INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON INDUSTRIAL POLICY
International Handbook on Industrial Policy
Edited by
Patrizio Bianchi ...
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INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON INDUSTRIAL POLICY
International Handbook on Industrial Policy
Edited by
Patrizio Bianchi Professor of Applied Industrial Economics and Policy and Rector, University of Ferrara, Italy
Sandrine Labory Lecturer of Applied Industrial Economics and Policy, University of Ferrara, Italy
Edward Elgar Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA
© Patrizio Bianchi and Sandrine Labory 2006 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited Glensanda House Montpellier Parade Cheltenham Glos GL50 1UA UK Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. 136 West Street Suite 202 Northampton Massachusetts 01060 USA
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data Bianchi, Patrizio, 1952– International handbook on industrial policy / Patrizio Bianchi, Sandrine Labory. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. Contents: Contents: Industrial policy in a global perspective — Competition and regulatory issues — Research, technology and innovation — Territory, industrial development and small firms — The use of game theory in industrial policy analysis – Particular views. 1. Industrial policy. 2. Globalization. I. Labory, Sandrine. II. Title. HD3611.B533 338.09—dc22
2006 2005058952
ISBN-13: 978 1 84376 836 4 (cased) ISBN-10: 1 84376 836 4 (cased) Printed and Bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall
Contents vii viii
Acknowledgments List of contributors Introduction Patrizio Bianchi and Sandrine Labory PART I
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INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
1. From ‘old’ industrial policy to ‘new’ industrial development policies Patrizio Bianchi and Sandrine Labory
3
2. Emerging issues in the new economy and globalization Ashish Arora and Alfonso Gambardella
28
3. European industrial policy Jacques Pelkmans
45
4. Industrial policy in developing countries: what can we learn from East Asia? Sanjaya Lall
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5. Do informational service activities translate into new industrial policy requirements? Jacques De Bandt
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PART II
COMPETITION AND REGULATORY ISSUES
6. Competition policy and innovation Jochen Lorentzen and Peter Møllgaard
115
7. State aid to business Stephen Martin and Paola Valbonesi
134
8. Mergers and concentration policy Hans Schenk
153
9. Liberalization and regulation of public utility sectors: theories and practice Tom Björkroth, Sonja Grönblom and Johan Willner 10. State-owned enterprises, privatization and industrial policy Andrea Goldstein
v
180 198
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PART III
RESEARCH, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION
11. Intellectual property rights and market dynamics Fabrizio Cesaroni and Paola Giuri 12. New approaches to intellectual property: from open software to knowledge-based industrial activities Nicolas Jullien and Jean-Benoît Zimmermann
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243
13. Science-based industries and spin-offs Marco Giarratana and Salvatore Torrisi
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14. Science parks and high-tech clustering Jan Annerstedt
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15. Technology policy and social policy: how industrial policy applies to health Daniele Paci and Stuart O. Schweitzer
298
PART IV TERRITORY, INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND SMALL FIRMS 16. Decentralizing industrial policies: threat or opportunity in developing countries? Leandro Sepulveda and Ash Amin
321
17. The local dimensions of industrial policy Marco Bellandi and Marco Di Tommaso
342
18. Business support policies Nicola Bellini
362
19. Small and medium-sized enterprise policies in Europe, Latin America and Asia Patrizio Bianchi, Sandrine Labory, Daniele Paci and Mario Davide Parrilli
380
PART V THE USE OF GAME THEORY IN INDUSTRIAL POLICY ANALYSIS 20. The genesis of game theory and its role in industrial economics Luca Lambertini
405
21. Differential game-theoretical analysis and industrial policy Roberto Cellini and Luca Lambertini
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PART VI
PARTICULAR VIEWS
22. Industrial policy: perspectives, experience, issues Christos N. Pitelis
435
Index
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Acknowledgments We are grateful to all the contributors to the Handbook but a particular expression of our gratitude goes to Marco Bellandi, Jacques De Bandt, Alfonso Gambardella, Paola Giuri, Andrea Goldstein, Sanjaya Lall, Jacques Pelkmans, Hans Schenk and Johan Willner, who provided comments and suggestions at various stages of the Handbook and/or read and commented on chapters from other contributors. David Ulph also provided useful suggestions for the Handbook at its earliest stages.
We dedicate this book to Sanjaya Lall, who unfortunately died in June 2005.
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Contributors Ash Amin is a professor and former Head of Geography at Durham University. His latest books include Cities: Reimagining the Urban, Polity Press, 2002 (with Nigel Thrift); Architectures of Knowledge, Oxford University Press, 2004 (with Patrick Cohendet); Placing the Social Economy, Routledge, London, 2002 (with Angus Cameron and Ray Hudson); and the Blackwell Cultural Economy Reader, Blackwell, 2004 (with Nigel Thrift). Jan Annerstedt is the co-founder of Interlace-Invent, an international consultancy focused on the design and management of innovation environments such as science parks, corporate R&D units and academic centres. Annerstedt holds the UNESCO Chair at the Copenhagen Business School, where he is a specialist in international economics and business strategy. He has been an advisor to various multinational companies and to regional and national governments and a consultant to international organizations such as the OECD, the European Commission, UNIDO, UNDP, UNCTAD and UNESCO. Ashish Arora has a PhD in Economics from Stanford University (1992). He is a Professor of Economics and Public Policy at Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, and co-director of the Software Industry Center at Carnegie Mellon University. Arora’s research focuses on the economics of technological change, intellectual property rights, technology licensing and international technology transfer, and he has published extensively on the growth and development of biotechnology and the chemical industry. More details are available at HYPERLINK (http://www.softwarecenter.cmu.edu/Arora.htm). Marco Bellandi is Doctor of Research in Political Economy (1987) and Full Professor (straordinario) of Applied Economics (2005) at the University of Florence (Faculty of Economics), where he teaches Political Economy, and Industrial Economics and Policy. His research builds on Marshall’s contributions, and on contemporary models of analysis and empirical investigation of industrial organization, with particular regard to external and internal economies, industrial districts, processes of innovation and change in local production systems. Nicola Bellini is Professor of Business Economics at the Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa. He has been an advisor for economic policy and planning at the Office of the President of the Emilia Romagna region in Italy and Research Fellow at the Nomisma Economic Research Institute in Bologna. He is the author of several books and articles on industrial and innovation policy issues, with special reference to local and regional development and innovation policies, the management of regional development agencies, the management and marketing of business support services and area marketing. Patrizio Bianchi is Professor of Applied Industrial Economics and Policy at the Faculty of Economics of the University of Ferrara. He has wide practical experience in policy decision making and implementation in the fields of industrial policy, development viii
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policy and privatization. He has advised various regional and national governments and also international organizations such as UNIDO and the European Commission. He has been Dean of the Faculty of Economics and is now Rector of the University of Ferrara. Tom Björkroth obtained his doctoral degree from Åbo Akademi University in 2003 and is now Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Competition Policy Studies, Turku School of Economics and Business Administration. His research interests include empirical industrial organization, infrastructure industries and, in particular, telecommunications and competition analysis and policy. Roberto Cellini (PhD in Economics at the University of Bologna) is Professor of Economics at the University of Catania (Italy). The main fields of his research are the theoretical and econometric problems of economic growth and game theory, where he focuses on differential games with reference to industrial organization issues. His publications include articles in leading economics journals, such as the Journal of Economic Theory and the Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. Fabrizio Cesaroni is an assistant professor at the University of Lecce and research associate at Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies (Pisa, Italy), where he obtained his PhD with a thesis on ‘Technology strategies in the knowledge economy’. His main research interests are in the economics and management of technology licensing and technology transfer, both by for-profit firms and by non-profit research organizations, such as universities and public research laboratories. Jacques De Bandt, with a Doctorate in Law and a PhD in Economics, is First Class Director of Research (Emeritus) at the French National Center for Scientific Research, and Professor at the University of Sophia Antipolis. His field of specialization is industrial economics, with special emphasis on business services. He is a founder and editor of the Revue d’Economie Industrielle. He is Chairman of AMARES and editor of FAIRE SAVOIRS (Inter-disciplinary scientific Association and Journal in Human and Social sciences). Marco Di Tommaso (PhD University of Naples and MSc University of Manchester) is Professor of Industrial and Development Policy at the University of Ferrara, Italy. In the field of industrial policy he has worked with international institutions (UNIDO, UNDP, CEPAL), local and national governments (Italy, Syria, China) and universities (UCLA, Birmingham, South China University of Technology). His research ranges from hightech industry to SMEs, clusters and developing countries’ industrialization policies. His latest book has been published by Edward Elgar (2005): Health Policy and High-Tech Industrial Development (with S.O. Schweitzer). Alfonso Gambardella (PhD, Stanford, 1991) is Professor of Economics and Management at the Università Commerciale ‘L. Bocconi’, Milan, Italy. His research interests are in the economics and management of technology and innovation. He has also taught courses on the economics of technology at the Department of Economics of Stanford University. His website is www.alfonsogambardella.it.
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Marco Giarratana is Assistant Professor of Management and Strategy at the Department of Business Administration of the Carlos III University in Madrid. He holds a PhD in Economics and Management from the Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa and a Laurea degree in Economics from the Bocconi University of Milan (Italy). His research interests centre on industrial dynamics, entrepreneurship, firm strategy and innovation. His works have been published both in international journals and in edited book chapters. Paola Giuri is Assistant Professor in Industrial Economics and Management at Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa. She obtained her PhD at Sant’Anna School, and spent two years as a visiting study fellow at SPRU, University of Sussex within the EC Marie Curie Programme. Her research interests are in the economics of innovation and patenting, entrepreneurship and innovation in different regimes of IPRs (including open source software) and large and small firms’ technology strategies. Andrea Goldstein is a senior economist at the OECD Development Centre. He was previously at the World Bank Group (Foreign Investment Advisory Services), the OECD Economics Department and Consob, and the Italian Securities and Exchange Commission, and has also been a consultant for the Inter-American Development Bank and the UK Department for International Development. His current research interests include multinationals from emerging, transition and developing countries, regulatory reform in network industries, the political economy of the global aerospace industry and high-skill migration from Latin America. Sonja Grönblom is a research associate at Åbo Akademi University, specializing in industrial organization, in particular applications to public sector reform and non-profit organizations. Nicolas Jullien defended his PhD on the economy of free software in 2001. He is today in charge of coordinating a research group on the uses of IT applications in Brittany (France), called Marsouin (http://www.marsouin.org). He also manages the European research project Calibre on free software for GET, one of the participants in the project (further details available at HYPERLINK http://www.calibre.ie). Sandrine Labory holds a PhD from the European University Institute of Florence (Italy) and is a lecturer of Applied Industrial Economics and Policy at the University of Ferrara. She has practical experience of European economic policies, having worked in various projects for European institutions. Her research interests include European policies and regulation, the organization of industrial production and industrial policy. The late Sanjaya Lall was Professor of Development Economics at Oxford University’s Department of International Development. He was chief editor of Oxford Development Studies, a former staff member of the World Bank and a consultant to several international organizations on technology, foreign investment and industrialization policies.
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Luca Lambertini (DPhil, Oxon) is Professor of Economics at the University of Bologna, and fellow of ENCORE, Faculty of Economics & Econometrics, University of Amsterdam. He has been a research fellow at the Institute of Economics and the Centre for Industrial Economics, University of Copenhagen. His research ranges from oligopoly theory to international trade and differential games. He has published in leading scientific journals. Jochen Lorentzen is Chief Research Specialist in the Human Resources Development Programme of the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), South Africa’s statutory research council for the applied social sciences. He has taught at universities and business schools throughout Europe and in the USA and South Africa. His principal area of research is technological learning and innovation in latecomer countries. Stephen Martin is Professor of Economics at Purdue University. His PhD is from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He has worked at Michigan State University, the European University Institute, the University of Copenhagen and the University of Amsterdam. He has been managing editor of the International Journal of Industrial Organization and President of the Industrial Organization Society. Peter Møllgaard is Professor of Law & Economics and Head of the Department of Economics at the Copenhagen Business School. He is associated with the Centre for Industrial Economics and with the Centre for Competition Policy at the University of East Anglia. His principal area of research is the application of industrial organization to competition policy. He has done work on horizontal and vertical coordination as well as technology transfer. Daniele Paci is a researcher at the University of Ferrara. He collaborates with scholars of the University of California Los Angeles and is a lecturer for L’Institute Graduate School in Industrial Development Policy and for the Master in Economics and Management of Health Services at the University of Ferrara. His research interests include high-tech clusters, intangible assets, patents and innovation in the biotech and pharmaceutical industry and industrial policy. Mario Davide Parrilli holds a PhD from Birmingham University and an MPhil of the IDS of Sussex University. He is a lecturer at the University of Birmingham. He is also co-ordinator of the Central American Graduate School in Industrial Development and SME Policies, Managua, Nicaragua and San José, Costa Rica. He has been a lecturer at the University of Ferrara and Scientific Co-ordinator of a Master’s in ‘International co-operation and social economy’ at the Centre for Didactic Innovation and Distance Education (CARID) at the same university. Jacques Pelkmans holds the Jan Tinbergen Chair of European Economic Integration at the College of Europe, Bruges, where he is Director of the Economic Studies department. He also is Council member of the WRR, a think-tank on public policy analysis attached to the Dutch Prime Minister’s Office in The Hague. Between 1990 and 2001, he was Senior Research Fellow at CEPS in Brussels and Professor of Economics at Maastricht
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University. His current research interests include liberalization and regulation of network industries in the single market, ‘better’ (that is, more efficient and effective) EU regulation, and the development of a functional EU subsidiarity test. Christos N. Pitelis is Director of the Centre for International Business and Management (CIBAM) and Reader in International Business and Competitiveness at the Judge Institute of Management, University of Cambridge. He has realized projects for governments, the European Commission, the United Nations, the Commonwealth Secretariat and the private sector. He is an honorary research fellow at the Birmingham Business School, fellow of L’Institute, Associate Professor at the University of Athens, fellow of the Athens Laboratory of Economic Policy Studies, and a non-executive director of the Medical Group of Companies, Athens. Hans Schenk is founding professor of organizational economics and academic chair of the Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute at Utrecht University’s School of Economics. He graduated from the University of Oregon, obtained his MSc and MBA at the University of Louvain and his doctorate in economics at the Université de Nice–Sophia Antipolis. He was previously a professor at Tilburg University, Erasmus University Rotterdam and the University of Groningen and held visiting positions in China, France and the UK. He has acted as consultant to Fortune 500 firms, the United Nations, the European Commission and various governments. Stuart O. Schweitzer is Professor of Health Services at the UCLA School of Public Health. Additionally, he is Visiting Professor of Economics at the University of Ferrara. His areas of teaching and research are health and pharmaceutical economics and industrial policy towards health. The second edition of his book, Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy, has been published by Oxford University Press. Leandro Sepulveda is a research fellow at Middlesex University (School of Health and Social Sciences) in the UK. His current research interests are industrial policy and SMEs, local and regional development, informal economic activity, and entrepreneurship amongst ethnic minorities. Prior to this he worked for the University of General Sarmiento (1997–2004) and ECLAC UN in Argentina. His work has largely been commissioned by public and private agencies at local and national levels. He holds a PhD from Durham University, UK. Salvatore Torrisi obtained his PhD from the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU), University of Sussex, Brighton, UK and his Laurea degree in Economics from Bocconi University Milan, Italy. He is Associate Professor of Economics and Management at the University of Bologna. He teaches in the European Doctoral Training Programme, ‘Industrial Dynamics and Firm Behaviour – Empirical Aspects’ (ETIC) at MERIT, University of Maastricht. His main research interests are in the economics of innovation, the impact of new technologies on firms’ productivity and the dynamics of high-tech industries. Paola Valbonesi (PhD in Economics, 1995, European University Institute, Florence) has been Associate Professor of Economics at the Department of Economics, Padua
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University, since 2002. She has held visiting positions at the Hungarian Academy of Science (1991), the University of York (1997) and the Centre for Industrial Economics at the University of Copenhagen (1998). Her research interests include various topics in industrial organization, focusing on competition policy and regulation of public utility. Johan Willner obtained his doctoral degree at Åbo Akademi University, where he has been Professor of Economics since 1988. His research interests include theoretical and applied industrial organization, and to some extent public economics and corporate governance. He is one of the founding members of the European Network on Industrial Policy (EUNIP). Jean-Benoît Zimmermann is CNRS Research Director at GREQAM (Groupement de Recherche en Economie Quantitative d’Aix-Marseille) and IDEP (Institut d’Economie Publique) in Marseilles. His main topics of interest are economics of interactions and networks, proximity dynamics, innovation and intellectual property economics (Open Source Software). More details are available at HYPERLINK (http://www.vcharite.univ-mrs.fr/ greqam/index_fr.php).
Introduction Patrizio Bianchi and Sandrine Labory
Putting together a Handbook on Industrial Policy appears challenging at first sight. Both the reflections within industrial economics and the practical experiences over time and across the world point to a richness of contexts, approaches, factors and determinants that make it difficult to define the problems and delineate the fields of application. Hence we chose to start from empirical observation to arrive at general properties and systematic characteristics that theoretical perspectives should take into account and explain (an approach that classical economists took, and that the pioneers of industrial economics such as Bain also adopted). The Handbook has been put together with the aim of providing an overview of all the approaches and relevant themes of the ample field of industrial policy. Our objective was not to promote a particular approach or school of thought. We think it is a task of the reader to derive the most relevant questions and the most relevant approaches from the richness of perspectives proposed in the Handbook. All chapters are written by specialists with deep knowledge of particular sectors, regions or policy fields that they have observed empirically. This make it possible to point to relevant current policy issues and derive implications for theory and methodology. The meaning of the term ‘industrial policy’ has changed a lot over time. Until the 1980s, the term meant the direct intervention of the state in the economy, the direct control by the government of large parts of the production apparatus and a set of public actions aimed at limiting the extent of the market and at conditioning productive organization. Nowadays, the term ‘industrial policy’ indicates instead a variety of policies which are implemented by various institutional subjects in order to stimulate firm creation, to favour their agglomeration and promote innovation and competitive development in the context of an open economy. The new industrial policies are therefore mainly industrial development policies, where industry is implicitly considered as the organization, and the strategic management of human competencies and technical capacities. Industry in this sense is the main driver of what we may call the Wealth of Nations, meaning the capacity to produce and distribute wealth within a community. Some important changes have indeed occurred in the economy and have generated the need for firms to adapt and restructure. These changes are manifold, ranging from purely economic aspects (increase in world trade, improvements in financial markets), to technological ones (diffusion of the information and communication technologies) and political ones (end of the division of the world into two political blocks). All these changes are often confused or only partly considered and we think they all constitute what everyone tends to call ‘globalization’. Globalization, understood in this sense, has led to the necessity for firms to undertake dramatic structural changes. Very often firms have called on governments for help: to better understand the changes going on or to be directly supported. As a result, the new industrial development policies have been defined within the constraints imposed by xv
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international agreements such as the WTO rules or the European Union legislative framework for European states. Industrial development policies are all policies aimed at favouring and accompanying structural change. They are dynamic in nature and primarily consist of programmes that evolve over time according to the evolutions of the economy and its context and according to the realizations achieved. It is possible to define two broad sets of policies. First, there are policies aimed at defining the rules of the competitive or competitiveness game. These are anti-trust, property right legislation, international rules on world trade, and so on. Second, there are policies aimed at providing or improving firms’ and individuals’ capabilities to take part in the competitive game. These are technology and research policy, training and education, policies favouring linkages between firms, universities and local or regional authorities, and so on. We have therefore articulated this Handbook around these themes, defining four axes that also fit the information that emerges out of not only the economic literature but also the documents published by the European communities and by other international institutions. These four axes constitute the four main Parts of this Handbook. First, there is an important part that we have to call ‘market opening’ that is centred on the actions aimed at integrating capital and product markets so as to increase the extent of the market (Chapter 3). It also includes actions aimed at helping agents to take part in the global competition game (Chapter 4) and actions aimed at helping to exploit the opportunities of the global game (Chapters 2 and 5). Hence these actions require an analysis of the changes in worldwide production processes, that is performed by the authors of Part I of the volume. Thus Arora, Gambardella, Lall and De Bandt show, among other things, the emergence of global-scale production systems where firms from developing countries may develop capabilities that are complementary to the capabilities of firms in developed countries. The second axis which we think is emerging is that of the ‘rules’, that is, market and competition guarantee, that includes the redefinition of the role of anti-trust authorities (Chapters 6, 7 and 8), the actions of privatization of public services and the regulation of the risks of creation of new monopolies (Chapters 9 and 10). This axis is therefore one concerned with ensuring that markets function efficiently and that competition is as free as possible (Chapters 6, 7 and 8). In today’s globalized world the problem of the national state no longer being the ultimate reference of economic development and the absence of a world authority able to guarantee the rules of the game is strongly felt, as are the problems of taking account of market dynamics in competition cases (Chapters 6 and 8). The third axis concerns both rules and capabilities. It is about the role of research, of innovation and of the so-called ‘new science – new industry’ relationship in making markets and competition more dynamic. Innovation requires the two extreme levels of industrial policy: national or supranational regarding the definition of rules such as property rights; and local regarding the creation of knowledge (spin-offs and science parks examined in Chapters 13 and 14), that is, capability building. Regarding rules, the changes outlined above have led to the definition of new property rights regimes such as the open source model (Chapters 11 and 12). Innovation policies also interact with other policies, such as social policies (Chapter 15). The role of local realities constitutes the fourth axis of the new industrial development policies, which is the core of their capability-making aspect. Local realities and therefore
Introductiom xvii territories have been rediscovered as important determinants of productive development, in particular through the role of SMEs and their clusters (of which industrial districts represent a type), especially when they are locally rooted and when the territory is taken as a resource that can be exploited (Chapters 16, 17 and 19). For this purpose, provision of local public goods such as business support services is essential (Chapter 18). Decentralized industrial policies have proved to be useful but their effectiveness depends on their being integrated to a national (centralized) strategy (Chapters 16 and 19). The analysis conducted within the four axes points to a number of issues regarding, not only the practical implementation of industrial policies, but also their analysis in the field of economics. Hence Part V of the Handbook focuses on methodological and conceptual issues. A specific consideration of the important tool that has greatly influenced industrial economics, namely game theory, is first undertaken, showing that game-theoretical analyses have increasingly taken dynamics into account (Chapters 20 and 21). The Handbook is concluded by a particular view of concepts and approaches (Chapter 22). Overall, we think that the Handbook shows that, while the concept of industrial policy has been put to one side for a long time, numerous scholars have continued working on the subject and have developed a very rich field: studies are rich in methodological and conceptual approaches, in theoretical and empirical considerations, hence the very fertile and influential field. The new industrial development policies turn out to be programmes or strategies (objectives and means) of industrial development defined by a country or a group of countries (as in the EU). They primarily aim at providing the conditions for business performance, but they also include, as experience throughout the world shows, measures aimed at sustaining and promoting industrial restructuring, that is, at orientating comparative advantages (specializations). We provide below a brief summary of each chapter in order to guide the reader through the Handbook. Part I Industrial policy in a global perspective Patrizio Bianchi and Sandrine Labory provide an analysis of the new industrial development policies as they emerge out of the contributions to the Handbook, together with a historical perspective and theoretical interpretation of the move from ‘old’ industrial policies to the ‘new’ industrial development policies. The main characteristics of the new policies and the implications in terms of research agenda are pointed out. The chapter by Ashish Arora and Alfonso Gambardella discusses a number of questions raised by globalization on the basis of an analysis of a particular case, that of the significant growth of software production in some emerging economies. The chapter discusses the effects of the rise of the software industry in five countries – Brazil, China, India, Ireland and Israel – on the development of the sector in the USA, Europe and Japan. It is shown that, while the USA is likely to remain an important R&D centre for software, specializing in high value-creating phases of the production process, Europe and Japan incur more risks, essentially because they are not as able as the USA to attract a skilled workforce from the emerging countries and because the ability to relate to the firms in the emerging countries which have complementary activities is higher in the USA. The analysis of the chapter has a number of implications, including countries’ specializations, outsourcing and human capital policies.
