories, 1793 1916. Canadian Geographer 39(2), 140 156. Brody, H. (1992). Maps and Dreams. Toronto: Douglas and McIntyre. Brosius, P. (2001). ‘Local knowledges, global claims: On the signiﬁcance of indigenous ecologies in Sarawak, East Malaysia’. In Grim, J. & Sullivan, L. (eds.) Indigenous Traditions and Ecology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press and Center for the Study of World Religions. Chapin, M., Lamb, Z. and Threlkeld, B. (2005). Mapping indigenous lands. Annual Review of Anthropology 34, 619 638. Fox, J., Suryanata, K., Hershock, P. and Pramono, A. H. (2006). Mapping power: Ironic effects of spatial information technology. Participatory Learning and Action 54(1), 98 105. Harley, J. B. (1989). Deconstructing the map. Cartographica 26(2), 1 20. Harley, J. B. (1992). Rereading the maps of the Columbian encounter. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 82(3), 522 542. Harmsworth, G. (1998). Indigenous values and GIS: A method and a framework. Indigenous Knowledge and Development Monitor 6(3), 3 7. Peluso, N. L. (1995). Whose woods are these? Counter mapping forest territories in Kalimantan, Indonesia. Antipode 27(4), 383 406.

Poole, P. (1995). Geomatics, who needs it? Cultural Survival Quarterly 18(4), 1 77. Rundstrom, R. A. (1995). GIS, indigenous peoples, and epistemological diversity. Cartography and Geographic Information Systems 22(1), 45 57. Sirait, M., Prasodjo, S., Podger, N., Flavelle, A. and Fox, J. (1994). Mapping customary land in East Kalimantan, Indonesia: A tool for forest management. In Fox, J. (ed.) Spatial Information and Ethnoecology: Case Studies from Indonesia, Nepal, and Thailand, pp 1 14. Honolulu: East West Center. Turnbull, D. (1993). Maps Are Territories: Science Is an Atlas: A Portfolio of Exhibits. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Wood, D. (1992). The Power of Maps. New York: The Guildford Press.

Relevant Websites http://www.conservationgis.org ESRI conservation program: native/ﬁrst nations index. http://www.iapad.org Integrated Approaches to Participatory Development (IAPAD). http://www.nativemaps.org The Aboriginal Mapping Network in Vancouver, British Columbia. http://ppgis.iapad.org The Open Forum on Participatory Information Systems and Technologies. http://www.paﬁd.org The Philippine Association for Intercultural Development (PAFID).

Industrial City R. Harris, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Agglomeration Economies The economic advantages that accrue to manufacturers who cluster in industrial cities. Downtown A term ﬁrst coined in the United States to refer to the central business district and, usually, to immediately adjacent industrial or residential areas. Economic Base The main, or major single, source of local employment. Sometimes, used to refer only to employment in a sector that exports beyond the metropolitan region. Externalities The uncompensated costs, or beneﬁts, of an economic activity. Commonly exempliﬁed by the polluting factory that imposes health and other costs on those who live nearby, and especially downwind. Industrial Suburb A suburb that has a substantial base of manufacturing employment, but which is usually integrated into the city-wide labor market. Telecommuting Using telecommunications, rather than the daily commute, to maintain contact with an employer or client. Zoning A tool of land-use planning by which municipalities can control the use to which particular parcels of land are put.

Industrial City An industrial city is an urban place in which manu facturing dominates the local economy and, by extension, the environment and social relations. Such cities have often been associated with high levels of air and/or water pollution. The social structure and class relations of their workplaces are often polarized and this is both reﬂected and reproduced in a simpliﬁed social geography. This was especially true in smaller centers and company towns. The ﬁrst industrial cities arose, in Western Europe and North America, in the nineteenth century in contrast to their compact, preindustrial predecessors. Large scale production and innovations in transportation technology enabled a growing separation of home from work. Mu nicipal zoning regulations encouraged the formation of extensive, homogeneous land use districts. Because of de industrialization, in Europe and North America, the industrial city has arguably been supplanted by the postindustrial metropolis. In recent years, the most rap idly growing industrial cities have been those in a handful of developing nations. The growth of the industrial city

has promoted as well as reﬂected economic growth, transformed the social and esthetic experience of its residents, encouraged the growth of state regulation as well as voluntary associations and clubs, and created new possibilities for political association.

Deﬁnition Cities are often distinguished in terms of their dominant form of economic organization (e.g., capitalist, socialist), culture (e.g., Islamic), or their technology. These terms imply different views about what forces are the most important in shaping urban growth and change. The concept of the industrial city implies that technology is vital in this regard. According to this view, best articu lated by Gideon Sjoberg, because preindustrial cities depended upon animate sources of energy, production was small scale and relatively inefﬁcient, land transpor tation occurred at a walking pace, and cities were small, compact, and dense. The development of inanimate sources of energy, initially steam power and later elec tricity, increased the scale and efﬁciency of manu facturing and also of urban transportation. They enabled workers to commute, making possible the large scale separation of home and work and the growth of much larger, industrial cities. Industrial cities, then, can exist and have existed in both capitalist and socialist countries, such as the United States and what was once the Soviet Union, respectively. Industrial production usually entails a clear separation between mental and manual labor. The class structure of large industrial enterprises tends to be polarized between a large number of relatively unskilled workers and smaller numbers of owners and managers. Industrial cities, then, tend to be socially polarized and with a small middle class, whether professionals or the self employed. The simplest class structures, and the most extreme so cial polarizations, occur in the company town. Most company towns exist to exploit a local resource, for ex ample, a mining deposit or nearby timber stands, or a site of water power, which was a determining inﬂuence before the advent of steam engines and then long distance electricity transmission. Even today, the costs of such transmission means that power intensive industries sometimes locate next to major dams, an example being the ALCAN aluminum reﬁnery at Kitimat, British Col umbia. Because the resource must be tapped in situ, the company has little or no choice about where to locate its facility and workforce. In some cases, however,

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manufacturing companies have selected somewhat isol ated sites, usually in an effort to control their labor force. Some model industrial communities have worked well, but from the company’s point of view the risks are high. A dramatic example was the town of Pullman, Illinois, which was established by a manufacturer of railroad cars in the 1880s. Soon after its foundation, Pullman was the site of a confrontation that grew into the largest indus trial strike in US history. Most manufacturers have pre ferred to locate in larger urban centers, where they are freer to hire and ﬁre at will. Not all large, industrial cities are equally polarized in social terms. Cities, such as Manchester, England, in the nineteenth century, that contained a small number of large factories are likely to display sharp class contrasts. It is no coincidence that Friedrich Engels, who with Karl Marx developed inﬂuential ideas about the importance of class struggle, knew Manchester better than any other British city because he owned a mill there. In contrast cities, such as Birmingham, England, that contained many small workshops where masters and artisans worked together and where social mobility was more common, were less polarized. It is no coincidence that, during the early 1830s, it was in Birmingham that mas ters and workmen joined together to stage the huge political demonstrations that compelled the British government to broaden the franchise in the Reform Act of 1834. Another inﬂuence upon social relations in the indus trial city is the manner in which housing is provided. Tenants move easily and frequently; home owners have a stake not only in their home and neighborhood but in their city. Employers and politicians have usually as sumed that home owners are less likely to espouse radical causes, or to go on strike, than tenants. Following the Pullman strike of the 1890s, employers in company towns actively encouraged their workers to acquire homes. In the twentieth century, governments in many countries have encouraged home ownership, in part for its sup posed political consequences. Other options are possible. In China after the revolution of 1949, for example, a system was developed whereby state enterprises provided housing (as well as health and education services) for their workers, so that industrial cities in effect became aggregations of work unit compounds, or partly self contained industrial villages. This had the effect of fragmenting the workforce, cutting across the social dis tinctions of occupation and class, based to some degree on communist party membership. Similarly, paternalist arrangements were developed in the same period by major private sector employers in Japan. Such systems cannot easily coexist with entrepreneurial capitalism, however, and the trend in both these Asian countries has been towards a clearer separation between work and housing relations.

Internal Geography The class relations of the industrial city are reﬂected in, and reproduced through, the geography of the urban landscape. Its most characteristic and signiﬁcant feature is the separation of work and home. In preindustrial cities, the characteristic unit of production was the household, which often contained extended families. Commonly, an artisan lived and worked in the same structure: stairs connected a ground ﬂoor workshop to living accom modation, and perhaps, storage rooms on upper ﬂoors. Journeymen, apprentices, and, in more afﬂuent house holds, servants might occupy attic space. In this era, it was largely the merchants’ warehouses, used to store goods involved in long distance trade, which deﬁned their own geographical district. Elsewhere, homes, industry, and commercial activity were tightly interwoven. As the scale of production increased, the corres ponding social unit became the company, not the household. At ﬁrst, as in Coventry in the mid nineteenth century, small manufacturers appended factories to family homes. But proximity to growing numbers of workers, and the noise and pollution from power driven machinery, soon encouraged them to build dedicated factory buildings and to move their homes elsewhere. They became commuters. In the earlier and smaller urban centers, they traveled to work by carriage. Thus Engels described how, during the 1840s, Manchester mill owners commuted from suburban homes to centrally located factories. In larger cities, by the second half of the nineteenth century, they could rely on commuter trains. For the more afﬂuent, among whom women were ex pected to stay at home, the emerging geography of the industrial city created distinct social worlds for men and women. Workers, including many women, lived close to their jobs. They worked ten or even twelve hour a day, and low wages compelled them to walk to work. Their lives, and those of their families, were audibly regulated by the factory whistle. For many decades, industrial cities displayed a dense and promiscuous intermingling of housing, factories, and the small shops that sold daily essentials. In the era before refrigerators, these included all types of perishable foods. Home may have become separated from workplace but, as a physical as well as an economic fact of life, the latter continued to loom large. From the late nineteenth century, new methods of transportation transformed the industrial city. Industry in port cities was usually distributed beside or immediately behind waterfront warehouses. In some early industrial cities, for example Birmingham, England, and the ad jacent Black Country, canals enabled scattered industrial growth, but in most cities it was the railway that hastened the process of decentralization. Some industries had al ways been located towards or beyond city limits, espe cially those like tanning that produced unpleasant smells

Industrial City

or those like brick making that required extensive sites. As rail transportation became dominant for freight in the second half of the nineteenth century, however, it became increasingly common for manufacturers to establish or move their operations outwards, along radial rail lines or adjacent to suburban freight yards. By the early twentieth century, land developers laid out and marketed industrial districts, now known as industrial parks which were well served not only by rail but also by water, waste disposal, and electricity. Among the ﬁrst of these in North America were Chicago’s Central and Clearing districts. Rail transportation also fostered the unplanned growth of industrial suburbs, and of satellite towns, communities that lay within the same economic region as a major urban center but beyond commuting distance. This de centralized pattern was reinforced by the advent of truck transportation, which became important during the inter war years for the shipment of goods within urban areas and then, after 1945, for long distance shipments. Since the 1960s, lighter industries have also been attracted to fringe locations by their use of air freight, and all major airports are now large nodes of warehouse and industrial employment. Among small companies, the removal of factories was accompanied by management and clerical functions. By 1900, however, the growth of large corporations enabled the creation of head ofﬁces that remained, or were lo cated, downtown. Especially in North America, where height regulations were permissive, steel frame technol ogy and elevators permitted ofﬁces to concentrate in central business districts (CBDs). Since 1945, suburban ofﬁce parks, especially dedicated to routine functions, have become common. These changes in manufacturing location have en couraged workers to move away from central residential areas, including those that contemporaries labeled slums. The decentralization of industry was viewed as one of the more positive forces shaping urban areas, around 1900. Near suburban factory sites workers occupied new, sin gle family housing. In Europe, most of this was company or speculatively built. In North America, much was owner built, typically where land was very cheap, be cause they were unserviced and unregulated. Innovations in transportation technology made it possible for employees to live further from work. Un usually, in London, the government encouraged railway companies to offer cheap fares on workers’ trains. In most industrial cities, even those like Melbourne which ac quired a rail network, commuter trains were used by the middle class. Some large cities, such as Paris, Boston, and New York, built subways, where fares became affordable to a wide social cross section. But in most places, the ﬁrst form of mass transportation was the electric streetcar (tram). During the 1890s, cities across North America, Australia, and Western Europe acquired streetcars that

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opened up lower density workers’ districts that became known as streetcar suburbs. By the 1920s, buses sup ported development in the interstices of rail and car lines. Looser patterns of development became possible with the advent of the automobile. Ford’s model ‘T’ made car ownership affordable to skilled workers in the United States from the 1920s. Elsewhere, cars only shaped the industrial city after 1945, but then at all scales. Houses acquired garages, then prominent double garages; new subdivisions were laid out to accommodate and manage cars, with wide streets and culs de sac to prevent through trafﬁc; shopping areas, initially roadside strips and then clustered malls, were given extensive parking; residential development occurred at increasing distances from workplaces; limited access highways became the arteries of the industrial city. None of these transport technologies determined the exact form of the industrial city. Many municipalities, especially in North America, allowed the car to rule. European cities, notably Stockholm, planned public transit. But each new technology changed the city’s geographical possibilities by enlarging them. Together, except for a minority of workers, they removed the sights and sounds of the factory from the home life of workers and their families. One way that planners and municipalities have ac commodated new methods of transportation has been through land use regulation. In the industrial city, and in early industrial suburbs, homes and industries grew up cheek by jowl. Workers and their families had to put up with the resulting externalities, the uncompensated costs of noise and air pollution. In the early twentieth century, land use zoning was introduced progressively, whereby districts came to be zoned exclusively for housing, in dustry, and commercial activity, and then for sub categories of use – such as light industry or single family dwellings on large lots. The rationale was that zoning could limit externalities. Because of the way this tool was implemented, it inhibited the intermingling even of land uses that are closely complementary (e.g., small stores in residential areas) and mandated a large scale segregation of land uses that many now ﬁnd monotonous and dys functional. Recently, encouraged by the New Urbanism, more ﬂexible methods of land use regulation have been introduced.

Global Trends and Patterns Many industrial cities have lasted long enough to ex perience not only a rise but also stagnation and decline. The ﬁrst industrial centers developed in Britain, Western Europe, and North America. Some, such as New Lanark, Scotland, and settlements in New England, were at tracted to water power and were no more than villages.

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As industrial towns developed on the basis of steam power and adjacent to coal ﬁelds, larger clusters formed – such as the Black Country, the Ruhr, and the Pittsburgh region. Other regions depended on external economies, notably, the sharing of a skilled, specialized labor force. These served domestic, and sometimes, continental markets. A few, notably the Lancashire mill towns, relied on a captive colonial empire. Since the 1970s, there has been a globalization of trade and of the markets for manufactured goods. This has led to the decline of many centers of manufacturing in the de veloped world. Individual industrial cities had experienced decline in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but the extent of recent shifts is unprecedented. Whole indus tries, such as steel making around Pittsburgh, and spinning in Manchester, have disappeared, and with them the eco nomic base of metropolitan areas. De industrialization has posed a huge challenge to many industrial cities. Some have met it by reinventing themselves. Pittsburgh, whose steel mills have been demolished, is prospering as a center of biotechnology; recycling factories and warehouses as com mercial lofts and residential condominiums, Manchester is marketing itself as a cultural center. The esthetic and architectural potential of warehouses and factories have been deployed to revive waterfronts and once industrial areas in many cities, for example, Toronto’s Distillery district. But other cities struggle. For largely abandoned places such as downtown Detroit, Michigan, and Camden, New Jersey, loss of factory jobs and the suburbanization of the middle class have produced an urban wasteland. In the work, for example, of Camilo Vergara this has yielded an esthetic of industrial ruin that has a visual appeal but, as yet, no commercial potential. The decline of many industrial cities, and the declining share of manufacturing in the employment base of diversiﬁed cities like London and New York, has encouraged some to speak of an emerging postindustrial city. To the extent that manufacturing is no longer the major source of employment in the developed world, this label makes sense. It acquires resonance when nonmanufacturing employees emancipate themselves from the daily commute by tele commuting. As yet, however, the continuities between in dustrial and postindustrial cities are considerable. De industrialization in Europe and North America has been accompanied by the rapid growth of industrial ur banization in some parts of the developing, and newly industrialized world. The most dramatic examples are provided by China, which has rapidly become the major supplier of a wide range of goods to the world, from toys, zips, and shoes to refrigerators, steel, and concrete. These goods are produced in a range of places that extend from those that are small and specialized, such as Qiaotou (zips), Sheng Zhou (ties), Wen Ling (shoes), and Yiwu (socks), through larger and heavily industrial places such as Harbin and Chengdu, to diversiﬁed metropolitan centers, notably Shanghai, that also contain manufacturing. This

range of urban settings was typical of earlier phases of industrial growth and, in that respect, history is repeating itself. A major difference is that, fueled by a large, global consumer market, the pace of growth in modern industrial cities is even faster than that of its predecessors, while its dimensions are larger. Beginning with a single family run business in 1980, for example, entrepreneurs and 50 000 migrant workers have made the town of Qiaotou, Zhejiang province, into the dominant global center for the production of clothing fasteners: production in 2005 in cluded 15 billion buttons and 200 million meters of zips. Manchester was the ‘shock city’ of the 1840s, Chicago of the late nineteenth century, and Los Angeles – much more a manufacturing center than is commonly realized – of the twentieth century. But what is now happening in a number of Chinese cities goes beyond shock, to awe.

Signiﬁcance Our understanding of the nature and signiﬁcance of the industrial city has been steadily broadened by a succession of intellectual traditions. From the beginning, observers appreciated the signiﬁcance of urbanization for the growth of industry while recognizing its destabilizing effects. From the 1920s to the 1960s, the dominant Chicago school of urban sociology emphasized the personal and social consequences of urbanism. During the 1970s and 1980s, Marxists and social historians focused upon how the city affected class relations and politics, while feminists showed how industrial urbanism affected men and women differ ently. Since the 1980s, scholars have explored the cultural effects of cities on our experience of modernity, and upon the way cities themselves, and not just municipalities, govern their occupants. At the same time, the public health issues have been rediscovered, but now within a global and environmental frame of reference. The industrial city has not only reﬂected the rise of industrial scale production but also enabled it, while shaping our society and culture. The concentration of enterprises in urban centers yields external economies that include the sharing of a skilled labor force, of spe cialized suppliers of raw materials and of business ser vices, and of the costs of physical infrastructure. For the individual ﬁrm this reduces costs, while in the aggregate it facilitates economic growth. The juxtaposition of many related industries, suppliers, and consumers provides fertile ground for the development, testing, and imple mentation of new business ideas and products, whether by serendipity or through conscious efforts to outdo competitors. This economic ferment spawns, and is in turn fertilized by, the sorts of social and cultural innov ations that have characterized industrial cities. Those, like London, New York, and Shanghai, that are diverse in economic terms have also been important cultural

Industrial City

centers, and have generally been better able to innovate and adapt than those, such as Manchester and Detroit, that were more specialized. In various ways, industrial cities have both reﬂected and hastened economic growth. The residents of industrial cities have always paid a price in terms of public health. Historically, large scale manufacturing concentrated low income households in poorly serviced slums, and produced polluting chemicals. Until the early twentieth century, mortality rates were higher in urban than in rural areas, and even then, pol lution was accepted as an inevitable correlate of pros perity. In Yorkshire, England, people said ‘‘where there’s muck there’s brass [money].’’ A growing awareness of public health problems in industrial towns such as Homestead, Pennsylvania, led to improved water and sewer systems, together with public health initiatives and local efforts to limit industrial emissions. Since the 1970s, public awareness of the regional and global consequences of industrial pollution has prompted many national governments to act. In the developed world, legislation has helped improve air and water quality in industrial cities such as Hamilton, Ontario. The absence or lax enforcement of such regulations in the developing world, however, is producing appalling local conditions. Today the most polluted industrial cities are in the developing world, notably China. There is still brass in muck. The rise of large, industrial cities has also had social consequences that are often known as urbanism. The city dissolves the informal controls of the village or small town. Most urban residents are unknown to one another, and most social interactions in cities occur between people who know each other only in speciﬁc roles, such as parking attendant, store clerk, or customer. Individuals become more free to live as they wish, and in ways that deviate from social norms. In response, and because the high density of city living requires the pliant coordin ation of many thousands of people, urban societies, and especially, municipalities have developed a wide range of methods to control urban behavior. These include regulations that control private land use, building con struction and maintenance (to minimize ﬁre risk), and the production of pollution and noise (especially at night). They also regulate public behavior, especially parking and trafﬁc, through prohibitions against jaywalking and speeding. Of necessity, they have established technologies (parking meters, stop lights, remote cameras, trafﬁc calming devices) and armies of people to enforce these regulations, including inspectors and parking wardens as well as the police. To the extent that this regulatory apparatus responded to conditions that were unique to, or which took their most extreme form in, the industrial city, they may properly be regarded as urban in character. The freedoms, now regulated, of city life have been associated with a common experience of anonymity and alienation in the urban crowd. In response, and because

387

they often could not rely on informal social networks, city dwellers have deliberately sought community, by forming clubs and associations. Because of their speciﬁc gender roles, women have been most signiﬁcant in the more informal and localized of these. City dwellers have also found community by identifying with city wide organizations, notable professional sports teams which, from Aston Villa FC to the Brooklyn Dodgers, were a product of the late nineteenth century city. More gen erally, industrial cities gave birth to new forms of class, ethnic, and political association, many rooted in working class neighborhoods, which shaped municipal and na tional politics. The most fundamental guideline of all that regulates urban life is the clock, which deﬁnes the rhythms of work, shopping, and recreation. These rhythms are faster than those of the country, more predictable in detail, and yet in aggregate more varied. Historically, they created entirely new experiences of speed, ﬂuidity, juxtaposition, syncopation, and change, and then a corresponding esthetic of modernity that has been ex pressed by novelists, composers, and painters. In that sense, industrial cities helped to shape culture in the narrow sense as well as the broad. Arguably, and per haps most important of all, because the rhythm and landscape of the city – of planted parks no less than of parking lots – is artiﬁcial, industrial cities have fostered the assumption that humanity is able to control its own destiny. It is only in very recent decades that the ex perience of water and air pollution on a regional scale, and of global warming, has undermined that peculiarly urban assumption. See also: Capitalism; Central Business District; DeIndustrialization; Industrial Parks; Modernity; New Urbanism; Slums; Suburbanization; Urban Planning and Human Geography; Urbanism.

Further Reading Barth, G. (1980). City people. The rise of modern city culture in nineteenth century America. New York: Oxford University Press. Briggs, A. (1965). Victorian cities. New York: Harper and Row. Buder, S. (1967). Pullman. An experiment in industrial order and community planning. New York: Oxford University Press. Dennis, R. (1984). English industrial cities of the nineteenth century. A social geography. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Engels, F. (1952). The condition of the working class in England in 1844. London: Allen and Unwin. Fogelson, R. M. (2001). Downtown. Its rise and fall, 1850 1950. New Haven: Yale University Press. Gillette, H. (2005). Camden after the fall. Decline and renewal in a postindustrial city. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Harris, R. and Lewis, R. (2001). The geography of North American cities and suburbs, 1900 1950. A new synthesis. Journal of Urban History 27, 262 293. Jacobs, J. (1969). The economy of cities. New York: Random House. Joyce, P. (2003). Rule of freedom. Liberalism and the modern city. London: Verso.

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Lewis, R. (ed.) (2004). Manufacturing suburbs. Building work and home on the metropolitan fringe. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Masareel, F. (1972). The city (die stadt). New York: Dover (original publication, 1925), http://newpartisan.com/images/masereel/ index.html (accessed on Nov 2007). Melosi, M. (2000). The sanitary city. Urbna infrastructure in America from colonial times to the present. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Merriﬁeld, A. (2002). Metromarxism. A Marxist tale of the city. New York: Routledge. Mumford, L. (1961). The city in history. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. Sjoberg, G. (1960). The preindustrial city. Past and present. New York: The Free Press. Teaford, J. (1993). Cities of the heartland. The rise and fall of the industrial midwest. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Vergara, C. J. (1999). American ruins. New York: Monacelli Press. Weber, A. F. (1963). The growth of cities in the nineteenth century. A study in statistics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press (original pubication, 1899). Wirth, L. (1969). Urbanism as a way of life. In Sennett, R. (ed.) Classic essays on the culture of cities, pp 143 164. New York: Appleton Century Crofts (original Publication, 1939).

Relevant Websites http://www.makingthemodernworld.org.uk/ A narrative that includes keyword searchable images, London Science Museum, Making the Modern World. http://digitalgallery.nypl.org A topical and keyword searchable collection, not exclusively of New York City, New York Public Library Digital Gallery. http://memory.loc.gov Browse by topic (e.g., cities, towns), document type (e.g., photos, prints) or keyword searchable, Library of Congress. American Memory. http://www.artmuseums.harvard.edu/collections Harvard University Art Museums, Collections. http://www.library.pitt.edu Historic Pittsburgh Image Collections, Photographs of Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh (University Library SystemDigital Library). http://invinciblecities.camden.rutgers.edu/intro.html Howard Gillette and Camilo J Vergara. Invincible Cities. http://detroityes.com Lowell Boileau. Fabulous ruins of Detroit, Detroit Yes. http://www.archive.org Prelinger Archive, Internet Archive.

Industrial Districts F. Celata, University of Rome ‘‘La Sapienza’’, Rome, Italy U. Rossi, University of Cagliari, Cagliari, Italy & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction In an essay that published in 1987, economist Giacomo Becattini recalls the time in which the concept of external economies and industrial atmosphere originally appeared. A 1969 study, published in a revised form in 1975 by IRPET (a Tuscany based research institute of which Becattini was the director at the time), offered an inter pretation of Tuscany’s development path which em phasized the role of the geographic, historic, and societal characteristics of the region. The work touched upon, al beit only in empirical terms, the notion of the industrial district by referring to the ﬂow of external economies directed toward individual ﬁrms within a process of productive specialization on a local level. Drawing in spiration from Alfred Marshall’s book on industry and trade, the study placed emphasis on the special atmos phere pervading localized agglomerations of small and medium sized ﬁrms specializing in leather goods and footwear, textiles, and furniture in Tuscany, such as Santa Croce sull’Arno, Prato, Montecatini Terme, etc. In the essay, Becattini lamented the delayed consideration of these categories by mainstream economists as well as by politicians and policymakers. In this and in his subsequent work, Becattini – unanimously recognized as the founder of the Italian school on industrial districts – invites the scholarly community to a twofold rehabilitation of geography within the realm of spatial economic theory and applied research. On a disciplinary level, he acknowledges the importance of human geography within the disciplines investigating the dynamics of regional economic devel opment (two contributors to this path breaking publi cation are geographers themselves: Fabio Sforzi and Maria Tinacci Mossello), and, perhaps more importantly, on a theoretical level, Becattini underlines the import ance of a geographic perspective in applied economic research by pointing to ‘localized sociospatial systems’ and the always unique ‘thickening of productive relations’ as major units of analysis in industrial economics and in regional economic development studies more generally. The reassertion of the importance of geography in economic theory and empirical research resonates with the contemporary rehabilitation of space over time by some leading social scientists in the same period with reference to other social issues and ﬁelds of investigation. Broadly speaking, it can be argued that in the 1980s the so called ‘Tuscan model’ came to represent in the ﬁeld of regional

science and local economic development studies something comparable to what the city of Los Angeles represented in the context of postmodern urban development: an allegedly paradigmatic example of sociospatial transformations in post Fordist times. Ironically, the recognition of such a paradigmatic role occurred despite the fact that Tuscany was not a post Fordist region or a ‘new’ industrial space properly deﬁned, as its industrial development trajectory was much older than those of other notable examples of regional post Fordism (such as those in the American Sun Belt). Or, to put it in a different way, Tuscany symbolized the ways in which the post Fordist mode of production was able to bring together the old and the new, the history and the present of industrial organization in capitalist societies. In the eyes of industrial districts scholars, Tuscany was indeed a unique and at the same time successful combin ation of economic and sociocultural, exogenous and en dogenous factors in regional development processes. These factors include: ﬁrst, the national division of labor that prevailed in the Italian economy after the political uniﬁ cation of the country in the nineteenth century with the localization of large factories in the North–West and the other regions of the Center–North, such as Tuscany itself being excluded from mass industrialization; second, the region’s long term tradition of craft production in labor and design intensive sectors, such as clothing and the gar ment industry; third, the share cropping system (mezzadria) prevailing in agriculture with its remarkable economic versatility and unchanging social formations (the ‘Medi terranean model’ of household structure and, most notably, the intense allegiances generated within enlarged family lineages); fourth, the professional ethic of local entre preneurs, resulting in a widespread recognition of well performed work (epitomized by the enduring belief in the ‘mastery of the craft’); ﬁfth, the outward looking character of the regional economy due to the wealth of international economic exchanges (testiﬁed by the role played in indus trial districts development by brokers acting for foreign ﬁrms in channeling international demand toward Tuscany); sixth, the open mindedness of the region linked to the unique legacy of cultural and artistic resources with their potential for attracting foreigners and enlightened visitors.

The Emilian Model and the Institutionalist Turn Although Becattini referred to the work of Alfred Marshall as the main source of inspiration in the (re)discovery of

389

390

Industrial Districts

industrial districts and ‘light industrialization’ paths in Tuscany, the emphasis he placed on the role of en dogenous and sociocultural factors implicitly called for an expansion of industrial district theory itself beyond Marshallian externalities, agglomeration theory, and the conventional boundaries of neoclassical economics. Critics of this classically Marshallian characterization of industrial districts suggested a more explicit engagement with the concept of ‘embeddedness’ in economic sociology as well as with the emerging strands of neo institutionalist theo rizing in regional development studies. The Marshallian framework of analysis, however, has not been abandoned following these critiques but – as we see below in this article – has been updated and amended with other the oretical approaches such as neo Schumpeterian economics and the transaction costs theory, giving rise to a ‘neo’ Marshallian perspective. Initially, the ‘Tuscan model’ of the industrial district provided a fundamental contribution to the making of the geographic imaginary and mythology associated with the rise of the Third Italy as a sociospatial paradigm in post Fordist capitalism. However, following the revisiting of the Marshallian legacy and the inﬂuence acquired by neo institutionalist and neo regionalist theorizations, scholars have looked for other regional models of in dustrial district organization. In this vein, since the mid 1990s Emilia Romagna has gradually taken the role played earlier by Tuscany. Emilia Romagna is a region that has many examples of prosperous industrial districts: ceramics in Sassuolo, knitwear in Modena, motorcycles and shoes in Bologna, and food industry in Parma. Since the beginning, a distinguishing feature of the ‘Emilian model’ of industrial districts has been related to the speciﬁc institutional base of the local economy. Since the early 1980s, economist Sebastiano Brusco had noticed how the artisans and small entrepreneurs of Emilia Romagna cope with customary difﬁculties associated with the small size of ﬁrms by creating associations of mutual help and assistance (such as the National Confederation of Artisans, CNA) and various entities of public–private partnership. These associations and coalitions specialize in the provision of a host of producer services; for in stance, they coordinate purchasing and credit negoti ations, they set up technical consultancy ofﬁces as well as consortia for marketing and purchase of raw and semi fabricated materials, and, most importantly, establish cooperatives providing guarantees for bank loans at the lowest possible rates of interest. This form of interﬁrm cooperation and interdependence, strongly supported by the local and regional government and other regional actors such as local banks and the trade unions, has created the institutional thickness on whose basis in dustrial districts have grown up and ﬂourished in the region, compensating the inefﬁciencies as well as the increasing hollowing out of the state as a regulator of

economic activity in post Fordist and post Keynesian societies. The presence of these institutional intermedi aries crossing conventional economy/state/civil–society boundaries has allowed industrial districts and similar sociospatial conﬁgurations of small ﬁrms to be com petitive in a world dominated by big ﬁrms, global actors, and transnational networks. The attention that has been devoted to the insti tutional foundations of the Emilian model has offered a more comprehensive understanding of the role played by sociocultural and endogenous factors in regional eco nomic development, which had been only inductively highlighted in studies on the ‘Tuscan model’. Subsequent literature dealing with what came to be known as the ‘associational economy’, in the mid and late 1990s, has been particularly inspired by studies investigating the role of these institutional intermediaries in the de velopment and reproduction of industrial districts in Emilia Romagna. Elaborating on this example, students of regional economic development have reached a point of consensus over the fact that while networks of tech nologically advanced ﬁrms tend to gain their com petitiveness from access to scientiﬁc knowledge, codiﬁed rules, technical advances, and strategic management, small ﬁrm networks tend to rely more on informal, mainly tacit and interactive, knowledge as a source of competitive advantage as well as on individual and col lective experience, apprenticeship, incremental innov ation, adaptation to changing circumstances, and organizational ﬂexibility. This neo institutionalist theo rization has contributed to the building of a theory of industrial districts which is less dependent on the original sociospatial context of the Third Italy (Figure 1) and more easily applicable to other geographic contexts.

Traveling Theory: Industrial Districts outside the Third Italy A crucial contribution to the generalization and the internationalization of industrial districts theory has come from the work of the US scholars Michael Piore and Charles Sabel and particularly from their ground breaking concept of ﬂexible specialization. Thanks also to their work, industrial districts started to be regarded as concrete manifestations of a generalized shift toward ﬂexible industrial organization in post Fordist times. In the wake of this rising attention at an international level, concentrations of specialized clusters of small and me dium sized ﬁrms have been found and investigated in many regions of the Western World, including Southern Germany (Baden Wu¨rttemberg), Southern France (Rhoˆne Alpes), and the US West Coast. According to these studies, industrial districts take shape not only as a consequence of the thickening of

Industrial Districts

391

Textile Clothing Leather

Conegliano

Footwear

Brescia Vicenza

Venezia

Furnitures Ceramics

Mechanical engin. Metal Others

Carpi Sassuolo

Prato

Bologna

Firenze Ancona Arezzo Macerata

0

50 km

Figure 1 Industrial districts in the Third Italy. Adapted from Sforzi, F. (1990). The quantitative importance of Marshallian industrial districts in the Italian economy. In Pyke, F., Becattini, G. & Sengenberger, W. (eds.) Industrial Districts and Inter-Firm Co-operation in Italy, pp 75 107. Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies.

cooperation ties between autonomous small sized pro ducers, like in the Third Italy, but also as a result of outsourcing strategies and the restructuring of previously vertically integrated production systems or in the wake of state led industrial development. Related dynamics of industrial reorganization have been observed in a wide range of geographical contexts and economic sectors, such as South Korea (electronics, fabricated metal, and textiles), Japan (Toyota city), Seattle (Boeing production system), California (wine industry), Ile de France (fash ion clothing and high technology industries), and many others, especially in the so called Global South, as shown in the remainder of this paragraph. A notorious example in this respect is the Hollywood’s ﬁlm and television industry. Similarly to design intensive industries, ﬁlm production required continuous upgrading and had to deal with increasingly volatile and fragmented markets during the 1950s and 1960s. Responses to this uncertain economic situation have been of a different kind: from vertical disintegration to a widespread reliance on con tingent staff, from the decreasing size of studios to their outright abandonment, and from product differentiation to the spread of specialized independent companies.

Scholars have observed that these organizational strat egies are aimed not only at fostering specialization but also at externalizing and socializing risks and losses. The rise of industrial districts and the disintegration of Fordist industrial complexes are thus complementary processes highlighting the convergence of both large and small ﬁrms toward increasingly networked organizational structures. From this point of view, districts being dom inated by locally owned small sized ﬁrms can be dis tinguished from industrial clusters having a more hierarchical organization. The German region of Baden Wu¨rttemberg, for example, shares many features with the Third Italy, including the role of regional socioeconomic history, local culture, intermediary institutions, and a widespread attitude toward interﬁrm cooperation. Being specialized in the production of machine tools and automotive components, and similarly to Japanese in dustrial districts, the innovation process is to a larger extent internalized in leading large companies that are keen to preserve their technological know how and have a key role in coordinating the production process. The shift toward ﬂexible modes of production has been in vestigated and documented also within old industrialized

392

Industrial Districts

regions in the context of decentralizing strategies pur sued by large companies. But the majority of ﬂexible production systems has been highlighted, as said in the introduction to this article, mostly with reference either to regions whose local development trajectory has taken shape over the long run, such as those of the Third Italy, or to ‘new industrial spaces’, such as those of the American Sun Belt, which have developed in more recent times. The so called Californian School of external econ omies interpreted the rise of ﬂexible production strat egies as a response to the growing uncertainty of contemporary markets. The increasing division of labor between autonomous and at the same time inter dependent ﬁrms has been understood as an attempt at maximizing the beneﬁts of specialization and reducing the risks of technological lock in. Disintegration of pro duction and the intensiﬁcation of interﬁrm linkages raise transaction costs due to the need for more frequent, less predictable, and more complex interactions. Spatial ag glomeration is an optimal solution for keeping transac tion costs low, allowing a more direct relationship between buyers and suppliers, the adoption of just in time supply systems, mutual trust, and a host of shared interests. Other contributions in this ﬁeld have focused on the relationship between agglomeration and innovation, drawing inspiration from evolutionary and neo Schum peterian economic theory and trying to go beyond the abstract idea of an industrial atmosphere as something intangible. In doing so, the analytical focus has shifted from the complex network of interdependencies that keep industrial districts together to the role of these synergies in sustaining the evolution and regeneration of the whole regional innovation system. From this point of view, the economic process has been viewed as aimed at producing knowledge, rather than products or simply technology, and incremental innovation has been inter preted as an interactive learning process. In a world where codiﬁed knowledge can be easily transmitted across long distances, noncodiﬁed or tacit knowledge becomes increasingly valuable, being difﬁcult to be (re)produced and impossible to be imitated. The notion of tacit knowledge was ﬁrst introduced by Michael Polanyi to refer to aspects of technological know how which cannot be easily expressed in formal statements or communicated over long distances. Its transmission is based on interpersonal relationships, contextual experi ence, learning by doing or by seeing, and face to face contacts. Information exchanges, as well as market ex changes and the coordination of production, demand physical proximity as they require frequent face to face interaction, rapid feedback, the transmission of non codiﬁed information, and multidimensional and per formative communication.

The neo Marshallian conceptualization of external economies ﬂowing through vertical relations with sub contractors along the value chain is complemented with the idea of horizontal relationships taking shape between ﬁrms and a wide range of actors. Empirical studies have demonstrated that the role of direct exchanges has been largely overestimated and that input–output relations are not sufﬁciently dense to account for the concentration of ﬁrms in the majority of industrial districts and for their performance. Especially in innovative clusters, the adoption of the industrial district model is not due to the need to reduce transaction costs related to market ex changes, but is due to nonmarket exchanges and a variety of ‘untraded interdependencies’: ﬁrms need to locate in mutual proximity in order to participate in a buzz of communication and interaction that fosters innovation and technological experimentation. This could explain not only the rise of industrial districts but also the ag glomeration of high tech industries, like in Silicon Valley, and even the concentration of ﬁnancial, advertising, law, and other advanced producer services in global cities such as New York or London. From this perspective, Marshallian industrial districts came to be regarded as a speciﬁc manifestation of a more general tendency toward spatial clustering and interﬁrm cooperation. A controversy has arisen about whether hyperspe cialized industrial regions are able to provide such a relational and communicative buzz in an efﬁcient way when compared to more diversiﬁed and socially dense urban environments. The New York garment district has been presented as a demonstration of the importance of both sources of externalities. The concentration of ap parel manufacturers and their contractors in midtown Manhattan, in proximity with a wide range of fashion related businesses such as retailers and specialized ser vices, design schools, or fashion magazines, has proven to be a crucial source of competitiveness despite the high cost of location that ﬁrms have to afford. Similarly, in novative clusters like Silicon Valley are located in the outskirts of metropolitan regions in search of a balance between the beneﬁts of industrial specialization, deﬁned as Marshallian externalities, and the so called Jacobs’ externalities (from the work of urbanist Jane Jacobs) as sociated with the economic and social variety of large cities. Another inﬂuential contribution to the generalization of the idea of the industrial district has come from Michael Porter and his theory of clusters. Clusters differ qualita tively from industrial districts, even though the two terms are frequently confused and used interchangeably. Busi ness clusters generally include more varied forms of geographic concentrations of ﬁrms compared to those conventionally highlighted under the banner of industrial districts theory. Clusters literature considers, for instance, both hierarchical and nonhierarchical structures in the

Industrial Districts

Table 1

393

A typology of industrial districts and related local production systems

Type

Firm size

Specialization

Governance

Features

Regional examples

(Neo)Marshallian industrial districts The ‘Emilian model’

Small

Craft production, design-intensive sectors Labor-intensive industries

Non-hierarchical

Industrial atmosphere

Prato, Santa Croce sull’Arno

Semi-hierarchical

Modena, Sassuolo

Flexible production systems

Mixed

Manufacturing, technological innovation

Semi-hierarchical

Learning regions

Small and medium

High-tech

Mixed

Business clusters

Mixed

A wide range of manufacturers and services providers

Semi-hierarchical

Institutional thickness, embeddedness Spatial division of labor, coordination economies Knowledge exchanges, face-to-face contacts Policy-led development, intersectoral linkages

Small and medium

governance of contractual interﬁrm relations, while industrial districts theorists usually privilege the non hierarchical structures developed by locally owned small sized ﬁrms (Table 1). Moreover, cluster scholarship in vestigates a set of economic agents which is wider than the one considered in industrial districts studies: for instance, a cluster can be formed by service providers, while indus trial districts are customarily indentiﬁed with reference to the manufacturing sector. Despite its elusiveness, the theory of clusters has the merit of providing a more simpliﬁed and generalized account of the importance of proximity and specialization for industrial competitive ness. From this point of view, dealing with spatial clus tering has proven to be a more viable analytical task as compared to the conceptual vagueness and lack of theo retical rigor frequently characterizing the work of geog raphers and economic sociologists dealing with industrial districts. Consequently, the notion of the cluster has entered economic analysis far more readily than the concept of industrial districts, contributing to a geographic turn in economic theory and to a renewed attempt at integrating spatial agglomeration into formalized eco nomic models. The theorization of clusters and industrial districts has contributed, moreover, to the updating of the lexicon of local economic development policies. Scholars usually have approached industrial districts not only as viable analytical concepts but also as success stories and as policy tools. These sociospatial entities exempliﬁed the paradoxical image of an increasingly globalized world where competitive advantages increasingly lie in local ized knowledge spillovers and relationships. This region centered representation of the world economy is in stark contrast to previous functionalist understanding of the center–periphery relationship and has invited scholars and policymakers to embrace a distinctly endogenous

Hollywood, Seattle, BadenWu¨rttemberg, Japan Silicon Valley, Cambridge

California, Massachusetts, Singapore

approach to industrial upgrading. Industrial policies, in Europe and elsewhere, have been committed to the en hancing of existing industrial districts (in Italy, for ex ample, with the Law 317/1991) and have more generally emphasized the importance of cooperation, endogenous development, and regional uniqueness. The rediscovery of the region as a strategic unit of coordination and governance has inspired political studies investigating rising forms of new localism and new regionalism. The industrial district model, originally interpreted as an alternative pathway for the organization of advanced economies, has been exported to the developing world and to the peripheral regions of industrialized countries, such as the Italian Mezzogiorno. This is no surprise, as Marshallian industrial districts are industries mostly lo cated in areas like the Third Italy, which have never undergone a process of Fordist industrialization. The formation of industrial districts is rather the result of the upgrading of local agglomerations of small sized craft producers, which are widespread in the Global South. A well known example is that of the Sinos Valley district, in the Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul, with more than 1500 ﬁrms involved in shoes production. Unlike Mar shallian industrial districts, the cluster has developed as a supplier of the large US companies and many local ﬁrms have grown in size and have integrated vertically and horizontally. The co presence of small and large ﬁrms, of ﬂexible specialization and Fordist organizational patterns, of localized ties and external linkages has indeed turned out to be a common feature in regions which were cus tomarily regarded as exemplary cases of industrial dis tricts incubators. The two Mexican footwear districts of Guadalajara (women’s shoes) and Leo´n (men’s shoes) have a similarly dualistic industrial organization, with some ﬁrms operating in quasi hierarchical chains dom inated by the US based buyers and a number of smaller

394

Industrial Districts

ﬁrms producing for the domestic market on a more equal and cooperative basis. Other examples of industrial districts have been found in India, Thailand, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and in many other geographic contexts, in cluding the villages and the township communities of rural China. These countries are thought to hold a comparative advantage in specializing in labor intensive industries which do not require the employment of ad vanced technologies. Focusing on the endogenous evo lution of locally owned small ﬁrms, the industrial districts model has offered a regionally embedded pathway to industrialization which diverts from conventional state driven development strategies.

Conclusion The traveling of the theory of industrial districts through different geographic contexts and theoretical per spectives has contributed to the reassertion of the im portance of space and place in economic analysis and to improve conventional understanding of regional devel opment processes and policies. This not only has en riched the original conceptual model, but has also attracted criticism for a tendency to excessive general ization and empiricism at the same time. Some authors have contended that the generalization of the original model has been mostly instrumental to its translation into a tool of regional and industrial policy, as has happened in other lines of new regionalist enquiry. The institutionalist rereading of the industrial districts literature has been criticized for its conceptual fuzziness. This literature – it has been argued – provides a so phisticated understanding of the complex links that tie economic processes to speciﬁc places, but is unable to explain why this has happened there rather than some where else. The balance between competition and co operation, local and translocal interdependencies, and competitive success and economic decline is inherently precarious, and its repositioning is continuously changing and transforming places. The spatial clustering of ﬁrms is likely to conﬁgure itself as a transitional stage in a trajectory of organiza tional change. The standardization of production and an increasing price competition, over the medium run, could favor the integration of production and delocal ization as attempts at reducing costs and enlarging the scale of production, at the expenses of quality and product differentiation, as occurred in both the Third Italy and Silicon Valley during the 1990s. Being specialized in labor intensive products, (neo ) Marshallian industrial districts are particularly exposed to competition from developing countries with lower wage rates. Scholars have long wondered whether industrial districts would survive the increasingly powerful forces of

globalization. In the Third Italy, increasingly competitive pressures have led to groundbreaking restructuring pro cesses. Small sized ﬁrms have ﬂed high quality niche markets, trying to grow in size, through mergers and ac quisitions. Only a small number of leading medium sized ﬁrms have been able to transform themselves into global brands. In many cases, these ﬁrms have delocalized the production process in newly industrializing countries and have retained the service functions such as design, mar keting, and retailing. Long distance links with production branches and suppliers located in Eastern Europe (par ticularly in Romania) and in East Asian countries, in many cases, have entirely replaced local interdependen cies or shorter distance networks (with producers located in the South of Italy, for example). The small size of ﬁrms, the informality of their mutual relationships, and over specialization, which were once supposed to be strategic assets, have proven to be obstacles put in the way of the necessary internationalization of industrial districts. The institutional foundations of districts, on the other hand, have proven to be difﬁcult to be reproduced over time, being constantly challenged by ﬁrms’ individualist agency, opportunism, and generational turnover. Case studies conducted in ‘paradigmatic regions’ such as Tuscany or Baden Wu¨rttemberg have shown how place based ties are likely to engender forms of institutional lock in: routines and conventions which hinder the district’s regeneration process. Scholars have rarely succeeded in providing an evo lutionary explanation of how industrial districts rise and fall within the contexts of increasingly multiscalar socioeconomic formations. Interscalar production rela tionships lack systematic investigation and have been weakly theorized. The emphasis which has been placed on geographically localized ties overlooks the role played by external relations of coordination linking districts to the global economy. Clusters serve as nodes of dense interﬁrm relationships which nurture innovations within the global networks of production. These networks are in many cases dominated by large multinational corpor ations needing at the same time to be embedded in speciﬁc places and to be stretched across larger geo graphic space. The representation of a locally bounded network of cooperative relations dealing with global markets has thus been amended with the analysis of a wide range of transcalar linkages connecting local pro duction systems to global commodity chains through networks of hierarchical and uneven relationships. While the emphasis placed on self contained and lo cally bounded interdependencies allowed early pro ponents of industrial districts theory to leave aside conventional sector centered views of the industrial process, embracing instead a place based perspective, more recent insights have reasserted the importance of network representations, approaching spatial clustering

Industrial Districts

as only one among many relational proximities enabling production to be coordinated and the global economy to function. Local production systems are interpreted as entities being directly or indirectly connected to each other across differing geographic scales and persistently rooted in speciﬁc places and locales, which are themselves embedded in wider geographic networks. Skepticism toward rigid scalar representations of the spatialities of globalization have opened the way for the embracing of a so called ‘ﬂat ontology’: connectivity between places and ﬁrms is not understood merely in terms of geographic co location, but rather in a topolo gical fashion. Spatial clustering coexists with long distance networking: both local buzz and global networks are important for coordinating production and creating knowledge, for industrial upgrading and adaptation. From the perspective of relational economic geography, this means trying to broaden the reach of production net works and to open up ‘black boxes’, such as the ﬁrm, the district, and the region, in order to understand how networks function and develop connections between actors and structures through power relations. See also: Agglomeration; Embeddedness; Fordism, PostFordism and Flexible Specialization; Global Commodity Chains; Global Production Networks; Institutionalism/ Institutional Geographies; Learning Regions; Local Development; Local Economic Development, Politics of; Local Economic Development; Locality Debates; New Regionalism; Regional Development and Noneconomic Factors; Regional Development, Endogenous; Regional Innovation Systems; Relational Economic Geography; Social Capital; Spatial Clustering, Detection and Analysis of; Spatial Division of Labor.

Further Reading Amin, A. (1999). The Emilian model: Institutional challenges. European Planning Studies 7(4), 389 405. Amin, A. and Thrift, N. (1992). Neo Marshallian nodes in global networks. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 16, 571 587.

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Asheim, B. T. (2000). Industrial districts: The contributions of Marshall and beyond. In Clark, G. L., Feldman, M. A. & Gertler, M. S. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Economic Geography, pp 413 431. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bagnasco, A. (1977). Tre Italie. La problematica territoriale dello sviluppo italiano. Bologna: Il Mulino. Becattini, G. (ed.) (1975). Lo sviluppo economico della Toscana. Florence: IRPET. Becattini, G. (ed.) (1987). Mercato e forze locali: Il distretto industriale. Bologna: Il Mulino. Becattini, G., Bellandi, M., Dei Ottati, G. and Sforzi, F. (2003). From Industrial Districts to Local Development. An Itinerary of Research. Cheltenam: Elgar. Brusco, S. (1982). The Emilian model: Productive decentralisation and social integration. Cambridge Journal of Economics 6, 167 184. Cooke, P. and Morgan, K. (1998). The Associational Economy. Firms, Regions, and Innovation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hadjimichalis, C. (2006). The end of Third Italy as we knew it? Antipode 37, 82 106. Harrison, B. (1992). Industrial districts: Old wine in new bottles? Regional Studies 26(5), 469 483. Markusen, A. (1996). Sticky places in slippery space: A typology of industrial districts. Economic Geography 72, 293 313. Markusen, A. (1999). Fuzzy concepts, scanty evidence, policy distance: The case for rigour and policy relevance in critical regional studies. Regional Studies 37, 701 717. Martin, R. and Sunley, P. (2003). Deconstructing clusters: Chaotic concept or policy panacea? Journal of Economic Geography 3, 5 35. Park, S. O. and Markusen, A. (1995). Generalizing new industrial districts: A theoretical agenda and an application from a non Western economy. Environment and Planning A 27, 81 104. Piore, M. J. and Sabel, C. F. (1984). The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity. New York: Basic Books. Porter, M. (1998). Clusters and the new economics of competition. Harvard Business Review 76, 77 90. Scott, A. J. (1988). New Industrial Spaces: Flexible Production Organization and Regional Development in North America and Western Europe. London: Pion. Sforzi, F. (1990). The quantitative importance of Marshallian industrial districts in the Italian economy. In Pyke, F., Becattini, G. & Sengenberger, W. (eds.) Industrial Districts and Inter Firm Co Operation in Italy, pp 75 107. Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies. Storper, M. (1997). The Regional World. Territorial Development in a Global Economy. New York: Guilford Press. Tinacci Mossello, M. (1982). Economia e geograﬁa. Dall’analisi delle economie di agglomerazione alla teoria dello sviluppo regionale. Rivista Geograﬁca Italiana 90, 304 331. Trigilia, C. (1986). Grandi Partiti e Piccole Imprese: Comunisti e Democristiani Nelle Regioni a Economia Diffusa. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Industrial Location K. Chapman, University of Aberdeen, Old Aberdeen, UK & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Agglomeration Economies Economic beneﬁts (especially cost savings) gained by individual ﬁrms as a result of their proximal location to other ﬁrms. Behavioral Approach It draws upon insights from psychology to emphasize the role of decision making in human geography. Cumulative Causation It refers, in a geographical context, to the way in which human actions/decisions through time are interrelated. More speciﬁcally, these interrelationships often involve positive feedback effects contributing to uneven development. Economic Man A concept used in normative (see below) location theory. It assumes that decisionmakers involved in economic activity are motivated exclusively by the objective of proﬁt maximization. Economic man is also assumed to possess perfect information and infallible judgment. Industrial District A localized region of specialized economic activities gaining agglomeration economies (see above) by the exploitation of close internal (to the district) linkages based on ﬂows of goods and, especially, information. Locational Hierarchy It refers to the links between the hierarchical structure of organizations, especially large ﬁrms, and the geographical distribution of their various activities. Locational Interdependence It refers to the way in which individual choices of location (by ﬁrms) are inﬂuenced by the location choices of others. Mode of Production The structured social relationships involved in the organization of productive activity. New Industrial Spaces Concentrations of manufacturing, especially associated with newer technologies such as electronics, that have developed in areas, such as Silicon Valley, quite different from the traditional centers of industrial production. New International Division of Labor A special case of the spatial division of labor (see below) associated with the internationalization of production as reﬂected in the establishment by transnational corporations of manufacturing facilities in rapidly industrializing countries, notably in Southeast Asia. The phenomenon was characterized as ‘new’ in an inﬂuential book published in 1980. Normative The normative approach to explanation attempts to establish what ‘should’ occur in a particular situation deﬁned by a set of carefully speciﬁed

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assumptions. It therefore provides a yardstick or norm with which reality may be compared. Quantitative Revolution A phase during the 1950s and 1960s when statistical and modeling techniques were widely adopted in Anglo-American geography. Regional Policy Policy measures addressing the economic, social, and political problems arising from uneven development. Spatial Division of Labor A concept which describes and seeks to explain the concentration of particular sectors and/or types of production in speciﬁc geographical areas.

The study of industrial location is concerned with the spatial distribution of manufacturing activity. It shares this focus with industrial geography and the terms have be come virtually synonymous in academic usage. Industrial location is sometimes distinguished from industrial geog raphy by an explicit focus upon the circumstances sur rounding the choice of location for new factories rather than a broader concern with the multiple inﬂuences (such as factory closures) shaping the distribution of manu facturing. This review embraces both interpretations, at tempting to clarify the research questions linking them before proceeding to address: (1) the location of individual factories and (2) the geography of wider systems of pro duction. Finally, attention is drawn to the relevance of industrial location for various strands of public policy.

Factories, Firms, Industries, and Places Reﬂecting upon the scope of industrial location/geog raphy, it is apparent that the boundaries are difﬁcult to deﬁne. The location of a single factory cannot be understood without reference to its relationships with other factories. These may be part of the same ﬁrm or they may be owned by other ﬁrms acting as suppliers, customers, or competitors. Thus, the objects of study in industrial location/geography embrace factories and ﬁrms as well as aggregations of ﬁrms operating within the same industry or within wider systems of production involving different sectors. These objects of study are applied in tackling research questions from two very different, but related perspectives. First, questions may be directed toward solving an optimizing problem – ﬁnding the ‘best’ location for a speciﬁc investment. The resolution of such problems, however, clearly has impli cations for communities chosen (and those not chosen) to

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receive such investments. Much work in industrial lo cation/geography reﬂects this reality, representing a second, essentially welfare rather than business oriented approach. Despite ideological differences, the two dif ferent starting points contribute to our understanding of the reciprocal relations between the evolution of indus tries and the evolution of places. The signiﬁcance of these reciprocal relations is en hanced by the very uneven distribution of manufacturing activity, evident at a variety of geographical scales. Relatively few countries account for the bulk of world manufacturing output and industrial activity within these countries is similarly concentrated in relatively few regions. The character of these regions, whether tradi tional centers of heavy industry such as the Ruhr in Germany or new industrial spaces such as Silicon Valley in California, is intimately connected with the fortunes of their principal manufacturing sectors. The decline of its coal, steel, and heavy engineering complex has posed a very different set of problems for the Ruhr from those associated with the spectacular growth of the electronics and, more recently, the biotechnology industries in Silicon Valley. Indeed, the pace of industrial change is accelerating, a trend reﬂected in a substantial research literature concerned with the dynamics of industrial location. This literature focuses upon the relationships between technical change, innovation, and regional de velopment. Biological metaphors such as life cycles have been widely employed in this literature which has re invigorated interest in the study of industrial location.

Location Factors and Factory Location Different manufacturing processes require different combinations of inputs; iron and steel plants, for example, are major users of energy, whereas labor is much more important in the cost structure of a factory making clothing. A substantial literature has examined the interactions between spatial variations in the availability and cost of the multiple inputs required by industrial processes, the geography of demand for the outputs of these activities, and the choice of location for new fac tories. Attention was initially focused upon these inter actions at the national scale, but they have become even more relevant at the international scale as a result of the cross border operations of large companies (see below). Various typologies of location factors have been pro duced drawing upon essentially empirical, survey based methodologies, but resting upon the foundations pro vided by industrial location theory. The logic of location theory is reﬂected in Figure 1 in the distinction between factors primarily inﬂuencing the cost of production and those primarily inﬂuencing the revenues earned by sell ing manufactured goods.

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The work of Weber has, arguably, exerted the greatest inﬂuence upon the study of industrial location. He out lines the basic principles governing the choice of location for a new factory, starting from the premise that the best location is the one at which costs are minimized. Con siderable emphasis is placed upon transport costs, al though he acknowledges that spatial variations in labor costs and agglomeration economies (see below) may also be important. He conceptualizes the problem in terms of the outcome of a balance of forces deﬁned by the relative attractiveness of raw material and market locations. Thus, in a world where transport costs are high, the least cost location is, allowing for possible modiﬁcations by labor costs and agglomeration economies, deﬁned by the costs of assembling inputs from suppliers relative to the costs of distributing outputs to customers. Although ex tremely simplistic, this view of the industrial location problem was consistent with the prevailing pattern of manufacturing when Weber ﬁrst published his book in Germany in 1909, as the coalﬁelds attracted heavy, raw material based industries and market oriented industries concentrated in the major centers of population. Weber’s work is generally taken as the point of de parture in normative studies of industrial location, but his ideas were extended by several others following the neoclassical tradition of location theory. Weber un realistically assumed that the manufacturer could sell all s(he) produced and took no account of the potential ef fect of the location and actions of competitors upon sales. This problem was addressed in subsequent reﬁnements which recognized that decisionmakers react to com petitors, giving a degree of locational interdependence as the best location changes according to the strategy of others. A closely related insight, that some factories may be better placed to serve potential customers, shifted the emphasis away from spatially variable costs to variable revenues. Several writers showed how factories may be

Costs

Factors influencing: Costs & Revenues

Revenues

Materials

Transport

Energy

Infrastructure

Markets

Land (sites)

Agglomeration

Competition

Labor

Public Policies

Capital

Figure 1 A typology of industrial location factors.

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situated to maximize revenues from sales to surrounding market areas, applying similar logic to central place theory. The least cost and locational interdependence (mar ket area) perspectives each represent partial views of the industrial location problem. Commonsense suggests that the rational business (wo)man should seek a location at which proﬁts (total revenues minus total costs) are maximized. Most contributors to industrial location theory were aware of this and some attempted to derive more ambitious theoretical representations which sim ultaneously incorporated the variables inﬂuencing both cost and revenue sides of the equation. Successive re ﬁnements struggled to accommodate the complexities of the problem, including the fact that the cost/revenue variables are not necessarily independent of one another (as represented by the overlapping zone in Figure 1). For example, better transport and other infrastructure facil ities may not only reduce operating costs in one place relative to another, but also enhance the opportunities for selling products and, therefore, for increasing revenues. Theoretical approaches to the study of industrial lo cation have proved difﬁcult to apply in the real world of business practice, although they have been inﬂuential ideas in the world of academic geography. Weber’s ap proach is both deductive, proceeding from a set of basic propositions regarding the objectives of those responsible for the industrial location decision, and also normative, in the sense that it identiﬁes the optimal outcome for the manufacturer under a clearly speciﬁed set of conditions deﬁned by a series of simplifying assumptions. In these respects, industrial location theory both inspired and reﬂected the prevailing intellectual orthodoxy of the ‘quantitative revolution’ in the 1950s and 1960s. Although the ‘new economic geography’ of the 1990s continued to draw upon neoclassical location theory in seeking to explain the uneven distribution of economic activity (including manufacturing), the ‘cultural turn’ has gener ated a very different view of the way that business ﬁrms reach decisions, including location decisions. Indeed, it could be argued that early efforts to make industrial lo cation theory more ‘realistic’ anticipated the shift of in tellectual direction within human geography represented by the ‘cultural turn’. The assumption of economic man (sic) underpinned the models of location theory, including Weber’s analysis of the industrial location problem This notional deci sionmaker is distinguished by the single minded pursuit of proﬁt maximization and by the possession of complete knowledge of all relevant economic information, in cluding the ability to predict the actions of competitors and future events. Some writers attempted to qualify these unrealistic omniscient powers while retaining the essential assumption that decisionmakers strive to ﬁnd the optimal factory location. Rawstron introduced the

notion of spatial margins to proﬁtability which deﬁned the boundaries of an area, surrounding the optimal lo cation, within which proﬁtable operation can be achieved. This idea was subsequently developed by Smith and Pred, the latter proving inﬂuential in the emergence of a behavioral approach applied not only in the study of industrial location, but also in other areas of human geography during the 1960s and 1970s. The behavioral approach attempted to explain the distribution of business activity, including the location of factories, by focusing attention upon the decision making process. Not surprisingly, this focus highlighted the dis cordance between the qualities of economic man in the abstract world of location theory and the more complex inﬂuences upon the actions of decisionmakers in the real world. More speciﬁcally, numerous empirical studies of industrial location decisions involving questionnaire surveys emphasized the importance of somewhat ill deﬁned and ambiguous personal considerations over more rational location factors such as proximity to raw materials and markets. This strand of research in indus trial geography proved relatively short lived, not least because the investments associated with the post World War II boom in North America and Western Europe dried up in the 1970s and factory closures became much more frequent events than openings. Nevertheless, lo cation theory and behavioral concepts remain important in the overlapping worlds of management studies and business consultancy as major companies and public/ private sector agencies have strong mutual interests in negotiating over the location of large scale, internation ally mobile investments such as electronics and motor vehicle assembly plants. These negotiations are often informed by location factor analyses deriving their in spiration from the traditions of location theory and be havioral studies.

Systems of Production Implicit in industrial location theory is the assumption that the unit of production (the factory) and the unit of organization (the ﬁrm) are combined in the form of the single plant ﬁrm. Contemporary industrial production is, however, dominated by large, multiplant, multiproduct corporations. The spatial structure of these corporate production systems became a focus of research attention during the 1960s and 1970s, although concern with the role of large ﬁrms as agents of geographical change (ex tending well beyond the location decision narrowly de ﬁned) remains an important strand of enquiry. One important consequence of the focus upon large ﬁrms has been an appreciation of the fact that the location of factories is only one aspect of the geography of pro duction. The operations of factories are supported by

Industrial Location

other activities in management, research and develop ment (R&D), and so on. Furthermore, case studies of large ﬁrms have emphasized that these activities tend to be found in different kinds of place as hierarchical sys tems of control are expressed on the ground in locational hierarchies with, for example, head ofﬁce functions concentrated in major metropolitan centers and manu facturing dispersed to more peripheral locations. Massey translated these empirical ﬁndings into the concept of the spatial division of labor which she sub divided into two basic types. First, a sectoral division of labor associated with regional specialization in particular industries; second, an intrasectoral division of labor based upon the locational strategies of large ﬁrms. Sectoral divisions of labor reﬂect and contribute to the inter dependencies (noted above) between the evolution of industries and the evolution of places as the social re production of particular skills reinforces the distinctive ness of economic landscapes associated with the production of motor vehicles as compared with those specializing in, for example, the production of chemicals. The identiﬁcation of intrasectoral spatial divisions of labor was, however, Massey’s most inﬂuential contri bution. This insight provided a link between narrower concerns with the geography of ﬁrms and the much broader, Marxist inspired interest in the geography of capitalism during the 1980s. Thus, the impact of indus trial restructuring upon different regions was partially explained in terms of intracorporate spatial divisions of labor. In particular, it was noted that manufacturing branch plants in peripheral regions tended to be more vulnerable to job losses and closure in times of recession than facilities situated closer to the centers of corporate control. Intracorporate spatial divisions of labor have not only been identiﬁed at the national scale. Frobel et al. postulated The New International Division of Labour based upon the same link between the organizational and spatial structures of large corporations. Advances in communication and transport technologies have facili tated the coordination and control of corporate systems dispersed between many countries. In these circum stances, global corporations based in developed countries such as the US and Japan have established plants across a wide spectrum of industries, including electronics and clothing, in countries with much lower labor costs such as Mexico and Malaysia. These corporate strategies have contributed to major changes in the location of industry at the global scale. It is important to emphasize that, while intracorporate spatial divisions of labor have exerted an important inﬂuence upon the location of in dustry, the nature of this inﬂuence is constantly changing in response to the ﬂuid internal structure and external boundaries of large business organizations. A trend toward ﬂatter networked organizations will create dif ferent patterns from those associated with the top

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down, hierarchical structures which inﬂuenced Massey’s thinking. Despite the expanding power and inﬂuence of large ﬁrms, the distribution of manufacturing cannot be ex plained exclusively in terms of the operation of intra corporate systems of production. One of the most enduring research themes in the study of industrial lo cation has addressed the phenomenon of agglomeration, deﬁned as the tendency for productive activities to locate in close proximity to one another. This characteristic clustering reﬂects the existence of regional systems of production based on complex interﬁrm relationships. Efforts to understand the nature of agglomeration, in particular the beneﬁts gained by participating ﬁrms from mutual proximity, have addressed the central problem of explaining the uneven distribution of manufacturing ac tivity. These efforts have extended from Weber’s in corporation of agglomeration in his industrial location theory to more recent work on industrial districts, new industrial spaces, and clusters. Simplifying considerably, two general strands may be identiﬁed in this substantial literature. The ﬁrst emphasizes the essentially static, cost based advantages gained by the agglomeration of related ﬁrms; the second is concerned mainly with the dynamics of innovation and learning. The pervasive in ﬂuence of normative industrial location theory and, in particular, the ideas of Weber ensured that the former remained the preferred approach to the analysis of industrial agglomeration at least until the 1980s. This focused on the costs of transactions between inter dependent ﬁrms. These transactions are sometimes ex pressed as physical ﬂows or linkages in a production chain concerned with, for example, the manufacture of motor vehicles or chemicals. They may also take the less tangible form of services such as accountancy. Whatever the precise nature of the transaction, the underlying as sumption is that the spatial proximity of supplier and buyer reduces costs and enhances the overall efﬁciency of the production system. Contemporary interest in ag glomeration has shifted away from a focus upon trans action costs toward an emphasis upon information based relationships. This partly reﬂects a greater awareness of the social nature of production. Within this context, the spatial proximity of ﬁrms is seen to facilitate the circu lation of information and ideas (i.e., knowledge), thereby contributing to the collective learning necessary to sus tain the momentum of innovation and improvement upon which the competitive advantage of production systems rests. At ﬁrst glance, it is surprising that proximity should be so important in a world made smaller by satellite communications and the Internet. Numerous studies have confronted this paradox, noting that social networks, which are typically constrained by distance, are import ant mechanisms for the circulation of nonroutine, high level information and business intelligence. The

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tendency for ﬁrms involved in relatively new sectors such as biotechnology and nanotechnology to cluster in particular regions has been widely noted and seems to conﬁrm the signiﬁcance of localized knowledge circulation systems in promoting agglomeration.

Industrial Location and Public Policy The impact of the uneven and dynamic distribution of manufacturing upon the economic and social character of places has often encouraged states to try to inﬂuence the pattern of industrial development. This generalization remains true for very different political systems ranging from the modiﬁed state socialism of China to the mixed economies of Europe and the free market capitalism of the US. Many aspects of public policy directly and in directly affect the manufacturing sector. Thus, all states pursue a wide range of industrial policies incorporating, for example, measures designed to regulate competition or to encourage entrepreneurship. Science and technol ogy policies promoting R&D and trade policies relating to cross border ﬂows of investment also inﬂuence the geography of industrial development. All of these various policies are, however, primarily concerned with shaping the commercial environment of manufacturing ﬁrms in ways designed to enhance the overall economic per formance of the state relative to other states. Any inﬂu ences upon the location of industry are incidental to this wider objective. By contrast, various strands of regional policy have sought to directly inﬂuence indus trial location. Regional policy is concerned with addressing the in equalities of opportunity associated with uneven devel opment which is a basic geographical characteristic of the capitalist mode of production. It is also a basic charac teristic of the industrial mode of production regardless of the political system in which it is set. The distribution of manufacturing in the former Soviet Union and in con temporary China both display massive regional dis parities which suggest that the mechanisms underpinning agglomeration in space and cumulative causation through time have universal validity. Manufacturing has been and remains central to the operation of these mechanisms even in postindustrial economies where the shift in em ployment toward services tends to divert attention away from its continuing economic signiﬁcance in, for ex ample, sustaining a wide range of producer services. Nevertheless, it has usually been the welfare con sequences of industrial decline which have encouraged the adoption of regional policy and, more speciﬁcally, efforts to attract investment in new, to replace dis investment in old industries. Regional policy in the UK, for example, had its origins in the depression of the 1930s which was experienced most severely in the industrial

heartlands, such as Clydeside and Tyneside, based upon coal, steel, and shipbuilding. The essence of regional policy is that it applies only to certain areas within a country. Deﬁning the boundaries of these areas is, therefore, a prerequisite to policy implementation. Over a period of more than 50 years, various UK governments successively modiﬁed and extended the areas qualifying for assistance from those initially identiﬁed in 1934. The assistance provided has embraced a wide range of in struments, including grants and loans to encourage cap ital investment, subsidies to support employment and expenditure on public infrastructure such as transport facilities. Such measures have been aimed at supporting existing ﬁrms and industries, but considerable effort has also been devoted to attracting investment into a region from other regions within the UK or from other countries by seeking to inﬂuence the location decisions of private sector ﬁrms. Similar efforts have been made by national and federal authorities in virtually all developed coun tries. In the US, for example, most of the poorer southern states have regarded industrial location policies as central to their economic development strategies. Despite the widespread adoption of regional policy, its effectiveness has always been controversial. Often in spired by short term political expediency rather than any consistent long term objectives, it is difﬁcult to measure success and failure. Most national governments have progressively diminished or abandoned identiﬁable packages of regional policy measures since the late 1980s in response to these difﬁculties and to the pervasive in ﬂuence of the neoliberal orthodoxy favoring market so lutions to economic development problems. This inﬂuence has been reinforced by the parallel demise of socialist state planning, embracing direct intervention in industrial location, following the fragmentation of the Soviet Union and its empire. Area based development agencies involving loose coalitions of public and private sector interests have partially ﬁlled the policy vacuum left by these trends. The areas represented by such agencies extend from local communities through subna tional regions to countries and even supranational blocs such as the European Union. Thus, competition to attract industrial investment is no longer restricted to regions within the same country. Large scale, internationally mobile projects such as Japanese owned motor vehicle and electronics assembly plants have, for example, pro voked locational tournaments between communities, re gions, and countries. Numerous cases have illustrated the continuing importance of efforts to inﬂuence industrial location decisions by offering a wide range of incentives, including free sites, investment grants, and various forms of infrastructure provision extending from new roads to education and training facilities for potential employees. Incentive packages offered in support of large projects typically involve a multiplicity of agencies and

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institutions, emphasizing the complex and sometimes conﬂicting interdependencies between the various scales of political and economic organization. On a general level, these interdependencies highlight and reﬂect the role of foreign direct investment as one of the key drivers of globalization. More speciﬁcally, they indicate that the location of industry remains an important issue on public policy agendas. See also: Agglomeration; Firms; Industrial Organization; Industrial Restructuring; Location Theory; Public Policy; Regional Development Models; Regional Development Theory; Spatial Division of Labor; Uneven Development.

Further Reading Barnes, T. J. (2001). Re theorizing economic geography: From the quantitative revolution to the ‘cultural turn’. Annals, Association of American Geographers 91, 546 565. Bathelt, H., Malmberg, A. and Maskell, P. (2004). Clusters and knowledge: Local buzz, global pipelines and the process of knowledge creation. Progress in Human Geography 28, 31 56. Chapman, K. and Walker, D. (1991). Industrial Location: Principles and Policies (2nd edn.). Oxford: Blackwell. Commission of the European Communities (1993). New location factors for mobile investment in Europe. Regional Development Studies 6, Dicken, P. (2004). Global Shift (4th edn.). London: Sage. Estall, R. C. and Buchanan, O. (1980). Industrial Activity and Economic Geography (4th edn.). London: Hutchinson. Fisher, P. S. and Peters, A. H. (1998). Industrial Incentives: Competition among American States and Cities. Kalamazoo, MI: Upjohn Institute. Frobel, F., Heinrichs, J. and Kreye, O. (1980). The New International Division of Labour. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gordon, I. R. and McCann, P. (2000). Industrial clusters: Complexes, agglomerations and/or social networks. Urban Studies 37, 513 532. Greenhut, M. L. (1956). Plant Location in Theory and Practice. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina. Hayter, R. (1997). The Dynamics of Industrial Location. Chichester: Wiley. Hoover, E. M. (1948). The Location of Economic Activity. New York: McGraw Hill. Krugman, P. (1991). Increasing returns and economic geography. Journal of Political Economy 99, 483 499. Losch, A. (1954). The Economics of Location. Woglom, W. H. (trans.). New Haven, CT: Yale University. MacKinnnon, D., Cumbers, A. and Chapman, K. (2002). Learning, innovation and regional development: A critical appraisal of recent debates. Progress in Human Geography 26, 293 311. Malecki, E. J. (1997). Technology and Economic Development (2nd edn.). Harlow: Longman.

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Malmberg, A. and Maskell, P. (2002). The elusive concept of localisation economies towards a knowledge based theory of spatial clusters. Environment and Planning A 34, 429 449. Massey, D. (1984). Spatial Divisions of Labour: Social Structures and the Geography of Production. London: Macmillan. Moriarty, B. M. (1980). Industrial Location and Community Development. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina. Nishioka, H. and Krumme, G. (1973). Location conditions, factors and decisions: An evaluation of selected location surveys. Land Economics May, 195 205. Phelps, N. A. and Tewdwr Jones, M. (2001). Globalisation, regions and the state: Exploring the limitations of economic modernisation through inward investment. Urban Studies 38, 1253 1272. Pred, A. (1967). Behaviour and location: Foundations for a geographic and dynamic location theory (part 1). Lund Studies in Geography Series B 27. Rawstron, E. M. (1958). Three principles of industrial location. Transactions and Papers, Institute of British Geographers 25, 132 142. Schmenner, R. W. (1982). Making Business Location Decisions. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Schoenberger, E. (1997). The Cultural Crisis of the Firm. Oxford: Blackwell. Smith, D. M. (1966). A theoretical framework for geographical studies of industrial location. Economic Geography 42, 95 113. Smith, D. M. (1981). Industrial Location: An Economic Geographical Analysis (2nd edn.). New York: Wiley. Storper, M. (1997). The Regional World. New York: Guildford. Storper, M. and Walker, R. (1983). The theory of labour and the theory of location. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 7, 1 43. Storper, M. and Walker, R. (1989). The Capitalist Imperative: Territory, Technology and Industrial Growth. Oxford: Blackwell. Wannop, U. (1995). The Regional Imperative: Regional Planning and Governance in Britain, Europe and the United States. London: Jessica Kingsley. Watts, H. D. (1980). The Large Industrial Enterprise. London: Croom Helm. Watts, H. D. (1981). The Branch Plant Economy: A Study of External Control. London: Longman. Weber, A. (1929). Theory of the Location of Industries. Friedrich, C. J. (trans.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago.

Relevant Websites http://www.berr.gov.uk Department for Business Enterprise & Regulatory Reform. http://ec.europa.eu European Commission: enterprise, economy, and regional policy. http://www.unctad.org United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. http://www.unido.org United Nations Industrial Development Organization.

Industrial Organization J. Patchell, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Geography of Enterprise The study of the inﬂuence of the policies and structures of multiproduct, multiplant enterprises on changes in industrial location and on process of regional economic development. Monopolistic Competition A market/industry that allows competition among many ﬁrms, but within which each ﬁrm differentiates to achieve some market power. Monopoly A market/industry dominated by one ﬁrm. Oligopoly A market/industry in which a few ﬁrms produce a high proportion of total output. Sunk Costs Investments that cannot be altered or recouped. Transaction Costs The costs incurred in undertaking transactions (other than production costs). Untraded Interdependencies The conventions, informal rules, and habits that coordinate market transactions under conditions of uncertainty.

Industrial organization is a conceptual framework for economic and especially industrial geography. Indeed it could be said that industrial geographers study the spatial organization of industry whether that be the way space organizes industry or industry organizes space. Yet in dustrial geographers do not deﬁne their research as the study of industrial organization (IO); this title belongs to one of the strongest subdisciplines of economics. This essay focuses on the interrelations between the two to provide insights into the orientation of industrial geog raphy – its foundations on IO, its distinctions from it, and complementarities between the two approaches. Sheppard deﬁnes IO as an applied branch of micro economics concerned with effective competition and es pecially the inﬂuence of big business, corporate power, monopoly, and antitrust. For Carlton and Perloff, IO is ‘‘the study of the structure of ﬁrms and markets and of their interactions.’’ The ﬁrst of these deﬁnitions provides both the traditional and essential contribution, it is con cerned with effective competition. IO recognizes that the market rarely takes the shape of the idealized neoclassical model of perfect competition. Rather large ﬁrms dominate and have a strategic interest in manipulating the market for their beneﬁt – the greater the degree of monopoly obtained, that is, the greater the degree of market power, the greater the proﬁts. There are in fact several market structures – competitive, monopoly, monopsony, oligopoly, oligopsony, and monopolistic competition. The second

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deﬁnition, while not rejecting the approach of the former, uses price theory to incorporate the operations of the market within and outside of the ﬁrm and therefore pro vides additional explanations for the different types of markets. The overall cohesiveness of the discipline is il lustrated in Figure 1. In the effective competition view causality runs stron gest from determinants or basic conditions, through structure and behavior onto performance. Technological scale economies, for example, will strongly predetermine whether a market is competitive, monopolistically com petitive, oligopolistic, or monopolistic. If the market is monopolistic ﬁrm behavior will tend to be opportunistic in the market, while oligopoly fosters collusion. Monopolistic competition, on the other hand, encourages differentiation based competition and advertising. The price theory view (incorporating transaction costs, game theory, and con testable markets) strengthens reverse causality to examine how performance inﬂuences behavior, behavior inﬂuences structure, and structure inﬂuences basic conditions or de terminants. In both approaches there are strong causal relationships to public policies and other forms of gov ernance. And crucially for both approaches, evaluation of the system – the performance of the industry/market structure – is the provision of beneﬁts to the consumer. This uniﬁed model while showing a recognized struc ture does not reﬂect all the differences within IO. The New Chicago School and the new industrial organization theory, for example, are forgiving of monopoly and oli gopoly, claiming such a ﬁrm’s position reﬂects efﬁciency of organization. The uniﬁed model of IO has had wider in ﬂuences in economics and business, however. Prominently, the transaction cost theories of Coase and Williamson intersect IO and the new industrial economics. The ob jective of fostering pure competition has been reversed to reveal how ﬁrms can take advantage of market structure to gain market power. The power of Porter’s approach has been to convert his knowledge of the structure of markets to explaining ﬁrm strategy. The economics of business and organization beneﬁts from this conversion as well. The impact of IO on industrial geography has been profound and pervasive. As will be traced out in the fol lowing sections, much of industrial geography (or for our purposes geographic industrial organization, GIO) is propelled by the reality of monopoly and oligopoly, ex plaining its spatial outcomes and searching for alternatives. In the process GIO has incorporated IO explanations such as sunk costs and transaction costs and looked elsewhere to explain organization–space relations. While GIO’s spatial

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Basic conditions determinants Demand Elasticity Substitutes Seasonality Rate of growth Location Lumpiness of orders Method of purchase

Production Technology Raw material Unionization Product durability Location Scale economies Scope economies

Structure Number of buyers and sellers Barriers to entry new firms Product differentiation Vertical integration Diversification

Policy and governance Economic ideology/theory Competition regulations (antitrust) Taxes and subsidies Investment and employment incentives Macroeconomic policies Regulation of utilities Public ownership Social governance/regulation

Conduct Advertising Research and development Pricing behavior Plan investment Legal tactics Product choice Collusion Merger and contracts

Performance Price Allocative efficiency Product quality Profits

Production efficiency Equity Technical progress

Figure 1 Structure, conduct, and performance. After Carlton, D. W. and Perloff, J. M. (2005). Modern industrial organization. Boston: Pearson; Sheppard, W. G. (1997). The economics of industrial organization. Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall.

focus is an obvious compliment to IO, they differ in a crucial manner. For IO theorists, the bottom line is per formance for the consumer. Geographers, on the other hand, are overwhelmingly concerned with the perform ance of industrial organization on the places of production.

The Large Firm/MNC Model The IO and geographic industrial organization per spectives have a common origin in recognizing the limi tations of the neoclassical model of perfect competition. The fundamental base of IO is to add monopoly/mon opsony, oligopoly/oligopsony, and monopolistic com petition market structures to the pure competition model.

The different structure of these markets results from the beneﬁts of size, and therefore much of IO is concerned with how ﬁrms develop and utilize size to their advantage: exploring in particular the possible damage done to con sumers and competitors by the ability of monopolists to set prices above marginal costs or the potential for price collusion by oligopolists. As a reﬂection, the geography of enterprise or corporate geography (key authors including P. Dicken, R. Hayter, G. Krumme, M. Taylor, N. Thrift, and D. Watts) developed primarily as an analysis of giant multiproduct, multiplant, and multiregion or multi national corporations. Geography of enterprise, thus, incorporates monopoly/ oligopoly as its perspective on industrial organization, with

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the essential assumptions that these ﬁrms are able to achieve economies of scale through vertical integration and economies of scope through horizontal diversiﬁcation and horizontal differentiation. The economies are ob tained not only in production, but also in management, R&D, advertising, and distribution. Incorporating product cycle concepts into this theorization, geography of enter prise examined the location of different corporate activ ities. Markusen has produced the most comprehensive analysis of how oligopolies evolve to control a national space of production and the consequential reduction of regionally dispersed small ﬁrms. Most geography of en terprise research, however, begins with the reality of na tional or multinational corporations. Investigations of competitive and collusive strategies revealed locational matching by same country companies of branch plants in peripheral regions, competing branch plant location from ﬁrms in different regions/countries, and also collusive entry and carving up of regions by oligopolies to create regional monopolies. Geographers extended IO’s treat ment of barriers and advantages to entry by analyzing multiregional or multinational ﬁrms’ establishment of new plants and distribution centers. The aspatial theorization of mergers and acquisitions and the role of vertical inte gration were contrasted against the spatial segregation of particularly corporate head ofﬁces and R&D. Although the geography of enterprise can recall studies of basing point and uniform pricing strategies or point out the administered nature of internal transactions as a nod to the recognition of consumer beneﬁts, for the most part the performance of concern is impact on places of production. Particularly by creating monopsony and oligopsony conditions in local and regional factor mar kets, large enterprises are capable of manipulating mar kets and their regulation to their beneﬁt. There have been two overriding and related concerns. One has been to investigate the search for cheaper and more ﬂexible labor and the capacity to inﬂuence these conditions. In the ﬁrst instance, Clark characterized ﬁrms as locating manufacturing production to gain lower costs, control the work force, and to break beneﬁt comparison between blue collar and R&D workers. This focus on manufacturing production intersects with the social relations of production school that offered a broad critique of corporate exploitation of labor conditions in different places but did not link this to market struc tures. In the second instance corporations bargain with governments to obtain incentives such as infrastructure, regulatory ﬂexibility, tax relief, legalized labor control, and so on. These incentives broach other geographical questions in relation to multipliers and negative ex ternalities, but they also highlight the fact that GIO does not take labor conditions or government policy for granted. Rather it looks at these as malleable by cor porate power.

The impacts of large corporations in shaping the struc ture of competitors and the social division of labor in their industry are also of concern. Fredricksson and Lindmark examined the relative internal efﬁciencies of large ﬁrms and small ﬁrms. Taylor and Thrift sketched out the relationships of leading ﬁrms, suppliers, and loyal opposition emphasizing the latter pairs role in production buffering and lowering wages. Christopherson and Storper introduced the idea of corporate disintegration of activities to local and distant suppliers. Around the same time the Japanese economists were explaining the quasi vertical integration of their pro duction systems by extending Williamson’s transaction cost theory. These concepts were drawn into geographical dis cussion albeit, focusing on the learning advantages of interﬁrm relations. The shift from Fordism to ﬂexible spe cialization, particularly as driven by technological change, but with implications for internal and external restructuring of production was incorporated into these discussions. As another example of GIO following IO’s lead in examining the impact of internal cost structures on industry structure, sunk costs have been recognized for proscribing ﬁrm or ganization and location options, and barriers to entry. The geography of enterprise approach is distinguished by its use of multifaceted empirical case studies, usually incorporating interviews. A case study of the activities of an oligopolist or even of large ﬁrms within limited monopolistic competition has obvious advantages to ex plaining the competitive structure of an industry with few concerns in regard to representativeness. Caution has to be exercised, however, with increasing complexity and numbers of suppliers in a production system. Moreover, as indicated above the openness of the case study ap proach allows for consideration of the complexities and bargains inherent to labor and government negotiations, the introduction of technologies, and their interrelations. An important facet of the case study approach is to reveal the different strategies used by ﬁrms of different coun tries or among a country’s ﬁrms.

The Industrial District Alternative The industrial district was rediscovered in the 1980s as a potential alternative to oligopolies, indeed conceptual ized as the ‘second industrial divide’ it was proffered to reverse this dominance. The importance of small ﬁrms and of cooperative–competitive relations in agglomer ations gained further attention after Porter recast them as clusters. The ramiﬁcations for GIO, however, were to focus attention on explaining these interﬁrm relations with greater rigor. Geographers did so in a manner that both incorporated IO concepts and sought to overcome their deﬁciencies. Scott based his reinterpretation of agglomeration on an inversion of the Coasian transaction cost argument for

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integrating the functions of the market. He argued that internal economies of scale and scope would likely dis integrate when market instability, varying optimal scales of operation, conditions that preclude market failures, and segmented labor markets prevailed, particularly when agglomeration conditions allowed. Recalling Mar shall, but also citing work in industrial districts in Italy and France, Scott pointed to the knowledge, familiarity, and trust that allowed ﬁrms in agglomerations to escape some transaction cost based market failures. Lorenz de veloped a complimentary view citing an industrial dis trict’s capacity for providing collective goods and norms of competition. Grabher incorporated Granovetter’s weak and strong ties into the analysis. Storper took the syn thesis of external economies and sociocultural per spective further by adding conventions theory to Dosi’s concept of ‘untraded interdependencies’. Much of the early industrial district research and theorization focused on production where the majority of inputs and ﬁrms of a given industry concentrated with a speciﬁc region, and was criticized for the expectation of endogenous heroics. Indeed later research on industrial districts and clusters emphasized the need for ‘local buzz’ to be fed by ‘pipelines’ or other forms of interaction with the global economy. On the other hand, in the face of globalization, interest in the industrial district as a comprehensive sector of activity has given way to in vestigating clusters of functional specializations. Pre eminent among these are the networks of producer services such as advertising, ﬁnance, music, and R&D functioning through projects and networks. An important aspect of this work is to look at the interrelations of the interﬁrm networks with the intraﬁrm organization. This work coalesced with the world cities view of increasing concentration of higher ordered services.

Integrating MNCs, Functions, and Networks across the Global Value Chain The multinational or transnational view of industrial or ganization was always an integral perspective of the en terprise/corporate geography approach. However, whereas early work had primarily focused on the dispersal of stages in manufacturing, commodity and value chain analyses broaden the GIO perspective to other industries and in corporate market inﬂuences more directly into spatial organization. This manufacturing based perspective was challenged by Gerefﬁ’s distinction between producer and market driven commodity chains and Porter’s directives that value can be produced anywhere in an organizational value chain and anywhere in a spatial value chain. The burgeoning literature on agricultural commodity chains, revealing industrial production, distribution, and marketing processes, demonstrates compatibility with

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GIO theorization. This ﬁeld also proffers alternatives to MNC organization such as short food supply chains and various designations of origin supply chains or ﬁlie`res. Perhaps more than any area oligopoly/oligopsony is most evident in the world of Wal Mart and Carrefour. Wrigley has been at the forefront in drawing this reality in eco nomic geography explaining both the multinational reach of large retailers and how their sourcing and distribution differs from manufactures. In addition the increasingly multinational expansion of producer services ﬁrms, es pecially ﬁnance and business services, gather attention. The longstanding interest of enterprise geography in ﬁrms being shaped by their environment and shaping their local environments has developed further by incorporating concepts from the industrial districts and networks litera tures into that of global production chains. The impact of multinationals on the various locations of their production chains depends on the positive and negative manners in which they engage the relational assets of a region. These relational assets include external economies of scale and scope, localization economies, and supporting institutions. It is the latter asset where much attention has been focused. Industrial geographers have complemented the IO literature by demonstrating how ﬁrms respond not only to one policy and governance regime, but they do so at different scales and in networks of these regimes. Furthermore, a major thrust of research has been to draw out the interrelations among technology, policy, and sociocultural inﬂuences. An important new area of research is to link con sumption with production. Whereas much of GIO re search has investigated production in ﬁrms and in industrial districts primarily through the lens of product ive efﬁciency and without much direct link to demand conditions, researchers are increasingly investigating how demand in place inﬂuences production and how com panies inﬂuence demand in place. One approach investi gates the interactions of consumer expressivity of demand and corporate manipulation of demand in the home, the streets, and the malls. Importantly, however, this shaping of demand is traced back through the commodity chain to expose the impacts of consumption upon the social and environmental conditions at places of production. This linking of consumption and production further compli cates elucidation of multiscalar policy and governance impacts on the spatial organization of industry as often environmental, social, and economic objectives at either end of the value chain may differ signiﬁcantly.

Conclusion The fundamental impulse of economic geography’s intersection with IO has been retained over four decades. IO begins with a recognition of the limitations to neo classical competition and the role of big ﬁrms in shaping

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the structure of markets. GIO assesses the location pat tern of markets that results from the organizational strategies of big ﬁrms and how the ﬁrms shape and are shaped by each marketplace. Particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, geography directly or indirectly borrowed many concepts from IO: competition (locational match ing), oligopoly collusion, barriers to entry, sunk costs, and transaction costs. The continuing relevance of these ap proaches is captured by Dicken’s iterative appraisals in his popular Global shift.

However, since that period geography has not pursued developments in IO. It has not taken up the deeper sig niﬁcance of transaction cost economics – bounded ra tionality and opportunism are a rejection of the perfect rationality of neoclassical theory. Yet economic geog raphers generally conﬂate the transaction cost and neo classical perspectives and have not attempted to deal with the implications of this radical perspective on its own terms, as for example, Ostrom does with common pool resource theory for distinctly territorial issues. Nor have

Performance (locations of production) Employment levels Wage rates Community development Externalities Capacities for structural change Physical and social infrastructure Enterpreneuralism and social capital Culture

Spatial structure of production Distance and distribution Labor forces and wage levels Technologies and resources Scale and scope economies Vertical and horizontal integration Physical and social infrastructure Capacities for structural change Entrepreneurialism and social capital

Conduct (production and distribution)

Policy and governance Competition regulations Industrial policies Investment/employment subsides Tax policy Macroeconomic policies Externality and social regulations

Locational choice Marketing and pricing Research and development Corporate social responsibility Investments Product choice Competitive strategies Mergers, collaboration, outsourcing

Performance (locations of consumption) Variety, quality, and prices Production and allocative efficiency Equity Profits Externalities Culture

Figure 2 Geography of structure conduct performance. After Carlton, D. W. and Perloff, J. M. (2005). Modern industrial organization. Boston: Pearson; Sheppard, W. G. (1997). The economics of industrial organization. Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall.

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geographers made much use of other advances such as Lancasterian differentiation, Akerloff ’s information the ories, or game theory that could illuminate the supply chain perspective that has become the thread for understanding globalization. Economic geographers have demonstrated a pro pensity to search for alternatives to the economizing viewpoint inherent to IO. The rediscovery of the indus trial district symbolizes this search, and furthermore from the mid 1990s GIO has refocused the differences of re gions and contingent institutional and evolutionary processes. This trend puts the divergence from IO in perspective, for GIO has made three notable achieve ments, which are sketched in Figure 2. First, and reaching back to its initial stimulus, GIO has re interpreted the performance of industrial organization for the people in the places of production. For IO, the people, the resources, the environments, and the insti tutions of these places are simply inputs for corporate use and consumer satisfaction. Second, GIO demonstrates the diversity of policy and governance, varying vertically in levels of control within nations and horizontally among regions and nations. Furthermore, GIO has ﬂe shed out the diversity of institutions, formal and informal, that make up this governance. Lastly, and at a more formative stage, GIO is revealing the relationship be tween consumer and production performance by showing the social and environmental consequences of con sumption in places of production. IO and GIO offer much to each other in terms of theory and empirical testing, and in terms of evaluating theoretical beneﬁts against impacts on people in place. Moreover, perhaps both can occasionally revisit the im pact of large ﬁrms, neither becoming infatuated with the mechanisms of the new industrial economics or the evolutionary processes of geography’s institutional turn. See also: Industrial Districts; Retail Geographies.

Further Reading Akerlof, G. (1970). The market for ‘lemons’: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, 488 500.

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Carlton, D. W. and Perloff, J. M. (2005). Modern industrial organization. Boston: Pearson. Christopherson, S. (2002). Why do national labor market practices continue to diverge in a global economy. Economic Geography 48, 1 20. Clark, G. L. (1981). The employment relation and the spatial division of employment. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 71, 412 424. Clark, G. L. and Wrigley, N. (1995). Sunk costs: A framework for economic geography. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers NS 20, 204 223. Coase, R. H. (1937). The nature of the ﬁrm. Economica 4, 386 405. Coe, N. M., Hess, M., Yeung, W. C. H., Dicken, P. and Henderson, J. (2004). Globalizing regional development: A global production networks perspective. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers NS 29, 468 484. Dicken, P. (1994). Global local tensions: Firms and states in the global space economy. Economic Geography 70, 101 119. Dosi, G., (1987). Institutions and Markets in a Dynamic World. Brighton: SPRU Discussion Paper No. 32. Fredrickson, C. G. and Lindmark, L. G. (1979). From ﬁrms to systems of ﬁrms: A study of interregional interdependence in a dynamic society. In Hamilton, F. E. I. & Linge, G. J. R. (eds.) Spatial analysis, industry and the industrial environment 1, pp 56 77. New York: Wiley. Gerefﬁ, G. (1994). The organization of buyer driven global commodity chains: How US retailers shape overseas production networks. In Gerefﬁ, G. & Korzeniewicz, M. (eds.) Commodity chains and global capitalism, pp 95 122. Westport, CT: Praegar. Grabher, G. (ed.) (1993). The embedded ﬁrm: The socio economics of industrial networks. London: Routledge. Granovetter, M. S. (1985). Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology 91, 481 510. Hayter, R. (1997). The dynamics of industrial location: The factory, the ﬁrm and the production system. Toronto: John Wiley & Sons. Hughes, A. and Reimer, S. (eds.) (2004). Geographies of global commodity chains. London: Routledge. Krumme, G. (1969). Towards a geography of enterprise. Economic Geography 45, 30 40. Lancaster, K. (1966). A new approach to consumer theory. Journal of Political Economy 74, 132 157. Lorenz, E. H. (1992). Trust, community, and cooperation: Towards a theory of industrial districts. In Storper, M. & Scott, A. (eds.) Pathways to industrialization and regional development. London: Routledge. Markusen, A. (1985). Proﬁt cycles: Oligopoly and regional development. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sheppard, W. G. (1997). The economics of industrial organization. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall. Scott, A. (1988). New industrial spaces. London: Pion. Taylor, M. and Thrift, N. (1983). Business organization, segmentation and location. Regional Studies 17, 445 465. Watts, H. D. (1980). The large industrial enterprise: Some spatial perspectives. London: Croom Helm. Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: The Free Press.

Industrial Parks S. M. Walcott, University of North Carolina, Greensboro, NC, USA & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Eco-Industrial Park District where businesses cooperate with each other and the local community to efﬁciently share resources leading to economic and environmental improvements. Economic Multiples Related ﬁnancial beneﬁts that ﬂow from a particular economic activity. Growth Pole Area from which economic beneﬁts radiate out to economically enhance other related businesses in the contiguous region. Localization Economies Efﬁciencies that come from shared resources by related ﬁrms in a similar industry being in the same location. Multimodal Various types of interrelated transportation often involved in shipping goods and concentrated in one area, such as ships, trains, and trucks. Neo-Marshallian District Concentration of ﬁrms connected to a community in a particular area; a socioeconomic unit. Production Chain Firms and activities involved in the production of a particular good. Social Division of Labor Distinction between different types of labor based on their skill level. Space of Flows Place and process of transport for ideas, goods, or services. Tacit Knowledge Information that is acquired and exchanged by verbal, nonwritten transmission.

Introduction An industrial park consists of a piece of land designed speciﬁcally to promote industrial activities through inte gration with transportation facilities and other supportive infrastructure. The vision that emerged from the 1958 Dartmouth College Conference on Industrial Parks stressed the ideal compatibility of structures supporting industrial activities inside the district with the larger setting of the area outside, favoring a park like character. ‘Industrial dis trict’ serves as another, broader term for the same designed development, also known as ‘industrial estates’ outside North America. The relationship of these three terms is based on shared characteristics of a designed concentration of ﬁrms who cluster in a particular spatial area in order to derive and create economic beneﬁt from this locational agglomeration. Some industrial districts concentrate on a particular type of product (electronics, leather goods) to cluster production related ﬁrms.

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Alfred Marshall produced the classic study of an idealized industrial district based on London in 1890. His work stressed the district’s beneﬁts of interdependency and external localization economies of scale, particularly for small and medium size enterprises, in a free market setting that otherwise favored large producers with in tegrated in house functions proﬁting from internal economies of consolidation. The advantages to ﬁrms co locating in a concentrated cluster ﬂowed from a shared social division of labor that brought together employees with a range of skills needed for various tasks at different stages of the production chain. Managers, skilled crafts men, routine laborers, designers, marketers, and ofﬁce support staff would be attracted to a location due to the enhanced job opportunities in one place. They would also beneﬁt from mingling together, exchanging tacit knowledge, and creating a ‘thick industrial atmosphere’ binding businesses with the locale. Reduction of costs and improvement of product were predicted to ﬂow from trust building proximity. Early industrial parks were located in or proximate to cities in order to beneﬁt from the urbanization economies of a transportation nexus and large pool of appropriately skilled labor. The ﬁrst US industrial parks began in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (1899 in Chicago, 1905 in Kansas City and New York City). They increased rapidly in the 1960s following development of the interstate highway system which encouraged point to point inter modal transport of goods. Relatively higher city land costs and the movement of workers to the suburbs, along with related service components, pushed parks further to the urban fringe. Whether industrial parks are zoned areas of warehouses, business ofﬁces sharing a similarity of form and function, or factories related by production niches, their clustered nature creates a distinct landscape pattern char acteristic of a concentrated economic area. Innovations in industrial processes promoted deverticalization – moving away from product assembly in one large factory in favor of parts production in various specialized companies with light assembly of components that ﬂowed from warehouses. Distribution via large trucks needing straight roads and ample off loading space also dictated design of industrial park facilities and prioritized location with easy highway access. As indicated in the model displayed in Figure 1, low and long buildings typically predominate in the industrial park mix, with several ofﬁce towers in an amenity setting of a ‘prestige pond’ accompanied by tree lined streets. Transport friendly straight roads, linking with a large ar terial highway, divide the planned streetscape.

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Figure 1 Diorama of Zhangjiang Hi-tech Park layout, Shanghai. The setting resembles a Western suburb with arboreal landscaping around FDI companies.