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Chapter 3, by Jacques Pelkmans, examines the evolution of industrial policy in the European Union. It first provides a rigorous analysis of the decision-making framework for industrial policy within the European Union, given by the rules defined by the Treaties. It explains the two levels of application of industrial policy, namely national and European, and shows the complementarity of the two levels. The chapter thus shows the overwhelming importance of European integration in determining structure and performance of industry in Europe, as a result of the deepening, widening and enlargement of the EU. Sanjaya Lall determines how proper industrial development policies should be elaborated in order for countries’ competitiveness to improve, on the basis of an analysis of the East Asian experience. He reviews country performance over the period 1980–2000 in the developing world in terms of market shares for manufacturing value added and manufactured exports. He shows that the countries that performed best were East Asian ones. Within the East Asian region, the best performing were those, such as Korea and Taiwan, which implemented comprehensive industrial policies, that is, policies aimed at both the rules (effective institutions, bureaucracies, regulation) and capabilities (sustaining domestic firms). Thus most of them used infant industry protection, export subsidies and targets, credit allocation, local content rules and so on to build their industrial capabilities base. Jacques De Bandt provides some considerations in Chapter 5 on the changes that economies are experiencing worldwide and the consequent need for industrial policies. He stresses that what is going on is very complex to understand and is inducing a change in production systems, whereby knowledge management and creation is fundamental. Hence the economy is turning to a ‘knowledge-based’ economy in the sense that methods of production involve intense knowledge creation and management. Industrial policy should therefore change objectives and priorities. Policies should help to understand the complexity of production realities and systems and, on this basis, provide appropriate training to the population, promoting multidisciplinary approaches, system analysis and modelling, information and knowledge engineering, and so on. Thus policy should help develop competencies, the capabilities for producing and transforming knowledge into operational solutions or applications. The organizational set-up that implements policies should also be carefully designed, with an emphasis on the ‘bottom-up’ approach, but ‘with the understanding that the emphasis is not on individual actors, but on specific decentralized production systems’. Part II Competition and regulatory issues Chapter 6, by Jo Lorentzen and Peter Møllgaard, examines the implications of the intensification of innovation for competition policy. It has indeed been argued that globalization has meant increasing importance of innovation for firms. To face the challenge of more frequent innovation, one strategy that firms have been adopting is to form technological alliances. Policies have favoured such collaboration in order to increase innovation and its diffusion. However, these policies raise questions for anti-trust policy, since collaboration may continue at the final stages of production. The chapter examines this paradox. First, a review of the rationale behind technological alliances is presented. Second, the organization of industries in a dynamic context is analysed and consequences for competition policy are derived. The authors conclude that, despite the complexity of analysis, competition authorities should monitor the behaviour of high-tech firms during and also after judging cases. The authors call for more empirical research on where
Introductiom xix technological trajectories, especially in the new sectors, are heading. For this purpose, multidisciplinary research is needed. The chapter by Stephen Martin and Paola Valbonesi provides an objective and complete account of state aid in both the European Union and the USA. The authors show that state aid is present in both regions, despite legal impediments and resulting economic inefficiencies. They first review the main theoretical literature on the subject, namely strategic trade policy, tax competition and rent seeking, and conclude that none of the literature makes a case for state aid as an efficient or welfare-improving tool. The authors subsequently review the legal framework for state aid in the USA and the EU. The main competition-distorting question raised by state aid concerns inter-state competition in the USA and inter-member state competition in the EU. The empirical evidence is that, in both regions, state aid is still implemented in significant amounts. In the EU, enlargement to Central and Eastern European countries also raises new issues for state aid, since these countries employ these instruments to help their convergence to the rest of the EU. Hans Schenk concentrates on the anti-trust case of mergers in Chapter 8. He shows that, although mergers and acquisitions operated by firms in all industries represent enormous value, since firms spend amounts comparable to countries’ GDP to merge with or to acquire other firms, empirical studies do not provide evidence of positive efficiency effects of these operations. Evidence, however, is mainly on static efficiency effects, not dynamic efficiency effects. The author goes on to review empirical practice in the treatment of merger cases by competition authorities in the EU, the USA, Canada and Australia. Here again, dynamic efficiencies have been considered only in a few cases. The author shows that each region tends to have its own system without international coherence. Chapter 9, by Tom Björkroth, Sonja Grönblom and Johan Willner, deals with theoretical and empirical aspects of liberalization and deregulation of public utility sectors. The theoretical part of the chapter analyses the impact of competition and ownership on allocative efficiency and the significance of the cost structure for the possible trade-off between the imperfections associated with different regimes. Theory seems to suggest that the threshold for liberalization to be beneficial may be higher than usually believed. The empirical part focuses on telecommunications and electricity provision, with short discussions of other industries such as water and public transport. Deregulation in telecommunications has in most cases been followed by lower prices, but some incumbents were also technically progressive, and in those cases there are some question-marks related to the counterfactual. Similar concerns have been raised in the energy sector, but there have in addition been doubts about reliability, lost advantages of vertical integration or excessive consolidation. The chapter by Andrea Goldstein concludes Part II on competition and regulation, concentrating on nationalization versus privatization issues in both developed and developing countries. The chapter reviews alternative explanations of state ownership as a tool of industrial policy. It provides evidence on the role that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) played in the economic growth process of some developed and non-developed countries, on the motives for privatization, on the conditions in which SOEs have been sold and on the effects of such a policy choice. The case of France is also discussed in more depth. Goldstein concludes that the institutional framework within which privatization is undertaken is very important in determining its success or failure; governments should be as objective as possible, in the sense of resisting ideology, in order to raise the probability of success.
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Part III Research, technology and innovation This part contains five chapters, each of which deals with specific key issues regarding technology and research policy. Fabrizio Cesaroni and Paola Giuri analyse the crucial issue of innovation protection. More specifically, the authors examine two models of intellectual property protection, namely the strong intellectual property rights (IPR) model and the open source/open science model, and their implications for innovative activities and market dynamics. The IPR and the open science models present advantages and disadvantages in terms of incentives to innovate, adoption of technological innovations and diffusion of technologies. The chapter focuses on some key and emerging issues on intellectual property protection and examines the effects of (stronger or weaker) patent protection on the innovative activity of large and small firms and on entry and growth of new technology-based firms. The main policy implications are, first, that the pros and cons of each model are influenced by the differences in the characteristics of the various industrial sectors; second, that the presence of complementary assets also influences the preferred model. Nicolas Jullien and Jean-Benoît Zimmermann also analyse the issue of the IPR versus the open source model of intellectual property protection, arguing that intellectual property protection is in practice always the result of a compromise between the various actors involved: producers, consumers and public authorities. Historically, protection has experienced phases where stronger and weaker protection have alternated. The authors argue that, in the software industry, the trend tends to be towards weaker protection, as shown by the diffusion of the open source model. More generally, in the knowledge-based economy the trend should be, contrary to what tends to happen nowadays, going towards weaker protection since there are enormous gains to be made from the sharing of knowledge and innovation as realized under the open source model. The definition of intellectual property rights is crucial in determining the incentives to innovate and to commercialize innovations. Such commercialization generally arises out of spin-offs from existing companies or from universities. Marco Giarratana and Salvatore Torrisi analyse spin-offs in detail, addressing a number of questions. Are they an important form of science-based entrepreneurship? Where do they come from (academic institutions, established firms)? What about their post-entry performance relative to other new science-based or technology-based firms? Why do some countries and institutions differ in the rate of new science-based firms formation? The authors answer these questions first by illustrating the importance of science-based industries and spin-offs; second, they explain the empirical evidence using different theories; and third, they analyse different policies aimed at science-based spin-offs. The creation of science parks and business incubators particularly favours spin-offs. In Chapter 14, Jan Annerstedt reviews the theoretical and empirical evidence on a particular form of innovative networks that has been a focus of technology policy over recent years, namely science parks. Science parks are geographically limited areas where business, private and public research centres and local governments are brought together in order to create ‘innovation environments’, that is, environments where the close and dense network relationships between the various actors of innovation favour innovation and firm creation. The chapter reviews the historical evidence on science parks and defines three generations of such parks, with an increasing integration of the parks into the local urban areas and into global flows of knowledge. The chapter subsequently goes beyond the science park
Introductiom xxi evolution to address more general policy-relevant issues of locally based clustering of innovative firms and their supporting institutions. Science parks are areas that favour firm creation, be they start-ups or spin-offs from public institutions or from companies. Daniele Paci and Stuart Schweitzer present an interesting and often neglected issue related to technology and research policy, namely the interaction between technology policy and other policies. They concentrate on a high-tech sector, the pharmaceutical sector, and make two points. First, the way a sector is defined in the analysis influences the policy implications one reaches; second, taking a broader view allows us to take important interactions between policies into account. Thus defining the health industry as comprising all the sectors that realize products aimed at providing health services (medical machinery, drugs and so on) with a market composed of not only patients but also health ‘providers’ (doctors, chemists and so on) leads the authors to outline crucial trade-offs, such as the interaction between technology policy that aims at favouring innovation in the sector allowing for monopoly rents over innovations (patents) and social policy that aims at providing health to all at low cost, hence favouring competition between firms. Part IV Territory, industrial development and small firms Part III showed that industrial policy in practice has had a tendency to decentralize, in line with the new ‘bottom-up’ approaches. Thus high-tech clusters have been a focus of technology policy in many countries over recent years. Part IV is therefore specifically dedicated to local industrial development and policies. Leandro Sepulveda and Ash Amin start this part by providing an analysis of the new decentralized industrial policy approach. They argue that this new approach has many merits, but at the beginning of its implementation there has been a tendency to decentralize too much and forget the importance of centralized policies. If industrial development is first and foremost localized on specific territories where it embeds, some degree of centralization is also required, in order to define coherent rules throughout the country and to allow successful experiences to spill over into other regions of the country. These arguments are illustrated with the case of Argentina. Marco Bellandi and Marco Di Tommaso then go deeper into the analysis of the rationale and forms of local industrial policies, that is, the local dimension of industrial policy. They also stress that local industrial policies have to be coherent with strategic objectives defined at a more central level. They carry out a deep and rigorous analysis of local industrial policies and show their various dimensions. They also show that the fundamental reason for the local level of industrial policy is that industry develops only if it embeds locally. This ‘embeddedness process’ determines the success of industrial development and can be supported by the public provision of public goods of various types. In Chapter 18 Nicola Bellini examines a particular kind of local industrial policy, namely business support policies. These policies are specifically aimed at assisting enterprises or entrepreneurs to develop their businesses and to respond effectively to the challenges of their business, social and physical environment. The chapter discusses three main approaches that are based on different research paradigms. It ends by pointing to the lack of evaluation of these policies. According to Bellini, evaluation is rarely carried out owing to the many difficulties of this exercise, such as technical difficulties which are explained in the chapter. However, evaluation has started to be performed in various ways. One example
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is analyses testing the additionality of business support policies. Other examples are examined, showing that evaluation should be a priority on the research agenda. Local industrial development primarily involves the creation and development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The last chapter of Part IV, by Patrizio Bianchi, Sandrine Labory, Daniele Paci and Mario Davide Parrilli, focuses on SME policy. It provides an overview of the policy tendencies in both developed and developing countries, focusing on three continents, namely Europe, Latin America and East Asia. It shows that globalization has led to the focus on networking as a tool to consolidate SME development. The comparison of SME policies in developed and developing countries leads the authors to conclude that developing countries often have SME policies but which lack coherence such as is provided, for example, in Europe by the European decision-making framework. In addition, attention is often focused on the larger firms among SMEs and not on the myriad of very small firms that represent an important share of employment and contribute significantly to socioeconomic stability. This therefore risks creating a fracture within the national production systems. Part V The use of game theory in industrial policy analysis The various chapters of the Handbook so far have shown that globalization poses new challenges not only to the practice of industrial policy, that is, policy decision making and practical implementation, but also to the analysis of industrial policy by economists (and possibly other scholars). Part V addresses these challenges in more detail, focusing on an important tool of industrial economics, game theory. Chapter 20, by Luca Lambertini, shows how game theory has come to play an important role in industrial economics, providing a rigorous objective tool for the theoretical perspective. However, only the static game-theoretical framework was first used extensively. This approach has a number of drawbacks, including restrictive and often unrealistic assumptions and the sensitivity and variability of results to the particular assumptions made. Hence this perspective has been increasingly questioned, not least because of the evolution of the competitive conditions and of the industrial policy problems faced by decision makers to which static game theory was increasingly unable to provide satisfactory answers. Dynamic game theory has developed recently and rapidly. The first chapters of the Handbook show that looking at the reality of industrial development and policies leads to evidence that a proper approach is necessarily dynamic. In fact, Roberto Cellini and Luca Lambertini in Chapter 21 show how results and policy prescriptions change when dynamic rather than static games are considered. Part VI Particular views Christos Pitelis reviews the various methodological approaches to industrial policy analysis, focusing on the example of the EU and providing a bird’s eye view of extant alternative perspectives on industrial (and competition) policies. The chapter also derives implications in terms of industrial development policies in developing countries.