Locational Attributes: Sticky Place in Space of Flows Research on industrial parks ranges from consideration of static locational assets such as proximity to major trans portation linkages, cost of land, tax relief, access to re search facilities, and other business considerations to valuing social factors such as community input and sup port at least as highly. This cultural turn in economic geography reﬂects lessons learned from previously suc cessful industrial parks and regions that managed to turn around and advance out of a downturn, as did Silicon Valley in the 1980s. The level of cooperation required can be based on relationship ties or location ties. The ‘Italian School’ of geographers used case studies based in the more advanced northern Third Italy. They particularly stressed the contribution of local cultural ties to the success of agglomerated ﬁrms in certain regions – a factor that in dustrial parks seek to both beneﬁt from and transcend with a footloose set of globally replicable models. Particular components of these models vary from place to place, reﬂecting local strengths, development levels in the surrounding region, and management choices. The ﬂexible specialization of ‘new industrial districts’ reﬂected the ability of ﬁrms to change products rapidly to meet emerging market opportunities, producing customized goods in small, high proﬁt quantities. Computer aided

production, as well as specialized skill sets in the social division of labor enable technically related but diverse outputs that draw varied clusters of companies to a park. Examples include a company that produces both medical devices and car parts, for example, which rely on similar electronic circuitry. Companies that produce by utilizing machine stamping molds can rapidly adapt to custom needs, enabling a variety of goods and markets to be served. Other production process innovations that en courage the growth of industrial parks on the outskirts of cities perched on a major transportation nexus include the popularity of just in time delivery. Parts needed in the production process arrive just as they are needed, reducing stationary warehouse costs in favor of prioritizing trans portation ﬂows with trucks as the new warehouses on wheels. Industrial parks cluster ﬁrms related in the process, with examples including major car (e.g., General Motors) and electronics (e.g., Motorola) manufacturers. Some concentrations are of a size to constitute a separate semi urban complex (e.g., Toyota City, Japan). Locations utilize industrial parks to create develop ment ‘magnets and glue’ – ‘sticky places’ containing at tractive elements for a variety of types of industrial parks. A dichotomous discussion revolves around whether the most important factor in the geography of industrial parks lies in attributes of the park itself, or resides in factors adhering to the location. Is the most critical

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feature the local manager, university technology transfer, government regulations, trained workforce, embedded cultural attitudes, or a combination of several key in gredients? Why do industrial parks in Sunbelt southern and western locations seem more successful than those in Massachusetts, or the Midwest, for example? Industrial parks in India and China seek to learn from each other, and study the example of Singapore which manages large developments in each country.

Types of Industrial Parks and Features Traditional industrial parks from the dawn of the Indus trial Revolution – transported by colonial capitalists to occupied territories as industrial ‘estates’ – lend their name to a new global incarnation as neo Marshallian nodes. These industrial parks encapsulate transnational companies – along with numerous native companies – to draw on clusters of anomalous labor and enhanced infra structure attempting to reproduce conditions at lower costs that prevail in the more developed home country. The growth of industrial parks outside traditional de veloped countries and core originating locations indicates the establishment of new nodes of production sites. These often formerly peripheral locations avoid drawbacks of concentrating in regions with relatively high labor, land, and transport costs. New areas compensate for the initial construction expenses of production and support facilities such as roads, telephone, water, and electrical connections with relatively low costs in other respects. Other types of industrial concentrations include: (1) hub and spoke districts where companies cluster around a local giant ﬁrm that they serve; (2) the satellite in dustrial platform inhabited primarily by branch plants of foreign companies headquartered in their home nation; and (3) a state centered district featuring companies tightly tied to the national government. These globally scattered industrial park variants sustain modernization efforts in their home, as well as headquarter regions. Another typology of industrial districts considers scalar differences. Within the science based category of technopoles – growth poles of clustered companies whose economic robustness lies in their innovative value added feature – the enterprise complex can be at the regional extent, at an urban level (special technology oriented cities in Japan, Taiwan, China, and Korea), or the inter urban scale. The level of government inter vention varies to reﬂect overall government involvement in national economic outcomes, or reﬂects particular scalar priorities such as Research Triangle Park which was initiated by the state government and anchored originally by a national entity. Research based ‘science park suburbs’ reﬂect the in creasing size and importance of agglomerated developments

that cluster in an area to take advantage of co located fac tors of production such as research universities and investor funding. Beijing’s Zhongguancun, North Carolina’s Re search Triangle, Taiwan’s Hsinchu, and California’s Silicon Valley are examples of burgeoning complexes. Global interconnections between industrial parks in different countries come from personal ties between employees who share similar national and/or school ties. Several features particular to science parks are designed to commodify lab bench breakthroughs into market successful products. These organizations include business incubators providing (ideally) instructions on how to set up and manage a business, as well as networking opportunities for nascent entrepreneurs, shared physical (electricity, telephones, computers, climate control) and human (secretarial, legal, accounting) support and overhead. Large industrial districts can include residences ranging from worker dormitories to management level amenity housing, along with tennis courts, grocery stores, conference centers, parks, and other facilities catering to economic clusters. Some studies demonstrate that developing the human managerial side exceeds in importance the substitution of early capital outlays for physical investments in a business. Planting does not necessarily lead to growing – nurturing is crucial, and some locations as well as management models perform this function better. The industrial park model provides a spatial and structural shell, planted in various environments and inhabited by various ﬁrms and actors. Studies demonstrate that well managed industrial parks level the playing ﬁeld for ﬁrms birthed as university spin offs and those created as corporate spin offs, providing both with similar managerial skill sets and experiences.

Function of Industrial Parks in the Developing World Industrial parks concentrate scarce ﬁscal and human capital in the developing world, focusing efforts in a concentrated space, reducing transportation and com munication costs, and hopefully creating a growth pole with economic multiples spilling over to surrounding areas. Spaces designed to contain companies designated to locate within them also contain hopes that they will function as learning districts – places where tacit know ledge is exchanged that will advance the level of value added in products and production processes, leading to increased efﬁciencies and proﬁts. Global corporate ties through branch or more removed production chain relationships promote the geographically far ﬂung interdependency of related park occupants. The linkage of ﬁrms to an information space of ﬂows both within and outside the ﬁrm, district, and region promotes adaptability and thus stability at all scales. This location within a space of ﬂows performs a particularly valuable

Industrial Parks

function for ﬁrms located outside their native region. In habiting a familiar environment encourages global lo cations of operations of ﬁrms, permitting penetration of new markets designed to ﬁt local needs and production advantages. Regions utilize industrial parks as a com petitive strategy against more advanced regions. In one example an American conglomerate created an industrial park in Vietnam built on a Japanese model but managed by Thai and Vietnamese investors who were interested in outcompeting Chinese locations to attract Western com panies. Singapore’s science and industrial park model performed well enough to catapult that city state into an Asian success story, but faced strategic challenges beyond its borders. The Suzhou Industrial Park model, for ex ample, touted its national level ties but suffered setbacks from its failure to cultivate ties to the city and province authorities who started a rival industrial park. Suzhou’s ambitious industrial park, spread along the edge of a large lake, included a mini city with shopping in a new down town district. Residences and British style schools served workers from the low lying warehouse style factories in a comprehensive development on the outskirts of the tra ditional Chinese city of Suzhou (Figure 2). Concerns that local and small companies would be dominated by multinational giants, obliterating the ex istence of industrial districts, have not been validated. On the contrary, large companies locate representative

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branches in developing world industrial parks to learn from each other, group resources to learn about new markets, take advantage of park managers as interfaces with foreign governments, attract labor pools and scarce infrastructural support systems, and serve as mentors for local companies, as well as spin offs in a co pete (co operative competition) environment. The nonpecuniary interdependencies of tacit knowledge exchange and interpersonal network trust building seem especially useful in nonlocal settings, where old structures serve new functions in a globalized business environment.

Eco-Industrial Parks Another new form of industrial parks responds to a heightened contemporary concern for reducing deleterious impacts of industrial activity on the physical environment. As deﬁned by the President’s Council on Sustainable De velopment, an eco industrial park consists of ‘‘[a] group of businesses that work together and with the community to efﬁciently share resources (materials, water, energy, infra structure, natural habitat and information), enhance eco nomic prosperity and improve the environment.’’ Eco industrial parks seek to create attractive natural settings that preserve and enhance the ‘green’ character of the landscape, minimizing negative impact from production processes

Figure 2 Diorama of China Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park, Suzhou. Comprehensive development plans feature graduated building heights, including a new urban lakeside concentration.

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involving chemical, gas, density, and transport intensive effects. General quality of life improvements through net working with the surrounding community increase the scale of park considerations. Proponents argue that environmentally sensitive de velopment also promotes economic efﬁciency in several respects. Arboreal settings with winding paths are per ceived as conducive to innovative activities in research and development intensive science parks, while clean up costs from pollution are reduced in factory settings by avoiding environmental damage in the production and distribution process from the outset. Conscious cutting edge strategies include energy efﬁciency, waste manage ment, material reduction, and water treatment schemes. The variety of forms of industrial parks attests to their utility from the industrial revolution to the increasingly globalized economy and across its varied spaces of pro duction. Shared advantages of proximity may vary within parks, but they clearly reﬂect the power and attractive ness of clusters by their very prevalence across the eco nomic landscape. See also: Agglomeration; Foreign Direct Investment; Global Production Networks; Transnational Corporations in Developing Countries.

Castells, M. and Hall, P. (1994). Technopoles of the World: The Making of 21st Century Industrial Complexes. London: Routledge. Fosnsa, S., Acharib, G. and Rosso, T. (2004). A fuzzy cognitive mapping analysis of the impacts of an eco industrial park. Journal of Intelligent and Fuzzy Systems 15, 75 88. Hansson, F., Husted, K. and Vestergaard, J. (2005). Second generation science parks: From structural holes jockeys to social capital catalysts of the knowledge society. Technovation 25, 1039 1049. Markusen, A. (1996). Sticky places in slippery space: A typology of industrial districts. Economic Geography 72, 294 314. Park, S. (1996). Networks and embeddedness in the dynamic types of new industrial districts. Progress in Human Geography 20, 476 493. Phillips, S. and Yeung, H. (2003). A place for R&D? The Singapore science park. Urban Studies 40, 707 732. Pratt, A. (1991). Industrial districts and the ﬂexible local economy. Planning Practice & Research 6, 4 8. Saxenian, A. and Hsu, J. (2001). The silicon valley Hsinchu connection: Technical communities and industrial upgrading. Industrial and Corporate Change 10, 893 920. Scott, A. J. (1988). New Industrial Spaces. London: Pion. Storper, M. (1997). The Regional World: Territorial Development in a Global Economy. New York: Guilford. Walcott, S. (2001). Growing global: Learning locations in the life sciences. Growth and Change 32, 511 532. Walcott, S. (2003). Chinese Science and Technology Industrial Parks. Aldershot: Ashgate. Yeung, H. (2000). Organizing ‘the ﬁrm’ in industrial geography I: Networks, institutions and regional development. Progress in Human Geography 24, 301 315.

Further Reading

Relevant Websites

Amin, A. and Thrift, N. (1992). Neo Marshallian nodes in global networks. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 16, 571 587. Asheim, B. (2000). Industrial districts: The contributions of Marshall and beyond. In Clark, G., Feldman, M. & Gertler, M. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Economic Geography, pp 413 431. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

http://www.indigodev.com Eco Industrial Park Handbook for Asian Developing Countries, Indigo Development. http://www.indigodev.com Eco Industrial Parks (EIP), Indigo Development. http://www.answers.com Industrial Park, Answers.com.

Industrial Restructuring R. Hudson, University of Durham, Durham, UK & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Environmental Footprint All economic activity has an impact on the natural environment. This arises because of the transformation of raw materials in production, from the consumption of hydrocarbons in transportation, and from the wastes created as a result of production, transport, and consumption. These environmental impacts are referred to as the environmental footprints of a particular activity or of the aggregate economy. Political Economy This refers to a variety of approaches to understanding economies and their geographies, including evolutionary, institutional, and Marxian variants. While these differ in important ways, they share a rejection of the assumptions and staticequilibrium approach of mainstream neoclassical economics. Product Life Cycle Companies engage in research and development to create new products. Once such a product is launched on the market, it has a speciﬁc life cycle as the market, for it initially grows, matures, and then declines. The pace of change and the length of the cycle vary with the type of product. For example, for fashion clothing life cycles are short and change rapidly whereas for cans of beans the life cycle is much longer and changes more slowly. Socially Necessary Labor Time The average amount of human labor needed to produce a given commodity using average technology. Companies that can restructure to use production methods that require less than the socially necessary labor time thus reap competitive advantage and prosper; conversely, those with methods requiring more than the socially necessary labor time encounter problems and if they fail to restructure to address these problems, they may fail and become bankrupt. Spatial Division of Labor This term describes the ways in which work is divided between places, within and between individual companies, at a range of spatial scales (regional, national, international). Companies can seek to use spatial ﬁxes – that is, searching out locations particularly suited to a given task or stage in the overall production process – as part of their restructuring strategies. Vertical (Dis)Integration Companies can reduce their unit production costs – for example, the cost of producing an individual automobile – by integrating different stages of production within the boundary of the company and producing in-house. This is referred to as vertical integration. Alternatively, ﬁrms may engage in a

process of vertical disintegration, choosing to buy goods and services from suppliers rather than producing them in-house – if this cuts production costs.

Introduction By the mid 1980s the term ‘restructuring’ had become almost commonplace in economic geography and cog nate social science disciplines. It denoted a ‘qualitative’ change from one state, or pattern of organization, to another. As such, restructuring can involve changes in any, or all, of the how, what, or where of economic ac tivities. However, it is necessary to make a distinction between what Lovering terms ‘‘the restructuring ap proach’’ and the concept of restructuring as it is more generally deployed in a variety of political–economy approaches, although the two are clearly related. The former had its roots in Marxian political economy and was very much a product of attempts to come to grips with the spatially differentiated impacts of industrial change in the 1970s and 1980s. Lovering suggests that some commentators in the 1980s described the re structuring approach as ‘‘the structural approach,’’ in dicative of a tendency to read Marxian political economy in a particular structurally inﬂected way. While this was understandable in the context of contesting most of the approaches of economic geography at the time, it is, in fact, a limiting characterization of both Marxian and restructuring approaches. This change encompassed simultaneous shifts in spatial divisions of labor at spatial scales ranging from the international to the local. The latter refers a variety of approaches to understanding the constant revolutionizing of processes and products within capitalism that certainly includes Marxian approaches, but also includes consideration of evolutionary and in stitutional approaches to political economy. Bringing these together enables more subtle and nuanced per spectives of the changing how, what, and where of in dustrial production within capitalism. A central insight of Marxian political economy is that competition for proﬁts among companies is central to the developmental dynamic of capitalism, providing the impetus for restructuring industry and the economy via revolutionizing the how and what of production. As such, it may also involve restructuring the spatiality of the economy and what is produced where. The fundamental qualitative distinction between different forms of inter corporate competition was famously summarized by

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Schumpeter: adaptive forms of competitive strategy take given constraints as binding, whereas creative strategies seek to break these constraints. This dichotomy has been echoed within recent approaches in economic geography under rubrics such as ‘‘weak’’/‘‘strong’’ forms, or ‘‘structure dependent’’/‘‘structure focused’’ domains, of competition. Although over simplistic, these dichot omous distinctions are nonetheless important in pointing to differing forms and processes of restructuring. Whereas weak strategies revolve around competing on cost for existing products within a given technological– organizational paradigm, strong strategies are based upon what Schumpeter described as market disturbing activity and product differentiation, innovation, and quality ac tivities and attributes that vary between companies, sec tors, times, and places. These distinctions between types of strategy are, however, analytic, with abundant evi dence that in practice corporate decision making cuts across this analytic distinction.

Restructuring, ‘Weak’ Competition and Changes in Geographies of Production: Opportunities and Limits ‘Weak’ forms of competition revolve around companies seeking reductions in production cost within the par ameters of an existing technological paradigm, within which all ﬁrms producing a particular product operate. These forms of weak competition echo neoclassical economists’ views as the ‘only’ form of competition, predicated on the basis of assumptions of static equi librium and perfect knowledge. Such views of com petition are integral to the locational models of Lo¨sch, Weber, and their adherents. Such competition can occur in many domains, but the most visible and well known direct impacts on geographies of production have re sulted from ﬁrms seeking ‘spatial ﬁxes’ via relocating production, both intranationally and internationally, to places with cheaper (in terms of unit production costs) and more malleable labor to enhance or preserve com petitiveness. There are numerous well documented ex amples of such forms of spatial restructuring, especially in industries such as clothing, garment, and footwear production. Companies in labor intensive sectors exploit variations in labor market conditions as a necessary condition of their competitive survival. While reliance upon low wages and the transfer of production to more favorable labor market locations is a very sectorally and temporally speciﬁc form of inter capitalist competition, such labor cost and labor market differences can nonetheless deﬁne the parameters for restructuring labor relations, wages, and working con ditions in situ under the threat of relocating unless workers agree to such changes. As part of their

restructuring processes, then, companies may openly seek to set factories against one another, playing upon and exploiting the immobility of labor and people’s ties to place. The threat of relocation can, in these circum stances, be as effective in meeting corporate goals as actually relocating. This became abundantly clear, for example, in 2006 as Volkswagen set about reshaping its geography of production in Europe. It shifted part of the production of the small Polo passenger car to Brussels in Belgium from Pamplona in Spain as this had become viewed as a problematic factory because of trades union activity. This move was deliberately and precisely cal culated to put pressures on the Spanish trades unions to behave more cooperatively. However, there are also limits as the extent to which (the threat of) relocation can be used in restructuring strategies, even in activities requiring large amounts of cheap labor, because of other imperatives, such as prox imity to market. For example, many service industries must remain close to markets, despite an explosion of new low wage job categories that require little skill or formal training, but are highly market oriented. These include the armies of cleaners in city center ofﬁces, blocks, and hotels, and of private security guards and parking garage attendants. However, in some respects these limits con tinue to be eroded by technological changes. For example, in the new millennium, advertising ofﬁces in London are relocating from Soho to the East End, a move made possible by more sophisticated information technology (IT) and communications technologies.

Restructuring, ‘Strong’ Competition and Changes in Geographies of Production: Opportunities and Limits Strategies of strong Schumpeterian creative competition revolve around chronic disturbance of markets by con stantly revolutionizing what is produced and how it is produced via innovations that redeﬁne the socio organizational and technological paradigms of pro duction. This constant pressure for innovation, generating a constant ﬂow of new products and pro duction processes, is typically seen as a progressive as pect of capitalist production.

Restructuring via Managerial and Organizational Innovation Managerial and organizational innovations are ongoing processes. For example, historically they were integral to the emergence of vertically integrated Taylorist and Fordist mass production (discussed below), while in the contemporary economy large companies have devised

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new ‘hybrid’ organizational structures to cope with the complex challenges posed by increasingly ﬂuid and dy namic markets. They have developed dual organizational structures to deal with core and noncore activities, re spectively. Core activities are vital for the ﬁrm and the decisions to sustain them are disconnected from current make or buy decisions relating to routine noncore ac tivities. The emergence of the ‘virtual ﬁrm’ may also signal a signiﬁcant change in corporate organization. This brings together members of existing companies to exe cute a speciﬁc time limited task, effectively a process of mass customization of the enterprise linked to the emergence of ‘agile’ manufacturing enterprises, with the ability routinely to form virtual companies.

Restructuring via Process Innovation and New Technological Paradigms of Production On occasion, companies generate new production pro cesses and ways of organizing production because new products require such changes. More generally however, process innovation denotes technologically new ways of making existing products. Historically, the most signiﬁ cant of these are those referred to as Taylorism and Fordism. There are strong, systemic competitive pres sures to ﬁnd new ways of producing old commodities. Companies seek to restructure and revolutionize pro duction processes to gain competitive advantage over their rivals. This hunt for technological rents allows the labor time needed in production to be reduced below the existing socially necessary amount. Producers who suc cessfully use the new technology can then sell at below average prices, increase market share, and collect surplus (i.e., above average) proﬁts on each unit of the com modity sold. They then retain this competitive edge until the new technology diffuses and becomes generalized across the producers of a given commodity (or sector), establishing new productivity norms for that commodity (or sector). Thus, the new productivity norm reduces the required amount of socially necessary labor time. This, in turn, triggers a fresh round of research and development (R&D) in search of another technological advance and competitive advantage. In this way, the process of re structuring and constantly revolutionizing production technologies proceeds and competition becomes the motor of accumulation. This conception of restructuring and the dynamics of process innovation is speciﬁc to particular approaches to production and market conditions, however: essentially, Fordist mass production of standardized commodities sold in mass markets. In other models of production, process innovation has a differing signiﬁcance. De coupling product and process technologies in ﬂexible forms of high volume production has both further enhanced and

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signiﬁcantly altered the importance of process innovation to competitive strategy, with signiﬁcant implications for the ways in which companies seek to compete by investing in general purpose processes that are more ﬂexible, re sponsive and quickly changed, and easily reused across products and product families. Consequently, companies seek to move from the mass customizing of products and services on the basis of ﬂexible process technologies to the mass customization of process uniquely suited to their new market opportunities. There are, however, limits to the de coupling of product and process innovation, which tend to reestablish relationships between product and process in novation strongly reminiscent of those characterizing mass production. Process innovations can have direct implications as to where production occurs. Conversely, spatial variations in labor market conditions can shape which sort of pro cess technologies and competitive strategies are deployed in particular locations. These locational implications arise for two reasons. First, companies using established and old technologies and/or organizational forms may become bankrupt; or selectively close some plants; or relocate production to places in which labor market (or other) conditions permit the old technology to be com petitive with the new one. Second, companies using the new technology may need to ﬁnd fresh locations in which it can be proﬁtably deployed because of labor resistance to changing working practices and forms of work in long established centers of production. Typically, this could involve moving to areas in which ‘green’ labor is avail able. Such labor lacks knowledge and experience of ‘existing’ norms and practices of production for these commodities and thus will accept the conditions associ ated with the new technology. Conversely, in other cir cumstances, the importance of experienced and knowledgeable labor can tie production to particular places as these develop the endogenous capacity to generate new processes (and products) which ensure a competitive edge. Such technology districts are places in which economic growth occurs on the basis of in situ restructuring and product based technological learning.

Restructuring via Product Innovation Restructuring via product innovation as a route to com petitive advantage is an ongoing process. Product innov ation can take varied forms. It can relate to enhancement of existing, often seemingly mundane, products (e.g., Gillette’s creation of new types of razor in the last two decades) or to the creation of qualitatively different products within the same market segment as companies strive for a competitive edge via further segmenting ma ture markets (e.g., the creation of DVDs to replace CDs). Incremental innovation is increasingly important in

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allowing changes in response to consumer demand in more differentiated markets for both manufactured goods and services. Creating totally new products is of the greatest signiﬁcance, however, and involves the con struction of new markets rather than a zero sum game as to the allocation of shares of a given market with, therefore, much greater potential to set in motion radical re structuring. Such product innovation enables companies aim to create new markets in which they can be sole and monopolistic producers. Companies seek to protect their interests and intellectual property through devices such as patents. However, given the pace of technological change, performance superiority is often short lived. The systemic tendency of capitalist production to gen erate new products, in turn, raises further issues. First, what is the relationship ‘between’ research and development? Taylorist mass production is based on a linear sequential model of R&D creating breakthrough product innovations and then producing them in long runs of standardized products. In more ﬂexible systems of high volume pro duction, the processes of product innovation and develop ment are structured differently. In particular, there are three distinctive organizational features: self organizing develop ment teams; overlapping development phases, replacing a segmented with a shared division of labor; and a commit ment to continuous learning. Changing the form of product innovation within such ﬂexible forms of production – at the limit producing batch sizes of one, customized to the re quirements of the individual purchaser of – say – an automobile in deeply fragmented markets severely cir cumscribes the utility of the concept of the product life cycle. Competitive success depends upon being the ﬁrst to identify an emerging market, a segmenting market, or a change in consumer requirements in a previously un changing market. Success depends upon minimizing prod uct development and product changeover times, not upon being the lowest cost or highest throughput producer. This is linked to increasing volatility and ephemerality in fash ions and tastes as product life cycles for many commodities become increasingly brief, even transitory as when the commodity is a performance or spectacle. The growing emphasis on networked approaches to production organization has also inﬂuenced product in novation and leads to a reappraisal of the linear R&D model, in particular, in two respects. First, the emergence of new forms of interﬁrm network relationships is inﬂu encing the organization of product innovation. Quasi vertical disintegration can help facilitate coordinated de sign and investment. As a result, the product development process, from planning and conceptualization through designing and engineering, to manufacturing, is more re ﬂexive, consisting of overlapping and recursive loops ra ther than discrete linear stages. Second, incorporating network concepts into intraﬁrm organizational structures has also inﬂuenced processes of product development via

highlighting the importance of information ﬂows and interaction within and between all sections of a company. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that human creativity remains central to product innovation, however organized and whatever model of production is deployed. This raises important questions about creativity and the creation of new knowledge in production restructuring. The second issue concerns where new products are produced – in new or old ﬁrms, in new or old industrial spaces, in previously unindustrialized areas or in areas with an industrial history and tradition? – and the factors in ﬂuencing locational choice. In some circumstances, there is a close relationship between product innovation and new ﬁrm formation in particular locations. In certain respects, the volatility and ephemerality of products is enhancing the signiﬁcance of particular places as centers of product innovation. Industrial districts, producing a range of com modities, have often been centers of product innovation based on intense linkages and sharing of knowledge be tween ﬁrms and other institutions. For example, product innovations in banking and ﬁnancial services have become closely linked to London, New York, and Tokyo – recog nized centers of innovation, interpretation, and interaction. In the late twentieth century, in new industrial spaces of California, new ﬁrm formation was closely tied to product innovation in the IT and computing industries. New product pioneering ﬁrms were spun off from existing ones, deepening both horizontal and vertical divisions of labor and the transactional tissue of the local industrial complex.

Restructuring via Market Creation and Marketing Innovation According to Best, ﬁrms can succeed by identifying and ‘‘responding to’’ changes in markets or consumer prefer ences. As such, Best perhaps overestimates the extent to which ﬁrms simply respond to exogenously given changes in market demands rather than actively seeking to change consumer tastes and cultivating preferences for new products via advertising, as part of Schumpeterian market disturbing competitive strategies. Because consumers possess – and can ‘only’ possess – imperfect knowledge, they are susceptible to inﬂuence via advertising. However, although advertising has a venerable history, until quite recently it has only been a marginal inﬂuence on patterns of sales and production. The development of modern advertising – or put another way, the restructuring of the advertising industry via radical product and process in novation – was a central element in corporate strategies to create, organize, and, where possible, control markets, es pecially for mass produced consumer goods such as automobiles, TVs and other electronic goods, washing machines, refrigerators, and other household white goods. Mass production necessitated mass consumption, and this

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in turn required a certain homogenization of consumer tastes for ﬁnal products. The period between 1880 and 1930 saw the full development of an organized system of commercial information and persuasion, as part of the modern distributive system via more conscious and serious attention to the psychology of advertising and changes in advertising media. Indeed, modern capitalism could not function without advertising which offers mass produced visions of individualism. It is impossible to fully grasp the signiﬁcance of ad vertising without realizing that the material object being sold is never enough. Thus, even commodities providing the most mundane necessities of daily life must be imbued with symbolic qualities and culturally endowed meanings: this, indeed, is the crucial cultural quality of advertising’s modern forms. Commodities thereby meet both the functional and symbolic interests of the consumer via the ‘magic system’ of advertising. The competitive pressures of contemporary capitalism have stimulated further reﬁne ments to this magic system, further enhancing the im portance attached to culturally endowed and symbolic meanings and the identities that people (in part) form through consuming commodities. This has been linked to further product and process innovations in the form of advertisements, as the advertising industry itself has ex perienced further deep processes of restructuring. The power to shape demand, to create, disturb, and radically restructure markets, has become an increasingly important part of competitive strategy as product life cycles shorten and/or markets become increasingly frag mented and segmented and/or the boundaries between goods and services become increasingly blurred. The fusion of goods and services, redeﬁning what constitutes the product, and the consequent mutation of markets are undoubtedly the most signiﬁcant aspects of the new economics of production. But the point to emphasize is that such changes are a result of proactive strategies of strong competition, not simply a weak competitive re sponse to exogenously given changes.

Restructuring Territorial Economies Changes in the location of activities are clearly an im portant strand of corporate restructuring. Consequently, restructuring can also relate to the issue of territorial restructuring and the restructuring of spatially deﬁned economies at various scales. Such restructuring is integral to processes of combined and uneven development, the connection between growth in some places and decline in others. The movement of capital as a part of corporate restructuring can open up new developmental possi bilities for some places but, equally often, lead to socioeconomic devastation in other places as a result of capital ﬂight and capital investment being suddenly and

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prematurely written off. One response to this has been the development of state economic developmental strategies to restructure national and subnational econ omies (regional, urban, etc.) in particular ways in relation to desired developmental outcomes. As one set of eco nomic activities declines in situ or takes ﬂight from a place, state agencies seek to shift those territorially de ﬁned economies from one developmental trajectory to another, better, and higher one, in response to a range of sociopolitical pressures and demands and to seek to maintain their authority and legitimacy. Such pressures can be particularly acute when the proximate cause of place speciﬁc economic decline is the decision to redeﬁne the boundaries between economy and state via privatization, leading to locationally concentrated capacity and closure and job loss. State strategies to re structure the economies of economically stricken places, such as northeast England or Cape Breton in eastern Canada, involve seeking to entice, via a variety of means, companies that are either establishing themselves for the ﬁrst time or, more often, already established companies that are seeking to restructure the geographies of their own operations and attract them to particular places. The aim is to create synergies between the company and places – ideally ‘win win’ outcomes – enhanced proﬁts for the company, new jobs and sources of tax revenue for the place. The pursuit of private sector investment has often in volved a restructuring of the state itself, not least via territorial restructuring and the devolution of power from national to subnational levels, which itself has often in volved the construction of new forms of state organization. There are limits to the capacity of states in countering localized economic decline, however. Three reasons are of particular signiﬁcance. First, there are processes internal to the logic of capitalist development that draw activities to successful centers of growth as a result of agglomeration and urbanization economies. Second, the spatial reach of economic activities typically exceeds the territorial juris dictions of states, especially as economic activities have become increasingly globalized. And third, economic crisis tendencies are internalized within the state rather than abolished by state involvement, which in turn strongly inﬂuences the form that state policies and practices can take and severely limits the capacity of states to do any thing other than go with the ﬂow of the logic of capital. This is revealed – inter alia – in the shift from plans with deﬁnite targets to markets and strategies that respond to market movements as steering mechanisms.

Eco-Restructuring In recent years, there has been growing recognition that industrial production is predicated upon processes of material transformation that have unavoidable impacts on

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nature and the natural environment. As concerns with the ecological impacts of industrial production, further heightened by the emergence of China and India as major centers of industrial production in a further twist to the evolving international division of labor, have intensiﬁed, there has been a growing interest in the concept of eco restructuring. Eco restructuring involves seeking to move capitalist economies onto more ecologically and environ mentally sustainable trajectories and as such has strong normative and moral connotations. Proponents of this viewpoint argue that via a judicious combination of in novations in product, process, and transport technologies, steered by appropriate state policies, the environmental footprint of industrial production, and in particular the impacts of enhanced carbon dioxide emissions to the at mosphere, can be lessened and kept within sustainable boundaries. It is recognized that this will necessarily in volve signiﬁcant changes in lifestyle and cultural shifts in attitudes towards production, mobility, and consumption and not just changes in hard technologies. In this sense, this is a move forward from the technological optimism of earlier times but it remains to be seen whether industrial capitalism can be successfully eco restructured to prevent global environmental catastrophe.

Conclusions Restructuring refers to radical qualitative rather than just incremental quantitative change and innovation in product, process, and organizational forms in economies and economic geographies. It can also refer to changes in territorial economies at a range of spatial scales. Re structuring is endemic to capitalist economies and their practices and will necessarily remain so as long as the economies remain capitalist. Consequently, restructuring remains an important concept in understanding econ omies and their geographies. It also remains important to policy makers seeking to steer economic change and development in particular ways, both in terms of terri torial development and ecological sustainability, and not least in recognizing the limits to their capacity to bend the strategies of capital in the directions that they – and/ or those seeking to inﬂuence them – see as desirable. Finally, we can note that while the theoretical space exists in which to consider more radical forms of re structuring and moves from capitalism to other modes of political and economic organization, there is little prac tical exploration of this space – although that is not to say that capitalist forms of restructuring are not contested by a variety of social actors. See also: Industrial City; Industrial Districts; Industrial Location; Industrial Organization; Industrial Parks; Industrialization.

Further Reading Best, M. (1990). The new competition: Institutions of industrial restructuring. Cambridge: Polity Press. Boddy, M. (1986). Structural approaches to industrial location. In Lever, W. (ed.) Industrial change in the United Kingdom, pp 56 66. London: Longman. Clark, G. (1992). Real regulation: The administrative state. Environment and Planning A 24, 615 627. Donoghue, M. T. and Barff, R. (1990). Nike just did it: International sub contracting, ﬂexibility and athletic footwear production. Regional Studies 24, 537 552. Ewen, S. (1976). Captains of consciousness: Advertising, the social roots of the consumer culture. New York: McGraw Hill. Ewen, S. (1988). All consuming images. London: Basic Books. Frobel, F., Heinrichs, J. and Kreye, O. (1980). The new international division of labour. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Harvey, D. (1982). The limits to capital. Oxford: Blackwell. Harvey, D. (1989). The condition of postmodernity. Oxford: Blackwell. Hudson, R. (1986). Nationalised industry policies and regional policies; the role of the state in the deindustrialization and reindustrialisation of regions. Society and Space 4, 7 28. Hudson, R. (2001). Producing places. New York: Guilford Press. Hudson, R. (2005). Economic geographies: Circuits, ﬂows and spaces. London: Sage. Hudson, R. (2006). On what’s right and keeping left: Or why geography still needs Marxian political economy. Antipode 38, 374 395. Lajtner, S. and Milne, R. (2006). VW shakes up polo production. Financial Times 18 May, pp. 24. Lash, S. and Urry, J. (1994). Economies of signs and space. London: Sage. Lipietz, A. (1980). The structuration of space, the problem of land and spatial policy. In Carney, J., Hudson, R. & Lewis, J. (eds.) Regions in crisis, pp 60 75. London: Croom Helm. Lovering, J. (1989). The restructuring debate. In Peet, R. & Thrift, N. (eds.) New models in geography vol. 1, pp 198 223. London: Unwin Hyman. Mandel, E. (1975). Late capitalism. London: New Left books. Massey, D. (1995). Spatial divisions of labour (2nd edn.). London: Macmillan. Nonaka, I. and Teece, D. (eds.) (2001). Managing industrial knowledge. London: Sage. Noteboom, B. (1999). Innovation, learning and industrial organisations. Cambridge Journal of Economics 23, 127 150. Pine, J. (1993). Mass customization: The new frontier in business competition. Harvard: Harvard University Press. Sabel, C. and Zeitlin, J. (1997). Worlds of possibilities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sassen, S. (1991). The global city: New York, London, Tokyo. Los Angeles: University of California Press. Schumpeter, J. (1961). The theory of economic development. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Storper, M. (1993). Regional ‘worlds’ of production: Learning and innovation in the technology districts of France, Italy and the USA. Regional Studies 27, 433 456. Storper, M. and Walker, D. (1989). The capitalist imperative. Oxford: Blackwell. Veltz, P. (1991). New models of production organization and trends in spatial development. In Benko, G. & Dunford, M. (eds.) Industrial change and regional development: The transformation of new industrial spaces, pp 193 204. London: Belhaven. Weaver, P. M., Jansen, L., van Grootveld, G., van Spiegel, E. and Vergragt, P. (2000). Sustainable technology development. Shefﬁeld: Greenleaf. Williams, R. (1980). Problems in materialism and culture. London: Verso.

Industrialization D. Simandan, Brock University, St. Catharines, ON, Canada & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Ideographic Epistemological perspective that focuses the research process on the detection of the uniqueness of each geographical location. It denies the nomothetic belief in the existence of universal patterns, and thus portrays reality in descriptive rather than explanatory terms. Nomothetic Epistemological perspective that focuses the research process on the uncovering of universal patterns, regularities, or laws. It perceives reality as the interplay of ‘surface characteristics’ and ‘deep structure’ and attempts to explain the former in terms of the latter.

Industrialization: Deﬁnitions and Measurement ‘Industrialization’ is a generic name for a set of economic and social processes related to the discovery of more efﬁcient ways for the creation of value. These more ef ﬁcient ways are lumped together under the label ‘in dustry’ or ‘the secondary sector’ (the primary sector of economic activity referring to agriculture, hunting, ﬁsh ing, and resource extraction, and the tertiary sector re ferring to services). Beginning with the late seventeenth century, industrial activity has dramatically enlarged its scope and scale, as machinofacture began to replace manufacture. Historically, industrialization studies have concerned themselves primarily with the period known as the Industrial Revolution, although in geography this area of enquiry has been the focus of many economic geographers interested in the contemporary logic of the global economic landscape. Using the criterion of the abruptness of change, one can distinguish two types of economic change: events (swift singular changes) and processes (protracted cu mulative changes). Industrialization is a process, not an event. A process is an emergent property of a system (country or region) resulting from a collection of events that share a number of similarities and that unfold over a slower timescale than that of its component events. If one entrepreneur opens an industrial plant in an otherwise agrarian region, that singular event cannot be labeled as industrialization. If a collection of events of this same kind achieves sufﬁcient signiﬁcance for the local econ omy, scholars and policymakers alike are entitled to refer to it at a higher level of generalization, that is, they can speak of a process of industrialization changing the face

of that regional economy. Two further conceptual prob lems require speciﬁcation in this context. First, one must distinguish between quantitative econ omic growth and qualitative economic change. If an al ready industrial region witnesses the opening of some new industrial plants, it is inappropriate to label that set of events as industrialization. Instead, we must refer to it as simply continuing industrial growth or economic growth. The concept ‘industrialization’ should be re stricted to the qualitative economic change occurring whenever an agrarian economy becomes to such an ex tent affected by the opening of new industrial plants that it becomes misleading to continue referring to it as an agrarian economy. In other words, industrialization is an emergent property of an economic system, a qualitative leap resulting from the spatially patterned aggregation of a collection of economic events. Second, one must pay attention to the measurement of the threshold above which it becomes appropriate to speak of a process of industrialization taking place. If one sin gular industrial event does not by itself constitute a pro cess of industrialization, when does it make sense to refer to such a process? Geographers, economists, historians, and sociologists of industrialization have been rather cas ual in their approach to this measurement problem, relying on commonsense just as much as on speciﬁc quantitative cutoff points. There are three major ways to decide as to whether one national or regional economy is undertaking industrialization. The ﬁrst requires a com parison of the relative contribution to the gross domestic product of the secondary sector (manufacturing industry) versus that of the primary sector (agriculture, ﬁsheries, hunting, and extraction of raw materials). The second compares the percentage of the workforce employed in industry versus agriculture. The third is more subjective, but also more geographical, in that it assesses the extent of industrialization by simply observing the landscape of a region. Since industrial activities necessitate a drastic change of the physical landscape (e.g., ﬁxed capital in the form of built environments), they are easier to spot than more subtle social processes such as exploitation, racism, or social stratiﬁcation.

Explaining and Timing Industrialization The fundamental question geographers have to ask is whether the concept industrialization has contributed in any substantive way to furthering scientiﬁc enquiry into how our social world works. There is probably no easy

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way to answer in any meaningful form such a question, because the answer given would depend on the level of explanation at which the concept industrialization is being deployed. It has been argued that industrialization has been particularly fruitful in helping geographers and social scientists operate at the higher levels of explan ation, or, at what might be termed ‘big picture’ thinking. Scientists and lay people alike relate to the world by building a more or less detailed and accurate model of what the world consists in and of how it works. At a very general level, it becomes fertile to have an understanding of how the history of the world has unfolded, and such an understanding would need to include the saga of indus trialization. As an illustration of ‘big picture’ thinking, we can consider Alvin Tofﬂer’s depiction of the course of history as a succession of three waves. The ﬁrst wave refers to the shift from hunter gatherer societies to agricultural, sedentary societies. The second wave refers to the relative decline of agriculture and the growth of industrial activities. Finally, the third wave designates the shift from industry based economic growth to service based economic growth, and the relative decline of blue collar workers in favor of white collar workers. Historians of industrialization have pointed out the fact that the timing of this process is crucial for under standing its nature. In particular, they identify three periods of industrialization: the ﬁrst refers only to England and pertains to historical contingencies between 1763 and 1846. The second includes countries such as USA, USSR, Germany, and Japan, which became in dustrialized in the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. The third refers to the countries that have started their industrialization after World War II (e.g., the tigers and dragons of Southeast Asia). The important observation in this context is that all other countries except England have had at least some other model of industrialization which they could imitate and emulate. England is unique in that there industrialization appeared spontaneously, unplanned, from scratch, through a set of economic initiatives that only in retro spect have been labeled ‘industrialization’. The theories invoked to explain the English Industrial Revolution have not ceased to proliferate and to take into account hitherto ignored factors such as genes. Since for all other cases of industrialization the imitation factor has played a role, it follows that the geographical study of innovation dif fusion is a required step in any serious attempt to make sense of this process. Geography pretends to be a scientiﬁc endeavor and the hallmark of a scientiﬁc endeavor is the attempt to explain and predict phenomena. To explain something means to uncover the law abiding mechanism that caused it. Scholars of industrialization have fallen short of this task, even though their work has converged on ad mitting the complexity of this process. There are several

interlocked problems that together keep industrialization in the clouds of ambiguity. At the most general level, industrialization is a social process, and epistemologists of the social sciences have cast doubt over the feasibility of explanation in the social realm. The innumerable variables that contribute to social outcomes do not seem to allow the social sciences to aspire to the same level of explanatory rigor as the natural sciences. Therefore, a more modest goal would be to understand rather than explain the process of industrialization. Understanding results from describing and comparing the various his torical and contemporary contexts in which industrial ization has occurred, without assuming that there is a law abiding mechanism through which industrialization necessarily emerges. The description and comparison of the aforementioned contexts allow researchers to detect both the nomothetic and the ideographic components of industrialization. The nomothetic components refer to those general facets of industrialization shared by all the various contexts in which it has occurred, whereas the ideographic components capture the unique, particular features that have stamped industrialization in a speciﬁc context. A related insurmountable obstacle to the explanation of industrialization is that it is not possible to experi mentally test and refute the various theories attempting to account for this phenomenon. Karl Popper made a forceful case for the idea that theories are scientiﬁc only to the extent that they are refutable. The problem with the scholarship on industrialization is that one can always invent a plausible ‘just so’ story and propose it as the explanation for this process, without having to subject it to the risk of experimental refutation. There is no single cause of industrialization. The process can emerge from a variety of causes. Similarly, the consequences of industrialization vary widely across geographical regions and historical times. In order to grasp these ideas in all their complexity, it is worth dis entangling and studying the relations between the often confused concepts of capitalism, modernization, and industrialization.

Industrialization and Capitalism Capitalism is a mode of production. A mode of pro duction is a particular way of organizing the economy and of allotting the costs and beneﬁts of economic ac tivities. Economic historians have identiﬁed modes of production other than capitalism (primitive communism, slavery, feudalism, socialism, and advanced communism) and economic geographers have aptly noted that elem ents from these other modes of production can coexist, somehow ‘etched’ in the fabric of the dominant mode of production today – capitalism. There is no relation of

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logical or causal necessity between capitalism and in dustrialization. This means that the two concepts do not entail one another either logically or causally. In plain language, capitalism does not necessarily lead to indus trialization (although it has often been considered as a favoring factor for industrialization, especially in the scholarship on the ﬁrst Industrial Revolution in England). Furthermore, industrialization can and has happened in noncapitalist regions (e.g., Stalin’s Soviet Union, 1924–53; Mao’s China; and Ceausescu’s Romania). To look at these relations the other way around, it is worth noticing that industrialization does not necessarily lead to capitalism (see the cases of Cuba, China, or North Korea today) and that industrialization is not a necessary condition for the emergence of capitalism (e.g., Third World countries may have a capitalist economy based on agricultural export oriented monocultures or on tourism). Statisticians’ urge to remember that correlation does not imply causation is therefore particularly relevant when studying the re lation between capitalism and industrialization: both across historical times, and across geographical spaces the two economic processes tend to go together. At ﬁrst glance, one could speculate that they are mutually re inforcing processes, although counter arguments to this hasty speculation can also be easily conceived. To understand the issues involved, note that the most prominent argument for the virtues of capitalism consists in the neoclassical economic theorizing of free markets as best means for the efﬁcient allocation of scarce resources to many needs. That argument, in turn, depends on the assumption of atomistic (innumerable) economic agents forced to coexist and ﬁght with one another in a con dition of perfect competition (i.e., none of them is powerful enough to be sheltered from competition). In other words, the alleged virtues of free markets collapse if the assumption of perfect competition is severely put into question by economic realities. The process of indus trialization systematically does exactly that: on the one hand, technologies (one type of ﬁxed capital) for the industrial process become yet more expensive (because they embody more and more knowledge), and this need for larger initial investments of capital encourages the concentration of capital in fewer hands (monopolies or oligopolies); on the other hand, the need for economies of scale acts as a catalyst for the further integration and concentration of capital. However, it is not only the case that the logic of in dustrialization can subtly move capitalist realities far away from their idealized virtues: as Marxist geographers have amply documented, the logic of capitalism renders industrialization a very fragile achievement. Just as the logic of industrialization favors concentrations of capital, which in turn undermine the free market conditions of healthy capitalism, so too the logic of capitalism favors the geographical relocation of capital, which in turn

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undermines industrial activities in old industrial regions. In the initial stages of the industrialization of a new re gion, the prospects of continuous growth seem safe and sure. Nevertheless, as time goes by, there is a tendency for the rate of proﬁt of local capitalists to fall because of factors such as exhaustion of raw materials, new com petitors entering the market, saturation of the market, increasing rent, new taxes (e.g., green taxes to internalize environmental externalities), increasing cost of labor because of unionization, etc. Since the logic of capitalism is the making of proﬁts for proﬁts’ sake, the local capi talists can choose to close the now unproﬁtable local plants and reinvest their money elsewhere, in regions where they can make higher rates of return on their in vestment. These new regions beneﬁt from industrializa tion, whereas the older ones suffer the costs of the opposite process – deindustrialization. In a long term perspective, three observations become self evident: the ﬁrst is that, any apparent beneﬁciary of capitalist industrialization has its prosperous days counted before turning into one of capitalism’s victims. Sometimes, these victims, because they are victims (i.e., high un employment, therefore oversupply of labor, therefore cheaper labor) might attract new rounds of capitalist in vestment. Second, from a spatial perspective, industrial ization and deindustrialization are processes that together express the historical geography of capitalism, its highly dynamic and uneven nature that so much impressed Marx and his followers. Third, from a political perspective, it becomes clear that the state has a crucial regulatory role to play in deciding the fate of industrialization. Many of the contemporary struggles over economic globalization emerge precisely because of the conﬂicts of interest be tween states and capitalists: the former care for economic development, high employment, and national ﬂourishing, whereas the latter obey the different (transnational) logic of capitalist competition.

Industrialization and Modernization As for the relation between modernization and indus trialization, their conceptual knot is more difﬁcult to untie. Modernization is the historical process whereby the social relations governing a human community have shifted from being based on kinship, tradition, collectiv ism, and magic/religion, to being based on rule of law, rationality, individualism, and scientiﬁc knowledge. The trick is to understand not only that modernization can be one of the unplanned effects of spontaneous industrial ization, but also that political leaders keen to modernize their countries can deliberately use industrialization as a very potent means to that cherished end. To give an example, Erving Goffman’s account of the moral career of stigmatization and his discussion of ‘tribal’

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(i.e., collective) stigma, together with Karen Horney’s work on collective neuroses have recently been deployed by geographers to shed light on the political performance of inferiority complexes and on their role in constituting marginal territories as ‘in need of industrialization’. Spe ciﬁcally, Simandan showed how Romanian and Norwegian intellectuals educated in Paris in the nineteenth century, upon their return back home, put their countries on the path of industrialization and modernization by attempting to copy what they saw in France. Industrialization played the role of a difference reducing engine between a de plorable economic backwardness and an intense longing for modernization. The positive stories of industrialization have played a major role in the invention of the modern nations, as an analysis of media and of general education school texts would clearly reveal. They have occupied a privileged position in the ‘spaces of constructed visibility’ where the imaginary geographies of the nation are fabri cated (exhibitions, museums, textbooks, traditional and electronic media, and public ceremonies). Nevertheless, and of paramount signiﬁcance, these stories have helped fabricating ‘the modern ﬁction’ of the nation, and not just some timeless collective identity. Until recently, the parties concerned with the devel opment of the Third World countries have encouraged their industrialization as a way out of backwardness and poverty and toward civilization, modernity, and pros perity. The problem with this encouragement is that it is value laden: it implies that the values of modernity (which happen to be the values of Western culture) are superior to the values of traditional cultures in the Third World, which is akin to saying that the Westerners are superior to the ‘primitives’. Since Western scholars and politicians alike have publicly rejected the older as sumptions of Western superiority and have embraced an egalitarian worldview according to which all cultures are equally valuable, the ongoing advocacy of industrializa tion as a solution for the Third World appears deprived of its most entrenched rationale. To propose a solution implies that there is a problem, and if backwardness is not the problem, than what is it? These thorny questions could be left to the pondering of critical geographers and postdevelopment studies scholars and we could turn in stead to the weighting of the overall costs and beneﬁts of industrialization.

Costs and Beneﬁts of Industrialization Industrialization’s legacy of delegation of responsibility for environmental problems has been well documented by geographers and industrial ecologists. The internal ization of its negative environmental externalities re mains an inconsistent and poorly enforced practice in many parts of the world. Furthermore, the deeper

question of the limits of natural resource substitution has received sustained attention only from a few specialists, despite the fact that the fate of industries is written in the answer to that question. Unlike the developed countries who became indus trialized before World War II (England, USA, USSR, Germany, and Japan), the Third World countries who are currently trying to start or speed up the process are confronted with the lack of sufﬁcient local capital. This means that for them industrialization can come only at the cost of increasing dependence on foreign capital. If they choose to specialize in export oriented industrial production instead of import substitution industrial production, this foreign dependence for capital is further ampliﬁed by a dependence on volatile and competitive foreign markets. Furthermore, given that current inter national economic policies set by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization implicitly or explicitly support national economic specialization (Ricardo’s principle of com parative advantage writ large), the least developed countries in the world are pressured to participate in a global economic gamble in which their odds of winning are very long indeed. Aside from modernization, the other most frequently invoked beneﬁt of industrialization is economic devel opment. The problem – as some Third World countries have found out – is that industrialization does not ne cessarily lead to massive economic development. Let us clarify the concepts involved. Economic growth refers to a quantitative increase in the gross domestic product of a country. Economic development refers to a qualitative structural change in a given economy. If a given country or region has some industrial plants specialized in the production of consumer goods and/or is totally export oriented, it runs the risk of witnessing economic growth without economic development. The respective indus tries are not organically embedded in the regional or national economy and play the role of the cherry on the cake instead of playing the more ambitious role of the yeast that makes the whole cake grow. This latter role usually is performed by capital goods industries, i.e., those industries that produce equipment needed for the development of other industries. The lesson to be gleaned from this brief analysis of economic growth versus economic development is that whether indus trialization is beneﬁcial or not critically depends on what kind of industrialization one is speaking about. Scholars and policymakers have also argued that in dustrialization is the best way to ﬁght excessive population growth in the Third World. Rural dwellers tend to have very large families partly because they are less educated than urban dwellers, and partly because for them children are a source of wealth and security in old age. The process of industrialization leads to increased urbanization,

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increased general level of education, and increased in come, all of which contribute to changing cultural and demographic patterns in the direction of massively re duced fertility rates. In statistical parlance, the impact of industrialization on fertility rates is mediated by the variables urbanization, education, and income.

Geography and Industrialization The relation between the study of industrialization and the discipline of geography can be decomposed into: (1) an analysis of how the tools of geography enhance our understanding of industrialization, and (2) an analysis of how the interdisciplinary research of industrialization can add depth and context to the traditional concerns of economic and historical geographers. Geography is a generic name for a set of various scientiﬁc practices loosely held together by a common concern for the big themes of ‘space’ and ‘society–nature relations’, as well as by the networks generated through its having a distinct position in the academic division of labor. In other words, various texts count as geography to the extent that they emphasize the use of concepts such as ‘space’, ‘place’, ‘distance’, ‘region’, ‘territory’, ‘landscape’, and ‘environ ment’ as entry points into the investigation of the social world. To study industrialization from a geographical point of view amounts to embracing a style of thinking that is biased toward the aforementioned spatial cat egories. Is this bias justiﬁed? Instead of arguing that the geographical point of view is indispensable to the study of industrialization, we could make the more modest claim that geography provides a conceptual toolbox for qualifying the sometimes crude accounts of this process. Industrialization unfolds in space and produces space, and so do the related phenomena of deindustrialization, modernization, globalization, dependency, and pollution. The recognition of the spatial dimension of industrial ization becomes signiﬁcant only to the extent that geographers can extract the actual regularities, patterns, or ‘laws’ of the operation of this process. It is at this level of analysis that old and new challenges keep the geog raphical conversation open. One of the ‘old challenges’ comes from the fact that different political economic worldviews force divergent interpretations of the same economic processes. Thus, a geographical perspective indebted to neoclassical economics (e.g., older style in dustrial location analysis) brings with it a more or less tacit endorsement of the beneﬁcial effects of industrial ization, whereas a Marxist perspective carries with it a strong normative baggage that urges sensitivity to issues of social justice. Rather than trying to endorse one view and to discard the remaining views, it might be prefer able to think of these different approaches as theoretical resources with complementary roles to play. Each school

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of thought is a constellation of gains and losses: each take on the spatial logic of industrialization may be particu larly insightful in one respect, and appallingly silent in other respects. Once with the turn to culture in the Anglo American human geography of the 1990s, the geography of indus trialization has witnessed, among other revampings, an orientation toward institutional and evolutionary ap proaches to the analysis of the spatial dynamics of the industrial sector. These new directions have enriched the explanatory power of economic geographies, by showing how path dependency, institutional cultures, and geo graphical relations complicate the fabric of pure eco nomic logic. Nevertheless, more quantitatively minded geographers lament the lack of clarity, rigor, and em pirical support that the new vocabularies of these recent schools brought about. One of the ‘new challenges’ that confronts the geography of industrialization comes from post structuralism, femi nism, and nonrepresentational theory. These approaches share a reluctance toward grand theories and criticize both neoclassical and Marxist perspectives on industrialization for their illusionary beliefs about an objective economic reality governed by laws about to be ‘uncovered’. This line of criticism alerts us to the limitations of a nomothetic study of industrialization within a presumed global space economy and brings attention, at least in directly, to the possibility of using other entry points to industrialization research. To illustrate this latter point, Simandan’s recent attempt to integrate the ﬁeld with the help of a master metaphor called ‘recursive carto graphies’ starts with the simple but powerful idea that the world is the result of the interplay and mutual meta morphosis of ‘three’ elements: rhythms, events, and leg acies. A short quote from the industrial geography literature is very helpful for understanding this model: ythe historical process of industrialisation in North America and Europe is marked by stories of small acci dents leading to the establishments of one or two persistent centres of production. Thereafter cumulative processes can generate a geographical structure of production which may be stable for long periods of time (italics added). (Hassink and Dong Ho, 2005: 572)

Three words have been emphasized in the text. The ﬁrst is ‘small accidents’ and in recursive cartographies this would be translated as ‘events’. Anything that ab ruptly disrupts the preexisting order of things qualiﬁes as event. The outstanding features of events are that they bring genuine novelty and they perturb the state of af fairs, though in largely different extents. The discovery of electricity, political elections, a bankruptcy, a strike, a merger, a foreign investment, etc., are all events.

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The second word emphasized is ‘persistent centers of production’, which in recursive cartographies would be labeled as ‘rhythms’. Anything that regulates a place, bringing constancy, predictability, and structural identity to it, constitutes a rhythm. Five decades of communist rule in Cuba, the production of chocolate in Birmingham, the four seasons of the temperate climate, the urban time tabling of the transportation network, and the legal system of a country, are all rhythms. They weave the fabric of a place, while being from time to time wounded by events that challenge their hegemony in processes of place for mation. The advent of industrial activity to a rural area is an event; in its wake, that industrial activity becomes a rhythm that begins to reconstitute that area as ‘industrial’ (workers going to work at 8 am and returning at 5 pm, the schools adapting their curricula to prepare the new workforce, the streams of income in that local community becoming dependent on those industrial plants, etc.). The third word emphasized is ‘cumulative processes’, which in recursive cartographies would be classiﬁed under the heading ‘legacies’. Anything left in the world that is not either ‘event’ or ‘rhythm’ qualiﬁes as ‘legacy’. Put simply, the legacy of a place is the coagulation of its past events and past rhythms, with the critical observation that this does not mean that legacy is ‘dead’, lacking agency. Quite on the contrary, it contributes to place formation exten sively: our actions are often guided by lessons learned from past actions, the stereotypes that produce the ‘image’ of a place come from past knowledge (and that image signiﬁ cantly inﬂuences present decisions – e.g., to invest or not to invest in a given regional economy), and a rhythm (e.g., the petrochemical industry) might rest on regional leg acies (petroleum). The many types of cartographies of industrialization to be found in contemporary geographical scholarship make research in this area reach a level of vibrancy and sophistication rarely found outside geography and promise to contribute to broader questions and critiques of our present condition. See also: Capitalism; Development I; Diffusion; Industrial City; Industrial Districts; Industrial Location; Industrial Organization; Industrial Parks; Industrial Restructuring; Innovation; Modernity.

Further Reading Allen, R. (2007). Engel’s Pause: A Pessimist’s Guide to the British Industrial Revolution, Economics Series Working Papers 315, University of Oxford, Department of Economics, revised. Amin, A. (1999). An institutional perspective on regional economic development. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 23, 365 378. Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined Communities (2nd edn.). London: Verso. Ayres, R. (2007). On the practical limits to substitution. Ecological Economics 22, 115 128.

Barnes, T. (2001). Retheorizing economic geography: From the quantitative revolution to the ‘Cultural Turn’. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 91, 546 565. Barnes, T. (2003). The place of locational analysis: A selective and interpretive history. Progress in Human Geography 27, 69 95. Bickerstaff, K. and Walker, G. (2003). The place(s) of matter: Matter out of place public understandings of air pollution. Progress in Human Geography 27(1), 45 67. Boschma, R. and Frenken, K. (2006). Why is economic geography not an evolutionary science? Towards an evolutionary economic geography. Journal of Economic Geography 6, 273 302. Bottazzi, G., Dosi, G., Fagiolo, G. and Secchi, A. (2007). Modeling industrial evolution in geographical space. Journal of Economic Geography 7, 651 672. Bunge, M. (2006). Chasing Reality: Strife over Realism. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Burt, T. (2005). General/particular (key debates in geography). In Castree, N., Rogers, A. & Sherman, D. (eds.) Questioning Geography: Fundamental Debates, pp 117 130. Oxford: Blackwell. Carr, D. (2008). Narrative explanation and its malcontents. History and Theory 47(1), 19 30. Castree, N. (2007). Capitalism, the Left and the new world (dis)order. Progress in Human Geography 31(4), 563 570. Clark, G. (2007). A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Davies, R. W. (1980). The Industrialisation of Soviet Russia Vol. 1. The Socialist Offensive. London: Macmillan. Gibson Graham, J. K. (ed.) (1996). The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It): A Feminist Critique of Political Economy. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Goffman, E. (1990). Stigma. Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Grabher, G. (1993). The weakness of strong ties; the lock in of regional development in the Ruhr area. In Grabher, G. (ed.) The Embedded Firm; On the Socioeconomics of Industrial Networks, pp 255 277. London: Routledge. Grabher, G. and Stark, D. (1998). Organising diversity: Evolutionary theory, network analysis and post socialism. In Pickles, J. & Smith, A. (eds.) Theorising Transition. The Political Economy of Post Communist Transformations, pp 54 75. London: Routledge. Gregory, D. (1998). Explorations in critical human geography. Hettner Lecture 1997 Department of Geography, University of Heidelberg. Hagerstrand, T. (1952). The Propagation of Innovation Waves. Lund: Royal University of Lund. Harvey, D. (1999). Limits to Capital (2nd edn.). London: Verso. Harvey, D. (2003). The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hassink, R. and Dong Ho, S. (eds.) (2005). The restructuring of old industrial areas in Europe and Asia: Editorial. Environment and Planning A 37, 571 580. Horney, K. (1950). Neurosis and Human Growth. The Struggle for Self Realization. London: W. W. Norton & Company. Hudson, R. (2005). Rethinking change in old industrial regions: Reﬂecting on the experiences of North East England. Environment and Planning A 37, 581 596. Kemp, T. (1978). Historical Patterns of Industrialisation. London: Longman. Kemp, T. (1989). Industrialisation in the Non Western World (2nd edn.). London: Longman. Licht, W. (1995). Industrializing America: The Nineteenth Century. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Martin, R. (2001). Geography and public policy: The case of the missing agenda. Progress in Human Geography 25, 189 210. Massey, D. (1995). Spatial Divisions of Labor: Social Structures and the Geography of Production (2nd edn.). Basingstoke: Macmillan. Massey, D. (2005). For Space. London: Sage. Minca, C. (2007). Humboldt’s compromise, or the forgotten geographies of landscape. Progress in Human Geography 31, 179 193. Murdoch, J. (2006). Post Structuralist Geography: A Guide to Relational Space. London: Sage.

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O’Rourke, K. H. and Williamson, J. G. (2005). From Malthus to Ohlin: Trade, industrialisation and distribution since 1500. Journal of Economic Growth 10, 5 34. Painter, J. (2000). State and governance. In Sheppard, E. & Barnes, T. (eds.) A Companion to Economic Geography, pp 359 376. Oxford: Blackwell. Peck, J. (2008). Remaking laissez faire. Progress in Human Geography 32(1), 3 43. Peck, J. and Theodore, N. (2007). Variegated capitalism. Progress in Human Geography 31, 731 772. Popper, K. (1935). The Logic of Scientiﬁc Discovery (1959 edn). London: Hutchinson. Plummer, P., Sheppard, E. and Haining, R. (1998). Modeling spatial competition: Marxian versus neoclassical approaches. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 84, 575 594. Rindermann, H. (2008). Relevance of education and intelligence at the national level for the economic welfare of people. Intelligence 36(2), 127 142. Rodrı´guez Pose, A. and Storper, M. (2006). Better rules or stronger communities? On the social foundations of institutional change and its economic effects. Economic Geography 82(1), 1 26. Rutherford, T. (2004). Convergence, the institutional turn and workplace regimes: The case of lean production. Progress in Human Geography 28, 425 446. Sadler, D. and Thompson, R. (2001). In search of regional industrial culture: The role of labour organisations in old industrial regions. Antipode 660 686. Scott, A. (2000). Economic geography: The great half century. Cambridge Journal of Economics 24, 483 504. Scott, D. (2005). Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Simandan, D. (2004). Poverty, resource management, and the cultural politics of industrialization in Central Europe: The case of the Romanian Carpathians. Romanian Review of Political Sciences and International Relations I (2), 45 60. Simandan, D. (2005). Pragmatic Scepticism and the Possibilities of Knowledge. Timisoara: West University Press. Simandan, D. (2006). Marginally Modern. Arad: ‘Vasile Goldis’ University Press. Sowell, T. (1998). Conquests and Cultures: An International History. New York: Basic Books.

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St. Andors (1977). China’s Industrial Revolution. London: Martin Robertson. Storper, M. and Salais, R. (1997). Worlds of Production: The Action Frameworks of the Economy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Swyngedouw, E. (2000). The Marxian alternative historical geographical materialism and the political economy of capitalism. In Barnes, T. & Sheppard, E. (eds.) A Companion to Economic Geography, pp 41 59. Oxford: Blackwell. Thrift, N. (2000). Pandora’s box? Cultural geographies of economies. In Clarck, G. L., Feldman, M. P. & Gertler, M. S. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Economic Geography, pp 689 704. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Thrift, N. (2007). Non Representational Theory: Space, Politics, Affect. London: Routledge. Tofﬂer, A. (1980). The Third Wave. New York: Knopf. Weeks, J. (2005). Population: An Introduction to Concepts and Issues (9th edn.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Weiss, J. (2002). Industrialisation and Globalisation: Theory and Evidence from Developing Countries. London: Routledge. Yapa, L. (1996). What causes poverty? A postmodern view. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 86, 707 728. Yeung, H. (2005). Rethinking relational economic geography. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 30(1), 37 51.

Relevant Websites www.fordham.edu Industrial Revolution and the Standard of Living Essay. www.lakemac.infohunt.nsw.au Industrialization website a good brief overview of history and characteristics of The Victorian Web Site at Brown University. This site is useful for nutshell summaries of the Poor Laws, the Corn Laws, etc., lectures on The Industrial Revolution in England by Arnold Toynbee lectures on The Industrial Revolution.

Industry, Historical Geographies of R. Lewis, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Luddites Early-nineteenth-century British manufacturing workers who resisted the intrusion of new technologies and work practices by the smashing of machines. Short-lived and unsuccessful, they reﬂect the disruptive power of industrial capitalism on earlier industrial systems. Underdevelopment The process by which industrialized countries actively blocked the economic development of nonindustrialized countries in most parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Zaibatsu Japanese commercial groups that became large diversiﬁed industrial corporations with interests in many parts of the national economy. Part of the state-led industrialization that occurred under the Meiji period from the late nineteenth century, they continue to dominate Japanese economic and political life.

Uneven Development and the Historical Geographies of Industry Contemporary geographies of industry look quite differ ent from what they did two or three hundred years earlier. Today, in the ﬁrst decade of the twenty ﬁrst century, people are both hypnotized and horriﬁed by China’s as tonishing industrial development. One hundred years ago, observers were equally alarmed and exhilarated by the rapidily expanding industrial powers of the United States, while 200 years ago many were deeply shocked and ex cited by the rise of industrial Britain. These stories, stories of the rise and fall of industrial might in the modern period, reﬂect capitalist uneven development. The sys tematic process of economic growth and decline over time and space ensures that there are marked differences in the character and effects of industrialization in eighteenth century Manchester, nineteenth century Chicago, and contemporary Shanghai. The uneven development of industry over time has taken place at different scales, from the global to the local. In all cases, and regardless of time and place, a singular set of processes have, in different combinations and in different ways, shaped the world’s industrial his tory. As a coherent socioeconomic system, capitalism depends on capital accumulation and investment, the subordination of labor, the development of new pro duction, transportation and communication technologies, the expansion of markets, continued access to raw

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materials, and state intervention and regulation. The changing contours of capitalist industrial growth were associated with major reshufﬂing of the leading positions within the industrial world order. The European imperial order was refashioned in the late nineteenth century as Germany and the United States took over world lead ership from Britain. More recently, the preeminent pos ition of the United States and the major European industrial countries has been challenged by Japan. In the ﬁrst years of the twenty ﬁrst century the dramatic ex pansion of China’s state led capitalism heralds a new economic superpower. The shift of industrial capital from place to place over time – the historical geographies of industry – occurred within four overlapping phases. The ﬁrst phase dates from 1650 when proto indus trialization became commonplace throughout many European rural areas. The development of a large number of small producing units initiated extensive manufacturing throughout France, Germany, Switzer land, Spain, Great Britain, as well as parts of Eastern Europe. Proto industrialization had a dual effect. First, it broke down the local character of trade by incorporating proto industrial areas into large merchant controlled trading regions. Port cities, from Liverpool to St. Malo and Hamburg, drew upon the products of the manu facturing workshops and distributed them throughout the world, and in the process redrew the parameters of the global economy. Second, it transformed everyday life. The search for cheap labor and proﬁts reordered the relations of rural production. While the appearance of large manufacturing units employing machinery and in animate power would have to wait until the nineteenth century, the social relations of proto industrialization created a proletariat that was dependent on the sale of labor power for its survival. The second phase involved the rise of industrial capit alism, the de industrialization of older industrial districts, and the ascendancy of Great Britain as the world’s pre eminent power between 1740 and 1815. Even though proto industrialization was common throughout many parts of Europe, Great Britain was the ﬁrst country to experience modern industrialization. A unique set of conditions trans formed a small industrial producer, creating the world’s most powerful industrial state. Increasing incomes and wealth freed up investment capital and generated market demand. A large urban based proletariat supplied cheap and disposable laborers for the mills and factories. The development of scientiﬁc knowledge and labor skills pro moted incremental technological innovation that was

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funneled into existing (textile) and new (machine tools) sectors. State support for the creation of modern legal, property, monetary, and tax systems laid a stable base for economic growth. Strong trading links in the countryside, Europe, and the colonies provided resources, markets, and business networks that sustained continent spanning com modity chains. New transportation facilities such as harbors, roads, and canals meshed together the different components of the developing regional industrial division of labor and, in the process, reduced transport costs and delivery times, and facilitated the exploitation of raw materials, especially iron and coal. Together, these conditions fueled rapid in dustrial growth, resulting in the development of Great Britain as the ﬁrst modern industrial state by the end of the eighteenth century. The third phase, running from the late eighteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century, involved the slow, nonlinear, and uneven, but nevertheless inexor able emergence of industrial manufacturing in most parts of Europe, as well as the United States, Canada, and Japan. As these regions’ industrial base developed, they chal lenged Britain’s industrial preeminence. The rise of an Atlantic based industrial complex from the 1870s differed in important ways from the previous round of industrial change (Figure 1). Growth was driven by new industries, most notably steel, chemicals, electrical appliances, autos, and new technologies, such as the combustion engine and electrometallurgy. Together, these freed manufacturers from the locational constraints of coal and steam. The large vertical integrated, multiunit corporation replaced the family ﬁrm as the central organizational form for capital accumulation and labor control. The banking sys tem became increasingly critical as it permitted indus trialists to assemble capital in a variety of new (and secure) organizational forms. This is not to say that old production methods and organizational forms were redundant; smal ler scale custom, batch, and high volume producers con tinued to coexist with corporations deploying new production methods and organizational forms. Neverthe less, large scale industrial organizations became dominant and reshaped the global economic landscape. A different process of industrialization took place in Japan. Building on the ﬂedgling manufacturing economy constructed under the Tokugawa regime (1600–1868), Japan experienced extensive industrial growth during the Meiji period (1868–1945). Coordinated by an activist state that invested in the necessary infrastructures (rail roads and energy), Japan’s industrial base was built around a tripartite structure by the early twentieth century. The realization of immense economies of scale reduced costs and gave access to international markets. The establishment of zaibatsu allowed a new industrial bourgeoisie to oversee the promotion of new industries, market expansion, and technological change. Large metropolitan complexes, most notably Osaka–Kobe and

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Tokyo–Yokohama, developed and became the home of the modern industrial state. Economic and political restructuring after World War II refashioned property relations, educational systems, corporations, and capital– labor relations. Cocooned within the sphere of American industrial and political interests, post war Japan experi enced dramatic growth and the rise to international prominence. Finally, since 1945, industrialization has penetrated most regions of the world, most notably the newly in dustrializing countries of Asia and Latin America, pro ducing a new industrial division of labor and an interlinked and integrated industrial society on a scale never experienced before. Industrial change in these countries has taken a different pathway than the earlier ones. Malaysia, for example, before the 1970s was a typical staples producer, supplying tin, rubber, and vegetable oil to the developed world. Shackled to pri mary commodity production since the nineteenth cen tury, the country was embedded in the European imperial order. In the past 35 years, however, it has re duced this export commodity function and has resituated itself within the new international division of labor. Its industrial base now rests on export oriented manu facturing industries. As in Japan, a centralized state in stituted an industrial policy favorable to foreign direct investment and encouraged ﬁxed capital and social cap ital investments. What is different is that manufacturing expansion is mostly driven by foreign capital, is export led, and heavily relies on low wage industries (textiles, electronics, rubber) that have little ability to generate economic interdependency within Malaysia.

The Spatial Division of Labor and the Historical Geographies of Industry One of the most dramatic effects of the long term processes of uneven development and capital accumulation has been to divide the world into quite distinct parts, to forge a dis tinctive yet shifting spatial division of labor. Regardless of the labels given to this division, core–periphery, developed– underdeveloped, or First Third–Third World, the primary effect of capitalist industrialization has been to geographic ally divide the global economy by power and proﬁts. This has been a long time in the making. The manufacturing dominance of non European countries more than 250 years ago has been undermined. In the eighteenth century, India and China accounted for 57% of the world’s manufacturing output (Table 1). The dual processes of modern industrial manufacturing and European empire building, however, destroyed the handicraft character of the early leaders and led to the supremacy of a handful of industrial capitalist countries in Europe and North America. By 1913 more than 60% of all manufacturing output was concentrated in three

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St. Petersburg

Moscow Manchester Berlin

London Atlantic Ocean

Essen

Kiev

Paris

Milan

EUROPE

0

500 km

CANADA

Montreal

New York Chicago

San Francisco

Baltimore

UNITED STATES St. Louis

Atlantic Ocean New Orleans

Pacific Ocean

MEXICO

Gulf of Mexico 0

500 km

Patrick Vitale

Figure 1 Industrial districts of the US, Canada, and Europe, c. 1880. Sources: Based in part on Pollard, S. (1986). Peaceful conquest: The industrialization of Europe, 1760 1970. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Meyer, D. (2001). The national integration of regional economies, 1860 1920. In Mcllwraith, R. & Muller, E. (eds.) North America: The historical geography of changing continent (2nd edn.). Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littleﬁeld.

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Table 1 1913

Manufacturing output of selected countries, 1750

Country

China India France Japan Germany United Kingdom United States

% 1750

1830

1880

1913

32.8 24.5 4.0 3.8 2.9 1.9 0.1

29.8 17.6 5.2 2.8 3.5 9.5 2.4

12.5 2.8 7.8 2.4 8.5 22.9 14.7

3.6 1.4 6.1 2.7 14.8 13.6 32.0

Note: Output consists of both handicraft and industrial manufacturing. Source: Tomlinson, B. (1999). Economics: The periphery. In Porter A. (ed.) The Oxford history of the British Empire, volume III: The nineteenth century, p 69. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

countries: the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom. At the same time, the underdeveloped world has been turned into a huge reservoir of raw materials for the developed world’s factories. While rubber from Malaysia, cotton from India, iron ore from Brazil, and coffee from Kenya have fed the industrial machine of the developed countries, little processing has been done in the under developed world. This has several serious consequences. First, most of the value added component of the ﬁnal product has gone to North American and European manufacturers. Second, the economies of the under developed world are highly unstable because of their reliance on primary products and declining terms of trade which favor the First World. Third, the ﬂuctuating needs of developed countries and the ability of ﬁrms to shift capital from place to place in search of ever more better quality and cheaper supplies of raw materials have trapped periphery countries in a vicious cycle of underdevelopment. Critical to the shifting international division of labor, both in the past and in the present, have been interﬁrm and intraﬁrm backward and forward linkages operating across national boundaries. From the earliest days, ﬁrms, by deploying their own agents or long distance mer chants, have traded manufacturing inputs. Indeed, to a large extent, Western dominance of global industry over the past 300 years has relied upon the ability to control the commodity chain, from access to raw materials to the distribution and marketing of ﬁnished products. Before the end of the nineteenth century, relatively unintegrated industrial ﬁrms relied on a wide set of intermediaries to coordinate the ﬂow of manufacturing inputs and outputs. With the merger movements starting at the end of the nineteenth century and the rise of the large vertically integrated corporation an increasing share of trade be tween ﬁrms became internal to the ﬁrm. A complex system of ownership and intracorporate interaction de veloped. In the early twentieth century, for example,

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large corporations, such as US Steel controlled raw ma terial sites (iron ore mines), large integrated steel mills, ﬁnishing steel works, transportation (railroads and ship ping ﬁrms), and wholesalers, were integrated through board membership with ﬁnancial houses and banks. Large transnational corporations have the ability to drastically reshape national, regional, and local industrial landscapes. The burgeoning economic power of corpor ations in eighteenth century Britain, nineteenth century United States, and twentieth century Japan has been played out in many other countries. American large scale, direct investment since the 1880s, for example, has led to the development of a branch plant economy in Canada. Seeking the markets of Canada and the British Empire (through Canada’s preferential trade agreements), plentiful raw material supplies, and greater proﬁts, American cap italists began venturing into the manufacturing sector of Central Canada and the timber and mineral resources of the hinterland in the last decades of the nineteenth century. This has continued ever since, resulting in limited indus trial development, the ﬂow of proﬁts out of Canada, and massive US business and political inﬂuence in Canadian life. The state has been critical to the formation and un folding of uneven development and the international division of labor. Before World War I, when private entrepreneurs operating through the market were the dominant agents of industrial change, the state’s direct role in industrial development was minimal. In Great Britain and many other European countries, however, the developing industrial state did promote and orchestrate economic activities. Various levels of government (from the national to the local) intervened in a variety of ways. Although there were few explicit attempts to build a state led industrial policy before World War I, govern ments, through the redistribution of income, the devel opment on nonindustrial sectors, and support for economic and social institutions, underpinned the for mation of a modern industrial society. In the last third of the nineteenth century in emerging industrial nations, such as Japan, Canada, the United States, and Russia, the state was a more important agent of change and, under the guise of national development, a major vehicle for capital accumulation. The state has become more involved in supporting, coordinating, and defending industrialization over the past 100 years. It has been involved in drawing up in dustrial policy by, among other things, facilitating in dustrial access to credit, establishing intranational and international trading pacts, and stoking consumer mar kets. The state has become more heavily involved in ﬁ nancing and building necessary infrastructures, from nineteenth century Canadian railroads to twentieth century Chinese ports. The contemporary state has also been extremely active in establishing the ideological,

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legal, and technological framework of the capitalist and state socialist systems. Finally, the state has formulated and implemented militaristic and territorial expansion in order to drive national economic expansionism. From the British intrusions into its colonies before 1800 to eco nomic colonization by the United States and Japan’s territorial ambitions in Asia in more recent times, the state has shaped international, regional, and local div isions of labor. The recent growth of newly industrializing countries has had little impact on the international division of labor: proﬁts continue to be siphoned off by head ofﬁces in Los Angeles, Frankfurt, and Tokyo; technological in novation remains in the older developed world; capital shifts from place to place seeking the best returns; and state policies reinforce existing practices of capital ac cumulation that favor the developed world. This is evi dent in the case of the maquiladoras hugging the southern side of the US–Mexican border. Brought in after the closing of the Bracero (guest worker) program in 1965, the purpose of the maquiladora program was to attract foreign assembly plants to Mexico. Starting off quite slowly, the pace of growth quickened after 1980, and by 2000 more than 3500 ﬁrms employed 1.3 million workers. Most plants are owned by developed world ﬁrms (such as Volkswagen at Puebla and Toyota at Tijuana) which have come seeking low wages, poor environmental regulations, high proﬁts, and a pliable national state. The result is the maintenance of the developed–under developed divide.

Place and the Historical Geographies of Industry As the Mexican maquiladoras suggest, industrialization has created a complex set of specialized regional and urban conurbations. Regions and urban areas are pools of eco nomic, political, and social resources and offer industrialists accessible and place speciﬁc sets of markets, labor, tech nologies, information, and commodities. From the very beginning, regional agglomerations of particular industries have appeared. In the eighteenth century, production of textiles and other manufactures was concentrated in vari ous regions of India and China. More recently, industry has clustered in Europe and North America: silk in Lyonnais and New Jersey; cotton in Alsace, Lancashire, Belgium, New England, and Saxony; and steel in the West Midlands, the Ruhr, and the American Midwest. At the same time, regions were underdeveloped. The classic case is the American South, which missed out on the ﬁrst burst of industrialization in the early nineteenth century. As well as supplying raw materials (cotton, lumber, and tobacco) to the US North and Europe, it also had a low wage, low skill, labor intensive industrial economy that remained in

thrall to industrialists and ﬁnanciers in New York, Phila delphia, and London until well after World War II. The capitalist industrial division of labor consists of a regional framework divided by industrial production, raw material supply, and markets. Urban agglomerations of different sizes and special izations developed as integral parts of the industrializa tion process. The large metropolis is the home of a diversity of industries. Berlin, London, Paris, New York, Montreal, Tokyo, and Shanghai manufacture a dazzling array of producers’ goods (chemicals, machinery, foundry products) and consumer goods (clothing, processed food, books). As major industrial, ﬁnancial, and political cen ters, these large metropolitan areas are the primary nodes of their national manufacturing economy and, by exten sion, the global economy. Further down the urban sys tem, a much larger number of specialized cities turn out particular products. From the earliest days of proto in dustrialization to the development of new industrial cities in the growth areas of Asia and Latin America, small specialized cities have been essential to the national and international industrial division of labor. From watchmaking in Geneva and Jura to cutlery in Shefﬁeld and rubber in Akron, specialized cities have been part of both corporate and industrial commodity chains that stretch across regions, nations, and the globe. Industrial change initiated new forms of social dif ferentiation. New class relations developed as prole tarianization and the rise of new classes accompanied industrialization. The preindustrial domestic system was replaced by capitalist investment, increased workplace scale, growing mechanization, and elaborate divisions of labor. Blue collar and clerical working classes labored in the factories, ofﬁces, docks, building lots, and streets of the capitalist city. In rural areas, new forms of social stratiﬁcation appeared as industrial farming replaced older types of food production. A well educated, well paid professional class consisting of lawyers, academics, bureaucrats, politicians, and factory managers controlled, managed, and coordinated the functioning of the work and nonwork worlds. The merchant and the lord were replaced by the new overlords, the industrial bourgeoisie of manufacturer, corporate executive, and ﬁnancier. Al though taking different forms at different times in dif ferent places, these three classes (workers, professionals, and bourgeoisie) continue to be the basic class structure of a modern industrial society. This has been grafted onto existing forms of social stratiﬁcation, such as the Indian caste system, and integrated within hierarchies centered on race, ethnicity, and gender. These social distinctions have transformed the social geographies of the industrial metropolis. When these complicated social differences are combined with the dynamics of the capitalist housing and labor markets, a well deﬁned and highly graded set of neighborhoods are

Industry, Historical Geographies of

constructed. The social worlds of metropolitan areas are fraught with class, racial, and ethnic based residential differentiation. As Frederick Engels pointed out, the residential geography of nineteenth century Manchester was class based. Similarly, early twentieth century Chi cago exhibited an array of social areas; the exclusive ghettos of the White native born professional and entre preneur were cheek by jowl with the vast working class district, which was differentiated by country of origin, race, and occupation. The physical distance separating the exclusive ‘Gold Coast’, middle class Hyde Park, immi grant Packingtown, and the African American district south of the Loop (Chicago’s central business district) were small, yet the social distances were gigantic. Capit alist industrialization ﬁnely calibrates urban social space. Modern industrialization has triggered large scale population migration. Two movements are particularly important: the shift of people from the countryside to the city, and mass migration from one country to another. Although the reasons and manner in which these oc curred varied across time and space, two basic processes have driven the reshifting of populations within and across national borders. The ﬁrst has to do with political security and citizenship. From the dismantling of existing socioeconomic systems in the underdeveloped world to the pogroms in Eastern Europe, people have moved to escape political turbulence and oppression and to build a better life. The second has to do with work. Between the seventeenth century and World War II, for example, hundreds of millions of Europeans, uprooted by eco nomic and political changes have sought better working conditions and economic well being. As early as the seventeenth century, growing industrial production and increasing agricultural productivity in Europe freed rural populations from the everyday rhythms of the country side, forcing farmers, peasants, landless laborers, and displaced industrial workers, forcing them to move to the burgeoning industrial cities, such as Manchester, Paris, Berlin, and Prague. More recently, a similar process has taken place in other parts of the world. Today, in one of the largest movements of people ever known, more than 100 million rural migrants live in China’s rapidly growing industrial cities. Migrants have crossed national borders. In some cases, this is legal. Before the 1960s, drawn by industrial pro duction in urban factories and the opportunities of modern agriculture, the British colonies of the United States, Canada, and Australia were settled by large number of Europeans. In the underdeveloped world, other groups, including East Indian and Chinese, have been drawn to trading centers where they have acted as intermediaries in the ﬂow of raw materials and manufactured goods between the developed and underdeveloped worlds. More recent shifts in the global industrial economy have stimulated population shifts on a scale never before experienced.

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People from Africa, Latin America, and Asia, forced by changing economic and political relations on the land and in the cities, have moved, sometimes as citizens, sometimes as guest workers, to the developed, Westernized countries. In other cases, immigration has been illegal. People from, among other places, Turkey, Mexico, China, and Nigeria, have slipped across the borders of the industrialized West looking for work. It is estimated that the United States may have up to 12 million illegal immigrants. Modern industrialization has been a painful and violent process. It has dislocated custom, upset routines, and re oriented everyday life. The shift to mechanization, factory work, and intensive forms of social divisions has led to a range of responses: Luddites raged against the machine as a way to defend their future; industrial workers joined unions to protect their rights and improve working con ditions; and political elites and industrial bourgeoisie used the police and military to impose law and order on workers. Less dramatically, but perhaps more insidiously, industrialization has refashioned everyday life: village custom has been replaced by the strictures of urban fac tory time, while older social patterns and structures have been uprooted by modern forms of social stratiﬁcation. Industrialization in all of its forms requires the sur veillance and rationalization of industrial spaces. From within the factory to the metropolitan landscape, from corporate driven projects to state sponsored continental markets and trade unions, changes to everyday life have been marked, painful, and decisive. Even though these changes have not been always obviously violent or rapid, they have, nevertheless, whittled away at older lifeways, imposed new ones, and reconﬁgured everyday life to ﬁt the industrial capitalist regime. A fundamental feature of capitalist uneven develop ment and the changing spatial division of labor is de industrialization. De industrialization has a long history: from the de population of cottage and domestic pro duction in Europe and the state sponsored destruction of colonial industries in India to the more recent dis investment and economic decline in the older industrial regions of Europe (the Ruhr, Northern England, and Scotland) and the United States (the Midwest and New England), the uneven development of capital and power leaves relic and redundant landscapes with their at tendant problems and despair. Two cases, the English Weald and the American Midwest, illustrate elements of the historical geography of de industrialization. In the early eighteenth century the Weald was a successful proto industrial region built on the production of glass, cloth, and iron goods. By the end of the century, however, these sectors had declined in importance and the region was unable to make the transition to full scale modern industrialization. The reasons for this, although speciﬁc to the Weald, also point to the enduring com monalities of capitalist industrialization: dependence of

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its producers on outside capital and credit, the relegation of local interests to national and international ones, and the absence of interdependent diversity. As a result, the Weald could not compete with the new industrial economies emerging in the North and the Midlands. The American Midwest was unable to make the transition from an automotive based industrial economy forged before World War I to the electronic one of the late twentieth century. The region’s cities and towns, such as Detroit, Akron, Pittsburgh, and Chicago, went into a spiral of economic decline as key industries (automobiles, tires, steel, and electrical appliances) shut down factories and laid off hundreds of thousands of workers. The Midwest’s successful production regime was undermined by a combination of declining prod uctivity, technological competition from Europe and Asia, the shifting of capital out of the region, and chan ging industrial policy. As part of a policy of disinvest ment, capital was moved out of the Midwest’s industrial centers as manufacturers sought greenﬁeld sites in the American South, Mexico, and Taiwan where they could ﬁnd higher proﬁts, escape a high wage and unionized workforce, and build new factories where new production processes and technologies could be installed. In many ways, the fundamental dynamics of capitalist industrialization have not changed much over 400 years. The processes undermining the industrial economies of the English Weald and the American Midwest are the same. Capital continues to transform societies and land scapes. The result has been uneven development, whether in Britain and other parts of Europe during the ﬁrst round of industrialization or the more recent changes occurring in the United States and Asia. From the small centers in seventeenth century Western Europe to the burgeoning industrial economies of East Asia, accumulation has favored different people and different places at different times. In the process, people have been turned into an industrial proletariat; new technologies have restructured the productive forces; the search for new and expanding markets has produced a cornucopia of commodities that sustain everyday life; and the state has regulated, co ordinated, and planned the industrial economy. Whether it is the French silk manufacturer operating out of eighteenth century Lyon or the automobile executive making decisions in Tokyo’s downtown business district, the search for larger proﬁts and markets has driven in dustrial capitalism and created complex spatial divisions of labor over 400 years. Nevertheless, the differences across time and space are vast and imposing. The manufacturers, merchants, and ﬁnanciers who gathered in early nineteenth century coffee houses in Manchester, Lyon, and Philadelphia

functioned in a different world from the executives of the huge multinational, multiunit conglomerates that dom inate today’s global industrial world. The day to day conditions that workers face differ dramatically. Histor ically, the working class elite of Western Europe and North America have reaped some of the beneﬁts of an ever expanding global economy, while the peasants turned proletariat of the industrial South continue to work under the worst of conditions. At the same time, the development of the underclass in Detroit and Los Angeles is just the other side of the coin of the growing size of the wealthy middle class in Shanghai and Mumbai. Large international ﬂows of labor have only complicated this differential pattern of work and everyday sustenance. The speciﬁc causes and the effects of modern de indus trialization differ from those that destroyed cottage production in the eighteenth century. Often violent, al ways transformative, mundane, insidious, and everyday, capitalist industrialization has remade the world in its own image time after time. See also: Capitalism and Division of Labor; Finance, Historical Geographies of; Historical Geographies, Urban; Trade, Transport and Communications, Historical Geographies of.

Further Reading Barrett, J. (1987). Work and community in the jungle: Chicago’s packinghouse workers, 1894 1922. Urbana, IL: University of Chicago Press. Cowie, J. and Heathcott, J. (eds.) (2003). Beyond the ruins: The meanings of deindustrialization. Ithaca: Cornel University Press. Dennis, R. (1984). English industrial cities of the nineteenth century: A social geography. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Drabble, J. (2004). An economic history of Malaysia, c. 1800 1990: The transition to modern economic growth. London: Macmillan. Gregory, D. (1990). ‘A new and differing face in many places’: Three geographies of industrialization. In Dodgson, R. & Butlin, R. (eds.) An historical geography of England and Wales (2nd edn.), pp 351 399. London: Academic Press. Hudson, P. (1992). The industrial revolution. London: Edward Arnold. Kemp, T. (1978). Historical patterns of industrialization. London: Longman. Meyer, D. (2001). The national integration of regional economies. In McIlwraith, R. & Muller, E. (eds.) North America: The historical geography of a changing continent (2nd edn.). Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littleﬁeld. Meyer, D. (2003). The roots of American industrialization. Baltimore: John Hopkins Univerisity Press: John Hopkins. Mosk, C. (2001). Japanese industrial history: Technology, urbanization and economic growth. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Pollard, S. (1986). Peaceful conquest: The industrialization of Europe, 1760 1970. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tilly, C. (1983). Flows of capital and forms of industry in Europe, 1500 1900. Theory and Society 12, 123 142. Tomlinson, B. (1999). Economics: The periphery. In Porter, A. (ed.) The Oxford history of the British Empire. vol. III: The nineteenth century, p 69. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Inequality G. DeVerteuil, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Economic Inequality The unequal distribution of income and wealth within and across societal groupings. Gini Coefﬁcient Commonly used measure of inequality, expressed in percentage terms between 0 (no inequality) and 100 (total inequality). Inequality Involves arithmetically unequal distributions that also have a normative/moral dimension. Inequity Distributions that are unjust (usually determined by need), but not always arithmetically unequal. Polarization Special subset of inequality, concerned with the top and lower extremes gaining at the expense of the middle within a given distribution (usually income or wealth). Spatial Inequality The spatial manifestations and implications of inequality. Welfare Geography Branch of human geography popular in the 1970s that focused on ‘who gets what, where, and how’.

destitution. To make matters worse, many states seem more bent on magnifying and reproducing, rather than countering, these mounting disparities through privat ization and drastically reduced ambitions at income redistribution. Even this cursory examination suggests that inequality must be treated as among the most pressing social and geographical issues of the twenty ﬁrst century. Witness the recent high proﬁle campaigns to Make Poverty History and reduce debt loads within the less developed world (e.g., Live 8 concerts in 2005). Witness also, worries in the developed world that extreme poverty and in equality may be fertile ground for failed states and ul timately terrorism. Geography is deeply implicated in the concentration of wealth and poverty. As a relative latecomer to the ﬁeld, human geographical interest in inequality has waxed and waned, but the resurgence of global inequality has once again placed the issue front and center within the discipline.

Organization of Entry

Deﬁnitions, Expressions, and Measurements The world in the early twenty ﬁrst century seems more socially and economically unequal than at any other time in living memory. While the super rich live in mind boggling luxury and privacy, the most destitute – in refugee camps in Sudan, the callejones of Lima, or on the streets of Skid Row, Los Angeles – live in medieval like conditions. Previously socialist nations with moderate levels of inequality, such as China and Russia, are cur rently undergoing signiﬁcant growth in the gap between haves and have nots. Most American cities are losing their middle class neighborhoods, bifurcating between privatized enclaves of afﬂuence and concentrated zones of poverty for those left out of the postindustrial, post Fordist urban economy. Los Angeles and New York City experience income gaps that are comparable to cities in the less developed world. In these very cities of the less developed world, almost all growth occurs within pe ripheral mega slums, disconnected from infrastructure and the victims of social apartheid. Increasing inequality seems to go hand in hand with globalization; while some nations are enjoying unprecedented prosperity, nearly half the world’s population subsists on less than US$1000 a year, with some 1 billion citizens living in utter

Given the sprawling and multifaceted nature of in equality, this entry is necessarily wide ranging, cursory, and eclectic. Let us begin by deﬁning inequality and its associated terms, then proceed to the concept of spatial inequality and its origins in several key foundational subﬁelds – Marxist urban political economy and welfare geography – that established and formalized geographical interest in issues of inequality in the 1970s. The waning geographical interest in inequality during the 1980s was re energized by the resurgence of global(ized) inequality in the 1990s and beyond. The attention paid to two key contemporary issues – income polarization and concen trated poverty in particular – is necessarily urban focused, because it is in cities, and especially large cities, where inequalities and resistance to it are most apparent, where the rich and poor concentrate and rub shoulders (but mostly ignore each other). The role of the (welfare) state in mediating inequality is also discussed, including the sense that the state is now magnifying, rather than countering or ignoring, inequality. Several examples from Los Angeles are offered. Similar issues are then high lighted in the less developed world, particularly with regard to the urbanization of poverty and the spatial separation of the classes. Here, the case of Sao Paulo is used to ﬂesh out these concerns. Finally, a glimpse is offered into how geographers are currently approaching inequality.

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Deﬁnitions Arithmetic inequality refers to a situation in which people are receiving unequal quantities of some attribute within a given distribution. Beyond this relatively basic starting point, deﬁning inequality from a social science perspective is a difﬁcult and daunting task, given its incredibly complex and sprawling usage. Inequality can mean radically different things to different people, and as such, any deﬁnition will necessarily be limited. Part of the deﬁnitional challenge is also that inequality is related to a great many concepts, including inequity, disadvantage, disparity, polarization, and so forth. The aim here is to derive a parsimonious deﬁnition of inequality, while also clarifying how inequality overlaps with some of these associated terms. David M. Smith is careful to deﬁne inequality as a special type of differentiation or variation of character istics among members of a designated group. Certain personal attributes (e.g., name, height, weight, hair color) are different among different populations – this variation is seen as normal and does not provoke any sense of moral indignation or inequality. However, if these superﬁcial personal attributes were suddenly used to discriminate, to make some populations disproportionately better off than others in terms of income, wealth, health, or life chances, then the concept of inequality could be invoked because this is no morally relevant basis to so discriminate. In other words, there is a moral and normative di mension to inequality, a sense of what ought to be fair or unfair. This moral dimension is captured in the over lapping term of inequity. Inequity refers to distributions that are unjust, but not always arithmetically unequal. Why? Because sometimes (and somewhere) certain groups have greater needs than others, and inequity arises by treating everyone the same – some groups re quire greater quantities in proportion to their greater needs (i.e., more than their arithmetic fair share), and so even inequality may be morally justiﬁable at times. More often than not, of course, inequity and inequality overlap, as many groups do not even receive their minimum fair share at all (an unjust and unequal outcome). For the purposes of this article, focus is laid on inequality as unjust and unequal distributions and outcomes, thereby capturing the spirit of both inequality and inequity. The term inequality also brings up issues of social justice, a concept that will be discussed in the ﬁnal section. Sufﬁce it to say that social justice is concerned with how society’s beneﬁts and disbeneﬁts are distributed and why, and ultimately how inequality can be reduced, if not eliminated. So, if 1% of the nation’s population, using a particular attribute (such as higher education), was hoarding 99% of the wealth, surely this condition would be deemed one of inequality. By deﬁnition, inequality is a relative or comparative concept, spanning standards across the whole of society, regions, or neighborhoods.

Our conceptual understanding of inequality may be further strengthened by deﬁning a few more associated terminologies. Polarization is regarded as a special subset of inequality, occurring when the highest and lowest ex tremes of any social characteristics (however deﬁned –but usually income or earnings) are both growing at the ex pense of the middle, creating a bimodal hourglass distri bution, rather than an egg shaped one. Further, there are many terms associated with the bottom of the inequality spectrum, including disadvantage and deprivation. For instance, socioeconomic analysis in the UK regularly uses six dimensions of deprivation, all ranked by region in a relative fashion: income, employment, health, education/ skills/training, housing, access to services. In the less developed world, measures of deprivation are relative and absolute, since there are segments of the population that do not even have access to these basic necessities of life. Expressions of Economic and Social Inequality To ﬂesh out the previous conceptualizations, let us brieﬂy illustrate several key expressions of inequality, em phasizing economic inequality – that is, the unequal and inequitable distribution of income and wealth within and across societal groupings. Economic inequality has been focused upon because most of the world’s population lives in capitalist societies where access to and quality of various elements of social well being – including nutrition, shelter, health, education, employment opportunities, clean en vironments, leisure, security, social stability, and so forth – are increasingly determined by purchasing ability. Eco nomic inequality inevitably creates social inequality, as some groups are denied access to these basic elements of social well being. As a result, these groups suffer from social exclusion, denial of basic human rights, and a lower quality of life. Economic and social inequalities are tightly linked to class, but interact with a variety of other key social denominators that relate to power, opportunity, and life chances, such as (but not limited to) race, gender, sexual orientation, (dis)ability, religion, and age. For example, people living long term in deprived areas in the developed world tend to have lower health status and suffer from more violence and self destructive be havior. This is because their relative material deprivation vis a vis the rest of the society is compounded by feelings of chronic stress (due to lack of control over their en vironments), as well as humiliation over their devalued social position, particularly in highly unequal societies such as the United States where race becomes a com pounding factor. In the US case, race and class reinforce each other in particular places – usually inner city ghettos – indicating a deeply stigmatized class position that goes beyond merely the associated material deprivation. An other example involves gender. Through relentless cuts to welfare, single female parents are increasingly consigned

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to poverty, losing out to dual income earners who are colonizing the most valuable and strategic urban spaces. Finally, it is important to differentiate among de scribing, understanding/explaining, and addressing (i.e., reducing) inequality. Although these different approaches will crosscut the rest of the entry, sufﬁce it to say here that understanding/explaining inequality goes beyond simple, neutral descriptions (i.e., inequality is or is not occurring) to examining numerous processes that create inequalities. Most agree that inequalities are expressions of the eco nomic and social systems in which they are embedded, and that addressing inequality is important because of the societal breakdowns and costs it engenders. An example of social breakdown is the increased crime and fear that ac company gross inequality, as those left out feel little ob ligation or attachment to a society that excludes them. It should come as no surprise that nations with high levels of inequality also usually have high crime rates. Finally, ad dressing/reducing inequalities involves moving beyond academic research to a more direct engagement with the (unequal) material realities of the world. Measuring Inequality There is no single metric (or scale) that can capture all the intricacies of economic inequality. The most popular (and best understood) measure is the Gini index for in come or wealth. The Gini index is represented as a co efﬁcient with a range from 0 to 100: scores near zero display almost no inequality, while those approaching 100 display extreme inequality. Visually, the Gini coefﬁcient

is represented as a curve, plotting the cumulative dis tribution of population against the cumulative distri bution of income. A diagonal straight line signiﬁes absolute equality, in which each member of the popu lation has an equal share of income. In reality, it is more likely that distribution is unequal, in which case the line sags below the idealized diagonal. The more the line sags, the greater the inequality. Using the World Income In equality Database, it is possible to obtain Gini index scores for a variety of nations across the world. Nations with very high levels of inequality – such as Brazil – have Gini coefﬁcients over 55, while nations with low levels – such as the Scandinavian countries – have Gini co efﬁcients under 30. Figure 1 illustrates the Gini index, with the line of equality (Gini ¼ 0), as well as two hypothetical income distributions that depart from perfect equality – one moderately unequal, the other highly unequal. In the moderately unequal distribution, the poorest half of the population earns 40% of the total income, while in the highly unequal distribution, the poorest half only earns 25% of the total income. Other approaches to measuring inequality include using the ratio between extreme values (usually only the top and bottom deciles), a technique primarily undertaken to measure income polarization. Further, regions can be ranked according to a variety of deprivation and well being measures. All measures must be approached with some caution, however. The level of inequality measured is complicated by – if not a function of – scale, since different unit aggregations can produce different levels of inequality.

100

80

Cumulative % of income

Line of Perfect Equality (Gini = 0)

60

40 High inequality

20 Moderate inequality 0 0

20

40

60

Cumulative % of population

Figure 1 Gini coefﬁcients.

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Larger scales – such as the national – can obscure im portant internal variations, a problem of ecological fallacy. For instance, the relatively modest income inequality at the level of the Canadian nation obscures far greater in equalities at the urban level, particularly in the primary city of Toronto, where the poor earn about the same as the poor everywhere else in urban Canada but that the rich are far richer.

The Concept of Spatial Inequality Up to this point, the discussion of inequality has been largely aspatial, perhaps because the study of inequality has been very much the domain of just two disciplines: economics and sociology. Between them, there is a staggering amount of theoretical and empirical work; economists focus on explaining and measuring income distribution, while sociologists emphasize the role of class stratiﬁcation, social inequality, and social classes in their research. Perhaps because of the substantial amount of research, the ﬁeld is highly contested and fragmented. Insights from other disciplines, including geography, have been increasingly contributing to the body of knowledge, particularly with regard to widening the purview of economic models limited to proﬁt maximizing indi viduals, linear time, and aspatial processes. Before tracing the origins of geography’s relatively recent foray into inequality, let us brieﬂy highlight some of the fundamental ways in which space, place, and scale are deeply implicated in the creation and sustaining of inequality, constituting a distinct concept and ﬁeld of inquiry known as spatial inequality. At its simplest, eco nomic inequality necessarily has a spatial expression, as different places experience different degrees of wealth and poverty. In other words, some places are more im pacted than others, and this realization has a long history. The ﬁrst systematic mappings of the areal differentiation of inequality began with the Chicago School of Sociology and its concentric zone model. Using a variety of social indicators and measures of social deprivation (disorgan ization), they found an unequal pattern, with most of the problem areas conﬁned to the zone in transition around the central business district (CBD). It was in this zone in transition where a striking pooling of crime, vice, in sanity, or low income could be observed. Since the 1920s, patterns of inequality have been usefully mapped, in creasingly with the tool of geographic information sys tems (GISs) and using exploratory data analysis techniques. However, these mapping exercises tend to be weak in terms of explaining the deep seated causes of inequality. A deeper approach is to go beyond the mapping of (uneven) patterns to see how place and inequality are mutually dependent and constitutive. As Janet Kodras

contended, inequality is a place bound and geographic ally speciﬁc interplay between the market that distributes economic resources, and the state, whose role is sec ondary, serving to counter or reinforce disparities. Fur ther, this process is scale dependent, in that broader global and national market and state processes that create inequalities are ﬁltered through speciﬁc local contexts, creating place speciﬁc variations in patterns of afﬂuence and poverty. The causes and experience of inequality in Detroit are more a product of de industrialization and racism than in Eastern Kentucky, which has always suf fered from isolation and underdevelopment. Using this more sophisticated approach, place is in extricably implicated in the production and sustaining of inequality, as well as potential solutions. Geographers point to how the place exclusion and separation of the have nots from the mainstream can reduce their social well being; disadvantages are passed on over the gener ations in place through spatial and social exclusion, thus promoting material deprivation and the inability to par ticipate fully in society. Conversely, advantage can be passed on simply by being born in a good place. Geog raphy has an important role in cumulating, reinforcing, and perpetuating inequalities over time. Reducing in equality through state intervention and resistance to op pressive structures is also a deeply geographical process, one which will be highlighted throughout the article. Emergence of the Geographical Focus on Inequality Spatial inequality as a legitimate human geography con cept emerged as a result of dissatisfaction with 1960s spatial science. This dissatisfaction stemmed from the latter’s lack of policy relevancy, its largely descriptive na ture, and its disinterest in real world social conditions, ideologies, and solutions. By the 1970s geographers were subsequently focusing on questions of social problems – poverty, class, crime, racial discrimination, and inequality – and how public policy, supported by geographically sensitive research, could help alleviate the worst extremes. Nevertheless, certain holdovers from the spatial science era – including the application of the Gini index – have usefully persisted to the present day.

Marxist urban political economy Marxism had always been attuned to the disparities caused by capitalism. The Marxist approach to spatial inequality was largely set out by David Harvey’s Social justice and the city. Harvey’s book had two parts: the ﬁrst focused on liberal formulations of urbanism and geog raphy more generally, while the second part exposed some of their very limitations by using a radical, Marxist

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approach. In Harvey’s view, the capitalist city by its very nature reproduced inequality through a regressive re distribution from the poor to the wealthy. This cumu lative causation mechanism was related to unfairly structured ‘‘location of jobs and housing, the value of property rights, and the price of resources to the con sumer.’’ In order to reduce the inequalities inevitably produced by the goals of market efﬁciency, Harvey put forth the concept of ‘‘a just distribution justly arrived at,’’ with the aim of achieving ‘‘territorial distributive justice.’’ A ‘‘just distribution’’ must take into account need, con tribution to the overall good, and merit. Ultimately, a sense of territorial social justice may occur if the fol lowing two sets of conditions are fulﬁlled: 1. The distribution of income should be such that (1) the needs of the population within each territory are met (needs), (2) resources are so allocated to maximize interterritorial multiplier effects (contribution), and (3) extra resources are allocated to help overcome special difﬁculties stemming from the physical and social environment (merit). 2. The mechanisms (institutional, organizational, polit ical, and economic) should be such that the prospects of the least advantaged territory are as great as they possibly can be. The ‘‘just distribution justly arrived at’’ concept would prove inﬂuential over the next decade, particularly in welfare geography. In the second part of his book, how ever, Harvey recast his critique of the capitalist city (and liberal theory) in terms of accumulation and class struggle, the state working to reproduce unequal social relations, exploitation and conﬂict, of systems not working in balance. Social justice now becomes more contingent on societal processes, rather than some un changing set of norms. Distribution was more explicitly related to production, and there is more emphasis on solutions that are not based in the capitalist system, as one cannot truly alter the inherently unequal distribution of income without altering the very structure that pro duced it. Put simply, city structure thwarted all truly redistributive efforts. Other Marxist geographers would pick up on these themes, particularly the sense that spatial inequality was inherent to capitalism and necessary to its perpetuation. The line of argument revolved around the following: capitalism leads to an unfair allocation of local oppor tunities and services, based initially on the structure of labor markets. Labor markets determine the level of dependency on the state and the ability to access ﬁnance and property markets. Land and housing markets re produce labor market inequalities, and thus inequality is passed on by the inherited local environment. This en demic inequality at the local level is exacerbated by larger forces of centralization and decentralization that

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actively produce developed and underdeveloped regions and nations (e.g., uneven development).

Welfare geography Like Marxist urban political economy, welfare geography emerged as a critique of spatial science. However, welfare geography adopted many of the tools of spatial science and continued the search for generalizable patterns, casting them within a normative and quantitative light. Borrowing liberally from welfare economics, the goal of welfare geography was to shed light on ‘who gets what, where, and how’. The role of geographers was to expose spatial inequalities, and perhaps even contribute to better spatial arrangements within society. However, there was no sense of fundamentally changing existing structures; rather, as in the liberal tradition of social justice, the goal was to advantage the worst off and treat the extremes of inequality rather than removing them entirely. The case of public facility location theory is in structive, as it epitomizes many of the key tendencies of welfare geography in the 1970s. These included the distribution of and access to services, as well as the im portant normative role of the state in rectifying the capitalist tendency toward unevenness and inequality by seeking the most egalitarian spatial arrangements for society. Public facility location theory aimed at ﬁnding the most efﬁcient and equitable locations for public fa cilities (e.g., libraries, hospitals, incinerators, shelters, etc.). These locational decisions differed from private locational decisions, since the latter does not have to address the irksome concept of equity – what is a fair and adequate distribution of public facilities that maximizes social welfare? While measuring efﬁciency was straight forward (e.g., staying within a prescribed budget), meas uring equity through prescriptive modeling was more difﬁcult, particularly when certain facilities have wide spread beneﬁts but localized externalities and spillover costs (e.g., incinerators, airports). Various surrogates for equity were used, including minimizing distance to ser vice facilities for the maximum amount of clients, as well as maximizing the intensity of services to the neediest clients. Through its largely quantitative and neoclassical assumptions about distance, pattern, accessibility, im pacts, and externality effects, public facility location theory joined the normative and the spatial, although the latter was weakly developed. By the 1980s, interest in neoclassical, quantitative modeling of welfare criterion waned, replaced by con cerns for broader and more conﬂictual issues, including the unequal distribution of beneﬁts and burdens across the city and the role of the state in sustaining these distributions. For example, the state sanctioned satur ation of de institutionalized mentally ill patients in

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service rich yet marginalized inner city areas was criti cized for being quite convenient for the city as a whole, but unequal for those individuals who had to live under such segregated conditions. As time went on, there was an even more pronounced shift away from the entire idea of modeling and mapping inequality (and issues of distri bution, access, and the rectifying state), replaced by more identity based, post structuralist frameworks whereby race and gender (and other key social demarcators) were now central in understanding inequality, along with class. The explicit concept of the geography of inequality be came rather muted, if not slowly subsumed into the larger realm of critical geography.

outside of geography. However, while Sassen was inter ested in new cleavages formed by globalization – particularly the polarized growth of high end employment versus low end, informal and immigrant economies – Wilson focused on the areas and people left out of (if not left behind by) the process entirely. Within geography, the renewed interest in inequality was also being informed by trends that emphasized poverty, policy, and social justice. All of these areas of interest once again emphasized matters of exclusion, material realities, class, poverty, and, critically, economic and spatial inequality. Geographers were regaining their role of social critics in matters of inequality, whether in terms of urban exclusion, the geography of neoliberalism, or the declining welfare state.

Restructuring and the Resurgence in Inequality By the 1990s, geographers would once again directly engage issues of (economic) inequality, spurred on by dramatic real world shifts. After a brief post war inter lude during which broad social mobility seemed possible, inequality forcefully returned to the scene. The surge in inequality was a result of fundamental economic, polit ical, and social restructuring, including heightened globalized competition that produced a more ﬂexible, lean, and downsized postindustrial production, bifur cation of labor markets and falling wages, welfare state contraction, and the collapse of socialist economies. Geographical space was deeply implicated in and im pacted by all of these structural changes. Some examples included: (1) shifts in the place hierarchy, as some places, regions, or neighborhoods lost out and became dis advantaged, thereby producing a more uneven and fragmented world; (2) increasing urbanization of the very poor, along with the pooling of the very rich in urban space; and (3) aggravation of previous inequalities, and the emergence of new ones (skills, immigrants, etc.) in a post Fordist, postindustrial city. Sociologists were also sensitive to these geographical effects, particular at the urban scale in the developed world. Globalization was seemingly creating greater in come polarization in large cities, while simultaneously disadvantage – itself a product of global and local forces (de industrialization, spatial mismatch, racism, etc.) – was becoming more spatially concentrated, with predictably negative effects. These insights on urban inequality were most prominently presented by Saskia Sassen (global city and polarization) and Julius Wilson (underclass and spatial mismatch), respectively. Both focused on the (negative) outcomes of massive restructuring in the developed world after the 1970s, drawing inspiration from the rapidly changing conditions in American cities (e.g., Chicago, Los Angeles, New York), and both were instrumental in pro moting a more explicit spatial approach to inequality

Polarization and Global Cities The relationship between globalization and inequality is a massive topic of inquiry in its own right. Many commen tators point to how globalization has exacerbated pre existing inequalities by advantaging certain well positioned regions – such as the Pearl River Delta in China – while further isolating regions such as Bihar in India. Incomes in an increasingly globalizing world are diverging consider ably, a trend worsened by state reductions in efforts at redistribution (particularly the reduced taxation on the rich). As a result, we have witnessed the spectacular growth of the ‘super rich’ – the wealthiest 0.25% of the world’s population, who now own ﬁnancial assets equiva lent to that of the rest of the world’s population. Fragmentation and divergence are therefore hallmarks of globalization at the regional level, but also at the urban level; globalization of the city seemingly intensiﬁes in equality. By the 1990s, there was a substantial literature on how the bifurcation of the urban labor market, the demise of Fordism, and the retrenchment of the welfare state were creating a dual city in much of the developed world, in creasingly polarized between the residual poor and ascendent elites. These trends were at the expense of the middle class, and were purportedly creating an hourglass (rather than an egg shaped) income distribution. The concept of a bimodal, dual city was most prom inently articulated by Saskia Sassen. Her polarized global city thesis became the most discussed theoretical framework for understanding the relationship between globalization and inequality/polarization in the de veloped world. She reasoned that the formation of large, global metropolitan regions such as New York City and Los Angeles (the two most polarized urban centers in the United States) necessarily entails rising spatial and socioeconomic polarization. Incomes were polarizing because unprecedented increases in the numbers of high level professionals working in transnational industries

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(their very growth stimulated by globalization) were coinciding with the downgrading of well paying manu facturing jobs and the increasing informalization and casualization of basic economic activities, informalizing being the only way they could still operate in these high costs locales. Unlike the growth of the middle class under Fordism, globalized economic growth at present ‘‘is based on an industrial complex that leads not to the expansion of a middle class but to increasing dispersion in the in come structure and in the bidding power of ﬁrms and households.’’ Global cities were (and are still) at the ex tremes of this class polarization, as they feature the sharpest concentration of both high and low income groups, the latter of which are increasingly dominated by immigrants from the less developed world. Globalization is not the only culprit in this income polarization, but it has certainly accelerated the tendencies. Sassen’s focus on the local consequences of inequality and globalization has attracted substantial attention and criticism, including its disputable applicability to non American cities where racial and immigrant divisions are not nearly as pronounced, where the middle class is not shrinking, and where the welfare state is more active in countering gross inequalities. For example, polarization is nowhere near as pronounced in most European and Japanese cities. However, there is no doubt that many global cities, from Toronto to Berlin to Auckland, share certain common fault lines, including greater divergence between traditional poverty areas and gentrifying areas housing professional class households. The compart mentalization inherent in this globalized housing market may be seen as the cutting edge, if not the epitome, of the class divides that permeate the twenty ﬁrst century city. The Spatial Reorganization of Inequality: Concentrated Poverty If Sassen was concerned with the polarization of the wealthy and the poor at the expense of the middle class in global cities, Wilson was more interested in the dis turbing fate of those completely disconnected from the global economy and increasingly decoupled from eco nomic cycles entirely. While economic inequality had always been associated with economic segregation, Wil son detailed the spatial reorganization inherent in a qualitatively different kind of urban marginality and in equality of the so called underclass: the permanently unemployed and welfare dependent living in geo graphical and social isolation from mainstream society. In his 1987 book The truly disadvantaged: The inner city, the underclass, and public policy, Wilson emphasized the negative effects of concentrated poverty and spatial en trapment on African American inner city neighborhoods, itself the outcome of economic restructuring (especially de industrialization and the spatial mismatch of jobs as

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employment opportunities ﬂee to the suburbs), past racism, migration, and demographic shifts. Critically, the spatially contiguous and temporally stable nature of high poverty neighborhoods (traditionally measured as more than 40% of the households are poor) led to social isol ation from mainstream (job) opportunities and norms, which in turn perpetuated high unemployment and a tangle of social pathologies and intergenerational poverty. This is partially due to the fact that poor people are more dependent on and inﬂuenced by their immediate milieu than middle class or wealthier groups. The spatial sep aration and concentration of the poor magniﬁed their problems in a myriad of ways. Children growing up in high poverty neighborhoods encountered a hostile and generally negative environment, attended low performing schools that have few resources, lacked networks for durable employment, and were exposed to the tempta tions of street life without strong social buffers. Despite the signiﬁcant criticisms leveled against the concentrated poverty thesis – particularly the stigma tization inherent in the term underclass – Wilson did draw important attention to the spatial nature of this new, more magniﬁed urban poverty and inequality. Economic restructuring, geographical space, and race were all im plicated in the formation and sustaining of these new ghettos and their systematic exclusion from mainstream employment and opportunities. This form of ‘placism’ would be difﬁcult to transcend as it combined deep seated class and racial dimensions. The effects of this concentrated poverty persist over time, and currently extend to other forms of inequality as well. Living in excluded places usually means dis proportionately higher likelihoods of being exposed to environmental pollutants, being more vulnerable to en vironmental disasters (e.g., earthquakes, heat waves, hurricanes), and lacking access to positive environmental amenities, such as green space. The stressful and de graded social environment also translates into inferior health outcomes. Crime concentrates disproportionately in these same areas, adding further disrepute. Finally, homelessness may be seen as a key demarcator and the tip of the iceberg of extreme and concentrated poverty, as well as being the most visible indicator of inequality in American and other cities. Structurally, the conﬂuence of greater economic vulnerability from the 1970s onward – fewer well paying jobs, cutbacks to welfare – and dwin dling housing affordability in central cities led to the emergence of a large pool of precariously housed indi viduals. For some, these structural constraints intersected with personal vulnerabilities – mental illness, substance abuse, violence, foster care, etc. – to create a surge in homelessness in the 1980s. Concentrated poverty areas are frequently the originating location of many homeless people, as well as the invariable target for homeless services saturation.

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The afﬂuent also became more spatially concentrated during the 1980s and 1990s as the classes began to more forcefully pull apart, both socially and spatially. This concentrated afﬂuence was characterized by several urban phenomena: growth of gated and privatized com munities, as a means of reasserting some semblance of control over territory; hypergentriﬁcation of desirable, amenity rich neighborhoods in older cities; and the erection of bunkered downtown and edge city develop ments that act as command and control centers for the global city. These class divisions were reinforced and made increasingly rigid through geography, in some ways representing a return to the excesses of the Gilded Age when the poor lived in misery while the rich lived in complacent ignorance. The Mediating State? Responses to Inequality in the Developed World All of these trends beg the question of how (or whether) inequality is being mediated by the state within the de veloped world. As previously noted, the capitalist state’s role in shaping and producing inequality is secondary, essentially limited to offsetting or worsening existing market inequalities. Different welfare state interventions will ﬁlter the restructuring processes outlined by Sassen and Wilson in different ways, mediating unequal con sequences and producing different impacts at national and local levels. The state’s mediating role, however, must also be placed within the context of globalization and neoliberalism, both of which justify weakened state interventions in favor of a more unfettered, commodiﬁed capitalism. There is a sense that while societal needs and inequalities are mounting, the state’s interest in rectifying them is waning. Some commentators go so far as to say that the state is now actively complicit in reinforcing and magnifying inequalities, but this too is geographically variable – not all nations in the developed world have followed the same path in reproducing inequality. As a key mediator of inequality, the role of the welfare state is to provide a support system for those deemed deserving of being unable to fully participate in the labor market – the disabled, single mothers, and so on. In terms of inequality, the welfare state mediates in several ways: (1) it is a key support system for the lowest strata in society (i.e., those who do not work in the paid labor market), such that any shifts in support will have potentially critical effects on the entire spectrum; and (2) it can mitigate the worst impacts of economic restructuring and market shifts, if there is the political will. In many (but not all) de veloped nations over the past 30 years – most prominently the United States – the welfare state has largely been dismantled, devolved, and privatized, deteriorating the living conditions of the welfare dependent and exacer bating the differences between the worst off vis a vis the

rest of society. The American welfare state was always incomplete and residual, intervening only for market or family failure. Since its apogee with the War on Poverty programs in the 1960s, however, the American welfare state has suffered a lengthy demise with the decline of interventionist ideals and the rise of deregulated neoli beralism. In response to seemingly intractable problems of declining international competitiveness and budget def icits, the Reagan administration began to implement broad cutbacks to the welfare system, eliminating or downsizing many of the War on Poverty programs (e.g., public hous ing, welfare payments). With the end of the 1980s boom and the advent of the early 1990s recession, caseloads increased dramatically. As America slowly emerged from this last recession, a consensus developed around the idea that the federal welfare state required dramatic change. In 1996, President Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). The legislation fundamentally altered the federal welfare state, dismissing any entitlement to government assistance and shifting the focus from income maintenance to job training and employment. Moreover, it is based on the ‘work ﬁrst’ policy, despite evidence that reveals important spatial and personal barriers to employment among cer tain segments of the welfare dependent population. By prioritizing ‘personal responsibility’ over ‘work opportun ities’, PRWORA is a further step toward eliminating welfare, not poverty, and epitomizes the neoliberal, workfare–welfare state. While some of these key pro visions have subsequently been revised, the 1996 Act set into motion three irreversible shifts to the federal welfare system: (1) the increased localization of welfare provision and administration to the state and local level, through block grants and devolution of welfare provision re sponsibilities; (2) emphasis on individual rather than col lective responsibility for poverty, in the form of lifetime beneﬁts limits; and (3) the preference of self sufﬁciency over basic entitlements, embodied in the welfare to work provisions. Outside of the United States, however, the assault on the welfare state has been less drastic. This is an im portant point, as many European nations have en compassing and universalistic, rather than residual, welfare states that actively intervene to provide strong supports to not only the nonworking poor but the entire populace. For instance, welfare states in Scandinavia and Western Europe maintain strong monetary and housing supports for the unemployed. As a result, there is far less likelihood of being consigned to live in neighborhoods of last resort, thereby reducing the overall spatial polar ization so striking in American cities. Nonetheless, the longstanding stagnation of welfare payments in Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have had negative impacts on the most vulnerable populations and places. At the very least, there is a sense that even in the most

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egalitarian of nations, the welfare state is no longer as strong or supportive in rectifying inequality as it once was. Beginning in the 1990s, there was also a sense that the state – and again, particularly in the US – was moving away from simply cutting back on inequality reducing welfare supports to promoting more explicitly inequal ity reproducing and inequality magnifying policies. This shift must be seen within a context of globalized and neoliberalized competition that particularly forces the local state to emphasize image and entrepreneurialism over equality. These policies targeted those excluded by previous hollowing out of the welfare state: the poor, unemployed, welfare recipients, immigrants, and low skilled laborers. These groups were now subject to greater viliﬁcation, state authoritarianism, and punitive regulation. Examples include the de funding of local housing and welfare programs, the demolition and de concentration of public/social housing, the expressed pro gentriﬁcation practices within inner city areas, and the criminalization of the visibly poor. The homeless are particularly targeted under new, more aggressive policies. In many cities worldwide, the need to maintain a positive image for tourists and the middle/upper classes results in the proliferation of antihomeless ordinances. These or dinances make it difﬁcult for homeless individuals to access prime spaces for panhandling, recycling, sleeping, and so on. Concurrently, many marginal spaces in the city are being revalued and thus disappearing. Skid Row, Los Angeles (Figure 2) epitomizes many of these ugly trends to regulate (and spatially relegate) extremes of inequality. The 50 block area east of Downtown Los Angeles acts as a containment zone for the homeless and their services, and is home to over 8000 destitute souls. Skid Row contains a disproportionate

Figure 2 Skid Row, Los Angeles, 2000.

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amount of shelters, drop in clinics, substance abuse treatment centers, and the like. Social service saturation, along with the sense that Skid Row is a community of last resort, make it difﬁcult for its denizens to actually escape homelessness. Although routinely threatened with dis placement, Skid Row has endured because it acts as a convenient container for society’s castoffs. As an ex cluded ghetto, Skid Row represents the very lowest rung of the income strata, no more than a few blocks from the gentrifying Spring Street corridor, the bustling Latino shopping corridor on Broadway, and the corporate high rises of Bunker Hill. The containment policy of Skid Row is not the only instance of new modes of social and spatial regulation to deal with inequality in the Los Angeles city region. Since its rise to global city status, the preexisting social and spatial cleavages in Los Angeles have intensiﬁed to the point where different areas have now become more homogenized, while the social (and geographical) dis tance between areas has increased. The regulation of gross inequalities has taken other forms that implicate the local state, including privatization, fortiﬁcation of the built environment, heavy handed policing and sur veillance, and the mass incarceration of populations deemed dangerous. For those at the bottom, the state has moved from welfare to outright repression, with occa sional resistance in the form of sporadic and sometimes spectacular unrest (i.e., in 1992). In City of quartz, Mike Davis detailed the dramatic reconﬁguration of public space in Los Angeles to control and contain the dele terious outcomes of deep seated inequalities: ‘‘Welcome to post liberal Los Angeles, where the defense of luxury lifestyles is translated into a proliferation of new re pressions in space and movement, undergirded by the

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Figure 3 East Hollywood, 1999.

ubiquitous ‘armed response’. This obsession with physical security systems, and, collaterally, with the architectural policing of social boundaries, has become the zeitgeist of urban restructuring, a master narrative in the emerging built environment of the 1990s.’’ Private citizens have increasingly taken matters into their own hands, fortify ing in situ to defend their properties from the fear of crime (Figure 3). The Less-Developed World In the less developed world, inequality has also surged and urbanized since the 1980s, but this resurgence has been harder to conceal and contain given its greater visibility and scale. There is a sense that globalization is exacerbating inequality through enhanced cumulative causation and increasing returns to certain well situated regions, and the opposite effect for others. Examples of regional divergence include the gaps between North eastern Brazil and the Sao Paulo–Rio de Janeiro corridor, southern versus northern Mexico, coastal China versus the interior, and the high tech poles in southern India versus stagnating provinces in the north. Moreover, many of the key manufacturing centers of the less developed world – Mumbai, Sao Paulo, Johannesburg, and so on – have experienced stagnation coupled with unabated population growth, leading some commentators to speak of over urbanization, whereby city growth occurs with little employment growth or industrialization. Many new arrivals are ﬂeeing economic stagnation in the country side, victims of agricultural de regulation and state in action. Issues of relative inequality are ampliﬁed by concerns over absolute deprivation, as many of the poor in the less developed world lack access to even basic

necessities and infrastructure (housing, water, health, education, electricity, sanitation, etc.) resulting from extreme social exclusion. As such, poverty in the less developed world is both relative vis a vis the rest of so ciety, as well as absolute in terms of being unable to attain basic survival needs. In the face of this lopsided reality, the role of the state has been minimal. Indeed, state intervention is more likely to take the form of bulldozing squatter settlements or supporting middle class housing. State abdication in redressing inequality, or even providing taken for granted services, is a symptom of many longstanding problems, namely the failures of developmentalism. Indeed, ac cepting foreign aid usually means following a neoliberal path: opening up protected markets, reducing state interventions and guarantees, and so forth. There is no doubt that mega cities of the less developed world are at the forefront of the global urbanization of inequality. During the 1970s and 1980s, the majority of the poor living in Latin America moved from rural areas to urban areas, especially to mega cities such as Mexico City, Lima, Bogota, Caracas, Rio de Janeiro, and Sao Paulo. This trend is bound to continue; by the early twenty ﬁrst cen tury, the majority of the world’s poor will likely live in such urban areas. Most of these urbanized poor currently inhabit informal and excluded slums that present a grim future of blocked social and spatial mobility. Moreover, these slums are frequently in precarious natural environments, highly vulnerable to ﬂooding and earthquakes, as well as human made industrial hazards. Slum densities are skyrocketing, in direct contrast to the spacious neighborhoods of the emerging and established middle and upper classes. From Johannesburg to Manilla, these more powerful groups are pushing to create insulated living spaces that further

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remove and displace the very poor (squatters, itinerant street hawkers, and entrepreneurs) from prime urban spaces. Those displaced, along with arrivals from the countryside, are shunted to peri urban development. While understandably unique, Sao Paulo also typiﬁes many of these disturbing trends in the less developed world. As Brazil’s most populous and most prominent (albeit peripheral) global city, Sao Paulo also ranks among the largest metropolitan conglomerations on Earth. The region produces about one third of Brazil’s GDP and over half of its national industrial output, clearly making it the dominant global banking center, urban center, and economic motor. As we shall see, however, being a global city is no guarantee of a good life for the majority of Paulistanos. Sao Paulo is clearly both a First and Third world city – too poor for the former, too rich for the latter. Various contradictory processes – globalization, de industrialization, de concentration and polycentricity, tertiary expansion, polarization, social exclusion, peripheralization of the poor – translate into bewildering and ﬂagrant patterns of economic and spatial inequalities that exceed the local state’s ﬁscal capacity. Twenty percent of the population lives in informal housing (a proportion on the low side for the less de veloped world), largely in socially excluded peripheral areas, crime rates in some areas approach civil war conditions (20% of homicides can be attributed to the police!), and the wealthy increasingly separate themselves within fortiﬁed developments and move about by heli copter. In Sao Paulo, the rich are extraordinarily rich, and the poor are ruinously poor. One way to approach inequality in Sao Paulo is to examine its internal character and patterns of develop ment, and by extension the role of space and place in

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reinforcing inequalities. Sao Paulo’s intra urban geog raphy of inequality reﬂects both the degree of exogenous links to the world economy, as well as local forces and legacies. To many, the most prominent feature of Bra zilian cities (and the less developed world as a whole) is the stark contrast between rich and poor, to the point where one can talk about a dual built environment – one formal and legal, the other self produced, informal, and illegal. In Sao Paulo, these precarious zones are epit omized in peripheral favelas or shantytowns. Arguably disconnected from global ﬂows, favelas are very much locally produced and consumed. However, the people who live there are frequently displaced by global forces, especially with regard to agricultural reforms that have pushed farmers all over the less developed world into cities. They are part of the informal and irregular spaces of the city, and frequently built on steep slopes, river banks, and swamps. There are now over 12 000 favelas in Sao Paulo. At the opposite end of the global and class spectrum, self proclaimed ‘global investment zones’ are also emerging, essentially planned edge cities that re create (and replace) the original CBD, but with more control, less congestion and danger, and designed ex pressly as head ofﬁce space for multinational corpor ations. As a result, Sao Paulo increasingly suffers from the same intense multicenteredness and sprawl that one sees in North American cities, and with the same nega tive consequences for social cohesion. The image here (Figure 4) shows the gleaming skyscrapers of the World Trade Center de Sao Paulo (WTCSP), a business com plex complemented by a Hilton Hotel, convention center, and exclusive shopping that is intensely connected to the rest of the world but very much disconnected from its neighboring favela, shown here in juxtaposition.

Figure 4 World Trade Center de Sao Paulo (background) Jardim Edith favela (foreground), 2006.

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Just as the corporate world has sought refuge from the core of the city, so increasingly have the wealthy, par ticularly in reaction to high crime rates and the perceived lack of spatial separation between the classes. In the most extreme case, an entire gated city has been constructed (Alphaville) that contains homes for 32 000 residents, 1400 businesses, several shopping centers and parks, a private university, and a new Quality Suites hotel. Alphaville is an expression of the increasing concen tration and self segregation of wealth and the increas ingly divergent lifestyles of urban society under the inﬂuence of globalization. The people who live there are consciously following a globalized lifestyle, mimicking a North American privatized and suburbanized approach to everyday life that is not so different from a place like Southern California. Further, the exclusive control of these spaces by private capital can be interpreted as an integral part of development patterns, characterized by de regulation and ﬂexibility, that have emerged in Latin America in the face of reduced state spending. For those in the middle and upper classes who have not ﬂed to gated communities, the alternative is to reside in gated condominium towers or, like Los Angeles, take the matter of protection into their own hands. Similar levels of fortiﬁcation, fear, and violence are found in the most unequal societies, particularly in places such as Argen tina, Venezuela, and South Africa, as well as appearing in places with worrisome rises in inequality, such as Russia, Indonesia, and Trinidad and Tobago. In some of these cases, the signiﬁcant presence of oil revenue has inevit ably sharply widened inequality.

Current Approaches to Inequality in Human Geography In sum, geographers have been examining the spatial implications of inequality since the 1970s, emerging out of the foundational subﬁelds of Marxist urban political economy and welfare geography. By the 1980s, geo graphical interest in inequality had ebbed signiﬁcantly, only to be reawakened in the 1990s. This reawakening was spurred on by the emergence of globalized inequality and its particularly urban manifestations, namely the rise of income polarization and concentrated poverty. In both of these cases, geography was deeply implicated in the divergent, unequal fates of various urban populations. There was also the sense that the state – whether in the more or less developed worlds – was more bent on containing and magnifying, rather than alleviating, growing urban inequality. At present, geographers are continuing to deepen their interest in issues of economic inequality, particularly as they overlap with major social demarcators such as race and gender. Interest in economic inequality has also

widened to include critical geographers of all stripes, not just those inﬂuenced by Marxist political economy. The study of inequality is now a fundamental component of critical geography, and approaches include qualitative, case study and even some applied, policy oriented and mixed method/quantitative research. Geographers have grown more comfortable in their role of social critics in matters of inequality, and as such topics range widely. There is continuing work on how neoliberalism is creating in creasingly unequal and disparate geographies, to the point where it is now up to individuals to purchase/appropriate their own welfare services, the so called ‘DIY welfare state’. Geographers also appreciate that growing inequality is not necessarily an inevitable outcome of present trends. For instance, geographers are articulating Henri Lefebvre’s utopian concept of the ‘‘rights to the city’’ to conceptualize strategies to address urban inequality. In this concept, the goal is for all citizens to be able to forge urban life in a mutually beneﬁcial way. Rights to the city can also help frame resistance to oppressive state mediations of in equalities. At the very least, the resurgence in interest in inequality and social justice among geographers promotes a sense that even if full equality is difﬁcult to achieve, providing the greatest beneﬁt for the most disadvantaged segments of society is better than nothing. The current tendency to invariably castigate the state for magnifying inequality is also being slowly unpacked. It is perhaps not too late to give up on the state’s capacity or even willingness in ameliorating the worst inequalities. For instance, the current mayors of the two largest (and most unequal) cities in the United States – New York City and Los Angeles – have been pushing for more equitable urban policies that run against the neoliber alized trend, in terms of affordable housing, the homeless, recent immigrants, and living wage concerns. Indeed, there is probably more ambivalence regarding extreme inequality than outright state punitiveness. More to the point, much of the work being done now to manage the extremes of inequality is in the hands of voluntary sector agencies, many of which focus on providing genuine help to the have nots, even if the sector rarely questions the larger structural conditions that perpetuate inequality. In many European nations, the welfare state and unions remain vital forces in the face of rampant neoliberalism, ensuring that the gaps do not grow too wide. See also: Equity; Modiﬁable Areal Unit Problem; Poverty; Social Justice, Urban; Uneven Development; Uneven Regional Development; Welfare Geography.

Further Reading Badcock, B. (1984). Unfairly structured cities. London: Blackwell. Beaverstock, J., Hubbard, P. and Short, J. R. (2004). Getting away with it? Exposing the geographies of the super rich. Geoforum 35, 401 407.

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Caldeira, T. (2000). City of walls: Crime, segregation and citizenship in Sao Paulo. Berkeley: University of California Press. Chakravorty, S. (2006). Fragments of inequality: Social, spatial and evolutionary analyses of income distribution. New York: Routledge. Coates, B., Johnston, R. J. and Knox, P. (1977). Geography and inequality. London: Oxford University Press. Davis, M. (1990). City of quartz. New York: Vintage Press. Davis, M. (2006). Planet of slums. London: Verso. DeVerteuil, G. (2006). The local state and homeless shelters: Beyond revanchism? Cities 23, 109 120. Gregory, I., Dorling, D. and Southall, H. (2001). A century of inequality in England and Wales using standardized geographical units. Area 33, 297 311. Harvey, D. (1973). Social justice and the city. London: Edward Arnold. Kodras, J. (1997). The changing map of American poverty in an era of economic restructuring and political realignment. Economic Geography 73, 67 93. Massey, D. S. (1996). The age of extremes: Concentrated afﬂuence and poverty in the twenty ﬁrst century. Demography 33, 395 412. Sassen, S. (2001). The global city: New York, London and Tokyo (2nd ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Smith, D. M. (1987). Geography, inequality and society. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Smith, D. M. (1994). Geography and social justice. London: Blackwell. Smith, D. M. (2000). Moral progress in human geography: Transcending the place of good fortune. Progress in Human Geography 24, 1 18.

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Soja, E. (2000). Postmetropolis: Critical studies of cities and regions. London: Blackwell. Wacquant, L. (1999). Urban marginality in the coming millennium. Urban Studies 36, 1639 1647. Wilson, J. (1987). The truly disadvantaged: The inner city, the underclass, and public policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Wolch, J. and Dear, M. (1993). Malign neglect: Homelessness in an American city. San Francisco: Jossey Bass Publishers.

Relevant Websites http://www.inequality.org America’s Growing Economic Divide Resources for Journalists, Teachers, Policymakers, Citizens. http://www.worldbank.org Inequality Around the World, World Bank. http://www.ucatlas.ucsc.edu The UC Atlas of Global Inequality. http://www.ucl.ac.uk Understanding Slums, London’s Global University. http://www.wider.unu.edu WIDER: The World Income Inequality Database.

Informal Sector A. G. Aguilar, Universidad Nacional Auto´noma de Me´xico, Mexico City, Mexico E. P. Campuzano, Instituto Polite´cnico Nacional, Mexico City, Mexico & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Developing Countries The developing countries are those characterized by their low standard of living, poor infrastructure, and generally nonindustrialized. Other common used terms to describe this group include lessdeveloped countries, Third World countries, or nonindustrialized countries.

Introduction For many years, the informal sector has been a key issue in the literature on economic development, principally in developing countries, and has been a research topic in several disciplines such as geography, anthropology, sociology, and economics. These disciplines have pointed out the importance of studying this complex phenomenon that includes activities as diverse as traditional agri culture, livestock and ﬁsheries, retail, street vendors, home based workers and home production, small work shops, and bricklaying, and even some illegal activities such as the drug trade. Even with a vast body of literature on the theme, the conceptualization of informality is confused due to the lack of theoretical frameworks and appropriate empirical data. The problem of conceptual ization is more common than one might expect and is illustrated by the quantity of adjectives and nouns used to describe the informal sector, such as black, underground, hidden, shadow, clandestine, illegal, unregulated, precar ious, invisible, nonofﬁcial, subterranean, etc.; the nouns used include (informal) economy, sector, activities, and employment/work/jobs. Every characterization de pends on the goals, context and theoretical background of the research. In spite of its fuzzy nature and uses, almost all scholars agree that informality is an important phe nomenon because of its economic and social effects. Traditionally, the informal sector has been seen as a Third World problem, but for some years, these kinds of problems have increased in the developed world and in the transition countries. Recent evidence in developed countries has shown a growth in the informal economy and labor market, while the transformation of the eco nomic model of the ex socialist countries has been accompanied by a rapid rise of the informal economy – including illegal activities. Globalization has brought new forms of production, which include new forms of regulation (or de regulation), new types of industrial processes of organization, and the

446

growth of the tertiary sector. These critical changes have encouraged the utilization of unskilled workers, small size enterprises, and family workers in developing countries. Meanwhile, larger cities in the developed world are wit nessing the growth of part time jobs, and the polarization of their labor market. Thus, in different ways, global ization has generated new types of informal jobs and ac tivities (Table 1).

Conceptions and Measures of the Informal Sector Deﬁning the Informal Sector Characterized by its vagueness, the concept of the in formal sector has been used in different ways, contexts, and for different goals: interpretations range from sur vival activities to illegal procedures. We can distinguish two main strands in the development of the concept: the earlier views and the recent ones. Keith Hart in 1973 described formal income oppor tunities as salaried jobs and informal ones as self employment. This characterization was adopted by the International Labour Ofﬁce (ILO) in a mission in Kenya, Africa. In a study in this country, informal employment was conceptualized as labor intensive production, family owned, small scale operations, low entry barriers to entrepreneurship, and unregulated competitive markets. Following this study, the earlier conceptualizations in the informal sector saw it as encompassing marginal ac tivities which are unregulated and unregistered. These activities include unreported income from the pro duction or trade of legal goods and/or services, either from monetary or from barter transactions. In most of the cases, they comprise small scale production, semilegal, low productivity, and family based production. Recent conceptualizations of the term deﬁne the in formal sector as an important aspect of the economic and social dynamics of any country, but especially in less developed and in transition ones. They include issues like tax evasion (both direct and indirect), social security fraud, and the avoidance of labor legislation. In one strand of the new conceptualizations, the central char acteristic of the sector is the role played by the small entrepreneurs in the economic transformation of their situation and the opportunities created by these actors, including the positive impact on the decrease of unemployment; whereas in other conceptualizations, the informal sector plays a functional role in the

Informal Sector Table 1

Continued

Country

Year

Urban/ rural

Colombia Costa Rica

2000 2000

Chile Ecuador Nicaragua Paraguay Peru

1997 1997 2000 1999 1999

Uruguay Venezuela Thailand

2000 1997 2000

3.7 10.2 15

Coˆte d’Ivoire Gambia Bangladesh Indonesia

1996 1993 1993 1999

46 57.3 50.6 86.9 78.5 93.4 57.5 71

Iran,Is.Rep. Myanmar Croatia Poland

1996 1996 1997 1998

Urban Urban Rural Urban Urban Urban Urban Urban Rural Urban Urban Urban Rural Urban Urban Urban Urban Rural Urban Urban Urban Urban Rural

Table 1 Urban and Rural Informal Employment (Absolute and Percentage of the Total Work Force) by Country Country

Year

Urban/ rural

Numbers in 1000s Total

Informal sector (harmonized deﬁnition) Ethiopia 1999 Urban 1118.5 Rural 2137.7 Peru 1999 Urban 3606.1 Georgia 1999 Urban 39 Rural 13.5 India 2000 Urban 29 680 Rural 35 880 Latvia Urban 95.4 Rural 30.6 Russian 1999 Urban 2228 Federation Rural 560 Turkey 2000 Urban 1035 Rural 388 Informal sector Benin Cameroon Ethiopia

(national 1999 1993 1999

Ghana

1997

Madagascar Mali

1995 1996

Niger South Africa

1995 1999

Tanzania Zimbabwe Brazil Mexico

1995 1993 1997 1999

Georgia

1999

India

2000

Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan

1996 1999

Nepal

1999

Pakistan

1997

Philippines Latvia

1995 1999

Lithuania

1997 2000

Russian Federation

2001

Turkey

2000

Ukraine

1997

Percent of total employment Total 49.2 50.7 53.8 5.6 1.3 38.1 55 13.7 18.1 4.5

deﬁnition) Urban 275.5 Urban 119 Urban 1149.5 Rural 3665.3 Urban Rural Urban 239 Urban 370.6 Rural 805.5 Urban 302.6 Urban 1549 Rural 1157 Urban 345.9 Urban 154.1 Urban 12 870.4 Urban 7448.5 Rural 1693 Urban 73.4 Rural 29.9 Urban 39 970 Rural 39 740 Urban 962.7 Urban 139 Rural 55.1 Urban 375 Rural 1282 Urban Rural Urban 539.3 Urban 127.2 Rural 30.6 Urban 93 Urban 7.8 Rural 193.8 Urban 4525

27.3 29.7 47.2 14.2 3.1 51.3 61 17.3 29.4 18 64.8 76.2 61.2 68.2 17.3 18.2 18.1 8.5 41.3 74.2 9.2

Rural Urban Rural Urban

23.8 9 13.2 4.9

3654 962.8 356.8 755.9

Small or micro enterprises (national deﬁnition) Senegal 1996 Urban 665 Uganda 1993 Urban 654.9 Rural 11 452 Argentina 2000 Urban 3067.5 Bolivia 1999 Urban 1296.3

21.3 37.4 67

83.7 40.6 64.3

Numbers in 1000s Total 3913 132.5 116.4 1368.4 1223.6 305.1 554.7 4388.5 3579.7 3698 3272.3 20 159.7 414.2 100.7 197.5 12 728.3 42 966.7 844.2 1681.5 61.6 720 711

447

Percent of total employment Total 60.9 20.2 17.6 30.3 40 54.7 45.9 62.8 88.1 29.7 46.3 47.1 77.4 52.7 72.4 10 39.4 76.1 17.9 54.2 6.2 7.6 11.6

Source: International Labour Organization.

development and reproduction of capitalism by ﬂex ibilization of work, and the reduction of wages. Also, it is recognized that there is not a clear dividing line between formal and informal activities. Measuring the Informal Sector As a result of the lack of conceptual consistency, meas uring the informal sector has been a difﬁcult task. Broadly speaking, we can ﬁnd two ways of measuring the sector: direct and indirect. The ﬁrst one is used more in anthropological and sociological studies, because it im plies extensive ﬁeld work and its principal goal is to determine the importance of the informal labor market. The second one is more used in socioeconomic studies and international comparisons. Direct approaches

Household surveys have become an important source of information on the informal sector. In this kind of survey the key elements are the characteristics of the people engaged in informal sector activities, the participation of women and child labor, the characteristics of the households, and the survival strategies. This kind of measuring method is widespread. Business surveys are really important in determining the characteristics of the enterprises involved in these kinds of activities. The principal points of inquiry are the number and type of workers, the nature of economic

448

Informal Sector

capital used, and the survival strategies of small estab lishments. In this category we can include the surveys taken by ﬁscal authorities. There are few examples of household–enterprise surveys. They try to understand the relationship between entrepreneurial and household strategies and how one shapes the other, principally in less developed countries. Indirect approaches

Despite the complex methods to measure the informal sector, one of the most used is the analysis of discrepancies between national expenditures and income statistics – residual GDP. Brieﬂy, this consists in determining how much GDP is produced and how much money is really expended. The difference represents the shadow economy. In labor terms, the difference between the ofﬁcial and actual labor force, i.e., the residual labor force, is assumed to be working in the informal sector. The formal labor force can be measured using ﬁscal records or social se curity records. The difference is assumed to be informal.

Labor Markets, Growth, Urbanization, and the Informal Sector in Developed and Developing Countries Special attention has been paid to the informal sector in developing countries. Currently, the main conceptions of the sector/activities are related to the African, Latin American, and Asian contexts. The concept, at the beginning, stated the differential access to the urban labor markets in Africa and was characterized by low product ivity, small enterprises, and self employment. In the most recent views, informality is conceptualized as an oppor tunity to challenge the unequal distribution of poverty. In developed countries the phenomenon has not been studied much, principally due to its small size; however,

there is evidence of its growth. As opposed to the studies in developing countries, the principal focus in developed ones is the macroeconomic impact of these activities and state regulations. Nevertheless, the macroeconomic indicators do not necessarily show an increase in the informal sector in both developed and developing countries. There are other ways to identify these activities, for example, labor data. Studies on global cities reveal a polarization in the labor markets. In global cities, the growth of services creates not only high level employment, but also less qualiﬁed jobs. While the former are taken by highly educated and skilled people, the unskilled jobs are taken by recent immigrants, the poorly educated, and mar ginalized populations. Contrary to common thinking, there is evidence that educated and skilled people also engage in informal ac tivities, mainly due to tax reasons and the desire for economic freedom. In the following section some empirical evidence is presented to appreciate what is happening with infor mality nowadays. Current Patterns of Informal Sector Activity In recent years, world agencies have shown a real interest in determining what informality is and how to measure it. There is no consensus yet, but some institutions such as the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the ILO have reported on the situation. In this section we present an overview of informal sector trends. We choose the GNP, published by WB, and labor market information, published by ILO, to present the current situation in the world. In Figures 1 and 2, we can see the importance of the informal sector for less developed countries. While the Organization for Economic Co operation and Development

12.00 OECD 10.00

Formal_log

Middle East and North Africa 8.00

Europe and Central Asia Latin America and Caribbean

East Asia and Pacific

6.00

South Asia

Sub-Saharan Africa

4.00 2.00

y = −0.1077x + 11.632 R 2 = 0.6461

0.00 10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Informal sector

Figure 1 General income per capita and share of informal sector (% GDP). Source: Aguilar and Perez and data from the World Bank and the International Labour Organization.

Informal Sector

449

Formal_log

12.00 11.00 10.00 9.00 8.00 7.00 6.00 5.00

y = −2.3164x + 15.832 R 2 = 0.4667

4.00 3.00 2.00 2.00

2.50

3.00

3.50

4.00

4.50

Informal_log

Figure 2 Income per capita and informal sector (% GNP). Source: Aguilar and Perez with data from the World Bank database and the International Labour Organization.

(OECD) countries have the higher per capita income and the lower share of informal economy in the total GNP, Asia, Latin America, and sub Saharan Africa countries have lower income per capita and a higher share of informal sector in their GNP (Figure 1). It seems that the higher the income, the lower the contribution of informal sector in the economy (R2 ¼ 0.692). Nevertheless, if we see the same graph at the national level, even when the contribution of the informal sector in developing countries is higher, the relationship is weak (R2 ¼ 0.4667). This means that there are important local factors at play in the shaping of the informal sector. The informal sector is not the same in developed, developing, and in transition countries. Every country has particularities that encourage/discourage informal activities. Africa

The size of the informal economy in sub Saharan Africa was 42.2% in 2000. In countries like Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, the informal sector contributes more than 50% of the total GDP. In South Africa the share of the informal sector is 28.4%; meanwhile in Ethiopia, Malawi, and Mozambique it is around 40%. The informal sector makes up around 50% of the total labor market. In Ghana and Uganda more than three quarters of their urban workers are in the informal sector, whereas in Ethiopia, Cameroon, Madagascar, Nepal, Tanzania, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Gambia, this percentage varies from 50% to 75%. Latin America and the Caribbean

In Latin America and the Caribbean, the informal sector is around 40% of the total GDP. In Chile and Argentina it was less than 25% in 2000, whereas in Panama and Bolivia it represented around 65%. In the other coun tries, the share of the informal economy was between 25% and 60% of the GDP. In terms of the labor market in Brazil, Mexico, Ecua dor, Costa Rica, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay, between 25% and 40% of their urban labor workers were engaged

in the informal economy. In Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Venezuela, the share of the urban informal employment represented more than 40%. Asia and Paciﬁc

In Asia and Paciﬁc, the share of the informal economy was around 28% in the year 1999–2000. In Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Philippines, this percentage was higher than 40% and in China and Singapore this was lower than 15%. OECD

In the OECD the share of the informal economy was around 17.4% in the year 1999–2000. In Switzerland and USA, this percentage was around 8.8%; meanwhile in Portugal, Spain, Belgium, Italy, Korea, and Greece it was higher than 20% but lower than 29%. In the other countries, the share of the informal economy represented 10–20% of the total GDP. Central European and Middle Asian Countries

In the Central European and Middle Asian countries, the average of the informal economy was 37.7% in the year 1999–2000. The percentage of the informal sector in Azerbaijan and Georgia was 60.6% and 67.3%, respect ively; in Serbia and Montenegro, Poland, Slovenia, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovak Republic, this percentage was between 19% and 30%. In the other countries, the share of the informal economy represents more than 25% and less than 50%. For none of the countries the percentage of the urban informal workers surpasses 40% of total urban employment. Lithuania, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Kazakhstan, and the Russian Federation have the larger percentages.

Approaches to the Informal Sector It is clear that there is no polished theory on the informal sector, but some scholars have pointed out that there are

450

Informal Sector

three main approaches: dualistic, structural, and legalistic or institutionalist. The ‘dualistic’ view deﬁnes the informal sector as marginal or separated from the formal one. The sector is a niche for poor people in periods of crisis and its per sistence is due to the lack of sufﬁcient modern labor market opportunities, the faster rate of growth of popu lation in relation to job opportunities, or poor economic growth. ‘Structuralism’ sees the informal sector as subordinate to the formal one. In this perspective, the informal sector plays a very important role in the development of cap italism via the reduction of labor and input costs. The informal sector provides cheaper labor and input to formal enterprises allowing for the improvement of competitiveness of the latter. From Milton Santos’ point of view, there are two main circuits in the economy of developing countries: an ‘upper circuit’ and a ‘lower circuit’. The ﬁrst one represents the modern economy, is commonly high tech, and consequently has a sophisti cated system of production and commerce. On the other hand, the ower circuit is characterized by its small scale, the poor use of technology, and the intensive use of labor. Contrary to the dualistic view, for structuralists – including Milton Santos – the informal sector is not marginal or backward but it is part of capitalism, because the upper circuit dominates and requires the lower cir cuit to reproduce itself. The ‘legalist’, or ‘institutionalist’, view sees the in formal sector as micro entrepreneur’s response to the state’s over regulation and the lack of clear property rights. For Hernando de Soto – one of the main theorists of this perspective – the main factor in the growth of the sector is the role played by the state, which does not allow the micro or small entrepreneurs to develop their economic potential. These actors prefer to operate out side the regulations to reduce costs, time, and efforts instead of following the complex system of the state’s regulations which increases costs and crushes the ‘entrepreneurial spirit’. Although there is no reﬁned theory on informality, there are many recurrent themes. In the next section, the most common are presented. Principal Themes In this section our objective is to present a taxonomy of the themes that have been related to the informal sector and appear more frequently in the specialized literature. The division is not static but actually is more complex than we present here; many factors are related to each other in different ways. The section divides themes into three main categories: economic, insti tutional, and social. The ﬁrst two have received more attention, whereas the latter one is relatively new. In

different ways every vision uses almost all of the factors enumerated below. Economic themes

Settlement type has been shown to have a strong rela tionship with the informal sector. In fact, where the in formal sector is conceptualized as including waged employment, cities are more likely to have large amounts of workers in the informal sector. Developing countries with large cities have a large quantity of informal workers due to concentration of the labor markets, large amounts of rural out migration, and lack of opportunities in the formal labor market. In addition, urban informality in cludes a vast diversity of activities and jobs: from craft production or street commerce to companies linked to large transnational companies. Therefore, it is in the cities where the informal sector is more complex and palpable. Urban labor markets have received much more at tention than rural ones. As the informal sector has been conceptualized as an urban employment problem, the main contributions have emerged from this per spective. The increase of unemployment due to the high rates of rural–urban migration, the lack (or decrease) of social beneﬁts, underemployment, subminimum wages, and the presence of unregulated segments of the labor market have been identiﬁed as the main contributors to the informal sector. Poor people, in urban scenarios are more likely to be involved in nonformal activities because they cannot access the modern sector of the economy. Labor markets have been linked to poverty, princi pally in developing countries. One of the most inﬂuential themes is related to the relationship between national economic size and growth and the informal sector. From this point of the view, greater the size and growth of an economy, the less likely it is that people will engage in informal activities. This kind of vision was popular at the beginning of theorization on the informal sector and nowadays it is part of more complex explanations. It is recognized that the rate of growth of one economy is important but does not explain the entire problem. The size of one economy is related to the number of qualiﬁed workers, the availability of credit, and the number of small , medium , and large size enterprises. As we have seen, all these factors encourage/inhibit the growth of the informal sector. Both traditional and contemporary conceptions rec ognize that the size of the ﬁrm is intimately related to the informal sector. Micro and small size enterprises are more likely to engage in the informal sector due to their reduced capital, their incapacity to pay taxes, their ﬂexibility, and greater opportunities to escape state controls. The larger the ﬁrm, the lower the possibility of that ﬁrm being involved in informal activities because it

Informal Sector

has enough resources to access credit, a qualiﬁed labor force, and to pay taxes. Furthermore, the industrial structure is also important in the growth of the informal sector. In this sense, the relations between industrial enterprises and the pro ductive chains encourage the growth of informal sector by the de concentration of processes, subcontracting, ﬂexibilization, or the combination of two or more of these phenomena. In the period of late capitalism, globalization and industrial restructuring have promoted the increase of informal activities through different forms of subcon tracting. Generally, large ﬁrms in the developed world subcontract medium and small enterprises in the de veloping world and in the transition countries to produce goods and services. From large companies to home workers and home production there is a complex chain of inter mediaries, contracts (not all legal), and forms of production. At the end of the chain, there are families, small towns, or small ﬁrms that are unregulated by labor laws. In the developed world, the de concentration of production and the seeking of more efﬁcient production methods of production have promoted the increase of the informal sector. Nowadays, practices like outsourcing (buying manufactured products instead of producing them) and subcontracting are common; the result is an increase of the total number of part time jobs and the deterioration of working conditions. Institutional themes

Generally, the informal sector has been seen as consisting of widely unregulated or unregistered activities. In this case, the principal component is related to the role of the state, state agencies, and the avoidance of many rules. State regulations are the most utilized issue related to the informal sector. In fact, for many scholars the informal sector could not be deﬁned without its counterpart: the state. The state through legislation and regulations deﬁnes what informal activity is and what it is not, and thus its existence; whereas for others, the excessive regulations encourage the growth of the informal sector. Clearly, nowadays, there is a trend to de regulate many markets, including labor ones. Trying to attract Foreign Direct In vestment (FDI), many national states are determined to reduce or cut off many labor rights, such as pensions and social care, and to allow subcontracting or to encourage part time jobs and small scale production. This view has been supported by multilateral organizations such as the IMF and the WB and has been followed by almost all countries. The argument is more or less clear: the tax system is linked to the growth of the informal sector. The increase of tax burdens encourages the increase of the informal sector, whereas from the point of view of some institu tionalists there is not only the tax burden but the increase

451

of the tax system’s complexity and the excessive regu lation over labor markets, licensing requirements, and right to property that de incentivize productivity in creases of productivity. Stronger and more complex le gislation is important in the existence of the sector. Hence, the informal sector is the response of economic actors to the over regulation by the state. For example, in some economic literature the increase of the tax burden inﬂuences the growth of the informal sector due to the differential costs of employing or being employed with out taxes. The incentive to avoid taxes is reinforced by the fact that even when many companies or people are engaged in informal activities, they are not excluded from public goods or basic infrastructure. On the other hand, for some institutionalists, the informal sector is a reaction to the inefﬁciencies in public sector service provision. It has been recognized that if economic actors do not have enough incentives in terms of (cheaper) provision of public services, they are encouraged to pursue other routes, such as the informal sector. In many cases, state policies tolerate or even promote informal activities at different scales. In developing countries, governments have given incentives to en courage the development of small ﬁrms (mostly informal) to decrease unemployment. This situation is common in countries that went through structural adjustment in the 1980s and 1990s. In many countries, the informal sector has been seen as a reaction to the labor unions in two ways: employers do not want their employees to be unionized and, on the other hand, unions, principally in developing countries, do not have enough credibility. Hence, there are few barriers to the informalization of the workforce. In developed countries, immigrants, especially illegal ones, are more involved in informal activities. As they do not have permission to work, they prefer to avoid state regulations by working in small and unregulated businesses. In many developing countries, the informal sector is a reaction to the lack of conﬁdence in state institutions. In these terms, the state is seen as weak and untrustworthy, so the increase of the informal sector is only a part of the lack of conﬁdence in state rules, institutions, or legisla tions. Corruption creates the problem that only a few actors have access to the formal market. The creation of special rules (legal or not) that are on the side of these groups encourages the informal sector in two ways. On the one hand, the protected groups shape the market according to their interests, and, on the other hand, vulnerable groups unleash their energies to avoid these rules, even in the informal sector. In fact, state regu lations support the existence of the informal sector. Work in the informal sector can be an option to circumvent the rules imposed by some unions, such as forbidding certain processes and forms of labor. Also, the implicit high cost

452

Informal Sector

of unionization promotes the move of enterprises and workers toward the informal sector. Social themes

The informal sector is shaped not only by economic and institutional processes, but also by social ones. Since the 1980s, many authors have pointed out the importance of social networks, gender, and local cultures in the growth and relevance of the sector. Generally, it has been assumed that women are more likely to be involved in the informal sector than men. The informal sector allows them to work fewer hours and combine their income generating activities with domestic household tasks. Also, women usually take this kind of job as a response to a reduction in household income. The informal sector is more likely to be accepted in some places than others. This issue has been seen as a reﬂection local and regional traditions. In this case, it is not just that the informal sector is viewed as normal in one place, but that there is a completely history of the labor markets and their social and institutional regulations. Some scholars have found that social networks, espe cially those that are dense, are an important factor in promoting the informal sector. These networks are im portant in at least two senses. First, an easy way to get into the informal sector is to turn to a friend or acquaintance. The spread of the sector generally depends on the social relations between persons in a speciﬁc locality. Second, the informal sector requires a communal sense of social participation in order to avoid state regulations. Many informal workers, in developed and developing countries, state that one of the principal factors that drives them into the sector is the desire for autonomy and ﬂexibility in their work. They ﬁnd the informal sector more ﬂexible and autonomous than the formal one; hence they have more freedom to do their own business, to establish their schedule, and to combine their work with other activities.

Remarks and Conclusions Both the informal economy and informal labor market are special subjects in the ﬁeld of geography, not only as a speciﬁc topic but as an area of action. World statistics show the importance of the sector, in both developed and in developing (or transition) countries. Geography can play a very important role in the conceptualization and the determination of policies. The conceptualization of informality is one of the biggest issues. Despite their divergences, as presented here, many approaches are relatively close to each other; therefore, the next step is to develop a global and com prehensible conceptualization for the understanding of a very complex phenomenon.

Recent evidence has shown that informality grows as a response to the deterioration of living conditions both in the developed and in the developing world and the transformation of global industrial processes. However, there is a problem still: the analysis of the policies. Geography in this ﬁeld can contribute in many ways: from the study of patterns of localization of informal activities to the analysis of the policies that promote the growth of the informal sector. See also: Capital and Space; Dependency; Development I; Development II; Economic Crises; Economies, Alternative; Economies, Borderland; Economy, Informal; Global Commodity Chains; Labor Flexibility; Labor Markets, Regional; Neoliberal Economic Strategies; Urbanization; World/Global Cities.

Further Reading Aguilar, A. G. (1997). The urban labour market in Mexico: Global change, informality, and social polarization. Urban Geography 18, 106 134. Daniels, P. W. (2002). Urban challenges: The formal and informal economies in mega cities. Cities 21, 501 511. De Soto, H. (1989). The other path. The Invisible Revolution in the Third World. New York: Harper & Row. Gerxhani, K. (2004). The informal sector in developed and less developed countries: A literature survey. Public Choice 120, 267 300. ILO (2005). World Employment Report, 2004 05. Employment, Productivity and Poverty Reduction. Geneva: ILO. Laguerre, M. S. (1994). The Informal City. New York: St. Martin’s. Mead, D. C. (1996). The informal sector elephant. World Development 24, 1611 1619. OECD (2002). Measuring the Non Observed Economy. A handbook. Paris: OECD. Portes, A. (1995). En torno a la informalidad; ensayos sobre teorı´a y medicio´n de la economı´a no regulada (On informality; essays on theory and measurement of the unregulated economy). Mexico City: FLACSO Miguel Angel Porru´a. Portes, A. (2004). La Economı´a Informal (The Informal Economy). Santiago de Chile: CEPAL. Portes, A., Castells, M. and Benton, L. (1989). The Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less Developed Countries. Baltimore: John Hopkins. Santos, M. (1979). The shared space. The Two Circuits of the Urban Economy in Underdeveloped Countries. London: Methuen. Scheider, F. and Enste, D. H. (2000). Shadow economy: Size, causes, and consequences. Journal of Economic Literature 38, 77 114. Williams, C. and Windebank, J. (1998). Informal Employment in the Advanced Economies. London: Routledge.

Relevant Websites http://www.ilo.org International Labour Organization. http://www.imf.org International Monetary Fund. http://www.unescap.org United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Paciﬁc. http://www.escwa.org.lb United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia.

Informal Sector

http://www.uneca.org United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. http://www.unece.org United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.

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http://www.eclac.org United Nations Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean. http://www.worldbank.org World Bank.

Informalization D. Vaiou, National Technical University of Athens, Athens, Greece & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The informal sector/economy/activities, after a long standing association with Third World development, has gained currency in the industrialized world as well, particularly since the end of the 1970s. It is to this First World part of the debate that this article will focus. Informalization is proposed here as a reference to trends and processes to do with the restructuring of methods of production and, mainly, of work processes, as well as with deep transformations of the Fordist workplace and cul tures of production and work. It can be seen as an em phasis on the implications of the dramatic changes of post war development patterns – changes which modiﬁed the geography of production and work in ‘fortress rich world’ and beyond. Although these trends are worldwide, their intensity and particular content are place speciﬁc and linked to local histories of uneven development. In the mass of publications and policy documents which appeared in the 1980s and 1990s a huge variety of heterogeneous activities and processes were included under the umbrella term ‘informal’, rendering it a catchall category whose usefulness has at times been questioned. However, its use persisted since it captures, even imperfectly, trends and processes, which would otherwise be overlooked and which play an important role in urban and regional development in many places. Moreover, a new take can be recently identiﬁed, associ ated with international migration ﬂows.

Deﬁnitions and Dichotomies ‘Informalization’, as a term, aims to capture the dynamics of restructuring processes in the pursuit of a neoliberal agenda, rather than describe patterns of production and work characterized as informal. It is associated with a retreat of the state from many areas of public intervention, in the context of strategies which aim to promote market led growth in a globalizing world economy. An important component of such strategies has to do with the de regu lation of the labor market and of particular workplaces, as well as of the economy at large, along with an ideological attack on notions of collective organizing and action, all of which are considered as highly problematic rigidities of a Fordist regime. Flexibility is promoted as a remedy for crisis and stagnation and becomes a buzzword glossed over with ideas of innovation, choice, and creativity. In this context, informalization appears as a process of becoming informal. Becoming presupposes the existence of something formal: a post World War II model of

454

production, based on big ﬁrms, developed welfare sys tems, regular employment relations with full social se curity rights, and a strongly unionized workforce – all of which constitute the norm. Although this norm was time and place speciﬁc, it became a global model, vis a` vis which any other pattern of work and production organ ization ended up being considered informal, a deviation deﬁned in negative terms. The relevant literature includes not only a lot of controversy and confusion in the use of terms, but also different theoretical and disciplinary perspectives and goals – which, to a certain extent, are also reﬂected in the terms. Economy, sector, employment (or work), or ac tivities may be characterized informal (sometimes alter nating with black, irregular, underground, or shadow), while production patterns and forms of work included in the informal (as part of its deﬁnition) vary with the in tentions and perspectives of particular writers. A widely accepted and general deﬁnition comes from the Inter national Labor Organization (ILO) and, referring mainly to employment, it identiﬁes it as gainful activity without secure contracts, worker beneﬁts, and social protection; it includes both self employment in informal enterprises and paid work in informal jobs. In this rather slippery context, the informal is deﬁned in terms of a formal/informal dichotomy, which estab lishes a hierarchy: the ﬁrst part of the dichotomy is dominant, while the second is secondary, less important, deﬁned in terms of lack. By the same token, those asso ciated with the second part, with the informal, and the places where it predominates are also deﬁned as less important. However, activities/workers/places are in formal only from the point of view of debates and in terpretations which originate from, and of experiences particular to, the heartlands of Fordism. Such charac terizations are rather less helpful in understanding dif ferent histories of capitalist development. Literature originating from Northern Europe and North America initially focused on social security fraud or violation of welfare systems, for example, unemployed people on beneﬁts carrying out work without permission by the social insurance authorities, as well as the un regulated activity of small ﬁrms, self employed people, and self provisioning. Informalization, however, em phasizes more on the growing importance, mainly in cities, of the so called creative industries, of individual entrepreneurship, self steering and self promoting strat egies, of international networking, and new modes of

Informalization

work. Some of the previously considered villains are then elevated to innovative and creative agents of the new ﬂexible arrangements. Few are still interested in the dark side of such transformations: (almost) unlimited working hours, periods of nonwork (unemployment?), insecurity, and quick devaluation of knowledge and skills. By contrast, literature from many parts of Southern Europe, where the informal has been, historically, much more pervasive and embedded in local cultures, has emphasized more on the quality and conditions of work, social practices to do with coping and economic survival, tax evasion, and family involvement. Here, the limits between formal and informal are less clear, since the formal model had been only partially applied. In a con text where the productive structure is characterized by small ﬁrms and where welfare systems are weak, the di chotomies are neither self evident nor easy to support. One is rather faced with a continuum of activities ranging from purely formal to purely informal – with all inter mediate categories present. Informalization then refers both to transformations in the restricted areas of eco nomic activity and work which were formal and to the changing character and volume of informal activities. Here as well few continue to underline the dire con ditions of work and survival in the less creative and less glossy local versions of ﬂexibility and innovation.

The Speciﬁcity of Place Informalization does not take place in a vacuum, but in speciﬁc contexts of formal and place speciﬁc regulatory systems. It is therefore important to consider the his torical and spatial origins of what is called formal/in formal at any given time and place, as well as the range of informal activities and forms of work which form part of the speciﬁcity of particular places, linked as they are to their development histories. For example, traditional and modern forms of production create different demand for (informal) labor; place speciﬁc compositions of employ ment and unemployment lead particular groups of peo ple to informal activities for longer or shorter periods of time, as a ﬁrst job or in the context of multiple em ployment, while patterns of migration may bring still others to informal activities; traditions of gender relations place women and men in different power positions in formal/informal mixes of activities and work – positions which are in turn reproduced through gender divisions of labor in families and in the labor market; the particu larities of systems of regulation and of their enforcement leave room to devise ways of avoiding legislation and regulation; and relative afﬂuence of certain sections of the population and development of markets for the products contribute to further expansion of informal activities. Such processes and relations constitute the

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dynamic environments in which successive rounds of informalization may be identiﬁed, modifying what counts as formal arrangements at any given place and time. The three cases that are brieﬂy discussed below, although they cannot be considered in any way ‘representative’ or exhaustive, highlight a variety of circumstances, which determine and modify the content of infor malization.

Homeworkers in Local and Global Subcontracting Chains in Valencia Geographical literature on restructuring has pointed to the importance of subcontracting chains as a response to the problems of large factories and concentrations of workers, not only in backward or disappearing branches of production, but also in innovative industries and ﬁrms. Homeworkers, usually women, as the last ring in those chains, thus emerged as an emblematic ﬁgure of re structuring processes and informalization – a ﬁgure common, albeit hidden, in both the industrial core regions of the First World and in its peripheries. Immigrant women in the garment sweatshops of New York, local and later Chinese women homeworkers in Prato, computer assemblers in Athens, Bangladeshi women machinists or packers in the housing estates of Yorkshire, the ‘wives’ of shoemakers in the area of Valencia, in the Marche, or in central Athens, and many more, unveiled a wealth of human labor, which underlies the constitution of places whose productive structure is rather more complex than their standardized and selective representations. The area of Valencia in the South of Spain has a long development history of successfully combining export agriculture and manufacturing activities. In its pluriactive households, most men and women have some work ex perience in farming, small scale manufacturing, factory, and service work through their working lives. Household livelihoods thus derive from ﬂexible transformations and adaptations to changing circumstances. Global changes in shoe production since the end of the 1970s greatly af fected the area where there is a considerable concen tration of the sector. Local factories were taking orders from large US or North European customers, in a rela tionship of extreme dependence, which, in any case, is very common in subcontracting. In order to meet orders and tight schedules, local ﬁrms mobilized a workforce employed in the factory and a much larger one, involved in the process through putting out batches of work. Putting out was initiated by men factory workers, who took extra work to be done at home, by their wives. Through the wives’ extensive interpersonal networks of relatives, neighbors, and friends, work got distributed to a considerable number of women. Later, small workshops were also formed with one or two employees.

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The extreme ﬂexibility and adaptability of this system is well supported by an impressive volume of research in different countries and places. A key element of its effective operation is the informalization of working conditions: working hours adapted to the needs of orders, complete power of distributors and insecurity of workers, lack of contracts, social security payments, and other guarantees, and absolute ﬂexibility in mobilizing and dismissing the necessary workforce, mainly women who seldom gain the status of an industrial worker. This informalized organization of production was made still more informal when competition from low cost countries hit the sector, in the area of Valencia as elsewhere in Europe. However, while registered ﬁrms and employ ment declined, overall shoe production continued. Closing ﬁrms started operating as commercial ﬁrms and rented their machinery out to workshops, where (un documented) immigrants from Northern Africa found ways of earning an income. Migrants’ ever lower wages, reduced safety, and no beneﬁt payments contribute to yet another round of informalization and to the dynamics of local development. Selling Kastorian Furs to the Russian Nouveaux Riches International geographical literature since the early 1980s is rich with analyses of local success stories, identiﬁed in many countries and regions. Constellations of small and medium enterprises, revitalized artisanal production, re vival of untraded interdependencies, to do with local traditions of organizing production, local productive specializations, relations of trust, and so on, have become components of a new, ﬂexible, innovative model, often seen to be replacing inﬂexible and crisis ridden Fordism. Despite differences, a common denominator of most ex planations of local/spatial development patterns remains the almost exclusive emphasis on the ﬁrm and its evo lution – from large to small and medium, from rigid/ hierarchical to ﬂexible, and from paternalistic to learning. Missing from pictures of local success are the social and environmental costs, mirrored in environmental de struction, hyperexploitative working conditions, gender inequalities, law evading on many levels, and generally informal arrangements. This dark side of success is more than evident in the town of Kastoria, in Northern Greece, a geographically rather isolated town of c. 30 000 people, which is a major world center of manufacturing fur clothes from cuttings (miniscule slivers of material). Fur production is the dominant dynamic branch of the local economy, based on historical specialization, which dates back to the seven teenth century. This internationally unique specialization led Kastoria to control, in the early 1980s, 10% of fur trade, in general, worldwide. A key feature of the

productive system is its direct coincidence with the rou tines of everyday life of local people. Dense industrial relations among many small ﬁrms cut across local society, are based on family contacts and informal networks of trust, in which deals are verbal, time schedules are tight, raw material is very costly, and economic transactions are done in cash. A conspiracy of silence about the problems of the area is reproduced, along with intense conservative, petit bourgeois, and competitive attitudes, based on a continuous interweaving of enterprise, employment, and family. Spatial diffusion of small ﬁrms and the use of space as a means to consolidate and further develop such net works mark the organization of the city and its sur roundings as dominant components, positive or negative, in the productive system and in processes of social reproduction. Working in fur production is an unhealthy job, par ticularly in workshops and small ﬁrms, which try to shrink the cost of production by every possible means, including very small production space, bad lighting and ventilation, badly designed workbenches, and no safety measures for the use of toxic materials. Conditions of work at home may be somewhat better, but fur work upsets the entire household and brings home the tension and pollution of workshops. Fur workers themselves often promote putting out and engage their wives and daughters as homeworkers paid on piece rates. Women are discovered by the local productive system at times of boom and forgotten again at times of crisis. Patriarchal family structures make of them a captive and ﬂexible labor force, on which fur manufacturing depends for the more labor intensive parts of the production process. Women in the area are thus captive in a highly proﬁtable local specialization from which they have minimal beneﬁts. At the same time, to work in fur production is by no means an excuse for their other ‘duties’ as mothers, housewives, and farm workers. In the long history of fur processing in Kastoria, many ﬂuctuations in the importance and export orientation of the branch can be identiﬁed. Recent difﬁculties are in many ways linked to ecological campaigns, often violent protests, against killing living animals – which contrib uted to lower demand for fur clothes. After a short crisis at the end of the 1990s, exports of luxury fur clothes rose again to meet the demand originating from the new market of Russian nouveaux riches. This new clientele brought along highly individualized ways of selling the products and yet a new round of informalization and local adaptation. Creative Industries and the New Precariousness in Postuniﬁcation Berlin In many parts of the First World, restructuring of eco nomic activities has brought about tremendous losses of

Informalization

jobs and the spread of poverty among large groups of population. Against this bleak prospect, often a dire crisis, several remedies have been proposed and tried out, in cluding the development of knowledge intensive eco nomic activities, innovation driven restructuring, efforts to attract creative classes, and systematic place marketing, in attempts to activate mechanisms to attract investment, residents, and visitors and initiate new rounds of local economic growth. Geographic debate on these processes has been quite heated and includes a range of arguments, from sophisticated theorizations to selective focus on, and interpretations of, case studies, which are used to support the argument of a change of regime – toward something that has been called ‘soft capitalism’. In postuniﬁcation Berlin, much of the productive structure associated with traditional/Fordist industries collapsed, leading to job losses and high unemployment, particularly in the east. The reuniﬁed capital city saw in the 1990s a boom of real estate ventures, in which the local administration was also involved. An ensuing ﬁscal crisis led to cuts in a range of social services and in public support to a number of initiatives, including creative ones. At the same time, a major goal of local policy has been the promotion of a new image of the city, a breakaway of its divided past and the separate strategies followed by either of its parts for over 40 years. In this new image of a city of/for talents and tolerance, knowledge intensive indus tries (including media, design, culture, software, and life sciences) are central. The goal to become attractive as a place of living and working, for the creative classes as sociated with such industries has led, among other de velopments, to intensive gentriﬁcation of central neighborhoods in East Berlin, like Prenzlauerberg and its Silicon Alley, where clusters of new creative industries are located. Behind the gloss of knowledge and creativity, researchers have recently started to identify the agents of the new ethos, ambience and lifestyle, and their working conditions. Large numbers of young people, mainly men, are involved in a multitude of micro businesses or in self employment, which is codiﬁed as independence, entrepreneurship, and ﬂexibility. The situation in know ledge intensive industries often forces them to interact with competitors and risk losing their cutting edge in innovation. Orders are rarely regular and have to be met swiftly, by mobilizing networks of conjunctural or more permanent collaborators. Periods of excessive working hours, when leisure or personal time disappears, alternate with times of relative or absolute inactivity, thus making survival a rather precarious affair, despite artistic images and self images and allusions to trendy, easygoing lifestyles. The fragmented working lives of young aspiring men do not share the rigidities of the emblematic ﬁgure of the collective mass worker. Nor does their infor malized, ﬂexible, insecure situation verify a viable

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alternative to it, despite the rhetoric of choice, creativity, and success.

Winners and Losers The cases discussed above highlight various processes associated with informalization in different sociospatial contexts. Particular development histories provide useful threads to understand the present positioning of places, as well as why certain activities emerge, thrive, persist, transform, or decline. These histories also indicate how various processes of informalization get mobilized, both historically and actually, integrating or excluding differ ent groups of a potential workforce in a whole range of economic activities, which account for local success/ failure. Such processes seem to acquire a new intensity in the context of, and the debate around, globalization. The promised and celebrated impact of new communications technologies underlines accelerating transitions, speeding ﬂows, eliminating frictions, and eroding of borders, identities, and differences – from which particular places and social groups are expected to draw signiﬁcant beneﬁts. Less prominent in the relevant debate is the underside of such deep material and discursive trans formations, that is to say the effects on work and liveli hoods of a retreat of the state from many areas of public intervention, in particular from workplace regulation. Women, migrants, minorities, and youth are highly instrumental to these processes, a kind of natural pool for ﬂexibilization and local adaptation. For a younger gen eration of people, lifelong professional insecurity is the new norm. Continuous de and re skilling is necessary in order to remain ‘employable’ and contain the effects of precariousness in what have become highly fragmented and insecure working lives. As far as women are con cerned, welfare cuts in the name of efﬁciency, com petition, and rentability have not only removed the protective cushion of provisions, but have also increased the bulk of care work to be done within households. Hence, women, particularly from poorer social groups, who undertake such responsibilities, end up having fewer and more insecure job opportunities and a heavier bulk of unpaid work. A further round of informalization is as sociated with the post 1989 ﬂows of migrants, many of whom are undocumented and have no choice but to accept poor and insecure working conditions, thereby ﬁlling up a labor hierarchy from the bottom. Among migrants, women have become part of the restructuring of reproductive and care work and contributed to re vitalize even the job of the housemaid, for many decades vanished at least in Europe. Thus, more afﬂuent local households are in a position to transfer to women mi grants, at a low and widely affordable cost, much of the care work which the restructuring of welfare has thrusted

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Informalization

upon to them. Migrant men, on the other hand, are ab sorbed in construction, manufacturing, and agriculture, where low pay and precariousness match the demands of cost reduction and survival of many ﬁrms. Informalization, however, has moved beyond young entrants into the labor market, ‘invisible’ workers, or unpaid care; it has undermined previously regulated areas of employment and privileged groups of workers and affects highly skilled and knowledge intensive labor. The split up of permanent full time jobs and wage cuts, social allowances and social security, subcontracting and homeworking, and the proliferation of mini jobs and precarious activities – to mention only few – create many losers within landscapes of success and winning and within a discourse that celebrates the advantages of new forms of making a living. ‘Flexicurity’, a new buzzword in European Union (EU) documents, is a case in point here of a discourse that obfuscates informalization processes, which penetrates all areas of production and work but remains generally ‘hidden’ or unacknowledged. In order to fully grasp the dimensions of local success, a move beyond the ﬁrm and the entrepreneurial spirit of soft capitalism is necessary, both theoretically and em pirically. In order for the Fordist production and work organization to be destroyed, it has taken huge global and local economic restructurings. It has also taken a sweeping assault against important features of the collective mass worker. Routinized drudgery, standardization, rigidity, and de skilling have come under systematic criticism and put against choice, creativity, and ﬂexibility – all of which constitute the emerging new ‘norm’ of gainful employ ment. Seldom does one see references any more to the security and social guarantees, which were part and parcel of the conditions of work of the collective mass worker and are now deﬁned as comparative disadvantage and as distorting competition. In this context, it is crucial to shift the emphasis to the dark side of success: to the hard and deteriorating conditions of work and living, emanating

from informalization and promoted as the sole alternative for local success. See also: Fordism; Fordism, Post-Fordism and Flexible Specialization; Globalization, Economic; Informal Sector.

Further Reading Brenner, N. and Theodore, N. (eds.) (2002). Spaces of Neoliberalism: Urban Restructuring in North America and Western Europe. Oxford: Blackwell. Garcia Ramo´n, M. D. and Baylina Ferre´, M. (eds.) (2000). El Nuevo Papel de las Mujeres en el Desarollo Rural. Barcelona: Oikos tau. Kratke, S. (2002). Medienstadt. Urbane Cluster und Globale Zentren den Kulturproduktion. Opladen: Leske und Budrich. Lange, B. (2007). Die Ra¨ume der Kreativszenen. Culturpreneurs und ihre Orte in Berlin. Bielefeld: Transcriptverlag. Lipietz, A. (1996). La Socie´te´ en Sablier. Le Partage du Travail Contre la Dechirure Sociale. Paris: La De´couverte. Mingione, E. and Pugliese, E. (2002). Il Lavoro. Roma: Carocci. Paci, M. (2005). Nuovi Lavori, Nuovo Welfare. Bologna: il Mulino. Portes, A., Castells, M. and Benton, L. A. (eds.) (1989). The Informal Economy. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Roberts, B. (ed.) (1994). International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, special issue on ‘Informal economy and family strategies’, 18(1), 1 142. Vaiou, D. and Hadjimichalis, C. (1997/2003). With the Sewing Machine in the Kitchen and the Poles in the Fields. Cities, Regions and Informal Work. Athens: Exandas. Williams, C. and Windebank, J. (1998). Informal Employment in the Advanced Economies. London: Routledge. Ybarra, J. A., San Miguel, B., Hurtado, J. and Santa Maria, M. J. (2004). El Calzado en el Vianalopo´, Entre la Continuidad y la Ruptura. Alicante: IDELSA.

Relevant Websites http://www.info.worldbank.org Bank Information Center: World Bank (IBRD and IDA). http://www.uin.org.uk Union Ideas Network. http://www.eurosur.org/wide Women Action Forum for Networking.

Information Graphics A. L. Grifﬁn, University of New South Wales – ADFA, Canberra, ACT, Australia & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Brushing An interactive method for highlighting a subset of values in two or more dynamic information graphics. Cognition The mental processes involved in thinking, such as memory, attention, reasoning, and judgment. Cognitive Load The level of effort needed for a thinking and reasoning task. Focusing An interactive method for adjusting a dynamic display to ﬁlter out observations (e.g., outliers, or time points in a time series) for improving the clarity of a pattern found in the data. Hypothesis Testing A set of formal methods in statistical analysis for disproving a hypothesis. Interaction Change in a graphical display initiated by a user. Linking An interactive method for coordinating display changes in multiple information graphics that are viewed together. Preattentive Processing The rapid detection of a select set of visual properties that occurs without the viewer focusing his or her conscious attention on a visual display. Scientiﬁc Visualization Computer-based visualization of real-world, physically-based objects that cannot normally be seen by the naked eye. Semiotics The science of signs and symbols, including how meaning from signs and symbols is constructed and understood.

Introduction Information graphics are visual representations of data and information. The term ‘information graphics’ refers to a diverse collection of graphics, ranging from dia grammatic depictions of physical objects and processes to abstract representations of data that do not have an in trinsic physical interpretation. They include represen tations such as pictorial instructions, diagrams, charts, graphs, and maps, may be either static or dynamic, and are most commonly used for representing quantitative information. Figure 1 (itself an information graphic) shows a recent attempt at classifying different types of visualization methods by the purpose for which they are best suited. Within geography, researchers commonly use a combination of information graphics that can help them to understand different aspects of geographical problems.

For example, maps and animated maps can reveal spatial (and spatiotemporal) patterns while statistical graphics such as scatterplots or star plots illuminate relationships between different data variables.

The Purpose of Information Graphics: Graphics for Thinking versus Graphics for Communication Just as graphics can take a number of different forms, they can be constructed for a variety of purposes and for different individuals. One functional model of visual methods that has been used to think about different forms of visual representation compares representations using three characteristics: context of use, knowledge about patterns in the data, and level of reader interaction with the graphic (Figure 2). The context of use may range from public to private, where public uses of in formation graphics support visual communication and private uses are commonly used to support visual thinking. The level of knowledge that the graphic creator has about the dataset is related to the purpose for which the graphic is developed, ranging from exploring un known patterns and conﬁrming hypotheses to syn thesizing or presenting well understood relationships or explanations. The level of reader interaction with the data refers to the extent to which the graphics reader can alter or manipulate any of the characteristics of the graphic (e.g., colors, symbols, data variables represented, axes or scales, and viewpoints). Visual communication occurs when both the graphic designer and the graphic reader have some common, shared understanding of what the graphical marks that make up a graphic mean. The science that provides a conceptual framework for thinking about this shared understanding is called semiotics. The basic semiotic model is composed of three elements: the sign vehicle, the interpretant, and the referent (Figure 3). The sign vehicle is the carrier of meaning that acts as a translator between the graphic designer and the reader. The interpretant is the mental image or conception that the graphic reader has of what is depicted in the graphic, and the referent is the real world object or entity that is being represented in the graphic. Miscommunication can result when the graphic designer’s interpretant does not match the interpretant that the graphic reader develops from looking at the graphic. Visual thinking can be thought of as a cognitive process that produces insight by helping the graphics

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Figure 1 A periodic table of visualization methods that suggests which different information graphical forms are useful for particular goals, ranging from analyzing and communicating the structure of a dataset to capturing the key characteristics of processes. Reprinted by permission of http://www.visual-literacy.org.

reader see patterns, relationships, and anomalies in data. Because the producer and the user of information graphics in the context of visual thinking are often the same person, information graphics that are designed to support visual thinking often take a different form to those designed for visual communication (Figure 4). Because there is no need for the graphics reader to in terpret the graphical marks on the page (as s/he has designed them), it is more important for the information graphic to show a variety of perspectives on the data of interest. This is often achieved by combining different types of visual representations within a single infor mation graphic. Three main areas of research have been inﬂuential in developing knowledge on how to design graphics to support visual thinking: exploratory data analysis, information visualization, and geovisualization. The ﬁrst, exploratory data analysis, has its roots in statistics. In contrast to much statistical analysis, however, exploratory data analysis does not make a priori as sumptions about relationships in the data, as in hypoth esis testing. As such, exploratory data analysis involves attempts to identify systematic relationships between variables. Often, this approach involves using many

variables and several pattern searching techniques. A basic premise of this approach is that it is important for the graphic designer to ﬁnd the correct means of graphically presenting the data such that the graphic reader can become part of the pattern recognition pro cess (rather than relying on statistical hypothesis testing). Over time, exploratory data analysis has evolved to in clude an increased focus on interactivity, incorporating techniques such as brushing, linking, and focusing. The second, information visualization, is concerned with creating visual aids to support and enhance memory, thought, and reasoning (i.e., cognitive processes). In particular, information visualization focuses on creating computer supported, interactive visual representations of (primarily abstract) data to amplify cognition with the goal of supporting discovery, decision making, and ex planation. It places an emphasis on interaction with graphics, because manipulating these visual aids involves a weaving together of internal and external represen tations of information (i.e., the interpretant and sign ve hicle, respectively from the semiotic model in Figure 3) that enables the viewer to reason and address ‘what if ’ scenarios in a much more efﬁcient manner than s/he

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would if they had to consider and reason through the constraints of each scenario separately. The third, geovisualization, has its roots in cartog raphy, scientiﬁc visualization, and exploratory data an alysis. This area of work has also viewed visualization as a cognitive process whose goal is to produce scientiﬁc in sights and create new knowledge. A major focus of geo visualization has been not only on developing new ways of visually representing information through maps and other types of information graphics, but also on under standing differences between different types of viewers of graphics and how they are able to use the graphics to create new knowledge. Geovisualization has drawn upon perspectives from cognitive psychology in examining how factors such as experience, prior knowledge, and training affect perception, comprehension, and problem solving with maps and map based analysis environments.

A Reference Model for Creating Information Graphics Information graphics, no matter whether they are con structed to support visual communication or visual thinking, have both a designer and a reader. In some instances, such as when a scientist makes a graphic to try

to understand his or her data, the designer and the reader are the same individual. In other cases, such as when a journalist produces a graphic that supports an article s/he has written, the designer and the reader are different individuals. The efﬁcacy and efﬁciency with which in formation graphics are able to prompt understanding among their readers depends upon decisions made dur ing the design of the graphics and how these decisions interact with the capabilities of the human visual system. There are three key types of decisions that a designer makes when s/he designs information graphics: 1. how to transform data from their raw state into ordered relations (i.e., data tables); 2. how to create a visual structure for expressing the relations contained in the data tables; and 3. how to provide a particular view of that structure by modifying the characteristics of the visual structure (Figure 5).

Organizing the Data Data, however they are collected, rarely come in a form that allows direct and easy visual representation. For example, data may come as a string of values that needs to be classiﬁed and organized into a table through a

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Sign vehicle

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Figure 3 One example of the three components of the semiotic model in an information graphic. In this example, the symbol (upper portion of the diagram) acts as the sign-vehicle, or the carrier of meaning; the information graphic reader’s conception or mental image of a tree acts as the interpretant or concept (lower left); and the actual object in the real world (lower right) acts as the referent, or object of reference. Notice that different people may have different mental images of a concept. & 2005 2007. The Pennsylvania State University. All Rights Reserved. Used by Permission.

cross tabulation. Alternatively, data may consist of raw values that require a statistical operation before they can be used, such as calculating a mean or a median. The choice of how to ﬁrst structure the data and then visually structure the information graphic can be critical to the success of the graphic in aiding the reader to make sense of the data. In a well known example of mis specifying which characteristics of the data are important for the problem, engineers from NASA only consulted information graphics that showed the failure of O rings on space shuttle ﬂights structured by date, rather than by temperature, which was the ultimate cause of the O ring failure in the fatal explosion of the shuttle (Figure 6).

Choosing a Visual Structure Once the data are organized in an appropriate conﬁgur ation, the designer can decide upon a visual structure for representing the data. Although there are many ways in which the designer can match visual characteristics to data, some choices are better than others. There are two issues to consider when choosing from the many potential options: whether the nature of the visual characteristics

matches the nature of the data characteristics, and the limits and parameters of the human visual system. Characteristics of the data and graphical characteristics

Data variables can be classiﬁed as nominal (i.e., qualitative), ordinal (i.e., ranked but not quantiﬁed), or quantitative variables. Visual variables (i.e., graphical characteristics) have also been classiﬁed according to their suitability for use with nominal, ordinal, or quantitative data. Figure 7 depicts a set of nine fundamental visual variables: color hue, shape, arrangement, orientation, position in space, color value, color saturation, size, and spacing. An in appropriate matching between a visual variable and the data variable can actually make relationships and patterns in the data harder to see rather than easier (as compared to viewing the values in a table; Figure 8). The human visual system can both be exploited and act as a constraint when designing information graphics. It is therefore important for information graphics de signers to have a basic understanding of how humans process visual information. This processing can be div ided into two major steps: perception of visual stimuli

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Figure 4 Comparison of an information graphic designed for communication (left) with an example of an information graphic designed for thinking about a problem (right). Notice that the graphic designed for thinking actually uses a combination of different types of graphics to provide complementary viewpoints on the problem at hand, and that it is possible to link these diagrams to explore observations across the different representations. This particular example identiﬁes an outlier in the scatterplot and then uses the map to identify where that outlier is (Philadelphia).

Perception Human visual system

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Figure 5 A simpliﬁed model of the components of the design process for creating information graphics. There are two key types of features represented in this diagram: physical artifacts (i.e., materials used in different steps of the design process) and types of decisions. From Card, S. K., MacKinlay, J. D. and Shneiderman, B. (1999). Readings in Information Visualization. Using Vision to Think, p. 17. San Francisco, CA: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers.

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Figure 6 A comparison of an information graphic whose data were poorly structured for the task at hand (top) with a restructured information graphic that more clearly shows that launches with no O-ring damage only occurred at much higher temperatures than those experienced the day of the Columbia shuttle disaster (bottom). Adapted from the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. (1986). Washington, DC: Government Printing Ofﬁce and Tufte, E. R. (1997). Visual Explanations. Images and Quantities, Evidence and Narrative. p. 45. Cheshire, CT: Graphics Press. Reprinted with permission from Graphics Press.

(i.e., sensing visual information), and cognitive processes that interact with these stimuli and that allow the graphics reader to interpret what s/he sees. It is possible to think of perception as being the ‘looking’ component of vision, while cognition is the ‘seeing’. Visual perception

All vision requires three basic components: (1) light that is emitted from some source, typically either the Sun, a light bulb, or a computer monitor; (2) the eye, which contains millions of light sensitive cells; and (3) the brain, which interprets the light that enters the eye and makes sense of the sensed patterns of light in a part of the brain called the visual cortex. Although the human visual perceptual system is quite complex and is composed of many

subsystems, the process of sensing visual information can be generalized into two major stages: automatic processing and controlled processing. The ﬁrst stage is characterized by rapid parallel processing of information, sensing of certain kinds of information such as orientation, color, texture, movement and identifying the edges of objects, and storing information in memory in a transitory fashion. The second stage, on the other hand, is characterized by slow serial processing, the use of both short term and long term memory, and direction of attention. A look at the anatomy of the human eye can explain the roots of the two stages of visual perception (Figure 9). The retina is the portion of the eye that contains the photoreceptive cells that respond to light that enters the eye. These cells are not distributed evenly

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Figure 7 Visual variables and their suitability for representing different types of data variables (nominal, ordinal, and quantitative). This ﬁgure shows examples of each visual variable for point, line, and area symbols. Filled symbols indicate that the visual variable works well for representing that type of data. A half-ﬁlled circle indicates it may be marginally effective, while an open circle indicates a poor match between the visual variable and the data variable characteristics. & 2005 2007. The Pennsylvania State University. All Rights Reserved. Used by Permission.

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Figure 8 The color hues used in the information graphic at the top (a) are an inappropriate match between a visual variable and the characteristics of the data variable. The sine wave that is being represented in the ﬁgure is a quantitative variable, but color hue is best used for representing nominal (i.e., qualitative) information. The information graphic at the bottom (b) uses position in space as its visual variable, and is much more effective in its representation of the character of the sine wave. From Card, S. K., MacKinlay, J. D. and Shneiderman, B. (1999). Readings in Information Visualization. Using Vision to Think. San Francisco, CA: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers.

throughout the retina. There is a higher density of cone cells, which detect color, in the center of the visual ﬁeld, known as the fovea, while there is a higher density of rod cells, which respond to black and white light, in the surrounding area of the retina. The foveal area of the retina is responsible for focal vision, while the nonfoveal area is responsible for peripheral vision. Peripheral vision is particularly good at detecting movement and other changes in the visual ﬁeld, such as areas of contrast in size, intensity of light, or the color of light. Much of this information processing is preattentive, automatic, and attention shifting, as when movement across a display catches the eye of the viewer, who unconsciously tracks the moving object(s). While this preattentive surveillance of the eye’s ﬁeld of view is continually updating, a graphic reader can also shift his or her focus (i.e., attention) to speciﬁc fea tures in the display, such as text or more complicated symbols. This focused attention, effected by shifting the location of the foveola (the central part of the fovea) within the eye, allows the construction of a more detailed image due to the higher spatial resolution afforded by the higher density of cone cells in the fovea. In contrast to the image produced by the automatic preattentive

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second information design issue related to perception, if position in space is used as a visual variable in an in formation graphic, a visualization technique that uses an algorithm that causes related objects to cluster tightly in space will lead to the graphic reader seeing that set of objects as a group (and then potentially as a ﬁgure), while one that does not cause related objects to cluster tightly may make groups more difﬁcult to identify, which may be undesirable if one of the goals of the information graphic is to facilitate the identiﬁcation of commonalities be tween objects. Visual cognition

Fovea

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Figure 9 The anatomical structure of the human eye. Reproduced from MacEachren, A. M. (1995). How Maps Work. Representation, Visualization and Design. New York: Guilford Press, with permission from Guilford Press.

processing of peripheral vision, the controlled processing of focused attention is slow and serial rather than parallel. Although perceptual processes have many possible implications for the design of information graphics, two notable issues include the relationship between visual acuity and differentiating between symbols and the es tablishment of ﬁgures and the background within a graphic. Visual acuity, the size of the smallest dis criminable feature in a display, like the distribution of photoreceptive cells in the eye, varies spatially across the retina. The eye’s highest visual acuity occurs near the fovea, where the density of cells is the highest. The im plication of this for the design of information graphics is that symbols with small differences between each other will need to be perceived using the comparatively slower controlled processing of attention as small differences between symbols will not be discriminable through per ipheral vision. An example of an information graphic design that could accommodate this feature of perceptual processing might be that differences in symbols need to be exaggerated in the overall display, while on closer inspection (e.g., after zooming in), size differences could be proportionally related (in true scale) to the data values being depicted in the graphic. In the context of the

Once an image has been constructed in the brain’s visual cortex, it becomes understanding when the visual image interacts with the graphic reader’s existing knowledge. In other words, the image itself derives its meaning from its relation to other knowledge. In order for a new piece of knowledge to be generated, the graphic reader must ac cess his or her long term memory and compare know ledge that resides there with the visual image, which is itself stored in short term memory (Figure 10). This process of comparison between what is perceived and what is already known is often iterative, with the graphic reader further directing his or her visual attention to different areas of the information graphic or to additional information graphic based upon the results of his or her comparison of the visual image with knowledge stored in long term memory. It is thought that information graphics can aid in cognition because they are external to the brain, and as such are not limited to the capacity constraints of internal cognition. One such well known constraint is that short term memory can only hold 772 items at any point in time. Visual representations have a long history of serv ing as external aids to cognition, such as in writing out the sequence of operations needed to multiply two multidigit numbers together, or Mercator projection maps serving as a store of memory for calculating the shortest route between two locations. Information graphics have been suggested to improve cognition through a number of pathways. First, because they store information, they serve to increase the quan tity of information available for cognitive operations, decreasing the cognitive load because more information can be seen rather than remembered. Second, infor mation graphics are structured (rather than random) representations of information. This structure often means that related information can be grouped together in the graphic, reducing the time required to search for new information that is needed for cognitive activities such as problem solving and making comparisons. Third, this same structure can also allow graphics readers to recognize patterns, which is faster than recalling speciﬁc information from memory, and it may enhance pattern

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Figure 10 Kosslyn’s visual information-processing model. The boxes in this diagram represent three types of visual processing, while the italicized labels describe limits to types of memory or transformations between different types of memory. The plaintext labels indicate processes undertaken in different types of memory. For example, encoding is the process of moving information from short-term to long-term memory, while reorganization is the reshaping or reinterpretation of information stored in short-term memory based upon knowledge that is stored in long-term memory. Reproduced by permission of Kosslyn, S. M. (1989). Understanding charts and graphs. Applied Cognitive Psychology 3, 190, & John Wiley & Sons Limited.

identiﬁcation if the data are organized so that they en hance structural relationships. Finally, information graphics can allow readers to rely on their perceptual capabilities to make inferences more easily. For example, it is easier to infer that there is a north–south gradient in solar radiation by examining a map of solar radiation by country than it would be to examine a table that lists the radiation level for each country. In the graphic, the reader can see a progression in values from north to south that changes more or less in step with latitude. By con trast, when examining the table, the reader would have to decide how to mentally structure his or her comparison of the values, particularly if the table lists the countries alphabetically. This mental structuring, then, requires the reader to put more effort into understanding the rela tionship between values for different locations. Although using information graphics as external aids to cognition can often augment the reader’s cognitive pro cessing abilities, if not carefully designed to account for how cognitive processes operate, information graphics can actually decrease rather than increase the reader’s prod uctivity. For example, although animations might seem like a natural choice for representing processes, as they can be used to directly depict change in a system over time, if they are not interactive (i.e., they do not let the graphic reader pause or replay portions of the animation), an animation may actually hinder the graphic reader’s development of an understanding of that process if it contains so much in formation that the reader cannot remember all of the critical moments that describe the process. Deciding upon a Viewpoint Providing a particular view into an information graphic can be as simple as changing the angle from which a three dimensional scatterplot is displayed in order to minimize the concealment of one group of data obser vations by another group. Other more complicated

changes to the viewpoint include taking cross sections of volumes, providing multiple windows that can be viewed at different scales (e.g., detail and overview panes), and applying distortions that highlight relationships on a network, similar to the concept of detail and overview panes, but applied to network distances rather than spatial distances. A ﬁnal method for providing views into a graphic involves incorporating interactivity into infor mation graphics. With interactivity, readers can dynam ically change both the visual structure that are used to represent information, change the viewpoint presented in the graphic, and link multiple representations of infor mation to simultaneously provide complementary view points on the data being investigated. See also: Cartographic Animation; Color, Mapping.