PART I INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
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From ‘old’ industrial policy to ‘new’ industrial development policies Patrizio Bianchi and Sandrine Labory
Introduction The last 20 years have been characterized by significant changes in productive structures and international competition. The entry of new competitors, such as Japan in the 1980s and China and India more recently; technological changes such as the diffusion of information and telecommunication technologies (ICTs) and scientific breakthroughs such as genetic engineering and the development of biotechnologies; institutional changes such as the deepening of European integration and enlargement of the European Union (EU); social and demographic changes such as the ageing of the population in developed countries; and so on have led to the necessity of structural adjustments so significant as to redesign the economy and the society beyond the boundaries of national states. All these changes imply the definition of new industrial policies, at both national and international levels. In fact, new approaches to industrial policy have been tried out throughout the world, in particular the formulation and implementation of policies ‘from the bottom’ (local or regional), in a context in which the central authorities seem no longer to have the coercion and command powers they used to have. In contrast, old-type industrial policies were direct interventions by the central state in markets to pick winners and support the development of particular sectors. This policy functioned in a context where the national state was indeed the reference. We define industrial policies as a variety of public actions aimed at guiding and controlling the structural transformation process of an economy. The implicit assumption is that the industrialization process is essential for the transformation of the economy as a whole and it is possible to act on this process in order to guide the entire structural change mechanism. Public actions are multiple and varied, ranging from actions defining the rules of the competitive game to actions aimed at favouring the participation and performance of particular individuals and firms in the competitive game (the framework conditions). Industry has the capacity to organize production, mobilizing both tangible and intangible assets, in the sense of using existing assets and creating new necessary assets. Industrial policies therefore concern all productive activities. Industrial policies in this sense originate from the affirmation of the modern state and the emergence of capitalism. It is indeed as capitalism develops that the capacity to organize production, rather than the natural availability of scarce resources, becomes the main determinant of the wealth of nations. However, the rationale for and content of industrial policies has changed greatly since the beginning of capitalism and especially over the last 20 years. The main elements of industrial policies remain the same, namely industrial strategy definition, competition policy and regulation, technological policy, regional and territorial policies, methodological approaches and conceptual analysis. These six main elements constitute the six Parts of the Handbook. The practical experience analysed in the Handbook shows two things. First, there has 3
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been a shift of emphasis of governments towards providing the conditions for business to prosper (especially with the liberal push). Second, these framework conditions do not exclude actions aimed at promoting structural change. In fact, most governments throughout the world (in the EU, in the USA, also in developing countries) adopt measures to define and guarantee the rules of the competitive game (anti-trust, trade policy and WTO rules, and so on), but they also take measures to promote structural change (favouring the creation of resources such as human capital and knowledge and their exploitation). In this way a country’s comparative advantages can be influenced: developing countries have thus built specializations in electronics (Korea, Taiwan) and software (India) after building specializations in heavy and chemical industries (Korea) or consolidating some low technology sectors (Taiwan’s exports were based on labour intensive textile products, they are now concentrated in the man-made fibres’ sector). When the country’s industrial development reaches a certain level (as in some Asian NIEs such as Korea, Taiwan and Singapore or in industrialized countries at their present stage of development), measures aimed at promoting structural change are more concentrated towards the ‘strategic’ industries, that is, high tech industries which require high R&D investments. In this introduction we provide a brief historical overview of industrial policies across the world in order to put the current industrial policies into context, with special emphasis on American and European history. We also identify what emerges out of the Handbook in order to define the new industrial policies. The practical experience examined in the Handbook regards all countries in the world, both developed and developing. We call the new policies, ‘industrial development policies’, not to give yet another new name to old things but in order to stress their dynamic character: they aim at the dynamic adjustment and development of firms and sectors and therefore are not once-and-for-all punctual measures. Rather, they are programmes that evolve over time as conditions change. All chapters in the Handbook stress the importance of dynamics. We aim to raise the most important issues, not to be exhaustive in listing the issues, which would be an impossible task, given the richness of the various contributions to the volume. The present chapter is therefore structured as follows. In the first section we provide a historical analysis of industrial policy in order to outline the evolution of the practice of industrial policies by governments across the world. In the second section we outline the main rationale and contents of the new industrial policies, which we call ‘industrial development policies’ for precise reasons which we explain in more detail. We conclude with some questions and some suggestions for future research. 1 Historical perspective Industrial revolution and the modern state The control of the means of wealth production and political power are always closely linked to each other. However, it is with the birth of capitalism and with the consolidation of the modern state that the terms of the issue takes a new meaning. The English industrial revolution stemmed from an extraordinary convergence of social forces that determined an unprecedented structural break in world history. First of all, there was the construction of a unitary nation with a legislative framework and a management structure that emerged out of centuries of conflict between the growing parliamentary power and the monarchy which increasingly had to recognize human and local communities’ rights. The industrial revolution was itself the expression of a ‘bourgeois’ revolution that
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replaced the king and his divine mandate with a nation and a state. In that nation individuals no longer asserted themselves according to rights derived from ancestors but thanks to the capacity to accumulate wealth sufficient for them to be co-opted in the command system of the society in which they lived. The modern state was asserting itself, as an organization in which political power incorporates and expresses, thanks to explicit assets such as a set of rules, precisely defined roles and resources used to serve a unitary and specific sets of interests and aims (Poggi, 1992, p.33). The upheaval produced by the industrial revolution originated from the simultaneous consolidation of a framework of social governance and of a productive organization that was redesigning the overall organization of society while boosting its development, thereby expanding both resources and rights. We use here Dahrendorf’s analysis of the conflicts of modernity and define development as both the growth of resources and the increase in the rights to participate in the creation and use of resources (Dahrendorf [1987] 1990). The stimulus to trade, to innovation and to the organization of productive forces stems from the possibility to transform this economic tension into effective rights and legitimate political power. In the same manner the wealth of nations rapidly becomes the power of nations and therefore the government stimulates, sustains and promotes the new industry because it is the source of national power (Supple, in Cipolla, 1980, p.285). In this perspective, the political content of the three aspects always underlined in the classical literature on backward development has to be considered: the creation of the large national market, the availability of raw materials of limited costs and the access to capital to be invested in the new productive activities. The creation of a large internal market is necessary for the development of productive organization and for the full use of static and dynamic economies of scale so as to reduce prices and initiate competition against local producers. The creation of a large internal market also requires an organized central state that is able to unify fiscal systems, financial and monetary rules, weight and measure systems and, above all, to stabilize a system of property rights recognition, not only for physical goods, but also for intangible goods. When this internal market is no longer sufficient the expansion of productive forces beyond national boundaries has to be supported; thus, English economic growth starts exerting political pressure on other countries. The availability of raw material stems from the possibility of specifying property rights on lands and licences for the exploitation of the ground, hence on a public good. The availability of investment resources requires both the possibility of transferring resources across sectors, for example from agriculture to the infant industry, and of a cohesion and integration between ruling classes and a capacity to regulate the new financial markets. The expansion of the productive system again requires its international expansion, that necessarily is transformed into a conflict between nations. In this sense the industrial revolution and the consolidation of the modern state are unified in that ‘bourgeois’ revolution that marks the contemporary era. The development of capitalism not only consolidates the modern state, but also opens it beyond its boundaries in a race that assumes in the 19th century the form of imperialism. Imperialism is no longer and only the search for gold and silver in new lands to conquer, as in the Spanish model, or the need for colonization in order to resolve the problem of scarce land, as in
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the case of North America or Australia, but rather a means to guarantee a protected market in which to buy cotton and other raw materials and sell manufactured goods. This trade increases and increasingly becomes unequal between contractors. The extraordinary growth in Britain and subsequently in Germany and France led to the design of a new geography of the power of nations. As argued by Landes (1969), English progress represented an inevitable challenge for continental states. The governments of European states had been considering the development of trade and manufacture as the necessary element to guarantee the wealth of the country through a good trade balance, state wealth through proper fiscal receipts and the wealth of the population through stable and growing employment. All countries encouraged the development of trade and local production, with particular support for arms production. In most cases, however, these activities were realized in craft form and often managed by the state’s structures. As pointed out by Landes (1969), the English revolution introduced new modes of production, productive volumes and product typologies that changed the equilibrium of economic forces, so much so that industrialization was from the start a political imperative for all governments which had to follow the new English industrialists (Landes, 1978, p.183). Accepting English imports would mean being dependent on another country and experiencing a reduction in state income and a rise in unemployment. Facing the English challenge meant forcing industrialization but without the technical knowledge, the financial capital and the commercial networks that the United Kingdom had. Prussia was the most active in this forced industrialization and the King of Prussia implemented, until the unification of the Reich, an active policy of promotion of the new industry, of schools and universities for the diffusion of new technologies and research, such as the Prussian Gewerbeschulen or the Gewerbe Institut of Berlin and the massive obligatory schooling that resulted in a schooling rate of 97 per cent (Landes, 1978, p.447). The King of Prussia urged, or even forced, the local nobility, the powerful Hanseatic communities and the Jewish bourgeoisie to invest in manufacture while the state secured a strong presence through commercial protection, school creation and large orders of mainly warfare and infrastructural material such as railways. In the meantime the king promoted a customs union between Prussian states, the Zollverein of 1831, which significantly contributed to redefining the commercial and political forces in Europe. Economic growth received the same push in France, since the government favoured both the creation of banks and shareholders’ associations (the so-called ‘Caisses’) and a programme of investment in railways and infrastructure. The creation of the Crédit mobilier of the Péreire brothers (1852) represents a significant innovation in investment financing. These banks were rapidly diffused in France, Germany and then over all of Europe and were simultaneously deposit, discount and business banks, with large capacity in booming phases, when deposits were used in industrial investments, thereby producing the necessary liquidity, but an extraordinary fragilility in slump phases when the financial lever inverted and the whole system had no guarantees at its disposal (Gille in Cipola, 1980, p.223). Landes (1978, p.254) argues that ‘the period between 1850 and 1873 was the period in which European industry became adult’. Although English supremacy was maintained by a global orientation, the French, German and, to a lesser extent, Belgian industrial and financial systems were consolidating and needed to expand to the rest of the European continent and to the colonies. In this context, the entry of the United States into the world economy is quite original.
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As explained by David Riccardo at the beginning of the 19th century, the English and European economies were based on the exploitation of lands belonging to landowners who delegated its use to entrepreneurs. The latter used labour compensated at a subsistence level to produce for the market. Therefore, once landlords’ rents and labour wages were paid, profits depended on both the choice of the most efficient techniques of production organization and the extent of the market in which they sold. In such a context the possibility of increasing production depended on the possibility of increasing the extent of the market, hence of exporting outside the country. Therefore the competition between firms became a competition between countries in an international trade model in which each country tries to maintain the competitiveness of its national champions in order not to lose economic and hence political sovereignty. In the new American nation, conditions were different since neither lands nor labour supply were constrained. Therefore the possibility of production was technically without limits since demand expansion was ensured by luring a growing number of consumers or by conquering new territories. In this case dangers are presented by the lack of the risks were rather overcapacity of production or the creation of monopolies. Thus two approaches to industrial development emerge. In the United States, the federal state intervenes to guarantee the rules of the game and at the same time takes actions to sustain demand such as large structural investments or massive military spending. In continental Europe, the national state intervenes to sustain a system with limited dimensions in a competitive game that turns into a competition between nations. The state intervenes in Europe to create agents able to compete internationally or to close the market when local firms are not able to compete against foreign firms; it also tends to nationalize firms in strategic sectors (infrastructure or goods with military applications) in order to protect them from competitive forces. Anti-trust policies and natural monopoly regulation As a consequence of the above considerations, anti-trust policies differ widely between Europe and the USA. While in Europe the economic process was an optimization of limited resources, in the USA the constraint of limited resources did not exist. Economic growth in the USA relied on the initiative of entrepreneurs, the free interaction of whom determined the organizational forms that were adequate to the country’s development, through a Darwinian process. The consolidation of local powers, however, tended to limit this evolutionary process, since the control of all the strategic resources of an area or a sector could lead them to block the entire growth process of the nation. Thus, in the period following the Civil War and the Indian wars, when the geographic expansion of the country ran from the Atlantic to the Pacific oceans, no resistance existed anymore. Therefore strong concentration processes occurred in some crucial sectors such as oil, thereby creating difficulties both for the economy owing to the risk of monopolization by strong industrial trusts and for the state whose legitimacy was based on the free initiative of every citizen. The publication of the Sherman Act in 1890 reflects the importance of the political consolidation of the state against attempts to monopolize the economy. Any attempt to monopolize directly or through agreements between producers is considered as a criminal infringement that directly affects the autonomy of the state and hence one of the cultural pillars of the young American nation.
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Adam Smith had already warned in The Wealth of Nations that monopoly had to be avoided not only because it distorts the allocation of resources but also because the resulting distribution of wealth does not optimize the overall use of existing resources and creates social injustice. Monopoly also generates a feudal constraint between the monopolist, who can discriminate the quantity and prices of goods and the population, which has to consent and cannot give voice and hence has no freedom. The English tradition of Common Law had many cases of contracts that were declared null because they had been realized under a bargaining asymmetry between the contracting parties. In American courts too some cases had resulted in the cancellation of clauses of obligatory buying by exclusive suppliers. The Sherman Anti-trust Act attributed to these norms the value of fundamental law to regulate the entire American economy in its expansion phase. The subsequent Clayton Anti-trust Act of 1914 recognizes that in some cases, however, mergers can strengthen the smaller competitors to the point of making them effective contenders of consolidated incumbents. The prohibition of firms’ agreements had in fact induced the merger of local companies into large national companies that dominated the national market. The subsequent norms of the 1930s and 1950s further influenced the development of these firms, inducing them, first, to form conglomerates covering various fields of activities, so as not to take too dominating a position in specific sectors, and then to internationalize, in order to avoid their strength on the national market being seen as monopoly powers. Anti-trust norms have therefore not only avoided monopolies putting the legitimacy of the central state at risk but also oriented the development of American large firms. The AT&T case is an extreme case of this power of orientation. AT&T was divided into many local companies in order for the regulatory reform of the telecommunications sector to be effectively put in place, and this led to a reorganization of the whole American industrial system. The opening of sectors characterized by a natural monopoly to competition (namely the regulatory reform or liberalization of utilities) also included the air transport sector and had significant effects on the productive organization of the sector, not only in the USA but also worldwide. In the American tradition anti-trust action has been accompanied by actions to sustain demand through public procurement for civil or military uses, especially in sectors characterized by strong technological innovation. Another important element in the USA is the effective role of the financial market in the selection, stimulus and sanction of entrepreneurial initiatives. The crucial element, however, is the realization of a large market where competitive dynamics between subjects who recognize the common regulation imposed by the federal state are ensured. The European industrial history is very different because Europe is characterized by internal markets that are not large enough to guarantee efficient competitive dynamics. Therefore competition is between firms that represent national interests in a conflict between nations. In this context anti-trust policies have been different, if not opposed to American anti-trust. As stressed by Marshall (1919), the emulating race to reach the UK’s level of industrialization led to the promotion of industrial agglomeration processes which in turn resulted in the creation of trusts that were backed by the states. In Germany, the ‘Konzerns’became the instruments of forced industrialization and led to a strong industrial concentration and thus the creation of national champions able to compete against English
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leaders. In Japan, too, the ‘zaibatsus’were supported in order to create national champions. These national champions, however, contributed to the growing rigidity of the economy. This rigidity was of course reinforced by the consolidation of the authoritarian political regimes which progressively transformed the German and Japanese economies into war economies where all economic activities and civil life are subject to the national state. At the end of World War II, competition was introduced into the German economy by the allied forces which controlled the country. The Konzerns such as IG Farben in the chemical sector, or the big groups in the steel and metal sector that had played an important role in the armament of Germany, were broken up. The creation of the Federal Republic that brought together the territories occupied by the American, French and English troops, initiated a phase of economic reconstruction based on the concept of a social market economy. The social market economy was characterized by competition as a reference but with an attention to economic solidarity where even town halls, local states, foundations and trade unions were part of the ownership of firms which progressively reconstructed the big groups that were eliminated at the end of the war. German capitalism took shape within a dense network of public relations and was characterized by strong competitiveness in final productions and strong regulation at source, that is, governed by cross shareholdings through a limited set of large banks. Antitrust norms were implemented only in the 1970s, when the oil crisis created difficulties for the new economic giant and required the temporary admission of crisis cartels in order to face problems in some crucial sectors of the country. Japanese history compares to that of Germany. After the Meiji revolution which took place in the same year that the German Reich was created, 1870, an extraordinary technological and organizational catching up with regard to Western countries started. The feudal economy was rapidly reorganized into large banking and industrial conglomerates, the zaibatsus, that were also broken up by the temporary allied government at the end of World War II and progressively rebuilt in the shape of new industrial export-oriented groups thereafter. The role of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in the orientation and promotion of the strategic convergence between these groups has been widely discussed in the literature. However, the most important aspect is the possibility of reconstructing the groups which had to adopt aggressive commercial policies in order to grow without monopolizing the internal market. In this respect the Italian case is also interesting. Italy was also defeated in World War II and experienced extraordinary growth during the 1950s and 1960s. The industrial development of Italy took place much later than the English one, that is, at the beginning of the 20th century and 40 years after the country’s unification. Prior to the unification, Italy was divided into various states that were too small to allow the development of an efficient industry. Only the north-eastern region of the country had a developed textile industry thanks to its links with the Austro-Hungarian empire. Unification implied the need to develop a heavy industry that could sustain the willingness of the new state to increase power. Economic growth was sustained by public orders of armaments and infrastructure while foreign capital was attracted, first from France and then from Germany, in order to invest in business banks and to develop large firms in the steel and chemical sectors. This system, based on public demand for military goods and on inflation without limits, led to a high growth of firms that, however, remained deeply fragile. After World War I and during the crisis of the 1930s, the system
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collapsed, and in 1933 the state became the owner of a large part of the industry after the rescue of the main large banks and the creation of the Institute for Industrial Reconstruction (Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale, IRI). After World War II, a debate took place on the privatization of IRI, but Italy did not dispose of sufficient capital to acquire the state-owned enterprises. In addition the strategy of export orientation was considered as the best for the country’s development even by a large proportion of private entrepreneurs and required transforming raw material and semi-finished goods, the capital for which only the state could guarantee. A system of symbiosis developed between state-owned enterprises – that produced steel, energy, transport, that is, investment goods – and public companies that produced consumption goods such as cars, fridges, clothing and food. Such a system allowed a long period of growth for the country where capital and raw materials were scarce. The rules characterizing the system remained in place until the 1990s. In the new world and European context a process of massive privatization took place in the 1990s that affected both the banking sector and IRI, which was dissolved in the year 2000. A vast policy of competition guarantee and monopoly regulation was implemented through the creation of a network of independent authorities that regulate the various markets. This policy, however, has left ample margins for concentration in particular in the strategic information sector, thereby generating an anomalous situation of strong concentration of economic and political interests. If the three defeated countries experienced in the immediate post-war years an intense phase of reconstruction followed by an economic boom, the evolution of the victorious countries was more complex, where the economic and political costs of decolonization were added to the cost of reconstruction. The UK, France, the Netherlands and Belgium had to experience in the 1950s a difficult exit from colonialism that had allowed the internationalization of these relatively small countries. In the UK, the first merger and monopoly regulation was implemented in 1948, in a difficult phase of reorganization of the economy. British industry had been formed on the basis of an Empire of worldwide dimensions; it was left with an internal market of reducing dimensions, despite the attempt to create a customs union between the countries of the Commonwealth. The risks of monopolization were therefore high. British industry experienced a long period of decline in which nationalization and privatization alternated and in which the anti-trust norms accompanied a difficult restructuring. The UK’s massive privatization programme of the 1980s was accompanied by a stricter application of anti-trust policy, in particular in the sectors of telecommunications and information. The Broadcasting Act was adopted in 1980 and strictly regulated the propriety of journals and televisions in order to prevent too high a concentration of these sectors affecting not only the competitive but also the political framework. This can be considered as a relevant preoccupation, given the evolution of the Italian situation where the lack of application of anti-trust norms has allowed the major owner of journal and television channels to become the prime minister, thereby intertwining the political and economic powers. In France, following the tradition of control over industrial concentration, the government promoted merger between national firms in order to create national champions able to face the ‘American challenge’.1 After the phase of decolonization and during the 1970s, the French government claimed that the relaunch of the French economy could be realized
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only through support of large firms to the point where they could become dominant and therefore comparable to the American multinationals already present in Europe. This policy has been implemented by governments of different political stripes, sometimes through the nationalization of industry, sometimes using privatization. In this context, anti-trust policy initiated in the 1980s has had the effect of internal monitoring, with the idea that French competitiveness had to be defended primarily on international markets. The new orientation of the European industrial policy The European case is therefore different from the American tradition where market monopolization is a criminal infringement per se. In the European experience, articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome (now articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty) constituted the basis for the action in favour of competition in the European Community. However, these articles essentially provided safeguards of the proper functioning of markets which were being integrated into the new Common Market. Simultaneously, some norms regulating both state aids to industry and dumping were implemented, while state ownership was not regulated at the European level, member states being only obliged to make sure that stateowned enterprises were not favoured on the common market at the expense of other firms. Derogations, however, were permitted and firms’ agreements and state aids were allowed in cases when this would increase the competitiveness of the whole European industry. This common action significantly weakened during the 1970s, when the oil crisis led many large European firms to suffer difficulties and thereby create wider economic and social problems, up to and including political terrorism phenomena in some European countries. Hence public interventions aimed at sustaining industrial reorganization were implemented, much like the policies for industrial reconstruction that were implemented after the crisis of the 1930s and after World War II. These years of the 1970s were also characterized by the progressive decline of state-owned enterprises, in the sense that many of these enterprises became lame ducks, while the interventions used as social buffers during the most difficult years were generating market distortions that could not be sustainable over time. After the most acute phase of the crisis, when the strategies of ‘downsizing’ of many large firms started to bear fruit and when new entrepreneurs emerged, the process of European integration was given new impetus with the idea that it would help the European economy to recover competitiveness. Thus the Single European Act of 1986 and subsequently the Maastricht Treaty implemented in 1993 initiated a new phase of European integration, where the elimination of residual tariff and non-tariff barriers was claimed to be a necessary condition for European firms to be competitive, since the increase in the extent of the market would allow firms to exploit higher economies of scale, to increase in size and to offer European consumers lower prices and higher variety (Cecchini Report, 1985). Simultaneously, the integration of financial markets that had been postponed since the creation of the EEC was progressively started. The relaunch of the integration of European markets implied a wave of mergers and concentrations across European firms. This phenomenon was at the origin of both the more rigorous application of articles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty and the adoption of the Merger and Concentration Regulation in 1990. The regulation in fact gave the European Commission some powers to influence the industrial restructuring process that
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was taking place. In addition to this, both article 90 of the Rome Treaty (on state-owned firms) and article 92 on state aids were implemented more accurately, with important implications such as the decision by the Italian government to realize relatively rapidly a massive privatization of state-owned holding IRI that was agreed by the Italian minister Andreatta and the Commissioner of competition policy Van Myert, who had contested to the Italian government the excessive debt of the IRI and some of its main firms, such as Finsider in the steel sector and Alitalia in the air transport sector. This turning point of European policy led to the reduced focus on the policies that directly supported crisis sectors and that were implemented by national governments in agreement with the European institutions in the 1970s to avoid the decline of key sectors like steel, shipbuilding or sugar and textiles. European Commissioner Davignon had argued in 1970 that it was necessary to preserve the existence of strategic industrial sectors by helping them to rationalize and to renew equipment and buildings. This action, however, could no longer be justified in the second half of the 1980s and in the 1990s, when a new economic and political phase had started. In particular, the crisis of the former Soviet Union was generating a new scenario for Europe. The European Community became the European Union, having changed considerably since its beginning; to the six founding countries a number of new members had been added, from the Northern European states that were members of EFTA to the Southern European states that joined as soon as they turned into democratic regimes. The relaunching of the construction of the European market therefore took place in a new context, that of a Union between countries of varied structural histories and dynamics, instead of the relative homogeneity of the six founders. In this context it was clear that a policy focused on ensuring competition only would have risked not allowing the weakest firms in the Union, especially in the least developed regions and the periphery, to develop, thereby creating a widening gap between the competitive centre of the EU and the increasingly backward periphery. Hence a European structural policy was defined, aimed at favouring the development of marginal areas and their full participation in the competitive dynamics of the EU. In this process, important innovations in terms of methods of industrial development policy were introduced (progressively from the mid-1980s). Structural policies are first characterized by the necessary involvement of all public and private institutions of the concerned area in their formulation. Second, their elaboration requires the definition of development programmes that aim at enabling the territory and its firms to play an active part in the new European market. The definition of such a programme requires a deep analysis of the economic and social reality of the area to identify both the potentialities and the positive externalities (for example, transport infrastructure, schools and so on) that have to be created in order to sustain the development process. Cooperation between local firms also has to be favoured in order to produce the certifications that promote growth, such as quality trademarks for food products or technical standards for mechanical products. Within these programmes some investment aids can be provided after verification that they do not distort the proper functioning of the Single Market. This methodology of programming based on development plans has been diffused throughout Europe, even in the smallest towns. European structural policies have certainly not always been successful, but the successes in Ireland, northern Spain, Portugal,
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and also some areas in southern Italy, show that the large internal market can grow, not only strengthening the most competitive incumbents, but also allowing the entry of new competitors. In addition to the redefinition of territorial policies, the European relaunch has led to a new definition of research and innovation policies. The European Community had based this policy on the heritage of Euratom, which was the union of the six founding countries for the common development of atomic energy. The Euratom Treaty, adopted jointly with the Treaty of Rome, was centred on the institutional obligation to develop research on energy, using a common research centre. Euratom was subsequently merged into the EC treaties, while specific initiatives had been implemented to promote industrial research and innovation in crisis sectors. As a result, a set of varied and often incoherent measures were taken in the field and started to be coordinated within Framework Programmes (starting in 1984). However, the bulk of research and innovation policies were implemented at national level. The Maastricht Treaty subsequently put emphasis on the role of research and innovation in determining competitiveness. This emphasis was amplified in the declaration of the Lisbon strategy at the European Summit of 2000 when the EU heads of state took a strong position in favour of research and innovation to ensure higher competitiveness of European industry and higher levels of employment in Europe. Thus, to a certain extent, a European industrial policy has been defined, but one that is very different from the traditional meaning of the term. The shift of emphasis from declining industries to strategic industries (strategic in the sense of using a generic technology, that is, an advanced technology that has many potential applications to various sectors and that requires large R&D investment) is strong at the beginning of the 1990s, when Commissioner Bangemann publishes a report on industrial policy (the Bangemann Report: European Commission, 1990). In this document, he argues that governments should play the role of pathfinders and catalysts of industrial development. Without going into details (see Chapter 3) the new approach is then formalized in article 130 of the Maastricht Treaty so that for the first time industrial policy is explicitly mentioned in EC Treaties. The industrial policy that has emerged over the years is defined in the Communication, ‘Fostering Structural Change: an Industrial Policy for an Enlarged Europe’.2 This Communication follows the 2002 Communication on ‘Industrial Policy in an Enlarged Europe’3 and the 2003 Communication ‘Some Key Issues in Europe’s Competitiveness – Toward an Integrated Approach’.4 With these Communications the European Union has provided the concept of industrial policy with a new legitimacy, but precisely defining its new contents. In the new approach, industrial policy means a variety of policies aimed at creating an environment that is favourable to industry development. The European Commission recognizes the need for restructuring that most European industry is facing and ‘intends to mobilise industrial policy to accompany the process of industrial change’ (p.2). This industrial policy has three major aspects. The first is to improve the regulatory framework. A number of programmes and measures have been undertaken since the 1990s regarding this aspect, at both European and national level, such as the SLIM programme to simplify legislation and administrative procedures that business has to go through or the BEST programme aimed at benchmarking member states’ actions for SMEs (see Pelkmans et al., 2000; Pelkmans in Chapter 3 of this book). A second aspect refers to
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the ‘synergies between different Community policies having an impact on industry’s competitiveness’ (p.3) that have to be better exploited. Five particular synergies are identified: knowledge (innovation, research, training), functioning of markets (taxation, competition policy), cohesion (regional and employment), sustainable development (in particular eco-sustainable production) and finally an international dimension of industrial policy (to favour the access of Community companies to third countries). A third aspect regards sectoral policies. A return to sectoral policies is not proposed, but a need for adjustment of measures to the specificities of the sectors is suggested. The European Commission thus proposes to ‘ensure firstly a monitoring of the competitive situation of the main industrial sectors and the evolution of the process of structural change’ (p.38). Such monitoring makes it possible to identify the specific problems of each sector and, accordingly, to adapt the industrial policy measures taken at European level (which are horizontal in nature). Hence European industrial policy as defined in the Communications of the Commission is not a return to old-type industrial policy, but is a definition of the new industrial development policies in that it is defined as measures that favour the dynamic adjustment of industry to competitive challenges. This means both ensuring the conditions for business to develop and taking some measures to promote restructuring (development of and access to new technologies, training, access to financing, and so on). As a conclusion, the term ‘industrial policy’ is again legitimate in Europe, but in the precise and new sense of creating an environment favourable to industrial development, given that industry is still largely the main element of development and of European integration. The ultimate aim of industrial policy is economic growth and social stability (mainly through employment), in that it is part of a growth strategy. At European level, these industrial development policies are grouped under the term ‘competitiveness policies’ (see Chapter 3 by Pelkmans), thereby underlining the fact that these policies do not just aim at helping the manufacturing sector but aim at industrial development for economic growth and social stability. This change in perspective is linked to the evolution of the EU, but it has also reflected the dramatic changes that have occurred in the competitive context and that are often summarized as ‘globalization’. It has also been supported by a long and heterogeneous theoretical thinking in economics that has developed since about the mid-1980s. These reflections led to a change in the whole theoretical framework, towards a strong emphasis both on the role of competition and market opening and on the role of regions, cities and more generally the civil society, as well as the role of innovation as an engine of productive transformation. The following section therefore explains the changes in both the competitive context and the theoretical thinking that have led to the definition and implementation of the new industrial development policies. These new policies will be examined below. 2 New industrial development policies Globalization and new industrial policies Globalization is an all-embracing term that scholars and policy makers use to mean different things, from the intensification of worldwide exchanges to the diffusion of information and communication technologies (ICTs) that result in the advent of the ‘knowledge-based economy’.