Further Reading Bertin, J. (1981). Graphics and Graphic Information Processing, Berg, W. J. and Scott, P. (trans.). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Bertin, J. (1983). The Semiology of Graphics: Diagrams, Networks, Maps. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press (French edition, 1967). Card, S. K., MacKinlay, J. D. and Shneiderman, B. (1999). Readings in Information Visualization. Using Vision to Think. San Francisco, CA: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers. Chen, C. (2006). Information Visualization: Beyond the Horizon. Berlin: Springer GmbH. Harris, R. L. (2000). Information Graphics: A Comprehensive Illustrated Reference. New York: Oxford University Press. Kosslyn, S. M. (1989). Understanding charts and graphs. Applied Cognitive Psychology 3, 190. Kosslyn, S. M. (2006). Graph Design for the Eye and Mind. New York: Oxford University Press. Larkin, J. H. and Simon, H. A. (1987). Why a diagram is (sometimes) worth ten thousand words. Cognitive Science 11, 65 99. MacEachren, A. M. (1994). Visualization in modern cartography: Setting the agenda. In MacEachren, A. M. & Taylor, D. R. F. (eds.) Visualization in Modern Cartography, 6p. Oxford: Pergamon. Tufte, E. R. (1983). The Visual Display of Quantitative Information. Cheshire, CT: Graphics Press.

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Tufte, E. R. (1990). Envisioning Information. Cheshire, CT: Graphics Press. Tufte, E. R. (1997). Visual Explanations. Images and Quantities, Evidence and Narrative. Cheshire, CT: Graphics Press. Tukey, J. W. (1977). Exploratory Data Analysis. Reading: Addison Wesley Publishing. Ware, C. (2004). Information Visualization. Perception for Design (2nd edn.). San Francisco, CA: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers.

Relevant Websites http://utpjournals.metapress.com Cartographica: The International Journal for Geographic Information and Geovisualization. This is the website for an important journal in the ﬁeld of geovisualization. It publishes articles on a range of

aspects of representing, using, and communicating with geographic information. http://infoviz.pnl.gov Information Visualization at Paciﬁc Northwest National Labs: this is the research website for one of the leading groups in information visualization. The site contains links to both research papers and demonstrations of technologies developed in the lab. http://www.palgrave journals.com Information Visualization: this is the website for the ﬂagship journal in the discipline of information visualization. The journal publishes a wide array of papers that theorize information visualization, present techniques and methodologies, and evaluate the utility of information visualization techniques. http://www.infovis.net InfoVis.net: this website provides an excellent overview of resources that are available on information visualization, including a who’s who guide to important researchers, a resources page, and an electronic magazine with short articles.

Information Technology B. Parthasarathy, International Institute of Information Technology, Bangalore, India & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Custom Software Software tailor-made for customers to meet their needs efﬁciently. High-Level Programming Languages Increasingly human-like languages to communicate with computers, in contrast to communicating with zeros and ones. Microprocessor A system on a chip; or a silicon device integrating discrete circuit elements such as capacitors, resistors, and transistors, with logic and data-handling capabilities. Open Source Software Software released in the public domain for anyone to freely use, modify, and redistribute. Packaged Software A collection of informationprocessing functions for which there is a mass market. Software Bottleneck The quality and productivity lag in the development of software vis-a`-vis hardware production. Structured Programming Management of the software development process by segmenting it to permit coordination and control over teams of programmers.

Introduction Although information technology (IT) has come to be closely identiﬁed with microelectronics based computing since the mid twentieth century, it has existed ever since the means to represent information, such as language, graphics (including scripts), and number systems, were invented. Subsequently, the invention of the printing press to record information, as opposed to recording it on palm leaves, or telegraphy, to transmit information more quickly and to further distances than is possible using carrier pi geons, made information available to more people. While the invention of writing or telegraphy in earlier centuries means that microelectronics is just one more in a sequence of forces transforming IT, there are at least two reasons why this transformation is considered signiﬁcant enough to be the basis of a third industrial revolution. First, advances in microelectronics make it possible to obtain and deliver information from and to any corner of the globe, in real time, on a scale unparalleled in history. The historical relevance of such possibilities is height ened by concurrent economic and social transformations. The acceptance of economic globalization, for instance, has increased the demand for information about distant markets. Similarly, as the virtues of political democracy

are emphasized, access to information is viewed as a fundamental right. Second, IT is changing and becoming increasingly more powerful, affordable, and versatile. As a result, it is no more than a broad and fuzzy term to describe a variety of activities, ranging from issues con nected with the technology, such as computer hardware and software, to the deployment of the technology for information processing in application domains as distinct as design, cartography, and medicine. The origins of the inﬂuence of microelectronics can be traced to the invention of the transistor in December 1947 at the Bell Laboratories of American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T). The transistor is a device to amplify current, using the properties of a class of elements known as semiconductors, prominently silicon. Transistors are referred to as solid state ampliﬁers, and the ﬁeld of study devoted to them as solid state electronics, to distinguish them from the vacuum tubes that they displaced in electrical circuits. While the vacuum tube was a bulky device, the transistor was amenable to miniaturization. Since its invention, the dimensions of the transistor have fallen 10 000 fold and current transistor sizes are down to submicron scales. Thus the term microelectronics. Mass manufacture of the transistor came in 1951. In 1957, Jack Kilby of Texas Instruments and Robert Noyce, then with Fairchild Semiconductor and who later co founded Intel in 1968, integrated discrete circuit elem ents such as transistors, resistors, capacitors, and the associated wiring on a single block, or chip, of silicon to develop the ﬁrst integrated circuit (IC). By 1959, Noyce also developed the planar process to reliably manu facture ICs. Integration techniques improved rapidly and, in 1971, Intel embedded enough logic functions and data handling capabilities to produce the ﬁrst microprocessor, or a monolithic system on a chip. The Intel 4004 microprocessor contained 2400 transistors on a 12 mm2 area. Since then, a prediction made in 1965 by Gordon Moore, another co founder of Intel, that has come to be known as Moore’s law, has deﬁned the technological evolution of the microprocessor. Although the original prediction was that the number of transistors on a chip would double every year, and Moore later altered the forecast to every 2 years, the truism has since been used to refer to the doubling in the performance to cost ratio every 18 months. Thus, Intel’s Itanium II processor, re leased in 2003, had 220 million transistors, and the cost per transistor fell from approximately 0.15 cents in 1980 to about 0.0001 cents in 2005.

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While advances in microelectronics have physically shrunk, made affordable, and enhanced the functional potential of various information processing devices, their impact would be limited if they could not be instructed to undertake a range of tasks. It is these instructions, also referred to as software programs, or code, that lend versatility to microprocessors and make it possible to exploit their potential in various domains. In other words, although it has no materiality, it is software that ensures the revolutionary character of contemporary IT. This ability originates from the concept of stored program control (SPC), ﬁrst enunciated by John von Neumann in the 1940s. By proposing the entry and storage of pro grams as numbers, SPC provided the basis for a common digital language using which information in any form can be processed and conveyed by microprocessor based devices. Consequently, as advances in microprocessors have made possible more versatile applications, the technological characteristics of hitherto distinct electrical devices, such as computers and telephone switches, now resemble one another, a phenomenon referred to as convergence.

The Software Bottleneck Over the years, the technological convergence has been accompanied by a divergence. New design and manu facturing technologies have enabled the mass production of increasingly more reliable and powerful chips and other hardware, in highly automated, capital intensive operations. In contrast, software production is a relatively craft like, labor intensive operation relying more on trial and error to achieve its goals. The result is that software development is prone to defects, or bugs, delays, and cost overruns. According to one estimate from the late 1990s, 40–80% of a typical software project budget goes into ﬁxing bugs created earlier in the project, and 25% of all software projects are cancelled by which time they are 100% over budget. In other words, software productivity and quality have lagged that of hardware, creating a software bottleneck. The persistence of the bottleneck is not because of a lack of effort to improve quality and productivity. Instead, it must be understood in terms of the characteristics of software. Developing software is about abstracting and representing processes in various domains of human activ ity, since lines of code are meaningless unless they serve a social purpose. Fredrick Brooks refers to the challenges of conceptualization and abstraction as the inherent or essential difﬁculties of software, and the problems posed by the representation and production of software as the acci dental difﬁculties. He argues that the bottleneck persists because most technological advances aimed at improving quality and productivity focus on the accidental rather than

the essential. He further argues that overcoming the essential difﬁculties will be harder and slower, with no easy solutions or silver bullets. Underlying Brooks’ skepticism is an acknowledge ment that developing software is as much a social as a technological process. The social dimension of software development is crucial especially because of the need for communication between various stakeholders in the process. For software to be effective and useful, its developers must possess both an understanding of the domain for which the software is being developed, and a command over the programming language in which that under standing is to be represented. This is just like an author, say, of a book on geography in English, who must min imally possess both a command over the language, and insights into the subject, for the book to impart any knowledge of geography to its readers. But developers rarely possess domain knowledge, whereas clients, users, and domain experts are rarely trained to represent their knowledge in a programming language. Unfortunately, bridging this gap by having experts convey to developers, the practices and processes in their domain, is fraught with miscommunication, misunderstanding, and con ceptual confusion. This problem is magniﬁed as projects get larger and when the development task is partitioned among ever larger teams. Not only must the task be partitioned to facilitate the seamless integration of vari ous subtasks into a functioning whole, but the subtasks must also be explained to team members who may lack domain knowledge. Even if client or user requirements are clearly understood, software development faces another prob lem. Since software is a collection of functions, users need not invoke the same set of functions or, even if they do, the functions need not be invoked in identical se quence. Thus, as the number of lines of code grows, there are more routes to navigate through the software and the ways in which it can be used grow disproportionately. Foreseeing the different uses, and predicting how soft ware, especially those with hundreds of thousands of lines of code, will behave, when subject to diverse uses, is a challenge. This is exacerbated by the tendency of cli ents and developers to treat software as soft, that is, they take advantage of being able to add new functions or change the code with just a few keystrokes. But in doing so, they unwittingly tend to introduce new ways in which the software can behave, increasing the chances of cost and schedule overruns. In response to the persistence of the bottleneck, three distinct approaches to software development have emerged: customized development, packaged software development, and open source development. The rest of this article describes how these approaches have emerged by taking advantage of new technologies, and their

Information Technology

geographical implications. In doing so, it shows why, because of inherent limitations, none of them is a panacea to the bottleneck. The three approaches coexist as each transforms the bottleneck in particular ways. The ques tion of which approach is preferable depends on the kind of software needed.

Custom Software Development and Software Engineering Software development spread with the development of computers, as that is where microelectronics ﬁrst found application and programming was in demand. Since early computers were expensive, customers developed software customized to meet their needs as efﬁciently as possible. But the bottleneck was recognized early and, in 1968, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization sponsored a confer ence in Germany to discuss how reliable software could be developed for increasingly complex and mission critical systems. At this conference, the term software engineering was ﬁrst used, to encourage the nurturing of a discipline analogous to industrial engineering that has helped im prove manufacturing productivity. Drawing on similar ideas, software engineering has proceeded along two fronts. One front is production rationalization using struc tured programming to manage the software development process by segmenting it to permit coordination and control over programmer teams. The classic conception of the development process is the six stage waterfall model, so called because each stage – requirement an alysis, speciﬁcation, design, coding, testing, and main tenance – must be completed before ﬂowing into the next (Figure 1). Recent software management practices have focused on adopting industry wide certiﬁcation norms so that organizations adhere to the discipline of codiﬁed

quality procedures in the development process. The norms include the ISO 9001/9000 3 standards pre scribed by the International Standards Organization, and the Software Engineering Institute’s (SEI) ﬁve stage Capability Maturity Model that was originally developed for the US Department of Defense. The stages measure process maturity from an initial stage where the process is ad hoc or chaotic, to a ﬁfth and ﬁnal stage where the process is well documented and optimizes quality based on continuous quantitative feedback. A slightly different approach is the move toward object oriented technolo gies. The focus here is on developing a library of objects, or modules of code akin to manufactured components, that can be assembled in various ways to create different products, with the ultimate goal of making all users developers. The second front along which software engineering has advanced is automation. The shift to object oriented programming itself is based on the emergence of newer programming languages. The so called ﬁrst generation languages of the 1950s required a working knowledge of the machine, as they were no more than the binary in structions, or zeros and ones, which directly controlled the computer. With subsequent generations, however, languages became less machine speciﬁc and increasingly high level or human like. High level languages allow faster programming by less skilled programmers, re ducing labor time and costs. Further, the more software is intertwined with hardware, the less convenient it be comes in the long term. This is because maintaining and transferring machine speciﬁc older software to improved hardware, based on new technologies, is tedious and difﬁcult. The development of Java in the 1990s, a cross platform object oriented language that can run on any computer, irrespective of the speciﬁcs of the underlying hardware, is another step in the development

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of high level languages. This ‘write once, run anywhere’ universality permits the hiring of programmers on the basis of their domain experience rather than their knowledge of speciﬁc technologies. Although software engineering and management practices have helped improve overall productivity and quality, the software bottleneck is far from overcome, as there are wide variations in programmer productivity and quality. Indeed, since even the issue of whether current productivity metrics are at all appropriate remains un clear, some argue that reports of software productivity are often misleading numerical nonsense. The waterfall model of development has been dis credited for enforcing a rigid top down methodology. It is argued that no generic process model will work for all projects, much less one that is linear and sequential. In practice, software development tends to be iterative; there is learning by doing, with no sharp demarcation between conceptualizing and implementing. Thus, predictions about structured programming leading to a division of labor between mental and manual labor, as in manu facturing, have not been validated. Although the ﬁrst three stages in the waterfall model are relatively more conceptual and skill intensive, and the last three stages have been amenable to automation through the use of computer aided software engineering tools, such automation demands clear, detailed speciﬁcations. As a result, a lot of imple menting, testing, and coding is still done manually and the division of labor in software development is better under stood as a division between more and less skilled labor, but skilled all the same. Similarly, the extent to which process standards, such as those laid down by the ISO and SEI, will guarantee a quality end product, is contentious. While a product oriented approach like object ori ented programming is popular, it is uncertain whether it has delivered what it promised. This has to do with the difﬁculty of overcoming the biases in the training of programmers that favors doing everything from scratch. The reliance on virtuoso problem solving highlights another problem: software engineering lacks the insti tutionalized mechanisms of a mature engineering dis cipline for recording and disseminating demonstrably good designs and ways to choose among design alter natives. Although a discipline of computer science has evolved to provide a theoretical foundation to, for in stance, build formal mathematical models before writing code, packaging these results for operational use is in adequate. The result is that current software practice proceeds independently of this organized knowledge. Thus, what is practiced today is perhaps better described as software management than engineering, and some prefer to describe practitioners as soft crafters rather than software engineers. The limited improvements in productivity and quality make software development a skill and labor intensive

process. As the demand for new software spread, along with the need to maintain older software, skilled labor has become sought after. Unable to ﬁnd enough people with the right skills, and under pressure to cut costs, customers in the advanced industrial countries of North America and Europe, have been forced to out source their development, triggering the globalization of the software industry since the 1980s. Facilitating this pro cess, ironically, has been the falling cost of data com munications. Thus, with custom software production relying on software engineering, the software bottleneck manifests itself as a labor shortage, and countries with the right skills at a low cost, such as India and Ireland, seized this opportunity to become global centers of custom software production.

Packaged Software While software engineering was the adoption of mass manufacturing techniques for unitary software projects, the mass production of software in the form of packaged software had to await a mass market. The proliferation of computer usage from the late 1970s, with the availability of increasingly more powerful and inexpensive personal computers (PCs), created the market for packaged soft ware and the opportunity for a different means of over coming the software bottleneck. The market for a package of functions opens up when there are enough users with similar needs, each of whom ﬁnds cost ad vantages in shifting from a custom product. This is be cause, once software is developed, the cost of producing additional copies, or the marginal cost, is negligible since duplication is an electronic process, with almost no ma terial or labor costs. Thus, the average cost of a package declines with every additional user as the development costs are spread across more users. For producers, once a package is introduced for a speciﬁc set of functions, there are high entry barriers for a similar package. Software packages exhibit network externalities, where any increase in the total number of users increases the value of the package to the individual user. As the user base grows, the larger the number of people with whom a single user shares a standard means of representing, using and exchanging information. This, in turn, also favors monopolization since price is in versely proportional to the number of customers, and the lower the price, the more attractive it becomes to a larger number of users. But as the numbers of users grow, a different issue arises. For users, the decision to buy a ready solution represents a tradeoff between the cost of the package and the utility of having software tailor made to their needs. While the developer of a package incorporates a general set of functions to reach as many users as possible, there

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are limits to the extent to which the package can an ticipate and address various speciﬁc functions that a growing user base will demand. In other words, with an increasing number of users, a functional gap develops between the generality of the package and speciﬁc needs of individual users. For the user, there is a point beyond which these speciﬁc needs must be addressed by de veloping customized extensions. Then there is a wider market for a set of speciﬁc functions that, of course, opens up an opportunity to develop a new package. This has been the mechanism and basis for the rapid growth in the use of packaged software. Aided by the proliferation of PCs and copyright laws, packaged soft ware is a structural response to the software bottleneck. While software engineering attempts to lower develop ment costs by relying on methodologies like object orientation to facilitate software re use within organiza tions, packaged software lowers the unit cost of software by reusing software across organizations, thereby in corporating all the productivity advantages associated with software engineering at the scale of the entire economy. Thus, packaged software transforms the soft ware bottleneck. With custom software production rely ing on software engineering, overcoming the bottleneck calls for deploying more software professionals; with packaged software, it becomes a question of addressing the functional gap. The different approach to the soft ware bottleneck is evident in the cost structures. Whereas the cost of labor and materials that go into production and distribution typically accounts for two thirds of the sales of custom software services ﬁrms, for packaged software ﬁrms it is less than one third, although labor is critical for developing any kind of software. With labor costs playing a less important role, packaged software producers do not seek low cost locations. Instead, critical to meeting the software demands of any domain is an insight into the functional demands of the domain, and the practices that have evolved to address them. That proximity to the domain leaders offers the most potential for acquiring domain speciﬁc knowledge, especially in tangible knowledge, is evident from the shifting geography of the US packaged software industry, the largest in the world. With the increase in the number of packaged software ﬁrms, the industry has moved away from semi conductor and computer manufacturing regions to those with a concentration of sectors where software usage is high. For instance, producers of packaged software for the oil industry are clustered in an application district around Houston, the energy capital of the country.

Open Source Software When computers were expensive and rare, software that was developed was often shared among various users. But

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as software usage proliferated, and it became a lucrative product, commercial producers, especially of packaged software, released their products in binary code. This denies users the opportunity to either see or modify the source code, which is written in a high level program ming language, even if the software is buggy. Frustrated with buggy proprietary software, users began to volun tarily come together to develop an open source alter native, where the source code is released with the software, for anyone to use, modify, and redistribute. The release relies on the Internet to provide an electronic public domain. The rationale is that with enough eye balls, all bugs are shallow. Software in the public domain is more likely to be used in various ways by different users. If functional enhancements are required, or if bugs are noticed, even a technologically ignorant user can bring it to the attention of the project community in the hope that someone capable will ﬁnd the problem interesting enough to solve, thereby beneﬁting everyone. Since anybody can poten tially provide the solution, open source development is a decentralized process. It is compared to a bazaar, where many voices and agendas are pursued. It is in contrast to development within a ﬁrm that is akin to cathedral building using a unique top down master plan. However, when having to choose between solutions offered to a problem, open source project communities typically evolve a decision making structure that decides between alternatives based on a combination of technical ration ality and a normatively deﬁned notion of elegant code. Being a user driven development process, open source software production overcomes the problem of mis communication between developers and those with do main knowledge. Further, while custom software projects and packaged software have to schedule formal tests with users before product release, the open source process makes every user a tester every time, and draws on their feedback to react nimbly to alter the software whenever a bug is identiﬁed or an enhancement is required. This improves quality and productivity, and minimizes main tenance costs. Although it offers superior quality and productivity, participation in any open source project has two pre requisites. First, in a community deﬁned solely by an interest, and with no face to face contact, shared domain knowledge is vital. While there have been a few high proﬁle projects, such as the Linux operating system, that have formed a community running into the thousands, a 2002 study of 100 open source project found that most projects had a community of less than ten. This is because the larger ones tend to be based on universally shared domain knowledge in computer science and engineering. In contrast, developing an application in, say, the domain of banking, which is inﬂuenced by local regulatory re quirements, makes it hard for users outside that regulatory

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jurisdiction to participate in development. Thus, with open source production, the software bottleneck is trans formed to an application gap. The second prerequisite for participation in an open source project is Internet access, which is hardly uniform across the world. Thus, the geography of open source production is dictated by the geography of Internet access and the digital divide.

Conclusion After explaining the centrality of software to the revo lutionary character of the microelectronics based IT revolution, this article explained the quality and prod uctivity problems that have led to the software bottle neck. Three development approaches have emerged as responses to the bottleneck by taking advantage of technological advances. However, each of these ap proaches has only transformed the bottleneck, with an attendant geography of software production, and none provides a panacea. Thus, there are no silver bullets, and all three approaches coexist despite emerging from dif ferent technological periods. The question of which approach to use depends on the kind of software required. Customized software de velopment that relies on software engineering emerged when computers were expensive and rare. However, it is still relevant when mission critical software or a unique application is needed. Packaged software emerged with the spread of PCs, and works when there is a mass market for a set of functions and users are willing to prioritize price over a tight ﬁt with their speciﬁc needs. The open source approach is appropriate when there are users so

frustrated with commercial output that they are willing to work voluntarily with strangers to develop reliable, robust software. See also: Global Production Networks; High-Tech Industry; Industrial Organization; Innovation; Knowledge Economy; Regional Development and Technology; Technology and Regional Development; Technology Industries.

Further Reading Abbate, J. (1999). Inventing the Internet. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Brooks, F. P. (1999). The Mythical Man Month: Essays on Software Engineering (2nd edn.). Singapore: Addison Wesley Longman. Brown, J. S. and Duguid, P. (2002). The Social Life of Information. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. Campbell Kelly, M. (2003). From Airline Reservations to Sonic the Hedgehog: A History of the Software Industry. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Ceruzzi, P. E. (2003). A History of Modern Computing (2nd edn.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Cusumano, M. A. (1991). Japan’s Software Factories: A Challenge to US Management. New York: Oxford University Press. McConnell, S. (1999). After the Gold Rush: Creating a True Profession of Software Engineering. Redmond, WA: Microsoft Press. O’Riain, S. (2004). The Politics of High Tech Growth: Developmental Network States in the Global Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Parthasarathy, B. (2004). India’s Silicon Valley or Silicon Valley’s India? Socially embedding the computer software industry in Bangalore. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 28, 664 685. Shapiro, C. and Varian, H. R. (1998). Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. Weber, S. (2004). The Success of Open Source. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Informational City J. Rutherford, LATTS (Laboratoire Techniques, Territoires et Socie´te´s), Marne-la-Valle´e, France & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Informational Capitalism A techno-economic system held to have emerged in the last thirty years or so in which information generation, processing, and transmission are seen to drive the productive forces and restructuring of capitalism. Informational Worker/Labor Tertiary and quaternary sector workers whose main tasks involve the production, exchange, interpretation, and/or translation of information and knowledge. Multimedia Convergence A process involving the merger of data-processing technologies and computer services with telecommunications systems to allow the widespread networking and circulation of information. The integration of broadcasting technologies and services into this combined operating platform is a further recent step. Network Society A concept covering views that social and technological networks (and the increasing convergence between the two in some cases) now constitute the dominant social form of contemporary societies through their organization of major economic, cultural and political structures, and activities. Space of Flows Castells’ concept to capture the communicational space created by new technoeconomic networks and which is seen as now constituting the dominant functional arena (as opposed to the space of places) in which information elites mobilize, connect, and interact to sustain global urban economies. Symbolic Analysts Elite workers whose main tasks involve interpreting, analyzing, and transforming symbolic (valued) information based on words, numbers, images, etc. World City A strategically important urban node in which certain activities and operations are carried out which may shape and contribute to economic, political, and cultural globalization.

Preamble Information is, in spite of its somewhat opaque and elu sive nature, the sine qua non of the city, essential for cre ating and sustaining all kinds of intra and inter urban social, economic, political, and technical linkages without which the city as a concentration of people, buildings, institutions, ﬁrms, capital, etc., would not be able to exist.

The mutual dependencies between cities and information have rarely been anything less than crucial, but they seem to have been reinforced even further in recent times by ongoing socioeconomic and technological transforma tions. Social and economic change has, in particular, re deﬁned urban regions as systems for the production, management, and distribution of information, held to be the key raw material in a postindustrial society. At the same time, technological changes created ﬁrst new, highly reliable forms of information technologies, and then, through multimedia convergence and digitalization, allowed these to be linked to ever faster telecommuni cations to promote intensive global networking and exchange. Because of the importance of information circulation to the functioning of urban societies and economies, information and communications networks have been seen by some writers to be as crucial for contemporary cities as the development of the railway was for industrial cities in the nineteenth century. Yet, the networked nature of this information processing has served to loosen the ties that have traditionally bound cities to speciﬁc territories. The informational city is the geographical expression of this changing techno eco nomic paradigm. We should note that it touches on as pects of other urban theories, notably the global city and its concentration of command functions and producer services supporting the global economy, even if the latter more clearly deﬁnes a speciﬁc set of applicable strategic sites, rather than having tendencies toward a more com prehensive theory of urban development in advanced economies.

Introducing the Informational City It is argued that one of the most fundamental ongoing societal changes is concerning the shift from an industrial age to an informational age: that is, from an economy and society based upon the production and circulation of physical goods (from raw materials) and the forms of primary and secondary labor this necessitates, to an economy and society based upon the production and circulation of information and knowledge (symbolic goods of a more abstract or virtual form), in a pluralist sense, and the tertiary and quaternary sector workers (the infor mational labor or symbolic analysts) required to interpret or translate this information. Economic productivity is now derived primarily from knowledge generation, in formation processing, and their technological transmission and exchange. Information is the raw material which

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requires some level of knowledge to be transformed, with accumulated knowledge and more complex forms of in formation commodities as the outcomes (which are then fed back in as the process begins again). From this new form of socio technical organization – an informational mode of development – in which the emergence of new information and communications technologies was paramount, the concept of the infor mational city was developed during the 1980s by the urban sociologist Manuel Castells to capture how urban regions in advanced economies were being transformed by parallel dynamics associated with capitalist re structuring and the rise of information intensive indus tries (informational capitalism). Castells sees spatial form as the expression of societal organization, so in his ar gument there are technological and organizational di mensions to the informational mode of development, and it is their intertwining which permits a reconﬁguration of production processes and therefore of urban and regional space. Information intensive ﬁrms are restructuring and diversifying their production systems and locational strategies according to the means and capacities of new information technologies. This creates new spatial dy namics for the internal organization of these ﬁrms, but importantly also for cities and regions up and down the urban regional hierarchy. In this way, the impact of new technologies upon cities is addressed by exploring the sociospatial complexity of the restructured relations between these technologies, the production process, urban society, and urban space. Gone are the simplistic prophecies and hype which have commonly enveloped the emergence of new urban technologies in the past, and most notably ideas about a dissipation of cities with increasing ubiquity of informa tion. Informational cities have important interconnected infrastructures of information and communications technologies, but it is the basis of their economies upon information which distinguishes their development. The dominant spatial logic associated with this growth of information processing is one of parallel decentralization and concentration, focused on and enabled by a dense web of techno economic networks which Castells has termed the ‘space of ﬂows’.

The Economic Basis of the Informational City Information technologies have transformed the social and spatial organization of information processing activities, which, in turn, are viewed as more and more central to urban economies because economic production, distri bution, and management are increasingly dependent on knowledge generation, information exchange, and infor mation handling (and therefore on skilled informational

labor). Yet, the spatial logics resulting from these transfor mations are not homogeneous. Noting that the emerging techno economic paradigm applies to the new industrial space and the new service economy, Castells observed four main spatial dynamics common to large scale information intensive industry ﬁrms (which include banking, insurance, business and legal services, central administration, etc.): a distinctive spatial division of labor with different • parts of the production process requiring different

• • •

types of work and work arrangements; the main function in these industries is that of infor mation production (which may rely either on quan titative data handling or on more tacit information processing) which is located in a small number of innovative milieux; decentralization of other functions in the production process, which leads to a spatial hierarchy in parallel with the structural hierarchy of the industries; and locational ﬂexibility in production (except for the innovative milieux) as market locations change constantly.

These functional and spatial specialization dynamics represent considerable changes to the internal structures of ﬁrms which have become more hierarchical, splintered, and ﬂexible, or even vertically disintegrated. Information technologies have promoted ﬂexible production techni ques, while technological convergence with communi cations networks has allowed greater intraﬁrm networking to keep operations coherent and efﬁcient. Multinational companies create competitive advantage therefore by information exchange and management across their structures. Nevertheless, the idea of totally footloose en terprises being able, via information and communications technologies, to locate all their units anywhere is some thing of a myth. The decentralization of some activities reinforces the need for a concentration of others, par ticularly tactical, coordinating, or strategic activities which remain heavily dependent on advantages of agglomeration such as face to face interaction or copresence, tacit knowledge, and interﬁrm synergies (which represent a more intensive, scarcer, and valuable set of information inputs), for example, in ﬁnancial centers, technology clusters, or industrial districts. In this way, almost in spite of technological advances, the information economy re mains at least partly an economy of presence. As tech nologies facilitate the production of more information, there is a need for increasing numbers of workers and interaction between workers to interpret and to act on the information. Workforce restructuring is nevertheless an important element in the reorganization of ﬁrm strategies. This may lead to such processes as streamlining, sub contracting, automation, relocation, or use of temporary or part time labor, all of which have important consequences for work and labor in the informational city. Indeed,

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Castells suggests that employment structure in advanced economies is now dominated by skilled, highly adaptable information workers supported by a more ﬂexible, pre carious workforce submissive to the needs of markets at particular times. Organizational hierarchy in information production and processing leads in turn to a spatial hierarchy of urban regions based on these parallel decentralization – concentration logics. Decentralization of speciﬁc activ ities may involve a move to either smaller urban regions where operating and workforce costs are lower or sub urban areas of larger cities thus also privileging labor and market accessibility. At the top end of the hierarchy, major cities (and indeed the main business districts within these cities) are reinforced as the sites of infor mation production (most recently including that of the Internet content market) and informational decision making. They become the clearing houses for global information transactions. Crucially, it is the process of new technologies facilitating dispersal of some activities that allows the centralization of other activities. The global informational economy is thus founded on a network structure, or, more precisely, on a structure of innumerable intertwined networks. These techno or ganizational networks might be speciﬁc to individual ﬁrms or individual sectors, or they might interconnect multiple groups and organizations. They do tend, nevertheless, to share a common interurban logic, due to the location of economic actors (information elites) pri marily in cities.

The Spatial Logic of the Informational City: The Space of Flows Command and control functions within ﬁrms and within the information economy as a whole are allocated then to central cities. These cities (or the districts within them) can be seen as increasingly disconnected from the rest of the production space and increasingly interconnected between themselves in specialized global information networks. Castells has developed the concept of a space of ﬂows to describe what he perceives to be the now dominant deterritorialized communicational space – of information, people, organizations, capital, etc. – which organizes many socioeconomic processes, and through which cities (or speciﬁc zones of cities) are interlinked. This new space of ﬂows is the archetypal functional logic of the informational city. Supported by information and communications technologies, it is held to dominate (but not eliminate) the more traditional, historically con structed space of places. The former overlays the latter like a red carpet on the ground. Although the space of ﬂows permits deterritorialized network connection, which is the new structural logic of the global economy,

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its central nodes remain at the same time anchored in the traditional space of places. Organizations are located in places, and their workers and materials are place based, but the overall organizational or functional logic is ﬂow based, whether we are talking about a multinational company or an airport. Global ﬁnance ﬁrms locate in the City of London or in lower Manhattan both for the planetary connections these nodes attract and for the dense series of place based interactions made possible by agglomerations of similar activities. Nevertheless, information elites and infor mation based ﬁrms have been freed up from the local constraints of the latter and now mobilize, connect, and interrelate far more in ﬂows than in places. Indeed, this may even be an ultimate objective of all the techno economic change that urban regions have undergone in recent times. The organization of the global urban economy primarily in a space of ﬂows allows production, management, and markets (economic power) to bypass as much as possible forms of territorial regulation which exist to control them. Described by Castells, the space of ﬂows has three layers of (mutually constituting) physical supports: a circuit of electronic impulses such as telecommunica tions; a network of place based nodes and hubs; and the spatial manifestations of dominant groups and interests. In this way, while the technological infrastructure of the ﬁrst layer provides a foundation for contemporary socioeconomic processes, which take place both in and between the key cities of the second layer, it is in the third layer that powerful and wealthy elites control, conﬁgure, and articulate their own spatial requirements, frequently at the expense of the disconnected masses. The space of ﬂows does not therefore correspond only to cyberspace or to a network of urban nodes, but works through and is the outcome of dominant social practices. The ﬂows in the space of ﬂows are always both the basis and product of decision making, and are structured and directed in accordance, which helps to explain why access to the space of ﬂows is sociospatially highly uneven.

The Informational City as Dual City The space of ﬂows, the new architecture of the global economy, is then sociospatially differentiated, in terms both of where and how its informational webs connect to and become accessible by various places and social groups, and of how the space is actually managed and controlled by particular information elites. While the latter mobilize and circulate (physically and virtually) across the globe ever more rapidly and intensively, other social groups remain relatively or completely excluded from this premium net work space. A dual city results – the outcome of

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perpetual socio technical and instrumental segmentation. It is here that the space of ﬂows–space of places argument extends the economic development focus of the global/ world city hypothesis into the domain of social class distinctions. In an informational economy and network society, those who manage and circulate information (net work ers) constitute a socioeconomically afﬂuent group who are fully integrated into all manner of high level networks. By contrast, those whose labor does not meet the informational requirements of the global economy constitute a devalued and socioeconomically precarious group who do not ﬁt in with the logic of the network society and are therefore disconnected from many aspects of social and economic life. Such sociospatial polarization is occurring both within and between urban regions in all parts of the world. Graham and Marvin have examined the sociospatial consequences of com bined logics of network disconnection and wider urban fragmentation in a process they call ‘splintering urban ism’. While information and communications technolo gies may have been the driving force behind the emergence of the space of ﬂows, at the same time they are being conﬁgured to create and reinforce speciﬁc forms of dominant socioeconomic practices with socially divisive repercussions: these technologies and the services offered through • them are accessible only to the most afﬂuent groups in

• •

society, such that urban populations today are digitally divided into information haves and have nots; this is increasingly affecting accessibility of less afﬂuent groups to basic essentials such as money as ﬁnancial systems become informatized and withdrawn into the realm of electronic space; and these technologies are also increasingly being used for social control and surveillance, discriminately (or indiscriminately) tracking individuals through all as pects of their daily lives.

The informational city and its dominant spatial form, the space of ﬂows, are therefore both constitutive of and operated by a vast array of asymmetric power re lations between highly connected elites and disconnected social groups. We should note, however, that this digital control perspective is somewhat complicated by views of elites holding more essential command over information economies of presence through their management of face work. On a global level, similar polarizing processes are at work creating and sustaining an informational urban hierarchy atop which commonly are the urban centers of command and control in the Global North, while many of the most populous cities of the Global South struggle to integrate themselves into an informational, network based world economy.

Implications for Urban Theory The informational city is based on a techno economic reconﬁguration of production systems around infor mation processing units, with subsequent joint de centralization and concentration dynamics, in which functions of control and management are located in major urban centers. These centers and the elites re sponsible for information circulation are highly inter connected within a new spatial form, the space of ﬂows, but at the expense of disconnected and devalued social groups, which leads to new forms of urban polarization. Given the complex nature of these processes and logics, it is unsurprising that the notion of the informational city contests in many ways some of the more traditional deﬁnitions and ideas of the city. Foremost among these is the vision of the city purely as a bounded, territorial entity. In an economy and society dominated by information and knowledge production, circulation and mobility through overlapping networks, and the logic of the space of ﬂows, it is clear for many writers that the city has become more of a dynamic pro cess than a ﬁxed place. The space of ﬂows as the dominant spatial form of the informational city has three layers of physical supports, each of which depends on and brings together processes and practices from different scales. Technological infrastructures are designed and deployed according to local contexts, national regulations, and glo bal markets. Networks of global cities develop under similar multiscalar conditions. The spatial practices of elites are at once constituted by personal micro networks of contacts, spaces, commodities, and lifestyles, and func tional macro networks which cast these into the transac tional, decision making arena of the space of ﬂows. Cities which are composed primarily by such technical, eco nomic, and social ﬂows can hardly be seen only as terri torial units nested within nation states. In an age of almost limitless information, the informational city may also be virtually limitless. At least one reading of the global city argument discounts the idea of multiple global cities interlinked by networks in favor of one truly global city. These visions of the city as a process have opened up a fruitful research avenue into the nature and intensity of inter city information ﬂows. This research, conducted most notably by the Globalization and World Cities (GaWC) network, is based on the argument that the power and control capacities of certain cities are now determined more by the information that ﬂows through them than by any concentrations of information within them. All this does not mean, however, that the city as a place no longer exists. Indeed, informational cities are diverse because of their varying place based contexts and assets. Castells has himself adapted or qualiﬁed some of his analysis regarding the spatial logic of the infor mational city. He has stressed, for example, how the space

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of ﬂows can include some places (and the space of places some ﬂows) reafﬁrming therefore how it is not just a global virtual space of electronic connections. He notes that the informational city is no more likely to continu ously replicate Silicon Valley or Los Angeles than the earlier industrial city was to resemble Manchester. It is just that the speciﬁcities of these contemporary cities are outweighed by a common spatial logic: they are domin antly organized socially and economically by network ﬂows. Some of the most exciting recent urban research has therefore been intent on exploring the varying ten sions between network and territorial logics in urban transformations. In particular, there are constantly changing implications for urban governance in the in formational city as the production and locational strat egies of economic ﬁrms evolve. The actual or potential inﬂuence and action of local and regional authorities, still bounded by spatial and temporal restraints, appears out of step with the unhindered decision making of large information intensive ﬁrms. Rejuvenating local govern ments to develop controlling capacities over network based ﬂows would be desirable, but much research indicates that in these entrepreneurial times they are more often pandering their territories to the space of ﬂows than regulating the effect of the latter on people and places.

Critiques and Challenges A number of critiques have been leveled directly or in directly at the concept of the informational city. The following are the most notable. First, some commentators have observed that there is little or nothing new about the informational city, the resources upon which it is based, and its spatial, ﬂow based logic. This critique is similar to that concerning the global/world city (or indeed globalization as a whole) where it is argued that the transnational economic system of the seventeenth century was just as focused upon a small interconnected group of functionally important cities as it is now. Information and knowledge are held to have always been determining factors in urban pro duction systems, permitting signiﬁcant comparative ad vantages for cities throughout history, from the German Hanse of the ﬁfteenth century and in northern England during the Industrial Revolution, right up to modern day Silicon Valley. In all these cases, ﬂows of information are central. The argument that there is now merely more information or more rapidly available information has difﬁculty ﬁtting with a theory propounding a major re structuring of economies and societies. For neo Marxist critics, there is either not enough focus on how the in formational society and the informational city are still constitutive of capitalism, or there is not enough

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evidence of how these represent a major new phase in capitalist development. Second, the information and knowledge resources upon which the techno organizational complex of the informational city depends have perhaps been overly assimilated. While data information is widely available, knowledge (seen as skill or know how) is created by skilled interpretation or manipulation and as such is more rare and valuable. Crucially, contrary to infor mation, it is thus far from clear that the space of ﬂows logic is applicable to knowledge organization, which may be territorially embedded and more reliant on locational proximities and face to face interaction. In this way, the notion of an informational city at the heart of economic production concentrates too much on ubiquitous infor mation ﬂows and devotes too little consideration to the place of knowledge elements which are increasingly central to prosperous urban economies. The tendency to see information or the information economy as almost ubiquitous renders these terms almost meaningless as virtually any form of work can be seen as informational under some guise. The critique of this sees a far smaller percentage of urban labor as information workers which questions, as a result, the whole concept of the infor mational city. Third, there is an overwhelmingly economic focus to the informational city, with relatively little consideration of the wider range of social groups and viewpoints in volved in its constitution or reshaping. Castells’ more recent work has begun to address this, but there is a need to integrate a more diverse set of narratives and voices into this perspective to get beyond the dominant infor mational bourgeoisie (who themselves are undoubtedly more diverse than often portrayed). More focus on the plurality of information has been suggested as one way forward. It is also worth remembering that intensive socio technical connection is not a common objective for everybody in society. Many people complain about in formation overload and become rather blase´ faced with multimedia technology systems. Fourth, there are arguments suggesting a dominant technological or network determinism to aspects of the work of Castells. This derives from the way in which he attributes major importance to the information technol ogy revolution as a kick start to a new informational mode of development. Yet, Castells explicitly rejects any notion of technological determinism and is indeed at pains to show how the new mode of development is as dependent on organizational change as much as tech nology and is also tied into the wider restructuring of capitalism from the 1970s onward. The informational city is therefore an expression of all arrangements of the in formational society. A wider network determinism ar gument suggests that employing a unique network rationale to describe general spatial and organizational

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processes within an informational paradigm is problem atic in the sense that it ﬂattens quite signiﬁcant dis tinctions between different forms of network as well as underplaying the speciﬁc importance of institutional regulation in the shaping of networks (e.g., technical networks) over time and space. There are then a number of interesting theoretical issues around informational cities and political challenges for urban managers, but we have the space to highlight only two here. First, what of the (possibilities for) development of more ordinary informational cities beyond both the core set of global cities and the Global North? Further re search might focus, for example, on the degree to which information technologies and information production, processing, and circulation as a whole are actually transforming urban space and urban form in cities of the South. Or within a global political economy of infor mation, are these cities still destined, at least for the time being, to remain bypassed by and unintegrated into the space of ﬂows? If there still are fewer telephone lines in the whole of sub Saharan Africa than in Manhattan, perhaps we need to talk here about diverse and quite subjective forms of information and technology on the ground, rather than assuming that there is one exportable (or desirable) informational city model that can be de veloped the world over. Second, and partly following on from this, the main political challenge will be to explore the possibilities for opening up the informational city to a broader set of social groups than is currently the case (which will un doubtedly require a renewed role for all levels of the state), or for urban based resistance to the dominant (economic) informational logic. In this regard, Castells himself has begun to discuss these possibilities for grassrooting the space of ﬂows by illustrating how the nature of the space of ﬂows as produced and managed by dominant groups opens it up to alternative projects of resistance, diversiﬁcation, and new social and cultural meaning. Furthermore, most recently, he has outlined a notion that it is the switchers who hold the most power in the space of ﬂows by acting as the intermediaries between differing networks. Importantly, this group does not ne cessarily coincide with the afﬂuent, dominant groups who are most intensively integrated into these ﬂows. In any case these tendencies offer possibilities or opportunities which may ultimately reshape the space of ﬂows and therefore the political economic functioning of societies. People live in places, while power and domination rules through ﬂows: thus is the overwhelming and slightly

contradictory logic of the informational city. It reminds us though that there is nothing at all abstract (or indeed certain) or discarnate about current urban restructuring and development. Cities of the twenty ﬁrst century will continue to be built and reshaped according to the intertwining logics of territories and networks, the local and the global, and meaningful places and functional ﬂows. See also: Information Technology; Networks, Urban; Technological Change; Telecommunications; World/ Global Cities.

Further Reading Brunn, S. D. and Leinbach, T. R. (eds.) (1991). Collapsing Space and Time: Geographic Aspects of Communications and Information. London: Harper Collins. Castells, M. (1989). The Informational City: Information Technology, Economic Restructuring and the Urban Regional Process. Oxford: Blackwell. Castells, M. (1996 1998). The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture, 3 vols. Oxford: Blackwell. Catterall, B. (2002). Informational cities: Beyond dualism and toward reconstruction. In Bridge, G. & Watson, S. (eds.) Companion to the City, pp 192 206. Oxford: Blackwell. Gottmann, J. (1983). The Coming of the Transactional City. College Park, MD: Institute of Urban Studies, University of Maryland. Graham, S. and Marvin, S. (2001). Splintering Urbanism: Networked Infrastructures, Technological Mobilities and the Urban Condition. London: Routledge. Hall, P. (1998). Cities in Civilization: Culture, Innovation, and Urban Order. London: Phoenix Giant. Hepworth, M. (1989). The Geography of the Information Economy. London: Belhaven. Mitchelson, R. L. and Wheeler, J. O. (1994). The ﬂow of information in a global economy: The role of the American urban system in 1990. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 84, 87 107. Robins, K. (ed.) (1992). Understanding Information: Business, Technology and Geography. London: Belhaven. Sassen, S. (2000). Cities in a World Economy (2nd edn.). London: Pine Forge Press. Storper, M. (1997). The Regional World: Territorial Development in a Global Economy. London: Guilford Press. Thrift, N. (2002). A hyperactive world. In Johnston, R., Taylor, P. & Watts, M. (eds.) Geographies of Global Change: Remapping the World (2nd edn.), pp 29 42. Oxford: Blackwell. Webster, F. (2002). Theories of the Information Society (2nd edn.). London: Routledge. Wilson, M. and Corey, K. (eds.) (2000). Information Tectonics: Space, Place and Technology in an Electronic Age. London: Wiley. Zook, M. (2001). Old hierarchies or new networks of centrality? The global geography of the Internet content market. American Behavioral Scientist 44, 1679 1696.

Relevant Websites http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc Globalization and World Cities (GaWC) network.

Innovation R. Sternberg, University of Hannover, Hannover, Germany & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Innovation A new combination of production factors; in a narrower sense the ﬁrst introduction of an invention in the market. Innovation Policy All policies which intend to support the innovation activities of (real or potential) innovative actors in a given area; incentives try to reduce the cost and risks of innovation. Innovation System Comprises all determinants of the innovation process, that is, all important economic, social, political, organizational, institutional, and other factors that inﬂuence the development, diffusion, and use of innovations; spatial (e.g., continental, national, regional, and local) as well as aspatial innovations systems (e.g., sectoral) are distinguished. Knowledge Spillover The shift of newly created and/ or accumulated knowledge from the inventing person/ organization into productive capacity and the related persons and organization; such spillovers mainly take place within the same locality. Tacit knowledge Not codiﬁed and/or codiﬁable knowledge which primarily ﬂows through informal networks and which is usually privately owned.

Why Is Innovation Relevant – for Economic Geographers?

innovation can also be applied to noneconomic phenomena (social innovations, organizational innov ations), the economic causes and effects are by far the most signiﬁcant for economic geographic innovation research.

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Deﬁnitions Innovation as a concept was introduced by the eminent Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter and means more than just novelty. To him, innovation was a new com bination of production factors that set a process of cre ative destruction (including in regions) in motion. He saw basic innovations, clustered in time, as the triggers of long waves of economic development, which other scholars later applied also to regions. For a long time, the innovation process, deﬁned as the ﬁrst introduction of an invention in the market, was presented as a linear process consisting of the phases of scientiﬁc discovery (inven tion), product development (innovation in its true sense), market introduction, and diffusion. Today the consensus is that the chain linked model is moving closer to reality with its numerous linkages and feedbacks between dis covery, development, and commercialization in times of ﬂexible specialized regional economies; however, it is more relevant to industrial innovation instead of innovation in general (see Figure 1). Although the term

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Figure 1 The chain-linked model of the innovation process.

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Spatial Implications of the Genesis of Innovation and of Innovation Diffusion in Space There can be no question that the generation of innov ations and their diffusion in space and time are among the main determinants of the economic and technological competitiveness of nations and subnational regions. From an economic geographer’s perspective, it is important to emphasize that, ﬁrst, the genesis of innovation differs considerably from one region to another and, second, the characteristics of regions play a part in shaping this genesis. The geography of innovation is very uneven. Why? Essentially, there are ﬁve characteristics of know ledge underlying why location matters for innovative activity: (1) the uncertainty of the innovation process, (2) the reliance on university research, (3) the cumulative character of innovative activity, (4) the importance of learning by doing, and (5) the complexity of the innov ation process. Innovation needs new knowledge, which can be either tacit or codiﬁed. The transition from tacit to codiﬁed knowledge is difﬁcult and distance sensitive. New knowledge in turn requires the presence of persons who create this new knowledge. In contrast to information, new knowledge is mainly tacit, meaning it is tied to individual persons and cannot be transferred, or at least can only be transferred by face to face contact. Face to face contact, however, entails spatial proximity to the persons generating or in possession of this tacit knowledge. New information and communication tech nologies do not help reduce the distance sensitivity of tacit knowledge as they are only suitable for the diffusion of already codiﬁed knowledge. Since the number of creatives is rather small, and they are also very spatially mobile and selective, there are only a few potential re gions in a position to generate genuinely radical innov ations with economic potential. Depending on the theoretical perspective, the innovativity of regions depends on very different determinants. From the per spective of the individual, cognitive abilities, entre preneurial capacity, and attitudes toward risk and competence are important. From an institutional per spective, the culture, educational values, and resistance to change are important. The innovation system approaches emphasize sectoral systems, networks, and regional and national systems of innovation, and from a ﬁrm per spective it is crucial how R&D, the intraﬁrm selection, and diffusion process are organized. The second important aspect from the perspective of economic geographers is the diffusion of innovation over space. The Swedish geographer Ha¨gerstrand demon strated empirically based on observations in agriculture that the adoption of innovations outside their region of origin depends on hierarchies (city rankings) and neighborhood effects (as a result of social contacts). Ha¨gerstrand modeled the diffusion processes using

Monte Carlo simulations and other stochastic processes, and was able to visualize different phases of the diffusion process in the form of a logistic S curve. More recent works researching diffusion demonstrate that spatial diffusion depends in particular on the willingness of in novators to share their tacit knowledge and on the ab sorptive capacity of the (potential) adopters. The concept of absorptive capacity can be translated to apply to re gions as the varying openness and capability of regional innovation systems for extraregional innovations deter mines the perception and usage of innovation oppor tunities within a region. Entrepreneurs play an important role as knowledge ﬁlters in this process as they are in a position to and are interested in adopting innovations quickly. As entrepreneurs are additionally an element of the endogenous regional growth potential as a result of their considerable spatial immobility, it is also efﬁcient from the regional perspective to support entrepreneurs for the sake of boosting the innovational strength of the region. Learning processes are necessary for the gener ation and transfer of new knowledge and therefore in novations, as the generation of innovations is typically a shared process due to the high level of uncertainty and the limited capacity of individuals. Inter and intra regional innovation networks and collective learning therefore play an important role. These processes also have clear spatial implications, as the discussions of intraregional innovation networks as a result of the dis tance sensitivity of knowledge spillovers and tacit knowledge, and the discussions of learning regions show. Another argument for the signiﬁcance of collective learning processes permanently fed by intraregional networks is ‘ubiquitiﬁcation’. Here the fact is addressed that formerly locally speciﬁc production factors (e.g., specialized labor or infrastructure like business incu bators) are more easily accessible worldwide in this period of internationalization and globalization; in other words the source regions tend to lose their competitive advantage. Solely knowledge, which is hardly able to be codiﬁed (and, thus, more difﬁcult to transfer), yet well embedded in the regional innovation system, is immune to ubiquitiﬁcation. To conclude, the innovation issue is relevant for eco nomic geographers for various reasons. In a globalized world with decreasing lengths of product cycles, the eco nomic growth of nations and regions depends more than ever before from their ability to continuously produce all kind of innovations. As for the distribution of innovations over time and space, it seems to be clear that we have an uneven landscape of innovations and innovation behavior: regions (as individuals) differ in terms of their capacity to absorb new knowledge created elsewhere and to transfer it into growth and development. And ﬁnally, the creation of new knowledge as an indispensable precondition of in novation is distance sensitive and depends, at least

Innovation

partially, upon the local/regional embeddedness of actors and institutions. Therefore the importance of innovative (regional) clusters and innovative regions is reinforced by the fact that spatial proximity and the regional embedd edness of innovative actors like ﬁrms, individuals (entre preneurs, creatives, researchers), ﬁnanciers, and policymakers is key to the effective production and sharing of tacit knowledge.

Regional Innovation Theory The explanation of regional innovation processes has been one of the most popular subjects of human geog raphy and neighboring disciplines in the last two decades. There are many theories and schools of thought com peting with one another – none of which has yet achieved general acceptance. The consensus among economic geographers is that the genesis of innovations and their diffusion over space can be explained to a considerable extent by regional features – a ﬁnding that is constantly attracting more supporters also in the most important neighboring discipline within the framework of evo lutionary economics in particular, despite the fact that some scholars correctly point to additional dimensions of proximity (besides the spatial dimension). Territorially Based Systems of Innovation Approaches The regional innovation system (RIS) is a concept that has been created as a consequence of the national in novation systems (NISs) concept developed several years before. Both approaches take into consideration the sys temic character of the innovation process. A system of innovation comprises all determinants of the innovation process, that is, all important economic, social, political, organizational, institutional, and other factors that in ﬂuence the development, diffusion, and use of innov ations. The constituents of systems of innovation are components (organizations and institutions) and rela tionships among them. Important from an economic geography perspective is that an RIS (NIS) considers all components and relations among these organizations and institutions relevant in and for a selected region (nation). This does ‘not’ mean that all relevant organizations have to be permanently domiciled in the region (nation) in question. Rather, interregional (international) con nections and therefore extraregional (extranational) or ganizations may also inﬂuence the functioning of an RIS (NIS). Scholars emphasize the signiﬁcance of intra regional connections within RISs, mainly because of the spatial consequences of tacit knowledge and the ex change/transfer of such knowledge. The most important factors to be mentioned in this respect are knowledge

483

spillovers (e.g., persons or institutions adjacent to persons or institutions producing new knowledge may proﬁt from this neighborhood and they innovate more than if they would be located elsewhere), the similarly distance sensitive transfer of tacit knowledge, and continually signiﬁcant differences in innovation intensity between regions. Innovative ﬁrms (and innovative entrepreneurs running such ﬁrms) are the most important players within an RIS. In the work sharing innovation process, they use and need the complementary assets of other innovation actors in the region. The relations between innovative actors within and between RISs can be structured as shown in Figure 2.

Cyclical Models of Innovation-Based Regional Development The basic postulation of the ‘product cycle theory’ is this: Products and industries undergo an aging process con sisting of a phase of genesis and introduction, a growth phase, and a maturity or standardization phase with no deﬁnite time limit. Each phase has characteristic prop erties regarding market structure, competitive position, size of enterprise; and each phase makes speciﬁc demands on the location factors (see Figure 3). The spatial variant of the product cycle hypothesis explicitly includes technological progress in explaining the course of the phases and thus possesses a dynamic component: during the introduction phase, product innovations with their corresponding spatial demands as to manpower, R&D input etc., determine the locational decision. As the aging process progresses, process innovations and – due to declining unit cost yields – labor cost saving procedures and, at the same time, decentralized locations gain in importance. This approach has repeatedly been used to explain international and interregional locational shifts convincingly, although the empirical results are by no means uniform. The product cycle hypothesis elucidates the major part of the relationship between spatial division of labor and technological change by associating the early phases of the cycle – characterized by human capital intensity and product innovations – with the agglomer ations and the late phases – distinguished by wage cost intensity and process innovations – with the periphery. As the cycles of innovative products become steadily shorter, the standardization phase reduces as well or does not set in at all; this precludes the postulated de centralization during later cycle phases. Criticism of the product cycle theory essentially concentrates on deter minism relative to location shifts from the center to the periphery, the product concept, the applicability to all industrial products, and the insufﬁcient explanation for the location decision during the development and introduction phases.

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Figure 2 Innovative actors in Regional and National Innovations Systems and its connections.

The theory of the ‘long waves of economic develop ment’ in the tradition of Schumpeter postulates that long term economic development is subject to cyclical ﬂuctuation. The cycles differ in length (each consisting of economic growth, prosperity, recession, and depression) and are caused by a group of more or less continuous, partially linked basic innovations of individual entre preneurs in young sectors of technology which, sub sequently, cause new industries to emerge. Phases of growth are the expression of prior, phase speciﬁc basic innovations and follow a long term cycle. When the old basic innovations are exhausted, meaning that the yield of the corresponding investments dwindles, a phase of economic decline ensues. Since the mid 1970s, economic geographers have voiced an opinion on the ‘geography of the Fifth Kondratieff ’. They identify regional long waves, that is, regions too develop in cycles dependent on su perior economic cycles. In the process, each long wave creates its own ‘new’ regions which – as the wave recedes

– suffer economic recession as well. It is believed that at the root of the growth of young regions induced by long waves is the need of weak capital to make its risky in vestments in new technologies outside existing centers. Currently, there is disagreement on essential elements of the theory of the long waves, which renders its appli cation to innovative regions difﬁcult. Controversially discussed are the length of the cycles, the innovation concept, and the signiﬁcance of an enterprise’s size and form of organization. Likewise, there is no unanimity regarding the question of whether the phases of the long waves’ upward trend are really caused by endogenously generated innovations or rather by such factors as wars and historical coincidences. The Innovative Milieux Approach (GREMI) According to the milieu theory bearing the mark of the francophone Groupe de recherche europe´en sur les

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Figure 3 Innovation-driven regional product cycles.

milieux innovateurs (GREMI) group, innovations are the result of a collective, dynamic process set in motion by many individuals and institutions in a region forming a network of synergy producing linkages (see Figure 4). Hence, the milieu of a region results from interaction between enterprises, institutions, and labor, all of which, by way of collective, cooperative learning, help reduce the inherent insecurity during a period of changing techno logical paradigms. This kind of learning from and with one another is especially enhanced by the mobility of labor, by supply linkages, and in the form of face to face contacts which are facilitated by spatial proximity. Small enter prises proﬁt most from integration into regional networks. GREMI deﬁnes the milieu as a regional production system originating from integrated networks, consisting of tangible and intangible resources, characterized by a common, historically matured culture, based on collect ively developed and usable, regionally speciﬁc levels of knowledge, and founded on a system of social relation ships among local players that incorporates competition together with cooperation. The creative or – synonymous with it – the innovative milieu and innovative networks are inextricably linked. The former refers to the region alized part of an innovative network. Only part of the

milieu and its constituent networks are ever innovative at any given time. A milieu need not be restricted to a re gion. Spatial proximity, due to the spatial determination of numerous elements of the milieu, does however in crease the effect of the milieu considerably. These elements include human capital, which is less mobile interregionally than intraregionally, the considerably more intense interrelationships between innovation players in the form of direct, informal contacts, and the common cultural, psychological, and political background of the members of the network. Spatial proximity of the players does not, however, guarantee their interaction. Milieu theories primarily serve to explain the genesis phase of an innovation. The majority of empirical milieu studies is conﬁned to regions characterized by innovative networks. Technological information as a ‘raw material’, a sufﬁciently large pool of mobile labor, and the availability of investors willing to ﬁnance the risky projects in the ﬁeld of new technologies have been identiﬁed as neces sary (though not sufﬁcient) preconditions for the devel opment of an innovative milieu. Criticism of the milieu theory is directed above all at its low level of empirical evidence. Neither the milieu in general nor the innova tive milieu are deﬁned sufﬁciently clearly or at least

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Figure 4 The innovative milieu.

unanimously. Very often the spatial reference remains unclear. The integration of the innovation network idea, which is primarily person oriented, into the region ori ented milieu approach does not yet seem fully oper ational. Since – in addition – the concept is heavily oriented toward small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) as supporters of the innovations, it obviously neglects several aspects of reality. Learning Regions and Collective Learning Processes As the creation of innovations requires the exchange and passing on of tacit knowledge in particular, learning pro cesses are necessary. Individuals who do not yet possess

the knowledge necessary for innovations have to have it imparted from those who do possess it; they have to learn. The fact that tacit knowledge in its purest form can only be transferred through face to face contact makes spatial proximity between the teacher and student indispensable. Tacit knowledge does not travel easily – if at all. Spatial proximity alone is not a sufﬁcient condition for learning. Individuals should share some basic commonalities such as the same language, conventions, and norms. Regional embeddedness of both partners supports the probability of such commonalities because trust is facilitated. Former interactions, especially informal ones, help to bring in novative actors (back) together. While other forms of learning also exist, the concept of learning regions em phasizes the relevance of learning by interacting. The

Innovation

more innovative (or potentially innovative) individuals there are available in a region the better – and the greater the probability of intraregional and collective learning processes between them. The more these individuals are socially embedded in the region the more they share the commonalities mentioned above – and the more the learning process takes place within the region (rather than between regions). As a ﬁnal consequence, scholars claim that learning regions exist in which these processes are optimized for the promotion of the generation and dif fusion of innovations. Another argument supports the relevance of intraregional and collective learning pro cesses: to a degree the knowledge and, consequently the resulting innovation itself, are region speciﬁc. Each region possesses a region speciﬁc capital stock (knowledge) which can be interpreted as a comparative regional advantage. Localized capabilities and intangible assets further support this hypothesis – with the consequence that it is rare for such knowledge and innovations to travel beyond the boundaries of learning regions. From the perspective of the learning region this means that it beneﬁts ﬁrst from the economic advantages of an innovation. The concept of learning regions has, despite the initially limited level of empirical evidence to date, already been included in nu merous policy measures supporting regional innovations.

Empirical Evidence for the Regional Implications of Innovation Processes Measuring Regional Innovation Regional innovation research is still searching for the ideal data for measuring innovation. Because innovation has by deﬁnition a certain kind of novelty included it is very difﬁcult to use data from secondary, ofﬁcial statistics when measuring the innovativeness of ﬁrms or regions. Public industry classiﬁcations are always late – that is, they are always lagging behind product and process in novations (e.g., biotechnology). The ideal method would be to measure the innovations themselves as an indicator of output, for example, in terms of the number of new products within a given space and time. However, it is rather difﬁcult to ﬁnd adequate data that are comparable between regions. Another fundamental issue is what we actually mean by ‘new’. Additionally there are signiﬁcant differences between radical innovations (like the micro processor) or incremental innovations (from black and white TV to color). In most empirical studies, scholars therefore have to make compromises, some more satis fying, some less so. These include indicators of innov ation input (although the intention is to measure output) such as R&D expenditures against turnover, or share of R&D personnel against the total number of personnel in the region. Even patent data, which are frequently used as a parameter, are not an output indicator, but more

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accurately a throughput indicator, and have certain shortcomings (e.g., distortions as a result of different in dustries’ varying propensities to patent). The availability, including regionally, of such ‘auxiliary variables’ has improved signiﬁcantly in many industrialized countries in recent years, however. The Uneven Geography of Innovation In times of increasing globalization in particular, the spatial (and sectoral) clustering of innovative activities is a char acteristic feature of the economic geographies worldwide. There is even clear empirical evidence that the spatial concentration of such economic activities is greater the more knowledge intensive the economic activity is. In Japan, 41% of all persons employed in high tech industries are concentrated in the Tokyo metropolitan region which is home to ‘only’ 25% of the country’s total population. Empirical studies on the uneven geography of innovation in the US reveals that the strong geographic concentration of new product innovations is the result of a regional technological infrastructure which promotes information transfers and decreases the risks and cost of engaging in innovative activity. The 11 leading states, led by California and New York, account for more than 80% of all product innovations. In France, almost 40% of national employ ment in high tech industries are to be found in the Ile de France region around Paris. Even in a country such as Germany with a relatively balanced spatial structure, Munich as a high tech region is at the top of the German regions in terms of almost all innovation indicators, in some cases far ahead of the other regions. In developing coun tries and/or transformation economies spatial concen tration is even stronger. For most states there is a considerable consistency between the corresponding re gional rankings over time, although the rankings between the individual indicators certainly may vary. The Spatial Range of Innovation Linkages Both interregional (especially international) ‘and’ intrar egional linkages are important for ﬁrms and regions when innovation is considered. International innovation linkages are necessary to avoid the risk of technological and other lock ins. Intraregional linkages are crucial for the ex ploitation of local knowledge resources (tacit knowledge). The European Regional Innovation Survey (ERIS) shows that whether intra or interregional cooperation in in novation predominates is dependent upon the type of innovation actor (see Figure 5). For public research in stitutions, intraregional linkages are more common, whereas manufacturing ﬁrms attach greater importance to interregional cooperation in innovation. From the per spective of public research institutions, intraregional co operation with businesses is highly signiﬁcant; on the other

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Figure 5 Spatial range of innovative linkages of manufacturing ﬁrms Data source: European Regional Innovation Survey (ERIS).

hand, public research institutions cooperate more fre quently with other research facilities (rather than with businesses) across regional boundaries. Innovative ﬁrms do tend to place greater stronger emphasis on interregional linkages than less innovative ﬁrms. Another possibility for evaluating the relative role of the various spatial ranges of innovation linkages is the answer to the question of what inﬂuences ﬁrms’ innovation activ ities more: ﬁrm characteristics or regional determinants. ERIS data from 12 European regions show that ﬁrm spe ciﬁc determinants of innovation are more important than either region speciﬁc or extraregional factors. However, the distinction between ﬁrm level and region level determin ants of innovation is not strictly an ‘either/or’ matter. Of course, a ﬁrm without considerable innovation potential cannot generate notable innovations, even if the innovation conditions in the region where it is located are very fa vorable. However, the regional environment can help ﬁrms to realize their existing, but sometimes unexploited, in novation potential. In particular, the R&D environment that the region (and the other ﬁrms based there) offers an innovating ﬁrm is certainly capable of inﬂuencing a ﬁrm’s innovation behavior, even independently of ﬁrm related features. This has an impact on ﬁrm behavior as well. The ﬁrm and the region, therefore, consist of two groups of determinants of ﬁrm innovation activities that inﬂuence each other, even if not to the same level of intensity. The regional environment is not an independent determinant of ﬁrm innovation activity but is inﬂuenced by the charac teristics of local ﬁrms. Interﬁrm innovation cooperation can improve the competitiveness of ﬁrms and increase their skills. It appears, however, that although the regional

environment and innovation networks strengthen ﬁrms’ existing development potential, they are not able to gen erate this potential themselves. Local Geographical Knowledge Spillovers In view of the at least partially tacit nature of new knowledge, it is more probable that such knowledge tends to spread or be passed on more intraregionally than interregionally. Knowledge spillover as a form of ag glomeration economies can therefore be identiﬁed within regions in particular. Empirical studies from US regions in particular show, for example, that patent applicants in manufacturing cite other patents originating in the same city more frequently than they cite patents from other cities. Local geographical knowledge spillovers also exist between university research and ﬁrms innovative activity. Empirical results for US regions reveal that the spillovers of university research on innovation extended over a range of 50 miles from the innovating metropolitan area, but not with respect to private R&D. Star scientists at universities can play a key role in this respect in innov ation based regional development and can become an engine of regional growth provided they succeed in generating such intraregional knowledge spillovers.

Regional Innovation Policies Rationale for/of Regional Innovation Policies Policy cannot ignore the uneven geography of innovation. It can, however, make use of it to achieve political

Innovation

economic goals and, in doing so, has the fundamental choice between two alternatives. A growth oriented in novation policy would strengthen the strengths, that is, support the already relatively strong innovative agglom erations in order to promote national competitiveness and growth. Regional innovation policy aimed at achieving a balance, on the other hand, would try to support the in novation potential of (economically) peripheral regions with public investment in R&D infrastructure to help them catch up with already strong regions. While regional innovation policies aimed at achieving a balance domin ated for a long time in many countries, a change in thinking in many market economies now seems to be underway toward growth oriented regional innovation policies. Innovation oriented regional policies are in creasingly being replaced by regionalized innovation policies, particularly in member states of the European Union. Programs such as the ‘bioregio’ program in Germany, for example, which was set up as a competition between regions, tend to support regions which are al ready innovative, as they are in the best position to emerge victorious from such competitively structured programs. Even programs that are actually intended to reduce innovation disparities between regions, such as the Japanese ‘Technopolis’ program in all of the 47 pre fectures, have shown that the most successful regions are those which enjoy relative proximity to the prospering region around the capital city, Tokyo.

Why Regional Innovation Policies Are Potentially Relevant for Firm’s Innovation Behavior The reason for innovation policy is generally market failure: the risks and uncertainties associated with in novations mean that entrepreneurs would innovate less than is necessary for economic purposes if politics did not intervene. This means incentives are needed. This still leaves the difﬁculty of selecting the right future oriented technologies and industries that have the potential to grow in future (and are therefore worth supporting). This consideration can also be applied to regional innovation policies: regions where the level of innovation is lower than preferable from an overall economic perspective can be supported with policy instruments. The alternatives described under the section ‘Rationale for/of regional innovation policies’ then come into play when considering the question of which regions are to be supported and how intensively (and by whom: the regions themselves or central government, see Figure 6). As for innovation networks, empirical research reveals that public innovation policies should promote all types of innovation linkages, because a composite of coopera tive intraregional and interregional linkages promises to have particularly positive effects on the innovation out put. However, local political capacities to promote international linkages are limited. Local and regional

pra

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Innovation policy by the European Union

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Policy relevant impacts of innovation policy

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(Other cities and local communities)

Munich Innovation policy by the local government of the city of Munich ca

...

Nuremberg

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Augsburg

Spatially relevant impacts of innovation policy (intended or unintended)

Figure 6 Spatial scales of innovation policies (example of Munich/Germany).

l na gio

Innovation policy by the State Government of Bavaria

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Innovation policy by the German Federal Government

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Innovation

innovation policy must be aimed primarily at the in novating ﬁrms. The regional environment does indeed inﬂuence the scope and quality of operational innovation activities. This inﬂuence depends, however, to a con siderable extent on the characteristics of the ﬁrms and their entrepreneurs. The ﬁrm independent, autonomous inﬂuence of the regional environment must not be overestimated. This does not mean, however, that con cepts that put the region as a whole in the spotlight are obsolete. The idea of the ‘learning region’ and the con cept of ‘regional innovation systems’ are complementary and offer concrete recommendations for political action in the regions. It should, however, not be forgotten that a region represents an ensemble of individual innovation players (mostly ﬁrms). These ﬁrms do indeed consciously or unconsciously take advantage of the regional en vironment. However, the general focus of their activities is not primarily on the economic welfare of the region but on their own economic welfare. Political programs intended to increase the innovativeness of regions must therefore always begin with the innovation activities of local ﬁrms. Targets and Instruments Most regions try to achieve two complementary goals with their innovation policy: to improve their regional innovation infrastructures and to promote interaction between innovative actors. The aim is to improve the realization of the value of local resources for economic purposes, in other words to generate more innovations out of existing infrastructure and personal resources and, from innovations, to generate more innovations. Finally, the knowledge transfer from knowledge providers (e.g., universities, public research institutions) to knowledge recipients (private business) needs to be intensiﬁed. Po tentially this is easier at an intraregional level than interregionally, but many barriers between business and academia hinder this process. The most popular policy instruments include business incubators, science parks, technology transfer agencies, start up programs (espe cially dedicated to new technology intensive ﬁrms). All of these instruments and related strategies need a great deal of time before they (may) become successful. Em pirical studies of high tech regions such as Silicon Valley (USA), Greater Boston (USA), the ‘western crescent’ to the west of London (UK), Munich (Germany), and Shanghai (China) have demonstrated, however, that policy matters. However, this policy dividend is often not the result of explicit regional innovation policy, but far rather of implicit innovation policy (without any regional goals, but regional effects). The effects of military R&D expenditure by Department of Defense and NASA in the US in the 1950s on the genesis of Silicon Valley are clear proof of this.

See also: Agglomeration; Diffusion; Embeddedness; Knowledge Economy; Regional Innovation Systems; Technology and Regional Development.

Further Reading Asheim, B. and Gertler, M. (2005). The geography of innovation: Regional innovation systems. In Fagerberg, J., Mowery, D. C. & Nelson, R. R. (eds.) The Oxford handbook of innovation (1st ed). pp 291 317. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Camagni, R. (ed.) (1991). Innovation networks: Spatial perspectives. London: Belhaven Press. Castells, M. (1999). The information age: Economy, society and culture. Oxford: Blackwell. Cohen, W. and Levinthal, D. A. (1991). Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on learning and innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly 35, 128 152. Feldman, M. (1994). Geography of innovation. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Hagerstrand, T. (1967). Innovation diffusion as a spatial process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Jaffe, A. B., Traijtenberg, M. and Henderson, R. (1993). Geographic localization of knowledge spillovers as evidenced by patent citations. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 577 598. Lambooy, J. (2005). Innovation and knowledge: Theory and regional policy. European Planning Studies 13, 1137 1152. Malecki, E. J. (1991). Technology and economic development: The dynamics of local, regional, and national change. New York: Wiley. Malmberg, A. and Maskell, P. (2002). The elusive concept of localization economies: Towards a knowledge based theory of spatial clustering. Environment and Planning A 34, 429 449. Morgan, K. (1997). The learning region: Institutions, innovation and regional renewal. Regional Studies 31, 329 343. Ratti, R., Bramanti, A. and Gordon, R. (eds.) (1997). The dynamics of innovative regions: The GREMI approach. Aldershot: Ashgate. Simmie, J. (2005). Innovation and space. Regional Studies 39, 789 804. Sternberg, R. (1996). Government R&D expenditure and space: Empirical evidence from ﬁve advanced industrial economies. Research Policy 25, 741 758. Sternberg, R. (1997). New industrial spaces and national technology policies The case of Kyushu and the Japanese ‘Technopolis’ Strategy. In Simmie, J. (ed.) Innovation, networks and learning regions?, pp 159 177 ( Regional Policy and Development 18). London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers. Sternberg, R. (1998). Technologiepolitik und High Tech Regionen ein internationaler Vergleich (Technology policies and high tech regions an international comparison), 2nd edn (Wirtschaftsgeographie, Vol. 7). Munster, Hamburg: Lit. Sternberg, R. and Arndt, O. (2001). The ﬁrm or the region: What determines the innovation of European ﬁrms? Economic Geography 77, 364 382. Sternberg, R. and Tama´sy, C. (1999). Munich as Germany’s No.1 high technology region Empirical evidence, theoretical explanations and the role of small ﬁrm/large ﬁrm relationships. Regional Studies 33, 367 377.

Relevant Websites www.druid.dk Danish Research Unit for Industrial Dynamics. http://cordis.europa.eu/innovation policy/studies/ European Commission Cordis.

Input–Output Analysis G. J. D. Hewings, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL, USA M. Sonis, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL, USA, and Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Backward and Forward Linkages The purchases and sales relationships for a sector. Computable General Equilibrium More extensive models, incorporating both supply and demand responses and in which input–output systems are embedded. Economic Landscape Presentation of the Leontief matrix in a hierarchical form. Interindustry Transactions Sales and purchases relationships between sectors. Key Sectors Sectors whose change in production would generate an above-average impact on the economy. Leontief Inverse Matrix The matrix showing the direct and indirect relationships between all sectors. Multiplier The ripple effect on the whole economy generated by a change in one or more sectors.

Input–Output Analysis All economies are characterized by a degree of inter dependence between ﬁrms, households, and government; the input–output system of accounts provides a frame work for measuring the strength of these linkages. From these accounting systems, an input–output model can be developed to trace the way in which changes in one part of the system affect the whole economy. Most recent developments have placed the input–output accounts within computable general equilibrium and other more integrated models that enable consideration of both supply and demand changes within the economy. Further research has explored dynamic versions of these models as well as their presentation within multiregional frameworks to capture interdependencies over space.

Introduction The progenitor of input–output analysis, Wassily Leon tief, was able to translate Leon Walras’ ideas for a general equilibrium framework for the economy into a formal model. One of the fundamental questions that needs to be answered about an economy centers on its structure. However, there is very little consensus about what is meant by the term structure and how it might be inter preted. Many analysts resort to descriptions based on

sectoral shares of total output, drawing on the ideas of Kuznets, Williamson, and others. However, these de scriptions provide little guidance to the nature and strength of the interactions between these sectors. Are they connected, in what ways, and how strong are these connections? The input–output table and associated model provide one important set of economic data that can contribute some answers to these questions. Essentially, the purchases and sales relationships of all establishments (referred to as interindustry transactions) are aggregated into broad sectors based on the nature of the commodities produced in the plants or the services provided (for nonphysical commodities). These transac tions are then arranged in a matrix, as shown in Table 1. The sales made by each sector to the other sectors are shown in the rows; the purchases made by each sector can be examined from inspection of the columns. In addition to transactions between sectors themselves, sales are also made to a category referred to as ﬁnal demand; included here would be households, governments, and exports outside the nation or the region being considered. Similarly, to produce their products or provide services, the sectors employ labor and capital as well as import some of the needed items. This double entry accounting system is balanced in that total sales are equal to total purchases for each sector; in the example shown, all sectors have the same level of production but this would not be the case in a real economy. Table 1 may be considered as the set of accounts for an economy; using this base, it is now possible to create a model of this economy. First, it is assumed that the interindustry transactions are endogenous, while (ini tially at least) ﬁnal demand is exogenous. Second, the recipe by which each sector makes its products or ser vices is assumed to be ﬁxed over all levels of production. We assume that each sector produces goods and services according to a ﬁxed recipe (formally known as a pro duction function); hence, to produce $1 million worth of steel, we assume a ﬁxed proportion will be allocated to inputs such as limestone, iron ore, scrap, energy, coke, labor, and so forth. Inputs are expressed in monetary terms since it would be difﬁcult to combine tons of iron ore with megawatts of electricity, or hours of labor in some consistent fashion. This ﬁxed recipe enables us to express the transactions in proportional form, known as direct coefﬁcients; these are shown in Table 2. We used a simple case in which each sector’s output was $100 mil lion; to obtain the direct coefﬁcients, we divide the

491

492

Input–Output Analysis

Table 1

The input output table Interindustry transactions

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Sector 1 2 3 4 5 Total intermediate Value added Imports Total inputs

Table 2

1 21 1 3 31 10 66 20 14 100

2 0 8 20 2 25 55 40 5 100

3 9 7 0 38 26 80 10 10 100

4 3 29 50 0 1 83 17 0 100

Final demand

5 0 0 7 3 4 14 40 46 100

Households

Government

Exports

Total ﬁnal demand

Total sales

6 30 25 5 12 9 81 2 77 160

7 15 7 9 13 19 63 62 55 180

8 22 23 6 1 6

9 67 55 20 26 34

10 100 100 100 100 100

Input of iron ore

The recipe for production by sector

Sector 1 2 3 4 5

1 0.21 0.01 0.03 0.31 0.10

2 0.00 0.08 0.20 0.02 0.25

3 0.09 0.07 0.00 0.38 0.26

4 0.03 0.29 0.50 0.00 0.01

5 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.04

entries in the 5 5 part of Table 1 by 100. We further assume that these proportions are invariant with levels of production (i.e., no economies of scale – see Figure 1) and that substitution is not permitted.

Given the structure and assumptions described above, we are now ready to develop the input–output model. Let T describe the 5 5 transactions table from Table 1; let x be a 1 5 vector of total production levels by sector and let f be a 1 5 vector of total ﬁnal demands (column 9 in Table 1). The row balance for the table may be pre sented as: ½1

Now deﬁne A as a 5 5 matrix of input coefﬁcients (essentially the entries in Table 2) thus providing the relationship: T ¼ Ax

½2

Substituting eqn [2] into [1], we have Ax þ f ¼ x

½3

Further manipulation yields: x

Ax ¼ f

ðI AÞx ¼ f x ¼ ðI AÞ 1 f

200 units of steel 100 units of steel

10 units ore

Input of coal 40 units coal

The Input–Output Model

T þf ¼x

20 units ore

½4

80 units coal

Figure 1 Input combinations are ﬁxed over all levels of production.

The last entry in eqn [4] may be read as follows: total production is equal to ﬁnal demand premultiplied by a (multiplier) matrix that essentially captures the direct and indirect linkages of each sector to every other sector. It is referred to as the Leontief inverse matrix and is shown in Table 3. The entries reveal the direct and in direct impacts on a sector when ﬁnal demand in the sector at the top of the column changes by $1 (or $1 million or $100 million). From Table 2, sector 3 pur chased $0.09 for every $1 of production from sector 1; in Table 3, the corresponding entry is $0.18. When sector 3 buys goods from sector 1, sector 1’s production increases and this, in turn, generates additional demands on other sectors and eventually some of these sectors will require further inputs from sector 1. The difference in the cor responding entries in Tables 2 and 3 are the indirect effects. At the bottom of the multiplier table there is a row labeled multiplier; note that these values vary from 1.37 (sector 5) to 3.23 (sector 4). These entries provide information on the impact on the rest of the economy (including the sector in question) of a unit change in ﬁnal demand in any sector. The value 2.98 for sector 3 tells us

Input–Output Analysis

Table 3

multipliers or the sum of all row multipliers:

The Leontief inverse matrix

Sector

1 1.33 0.23 0.40 0.58 0.31 2.85

1 2 3 4 5 Multiplier

2 0.05 1.17 0.36 0.19 0.41 2.18

3 0.18 0.30 1.41 0.61 0.48 2.98

4 0.15 0.50 0.82 1.38 0.38 3.23

5 0.02 0.04 0.13 0.09 1.09 1.37

that for every increase of $1 in ﬁnal demand in that sector an additional 1.98 worth of activity is generated for a total value of production of 2.98. Why do these values vary? They reﬂect the degree to which a sector is dependent on other sectors in the economy for its inputs and as a source of consumption for its products and they also depend on the structure of production (the recipe). Multipliers not only vary by sector they also vary by economy; small, regional economies that are very open would tend to have smaller multipliers since they may be more dependent on input sources outside the region and also sell a signiﬁcant portion of their production to de manders outside the region.

V ¼

n X j 1

Using the Input–Output Model In the Leontief inverse matrix, each sector is directly and indirectly linked with all other sectors. For each sector i, these linkages are divided into two different types: ‘backward linkages’ describing the direct and indirect economic inputs of other sectors into sector i, and ‘for ward linkages’ describing the direct and indirect eco nomic inputs of sector i into all other sectors. The backward linkages of sector i are associated with the column i and its forward linkages are associated with the row i of the Leontief inverse. Therefore, the overall intensity of backward and forward linkages of sector i can be measured as sums of the components of the ith column and the ith row of the Leontief inverse. Thus, the column and row multipliers of the Leontief matrix B ¼ bij can be deﬁned as: n X

bsi ; Bid ¼

s 1

n X

½5

bis

s 1

In vector notation, the row vector of column multi pliers and the column vector of row multipliers may be presented as follows: 0

Mdc ¼ Bd1

Bd2

y

B1d

1

BB C B 2d C Bdn ; Mr d ¼ B C @ : A

½6

Bnd

The global intensity of the backward and forward linkages of the Leontief inverse is the sum of all column

Bdj ¼

n X i 1

Bid ¼

n X

bij

½7

i; j 1

and the average multiplier is equal to V/n. These characterizations can be used to identify key sectors, those that create an above average impact on the rest of economy. Two main types of indices have been proposed: 1. Power of dispersion for the backward linkages, measur ing the degree to which a change in the sector of reference is greater than the average for all sectors: BLj ¼

n n 1X 1 X bij = 2 bij ¼ n Bdj =V ni 1 n i;j 1

½8

2. Sensitivity of dispersion for forward linkages, measuring the degree to which a unit change in all sectors’ ﬁnal demand would create an above average increase in output in the sector of reference: FLi ¼

Bdi ¼

493

n n 1X 1 X 1 bij = 2 bij ¼ Bid = V nj 1 n i;j 1 n

½9

Moreover, the sum of all backward linkages and the sum of all forward linkages are equal to n, and the average linkage is equal to 1. Table 4 presents the Leontief inverse, column and row multipliers and backward and forward linkages cal culated for the regional input–output system. Arranging the row vector of column multipliers according to their size, we have the row vector of the rank size hierarchy of column multipliers where the roman ﬁgures I, y, V de note the ranking of these multipliers by size. The cor responding rank size hierarchy of backward linkages is also shown in Table 4. A similar organization of the row multipliers can be presented in the same table. The usual interpretation is that a backward linkage index BLj41 indicates that the corresponding column multiplier Bdj is larger than the average column multiplier and, therefore, a unit change in ﬁnal demand in sector j will create an above average increase in the economy. Similarly, for the forward linkage index FLi41, the corresponding row multiplier FLi is larger than the average row multiplier, and, thus, a unit change in all sectors’ ﬁnal demand (in cluding sector i ) would create an above average increase in sector i. Using these hierarchies of backward and forward linkages, we can divide sectors into four groups: (1) sector i is considered a ‘key sector’ if BLi41 and FLi41; (2) sector i is considered as ‘a backward linkages oriented sector’ if BLi41 and FLio1; (3) sector i is deﬁned as ‘a forward linkages oriented sector’ if BLio1 and FLi41;

494 Table 4

Input–Output Analysis

Linkages and key sectors Leontief inverse

Row multipliers

Sectors

1

2

3

4

5

1 2 3 4 5

1.33 0.23 0.40 0.58 0.31

0.05 1.17 0.36 0.19 0.41

0.18 0.30 1.41 0.61 0.48

0.15 0.50 0.82 1.38 0.38

0.02 0.04 0.13 0.09 1.09

Column multipliers

2.85

2.18

2.98

3.23

1.37

Backward linkages

1.13

0.86

1.18

1.28

0.55

Rank-size hierarchy of backward linkages

III

IV

II

I

V

1.73 2.24 3.12 2.85 2.67 V

Forward linkages

Rank-size hierarchy of forward linkages

0.69 0.89 1.24 1.13 1.05

V IV I II III

12.61

1.4 Forward linked sectors

Key sectors 3

1.2

Forward linkages

4

5

1

Backward linked sectors

Weakly linked sectors 2

0.8

1

0.6

0.4

0.2

0 0

0.2

0.4

0.6 0.8 Backward linkages

1

1.2

1.4

Figure 2 Classiﬁcation of sectors.

and (4) sector i with both backward and forward linkages o1, is considered as a ‘weak linkages oriented sector’. Figure 2 presents a graphical illustration of the above concepts, where each sector i is represented by the point i with coordinates (BLi, FLi). There are two key sectors (3 and 4), the forward oriented sector (5), a backward oriented sector (1), and a weakly oriented sector (2). It should be noted that the above classiﬁcation of the economic sectors can be useful for the characterization of economic structure and structural change of the input– output system. For example, how does the classiﬁcation of sectors in this economy compare with those for other economies? To what degree can these differences be explained by differences in resource endowments, dif ferent growth paths, or varying dependencies on internal and external markets? Furthermore, the classiﬁcation, applied at different points in time for the same economy,

will provide one perspective on the evolution of that economy over time.

Multiplier Product Matrix and Structural Economic Landscape This section provides a new framework for key sector analysis based on the introduction of a new theoretical tool, the ‘multiplier product matrix’ (MPM). MPM is derived from the products of the corresponding column and row multipliers of the Leontief inverse and provides a presen tation of key sector analysis of backward and forward linkages in the visual form of a macroeconomic photograph (economic landscape) of the structure of an economy, providing a basis for the comparison of structures of dif ferent economies or the same economy over time.

Input–Output Analysis

Input–Output Analysis and Structural Change

The mij of the multiplier product matrix components M ¼ mij have the form: mij ¼

Bid Bdj V

Leontief suggested four basic concepts of structural an alysis that could be revealed from an examination of input–output tables: dependence and independence, hierarchy, and circularity. Dependence and independ ence are determined by the presence or absence of interindustry transactions. The more cells that are ﬁlled, that is, the more interindustry transactions in a system, the more dependent the industries are on each other. A case of complete dependence occurs when all the cells are greater than zero, generating a system of mutual direct dependence. In this case, an increase in the ﬁnal demand of any sector will generate interindustry trans actions that will affect, directly and indirectly, the output of all other sectors without exception. The chain of ef fects will be circular, in a sense that the sector that provokes the initial increase will receive back, indirectly, some response to the stimulus that it produces. However, in most cases, the system is characterized by one in which not only some but the majority of the cells are empty. One can rearrange the rows and columns of the original table in an intentionally predeﬁned way, in order to identify the hierarchical pattern of the system. In general, this procedure leads to a triangulated pattern that rep resents, analytically, a system where the effects of chan ges in the ﬁnal demand spread from the upper sectors to the lower ones, whereas the reactions in the opposite direction are very limited. In such a system, a hierarchy is

½10

It is important to underline that the column and row multipliers of the MPM are the same as those of the Leontief inverse: n X j 1

mij ¼

n X Bid Bdj j 1

V

¼ Bid ;

n X

mij ¼

i 1

n X Bid Bdj i 1

V

¼ Bdj

½11

Essentially the components of the MPM are arranged in a hierarchical fashion from the northwest to the southeast corner of Figure 3. This ordering also preserves the rank size hierarchy of sectors developed in Table 4. Essentially, MPM is presented as a three dimensional picture of the economy; by careful manipulation of the row and column orderings, it is possible to directly compare the economic structure of several economies. By preserving the ordering of the rows and columns de veloped over one time period, it is possible to visualize how the structure has changed over time. It is also pos sible to compare two economies. Figure 4 compares the structure of two large Chinese metropolitan economies – Shanghai and Beijing. Using the former as the base, it is possible to see how Beijing differs – the economy is much more homogeneous than Shanghai and the rank order ings of the importance of transactions vary.

0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3

yo

5 1

rch

2 rs

multiplie

Hi

5 y of row

era

4 Hierarch

fc

2

olu

Figure 3 The economic structure interpreted by the multiplier product matrix.

mu

1 0

mn

3

ltip

4 0.1

lie

rs

0.2

3

495

496

Input–Output Analysis

0.40

0.30

0.20

0.20

0.10

0.10 10

0.30

6

6

Beijing 1987 ‘landscape’ using Shanghai-imposed hierarchy

10

1

17

16

15

18

15

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15

7

10

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6

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7

8

0.00

8

10

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Shanghai 1987: The MPM cross-structure ‘landscape’

0.40

0.40 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15

0.10

0.10 0.05

6

0.00 18

10

6

2

7

8

Co lu ba mn h ckw ie ard rarc link hy o ag f es

15

15

1

17

16

14

rd

backwa rchy of ra ie h w s Ro linkage

10

0.20 0.15

0.00

7

(b)

0.30

0.05

9

Co lu bac mn h kw i ard erarc link hy o age f s

0.35

0.25

10

12

11

10

0.35

(c)

of rchy s hiera Row rd linkage a foww

Figure 4 Comparison of two economies, Shanghai and Beijing (using Shanghai’s hierarchy), 1987.

established, where the upper sectors are buyers while the lower ones can be characterized as suppliers. Researchers have used the triangulation process to identify those properties and to compare the internal structure of the interindustry transactions of the US and Western Europe economies. More recent analysis has used the input–output system to unravel the contri butions that changes in technology and changes in de mand have made to changes in production in economies. In developed economies, it would appear that changes in demand – both in terms of level of demand and allocation across sectors – have been more important than changes in technology. In developing economies, the latter com ponent is much more important, as these economies embrace newer, more sophisticated technology. However, even in these economies, changes in demand are still extremely important. Even though input–output tables have been produced for a large number of national and regional economies, there has been relatively little work exploring the nature of similarity or differences in structure across these

economies. Some researchers have proposed methods to slice the transactions in a hierarchical way to reveal the structure of different levels of interaction; in some very open economies, a small number of slices account for a large percentage of the transactions. This work has also been linked to external linkages, exploring the role of trade in the transformation of economic structure.

Applications of Input–Output Models The range of applications of input–output models is extensive. They have been used to help economies re cover from serious shortages (e.g., the post World War II recovery in the US) and to assist in the articulation of development strategies to simple exercises designed to measure the contribution of a new ﬁrm to an economy or the loss of an existing ﬁrm. Much of the focus of these exercises centers on the estimation of the multiplier ef fects; in challenging ﬁscal conditions, input–output models have often been used to estimate the tax

Input–Output Analysis

implications of alternative strategies or the contribution that might be made through the reallocation of resources from one program to another. During the 1970s and 1980s when there was a great deal of attention directed to regional development strategy based on growth centers, input–output models were in great demand. More re cently, the models have been employed in the evaluation of competitiveness studies and their associated cluster based initiatives. These analyses move beyond simple consideration of linkages and agglomeration to consider the strategic contributions of supply chains in promoting economic development of targeted industries.

Input–Output in More Extensive Systems Input–output components are now more often nested within broader modeling frameworks; these would in clude computable general equilibrium models (CGE), econometric input–output models, and linear program ming models. These developments have preserved the advantages of the input–output framework (e.g., the focus on interdependency) while introducing more ﬂexibility into the way in which the production system is modeled. In CGE models, substitution is allowed, scale economies can be introduced, and consideration given to different market structures (imperfect competition or monopol istic competition). Further, some attempts have been made to integrate the developments in the new economic geography with spatial general equilibrium models; one avenue has explored this in an interregional context in which ﬂows of goods between regions are moved over a transportation network rather than in a topology of re gion links that does not differentiate distance, congestion, or capacity constraints. The econometric input–output framework provides the capability to combine the sectoral detail of the input– output structure within an econometric system, thus providing both impact analysis and forecasting capabil ities. These models have also been used to examine the impacts of alternative visions of the future of the econ omy. As with all forecasting systems, considerable effort is placed on forecasts of the exogenous components of the model but, equally, attention is also directed to the mechanisms of structural change – including changes in technology, the quality, quantity, and variety of goods or services produced and, at the regional level, the location of inputs and markets. These models have been used to examine issues such as the hollowing out of regional and national economies (decrease in dependence on local sources of supply and markets) and the fragmentation of production systems to exploit scale economies as a result of decreases in transportation costs. A further development is in the integration of input– output systems into extensive models to address the ana

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lysis of unexpected events, such as climate incidents or earthquakes. The challenges here are often to link the essentially macroeconomic character of the input–output framework with networked structures in which the time dimension assumes a critical role. Recovery from earth quake disruptions, major ﬂoods, or other catastrophes often requires careful consideration of the optimal allo cation of resources to ensure restoration of the economy as quickly as possible. The inherent advantage of the input–output system in charting the links between sec tors proves to be of considerable value; recent develop ments have transformed these models from annual to quarterly or even continuous time formulations to make the linkage with continuous time network systems (such as electricity or water supplies) more realistic and valuable. Development in computer technology now offers the possibility of developing models with hundreds or even thousands of equations. One area under development is the presentation of results in more graphical formats and the use of geographical information systems to provide attractive, ﬂexible formats for data retrieval and speciﬁ cation of the spatial structure of the models. See also: Industrialization; Quantitative Data; Quantitative Methodologies.

Further Reading Bacharach, M. (1970). Biproportional Matrices and Input Output Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bergman, E. M. and Feser, E. J. (nd). Industrial and Regional Clusters: Concepts and Comparative Applications. http:// www.rri.wvu.edu/WebBook/Bergman Feser/contents.htm (ac cessed June 2008). Brocker, J. (1998). Operational spatial computable general equilibrium modeling. Annals of Regional Science 32, 367 387. Cooper, R. J., Donaghy, K. P. and Hewings, G. J. D. (eds.) (2007). Globalization and Regional Economic Modeling. Heidelberg: Springer. Dewhurst, J. J. L. I., Hewings, G. J. D. and Jensen, R. C. (eds.) (1991). Regional Input Output Modelling: New Developments and Interpretations. Aldershot: Avebury. Doi, M. (ed.) (2006). Computable General Equilibrium Approaches in Urban and Regional Policy Studies. Hackensack, NJ: World Scientiﬁc. Hewings, G. J. D. and Madden, M. (eds.) (1995). Social and Demographic Accounting. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hewings, G. J. D., Sonis, M. and Boyce, D. (eds.) (2002). Trade, Networks, and Hierarchies. Heidelberg: Springer. Hewings, G. J. D., Sonis, M., Madden, M. and Kimura, Y. (eds.) (1999). Understanding and Interpreting Economic Structure. Heidelberg: Springer. Leontief, W. W. (1986). Input Output Economics (2nd edn.). New York: Oxford University Press. Miller, R. E. and Blair, P. D. (1985). Input Output Analysis: Foundations and Extensions. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Miller, R. E., Polenske, K. R. and Rose, A. Z. (eds.) (1999). Frontiers of Input Output Analysis. New York: Oxford University Press. Morishima, M. (2002). Equilibrium, Stability and Growth A Multi Sectoral Analysis (2nd edn.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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Okamoto, N. and Ihara, T. (2005). Spatial Structure and Regional Development in China: Interregional Input Output Approach. Tokyo: Institute for Developing Economies. Roy, J. (2004). Spatial Interaction Modeling. Heidelberg: Springer. Ten Raa, T. (2006). The Economics of Input Output Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Treyz, G., Rickman, D. and Shao, G. (1992). The REMI economic demographic forecasting and simulation model. International Regional Science Review 14, 221 254. Web Book of Regional Science, Industrial and Regional Clusters; Regional Impact Models; Keystone Sector Identiﬁcation http:// www.rri.wvu.edu/regscweb.htm (accessed June 2008).

Institutionalism/Institutional Geographies D. Mackinnon, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, UK & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Embeddedness A concept which highlights how particular forms of economic activity are grounded or rooted in particular places. Governmentality An approach, derived from Foucault’s later work, that focuses on the techniques and rationalities (mentalities) which governments deploy to govern their subject populations. Institutional Thickness The notion that the role and quality of institutions in a region is a determining factor in economic development. Mode of Regulation A concept developed by the French regulationist school of political economy which emphasizes the role of wider processes of social regulation in stabilizing and sustaining capitalism. Neoliberalism A political and economic framework that seeks to reduce state intervention and embrace the free market, stressing the virtues of enterprise, competition, and individual self-reliance. Path Dependency A concept adopted from institutional and evolutionary economics which highlights the inﬂuence of past decisions and experiences in shaping how economic actors respond to wider processes of economic change. Post-Structuralism A set of theories derived from philosophy and literary and cultural studies which stress the fractured identities of individual subjects, seeing these as products of broader social categories and discourses. Regime of Accumulation Another key regulationist term, referring to a relatively stable form of economic organization which structures particular periods of capitalist development, based on a balance between production and consumption. Structuration Theory A sociological theory developed by Anthony Giddens in the 1980s which sought to integrate an emphasis on wider social structures with an understanding of individual actions.

Introduction Institutions have become an important focus of interest in contemporary human geography, informed by various strands of institutionalist thought. Institutions can be deﬁned as both formal organizations such as government agencies, corporations and voluntary bodies, and broader sets of habits, rules, and values that structure people’s

actions. The term tends to emphasize taken for granted behavior and practices that have become routine and normalized. Geographical research generally examines the role of institutions in structuring the management and organization of space. Geographers are particularly interested in the spatial scales or levels of activity at which institutions operate, ranging from the local and regional to the national, international, and global. Insti tutionalism refers to any strand of thought that is cen trally concerned with the role of institutions in shaping social life. In many cases, human geographers have adapted institutionalist theories originally developed in other social sciences and humanities such as economics, sociology, political science, philosophy, and literature. Three different forms of the claim that ‘institutions matter’ are identiﬁed by the sociologist Bob Jessop. First, the notion that institutions are important in a thematic sense as a key focus of research. Second, a methodo logical claim that institutions provide a useful entry point for researching different aspects of social life. Finally, an ontological claim that institutions are a fundamental part of human existence. Much geographical research on in stitutions is thematic or methodological in nature, al though some of the theories imported from other disciplines make strong ontological claims (e.g., insti tutional economics, the regulation approach, and struc turation theory). Geographical research on institutions in the 1970s and early 1980s tended to regard institutions as synonymous with organizations. One key expression of this work was an edited book, entitled Institutions and Geographical Pat terns, published in 1982. Here, institutions covered bodies such as building societies, local authorities, development agencies, banks and pension funds, and planning au thorities. The main focus was on how such organizations shaped the geographical landscape through particular decisions and interventions, considering, for example, how private corporations and development agencies shaped patterns of industrial location. Such concerns overlapped with another key strand of 1970s and 1980s ‘institutionalism’: namely the managerialist school of urban research which assessed the role of urban managers and ‘gatekeepers’ in shaping urban land and housing markets. The main institutions of interest here were building societies, local authorities, estate agents, and property developers. Interestingly, the adoption of an ‘institutional approach’ tended to be viewed as a middle or ‘third’ way between privileging either general theory or particular examples and observations. In contrast to

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the prevailing philosophies of spatial science and hu manistic geography which stressed the importance of general processes and individual actors respectively, in stitutionalism provided a ‘methodological’ framework for linking particular case studies to wider concerns.