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According to the present authors it is a term used to mean numerous changes that have occurred in the real economy over the last 20 years and that together have resulted in necessary structural adjustments for firms. The increase in worldwide exchange (be it trade or foreign direct investment, FDI) is not new and has been going on throughout the 20th century; however, it has accelerated in the last two decades (for the evidence, see Audretsch, 2003; Lall, 2004), owing to various factors, including in particular the diffusion of ICTs, the continued pressure for trade liberalization within the GATT and then the WTO and the improvements in financial markets. Lall, in Chapter 4 of this volume, summarizes the changes as ‘the intense pressures created by rapid and inexorable technical change, failing transport and communication costs (shrinking economic distance), widespread liberalisation and the spread of global production networks’. De Bandt argues in Chapter 5 that changes include ‘increased communication at lower costs, increased international flows of production factors (. . .), world-wide dissemination of production facilities and capabilities, continuous and rapid growth of international trade’ and, in developed countries, ‘the ageing of the population’. A last, but not least, factor is the change in the international political landscape, with the end of the division of the world into two blocks that had been taking place since the end of World War II. As a result, new countries have emerged in the international economy, for instance Eastern European countries and China. All these factors imply a progressive change in competitive conditions that we can call ‘globalization’. It means a change in the extent of the market (demand and supply conditions) that has induced the need for firms to adjust. Non-price strategies have to be adopted in most sectors, meaning increasing the differentiation of products by rapid product renewal and production of many varieties. Products incorporate consumer tastes and new technologies so that their knowledge content increases. The most value-creating phases of the production process are no longer those in manufacturing, as in the mass production system, but the phases located just before and after manufacturing, respectively research and product development (pre-manufacturing) and marketing and commercialization (post). As argued by Bianchi and Labory (2004), these phases are also the phases which are most intensive in intangible assets such as knowledge (innovation as a creation of knowledge), human capital, organizational capital (the way the teams of researchers and marketers are organized determines their effectiveness in creating appropriate products) and the social capital (the conventions, norms and values of a society that are expressed in its formal and informal institutions and that make relationships easier, more trusting and more efficient). Hence we agree with De Bandt (Chapter 5 of the present volume) that the structural changes firms face include the design of new production systems. Firms are encountering difficulties in adapting to the changes, for different reasons that De Bandt outlines in his chapter. First, it is difficult to understand ‘what has been really changing, on a permanent basis, and what the implications are’; second, economic actors in general are often reluctant to change; third, the changes that have to be made appear to be very complex and deep, implying a long learning process. This necessity of deep structural changes has led many firms to ask for protection and assistance, which governments have taken seriously, hence the debate on the possible return to old-type industrial policies. The contrast between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ industrial policies should not only be seen in a historical perspective, as above, but also as a debate
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that emerges again each time the relative position of countries weakens with respect to new entrants. As illustrated by Martin and Valbonesi in Chapter 7, the policies of direct subsidies to industry through state aid remain very diffused actions although they are widely recognized as inefficient. The reason is that the social groups affected by the crisis ask governments for direct help. The emergence in particular of China, just as with that of Japan in the 1980s, has implied the re-emergence of a request for protection even in very liberal countries. This request has been seen by some scholars and other observers as a return to old-type industrial policy. However, a return to old-type industrial policies is impossible. Not only, very often, does the competitive framework shaped by the laws and regulation (anti-trust, product and labour regulation and so on) not allow the implementation of such policies, as for instance the EC treaties prohibit such a return in the European Union (see Chapter 3) but also international rules such as those of the WTO do not allow (in general) a government to subsidize its domestic firms at the expense of foreign ones. Hence the debate over whether we are experiencing a return to old-type industrial policies is largely irrelevant. What is relevant is that the challenges brought by globalization as we intend it here have led to the progressive definition of new industrial development policies. Before turning to an explanation of these new policies it is necessary to analyse the change in economic thinking that has been at least partly induced by globalization and that has also been influential in framing the new policies.5 The years of crisis and the renaissance of economic thought The neoliberal revolution which involved, in the 1980s, all the international organizations and all national governments, put an end to the old approach to industrial policy; the new ideology even led to the elimination of the term ‘industrial policy’ from the vocabulary of economists. However, over the same period, a new approach to policies for industrial development was elaborated, which increasingly influenced the actions of both international institutions and national and regional governments. The liberal line of policy was defined as a general reorganization of the economy, centred on the opening of economies, the privatization of state-owned companies and the deregulation of economic activities. The new line was subsequently stylized as the ‘Washington Consensus’ (Stiglitz, 2002). Experience shows that this approach did not function per se; that is, it did not lead obviously to the expected fruits: growth and development. Various chapters of this Handbook show this: Lall in the case of East Asia, Bellandi and di Tommaso regarding local industrial policies in developing countries, Bianchi et al. in the case of SME policies. Evidence is also provided in the Handbook that the liberalization of utilities has not always provided the expected fruit either. Thus Björkroth et al. show that there is neither theoretical nor empirical uncontroversial evidence that the opening of network industries (industries characterized by an essential infrastructure or natural monopoly such as electricity, gas, water supply and so on) has led to lower prices and higher quality, hence higher welfare. Telecommunications, though, is a case apart since the natural monopoly no longer exists thanks to technological innovations in the sector. In this latter case, the effects of the opening to competition have been shown to be largely positive.
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Together with the new liberal prescription, some countries considered both the capacity to stimulate development from below and market forces as the dynamic engine of the economy. This stimulus was realized through two ‘discoveries’, the emphasis of two intellectual and operative fields of thought that had remained at the margin of economic thinking and most of all of political action, namely (a) the role of innovation and research, and (b) the role of the territory and of cooperative clusters of firms. Both approaches have very ancient roots but they really emerged in the 1980s to stimulate more complex economic visions than the ones offered by the existing orthodoxy. Eminent scholars refocused their work on industrial organization dynamics and several policy practitioners pioneered new approaches to local development in an open economy. Growth theories had long been focused on macroeconomic views and the accumulation of physical capital and labour (in the sense of quantity of labour, not quality, that is, skills), such as the famous model of Solow (1956). The oil crisis and the long years of stagnation and inflation determined a strong need to search for the hidden dynamics of growth. Hence growth theory was enriched by the consideration of endogenous factors of growth, mainly technological capital (Romer, 1986,6 1990) and human capital (that is, skills, as in Lucas, 1988). Numerous theoretical and empirical studies have been performed to show the importance of endogenous factors which are essentially countryspecific (for instance, Barro, 1991; Barro and Lee, 1993, show the importance of human capital and public goods in determining growth, while Caballero and Jaffe, 1993, assess the effect of the stock of knowledge and its evolution on growth). The work of Schumpeter was reconsidered together with the development of an evolutionary vision of the economy where the competitive dynamics determine development patterns that are not predictable ex ante but are path-dependent (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi, 1991; Stoneman, 1995; Fagerberg and Verspagen, 2004). Besides this evolutionary approach, a rediscovery of institutions occurred. Institutions include firms and states and are viewed as agents that can act as intermediaries in the relationships between individuals and are able to provide rules that can internalize these conflicts (North, 1990). Firms were viewed again as complex organizations within which contracts have to be organized (Williamson, 1975, 1985; Williamson and Winter, 1993; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) or in which behavioural routines are generated (Nelson and Winter, 1982) and where phenomena of learning and knowledge accumulation have a key role in the growth of firms (Teece et al., 1994; Dosi and Marengo, 1994). These routines ensure the coherence of productive systems within firms and greatly condition the capacity of managers to react to external events and to reply in innovative ways. Within sectors one could observe strategies of differentiation according to the capacity to innovate and therefore to attack competitors in competitive wars that game theory tools allowed to stylize in theoretical analyses (Tirole, 1988; Lambertini, Chapter 20 in this volume), just as the consolidating strategic management corpus was increasingly used in firm management (Porter, 1990). Innovation, first intended as technological change and then extended to also mean organizational transformations and the introduction of new products that change tastes and consumption patterns, is recognized as the engine of structural change and therefore increasingly risks generating monopolistic abuses that tend by nature to block change, with very negative effects on democracy (for instance, Cowling et al., 1999).
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Overall these new theories all point to the complex characteristics of social and economic dynamics that allow a community to improve its capacity to generate surplus, to accumulate wealth and to favour the birth of new firms. This is rather close to the ideas of Hirschman (1963), who argued that development arises as a consequence of disequilibria (p.77) and that industrial development is the engine of economic development. The theory of balanced development (Nurske, 1953; Lewis, 1954) was consolidated in the 1950s and stylized the growth process as the capacity to develop harmoniously the various sectors of the economy, so as to avoid generating disequilibria between demand and supply that could slow the growth process down. Development appears to arise out of a big push on demand operated mainly by the state, together with a careful regulation of imports in order to avoid the new demand being met by foreign, already strong firms, and being met instead by the new local firms. This is close to the theory of infant industry protection first developed by Stuart Mill in the UK and List in Germany. The structuralist approach represented by Myrdal (1957) reached the same conclusion and recommended protection because of the rigidities of the markets in developing countries. These ideas translated into the policy of import substitution implemented in Latin America in the 1950s. This policy consisted in protecting the local firms that produce in the sectors where the country tends to import a high volume of products. This policy led to the development of a number of industrial sectors in Latin America which, however, never managed to gain significant autonomy. As shown by Rodrik (2004) or Chapters 16 and 19 in the case of SME policy, the problem was not that no industrial policy was implemented, since a number of measures such as public ownership, public R&D or subsidized credit were used to support domestic industries; the problem is that industrial policy has not been concerted and coherent. The studies on innovation and technological change, and on science as a generator of new economic development possibilities in a competitive context, have had a significant impact on the political debate both in North America and in Europe. In the USA, the rapid growth of new sectors related to information and communication technology, together with the diffusion of new financial means, determines the emergence of the so-called ‘New Economy’, that leads to the redefinition of the industrial structure of the country, with the emergence of new leaders and the consolidation of new success factors for the business community. Stress is put on both the necessity for government to invest massively in fundamental research (for instance, the genome) or in new communication infrastructure (for instance, the Gore project on information highways) and the local aspects of high-tech and high science sectors’ development (Silicon Valley, Massachussets, Texas), that is, areas of anciently rooted development where the division of labour between university, large firms, high-tech SMEs and the financial system is redefined. In Europe, a new impetus is given to the integration of the European markets and a new emphasis on innovation policy actions that are grouped within Framework Programmes in order to provide some coherence. This approach also emphasizes the necessity of clustering of universities, firms and public institutions across Europe, in order to create transnational networks of innovation and also to consolidate the technical and scientific capacity necessary to spin off new productive activities at local level (see Chapters 13 and 14).