Institutions and Economic Geography In contrast to mainstream neoclassical economics, eco nomic geographers tend to emphasize the institutional foundations of markets, recognizing that the economy is shaped by a wide range of institutional forms and prac tices. Drawing upon the ‘old’ institutional economics of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (rather than the ‘new’ (neoclassically oriented) institutionalism developed by mainstream economists), institutions are deﬁned as sets of rules, habits, and values, although dis tinct organizations such as ﬁrms and development agencies have tended to be emphasized in much eco nomic geography research. The focus on institutions represents a key dimension of the shift toward a more culturally informed economic geography, in contrast to the reliance on economic categories derived from neo classical and Marxist thought in the 1970s and 1980s. Economic geographers are particularly interested in how local and regional economies are shaped by distinctive institutional arrangements. This has encouraged the rise of a ‘new regionalism’ which examines the effects of so cial and cultural conditions within regions in helping to promote or hinder economic growth. Successful regions such as Silicon Valley in California, Northeastern and Central Italy, and Baden Wurttemberg in Southern Germany have attracted particular attention, as eco nomic geographers have attempted to identify the social and cultural foundations of economic growth and prosperity. The regulation approach, developed by French economists in the 1970s, has focused attention on the role of particular institutional ‘supports’ in stabilizing capit alism, allowing periods of sustained growth to occur. These institutional ‘supports’ are understood in terms of the mode of regulation, referring to the norms and conventions which shape the process of capitalist devel opment. Key aspects of capitalism upon which regulation is focused include labor and the wage relation, forms of competition and business organization, the monetary system, the state, and the international regime. When these different objects of regulation are linked together in a coherent fashion – achieving a balanced relationship between production and consumption – a period of stable growth, known as a regime of accumulation, ensues. The key regime of accumulation identiﬁed by regulationists is Fordism, prevalent between the 1940s and the 1970s in Western Europe and North America primarily. It was

based on mass production and mass consumption, linked through rising wages for workers and increased prod uctivity in the workplace. After the breakup of Fordism in the 1970s and early 1980s, elements of a new ‘post Fordist’ regime of accumulation based on ﬂexible pro duction emerged. Regulationist work in geography in the mid to late 1990s moved away from the Fordist/post Fordist debate, however, recasting regulation as an un even process grounded in a range of different spaces of regulation and highlighting the role of local state agen cies in mediating between local conditions and national regulatory frameworks. In addition to the theoretical inﬂuence of institutional economics and the regulation approach, the emphasis on institutions has been reinforced by studies of industrial districts in the 1980s. Drawing on the earlier writings of the English economist, Alfred Marshall, this work draws attention to the renaissance of industrial districts within developed countries, such as Italy, France, Japan, Denmark, and Spain, involving a revival of local craft traditions and skills. The districts of Central and Northeastern Italy became particularly emblematic (Figure 1), becoming known as the ‘Third Italy’ (in contrast to the rich, industrial North and the poor, agrarian South). A key theme concerned the role of wider institutional and sociocultural factors in supporting net works of small ﬁrms and entrepreneurs. A dense network of local authorities, labor unions, industry associations, and chambers of commerce developed a sophisticated reservoir of knowledge, skills, and resources and pro vided business premises and a range of services to small ﬁrms. A related set of ideas from economic sociology have been utilized to argue that the economy is always grounded in social relations, particularly Karl Polanyi’s conception of ‘the economy as an instituted process’. Geographers have ‘spatialized’ the sociological concept of ‘embeddedness’, emphasizing how particular forms of economic activity are not only grounded in social re lations, but also rooted in particular places. Such ‘embeddedness’ has been linked to a focus on the role of local institutions in mobilizing resources for develop ment. A key contribution here is Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift’s concept of ‘institutional thickness’. Four levels of ‘institutionalization’ are identiﬁed: the number of insti tutions present; the degree of interinstitutional inter action; the formation of coalitions; and the development of a common agenda incorporating key institutions and actors. Another strand of research on learning regions stresses the importance of path dependency and the role of institutions in shaping economic development trajec tories. Path dependency means that the ways in which economic actors respond to wider processes of economic change are shaped and informed by past decisions and experiences. Reﬂecting its ‘new regionalist’ outlook, the

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Figure 1 Industrial districts in Italy. Reproduced from Amin, A. (2000). ‘Industrial districts’. In Sheppard, E. & Barnes, T. J. (eds.) A Companion to Economic Geography, pp 149 168. Oxford: Blackwell, with permission from Blackwell Publishing.

learning regions approach argues that globalization is encouraging the emergence of new forms of the spatial agglomeration or clustering of economic activity based on knowledge creation. Geographical proximity allows ﬁrms to transmit tacit forms of knowledge based on direct experience and expertise through face to face com munication, supported by a range of informal conven tions and ties (institutions in the broader sense). While institutionalism and the ‘new regionalism’ have been highly inﬂuential in economic geography since the late 1980s, they have also attracted some criticism in re cent years. Both the institutional thickness and learning regions’ literatures have been criticized for failing to ad equately specify the mechanisms which link insti tutionalization and agglomeration as processes to regional growth and learning as outcomes. More fundamentally perhaps, the underlying focus on regions as bounded spatial units has been called into question by the ‘re lational turn’ in economic geography which emphasizes the importance of the broader networks and relations that link different places in an increasingly globalized world. Accordingly, the focus on local relationships between ﬁrms and institutions has been supplemented by a new

concern with the role of extraregional networks in linking ﬁrms to distant sources of information and support.

Institutional Geographies of Social Welfare and Control Institutions have also been a major focus of research in social geography since the 1980s, particularly in work on practices of social welfare and control. In particular, such research has concentrated on institutional spaces such as prisons, hospitals, asylums, and workhouses established to house those regarded as different or deviant in relation to mainstream society – ‘the mad, the bad, and the sad’. This body of research investigates institutions in a very direct and immediate sense as actual physical buildings and sites which have sought to restrain, control, treat, and cure patients according to prevailing conventions and norms. Much of this work is strongly historical in nature, tracing the establishment and development of institutions in the late eighteenth and nineteenth cen turies as part of the emergence of modern society and the bureaucratic state. The key theoretical inspiration here is

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the work of the French post structuralist philosopher Michel Foucault, characterized by a general concern with the production or formation of human subjects through wider social and institutional processes. Distinguishing between the categories of ‘same’ and ‘other’, Foucault was particularly interested in understanding the operation of modern society through the classiﬁcation, isolation, and disciplining of those seen as abnormal or deviant. A key element was the movement away from the physical punishment of the deviant and criminal (a characteristic of premodern times) to an effort to cure and treat such groups in line with modern principles of legality. Interestingly, the need for the geographical separation or seclusion of the deviant became a major theme, in contrast to the premodern era when they tend to be mixed in with the broader community or housed in general purpose prisons. For example, Miles Ogburn assessed the separate conﬁnement of prisoners as a cor nerstone of penal policy in the nineteenth century in the United Kingdom (UK). Similarly, Chris Philo examined the growth of a ‘medico moral’ discourse of nineteenth century professionals which argued for the establishment of separate asylums to regulate and treat the insane, something which shaped the institutional geography of the so called ‘mad business’. A third example, analyzed by Felix Driver, concerns the growth of workhouses in England and Wales following the 1834 Poor Law, both reﬂecting and contributing to the expansion of the state through the collection and control of information and the standardization of bureaucratic practices. A key element in this process was the replacement of a complex array of private, charitable, and locally run facilities with a ra tional, integrated, and state controlled system of insti tutions (Figure 2). Accordingly, geographical uniformity would replace local differences with the legitimacy of the state depending on the consistent application of its pol icies throughout the territory. The role of central state agencies and inspectors was crucial, although standard ization was often resisted by local interests. A distinction between two types of institutional geographies is made by Chris Philo and Hester Parr: a geography of institutions and a geography in institutions. The former involves an assessment of the actual locations of asylum and other facilities in relation to population, settlement, land use, etc. As outlined above, physical or spatial separation from the rest of society has been a key locational principle, with the dominant ‘medico moral’ discourse of the nineteenth century, for instance, em phasizing that asylums should be sited in tranquil rural environments where attractive surroundings, coupled with some gentle agricultural labor, would be therapeutic for inmates. Other work has focused on the location of mental health facilities in urban areas in the post war period, examining the impacts on, and attitudes of, surrounding communities. Studies of the internal

Figure 2 The geography of authorized workhouse construction in England and Wales, 1835 39. From Driver, F. (1987). The historical geography of the workhouse system in England and Wales, 1834 1883. Journal of Historical Geography 15(3), 269 286.

micro geography of institutions have, on the other hand, examined the arrangement of inner spaces in order to regulate and rehabilitate patients for their ultimate reintroduction into society. Of central importance here is the image of the panopticon – an institutional design which enables the authorities to observe all prisoners without the latter being able to tell if they are being observed (Figure 3). Developed by the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham in the late eighteenth century, the image of the panopticon was deployed by Foucault in his study of prisons and as a broader metaphor for modern society with its orientation toward observation and regulation. Another strand of research has examined the widespread process of ‘deinsti tutionalization’ in recent decades, something which reﬂects dissatisfaction with the idea of separation as a solution to deviance. Studies have assessed community and voluntary provision and investigated the identities and attachments to place of people with mental health problems and disabilities, employing qualitative methods such as interviews, focus groups, and participant observation.

Institutions and State Restructuring Traditionally, the state represented the key institution of interest in political geography. More recently,

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Figure 3 Panopticon blueprint by Jeremy Bentham, 1791. From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panopticon.

however, work on the state’s role in the organization and management of space – something which can seen as formal ‘large P’ politics – has been supplemented by a focus on more informal ‘small p’ issues in terms of the politics of identity, gender relations, and the growth of social movements. A wider sense of institutions as sets of social and political norms and conventions is discernible in some of this work. At the same time, the conventional focus on government, referring to formal state institutions and bureaucracies, has given way to the broader notion of governance, incorporating various semi and nonstate actors such as special purpose agencies (often known as ‘quangos’ in the UK), private sector corporations, and voluntary bodies. The role of such actors in the management and delivery of services has been sub stantially increased in many countries since the 1980s, reﬂecting, in part, the inﬂuence of neoliberal reform programs. Neoliberalism is a political and economic project which seeks to reduce state intervention in the economy and society and embrace the free market, stressing the virtues of enterprise, competition, and individual self reliance. It was embraced by the United States (US) and the UK in the late 1970s and early 1980s before being adopted by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), who often required developing

countries to introduce neoliberal reforms in exchange for ﬁnancial assistance. Neoliberal policy measures in clude privatization (transferring state owned enterprises into private ownership), liberalization (opening up protected sectors to competition), and de regulation (relaxing the rules and laws under which business oper ates). In theory, neoliberalism stresses the need for ‘de institutionalization’, involving the abolition of existing organizations and rules in favor of market forces. In reality, however, the introduction of neoliberal reforms has required substantial ‘reinstitutionalization’, relying on the establishment of supporting frameworks and norms. Two of the most inﬂuential ‘institutionalist’ theories in recent political geography research are the contrasting approaches of the political sociologists Michael Mann and Bob Jessop. While Mann’s account of the develop ment of the state in relation to the sources of social power has been deployed largely to examine historical aspects of state formation and growth, Jessop’s neo Marxist theories have directly informed political geography re search into contemporary processes of state restructuring. Jessop adopts a broad and inclusive perspective which seeks to place state power in its social, political, and economic context, focusing on the relationship be tween state institutions and social groups. Another

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inﬂuential approach which has inspired recent geo graphical research is the governmentality theory de veloped by Foucault. In broad terms, Foucault understood government as the ‘conduct of conduct’ – the array of techniques, practices, and rationalities (mental ities) that political agencies and authorities have de ployed to govern and shape the activities of their subject populations. More recently, neo Foucauldian writers have sought to analyze advanced liberalism (neoliberal ism) as a distinct political formation. This broad program of government is articulated and enacted through an array of mechanisms, techniques, and procedures which can be referred to as technologies of government. The role of these technologies – embedded in speciﬁc prac tices such as audit, targeting, ﬁnancial management, and business planning – is important in giving central gov ernment the capacity to shape the practices of local agencies ‘from a distance’. A major theme of recent research has been the so called ‘hollowing out’ of the national state, referring to the transfer of functions and responsibilities to other scales and sites of governance. In a heavily cited account, Jessop has identiﬁed three main processes of ‘hollowing out’. First, the denationalization of the state involves the transfer of some responsibilities and functions ‘upwards’ to supranational institutions such as the European Union (EU) and ‘downwards’ to local and regional agencies. Second, the ‘destatization’ of the political system refers to a shift of power ‘outwards’ to various arms length agen cies, private interests, and voluntary bodies. Third, the internationalization of policy regimes involves a growing volume of linkages between national, regional, and local institutions and personnel in different countries. This enables policy transfer as initiatives introduced in one country are taken up and adopted by ofﬁcials in another. Notable examples include privatization and the transfer of workfare initiatives from the US to the UK. While the supranational tier of government has become more prominent, the subnational scale has attracted the most geographical interest. Research has examined the creation of ‘new institutional spaces’ at the local level in the 1980s and 1990s through the establishment of new local state agencies such as Urban Development Corporations, Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) and National Health Service (NHS) Trusts by the Conservative gov ernment in the UK (Figure 4). In an important contri bution, the geographer Jamie Peck argues that geographies of governance emerge out of a process of interaction between new regulatory tendencies at the national level and the preexisting institutional landscape at the local scale. The inﬂuence of preexisting institutional structures in shaping the local implementation of national regulations means that governance takes different forms in different places. Research on the TEC network in England and Wales and local enterprise companies (LECs) in

Scotland and Wales deployed notions of institutional ‘lay ers’ and ‘ﬁlters’ to examine the shifting geographies of governance within the UK. In recent years, devolution has become a key focus of research, particularly in the UK. It represents a key process of state restructuring in many countries since the 1970s and new devolved institutions were established in the UK in 1999. In the latter case, it can be seen as the latest round or ‘layer’ of state regulation, creating new geographies of governance. The notion of the ‘ﬁlling in’ of the state has been developed by a team of British political geographers, arguing that this metaphor can provide a handle on the processes occurring at the re gional level under devolution, compared to ‘hollowing out’ which is focused on the national scale. ‘Filling in’ provides a framework for assessing the reorganization of governance within particular territories, involving the establishment of new institutions and/or the recon ﬁguration of existing ones, a process which has accentu ated the geographical unevenness of the institutional landscape.

Institutions and the Construction of Regions Reﬂecting growing dissatisfaction with both spatial sci ence and structural Marxism, a number of prominent human geographers called for a ‘new’ regional geography in the late 1970s and 1980s. This can be seen as part of a search for a middle way between a focus on general processes and mechanisms and an emphasis on the par ticular and unique. The key theoretical inspiration here was the sociologist Anthony Giddens’ structuration the ory which emphasized the role of regions or ‘locales’ as settings for social interaction where people are socialized into society through various institutional processes, par ticularly education. In this context, the term institutions tended to refer to taken for granted rules, habits, and routines through which society is reproduced. Ultimately, however, Giddens tended to take the existence of regions for granted, failing to consider how they were historically produced and transformed, issues that were exciting the attention of geographers. In addition to Giddens’ struc turation theory, this rediscovery of regional speciﬁcity was linked to a Marxist informed understanding of re gions as local responses to wider capitalist processes and more humanist view of regions or places as the focus for cultural identiﬁcation. One of the most interesting strands of this ‘new’ regional geography is the Finnish political geographer Anssi Paasi’s examination of the construction and institutionalization of regions. Paasi conceptualizes this in terms of four stages: the development of ‘territorial shape’ as regional boundaries and structures are deﬁned;

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Yorkshire & Humbershire 48 Barnsley/Doncaster TEC 49 Bradford & Disitrict TEC 50 Calderdale & Kirklees TEC 51 Humberside TEC 52 Leeds TEC 53 North Yorkshire TEC 54 Rotherham TEC 55 Sheffield TEC 56 Wakefield TEC

South East 1 Essex TEC 2 Hampshire TEC 3 Heart of England TEC 4 Hertfordshire TEC 5 Isle of Wight TEC 6 Kent TEC 7 Milton Keyness & North Bucks TEC 8 Surrey TEC 9 Sussex TEC 10 Thames Valley Enterprise London 11 AZTEC 12 CENTEC 13 CILNTEC 14 London East TEC 15 North London TEC 16 North west London TEC 17 SOLO TEC 18 South Thames TEC 19 West London TEC

North West 57 Bolton/Bury TEC 58 CEW TEC 59 Cumbria TEC 60 ELTEC Ltd 61 LAWTEC 62 Manchester TEC 63 Merseyside TEC 64 METRO TEC (Wigan) Ltd 65 Normid TEC 66 Oldham TEC 67 OUALITEC (St. Helens) Ltd 68 Rochdale TEC 69 South & East Cheshire TEC 70 Stockport/High Peak TEC

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Figure 4 New institutional geographies: the ‘original’ TECs in England. Note: TECs were replaced by Learning and Skills Council in 2001. From Jones, M. (1999). New Institutional Spaces: TECs and the Re-Making of Economic Governance. London: Jessica Kingsley.

the establishment of ‘symbolic shape’ as regional symbols and images enter into the consciousness of the wider society; the emergence of institutions as key agencies of socialization reproducing regional distinct iveness; and the consolidation of the region within

wider social and economic structures as these insti tutionalization processes persist. He emphasizes the re production of regions through collective, institutionally mediated rules and the development of regional consciousness.

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Summary As this article has shown, institutions are an important focus of research in geography. They began to attract signiﬁcant attention in the late 1970s and early 1980s as certain geographers searched for a middle ground be tween spatial science and structural Marxism with their emphasis on general theories and processes and hu manism which focused on individual consciousness and experience. Interest in structuration theory, the regu lation approach, and institutional economics can all be seen as expressions of this search for a middle ground. The inﬂuence of post structuralist theorists like Foucault, by contrast, has emphasized difference and subjectivity, linking to long standing interests in the local and unique within geography. As a result of these diverse inﬂuences and orientations, institutional work in geography exhibits considerable richness and diversity. Much of it combines a sensitivity to difference and agency with an awareness of the broader ‘structural’ forces shaping the organization and management of space. Institutional research has at tracted some criticism, mainly in economic geography, but institutions seem set to remain a central theme of geographical research. Future developments are likely to place more emphasis on the need for engagement with issues of public policy across different policy ﬁelds and geographical scales. See also: Embeddedness; Fordism; Fordism, Post-Fordism and Flexible Specialization; Foucauldianism; Governance; Governmentality; Neoliberalism.

Amin, A. and Thrift, N. (1994). Living in the global. In Amin, A. & Thrift, N. (eds.) Globalisation, Institutions and Regional Development in Europe, pp 1 22. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Driver, F. (1989). The historical geography of the workhouse system in England and Wales, 1834 1883. Journal of Historical Geography 15, 269 286. Flowerdew, R. (1982). Institutions and Geographical Patterns. London: Croon Helm. Jessop, B. (1994). Post Fordism and the state. In Amin, A. (ed.) Post Fordism: A Reader, pp 251 279. Oxford: Blackwell. Jessop, B. (2001). Institutional re(turns) and the strategic relational approach. Environment and Planning A 33, 1213 1235. Jones, M. (1999). New Institutional Spaces: TECs and the Re Making of Economic Governance. London: Jessica Kingsley. MacKinnon, D. (2000). Managerialism, governmentality and the state: A neo Foucauldian approach to local economic governance. Political Geography 19, 293 314. MacLeod, G. (2001). Beyond soft institutionalism: Accumulation, regulation and their geographical ﬁxes. Environment and Planning A 33, 1145 1167. MacLeod, G. and Jones, M. (2001). Renewing the geography of regions. Environment and Planning D, Society and Space 19, 669 695. Massey, D. (1994). A global sense of place. In Massey, D. (ed.) Place, Space and Gender, pp 146 156. Cambridge: Polity. Paasi, A. (1996). Borders, Territories and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the Finnish Russian Border. Chichester: John Wiley. Painter, J. and Goodwin, M. (1995). Local governance and concrete research: Investigating the uneven development of regulation. Economy and Society 24, 334 356. Philo, C. (1987). Fit localities for an asylum: The historical geography of the mad business in England as viewed through the pages of the Asylum Journal. Journal of Historical Geography 13, 389 415. Philo, C. and Parr, H. (2000). Institutional geographies: Introductory remarks. Geoforum 31, 513 521. Thrift, N. (1983). On the determination of social action in space and time. Environment and Planning D, Society and Space 1, 23 57. Williams, P. (1982). Restructuring urban managerialism: Towards a political economy of urban allocation. Environment and Planning A 14, 95 106.

Relevant Websites Further Reading Amin, A. (2000). Industrial districts. In Sheppard, E. & Barnes, T. J. (eds.) A Companion to Economic Geography, pp 149 168. Oxford: Blackwell.

http://www.devolution.ac.uk/ ESRC Research Programme. http://www.institutions.org.uk/index.html Rossbret Institutions Website. http://www.worldbank.org/ The World Bank.

Integrated Spatial Data Infrastructure R. Foley, NUI Maynooth, Maynooth, Ireland & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Data Protection The requirement that data about people conforms to rules of nondisclosure and privacy. Geospatial Information Any information that can be geographically referenced, that is, describing a location or any information that can be linked to a location. Global Positioning System (GPS) A satellite-based navigational system allowing the determination of a unique point on the earth’s surface with a high degree of accuracy given a suitable GPS receiver. Interoperability It is the ability to link different applications regardless of proprietary software used at the source together so that several web services are available concurrently. Metadata The data describing the data. Typically this consists of a number of descriptor ﬁelds identifying content, quality, currency, ownership, and other characteristics. Standards An agreed set of minimum requirements, which are to be reached by all data providers.

Introduction and Context With the development of Geographic Information Sys tems (GISs) from the late 1960s on and with the rapid development of computing technology and power, geo graphical information (GI) and digital spatial data have become key resources in all branches of geography. As cartographic data have become increasingly digital, both in terms of their sourcing and manipulation, the power of spatial data is increasingly recognized across the globe. The recent arrival of cartographic resources into main stream consciousness through the development of Goo gle Earth and other Internet based data has also created an increased awareness of the power of mapping. At a governmental level the increasing use of GI in all bran ches of government and its widespread adoption and use in civil society is well established in the developed world and is growing in the developing world as well. Within society as a whole there is also an increased awareness of the ways in which spatial data underpin society in the form of in car navigation systems, satellite imagery use in the media, and the use of GI in business demographics. One of the principal tasks of GI experts therefore, is to manage and shape this increased potential and awareness and one of the key global models used to try and do this is spatial data infrastructures (SDIs).

One deﬁnition of an SDI is: The technology, policies, standards, and human re sources necessary to acquire, process, store, distribute, and improve utilization of geospatial data. (FGDC, 1994)

SDIs were ﬁrst discussed and proposed in the early 1990s in both Europe and the US. The inﬂuential report by Lord Chorley published in London in 1987, focused on the potential of spatial data to underpin much of the future informational needs of society. Speciﬁcally, Chorley made a number of recommendations around the human dimension of GI and the need for a coordinating body to manage the development of the industry and the data. This recognition of the need for coordination was particularly pertinent to discussions on copyright, standards, interoperability and take up. The coordination role to fully develop and explore the potential of GI is one that lies at the heart of SDI. In the early 1990s a similar initiative in the US, driven by the Federal Geo graphic Data Committee (FGDC), led to the formal endorsement by the then President, Bill Clinton to de velop a national spatial data infrastructure (NSDI). Figure 1 below outlines the core components envisaged in the US NSDI. One of the leading proponents of SDI is Ian Masser, who saw spatial data as a national asset, having something in common with other infrastructural elements such as railways and roads. The spatial scale of operation for SDI is important and much attention in recent years has been focused on the need for regional, national, and even global organizations all of which are linked by common standards but which also vary from continent to continent and country to country. Masser also identiﬁed the NSDI as the most developed level with other levels identiﬁable at supernational (Global Spatial Data Infrastructure (GSDI), and Inter Continental versions) and subnational level (typically in federal countries). At the beginning of 2007, there were over 120 countries worldwide either actively developing, or considering the development of, an SDI.

Key Components of an SDI There are a number of key components that underpin SDI, whatever be the spatial scale at which it operates. These include legislative frameworks, content and data frameworks, metadata and standards, quality issues, geoportals, human factors, and dissemination and

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Clearinghouse/Portal i gh

Metadata

GEOdata

Framework

to an agreed international standard. Agreements on what core data layers should be included in these frameworks is a source of considerable debate within SDI. The US NSDI lists seven framework themes, which include: geodetic control, cadastral, orthoimagery, elevation, hy drography, administrative units, and transportation. These provide a good working model for most SDIs. Metadata and Standards

implementation. By deﬁnition, each of these are diffuse and complex areas but to realize a vision of an SDI, they are all essential in teasing out the real life issues that such an initiative faces. They also need to be understood in placing SDI more closely within the wider GIS and geography disciplines.

As part of the development of spatial data standards, in part driven by the Chorley Report, a series of technical committees, namely 211 and 278, have met at ISO level to develop and agree a set of technical standards and agreed metadata formats for spatial data. Current standards include the ISO19100 Series/TC 211, as well as standards developed by agencies such as the FGDC in the US and the private sector Open GeoSpatial Con sortium (OGC). Metadata which, simply put, is ‘data about data’, is essential to these standards in that it re quires data holders to use standard descriptors to docu ment the precise nature of the spatial data holdings. A number of international standards such as the Dublin Core are already being used in this area.

Legislative Frameworks

Quality Issues

The development of any SDI requires a minimum level of legal standing and support. The relationship between GIS and the ‘law’ is still being worked out and varies considerably across the globe. This depends also on the geographical scale of the framework and can range from the local and regional to the national, international, and global. Initiatives at world (Global SDI) and continental level (e.g., the EU INSPIRE initiative) aim to set these agreed legal frameworks in place. At a spatial data level, agreements on data protection, copyright, and ownership all have the potential to be serious barriers to the de velopment and adoption of SDI and need to be addressed at a very early stage. It is clearly easier to handle national legal requirements than international ones.

Clearly, it is impossible to manage and standardize spatial data from all over the globe. Quite apart from difﬁculties with projections and coordinates, national and private mapping agencies produce maps at a bewildering range of scales, few of which are standard. Similarly, the der ivation and accuracy of digital spatial data varies hugely around the world. Even in countries with a long scientiﬁc cartographic tradition such as the UK, Germany, and the US, the arrival of new technologies such as satellites and GPS has brought with them full adjustments to the na tional grids. Much of the initial work of global SDI has focused on the development of initial small scale but worldwide layers such as the Digital Chart of the World, a global dataset released in 1993. Other quality issues relate to scale, currency, and the breadth of attribute data.

Content and Data Frameworks

Geoportals and Distributed Information Systems Architecture

Standards S an d

Partnerships

Figure 1 Suggested componets of a Spatial Data Infrastructure (FGDC, 1994)

The range and coverage of spatial data are extensive at the beginning of the twenty ﬁrst century. Many subjects collect and use spatial data and these range from ad ministrative data routinely collected by government on employment and electoral rights to subject speciﬁc data such as health care utilization and land ownership. The level of coverage does however vary considerably both between and even within countries. While SDIs do not aim to suggest an agreed standard minimum data set, they provide instead a framework or template into which sets of digital spatial data may be arranged and organized

A key aspect of any SDI is that, once data have been collected, collated, and veriﬁed to agreed international standards, it must be disseminated to potential users. Quite apart from the complex legal aspects of data dis semination and data sharing, the technology must be capable of allowing spatial data to be distributed equally, correctly, and with an acceptable level of ease for the end user. The growth of the Internet has been a huge factor in making such geoportals feasible for the distribution and online cataloging of spatial data sets. Geoportals are a

Integrated Spatial Data Infrastructure

generic name for the IT service locations which users access to identify, view, and download spatial data sets. As such they are the ‘public face’ front end to any SDI and are a key outcome of developments in ‘Internet GIS’. Human Factors As the quantity and quality of spatial data has mush roomed since the 1980s, the value and importance of spatial data has also been recognized. In an increasingly IT literate world, information and access to it brings with it associations with power and ﬁnancial gain. As such, the ownership of data, who is allowed use of it, and who should beneﬁt from it, are key concerns. Linked to this, the rights of individuals to privacy and the wider im portance of data protection offer a real challenge to SDIs worldwide. As the fundamental aim of SDI is to pull together and disseminate spatial data sets, the potential for individuals and agencies to prevent this from hap pening is enormous for a variety of reasons, including, national interests, legal challenge, work priorities, and commercial concerns. Dissemination and Implementation Quite apart from the effective dissemination mentioned above, the real challenge to full SDI development lies in its implementation. Much of that implementation is linked to both data audit (on the collection side) and public access (on the dissemination side). A good SDI should by deﬁnition have a minimum core set of data, at an acceptable scale and with an acceptably complete level of coverage. All of these elements are easier said than done.

Current Spatial Data Issues This section outlines current research around a range of key spatial data infrastructural issues, including standards for both data and metadata, interoperability versus har monization, data quality, access, intellectual property rights (IPR) and digital rights management, and man aging change. All of these issues have an impact on how spatial data is collected, processed, stored, interpreted, used, and disseminated by the owning organization and how it is accounted for by data custodians. Much of the research on SDI has been driven by technical discussions around standards, interoperability, and dissemination. The work of Burrough and Masser in Europe and by the FGDC in the US had been mirrored by work in Africa, Asia, and Australasia. Much of this work has yet to ﬁlter into mainstream geographical lit erature though the work of Pickles in creating a debate on the human implications of GIS may yet be replicated as the wider world picks up on the potential of GI and its

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organization within SDIs. In particular, critical debates on data ownership, power, and representation are also appearing in the wider human geography literature but these may be necessary to fully understand the impli cations of SDI development and to help clarify where SDI can really work for the common good in terms of opening up access to spatial data and promoting its op timal utilization. The literature on Standards and Interoperability is best summarized in some of the current literature. Masser, in particular, identiﬁes the current state of play around the world in terms of national, regional, and global standards and provides a selective history of their development. He comments in particular on the recent organization of a global initiative, GSDI that is a natural progression from the smaller national level SDIs. Issues of data quality continue to be crucial to the acceptability and success of SDI development. Evidence suggests that public expectations have increased with the IT revolution and such expectations are clearly linked to acceptable standards in terms of the level of accuracy, the number of available datasets, and usability of spatial data sets col lected and disseminated within SDI frameworks. Data access is a subject that has always exercised geographers and despite the obvious efﬁciency gains in storage and maintenance in a digital age, there are still trade offs taking place between data owners and data users. The dissemination of spatial data within SDI is in part driven by an understanding of public rights to spatial data. This clearly varies internationally in that different states have different attitudes to the release of spatial data, ranging from free public access to heavily protected and costly data sets. Some of these difﬁculties also reside in debates around IPR and ‘added value’. Arguments abound as to the fact that raw spatial data is developed by states but the value added product is the comprehensible spatial map layer which the user needs and the ownership of that is vested in the data creators/owners. Increasingly, privately collected spatial data, enhanced by technologies like GPS and Lidar, are an additional complication in relation to ownership and access.

Current Drivers and Barriers While much of the literature and discussions around SDI have been embedded in technical discussions and the wider policy and political implications, it is worthwhile to summarize the current state of play in terms of Dri vers and Barriers. An implicit aim of SDI is to place in the public arena a set of spatial data layers which can be easily accessed, used, and manipulated. It is almost cer tain that the Internet will be the medium for this dis semination and that this in turn may allow for potentially free and unrestricted use of those datasets. This outcome

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is what should ultimately guide how SDI is developed. If there are concerns and difﬁculties these will determine the nature of the data ﬁnally provided and the one im ponderable at this stage is what form the access and utilization of that data will take. Will access to such data create a demand for more? Will the ways in which the public interpret and use that data affect what data is provided? Will the data be exploited commercially by the data users more than the data providers? Will SDI underpin global developments in e government in a positive or negative way? Arguably, once users understand and use distributed spatial data sets, as envisaged by SDI, the ﬂexibility and sheer ease of access should arguably create an additional demand. The success of geoportals such as the Alexandria Digital Library and the National Statistics website in the UK show just how such access has enabled individuals, community groups, agencies, and other government de partments. With the development of the Internet and more signiﬁcantly the growing use of spatial data in normal daily life (SatNav, GPS, Weather maps, Google Earth), there is evidence for a growing voluntary spatial data creation process which currently lies parallel to any putative SDI framework. For many data providers, a continuing concern is the way in which their data might be misused or misinterpreted. Spatial data have enormous potential in maximizing economic, social, and environmental beneﬁts. The com mercial, social, and economic value of such data sets is being recognized daily. A conﬂict may exist between the raw data and its use for commercial proﬁt or state control. One thing that should be pointed out is that SDI makes no explicit provision for free access to spatial data, though some people may understand it as this. Essentially, there is the scope in SDI to disseminate data in a charging regime that may range from free to full commercial cost. Getting the pricing right is one of the challenges which may affect the success of SDI development. At a wider level, SDI has the potential to provide a good example of technology transfer, bringing the tech nical knowledge of the spatial data community into the real world for its greater beneﬁt, while at the same time safeguarding the standards of that data. Other potential beneﬁts relate to the development of agreed models and templates to improve data sharing protocols and also provide a form of future prooﬁng as volumes of available data increase. The global initiatives around e government are also very strong drivers for the implementation of SDI as they provide a technical and political solution in disseminating government data. Barriers to the successful implementation of SDI are manifold. Some of the difﬁculties encountered in de veloping the US NSDI are well known. Interestingly, standards and interoperability aspects have proved much less difﬁcult than agreements on what data sets should be

included and the difﬁculties of working with multiple stakeholders. The latter aspect, which incorporates legal and human factors associated with data sharing, data access, and both national and international agreements continues to hold up progress in a number of key areas. Additionally, the continuing speed and unpredictability of ICT technological change (ICT – Information and communication technology) through the development of location based services and mobile technologies repre sent both a barrier and an opportunity. Data access and data creation are enabled through such technologies. Linked to this the awareness of spatial data through so cietal advances in GPS/mobile applications may embed the power and value of spatial data even further into human consciousness. Such developments have also the potential to spiral out of control and perhaps a full and concretized development of SDI may be one way to manage this potential for the common good.

The Future of SDI Finally, there are a number of ongoing discussions and large scale research initiatives about the ways in which SDI may develop. The Australian SDI (ASDI) identiﬁes ﬁve priority areas, namely: governance, access to data, data quality, interoperability, and integratability. It identiﬁes the need for clear policy mechanisms, cham pions of the concept, better understanding of governance, and stronger ties with wider technological frameworks. One example from Europe which may exemplify this is the Infrastructure for Spatial Information in Europe (INSPIRE) initiative in the EU. This is at the stage of ratiﬁcation and the result will be an agreed and fully developed model for public sector SDI across the member states that is to be implemented through an EU Directive before 2010. At the same time it is important to be aware of real izable targets worldwide. One of the potential dangers of SDI, especially to its proponents and some members of the GI community, is its aspirational aspect. The exist ence of strong legislative backing, which initiatives such as INSPIRE promote, may not be practical in other parts of the world. Progress may be slower in places which are either less technologically developed or where national interests around data protection and national security (such as in the US and China) may hamper that devel opment for the moment. The unpredictability of human response and take up are also issues that will continue to hamper development. It is ultimately important to point out that, quoting the case of the US NSDI: the NSDI is not a concrete ‘thing’ but is more of a vision, a state of mind, a campaign and an enabler for better use of scarce resources. (Longley et al., 2005)

Integrated Spatial Data Infrastructure See also: GIS and Society; Global Positioning/GPS.

Further Reading Burrough, P. and Masser, I. (eds.) (1998). European geographic information infrastructures: Opportunities and pitfalls, GISDATA 5. Taylor and Francis Ltd. and European Science Foundation: London. Cho, G. (2005). Geographical information science: Mastering the legal issues. Chichester: Wiley. Crompvoets, J., Rajabifard, A., Bregt, A. and Williamson, I. (2004). Assessing the worldwide developments of national spatial data clearinghouses. International Journal of Geographical Information Science 18(7), 665 689. Curry, M. R. (1998). Digital places: Living with geographic information technologies. London: Routledge. Department of the Environment (1987) Handling geographical information: Report of the inquiry chaired by Lord Chorley. London: HMSO. Federal Geographic Data Committee (1994) Executive Order 12906, http://www.archives.gov/federal register/executive orders/pdf/ 12906.pdf (accessed 16 July 2007). Groot, R. and McLaughlin, J. (eds.) (2000). Geospatial data infrastructures: Concepts, cases and good practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Longhorn, R. and O’Riain, G. (2005). Investigation of Best Practice Principles for a Spatial Data Infrastructure in the Technical Field. Dublin: Report to the Irish Spatial Data Infrastructure Committee. Longley, P., Goodchild, M., Maguire, D. and Rhind, D. (2005). Geographic information systems and science (2nd ed.). Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.

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Martin, D. (1996). Geographic information systems: Socioeconomic applications (2nd ed.). London: Routledge. Masser, I. (2005). GIS worlds: Creating spatial data infrastructures. Redlands: ESRI Press. Nebert, D. (ed.) (2004). Developing spatial data infrastructures: The SDI cookbook, version 2.0. Reston: GSDI. Pickles, J. (ed.) (1995). Ground truth: The social implications of geographical information systems. New York: Guilford Press. Schuurman, N. (2005). GIS: A short introduction. Oxford: Blackwell. Williamson, I, Rajabifard, A. and Feeney, M. E. F. (2003). Developing SDI: From concept to reality. London: Taylor and Francis.

Relevant Websites http://www.agi.org.uk/default.asp Association for Geographic Information UK. http://www.anzlic.org.au/infrastructure ASDI.html Australian Spatial Data Infrastructure. http://www.geoconnections.org/CGDI.cfm Canadian GeoSpatial Data Infrastructure. http://www.eurogi.org/default.asp European umbrella organisation for geographic information. http://www.fgdc.gov/components Federal Geographic Data Committee. http://www.gsdi.org/ Global Spatial Data Infrastructure Association. http://www.ec gis.org/inspire/ INSPIRE.

Intensive/Extensive Research K. Falconer Al-Hindi, University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE, USA & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Abstract In critical realist analysis, the conceptual level at which all but the necessary and contingent properties of an object or social structure have been stripped. Abstraction A crucial step in critical realist analysis. It takes a form called retroduction in which the scholar begins with an event that takes place in a speciﬁc concrete setting. Next, the scholar develops a one-sided abstraction from that event in successive rounds in order to identify the necessary and contingent properties of an object or social structure. Concrete In critical realist analysis, the conceptual level at which occurrences may be observed and documented (e.g. sale of property, or political rally). Contingent Relations When two phenomena have a connection to one another that is not required in order for those phenomena to be what they are, the relations are said to be contingent. That is, the association between the two could cease without disturbing the status of the property of interest. For instance, the husband and the baker he patronizes have a contingent relation. Both would be what they are without the latter selling to the former. Critical Realism The philosophy of science originated by Roy Bhaskar and widely adopted by geographers following Andrew Sayer. A key tenet of critical realism is that what causes something to happen has nothing to do with the frequency of occurrence. Empiricism Philosophy of science which holds that what is apparent is all that is real, and perception – usually visual perception – is all that is required to know the world, or especially to know a speciﬁc phenomenon. Empirical observations are much more important than theory, which is often considered irrelevant by empiricists. Necessary Relations A connection between two individuals or objects without which the things cannot be what they actually are. For example, the husband–wife relation is a necessary one, for without a wife, a man cannot be a husband (we might say he is single, divorced, a widower, etc., but would not describe him as a husband). The condition of being a husband requires that the man is married to a wife. Realism A philosophy of science that distinguishes among what can be perceived, what makes things happen, and the level of underlying social structures. Naı¨ve realism is virtually synonymous with empiricism, and insists that what is perceived directly is all that is

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real (e.g., the ‘common sense’ geographer). Contrast with critical realism. Retroduction A ‘thought experiment’ that identiﬁes objects, mechanisms, necessary and contingent relations to be investigated in intensive research. Structure and Agency A sociological view of human social life that distinguishes between individuals as agents, who act in ways that either uphold structures or challenge them, and institutions, which, though they are human creations, comprise sets of rules and practices that both constrain human action and offer opportunities.

Deﬁnitions Intensive and extensive have speciﬁc meanings within the philosophy of science known as critical realism. Intensive research investigates causal relationships among phe nomena in order to discover the mechanisms that cause an event to take place. Extensive investigations seek to discover how common or widespread a phenomenon is; that is, to uncover empirical regularities. Intensive and extensive researches may complement one another. For example, an intensive study of the gendered division of household labor might examine causal factors such as the gender ideologies of adults in the family. Other important factors might include: ages and any special needs of household members; hours of paid work; commute times; and self assessments of skill and interest in household work and dependent care. An extensive study of the gendered division of household labor would investigate the frequency with which women perform more than two thirds of the work. According to critical realism, how often something happens (in this case, how often women assume the second shift of household work and childcare) has little or nothing to do with why it happens or what causes it to occur. The same event can have different causes under different circumstances; here, one woman might perform the second shift because doing so is consistent with her gender ideology, while another woman might do so because her male partner refuses to do half of the domestic work.

Origins of Intensive/Extensive in Human Geography and the Social Sciences Intensive and extensive have come with critical realism into geography primarily through the work of Roy

Intensive/Extensive Research

Bhaskar, Rom Harre´, and Andrew Sayer. Bhaskar and Harre´ are philosophers of science and it is with critical realism as such that they are concerned. Intensive and extensive ﬁrst appear in Harre´’s Social Being (1979) during his discussion of acceptable research methods in sociology. He makes three important points. First, intensive research studies an individual believed to be typical of the group of interest, or a small number of individuals who belong to the group. In the latter case, the small group’s members will share a relatively large number of characteristics. Extensive research, by contrast, involves a large group of individuals who share a small set of characteristics. Second, intensive research seeks to reveal structural relations and interactions among group members; it also permits detailed descriptions of indi viduals. Harre´ clearly favors intensive work: he argues for an intensive and idiographic social science. Sayer’s Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach (1984, 1992) introduced critical realism, and the key concepts inten sive and extensive at a time when many geographers were struggling to get past positivism and empiricism, and offered a new conceptualization of the relationship be tween theory and empirical work alongside a compelling critique of positivism.

Intensive/Extensive in Methodology Intensive and extensive are central to critical realist philosophy with respect to methodology, method, and

Table 1

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ontology. To begin, they are distinguished from each other in each aspect of research methodology and method. These properties are summarized in Table 1. Methodology begins with research questions: what will the study investigate? Intensive and extensive ap proaches are useful for different kinds of questions. The types of questions that intensive research answers con cern causality and process: for instance, what causes an event to take place? The spatial relations in intensive research are substantive; there is a meaningful, necessary association between agents or things in geographic space. Groups are studied in which individuals are causally related to one another and interact in meaningful ways, for example, employers and employees. These two cat egories of individuals, to extend the example, interact with each other in ways that bear on phenomena that may interest geographers and other social scientists, such as the displacement of workers by technology or the gendering of workplaces. Intensive research produces causal accounts capable of explaining the mechanisms and relationships through which speciﬁc events take place. Corroboration of research results afﬁrms the ﬁndings of intensive research. Intensive research is con ducted using methods such as semi structured and in depth interviews, ethnography, and other qualitative approaches. Intensive accounts are characterized by de tailed descriptions of causal relationships among mem bers of the group studied. The concrete patterns and contingent relations discovered are unlikely to be found elsewhere exactly as they are in the speciﬁc case studied.

Intensive and extensive research: a summary Intensive

Extensive

Research question

How does a process work in a particular case or small number of cases? What produces a certain change? What did the agents actually do?

What are the regularities, common patterns, distinguishing features of a population? How widely are certain characteristics or processes distributed or represented?

Relations

Substantial relations of connection

Formal relations of similarity

Type of groups studied

Causal groups

Taxonomic groups

Type of account produced

Causal explanation of the production of certain objects or events, though not necessarily representative ones

Descriptive representative generalizations, lacking in explanatory penetration

Typical methods

Study of individual agents in their causal contexts, interactive interviews, ethnography. Qualitative analysis

Large-scale survey of population or representative sample, formal questionnaires, standardized interviews. Statistical analysis

Limitations

Actual concrete patterns and contingent relations are unlikely to be representative, average, or generalizable. Necessary relations discovered will exist wherever their relata are present, e.g., causal powers of objects are generalizable to other contexts as they are necessary features of these objects

Although representative of a whole population, they are unlikely to be generalizable to other populations at different times and places. Problem of ecological fallacy in making inferences about individuals. Limited explanatory power

Appropriate tests

Corroboration

Replication

Reproduced from Sayer, A. (1992). Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach (2nd edn.). London: Routledge, with permission from Routledge.

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Intensive research is not representative or generalizable in the usual sense, but may be so in the critical realist sense, where conditions that activate causal powers in herent in necessary relations among objects may be found in settings beyond those investigated directly. Extensive research is interested in spatial patterns and the distribution of a phenomenon: how often does the event occur? Under what conditions? The spatial re lations in extensive research are formal, concerning phenomena that fulﬁll standard criteria. The groups studied belong to the same taxa, or category. Continuing the examples begun above of employers and employees, an extensive study could survey a large sample of em ployers for information on numbers of employees dis placed by technology, or collect data from a large number of employees on their perceptions of gender in the workplace. Extensive research is associated with quanti tative measurement and uses standardized instruments for collection of data from large numbers of individuals, such as surveys or standardized interviews. Extensive accounts are characterized by claims to generalizability. Extensive research does not provide an explanation why the phenomenon occurred (here, unemployment due to replacement of workers by technology or the character of gender relations in the work setting): only its frequency and possibly some correlations which, instead of being causal, are only casual. Replication is often used to test research results gained through extensive studies. Results are representative only for the population from which the sample is taken. Extensive realist research may appear more familiar to many (noncritical realist) geographers, although within a critical realist framework it can be distinguished from empiricism and most versions of positivism by its concern with causality: what causes events to take place? Because the individuals studied are related only formally (e.g., they are all employees), the explanatory power of extensive research is much less than that of intensive study, but it may aid in identifying external and contingent factors. The search for causal relations distinguishes extensive research in critical realism from that in positivism. Critical realism is distinguished by its deep ontology, which identiﬁes three domains: the real, the actual, and the empirical. The real is a realm in which objects with structures and powers exist. Examples of objects include different entities such as the US Census Bureau and natural gas. Each has the capacity to make things happen; the structures that enable such occurrences are called necessary properties of each object. For example, natural gas has the ability to burn. Whether or not it burns de pends on a contingent relation: its contact with a spark. In the domain of the actual are occurrences and their effects that arise from the activation of objects’ powers. The domain of the empirical is where people experience events (which may or may not be observed; there are

other ways of sensing events). To continue with the ex ample of natural gas, inhaling it may cause a person to lose consciousness: an empirical event. To work through an example beginning in the empirical domain, start with the US Census survey newly arrived in the mail. In order for census surveys to be distributed, enormous resources for printing, mailing, and delivery must be activated, which occurs at the level of the actual. At the level of the real we ﬁnd the US Census Bureau, a division of the United States Federal Government (the State) itself, with its mandate, policies, procedures, budget, ideological underpinnings, and employees. Critical realism’s onto logical depth permits it to investigate what makes things happen, in contrast to positivism, in which realism’s three realms are collapsed into just one: the empirical. With only the realm of experience to study, critical realists argue that positivism’s ability to understand phenomena is severely limited. Intensive and extensive are key to realist ontology. Continuing with the example of the US Census, an in tensive investigation of the question ‘‘why were few sur veys returned?’’ concerns the three domains of empirical, actual, and real. In the actual realm, perhaps some surveys were not delivered. At the real level we might ﬁnd that the US Census Bureau did not command sufﬁcient resources to print and distribute all of the surveys. Alternately, we might discover that so many citizens are experiencing a crisis of conﬁdence in their institutions that they decided not to complete the surveys. An extensive investigation would proceed very differently. Rather than posing a ‘why’ question, a question concerning extent is appro priate: How many surveys were returned, and from where? The addresses from returned surveys could be entered into a geographical information system (GIS) and mapped in order to answer these questions. Depending on the resulting spatial distribution, additional questions could be asked or hypotheses developed. Note that the research question associated with extensive research is one of number and pattern, while the intensive question is concerned with understanding. The connection between intensive and extensive concrete research is integral to the concrete–abstract relationship in critical realism. While intensive and ex tensive may start from the same observation, they are concerned with different types of questions and use dif ferent methodologies. Intensive research investigates causal processes in one or a small number of cases; ex tensive research examines common properties and spatial patterns of a population or large sample. Some studies combine the two. Abstraction takes a speciﬁc form in critical realism called retroduction. These thought ex periments must proceed recursively; that is, the scholar must work through higher to lower levels of abstraction as well as from lower to higher levels in recursive rounds. If the abstraction does not appear to work at each level,

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then it must be modiﬁed. Intensive research investigates the abstraction, and relationships discerned through retroduction, while engaged with all three of critical realism’s ontological levels. Intensive and extensive research can be, but may not be assumed to be, complementary. A number of studies have begun with an extensive investigation and then developed methodologically related research questions based on the ﬁndings for intensive investigation. How ever, such an intimate connection between the two ap proaches is required in order to consider the studies complementary of one another. Members of just any pair of intensive and extensive studies of the same phenom enon are unlikely to complement one another in a strong sense. One exploration of contingency (causal mech anisms that may or may not be activated in a speciﬁc context) has argued that the difference between intensive and extensive may be collapsed when research methods that account for local variation in explanatory factors and that can process large amounts of quantitative data from diverse locales, such as the expansion method, are employed.

Intensive/Extensive in Space The spatial properties of intensive and extensive came to geographers’ attention, along with the ﬁrst discussions of critical realism, in the early 1980s, with what became known as the localities debate. Many scholars linked the study of localities with critical realism and sought to identify the necessary aspects of the spatial relationships they observed by conducting intensive case studies. A discussion arose concerning the difference that space makes in such research, with Andrew Sayer maintaining that space mattered at the concrete level but that it was irrelevant at the most abstract level of analysis. Dis agreement over the role of geographic space was attrib uted to confusion between abstract and concrete research, and here intensive and extensive play crucial roles. Abstract research in critical realism relies on thought experiments (painstaking mental work) to dis cern the necessary properties of objects at the level of the real. From concrete situations at the empirical level the scholar is to discard properties of objects that are un necessary to producing the effects these objects have on the ground. As the argument went, the speciﬁc spatial properties of objects such as the capital–labor relation or patriarchy are left behind through succeeding rounds of abstraction from the empirical level to the real. Abstract does not have to mean a spatial, but some interpreted it as such. By the early 1990s, three signal contributions of in tensive and extensive (and critical realism more gener ally) to geography could be identiﬁed. First, intensive

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research and attendant methodological arguments offered insight toward a resolution to the debate between agency and structure. Intensive investigations of indi viduals (not necessarily people) positioned in causal re lationships to one another permit study of how social structures and their powers work out in concrete settings. Neither agency nor structure collapses; rather, agents are shown to operate in complex contexts in which struc tures’ mechanisms are at play. Second, the debate over space advanced geographers’ conceptions of geographical relationships. Engagement around the notion that there could be aspatial abstractions ultimately produced con sensus: that any abstraction devoid of spatial content is probably too abstract and not useful for social science; that spatial properties may in fact be necessary to causal mechanisms and in fact are central to objects’ being what they are and thus contribute to places being what they are; and that all social relations are spatial relations also. Widespread recognition of the political and relational nature of social space among human geographers gave further credence to the idea that space must always be ‘in’ critical realist analysis. Intensive research has the capacity to reveal that the spatial effects of, for instance, a national policy vary according to local contextual factors (say, gender ideologies). Extensive research lacks the ability to investigate these and so, as in positivism, the researcher may de facto assume that the same causal agents at work in one place are at work equally in all. Realists criticize much positivist and empirical geography research, saying that the search for empirical regularities and predictive power utterly confuses intensive and extensive by employing extensive methods of inquiry (e.g., large scale surveys) to answer intensive questions (e.g., what causes industry to locate in a particular area?). Local context may not be reduced to a few spatially variable factors such as employment rates, etc., but must be handled as the complex and combinatory locale that it is. Third, feminist geography’s engagement with critical realism, and particularly with retroduction, advanced understandings of methodology and the role of theory in feminist geography. A heated exchange among several feminist geographers in the pages of Antipode com plemented, in effect, the concurrent exchanges in main stream outlets about abstraction and the importance of spatiality to realism’s objects. Intensive case studies are an antidote against both the risk of over abstraction and the temptation to draw conclusions based on thought ex periments alone without evidence gathered through empirical research. Both intensive and extensive contribute to con ceptions of space at small and large scales, and for both smaller and larger areas. Intensive and extensive entered the discipline via investigations of regional, or meso scale, inequalities that were emerging in the United Kingdom by the 1980s. Intensive investigations at

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multiple and often far ﬂung sites generated understand ings of how national policies combined with contingent forces in speciﬁc settings to produce change. They were also conducted at single sites. Extensive studies have been less common but also involve small or large scales, smaller or larger areas. The difference between intensive and extensive lies with their frameworks of explanation and not their scale or areal extent. For geographers who associate critical realism with the localities studies of the 1980s or generally with economic or political geography, it may seem that in keeping with these subﬁelds’ historical approaches to study, intensive and extensive researches are solely con cerned with spatial relationships exterior to homes, of ﬁces, and other buildings. To the contrary, for example, peoples’ reasons for their activities can be causal forces and so both intensive and extensive research pursue in formation on these from individuals in their routine settings: often, interior spaces. Intensive research in particular has contributed to a relational conception of geographic space that is manifest in homes, ofﬁces, and institutional settings by tying observations of concrete events in them to mechanisms and necessary properties of objects such as patriarchy. Building on the theoretically informed empirical work of geographers studying economic change in the United Kingdom, scholars in the United States and beyond took up critical realism and particularly its intensive research methodology to investigate phenomena such as North west lumber production, women’s telecommuting, and transnational corporations in Southeast Asia. Frequently, these studies revealed unexpected explanations for spa tial relationships, as in Yeung’s discovery – through conducting intensive and extensive research simul taneously – that personal networks were key to ﬁrms’ decisions about locating in Southeast Asia. They also often complicated the classic notion of the region in ways that integrated newer insights such as a relational con ception of space. Places are shown by such studies to be complex rather than static and constitutive of social life rather than simple stages for human interaction. Critical realism’s abstractions are meaningless without their effects on the ground; intensive research uncovers and explains these effects while extensive research elucidates spatial rela tionships between such places. Thinking of places as al ways in process is one of the contributions to geography of intensive studies. This idea of the ever becoming na ture of places informed a new approach to regional

geography and, for some, reinvigorated what had other wise become an intellectual backwater. Since the beginning of geography’s engagement with critical realism, scholars have worked to compare, con trast, and reconcile critical realism with other approaches. Discussions of the role of intensive and extensive research have often arisen in these exegeses. For these workers, teasing out the implications of intensive and extensive for spatial relations and places has contributed immensely to more sophisticated and nuanced conceptions of spatial relationships and places. Most recently, intensive and extensive are mentioned in critical realist excursions in the feminist, education, and nursing literatures. The concepts are not developed in much depth however and it could be argued with respect to the last two that these engagements are just beginning. Lack of attention to place and space is notable. Geographers who engage with scholars in these areas will have much to contribute. See also: Capital and Space; Critical Realism/Critical Realist Geographies; Locality Debates; Mixed and Multiple Methods; Positivism/Positivist Geography; Quantitative Methodologies; Scientiﬁc Method; Spatial Expansion Method; Structuralism/Structuralist Geography.

Further Reading Bhaskar, R. (1975). A Realist Theory of Science. Leeds: Leeds Books. Del Casino, V. J., Grimes, A. J., Hanna, S. P. and Jones, J. P. III (2000). Methodological frameworks for the geography of organizations. Geoforum 31, 523 538. Harre´, R. (1979). Social Being. Oxford: Blackwell. Jones, J. P. III and Hanham, R. Q. (1995). Contingency, realism, and the expansion method. Geographical Analysis 27(3), 185 207. Sayer, A. (1992). Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach (2nd edn.). London: Routledge. Sayer, A. (2000). Realism and Social Science. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Sayer, A. and Morgan, K. (1985). A modern industry in a declining region: Links between method, theory and policy. In Massey, D. & Meegan, R. A. (eds.) The Politics of Method, pp 147 168. London: Methuen. Yeung, H. W. C. (1997). Critical realism and realist research in human geography: A method or a philosophy in search of a method? Progress in Human Geography 21(1), 51 74.

Relevant Websites http://www.lancs.ac.uk/fass/sociology/proﬁles/Andrew Sayer/ Professor Andrew Sayer, Department of Sociology, Lancaster University.

Interdisciplinarity P. Raento, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Cultural Geography A subﬁeld of human geography with interest in cultural phenomena. Cultural Turn A renewed and expanded interest in the study of cultural phenomena in human geography in the 1980s and 1990s. Diaspora The dispersion of a population that shares a place of origin or cultural characteristics. When written with a capital D, refers to the scattering of Jews after their exile from Babylonia. Holistic It is concerned with wholes rather than their parts. Hybrid The offspring of two different species, an outcome of mixed origins. National Science An academic ﬁeld of study deemed central for the construction and maintenance of a national identity. Pandemic A worldwide epidemic of a contagious disease. Paradigm A predominant viewpoint in academic research, established and accepted by the majority of scholars. Positivism A science–philosophical way of thinking founded on the belief in objectivity, ﬁrst-hand observations, and measurability. Synergy An additional force or energy produced by working together.

Interdisciplinarity commonly refers to the joining of forces by two or more academic ﬁelds of knowledge. The word well describes the phenomenon, for the ﬁrst part (inter) implies togetherness, mutuality, and reciprocity. The second part of the word (discipline) connotes rules, boundaries, and order. Built in the idea of inter disciplinarity is the existence of disciplines, branches of knowledge in academic institutions. Interdisciplinarity therefore is a twentieth century concept, which followed the institutionalization and segmentation of scientiﬁc research in the nineteenth century. Technological in novations, growth of population and industrial pro duction, and the consolidation of modern state structures all increased the need for knowledge. The differentiation within disciplines encouraged the crossing of their boundaries. The roots of interdisciplinarity, like those of disciplines such as geography or philosophy, nevertheless reach to classical Greece and Rome. The motivation for interdisciplinary collaboration often emerges from a speciﬁc problem in need of a solution or a

signiﬁcant new development in society. Globally relevant examples include the impact of information technologies or pandemics such as HIV/AIDS and the bird inﬂuenza. Collaborating scholars approach their topic of study using the theoretical, methodological, and conceptual toolkits characteristic of their own disciplines, but adjust them to serve a common goal. Their work ideally produces a comprehensive understanding of a particular phenom enon, a region, or its people. Rather than merging entire ﬁelds, interdisciplinarity draws in a mutually supporting fashion from particular specialties within disciplines. Success highlights instrumental problem solving and a constructively critical exchange of ideas.

A Response to Major Changes Interdisciplinarity typically evolves through para digmatic changes which often follow transformations in society. In these situations, predominant views are chal lenged and even replaced, because they no longer can answer emerging questions in a satisfactory manner. In human geography, one recent landmark change was the renewed interest in culture in the 1980s and the 1990s. In this so called cultural turn, the ways in which human geographers had traditionally approached the complex concept of culture were questioned. Critical researchers moved the focus from the study of forms and structures to the interpretation of meaning in the examination of landscapes, from high culture to popular culture, from quantiﬁcation toward qualitative methods, and from so cietal and general to quotidian and individual foci. Per spectives employed in anthropology and sociology were particularly useful in this remaking of culturally oriented human geography. The debate resulted in a considerable diversiﬁcation of human and cultural geographical in vestigations and new collaborative networks. The changes supported the visibility and credibility of human geog raphy as a social science and underscored the importance of space in human phenomena. This diminished the relative isolation of human geography, caused by geo graphy’s strong roots in the positivist tradition of science. However, the development also worked to widen a gap between human and physical geography, and between approaches within human geography, raising concerns about the future of holistic geography and a com prehensive understanding of regional processes. The diversiﬁcation and hybridization of views were related to a broader change in the philosophical foun dations of science and understanding of human

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phenomena, in the shift from modern to postmodern approaches. This has meant the questioning of previous, historically overarching, and predominantly Western, often masculinist, ways to think and explain the world. A need to take into account a variety of voices and to in spect multiple scales of activity (from the local to the global level) has been highlighted. Human geographical studies of consumption ex emplify the shift toward postmodern and cultural ap proaches. Early studies about consumption relied heavily on economy in their modeling and evaluation of networks from the perspective of efﬁcient ﬂows, accessibility, and most suitable locations. Along with the challenge to pre dominant views in architecture and with human geo graphical interest in behavioral studies came questions such as, ‘‘How do spatial designs impact behavior and identity of consumers?’’ Subsequent inquiries enhanced contacts between semiotics and the geographical inter pretation of symbolic meanings (drawing from landscape studies and cartography). Also evident were connections to the sociological study of inclusion and exclusion in public and private space. These changes emphasized qualitative methods and individuals over quantiﬁcation and systems. Simultaneously, new themes – such as food – entered human geographical studies about consumption, and re searchers asked how spaces themselves are being con sumed. For example, in the marketing of cities and their neighborhoods, images of cultural and intellectual vivacity, cuisine, economic prosperity, comfort and convenience, and safety are valuable place promotional tools. Recent concerns about the environmental impact of agriculture, the role of food in the development and political stability of societies, and the geopolitical implications of food re lated risks have shown, however, that knowledge from both human and physical geography is necessary for reaching a comprehensive geographical understanding of complex phenomena like food and cities.

Research Institutions Interdisciplinary institutions typically take the form of centers, programs, or other special units of a university or a college rather than being entirely independent. Ex amples of interdisciplinary employers of human geog raphers include area and cultural studies institutes, migration research centers, and women’s studies pro grams in universities worldwide. The work conducted in these units focuses on a particular globally relevant phenomenon, a cultural sphere, or a territory. The em ployees represent a variety of academic backgrounds, so that human geographers work together with historians, anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists. The history and research emphases of these units often reﬂect the settlement history and cultural characteristics

of the surrounding region. For example, in the USA, the migration history of a university’s host region steers academic interests toward population groups that are prominent in the area. In many smaller countries in Europe, interdisciplinary research units may have been designed to improve knowledge of economically and politically important regions because of their historical inﬂuence in that country. Quite frequently these con nections are evident in the outside funding received by these institutions. Foreign governments or civic organ izations may provide grants or other support for par ticular units in order to promote their own visibility, to maintain active connections with an emigrant population, and to stay updated of the latest relevant research. These funds may be earmarked for researcher exchange, popu larization of science, or the promotion of cultural activ ities. The so called third task of universities – the involvement of academics in societal discussions and ac tivities – typically carries notable weight in inter disciplinary units. Two Examples At the University of Nevada, Reno, the Center for Basque Studies brings together scholars who conduct research on the Basque population and society in Spain and France and their history and cultural inﬂuence in the New World. The center has a specialized research library, an interdisciplinary publishing program, and an inter national, multilingual faculty who represent a variety of social sciences. The center’s small group of doctoral students works together with scholars from other de partments at the University of Nevada to combine their regional–cultural expertise with broader general meth odological, conceptual, and theoretical knowledge. One of the collaborating departments within the center’s network is the Department of Geography. A student may thus graduate with the interdisciplinary degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Basque Studies (Geography) and pursue an academic career in similar interdisciplinary research centers or in human geography. The location of the center is no accident, for Northern Nevada lies within the hearth of Basque culture area in the American Southwest. The need for a Basque research program emerged in the 1960s, when scholars working on a larger research project in the surrounding Great Basin recorded multiple layers of Basque history and culture in the area. Over the decades, the center has grown in size and diversiﬁed its activities. The faculty and staff work with the local community organizations to broaden knowledge of regional history and culture and to pre serve and study these traits. The government of the Basque Autonomous Community in Spain has sponsored international research conferences about Basque society in Europe and the Basque diaspora in the New World.

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The Renvall Institute of Area and Cultural Studies at the University of Helsinki, Finland, was founded in the late 1960s to promote interdisciplinary and international exchanges. The institute is part of the College of Arts, but it collaborates with several departments and colleges. The scope of the institute has gradually expanded from regional interests to be global in its reach, reﬂecting changes in the Finnish society and in universities worldwide. Thus, former foci on the German culture area and on the British Isles have been merged into a broader European Area and Cultural Studies program. The in stitute currently hosts ﬁve other regionally deﬁned cul tural and social studies programs, which reﬂect Finland’s political, cultural, and economic history and interests, and academic tradition. These programs are Nordic Studies, Russian and East European Studies, North American Studies, Latin American Studies, and Asia Paciﬁc Studies (African Studies are housed under a dif ferent unit at the University of Helsinki). In these six programs, interdisciplinarity is promoted through diverse international teaching and visitor activities. Daily rou tines are conducted in at least six languages. Human geographers (who represent the College of Science) work at the institute as adjunct faculty members, guest lec turers, board members, and administrative coordinators.

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landscapes, its material constituents, and their represen tations in visual arts and people’s perceptions. In a re search project about new transportation arrangements in a city, these approaches, the expertise of urban planners, and physical–geographical knowledge about urban nature may come together in complementary, mutually supporting fashion so that infrastructural solutions accommodate the preferences of local residents while meeting logistical and environmental requirements. In some geography departments, this potential for synergy and the respect for the old ideals of synthesis and unity in science are used to support research proﬁling thematic emphases, such as broadly deﬁned urban studies or environmental studies. Under one banner, human and physical geographers and urban planners combine their expertise to produce essentially interdisciplinary per spectives on cities and the environment. A study of waterways in urban areas can thus result in a holistic understanding of a physical–geographical phenomenon and its economic, ecological, and recreational impact on, and meaning to, city dwellers. By promoting these interdisciplinary possibilities within geography and countering the concerns about compartmentalization, individual departments have sought to stand out in the competition for funding and students. Administrative and teaching duties related to these activities are inter disciplinary in character.

Interdisciplinary Practices The names of units only tell a partial story, for many interdisciplinary activities take place in informal networks and routines of individual faculty members. Program coordination, guest lecturing, and seminar attendance are all tasks that enhance the role of interdisciplinarity in one’s professional proﬁle, but this may be hidden behind disciplinary deﬁnitions and titles. The specialization of disciplines has created new hy brids and new knowledge through the crossing of con ventional boundaries. Arguably, many large geography departments across the world are interdisciplinary in character, for they host a variety of specialties across the broad scope of geography. As a result of this broadness, the faculty often consists of human geographers, physical geographers, and, in many countries, urban and regional planners, each of whom represent highly specialized subﬁelds. Human geography alone has numerous subﬁelds, the histories, methodologies, and theoretical foundations of which can be notably different from one another. The growth of diversity continues, containing both opportun ities and challenges for collaboration. A specialist in transportation geography may approach space as logistical networks, measurable ﬂows, and location patterns, using sophisticated computer assisted cartographic tools to visualize the ﬁndings. In the meanwhile, the cultural geographer next door may investigate the meaning of

Networking Rather than housing everyone under one roof, parti cipants in loosely arranged networks are scattered across space in separate departments, cities, and countries. Successful maintenance of these networks requires mo bility, active communication, and coordination over dis tance. Technological advancements that have greatly supported this collaboration include electronic mail and advanced audio–visual devices that allow comprehensive and convenient person to person and group communi cation, irrespective of location. Also important is the evolution of air travel into a relatively inexpensive, efﬁ cient, and convenient tool for global access. These technologies are irreplaceable for contemporary aca demics, for they facilitate communication in person. Several studies show that most scholars still prefer to exchange ideas face to face and appreciate the informal social dimensions of their work. Not surprisingly then, an increasing number of congresses, thematic workshops, and seminars are organized around interdisciplinary re search themes all over the world. The meetings of na tional or other major geographical societies, such as those of the Association of American Geographers (AAG) and the International Geographical Union (IGU), are also interdisciplinary, in that they bring together geographers

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from all specialties. For many geographers, the oppor tunity to learn about a new place and its people is an additional incentive for participation. These observations underscore the complexity and informality of the prac tice of interdisciplinary.

Interdisciplinary Publishing Researchers and publishers depend on one another, for research provides the raw material for publishers and researchers need to get published to promote their ﬁndings, careers, and name recognition. Not surprisingly, academic publishing has followed the trends of growth, specialization, and interdisciplinarity characteristic of academic research activities and institutions. Typical publications with interdisciplinary contents are edited books, in which diverse groups of scholars team up to assess particular themes from multiple angles. Within disciplines, interdisciplinary approaches are promoted in books where one or two authors challenge predominant views with the help of other disciplines. The bulk of interdisciplinary publishing, however, takes place in academic journals.

Journals Interdisciplinarity takes many forms in journal publish ing. The market has grown and diversiﬁed greatly since the 1970s, again reﬂecting changes in academia and so ciety. One result has been the emergence of thematically deﬁned journals, which encourage and invite submissions from a variety of ﬁelds. An example is the Annals of Tourism Research, published since 1973. It seeks to advance the understanding of tourism by serving as a forum of interaction for multiple disciplines. The growth and specialized segmentation of the global tourism industry especially since the 1990s increased social scientiﬁc re search about the branches of this industry. This special ization, new themes and processes, and the scholarly pressure to publish encouraged the launching of new, interdisciplinary, and more narrowly deﬁned journals, such as International Gambling Studies in 2000. This journal attracts a heterogeneous group of gam(bl)ing and tourism scholars, who represent numerous social sciences (in cluding human geography), economy, and psychology. In addition to scholars and students, the readers are pol icymakers and casino business representatives. The founding of a new journal indicates that a ﬁeld of re search has gained prestige and moved from the margins of academic interest toward the center. Several geographical journals are interdisciplinary in character. One example is journals that focus on a par ticular subﬁeld of human geography from a broadly

deﬁned thematic perspective. For example, in Political Geography, the focus is on the spatial dimensions of pol itical phenomena. The deﬁnition attracts not only polit ical geographers from various research traditions, but also authors and readers from other ﬁelds, especially political science. The unifying theme is the relationship between space and politics, which is at the core of, but not ex clusive to, political geography. Journals like this resulted from the increased specialization and hybridization within geographical research in the 1970s and 1980s. Another example is all inclusive journals of geography that seek to represent the entire spectrum of geographical research. These journals are usually older than the spe cialized ones, reﬂecting the evolution and foci of aca demic geography since the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The publishers are likely to be national geographical societies, the task of which is to promote geographical education and knowledge, to support a professional community of geographers, and to foster holistic collaboration across geography’s internal bound aries. The Annals of the Association of American Geographers and The Geographical Review, by the American Geo graphical Society, are examples of these journals in North America. Some societies, such as the Royal Geographical Society in Britain and the Institute of British Geog raphers, use a commercial publisher for the production and distribution of their journals (Area and Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers). In small, linguistically unique countries, such as Finland, where geography is considered to be a national science, the all inclusive ap proach is seen as a valuable way to support the training of young scholars and the evolution of the national lan guage(s). Terra, a Finnish and Swedish language quar terly journal of the Geographical Society of Finland, serves the entire community of Finnish geographers by informing the readership about the latest trends in geography, about contacts to its sister disciplines and to other countries, and about the evolution of Finnish and Swedish language terminology in geography and other relevant ﬁelds. The journal both maintains the pro fessional identity of geographers in Finland and aids in collaboration across (sub)disciplinary boundaries by publishing theme issues designed for this purpose. Con ﬁrming the relatively long and well established history of institutional geography in the country, the journal reached its 120th volume in 2008. However, human and physical geographers, and their peers in other ﬁelds, follow different publication strate gies and have different preferences regarding audiences, outlets, and styles of presenting their ﬁndings. The scene is, therefore, very complex and some tension exists. In Britain, one study has shown that human geographers favor geographical journals, whereas their colleagues in physical geography prefer to publish their work in spe cialized journals outside of geography. Especially scholars

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outside of the Anglo American core of academia make strategic and ethical choices of language when searching for outlets for research articles. Some approaches or topics that would not be of interest to an international audience may be nationally or regionally relevant and offer access to valuable information to speakers of a particular language. In some countries, established geo graphical journals may have prestige that attracts sub missions from other disciplines, whereas elsewhere geography is less prominent. Factors affecting the choices include personal career goals, national science policies, evaluation practices, and perceptions of prestige and hierarchies. All this steers the interdisciplinary research and publishing practices of individual scholars in par ticular settings.

Instruction In contemporary universities, students have more and more choice regarding what to study. Disciplinary spe cialization and interdisciplinarity have provided students with an unprecedented opportunity to shop for know ledge. Behind curricular innovations are also the needs of students, the need to train scholars, and the need to offer professionals continuous education opportunities. Some times institutional rearrangements, such as downsizing of budgets, produce mergers that enhance interdisciplinarity in academic curricula. Interdisciplinary programs offer opportunities for joint teaching and guest lecture series. On the one hand, this approach is instructive for students and teachers alike, for it promotes comparative and critical discussion in the classroom. On the other hand, the joining of forces in teaching may underscore one’s disciplinary background and subject matter, especially if the perspective is com parative. Furthermore, interdisciplinary units often invite instructors to assess a topic from the perspective of a particular branch of knowledge. In a North American Studies program, the adjunct faculty member from a geography department may teach an introductory course about the regional or human geography of North Amer ica, cross listing the class under geography. These courses typically contain elements of both human and physical geography, based on a view that basic knowledge about physical–geographical processes is needed to understand human activity, the formation of regions and cultural spheres, and the continuous change of landscape. The course may form part of a series of specialized ﬁrst year classes, which supports a social scientiﬁc synthesis of human phenomena in North America at a more advanced level of study. Disciplinary specialties of faculty members can be used in this way to promote interdisciplinary and holistic thinking among students and introduce to them a selection of approaches available in the emphasized ﬁeld.

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Interdisciplinary instruction is a challenge to the teachers’ teaching philosophy and practices, because these scholars can expect to meet a class of students from diverse academic backgrounds. It also matters where one teaches, for practices vary from one country and insti tution to another. In North American universities where many courses can be selected freely, one teacher may have students from over half a dozen disciplines, with considerably diverse prior knowledge about the subject matter. In these cases, the challenges are at least twofold, irrespective of whether the class is listed under geog raphy or some interdisciplinary program. One challenge is to guarantee that the applied perspectives, supporting concepts, and the goals of the class are clear to all at tendees. Another is to make sure that the students are offered an equal opportunity to participate in the class discussion and exercises. In contrast, in countries where entry to an undergraduate program is based on qualifying examinations or some other form of preselection, the new students will have an even level of skills and relatively standardized background knowledge about their major subject, but know fairly little about approaches in other relevant disciplines. In both contexts, the choice of reading materials must be carefully balanced. The tea cher of an interdisciplinary class, therefore, needs to solve how to assess key concepts and methodologies, and how to encourage the students to search and apply in formation across disciplinary boundaries. Possible solu tions are multiple and vary, but, generally, teachers of interdisciplinary themes and groups of students con stantly scrutinize their teaching philosophy and practices to adjust ﬂexibly to the demands of each class.

Beneﬁts and Obstacles Interdisciplinarity means different things to different scholars, and practices vary. The role of individuals is, in any case, crucial in the evolution of interdisciplinarity. This is so because individual scholars make decisions and interact with others in groups, networks, and institutions. Successful collaboration requires careful and conscious attention to communication, for specialized expert com munities typically have their own, nuanced vocabularies, and one word can mean different things to different people. Trust and social skills that can accommodate differently sized egos are among the critical constituents of successful interdisciplinary work. The design of inter disciplinary projects, even within geography and one linguistic sphere, demands that the participants fully understand the ways in which they themselves and others construct, order, and communicate knowledge. At one end of the spectrum of views are those who see interdisciplinarity as an opportunity and strength – as something desirable. In their view, boundary crossing,

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experimental hybrids, and exploration beyond conventions support creativity and innovation. From this perspective, interdisciplinarity encourages continuous learning, intel lectual stimuli, and freedom of choice. Open mindedness and constructive competition of perspectives are mutually supportive and help to underscore the spatial dimensions of human phenomena. According to those who think of interdisciplinarity as a strength, one outcome is an en hanced and better deﬁned professional identity as geog rapher, human geographer, and, say, political or cultural geographer, because interdisciplinary scholars must understand the speciﬁcs of their own contribution. The holders of these views consider all this beneﬁcial to the evolution of academic research, in general, and human geography, in particular. The emphasis here is on the ﬁrst part of the word (inter): on a conﬁdent collaboration of disciplinary bases in order to understand phenomena such as migration, pandemics, or consumption. Those of a more critical view place the emphasis on the latter part of the word (discipline). From this perspective, caution is recommended, and disciplinary cores and boundaries need to be maintained to protect continuity and clear professional identity. The holders of this view point out that novel ideas are not always welcomed and competition, disciplinary differences, and subsequent dif ﬁculties in communication are likely to strengthen boundaries rather than lower them. The promotion of new ways of thinking and networking can require an un comfortable degree of risk taking, not least because the pushing of boundaries of the mainstream may lead to defense reactions and resistance. Scholars proposing es tablishment shaking ideas may encounter difﬁculties in ﬁnding research funding, which depends on outside evaluation and trends in national or organizational science policies. Critics point out that the pursuit of inter disciplinarity may include difﬁculties of getting tenure and feelings of being marginalized or confused about one’s professional purpose. Some face difﬁculties in ﬁnding suitable publication channels. All these obstacles may harm individual career development and delay public scrutiny of the proposed ideas. On the other hand, successful overcoming of these difﬁculties can proﬁle these individuals as path opening pioneers in their re spective ﬁelds, adding to the lure of interdisciplinary exploration. See also: Cultural Turn; Geographical Journals; Human Geography; Knowledge Communities; Los Angeles School of Post-Modern Urbanism; Migration; National Schools of Geography; Research Funding Bodies.

Further Reading Agnew, J. and Duncan, J. S. (eds.) (1989). The Power of Place. Bringing Together Geographical and Sociological Imaginations. Winchester: Unwin Hyman. Bracken, L. J. and Oughton, E. A. (2006). ‘What do you mean?’ The importance of language in developing interdisciplinary research. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 31, 371 382. Dear, M. and Flusty, S. (eds.) (2002). The Spaces of Postmodernity. Readings in Human Geography. Oxford: Blackwell. Dogan, M. (1997). The new social sciences: Cracks in the disciplinary walls. International Journal of Social Sciences 153, 429 443. Douglass, W. A. and Raento, P. (2004). The tradition of invention. Conceiving Las Vegas. Annals of Tourism Research 31, 7 23. Gaile, G. L. and Willmott, C. J. (eds.) (2006). Geography in America at the Dawn of the 21st Century. New York: Oxford University Press. Gregory, D. (1994). Geographical Imaginations. Cambridge: Blackwell. Johnston, R. (2003). Geography: A different sort of discipline? Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 28, 133 141. Jones, P. and McDonald, N. (2007). Getting it wrong for the ﬁrst time: Building an interdisciplinary research relationship. Area 39, 490 498. Klein, J. T. (1990). Interdisciplinarity. History, Theory and Practice. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press. Klein, J. T. (1996). Crossing Boundaries. Knowledge, Disciplinarities, and Interdisciplinarities. Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia. Library Trends (1996). Special issue 45 (2). Murphy, A. B. (2006). Enhancing geography’s role in public debate. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 96, 1 13. Philo, C. (ed.) (1991). New Words, New Worlds. Reconceptualising Social and Cultural Geography. London: Institute of British Geographers. Sluyter, A., Augustine, A. D., Bitton, M. C., Sullivan, T. J. and Wang, F. (2006). The recent intellectual structure of geography. The Geographical Review 96, 594 608.

Relevant Websites http://www.ees.elsevier.com/atr Annals of Tourism Research. A journal by Elsevier. http://www.aag.org Association of American Geographers, Washington, DC. http://basque.unr.edu Center for Basque Studies, University of Nevada, Reno. http://www.tandf.co International Gambling Studies. A journal by Taylor and Francis. http://www.igu net.org International Geographical Union. http://www.ees.elsevier.com/jpgq Political Geography. A journal by Elsevier. http://www.helsinki.ﬁ/hum/renvall/english Renvall Institute for Area and Cultural Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland. http://www.rgs.org Royal Geographical Society, London, UK. http://www.helsinki.ﬁ/maantiede/geoﬁ/terra/ Terra. A journal of the Geographical Society of Finland (in Finnish and Swedish). http://www.amergeog.org/gr The Geographical Review. A journal of the American Geographical Society.

Intermediate Technology M. Parnwell, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction The appropriate role of technology in the process of development lies at the heart of the notion of ‘inter mediate technology’. The concept was originally de veloped by E. F. ‘Fritz’ Schumacher, whose seminal volume Small is beautiful: A study of economics as if people mattered (1973) challenged many of the orthodox views, processes, and outcomes associated with Western models of economic development. Although Schumacher’s thesis was formulated at a particular moment in the history of modern development, it contributed signiﬁcantly to an intellectual shift which today can be found rooted in the environmental, democratization, and grassroots devel opment movements, and still has a certain currency and validity today.

Schumacher’s Thesis Fritz Schumacher questioned the paramount position that had been ascribed to technology and innovation in the process of economic development in the inﬂuential work of Joseph Schumpeter, most particularly his The theory of economic development: An inquiry into proﬁts, capital, interest, and the business cycle. Technological innovation was seen as an essential means of strengthening the competitive position of ﬁrms, and the pursuit of technological advancement was positioned as the motor driving capitalist industrialization forward, particularly in very large ﬁrms which could support research and development. This ‘idolatry of giantism’ and ‘reiﬁcation of technology’ had provided a cornerstone of Western industrialization, and was widely prescribed as a model with which to bring about economic development in some of the world’s poorer regions. Schumacher profoundly disagreed. Although the transmission of technology led capitalist industrialization had some role to play in many so called less developed countries (LDCs), modern capitalist development had generally taken the form of small dynamic islands sur rounded by massive stagnant seas of poverty, despair, and unemployment. A classical ‘dual economy’ had emerged, with a technologically advanced modern sector accessible only to a small and privileged minority, and a swollen traditional sector which provided a means of survival but little else for the great mass of the population. Set against a backdrop of a poor and predominantly rural population, large scale distress migration to the cities, mass

unemployment and underemployment, limited domestic availability of capital, and a limited indigenous pool of skills and expertise, Schumacher argued that a labor displacing development strategy centered on the import ation of technology and investment resources, and the promotion of capital intensive Fordist mass production systems was wholly inappropriate to the stage of devel opment, the current capabilities, and the social and welfare needs of most LDCs. In his characteristically polemical style, Schumacher wrote of a ‘process of mutual poi soning’, whereby modern industrial development in the cities destroyed (through competition based on greater efﬁciency and sophistication) the economic structure of the (rural) hinterland, which ‘took its revenge’ on large urban areas through mass migration which rendered the cities ‘utterly unmanageable’. Schumacher was also pres cient in his view that this modern technology driven de velopment strategy was ‘on a collision course with nature’. Schumacher advocated a people focused development strategy based on immediate needs, capabilities, and circumstances, and appropriate technology choices. He argued for autonomous and sustainable development which built up locally the capacity for education, or ganization, discipline, and ingenuity in an evolutionary manner, rather than being created or borrowed from afar through a process of technological ‘leapfrogging’. Schumacher’s writing on technology was profoundly in ﬂuenced by Mahatma Gandhi’s ideas of swadeshi (local ized production using local resources and mainly for local markets), and was further reinforced by a visit to Burma in 1955, which stimulated his thesis on an anti materialist, antiacquisitive, spiritually centered, and nonviolent Buddhist economics. Schumacher cham pioned ‘production by the masses’ ahead of ‘mass pro duction’, and advocated a rural, decentralized, and employment generating (labor intensive) bias in devel opment policy as opposed to an urban, industrial , cap ital , and technology driven strategy that relied on an uncertain process of trickle down to deliver doubtful developmental beneﬁts to the mass of the population. Schumacher was not antitechnology, nor was he ad vocating a regressive development strategy. His notion of ‘intermediate technology’ represented an appropriate point on a continuum between basic, indigenous tech nology (which he characterized symbolically as a d1 technology in a relative calculus of equipment costs per workplace), and sophisticated, modern technology (d1000 technology). The gap between the two was

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Table 1 The main characteristics of orthodox and alternative development

Technology Scale Cost Energy input Ecological impact Pollution rate Centralization Sophistication Production focus Relation to human needs

Orthodox

Alternative

Modern Large Expensive Large Unsound High Centralist Complex Capital intensive Incompatible

Alternative Small Inexpensive Small Sound Low Decentralist Simple Labor intensive Compatible

Adapted from Varma, R. (2003). E. F. Schumacher: Changing the paradigm of bigger is better. Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society 23(2), 114 24.

enormous; the introduction of the latter not only tended to kill off the former, and dramatically reduce its em ployment and income earning capacity, but it also lim ited the scope for endogenous technological evolution. Intermediate technology was characterized symbolically as a d100 technology – more advanced than traditional but less sophisticated than modern, but in reality very variable according to local conditions – which was more affordable, more in tune with the setting and context, and more likely to raise productivity without reducing em ployment. Schumacher presented intermediate technol ogy not only as an alternative (i.e., non Western) model of development but also as a philosophical idea about a culture of production. The main features of Schu macher’s alternative to mainstream Western development are summarized in Table 1.

Intermediate and Appropriate Technology Schumacher used the phrases ‘intermediate technology’ and ‘appropriate technology’ more or less interchangeably. There is no universal deﬁnition of ‘appropriateness’ – there are social and environmental, as well as economic, dimensions to be considered, and these will be weighted variously by different interest groups. At the time of his writing, a form of production technology that was an improvement on indigenous technology but did not have the labor displacing, small ﬁrm destroying, and capital consuming character of advanced Western production methods was deemed ‘appropriate’ in most LDC contexts, although the appropriate level of technological sophisti cation varied by setting and circumstance. Appropriate technology would bring the optimum economic, social, and environmental returns to the community concerned, set against local resource endowments and prevailing conditions. It would utilize local materials and power sources; would involve local people as much as possible in the development and introduction of improved technol ogies; use existing or easily developed skills and require

Figure 1 Appropriate technology in Northeast Thailand. & Michael Parnwell.

only limited amounts of investment; would enhance em ployment opportunities and require limited movement of labor; would minimize local, social, and cultural dis ruption; cause little environmental damage; and would ensure that the main economic beneﬁts go to local people in greatest need. Figure 1 provides a good example of appropriate technology: the vehicle depicted, on a street side in Northeast Thailand, is a locally manufactured vehicle which farmers use to take their farm produce to market, and which uses for its motive power an engine which also functions as a water pump and an electricity generator. Figure 2 contrasts traditional ploughing technology in Burma with the intermediate technology of the power tiller in Indonesia and a tractor in Thailand: each tech nology may be considered ‘appropriate’ or ‘inappropriate’ depending on the local setting and circumstances. Intermediate technology can derive from a number of sources. It can be taken ‘off the technological shelf ’ by giving poorer or more remote parts of the world access to (perhaps outmoded developed world) technologies that are available elsewhere. It might take the form of im provements or ‘upscaling’ of traditional technologies, or the blending of traditional and imported technologies (e.g., micro hydropower technologies which generate energy for small communities), or the modiﬁcation (downscaling) of imported technologies. Or it may center on the local or domestic development of original and new technologies for speciﬁc production, livelihood, or lifestyle purposes.

Examples of Intermediate Technology There are many examples that could be used to illustrate intermediate technology as Schumacher may have

Intermediate Technology

Figure 2 Ploughing technologies in Southeast Asia: traditional, intermediate, and advanced. & Michael Parnwell.

envisaged it (e.g., in agricultural production, manufactur ing, energy generation, domestic life, pharmaceuticals, transportation, recycling, etc.), but we will restrict our selves to just one: the promotion of improved cooking stove design in developing countries. This is chosen be cause it provided quite an important focus of a group formed by Schumacher to disseminate appropriate forms of technology to the poorer regions of the world – the Intermediate Technology Development Group (formed in

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1964, and now called Practical Action) – under its Stoves Project. It allows us to show how any form of technological development must be fundamentally rooted in its pre vailing social, cultural, economic, and environmental contexts if it is to be both appropriate and successful. An improvement in cooking stove technology, while on the face of it quite a small step and a basic process, has considerable potential to make a difference to the health, quality of life, and livelihoods of a great many people in the poorer parts of the developing world. Problems with traditional stove technology (typically the three stone hearth – a ﬁre made between three large stones which are used to support a cooking pot) include: fuel–heat con version inefﬁciency, and thus high fuel consumption, which has either cost (purchase) or time (collecting) im plications, and may contribute to a decline in biomass resources and associated environmental problems; health hazards from smoke and poisonous gas, as well as ﬁre hazards; inconvenient and time consuming with regard to lighting and attending, and difﬁcult to regulate heat out put. There are many potential solutions to these problems – improved stove design, use of different stove con struction materials, fuel substitution and fuel processing, ventilation through hoods and chimneys, etc. – many of which may appear quite basic, but without reference to the situation within which they are placed they may prove to be inappropriate to local people’s needs, capabilities, and preferences, and thus uptake levels. Although traditional cooking technology has the ad vantage of zero or negligible cost, use of widely available fuels, and zero maintenance, it is inefﬁcient, wasteful, difﬁcult to control and use, it has a high risk of scalding and burning, and smoke may cause respiratory problems. Many improvements on the open ﬁre have been de veloped, ranging from simple charcoal stoves through multipot chimney stoves up to gas burning hobs and ovens. In India a bio residue gasiﬁer stove (BRGS) has been developed locally by the Centre for Appropriate Rural Technologies at the National Institute of Engin eering in Mysore, which is a signiﬁcant improvement on traditional and even improved mud stoves. The tradi tional stoves have an energy efﬁciency of only around 10%, meaning that they use a lot of woodfuel, and create a great deal of smoke while generating little heat. In contrast, the BRGS consists of two metal cylinders, one placed inside the other (see Figure 3). Agricultural waste such as coconut fronds, bagasse (the waste from cane sugar manufacture), groundnut shells, rice husks are placed in the outer section, and small pieces of fuel wood in the inner section, which is then lit using kerosene. One load of fuel will burn smokelessly for about 3 h at a 40% efﬁciency rate. The waste agricultural residues in the outer chamber can be then reused as fuel. This stove is a dramatic improvement on the traditional stove, and ob viates the need for more expensive higher technology

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Intermediate Technology

Criticisms of Intermediate Technology

Figure 3 Cross-section of a bio residue gasiﬁer stove. (1) The inner sleeve with small pieces of wood; (2) the outer sleeve with biomass. & Appropriate Technology. Source: ‘‘Energy Efﬁcient, Smokeless Stoves Launched in India’’, Appropriate Technology, 33, 2, 55 56 (2006).

cooking solutions such as gas burners using liquid petroleum/natural gas cylinders. However, ﬁnding a technological solution to the problem of open ﬁre cooking is not simply a matter of substituting one form of technology for another with superior features. The Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG) publication Improved wood, waste and charcoal burning stoves: A practitioner’s manual identiﬁes a wide range of criteria that have to be ascertained by means of an on site ‘situation assessment’ before a correct technology choice can be made. These include: the fuel types that are used and alternative sources that may be available locally; locally available materials and skills; social activities that may be associated with cooking, including the gender division of labor; user preferences and potential; aware ness of and receptiveness to alternative designs and the beneﬁts they can provide; the potential for local manu facture of alternative technologies; the cost of alternative stove technologies and their local affordability; the uses to which stoves are presently put, and the utensils that are used; frequency of use; maintenance potential for improved stove technologies; and so on. It may be ne cessary to incorporate several aspects of the traditional technology and accommodate various elements of the prevailing social, cultural, and environmental setting to ensure that improved designs are acceptable to the target groups. Meeting needs, matching potential, and juggling costs and beneﬁts are thus just as important as advancing technology. Context counts.

Schumacher’s intermediate technology agenda has not been without its critics. It is argued to have created a rather romanticized and blinkered vision of the true situation. Thus while Gandhi and Schumacher were advocating intermediate forms of technology for rural India to protect peasants from the pernicious impact of modernization, farmers themselves were actively seeking to acquire new, improved technologies, such as were as sociated with the ‘Green Revolution’, in order to strengthen their livelihoods. In other words, outside ex perts sometimes presented an ideologically biased per spective on technology that went against the grain of what local people wanted, and perhaps needed. By re stricting the kinds of technology that were deemed ‘ap propriate’, local communities were cast in a survivalist role which, through the use of a relatively inferior technology which was conducive neither to efﬁciency nor growth, denied them the possibility of and opportunity for development. To a degree it also perpetuated the ‘technology gap’ between the rich and the poor, the ad vanced and the backward. A second important criticism is that the advocacy of a gradualist and evolutionary approach to technology development runs against the grain of recent experience. The dramatic development of East and Southeast Asia from the late 1970s onward, much of it predicated upon precisely the processes that Schumacher had been so critical of – foreign capital investment, Western industrial transplants and their (relatively) advanced technology, export oriented industrialization, rapid urbanization, signiﬁcant rural–urban migration – suggested either that Schumacher got it wrong or that his philosophy was time speciﬁc to a stage of serious underdevelopment. Rapid export oriented manufacturing development led to the dramatic transformation of several Asian economies (Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, China), and quickly soaked up large pools of hitherto underutilized rural and urban labor, as well as accelerating the demographic transition. While the early stages of these countries’ industrialization utilized relatively labor intensive production methods, because cheap labor had drawn foreign ﬁrms and foreign investment to East and Southeast Asian shores, sub sequent development has increasingly been built on these countries’ ability to acquire, assimilate, and learn from imported modern technology, and to innovate and ad vance their domestic technological capabilities. Their development has resulted from an openness to advanced foreign technological knowledge, not a denial of it as advocated in the intermediate technology approach. A third criticism is that the focus on technology tended to downplay the inﬂuence of other contextual factors (e.g., social, cultural, political, capitalist relations,

Intermediate Technology

inequality, power, repression, disenfranchisement) on the developmental outcomes – such as unemployment, in debtedness, dependency – that intermediate technology was intended to address. Many of these problems had little speciﬁcally to do with technology choices, and thus suggested the need for social and political change to precede technological change, as the latter is very un likely to bring about the former. A ﬁnal criticism is that the advocacy of a gradualist and evolutionary approach to the development of technology denies many parts of the world the opportunity to access the environmental, social and economic beneﬁts that ad vanced technology has the potential to deliver. These technologies are often superior, safer, cleaner, and more efﬁcient than the outmoded technologies they replace, and a strategy of inferiorization thus runs counter to objectives such as reducing the environmental external ities associated with development. Accelerating rather than retarding the technology transition, and ﬁnding ways of speeding up and making more complete the process of technology transfer is thus advocated as the way forward. Late developers have the enviable opportunity of ‘tech nology leapfrogging’, allowing selective use to be made of available technologies without making the same mistakes that may have been encountered in the evolutionary de velopment of technology in economically more advanced regions, and also avoiding the conservative inﬂuence of vested interests which may otherwise retard technology development. Developing countries can, for example, leapfrog to greener production technologies.

Technology Leapfrogging There are many examples of where technology leap frogging has brought signiﬁcant beneﬁts to recipient communities in some of the poorer regions of the world. These beneﬁts include improved convenience and qual ity of life, standard of living, and livelihood. Two short illustrations will sufﬁce here. Grameen Telecom (GT) is a nonproﬁt organization in Bangladesh that has close connections with the world famous Gremeen Bank, a nongovernmental organization (NGO) that specializes in providing micro ﬁnance for micro enterprise development among the country’s poor (especially women) to enable them to diversify their economic activities and build stronger livelihoods. GT provides mobile telephones to poorer rural people and communities as part of the government’s Village Phone Program. This program is designed to give rural people access to communications technology and the infor mation revolution in a country where the landline system is woefully inadequate, not least in more remote rural areas. In addition to providing a source of income to the ‘phone ladies’ who lease the phones from GT and operate

527

the system by charging fellow villagers to use the service, the program enables villagers to keep up to date with commodity prices and thus avoid being cheated by merchants, and to keep in touch with family members who have migrated to work in other parts of the country. Thus a cutting edge technology has been used to cir cumvent deﬁciencies in a less advanced technological system to bring deﬁnite social and economic beneﬁts to poor rural communities. One of the problems with the GT system concerns the charging of cell phone batteries in communities that have not yet been connected to the national electricity grid. Another advanced technology – solar photovoltaic (SPV) – has been used to overcome this problem and provides our second illustration. There are still many parts of the developing world which have either not been connected to national electricity grid systems or where the level of energy demand or the dispersed nature of the population does not make such a large scale system economically viable: 1 billion people in Asia do not have access to electricity. As such rural communities are de prived of the convenience and opportunities that is provided by an electricity supply that most areas of the world now take for granted. Instead they have to rely on alternative, often far less convenient sources of energy and lighting, such as biomass, kerosene, candles, battery powered torches, etc., or on diesel powered generators which typically consume signiﬁcant amounts of imported petroleum. Where – as in many parts of the developing world – sunshine is in plentiful supply, SPV technology represents a promising high technology solution to local energy problems, especially where appliances (e.g., do mestic lighting, radio, TV, refrigerators, water pumps, vaccine storage, telecommunications, etc.) can be run off 12 volt batteries which SPV cells are typically used to charge. SPV technology can be used to power solar lighting kits for community centers, for instance, which have been used to help improve literacy levels and other education and training outcomes. In addition, SPV technology helps to reduce consumption of biomass and fossil fuels, and thus makes a contribution to the ameli oration of global warming. At present SPV technology is relatively expensive, and cannot compete with commercial energy systems, but in more remote locations it often represents the best, and most cost effective option, especially if it is introduced as part of international or local development assistance programs, or where governments help reduce the cost of the technology by waiving import duties and sales taxes because of the technology’s importance for local devel opment. Nonetheless, the very poor may still be excluded from this technological ﬁx as a result of their lack of collateral to obtain the necessary equipment on credit, or to pay the running/electricity costs to the energy pro viders. There is 1.5 MW of installed SPV capacity in

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Mali, for example, but much more potential has been identiﬁed, and government policy is now giving SPV technology a high priority. Some 1416 photovoltaic bat tery charging stations (PVBCS) had been installed in villages in Thailand by the late 1990s (56% in the upland parts of the northern region), giving people a local source of electricity when previously they had had to take their batteries into far away towns for recharging once a week. In a survey, more than two thirds of respondents con sidered their quality of life to be ‘better’ or ‘much better’ as a result of this relatively high technology response to a local development problem.

development, calls for a radical ecological economics, and movements against materialism, overtechniﬁcation, developmentalism, and globalism which have much in common with the Buddhist economics that Schumacher espoused.

The Future

Anon (2006). Energy efﬁcient, smokeless stoves launched in India. Appropriate Technology 33(2), 55 56. Francis, A. J. and Mansell, D. S. (1988). Appropriate technology for developing countries. Blackburn: Research Publications. Grieve, R. H. (2004). Appropriate technology in a globalizing world. International Journal of Technology Management and Sustainable Development 3(3), 173 187. Gullberg, M., Ilskog, E., Katyega, M. and Kjellstrom, B. (2005). Village electriﬁcation technologies: An evaluation of photovoltaic cells and compact ﬂuorescent lamps and their applicability in rural villages based on a Tanzanian case study. Energy Policy 33, 1287 1298. Kaplinshy, R. (1990). The economies of small: Appropriate technology in a changing world. London: Intermediate Technology Publications. Schumacher, E. F. (1973). Small is beautiful: A study of economics as if people mattered. London: Abacus. Schumpeter, J. A. (1934). The theory of economic development: An inquiry into proﬁts, capital, interest, and the business cycle. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Sriuthaisiriwong, Y. and Kumar, S. (2001). Rural electriﬁcation using photovoltaic battery charging stations: A performance study in northern Thailand. Progress in Photovoltaics: Research and Applications 9, 223 234. Stewart, B. (1987). Improved wood, waste and charcoal burning stoves: A practitioner’s manual. London: Intermediate Technology Publications. Varma, R. (2003). E.F. Schumacher: Changing the paradigm of bigger is better. Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society 23(2), 114 124.

The pendulum appears to have swung away from the idea of controlling technological advancement in poorer countries and regions in order to protect jobs, limit capital leakage, and strengthen the capacity for en dogenous technology development, to a strategy of ac celerating the North–South transfer of appropriate forms of technology and the capacity of poorer countries to absorb and make use of it. As such, Schumacher’s advo cacy of intermediate technology appears to have been relevant to a particular moment in the history of modern development and a speciﬁc segment of the global econ omy. Nonetheless, his philosophy has taken on a much wider resonance in recent years as more and more people have started to question the destination that a technol ogy driven path is taking the world in social, economic and, most particularly, environmental terms. Technology has delivered amazing advancements and improvements, but has also wrought incredible destructive power. Humankind’s ability to overconsume natural resources, pollute the biosphere, and threaten future development has been facilitated by the cavalier and often in appropriate application of modern technology. These problems have stimulated a reaction which is gaining in scale and momentum across the globe, and which has been strongly inﬂuenced by Schumacher’s philosophical position, inter alia, on the scale and capital intensity of production, our complacent attitude and behavior toward resources and the natural environment, the importance of building according to context and capability, and the need for people centered and self reliant forms of development. Described as the ‘father of the Green movement’, Schumacher’s inﬂuence can be identiﬁed in the current preoccupation with sustainable

See also: Development I; Green Revolution; Nongovernmental Organizations; Sustainable Development.

Further Reading

Relevant Websites http://www.grameenphone.com Grameenphone. http://www.grameen info.org/grameen/gtelecom/ Grameen Telecom. http://www.itdg.org/ Intermediate Technology Development Group. http://www.practicalaction.org/ Practical Action. http://www.schumachersociety.org/ The E.F. Schumacher Society. http://www.grameenfoundation.org/ The Grameen Foundation. http://www.schumacherfoundation.org/ The Schumacher Foundation.

Intermodality A. R. Goetz, University of Denver, Denver, CO, USA & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Containerization Process by which steel boxes are used to store, protect, and handle cargo being transported and easily interchanged between trucks, trains, and ships without rehandling contents. Double Stacking Practice whereby containers are placed on top of one another on a ﬂat or recessed railroad car that improves capacity. Land Bridge Using railroads to ship containers from one coastal port to another, thus facilitating the maritime movement of containers; most often used in the context of shipping containers across North America from west coast to east coast ports. Piggyback A truck–rail intermodal service where a truck trailer with wheeled chassis is loaded onto a railroad ﬂatcar for transport; also known as trailer-onﬂatcar (TOFC). Post-Panamax A generation of container ships that are built with dimensions larger than can be accommodated by the Panama Canal. TEU (Twenty-Foot Equivalent Unit) The standard measure of container trafﬁc based on 20 ft long containers.

Introduction Precisely deﬁning intermodal transportation can be a tricky endeavor. There are numerous deﬁnitions of the term, each with nuances that may be applicable in par ticular contexts. A basic deﬁnition of intermodality is transportation by more than one form of carrier during a single journey. In this sense, virtually all transportation historically could be classiﬁed as intermodal since the use of more than one mode is typical, such as when the ﬁrst sailing ships were loaded with cargo taken from horse drawn carts. Sometimes the terms ‘multimodal transport’ or ‘combined transport’ are used to describe transport involving two or more modes. A somewhat broader def inition of intermodal transport from Gerhardt Muller of the US Merchant Marine Academy is ‘‘the transportation of passengers and freight on two or more different modes in such a way that all parts of the transportation process, including the exchange of information, are efﬁciently connected and coordinated.’’ This second deﬁnition is more descriptive of the larger meaning associated with intermodalism, particularly regarding the efﬁciencies that accrue as a result of connected and coordinated services.

Key differences include the ease of transferability through the use of new technologies and organizational control, and the increased reliability of on time, door to door services geared to the needs of customers. Simple trans fers of freight or passengers from one mode of transport to another had come to be viewed largely as separate activities from the perspective of the individual modes of transportation. An intermodal approach sees the whole process of moving people or goods as a connected system working together as opposed to separate modal systems working independently and/or competitively. Broader deﬁnitions of intermodalism have been prof fered by practitioners and academics. Former US Federal Highway administrator Gloria Jeff deﬁned intermodalism as ‘‘a system that is both safe and efﬁcient, and productive and ﬂexible, in responding to the needs for goods move ments and offers people choices and ﬂexibility in their personal movements; the system must also be inter national, intelligent, and inclusive.’’ An even broader deﬁnition was proposed by University of Denver Pro fessor, Joseph Szyliowicz, who incorporated the concepts of sustainability and ethics in his deﬁnition: ‘‘An inter modal system is one in which the individual modes are linked, governed, and managed in a manner that creates a seamless and sustainable transportation system; such a system should be economically efﬁcient, environmentally sound, safe and secure, and ethically based.’’ Each of these deﬁnitions in turn broadens the intermodal concept to embrace a much larger meaning beyond simply ‘trans portation involving more than one mode’.

Brief History The intermodal approach to transportation has become more widely recognized and adopted by private sector providers of transportation, governmental agencies, and the larger transportation community. The private sector has led the way in the adoption of intermodal technol ogies within the freight transportation arena, most notably the pioneering efforts of Malcolm McLean and Sea Land Services in the 1950s in spearheading the container revolution. The era of containerization of ﬁcially commenced in 1956 when the ship Ideal X sailed from New Jersey to Texas with a load of containers that could be transported on ships, rail cars, or trucks. At about the same time, railroads developed specialized ‘piggyback’ services featuring truck trailers (with wheeled chassis) on ﬂatcars [TOFC] and later, containers on ﬂatcars [COFC]. In 1964, the International Standards

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Organization (ISO) adopted a standard for container size of 8 ft width and height, and 20 ft length, thus establishing the twenty foot equivalent unit (TEU) as the standard measure of containerized freight. Today, both 20 ft and 40 ft containers are used extensively. Starting in the early 1980s, shipping lines and rail roads began to experiment with ‘double stacking’ con tainers on rail cars to increase volume throughput. In 1984, the shipping giant American President Lines (APL) through its Stacktrain unit pioneered double stacking of containers on rail ﬂatcars that dramatically improved the capacity and productivity of landside container transport. Soon thereafter, other shipping lines, such as Sea Land, K Line, Maersk, and NYK developed their own double stacking operations in conjunction with the major railroads. Many railroad bridges and tunnels had to be rebuilt subsequently to accommodate the increased height requirements of double stacked containers. The success of containerization and double stacking in the railroad industry has led to the development of 48 ft and 53 ft domestic containers, in addition to the standard 20 ft and 40 ft international containers. These larger domestic containers make it easier for railroads to interface with trucks, since these containers conform to more standard truck trailer lengths. Deregulation in the US and other states from the early 1980s played a major role in facilitating inter modalism by making it easier for transportation com panies to coordinate services across modes. The success of integrated package delivery ﬁrms, such as FedEx, UPS, and DHL, has underscored the value of the intermodal concept. More recent innovations in electronic data interchange (EDI) and the development of specialized logistics and supply chain management ﬁrms (third party providers) have facilitated the development of intermodalism. Today, intermodal operations are part and parcel of the maritime, railroad, trucking, and air cargo businesses, and have resulted in a much more in tegrated and efﬁcient freight transportation system. An intermodal approach has resulted in increased proﬁt ability, better utilization of existing infrastructure, re duction in need of additional capacity, fewer environmental externalities, lower prices, and better customer service. While freight intermodality pertains to how goods move, passenger intermodality is focused on moving people within and between the major passenger transport modes: in cars on roads and highways, by airplane, in buses, by rail transit, in water ferries, by bicycle, and as pedestrians. In a strict sense, most personal transportation is already intermodal in character. Whether walking to one’s car or to a bus stop, or taking a train to get to the airport, there usually are two or more modes of travel involved in most trips. But again, the concept of pas senger intermodalism goes beyond just involving two or

more modes to emphasize the ease of connections be tween the modes that relies on seamless coordination. In North America, passenger intermodalism has not been developed nearly as well as freight intermodalism, due mainly to the overwhelming dominance of the auto mobile in personal transportation. In Europe and Asia, by contrast, passenger intermodalism is more advanced be cause passenger transit systems are more extensive and better coordinated with each other. Governmental transport agencies in North America, Europe, Asia, and around the world have reacted to the intermodal revolution in freight transportation by in creasingly adopting and promoting it as ofﬁcial policy in both freight and passenger transportation. In the US, the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efﬁciency Act (ISTEA) of 1991 was the ﬁrst major piece of federal transportation legislation that did not contain the word ‘highway’ in its title. It signaled a shift in thinking about transportation away from individual modal per spectives to a more integrated intermodal approach. Since government is responsible for providing much of the infrastructure used in both freight and passenger transportation worldwide, government recognition of intermodalism has been an important step in the devel opment of the larger system, particularly for the pas senger sector.

The Intermodal Concept As the term intermodal has become more widely used, its exact meaning has become more difﬁcult to pinpoint. The intermodal concept has proven to be somewhat amorphous, as different individuals tend to have widely differing notions of what intermodal really means. Its deﬁnition oftentimes hinges on the differentiation be tween ‘multimodal’ and ‘intermodal’, or between ‘pas senger intermodalism’ and ‘freight intermodalism’. Multimodal versus Intermodal One distinction that is often made is between the terms ‘multimodal’ and ‘intermodal’. To some, multimodal and intermodal are interchangeable terms; while to others, the distinction is important. Strictly speaking, multi modal means ‘more than one mode’, while intermodal suggests ‘connections between modes’. Thus, multimodal transport may involve two or more separate transport systems, thus providing more system choices, while intermodal transport emphasizes the most efﬁcient way of moving from point to point within an integrated trans portation system. Multimodal transport can involve adopting a generic, non mode speciﬁc approach to problem deﬁnition and problem solving. In intermodal transport, key interactions between modes (including transfers) and also policy and service interactions are

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paramount. Some feel that intermodal transport, strictly focused on connections between modes, represents a subset of the much larger ﬁeld of multimodal transport, while others feel that intermodal transport is the broader ﬁeld, and that multimodal transport is a necessary pre requisite to the more comprehensive and better con nected intermodal system. This latter conceptualization was expressed more formally by Robert Martinez of the US Department of Transportation (USDOT) Ofﬁce of Intermodalism who introduced the following three part deﬁnition: choice among transportation options provided by • competing modes, independently or in combination

•

•

(choice also means that decision makers need to consider alternative systems to address transportation needs before investing in infrastructure); connections that provide convenient, rapid, efﬁcient, and safe transfer of people or goods from one mode to another (including end point, pickup, and delivery) during a single journey to provide the highest quality and most comprehensive transportation service for cost; and coordination and cooperation among transportation organizations to improve transportation service, quality, safety, and efﬁciency across all modes or combinations of modes in an environmentally sound manner.

This deﬁnition of intermodalism has been used by the USDOT and also by numerous research studies investi gating intermodal planning practices. Other studies prefer to use multimodal as the key word to describe a similar process, while still others use both key words together. In a European context, terms such as ‘combined transport’, ‘integrated transport’, or ‘interoperability’ are used to describe similar processes.

Freight Intermodal versus Passenger Intermodal Another important distinction is between freight and passenger intermodal transport. Growing interest in both freight and passenger intermodalism in government and the private sector has created some confusion when using the term intermodal. The intermodal concept was ini tially developed within the freight industry. To many in the private sector and some in government, intermodal transport means freight intermodal transport. To others, mostly in local government and planning, intermodal transport means passenger intermodal transport. As a result, it becomes necessary to specify which type of intermodal transport one is discussing. The following sections illustrate the contemporary landscape of both freight and passenger intermodalism.

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Contemporary Freight Intermodalism Intermodalism, and especially containerization, has pro foundly affected all modes of freight transport, but it has probably had the greatest effect on the maritime industry. Loading and unloading ships used to be a very labor intensive activity performed by gangs of dockers at ports. Containerization has facilitated the use of large special ized gantry cranes that have dramatically improved the speed of handling. A 40 000 ton container ship can be loaded or unloaded today using less than 750 man hours, while traditional methods would require 24 000 man hours. This reduction in the amount of workers required on the waterfront has had signiﬁcant labor ramiﬁcations in an industry where unions have been historically strong. Protection of cargo from damage or loss, and overall security has been enhanced through containerization. The economic success of containerization has led to the construction and utilization of ever larger container ships, the largest of which today have capacities ex ceeding 8000 TEUs. The largest container ships are classiﬁed as ‘post Panamax’ because their large dimen sions do not permit them to cross through the Panama Canal, or sometimes ‘Mallacamax’ referring to the size limit of ships passing through the Strait of Malacca near Singapore. The economies of scale engendered by con tainerization, as well as by ocean shipping deregulation and economic globalization, have resulted in a more concentrated maritime industry, characterized by a small number of global strategic alliances (Figure 1). Ports have been signiﬁcantly affected by container ization due to the need for signiﬁcant investments in gantry cranes and for greater berthing and channel ca pacity to accommodate larger ships and increased con tainer storage in port areas. These economic pressures have also intensiﬁed inter port competition. There are several major ‘ranges’ or geographic regions featuring major ports that container ships serve, such as the Far East (Hong Kong, Singapore, Kaiosiung, Pusan, Kobe, and Yokohama), West Coast North America (Los Angeles/Long Beach, Oakland, Vancouver, Seattle, and Tacoma), East Coast North America (New York–New Jersey, Baltimore, Hampton Roads, Charleston, and Halifax), and Northwest Europe (Rotterdam, Hamburg, Antwerp, Bremen, and Le Havre). Today, the largest container ﬂows are from the Far East to the West Coast of North America, reﬂecting the huge growth of trade in manufactured goods from China and East Asia to the US. Projections indicate that container trafﬁc across the Pa ciﬁc will double over the next 20 years. Intermodal container trafﬁc has been increasing at ports throughout the world, including in the Caribbean and Mediterranean Seas, as well as in ports in Australia and Oceania, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia.

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Figure 1 A post-Panamax container ship. Courtesy: NYK Lines.

Integrating land and sea movements of containers as part of a through transport concept is a critical devel opment in freight intermodalism. Previously separate and highly competitive, the railroad and trucking industries have become much more integrated with each other and with the maritime shipping industry. The railroad in dustry, in particular, especially in North America, has been radically transformed as a result of containerization, double stacking, deregulation, and integrated services (Figure 2). Spurred by the rapid rise in the use of con tainers by the shipping industry, railroads in North America began in the 1980s to dedicate blocks of trains to move double stacked containers from West Coast ports to inland terminals, especially Chicago. The use of rail roads to move containers across North America has also created a form of ‘land bridge’ between Asia and the East Coast of North America or Europe. The land bridge concept became more popular once post Panamax con tainer ships began service. Most intermodal containers on rail are unloaded at inland centers or switching yards, and transferred to trucks for ﬁnal distribution. Today, the intermodal shipment of containers accounts for a large and rapidly growing segment of business for each of the ﬁve major North American railroads – the Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF), Union Paciﬁc (UP), CSX, Norfork Southern (NS), and Canadian National (CN) – and has become an important component of some of the largest trucking ﬁrms, such as JB Hunt or Schneider Transport. In Europe, intermodal development of rail roads has been hindered by the shorter land distances that are better suited to truck transport, and by problems of interoperability between national rail systems. There are, sometimes, loading gauge problems for container

trains as well as capacity problems on rail networks which are much more heavily used for passengers in Europe than in the US. Also, there is a greater emphasis on the use of inland barges on the Rhine and other river systems in Europe. Landside intermodalism in Asia is limited by the insular geography of much of the region, but sig niﬁcant investments in rail and road infrastructure in China may lead to a much more integrated system there. Australia and New Zealand are also developing a more coordinated intermodal system. As the intermodal con cept spreads through other regions of the world, more efﬁcient landside connections will be improved in con junction with regional economic development. Air cargo transport has beneﬁted from container ization through the use of specialized containers that ﬁt within the rounded fuselage of wide bodied aircraft. In tegrated carriers, such as Fed Ex, UPS, and DHL rely on the speed of air cargo and the improved transferability of freight to other modes to build highly successful package and express freight delivery operations.

Contemporary Passenger Intermodality Imagine a future whereby an individual takes a trip from Meridian, Mississippi, USA to Vouray, France, using a combination of modes, including local transit, intercity bus, intercity high speed rail, and international air in which only one through ticket has been purchased and baggage is picked up at the origin and delivered to the ﬁnal destination. This vision describes the essence of what intermodal passenger transportation is all about: seamless, efﬁcient, environmentally sound, and safe

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Figure 2 Double-stacking containers on a railroad ﬂatcar using an overhead gantry crane. Courtesy: Pacer Stacktrain.

transportation for travelers moving from point to point throughout the world. When Fed Ex, UPS, or DHL delivers a package from Manassa, Colorado, USA to Mandya, India, several modes of transportation are involved, but the customer calls one company and the delivery occurs with a guar anteed time of arrival. But if a passenger wishes to make the same trip, that person would have to contact at least four separate transportation providers to schedule the trip at a relatively high cost with no assurances of actual time of arrival. This example illustrates important dif ferences between the freight and passenger transporta tion sectors. To be fair, it should be recognized that it is easier in most cases to ship packages rather than people. Packages do not talk back, and do not mind being stacked up in warehouses or on trucks. Still, given the importance of transporting people, intermodal passenger perform ance can be improved to at least approximate the efﬁ ciencies already achieved in the freight sector. The vision of a seamless, integrated passenger system can be made more focused by considering best practices in places where passenger intermodalism has been more successful. The infrastructure of some European and Asian passenger systems is better suited to intermodalism as the individual systems of intercity rail, bus, and local transit are themselves better developed than in North

America or other parts of the world. But Europeans and Asians have also made important strides in linking these systems together so that connections are much more convenient to the traveler. The classic examples are the intercity rail stations with direct access to national high speed networks located in the lower levels of major European airports, including Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Frankfurt, Milan, Oslo, Paris, Stockholm, and Zurich. With the development of the Trans European High Speed Rail Network, an international ﬂight to any of these major airports provides convenient access to nu merous cities and towns throughout Europe. Other air ports, such as Heathrow and Gatwick in London, provide rail access only to local area rail terminals, whereupon travelers can be connected to a national rail system. Once reaching the desired city, the more ubiquitous local rail transit, streetcar, or bus systems can take travelers close to their ﬁnal destinations. Good air–rail connections can also be found in Tokyo, Osaka, Seoul, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Shanghai which features the world’s ﬁrst and only operational magnetic levitation (Mag Lev) train line. Improving air–rail connections in North America include New York (JFK, LaGuardia, and Newark Airports), Washington, DC (Reagan National and Baltimore, Washington), Chicago (Midway and O’Hare), Atlanta, Boston, Cleveland, Fort Lauderdale,

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Figure 3 Intermodal passenger operation featuring rail service to an airport. Air Train-JFK connects Kennedy Airport’s eight terminals with the New York City subway system and the Long Island Railroad. Courtesy: Air Train-JFK.

Miami, Minneapolis, Philadelphia, Portland, Providence, St. Louis, and San Francisco. Most of these US air–rail connections are to local rail systems, not regional or national (Figure 3). Passenger intermodalism is facilitated through the use of intermodal passenger stations and terminals that serve as a focal point for rail, bus, taxi, ferry, bicycle, and pedestrian transport. These intermodal stations and terminals play a critical role in providing enhanced connectivity throughout the entire system by serving as the linchpins of an integrated passenger transport system. In most instances, the central railway terminals serve as the main intermodal stations for cities, but subsidiary intermodal centers at airports, seaports, and other stra tegic locations on the intermodal network are also quite important. Many outlying rail stations around major cities, for example, have large automobile park and ride lots that serve as an intermodal transfer spot between cars and trains.

Conclusion The intermodal concept is revolutionizing both freight and passenger transport around the world. Relying on innovations such as containerization, double stacking, and the through transport concept, the speed and reliability of goods movement involving the maritime, railroad, trucking, and air cargo industries has been greatly en hanced. Passenger intermodalism has been slower to develop than on the freight side, but signiﬁcant progress in establishing more and better air–rail linkages and

better connected local and regional transit systems through intermodal passenger terminals and stations herald a brighter future. See also: Logistics; Railways; Transport and Globalization.

Further Reading Boske, L. B. (1998). Multimodal/intermodal transportation in the United States, Western Europe, and Latin America: Government policies, plans, and programs. Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, Policy Research Project Report 130. Austin, TX: University of Texas. Carmichael, G. (1997). An overview of the 21st century North American intermodal system. Transportation Law Journal 25(3), 321. Coogan, M. A. (1993). Airport access: Case study in intermodalism. In Intermodal Planning: Concept, Practice, Vision, Special Report 240, pp 90 91. Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board, National Research Council. Coyle, J. J., Bardi, E. J. and Novack, R. A. (2006). Transportation (6th edn.). Mason, OH: Thomson South Western. Crain and Associates, Inc. with Paciﬁc Consulting Group. (1996). Institutional barriers to intermodal transportation policies and planning in metropolitan areas. Transit Cooperative Research Program Report 14. Transportation Research Board, National Research Council. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. Goetz, A. R., Szyliowicz, J. S., Vowles, T. M. and Taylor, G. S. (2004). Assessing Intermodal Transportation Planning at State Departments of Transportation. Denver, CO: National Center for Intermodal Transportation. Goetz, A. R. and Vowles, T. M. (2000). Progress in intermodal passenger transportation: Private sector initiatives. Transportation Law Journal 27(3), 475 497. Levinson, M. (2006). The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Martinez, R. (1993). Perspective from the ofﬁce of intermodalism. ISTEA and Intermodal Planning: Concept, Practice, Vision, Special Report

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240, pp 47 54. Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board/ National Academy Press. Muller, G. (1999). Intermodal Freight Transportation (4th edn.). Washington, DC: Eno Transportation Foundation and Intermodal Association of North America. Peyrebrune, H. L. (2000). Multimodal aspects of statewide transportation planning. National Cooperative Highway Research Program, Synthesis of Highway Practice 286. Transportation Research Board, National Research Council. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. Rodrigue, J. P., Comtois, C. and Slack, B. (2006). The Geography of Transport Systems. London: Routledge. Slack, B. (1998). Intermodal transportation. In Hoyle, B. & Knowles, R. (eds.) Modern Transport Geography (2nd edn.) pp 263 289. Chichester: Wiley. Szyliowicz, J. (2000). Intermodalism: The challenge and the promise. Transportation Law Journal 27(3), 299 315. TransManagement, Inc. (1998). Innovative practices for multimodal transportation planning for freight and passengers. National

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Cooperative Highway Research Program Report 404. Transportation Research Board, National Research Council. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. US Government Accountability Ofﬁce (2005). Intermodal transportation: Potential strategies would redeﬁne federal role in developing airport intermodal capabilities. GAO 05 727. Washington, DC: US Government Accountability Ofﬁce.

Relevant Websites http://www.intermodal.org Intermodal Association of North America (IANA). http://www.du.edu/transportation Intermodal Transportation Institute (ITI), University of Denver. http://www.iaro.com International Air Rail Organization (IARO).

International Organizations R. Peet, Clark University, Worcester, MA, USA & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Bretton Woods Meeting held in 1944 to set up an international economic regulatory regime for the postwar period. GATT The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs that governed international trading relations between 1948 and 1994. Governance Code of conduct and regulation of the operations of institutions usually situated in civil society. IMF The International Monetary Fund, an institution set up at Bretton Woods to give short-term loans to member countries experiencing balance of payments and currency crises. Keynesianism Following the economist J.M. Keynes, this term refers to intervention by states in the running of capitalist economies through monetary and ﬁscal policies. Neoliberalism Late-twentieth-century revival of nineteenth-century, free trade liberalism that advocates de-regulation, privatization, and other policies. Washington Consensus Informal agreement reached by the US Treasury, the IMF, and the World Bank in the 1980s on a set of neoliberal policies prescribed as conditionality on loans made by the international ﬁnancial institutions. World Bank An institution set up at Bretton Woods to give long-term development loans initially to countries undergoing reconstruction after World War II, but eventually mainly to Third World and post-Communist member countries. World Social Forum Meeting of social movements held each year usually in Porto Allegre, Brazil to discuss alternative development. WTO The World Trade Organization, a more formal successor to GATT with extended powers to regulate intellectual property rights and trade in services, as well as international commodity trade.

Introduction International organizations are private and public institutions operating in several or many countries. Pri vate international organizations are typiﬁed by multi national corporations that operate in several countries, but maintain a deﬁnite base in one; and by transnational corporations, operating internationally and without particular national commitment. Public international

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organizations are typiﬁed by the international ﬁnancial institutions, as with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organ ization (WTO) and international political, cultural, and economic institutions, typically the United Nations (UN) and its various agencies like the World Health Organ ization (WHO), the UN Development Program (UNDP), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). There are also several major institutions that have memberships restricted to small groups of countries, yet operate internationally, as with the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the group of seven or eight countries (G7/8). Inter national organizations have assumed increasing signiﬁ cance in the post World War II period as economies, cultures, and polities have globalized – that is, as the time needed to traverse space has decreased and the oper ations of institutions have increased in scale.

Theoretical Approaches One way of looking at the relationship between the two types of international organizations, private and public, is that the public institutions regulate a global economy and polity that would be more crisis prone if it were to op erate alone. A version of this that is signiﬁcant in human geography is referred to as regulation theory. Regulation theorists place their conception of economic growth (regime of capital accumulation) in the context of broader sociopolitical institutional forces (mode of regulation). They see economic history as alternating phases of relatively stable capital accumulation, inter rupted by sharp, punctuating restructuring crises. That is, regulationists do not see capitalism as self stabilizing, and certainly not as self healing, but see precarious stabil ization being achieved by the power of agency – in creasingly global agency. That is, stability has to be reestablished by institutional actions that may or may not occur, may not be completely successful, or may have unintended but signiﬁcant consequences. As part of the regulation school derives from Marxism, agency can be transformative in socialist, ecological, feminist, and other directions – for regulationists, a far better economic world is possible. In this mainly French school of thought, the central concept ‘mode of regulation’ is understood as a ‘situated rationality, illuminated by a dense network of institutions’ that inﬂuences and directs the trajectory of an economy. That is, with the regulation school, eco nomic growth is directed by an institutionally produced

International Organizations

rationality, rather than growth being ‘natural’, ‘endemic’. International organizations try to produce a more ra tional global economy. Another aspect of the analysis concerns its level or speciﬁcity. International organizations can be looked at via an analysis intermediate between grand theories of world systems or modes of production like capitalism, and empirical details of characteristics and events, as with histories and detailed geographies. An example of this intermediate level analysis deals with institutions. Interest in institutionalism has recently been revived in a number of academic disciplines – institutional eco nomics, for instance. In human geography, the argument is that economic activity is socially and institutionally situated rather than autonomous. Institutional economic geography looks at the shaping of space economies by environments of institutions, with one main strand of institutionalist interest focusing on social regulation, governance, and the effect of policies in shaping global, national, regional, and local economies. The main prob lem with the term ‘institution’, however, is that no one is sure what it means – organization, as with a corporation or a global bureaucracy, or values, like efﬁciency or be nevolence? In what follows, institution initially means an organizational entity, located in a space, with a mission and declared purpose, backed by command over some kind of resource (ideas, expertise, money, and con nections). But additionally, institution is used in the sense, derived from the social theorist Michel Foucault, of a ‘community of experts’, an elite group controlling an area of knowledge and expertise, that exerts power over spaces that extend to the global. International organiza tions are among the most powerful of a system of insti tutions involved in global governance.

Global Governance The global capitalist economy is made up of thousands of specialized components tied physically together by ﬂows of products, resources, people, and money, and tied together organizationally by markets governed by gov ernmental, intergovernmental, and governance insti tutions – at the global scale these are international organizations. In neoliberal theory, governmental inter vention into market mechanisms is thought to be un necessary. Indeed, in extreme neoliberalism, government is said to be harmful to economic efﬁciency and dan gerous to political liberty, because it constrains the freedom of individual action. But in practice, all mar ket systems are embedded within institutional or organizational contexts that include state legislation, governmental intervention, and increasingly governance regulation. When market systems were primarily national in geographic scale, the necessary institutional

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framework could similarly be limited to the nation state. With regionalization, such as the partial integration of the West European economies, governance expanded to the international scale, as with the European Union. However, the globalization of capitalism has long re quired and, indeed has been led by, the parallel global ization of institutional regulation by international organizations. In the ﬁrst globalization of the late nine teenth century, British national institutions precariously managed international economic relations, with sterling as agreed upon currency of account, and London as global, hegemonic center of political–economic power. Pax Britannica was challenged during two ‘world wars’, with Britain demoted in their aftermath to the status of sub hegemony – although remnants of the previous he gemony remain, for example, in London’s strong position in global currency exchange and the international bond market. In the second globalization of the late twentieth century, US institutions have come to precariously manage international economic relations, with the US dollar as currency of account, Wall Street as main center of political–economic power, and Washington DC as center of political power. However, the second global ization learns from the collapse of the ﬁrst globalization in the Depression of the 1930s that nationally based in stitutions cannot sufﬁce, no matter how economically and militarily powerful Pax Americana may be. Hence the International organizations such as the IMF and World Bank, as well as international currencies, like the US dollar, the Yen, Deutschmark, Pound and Euro, elements of a spectacular array of regional, supranational, inter national, and truly global entities, are greatly inﬂuenced by, but only partly disciplined by, American political economic and political militaristic power. The capital invested in global development is con trolled by large ﬁnancial institutions: global governance institutions, such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the G7/G8; and private banks, of various kinds, involved in global capital markets. These institutions supply much of the capital needed to ﬁnance development. They also control the ﬁnancial expertise necessary for investment decisions. International ﬁnancial organizations of all types, governance and private, consult with each other on a daily basis and form conglomerates to tackle invest ment related problems. These institutions form com plexes of ﬁnancial power bound together by regular exchanges of personnel and policy ideas. They exercise control, through money and expertise, over billions of people the world over, at the basic level of livelihood. Banks and other ﬁnancial institutions see global devel opment as an opportunity for earning interest on de posited funds. The global governance institutions like the World Bank, but some private ﬁnancial institutions like investment banks, try to portray development ﬁnancing as motivated partly by humanitarian concerns, like global

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poverty. Yet there remains a widespread, critical belief that global ﬁnance capital produces a form of develop ment conducive to its own interest – making money. Global ﬁnancial organizations thus become a center of controversy, where interests collide over vital issues of global development.

Origins of International Financial Organizations The idea of establishing international ﬁnancial organ izations to regulate global economic development came as a response to growing problems in the years between the two world wars of the twentieth century. At ﬁrst, bankers were the main actors rather than governments who, following a liberal ethos, initially tried to avoid direct intervention in explicitly ﬁnancial international affairs. Far more aware of the effects of national interest rates, for example, in attracting or repelling capital, bankers advocated some kind of international cooper ation. For example, the German reparation payments, made under the Dawes Plan of 1924, were negotiated by the chairmen of the boards of the New York Federal Reserve Bank and the Bank of England. There was an international organization in place – the League of Na tions – but it remained primarily a ‘political’ organiza tion. However, it maintained an Economic and Financial Organization, and it sponsored a series of international conferences in various European cities between 1920 and 1933. In these initial moves we can see the beginnings of the idea that international ﬁnancial organizations should regulate global development. In the mid 1920s, the League of Nations helped ar range loans to stabilize the economies of several Euro pean countries. An international economic conference, convened by the League at Geneva in 1927, and attended by several nonmember countries, such as the US and the Soviet Union, came up with a series of resolutions dealing with trade, cartels, and other issues that were thought to constitute an international code of behavior in policy matters. Discussion of a Bank for International Settlements (BIS) took place in 1930. And since then, regular meetings have been held in Basel, Switzerland, among central bank governors and experts from other ﬁnancial agencies. The BIS conducts its own research in ﬁnancial and monetary economics and collects, compiles, and disseminates economic and ﬁnancial statistics, sup ports the IMF and World Bank, performs traditional banking functions for national central banks (e.g., gold and foreign exchange transactions), as well as trustee and agency functions. The main international ﬁnancial insti tutions, however, were formed by governments through the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement. This established permanent international organizations to promote inter

national monetary cooperation and provide the ma chinery through which countries could consult and collaborate – the IMF, the International Bank for Re construction and Development (IBRD) (later World Bank), and an International Trade Organization (ITO) that never got off the ground. The boards of governors and executive boards of these institutions would be controlled by the countries with the largest investments (quotas). There was one issue, later to become highly contro versial, that divided the Americans and the Europeans. The European view of the lending operations of the IMF was that resources would be provided to member coun tries more or less on request, as they were needed. In particular, the British delegates to Bretton Woods thought that members should be free to pursue whatever domestic policies they desired, even if these affected exchange rates, a central international concern of the conference. By contrast, the Americans thought that borrowing foreign currency (dollars as it turned out) from the IMF was not an unqualiﬁed right. At a pre conference, the US delegation proposed that language of the proposed Articles of Agreement (Article V) be changed from a ‘‘member shall be entitled to buy another member’s currency from the Fund’’ to a ‘‘member may buy the currency of another member from the Fund’’ (emphasis added). The United Kingdom had the support of virtually all other countries in successfully opposing this change. However, later the US director on the IMF executive board insisted that use of IMF resources should be subject to close scrutiny to assure a country’s ad herence to its principles and purposes. Indeed, the US executive director challenged several requests to draw on IMF funds in the late 1940s on these grounds and, as a result, in 1950 the managing director speciﬁed that countries would have to lay out the speciﬁc steps they would take in overcoming balance of payments dif ﬁculties. Britain and France abstained in the subsequent vote on this issue, while other countries agreed to the American notion of ‘conditionality’ only because the US was their main source of credit. This conditionality laid on IMF and World Bank loans has subsequently become the main issue of controversy in global economic gov ernance. Nation states resent having their economic policies scrutinized and controlled by economists at the international governance institutions directly, and by the US Treasury Department indirectly. The Bretton Woods Institutions were supposed to govern agreed upon principles for the conducting of economic affairs decided at the conference. The main principles governing post war development were as follows: 1. The experience of the competitive depreciation of currencies during the 1930s led to the principle of

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2.

3.

4.

5.

international control over exchange rates between national currencies under what can be termed ‘man aged ﬂexibility’. Under this, the par values of member country currencies were deﬁned in gold, but allowed to vary around these standards, with par values changed by more than this only under drastic con ditions and by permission of the IMF. A pool of gold and currencies to be drawn on in case of balance of payments difﬁculties was subscribed by member countries to the IMF, according to a quota system adjusted every ﬁve years. The quota deter mined the country’s drawing rights and also its vote in the institution. Countries could exchange speciﬁed amounts of their currencies for those of other counties under conditions supervised by the IMF. To enable multilateral trade, after a ﬁve year transition period, all member countries were to eliminate controls making currencies convertible into one another at the ofﬁcial rates without restrictions or discrimination unless approved by the IMF. Various ‘scarce currency’ provisions were made to decrease instabilities resulting from shortages due to sustained surpluses in a country’s balance of payments – the IMF was authorized to declare the scarcity, ra tion its remaining supply, require a country to sell currency to it, in exchange for gold, or use other measures. The Bretton Woods Agreement established a per manent ﬁnancial institution to promote international monetary cooperation and provide the machinery through which countries could consult and collabor ate. This institution, called the IMF, a specialized agency of the UN, was part of an envisaged system that also included a bank dealing with long term in vestments, the IBRD, a trade organization (ITO) that eventually became the WTO, and actions to promote full employment under the UN Economic and Social Council. The IMF would have a board of governors, representing all member countries that met annually, an executive board, of which ﬁve members would be from countries with the largest quotas, meeting con tinuously, and a managing director, who was not a board member. Voting on both boards was to be ac cording to quotas. Under the original quota system, the US had 27.9% of the vote and the UK 13.3%. Today, the US continues to have the largest bloc of votes and together with the other big developed countries controls policy formation in the inter national ﬁnancial organizations.

The IMF As originally conceived at Bretton Woods, the IMF was to be a supranational body essentially doing two things: it

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would regulate the rates at which currencies were ex changed among member countries; and it would help ensure international stability by making loans at times of crisis in member countries’ balances of payments. Though its mission statement remains essentially the same, the IMF has subsequently undergone major changes, including several apparent reversals of fortune, that nevertheless resulted in an overall accumulation of power and inﬂuence. Today IMF policies directly affect the economies of 184 countries and inﬂuence, sometimes drastically, and some say disastrously, the lives of the vast majority of the world’s people. The IMF is probably the single most powerful nonstate (governance) institution in the world. Publicly, governments have to praise the IMF while bickering privately about the policies imposed on them, because they may soon need it. By contrast, thousands of workers and students demonstrate against the IMF, in many cases losing their lives in the process because, they say, its economic policies produce poverty, hardship, and starvation. The IMF gives short term loans to member countries experiencing balance of payments crises, essentially from previously deposited funds, but with the essential dif ference that the loans are made in ‘harder’ (more inter nationally acceptable) currencies than the deposits. Originally, under the Bretton Woods Agreement, the conditions for IMF loans to member countries required simply ‘‘an effective program for establishing or keeping the stability of the currency of the member country at a realistic exchange rate.’’ Over 50 years this limited ‘conditionality’ has grown into something far more. Loan conditionality, imposed on what are usually desperate governments, has become a way for the IMF to regulate the entire gamut of a country’s economic policies. It is not the actual deliverance of the loan, but the conditions laid on its acceptance, that is contested. Governments are required to adopt a set of economic policies and pre scribed ﬁnancial measures based on what the IMF thinks will promote economic stability, increasing the govern ment’s capacity to service loans – that is, make interest and loan repayments. By what theoretical means does the IMF establish these policies? The institution appeals to the best of neoclassical economic science backed now by 50 years of experience in the loan business. However, a critical examination of that experience suggests instead that it extracts repayment at the expense of the economy, and especially on the backs of the poor people, of the borrowing country. In addition, a critical look at its economics, especially after the mid 1970s, suggests the IMF adheres to a neoliberal version of neoclassicism, codiﬁed as the ‘Washington Consensus’. The term Washington Consensus refers to the policy reforms im posed when debtor countries borrowing from the IMF and World Bank submit to strong conditionality. By ‘Washington’ is meant the political Washington of the US

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Congress and senior members of the administration, and the technocratic Washington of the international ﬁnancial institutions, the economic agencies of the US govern ment, the Federal Reserve Board, and the think tanks that cluster in Washington, London, and other centers of international power. By ‘policy’ is meant policy instru ments rather than more general objectives of policy or the eventual outcomes of policy. In terms of the insti tutional formation of recent neoliberal economic policy, the term Washington Consensus can be used to refer to some of the political interests that brought right wing ‘progressive reform’ ideals to Washington in the mid 1970s and early 1980s, together with the bureaucratic– technical interests whose professional training in neoclassical economics proved amenable to persuasion by neoliberal ideas. The IMF operates primarily as banker to the central banks of nation states. The policies suggested by the IMF almost always require reducing tariff barriers on imports and thus eliminate jobs. The IMF increases interest rates to cool the economy and reduce inﬂation, and this too reduces employment. At the same time, the IMF imposes austerity programs that cut back government services and remove state subsidies that have kept food prices low. So, critics argue, IMF con ditionality creates unemployment and poverty while re ducing the national state’s power to remedy the resulting social problems. Immediately, people who can least afford it are made to pay for loans to governments whose pre vious policies are deemed mistaken by IMF economists. More than this, the IMF imposes its own economic be liefs on countries that might wish to develop differently. IMF loans then become a point of tension at which social struggles within a society articulate with tensions be tween the society and the global system, with two main institutions – the national state and the IMF – at the center of controversy. From a critical perspective, the IMF extracts conditions that favor repayment at the ex pense of poor and working people.

The World Bank The second main international organization set up to govern development at Bretton Woods was the IBRD or World Bank as it became known. The World Bank Group actually consists of ﬁve specialized institutions: 1. The IBRD makes development loans, guaranteeing loans, and offers analytical and advisory services. The IBRD borrows at low interest rates by selling bonds in private capital markets in First World countries and makes near market interest loans to ‘creditworthy countries’ in the Third World and elsewhere. It has made about $360 billion in loans over its lifetime and currently lends $10.5 billion a year for some 90 new operations in 36 countries.

2. Countries that are ‘usually not creditworthy’ in international ﬁnancial markets can get loans from the second banking institution, the International Devel opment Association (IDA). IDA loans carry no inter est, but a 0.75% administrative charge is made annually. The IDA, averaging $6 billion a year in lending to the poorest countries, is funded from member governments’ national budgets. 3. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) is the largest multilateral source of loan and equity ﬁnancing for private sector projects in the developing world. 4. The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) provides investment insurance. 5. The International Centre for Settlement of Invest ment Disputes (ICSID) facilitates the settlement of investment disputes between governments and foreign investors (World Bank website). The terms ‘World Bank’ and ‘the Bank’ refer properly only to the IBRD and the IDA. The president of the World Bank is appointed on recommendation by the US (with the director of the IMF appointed by the Western European countries). Its headquarters is in Washington, DC and it has the same membership as the IMF – 184 countries. Its staff numbers 8000 employees in Wash ington and 2000 in the ﬁeld. The World Bank is owned by its member countries represented by a board of gov ernors, that meets once a year, and a Washington based board of directors that conducts day to day business. The purposes of the World Bank, as stated in Article 1 of the original (Bretton Woods) Articles of Agreement, are: 1. To assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of members by facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes, including the res toration of economies destroyed or disrupted by war, the re conversion of productive facilities to peacetime needs, and the encouragement of the development of productive facilities and resources in less developed countries. 2. To promote private foreign investment by means of guarantees or participations in loans and other in vestments made by private investors; and when private capital is not available on reasonable terms, to sup plement private investment by providing, on suitable conditions, ﬁnance for productive purposes out of its own capital, funds raised by it and its other resources. 3. To promote the long range balanced growth of international trade and the maintenance of equi librium in balances of payments by encouraging international investment for the development of the productive resources of members, thereby assisting in raising productivity, the standard of living, and con ditions of labor in their territories.

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4. To arrange the loans made or guaranteed by it in relation to international loans through other channels so that the more useful and urgent projects, large small alike, will be dealt with ﬁrst. 5. To conduct its operations with due regard to the effect of international investment on business conditions in the territories of members and, in the immediate postwar years, to assist in bringing about a smooth transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy (World Bank 1989). For the ﬁrst decade of its existence, the IBRD made loans for the post war reconstruction of Europe. As it turned toward the richer Third World countries in the 1950s, the World Bank concentrated on project loans for infra structural development. In the late 1960s and 1970s, the World Bank added a basic needs program aimed at poverty alleviation. In 1979 the World Bank began to stress program loans to induce ‘reforms’ in recipient, mainly middle income counties; by reform was meant structural adjustment lending to promote export orien tation and trade liberalization. In this, the World Bank followed the lead of its senior partner, the IMF, under a division of labor that allocated ‘stabilization programs’ (short term adjustment lending) to the IMF and longer term ‘structural adjustment lending’ aimed at correcting deeper ‘structural’ problems, to the World Bank. Under this new orientation, poverty took a back seat to new driving forces of macroeconomic policy, stabilization and balance of payments adjustments, all understood within a neoliberal doctrine stressing strict limits to governmental intervention and the virtues of ﬂexible, self adjusting, free markets. Some commentators ﬁnd the World Bank shifting at the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s to a revised neoliberal model stressing market friendly state intervention and good governance (political pluralism, accountability, and the rule of law) with a renewed em phasis on social issues like poverty and education and a dedication to debt reduction. Thus, in the 1990s, the various ‘World Bank development reports’ outlined a new ‘holistic approach’ to development involving social safety nets, poverty, health, education, environment, rural areas, and gender considerations, in concert with con ventionally neoliberal areas, like increased property rights, trade liberalization, and privatization. Both the IMF and the World Bank now say that they are com mitted to global development through debt relief for poor Third World countries and to poverty eradication.

The WTO After World War II, trade reassumed the crucial position for the growth of economies it had in the second half of the nineteenth century. Increasingly trade became the single most important part of the expansion of economies

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linked into a globalizing system. Global institutions governing the conditions of trading relations among countries were, at least potentially, placed into positions of great political–economic power. However, the recog nition by nation states, particularly the US, that the global governance of trade might exert signiﬁcant control over national economies, and the apprehensions aroused by this in a system riven by international competition, long prevented this power potential from being formal ized in an institution. Instead international trade was intermittently regulated through rounds of bilateral and multinational negotiations and the set of agreements known as GATT, signed by 23 governments in 1947. Governance was intermittent because agreements could be unilaterally abrogated, retaliatory actions could easily be initiated, especially by powerful countries, and there was little in the way of an enforcing mechanism. How ever, the number of countries involved in the GATT rounds grew, the proportion of world trade that came under its aegis increased, and a system of power relations stabilized under the domination of the US, so that ﬁnally GATT could be concretized as the WTO. Established on 1 January 1995, the WTO is a more formal, institutionalized version of the GATT. The GATT/WTO system regulates international trade in goods and services using a system of objectives and rules laid out in articles of agreements among member governments. As an organization, the WTO consists of a director general, a deputy director general, and a sec retariat (or bureaucracy) housed in Geneva, Switzerland, where many UN agencies have their headquarters. Like the IMF and the World Bank, it also exists as a broader institution, in this case consisting of trade representatives sent from member countries to meetings organized at a number of levels, and thousands of specialists, consultants, and lobbyists who exercise considerable power – the intricacies of trade regulations inviting ex pertise. The WTO operates within a discourse that, while changing in emphasis over time, has consistently advocated the ‘liberalization of trade’ – that is, the freeing of international movements of commodities and (recently) services from governmental restraint. Freeing trade from tariffs and other governmental restrictions, and thereby allowing competition and markets to func tion more freely at the international level, is said to lead to more rapid economic growth that beneﬁts everyone. Trade liberalization is one of the leading aspects of the post war economic regime that led to global neoliberal ism. However, while GATT was relatively uncontro versial, the WTO, as a leading proponent of neoliberal ideas, is at the center of controversy over the direction globalization has taken. Indeed protests against the WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle in 1999 have come to symbolize the entire debate over the future course that globalization might take.

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The basic power of GATT and the WTO resides in GATT Article I, the General Most Favored Nation Treatment clause, saying that any advantage, privilege, or immunity granted by any member country to another shall be immediately and unconditionally accorded to all other member countries. That is, lower tariffs granted to a favored nation are automatically extended to all members of GATT/WTO, but are not necessarily granted to nonmembers, unless negotiated separately through bilateral agreements. By joining GATT/WTO, a country can gain far freer access to global markets for its exports, with the WTO making sure that the full range of access rights are granted and exercised. This places the WTO at the center of power in the regulation of the global economy, in a position different in emphasis (in that trade is the focus), but at least equal in importance, to that occupied by the IMF. And given the extensions made to the power arena of GATT during the Uruguay Round of international discussions, into services, intel lectual property rights, and the governance of certain capital movements, even as it came into being the WTO was also assuming perhaps the dominant position in the global economic governance structure. The WTO is an institution formed through the interactions of governments under certain conditions. Governments meet at the WTO through their trade ministers, representatives, and delegates under speciﬁc circumstances: (1) to discuss trade issues – with declared immediate objectives in mind; (2) to reduce trade bar riers, settle trade related problems; and (3) with an overall purpose – to increase the volume of trade, in crease production, and raise incomes. More than an in stitution, the WTO is a place, or a discursive space, where intergovernmental meetings occur, experts con gregate, expertise is employed, and decisions are made within a common understanding expressed in a speciﬁc, political–economic language. In other words, the WTO is part of a center of hegemonic power, part of a broader international complex of institutions, and ensconced within a broader geoeconomic regime.

International Organizational Complexes The World Bank and the IMF cooperate on a daily basis with ﬁnance ministries, with central banks, and with the big private banks controlling access to global accumu lations of capital through the ﬁnancial markets. Any conception of the regulation of global development by quasi public ﬁnancial institutions has to take this con nection with the banking world into account. The prominent trade economist Jagdish Bhagwati calls this connection the ‘‘Wall Street Treasury Complex.’’ Joseph Stiglitz, formerly chief economist at the World Bank, says that the IMF in his experience follows ‘‘an ideology that

was broadly consonant with the interests of the ﬁnancial community.’’ Elsewhere the ﬁnancial connection is de scribed as the Washington–Wall Street Alliance, an in stitutional complex centered on the US Treasury Department, the IMF, and the World Bank, with an in tellectual offshoot to Harvard University, particularly the Harvard Business School, whose MBA, doctoral, and executive education programs train the corporate and banking elites, but with the leading role being played by Wall Street bankers, especially investment bankers. This alliance of powerful institutions headquartered mainly in the US operates within a broader context of international organizations, such as the OECD representing 30 in dustrial countries, and through organized, intergovern mental meetings. Since 1975, the heads of state or government of the major industrial countries have met annually to deal with major economic and political issues facing the global capitalist system. At ﬁrst, France, the US, Britain, Germany, Japan, and Italy were referred to as the Group of Six (G6) countries, and then with Canada in 1976 the Group of Seven, or G7, and in 1998, with the full participation of Russia, the Group of Eight, or G8. The G7/8 Summit deals with macroeconomic management, international trade, and relations with de veloping countries – as with debt forgiveness. In addition, the G7/8 holds a series of ministerial meetings among ﬁnance ministers, foreign ministers, and environmental ministers, among others. Since 1999, the G7/8 has also sometimes met with ‘emerging market’ countries, such as Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey, referred to as the G20, within the framework of the Bretton Woods institutional system. Even so, a leading issue remains as to why a small number of countries and ﬁnance institutions should control development in a world that considers itself to be democratic?

Global Power Financial power is centered in a few ‘global cities’ that accumulate the capacity for widespread political– economic control by serving as concentrated command points in the organization of the world economy and as key locations for ﬁnance and specialized service ﬁrms. Control is centered in the few cities that move from being company and corporate headquarters into being ‘capital markets’, ﬁnancial centers for national and international economies. The globalization of the late twentieth cen tury saw increased concentration of capital at the top of this global hierarchy, especially New York, London, Tokyo, and Frankfurt, with one city, New York, consis tently presiding over the rest. The dominance of New York comes from the amount of capital the city controls and the technological sophistication with which money

International Organizations

can be moved from Wall Street to anywhere in the world. Essentially, this kind of global power is exercised by controlling access to the biggest capital accumulations in the world and directing ﬂows of capital in various forms – as equities, bonds, derivatives, foreign exchange, and direct investment – to uses and places that are approved by Wall Street banks and investment ﬁrms. Capital markets are ﬁlled with ﬁnancial experts making money from the uncertainties that stem from the normal oper ation of capitalism – a system whose overall ‘rationality’ emerges from the collision of millions of self interested actions motivated by proﬁt. Expertise tries to overcome uncertainty by collecting and applying ﬁnancial and technical information that has to be combined with subjective judgments based on practical experience – expertise is institutionalized experience. As a result, the annual passage, through a global city like New York, of documents controlling trillions of dollars in commercial and ﬁnancial assets leaves, as its institutional residue, a system of thousands of specialized companies ﬁlled with connections, knowledge, and expertise. The combination of expertise, concentrated in specialized institutions, with real control over substantial capital investment, is the basis of the political–economic power exercised by global centers of ﬁnancial power. This power takes many forms. One form is the inﬂuence of capital markets on the making of global development policy by governmental and governance organizations. The most important actors in international capital markets are corporations directly investing in foreign countries and ‘professional’ or ‘in stitutional’ investors, ﬁnancial institutions that invest the savings of individuals, particularly through pension and mutual funds, and invest for nonﬁnancial companies, such as insurance companies, in the forms of bonds, equities, and loans. In making these decisions, corporations and investment professionals employ assessments of countries using a range of consultancies and specialized insti tutions, especially national credit ratings made by agen cies like the Economist Intelligence Unit, Business Environment Risk Information, International Country Risk Guide, and Euromoney Institutional Investor. Pro fessional investors in such capital markets look at the development policies of governments as signals of the investment risk involved in buying sovereign debt in the form of government bonds. An assessment that a government bond issue carries a high risk of default or rescheduling, or that the inﬂation rate will rise, or ex change rates become volatile, means that investors demand a higher interest rate, increasing the cost of debt service, or that bond issues will be under subscribed or, worse still, withdrawn from the market. The capital market, acting through institutional investment decisions, inﬂuences development policy through mechanisms like bond interest rates, direct investment, and speculative

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trading in national currencies. Some theorists of inter national capital markets argue that globalization, ac companied by increased market openness and greater capital mobility, has increased the power of capital over government policies. This is particularly the case for the ﬁscal and monetary policies of governments that are quickly and efﬁciently punished by reactions from the international bond and currency markets. During the 1970s, the ﬁnancial markets punished governments that persisted in following social democratic, Keynesian de velopment policies that investors believed led to state deﬁcits that would impede repayment of borrowed funds. The paradigmatic case was the disciplining of the British Labour Party in 1976. The terminal case was France’s Mitterand government committed to economic expan sion combined with income redistribution, but forced by bond interest rates of 17.4% to reverse course in 1982 83. Since then, policies in developed countries have con verged on a neoliberal policy model preferred by the market, consisting of smaller governments, lower deﬁcits, less state provision of social services, lower levels of taxation, less regulation, and smaller unions. Since the mid 1980s international investors have had a high degree of conﬁdence in the policies of what became liberal, ra ther than social, democracies in the developed world. Financial markets retain a strong inﬂuence on govern ment policies but now consider only a limited set of policies in assessing risk premia, leaving some room for policy maneuver and choice (within a basically neoliberal regime) in development policy decisions. By comparison, in the case of ‘emerging markets’ (low or middle income, developing countries), investors retain a strong and broad inﬂuence on governmental policy. Although emerging market governments are not always constrained to follow the dictates of global capital markets, the cost of defying them is often high.

Wall Street New York’s leading position in global ﬁnance capitalism translates into deep and sustained political–economic inﬂuence on development policies. Inﬂuence is exerted through a number of power relations linking Wall Street institutions to governments and governance institutions. Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s, two powerful credit rating organizations, assess the bonds and loans of over 100 sovereign nations, as well as thousands of corpor ations the world over, to ratify their eligibility for pur chase by global investors – this ‘rating’ includes examining the country’s economic policy regime – ac cording to ‘objective criteria’ established on Wall Street. A low rating sends a signal to governments that devel opment policies should be changed. This kind of indirect inﬂuence might be termed Wall Street’s setting of the

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‘investment climate’ within which nation states, corpor ations, municipalities, and other organizations may de termine their own policy direction, knowing that some are far more costly than others. Finance capital also directly affects the economic policies of governments through the persuasive inﬂuence of Wall Street on the International Financial Institutions involved in global economic governance, especially the IMF and World Bank, organizations that in turn coerce governments to borrow outside the private capital markets. More exactly, the main line of inﬂuence between the New York capital market (Wall Street) and the inter national ﬁnancial organizations lies through the invest ment banks. Investment banking is a specialized part of US ﬁnance capital created by the Bank Act of 1933, more commonly known as the Glass–Steagall Act. The Act was designed to separate banking from the securities business, and divide commercial banking, taking deposits, and is suing short term loans, from investment banking, con cerned more with corporate ﬁnance, mergers, and acquisitions. Glass–Steagall restricted the primary mar ket, involving the ‘ﬂoating’ of publicly traded corporate securities, to investment banks – ﬂoating means setting the price and terms on initial public offerings (IPOs) of stocks and bonds that are later traded on secondary markets (such as the stock exchange). In particular, one of a small number of investment banks, the ‘special bracket ﬁrms’ (traditionally Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, Salomon Brothers, First Boston, and Morgan Stanley), takes the lead in forming a larger syndicate of banks that underwrites major issuances of corporate stock and bonds and handles the intricate connections with regulators (as with the Securities and Exchange Commission), the specialized accounting and legal service ﬁrms, and the potential buyers in the secondary market. Here, the connection with large blocks of capital is crucial because underwriters have to ‘take up’ any unsold shares or bonds in any new issue. Since repeal of Glass–Steagall in 1999, commercial banks, like Chase Manhattan Corporation and Citibank, have developed, or acquired, investment banking facilities, as well as a range of insurance and stock brokerage services, to produce ﬁnancial conglomerates that are the biggest corporations in the world, making proﬁts even larger than the huge pro ductive and retailing corporations. These ﬁnancial organizations essentially control access to the New York capital market and its accumulated expertise. Through this, they exercise considerable control over global development. In the post war period, especially as the neoliberal policy regime was established, many of the key posts in the US government and in the global governance insti tutions involved with the ﬁnancial aspects of national and global economic policy were occupied by experts from the investment banking industry. An elite corps of policy

makers circulates between investment banking and the highest levels of governmental and governance institutions. The change in direction of economic policy, from an essentially Keynesian to a neoliberal position, begun during the US Nixon and Ford Republican ad ministrations, solidiﬁed in the 1980s, under the Reagan and (ﬁrst) Bush Republican administrations, and con tinued in the Clinton and second Bush administrations, was overseen by investment bankers. Investment banking exercises a range of interconnected powers that reach back into the capital market and forward into the production of policy, with control exercised as a com bination of expertise, meaning experts armed with spe cialized knowledge, connections with the ﬁnancial, corporate, and governmental worlds, and command over ﬁnancial resources, especially large blocks of investment capital. Political–economic power is then exercised on development as combinations of ideas, expertise, and ﬁnance. If we re read the neoliberal Washington Consensus development policies, adopted by the ﬁnancial govern ance institutions in the late 1980s, and dominant ever since, from the bankers’ perspective, we can see that minimizing state spending, increasing competitiveness, securing property rights (including those of foreign companies), and having export orienting economies to produce hard currency, all maximize the loan capacity of developing countries and ensure, to the fullest extent possible, the ability of an economy to repay principal and interest. This does not amount to some kind of cynical conspiracy by bankers and multinational corporations to create puppet economic regimes, despite the evidence that meetings recur among banking and governmental allies. Also, once appointed to bureaucratic positions, bankers have considerable freedom to interpret what remains, however, predominantly a banking point of view. However, an export oriented, privately controlled, mar ket economy ‘is’ the banker’s conception of the ‘sound’ economy, even when rethought in terms of the more general common good. The problem is that this notion of a sound economy does not appear good to those about to be made unemployed, cut off from public services, and paying exorbitant prices for water, electricity, and other recently privatized services. The Washington–Wall Street Alliance, the OECD, and the G7/8 governments have established, protected, and reinforced a neoliberal policy regime that served to de regulate the world economy (in terms of national state intervention), freeing the way for global, and particularly US corporations, the trading of industrial commodities without interference, and the movement of capital assets across national boundaries that have been reduced in signiﬁcance. For critics, rather than a sound global system, the result is a wild economy of colliding interests and immanent debt crises beyond the control of any particular interest or institution. It is

International Organizations

evident, from bankers’ emphasis on ﬁnancial reform in debtor countries, and in their belief that real economic growth is the only way debtor countries can service debts and repay loans, that they think the ﬁnancial structure and the quality of ﬁnancial services play a decisive role in making real growth possible, and that, reciprocally and mutually, investment in production and in long term development projects is crucial to a country’s ﬁnancial status, its creditworthiness with regard to banks, and by extrapolation, to the international ﬁnancial system and its stability. The IMF and the World Bank were established to play this dual role, of stabilizing the global ﬁnancial structure and encouraging economic development. The questions remain, however, what kind of development, toward what ends, and in whose interest? The most difﬁcult question of all in the area of international ﬁnance is control over development by ‘The Market’, meaning the various capital markets centered on Wall Street, New York City. Saying that Wall Street is the most powerful actor in setting the policies used by global governance institutions to develop countries the world over implies a more conscious collective actor than may indeed be the case. The central ﬁnancial institutions lo cated on Wall Street are the equity and bond markets, and these no one controls. While ﬁnancial analysts may objectively ‘study the numbers’ while balancing return with risk in evaluating whether to invest client money in the bonds or shares issued in foreign countries, the de cision is rendered into subjective judgment by un certainty about the future when the bonds will be repaid or the shares sold again. The international ﬁnancial market, then, is a meeting point where biases and guesses collide. Yet the collision of uncertainties in the market determines the economic fate of nations, states, and the global economy. Global development, directed by inter national ﬁnancial organizations, private and public, has radical uncertainty at its heart.

Counter-hegemonic Organizations Every year, social movements opposed to neoliberal globalization meet at the World Social Forum (WSF). There they discuss an alternative ‘Southern agenda’. The meeting takes the form of a festival. But the thou sands of people who attend a week of conferences, panels, workshops, seminars, cultural activities, and demon strations have the serious intent of producing real social and economic alternatives to neoliberal globalization. The idea for a WSF came out of the massive protests against the WTO meeting in Seattle in 1999. Three ac tivists met in Paris in January 2000 to discuss alternatives to contemporary globalization: Oded Grajew, founder of the Brazilian Business Association for Citizenship (CIVES), an organization of progressive businesses

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aligned with the Brazilian Workers Party; Francisco Whitaker, of the Brazilian Justice and Peace Commission (CBJP); and Bernard Cassen, chair of Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citi zens (ATTAC), France. Grajew proposed a Social Forum as an alternative to the World Economic Forum (WEF), held each year in Davos, Switzerland, that convenes leaders of Western states, CEOs, and some NGOs, to discuss the global economy; the WEF supports neoliberal globalization. Grajew, proposed an alternative Social Forum, held at the same time, to discuss alternatives to those supported by business at the WEF. The idea was to hold the Forum in the Global South, preferably the city of Porto Alegre, Brazil, known for its participatory bud get process, and controlled at that time by the Brazilian Workers Party. The city’s agreement was secured, and the ﬁrst WSF was held nine months later with 10 000 people attending. The second Forum in 2002 had 50 000 people show up; the third in 2003 had 100 000 activists attend; the fourth, in India, had 120 000 participants; and the ﬁfth, in 2005, in Brazil, had 150 000 registered. In 2006, a polycentric WSF was held in several places: Bamako, Mali; Caracas, Venezuela; and Karachi, Pakistan. Along with these, many smaller social forums have taken place, including the European Social Forum, the Asian Social Forum, the Mediterranean Social Forum, the Italian Social Forum, Liverpool Social Forum, and the Boston Social Forum. The social movements at the WSF believe in radical, participatory democracy – participatory in the sense that civil society organizations are engaged directly in government. Movements from the Third World in particular want decisions about debt (to the First World) and debt repayment to be made by civil society rather than states – many activists are for debt repudiation on the grounds that only the elites beneﬁted from the loans. While some movements want to reform the state, many see the Third World state as oppressive, and want local control and participatory democracy, with links among more decentralized communities in a ‘Southern Front’. Networks of movements and activists have emerged in the last few years; many activists ﬁnd networks to be a powerful instrument to change the world since they ‘anticipate’ the features of the new world they want to build – they are decentralized, democratic, coercion free, and radically nonhierarchical. There is a counter hegemonic institutional structure that mobilizes millions of people in social movements and develops a ‘counter expertise’. This counter expertise serves social movements by reformulating their wants and needs into policy proposals – within an awareness that this creates power inequalities between people and experts. Counter expertise also opposes the policies and practices of the conventional international organizations. Another world is made possible only by thinking carefully in advance.

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Implications for Global Economic Geographies Global economic geographies can be conceived in terms of institutions, power centers, and ﬂows of inﬂuence. In advanced modernity, governance policies and practices are conceived by experts in institutions concentrated in a few power centers, global cities that exercise power in world space. Each power center can be thought, in and of itself, as a place, in the sense of a cluster of inter connected institutions, or what might be termed an in stitutional complex. Furthermore, centers of power can be classiﬁed as belonging to three main types, according to the dominant purpose of their leading institutions and the type of power they initiate: (1) economic, meaning that their leading institutions deal primarily in money, as with ﬁnancial markets, investment banks, or corporate headquarters, and transmit power as control over in vestment and ﬁnancial expertise; (2) ideological, meaning that institutions deal in ideas produced at the level of theory, as with universities, research institutes, and foundations and transmit power as scientiﬁcally justiﬁed ideas, rationalities, and discourses; and (3) political, meaning that institutions construct and enforce ideas in practical formats, as with government and governance centers that transmit power as policy. Power, then, takes three forms: ideological, meaning control over rational ities; economic, meaning control over capital; and polit ical, meaning control over practice. Power centers composed from complexes of insti tutions can also be mapped by looking at power relations or as power transmitted across space – this provides an organizing framework for global economic geographies. To begin with, each power center concentrates resources (capital, ideas, and expertise) from a broader ‘ﬁeld of power’. This ﬁeld may be physically contiguous, in the sense of a hinterland. It may consist of networks among widely separated centers. Or it might be ‘virtual’ in the sense of position in a world wide web. Experts clustered in power centers process intellectual, theoretical, and practical resources drawn from ﬁelds of power by ap plying their own concentrated knowledge and expertise. As argued above, power centers formed by institutional complexes can be classiﬁed as hegemonic, meaning that they produce ideas and policies with sufﬁcient theoretical depth and ﬁnancial backing that they dominate thought over wide ﬁelds of power; sub hegemonic, referring to peripheral centers of power that translate received dis courses, modify and add to ideas, and provide evidence of their validity through regional practice; and counter hegemonic, meaning centers, institutions, and movements founded on opposing political beliefs that contend against the conventional, and advocate policy alternatives. Furthermore, in the modern world, ideas backed by political, cultural, and economic resources

are transmitted among power centers in the speciﬁc ideological form of discourses that are legitimated as scientiﬁc, and backed by resources that are recognized as productive, such as capital investment. At the receiving end, in sub hegemonic centers, discourses release their contents as ‘power effects’, as with theoretical persuasion. Even so, this explosion of persuasive content should not be seen as a one way movement of uncritically received power but, rather, as an articulation in both senses of the term: as creative combination with ideas and expertise originating in local institutions; and therefore as a process of rewriting and modiﬁcation, but also independent dis covery and creative adaptation. Peripheral power centers are sub hegemonic in that they basically support, while modifying, the ideological positions taken by central institutions. However, they may also be counter hege monic in that they differ fundamentally by offering al ternative ideas backed by their own varying constellations of experiences, modes of interpretation, and intellectual, if not ﬁnancial, resources. Formed into alternate dis courses by organic intellectuals, peripheral experiences contend against policy in sub hegemonic, hegemonic, and (though they are rare) counter hegemonic centers of power. Power of even the most apparently solid, in disputable kind, is ever destabilized by class, gender, ethnic, and regional differences in experience and interpretation. See also: Financial Centers, International; Foreign Direct Investment; Globalization and Transnational Corporations; Trade, International.

Further Reading Dryzek, J. S. (1996). Democracy in capitalist times. New York: Oxford University Press. Eckes, A. E. Jr. (1975). A search for solvency: Bretton Woods and the international monetary system, 1941 1971. Austin: University of Texas Press. Germain, R. (1997). The international organization of credit: State and global ﬁnance in the world economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kaufman, G. G. (1986). The US ﬁnancial system: Money, markets, and institutions. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. Kidwell, D. S. and Peterson, R. L. (1987). Financial institutions, markets, and money. Chicago: The Dryden Press. Mosley, L. (2003). Global capital and national governments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Obstfeld, M. (1998). The global capital market: Benefactor or menace? The Journal of Economic Perspectives 12, 9 30. Peet, R., Born, B., Davis, M. et al. (2003). Unholy trinity: The IMF, World Bank and WTO. London: Zed Press. Peet, R. (2007). Geography of power: Making global economic policy. London: Zed Press. Sassen, S. (1991). The global city: New York, London, Tokyo. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Scammell, W. M. (1980). The international economy since 1945. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Sparke, M., Brown, E., Corva, D. et al. (2005). The World Social Forum and the lessons for economic geography. Economic Geography 81, 359 380.

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Relevant Websites http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org Bretton Woods Project. http://www.imf.org International Monetary Fund.

http://www.multinationalmonitor.org Multinational monitor. http://www.worldbank.org World Bank. http://www.wsﬁndia.org World Social Forum India.

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Internationalization of Education J. L. Waters, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction It is widely believed that the growth of mass, standard ized education in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries played a crucial role in the development of the modern nation state and the expansion of national con sciousness. This bond between education and society was gradually transformed over the course of the twentieth century, as education systems were increasingly linked to capitalist expansion in a global economic context, which has included the gradual presence of the market in educational funding and delivery. Over the last 20 years, the internationalization of education has marked a deepening and expansion of the relationship between education and transnational interests, allied to the as cendancy of neoliberal forms of governance and the es tablishment of a global knowledge economy. The internationalization of education is a multi faceted process, occurring simultaneously at different spatial scales. Most obviously, it involves the inter national mobility of more than 2 million students pur suing education outside their home country, but it also includes the strategies of supranational organizations, national governments, provincial and regional ministries, and municipal school boards, as well as numerous indi vidual educational institutions, promoting and enabling internationalization. Organizations such as United Na tions Educational, Scientiﬁc and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Organisation for Economic Co oper ation and Development (OECD), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) have been actively involved in advancing an internationalizing agenda. Governments, particularly those in the English speaking West, have fostered international alliances with overseas academic institutions and developed national education brands, although frequently cross border institutional collabor ations have occurred without the direct involvement or guidance of national governments. Many public education institutions have recently engaged in entre preneurial activities related to the development, mar keting, and provision of international products and services, establishing satellite university campuses, dis tance or e learning programs, international MBA cour ses, and offering joint degrees with overseas institutions while encouraging student and staff exchanges. Some have been involved in the recruitment of students through overseas education events, while the employ ment of local private consultants to work on their behalf

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is increasingly common. Importantly, however, the internationalization of education has not affected all countries, regions, and localities in equal measure or in the same way – there is a distinctive and signiﬁcant geography to this process. This article identiﬁes the most important dimensions of this: international student mo bility, the emergence of a multibillion dollar inter national education industry, and recent moves toward the global standardization of educational testing and delivery.

The Geography of International Student Mobility The internationalization of education is most commonly associated with the signiﬁcant and increasing mobility of international students. According to a recent survey by the British Council, there are more than 2.1 million tertiary level international students – twice the number of 20 years ago. Over this period, the international mo bility of students has followed a distinctive geographical pattern: from developing to developed countries, from East to West and from non English speaking to English speaking countries. The British Council has coined the term main English speaking destination countries (MESDCs) to describe the preferred locations of inter national students. These countries, namely, the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK have attracted by far the largest share of such students globally (Figure 1). Demand for international student places, in contrast, comes principally from Asia, particularly China (PRC), Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, and Singapore (Figure 2). In Vision 2020, a report commissioned by the British Council in conjunction with International De velopment Program (IDP) Australia and Universities UK, provides a forecast of international student mobility. By 2020 demand for student places from Asia is expected to reach 1.9 million or 71% of the global total for the MESDCs; in contrast, Europe will account for only 12% of the total ﬁgure. While the majority of international students apply for a student visa on an individual basis, schemes such as European Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students (ERASMUS) have sought to organ ize international student mobility on a larger scale. ERASMUS is the European Commission’s educational program for higher education students, teachers, and institutions. Introduced in 1987, its primary aim has been

Internationalization of Education 60

Percentage share

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Canada

Australia

UK

US

New Zealand

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Figure 1 Market share of international students (2002). Source of data: Bo¨hm, A., Follari, M., Hewett, A. et al. (2004). Vision 2020: Forecasting international student mobility - a UK perspective. British Council, Universities UK and IDP Australia.

1000 Number (000s)

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The advantages of international schooling include a greater range of specialist subjects, a preferred pedagogic style (promoting creativity over rote learning), as well as providing the opportunity to become proﬁcient in a for eign language. All international students, regardless of their actual academic achievement, acquire the cultural capital associated with ‘overseas experience’; immersion in a foreign culture – especially a Western, English speaking culture – is thought to promote a more cosmopolitan outlook and an ability to work in cross cultural settings. International students are seen as part of a global, trans national, and highly skilled workforce. In certain pro fessions, particularly those associated with global industries such as ﬁnancial services, a cosmopolitan sensibility is regarded as a valuable commodity; there is some evidence to suggest that international students who return to their home country following graduation ﬁnd it easier to get a job in these preferred professions than graduates educated locally. More controversially, there is some concern among government agencies in host countries that international study is sometimes regarded as a backdoor route to per manent settlement, where illegally overstaying a student visa may be followed by employment, citizenship, and the subsequent migration of other family members.

500 400

The Business of International Education: Political and Economic Implications

300 200 100 0 Oceania

Europe

Americas

Asia

Africa

Figure 2 Global demand for international student places (2003). Source of data: Bo¨hm, A., Follari, M., Hewett, A. et al. (2004). Vision 2020: Forecasting international student mobility - a UK perspective. British Council, Universities UK and IDP Australia.

to increase student mobility within the European Com munity. Since this time and as a consequence of this program, more than 1 million students have spent a period of their study overseas.

International Education: A Student’s Perspective Students are attracted to overseas study for a number of reasons. First, they may perceive deﬁciencies or in adequacies in the education available in their home country. At the same time, there is a widespread per ception that an overseas education – particularly a ‘Western’ education – is invariably superior.

International education is big business with estimates for the worldwide market in international higher education ranging between $30 and $100 billion. Its relative value varies for different national economies, being especially signiﬁcant within the MESDCs. For the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK, inter national activities of various kinds are an increasingly signiﬁcant source of revenue for governments and uni versities. Indeed, in a current climate of neoliberal gov ernance resulting in state funded disinvestment in key services including education, the present and future of state funded higher education is becoming reliant upon the income generated by fee paying international students. Despite a concomitant dependency on international students, these countries have approached the inter nationalization of their education systems in quite dif ferent ways. The internationalization of Australia’s higher education sector is highly centralized, coordinated by one main organization (IDP) with support from Australian Education International (AEI). IDP is currently owned by 38 of Australia’s 39 universities; it is a nonproﬁt or ganization with an annual turnover of $108.1 million. In 2002, it ranked 353 in Australia’s top 500 private com panies, blurring the boundaries between public and pri vate initiatives in education.

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The UK has also centralized the organization of its internationalization process through the British Council. This is a nonproﬁt organization, operating as an executive nondepartmental public body and sponsored by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce. For 2003/2004, the ﬁnancial turnover of the Council was estimated at d479 million, including d164 million from a core grant in aid from the Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce and d154 million from the selling of services such as English lan guage courses and examinations. In 2002–03 the Council worked in 110 countries and taught English to 500 000 students. It has also collaborated closely with IDP in developing the International English Language Testing System (IELTS). In April 2004 these two organizations hosted a one day conference in London resulting in a publication outlining a vision for the future of inter national student mobility. International education in New Zealand is coordin ated by Education New Zealand – a single nonproﬁt organization that describes itself as ‘‘independent of government, recognized by government, and industry owned.’’ It acts on behalf of both public and private education providers at secondary and tertiary levels and lists its functions as: ‘‘advocacy on behalf of New Zeal and’s education export industry,’’ ‘‘assisting the New Zealand government and its agencies with policy devel opment in relation to the education export industry,’’ ‘‘promotion of New Zealand as a study destination,’’ and ‘‘promotion of the ‘Educated in New Zealand’ brand.’’ It exempliﬁes the intragovernment collaborations charac teristic of international education, involving the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand Immigration Service, and the Asia 2000 Foundation. The development of national education brands, pro moted globally, has been a key element of these inter nationalization strategies. New Zealand launched the Educated in New Zealand brand in 2001. The govern ment utilized the services of a private company to devise an international marketing plan, allocating $3.5 million over 5 years to develop the brand, including support for a ‘one stop shop’ website. In June 2004, control of the international marketing of New Zealand’s education was transferred to the ‘Promotions and PR Reference Group’ and core funding for international education thereby shifted from government to industry. In the UK, efforts to develop a national education brand have been coordin ated. As in New Zealand, this process has involved col laboration across several government departments; the Council receives funding from the Department for Education and Employment, the Department of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Defence, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce. It also employs several large private companies for research, public relations, and brand development/advertising. ‘Education UK’ was

ofﬁcially launched in 2000, involving several high proﬁle overseas events, beginning in Hong Kong (British Council 2000). Presently, ‘Education UK’ offers six ‘products’ to potential students, including English lan guage courses, degree courses, and MBA and post graduate courses. Canada and the US have so far lacked a centralized, government wide policy in respect of international education. In Canada, federal government and provincial government have jurisdiction over different aspects of what could potentially fall under the rubric of ‘inter national education’. Educational policy and practice, through the Ministry of Education, is the responsibility of provincial government, and the provinces differ con siderably in their approaches to internationalization. At the same time, other important facets of international education come under the jurisdiction of federal gov ernment – foreign policy, human resource development, international trade, and immigration policy are all the responsibility of federal departments. International Trade Canada (ITCan) administers the export of educational services, and Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC) is responsible for international diplomacy, treaties, and the promotion of Canadian culture. Human Resources and Skills De velopment Canada (HRSDC) advocates international partnerships which foster collaboration in learning while also promoting a positive image of internationalization amongst universities and colleges in Canada. Immi gration policy is the responsibility of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), and this includes the issuing of international study permits (or student visas). It is this complex division of responsibilities, between federal and provincial government, that makes the conception and implementation of a distinct plan for international edu cation problematic. Educational exports are worth an estimated $12 bil lion annually to the US economy and yet it still lacks a centralized approach to international education. The events of September 11, 2001 have encumbered the de velopment of a national strategy for international edu cation: the US Department of Homeland Security now manages a national computer database, designed to track foreign students for the duration of their study, while the student rejection rate has also increased signiﬁcantly over the same period. As these examples suggest, particular Western coun tries have been extremely proactive in the commercial ization of their education systems, involving private corporate involvement in addition to numerous public agencies. Work by geographers is also beginning to un cover the internationalizing strategies of countries out side this Western ‘core’ of MESDCs, such as Singapore’s self styled development as a global education hub through formal arrangements with a variety of overseas educational institutions.

Internationalization of Education

Regional Initiatives and Transnational Partnerships Various regional partnerships have been pursued under the internationalization of education such as the Asso ciation of Paciﬁc Rim Universities and the European area of higher education. In Canada where, as noted, edu cation is the responsibility of the different provinces, a regional strategy toward the internationalization of education has been necessary and provides a useful il lustrative example. In Advancing the Canadian agenda for international education, a Report of the Millennium Consultation on International Education, the Canadian Bureau for International Education (CBIE) describes provincial level approaches. Provinces are autonomous and directly competitive. They are also unambiguously concerned with the revenue generating potential of internationalization. The CBIE proffers several examples of the active involvement of the provincial government in inter national education. In 2000, the Department of Edu cation in Manitoba founded the Manitoba Council for International Education, which is described as a con sortium of fee paying members that included public schools, higher education institutions, and private edu cational providers, with the primary aim of coordinating joint marketing activities. In New Brunswick, the pro vincial government has established and continues to fund the Universities International Centre for recruiting international students and promoting the New Bruns wick ‘branded’ umbrella overseas. Alberta’s International Education Strategy has resulted in the Alberta Centre for International Education, comprising partnerships be tween public and private secondary and postsecondary institutions. According to the CBIE report, it operates as a joint marketing agency, extracting fees from its member institutions. In addition Quebec, also, has recently an nounced the launch of a plan to encourage international activities – the Programme pour l’Internationalisation de l’Education Que´be´coise. All of these provincial initiatives signify collaborations between ‘multiple stakeholders’, intersecting public and private interests with an over riding economic motive. The British Columbia Centre for International Education (BCCIE) is the longest run ning of all provincial initiatives in Canada, established in 1990 as a consortium of postsecondary institutions and funded by the British Columbia Ministry of Education. It is a nonproﬁt society governed by a board of directors that includes educators and representatives from gov ernment and business and its membership comprises all 27 public postsecondary institutions in British Columbia. The province is overtly concerned with the ﬁnancial potential of internationalization, embracing the concept of marketization. It can be seen how such initiatives further the development of an internationally

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differentiated market for education: the BCCIE is tasked with creating a distinguished ‘brand image’ for provincial education, described in terms of ‘educational products and services’. It highlights a pervasive concern with the skills and attributes necessary to work in a global market. The evident interest in benchmarking and quality as sessment measures is characteristic of the application of neoliberal economic tools to education systems globally. And ﬁnally, the BCCIE is attempting to forge a number of different international and translocal connections – sometimes involving the federal government and some times bypassing it. According to the BCCIE, inter national education generates ‘‘signiﬁcant revenue for Canada, British Columbia and the public postsecondary institutions in the province’’ amounting to CA$2.5 billion per year – the equivalent of 27 500 jobs. For British Columbia, the market is in excess of $200 million boosting it beyond commercial ﬁshing in terms of eco nomic importance. The internationalization of education also includes some unexpected alliances that often seem to bypass the inﬂuence of the nation state, exempliﬁed by Universitas 21 (U21). It describes itself as an international network of leading research intensive universities whose purpose is to facilitate collaboration and cooperation between the member universities and to create entrepreneurial op portunities. The organization was founded in 1997 and has 17 members from 10 countries. (The members of Universitas 21 are: University of Melbourne, University of Queensland, University of New South Wales, Uni versity of Auckland, University of Hong Kong, National University of Singapore, Peking University, Fudan Uni versity, University of British Columbia, McGill Uni versity, University of Virginia, University of Birmingham, University of Nottingham, University of Edinburgh, University of Glasgow, Lund University, and Albert Ludwigs Universitat Freiburg.) In 2001 ‘Universitas 21’ initiated ‘Universitas 21 Global’ – a result of collabor ation between 16 of the member institutions and the Thompson Learning Corporation. U21 Global is con cerned with establishing online degree courses, and in 2003 it launched the ﬁrst completely online MBA pro gram. The Masters course is sold to major markets in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia. U21 Global ex empliﬁes the common and close relationship between the public and private sectors in international education. ‘Thompson Learning’ is a large, private publishing company that has provided the technology and expertise behind U21 Global in addition to US$25 million in funds. Universitas 21 is also implicated in the drive to manage modes of assessment and enforce quality control in international education, marketing the U21 brand on the basis of this image; it has been directly involved in the development of international quality assessment tools through U21pedagogica.

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On one level, Universitas 21, along with other emer gent forms of ‘e learning’, would seem to be redeﬁning the geography of international education. New technol ogy is undermining the necessity of spatial mobility – ‘WebCT’ is used to run tutorial groups simultaneously on three continents. U21 is also piloting the use of electronic books. Simply put, the developments represented by U21 Global are allowing students access to an overseas edu cation at home. While this might appear to represent the democratization of access to Western forms of education outside the West, in reality the costs of these courses prohibit all but the wealthiest students from participating.

Overseas Institutions and Offshore Schools One very recent development in the internationalization of education has been the establishment of ‘overseas’ institutions (schools and university campuses) outside the MESDCs. In early 2006, the University of Nottingham in the UK became the ﬁrst foreign higher educational in stitution to be granted a license to open a campus in China. This was followed closely by The University of Liverpool, which opened a new university in Suzhou west of Shanghai in September 2006. Students of these institutions will graduate with full University of Not tingham and University of Liverpool degrees (respect ively). While the practice of establishing an overseas campus or institution is relatively rare, other universities in the MESDCs have been heavily involved in setting up ‘joint educational initiatives’ with foreign institutions. These practices have an unexpected precedent at the provincial level in Canada, involving the establishment of certiﬁed ‘offshore schools’. At present, Ontario, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick all have offshore schools, enabling students to receive a provincial Ministry of Education certiﬁed education ‘in China’. The program is taught in English by provincially certiﬁed teachers, and its graduates are issued with a provincial (e.g., British Columbia) High School Graduation Cer tiﬁcate. The ﬁrst school of this kind was ‘Dalian Maple Leaf International School’ in Liaoning province, which began in 1997 as a pilot project. Student enrolment in the program rose from 55 in 1997 to 1300 in 2003. This trend is likely to continue beyond China into other countries with a high demand for international credentials. It en ables students to receive an ‘international education’ at home.

International Standardization of Education Through the implementation of principles of standard ization, the proliferation of testing, ranking, and

benchmarking in education is increasingly international in scope. Large private companies intersect with public higher education institutions as they formulate and ad minister standardized testing systems, thereby attempting to create global markers of educational distinction. One of the foremost examples of global educational testing is provided by the Educational Testing Service (ETS), a private company that in 1947 procured the testing pro grams of the American Council on Education, the Car negie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, and the College Entrance Examination Board. The ETS possesses several trademarks associated with inter national educational testing, including the Graduate Record Examinations (GRE), The Praxis Series: Pro fessional Assessments for Beginning Teachers, Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL), Test of Spoken English (TSE), and Test of Written English (TWE). It describes itself as ‘‘the world’s largest private educational measurement organisation’’ and claims that since 1964, nearly 20 million students have taken the TOEFL in more than 105 countries. According to information pro vided by TOEFL, more than 4500 institutions worldwide use the scores from these tests for international recruit ment. In addition, ETS runs the ‘Center for Global As sessment’ and the ‘Global Institute’, with the mandate to develop curricula and courses that meet the demands of education ofﬁcials in government ofﬁces, colleges and universities, and testing agencies. The ETS not only administers and designs tests, therefore, it also propagates this system through the training of ‘ofﬁcials’ within the education sector. The International English Language Testing System (IELTS) provides another example of the strategic internationalization (and marketing) of testing systems, and their consequent worldwide adoption. It demon strates, also, the international alliances forged through these processes, being jointly managed by the University of Cambridge ESOL Examinations, the British Council, and IDP Education Australia. Figures for IELTS Aus tralia claim an annual turnover of $19.8 million, and a growth in turnover from 2001 of 61%. In 2002, IELTS Australia operated in 26 different countries, it adminis tered 92 986 tests and it has 92 test centers worldwide. Perhaps most signiﬁcantly, IELTS has captured the Chinese market through a ‘network partnership’ (the China IELTS Network). In 2002, 89 134 tests were ad ministered through this network (a growth of 95% on the previous year). The IELTS is the only test accepted by the Australian Department of Immigration and Multi cultural Affairs for student visa purposes (according to Studyinaustralia 2004 – the ofﬁcial government website for international students), suggesting a gradual cor nering of the global market in testing and standardization. There has been a growing interest, also, in the rela tionship between large supranational organizations and

Internationalization of Education

the internationalization of education, particularly the role of the UNESCO, the OECD, and the World Bank. Founded in 1946, UNESCO has 189 member states and is involved in scientiﬁc, cultural, and educational projects throughout the world. Its overarching objective is to promote cooperation and understanding among nation states, which consequently facilitates the development of comparable, normalized education systems globally. The organization’s mandate includes a role in developing and implementing the practice of ‘standard setting’ in inter national education through ‘‘preparing and enabling the adoption of international instruments and statutory rec ommendations.’’ These forms of standardization involve, principally, the measurement and monitoring of national education systems and their insertion into and consoli dation within a formal ranking of global education. Several key features of this particular role can be identiﬁed. UNESCO is responsible for producing the ‘World Education Report’, containing statistics on various aspects of educational provision for 190 countries and territories. Since the 1993 report, UNESCO has sought to expand and deepen available data, through the worldwide dissemination of the revised International Standard Classiﬁcation of Education (ISCED) – a for mula devised by the organization. Moreover, in 1997, and in conjunction with the OECD, UNESCO launched the World Education Indicators (WEI) project, the aim of which was to develop ‘policy relevant’ education indi cators that enable the international comparison of edu cation systems. The project has produced a comparative data set of education indicators for 1998–2001, including ‘detailed mappings of national education systems’ and three substantive reports (Investing in Education (1999), Teachers for Tomorrow’s Schools (2001), and Financing Education – Investments and Returns (2003)). The or ganization has also developed the Global Forum on International Quality Assurance, Accreditation, and the Recognition of Qualiﬁcations. The forum was launched in 2002.

Conclusions This article has highlighted the most signiﬁcant dimen sions of an emergent geography of international edu cation, although a comprehensive examination of the multitude of current initiatives is an impossible task. Reﬂected in the discussion above, recent interest in the internationalization of education has led researchers to examine the process from a number of different per spectives, including the relationship between inter national education and immigration policy, family strategies and conﬁgurations, different forms of capital (particularly cultural and social), the impact of inter national students on ‘host’ societies and communities

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(such as on housing), highly skilled migration, new forms of institutional power, the rescaling of social repro duction, the creation of cosmopolitan citizens, and global cities and national objectives. The internationalization of education is clearly an emergent and increasingly vibrant ﬁeld of research. See also: Knowledge Economy; Labor Flexibility; Labor Market; Migration; Neoliberal Economic Strategies; Transnational Elites; Transnationalism.

Further Reading Appleton, S., Sives, A. and Morgan, W. J. (2006). The impact pf international teacher migration on schooling in developing countries The case of Southern Africa. Globalisation, Societies and Education 4(1), 121 142. Bohm, A., Follari, M. and Hewett, A. et al. (2004). Vision 2020: Forecasting international student mobility a UK perspective. British Council, Universities UK and IDP Australia. British Council (1999). The Brand Report Building a world class brand for British education. London: British Council. Butcher, A. P. (2004). Educate, consolidate, immigrate: Educational immigration in Auckland, New Zealand. Asia Paciﬁc Viewpoint 45, 255 278. ERASMUS. http://ec.europa.eu/education/programmes/socrates/ erasmus/erasmus en.html (accessed Oct. 2007). Farquhar, R. H. (2001). Advancing the Canadian Agenda for International Education. Canadian Bureau for International Education. Huang, S. and Yeoh, B. S. A. (2005). Transnational families and their children’s education: China’s ‘study mothers’ in Singapore. Global Networks 5(4), 379 400. Lewis, N. (2005). Code of practice for the pastoral care of international students: Making a globalizing industry in New Zealand. Globalisation, Societies and Education 3(1), 5 47. Mitchell, K. (2006). Neoliberal governmentality in the European Union: Education, training, and technologies of citizenship. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 24(3), 317 474. Olds, K. (2007). Global assemblage: Singapore, Western universities, and the construction of a global education hub. World Development 35(6), 959 975. Olds, K. and Thrift, N. (2005). Assembling the ‘‘global schoolhouse’’ in Paciﬁc Asia. In Daniels, P., Ho, K. C. & Hutton, T. (eds.) Service Industries, Cities and Development Trajectories in the Asia Paciﬁc, pp 199 215. London: Routledge. Robertson, S. (2003). WTO/GATS and the global education services industry. Globalisation, Societies and Education 1(3), 259 266. Robertson, S. (2005). Re imagining and rescripting the future of education: global knowledge economy discourses and the challenge to education systems. Comparative Education 41(2), 151 170. Waters, J. L. (2006). Emergent geographies of international education and social exclusion. Antipode 38(5), 1046 1068. Waters, J. L. (2006). Geographies of cultural capital: Education, international migration and family strategies between Hong Kong and Canada. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 31, 179 192. Waters, J. L. (2005). Transnational family strategies and education in the contemporary Chinese diaspora. Global Networks 5(4), 359 378.

Relevant Websites http://www.bccie.bc.ca British Columbia Centre for International Education (BCCIE).

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http://www.britishcouncil.org British Council. http://www.educationnz.org.nz Education New Zealand. http://www.ets.org Educational Testing Service (ETS).

http://www.idp.com IDP Education Pty Ltd. http://www.unesco.org UNESCO 2003a.

Internet, Economic Geography M. Zook, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, USA & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Domain Names A domain name is a unique identiﬁer (e.g., nytimes.com or manchester.ac.uk) associated with an IP address that allows users to easily access a speciﬁc Internet resource such as a website. E-Commerce E-commerce encompasses a wide range of technologies from placing and receiving simple email orders to inventory tracking systems which automatically place orders based on sales. All e-commerce systems share a common focus on the use, organization, and transmission of electronic data to coordinate the movement of physical objects. EDI Electronic data interchange refers to a standardized data format that allows for the exchange of structured and complex information between and within ﬁrms. Knowledge ( Tacit and Codiﬁed) Codiﬁed knowledge is knowledge that is possible to record or transmit and therefore lends itself more easily for transmittal across distance. Tacit knowledge is knowledge acquired through observation or interaction and is often thought to be best transmitted face to face. Point of Sale (POS) Systems POS systems are computer systems that collect data on the sale of items (generally through a bar code reader) and automatically send this data to inventory management software which can automatically place an order to restock items. RFID Radio frequency identiﬁcation (RFID) is a system by which items receive small tags which can be read at a distance by specialized RFID readers making inventory and sales easier.

The Internet Changes Everything A popular meme during the 1990s was ‘‘the Internet changes everything.’’ While clearly hyperbole, the idea of technologically driven change was and remains an important element in popular views of the economy. Geographers take a more measured view that strives to keep technological and geographical determinism in check. Rather than generalizable linear relationships, geographers focus on the complex collections of differ ence between places and are acutely cognizant that the creation and use of new technologies is embedded in larger social networks. This is not to deny the transfor mative power of the Internet but to recognize that this power is ﬁltered through existing and evolving spatial,

institutional, and cultural aspects of the economy. Firms, governments, workers, consumers, etc., all engage in the dynamic use of the Internet and these actions – in con cert and conﬂict with the myriad of simultaneous and parallel actions by other actors – shape how the Internet unfolds and is deployed across the spatial economy. This process holds the potential for great change, for example, the nineteenth century technologies of the railroad, tel egraph, and telephone helped usher in the modern corporation and shifted the competitive advantage of regions, but it is prudent, to distinguish between the possible and the evitable. Toward this goal, this article reviews the interaction between the Internet and economic geography. The term Internet is used here as a catch all term for the use of a range of general purpose information technologies (ITs) and software deployed across public, private, and peered networks rather than a more limited deﬁnition. This decision reﬂects both the diversity of implementations of IT and the Internet and the rapid change associated with it. This allows one to focus on the larger processes at work rather than the speciﬁc manifestations tied to par ticular technologies. This article covers three main sub jects. The ﬁrst examines the role of distance in the age of the Internet. In other words, to what extent has the Internet ‘destroyed’ distance and what type of economic frictions remain relevant? The article then considers how Internet technologies are used to organize and move the inputs and products of the economy via a range of soft ware and hardware platforms. Encapsulated under the label of electronic commerce (e commerce), this process can engender great change within the organization and location of production and consumption. The ﬁnal topic focuses on how the uneven use of the Internet across time, place, and organization creates a differentiated geography of change and challenge. Together the review of these topics illuminates the complex economic geog raphy of the Internet and the ways in which it has in sinuated itself into the daily tasks of production and consumption.

Calculating Distance in the Age of the Internet Tobler’s ﬁrst law of geography, that is, ‘‘yeverything is related to everything else, but near things are more re lated than distant things’’ is often cited as a casualty of the Internet era. Pundits of various stripes have been declaring the death of distance, for over a decade.

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More recently, Thomas Friedman’s bold declaration that the ‘‘world is ﬂat’’ because IT has removed geographic and other barriers to competition has gripped the popular and policy imagination. Despite this prevailing rhetoric, researchers have repeatedly demonstrated the continued uneven spatial pattern of Internet infra structure, use, and content throughout the world. As Figure 1 illustrates the countries with highest levels of per capita use of the Internet remain largely Western (with the notable exceptions of Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) and wealthy. Even countries within this privileged group with high numbers of Internet users per capita exhibit wide variation in the adoption of do main names – a key indicator of Internet content distri bution – with countries like Taiwan, Korea, and Japan ranking far below other developed economies such as Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These differences are in turn replicated at all scales as access and use of the Internet varies at the subnational and local level. Thus, the adoption of the Internet is far from uniform and is instead shaped by an inherently messy negotiation between people, polities, and technologies. Despite its ability to organize and shift information easily across vast distances, the Internet is also fundamentally tied to physical places and the people, who create, regulate, distribute, and consume its data. Simply put, the Internet has been, is, and likely will always be clustered in par ticular places. Even the seemingly simple expectation

that someday the Internet will be accessible everywhere is belied by the continued pace of change and innovation. Rather than there being one ﬁnal and ﬁxed goal, new technologies regularly appear so that even if all places had Internet dial up service (a near impossibility in and of itself), better access such as high speed broadband or wireless would appear during the rollout of dial up ser vice replicating the digital divide albeit at a different strata. In short, the Internet will always be differentially distributed across space and likewise, the use of the Internet or Internet based applications will be differen tially distributed across users and ﬁrms based on their cognitive and technical skills. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that ‘‘death of distance’’ discourse is compelling because it does contain elements of truth. ITs are making it easier to overcome the friction of physical distance and establish and maintain regular and meaningful contact with people around the world. There are, however, two important caveats to this. First, knowledge creation and transfer are increasingly important factors in economic fortunes and these capabilities seem to work best in physical proximity which facilitates tacit knowledge exchange. While access to raw materials and transportation remains as necessary as at the height of Fordism, knowledge embodied in skilled labor is a key input to many activities and one must be cognizant of how creation and use of knowledge takes place in the Internet era. While IT enabled logistics systems make it easier to stretch out just in time supply

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Figure 1 Domains and users per 1000 people, June 2007. Codes based on Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) top-level domain (TLD) assignments; codes for selected countries: AU Australia; AT Austria; BE Belgium; CA Canada; CZ Czech Republic; DK Denmark; EE Estonia; FI Finland; FR France; DE Germany; HK Hong Kong; IS Iceland; IE Ireland; IL Israel; IT Italy; JP Japan; KR South Korea; LU Luxembourg; NL Netherlands; NZ New Zealand; NO Norway; PT Portugal; SG Singapore; SI Slovenia; ES Spain; SE Sweden; CH Switzerland; TW Taiwan; UK United Kingdom; US United States. Due to legibility issues, countries with lower levels of users and domains are simply represented by diamonds. From http://internetworldstats.com (users); http://www.zooknic.com (domains); includes registrations of biz, com, info, mobi, net, org and ccTLD domains.

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chains it remains difﬁcult to replace all the advantages of physical proximity, for example, face to face communi cation, chance meetings, access to ‘buzz’ or gossip, etc. There are numerous attempts to use the Internet to in crease the quality of knowledge transfer across physical distance, for example, voice over internet protocol (VOIP), email, thread discussion groups, instant mes saging, as well as more complex knowledge management systems, but these remain imperfect substitutes. In short, the more complex an interaction is, the more difﬁcult it is to overcome the friction associated with physical distance (see Figure 2). The second caveat is that there are additional di mensions to economic friction beyond simple distance that can impede the ﬂow of knowledge and forestall a successful economic interaction such as those listed in Figure 2. These frictions are increasingly coming to the fore as the task of moving objects has become easier. Although the idea of industrial districts where ‘‘the mysteries of the tradeywere in the air’’ have been around for over a century, scholars have reinvigorated this ﬁeld over the past three decades, partially to answer the question of why clusters persist in the Internet age, particularly in the very IT industries that are providing the means to transcend space. Pointing to the advantages of shared culture, networks of social relations, common behavioral norms and expectations, etc., researchers have constructed theoretical justiﬁcations backed by empirical evidence as to why this clustering occurs. One particu larly relevant example to this article was the clustering of dot com companies during the 1990s, that is, companies developing and using the very technology that was re puted to destroy geography. Given the high complexity of

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Figure 2 Complexity and frictions.

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the activities of these companies, combined with the re lational, organizational, and labor need frictions of ven ture funded startups, it is not surprising that these ﬁrms clustered despite the popular rhetorical expectations to the contrary. As Leamer and Storper note (p. 653) ‘‘ythe exchange of uncodiﬁable ambiguous information that depends on a high level of trust and shared context is likely to continue to require a signiﬁcant amount of co presence.’’ In short, the Internet does not make Tobler’s law obsolete, but it vastly complicates the types and deﬁnition of distance that economic geography must consider. Near things do matter more than distance things but measures of close and far are no longer a one dimensional variable of physical proximity but a composite measure en compassing relational, cultural, technological, and lin guistic components in addition to Euclidian distance. Moreover, the component that rises to the top as most crucial varies depending on the frequency, nature, and complication of an interaction. The economy in the Internet era is increasingly structured in complicated networks which connect some places and leave others – even those physically proximate to key nodes – cut off. In a very real sense, people and places may be more closely tied economically with the other side of the planet than what is right down the road. This, however, represents a complication of distance rather than its simple destruction.

Moving Stuff: Atoms versus Information Despite the complex deﬁnition of distance and friction operating in the Internet era, it is easy to become overly focused on the movement of information and knowledge versus the movement of atoms (physical products). The fact that information and content can be easily and widely distributed is often mistakenly extended to the movement of things. Instead, particular places are con nected in highly speciﬁed ways, for example, low cost labor, ﬁnancial resources, markets, etc., to global networks resulting in a system of production that is both place rooted and networked at the same time. In actuality, there is a small range of informational products and services that are open for instantaneous shipment, for example, music or video downloads, data services, etc., and even these purely informational products still rely upon ma terial reality, that is, recording studies, musical venues, for their production. Moreover, their ease of shipment has made it simple for consumers to redistribute the product for free much to the chagrin of copyright hold ers. As a result, many dominant powers in these indus tries, for example, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) are attempting to reinvigorate another friction, that is, copyright law, to maintain their sales.