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The need for a public regulation therefore emerges again. In particular, guaranteeing access rights and property rights without limiting competitive dynamics appears to be very important. The new challenges to anti-trust are discussed both in the USA and in Europe. In the USA, the long debate on contestability is back to the fore with spectacular cases such as Eastman Kodak, Microsoft and Intel. Anti-trust policy revives and intensively uses game theory (especially in the case of Eastman Kodak against Image Technical Service in 1992). The emphasis on innovation increases the interest in and attention to the institutions that generate and accumulate innovation, such as universities, the training system and the public and private research centres, and therefore in the rules aimed at promoting, guaranteeing and transferring innovation. The systemic character of these institutions is stressed and innovation systems are defined as sets of public and private, national and local, institutions that design both cooperative and competitive innovative relations (national innovation systems, see Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1992; Metcalfe, 1995). In the same manner the rediscovery of the multiplicity of organizational forms and therefore of the cooperative and competitive relationships that are built between firms induce a necessity to rediscover the territory as a social and cultural support for clusters that, in order to be stable, require constraints of trust that cannot be summarized in price negotiations only. During the uncertainty and the problems of the 1980s, indeed, the crisis of large firms led to the emergence of new organizational models. Models of quasi-markets were rediscovered, where groups of firms bounded by trust constraints acted on highly innovative and flexible dynamics (Piore and Sabel, 1984). The analysis of Italian industrial districts points to cultural and social parameters as determining the strength and the advantages of the linkages existing between the firms in highly innovative production systems (Becattini, 1979, 1990, 2002; Brusco, 1982, 1989); the same analysis is extended to very dynamic contexts such as the film industry (Storper, 1997) and is used in taxonomies of clusters which exist in very diverse environments (Porter 1998a, 1998b). Both discoveries give importance to the historical context in which economic relations are built. A new evolutionary political economy approach pays more and more attention to the social dynamics which support economic change (Amin and Thrift, 1994). A new economic geography redesigns the relationships between countries, raising issues that seemed forgotten, such as the difference between a nation and a region (Krugman, 1995). The debate on regional development merges with the debate on local development and a new vision emerges whereby not only firms but also territories are in competition in the global economy. The importance of productive clusters in the competitiveness of territories is pointed out and discussion therefore focuses on the ways to create agglomerations where the historical conditions have not endogenously generated these productive organizational forms. The importance of the coherence between the decentralized industrial policies and the policy framework provided by the state is also stressed (Bianchi, 1994; Bianchi et al., 1998). The two discoveries mentioned above also give importance, once again, to the organization of production as the unit of analysis of industrial economics, hence the attention to industrial organization (Tirole, 1988; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). The 1980s and the 1990s therefore seemed to be years in which the consolidation of the neomarginalist orthodoxy was reducing economic analysis to abstract and stylized
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forms, whereas in fact this new orthodoxy was providing new vigour and strength to a new thinking on society and industrial organization. In fact, here again, the evolution of the real economy was driving changes in intellectual approaches. The new industrial development policies and the role of the state The experience of industrial policy practice around the world reviewed in the Handbook, show that the new approach to industrial policy that has emerged in the EU can be generalized. The new industrial development policies consist in a variety of measures that aim at favouring firms’ structural adjustment and helping the development of new sectors. For this purpose, the conditions (framework) for business has to be built and function well, but the government can also play a role of ‘pathfinder’, ‘catalyst’ (European Commission, 1990) or of ‘athlete’, ‘coach’ and ‘referee’ (Chu et al., 2001), according to the stage of development of the country. Chapter 4 shows that East Asian governments were very active in orientating and promoting development at early stages (building institutions, rules and markets, and favouring the growth of specific sectors by concentrating resources there). As development proceeds, however, governments become ‘coach’, that is, ensure rules and adapt more horizontal (functional) measures, that apply to the whole industry and are not specific to some sectors. Both developed and developing countries implement measures to favour the development of high-tech sectors which are considered as ‘strategic’ in terms of growth potential and spillovers to other industries (R&D programmes with subsidies, creation of research institutions, science parks, and so on; training of scientists and engineers; public orders; and so on). Both developed and developing countries also support weaker actors, namely SMEs (see Chapter 19) or specific territories that may be backward (Chapters 16 and 17) and also crisis sectors. State aids, in the form essentially of subsidies, although inefficient from an economic point of view and illegal in most countries, are still widely used (see Chapter 7 on the cases of the EU and the USA). The various measures can be grouped into two broad types, rules and capabilities. Rules represent the interventions that design the institutional set-up of the system, the rules of the competitive game. They include anti-trust legislation, regulation of sectors (network industries or utilities in particular), protection of intellectual property rights, regulation of products and regulation of labour markets. Regarding anti-trust, a number of issues emerge among which the consideration of dynamics in cases. Both Chapters 6 and 8 highlight this point. As shown by these chapters and by Chapters 20 and 21, game theory has been essential in providing a rigorous tool on which to base judgments. The development of the dynamic game-theoretical framework appears to be promising in allowing us to take market dynamics into account, although more research is needed, as stressed by Cellini and Lambertini. Alternatives to traditional intellectual property protection such as patents are being developed, in particular the open source model (Chapters 11 and 12). This model is based on a particular juridical tool, namely the ‘General Public Licence’ or GPL, whose principle is to persuade its adopters to disclose the source code of the concerned programmes and of any further improvement if they circulate them, as well as the free circulation of the code under the sole condition of maintaining its ‘open’ character. New knowledge is immediately available in the public domain, but any agent that uses it has also to make his
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inventions available publicly. As stressed by Jullien and Zimmermann, the GPL model favours the constitution of collective knowledge creation, which is essential in the globalized or intangible world as we intend it. Capabilities are actions aimed at providing economic agents with the capacity to take part and perform well in the competitive game. They represent the way in which collective mechanisms for the definition of growth opportunities are activated. They are actions aimed at favouring the availability of tangible (finance, infrastructure, and so on) and, especially, intangible assets (knowledge, human capital): policies to develop human capital, to create knowledge; that is, to innovate. They are implemented at various levels: local because linkages appear to be better created at the local level (see Chapter 17), but also at a higher level because they are spillovers and economies of scale to be realized (R&D, human capital mobility and so on). Coherence between the various measures and between the various levels is provided in part by creating linkages between various agents aimed at generating the conditions for growth of an entire production system. If therefore the definition of ‘industry’ is again the organization of production, the industry nowadays increasingly involves integration between manufacture and services, because the creation of value is increasingly determined by intangible assets related to knowledge, as we stressed above and as De Bandt develops in detail in Chapter 5. Therefore service activities and in particular information services are essential for development because they make a bridge between diverse activities thanks to the transfer of knowledge between sectors (Chapter 5). Business support services are important in contexts in which new productive firms are clustering, although evidence on their effective implementation and on their effect is hard to find (Chapter 18). The increasing importance of intangible assets is even greater in high-tech sectors, where innovation is linked to basic research, such as the life science sectors (Chapter 15) or ICTs (Chapters 11, 12 and 13). These sectors have represented a focus of the new industrial development policies because they are a major source of growth and competitiveness, as Giarratana and Torrisi stress. In these sectors, the capacity to generate intangible assets is primarily determined by territorial clusters and linkages (Chapters 13 and 14). Knowledge has been shown to be more effectively communicated and created in local networks, especially when knowledge is of the tacit (non-codified) kind. The deep reason for this effectiveness appears to be the embeddedness of relationships into local communities, that share norms and values (social capital) that ease communication. The importance of the embeddedness of industrial activities in territories is also stressed in Chapter 17. The importance of networking for innovation and knowledge diffusion recognized by policy makers and realized in implemented policies has also taken the form of promoting relationships between all actors of innovation systems, including universities and other research centres and institutions of various types. The role of universities has changed profoundly over the last 20 years. From being essentially providers of knowledge to students, universities have taken an active role in knowledge creation and diffusion, building relationships with firms in order to understand their competence requirements and also commercializing innovation through spin-offs. University spin-offs have indeed been an important and increasing phenomenon (Chapter 13). The end of the political division of the world into two blocks and the entry of new large countries in the worldwide competitive arena and integration processes of large areas such
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as Europe have led not only to the redefinition of the extent of the market on which firms compete, but also to the redesigning of the frontiers of the state and therefore the extent of the rules within which firms could define their strategies. Globalization is therefore not only the intensification of exchange within an increasingly integrated world economy, but also a complete change in the reference values that structured the world economy from the end of World War II onwards. The declining possibility of the state to act as the ultimate reference of sovereignty implies the emergence of new subjects able to formulate and implement industrial development policies: the cities, the regional governments and the international agencies. Hence a multiple consensus has to be found in order to formulate and implement policies that concern firms that are localized in territories with historical specificities but open to international competition. Policy making is no longer an action decided by a central government to limit or subsidize individual behaviour but rather a programme that involves all the institutions of a territory and that is aimed at consolidating an environment able to increase the collective competitiveness and therefore to stimulate the latent innovation capacity. It addresses the dynamics of the economy by aiming at favouring the development of industry and its structural adjustment when needed. Rodrik (2004) in a similar way argues that ‘the right model of industrial policy is not that of an autonomous government applying Pigovian taxes or subsidies, but of a strategic collaboration between the private sector and government with the aim of uncovering where the most significant obstacles to restructuring lie and what types of intervention are most likely to remove them’ (p.3). The role of local and regional administrations therefore changes. They were subordinates to the national and central level; they are now active in the decision making of policies aimed at attracting investment and at developing the local endowment of intangible assets (human capital and knowledge). Thus globalization is characterized not only by the intensification of competition between firms, but also by the competition between territories and between production systems. Hence the rich local dimensions of industrial policy, as stressed by di Tommaso and Bellandi in their chapter. It appears that, initially, in the late 1980s and 1990s, decentralization of industrial development policies was advocated (essentially by scholars, but also by some international organizations such as UNIDO) as being the best solution to foster development or help developed countries resolve their competitiveness problems (Europe in particular). Hence ‘bottom-up’ approaches were advocated, where action was essentially at local level while the national level (or above) would coordinate actions and favour the exchange of information and experiences across territories (Bianchi et al., 1998). The chapters of the Handbook show that in practice actions at local level have been widely implemented but without sufficient centralization: Sepulveda and Amin (Chapter 16) show this for the case of Argentina; Lall (Chapter 4) shows that the most successful East Asian countries have been those that have implemented national strategies or programmes aimed at the development of the country and including some local actions too (for instance, orchid production in Taiwan, discussed by Rodrik, 2004). Chapter 14 also raises the question of the impact of locally limited experiences such as science parks on the rest of the economy and argues that the diffusion of global production and value creation processes implies the need to favour the integration of local experiences into such global chains. The old-type policies are not entirely abandoned either. As we stressed earlier on, it appears that protectionist policies are effective at some stages of development. State
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ownership has also been extensively used in both developed and developing countries at industrialization stages (or reconstruction for the latter states), as shown in Chapter 10 and as shown by the historical review of industrial policy in the first part of this chapter. A country’s specializations are therefore not determined by a given resource endowment only; they are also determined by learning processes and by competencies that are developed mainly at local levels (capabilities to develop own intangible assets and to attract intangible assets such as knowledge and technology, and human capital), and that can be favoured by government’s policy, as shown in Chapter 2, by Arora and Gambardella. Arora and Gambardella show in Chapter 2 that the policies implemented in India in the area of Bangalore (but also in four other countries, Brazil, China, Ireland and Israel) in the software sector have brought positive effects not only locally but also in the USA, because they have stimulated the competition between firms and the cooperation between institutions inducing human capital mobility that has accelerated the diffusion of knowledge and therefore of innovation. In this example the industrial development policies implemented by developing countries aimed at high-skill and high-tech sectors have changed the international competitive advantages, at the expense of Europe, which does not seem to be fully aware of this dynamics. As a consequence, globalization (as defined here) implies the irrelevance of the old debate on industrial policy and the definition of industry. The new industrial policies are actions that governments implement in order both to define the rules and to help develop capabilities. Thus, for example, in the EU, the new approach to policy outlined earlier (pp.12–14) aims at providing the appropriate framework for business to be competitive, and this means both providing the rules (anti-trust, property rights) and also implementing structural policies that help backward regions and weaker actors (such as SMEs) to develop appropriate capabilities. Structural policies also include the important actions that help the creation and diffusion of knowledge (technology and research policies). The new industrial policies are therefore effective in generating the growth of developing countries. Thus Lall in Chapter 4, shows that what we learn from the East Asian experience is that the development process accelerates only if the industrial core of the country can be made dynamic. This occurs with national and concerted programmes. Many countries in Latin America have had difficulties. Chapter 19 shows that, at least concerning SMEs, the problem with Latin America is not that no industrial policies have been implemented, but that they have been implemented incoherently, as they were not part of a national strategy of industrial development. Chapter 16 also shows in the case of Argentina the lack of action at the national level that undermines the effect of local industrial development policies. As pointed out by Rodrik (2004), ‘the challenge in developing countries is not to rediscover industrial policy, but to redeploy it in an effective manner’ (p.5). There has been a debate on whether industrial policy has determined the rapid development of East Asian economies such as Taiwan, Korea and Singapore. The debate has focused on the role of selective industrial policies (specific to sectors), as shown by Chang (2001). Our definition of industrial development policies implies a new view of the debate: what is relevant is not whether selective or functional policies are useful but what is the appropriate mix of measures to determine industrial development. Industrial development
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policies are programmes or strategies consisting of a variety of measures (both rules and capabilities), the mix of which is specific to a country’s conditions and historical experience. Conclusions Industrial policy is a field of economic research which is and has long been very rich in approaches, methods and empirical fields of observation. Both the practical experience in countries in all parts of the world and the literature reviewed in the Handbook show the richness of the field and the fertility of research. What emerges from the present volume and from our historical analysis can be summarized in two major points. First, ‘globalization’ has led to the definition and implementation of new industrial development policies, where globalization is considered as the numerous economic, technological and political changes that have occurred over the last 20 years or so. These changes have induced a change in the extent of the market of many firms, that is, of competitive conditions, that have implied their necessary restructuring to adapt to changes. Firms have often called for industrial policies in order to help these adaptations. Second, the industrial policies defined nowadays do not represent a return to the old-type industrial policies that aimed at picking winners and directly intervening in markets to correct once and for all market failures. The ‘new’ industrial policies consist of large sets of measures that aim at providing the appropriate framework for industrial development to take place, via both the creation of firms and sectors (creation of comparative advantages) and the structural change of existing firms (structural change). This does not mean, however, that old-type industrial policies have completely disappeared. The amounts of state aid spent by governments throughout the world show that direct support is still there. In addition, it appears that old-type industrial policies are particularly useful at earlier stages of development. The difficulty for governments nowadays is to define the set of measures in coherent ways, so that their effects converge towards the same point. Coherence involves two aspects. First, there is coherence between the various measures, that is, measures defining rules and measures promoting the development of capabilities, so that the whole is a synthesis of the various actions rather than a sum where interaction effects are not taken into account. Second, coherence must also be ensured between the different levels of intervention, namely local, regional, national and supranational. The trade-offs between the costs and benefits of centralization have been identified for a long time (see Neven and Röller, 2000), but without considering both the complexity of the new production systems and the creation of global value creation processes (as stressed by Annerstedt in his chapter). We have shown in the present chapter that a clear tendency of industrial development policies has been to ‘go local’, but the importance of centralization to guide structural changes and ensure spillovers between local experiences has been too often neglected (both in the case of policies in developing countries and in the case of innovation and knowledge diffusion policies). Consistency over time is also essential. Another difficulty is that these sets of measures that constitute coherent programmes or strategies have to be constantly adapted because industrial development is inherently a dynamic process. The need to take account of dynamics is thus stressed in many chapters of the present volume, from those on anti-trust (Chapters 6 and 8) to those on territories (Chapters 17 and 19) and science, technology and innovation policies (Chapter 14).
‘Old’ industrial policy to ‘new’ industrial development policies
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Overall, we suggest below a (non-exhaustive) number of issues that emerge out of the Handbook. First, developed and developing countries face different problems but with globalization the solutions to problems (the industrial policy measures) are increasingly related (global production systems; exchange of human capital and other complementary intangible assests). Second, there does not appear to exist a general recipe for industrial development; the mix of measures must be adapted to a country’s conditions (availability of resources, stage of development) and historical experience. Third, measures are implemented at various levels of government and more research is needed on how consistency is ensured. Fourth, evaluation of policies is a field of research that has to be developed. Often politicians do not like it since it may criticize some of the policies they have adopted and financed (hence they do not fund evaluation studies); evaluation is in any case a difficult exercise. Fifth, there are many approaches to industrial economics: neoclassical, evolutionary, . . .; all seems to converge in putting the production system at the centre of the analysis and in claiming that a dynamic view is needed. The need to take dynamics into account is (implicitly or explicitly) outlined for example in Chapters 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12, 14, 19, 20 and 21. The new industrial development policies are therefore essentially pragmatic. They consist in developing a national programme of industrial development within which local actions are defined, involving all the actors concerned, such as business, universities and other institutions. They are thus no longer specific actions aimed at specific market failures, because market failures are often too difficult to identify and to resolve (information required is complex and incomplete or too many factors are at play to determine with any degree of precision the right level of tax or subsidies). They do not aim at ‘picking the winners’ either, because winners often come out of random evolutionary processes that are impossible to predict. They aim at favouring the development of industrial sectors and the dynamic adjustment of firms to competitive conditions by providing both rules and capabilities. Industrial development policies are generally horizontal (applying to all sectors) but are also vertical in some instance: sectors have specificities and policies have to be adapted to these specificities. These policies therefore comprise a variety of measures, all aiming at providing the appropriate framework for industrial development, and the main problem of policy makers is to ensure coherence. The experience reviewed in the various chapters of the Handbook shows that the best performing countries in terms of development and growth are those where the governments elaborate and implement coherent development strategies or programmes, such as Korea and Taiwan in South East Asia. We think that future research on industrial policy should focus on the above issues and particularly on the issue of how to ensure the coherence and consistency of industrial development policies. Notes 1. This expression is the title of a book published by a French journalist and that became very famous, Le Défi Américain (The American Challenge), in 1969. 2. COM(2004) 274 final, 20.04.2004, Brussels. 3. COM(2002) 714 final, 11.12.2002, Brussels. 4. COM(2003) 704 final, 21.11.2003, Brussels.
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5. Such influence is also demonstrated by Pitelis in Chapter 22 of this volume. 6. This is a seminal paper of endogenous growth theory.
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Landes, D.S. (1969), The Unbound Prometheus, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Landes, D.S. (1978), Prometeo liberato. Trasformazioni tecnologiche e sviluppo industriale nell’Europa occidentale dal 1750 ai giorni nostri, Milan: Einaudi (Italian translation of Landes, 1969). Lewis, W.A. (1954), ‘Economic development with unlimited supplies of labour’, Manchester School, XXII, 139–91. Lucas, R.E. (1988), ‘On the mechanics of economic development’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 22, 3–42. Lundvall, B.A. (ed.) (1992), National System of Innovation. Towards a Theory of Innovation and Interactive Learning, London: Pinter. Marshall, A. (1919), Industry and Trade, London: Macmillan. Metcalfe, S. (1995), ‘The economic foundations of technological policy. Equilibrium and evolutionary perspectives’, in P. Stoneman (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Innovation and Technological Change, Oxford: Blackwell. Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1992), Economics, Organisation and Management, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall. Myrdal, G. (1957), Asian Drama: an Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations and the Challenge of World Poverty, Allen Lane: The Penguin Press (1968). Nelson, R.R. and S.G. Winter (1982), An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Neven, D. and L-H. Röller (2000), The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in Europe and the Member States, Berlin: Edition Sigma. North, D. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Nurske, R. (1953), Problems of Capital Formation in Developing Countries, Oxford: Blackwell. Pelkmans, J., S. Labory and G. Majone (2000), ‘Better EU regulatory quality: assessing current initiatives and new proposals’, in G. Galli and J. Pelkmans (eds), Regulatory Reform and Competitiveness in Europe, vol. I, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar. Piore, M. and C. Sabel (1984), The second industrial divide, New York: Basic Books. Poggi, G. (1992), Lo Stato, Bologna: Il Mulino. Porter, M. (1990), The Competitive Advantage of Nations, London: Macmillan. Porter, M. (1998a), ‘Location, clusters and the “new” microeconomics of competition’, Business Economics, 33(1), 7–17. Porter, M. (1998b), ‘Clusters and new economics of competitiveness’, Harvard Business Review, December, 77–90. Rodrik, D. (2004), ‘Industrial policy for the 21st century’, paper prepared for UNIDO. Romer, P. (1986), ‘Increasing returns and long-run growth’, Journal of Political Economy, 94, 1002–37. Romer, P. (1990), ‘Endogenous technical change’, Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), S71–S102. Solow, R.M. (1956), ‘A contribution to economic growth theory’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70(1), 65–94. Stiglitz, J.E. (2002), Globalization and Its Discontents, New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company. Stoneman, P. (ed.) (1995), Handbook of the Economics of Innovation and Technological Change, Oxford: Blackwell. Storper, M. (1997), The Regional World: Territorial Development in a Global Economy, New York: Guilford Press. Teece, D.J., R. Rumelt, G. Dosi and S. Winter (1994), ‘Understanding corporate coherence: theory and evidence’, Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation, 23, 1–30. Tirole, J. (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organisation, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Williamson, O. (1975), Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New York: The Free Press. Williamson, O. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: The Free Press. Williamson, O. and S.G. Winter (eds) (1993), The Nature of the Firm. Origins, Evolution and Development, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2
Emerging issues in the new economy and globalization Ashish Arora and Alfonso Gambardella
1 Introduction The 1990s have raised new issues for industrial development, and hence for industrial policy, following the opportunities opened up by information technology (IT) and the socalled ‘new economy’. In this chapter we look at one phenomenon observed at the global level which we employ as a case for discussing some broader questions. This is significant growth of software production in some emerging economies. Its peculiarity is that such a spectacular development has occurred in regions where one would have hardly predicted the rise of human capital-intensive activities. We will discuss software growth in five countries – Brazil, China, India, Ireland and Israel – following a two-year research that we coordinated on this topic (Arora and Gambardella, 2005a). As we shall see, the phenomenon is certainly striking. For example, a country like India had practically no software production in the late 1980s and it is now a leading world exporter in this industry. Most importantly, the story of software growth in these regions exemplifies some relevant new questions for industrial development and policy. As a basis of our analysis we rely on some recent innovative contributions on industrial policy and related subjects. Gomory and Baumol (2000) have argued that the theory of comparative advantages, as a basis for understanding trade and specialization across countries, is at best indeterminate. We will discuss their contention that, even if we restrict the potential specializations of a country or region to fields in which they have comparative advantages, we are still left with so many options that it is difficult to predict where the country or region will actually specialize. Rodrik (2004) and Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) make a similar point. They too argue that there are many potential outcomes of the search for the right specialization. Therefore a country or a region has to single out its own specializations or comparative advantage through a process of ‘self-discovery’. By the latter they mean that the country or region has to find out its profitable industries or opportunities by experimenting with different potential fields through entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial search. Finally, we adopt Klepper’s (2004) perspective that a good deal of the competencies to form new industries or areas of activities arise from previous capabilities in similar realms. That is, the process of industrial development is not made of jumps and discontinuities. New successful industries or firms arise from previous successful industries or firms through related diversification. In this respect Klepper’s framework also suggests that the competencies created within firms, and particularly within successful firms, play a notable role in fostering industrial growth. Against this background our software industry stories enable us to discuss three issues in the context of the new economy and globalization. First, the growth of the software industry in our five countries hits head-on the widely debated topic of outsourcing. The fear of job and competitiveness loss in the advanced countries, along with other consid28
Emerging issues in the new economy and globalization 29 erations, means that the subject is ripe for a better understanding of the industrial policy implications for both the advanced and the developing economies. Second, our stories illustrate some effects of the growth in the supply of human capital in some developing economies and the implications for the developed world. We will discuss industrial policy on this subject for both the advanced and the developing countries. Finally, we compare the potential responses of the USA and Europe. We will argue that not only does the USA appear to be better fortified to cope with the growth of human capital-intensive activities in developing economies, but it is also better equipped to take advantage of fruitful complementarities with them. Our conclusions will provide additional remarks about the industrial policy consequences that arise from these three issues, by taking the Hausmann–Rodrik, Gomory–Baumol and Klepper frameworks and using them to elaborate on potential policy actions in this context. The next section briefly presents the Gomory–Baumol, Hausmann–Rodrik and Klepper frameworks. Section 3 illustrates the spectacular development of software in our five countries. Section 4 discusses whether these patterns are beneficial for the advanced economies and particularly for the USA and Europe. Section 5 examines whether they are beneficial for the developing countries. Section 6 concludes by discussing emerging industrial policy implications and some related actions. 2 Industrial policy for the 21st century Gomory and Baumol (2000) argue that the industrial specializations of countries in the 21st century are no longer based on natural endowments, but are determined by processes of learning, education and so on. This produces a fundamental novelty. When the domestic specializations depended on the endowment of immobile resources, there was a relatively narrow range of activities that could be effectively developed: those that were gauged by the resource endowments. By contrast, if the specializations depend on learning, the acquisition of skills and other factors that are not tied to what is available locally, many more activities can be developed. For example, a country rich in some mineral resource can become an international specialist in its extraction and possibly in industrial productions that make use of it. But when specializations are acquired via learning, education or skills, there is no reason to confine the country’s trajectories in one direction or another. In principle, anything can be learned. This influences the benefits of the trade relations between countries. The question that Gomory and Baumol ask is how a country will be affected if a trading partner becomes more productive in a given industry. They argue that, if a country produces a vast range of goods compared to its trade partner, both the country and the partner will gain. This is because the countries can have very heterogeneous productivity levels across industries. Hence, if a country produces many goods, it will allocate resources to industries in which it is very productive but also to industries in which it is not productive. This is inefficient because the country has to ‘waste’ some of its resources in industries in which it is not productive. If the partner becomes more productive in some domain, there is a chance that it will be in one of the activities in which the former country is not productive. The first country will then buy the good from the partner, will redeploy the saved resources onto domestic activities in which it is more productive and may gain additional efficiency because of its greater specialization. The trade partner will of course gain because it has become more productive in some of its industries.
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By contrast, if the trading partners are already quite specialized, already focus on the industries in which they are most productive, sell these goods both domestically and to the other country and buy the other goods from the latter, then an increase in the productivity of the partner in an industry in which the original country is operating can hurt it. This is because, if the first country now buys from the more productive partner, or the more productive partner produces for its domestic market and no longer resorts to the other country, the latter loses domestic industrial activities in which it employed resources efficiently. As resources are moved to the remaining domestic industries, the advantages from the increase in specialization are minor because at the aggregate level the gains from specialization were already high. Moreover, because the deployed resources were allocated productively, the gains from the additional specialization have to be high in order to compensate for the lost productivity of the very same resources. Thus Gomory and Baumol argue that, when two countries are unbalanced in terms of levels of growth and international trade volumes, they can both gain if the less advanced partner becomes more productive in some activities. By contrast, if two countries are at a comparable level of development, then, as a country becomes more productive, it will gain at the expense of the other. Put simply, an advanced nation gains from a more productive developing country partner, but there will be conflicts between two advanced countries if one of them becomes more productive in some activity. A key aspect of Gomory and Baumol’s argument is that the particular industries in which the countries specialize are hard to predict ex ante. Like Gomory and Baumol, Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) note that what makes the new industries unpredictable is that, unlike resource endowments, assets like learning or competencies (technological, organizational, managerial) can be applied to many realms. Comparative advantages do not disappear. For example, we shall see that the success of the Indian software industry rests in part on its wide supply of university graduates. But comparative advantages define at best a (large) set of potential specializations. The specializations that are actually pursued cannot be easily singled out. In principle, there were many potential areas where a human capital-intensive production, based on a large supply of academic graduates, could be fruitfully employed in India. Likewise, Hausmann and Rodrik ask why Bangladesh exports garments such as hats but not bed sheets, while Pakistan exports bed sheets but not hats. More generally, they point out that in developing countries the bulk of exports consist of a narrow range of products. Typically, a small proportion of products account for 60–80 per cent of their total exports. The authors then note that, as the Bangladesh–Pakistan example illustrates, similar countries end up specializing in different products within similar industrial activities and the specific products in which they specialize cannot be predicted by comparative advantages. According to Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) and Rodrik (2004), the way in which a country can find out its specializations is by a process of self-discovery or experimentation. This means encouraging entrepreneurship. In a very Schumpeterian way, they think of entrepreneurs as individuals who try new avenues, experiment with new industrial activities, produce innovations and so on. Moreover, by encouraging a large number of trials (via many entrepreneurs) society as a whole can experiment with many trajectories and find out which trajectories are more fruitful than others. The problem is that the private returns of the entrepreneurs are lower than those of the society. This is because, even if the entrepreneurs fail, society can gain. For example, failure provides information
Emerging issues in the new economy and globalization 31 that an industrial activity is unsuccessful or very costly and therefore advises others not to pursue it. Also entrepreneurial failures may nonetheless entail production of valid learning, information and the like, which may benefit second-comers. Thus, while entrepreneurship is the way to discover one’s specializations, it may be undersupplied, a point also made by Levinthal and March (1993). Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) and particularly Rodrik (2004) thus maintain that a key element of an ‘industrial policy for the twenty-first century’ is to support entrepreneurship in the search for successful specializations. Once the specializations are discovered, society will invest larger scale resources in them. This no longer requires industrial policy interventions because, if a direction proves to be successful, the private incentives to invest will be high enough and most likely not lower than those of the society as a whole. The key support, as Rodrik (2004) notes, is on discovery/experimentation, not on exploitation once the discovery is made.1 One potentially misleading feature of Hausmann and Rodrik’s framework is that the successful set of activities for a country is exogenously specified, awaiting discovery by a lucky entrepreneur. Klepper’s (2004) argument suggests that the successful specializations typically arise from related activities in which a country or a region has been successful in the past. To be sure there is a clarification to be made here. Hausmann and Rodrik think primarily of developing countries and particularly of countries in which there has been little or no previous industrialization. Their story is, then, one in which the countries have to find out their specialization, starting almost from scratch. By contrast, Klepper studies the rise of new industries in the developed world, where a good deal of industrial activities has been present for many years. To reconcile these views, and to clarify our perspective, the more a region is poor and industrially underdeveloped the more one expects the successful avenues to be exogenously determined because there are no previous comptencies on which to build. But if there are pre-existing competencies, one expects them to affect the rise of new opportunities. In this respect the pre-existence of competencies does not mean that the realm of activities is more restricted, as with given resource endowment. For one reason, as we shall also see from Klepper’s industry examples below, the reliance on previous competencies is not the same as similarity in products. Competencies are often general with respect to specific products, industries or activities. For example, competencies in organizing and managing firms or basic technological competencies can be applied to many fields. Moreover, competencies are a source of innovation, not just technological but also entrepreneurial. They are the basis for discovering new industries and product opportunities and for opening up new fields or activities. This is exemplified by Klepper’s stories on the genesis of four major US industries: TV receivers, automobiles, tyres and lasers.2 Klepper collected systematic data on the origins of the early firms in these industries and the evolution of firms and industries for some decades after the industries birth. The successful TV producers arose as a process of diversification from the leading US radio producers. The early automobile and tyre producers also emerged as diversifiers from related industries (for example, carriage and wagons or bicycles for cars and rubber for tyres). But in these two cases the successful producers that emerged soon after the birth of the industry were spin-offs from early successful car and tyre makers. This is not a contradiction of our more general point. Whether the new industries come from diversifiers or from successful early entrants, our point is that the pre-existence of competencies is an important factor in determining the directions of future specializations.
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There are some related remarks. First, Klepper emphasizes that the successful motor or tyre spin-offs or the successful TV producers came from successful motor or tyre firms or successful radio producers. That is, it is the successful firms, which hoard successful competencies, that spawn successful new competencies and therefore successful new firms or industries. In other words, it is not the presence of an industry or firms per se but of successful industries or firms that has to be looked for as a source of new industrial specializations. Second, Klepper shows that these patterns explain the location of industries. Because new firms arise from existing competencies, it is most natural to expect that they will locate where the parent competencies were located. Finally, the laser industry exhibits a slightly different pattern in that it remained fragmented over time and did not experience a shake-out leading to concentration in a few firms after some time. Klepper explains this by the fact that laser as a product is highly differentiated, suggesting that it relies on distinct submarkets. This entailed several sources of differentiated competencies with no drive for concentrating them in few firms. Relatedly, this did not lead to geographic concentration because the industry was scattered geographically when it started and it remained pretty much so because there was no force pushing for its convergence. Nonetheless, many successful laser firms did emerge as spin-offs of successful parents. 3 The software industry in Brazil, China, India, Ireland and Israel Basic facts During the 1990s, India, Ireland and Israel emerged as significant software exporters. In the same period, Brazil and China also developed an extensive software sector relying largely on their domestic market and they are now attempting to move to exports. Table 2.1 reports some estimates of the growth rates of the software industry in these countries and of their export shares. The table documents the spectacular growth of the industry in these countries and confirms that, while the 3Is (India, Ireland and Israel) rely on exports, Brazil and China have exploited their large domestic markets. Table 2.2 shows some additional figures for these countries and, by way of comparison, for the three leading software producers in the advanced world: the USA, Germany and Japan. From Table 2.2, the industry in our five countries is sizable, even though still smaller than in the three advanced nations. The success of the industry in the 3Is, Brazil and China is implied by the fact that they were non-existent in the late 1980s. Thus an industry of the size observed today was formed over a decade or so. This is the consequence not only of the high Table 2.1 Countries Brazil China India Ireland Israel
Brazil, China and the 3Is: software industry growth and export shares Average growth in the 1990s (%)
Exports as % of sales (2002 or latest available year)
20 30–35 40 20 20
1–2 11 80 85 70
Source: Arora and Gambardella (2005a).
Emerging issues in the new economy and globalization 33 Table 2.2 The software industry in Brazil, China and the 3Is and, by comparison, in the USA, Japan and Germany (2002 or latest available figures) Countries Brazil * China India Ireland (MNE) Ireland (domestic) Israel * USA Japan ** Germany *
Sales ($ bn)
Empl. (000s)
Sales/Empl. (000s)
Software sales/ GDP (%)
Software development index
7.7 13.3 12.5 12.3 1.6 4.1
160 ** 190 ** 250 15.3 12.6 15
45.5 ** 37.6 ** 50.0 803.9 127.0 273.3
1.5 1.1 2.5 10.1 1.3 3.7
0.22 0.23 0.96 0.34 0.04 0.17
2.0 2.0 2.2
0.05 0.08 0.09
200 85 39.8
1024 534 300
195.3 159.2 132.7
Notes: * = 2001; ** = 2000. MNE is the Irish figures for the multinational firms located in Ireland, while domestic is the figures for the domestic Irish firms. The sales figure for the MNE in Ireland might be inflated because many MNE account their European sales in Ireland for tax purposes. The software development index is the ratio between software sales over GDP (in per cent) and the GDP per capita of the country (in US$ 000s) (See also Botelho et al., 2005). Source: Arora and Gambardella (2005a).
average growth rates of the 1990s, reported in Table 2.1, but also of the fact that two-digit growth rates are still common in these countries (particularly in India) in very recent years. Moreover, the notable growth of software in these countries has made this industry an important new specialization in their overall economy. India and Israel have ratios of software sales to GDP even higher than those of the three leading nations (2.5 per cent and 3.7 per cent against 2.0 per cent and 2.2 per cent for the leading countries). The share is lower for the Irish domestic firms, Brazil and China (between 1.1 per cent and 1.5 per cent).3 However, these shares are higher than the share of software production in other advanced economies, such as Italy, the UK or France, at around or below 1 per cent. Moreover, in China, the growth rate of software has accelerated since the end of the 1990s and it has been systematically higher than the growth of GDP. Therefore the Chinese software to GDP ratio is expected to rise further. Finally, the software specialization of these countries is even more apparent if we look at the software development index in Table 2.2, which is the ratio between the software to GDP share and the GDP per capita of the country. This index is orders of magnitude higher for our five countries compared to the three leading nations. They are far more specialized in software than expected, given their overall level of development. Table 2.2 also shows that our countries differ in their sales per employee figures, reflecting qualitative differences in their software productions. Israel exhibits the highest ratio of sales per employee. The figure is even higher than that of the USA, which is the highest among the three advanced economies. As a matter of fact, software in Israel is largely product- and R&D-oriented and it focuses on these higher-end tasks probably even more than the USA, whose large industry comprises many activities including services not at the very top of the value chain. The ratio for Ireland is lower than the advanced countries’
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but higher than that of Brazil, China and India. This is also consistent with the stylized facts. The software industry in Brazil, China and India has lower value added and in India in particular it is heavily service-oriented. In Ireland, there is a group of product-oriented firms and several small consultancy and niche firms. Finally, the growth of the software industry in these countries has relied on a significant degree of entrepreneurship and of industrial as well as firm-level experimentation. In all five cases the development of the industry has been accompanied by a notable rise in the number of firms. In India, the membership of NASSCOM (the Indian software industry association) increased from around 100 in 1990 to 797 in 2000 (Athreye, 2005). Similarly, the number of new Irish software firms increased from less than 300 in 1991 to 760 in 2000 (Sands, 2005). Botelho, Stefanuto and Veloso (2005) report that, of a sample of 685 Brazilian software firms in existence in 2001, a little less than a third (210) were founded between 1996 and 2000, and a slightly larger fraction, 221, were founded between 1991 and 1995. There are no specific figures for the creation of new software firms in China or Israel. However, the existing scattered accounts support the idea of high rates of entry in software in both countries. Human capital and the supply of skills One regularity among our five countries, and particularly in the 3Is, is that they have exhibited an ‘excess’ supply of human capital and specifically an excess supply of engineering and technology graduates relative to their demand from manufacturing and related services. Simply put, these countries have produced more engineers than their hitherto lacklustre industrial sector could absorb.4 This process started before the rise of the software industry. From the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, these countries grew only modestly, while continuing to show a good rise in the number of college graduates, especially in science and engineering, relative to their level of development. Thus, when the IT boom started, they already exhibited a reservoir of underemployed college graduates. The underemployment of the college graduates is crucial here. In the more advanced countries as well as in the rapidly growing Asian countries such as South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, the science and engineering graduates, whose numbers were also growing, especially in the Asian Tigers, faced a high opportunity cost of working in the software sector. Plentiful job opportunities in industry and in well established firms with good opportunities meant that there would be fewer entrepreneurs setting up software firms and, more generally, the nascent software firms found it difficult to attract talented engineers. Why the 3Is were relatively abundant in technically skilled workers is not well understood, but having such an abundance turned out to be crucial for software success. To be precise, there are two issues here. The first has to do with the level of supply of the relevant human capital. The second is about the elasticity of the supply of graduates in these countries. In this respect the education institutions in all five countries have responded with sizable increases in the number of graduates as the demand for their services rose over the 1990s. For example, the accredited stock of engineers in India increased from around 60 000 in 1987–8 to around 340 000 in 2003, while IT professionals increased from around 25 000 to nearly 250 000. NASSCOM figures also indicate that in India the number of IT graduates increased from 42 800 in 1997 to 71 000 in 2001. By comparison, the number of IT
Emerging issues in the new economy and globalization 35 graduates in the USA increased from 37 000 in 1998 to 52 900 in 2000. During this period the IT workforce (which does not directly correspond to IT degree holders) in the USA was probably eight to ten times larger than the IT workforce in India. Other countries show a similar pattern. Tschang and Xue (2005) report that, in China, the number of IT graduates increased from 29 000 to 41 000 in 1999–2001. Botelho, Stefanuto and Veloso (2005) note that the 18 000 graduates in IT in Brazil in 2000 is a greater per capita number than that of China and India. OECD figures show that Ireland, with 34 000 graduates per year, has the third highest share of adult population with tertiary degrees (30 per cent of which are in science and technology), after Canada and the USA (OECD, 2003). Such increases were accomplished through a mix of private and public efforts, with the mix varying across countries. In Ireland, Israel and China, the bulk of the efforts were probably in the public sector. By contrast, in India, a substantial fraction of additional engineering capacity created during the 1990s was created in the private sector. Figure 2.1 reports data from the All India Council on Technical Education showing that the almost 80 per cent of the accredited intake capacity for engineering students at the undergraduate level in 2003 (about 340 000) was in privately financed colleges (those that did not receive grants from the government). The role of privately financed colleges, the vast majority of which were created in the 1990s, is even more marked if one looks only at ITrelated engineering programmes. Such a rapid expansion of engineering training capacity has raised valid concerns about the quality of the education and a variety of other social costs. Nonetheless, this supply response is a manifestation of a flexibility that is rare in more advanced countries and also speaks for the perceived returns on human capital.
Per cent private not granted
The ‘diaspora’ One peculiar but crucial element of the picture has been the role of human capital flows. The 3Is, but China and Brazil as well, have directly supplied human capital particularly to the USA. Some estimates provided by Carrington and Detragiache (1998) indicate that the stock of highly-skilled (more than 13 years of schooling) immigrants in the USA from China, India and Brazil were about 400 000, 300 000 and 60 000, respectively.5 Kapur and
Figure 2.1
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
84
82 76
92
86 80 80
76 66 1987–88 1995–96
42 26
25
2002–03
12 13 5 East
Central
North Region
West
South
Share of privately financed colleges in Indian IT capacity, by region and year
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McHale (2005) show that China is the second country after India ranked by the number of approved H-1B visa petitions by the US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Indians alone account for more than 42 per cent of all the H-1B visas approved in this period, over half of which went to computer-related occupations. Independent estimates of the US IT workforce indicates that more than 15 per cent of this workforce is from Asia, of which slightly less than one-third from India, implying that Indian born account for about 5 per cent of the IT (mostly software) workforce of about 3.2 million (IT Workforce Update, 2003). The diaspora can provide links, act as ‘reputational intermediaries’ and, upon returning, can bring back valuable skills and expertise. Despite much talk of IT professionals returning to India and China, only in Ireland has the return of skilled emigrants clearly increased the domestic supply of skilled people (Kapur and McHale, 2005). Similarly, the Sands (2005) survey of 58 Irish software entrepreneurs indicates that 66 per cent of the founders of the Irish software firms in her sample had worked abroad, 55 per cent had worked for multinational companies and 74 per cent of her companies had one founder who worked abroad, largely consistent with earlier findings (O’Gorman, O’Malley and Mooney, 1997). The Israeli case is similar to that of India. There is little evidence of systematic returns of immigrants to the USA. At the same time, there is no evidence of a major skill shortage in Israel. The number of US PhDs awarded to Israeli nationals has remained stable since the early 1990s, while the number of PhD students who plan to stay in the USA has increased slightly, from 51 per cent to 57 per cent, albeit well below the corresponding figure for Indian and Chinese PhD recipients in the USA, which is around 5–10 per cent. Despite the many potential benefits of a diaspora, the outflow of skilled engineers, scientists and doctors does represent a net loss of talent and of the considerable investment in training the emigrants. The broad question about the net effects of the international mobility of skilled people on the home country is a complex one and well beyond the scope of this chapter. However, Kapur and McHale (2005) conclude that the benefits from the diaspora outweigh the costs for the 3Is in the particular case of the software industry that we are discussing here. In other words, setting aside the question whether the brain drain represented by the diaspora was a good thing or not, the software industries of India, Ireland and Israel certainly benefited from having one. Given the domestic market orientation of the software industry in China and Brazil, the trade-off has likely been less favourable. 4 Is the growth of the Indian software industry good for the USA and Europe? In this section we turn to the question posed by Gomory and Baumol in the specific context of the software industry. Since outsourcing of software activities to India, from both the USA and Europe, has been the most significant in terms of employment, we focus on the Indian case to exemplify our argument. We start by discussing the relationships between the USA and India in software and then turn by comparison to the other advanced countries and particularly Europe. Since the 1990s, when the productivity of Indian software has increased, the USA has outsourced a good deal of software activities and services to this country. The bulk of the outsourcing, however, has involved software activities that are (a) complementary to valueadded activities done in particular in the USA and (b) at a ‘lower level’ of the value chain. Moreover, in spite of its notable growth, the Indian software industry is still small com-
Emerging issues in the new economy and globalization 37 pared to the USA. As shown by Table 2.2, the Indian software industry employs about 250 000 people while the US software industry employs over a million people. The difference in the total software workforce is even larger because many software professionals are employed by the user industries and the latter are far more developed in the USA than in India. As noted earlier, the total software workforce in the USA is estimated to be about 3.2 million as against 400 000–500 000 in India (Arora and Gambardella, 2005b). We will not enter the current debate on whether the current job losses due to growth in software production overseas will be quickly made up by the creation of new opportunities at home. This debate echoes earlier debates that appear to pit free trade against job losses in existing industries. The conclusion of most mainstream economists, with which we broadly agree, is that, although free trade creates winners and losers, the gains are greater than the losses and thus, if the winners were able to compensate the losers, free trade ought to be supported. In this instance, we think that policies such as retraining, or even some redistributive policies, which lessen the impact of such job losses, are a good idea.6 Our focus is on two other questions. The first is whether, following outsourcing, the physical separation of lower end (typically software coding and maintenance) from higher end (typically product design) software activities will affect US productivity in the higher end. This again echoes an earlier debate about whether product innovation requires proximity to manufacturing. In fact not only are there many industries in which the locus of production and the locus of invention are physically separated, but this is particularly true when the body of knowledge underlying the invention has a strong technical basis. For example, building on earlier work by Lamoreaux and Sokoloff (1996, 1997), Sutthiphisal (2004) studied the location of production and invention in three industries during the second industrial revolution: textile, footwear and the electrical industry. He finds that the locus of invention did not shift with the locus of production as the latter moved to other locations. Moreover, he finds that the link between location of production and invention is weaker in the more ‘science-based’ electrical industry. Using data from a century later than the second industrial revolution, Mariani (2001) studies the location of R&D and production facilities by the Japanese MNCs in Europe. She finds that, in low and medium R&D industries, R&D labs are more likely to be located close to production facilities than in more R&D-intensive industries. Our own work on the history of the chemical industry provides additional evidence. In particular, as discussed in Arora and Gambardella (1998), the US chemical industry has developed since the 1950s an independent sector of specialized engineering firms (SEFs) that supplied new process technologies via licences and chemical process engineering services to the rest of the world. Through both SEFs and chemical manufacturers the USA is still the world leader in the provision of chemical process technology and engineering services in spite of the fact that many chemical productions have been decentralized to other countries and particularly to the developing countries. The second question is about the evolution of these processes. As the Indian software industry becomes more sophisticated and productive, it may increasingly erode higher end activities. However, there are reasons to believe that the USA will remain the centre of software innovation for the foreseeable future. Two resources are crucial to remaining the centre of innovation in software: (a) access to talented designers, software engineers and programmers, and (b) proximity to a number of large and technically sophisticated users. The USA dominates on both counts.