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Nevertheless, the more important role of the Internet in the space economy is the movement of atoms via e commerce. E commerce has existed for some time, for example, electronic data interchange systems (EDI) date back to the 1970s but greatly expanded during the 1990s as the Internet made it feasible for businesses of all sizes; not just large corporations. Although e commerce en compasses a wide range of technologies from placing and receiving simple email orders to inventory tracking sys tems which automatically place orders based on sales, all systems share a common focus on the use, organization, and transmission of electronic data to coordinate the movement of physical objects. Because of this variety, many analysts including the U.S. Census (2007) deﬁne e commerce quite broadly on the basis of the use, organ ization, and transmission of electronic data to sell goods and services. This deﬁnition focuses on the economic activity, that is, sales, rather than a speciﬁc technological platform. Based on this deﬁnition it is possible to track the growth of e commerce over time and across sectors via the U.S. Census data. Figure 3 shows the size and industrial distribution of e commerce within the US economy. Despite the Inter net bubble of the late 1990s and early 2000s, e commerce has steadily expanded to US$2.4 trillion worth of trans actions in 2005. More importantly, these data highlight the concentration of e commerce in manufacturing and wholesale activities, that is, business to business (B2B) transactions, and the very low level of e commerce use within the retail and service sectors, that is, business to consumer (B2C). Thus, despite the visibility of online retailers, the bulk of e commerce takes place between businesses with an ever increasing share of these

Manufacturing* Merchant wholesale trade** Retail trade Selected service industries

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transactions conducted via Internet based platforms ra ther than EDI. More intriguing, however, than the simple size of e commerce activity is how it allows business and industries to reorganize themselves. Simply installing e commerce software need not create value for a company in some predestined and linear fashion (a fact aptly il lustrated by the dot com bust). Instead, ﬁrms can use e commerce to change the organization and geographies of their production systems and in so doing create value (through the reduction in inefﬁciencies or the rise of new types of interactions) and blend the world of atoms and the world of information. This promise, however, remains a work in progress as the Organisation for Economic Co operation and Development (OECD) notes that few ﬁrms (with the notable exception of larger corporations) have used e commerce to reorganize their production chains and tightly integrate themselves with suppliers and/or cus tomers. This is not surprising as it mirrors the decade long process by which earlier technologies were used to transform existing business systems. A key issue for economic geography is how this process plays out over space. Although the spatial contours of e commerce use is ﬁrm and industry speciﬁc, there are fault lines emer ging such as urban/rural differences, large/small ﬁrm size, etc. Although rural ﬁrms are arguably positioned to accrue the greatest beneﬁts from e commerce adoption they are often at a disadvantage because of lower edu cation levels and other capabilities. Additionally, because of the uncertainty around how best to implement e commerce, it is likely that ﬁrms located in cities with better human resources and access to knowledge will be earlier adopters. This divide (again based on resources

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and knowledge) is also likely to be evident between large and small ﬁrms and independent and branch plants. Aoyama provides a particularly compelling example of how the variation in e commerce implementation with her study of how consumer based e commerce in Japan took a radically different path than that of the US. Rather than relying upon desktop computers and shipping to one’s home, Japan developed a system of convenience store kiosks that acted as site of sales and service. Moreover, a ﬁrm’s placement and power within an in dustry has considerable impact on how e commerce is implemented and which ﬁrms are at an advantage given a particular design. Wal Mart is well known for the con siderable pressure it is able to bring to suppliers to adopt certain technologies and procedures and the US auto industry witnessed the imposition of the Covisint system on auto suppliers by the big three assembly ﬁrms. Yet again this shows the complexity and wide range of vari ables that shape the use of the Internet in the space economy.

An Uneven Geography of Change and Challenge The combination of new deﬁnitions of distance and the reorganization of industries engendered by e commerce brings up important questions of how this evolving geography impacts people and places. Although it is easy to view the Internet as yet another means by which capital can be mobilized to the disadvantage of labor and place, this is an overly simplistic reading. Firms remain constrained by various economic frictions (See Figure 2) and some workers (generally the higher skilled) can take advantage of new spatial and temporal ﬂexibility that the Internet offers. Mirroring the trajectory of earlier tech nologies, the Internet will continue the historical uneven process of economic development, albeit via networks that stretch across vast distances and in conﬁgurations that are complex and bewildering. The effect of these changes depends upon the position (both spatial and organizational) one holds in the economy. Leamer and Storper note that technologies like the Internet will ‘‘yincrease product differentiation in the economy and create new forms of complex transactions, even as it simpliﬁes others and permits further spreading out of routinized behaviors.’’ Figure 3 illustrates that there is high e commerce use within manufacturing and relatively low use in retailing and services. Indeed many personal services such as hairdressers and medical care and industries such as construction simply require that labor be physically present. On the other hand, information and communi cation technology (ICT) enabled e commerce has allowed for signiﬁcant changes within a number of retail

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jobs. Powerful point of sale (POS) technologies within large retailers increase distribution and stocking efﬁ ciency; self check out kiosks and automated toll booths have lowered the number of needed cashiers; and fast food restaurants are using IT to relocate the workers who take drive through orders to centralized back ofﬁce lo cations. This shifting of customer service activities has a signiﬁcant effect in shaping the form and geography of work for these job but it is not the Internet per se that changes working conditions. Rather it is the manner in which the Internet is used that reshapes the spatial conditions of workers. Moreover e commerce systems are helping to de skill or eliminate some jobs, for example, bar scanners and radio frequency identiﬁcation (RFID) tags lowering the amount of labor needed for inventory taking. This, however, is clearly not a linear process as new jobs related to the creation and maintenance of these IT systems are also created. Although this provides cold comfort to workers who lose their jobs, especially since the location and skills required for this new work need not be anywhere near them, it demonstrates that it is not a linear process but one mediated through layers of economic friction. For example, the standoff between the longshoremen union and the port of Long Beach in the fall of 2002 was less about the introduction of IT per se and more about the wish of mangers to use the Internet to spatially shift work inland to sites with nonunion labor. In other words, jobs that had been conﬁned to the port for practical reasons were suddenly open to a spatial shift because of the technology. The decision to do so as well as the resistance to it shows the larger societal and political dimensions to what at ﬁrst might seem to be a simple technocratic decision. An important concern, of course, is the extent to which the potential of the Internet and relative power differential between ﬁrms versus people and places will lead to the offshoring work or a ‘‘ﬂat world.’’ While clearly taking place, for example, the OECD estimates that 20% of jobs in OECD countries could potentially be done from any geographic location, offshoring is tem pered by a number of issues (Figure 2) ranging from the use of tacit knowledge in production to concerns about privacy and the ability to access skilled labor. In short, the Internet does not lead ineluctably to offshoring, but it has allowed ﬁrms to pursue a variety of location strategies that are sometimes contradictory, sometimes comple mentary, and whose logics vary across space. This means that the Internet alone does not determine the fortune of people and places. Rather, the outcomes will result from sustained political contestations. While there is ready evidence of jobs being eliminated or relocated, there are also a number of factors which will keep work tied to particular locations.

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Change Is Real but Geography Remains Relevant Since its conception as a military communications system during the Cold War, the Internet has permeated across the globe and into many aspects of daily life and business. Indeed, the Internet has enabled a wide range of eco nomic activities that hitherto would not have been possible, for example, eBay’s enabling small scale sales between people separated by any number of economic frictions including distance. Moreover, the possibilities are tremendous as users and ﬁrms experiment with and innovate around the Internet. As a result there are a number of promising avenues for future research. At the core is the fundamental task of extending our understanding of how e commerce (based on Internet related technologies) changes the spatial organization of production and consumption. This article sketched the basic contours of existing research but there remains much to do. For example, has e commerce led ﬁrms to rely more upon externalized market transactions rather than keeping functions internal? In which areas have ﬁrms achieved more efﬁciency (proﬁt) through the use of e commerce? How have these changes impacted the number and type of jobs within ﬁrms? How do changes in structure and efﬁciency affect a ﬁrm’s inter action with near and distant markets and suppliers? Has e commerce made certain channels to ﬁnal and inter mediate consumers possible at lower volumes? And most importantly, what are the geographies of these transfor mations in production, distribution, and consumption? A related issue is the evolving relationship between the creation, manipulation, and utilization of information in the economy, for example, the entertainment and media industries. The rise of web 2.0 applications – the use of the Internet by online communities and social networking sites to create and collaborate – blurs the division between (and the geographies of) producers and consumers. The applications of web 2.0 include wikis (user generated re sources open to anyone to edit), folksonomies (the ag gregation of users’ annotations of online resources into classiﬁcations and indices), and mash ups (user created hybridizations of two or more online services). The growth of web 2.0 means that users are increasing co producers of the information and entertainment resources they con sume and gives rise to a number of possible research topics. How will the cooperative spirit of online com munities fare in the face of efforts to commercialize as pects of web 2.0? How will geographically deﬁned regulatory regimes such as copyright interact with this alternative (and network deﬁned) paradigm? How will the delineation between the public and private spheres evolve? Will web 2.0 applications live up to their collaborative/ democratic ideal or be captured by narrow commercial or geographically deﬁned interests?

Another important trend in the relationship between the Internet and economic geography is the growing ubiquity of mobile devices alongside the increasing availability and use of spatial data. Websites such as Google Maps and Microsoft Live Search Maps allow anyone to access and easily search street maps and sat ellite imagery. Meanwhile web 2.0 functionality (such as Google’s My Maps) is allowing these same people to make and share spatial annotations to anywhere on the globe. As a result, users of the Internet are increasingly able to inhabit physical environments while simul taneously moving through a dynamic information cloud (accessed and edited through mobile devices) that is in dexed to their spatial location. This prompts a number of questions. How will physical proximity interact with prominence within the information cloud? How will this impact the visibility of local businesses, particularly retail locations? What new information services will emerge to take advantage of this spatialized data (particularly user generated data)? A ﬁnal direction for future research lies within the virtual games/worlds such as Worlds of Warcraft or Second Life in which millions of people spend hours a day using. Most relevant for economic geography are the worlds with tradeable currencies and active economies. Enterprising individuals within these worlds are suc cessfully constructing professions and businesses dedi cated to the creation and sale of virtual items, for example, a custom designed house that ones computer self can occupy and enjoy or other consumer goods ranging from a sports car to a customized private island. There are even sweatshops in China where workers conduct repetitive and mind numbing actions in the online worlds for hours on end to collect virtual gold pieces that are in turn sold to US players who covet digital items such as a magic sword and do not want to take the time necessary to earn the gold on their own. Key questions to be explored include, will these synthetic worlds become important economic sites in their own right or remain academic curiosities? How successfully do virtual worlds overcome the economic frictions highlighted in Figure 2? For example, can virtual world teleconferencing provide enough of a simulacra of co presence that it will ease the transfer of uncodiﬁable knowledge? This short review of but a few possible research agendas highlights the exciting potential of the Internet and illustrates that no particular use or implementation is inevitable. Moreover, it argues against characterizations that the ‘‘world is ﬂat’’ or ‘‘everything is changed.’’ The various drags of economic frictions are still present, and are only partially and selectively being overcome. In fact, one of the great ironies of the twenty ﬁrst century is that as economies and ﬁrms become more reliant upon the Internet to transcend space, the particularities and

Internet, Economic Geography

abilities of places are increasingly key points of differ entiation. In short, the Internet doesn’t reduce the rele vance of geography. It simply adjusts which aspects of geography and which types of economic friction are most relevant for analysis. See also: Agglomeration; Cultural Economy; e-Business and e-Commerce; Embeddedness; Information Technology; Internet/Web Mapping; Knowledge Economy; Mapping, Cyberspace.

Further Reading Aoyama, Y. (2001). The information society, Japanese style: Corner stores as hubs for e commerce access. In Leinbach, T. & Brunn, S. (eds.) Worlds of Electronic Commerce, pp 109 128. New York: John Wiley. Cairncross, F. (1997). The Death of Distance: How the Communications Revolution Will Change Our Lives. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. Castronova, E. (2005). Synthetic Worlds: The Business and Culture of Online Games. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. David, P. A. (1990). The dynamo and the computer: An historical perspective on the modern productivity paradox. American Economic Review 80(2), 355 361. Freidman, T. (2005). The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty First Century. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. French, S., Crewe, L., Leyshon, A., Webb, P. and Thrift, N. (2004). ‘Putting e commerce in its place: Reﬂections on the impact of the Internet on the cultural industries’. In Power, D. & Scott, A. J. (eds.) Cultural Industries and the Production of Culture, pp 54 71. London: Routledge.

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Leamer, E. and Storper, M. (2001). The economic geography of the Internet age. Journal of International Business Studies 32(4), 641 665. Leinbach, T. (2001). Emergence of the digital economy and e commerce. In Leinbach, T. & Brunn, S. (eds.) Worlds of E Commerce, pp 3 26. New York: John Wiley. Leyshon, A. (2003). ‘Scary Monsters? Software formats, peer to peer networks and the spectre of the gift’. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 21, 533 558. OECD (2006). Information Technology Outlook. Paris: OECD. Porter, M. (2001). ‘‘Strategy and the Internet’’. Harvard Business Review March, 63 78. Townsend, A. M. (2001). The Internet and the rise of the new network cities, 1969 1999. Environment and Planning B: Planning & Design 28(1), 39 58. Zook, M. (2000). The web of production: The economic geography of commercial Internet content production in the United States. Environment & Planning A 32(3), 411 426. Zook, M. (2001). Old hierarchies or new networks of centrality? The global geography of the Internet content market. American Behavioral Scientist 44(10), 1679. Zook, M. (2005). The Geography of the Internet Industry: Venture Capital, Dot Coms and Local Knowledge. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Relevant Websites http://internetworldstats.com Internet Usage World Stats. http://www.oecd.org OECD’s Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry. http://www.census.gov U.S. Census Bureau E stats Program. http://www.zooknic.com Zooknic Internet Geography Project.

Internet/Web Mapping M.-J. Kraak, ITC – International Institute of Geo-Information Science and Earth Observation, Enschede, The Netherlands & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Cartography The art, science, and technology of making and using maps. Geodata Infrastructure (GDI) Geospatial data infrastructure encompasses the networked geospatial databases and data-handling facilities, the complex of institutional, organizational, technological, human, and economic resources which interact with one another and underpin the design, implementation, and maintenance of mechanisms facilitating the sharing, access to, and responsible use of geospatial data at an affordable cost for a speciﬁc application domain or enterprise. Map A symbolized representation of a geographical reality, representing selected features and characteristics, resulting from the creative effort of its author’s execution of choices, and is designed for use when spatial relationships are of primary relevance. Web Map A map presented in a web browser.

remain the valuable products they used to be. Expertise is still required, but differently, since the role of maps has changed and expanded. In the past (paper) maps were designed to be both database and presentation media. Digital cartography and GIS have split these tasks, but these days the link between the two tasks can be even better preserved. In modern on screen environments, one can store much more data ‘behind’ the map, than on a single paper map. Linking multimedia elements to the map can enrich them even more, especially on the WWW with its hyperlink options and capability to dis seminate interactive three dimensional (3 D) maps. The new mapping environments can be characterized by two keywords (interactivity and dynamics) and as such introduced the word visualization, which also requires a different view on map design, especially with the WWW as the output medium.

Internet Technology and Maps Introduction The environment in which maps have been produced and used has changed considerably. During the last two decades, cartographers, geoscientists, and computer sci entists have witnessed highly dynamic and important developments in the ﬁelds of acquiring, managing, ana lyzing, interacting with, and visualizing large amounts of geospatial data. Especially, the ﬁeld of visualization has undergone a rapid change. Next to static maps, nowadays, immersive and highly interactive virtual environments can be used to explore and present dynamic geospatial data. The World Wide Web (WWW) is today’s promin ent medium to disseminate geospatial data and maps. In the past producing maps was the realm of cartographers. Their skills and laborious activities were a guarantee that authorative maps were produced. The rise of geographic information systems (GISs) has increased those involved in making maps. Today’s revolution around the WWW has even further increased the number of people involved in making maps. Making maps via GIS still involves geo professionals; however, making maps via the WWW in cludes potentially everyone having access to this new medium. These new mapmakers have different demands, and force a change from a traditional supply driven map production to demand driven map production. Ir respective of these changes, it is still about maps, which

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The Internet originates from the United States Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPAnet), a mili tary funded communication network, which was started in 1969 to allow collaboration among researchers at dif ferent locations. With the adoption of transmission con trol protocol/internet protocol (TCP/IP) by ARPAnet, user network (USEnet), and EUnet, the network ex panded globally in 1983. This moment can be seen as the birth of the Internet. The layer structure of TCP/IP allowed other standard protocols like File Transfer Protocol (FTP) for ﬁle transfer, telecommunication net work (TelNet) for terminal services, and simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) for e mail to be incorporated. In 1993 with the deﬁnition of the hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) and hypertext markup language (HTML) protocols at European Organization for Nu clear Research (CERN), the WWW was born. The WWW can been seen as a network of linked documents, pictures, videos, and other information sources. For the layout of individual web pages, HTML is still widely used. For the exchange of the content (documents, etc.), extensible markup language (XML) is more and more used. It encodes the content in a (text) document for storage and transfer purpose, and it also describes the structure of the data. This combination makes XML documents self descriptive. Individual tags can be deﬁned which allows for XML languages for different purposes, like the geographical markup

Internet/Web Mapping

language (GML) for geographic data, and, for instance, also mathematical markup language (MathML) for mathematical formulas. Until recently, maps presented on the web have been raster based. They had a ﬁxed resolution, and would not allow for interactivity, other than clickable maps. Common ﬁle formats are Graphics Interchange Format (GIF), Joint Photographic Experts Group (JPEG), and Portable Net work Graphics (PNG). With the introduction of the Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG), resolution independent vector graphics can be presented. SVG is an XML based language for 2 D vector graphics. It allows for many interactive functions such as zoom, pan, different trans formations, as well as dynamic change of object attributes. The so called client–server architecture plays a prominent role in how users are able to display a map on a screen. Via a web browser (the client), one can send a request to a web server (the server), which will respond and return the requested item. In a simple setup this item could be a JPEG ﬁle that contains the image of a map. Offering interactivity to the user makes the client– server structure more complex. As a solution, one can work with plug inns on the client side, for example, the user has to download a program to be able to enjoy the interactivity. When most activity takes place on the ser ver, but required data to be sent up and down between the client and server, one deals with so called thin clients. A thick client results in less data trafﬁc and more activity on the user side. There are many different alternative solutions. Popular are the so called distributed systems. Here a set of independent servers each execute their own speciﬁc task, but a user will not notice this. An online bookshop is a good example. If one orders this book, Elsevier will send it from its warehouse, the payment will go via a credit card company, but the customer will be lieve he/she only dealt with the online bookshop. A distributed approach puts demands on the individual components that have to work together. One has to realize seamless subsystem integration. Technology to be used should allow the interoperability of heterogeneous com ponents without knowing their implementation details. The Open GeoSpatial Consortium (OGC) has set up a set of speciﬁcations to make this work in the geo world. In this context, one has to specify and set up an infrastructure of interoperable web services. A service can be described as a distinct part of an overall functionality which is accessible via standardized interface. It could, for instance, be an algorithm that calculates the shortest route between two locations. An interface describes the methods that the software component implements and their calling con ventions without specifying how it is implemented. It is obvious that standardization is an important keyword. The OGC and ISO TC/211 are the important standardization organizations. The ﬁrst has deﬁned rules for the web map service (portrayal of maps), the web coverage service

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(interface to raster data), and the web feature service (interface to vector data). For the deﬁnition of the data a geoversion of XML, GML is used. A GML description includes both spatial and nonspatial properties of geo graphic objects. To be able to draw a map, one has to transform the GML data using a portrayal service, which results in a map graphic, for example, using SVG.

Maps on the Internet Maps on the WWW can play different roles. Of course, they will function as they did before. They will present a message by showing geospatial patterns and will increase insight in geospatial relations. However, on the WWW the map can function as an interface to other (geo) in formation in cyberspace or will guide the surfer navi gating the WWW. In providing access by clicking objects, the map will bring the surfer to other web pages, which can contain again maps, photographs, or text. In this re spect the map could play a prominent role in a country’s geospatial data infrastructure (GDI). In its role of guiding the surfer through parts of cyberspace, maps will help to keep track of paths through, for instance, a single website. Why is the WWW an interesting medium to present and disseminate maps and/or the data behind those maps? The answer is that information on the web is virtually platform independent. Also, many users can be reached at minimal costs and it is easy to update the maps frequently. Furthermore, the WWW allows for a dynamic and interactive dissemination of geospatial data. This results in new mapping techniques as well as new use possibilities not seen before with traditional printed maps and most on screen maps. While preparing maps for the WWW, one has to remind that its access is geographically skewed, for example, some part of the world still have poor access, such as Africa, Asia, and parts of Latin America. Also, one has to remember that the WWW is a fast medium used by impatient people. Long download times will make users lose their interest. In addition, people expect up to date information, and if a site appears older than several weeks, it will be considered of no value. Type of Maps What type of maps, from both provider and user per spective, can be found on the web? Figure 1 presents a classiﬁcation. It gives an overview of current possibilities, from the perspective of how the map image is used based on the keywords, interaction and dynamics. The scheme distinguishes between nondynamic and dynamic web maps. Each of these categories is further subdivided into noninteractive and interactive maps. The most common map found on the WWW is the static noninteractive view only map (see Figure 2). In most cases, these are scanned existing paper maps. This form of presentation

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Figure 1 Add t ona ro e of the map on the WWW: funct on as an ndex ( eft); search too (center); prev ew (r ght). From Kraak, M.-J. (2000). Access to the G , the funct on of v sua zat on too s. n Groot, D. & McLaugh n, J. (eds.) Geospatial Data Infrastructure – Concepts, Cases, and Good Practice, pp 217–232. Oxford: Oxford Un vers ty Press.

Originally textile Industries were one of the main providers of labour. Things changed dramatically.

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Base map Soil map (partial) Landuse map Statistics Video of city centre Text documents

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Figure 2 Classiﬁcation of web maps. From Kraak, M.-J. (2000). Settings and needs for web cartography. In Kraak, M.-J. & Brown, A. (eds.) Web Cartography Developments and Prospects, pp 1 8. London: Taylor & Francis.

can be very useful, for instance, to make historical maps more widely accessible. To have such maps on the WWW allows one to study and share (inter) national cartographic heritage. The nondynamic view only maps can serve to give the web surfer an impression of avail able products, and the National Mapping Organizations can show details – teasers – of their map series. A problem with many of the nondynamic view only maps is that they have not been designed for the WWW, and the colors of the original maps will often not reach the user as planned, due to technical (color) constrains. Another factor that can cause problems is the fact that most ori ginals have an information density too high for the WWW. The nondynamic maps can be interactive. These are the so called ‘clickable’ maps. In this case, the map functions as an interface to other data. Clicking on a geographic object could lead to other information sources on the web, such as other maps, images, or text. Inter activity could also mean that the user has the option to zoom and pan. Google Maps has made this map type to be the minimum in options expected by users. Alter natively, it could allow the user to deﬁne the contents of the web map by switching layers off or on. Sometimes, it is also possible to choose symbology and colors. The WWW is especially suitable to present dynamic maps, like animations that represent dynamic (geo) processes. The so called animated GIF can be seen as the non interactive version of the dynamic maps. Several bitmaps, each representing a frame of the animation, are pos itioned after each other and the WWW browser will continuously repeat the animation. Famous examples are the commonly used spinning globes (URL 6). Slightly more interactive versions of this type of maps are those to be displayed by media players in, for instance, Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG) format. The WWW browser and its plug inns deﬁne the interaction options, which are often limited. More interaction can be created by JAVA, JavaScript, or virtual reality modeling language (VRML). VRML especially offers opportunities to deﬁne the travel path through 3 D scenes. Design of Maps What makes web maps different? Starting point is that web map design is no different from other map design. That is, while producing the map one will apply the

cartographic grammar considering the nature of the data to be represented, and the message the map should tell. Normally, one would include audience in the previous sentence as well. However, for maps presented on the web, the audience is very much unknown. Even though one might aim at a particular user community, one will never be sure of who is looking at the maps. An exception might be if the maps are presented in a ‘closed’ intranet environment. In some cases the geospatial data provider will not even be sure on how their maps look like at all. This might be partly due to the user’s web browser en vironment, but can be due to interaction and symbol ization options given to the user as well. The fact that most maps have to travel half the globe before they reach the (unknown) user’s browser dictates that the web map should not be too large in both image and ﬁle size. The image size should be limited because scrolling up and down or left and right is not promoting a sense of map overview, and the ﬁle size should be kept to a minimum while it is unlikely the user will be willing to wait for the map to download. The map contents (information density) should be low as well, because a typical user surﬁng the web has a relatively short span of attention. All this may look disadvantageous but it offers a challenge to produce well designed maps. It is possible to put all kinds of additional (or omitted) information behind the map image, because of the interactive nature of the WWW. Clicking objects or mouse over techniques can make this (additional) information accessible. These techniques could also be used to display text on the map. Presenting text in an on screen map is, from a point of visibility and legibility, rather problematic and could be solved via mouse over techniques. When the user moves the cursor over the map and it hits a town symbol, it could show the name of the town. Mouse over techniques can also be used to highlight geographic objects based on user interaction. The basic map could be viewed in pastel tints while moving the mouse around will present the object under the pointer in bright colors. Design techniques in relation to clarity (crispness of the symbol’s appearance) and transparency can be applied. Shading could be applied in combination to offer a 3 D look to those symbols selected. In summary all these ‘special effects’ can not just be used to make the maps attractive, but also to provide additional infor mation or help in navigating the web map, and function

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even as a map legend. Clicking a map object could access a database with additional information related to the object. The application of such an approach depends on what information the provider wants to put on the WWW: present a map or offer geospatial data. In the design of web maps, color is a separate issue. It can be used to realize many of the above effects, but it is also one of the weak points of web browser environments. Al though computer screens nowadays can present millions of colors, even more than the human visual system can handle, a safe use of color would limit one to the 246 colors of the so called web safe color palette. How to ﬁnally design or produce the map will depend on the provider’s aims. Questions such as which type of web map (nondynamic/dynamic) is applicable have to be answered. When it comes to production, the mapping process will often have to be adapted compared to traditional mapping, if one intends to use the new opportunities offered by the WWW as medium to present maps. Another important question: what (design) action do we leave to the user? The possibilities offered by the WWW have extended the traditional cartographic variables. Web design software enables the application of new variables, like blur, focus, and trans parency, while shadow and shading play a prominent role as well. Blur give symbols a fuzzy appearance and can, for instance, be applied to visualize uncertainty, while focus will introduce blinking symbols to attract attention. Both transparency and shading/shadow can be used to simu late a 3 D look. Transparency can be seen as a kind of fogginess, by which part of map content is obscured or

faded in favor of other information. For example, it can be applied to subdue the background in a map in order to enhance the main theme in the foreground (for instance a drape of geology over terrain features). In a 3 D ‘landscape’ environment it can also be used as a depth cue. The use of shadow and shading increase the sense of depth. Shading is commonly used to increase the contrast between ‘ﬁgure’ and ‘ground’ or, for instance, in relief maps to create a 3 D terrain impression. Shadow, also known as cast or drop shadow, can be applied to give the symbols a 3 D look. In web maps, this 3 D feel of the symbols invites users to click on them to activate hyperlinks or mouse over effects. The visual effect of shadow is casting a shadow of the symbol on to the background. The origin of these new variables is partly found outside cartography; however, it is interesting to note that the cartographic principles have found their way in noncartographic literature (Figure 3). The new variables have been fully accepted in car tography. However, further research on the new variables effectively remain to be done, because despite all tech nological progress it remains important to wonder if the new representations and interfaces really work. An ad vantage of those empty maps is that they can be easily used in the world of mobile geocomputing. People will have portable devices such as mobile phones and/or personal digital assistants and call in for location infor mation. Small maps with answers to questions such as how to get to the railway station, or where the nearest bookshop is, will appear on the small screens of these

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Figure 3 New graphic variables: shadow/shading (upper left); blur (lower left); transparency (upper right); and blinking/focus (lower right). From Kraak, M.-J. and Ormeling, F. J. (1996). Cartography, the Visualization of Spatial Data. London: Addison Wesley Longman.

Internet/Web Mapping

devices which often will have a Global Positioning Sys tem (GPS) receiver included to establish the owner’s position. Those small screens require an economized map design. This should not be considered problematic since one can include lots of information behind the map image or individual symbols. Access to this hidden in formation can be obtained via, for instance, mouse over techniques or clicking map symbols. To ensure this approach, one has to make sure the symbols have an appearance that invites clicking them. In case of mouse over techniques, the appearance of a symbol will change or textual information appears on the map. Clicking the symbol might open new windows or activate other web pages.

Maps and the Geodata Infrastructure To realize the availability of maps over the Internet, not only the technology as described in the introductory section should be available, but the infrastructure to disseminate and access the maps should be available too. The need for such infrastructure is there because the traditional map and data supply driven environment is changing rapidly in a map and data demand driven en vironment. A more ﬂexible approach is required because more data is available from different sources and more non experts are using the data, and the web has become the predominant working environment and dissemination channel. Many data providers are offering their maps and data via the web and a start has been made to create portals, also called clearinghouses, where users can get access to the data in a kind of one stop process. This has been facilitated by a so called GDI. A GDI encompasses the networked geospatial databases and data handling facilities, the complex of institutional, organizational, technological, human, and economic resources which interact with one another and underpin the design, im plementation, and maintenance of mechanisms facili tating the sharing, access to, and responsible use of geospatial data at an affordable cost for a speciﬁc appli cation domain or enterprise. These developments have also introduced distributed geoservices. Based on the request, geoservices can in clude the delivery of data and maps, but they can also offer computational support to convert coordinated be tween differently systems. An example of this last option is a service that converts a GPS track collected by the user in a format that can be used in particular software. Other examples of geoservices are gazetteers where one types a geographic name and the service returns its lo cation in a map or as position in longitude and latitude. A well known service is offered by route planners. One gives a departure and destination, and the geoservice returns a driving advice either in a map or a list with

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directions. It is also possible to combine different geo services in a single solution, for instance, in a crisis management center, one is in need of different datasets to monitor events. The data are often supplied by different organizations and are traditionally difﬁcult to obtain and combine. The geoservices offer the possibility – again while adhering to Open Geospatial Standards – to combine the distributed data in a single application and keep track of events. If one of the suppliers update their data, this new information can be automatically streamed into the application of the crisis management center. Even ﬁeld data collected with, for instance, a personal digital assistant (PDA) can be automatically forwarded to the center or the center can supply the ﬁeld with the latest overall information. The web map service of National Geographic is also an interesting case. Besides a full ﬂedged web map ser vice where the user can select between different map types and satellite imagery while zooming in from world to street level, the website also offers ‘print friendly’ maps which provide basic maps of countries and regions. Strength of the website is the possible link between maps and the other resources of the National Geographic Society. Google offers Google Earth, a mapping product that combines an intuitive interface with a good map design, the wide availability of data, and the possibility to link your own data to the maps and satellite imagery. In fact, Google Earth is a good example of a geoservice because it streams satellite and other map data from external servers, while these graphics can be combined with other data provided by Google, such as, for instance, National Geographic photographs. Users can also add their own data to the imagery. These could be GPS tracks of tours or scanned maps that are draped over the imagery. The user can set the transparency of the maps added and as such compare, for instance, a scanned topographic map with the 3 D Google Earth model. Adding 3 D objects, such as buildings, is also possible. Next to these static examples, it is also possible to create dynamic Google Earth web services in which live data streams are added to the imagery. An example is the Tour de France, Europe’s biggest annual cycling event. Users can do a live tracking of the stages because every twenty seconds, the position of the cyclist is updated and shown on the imagery. Another trend that allows users to participate in web mapping is realized via so called mash ups. Here users can incorporate particular web services in their own web page. For instance one could show part of a map offered by Google and add a symbol to indicate the web page owner’s home location. In addition, this location could be the start/end point for route calculation to offer visitors of the web page the fastest/shortest path to that location from the user location.

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Conclusion An important advantage of the Internet is that the geospatial data and maps can be easily reused for dif ferent purposes. Somehow, the same data is offered by different web map services to both professional and public user groups. This, for instance, results in road datasets created by national mapping agencies being enriched by commercial vendors who offer the data to the public via online route planners. Tomorrow’s picture will not only show a complete merger of both pro fessional and public mapping worlds, but the geodata infrastructure, and as such maps, will be incorporated in a larger information and communication infrastructure. External (technological) inﬂuences will keep dictating the future appearance of the map, as has been the case in the past. See also: Digital Divide; Digital Earth; GIS, Mobile and Locational Based Services; Map Hacking; Map Interactivity; Mapping, Distributed.

Further Reading Cartwright, W., Peterson, M. M. and Gartner, G. (eds.) (2007). Multimedia Cartography. Berlin: Springer.

Erle, S., Gibson, R. and Walsh, J. (2005). Mapping Hacks: Tips and Tools for Electronic Cartography. Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly Media. Groot, D. and McLaughlin, J. (eds.) (2000). Geospatial Data Infrastructure Concepts, Cases, and Good Practice (Spatial Information Systems). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kraak, M. J. (2000). Access to the GII, the function of visualization tools. In Groot, D. & McLaughlin, J. (eds.) Geospatial Data Infrastructure Concepts, Cases, and Good Practice, pp 217 232. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kraak, M. J. (2000). Settings and needs for web cartography. In Kraak, M. J. & Brown, A. (eds.) Web Cartography Developments and Prospects, pp 1 8. London: Taylor & Francis. Kraak, M. J. and Brown, A. (eds.) (2000). Web Cartography Developments and Prospects. London: Taylor and Francis. Kraak, M. J. and Ormeling, F. J. (1996). Cartography, the Visualization of Spatial Data. London: Addison Wesley Longman. Mitchell, T. (2005). Web Mapping Illustrated: Using Open Source GIS Toolkit. Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly Media. Plewe, B. (1997). GIS Online: Information Retrieval, Mapping and the Internet. Santa Fe, NM: OnWord Press. Taylor, D. R. F. (ed.) (2006). Cybercartography: Theory and Practice. Oxford: Elsevier Science.

Relevant Websites http://earth.google.com Google Earth. http://plasma.nationalgeographic.com MapMachine, Maps, National Geographic. http://www.opengeospatial.org Open Geospatial Consortium.

Internet-Based Measurement M. Dodge, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK M. Zook, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, USA & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Domain Name A domain name is a unique identiﬁer (e.g., nytimes.com or manchester.ac.uk) associated with an IP address that allows users to easily access a speciﬁc Internet resource such as a website. IP Address Internet protocol (IP) addresses (e.g., 64.246.60.38) uniquely identify sites on the Internet and are necessary to ensure the delivery of trafﬁc. They are little seen or used by typical users. Latency The time (measured in milliseconds) that it takes to transmit and receive data between two nodes on the Internet. Ping A network utility which sends test data to a target Internet site to determine whether it is ‘live’ and accepting data and reports the latency to the site. Screen Scraping The use of a computer program to automatically collect online data or data output of Internet-based resources – most often a web page. Topological Location The location of sites on the Internet in terms of how they are connected to the rest of the network rather than a point deﬁned by latitude and longitude. Traceroute A network utility which maps out the path that data packets take between two hosts on the Internet, showing all of the intermediate nodes traversed, along with an indication of the speed of travel for each segment of the journey. Whois A utility to search for the ownership details of a domain name.

Internet based measurement is a set of methods that have been applied to quantitatively describe the structure, workload, and use of the Internet. They provide a practical means of doing a kind of virtual ‘ﬁeldwork’ on the Internet using online tools and network monitoring techniques to gather ﬁne scale primary data, as opposed to relying on aggregate secondary data sources (such as government statistics). Typically, these methods use freely available software tools and web resources to ex plore the internal topology of Internet links and/or the external geography of network infrastructure, content production, and use. By measuring the operation of the Internet in terms of where things are produced and consumed, who owns them, and how data travels, re searchers are able to critically engage and analyze the key network of the information age. In pedagogic terms, the

openness of these techniques can help users of the Internet to transform themselves from passive consumers to more informed and active explorers of their world. Internet based measurement as a methodology for human geography is important and innovative in several respects. First, the Internet itself has several important geographical dimensions, and quantitative measurement techniques can provide unique data to analyze this. The focus has been primarily on mapping the material geography of the infrastructures of the Internet via automatic surveys of connected hardware and software services. Knowing where things are physically located is useful analytically because variations in spatial patterns provide researchers insight into underlying processes. Second, ‘ordinary’ users can explore and measure the structure and operation of the Internet for themselves. This is because the Internet was purposefully designed as an open network that encourages active exploration and experimentation. This methodology does not require a costly investment in expensive, specialized tools to obtain large and representative data samples. Many of the tools and techniques for Internet based measurement already exist, having been created by engineers for the practical purposes of debugging network problems. These tools can be successfully leveraged to generate data useful for the context of social science research questions by pro viding tactical knowledge of the network that cannot be gained in any other way. Using the Internet to measure and map itself is par ticularly useful for studies of the social geography of online interaction or the economic geography of website production where location is a key variable. For example, Internet based measurement can reveal how territorial geographies of regulation and enforcement, particularly obscenity or libel laws, help shape the location of Internet activity. In addition, because the freedom to surf the web is not universal, Internet based measurement methodologies are useful in identifying and evaluating state attempts to censor the dissemination or con sumption of information by their inhabitants. Techni cally, censorship is often performed on behalf of a national government by commercial Internet service providers (ISPs) who block content reaching customers using a list of banned websites or domain names. Con ceptually, this is the same process as software ﬁlters that parents can install on individual personal computers (PCs) to block access to inappropriate materials by their children. However, given the dynamic nature of the

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Internet, this type of censorship is often partial and re quires authorities to continuously update the list of blocked sites. More insidious censorship can also be undertaken by search engine companies, who adapt their algorithms to give different, selective, results to users in particular countries. Crucially, users are not made aware that their results have been altered; for example, Google’s agreement with the Chinese government means it alters key search results for Chinese users, including searches on Tiananmen Square, Tibetan independence, and Falon Gong. Third, the Internet is a repository of a wide range of data which can be collected and cross referenced to allow researchers to create databases that measure ofﬂine phenomenon such as ﬁne grained geographies of crime statistics or apartment listings. Geographic location (e.g., postal codes) is one of the most effective means of in dexing data (Internet based or otherwise) since it enables linkages to a vast array of existing secondary data, such as demographic statistics from standard censuses. More fundamental, however, is the ability of empowered users or social movements to aggregate data spread across multiple web sources at relatively low cost to cast new light on long standing problems.

Locating the Nodes of the Internet The ability to reliably determine the geographic location of the nodes of the Internet’s infrastructure is the ﬁrst step for Internet based measurement. This task is chal lenging as the Internet was designed as a logical network that only ‘knows’ about topology (i.e., the location of connections capable of exchanging data) which can have little to do with physical location, deﬁned by geographic coordinates. Thus, while the Internet has a robust and scalable system of unique locations (e.g., identiﬁers like Internet protocol (IP) addresses or domain names), these locations are not ﬁxed to physical points on the ground or any particular position in the network. Moreover, be cause the Internet is a network of networks, rather than a homogeneous entity, the control of these location iden tiﬁers is decentralized and ﬂuid. In short, ‘no one owns the Internet’ as a whole, and instead each component part is owned and operated by many different organizations and individuals. Consequently, no one institution has a synoptic view of the whole Internet and no one maintains a register of where all the components are physically located. Determining the geographical location of components of the Internet is further complicated because different characteristics of a site’s operation can be in different places. For example, there are ﬁve distinct kinds of geographical location which are important for fully characterizing a website (or other Internet resource). These types of locations are:

1. lexical: a website is where its content refers, 2. hardware: a website is where its hardware server is physically located, 3. production: a website is where the author/maintainer responsible for it is located, 4. ownership: a website is where the legal owner is lo cated, and 5. users: a website is where its users are located. In some cases, all ﬁve locations will be largely coincident geographically (e.g., a university’s website). However, it is easy to imagine plausible scenarios in which a web page providing information on vacationing in Lexington, Kentucky, is hosted on a server in London, written by someone in Manchester for a website owner in Miami, which is read by people from across the world. The geographical precision of these different physical lo cations can also vary. Sometimes, location might be de termined as the precise x, y position (e.g., street address of the building containing the web server); other times one might only know city or national jurisdiction. Each type of geographical location of a website is determined via different techniques. Geography of Content The ﬁrst, and most obvious, method for determining the location of a website is based on lexical geography. Here, the content of the website is browsed to try to ﬁnd an ‘about page’ or ‘contacts page’ that provides a postal address or telephone number for the website. Other cultural and linguistic clues (e.g., ﬂags, symbols) in the content of a website might give useful indications of ‘real world’ location. This method, however, is far from foolproof as many Internet resources do not provide readily identiﬁable measures of this type or do not allow a researcher access, for example, password protected sites. Additionally, it is an extremely time consuming approach as it requires a human being to visually inspect and categorize each site. Geography of Hardware The second, and arguably most straightforward geo graphic measure of the Internet relies upon IP addresses. IP addresses are unique numeric identiﬁers, for example, 169.229.39.137, assigned to networked computers to ex change data. A variety of private and public databases exist that provide the associated geographic information for a particular IP address (Figure 1). While not fool proof, geo coding IP addresses are reasonably accurate (particularly at the national level) and are widely used by companies to track users, guard against credit card fraud, and provide web content tailored for different territories. Moreover, it is possible to automate this process via software scripts in order to locate tens or hundreds of thousands of IP addresses in a very short amount of time.

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Figure 1 The result of a database lookup on an IP address using the web service offered by hostip.info that gives a geographic address for the registered owner. Source: author screenshot.

The weakness of IP address geo coding is that the use of anonymizers and other techniques can mask a user’s actual location. More important for researchers is that most websites are hosted at dedicated server farms that have little to nothing to do with the location where the content for the site is generated or where the owner is located. Thus, IP addresses often highlight Internet in frastructure locations rather than content production centers. The applicability of this, of course, depends upon the research question pursued. Geography of Production/Ownership Because IP addresses are awkward for people to use, the domain name system (e.g., nytimes.com or manchester.ac.uk) was introduced in the 1980s and now comprises a key component for Internet navigation and measurement. Domain names are organized according to top level domains (TLDs) consisting of country code TLDs (ccTLDs) associated with domains ending with two letter

International Organization for Standardization (ISO) coun try code (e.g., .ca for Canadian domains, .ie for Irish domains, etc.) and generic TLDs (gTLDs) such as .com, .net, or .org. Approximately 35% of all domains are under ccTLDs and provide a crude measure of geographic location. However, the use of a country code domain name does not guarantee that the website is actually within the country indicated. The ownership, production, hosting, and use of that website could well be in another country or several different countries. Furthermore, approximately 65% of domain names fall under the category of gTLDs and are not related to any country. Thus, a much more accurate geographic location for domain names is derived via the online utility known as ‘whois’ which provides the ownership (listed as the registrant) information for a particular domain. Generally, it is possible to freely consult this registration information via a whois query but not all domain registration databases publicly give out the full address details of the owner. A whois query can be done interactively from any number of

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websites (Figure 2) and multiple whois queries can also be automated using software scripts. While the results of whois queries can be helpful in ﬁnding out where the registered owner of a domain name is, they are not always accurate. First, registration details held on a given domain name may be out of date, in correct, or deliberately false (e.g., spammers try to hide their true geographic location and would be unlikely to complete the registration honestly). Second, registrant information from a whois query only provides one lo cation for a domain and it is not possible to determine whether this is indicative of the site of ownership, production, or both. Third, the registrations for large organizations often give a single postal address (their

headquarters) and, thereby, may mask where the content for these individual domain names is actually being produced. Despite these issues, the technique of using whois information for geo coding websites were vital to the research by Matthew Zook on the geography of Internet content production. Using automated whois queries, he gathered comprehensive data on the location of .com domain name registrations in 1998 and demonstrated that the production of Internet content exhibited a signiﬁcant degree of clustering in particular cities in the US and globally. Relying upon these techniques (supplemented with the use of IP location data), he has analyzed the geographies of a number of Internet based activities

Figure 2 The result of a whois database lookup on the nytimes.com domain name using a free web service called domaintools.com. The output gives registration details including the postal address of the owner. Source: author screenshot.

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ranging from the clustering of Internet startup companies during the 1990s to the location of adult oriented web sites (Figure 3). Geography of Users The location of users of websites is arguably the most difﬁcult to measure as it is the least centrally organized

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aspect of the Internet. Moreover, it is an ill deﬁned and dynamic variable as new people continuously come online and existing users adapt their online practices. At the level of individual websites, however, it is possible to gather rich data on the number, location, and activities of users (Figure 4). While potentially helpful, it can only shed light on the users of a particular website and gaining access to the user logs of leading websites is a difﬁcult

Number of .com domains 1−5 6 − 25 26 − 100 101 − 300 > 301

(a)

< Median Within one-half standard deviation Within one standard deviation Within two standard deviations > Two standard deviations (b)

Figure 3 (a) The ownership pattern of .com domain names in the Boston metropolitan region (July 1998) and (b) the US distribution of adult websites at the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level (July 2001). The darker and larger circles indicate the MSA are more than two standard deviations above the average number of websites per MSA. Source: Matthew Zook.

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Figure 4 An example of typical website usage statistics giving details on the number and nationality of visitors. Source: author screenshot.

undertaking at best. For example, much could be learned by analyzing the geography of users of sites such as Google, Amazon, or eBay but these data are closely guarded as commercially sensitive. Measures of the number of Internet users at the na tional level is available but suffers from several draw backs. First, the scale at which this data is organized prevents analysis at any subnational units such as city or region. Also problematic is that the data on users is generally constructed by combining national sample surveys employing different methodologies and deﬁn itions of Internet use. Finally, these data provide at best a measure of the potential demand for Internet resources but say nothing about the types of activity in which users are engaged. Although less comprehensive, researchers have generally conducted their own surveys of users to gain higher granularity and more speciﬁcity. A middle ground between the rich albeit narrowly focused data from individual websites and the shallow yet comprehensive data from counts of users, are rankings that provide measures of the amount of user trafﬁc to all websites. Although there are a number of ranking services, Alexa.com provides a long running and in dependent measure of the popularity of websites among users. Alexa.com’s rankings are based on tracking the surﬁng activity of a panel of Internet users who have downloaded a web browser tool. Alexa.com relies upon this sample to judge the most popular websites on the Internet and even disaggregates the top websites per country (Figure 5). While this represents a reasonable approach, it is unclear whether these users are a repre sentative sample of Internet users (particularly when

disaggregated to the country level) and several avenues for bias have been identiﬁed by Alexa.com and others. Nonetheless, it provides one of the best publicly available means to compare the location of the users of websites at the country level.

Measuring Distance and Routes Across the Internet Another important element of Internet based measure ment is assessing distance between sites within the network. Given the topological structure of the Internet, physical distance between sites has little meaning. Instead, relative distances are measured using the journey time (i.e., latency) taken to transmit and receive data. Increasing latency implies increasing relative dis tance between two sites on the Internet. It is important to note, however, that there can be many different technical factors (e.g., types of hardware and network conﬁgurations which are shaped by ownership and institutional structures) that effect latency. An interesting point of analysis, both on the Internet and in the ‘real’ world, is to compute the relationship between distance on the ground and time–distance for different places. This relationship is not always linear because of barriers, lack of connectivity, and poor accessibility. Sometimes, the quickest sites to reach are not the closest physically while locations just down the street are completely ofﬂine. Analyzing the variable patterns in time accessi bility can provide insight into underlying structural processes.

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Figure 5 A sample of Alexa.com’s data listing of the most popular websites in Russia. Source: author screenshot.

Distance Measurement The simplest technique to measure latency uses the net work utility ‘ping’ which reports whether a particular site on the Internet is ‘live’ and accepting data. It works by sending out test data to a target site and listening for a

response. It is useful for distance measurement because it reports the round trip time of data packets. For example, Figure 6 shows the time (in milliseconds) each packet took to go from Lexington, KY to the web server at the University of Manchester and back again. The last line of

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Figure 6 A ping query from the University of Kentucky to a web server at the University of Manchester that provides a measure of latency between origin and target. Source: author screenshot.

the output reports the overall statistics. According to this, the average ‘distance’ for this particular journey across the Internet as measured by latency was 143 ms. Latency distances are very susceptible to changes in conditions on the Internet and can provide ways of quantifying possible trafﬁc congestion, much like measuring car speeds gives an indication of the level of road congestion. There also are several ways that ‘pinging’ latency distances can be used to learn more about structure of the Internet. First, and most obviously, a sequence of pings to the same site at different time periods can be used to build up a comprehensive longitudinal proﬁle of latency. Another useful extension is to take pings from different places on the Internet to triangulate in on a particular site. By triangulating from different points it is possible to get a sense of the relationship between latency and physical distance, assuming that the (approximate) geographic location of the origins and target are known. More importantly, combining the latency and physical distance can provide a measure of whether a place is readily accessible on the Internet or not. Data Route Measurement A much more sophisticated means of measuring distance through the Internet than ping is gained via the use of the utility ‘traceroute’ which reports details on the route data takes through the Internet. Traceroute is used in much the same way as ping but provides greater detail. It ef fectively maps out the path that data packets take be tween two sites on the Internet, showing all of the intermediate nodes traversed, along with an indication of the speed of travel for each segment of the journey. Al though traceroute is primarily for network engineers debugging routing problems, it has also been used by researchers to expose the political economic structures of the Internet. It reveals the hidden complexity of data ﬂows, showing how many nodes are involved, the

seamless crossing of oceans and national borders, and the typically convoluted transfers through separate networks owned and operated by competing companies. To illustrate how traceroute maps the Internet, it was used to chart the path from a PC at the University of Kentucky in Lexington, KY to a web server at the Uni versity of Manchester (Figure 7). The output looks ra ther cryptic at ﬁrst sight, but it is in fact a kind of one dimensional map, with each node traversed listed on a separate line. It gives a complete linear route listing showing how data packets traveled through the Internet starting in Lexington, traveling via Atlanta, Washington, Amsterdam, London, Reading, and Warrington and ending at Manchester. The three time measurements in milliseconds – such as 142 ms, 149 ms, and 144 ms – are round trip times for that segment and give a useful in dication of the speed of each link. Each node traversed is identiﬁed by its domain name and/or IP address. Most nodes have unusually long domain names (e.g., atla.abilene.sox.net) which identify specialized routing computers at the core of the Internet not normally seen by users. With a little bit of decoding, the names of these routers can yield useful information, such as the type of node hardware, the bandwidth of the link, the name of the ISP that owns a node, and often a node’s approximate location (usually at the city level). Many large network operators apply consistent naming conventions throughout their infrastructures, as in the machine names of the nodes of geant2.net. For example, the ‘lon.uk’ portion of the router name for segment 10 could reasonably be taken to mean London, UK (Figure 7). Utility of Traceroute Measurement in Research Just like ping, the usefulness of single traceroutes can be extended by running them from different sites to trian gulate the Internet’s structure. Web based traceroutes

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Figure 7 Traceroute measurement from the University of Kentucky to the University of Manchester. Source: author screenshot.

make it possible to run traces from many different starting points, including from different networks and in different countries. Web traceroute gateways are very useful for the active exploration of the Internet’s topol ogy from across the globe and illustrate the degree to which routes vary. Running multiple traceroutes to lots of different points across the Internet has also been used by researchers to gather large datasets on the topology of the core of Internet. Data gathered by traceroute can provide evidence of the Internet’s business ‘logic’ of following the cheapest paths rather than the shortest. Much international Internet trafﬁc is still routed through the US as the cheapest means of transit between regions. This can re sult in quite anomalous looking, geographically circuit ous routes being chosen. Traceroute data can also be used for forensic analysis of the Internet’s structure. For example, it is useful for deducing the approximate location of Internet hosts (such as websites) in terms of ‘hardware geography’. The output shows the location and identity/owner of the ‘upstream’ network provider even if the ﬁnal destination of the server is unclear. If the data travels into a certain city and does not leave it again, it is probable that the target is located there. Also, the ‘upstream’ network providers may keep logs for identifying a host that is of interest (this is of particular concern for law enforcement agencies in tracing the source of illegal activities).

Traceroute also reveals something of the hidden political economy of the Internet. The patterns of trafﬁc routing show transit agreements and mutual peering re lationships between competing companies. Details on these arrangements are often deemed commercially conﬁdential, but are revealed by necessity in how and where the actual networks interconnect to share data. The routing of trafﬁc reveals the structuring of business relationships in terms of who connects to who and the hierarchy of these connections (from periphery to center to periphery again). It can also show which tele communications carriers dominate the transfer of trafﬁc between particular countries and continents. These companies are likely to be inﬂuential in the structuring of global communications and tracerouting could provide an alternative way to quantify the extent of their power. Last, the output from traceroute provides a useful way to assess the number of international borders crossed and determine which territories (i.e., separate legal juris dictions) the data transits. The more ‘points of contact’ in the ﬂow from origin to target, the more potential there is that Internet trafﬁc could be intercepted and subjected to local regimes of monitoring, ﬁltering, censorship, and data retention. In short, does an e mail message transit through a third party nation that has hostile intentions, for example, does an e mail to someone in Palestine transit through Israel? Particularly in regions of conﬂict,

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being able to identifying territories that are transited might be vitally important in terms of the reliability of communication.

making the collection of up to date, ﬁne scale spatially referenced data (e.g., polluted sites, retail site locations) an easy task.

Internet-Based Measurement of Other Socioeconomic Phenomena

Conclusion

A ﬁnal aspect of Internet based measurement is its use as a means to gather data on phenomenon in physical space. One common method is the use of web based surveys. While these surveys are relatively easy to setup and conduct, sampling design and response rates are crucial to ensure statistically meaningful results. Researchers must ensure that their sample accurately represents the population they are studying rather than simply being a convenient way to conduct a survey. A related use of the Internet is to gather data that, particularly for datasets, are either prohibitively expensive to access or simply do not exist. A number of geographers have already lever aged the electronic format of the Internet to construct datasets (ranging from ﬁrms receiving venture capital to the location of corporate board members) in a relatively straightforward and, more importantly, cost effective manner. To date, most of these efforts are largely manual retrieval operations driven by the fact that the desired data exists in multiple locations and does not have a standardized format. An extension of this method known as screen scraping allows access to data that would not otherwise be avail able or would be excessively time consuming to aggre gate into a dataset. Screen scraping is deﬁned in this context as the use of a computer script (generally written by the researcher) to automatically collect the data out put of Internet based resources – most often web pages. These scripts are akin to user written macros to auto mate simple but repetitive tasks in a spreadsheet and are designed to generate automatic queries to web pages and collect and store the data received. While it is possible to conduct the queries by hand, screen scraping automates the process, greatly reducing research drudgery. It does, however, require programming and data cleaning skills as there is no ‘off the shelf ’ program that is readily avail able. Instead, researchers must craft their scripts specif ically to the structure of the data which they are trying to collect. A ready application of screen scraping is the well established technique of using directories as a method for identifying the locations of businesses. This method has been previously utilized with paper based data within historical urban geography. Although issues of the re liability and accuracy of directories are a concern, the key limiting factor in the use of this method is the amount of work needed to assemble the data. The technique of screen scraping can signiﬁcantly simplify this task,

As the Internet grows in size, expands in scope, and becomes increasingly embedded as a banal background to everyday living, it becomes ever more important to understand the politics surrounding its production. Understanding the topological structures and geog raphies of the Internet, through quantitative network measurement using the techniques and tools described here, provides one of the most valuable avenues into network politics (e.g., the issue of net neutrality), allow ing researchers to gather information ﬁrsthand and crit ically question network operations directly. The medium of communication might be virtual, but the Internet is dependent on physical infrastructure and human labor, most of which is invisible to users. The computers are small in scale and are usually hidden from view in an onymous server rooms and secure, windowless buildings, while the cables are under ﬂoors, in ceilings, and in conduits buried under roads. The technical geography of Internet infrastructures are easily overlooked (just like for other essential utilities of water, electricity), but they are not naturally given. The geographical structure and op eration of networks that service modern living can be exposed through Internet based measurement. Internet based measurement is likely to become easier as new and more powerful software tools for scanning the structure of Internet become available. Also, as com mercially provided search engine tools develop, they are increasingly providing new ways of surveying the infor mation structures of the web. Of course, researchers will continue to have to tread carefully the ethical bounda ries between critical ﬁeldwork and potentially criminal hacking. At the same time, Internet based measurement is also getting harder and riskier to do. Many parts of the Internet are being designed and operated in a much more closed fashion. For example, some networks block ping and traceroutes as a security precaution against malicious scanning. Although this makes Internet based measure ment more difﬁcult, it becomes evermore important to ensure that researchers remain capable of analyzing it independently. In particular, as the Internet intertwines with physical space it is essential that human geography follows this evolution in order to understand the in creasingly hybridized spaces inhabited in the twenty ﬁrst century. See also: Cyberspace/Cyberculture; Georeferencing, Geocoding; Internet, Economic Geography; Mapping, Cyberspace.

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Further Reading

Relevant Websites

Barabasi, A. L. (2003). Linked: The New Science of Networks. New York: Perseus Books. Branigan, S., Burch, H., Cheswick, B. and Wojcik, F. (2001). What can you do with traceroute? Internet Computing 5(5), 96. Castells, M. (2001). The Internet Galaxy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cukier, K. N. (1999). Bandwidth Colonialism? The Implications of Internet Infrastructure on International E commerce. Paper presented at INET’99 Conference San Jose, California. http:// www.isoc.org/inet99/proceedings/1e/1e 2.htm (accessed Mar. 2008). Dodge, M. and Kitchin, R. (2000). Mapping Cyberspace. London: Routledge. Dodge, M. and Kitchin, R. (2006). Net: Geography ﬁeldwork frequently asked questions. In Weiss, J., Nolan, J., Trifonas, P., Nincic, V. & Hunsinger, J. (eds.) The International Handbook of Virtual Learning Environments, pp 1143 1172. Netherlands: Springer. Grubesic, T. H. (2002). Spatial dimensions of internet activity. Telecommunications Policy 26(7 8), 363 387. Hayes, B. (1997). The infrastructure of the information infrastructure. American Scientist 85(30), 214 218. Lakhina, A., Byers, J. W., Crovella, M. and Matta, I. (2002). On the Geographic Location of Internet Resources. Technical report 2002 15. Computer Science Department, Boston University. http:// www.cs.bu.edu/techreports/pdf/2002 015 internet geography.pdf (accessed Mar. 2008). Murnion, S. and Healey, R. G. (1998). Modeling distance decay effects in web server information ﬂows. Geographical Analysis 30(4), 285 303. Shiode, N. and Dodge, M. (1999). Visualising the spatial pattern of internet address space in the United Kingdom. In Gittings, B. (ed.) Innovations in GIS 6: Integrating Information Infrastructure with GI Technology, pp 105 118. London: Taylor & Francis. Spring, N., Wetherall, D. and Anderson, T. (2004). Reverse engineering the internet. ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review 34(1), 3 8. Townsend, A. (2001). Network cities and the global structure of the internet. American Behavioral Scientist 44(10), 1697 1715. Zook, M. A. (2000). The web of production: The economic geography of commercial internet content production in the United States. Environment and Planning A 32, 411 426. Zook, M. A. (2005). The Geography of the Internet Industry. Oxford: Blackwell.

http://www.alexa.com Alexa the Web Information Company: website popularity survey. http://www.arin.net American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN): whois query interface. http://irrepressible.info Amnesty International. http://www.cia.gov Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): World Factbook, Internet Users. http://www.caida.org Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis. http://www.domaintools.com Domain Tools. http://www.hostip.info HostIP IP Geo Coding. http://www.iana.org Internet Assigned Numbers Authority: IANA’s list of all the country code top level domains. http://www.isc.org Internet hosts survey, conducted by Internet Systems Consortium/ Network Wizards. http://www.lumeta.com Internet mapping project. http://www.internetworldstats.com Internet Usage World Stats. http://www.netcraft.com Netcraft web server survey. http://opennet.net OpenNet Initiative. http://www.rsf.org Reports without Borders. http://www.telegeography.com TeleGeography. http://www.traceroute.org Thomas Kernen’s web traceroute list. http://www.visualroute.com Visual Route. http://www.zooknic.com Zooknic Internet Geography Project: Maps of Internet Users, Zooknic Internet Intelligence.

Interviews: In-Depth, Semi-Structured R. Longhurst, University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Cold Calling This is calling on people (usually strangers) without any prior approach or contact being made in the ﬁrst instance to ask if they would be prepared to be interviewed. Interviewers often get a high refusal rate using this approach. Positionality It describes a person’s position within the midst of complex, shifting and overlapping political, economic, cultural, social, sexual, gendered, and racialized processes. How people are positioned in relation to various contexts of power affects the way they understand the world. Some geographers have argued that reﬂecting carefully on and declaring one’s positionality may lead to more sound research because it becomes apparent that all knowledge is partial. Recruiting on Site It involves making contact with potential participants at a site or location that is relevant in some way to the research, for example, if someone was researching the culture of rugby they might attempt to recruit participants at a rugby club and/or ﬁeld. Reﬂexivity Critical and conscious introspection and analytical scrutiny of oneself as a researcher. Reﬂexivity involves examining one’s own practice in order to gain new insights into research. Situated Knowledge A notion that challenges the idea that knowledge is simply ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered. Instead, knowledge is ‘embodied’, that is, it is made by people who are situated within particular contexts. Snowballing A technique used by researchers whereby one contact, or participant, is used to help recruit another, who in turn puts the researcher in touch with another. The number of participants soon increases rapidly or ‘snowballs’. Triangulation It involves using a variety of methods to collect data as opposed to relying on one single form of evidence as the basis for ﬁndings.

they feel are signiﬁcant. The interviewer does not keep a tight rein on the interview but instead allows the inter viewee, through the use of open ended questions, to explore the subject in as much depth and from as many angles as they please. Interviews are usually conducted individually but can also be conducted in pairs or groups. In depth, semi structured interviews are probably one of, if not the most commonly used qualitative method in the discipline of human geography. Geographers have used in depth, semi structured interviews to collect data on a huge array of subjects, including gay pride parades, merchant banking, and geography ﬁeld trips to name just three. They have also reﬂected in great depth on the use of this method. At the level of research design geog raphers have considered issues such as who is inter viewed, what questions they are asked, how to select and recruit participants, where to meet, how to record and transcribe interviews, and how to analyze data. Geog raphers have also considered many of the ethical, polit ical, and epistemological issues surrounding the use of in depth, semi structured interviews. Interviewing takes a number of different forms. At one end of a continuum are structured interviews in which the interviewer asks a list of prescribed questions (these questions are always asked in the same way and the same order). In structured interviews respondents are dis couraged from deviating from the questions. At the other end of the continuum are unstructured interviews. In unstructured interviews respondents are encouraged to direct the conversation instead of the interviewer. In depth, semi structured interviews sit somewhere in the middle of this continuum. They involve directing re spondents to some degree mainly by talking and listening to people but in ways that are self conscious, orderly, and partially structured. However, in depth, semi structured interviews are more than simply chats to people. It can take days, even weeks, to get prepared to conduct several interviews. Background reading, formulating questions, and contacting interviewees to set up appointments can be demanding and time consuming.

Introduction In depth, semi structured interviews are verbal inter changes where one person, the interviewer, attempts to obtain information from another person by asking ques tions. Although the interviewer prepares a list of predetermined questions, in depth, semi structured interviews tend to unfold in a conversational manner. This offers participants the opportunity to explore issues

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Conducting In-Depth, Semi-Structured Interviews In depth, semi structured interviews can be used as a stand alone method or in conjunction with another method or several other methods (this is sometimes refereed to as ‘triangulation’). The researcher needs to prepare questions, decide who to recruit to participate,

Interviews: In-Depth, Semi-Structured

contact potential participants, choose a location, carry out the interviews, and transcribe the data, all the while being cognizant of the ethical issues and power relations involved in the research. Perhaps it is not surprising, therefore, that interviewing requires a high level of interpersonal skill. Interviewers need to be able to put people at ease. They also need to be able to ask questions in a straightforward but interesting way. Listening care fully to responses, acting in a way that develops trust and that is supportive, but without swaying participants to a particular position requires considerable skill. Before formulating interview questions researchers need to brief themselves fully in the subject area. Having done this it is important to create a list of themes or questions to ask participants. People who are very con ﬁdent at interviewing sometimes equip themselves with just a list of themes. It is imperative to have a logical sequence of questions or themes which have been pre pared in advance. Questions may be designed to elicit information that is ‘factual’, descriptive, provides background information, thoughtful and/or emotional. A combination of different types of questions can be effective depending on the research topic. Researchers tend to begin with a question that participants are likely to feel comfortable answering. More difﬁcult, sensitive, or thought provoking questions are best left to the second half of the interview when participants are likely to be feeling more comfortable. It is useful for interviewers to be familiar with the questions so as not to break the ﬂow of the interview by having to read them from a paper all the time. The next step is to select participants. Usually people are chosen on the basis of their experience related to the research topic. While the aim of many quantitative methods is to choose a random or representative sample, to be ‘objective’, and to be able to replicate the data, the aim of qualitative methods is to choose respondents who will help the researcher make sense of people’s experi ences. Thinking about who to interview often prompts researchers to reﬂect on their own identity and how this might shape the interactions during the interviews (this point is expanded in the section ‘Ethical issues and power relations’). There are many strategies for recruiting participants for interviews. Sometimes researchers carry out a simple questionnaire survey to gather contextual information and include a request at the end asking respondents who are prepared to engage in a follow up interview to pro vide their contact details. Sometimes researchers adver tise for participants in local newspapers or on radio stations requesting interested parties to make contact. Other methods for recruiting participants for interviews are ‘cold calling’ and ‘recruiting on site’. After inter viewing a participant it is common for researchers to ask the interviewee if they know others who might also be

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interested in being involved in the research. This tech nique is refereed to as ‘snowballing’. Having selected and recruited participants it is then necessary to decide where to conduct the interview. Obviously place can make a signiﬁcant difference to the way in which an interview unfolds. It is important that both the interviewer and interviewee feel comfortable. For this reason a relatively neutral setting can be good. If the interview is to be taped then it is also important that the interview is conducted somewhere that is relatively quiet, otherwise transcribing the tape is likely to prove difﬁcult, if not impossible. When interviewing business people or ofﬁcials from organizations or institutions it is common to interview them on their own premises. This is often easier logistically than attempting to meet in another location. An advantage of meeting a respondent at their workplace is that it is often very useful for a researcher to be in the environment that they are studying (assuming ‘work’ is the focus of the interview). A potential disadvantage is that the interviewee may feel uncomfortable speaking freely especially if they want to say negative things about their particular business, organization, or institution. It is not always possible to carry out in depth, semi structured interviews in an ideal setting but so long as it is relatively neutral, comfortable, quiet, and accessible for both parties then it is likely to prove successful. Semi structured, in depth interviews tend to last, on average, one h (but this can vary enormously). Busy people are reluctant to give up much more time than this and it is important not to overstay one’s welcome. If more time is required, an interviewer can ask the respondent if it is possible to arrange another interview for a later date. Having a second interview rather than one long inter view can also provide the interviewer with an oppor tunity to begin analyzing the material from the ﬁrst interview thereby returning to the second interview with more pertinent questions. Some researchers take notes when they conduct in depth, semi structured interviews. Others audio–video record the interview which provides them with both an aural and a visual record. Most researchers, however, simply audio record the proceedings. The advantage of this over note taking is that the researcher can focus fully on the conversation as it unfolds instead of feeling pressure to try and record the participant’s comments in a notebook. A disadvantage of audiotaping is that some participants may be uncomfortable being taped. Taping can affect dramatically the way in which people feel they are able to tell stories about themselves and others. Regardless of whether an interviewer decides to tape the conversation or not, it is a good idea after the interview to document the general tone of the conver sation, any important nonverbal cues, the key themes that emerged, and anything that might have been particularly

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interesting or surprising during the interview. This helps the researcher begin the task of analyzing the data. If an interviewer does audiotape an interview it is helpful to transcribe the conversation as soon as possible after conducting it. Hearing the taped conversation when it is still foremost in one’s mind makes transcription much easier. Sometimes researchers use a variety of different transcription codes, for example, the starts of overlap in talk can be marked by a double oblique //; pauses can be marked with a dot in parenthesis (.); nonverbal actions, gestures, and facial expressions can be noted in square brackets; and loud exclamations can be noted in bold type face. Once transcripts have been completed the researcher begins the task of analyzing the data – determining the meaning in the information gathered in relation to the purpose of the research. Most researchers look for themes, commonalities, and patterns to try to make sense of the information. It can also be useful to think about the differences that emerge in the data, noting themes that run counter to, or contradict, those that are emerging. Some researchers employ computer based programs (such as NUD*ist) to assist with the analysis of tran scripts. Others use more ‘low tech’ options such as marking signiﬁcant words and phrases with highlighter pens. If more questions are raised that need to be clariﬁed in order to serve the purpose of the study, then another in depth, semi structured interview may be warranted to examine the issue more comprehensively.

Strengths and Weaknesses of In-Depth, Semi-Structured Interviews Having addressed some of the ‘nuts and bolts’ of organ izing and conducting in depth, semi structured inter views I now discuss some of the strengths and weaknesses of this method. A strength of the method is that it is helpful for delving into and attempting to understand complex behaviors, experiences, and opinions. Other methods such as observation, closed questionnaires, census data, and structured interviews do not allow for much discovery or probing. In depth, semi structured interviews, however, offer interviewers and interviewees time and space to explore issues thoroughly. The method is also useful for collecting a range of opinions on a topic. Sometimes interviews reveal consensus but often they illustrate that people of different ages, ethnicities, gender, and sexualities have diverse opinions and experiences and do not agree on many issues. Semi structured, in depth interviewing can prove particularly useful for investigating personal, sensitive, or conﬁdential issues which informants might ﬁnd dif ﬁcult to disclose and discuss in a group interview or focus group. Such issues are also difﬁcult if not impossible

to raise in a questionnaire. It is possible that some people might feel under too much scrutiny in a semi structured, in depth interview and be less willing to open up than in the relaxed atmosphere of a group, but a skilled interviewer is usually able to overcome this by establishing a good rapport and trust with the respond ent. Most interviewees are forthcoming and eager to help out. Another strength of in depth, semi structured inter views is that potentially the method can be used in a way that shows respect for people. Interviewers usually indicate that they value the interviewee’s opinions (although complex ethical issues can arise when, for ex ample, an interviewee expresses highly discriminatory opinions in the interview). This does not necessarily imply that researchers empower their interviewees be cause the fact remains that most research beneﬁts the researcher far more than it does his or her interviewees. A weakness of the method is that it tends to be very time consuming. Formulating a schedule of questions and/or prompts, recruiting participants, organizing times and spaces in which to conduct interviews, and tran scribing and analyzing interviews all add up to many hours of labor. Another weakness of the method is that interviewing can open up participants to feeling manipulated and betrayed (but also to feeling empowered). Interviewing relies upon intersubjectivity – people engaging with and positioning themselves in relation to each other. It de pends upon human relationships and these relationships can be rewarding but also disappointing. These strengths and weaknesses illustrate that there are numerous ethical issues and power relations involved in conducing in depth, semi structured interviews.

Ethical Issues and Power Relations Conﬁdentiality and anonymity are two important ethical issues that have been discussed by geographers and others in relation to in depth, semi structured issues. Participants need to be guaranteed that all the data collected will remain secure under lock or on a computer database accessible by password only; that information supplied will remain conﬁdential and participants will remain anonymous (unless they desire otherwise); and that participants have the right to withdraw from the research at any time without explanation. Most re searchers offer to provide participants with a summary of the research results at the completion of the research project and to follow through on this pledge. Summaries can take the form of a hard copy or an electronic copy posted on a website. Another ethical issue that can arise when conducting in depth, semi structured interviews is that an

Interviews: In-Depth, Semi-Structured

interviewee may express sexist, racist, or other dis criminatory views. It is often argued that researchers ought to listen, pay attention, and be nonjudgmental, but sometimes being nonjudgmental might reproduce and even legitimize an interviewees’ discrimination through complicity. Researchers need to think carefully about how to deal with such situations. There are no easy an swers as to how to deal with these situations. Feminist, social, and cultural geographers in particular have made a useful contribution in this area. It cannot be assumed that interviewers will always be in a position of power over their interviewees. For example, a relatively young female graduate student might ﬁnd herself in the position of interviewing a wealthy middle aged businessman who expresses stridently discriminatory opinions. The young graduate at some points during the interview might ﬁnd it difﬁcult to know how to respond. Researchers also need to think carefully about how to interview in different cultural contexts. For example, ‘First World’ researchers investigating ‘Third World’ ‘subjects’ need to be highly sensitive to local codes of conduct. During interviews the interviewer and inter viewee are likely to keep repositioning themselves with respect to the multiple roles and fractured identities that they take up. How people position themselves in relation to ethnicity, gender, sexuality, class, age, and so on during interviews has implications for the interview overall and for interpreting interview data. Over the past decade, taken for granted notions about who is an insider, who is an outsider, who has access to ‘authentic’ knowledge, and who can speak on a particular subject have been raised by geographers in relation to interviewing. Geographers have also discussed and debated the concepts of ‘positionality’ and ‘reﬂexivity’ in relation to interviewing. Positionality describes a person’s position within the midst of complex, shifting and overlapping political, economic, cultural, social, sexual, gendered, and racialized processes. How people are positioned within various contexts of power affects the way they understand the world. Reﬂexivity involves reﬂecting carefully on one’s position as a researcher and declaring one’s posi tionality in the work. The aim of this strategy is to make explicit the researcher’s role in knowledge production. It becomes evident in such research that knowledge is ‘situated’ and partial rather than neutral and universal. Knowledge is not neutral but created by people who occupy particular subject positions. Some argue, however, that acknowledging one’s positionality and being reﬂexive about the research is perhaps easier said than done. Questions have been raised about how possible it is to fully understand ourselves as researchers, the researched, and the research context. While researcher reﬂexivity may be a useful goal, examining our own practice in order to gain new insights into research practice and knowledge production may be difﬁcult to achieve.

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Clearly there are many ethical issues and power relations that need to be teased out when conducting in depth, semi structured interviews. In depth, semi structured interviews now appear to be orthodox in human geography. They are no longer slighted as ‘soft methods’ (in fact, there is a long tradition in human geography – throughout the twentieth century – of researchers ‘talking to people’). There are, however, a number of other qualitative methods that although they share a great deal in common with in depth, semi structured interviews still seem to be reasonably poorly regarded in the discipline. Other qualitative methods such as focus groups, group interviews, ethnography, auto ethnography, autobiography, discourse analysis, and visual analysis still at times struggle for legitimacy in some ﬁelds such as economic and political geography. Overall, though, it seems that the discipline may be entering a period of more mature evaluation and re ﬂection on qualitative methods and this has in part been spurred by geographers’ extensive use of in depth, semi structured interviews.

Conclusion In depth, semi structured interviews are a commonly used method in geographical research. The method in volves talking with people – it relies on a reasonably informal interaction between interviewees and inter viewers. In depth, semi structured interviews are useful for investigating complex behaviors, opinions and emo tions, and for collecting a diversity of experiences. The method does not offer researchers a route to ‘the truth’ but it does offer a route to partial insights into what people do and think. Sometimes researchers rely upon in depth, semi structured interviews as a stand alone method; sometimes they are used in conjunction with other methods. In depth, semi structured interviews make a signiﬁcant contribution to geographic research especially now that debates about meaning, identity, subjectivity, politics, knowledge, power, and represen tation are high on many geographers’ agendas. Critically examining the construction of geographical knowledge as partial and situated has led to an interest in developing methodological strategies, such as in depth, semi struc tured interviews, that have potential for raising questions about researcher reﬂexivity, power relations, and ‘differ ent’ ways of writing and knowing. See also: Embodied Knowing; Emotional Knowing; Ethical Issues in Research; Feminist Methodologies; Focus Groups; Mixed and Multiple Methods; Performance, Research as; Quantitative Data; Situated Knowledge, Reﬂexivity; Subjectivity; Transcripts (Coding and Analysis); Triangulation.

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Further Reading Baxter, J. and Eyles, J. (1999). The utility of in depth interviews for studying the meaning of environmental risk. Professional Geographer 51, 307 320. Bennett, K. (2002). Interviews and focus groups. In Shurmer Smith, P. (ed.) Doing Cultural Geography, pp 151 162. London: Sage. Cloke, P., Cook, I., Crang, P., Goodwin, M., Painter, J. and Philo, C. (2004). Practising Human Geography, pp 148 159. London: Sage. Crang, M. (2002). Qualitative methods: The new orthodoxy? Progress in Human Geography 26(5), 647 655. Dunn, K. (2000). Interviewing. In Hay, I. (ed.) Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography (1st edn.), pp 50 82. Melbourne, VIC: Oxford University Press. Elwood, S. A. and Martin, D. G. (2000). Placing interviews: Location and scales of power in qualitative research. The Professional Geographer 52(4), 649 657. Kitchin, R. and Tate, N. J. (2000). Conducting Research into Human Geography, pp 211 219. Edinburgh Gate: Pearson. Longhurst, R. (2003). Semi structured interviews and focus groups. In Clifford, N. J. & Valentine, G. (eds.) Key Methods in Geography, pp 117 132. London: Sage. McDowell, L. (1998). Elites in the city of London: Some methodological considerations. Environment and Planning A 30, 2133 2146. Parr, H. (1998). The politics of methodology in ‘post medical geography’: Mental health research and the interview. Health and Place 4(4), 341 353. Schoenberger, E. (1991). The corporate interview as a research method in economic geography. The Professional Geographer 43, 180 189. Valentine, G. (1997). Tell me about y: Using interviews as a research methodology. In Flowerdew, R. & Martin, D. (eds.) Methods in Human Geography: A Guide for Students Doing a Research Project, pp 110 126. Edinburgh Gate: Addison Wesley Longman.

Valentine, G. (1999). Doing household research: Interviewing couples together and apart. Area 31, 67 74.

Relevant Websites http://www.geog.le.ac.uk Exploring online research methods in a virtual training environment: online interviews (University of Leicester). http://www.managementhelp.org General guidelines for conducing interviews, Management Library. http://www.msu.edu Interviewing in qualitative research, Michigan State University. http://www.intute.ac.uk Intute: social sciences, qualitative methods, web resources for education and research. http://www.resolutions.co.nz Research solutions: in depth interviews, innovative marketing research and strategy. http://www.scu.edu Resource papers in action research: convergent interviewing, a technique for qualitative data collection, Southern Cross University, Australia. http://aix1.uottawa.ca Tips for research interviews, University of Ottawa. http://www.wpi.edu WPI Worcester Polytechnic Institute Global Perspective Program Handbook for IPQ (Interactive Qualifying Project) advisors and students. Chapter 11: introduction to interviewing techniques.

Investment Promotion N. A. Phelps, University College London, London, UK & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction International economic integration – the international ﬂows of money, goods, productive investments, labor – has been neither natural nor inevitable. It has been or chestrated and contested by a wide range of actors including nation states, international organizations (such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, etc.), multinational enterprises (MNEs), nongovernmental organizations, and a whole host of what might be termed intermediary professions and organ izations. The investment promotion community might be considered as one increasingly important set of inter mediaries in the process of ‘globalization’. Indeed, the highly diverse set of activities, individuals, organizations, and associations that constitute the investment promotion community might be considered in the vanguard of those promoting international economic integration. While the promotion of inward investment may have a long history dating back to the sorts of place promotion apparent in now developed countries in 1800s, the rise of the investment promotion community ostensibly has been a post war phenomenon aligned with the major growth in foreign direct investment (FDI) ﬂows since the 1940s. According to the major reference source on the subject: investment promotion efforts are the result of com petition by governments in the effort to attract foreign direct investment. This competition is not entirely new; what is new is its aggressiveness and intensity. (Wells and Wint, 1990: 2)

During the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s many nations – especially developing countries – actually became more restrictive of FDI ﬂows into their territories. As ﬂows of investment in the form of loans and aid from international organizations have tended to decline in recent decades, private investment ﬂows in the form of FDI have assumed a greater importance and one which has seen the international policy environment sur rounding the regulation of FDI liberalize considerably. Since the 1980s, changes in national FDI policy en vironments overwhelmingly have been in the direction of liberalization, as governments have come to perceive MNEs and their associated FDI as bearers of scarce capital, technology, and knowledge essential to economic development. For example, between 1991 and 1998, a

total of 895 regulatory changes were made by nations of which 848 (95%) were more favorable and just 47 (5%) less favorable to FDI. The intensiﬁed competition for FDI has also been exacerbated by changes in the dynamics of competition among MNEs. Not only have the largest MNEs become more familiar with overseas operating environments they have also tended to accelerate decisions to invest in ra ther than export to overseas markets and to diffuse newer products and technology to these overseas locations. These sorts of practices have become both more gener alized and more pronounced as ‘time based competition’ has resulted in increased actual or potential mobility of productive investments. It is hardly surprising therefore that investment pro motion has emerged as something of a growth industry, though there are very few studies of investment pro motion activity let alone estimates of its effectiveness or global signiﬁcance in terms of employment. This article therefore attempts to sketch some rather vague bound aries around the investment promotion community situating it in a wider context of activities geared toward facilitating FDI ﬂows. It will draw attention to the di versity of actors and practices involved in intermediating the global economy and to the uneven geography of these practices of intermediation.

The Broad Contours of the Investment Promotion Community As a narrowly deﬁned set of practices investment pro motion sits alongside a whole host of other practices that are concerned directly and indirectly with the facilitation of FDI. Wells and Wint exclude practices such as the granting of incentives, the screening of investors, and negotiating with investors (even though these are often conducted within the same organization) let alone the other related practices to which we refer below. Narrowly deﬁned then investment promotion consists of: advertising, direct mailing, investment and seminars, investment missions, participation in trade shows and exhibitions, distribution of itineraries for visits of pro spective investors, matching prospective investors with local partners, acquiring permits and approvals from various government departments, preparing project proposals, conducting feasibility studies, and providing

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services to the investor after projects have become operational. (Wells and Wint, 1990: 8)

In some important respects this narrow deﬁnition ig nores the intimate connections between promotion and a range of other activities involved with promoting or fa cilitating FDI, and it is this wider sphere of activities which we wish also to examine. So, in developed coun tries, for example, promotion activities deﬁned in the narrow terms above almost always take place in a context in which ﬁnancial incentives are being offered. Indeed, evidence from the UK indicates that the activities of those involved in promotion have a bearing upon nego tiations with investors (including over grant aid) even when these are conducted in separate organizations. There is a host of activities that, outside of such a narrow deﬁnition, involve an element of promotion or with which promotional activities narrowly deﬁned articulate very closely in the facilitation of FDI. Conceived broadly, the investment promotion com munity is actually composed of an incredibly diverse set of individuals, organizations, and associations whose status in society and economy is rather difﬁcult to deﬁne. At the most general level of abstraction, and in light of the criticisms of this notion of global class formation at the global scale, it is hard to conceive of the investment promotion community as part of a ‘transnational capit alist class’. At a lesser level of abstraction, neither should, those involved in investment promotion, be considered as a coherent and deﬁned profession – there are no pro fessional credentials that are associated with this activity and indeed one of its deﬁning features is the blurring of private and public credentials. They may instead be most accurately conceived of as cadres or intermediaries whose argument and persuasion shape the material and dis cursive terms on which processes of international eco nomic integration proceed. Those involved range from individuals acting as consultants to companies and governments, to small companies that facilitate investment into a single host country, to vast multinational companies (such as the large accountancy ﬁrms) one element of whose work is concerned with consultancy and investment promotion. Interestingly some of the oldest and largest companies concerned purposely with investment promotion have been formed as specialized units within major multi national companies to evaluate new factory or ofﬁce lo cations (for example, IBM, Plant Location International). Others are more recent spinout companies from large multinational accounting and consulting ﬁrms (for ex ample, OCO Consulting). The investment promotion community includes these private sector actors but also is composed signiﬁcantly of state or quasi state organizations charged with promoting

investment into their respective national and subnational territories – often referred to as investment promotion agencies (IPAs). There may be good reasons – as Paul Krugman notes – why in economic theory countries do not and ought not to compete like businesses. However, the reality of economic policy and practice is that, the new competitive foreign investment environment has prompted analogies between competition among gov ernments for foreign investment and competition among ﬁrms for market share. (Wells and Wint, 2000: 4)

The investment promotion community, including IPAs, is at the heart of this process. As important prac titioner literature elaborates, with very few exceptions, countries serious about in vestment promotion depend heavily on the IPA to market and sell the location as a host to investment’ and ‘similar to the sales and marketing arms of companies they try to attract, IPAs are the cornerstone of a lo cation’s effort to attract ‘‘clients’’ y (MIGA 2000b: 2)

These state and quasi state bodies alone vary con siderably in terms of their size, recruitment policies, funding, and other resources. Their detailed remit and their status within or relationship to their respective state apparatus also varies considerably. Some of the most effective IPAs have a strong advocacy position within their respective governments and have been able to shape national economic priorities beyond the realm of investment promotion per se. Singapore’s Economic Development Board (EDB) would be an example of an agency which has moved well beyond simple attraction of FDI to articulate with other government bodies in order to, for example, stimulate the use of local suppliers by FDI, stimulate outward FDI by Singaporean com panies, develop overseas industrial and technology parks, and recruit skilled labor from overseas to Singapore. Over the last 30 years or so the number, size, and scope of these IPAs alone has grown steadily. According to one recent estimate, there were 410 national and subnational IPAs worldwide. The growth of these IPAs is symp tomatic of the widespread absorption of such competitive signals into the workings of national gov ernments. There is an assumption here that investment promotion activities are cost effective in generating FDI, and indeed studies ﬁnd that investment promotion yields positive returns to investment; however, there is also something of a ‘development paradox’ here to which we return below. Several of the major international organizations such as the World Bank (in the form of its Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, MIGA; and Foreign Investment

Investment Promotion

Advisory Service, FIAS), the Organisation for Economic Co operation and Development (OECD), and the United Nations (in the form of its United Nations Industrial Development Organization and United Nations Confer ence on Trade and Development) have an active interest and generate earnings from their investment promotion consulting and services. In fact, there is an element of competition among these organizations to provide services to governments wishing to promote their territories to overseas investors while each also tends to have a differ ential presence in different parts of the world. Arms of national governments such as United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) also are involved with technical assistance to particular subsets of host countries, with involvement seemingly closely linked to geopolitical concerns and domestic business and com mercial interests overseas. Moreover, the actual technical basis of those involved in investment promotion can vary from marketing, man agement consulting, law, architecture, land use, planning and economic development, engineering, environmental consulting, and political risk analysis to name the main closely related activities. Each of these embodies a distinct set of skills, though not all are practiced under some form of professional accreditation. Marketing and management consulting are sufﬁciently broad to encompass practices which involve a range of skills and can be predicated on proprietary ‘tools’ for location appraisals, benchmarking of organizational performance, etc. Finally, one indication of the growing maturity of the investment promotion industry is the sheer volume of information and materials that relate to all of the activities described immediately above. International organizations such as the World Bank and United Na tions produce annual and occasional reports on the likes of FDI trends and have themselves done much to en courage the competition for FDI through the likes of FDI competitiveness indexes. There are also regular country by country FDI policy reviews produced by the likes of the FIAS of the World Bank and the OECD. The World Bank, the Asian and African Development Banks, and major multinational consulting ﬁrms produce regular economic and investment proﬁles and assess ments and ratings of individual countries. Fledgling web and e mail based networks related to investment monitoring and information exchange have appeared over the past decade. FDI Xchange and IPAnet are run by the MIGA of the World Bank. Specialist magazines covering corporate location have existed for some time previous to this in major nations like the United States. Finally, associations – such as the World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies – catering to the in vestment promotion industry have also begun to thrive in the last decade.

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Some Geographical Dimensions of Investment Promotion Although we might style the investment promotion community as the promoters of the global economy, it is as well to remember that their role as intermediaries, as well as being temporally uneven, as alluded to above, is also geographically quite differentiated. First, the various actors we have enumerated above and the various activities in which they are involved have an uneven presence across different parts of the world. For example, investment promotion activities of inter national organizations such as the World Bank, OECD, and United Nations tend to be unevenly focused. Just at present, the World Bank and United Nations are most preoccupied with providing technical assistance with investment promotion to African nations in an attempt to assist their integration into the international economy. The OECD on the other hand has taken a lead in the transition economies of East and Central Europe. In similar vein, the largest multinational accountancy and law ﬁrms invariably play a role in facilitating investment in most national settings, although they may well be overshadowed in many of these settings by domestic in vestment promotion companies. Even the large specialist investment location consulting companies that exist (for example, IBM Plant Location International, Buck Con sultants International, and OCO Consulting) tend to have particular national markets and associated networks of clients in which they are embedded. Second, while Klak and Myers identify a ‘‘remarkably rapid uniﬁcation of policy around a neoliberal develop ment model across the third world,’’ any such general or global investment promotional ‘models’ are refracted through and actively modiﬁed in the process of transla tion to the speciﬁcs of local environments. Undoubtedly, stories of the successful capture of an FDI project and the organization and ethos of particular IPAs circulate internationally as models of best practice. Two model IPAs whose practices are imitated widely are Singapore’s EDB and the Industrial Development Agency. However, even the literature of the investment promotion com munity is self critical enough to realize that such models need to be adapted to the speciﬁcs of local FDI environments. Third, and following on from this, any convergence on neoliberal policy orthodoxies perceived or desired by commentators is predicated on a rather narrow view of the market for FDI. The investment decisions made by MNEs (the demand side of the market for FDI) are re markably diverse and involve considerations other than cost minimization. They vary according not only to the division of labor associated with a particular product or service (where distinctions are often drawn between fundamental research, development, and design let

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alone other separate functions such as sales and mar keting and the various stages of production) but also according to the likes of product cycle considerations and corporate strategy and culture. Moreover, this dif ferentiated demand for investment locations from MNEs is met and, it stands to reason, sustained by variety in the supply of potential investment locations offered by dif ferent nation states in terms of their differing factor endowments, business systems, and their different na tional modes of social regulation. Here, intermediaries play an important role in shaping opinions regarding particular investment locations as literature from the World Bank’s MIGA Investment Promotion Toolkit makes clear; because no investor has access to all the information needed to make a decision, they ﬁll in the gaps by making as sumptions, extrapolating based on known information and relying on the advice and opinions of others (in cluding the media, consultants, and competitors). (MIGA, 2000a: 3)

Fourth, according to one recent survey, the most im portant organizations used as sources of information in the international site selection processes of investing companies were in order: investment or merchant banks; the big accountancy ﬁrms; national IPAs and economic development agencies; specialized site selection ﬁrms; and general management consulting ﬁrms. Immediately we can draw an important observation from this: that it is the most internationalized of private sector actors, the investors themselves, as well as the largest merchant banks and accountancy ﬁrms that are the prime sources of ideas and practices relating to the competition for that investment. This reﬂects a more general pattern re garding the international spread of business regulation, in which private sector actors are the prime movers. Most investments by most MNEs actually take place without signiﬁcant recourse to the investment promotion com munity as we have tended to look at it. Nevertheless, there is an important geographical paradox in the role and development of the investment promotion com munity that we should be aware of. Finally, in global terms there exists a paradox as far as investment promotion, FDI, and development are con cerned. Contrary to popular perceptions the vast ma jority of MNEs are actually rather small in size and often extremely risk averse in their investment decisions. The fact that the majority of the world’s FDI ﬂows continue to circulate among the most developed nations is partly a testament to this. This inertia in FDI ﬂows stems from the fact that these countries represent the major markets and sources of knowledge, and it is these countries with which MNEs are already familiar and in which there are relatively complete and secure business and commercial

environments. It is these environments in which one would imagine that the need for intermediaries in the investment process is less. Yet, if anything, it is in these countries that the investment promotion community broadly deﬁned is at its most developed! It seems certain that intermediaries of various kinds are playing a role in facilitating FDI into major but complex emerging markets such as China, although this role may be rather muted in a setting in which invest ment promotion is ﬁrmly entrenched within an extensive state apparatus. Africa has long been largely excluded from the processes of international integration embodied in FDI ﬂows and if anything has become further isolated. It is precisely the sort of risky and uncertain FDI environment in which one might expect to ﬁnd the investment promotion community playing a signiﬁcant role. However, one recent survey found that only 7% of FDI inquiries into a selection of African countries came from intermediaries. Nevertheless, intermediaries can have a much wider impact in contexts such as Africa where they can be very inﬂuential in shaping investors’ impressions of host country business environments. Here, then, a major part of the work of IPAs such as Kenya’s Investment Authority is to convince overseas investors of the viability of the operating environment in general terms. Instead, it is the developed nations which beneﬁt from the largest ﬂows of FDI in which the greatest resources devoted to investment promotion – primarily from tax payers into state and quasi state IPAs. These ought to represent relatively safe, familiar, and core investment environments to MNEs such that the need for inter mediaries is virtually nonexistent. It is IPAs in these countries that have the greatest resources to compete for FDI and the greatest human resources and organizational reach to promote FDI. In the likes of the UK it has become apparent that a ‘grants culture’ has emerged in which FDI is facilitated by signiﬁcant and repeated grant aid and in which the investment promotion community is implicated. And so the chicken and egg like questions remain: Does investment promotion stimulate FDI or does FDI support the investment promotion industry? Can investment promotion play a role in reducing eco nomic development disparities between developed and developing countries in a liberalized investment climate or is it symptomatic of signiﬁcant geographical inequalities?

Conclusions The investment promotion community broadly deﬁned includes a diversity of practices and actors that have intermediated or facilitated international economic in tegration via FDI. The boundaries of this community are

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hard to deﬁne and tend to cut across some quite im portant professional distinctions. To date, the commu nity’s quantitative signiﬁcance in stimulating FDI ﬂows may be rather minor. However, the qualitative role played by the constituents of this community in trans mitting myriad signals regarding FDI may be much more signiﬁcant. It is this qualitative role which positions the community as part of cadres concerned with articulating national and international economies with processes of international economic integration. While private and public sector organizations with an international reach are part of the investment promotion community and while there are some reasonably com mon aspects to investment promotion, the intermediation of FDI ﬂows is geographically uneven. The comparative youth of this industry and its implication with recent rapid rises in the level of international economic inte gration via FDI ﬂows means that the role of investment promotion remains opaque. Even in those developed countries where the investment promotion community is most developed there is a genuine lack of knowledge regarding the role it plays and the attendant ramiﬁcations for policy regarding incentives and rules based com petition for FDI. In addition, it seems clear that such intermediaries will play an important though as yet un studied role in the integration of the major emerging developing country markets of China and India into the international economy. See also: Foreign Direct Investment; Global Production Networks; Trade, International.

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investment. Washington, DC: Foreign Investment Advisory service. NAO (2003). Regional grants in England: Report by the comptroller and auditor general. London: National Audit Ofﬁce, HC 702. Stationery Ofﬁce. Phelps, N. A. (2006). Capital’s search for order: Foreign direct investment, models and hybrid models of social order in Southeast Asia. In Yeung, H. W. C. (ed.) Handbook of research on Asian business research, pp 250 265. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Phelps, N. A., Power, M. and Wanjiru, R. (2007). Learning to compete: The investment promotion community and the spread of neoliberalism. In England, K. & Ward, K. (eds.) Neo liberalization: States, networks, peoples, pp 83 109. Oxford: Blackwell. Phelps, N. A. and Raines, P. (eds.) (2003). The new competition for inward investment: Companies, institutions and territorial development. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Phelps, N. A. and Wood, A. (2006). Lost in translation? Local interests, global actors and the multi scalar dynamics of inward investment. Journal of Economic Geography 6, 493 515. Robinson, W. I. and Harris, J. (2000). Towards a global ruling class? Globalization and the transnational capitalist class. Science and Society 64, 11 54. Safarian, A. E. (1999). Host country policies towards inward foreign direct investment in the 1950s and 1990s. Transnational Corporations 8, 93 114. Sklair, L. (2000). The transnational capitalist class. Oxford: Blackwell. UNCTAD (2002). The world of investment promotion at a glance: A survey of investment promotion practices. Advisory Study No. 17. United Nations (1999). World investment report: Foreign direct investment and the challenge of development. Geneva: United Nations. UNIDO (2003). Africa foreign investor survey 2003. Vienna: United Nations Industrial Development Organization. Vernon, R. (1979). The product cycle hypothesis in a new international environment. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 41, 255 268. Wells, L. T. and Wint, A. G. (2000). Occasional Paper 13: Marketing a country: Promotion as a tool for attracting foreign investment (revised edition). Washington, DC: Foreign Investment Advisory Service.

Further Reading Braithwaite, J. and Drahos, J. (2000). Global business regulation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Klak, T. and Myers, G. (1997). The discursive tactics of neoliberal development in small third world countries. Geoforum 28, 133 149. MacKinnon, D. and Phelps, N. A. (2001). Devolution and the territorial politics of foreign direct investment. Political Geography 20(3), 353 379. MIGA (2000). Investment promotion toolkit: Strengthening the location’s image. Washington, DC: MIGA. MIGA (2000). Investment promotion toolkit: Developing an investment promotion agency. Washington, DC: MIGA. MIGA (2002). Foreign direct investment survey. Washington, DC: Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. Morrisset, J. and Andrews Johnson, K (2004). Occasional paper 16: The effectiveness of promotion agencies at attracting foreign direct

Relevant Websites http://www.edb.gov.sg Economic Development Board, Singapore. http://www.ibm.com IBM Business Consulting Services: Plant Location International (IBM PLI). http://www.idaireland.com Industrial Development Agency, Ireland. http://www.investmentkenya.com Kenya Investment Authority, Invest in Kenya. http://www.waipa.org WAIPA, World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies. http://www.miga.org World Bank Group, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency.

Irredentism G. W. White, Frostburg State University, Frostburg, MD, USA & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Irredenta Land to which an irredentist claim is made. Irredentism The desire to annex adjacent land to a state because it historically belonged to the potential annexing state or because it contains people who are culturally akin to those in the potential annexing state.

Introduction The term ‘irredentism’ originates from the Italian phrases terra irredenta (‘unredeemed land’) and Italia Irredenta (‘unredeemed Italy’). Matteo R. Imbriani coined the latter term in 1877 as a reference to Austrian possessed Trieste. Earlier, in 1861, the modern Italian nation state was formed by the welding together of numerous prin cipalities on the Italian peninsula. Seeking to incorporate the entire peninsula into their new Italian nation state, Italian nationalists sought to expand their new state in an Italian uniﬁcation project known as Risorgimento (‘Resur gence’) (Figure 1). Venice (Veneto) was obtained in 1866, and Rome and the Papal States were annexed in 1870. However, several territories still eluded the uniﬁcation movement in the 1870s, causing great frustration and the emergence of the concept of irredentism. In addition to Trieste, Italian nationalists desired Trentino (Trento) and Istria, both controlled by the Austrian Habsburgs. Some desired Nice (Nizza; Nizzardo) and Savoy (Savoia), both of which had been traded to France in 1860 as part of a bargain that gained Napoleon III’s support for driving the Austrian Habsburgs out of the Italian peninsula. The famous Italian nationalist, Giuseppe Garibaldi was out raged at the bargain because he wanted his hometown and province of Nice to become part of the Italian na tion state. Though Savoy was relinquished, the House of Savoy provided the modern Italian nation state with all of its modern kings. Other Italian nationalists expressed desire for Corsica, Malta, Rijeka (Fiume), the Dalmatian coast, the Ionian Islands and the Swiss canton of Ticino. Though Italy had been a member of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria Hungary, strong Italian ir redentist feelings led the Italian government to side with the Triple Entente (France, the United Kingdom, and Russia) during World War I for the promise of Trieste, South Tyrol, and Istria. Allied victory in the war allowed for Italy’s annexation of these territories. Though the term irredentism stems speciﬁcally from the Italian uniﬁcation movement, it is more broadly the

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product of modern nationalism and its corollary the na tion state idea, the belief that every nation should have its own sovereign state. Modern nationalism began with the French Revolution of 1789 and spread until nationalist revolutions erupted throughout Europe in 1848. The French Revolution was inspired by the ideas of the En lightenment and its emphasis on the individual and civic responsibility. Later, the emergence of Romanticism and its emphasis on the collective group deﬁned by common language inﬂuenced nationalist thinking. Thus, replacing dynastic imperial governments with popular governments as had happened in France was not sufﬁcient; Romantic nationalists also desired to unite the speakers of a language into a single nation state even if it required the merging together of numerous dynastic territories. The Italian and German uniﬁcation movements are two of the earliest and most signiﬁcant examples. However, the conservative dynastic imperialist forces crushed the nationalist revo lutions in 1848 and remained an obstacle to national uniﬁcation projects through World War I. Frustrated be cause they were unable to quickly create nation states during revolution, nationalists were forced to slowly build their nation states piece by piece. The term and concept of irredentism emerged in the latter part of the nineteenth century after new nation states emerged but their terri torial extents were incomplete. Today, many irredentist projects are labeled with the adjective ‘Greater’, as in Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia.