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As noted, emerging software-producing regions are leveraging their abundance of relatively underused human capital, especially of engineers and IT professionals. The USA also produces abundant human capital. But that is not all. The very process of globalization, which has led to the growth of software overseas, has also worked to attract the best and the brightest to the USA, as also noted in our discussion about the diaspora. Even more significant is the relationship with the users. New software applications depend on knowledge about demand and the use of the applications. This is apparent, for example, in telecommunications and semiconductors, where the software needed to design the chip is part of the product itself. More generally a substantial fraction of software is used for running businesses and business processes. Therefore proximity to business activities is crucial for innovation in this industry, which consists of solutions to emerging business problems, often specific to particular industries such as banking, finance, retail, telecommunications or manufacturing. The development of new commercial applications or ‘solutions’ is a very special comparative advantage of the USA. India’s economy is growing and sophisticated domestic demand for software may eventually rise. At present, however, the USA lead is overwhelming. Moreover, as was true of human capital, globalization may reinforce this lead because innovative companies from Israel, Ireland and even India are increasingly moving their operations to the USA to be closer to the users or to sources of equity financing, legal services and thick and well-functioning labour markets. There are of course countertendencies as well. Insofar as Indians have a preference for staying in their home country, the cost of scientists and engineers will be lower in India, so that the cost of R&D activities that are human capital-intensive and relatively less intensive in physical infrastructure will be lower. There is anecdotal evidence that India is being viewed as an attractive location for certain types of R&D activities, although anecdotal evidence also suggests that US firms are not locating mission critical activities in India, nor are they moving activities at the technological frontier. These remarks suggest that the increased Indian competitiveness in software can more seriously affect other advanced nations, and in particular Europe and Japan. First and foremost, Europe and Japan are far less capable of attracting talents than is the USA. This is the most important problem. Relatively speaking, the problem of the dearth of IT users is not as serious. Europe and Japan have well developed IT user industries. Overall, the European and Japanese user industries may be less stimulating than the USA for software innovations. But, on the one hand, Europe and Japan have leading large companies in manufacturing, telecommunications or services that have provided several stimuli to software innovation. On the other hand, the differences from the USA are, in this respect, less significant than the gaps in the ability to attract talents. Apart from IT graduates and professionals from India or other developing countries with large supplies of skills, Europe in particular is unable to keep many of its own talents who are flowing steadily to the USA. While the inability to retain its own skilled workers is an obvious problem, the difficulties in attracting graduates and professionals from India, China or similar countries should be recognized as a problem as well. There are at least two reasons. First, these regions are gradually becoming world suppliers of skills. As Europe and Japan fail to tap such a supply, or if suppliers look overwhelmingly to the USA, they can hardly fill the skill shortage that they are facing, a problem that is exacerbated, especially in Europe, by the demographic trends. In a period in which growth is largely affected by the ability to expand the employment of skilled labour, an inadequate supply of skills can be a serious constraint. It could
Emerging issues in the new economy and globalization 39 explain in good part the low growth rates of these countries, and particularly of Europe, compared to that of the USA. The second reason is that, because the principal competition for the US IT and software firms is still from countries like Germany, France or Japan, the US ability to lever outsourcing and to link to the skilled labour markets in India or similar countries may produce strategic benefits as well. The US firms can gain competitive advantages over their European and Japanese competitors in terms of lower costs, greater flexibility and shorter product development cycles, as well as in terms of attraction of talents from these countries, which reinforces the productivity of the US firms. The problem is less severe for the European or Japanese multinationals which can locate in the USA and partly take advantage of the US trends. It will be more serious for the European and Japanese domestic industries. US firms may move to Europe or Japan, given that they have large commercial markets, and possibly contribute to the growth of the European or Japanese IT or software sectors. But the risk that Europe and Japan are running is that a good deal of the invention process in IT and software will increasingly be elsewhere and this may impinge on the overall competitiveness and growth of these industries. 5 Is the globalization of software good for India? The other twist of the question is whether the growth of software, and particularly its globalization, has net benefits for India.7 In addition to the standard benefits from specialization according to comparative advantage, it was a crucial strategy for India to specialize in activities that were complementary to the international industry. If India had moved up quickly onto higher value added products, as many had suggested, perhaps because of the common belief that moving up the value chain is the only way to sustain an industry, it would have most likely conflicted with the USA. Ireland and Israel faced this problem, especially during the downturn of the international IT demand after 2000. Because software product development was more important in these countries than in India, it was natural that the reduced international demand for IT had a bigger impact on them. Indeed, as shown in Arora and Gambardella (2005b), the performance of the Irish and Israeli software industries faltered in 2001–2, with reduced profitability and employment for the first time since the early 1990s. By contrast, the growth of the Indian software industry slowed but only to about 20 per cent per year in this period. The international migration of human capital also requires some thoughts. As Table 2.3 shows, the number of Indian-born residents in the USA increased nearly threefold between 1990 and 2000, with over 80 per cent of the Indian-born residents having tertiary-level education. Brazilian and Chinese-born residents have lower levels of tertiary education than those for Indians, but still above 50 per cent, and have also increased rapidly in the last decade. To put these figures in perspective, around 50 per cent of the native-born adult population in the USA has received tertiary education, second only to Canada. Such large-scale migration of human capital has conflicting welfare implications. To the extent that the increase in the US labour supply curbs US wages, this lessens the welfare of the native-born workers. By contrast, the Indian workers gain because the salary of the emigrants increases, as does the salary of the workers who stay in India (or at least it does not fall as much as it might have, given the large increases in the supply of Indian IT workers). The standard argument, however, also implies that, because the migration follows more productive opportunities in the USA, the reallocation of Indian workers to the USA implies a higher combined output of the two countries than if migration did not
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Table 2.3
India Brazil China
Selected foreign born populations in the United States aged 25 and over 1990
2000
Change (%)
% of 2000 population entering post1990
304 54 405
837 154 847
175 186 109
55 49 66
Educational Attainment (2000) Primary Secondary Tertiary (%) (%) (%) 5 9 20
15 36 26
80 55 54
Source: Kapur and McHale (2005); original data from the March 2001 Current Population Survey of the United States.
take place. Hence proper redistribution policies, or the extent to which Indian workers ship some of their benefits back to India (for example, links to Indian software companies, returnees, consumption of other Indian commodities), may in the end enhance the overall value for India as well. One problem might be if the people who migrate from India to the USA are the more productive individuals who also produce great externalities on others; for example, because they are more entrepreneurial, have better links to the USA or have greater technological or managerial capabilities. In this case, while their migration increases productivity because it helps restrain the growth in the supply of skills, it reduces the productivity of the remaining workers. We cannot exclude the possibility that the migrating skilled workers are the most productive ones. However, the available evidence is that the Indian software salaries have increased faster than those in the USA. Athreye (2005) showed that the US salaries for a variety of software occupations such as programmer, project leader, quality assurance specialist and systems designer increased by about 21 per cent between 1995 and 1999, while Indian salaries increased by nearly 45 per cent. It might be that without migration the salaries of the Indian software professionals might have increased even more. But migration has definitely not impoverished them. This opens the question whether India’s ability to sustain a continuous flow of human capital may turn this into a major opportunity. We have seen that India, but also Ireland, Israel, China and Brazil, have created several new academic institutions in the 1990s which expanded considerably their supply of graduates without – as shown above – reducing their salaries. As people move, and are replaced by new workers, the flow of workers to the USA feeds its software industry with talented programmers and motivated entrepreneurs. It may well be that the main Indian (or Chinese) resource could be its academic system supplying human capital to the world. 6 Implications for industrial policy The discussion so far suggests several implications for industrial policy. We focus on four issues. First, our software stories are suggestive of the unpredictability of the industries that may become the successful specializations of a country in the 21st century. As noted, it was hard to predict that any of our five countries could become a software powerhouse. It was even more unpredictable that they could exhibit comparative advantages in human
Emerging issues in the new economy and globalization 41 capital-intensive industries. Even within human capital-intensive industries it is not easy to explain why Ireland has become a specialist in software and not Scotland, for example, which has instead been more active in semiconductors, or why software developed in Brazil or China and not in Argentina or in Russia (which has a good supply of skilled mathematicians). As with ‘self-discovery’ all these countries found out gradually that they could become software producers. This stemmed from entrepreneurial activities that experimented with the industry early on. As Rodrik (2004) or Levinthal and March (1993) pointed out, self-discovery creates externalities that make the process more valuable socially than for the individuals that pursue it. The support of entrepreneurial activities for self-discovery is then a natural target for industrial policy. By contrast, the individual incentives are well in place once these industries develop, which suggests that later on there is little need for interfering with their growth. A second important area for industrial policy is outsourcing. Our discussion in this chapter suggests that, as long as a country has the ability to outsource complementary activities that are carried out relatively more efficiently abroad, the net effect of outsourcing is positive. In the particular case of the software industry, we noted that proximity to the users and the ability to form and attract talents are critical for supporting innovation capabilities. The USA excels in both. This makes it well positioned to benefit from outsourcing and to preserve innovative capabilities in higher end segments. Europe and Japan also have potentially stimulating users, but they are not that good at attracting human capital or even retaining their own. Outsourcing can then be a more serious problem than in the USA. We hesitate to generalize from one industry example; however, in Europe and Japan, industrial policy should design ways to promote the role of the users as a basis for stimulating innovation in upstream firms and sectors. This means paying special attention to the formation of links between industries and their suppliers, vertical relationships that sustain cooperative innovation efforts and so on. Even more importantly in Europe and Japan, industrial policy should concentrate on the formation and attraction of human capital. The problem is particularly severe in Europe because of its demographic trends. Europe should devise ways to tap into the new world supply of skills coming from countries like India or China. In this respect it is not unfair to say that the US ability to attract skills from these countries is one of its major competitive advantages today. The USA, however, faces another problem associated with outsourcing. It seems to be moving from being a country with comparative advantages in skill-intensive activities to a country with comparative advantages in very skill-intensive activities.8 The implied dualism could be serious. Moderately skilled workers (such as college graduates and white-collar workers, rather than just high-school graduates or lower) could face greater problems than in the past because of the rise of new competitors in some human capitalintensive industries. As noted earlier in this chapter, we agree with the general view that free trade based on comparative advantages is beneficial. However, industrial policy should work on the potentially severe distributional problems that could be associated with the transition. The specific form of these interventions is beyond the scope of this chapter. They could involve retraining of individuals or anything that could ease the asperity of change. But the US problem of the reduced comparative advantage of people who are ‘just’ skilled (and not very skilled) should not be neglected. Third, the role of the users can be cast in the more general framework of the sources of learning and competencies that can give rise to new comparative advantages. We discussed
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Klepper’s argument that successful new firms or specializations come from successful firms or industries through related diversification and more generally from competencies formed in pre-existing successful sectors. Our software industry stories are consistent with this view, as discussed in Arora, Gambardella and Klepper (2005). Here we can just mention the case of the Israeli software industry which has taken off from its strong and successful IT hardware industry and successful IT user sectors, as well as from the competencies that resided in the military. Similarly, the multinationals provided important sources of competencies in Ireland and even in Brazil. As a result, an effective industrial policy may not address the specific industries or firms that may constitute the new specializations, but the existing sources of competencies (industries, firms or others). This feeds self-discovery and entrepreneurial experimentation by creating the right incentives to spin off successful new firms and industries. The idea of encouraging an industry or a firm to spin off resources, competencies (particularly valuable ones) or even potential competitors may be counterintuitive. However, many resources or competencies of a firm are of greater value outside than inside it. For example, individual employees may have an incentive to pursue projects that are of little interest to the company because the latter has opportunity costs. By letting these employees go, the company can hire new employees. This rejuvenates its workforce and spins off employees who might be frustrated inside the company, and hence are less loyal or productive, because they cannot advance their projects or aspirations. Note that a successful company, precisely because it is successful, creates a lot of new opportunities, typically more than it can pursue. Tensions with its employees, who want to pursue certain projects or who want to leave, are then inevitable. From his long-standing experience at Intel and as one of the father founders of Silicon Valley, Gordon Moore noted this point (Moore and Davis, 2004). He also mentioned that one way to avoid competition from the employees of the company is to encourage them into activities that use the competencies formed in the successful company to perform complementary rather than competitive activities. For example, at Intel, once they figured out that they could do little to stop their employees’ spin-offs, they tried to encourage them onto the production of semiconductor equipment, which Intel could buy, rather than the semiconductor chip, which was the core business of Intel. Industrial policy could help drive the spin-offs of successful firms or industries into supplier rather than competitor sectors. This would also have the advantage of policy being consistent rather than in conflict with the incentives of the successful parent industries or firms. Finally, in this chapter we added our voice to the chorus that calls for a greater attention to human capital. We also noted the gap between the USA, on the one hand, and Europe and Japan, on the other. In this respect education policy, to enhance the quantity and quality of human capital, has become an important section of industrial policy. It is intriguing that in some European countries, such as Spain, there has been a notable increase in the share of graduates in the population in the past few years, while in others, such as Italy, this has not occurred (OECD, 2003). Moreover, in countries such as Italy there is resistance to moving academia into a research-oriented, international and meritocratic system. In the 21st century, this will have serious negative implications that go beyond education (or labour) policy per se and will impinge upon industry, industrial policy and therefore on the competitiveness of a country. At the same time, apart from the domestic supply of human capital, Europe and Japan should tap into the world supply of skills. The USA
Emerging issues in the new economy and globalization 43 has benefited significantly from its ability to mingle domestic and international human capital and to transmit its entrepreneurial culture to many graduates from other countries. Industrial policy in the 21st century will increasingly be tied to immigration policy. Apart from expanding the supply of human capital, which can in particular help Europe, given its demographic trends, openness to human capital from developing countries like China or India will have the additional benefit of expanding the skilled workforce with individuals whose ambitions, expectations and desire to grow are much higher than those of a domestic population that is in large part economically satiated. Notes 1. Hausmann and Rodrik cite a World Bank study by Rhee and Belot (1990) who provide several examples of the discovery of successful specializations in developing countries through entrepreneurial experimentation or sparked by specific events which demonstrate the unpredictability of the specializations and their heterogeneity across countries. 2. For a summary of these stories and the references to the original Klepper papers, see Arora, Gambardella and Klepper (2005). 3. As noted in a footnote of Table 2.2 the high share of the software multinationals’ sales in Ireland is largely a consequence of inflated invoicing in this country, for tax purposes. 4. See the country chapters in Arora and Gambardella (2005a) for details on the reasons for the excess supply of human capital in the five countries. Regressions of the stock of scientists and engineers on per capital GDP and other factors (not reported here) showed that India, Ireland and Israel had actual stocks that were higher than the predicted stocks of scientists and engineers. 5. Brazilian emigration of skilled workers, though lower in absolute volume, when expressed as a percentage of the stock of skilled population, is comparable to that of India and China. Unfortunately, the small absolute size of the stock of Brazilian immigrants in the USA has meant that little is known about their role in the growth of the Brazilian software industry. 6. On the debate about the outcomes for the USA of the outsourcing game in software and IT more generally, see for instance Mann (2003) and the McKinsey Global Industry report (MGI, 2003). 7. Once again, we focus on India for brevity and emphasis. 8. This remark was made to us by Dick Nelson. Of course he is not responsible for any improper way in which we are using it.
References Arora, A. and A. Gambardella (1998), ‘The evolution of industry structure in the chemical industry’, in A. Arora, R. Landau and N. Rosenberg (eds), Chemicals and Long Term Economic Growth, New York: John Wiley and Sons. Arora, A. and A. Gambardella (eds) (2005a), From Underdogs to Tigers: The Rise and Growth of the Software Industry in Brazil, China, India, Ireland, and Israel, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Arora, A. and A. Gambardella (2005b), ‘The globalization of the software industry: perspectives and opportunities for developed and developing countries’, in A. Jaffe, J. Lerner and S. Stern (eds), Innovation Policy and the Economy, vol. 5, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Arora, A., A. Gambardella and S. Klepper (2005), ‘Organizational capabilities and the rise of the software industry in the emerging economies: lessons from the history of some emerging industries’, in A. Arora and A. Gambardella (eds), From Underdogs to Tigers: The Rise and Growth of the Software Industry in Brazil, China, India, Ireland, and Israel, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Athreye, S. (2005), ‘The Indian software industry’, in A. Arora and A. Gambardella (eds), From Underdogs to Tigers: The Rise and Growth of the Software Industry in Brazil, China, India, Ireland, and Israel, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Botelho, A.J., G. Stefanuto and F. Veloso (2005), ‘The Brazilian software industry’, in A. Arora and A. Gambardella (eds), From Underdogs to Tigers: The Rise and Growth of the Software Industry in Brazil, China, India, Ireland, and Israel, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Carrington, W. and E. Detragiache (1998), ‘How big is the brain drain?’, IMF working paper no. 98, IMF Washington, DC. Gomory, R.E. and W.J. Baumol (2000), Global Trade and Conflicting National Interests, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Hausmann, R. and D. Rodrik (2003), ‘Economic development as self-discovery’, Journal of Development Economics, 72, 603–33.