Evolving and Varying Deﬁnitions of Irredentism Today, irredentism generally refers to the desire to have a state annex any territories of neighboring states on historical grounds or because such territories contain inhabitants of similar cultural/ethnic characteristics as the people within the potential annexing state. Often irredentism is seen as the attempt to bring all members of a nation and the territories they inhabit into a single state, commonly a nation state. Irredentism is a straight forward concept but it is less clear which of the many conﬂicts around the world are caused by it. Certainly, the numerous spatial disjunctions between peoples and states make irredentism a potential source of conﬂict in many places. Yet, resources, ideology, and border disputes also cause wars. In other cases, an ethnic minority may engage in armed resistance against a state but the goal may be secession, not irredentism. To distinguish between con ﬂicts caused by irredentism and those caused by other

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phenomena, a more nuanced deﬁnition of irredentism is frequently sought. However, the attempt to create a more speciﬁc deﬁnition has resulted in a term with varying deﬁnitions. Noami Chazan and David Horowitz view irredentism as having two types. The ﬁrst involves the incorporation of co nationals and their territories in neighboring states with their kin into a parent state. Examples are the German minorities in Poland and Czechoslovakia and Greeks in Albania and Turkey as these situations existed between the two ‘world wars’. Chazan disqualiﬁes the uniﬁcation of the two Germanies and the desire to unify the two Chinas and Koreas as irredentism because pol itical differences separated the peoples of these respect ive countries though they shared culture and history. Chazan’s and Horowitz’s second type of irredentism

refers to cohesive groups that are minorities in multiple countries and seek to be united into parent state. Chazan cites the Kurds of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran who desire their own Kurdistan. However, if one segment of a people is successful and the others are not, the situation results in secession (a distinct concept) though irredentism was the cause. Such happened with the Slovenes and the Azeris: Slovenes seceded from Yugoslavia but the Slo venes in Austria have not joined them; Azeris seceded from the Soviet Union but the Azeris in Iran have not united with them. Interestingly, these successful secession movements make these groups move from being ex amples of Chazan’s and Horowitz’s second type of ir redentism to their ﬁrst type. Benyamin Neuberger and Thomas Ambrosio do not accept Chazan’s and Horowitz’s second type of irredentism

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whereby a stateless people spread across more than one state unite and create their own new nation state. Neu berger points out that in such cases the creation of new states is too much like secession and, thus, would not sufﬁciently distinguish the two concepts. To maintain a distinction, Neuberger insists that irredentism must in volve a parent state so that peoples and territories across a border can be ‘redeemed’ as the etymology of the term implies. Moreover, though Neuberger agrees that ir redentism involves annexation of neighboring territories for ethnic reasons, he also identiﬁes three other ways in which territories are identiﬁed to be redeemed: (1) pre colonial history (i.e., recreating a past kingdom or empire), (2) colonial history (reestablishing past colonial bound aries), and (3) geography (namely physiography). Ambrosio also requires a preexisting state and further requires that territorial claims be based solely upon na tional afﬁnity. Viewing irredentism through the prism of international law, Ambrosio identiﬁes three types of irredenta: (1) state–state, (2) decolonization, and (3) state collapse. State–state involves two preexisting states. He points to Somalia’s invasion of Ethiopia as the classic example. By including the cases of the two Koreas and the two Germanies of the Cold War in this category, Ambrosio accepts the cases of one nation dominating two separate states as examples of irredentism though Chazan does not. Decolonization refers to states’ claims to ter ritories held as colonial possessions and uses Indonesia’s annexation of the former Portuguese colony of East Timor as an example. Finally, state collapse refers to the disintegration of states and national groups within them claiming territories beyond those of their existing ad ministrative units in an attempt to unite co nationals into a new nation state. Ambrosio uses the collapse of socialist Yugoslavia and the Croatian and Serbian irredentist projects, as well as the Soviet Union’s disintegration and the Armenian project as examples. Differing deﬁnitions of irredentism result in the ac ceptance or rejection of some actual cases as truly irredentist. Nevertheless, considerable overlap in deﬁn itions exists. Context is very important to understanding the nature of irredentism. Indeed, the term was coined to describe the Italian nation state building project. Thus, it was important to describe the context in which irredentism emerged. To gain further appreciation for irredentism’s nuances and evolving deﬁnitions, it is im portant to examine more closely the situations that are labeled irredentist. German, Armenian, and Somali ir redentism serve here as examples.

Examples of Irredentism German Irredentism Much like the Italian situation, no single uniﬁed German state existed for much of the nineteenth century. The

German state building project, like the Italian project, was inspired by Romantic nationalism with its emphasis on the collective group (i.e., das Volk) deﬁned by common language. Indeed, Romantic nationalism traces its origins to early nineteenth century German philosophers. How ever, despite the idea of a common language that united a people, languages themselves were not easily identiﬁed because dialects varied considerably over distance and many places contained a mixture of languages. To deﬁne the geographic limits of German speech and the so called rightful boundaries of the German nation state, German Romantics used physiographic boundaries. Examples of these boundaries are identiﬁed in Lied der Deutschen (Song of the Germans) or Deutschlandslied – also commonly known as Deutschland u¨ber alles (Germany above all), ori ginally written in 1841. The very ﬁrst stanza indicates that Germany should extend ‘‘From the Maas to the Memel, From the Etsch to the Belt.’’ The Maas ﬂows deep into the Netherlands, the Memel is found in Lithuania, the Etsch (more commonly known as the Adige) ﬂows in northern Italy and into the Adriatic at a point far south of Venice, and the Belt(s) are waterways well inside Denmark. These kinds of boundary conceptions provided the framework for the German nation state building project which proceeded by the welding together of numerous German principalities found within the spatial limits of this framework. Prussia and Austria were the driving forces behind this project but were competitors. As early as 1848, the Greater Germany (GroXdeutschland) and Small Germany (Kleindeutschland) proposals emerged. The former would have included most German speaking lands but by including the Austrian Empire, it would have also included a large number of non Germans (e.g., Slavs, Hungarians, etc.). Prussia’s triumph over Austria led to the creation of a German nation state in 1871. Though it had non Germans within it, the new German nation state represented the Small Germany conception because it excluded the German speaking areas of the Austrian Empire. Following World War I, the defeated German Empire was forced to relinquish a number of its territories (Figure 2). The Austro Hungarian Empire was dis mantled with many German inhabited areas awarded to the new countries, such the Sudetenland to Czecho slovakia. A newly created German Austria made the idea of uniﬁed Germany and Austria more desirable for German nationalists but the Allies prohibited their uni ﬁcation. Also, though the German and Austrian Empires lost territories that contained many non Germans, most of these territories were seen by German nationalists as rightfully German lands. Irredentism became strong within Germany. Adolf Hitler and the Nazis exploited German ir redentist feelings to rise to power. Hitler then satiated irredentist desires by annexing Austria, the Sudetenland,

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and many of the other ‘lost’ territories, as well as ex panding Germany’s boundaries to incorporate many scattered German communities of Central and Eastern Europe (Figure 3). Harking back to the Greater Ger many idea, the term Greater German Empire (GroX deutsches Reich) was employed. More commonly used was Third Reich, a term which proceeded from the Second Reich (1871–1918) and the First Reich (843–1806) (otherwise known as the Holy Roman Empire (of the German Nation)). This term meant to give the Nazi regime historical legitimacy and attempted to legitimize German irredentism. The destruction of Nazi Germany at the end of World War II resulted not only in the loss of the lands claimed for Germany during the war but also additional lands (Figure 4) and the expulsion of Germans from these lands. Re education within Germany has resulted in di minished irredentist feelings except from among the most extreme German nationalists. Armenian Irredentism After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Armenian Soviet Republic declared its independence and became the modern Armenian nation state (Figure 5). Its boundaries had been determined in 1938 by Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. Modern independent Armenia, however, represents only some of the eastern portions of historic Armenia (Figure 6) and does not include all Armenians within it. The western portions of historic Armenia are in

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Turkey and contain many places, such as Mount Ararat, that are of great signiﬁcance to the Armenian nation. Additional eastern portions of Armenia are ofﬁcially part of Azerbaijan, namely Nakhichevan and Nagorno Karabakh. In the late 1980s, Armenians desiring to unite Nagorno Karabakh with Armenia held mass public demonstrations. In 1989, the Armenian Pan national Movement (APM) emerged and was recognized by the Armenian government. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev proposed greater autonomy for Nagorno Karabakh but both Armenians and Azerbaijanis rejected the plan. The Azerbaijani government began an economic block ade of Armenia. A National Council representing Ar menians in Nagorno Karabakh formed and declared the region’s secession from Azerbaijan and its union with Armenia. The Armenian Supreme Soviet declared Nagorno Karabakh’s incorporation into Armenia. After Armenia and Azerbaijan became independent in 1991, the conﬂict over Nagorno Karabakh evolved into full scale armed conﬂict. Battle lines moved frequently, causing much death and large refugee ﬂows. By 1993, Armenian forces controlled most of Nagorno Karabakh, the land between Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh, and territories south to the Iranian border and eastward into Azerbaijan proper. In 1994, the Russian Federation helped to broker a cease ﬁre. The status of Nagorno Karabakh has not been agreed upon by the Armenian and Azerbaijani governments, though Armenians control the territory.

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Somali Irredentism Within Africa, irredentism has been expressed by So malis, whose distribution extends beyond the modern Somali state into Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya (Fig ure 7). The French, British, and Italians divided the Somalis into different colonies when they carved up the Horn of Africa in the latter part of the nineteenth cen tury. French Somaliland became the independent coun try of Djibouti in 1977. British Somaliland stretched from

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the Gulf of Aden in the north to the Ogaden region. The British were forced to yield the Ogaden region to Ethi opian Emperor Menelik II in 1897, effectively creating an Ethiopian Somaliland. Some Somalis were allocated to the British East Africa colony, later to become Uganda and Kenya. Italian Somaliland was in the south along the coast of the Indian Ocean. The modern independent Somali state emerged in 1960 from the uniﬁcation of British and Italian Somalilands. Somali nationalists have expressed their irredentism in a number of ways. Somalia’s ﬂag features a ﬁve pointed star whose points represent the aforementioned Somali inhabited territories. The preamble of Somalia’s Consti tution, written in 1961, states that the ‘‘The Somali Re public promotes by legal and peaceful means, the union of the territories.’’ Somalia’s Constitution also grants citizenship to all ethnic Somalis outside the Somali state. Though the Somali government did not claim sover eignty over neighboring territories, it claimed Somalis living in them be granted the right to self determination. For example, as the British government prepared to grant independence to Kenya, which it did in 1963, the Somali government lobbied the British to ﬁrst relinquish the Somali inhabited Northeast territories of their Kenyan colony. Though a British commission determined that Kenya’s Somalis supported annexation, the Kenyan co lonial government ignored the ﬁndings. The Somali government and Somali militias supported Somali guerillas in adjacent territories from 1960 to 1964. Somali and Ethiopian armed forces engaged along the border in 1964. The Organization of African Unity (OAU)

RUSSIA

Armenia BLACK SEA

GEORGIA

CASPIAN SEA

AZER. ARMENIA

TURKEY

N

SYRIA MED. SEA

LEBANON

IRAN IRAQ Current boundaries 0

JORDAN ISRAEL

Figure 6 Historic Armenia. Med. Sea

SAUDI ARABIA

0

Mediterranean Sea.

595

125 mil 125 km

70 BC boundaries of Tigranes the Great's Empire

596

Irredentism

Somalia & Somalis YEMEN SUDAN

ERI. DJI.

OF LF GU

AD

EN

ETHIOPIA

A

L

IA

OGADEN

S

O

M

N

INDIAN OCEAN

UG. KENYA

0

300 km

0

200 mil

Figure 7 Somalis and the Somali state. Eri. Djibouti; Ug. Uganda.

Somalis

Eritrea; Dji.

brokered a cease ﬁre and established a demilitarized zone on both sides of the border. The armed hostilities prompted Ethiopia and Kenya to create a mutual defense pact that provided for the coordination of both countries’ forces in the event of a military attack by Somalia. After the Ethiopian government weakened in 1974, a Somali separatist group known as the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) attacked government outposts. The Somali government supplied the WSLF and then ordered the Somali National Army (SNA) to invade Ethiopia in 1977. Within a month, more than half of the Ogaden was occupied. Foreign assistance to Ethiopia, including foreign soldiers, defeated the WSLF and SNA in early 1978 and forced the SNA to withdraw from Ethiopia. Though Somali guerillas continued the cam paign, the Ethiopian government ﬁrmly reestablished its control over the Ogaden by 1980. With the SNA signiﬁcantly destroyed, the seriously weakened Somali government has not advanced its irredentist claims. In 1977, 95% of Djibouti’s citizens voted for independence rather than union with Somalia though more than 60% of Djibouti’s citizens were Somali. In 1981, Somalia’s leader ended his claims to Kenyan territory; in 1984, the Somali and Kenyan governments agreed to end hostilities along their countries borders. Irredentism in the Rest of Africa With Africa having perhaps the greatest number of spa tial disjunctions between nations and states, irredentism could be a serious issue throughout the continent. However, the number of irredentist claims is small

compared to the divided peoples and lost lands. Benya min Neuberger addresses the question as to why more cases of irredentism do not exist in Africa and why the few irredentist projects have failed. He makes several points. Most notably, he argues that Africa has few true nation states – that is, states dominated by one ethnonational group. Many of Africa’s partitioned ethnic groups are minorities in all the states in which they reside. Thus, many such groups have no desire for uni ﬁcation with their brethren if they also will have minority status in the annexing state and their situation will not improve. Furthermore, with few African states having little more than an ethnic plurality, it means that par titioned groups are too small in number and thus too weak politically to maneuver the state into an irredentist project. Multiethnic state governments themselves do not desire to incorporate more people through land annex ation because such an act would only add to their states’ diversity and disrupt their internal balances of ethnic politics. Certainly, the declaration of war likely would only exacerbate internal weakness that in turn would threaten the very existence of the state, as has been the case with Somalia. Moreover, with Africa having so many multinational states, any state’s irredentist project only invites counter irredentist claims. It is not surprising then that the African Union (AU) does not support any alteration of country boundaries in Africa.

Conclusion Irredentism focuses heavily on the idea of uniting people of a shared ethnic afﬁnity and the territories that they inhabit into a single, independent, political state. This idea emerged with the rise of modern nationalism, which began with the French Revolution in 1789. However, ethnic and national identities are not concrete and un problematic but ﬂuid, evolving, and frequently inextric ably intertwined with conceptions of territory. It should not be forgotten that as recently as 1789, only 50% of the French spoke French and only 12–13% of France’s population could speak and write French according to the standards of the time. In Italy only 2.5% of the population regularly spoke Italian in 1860. French na tionalists deﬁne the French speaking region, and thus the appropriate boundaries for the French, by physical geography: the lands bounded by the Atlantic Ocean, the Pyrenees Mountains, the Mediterranean Sea, the Alps, and the Rhine River. Italian nationalists deﬁned Italy by the peninsula south of the Alps. Early German nation alists deﬁned the German speaking lands by waterways. Other national groups deﬁned their territories by historic kingdoms. Many of these kingdoms, however, had boundaries demarcated along physiographic boundaries because they were easy to identify and defend in

Irredentism

premodern times. Interestingly, despite rejecting colonial control, some peoples used historic colonial boundaries to deﬁne their national homelands. For example, Cam eroonian irredentists seek to alter the Cameroonian nation state by re establishing the boundaries of the German Kamerun colony as it was before it was divided into a French Cameroun and British Cameroon. Following World War I at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, state boundaries were redrawn to large degree according to the principle of ‘self determination’. Shared cultural characteristics such as language and religion were emphasized more than ever, ironically helping to fuel irredentism among the defeated who lost territory (e.g., Germans) and helping to bring about another war. After World War II, the international community ceased to accept irredentist claims based on ethnicity though ethnicity became the primary focus for irredentism, es pecially the study of it. Alexander B. Murphy points out that the only legitimate justiﬁcation for territorial claims since World War II have rested in the argument that a ‘‘territory itself had been wrongfully seized.’’ Thus, contemporary irredentist projects may be grounded in the desire to annex adjacent territory across a border inhabited by ethnic brethren; however, in order for the international community to accept such a territorial claim, the claim must have a historical justiﬁcation. See also: Political Boundaries; Territory and Territoriality.

Further Reading Abrahamian, L. H. (1998). Mother tongue: Linguistic nationalism and the cult of translation in postcommunist Armenia. Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies. Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post Soviet Studies, http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=iseees/bps (accessed in May 2008). Ambrosio, T. (2001). Irredentism: Ethnic Conﬂict and International Politics. Westport, Conn: Praeger. Ambrosio, T. (2002). Irredentism: Self determination and interstate war. In Beck, R. J. & Ambrosio, T. (eds.) International Law and the Rise of Nations: The State System and the Challenge of Ethnic Groups, pp 284 312. New York: Chatnam House Publishers. Brubaker, R. (1996). Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press.

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Carment, D. and James, P. (1995). Internal constraints and interstate ethnic conﬂict: Toward a crisis based assessment of irredentism. Journal of Conﬂict Resolution 39, 82 109. Chazan, N. (ed.) (1991). Irredentism and international politics. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Curtis, G. E. (ed.) (1995). Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country studies. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. Herb, G. H. (ed.) (1997). Under the Map of Germany: Nationalism and Propaganda 1918 1945. New York: Routledge. Hewsen, R. H. (2001). Armenia: A Historical Atlas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hobsbawn, E. J. (ed.) (1990). Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (2nd edn.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Horowitz, D. (1992). Irredentas and secessions: Adjacent phenomena, neglected connections. International Journal of Comparative Sociology 33(1 2), 118 130. McClellan, G. B. (1915). War stirs Italy to new ideals; irredentism has given way to a larger nationalism, which has united the country as it has never before been united. The New York Times, 16 March http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html? res=9A0CE6D8123FE233A25755C1A9639C946496D6CF (accessed in May 2008). Metz, H. C. (ed.) (1993). Somalia: A Country Study (4th edn.). Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. Murphy, A. B. (1990). Historical justiﬁcations for territorial claims. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 80, 531 548. Neuberger, B. (1992). Irredentism and politics in Africa. In Chazan, N. (ed.) Irredentism and International Politics, pp 97 109. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Schraeder, P. J. From irredentism to succession: The decline of Pan Somali nationalism. After Independence, http:// www.press.umich.edu/pdf/0472098985 ch5.pdf (accessed in May 2008). Suganuma, U. (2000). Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino Japanese Relations: Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkadu Islands. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. White, G. W. (2004). Nation, state, and territory. Vol. 1. Origins, Evolutions, and Developments. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littleﬁeld.

Relevant Websites http://repositories.cdlib.org Mother tongue: Linguistic nationalism and the cult of translation in postcommunist Armenia, eScholarship Repository. http://www.press.umich.edu The decline of Pan Somali nationalism, The University of Michigan Press. http://query.nytimes.com War stirs Italy to new ideals; irredentism has given way to a larger nationalism, which has united the country as it has never before been united, The New York Times, 16 March, 1915.

Islamic Urbanism N. AlSayyad, University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA I. Tu¨reli, Brown University, Providence, RI, USA & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Caliphal Palace A palace for the caliphs, the leaders of the Muslim World. Capital City A city that houses the government of its state. Garrison Town A town developed as a base for an army, and one that features military barracks. Islamic City An urban form inﬂuenced by Islamic practice. Market (in Arabic, su¯q) The commercial quarter in a city. Middle East A loosely deﬁned term used to describe the region between India, Russia, and the Balkans, including the Arabian Peninsula, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and at times part or the whole of North Africa. Mosque (in Arabic, masjid) The place of worship for Muslim males. Urban Form Physical manifestation of an urban society in the form of buildings, roads, parks, and infrastructure.

Introduction Initially preached by its Arabian Prophet Muhammad, Islam started as a religion around the beginning of the seventh century AD in the city of Mecca, in what is today Saudi Arabia. By the end of the eighth century, the Is lamic empire had extended, reaching India and China in the east and Spain and Morocco in the West. Beginning with the Umayyads (661–750) ruling out of Damascus and later Co´rdoba, a series of dynastic empires assumed the leadership of Islam each contributing to the devel opment of Islamic urbanism (Figure 1). Following nearly 11 centuries of expansion, the Muslim World started falling under European colonial rule during the nine teenth century. It was gradually incorporated into the European dominated world economic system. In the twentieth century, a series of independence movements led to the establishment of new nation states. Despite all the political and economic transformations, these soci eties continued many Islamic practices under colonial rule. Hence, the concept of Islamic urbanism can in corporate not only historic cities but also cities under conditions of colonization and globalization.

598

The European invasion of the Muslim World began in Moghul India. Next, Britain, France, and Italy established protectorates over North Africa. Only the Ottoman and the Qajar Empires remained as sovereign but eco nomically dependent Islamic states by the early twentieth century. World War I (1914–18) resulted in the partition of most of the Ottoman Empire’s Arab majority prov inces by the French and the British. Many Muslim provinces in the Balkans and in Central Asia came under control of the Soviet Union until the end of the Cold War. After the age of empire and colonization, the sub sequent nation states formed by Muslim majority soci eties often claimed Islam as an aspect of national cohesion, as a source of legislation, or as one of the principal sources of constitutional authority. Islamic urbanism is generally identiﬁed with the geographic area designated as the Middle East, but only one ﬁfth of the world’s Muslim population lives in this area. Setting aside the popular Western misconception that the Middle East is mainly Arab Muslim land, it is important to note that there is immense diversity within the Middle East with its Coptic, Druze, Maronite, and other religious groups. Indeed, the Muslim World ex tends well beyond the Middle East. It stretches from Turkey and the Central Asian Republics in the north to Nigeria in the south; and from Mauritania in the west to Indonesia in the east. Hence, the Islamic World is con stituted of societies of different economic and political systems; of numerous ethnic and linguistic groups; and of distinct geographic and climatic conditions. A little less than a third of the world’s Muslim population lives in the South Asia region. Indonesia is the world’s most populous Muslim majority nation with more than 200 million Muslims at the beginning of the twenty ﬁrst century. It is followed by Pakistan, Bangladesh, and then India, which has the largest Hindu population in the world but whose Muslim minority is still substantial, exceeding 100 mil lion people. In addition, there are signiﬁcant Muslim populations in China, Russia, and Africa as well as in Europe and the Americas.

Historiography of a Concept It may be more appropriate to talk about the urbanism of Islamic societies than to talk about Islamic urbanism per se although the two narratives are often invoked inter changeably in much of the literature. The ‘Islamic’ in Islamic urbanism does not only refer to the religion of

Islamic Urbanism

Dynasty

Capital cities

Period

Umayyads

Damascus; Córdoba

661−750; 756−1031

Abbasids

Baghdad, Samarra

759−1258

Aghlabids

Kairouan

800−909

Samanids

Bukhara

819−1005

Tulunids

Fustat

868−905

Fatimids

Kairouan, Mahdiya, Cairo

909−1171

Ghaznavids

Ghazna, Lahore

977−1186

Seljuks

Merv, Isfahan; Konya

1038−1194; 1072−1243

Almoravids

Fez, Marrakech

1056−1147

Almohads

Marrakech, Seville

1130−1269

Ghurids

Ghazna

1000−1215

Ayyubids

Damascus, Cairo

1169−1260

Delhi Sultanate

Delhi

1206−1555

Ilkhanids

Tabriz, Sultaniya

1256−1353

Mamluks

Cairo, Damascus

1250−1517

Ottomans

Bursa, Edirne, Istanbul

1281−1922

Timurids

Samarqand, Herat

1370−1506

Mughals

Agra, Shahjahanabad (Old Delhi), Fatehpur Sikri

1526−1858

Safavids

Tabriz, Qazvin, Isfahan

1501−1732

Qajars

Tehran

1779−1924

Fulani

Hausaland, Sokoto

1815−1903

599

Figure 1 The important dynasties of the Muslim World and their capital cities.

Islam as codiﬁed in its sacred texts but also refer to the general culture of Islam as understood by people in different locations. Therefore, it covers the practices of people who may not be strictly following the Islamic faith or who may not be practicing Muslims, nevertheless may be living and working within Islamic societies. In talking about cities or urbanism, scholars do not invoke notions like Christian urbanism, or the Christian city. So what is it that endows the urbanism of very di verse societies in the Muslim World with that religious title? Some have argued that there may be a special re lationship in these territories between Islam as a system of belief and the practices of Islam on one hand, and the process of urbanization on the other. The religion of Islam came into being in a city, Yathrib, mainly referred to, in Islamic texts, as Medina (in Arabic simply meaning the city), suggesting a direct link between Islam and urbanism. Islamic life in Medina remains a utopian ideal in Islamic thought until today. Some have even argued that Islam is essentially an urban religion, because only in a city can all of its potential be realized. As Islam spread, Muslims took over older existing cities as well as established new cities from scratch. Muslim urban order evolved together with the larger culture of Islam. The urbanism of Islamic societies does indeed reﬂect to a reasonable degree this culture, but it may be difﬁcult to argue that this situation is different from other religiously based civilizations. For example, we no longer speak of Christian cities, like we do of Islamic ones, either as cities simply based in the Christian World, inhabited predominantly by Christians, or formed

by a Christian ethic. But it is also true that for a con siderable part of the Middle Ages, medieval European cities could have been labeled Christian cities, particu larly by the then more advanced Muslim Middle East. It is important to note that the ‘Islamic’ city was originally labeled so by Orientalist scholars. Islamic urbanism may be an appropriate theme within urban geography because the concept of the Islamic city was fundamental in theorizing the urbanism of the Middle East, the Arab World, and possibly the rest of the Muslim World, particularly in the urban studies litera ture. Early scholars ﬁrst understood the Islamic city as a self contained entity, made up of a distinct society fundamentally different from its European counterpart. According to the theoretical frameworks and personal politics of these early scholars, discussions on the Islamic city have been carried out under multiple titles such as the ‘Muslim city’, ‘Middle Eastern city’, ‘near Eastern city’, and the ‘Arab Muslim city’. Despite the important contributions of other ethnic groups to Islamic urbanism, studies have focused on Arab cities and the distinct Arab culture that accompanied the rise of Islam. Non Arab Islamic cities were often un studied because it was the Arabs who established the ﬁrst cities that functioned under an Islamic form of govern ment. The dominance of Arab culture in much of the Middle Ages has also eclipsed the variety of others Is lamic states and regions. The theorization of the Islamic city began in the service of colonization. After Napoleon’s short lasting urban based occupation of Egypt (1798–1801), the study

600

Islamic Urbanism

of the Orient by the Europeans evolved into a systematic discipline. In the decades following the French invasion of Algeria in 1830, French scholars were commissioned to describe different aspects of the country in multivolume reports. Hence, the ﬁrst studies of the Islamic city were produced in this area (Maghrib) by French scholars, and were pursued by the British, German, and later, Ameri can scholars in different parts of the Middle East. Historians and philologists were among the earliest scholars to pay attention to Islamic urbanism. As other scholars such as architectural and art historians and urban geographers participated in the debate, the nature of inquiry changed from a search for a basic Islamic es sence to a discussion about the degree of the role of Islam in shaping urban form. This questioning initially gener ated new debates. Some scholars reverted to the ‘essentialists’ arguments originally introduced by the Orientalists to revive the concept of the Islamic city. Others attempted to identify unique aspects of Islamic social and legal practices to which they attributed Islamic urbanism. In terms of method, there have been two approaches to the Islamic city both inﬂuenced by the ideas of Max Weber. The art historical approach analyzed the Islamic city formally using morphological and typologi cal analysis. The second, sociological approach examined the structural characteristics of the urban order. Both of these approaches however described a model for the Is lamic city that was static and unchanging. Weber theo rized the medieval European city in comparison to its non Western, Oriental counterpart. While attempting to explain the origins of modern capitalism, he credited religion for the uniqueness of the European city, and in turn, the European city as its locus. Weber was later criticized for his Orientalism because he claimed the superiority of the European city over its Oriental coun terparts in India, China, and the near East. In addition, he also overlooked the impact of European colonialism on these cities. Nevertheless, his thinking continued to in form studies of the city in general, and of Islamic ur banism in particular, throughout the twentieth century. Weber identiﬁed the following ﬁve characteristics of the European city: fortiﬁcation, market, autonomy, asso ciation, and autocephaly (independence of the church). Based on his studies of Oriental cities, he argued that several of these characteristics may have existed in the Orient, but they came together only in the European medieval city. While he did not conduct a speciﬁc study of the Islamic city or Islamic urbanism as such, he made comments on the negative role of Islam in the develop ment of urban culture. Weber and later his sympathetic critics argued that Islamic cities lacked corporate insti tutions and a civic life comparable to the medieval European city. While studies based on rigorous archival research into local sources, from Ira Lapidus onward,

undermined such assertions, Weber’s criteria – religion, kinship, and guilds – remained important issues that in ﬂuenced Islamic urbanism. In the Orientalist tradition, Islam was credited with signiﬁcantly increasing the degree of urbanization in the Middle East. It was assumed that Islam introduced a characteristically Islamic city. The development of this concept was paralleled by the development of de scriptions of its physical form. The stereotypical model of the Islamic city consists of a mosque, a palace, a citadel, a market, and residential quarters with inward oriented housing. The Marc¸ais brothers, writing in the inter war period, ﬁrst offered the thesis that Islam is an urban religion. They attempted to isolate elements of urban form based on observations of Fez and Marrakech, and theorized the city as a morphological unit. Neither discussed in stitutional structure and social organization. Their Is lamic city consisted of the Friday mosque with a nearby market, and surrounded by a series of public baths. Their model was adopted and developed by other scholars such as Roger Le Tourneau, after World War II, who com bined their views with his previous work on the city of Fez. These three important French scholars who studied the Maghrib not only privileged the physical form of cities in their research, but also made assertions about the rest of the Muslim World. During the same period, Jean Sauvaget identiﬁed the market as the central element of his typical Islamic city. The mosque no longer occupied a central place, and a citadel/palace was placed at a high point. These elements appropriated the former urban order, so he argued. In the post war period, Gustav E. von Grunebaum likewise brought together the earlier scholarship on North Africa and that on Syrian cities presenting the ‘typical physical form of a city’ in terms of institutional structures. He argued that the Islamic city was segregated ethnically, tribally, and occupationally. It lacked a municipal or ganization as well as a guild like socioeconomic struc ture. Deﬁning the Islamic city by what it supposedly lacked, he went on to suggest, like Weber before him, that it did not represent a uniform type of civilized life, as did the Greek or Roman town. It was only in the later 1960s that Ira Lapidus became the ﬁrst to challenge this model and Weber’s assertion that Islamic cities lacked civic culture. Lapidus investi gated the forces that established Islamic cities as func tional urban entities based on the case studies of Aleppo, Cairo, and Damascus during the Mamluk period. He concluded that Muslim urban society divided essential powers and functions among its different component groups organized in quarters, and urban form was the outcome of the relations among these groups. Entering the 1970s, Albert Hourani and colleagues followed this line of reasoning in The Islamic City.

Islamic Urbanism

Referring to Weber’s critical components of the city, Hourani suggested that although Islamic cities may have lacked some of his components, they were still able to ﬂourish and maintain a high level of urban activities. Andre Raymond’s book Cairo, which used court records to identify social and economic communities active in the life of the city during the eighteenth century, set up an example for future studies of Islamic urbanism by introducing a dynamic human element. It was not until Edward Said’s critiques in his seminal book Orientalism that scholars started forsaking the Euro centric perspective. Janet Abu Lughod’s seminal article ‘The Islamic City’ critiqued the Orientalist chain of authority that plagued studies of the Islamic city and warned against making generalizations based on singular case studies. She emphasized, instead, the role that the Islamic legal system played in shaping the Islamic City. AlSayyad argued that the Islamic city model was in adequate because as a stereotype it did not take time and urban growth into consideration, and also because it di vorced form from function. He showed that the planned garrison towns, of medieval Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, were shaped mainly by administrative motives and that their growth was neither unstructured nor solely determined by Islam. In the case of taken over towns, the process of their Islamization often involved compromises to deal with predominantly non Muslim populations. Many of the capitals of Muslim dynasties were initially Caliphal palaces whose urban function could not be explained by invoking Islamic urban principles. Urban geographers like Eckart Ehlers contributed to the debate by pointing to the need to include the contemporary city into studies of the Islamic city, and by emphasizing the inﬂuence of such institutions as the religious endowment (waqf ) and the phenomenon of rent capitalism. More recently, Eldem and his colleagues worked on Ottoman cities in cluding the Arab Ottoman city of Aleppo challenging the Arab ideal of the Islamic city generated in part by Euro centrism and in part by modern nationalism.

Urban Form and its Elements One can identify three historical periods of urbanization and urban development in the Muslim World: a medieval phase, a premodern phase, and a modern phase. During the earlier stage of expansion from the Arabian Pen insula, which we may call, the medieval phase, the Is lamic empires established three kinds of cities: First, they established garrison towns such as Basra (Figure 2), Kufa, and Fustat, which they need to maintain the military campaign. Second, they took over older existing cities like Damascus (Figure 3). And third, they built palace complexes that developed into imperial capital cities like Baghdad of the Abbasids (Figure 4) and Cairo of the

601

Fatimids. In the ﬁrst type, a variety of Islamic principles calling for modesty and simplicity had an important impact on the allocation of urban functions, the place ment of institutional buildings, and the conﬁguration of urban spaces. These principles were derived from general tradition (‘urf) and jurisprudence (ﬁqh). Many of the cites that were taken over during the Islamic occupation of the Middle East also underwent a substantial transformation in their form and functions. Planned capital cities, which were initially large palace complexes, experienced a similar process as a result of their being opened up to the public or due to population expansion. All three types of cities seem to have developed the irregular, labyrinthine urban forms (Figure 5). Cities of the Muslim World experienced intermittent periods of instability due to the changing circumstances of trade routes between the eleventh and ﬁfteenth cen turies. The Ottoman Empire expanded its rule to North Africa, the Middle East, and the Balkans between the ﬁfteenth and eighteenth centuries. The security provided by the single state and particularly its institutions such as the religious endowment fostered a vibrant commercial and civic life. Through time and geography, the central role of the mosque within cities of the Muslim World remained remarkably consistent. Islam did not require a speciﬁc place for prayer, nor did it justify an institutionalized clergy. Hence, the mosque evolved as a modest place for the community of (male) believers to come together weekly, regardless of social stature. Traditionally, there were two types of mosques both of which served as spaces of praying, learning, and socializing, albeit at different scales. Residential quarters had small mosques for their own communities. Sultans or high ranking of ﬁcials commissioned much larger congressional (Funer ary or Friday) mosques. Gradually, the urban functions of the congressional mosque was expanded to include formalized spaces for religious schools (medrese), Islamic convents (tekke), soup kitchens (imaret), khans (an urban caravansary or inn), public baths (hamam), hospices, hos pitals (darussifa), and tombs (tu¨rbe). In particular, Ottoman urbanism came to be characterized by the austere monumentality of these mosque complexes (ku¨lliye) and the character they gave to the city as exempliﬁed, at its best, in Istanbul. Islamic empires facilitated trade by providing facilities that served travelers in their cities. They commissioned baths for cleaning, markets for exchange; and accom modation for storage and overnight stays. Markets con sisted of covered streets (su¯q), monumental strong rooms or buildings for the trade of precious objects (bedestan), and warehouses. Islamic empires further contributed to the civic life of the cities under their control by building citadels, monastic complexes, and educational establishments.

602

Islamic Urbanism

Urban form of Basrah

Residential Soclrelg Commercial Residential Residential Soclrelg Social Soclrelg religious Governmental Soclrelg Soclrelg Residential Residential

Land use & activity pattern (place)

Functional form

Spatial structure (linkage)

Physical form

Physical layout (figure-ground)

Figure 2 Basrah’s urban form analyzed. Source: AlSayyad, N. (1991). Cities and Caliphs: On the Genesis of Arab Muslim Urbanism. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. p 53.

A third element of urban form observable in the cities of the Muslim World was the palace complex. The Ab basids initiated the grand palace city complexes with the round city of Baghdad. The Safavids’ capital Isfahan featured a palace complex consisting of a succession of rectangular units of palaces and gardens inspired by the traditional Iranian gardens. The last of the Islamic grand palace complexes was the Ottomans’ Topkapi Palace,

which manifested the sovereignty of the sultan to his subjects through its location and architecture, looking over the whole city. The fourth element of urban form in cities of the Muslim World described in various models of the Islamic city was the residential quarter. The quarter was deﬁned according to the tribal, ethnic, or religious character of their occupants. It was a cohesive community the

Islamic Urbanism

603

Figure 3 The plan of the Islamic Damascus, based on Al-Munjid. 1. Church of St. John 2. Umayyad Mosque 3. Al-Khadra Palace 4. Market/Colonnade 5. Residential Quarters 6. Cemetery. Source: AlSayyad, N. (1991). Cities and Caliphs: On the Genesis of Arab Muslim Urbanism. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. p 94.

admission to which was regulated. Administratively, the quarter was a taxation unit for the government. In terms of public services, it was responsible for taking care of itself. The houses within the quarter were characterized by extended family living, and inward orientation or ganized around a courtyard (Figure 6).

The Contemporary Islamic City The Muslim World witnessed a second period of urban restructuring, owing to the rise of modern capitalism and the emergence of organized political and economic co lonialism. As Muslim majority societies were incorpor ated into the new economic system, they had to turn away from manufacturing to agricultural production. They became importers of European products. The mercantile cities of the Muslim World became nodes of transport between their agricultural hinterlands and the industrial port cities of Western Europe. The cities of the Muslim World were transformed formally by the colonial powers through the addition of dual cities. The development of these planned urban entities, initially for the colonizing elite, is well illus trated in such cities as Algiers and Rabat in North Africa. In planning the foreign districts, colonial administrations followed speciﬁc European models, including the use of geometric grids and a hierarchical ordering of urban functions and spaces. In some instances, as in Cairo, the

new urban expansion followed the French planning tra dition of Haussmann, by which squares were constructed as urban nodes, and then, connected diagonally to pene trate the older, irregular fabric. Following de colonization and the rise of independ ence movements from the 1940s through the 1960s, nationalistic attitudes brought about an increasing awareness of the cultural values implicit in the urban systems of Islamic societies. Governments welcomed operational deﬁnitions of Islamic urbanism before drawing new planning guidelines. This partially explains the numerous meetings on the Islamic city sponsored by research groups and political organizations throughout the Muslim World and their numerous publications ranging from reactionary treatments by nationalist scholars to the more critical additions to and critiques of the Orientalist approach. By the early 1960s, most peoples of the Muslim World had regained independence. New Islamic nation states in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East emerged as inter national deals struck at the close of World War II and from successful revolutionary movements. Following in dependence, departments of planning, housing, and urban development were set up as cabinet level minis tries to implement the agenda of modernization. Massive migration from rural areas to cities has led to enormous changes in the urban scene. Economic mod ernization has dramatically transformed the urban form of cities in the Muslim World. The social order of both

604

Islamic Urbanism

Figure 4 The general site arrangement of Baghdad and its urban elements. 1. Caliphal Palace 2. Mosque 3. Rahbah 4. Markets 5. Palaces of the royal family. Source: AlSayyad, N. (1991). Cities and Caliphs: On the Genesis of Arab Muslim Urbanism. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. p 121.

the extended family and residential quarter transpired along with the urban morphology they engendered. The mosque complex is no longer the heart of the city as many small and medium size mosques were built everywhere in and around cities. In some older cities, the market has turned into a tourist attraction. In most cases, independence brought with it the na tionalization of land and a planned economy, which gave

rise to the informal housing sector. In major urban cen ters, more than half of the urban population lives in the so called informal settlements comprising single and multistory dwellings, which are built on subdivided agricultural land without building permits. The impasse of modern planning, against a vibrant informal sector, led design and planning professionals in the Muslim World by the early 1980s, to question the validity of their

Islamic Urbanism

Figure 5 Urban fabric in the stereotypical Islamic city (Isfahan).

Figure 6 Enclosed residential quarters (Riyad).

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professional teachings derived from Western models and to visit traditional Islamic urbanism as a possible guide to the contemporary city. More recently, with neoliberal urban restructuring, gated enclaves and ‘splintering urbanism’ started making a presence in the lives of Muslim people. Oil dollars have opened a new chapter in Islamic urbanism. As aspiring national leaders of Islamic countries are seeking to turn their countries into players in the global marketplace, their cities are becoming key to this objective. One of the most ambitious projects of the last decades is Malaysia’s Multimedia Super Corridor, a vast urban redevelopment that stretches from the Petronas Twin Towers to the Kuala Lumpur International Airport, designed to jump start Malaysia in the information age. The island cities of Dubai (The Palm Islands, The Dubai Waterfront, and The World) in the United Arab Emirates are another such ambitious project. All these investments have cap tured worldwide attention and stimulated capital ﬂow to these Islamic countries, but they have also highlighted issues of social injustice. While one must accept that the model of the Islamic city developed by early scholars has now been debunked, it is also necessary to acknowledge that the concept of Islamic urbanism embodies historical realities that are fundamental in understanding the issues that are speciﬁc to the Muslim World. Hence, Islamic urbanism remains a compelling analytical category in the study of urban ization and urbanism of Muslim majority societies today.

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See also: Medieval Geography; Medieval Historical Geographies; Middle East and North Africa; Urban Architecture; Urban Design.

Further Reading Abu Lughod, J. L. (1987). The Islamic city: Historic myth, Islamic essence, and contemporary relevance. International Journal of Middle East Studies 19(2), 155 176. AlSayyad, N. (1991). Cities and Caliphs: On the Genesis of Arab Muslim Urbanism. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Bonine, M., Ehlers, E., Krafft, T. and Stober, G. (eds.) (1994). The Middle Eastern City and Islamic Urbanism: An Annotated Bibliography of Western Literature. Bonn: Ferd. Dummlers Verlag. Brown, L. C. (ed.) (1992). From Madina to Metropolis; Heritage and Change in the Near Eastern City. Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press. Ehlers, E. (1992). The city of the Islamic Middle East. In Ehlers, E., Bahr, J. & Harris, C. D. (eds.) Modeling the City: Cross Cultural Perspectives. Bonn: In Kommission bei Ferd. Dummlers. Eldem, E., Goffman, D. and Masters, B. A. (1999). The Ottoman City between East and West: Aleppo, Izmir, and Istanbul, Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Grabar, O. (1973). The Formation of Islamic Art. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Haneda, M. and Miura, T. (eds.) (1994). Islamic Urban Studies: Historical Review and Perspectives. London: Kegan Paul. Hourani, A. H. and Stern, S. M. (eds.) (1970). The Islamic City: A Colloquium. Oxford: Cassirer, University of Pennsylvania Press. Lapidus, I. M. (1967). Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lapidus, I. M. (ed.) (1969). Middle Eastern Cities. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Le Tourneau, R. (1957). Les Villes Musulmanes De L’afrique Du Nord. Alger. Marc¸ais, G. (1940). L’urbanisme Musulmane. Congres de la Federation des Societes Savantes de L’Afrique du Nord, Algeria. Marc¸ais, W. (1928). L’islamisme Et La View Urbaine. L’Academie des inscriptions et belles lettres: Compts Rendus 86 100. Raymond, A. (2000). Wood, W. (trans.). Cairo. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Sauvaget, J. (1941). Alep. Paris: Librairie Orientaliste P. Geuthner. Von Grunebaum, G. (1955). The structure of the Muslim town. In Islam: Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition, pp 141 158. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Relevant Websites www.archnet.org Archnet is an online English spoken community with a focus on art, architecture, and design in the Muslim world.

Island Development E. Clark, Lund University, Lund, Sweden & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction The contexts of island societies differ in decisive ways from those of continental societies. Differences in size, transportation conditions, diversity of natural resources, and relations to hinterlands are among the most signiﬁ cant characteristics that underlie the rationale for singling out islands as a distinct ﬁeld of regional devel opment research and policy. Insularity is commonly de ﬁned and measured in terms of three key variables: size, distance to a mainland, and extent of contact and ex change with other places. Island societies account for a disproportionate share (in relation to land area) of global human population. With decolonization they also account for a dis proportionate share of sovereign states. Islands further more harbor a disproportionate share of global biocultural diversity (biocultural signifying the intrinsic relatedness of biodiversity and cultural diversity). These conditions contribute to the rise in interest in island development issues during recent decades. The interests and perspectives of island societies have been increas ingly voiced and heard in international organizations. At the same time, critical research poses questions con cerning who is speaking for whom, and in whose interests various regional development models work. The history of development on many inhabited islands today is stamped by colonialism and imperialism, as well as op posing forces. In more recent postcolonial history (not in denial of the colonial present), small island states fare remarkably better than their larger continental counter parts in practicing democracy, with all that implies for development. There are advantages as well as disadvan tages associated with islandness, and the great diversity of geographical conditions and historical contexts of development in island societies does not lend itself to simple generalizations.

Islandness and Size Islands with large land masses, large populations, and/or located adjacent to a continent or other large island share little in common with small remote islands. Honshu¯ and Easter Island are both islands, the former the 11th largest landmass on Earth and home of the global city of Tokyo, the latter topping the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) isolation index of inhabited islands

(although Tristan da Cunha, Saint Helena, and other islands without airports are arguably more isolated). For this reason it makes analytical sense to subdivide islands into groups rather than treat them all as one broad cat egory. Furthermore, small landlocked continental states have more in common with small island states than do islands with large populations and land areas. For this reason, there is considerable overlap in research and policy organization between small island (including non sovereign jurisdictions) and small state issues. Drawing the line around what constitutes an island – upward vis a` vis continents and downward vis a` vis skerries and sandbars – is notoriously arbitrary. Sweden has, for instance, over 220 000 islands according to Sta tistics Sweden, but only 24 by European Union standards. The population ceiling for delineating small states or economies varies from less than 10 million to less than 1 million, while lower ceilings of 100 000 or even lower magnitudes are commonly used to identify small islands. The less tangible but no less signiﬁcant dimension of consciousness is also invoked to narrow in on small is lands, namely, those islands where the inhabitants are permanently conscious of being on an island.

Challenges to Island Development Challenges to development particularly associated with small islands are peripherality in relation to centers of decision making, limited diversity of natural resources and skills base, small domestic markets, income volatility, and high transportation and communication costs. Ab sence of contiguous hinterland and associated economies of scale coupled with low level of resource diversity impose openness toward world markets and specialization in one or a few income generating sectors. A crucial challenge to the success of these sectors is securing ad equate transportation infrastructure, often requiring ac cess to external capital in order to realize such large investments. On the other hand, the same absence of a rural hin terland has been forwarded as an important explanatory factor behind the rapid growth of island city states, such as Singapore and Hong Kong, for which the slow track of agriculture was not an option. Furthermore, some studies suggest that small size may be associated with greater solidarity and equality, and thereby fewer and less dis ruptive free rider problems and violent conﬂicts. In

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addition, ﬂexibility and capacity to adapt have been ar gued to be central components of social capital of par ticular importance in small island societies. Island societies have been innovative in governance and in tackling challenges associated with insularity. Jurisdiction has been effectively utilized to strategically attract rent based incomes, from prison services and hosting ﬁlm productions to offshore ﬁnance centers and the sale of Internet domains. Economies of place – capitalizing on geographical uniqueness that can add value to goods; a form of monopoly rent – can make up for diseconomies of scale. Some recent studies indicate that small island states are both better off and more successful in terms of economic growth than large countries. Also in dealing with challenges of local sustainability, island societies have been highly creative in environmental management and ecological practices, providing rich variation in ex perience from which to learn.

Transportation Conditions surrounding transportation are a key aspect of island development, inherently tied to relations to hinterland. Connections between small islands and other places are of necessity via sea or air. Island societies are therefore dependent on sea and air links for exchange with the outer world. Islands with ﬁxed links in the form of bridges or tunnels to a mainland or large island are commonly excluded from the category of island for this very reason: they lose a characteristic that is considered fundamental to islandness. As transportation technology has developed and relative costs of land, air, and sea transportation have changed, so have the conditions for this key aspect of island development. Shipping and cargo handling have been revolutionized in keeping apace with developments in efﬁciency of air and land transportation, with con sequential peripheralization of islands previously func tioning as hubs in transportation networks. Costs for investments in modern transportation infrastructure are prohibitively high for small island societies, exacerbating dependency on exogenous sources of ﬁnance. Exogenous interests tend toward investment in external links more than internal network development. While the constraints imposed by modern transpor tation technology are widely considered the single most distinguishing constraint of island development today, developing transportation capacities to surmount these constraints commonly entail concessions to exogenous interests tied to the ﬁnancing of such large infrastructural investments. These interests and the projects they pursue are not necessarily the same as those of the island population, and the material and value ﬂows generated by the projects do not necessarily beneﬁt the island

population. Transportation infrastructure facilitates penetration of exogenous economic forces as well as expansion of endogenous economic activities. Transpor tation facilitates exchange, also ecologically unequal exchange.

Models of Island Development A model of island development that has been highly inﬂuential since its formulation in 1985 is the so called MIRAB model, an acronym for migration, remittances, aid, and bureaucracy. It describes a form of welfare maximizing strategy in late colonial or postcolonial contexts based on remittances from migrants abroad, aid (which is often more easily procured in small economies, especially from a former or vestigial colonial power), and accompanying aid and workfare bureaucracy. Once es tablished, it tends to lock into place and is sometimes seen as an all too widespread paradigm of development failure, to be overcome rather than emulated. While some small island developing states around the world have been found to ﬁt into this category, there are other development paths and models that differ mark edly from MIRAB. One such alternative based on ﬁve capacities which characterize the creative political economies of another set of small island societies is the PROFIT model, another acronym standing for people considerations (affecting citizenship and rights of resi dence and employment), resource management, overseas engagement and recognition, ﬁnance, and transportation. In contrast to MIRAB, these island societies are charac terized by economically strategic immigration and mi gration policies, toughness in negotiating exploitation of local resources, control over viable means of transpor tation, and tax regimes designed to attract foreign investment, all of which are based upon self rule. The PROFIT model emphasizes the use of jurisdiction and paradiplomacy to establish endogenous policy formu lation and powers of implementation. Another model, under yet another acronym, is the SITE model of small island tourist economies. Islands command a powerful resource as imaginary and real sites of retreat and refuge from the stress of work, or escape and hideaway from the mundane humdrum of everyday relations. This source of rentier income has become a major sector of many small island economies. Like the export oriented plantation economies before it, however, the tourist industry often contributes little to sustain local economies in the form of local investments, tourism in come ﬂowing, instead, largely out of the economy. The expansion of tourism often involves absentee ownership, displacement, and gentriﬁcation of island communities, that is, a form of accumulation by dispossession. As long as islands continue to lure tourists, tourism will continue

Island Development

to lure island ‘developers’, maintaining its position as strategic sector for many island societies, of MIRAB, PROFIT, SITE, or other mold.

Uneven Island Development and Island Gentriﬁcation Islands may be geophysical givens of material reality, but how they develop is determined more by their positions, positioning and relations in an evolving social ecological system than by their physical limits or characteristics, however much the preexisting territorial structure of smaller landmass surrounded by water constitutes a precondition for – and is discursively utilized in – the production of regionality. If, as Torsten Ha¨gerstrand suggested, geography is constituted through struggles for power over the entry of entities and events into space and time, then understanding development on small islands must involve scrutinizing such struggles relevant to that development. Why remittances and aid here, and off shore ﬁnance there? Seeking explanations limited to en dogenous characteristics of inertia or creativity, resource endowment or policy choices, fails to position struggles over island time–space and resources into broader con texts of historical global capitalist relations. The above models are commonly presented as de scriptions of reality, and also carry a signiﬁcant element of normative policy recommendation, more or less ex plicitly with an eye toward economic growth. Here is a good example of how to encourage economic growth, there is an example of poor achievement in economic growth. From the perspective of uneven development, however, these models emerge as coherently connected rather than mutually exclusive ‘paths’ which island so cieties can ‘choose’ to follow, if only they make the op timal policy decisions. Island societies need to be seen as connected to geographically broader processes of capital accumulation. They are not only vulnerable to forms of exploitation and devaluation inﬂicted by capital accu mulation elsewhere, but also actively engage in processes of capital accumulation. The PROFIT model focuses on island societies that have been particularly successful in engaging in accumulation by dispossession (both at home and abroad), while the MIRAB model applies to islands that have been more the peripheral object of than the designers of capital accumulation. The one is the upside, the other the downside of the same connected processes of uneven development. The Cayman Islands, now known largely as a center for offshore ﬁnance, are an applauded example of success in making the transition from one of the poorest to one of the richest Caribbean island societies in a very short period. This is the PROFIT model par excellence. The perspective of uneven development underscores

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how the offshore ﬁnance of the Cayman Islands not only dispossesses considerable swaths of the population in the unfolding of this success story, but is also directly related to the redlining of and exploitative extraction from other less successful island societies, some perhaps locked into MIRAB conditions, others following (or subjected to) a SITE development path. Characteristics emphasized in analyses of PROFIT islands, namely, ﬂexibility and adaptability to strategic opportunities in the global arena, are the very same characteristics of capitalist, historical geography emphasized by theorists of uneven develop ment. It seems island societies can also play the game, and play it well. Consequently, gentriﬁcation of island communities has become a common conﬂict ridden process associated with development on many islands. The challenge for these communities is to take control over the develop ment process and strengthen local economies while avoiding displacement in the process.

Conclusion The speciﬁc landform of small islands lures not only imagination and tourism, but also a susceptibility to fall into one of two traps. It is common to see islands as microcosms of the larger world. This holds only in the very general sense that the Earth is an island in the cosmos, and tends to distract from serious considerations of the more speciﬁc contexts and issues of small island development. Except in this very general sense, small islands are not microcosms of the larger world, even if some common relations are more readily cast in relief in the context of small island societies – which explains the disproportionate use of islands as laboratories for scien tiﬁc ﬁeldwork as well as imaginary places in works of ﬁction. The opposite susceptibility is to fall into the ‘local trap’, to perceive these places as unique not only in the banal sense that every place is unique, but also in deed essentially different, bounded, self contained com munities, outside and apart from their continental other, where ‘global’ processes originate and are orchestrated. The myth of the primitive isolate refuses to be forgotten, in spite of overwhelming evidence that there are and have always been connections everywhere, that the world of humankind, as Eric Wolf argued, constitutes a totality of interconnected processes. Island societies are not isolated from global processes of capital accumulation, or outside the uneven regional development these processes generate. They are, however, unequally positioned to meet and engage in these processes. A major question for future research into island development is how to move from the MIRAB, PROFIT, SITE, and other formulas of

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unequal development toward more equitable, just, and sustainable paradigms of island development. Islands are the sites of a disproportionate share of biological and cultural extinctions in the global decline of diversity. As generators and custodians of both bio diversity and cultural diversity, island societies will therefore unavoidably play a key role in any political process aiming to stem this decline. Not least for this reason, island development issues concern us all. See also: Diaspora; Finance, Offshore; Gentriﬁcation; Local Development; Migration; Oceania; Oceans; Regional Development Models; Regional Inequalities; Remittances; Scale; Tourism; Uneven Development.

Further Reading Baldacchino, G. (2006). Managing the hinterland beyond: Two ideal type strategies of economic development for small island territories. Asia Paciﬁc Viewpoint 47, 45 60. Baldacchino, G. (2006). Innovative development strategies from non sovereign island jurisdictions? A global review of economic policy and governance practices. World Development 34, 852 867. Baldacchino, G. (ed.) (2007). A World of Islands: An Island Studies Reader. Charlottetown, Canada: Institute of Island Studies. Bayliss Smith, T. P., Bedford, R., Brookﬁeld, H. and Latham, M. (1988). Islands, Islanders and the World: The Colonial and Post Colonial Experience of Eastern Fiji. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bertram, G. and Watters, R. F. (1985). The MIRAB economy in South Paciﬁc microstates. Paciﬁc Viewpoint 26, 497 520. Biagini, E. and Hoyle, B. (eds.) (1999). Insularity and Development: International Perspectives on Islands. London: Pinter. Brookﬁeld, H. (1990). An approach to islands. In Beller, W., d’Ayala, P. & Hein, P. (eds.) Man and the Biosphere Series 5: Sustainable Development and Environmental Management of Small Islands, pp 23 33. Paris: UNESCO. Clark, E. (2004). The ballad dance of the Faeroese: Island biocultural geography in an age of globalization. Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geographie 95, 284 297.

Clark, E., Johnsson, K., Lundholm, E. and Malmberg, G. (2007). Island gentriﬁcation and space wars. In Baldacchino, G. (ed.) A World of Islands: An Island Studies Reader, pp 483 512. Luqa, Malta: Agenda Academic. Garcia Herrera, L. M., Smith, N. and Mejı´as Vera, M. A´. (2007). Gentriﬁcation, displacement and tourism in Santa Cruz de Tenerife. Urban Geography 28, 276 298. Gossling, S. (ed.) (2003). Tourism and Development in Tropical Islands: Political Ecology Perspectives. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Hodgett, S., Johnson, D. and Royle, S. A. (eds.) (2007). Doing Development Differently: Regional Development in the Atlantic Periphery. Sydney, NS: University of Cape Breton Press. Lockhart, D. G., Drakakis Smith, D. W. and Schembri, J. (eds.) (1993). The Development Process in Small Island States. London: Routledge. McElroy, J. L. (2006). Small island tourist economies across the lifecycle. Asia Paciﬁc Viewpoint 47, 61 77. Srebrnik, H. (2004). Small island nations and democratic values. World Development 32, 329 341.

Relevant Websites http://www.globaloceans.org Global Forum on Oceans, Coasts, and Islands. http://www.globalislands.net Global Islands Network (GIN). http://igu islands.giee.ntnu.edu.tw IGU Commission on Islands. http://www.insula.org International Scientiﬁc Council for Island Development (INSULA). http://www.geol.utas.edu.au International Small Islands Studies Association (ISISA). http://www.islandstudies.ca/journal Island Studies Journal. http://www.sidsnet.org Small Island Developing States Network (SIDSnet). http://islands.unep.ch UNEP Islands. http://www.unesco.org UNESCO Environment and Development in Coastal Regions and in Small Islands (CSI). http://www.smallislandsvoice.org UNESCO Small Islands Voice.

Italian Language Geography C. Minca, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, UK & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction Mapping contemporary Italian geography today is a ra ther difﬁcult task. Despite the discipline’s strong repu tation in the past, when Italian scholars contributed in important ways to continental debates on key geo graphical concepts, such as landscape and region, the last few decades have been characterized, by and large, by the lack of a clear theoretical core or neatly delineated schools of thought. Some historical and institutional context might help in understanding the present situation. Modern Italian geography began taking shape in the last decades of the nineteenth century, but was limited in its inﬂuence by the political and cultural context of the newly uniﬁed Italian state. In contrast to other European countries, academic geography emerged at a time when the Italian state was still struggling to organize and administer a territory that was extremely diversiﬁed and fragmented from a cultural, a political, and an economic point of view. It was not until the inter war period, under the Fascist regime, that the discipline would begin to be consolidated. The fascist state saw geography as a key element in the education of the ‘new Italian man’, but also as an important tool in the production of the scientiﬁc and cultural legitimacy for the Italian colonial enterprise (and, more generally, for the afﬁrmation of Italy as a great power). This was a phase of rapid expansion for the discipline, both at the school and university level, marked by the inﬂuence of both German geography and geopolitik, but also the French tradition of regional geography. The inﬂuence of these two traditions would leave an important mark on Italian geography in the years to follow, privileging the pro duction of regional monographs marked by a largely descriptive and somewhat deterministic ﬂavor. The dis tinct disciplinary foundations laid down during this period would have a signiﬁcant impact on the future of Italian geography at an institutional level in the post World War II era as well, as the newly formed Italian Republic grappled with the legacy of the regime. In the decades following World War II, geography took on a strong humanist tinge, assuring it signiﬁcant visibility in many faculties of philosophy, literature, and foreign languages, while the discipline remained rela tively marginalized within the social sciences, with the exception of some faculties of economics where eco nomic geography created a niche for itself (although this latter suffered a rapid decline in the last decade or so, in

some cases disappearing entirely from the curriculum). The reason why geography’s positioning within the teaching structure of Italian higher education is par ticularly important is that its research proﬁle has been largely determined by this very positioning. This ex plains, for example, why there are so few ‘departments of geography’ proper in Italy, and why most geographers work and teach – often in rather marginalized positions – in departments or faculties dominated by other discip lines. The ﬁrst consequence of this academic structure is the relative absence of strong clusters of geographers specialized in one speciﬁc subﬁeld and working together under one institutional umbrella, as is common in other national contexts; a second, related consequence, is the seemingly scattered nature of much of the research produced by Italian geographers. A third – and equally important – consequence is the apparent difﬁculty en countered by the different Italian geographical associ ations and societies in keeping the national community of geographers compact and visible – this is also due to the fact that individual geographers often struggle with ‘local’ academic conditions where, to survive the disciplinary competition, they are forced to accept major adminis trative roles and sacriﬁce their research objectives. Fi nally, the lack of any formal (and ﬁnancial) mechanism for recognizing the quality of research in the Italian university system, coupled with the increasing pressure for more and diversiﬁed teaching, has inevitably taken many geographers away from mainstream theoretical debates and from active participation in the international geographical community. This relatively weak structuring of Italian academic geography has, indeed, produced in the last few decades rather ‘ﬂexible’ disciplinary borders and some methodo logical ‘looseness’, often resulting in internal fragmen tation and lack of continuity and communication. But paradoxically, as happens sometimes in less structured ﬁelds of knowledge, such relative disengagement and fragmentation have also allowed for the emergence of moments of exceptional creativity and originality on the part of small groups of individuals, together with some episodes of extraordinary scholarship. For this very rea son, it is perhaps better to avoid any attempt at a con ventional mapping of disciplinary boundaries and achievements, and focus rather on identifying and com menting on a limited but signiﬁcant series of disciplinary threads that, although in a rather ﬂuid and discontinuous fashion, have been ‘making the discipline’ in the last

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decades, or at least have been the source of some of its more interesting production. Although it might be very difﬁcult to trace a coherent (and especially an exhaustive and illustrative) picture from the complex interweavings of such ‘threads’, recalling some of these intriguing connections of people, places, publications, and events does offer a more appropriate account of the ﬁeld of knowledge that we refer to as ‘Italian geography’.

Geographical Threads It is useful to start by identifying some key ﬁgures and groups, together with some topics and areas of interest that have most strongly inﬂuenced recent Italian geog raphy and that have, in some cases, also gained currency beyond the national context. From a theoretical point of view, some of the most interesting contributions of recent Italian geographical thought have been focused on: (1) the metaphorical power of geographical representations; (2) the relationship between cartographic reason, bour geois geography and modernity; (3) the crisis of geo graphical representation; and (4) the epistemologies of geographical praxis. During the 1980s, very important work was also published on the concepts of regional ization and territorialization, while the past decade has witnessed pioneering research on local development and the urban milieu, with geographers’ seminal contri butions gaining wide recognition also on the part of scholars in competing disciplines. In the last two decades, Franco Farinelli (at the Uni versity of Bologna) has literally rewritten the history of geographical thought, providing a new interpretation of the deterministic approaches that dominated the discip line during a great part of the 1900s and highlighting the (largely forgotten) ontological dimension of the Erdkunde project, while also forcefully condemning the ‘cartographic prison’ to which Western thought has been constrained since Anaximander. Farinelli’s theory of cartographic reason has indeed been an extraordinary contribution to the understanding of the ‘deep’ nature of geography and the genealogies of power that have always accompanied it. His latest work – Geograﬁa. Un’In troduzione ai Modelli del Mondo (Geography. An Introduction to the Models of the World) – is probably one of the most striking books on the philosophy of geography ever written. Farinelli’s elaboration of the relationship be tween Western thought and the translation/reduction of reality into the two dimensional plane of the map is a pathbreaking contribution not only to Italian geography but to the history of geographical thought more broadly. In 1985, Torino geographer Giuseppe Dematteis – possibly the best known Italian geographer, both within and outside the discipline – published Le Metafore della Terra (The Metaphors of the Earth), a book that would

change the course of Italian geography. Anticipating the post structuralist turn in Anglo American geography by several years, Dematteis’ book exposed the ways in which the power of geographical representations does not – and cannot – derive from their ‘scientiﬁcity’ but is, rather, the product of their metaphorical nature. Le Metafore della Terra is, indeed, a critical and sophisticated meditation on the ambiguous nature of geographical thought, calling for an acceptance of the partial truths with which geographers (as all social scientists) must grapple. But unlike the other social sciences, Dematteis would note, geography has as its object of analysis something quite solid, inevitably ‘material’ – the territory. This is why geography, now as always, functions as a precious cog nitive interface between the materiality of the world and its diverse representations. Dematteis’ reﬂections continue to strongly inﬂuence Italian geographical de bates and are certainly some of the most original con tributions that Italy has given to geography more broadly. Together with his work on the power of geographical metaphors, Dematteis also inaugurated a new season of theoretical and empirical reﬂection on the concept of urban milieu as a novel way of understanding local and especially urban development, anticipating some of the debates on the same topic later developed in English speaking and French speaking geography. A vibrant re ﬂection has emerged from his work, with a successful and growing team of economic and urban geographers ap plying Dematteis’ conceptualizations to numerous em pirical cases and inﬂuencing contemporary debates on the ‘urban’ also outside of academia. The ‘Torino school’ of economic geography is, in fact, probably the only school recognized as such within Italian geography at present. The third individual/thread whose contribution de serves to be highlighted is Angelo Turco (at the Uni versity of L’Aquila), best known for developing a geographically informed theory of complexity. Turco’s is a decisively ‘cultural’ reading of territoriality and terri torialization, closely engaged with new theorizations in semiotics and Luhmann’s work on complexity theory. In two of his best known books – Geograﬁe della Complessita` in Africa (The Geographies of Complexity in Africa) and, espe cially, Verso Una Teoria Geograﬁca della Complessita` (Towards a Geographical Theory of Complexity) – Turco elaborated a complex theoretical and methodological apparatus, tying it with a wider cultural–intellectual project. Turco’s work and that of the extended group of geographers associated with him throughout the 1990s focused especially on processes of territorialization in Africa, with the group’s work leading to the creation of a new journal (Terra d’Africa), the organization of countless international and national seminars and conferences, and the publication of numerous essays and articles; it is another one of the few examples in Italy of a clearly identiﬁable research ‘strand’.

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It is also in these same years that Adalberto Vallega (working at the University of Genova) published a series of volumes on the concepts of region and regionalization, grounding his reﬂection in an original approach to sys tems theory. His ‘systemic geography’ and his books on the history and the theory of the region in geography soon became a must read for most junior (and not so junior) human geographers in Italy. What is more, Vallega’s geographical interpretation of systems theory, especially as understood through the concept of ‘territorial systems’ (also adopted but with a different take by geographers working on complexity theory) gave decisive momentum to the theoretical debate in Italian geography during the 1980s. The national research program on ‘regions and regionalization’ in which both Vallega and Turco par ticipated (along with many other inﬂuential Italian and European geographers) represented in many ways the apex of this theoretical reﬂection, and has been enor mously inﬂuential since (as has been the edited volume that came out of the project – Regione e Regionalizzazione – Region and Regionalization, edited by Turco in 1984). These four ‘threads’ are perhaps the lines of thought that have most clearly marked Italian geographical debates in the past three decades, in some cases giving life to truly novel understandings of geographical represen tations. Needless to say, this list is incomplete and cer tainly risks marginalizing some other very interesting sources of reﬂection and equally valuable research en deavors; unfortunately, in the attempt to reconstruct the contours of such a fragmented ﬁeld as contemporary Ita lian geography, this risk is probably unavoidable. None theless, and despite the lack of a visibly formalized disciplinary debate, the ideas and people mentioned here have been fundamental in opening new and highly in ﬂuential research directions, something that is by and large accepted by the majority of Italian geographers today.

Key Sites and Networks Alongside (and together with) these lines of thought, a distinct series of other places, events, and networks have framed Italian geography more broadly in the last few decades. Within this wider research community, we can certainly identify the impact of the above cited theorists and those with whom they have principally dialoged, but also the inﬂuence of a variety of other strands of reﬂection. One of these informal networks is a group of (pre dominantly Italian) geographers that have gathered around the initiatives spurred by the so called ‘Palermo School’ which, under the guidance of Vincenzo Guarrasi, over the past decade or so has been recognized as a key ‘cultural geography’ research ‘cluster’ and has organized a series of very successful events/episodes of cutting edge

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geography. Among the many contributions of this group of researchers has been that of introducing semiotic ap proaches to the analysis of the relationships between culture and space, often in close collaboration with other local scholars from different disciplines; approaches that would later be adopted by ‘new cultural geographers’ as well, and which would have an important inﬂuence on the work of successive generations of Italian geographers more widely. This group of cultural geographers has been very proliﬁc through the years, organizing a variety of meetings and conferences, and publishing its contri butions within a number of edited volumes. The group’s most recent initiative, under the guidance of Giulia de Spuches and Vincenzo Guarrasi, has been the project of an Atlante Virtuale (Virtual Atlas), culminating in an edited collection and an extraordinary itinerant seminar organized in Palermo in 2000 that, through a series of (virtually) interconnected ‘events’ and ‘moments’, in terrogated the very idea of the ‘performance’ of geog raphies ‘in place’. Indeed, a whole series of new and alternative gatherings of Italian and continental geog raphers have been organized in Palermo in recent years under the umbrella of Guarrasi’s research project on the ‘cosmopolitan city’, gatherings that have become a sort of annual appointment for an informal group of geog raphers, Italian and not only. This informal network is partially the legacy of a group of (largely) Italian, Swiss, and French geographers that has been meeting for over 20 years to reﬂect on the nature and the limits of geographical representations. The group has had the intermittent participation not only of the previously cited Italian geographical theorists, but also a number of well known ﬁgures such as Denis Cosgrove, Gunnar Olsson, Claude Raffestin, and Ola So¨derstro¨m to name those whose work has perhaps had the greatest impact on Italian geography and geog raphers. It is extremely difﬁcult (if not impossible) to map the wider circle of protagonists, encounters, and col laborations linked with these initiatives – or their out comes: it has been, nonetheless, the most proliﬁc ‘network’ of Italian and foreign geographical theorists – and undoubtedly the most inﬂuential in its effects on Italian human geography. It has been particularly in ﬂuential, indeed, in providing alternative directions in an intellectual environment that, up until the 1970s, was still marked by a (confused) Vidalian legacy on the one hand, and an almost unconscious determinism on the other, coupled with an imported version of the quantitative revolution. Others, perhaps more indirect inﬂuences, are visible in the ‘Venetian’ geography of the past two decades. The 1988 workshop on ‘language and representation’ organ ized in Venice by Gabriele Zanetto was an important marker in this regard, as was the two volume edited collection Les Langages des Repre´sentations Ge´ographiques

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(The Languages of Geographical Representations) that followed the meeting; a work that remains one of the ﬁnest ex amples of disciplinary dialog between Italian and other European geographers. Following the success of this initiative – and thanks, above all, to the leadership of Zanetto – all through the 1990s, Venice continued to engage with international geographical debates in a variety of ways. For instance, Fabio Lando’s 1993 edited collection Fatto e Finzione (Fact and Fiction), a beautifully crafted anthology of Anglophone humanistic geography, introduced some of the most innovative theories and writings in this tradition to Italian geographers. Lando’s book paved the way to new research on geography and literature, inspiring a number of works on this topic. Its most important contribution has been, however, that of introducing an entire body of foreign geographical re search to Italian geography and geographers. More re cently, Venice has also been the locus of reﬂection on postmodern and post structuralist geography, thanks to the contributions of a younger generation of geographers strongly engaged with Anglo American debates. Another vital site for dialog among Italian human geographers has always been Milano. Of particular im portance here has been the human geography series published by Unicopli and directed by Giacomo Corna Pellegrini. The series introduced to the Italian market, among other things, the writings of the American be haviorist school, and published numerous monographs as well as translations of important works of human, polit ical, and cultural geography. Milano was also the focus of a number of other publishing initiatives at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, key among which two volumes dedicated to landscape research in geography by Maria Clara Zerbi, marking the return of Italian geog raphers to work on this topic. In recent years, the Istituto Orientale in Napoli has also become an important site in the production of cutting edge geographies. Under the leadership of Pasquale Coppola, a brilliant team of young geographers has begun to theorize in truly innovative ways the cultural, political, and urban geographies of the Mediterranean and the Italian South (as well as Latin America). The widespread international networks linked to this group and to what is probably the most successful doctoral program in geography in the country (formally, a degree in development geography) have made of Napoli a very proliﬁc site of geographical production and the intellectual home of a by now quite conspicuous number of young scholars whose work is widely appre ciated both in other Italian universities and abroad. Finally, we should note the important contribution made by Italian geographers to Marxist geography, in particular by Massimo Quaini who, following in part in the footsteps of historical geographer Lucio Gambi, published what is probably to date the only Italian geo graphical monograph translated into English: Geograﬁa e

Marxismo (in the English edition: Marxism and Geography). Quaini’s writings have also focused on landscape, the history of geographical thought, and cartography, all very well established themes in the Italian geographical lit erature, approaching them with a fascinating philological touch, as in his most recent L’ombra del Paesaggio (The Landscape’s Shadow) and Il Mito di Atlante. Storia della Cartograﬁa Occidentale in eta` Moderna (The Myth of Atlas. A History of Western Cartography in the Modern Age).

Geographical Societies and Journals Beyond these initiatives and events that mark some key foci of theoretical reﬂection in contemporary Italian geography, the role of several institutional bodies rep resenting the discipline should also be recognized. These bodies have been particularly important not only because they constitute real, institutional places that host key events and are the gathering points for geographers (something that is true for any national geographical association), but also because their journals act as the ofﬁcial and more visible fora of an ‘Italian geography’, although these are not as inﬂuential as they could (and probably should) be. Their conferences and workshops are key sites for the production of the identity of the discipline and, in many ways, represent the interests of geography in the governmental bodies that determine the funding and the direction of research and teaching in Italy. The Associazione di Geograﬁ Italiani – AGeI (the Asso ciation of Italian (Academic) Geographers) plays a key role in representing the discipline and in organizing national research groups and key conferences. In par ticular, the AGeI is charged with organizing the annual ‘Giornate della Geograﬁa’ (Geography Days) and the Congress of Italian Geographers, held every 4 years. The AGeI also publishes a relatively new journal – Geotema – with a series of special issues edited by different members of the association. The Societa` di Studi Geograﬁci (the Society for Geo graphical Studies), founded in 1895 as the Societa` di Studi Geograﬁci e Coloniali and based in Firenze, has not only always been a prestigious home for seminars and work shops, but also publishes the Rivista Geograﬁca Italiana, the only peer refereed journal in the ﬁeld at present, and a journal that has played a very inﬂuential role in the shaping of the discipline in years past. Another key geographical society is the Societa` Geo graﬁca Italiana (the Italian Geographical Society), foun ded in Firenze in 1867 and since 1872 located in Rome in the prestigious Villa Celimontana, an important symbolic space for Italian geographers. In many ways, the Societa` Geograﬁca Italiana plays a role similar to that played by sister institutions in Britain and other European

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countries. The Societa`’s Roman location is the site of the most complete geographical library in the country and every year hosts a number of important public gatherings and initiatives. It publishes the Bollettino della Societa` Geograﬁca Italiana, the other key ‘historical’ journal of Italian geography, with contributions from both geog raphers and other scholars interested in ‘geographical themes’. The Societa` has also recently been quite in ﬂuential in diffusing and connecting the work of geog raphers to the concerns of governmental institutions and, more generally, to the intellectual life of the capital, and it has sponsored a series of new editorial initiatives. The role and international prestige of Villa Celimontana further increased since 2000, when it was nominated as the location of the Home of Geography, hosting the archives and study center of the International Geographical Union (IGU). The director of the Home of Geography is currently Italian geographer Giuliano Bellezza. Italian geographers have, indeed, been active members of the IGU, with a number of Italian scholars holding the leadership of various commissions over the past decades. The late Adalberto Vallega was elected IGU President in 2004, an important recognition not only of Vallega’s own work but also of the contribution of Italian geography more broadly.

Conclusion As outlined in the above paragraphs, the absence of a clear mapping of Italian geographical production reﬂects the status of a discipline which might appear somewhat disarticulated and relatively isolated from international theoretical debates – and yet capable of producing, at

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times and within particular contexts, works of brilliance which would probably deserve better recognition by the geographical academy. Equally, the important contri bution given by leading Italian geographers to the IGU and other key international networks marks an impact that conventional disciplinary mappings often overlook. See also: Regionalization/Zoning Systems.

Further Reading Atkinson, D. (2000). Geopolitical imaginations in modern Italy. In Doods, K. & Atkinson, D. (eds.) Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical Thought. London: Routledge. Corna Pellegrini, G. (ed.) (1987). Aspetti e Problemi della Geograﬁa. Milan: Marzorati. Corna Pellegrini, G. and Brusa, C. (eds.) (1990). La Ricerca Geograﬁca in Italia. Varese: Ask Edizioni. Dematteis, G. (1985). Le Metafore della Terra. Milan: Feltrinelli. de Spuches, G. and Guarrasi, V. (eds.) (2002). Atlante Virtuale. Palermo: Universita` degli Studi di Palermo. Farinelli, F. (1992). I segni della Terra. Rome: La Nuova Italia Scientiﬁca. Farinelli, F. (2003). Geograﬁa. Un’Introduzione ai Modelli del Mondo. Turin: Einaudi. Lando, F. (ed.) (1993). Fatto e Finzione. Geograﬁa e Letteratura. Milan: Etaslibri. Minca, C. (ed.) (2001). Introduzione alla Geograﬁa Postmoderna. Padua: Cedam. Quaini, M. (2006). Il Mito di Atlante. Reggio Emilia: Diabasis. Turco, A. (ed.) (1984). Regione e Regionalizzazione. Milan: Franco Angeli. Turco, A. (1988). Verso una Teoria Geograﬁca della Complessita`. Milan: Unicopli. Vallega, A. (1976). Regione e Territorio. Milan: Mursia. Vallega, A. (1982). Compendio di Geograﬁa Regionale. Milan: Mursia. Zanetto, G. (ed.) (1989). Les Langages des Repre´sentations Ge´ographiques, 2 vols. Venice: Universita` di Venezia. Zerbi, M. C. (1993). I Paesaggi della Geograﬁa. Turin: Giappichelli.

Ivy League and Geography in the US R. Wright and N. Koch, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Glossary Ivy League Eight prestigious, private universities in the northeastern United States.

The Ivy League formed in 1954, but the study of geog raphy at these eight Northeastern American colleges began much earlier. Although explicitly a sports confer ence, the Ivy League comprises some of the oldest and most prestigious academic institutions in the United States. Seven members date to the colonial period: Harvard (est. 1636), Yale (est. 1701), University of Pennsylvania (est. 1740), Princeton (est. 1746), Columbia (est. 1754), Brown (est. 1764), and Dartmouth (est. 1769). The eighth, Cornell, was founded in 1865. Each Colonial institution provided instruction in geography in the early days and most subsequently established undergraduate or graduate programs at one time or another – some more than once. Although many Ivies have geographers on their faculties or retain some aspects of the ﬁeld in the guise of programs such as Urban Planning or Develop ment Studies, Dartmouth is the only one with a Department of Geography. Geography’s fate at these institutions has hinged on the activities of individual professors, the attitudes of key administrators, trends within the discipline, and events outside the ﬁeld itself.

Pre-1830: From University Subject to School Subject Mirroring instruction at Oxford and Cambridge at the time, the curricula of the seven colonial Ivy Leagues, included geography. Departments as we now know them did not exist and the study of geography (commonly referred to as ‘the use of the globes’ or ‘mathematical geography’) was part and parcel of teaching history, mathematics, and astronomy. Globes (‘one celestial and one terrestrial’) were central tools of instruction. A number of key texts complemented the study of the globes. Just as Isaac Newton did at Cambridge in the 1600s, Columbia, Dartmouth, Harvard, Pennsylvania, Yale used Varenius’ Geographia (1650) to teach math ematical geography throughout the 1700s. In the mid to late 1700s, Brown and Princeton used Martin’s Use of Both the Globes, and Gordon’s Geographical Grammar (1719) held pride of place at Harvard and Princeton. Brown, Dart mouth, Harvard, and Yale incorporated both Guthrie’s Geographical Grammar (1770) and Morse’s Universal

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American Geography (1797) in their curricula of the late eighteenth century. (Grammar references a text organ ized by nation, as opposed to alphabetically – a gazet teer.) Like their university counterparts in Britain, the Ivies had few instructors dedicated explicitly to the subject; geography was typically embedded in the general study of natural philosophy or mathematics. Neverthe less, in 1784, arguably the ﬁrst American professional geographer, John Daniel Gross, became a professor at Columbia. Although the Ivy Leagues included geography in their early curricula, its presence began to wane in the early 1800s. The exact reasons for this remain unclear; perhaps ‘mathematical geography’ became more deeply ensconced in the intellectual areas we now know as mathematics, physics, and astronomy and a consensus emerged that the remainder – the grammar and gazetteer geography – was best taught in schools rather than at university. The decision to drop geography came ﬁrst in 1816 at Harvard. That university had included geography on admissions exams since 1803, and continued to do so through most of the nineteenth century. In 1819, Dart mouth followed suit and eliminated the subject from a new curriculum. Both Columbia and Yale dropped instruction in favor of an entrance exam in 1825, and Brown and Princeton did the same soon after. By 1830, the University of Pennsylvania stood as the only college still offering geography and, although it began requiring an admissions exam in this year, it also began a new program to intensify its instruction in geography.

1830–1900: Slow Revivals The elimination of geography from the curricula dealt a blow to its development and institutionalization in higher education. Moreover, its relegation to the status of ‘school subject’ may have seeded the perception of geography as an idiographic and nonintellectual subject. In the nine teenth century, universities evolved away from the notion that students had to master a certain knowledge toward the idea that students could have more choice in what they learned. As the course offerings at elite universities broadened and included electives, the Swiss evangelical environmental determinist, Arnold Guyot, sparked the interest of northeastern intellectuals when he gave a series of lectures in the US in the late 1840s (published in 1849 as Earth and Man). Ira Young, a professor of natural philosophy at Dartmouth, immediately picked up on these lectures and the associated monograph and in 1850

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offered a course based on that text. In 1854, Guyot joined Princeton’s faculty, eventually chairing a Geography Department there until 1880. Guyot’s crude and theo logically informed linking of nature and human activity, for better or for worse, helped leverage geography as an academic discipline, and the use of his text diffused from Princeton and Dartmouth to some other Ivies. Darwin’s theories of evolution stimulated new interest in the environment, furthering geography’s recovery as a university subject in the Ivy League. Geography course work at Dartmouth, Pennsylvania, and Princeton became available, moving away from the early accents on math ematical geography and navigation toward understanding ‘man–land’ relationships. Harvard formally offered in struction in geography again soon after the Civil War and Yale reintroduced geography with Daniel Gilman’s ap pointment as Professor of Physical and Political Geog raphy. Gilman’s appointment, it may be worth noting, occurred two decades before Halford Mackinder’s selec tion as Reader in Geography at Oxford. An active scholar and teacher, Gilman left to take up the presidency of the University of California in 1872 and later headed Johns Hopkins University. His employment at Yale, neverthe less, led to growth in geography at that institution. Francis Walker (Professor of political economy and history) suc ceeded Gilman and taught regional and statistical geog raphy. William Brewer soon joined Walker on the faculty. A polymath with a speciﬁc interest in ﬂuvial geomorph ology, Brewer worked on sedimentation. The emphasis at Harvard in the late nineteenth cen tury also inclined toward physical geography, a trend cemented in 1878 with the appointment of William Morris Davis as an instructor in geology. Davis became the most inﬂuential geographer of his time, building the program at Harvard, shifting the center of inquiry in US Geography to theories of physiography and causation, and more generally championing the discipline. In 1885, he oversaw geography’s move from the Department of Natural History to the newly created Department of Geography and Geology. As Harvard’s program grew, the University of Penn sylvania’s Wharton School of Business developed a rival approach to that of Davis’ physiography. Wharton scho lars under Emory Johnson focused on economic geog raphy, as the study of human use of natural resources. With the emergence of the social sciences as ﬁelds of study in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the emphasis on physiography at certain institutions complicated geography’s intellectual identity. Some programs, however, maneuvered between physical and human geography. At Dartmouth College, for example, President William Jewett Tucker pushed for the devel opment of the social sciences throughout the 1890s and when the Department of Social Science split into Soci ology and Economics, these new entities both sponsored

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instruction in geography. In addition, Dartmouth’s new Tuck School of Business Administration offered geog raphy courses from the start. Brown revived geography around the same time with modest offerings in physical geography. Cornell’s curriculum included geography for the ﬁrst time in the 1890s; both economic and physical geography were offered. At Yale in the late 1890s, Her bert Gregory began strengthening the geography wing of the geology department. Columbia made its Geography Department independent in 1896.

1900–20: The Heyday of Ivy League Geography By the turn of the century, geography was part of the curricula of all eight Ivy League universities. This period may have been, in some senses, the heyday of Ivy League Geography. The Ivies, and especially Harvard, produced the ﬁrst generation of professional geographers in the United States. One of its graduates, Wallace Atwood, took a position at Harvard and subsequently moved to Clark, establishing the Graduate School of Geography at that institution. Clark now boasts the oldest sustained program in the US and one that has generated more PhDs in geography than any other. Another Davis stu dent, Herbert Gregory, hired half a dozen geographers at Yale between 1900 and 1910. The intellectual core of the discipline at this time largely centered on Davisian physical geography. Davis himself came to recognize, however, that the ﬁeld was broader than this. He tried to get practitioners, especially his mentees, to develop a set of subﬁelds like climatology, anthropogeography, and commercial geography under the rubric of what he called ‘ontography’. Some of Davis’ students, Isaiah Bowman (PhD Yale and on Yale’s faculty 1905–15) and Ellsworth Huntington (also Yale), helped provide meaning for this new term, retaining a con nection to Darwinian ideas of natural selection and evolution but assessing human activity in the context of the physical environment. Lurking in all this was, of course, environmental determinism. With roots tracing back to Guyot and some strong tendrils in eugenics, determinism’s dark gravitational force continued to drag on the discipline. The loss of a number of important intellectual leaders at Harvard, Cornell, and Yale checked much of the progress of the previous couple of decades. In 1906, Harvard physical geographer Nathaniel Shaler died and 6 years later, Davis retired from Harvard. His departure was a huge loss; none of his successors could match his energy and vision. With Atwood leaving in 1920, Har vard’s program in geography was unquestionably weaker than 20 years earlier. In this period, Cornell’s Ralph S. Tarr, a student of Shaler and Davis, died unexpectedly.

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He had developed a burgeoning geography program through the Geology Department. Tarr oversaw Cor nell’s development as a center for research and graduate education, and eventually headed the new Department of Physical Geography in 1906. At Princeton, William Libbey, Guyot’s successor, left the university’s geography program in a reduced state. In 1915, Herbert Gregory, the champion of geography at Yale, became seriously ill and was forced to relinquish his chairmanship. In the same year, Isaiah Bowman – the Harvard trained scholar diplomat – became the new director of the American Geographical Society. The geography wing of the Geology Department was subsequently terminated. The University of Pennsylvania also suffered a major loss in 1919 when J. Russell Smith left for Columbia. A dedi cated organizer, Smith oversaw the uniﬁcation of geog raphy and industry as a separate subdivision of the Department of Economics and Social Science at Whar ton. He was recruited by Columbia’s President to or ganize economic geography at the University’s new School of Business, as he had done at Wharton. Three other established scholars also soon left. Given Wharton’s previous loss of Walter Tower to the University of Chi cago, Pennsylvania geography was substantially dimin ished. Brown’s geography instruction terminated around 1914, leaving only Columbia and Dartmouth well pos itioned in the inter war period. All this downsizing oc curred as many English, French, and German universities institutionalized geography as a discipline, associated with both a new phase of empire building and pedagogic needs (for high school geography teachers). The absence of formal empire probably contributed to the erosion of the place for geography in the US during this period.

1918–45: Theory and Practice World War I produced new attitudes about geography as a discipline. The large scale employment of professional geographers by government agencies led to a push for the development of the technical aspect of the ﬁeld over the theoretical. At the same time, its major theoretical foundation – environmental determinism – came under increasing scrutiny. Determinism had little international support as well as a skeptical domestic audience, yet some inﬂuential scholars, notably Ellen Semple (Chi cago) and Huntington, continued to champion it. Al though the late 1920s were marked by a new emphasis on the region, the regional concept failed to provide the unifying framework geography needed to maintain its prestige in the most elite institutions of higher learning. Historians of the discipline note that it was not intel lectually strong in the ﬁrst half of the century. ‘Amateur’ and ‘mediocre’ are two of the most damaging terms used to describe the scholarly state of affairs by both

commentators at the time and by those writing histories. At elite, inﬂuential universities, such frailty would be a particular problem. Increased demand for practical education and the attack on environmental determinism was devastating for geography in the Ivy League universities; these insti tutions increasingly emphasized the importance of theory and held technical instruction in low esteem. In contrast, geography departments in the new land grant colleges of the Midwest prospered in this environment. Because these universities were designed in part to support to the Midwestern agricultural economy and serve the broader public, they welcomed the applied elements of geog raphy. Thus, the considerable expansion of geography in the inter war period occurred most signiﬁcantly in the state universities and comparatively less so in the elite colleges of the Northeast. Ivy League geography pro grams – which were already vulnerable from major pre war losses that exposed their still unsuccessful institutionalization – began to lose ground to Midwestern geography departments. Ironically, the earliest geography faculties at many land grant universities were drawn largely from students trained at the Ivy Leagues, under the likes of Davis, Gregory, and Tarr. Despite these shifts, Dartmouth and Columbia, the two institutions that had not suffered major setbacks in the pre war era, fared relatively well during this period. At Columbia, J. Russell Smith managed the geography program and the university averaged a PhD per year in geography in the inter war period. Dartmouth, which has historically focused on undergraduate education in the Arts and Sciences and has never formally offered graduate coursework in geography, continued to develop a program for undergraduates. Dartmouth’s adminis trative leadership looked upon geography with favor, and in 1942 the discipline achieved department status.

1945–Present: And Then There Was One World War II, like World War I, stimulated institutional interest in geography in the American academy. In the Ivy League, however, the picture was much more mixed. By the 1980s, every Ivy League program with the ex ception of Dartmouth’s had been disbanded. The reasons behind these terminations vary around themes of weak faculty and the discipline’s uncertain intellectual terrain. The adverse ﬁscal context faced by institutions in the aftermath of World War II probably made things worse. Although geographers can be counted among the faculty at Brown and Princeton (notably Julian Wolpert – the Bryant Professor of Geography, Public Affairs, and Urban Planning at the Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs), these two institutions never developed programs in geography to the same

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extent as their sister schools. The rest of the essay de scribes events at the remaining six universities. The closure of Harvard’s program in 1948 dealt a severe blow to Ivy League geography and to US geog raphy more generally. Harvard’s program had remained modest in the 1920s. Still part of the Department of Geology and Geography, geography had nevertheless begun to show signs of life. Kirk Bryan was appointed in 1926 to bolster physical geography; 2 years later, French geographer Raoul Blanchard and Derwent Whittlesley joined the faculty. These appointments were designed to build up the human side of the program and steer geography toward being a separate ﬁeld. These ap pointments appear to have affected PhD production; Harvard granted two PhDs in geography in the 1920s (including the only one to a woman – Millicent Todd Bingham) whereas eight were awarded in the 1930s. The appointments of Edward Ullman (PhD Chicago) and Edward Ackerman (PhD Harvard) in the 1940s augured a new day for geography at Harvard – built on human geography. In May 1947, however, the ad hoc promotion committee agreed to promote Edward Ackerman to As sociate Professor; conﬂict ensued when geologist Mar land Billings protested the vote. Billings appealed to Provost Paul Buck, asserting Geology’s need for the half position they would be losing by Ackerman’s full ap pointment in geography as well as casting doubt on the intellectual merits of human geography as a ﬁeld. That year, an Ad Hoc Committee on Geography was formed, and included the President of Johns Hopkins, Isaiah Bowman. Bowman knew the President of Harvard well, and thus played an inﬂuential role in the decisions regarding the future of geography. Bowman had little respect for Harvard’s geography program as it tended more toward the human side of the ﬁeld and away from the physiography he enjoyed as an undergraduate at Harvard. Whittlesley, the only tenured human geog rapher, proved to be a poor advocate for the discipline; Edward Ullman did much more in the program’s defense. Yet Bowman’s lack of support probably sealed the pro gram’s fate. His inaction was perhaps a favor to President Conant, who likely already had geography’s elimination as a set objective, given budget stresses at the university at the time and his personal disdain for the discipline. While protests from numerous geographers ensued, the Committee used selective evidence from Carl Sauer, who wrote the chairman, saying that the ﬁeld of geography ‘‘is very poorly deﬁned’’ and that geography has often been done best by nongeographers. Ackerman and Ullman were ﬁred; Richard Logan, an instructor teaching intro ductory courses on a term appointment, was not rehired. Whittesley was retained as the sole tenured geographer; Ullman departed Harvard for the University of Wash ington in 1951 to join William Garrison and some other (quantitative) revolutionaries in Smith Hall (see

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Quantitative Revolution). Ironically, 15 years later when Harvard became the home for the Laboratory for Computer Graphics and Spatial Analysis (LCGSA), University of Washington graduates Waldo Tobler and Brian Berry ﬁgured among the ﬁrst scholars to give papers at the new facility. Berry would return (1976–81) as an endowed Chair and Professor of City and Regional Planning and Director of the LCGSA. This laboratory developed SYMAP, the early computer mapping pro gram and precursor to geographic information science (see Bowman, I.; Garrison, W.). While many commentators recall Jean Gottmann’s declaration that the closure of this department was ‘‘a terrible blow y to American geography,’’ the fallout from the demise of geography at Harvard was not im mediate. One year after the events at Harvard, Yale re instated Geography to departmental status. After the collapse of Yale’s geography program in 1915, Ellsworth Huntington had returned as a research associate and the only geographer in the Geology Department. A few dissertations were completed at this time, and almost all of the doctoral work completed in the 1930s was in physical geography. In 1945, however, Stephen Jones, hired originally in International Studies, was appointed associate professor of geography. Although geography gained department status in 1949, and had hired several more geographers on faculty, Jones’ efforts to fully in stitutionalize the subject were unsuccessful. The geog raphers he employed were not productive scholars and proved incapable of maintaining a coherent independent identity for the program in the face of competition for resources – especially from area studies. The department at Yale awarded one PhD in the 1950s and another one in the 1960s. In addition, Time Magazine’s 1963 article on ‘easy A’s’ highlighted the ‘gut’ geography courses at Yale mocking the political geography course that had no re quired reading. Yale terminated geography for the last time in 1967. At the University of Pennsylvania, geography moved along an alternative trajectory with geography being or ganized through the university’s business school, Whar ton. Although the inter war period had been marked by the growth of business administration with an emphasis on economic geography, the trend was reversed in the post–World War II years. Declining enrollments in geography resulted in a shift in business programs away from economic geography. In the mid 1950s, Walter Isard moved from MIT to join Penn’s economics faculty, with the mandate to establish a regional science PhD program. Within 2 years, Isard was chairing a separate Department of Regional Science, which had links to geography. Michael Dacey, Duane Marble, Julian Wolpert, and Allen Scott were all faculty members at one time in Penn’s Department of Regional Science and Regional Science at Penn has produced scholars who now occupy positions in

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geography. In 1963, the University of Pennsylvania closed its Geography Department and shifted some faculty positions to Regional Science. Isard moved to Cornell in 1979; 14 years later, Penn’s Regional Science department closed – having granted about 140 PhDs since its in ception. Cornell’s City and Regional Planning program contains the only Regional Science track in the Ivies. In the past two decades, Cornell has conferred 31 PhDs in regional science; some of these graduates have also ob tained academic positions in geography. Columbia University’s excellence in graduate studies in geography went unmatched by the other Ivy Leagues for much of the twentieth century, but this did not pre vent the department’s eventual termination. After early success in establishing geography at Columbia, Russell Smith did not do enough to strengthen the program and consolidate its position at the university: he spent little time on campus and dedicated most of his efforts to writing textbooks. In later years, Columbia’s graduate enrollment numbers were reasonable, but the best and most promising students were opting instead to study at expanding departments at Michigan, Wisconsin, or Chicago. With roots in Columbia’s School of Business, the department also suffered from the decline of eco nomic geography in the post war period. Smith’s retire ment during this time was followed by the eradication of two tenured positions in the 1970s, appointments ﬁlled by junior colleagues on 3 year contracts. Another loss came when the department’s chairman, William Hance, retired in 1981. Although graduate enrollments were still around a dozen each year in the early 1980s, the ad ministration claimed that the quality of the students had declined. Undergraduate course requirements in geog raphy were eliminated in 1985 and new courses in re mote sensing were not permitted. Given the lack of popularity of geography courses outside the department, administrators felt that it was not fulﬁlling either its in tellectual or its service function. The decision to close the department ﬁnally came in 1986. The establishment of a full blown Department of Geography at Dartmouth coincided with the appoint ment of a third professor of geography Van English; he joined Al Carlson and Trevor Lloyd on the faculty. All three held Clark PhDs. The curricula offerings in the 1940s reﬂected the times with a War Course as well as map interpretation as part of Defense Instruction joining the more regular fare of regional and physical geography. With the end of global conﬂict, war related courses de faulted to more conventional rubrics of air photo inter pretation and cartography. Robert Huke (PhD Syracuse) joined the faculty in 1953 and championed the discipline on campus. He was a beloved teacher and an energetic promoter of geography among students and faculty. The department slowly grew to include six full time lines by the mid 1970s. Laura Conkey became the ﬁrst

woman appointed to a tenure track position in the de partment and subsequently the ﬁrst woman tenured in a Geography Department in the Ivy League. Between 2000 and 2005, the department added three new positions. Today the department includes nine full time tenure track faculty; two hold joint appointments (with Women’s and Gender Studies and Environmental Studies re spectively), and two others now hold endowed chairs – the ﬁrst such appointments conferred on geographers at Dartmouth in its history. In 2007, women in tenure track appointments in the department outnumbered men for the ﬁrst time. Why has this Ivy League department not only sur vived but also ﬂourished when the others foundered? Without a doubt, Bob Huke’s personality and tireless efforts on behalf of geography helped trump doubts about the department’s viability and place in a liberal arts environment. The department always cared deeply about undergraduate teaching and developed consist ently sound undergraduate enrollments. The department has also hired carefully, emphasizing teaching and re search excellence as well as collegiality. In the last couple of decades, the department has only put forward strong candidates for tenure and promotion whose work res onates across campus and the discipline. Geography at Dartmouth has been opportunistic, open to moving in new directions when the chance arose. In addition, for decades, department chairs have steered a course that promotes the unique contribution of geography as a theoretically oriented discipline, and marking it as distinct from potentially competing campus programs in environmental studies, various area studies, and its sister social science departments – Anthropology and Sociology. The department also values and celebrates research collaborations between faculty and under graduates – this article being one example among many. The Geography Department at Dartmouth recently developed ad hoc postbaccalaureate and postdoctoral programs, which the faculty plan to leverage into a masters degree course sooner rather than later. Hopes for new Ivy League graduate programs in geography, how ever, do not rest entirely with Dartmouth. In 2003, Brown’s initiative in spatial structures in the social sci ences came on line; this interdisciplinary research cluster analyzes the impacts of spatial relations and contextual effects on social problems. Harvard’s interdisciplinary Center for Geographic Analysis, opened in May 2006, also augments geography’s (Ivy League) standing. Whe ther these new research centers seed new departments at Harvard and Brown or new programs in geography elsewhere in the Ivy League remains to be seen. See also: Anglo-American/Anglophone Hegemony; Feminist Geography, Prehistory of.

Ivy League and Geography in the US

Further Reading DeBres, K. (1989). An early frost: Geography at Teachers College, Columbia and Columbia University, 1896 1942. The Geographical Journal 155(3), 392 402. Fellmann, J. D. (1986). Myth and reality in the origin of American economic geography. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 76(3), 313 330. Glick, T. F. (1988). Before the revolution: Edward Ullman and the crisis of geography at Harvard, 1949 1950. In Harmon, J. E. & Rickard, T. J. (eds.) Geography in New England, pp 49 62. New Britain, CT: New England St. Lawrence Valley Geographical Society. Koelsch, W. A. (2001). Academic geography, American style: An institutional perspective. In Dunbar, G. S. (ed.) Geography: Discipline, Profession and Subject Since 1870: An International Survey, pp 245 279. Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Martin, G. J. (1988). Geography, geographers and Yale University, c. 1770 1970. In Harmon, J. E. & Rickard, T. J. (eds.) Geography in New England, pp 2 9. New Britain, CT: New England/St. Lawrence Valley Geographical Society. Martin, G. J. (1998). The emergence and development of geographic thought in New England. Economic Geography 74, 1 13. Simpson, R. E. and Huke, R. E. (1988). One view of geography at Dartmouth College. In Harmon, J. E. & Rickard, T. J. (eds.)

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Geography in New England, pp 10 24. New Britain, CT: New England/St. Lawrence Valley Geographical Society. Smith, N. (1987). Academic war over the ﬁeld of geography: The elimination of geography at Harvard, 1947 1951. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 77(2), 155 172. Spencer, J. E. (1974). The evolution of the discipline of geography in the twentieth century. Geographical Perspectives 33, 20 35. Warntz, W. (1964). Geography Now and Then. New York: American Geographical Society. Withers, C. W. J. and Mayhew, R. J. (2002). Rethinking ‘disciplinary’ history: Geography in British universities, c. 1580 1887. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 27(1), 11 29.

Relevant Websites http://www.s4.brown.edu Brown University Spatial Structures in the Social Sciences. http://www.dartmouth.edu Department of Geography, Dartmouth College. http://www.gis.harvard.edu Harvard University Center for Geographic Analysis.