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IT Workforce Update (2003), ‘The outlook in 2003 for information technology workers in the USA’, Commission on Professionals in Science and Technology (available from http:// www.cpst.org/ ITWF_Report.cfm; last viewed, 3 May 2004). Kapur, D. and J. McHale (2005), ‘Sojourns and software: internationally mobile human capital and the software industry in India, Ireland and Israel’, in A. Arora and A. Gambardella (eds), From Underdogs to Tigers: The Rise and Growth of the Software Industry in Brazil, China, India, Ireland, and Israel, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Klepper, S. (2004), ‘The geography of organizational knowledge’, mimeo, Carnegie Mellon University. Lamoreaux, N. and K. Sokoloff (1996), ‘Long term change in the organization of inventive activity’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 93, 12686–92. Lamoreaux, N. and K. Sokoloff (1997), ‘Location and technological change in the American glass industry during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries’, NBER WP #5938, Cambridge, MA. Levinthal, D. and J. March (1993), ‘The myopia of learning’, Strategic Management Journal, 14, 95–112. Mann, C. (2003), ‘Globalization of IT services and white collar jobs: the next wave of productivity growth’, International Economics Policy Brief, Number PB03-11, December. Mariani, M. (2001), ‘Next to production or to technological clusters? The economics and management of R&D location’, Journal of Management and Governance, 6 (2), 131–52. McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) (2003), ‘Offshoring: is it a win–win game?’, San Francisco, CA: McKinsey & Co. Inc. Moore, G. and K. Davis (2004), ‘Learning the Silicon Valley way’, in T. Bresnahan and A. Gambardella (eds), Building High-Tech Clusters: Silicon Valley and Beyond, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. OECD (2003), Education at a Glance, Paris: OECD. O’Gorman, C., E. O’Malley and J. Mooney (1997), ‘Clusters in Ireland. The Irish indigenous software industry: an application of porter’s cluster analysis’, NESC, National Economic and Social Council, Research Series, Research Paper no. 3, November. Rhee, Y.W. and T. Belot (1990), ‘Export catalysts in low-income countries’, World Bank Discussion Paper, World Bank, Washington, DC. Rodrik, D. (2004), ‘Industrial policy for the XXI century’, mimeo, Harvard University. Sands, A. (2005), ‘Eye of the tiger: evolution of the Irish software industry’, in A. Arora and A. Gambardella (eds), From Underdogs to Tigers: The Rise and Growth of the Software Industry in Brazil, China, India, Ireland, and Israel, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sutthiphisal, D. (2004), ‘The geography of invention in high- and low-technology industries: evidence from the second industrial revolution’, working paper, Department of Economics, UCLA. Tschang, T. and L. Xue (2005), ‘The Chinese software industry: the implications of a changing domestic market for software enterprises’, in A. Arora and A. Gambardella (eds), From Underdogs to Tigers: The Rise and Growth of the Software Industry in Brazil, China, India, Ireland, and Israel, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3
European industrial policy Jacques Pelkmans
Introduction The present chapter discusses industrial policy of the European Union. The reader will encounter complexity, two levels of policy making, drastic changes over time and the overall difficulty of where to draw the boundaries of EU industrial policy. In the European Union industrial policy is pursued at (at least) two levels of government: the EU and the member states’ levels. Furthermore, owing to shifting convictions in economic analysis as well as the logic of pro-competitive market integration (which has greatly deepened over time), the nature and intensity of European industrial policy has drastically changed over the five decades since the treaty of Paris.1 These two ‘European’ features add to ‘general’ complications in analysing industrial policy, such as the contrast between normative economic (‘welfare’) and positive analytical approaches of industrial policy, the variations in classification of what industrial policy is, and the potentially vast range of tools, quasi-tools and soft forms of persuasion in this area. The aim of the present chapter is to set out and explain the great significance of European integration in determining (changes in) structure and performance of industry in Europe. This is due to the deepening of economic integration since the 1970s, the widening of its scope and the enlargement of the club. Member states, drawing on the treaties but also on changing insights about the role and dynamics of markets, have agreed to bind themselves ever more by the pro-competitive logic of deepening market integration and to abide by the ever stricter constraints that this implies. In addition, they have not (or better, only marginally and selectively) shifted to the EU level the tools for interventionist policy making member states themselves used to employ in the past. The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 1 discusses at some length the division of powers between, and the complementarity of, the member states’ and EU level of government when it comes to industrial policy. A comprehensive survey is provided, based on a wide and fairly detailed classification of industrial policy instruments. Section 2 will address the place and meaning of three cross-cutting issues, namely, the indiscriminate use of the ‘competitiveness’ label in the EU circuit of business and of policy makers, the relation between services and EU industrial policy and, finally, that of European infrastructure. Sections 3, 4 and 5 will deal, respectively, with the three building blocks of the wide concept of industrial policy distinguished in section 1, that is, the EU framework of market integration, EU horizontal industrial policy and EU sectoral or specific industrial policy. The chapter ends with the main conclusions. The reader, it is hoped, realizes that the subject area is much too vast to be surveyed comprehensively. Choices have to be made. One such choice is that I shall focus more on the framework and the horizontal aspects, as the incentive structure for industry and industrial markets is dominated by these two. A corollary is that section 5, on sectoral and specific policy, is limited to an overall perspective, with (brief) illustrations only about ICT and technology, while refraining from details on sectors. Another choice is to remain complementary to other authors in this 45
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volume dealing with a range of specific economic analyses which often are relevant to EU policy. 1 Industrial policy: what the EU and member states do and do not do There is a great deal of confusion about what industrial policy is, only surpassed by the confusion about what European industrial policy might be. The latter is even more complicated because the EU level has ample constraining powers vis-à-vis member states’ instruments and their use, while at the same time the EU level itself is also restricted in its actions and does not dispose of anywhere near the same range of tools as member states might employ, in a constrained fashion or not. 1.1 Scope and constraints of European industrial policy Figure 3.1 should help to reduce such confusion to an appreciable extent. A complete resolution is beyond the capacity of the author, for the simple reason that no taxonomy can fully respect the range of views on industrial policy which can be found in the literature. The figure combines three features: a comprehensive classification of industrial policy and of other policies somehow influencing industry, a sixfold breakdown of how EU and national powers are related (see ‘Notes’) and an application of the latter to the many distinct elements of industrial and other policies specified in the classification. The classification begins by distinguishing two sets of policy which influence industry, yet are not part of industrial policy, namely, ‘policies not for industry which affect industry’ for obvious reasons, such as macroeconomic stability with fiscal and monetary instruments; redistributional tools; agricultural and services policies; tax policy; energy; land-use and so on, and ‘policies which directly help or constrain industry but are not meant (only) for industry’, such as price controls, buy-national campaigns, tied development aid or environmental policies addressing specific hazards such as poisonous chemicals or smog. The remainder is defined as a ‘wide concept of industrial policy’ and consists of three building blocks: framework aspects, horizontal industrial policy and sectoral and specific industrial policy. For all the elements specified in Figure 3.1, a proxy indication is provided about the division or combination of powers at EU and member states’ levels. For a full understanding of the nature, scope and potential of EU industrial policy, all these elements would have to be explained separately, though in a coherent fashion. Given the space constraint, it should be sufficient to concentrate on the three building blocks of ‘wide’ industrial policy, with occasional references to other elements in the figure where appropriate. Some special attention will be paid to three such references in section 2. Broadly speaking, the economic and institutional importance of EU industrial policy is greatest for the EU framework aspects. The respective weights of horizontal and sectoral and specific policies cannot be established in general terms. Both are constrained by the EU framework aspects as well as by other subsidiarity considerations which often – though not invariably – mean that the EU level of government has few ‘hard’ instruments to act. It is crucial to keep these limitations in mind when studying the flurry of EU policy documents on industrial policy, ‘competitiveness’ strategies or ‘entreprise’ policies. Most such documents are long on analytical aspects and on recommended directions on how to mend one’s ways in European industrial markets, but short on relatively ‘soft’ or concrete Actions or the employment of significant funding and other instruments. One may regard this as the inevitable outcome of a much more market-driven approach to industrial
European industrial policy 47 Policies (somehow) affecting industry
Policies NOT for industry
Policies for industry
but affecting industry such as • macroeconomic (EU/nat.) • redistributional (nat.) • wage policies/industrial rel.(nat.) • agricultural/fisheries policies (EU/nat.) • services policies (EU/nat.) • tax policies (nat. (EU)) • land-use policies (nat.) • infrastructure policies (nat. (EU)) • energy (security) policies (nat. (EU))
Non-industrial policy measures directly affecting industry • buy national campaigns (EU) • regional planning/ development (nat./EU) • price controls (EU) • tied development aid (nat. (EU)) • overall export promotion (EU) • specific environmental policies (nat./EU)
(Wide concept of ) industrial policy
framework aspects
establishment IM (EU) proper functioning IM (EU) • (lack of justified) harm.n. • lack of standards & C.A. • removal distortions competition policy (EU/nat.) • state aids • network industries regional/cohesion policies (general) (EU/nat.) better regulation (EU/nat.) state ownership (nat.)
horizontal industrial policy
sectoral/specific industrial policy
research strategies (nat./EU) innovation stimulus (nat./EU) entrepreneurship & risk capital (nat./EU) skills & human capital (nat.) restructuring funds (nat./EU) competitiveness tests for other policies (e.g. ENV; etc.) (EU) public procurement (nat./EU)
sectoral interventions (EU) sector policies (EU; EU/nat.) clustering & filières policies (nat.) trade policy (EU) specific aspects of regional/cohesion policies (EU/nat.) technology policies (EU/nat.) defence procurement (nat.)
Notes: EU → EU powers; EU/nat. → shared powers; nat. → member states’ powers; nat./EU → shared powers, mainly national; nat. (EU) → national & EU constraints or marg. inputs; EU → little nat’l. leeway, strict EU constraints.
Figure 3.1
EU and national powers of industrial policy instruments
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change, which is no doubt correct, but it might just as well be seen as an explicit choice not to endow the EU level with forceful instruments and powers to influence or ‘engineer’ the future path of Europe’s industries. Writing in 2005, the two perspectives boil down to very much the same result in terms of industrial policy potential. The framework aspects follow directly from what the EU is. The European Union is, in economic terms, essentially an Economic and Monetary Union. The Economic Union consists of the internal market (an extremely comprehensive concept with a strong legal basis and a powerful institutional backing) and a very modest set of ‘cohesion’ policies. The cohesion policies largely consist of regional instruments for relatively poor regions in the Union, and to some extent for providing funds for relatively poor countries in the EU. ‘Cohesion’ would seem to refer to a kind of redistribution from richer to poorer areas in the EU. Nevertheless, cohesion amounts to an efficiency-based long-run strategy of ‘catch-up growth’. The interventions are meant to accelerate catch-up growth and, once this is achieved, cohesion policies are terminated. Cohesion policies do influence industry in a number of ways but especially by improving the determinants of location and investment. However, it ought to be noted that cohesion policies do not and cannot address specific industries (or services, for that matter). Such policies are more horizontal, that is, are mainly oriented to hard (networks and roads/bridges/tunnels) and soft (human capital, technical schools, retraining facilities, administrative capacity) infrastructure. The Monetary Union in strict treaty terms comprises not only the ‘eurozone’ of (now) 12 countries2 but also the non-eurozone countries insofar as they have obligations under what the treaty calls the second stage of EMU.3 1.2 Internal market rationale The hard core of the Economic Union is the internal market. A good understanding of the internal market, the logic of its design and of its proper functioning is indispensable to grasp the nature, scope and potential of EU industrial policy at the two levels of government. An economically meaningful definition of the internal market reads as follows: ‘the free movement of goods, services and factors of production as well as the right of establishment across intra-EU frontiers, accompanied by all necessary common regulation and/or policies for this internal market to function properly’.4 What the treaty calls the ‘establishment’ of the internal market boils down to the accomplishment of free movement and (company) establishment, but, in actual practice, this accomplishment can often only be had if degrees of common regulation or mutual recognition are agreed first. Thus, the establishment and proper functioning are frequently pursued simultaneously. However, proper functioning implies the absence of market failures and this refers to competition policy as well. Therefore the framework box, bottom left in Figure 3.1, mainly concerns the internal market: when its establishment is incomplete, it leaves a degree of freedom to member states (the few examples left nowadays include the absence of an internal labour market and the lack of a true EU patent), and when the proper functioning is not (yet) adequately dealt with, it might refer to a lack of justified harmonization (due to one or a few recalcitrant member states), a lack of common standards or the slow liberalization of network industries (indeed, without a common EU regulator, unlike the case of national markets). For the most part, however, the internal market is well established and its functioning improves with deepening and widening of scope. This will be discussed in section 3. The
European industrial policy 49 common regulation in ‘approximated’ (harmonized) or centralized form has recently become much more rigorously scrutinized under the label ‘better regulation’ (see section 4). The new approach of subjecting all substantive Commission proposals to regulatory impact assessment, based on an analytical methodology, is bound to influence whatever industrial policies are going to be proposed. Finally, the framework box in Figure 3.1 mentions state ownership. It is good to underline that the EU treaty is neutral with respect to ownership (art. 295, EC) and that privatization is strictly a matter of the member states. The casual substitution between terms such as deregulation, liberalization and privatization when it comes to the liberalization of and EU-wide competition in network industries is incorrect, even though it is routine in many circles. For the EU, privatization is strictly the change of ownership from state (or provincial or municipal) to private shareholders. The Union is interested in the combination of competition, also over intra-EU frontiers, hence free movement and (company) establishment, with justified regulation in network industries, not in state versus private ownership. Equally important, although state ownership is a matter of the member states, the treaty does not allow any concrete advantage for such firms in the internal market. It is hard to think of any economic reason why a company should remain in state hands, other than a protection against unwanted takeovers. Even fresh capital invested by the state in the company is seen as illegal (because distorting) state aid if an independent investor would not have been willing to do the same. 1.3 Horizontal industrial policy Horizontal industrial policy is of relatively recent origin. Indeed, of the seven categories specified in the middle box at the bottom of Figure 3.1, none of them existed at EU level in, say, 1980 in a meaningful way, or at all. The EU had no programmes or in-depth analyses in areas such as innovation stimuli, entrepreneurship and risk capital, skills and human capital and competitiveness tests for EU policies. Around 1980, almost all research funding was spent on nuclear and other energy research in the framework of Euratom. The first ESPRIT (on computers and IT) programme dates from 1981. An EU restructuring fund did not exist except for steel and was paid by the steel mills themselves in the framework of the ECSC. And EU public procurement is too tiny to be utilized for strategic purposes, and no such objective had been made explicit anyway. However, the issues in the horizontal industrial policy box were influenced by the EU level when imposing disciplines on national industrial policies under some of these rubrics. Thus research subsidies of a ‘fundamental’ nature are not caught by the state aid regime, but if research is ‘applied’ subsidies are disciplined depending on how close the applications are to reaching the market. National restructuring programmes did exist and were subjected to complex state aid disciplines, more often than not politically influenced at the highest level of EU politics via ad hoc decisions on rescue operations. National public procurement was formally disciplined by non-discrimination provisions in the treaty and a few weak directives on goods and on public works which were hardly enforced in those days. The later shift to horizontal EU industrial policy, beginning with the Bangemann report (1990), therefore required a wholesale rethinking of the way government intervention could usefully facilitate the static and dynamic efficiency of markets in Europe and what market institutions might be of help (for example standards, certification and quality incentives, or innovation structures, or skill enhancement). Next to no such thinking had been present at EU level and no policies had been initiated around 1980.
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At the EU level, the 1980s and early 1990s consisted of enormous deepening and widening (of scope) of the framework box in terms of the internal market in goods, services and capital. The corollary of the Single Market Programme consisted in the widening of competition policy, and complemented by the EC merger regulation. All this was bound to have many implications for what member states have become accustomed to do. Friction merged on the interface between the EU level and the member states’ level, in regular struggles between the Commission and the Council and, to some extent, between member states in the Council. The upshot was to discipline and improve the sectoral and specific industrial policies both at EU and member states’ levels. Thus the middle box of horizontal issues was of marginal importance at best. Writing in 2005, approaches have radically changed. As section 4 will elaborate, today’s emphasis in European industrial policy at both levels of government consists of a combination of the framework and the horizontal boxes, with relatively little attention paid to the sectoral and specific box except for technology policies. 1.4 Sectoral and specific industrial policy Sectoral and specific industrial policy lies at the origin of the Community. European economic integration began in 1952 with a ‘deep’ free trade area in coal and steel, called the European Coal and Steel Community. Its ultimate aim clearly being the cementing of peace between former adversaries, the legal commitments consisted of a combination of intra-ECSC free trade in coal and steel with extensive actual and potential interventions in the sectors, including investment plans and (under the admittedly extreme scenario of a ‘manifest crisis’, art. 58, ECSC) even the administrative organization of intra-ECSC trade. Looking back at the ECSC five decades later, the contrast with today’s economic thinking about the functioning of markets and specific interventions is rather sharp. It is true that the ECSC initiated a kind of European competition policy and that state aids were completely forbidden,5 but otherwise the ECSC hardly managed to create a functioning internal steel market and never accomplished an internal market for coal. In fact, the steel market enjoyed its share of the ‘golden growth era’ of the EU between the mid-1950s and 1973, but an undistorted internal market in steel only came about just before the ECSC treaty was integrated in the EC treaty (in 2002). In fact, the early and unstoppable decline in coal and the subsequent decline of steel have caused tremendous adjustment problems, often concentrated in certain regions as well, prompting all kinds of regional jobs programmes and ad hoc responses. In the same period of concluding the ECSC treaty, attempts to agree on a similar sectoral treaty for agriculture (the so-called ‘Green Pool’) only just failed. However, they formed the basis of what later was to become the Common Agricultural Policy in the EEC. The Rome treaty of 1957 did not have a sectoral slant, at least not for industry, except for a minor clause in shipbuilding (which has caused subsidy problems until today). The only sectoral bias one finds is that in (the common) transport policy, which was first interpreted in a highly interventionist fashion, resulting in a delay of two decades before the ECJ in 1985 ordered the Council to speed ahead with the liberalization of intra-EU transport in all six modes. The long EU struggle to come to grips with the enduring steel crisis has ultimately helped the Commission to rationalize the EU state aids regime. This is the subject of Chapter 7. Suffice it here to say that, first, the consistency of EU state aid discipline over different sectors had to be accomplished;6 second, the residual political control of the
European industrial policy 51 Council over the Commission’s regime under art. 89, EC had to be pre-empted;7 third, the regime had to be organized in ways similar to the rules of antitrust with well-justified block exemptions rather than allowing scope for ‘negotiating rules’ for member states time and again;8 and, finally, the underlying economics of justifying state aids could be addressed, as was done after an invited paper by Besley and Seabright (1999). The result of the long haul of rationalizing state aid in the EU has been a drastic reduction of national state aid in relative terms and, to some degree, even in absolute terms, as well as a more rational rearrangement of the types of aid given. A quick glance at the sectoral and specific industrial policy box, bottom right in Figure 3.1, makes it clear that the member states’ discretion for such policies today is limited at best. Sectoral policies other than state aids, of course, are not allowed to be anticompetitive, whilst discrimination in, for example, filières or clustering goes against the treaty, too. Other than defence procurement (and, indeed, sales worldwide), exempted under the treaty,9 national leeway is modest. EU policies can have sectoral or specific effects, notably under trade policy which is, by definition, as detailed as individual tariff lines at the six-digit level. However, after many GATT rounds, a host of EU bilateral free trade area agreements with eastern and southern neighbours as well as with South Africa and Mexico, and the EU version of the Generalized System of Preferences, industrial MFN tariff protection is low overall, cases of MFN tariffs higher than the highest clothing tariffs of 13 per cent are exceedingly rare and most countries (other than non-European OECD countries) do not even pay these MFN tariffs but lower ones, or none at all. Quotas vis-à-vis WTO members are outlawed and all that remain are a few quotas for aluminium and steel against exporters from several ex-Soviet Union countries not yet in the WTO. Clothing quotas under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement have expired with the arrangement itself (late 2004). EU policies under ‘cohesion’ cannot be sector-specific but compensation measures (retraining, quality upgrading and so on) are possible. Furthermore, infrastructural investments and other actions improving the investment climate as well as otherwise burdensome environmental clean-ups can be funded under regional and cohesion policies. What remains boils down to technology policies where both EU and member states have been active. One can discern a trend with the emphasis shifting more to the EU level of analysis and bringing together the experts at research and sectoral level. Indeed, the line between the EU research strategy in the horizontal box and the EU technology policies in the specific policies box is hard to draw. As sections 4 and 5 will show, both tend to shy away from ‘picking winners’. For all these reasons, section 5 will only briefly touch upon two ‘evergreens’ in the specific policy box, namely, ICT strategy and technology policy. 2 The economic relevance of cross-cutting issues Even a wide concept of industrial policy will not encompass all influences on industrial structure and performance. Conversely, when trying to encompass all such influences, the term ‘industrial policy’ eventually becomes meaningless. The bottom half of Figure 3.1 already stretches the concept very far. Before going into the details of the three boxes in the following three sections, however, it is likely to serve the understanding of European industrial policy if some reflections are offered on a few cross-cutting issues of relevance to the performance of industry in Europe. Many issues in the two top boxes in Figure 3.1 would be eligible for such reflections. A few examples can illustrate how wide the discussion would stretch. Thus, although (industrial) business is capable of surviving under
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almost any macroeconomic policy regime, or system of industrial relations, or strategy for energy security, there can be little doubt that the quality of such regimes matters a lot for the efficiency, profitability and long-run dynamism of industry. Again, these three are ruled by quite distinct combinations of EU and national powers. Thus macroeconomic stability has become a firm obligation in the treaty for all member states – a major and commendable achievement – even if the division between monetary and fiscal policy differs between eurozone (not having a monetary policy at national level anymore) and non-euro countries (having national monetary policies, but under considerable constraints). In contrast, the system of industrial relations is truly national, with all the differentiations this implies. Similarly, the EU has only limited powers over national policies concerning energy security, indeed, virtually none over the very choice of what energy source to give priority to in the first place. A warning is also in place before linking corporate taxation to European industrial policy. First, the EU has no corporate taxation of its own and there is no legal basis to create an EU-wide corporate tax floor. Second, the harmonization of corporate tax in the EU has thus far proved to be extremely difficult, in part because corporate tax competition might be better, in part because treasuries dislike the loss of what they regard as fiscal sovereignty, in part because the short-run losses due to harmonization of the tax base are feared by some. Third, corporate taxation relates to business in general and most businesses are found in the services, not in industry. Of course, one can (rightly) argue that tax issues may make cross-border mergers unduly difficult, but again that does not apply solely to industry. A recent fear amongst some political leaders is that corporate tax competition, especially from the new member states, is inviting a ‘race to the bottom’. If this race is not going to be resisted, companies will have to migrate to Central Europe and accentuate a process of ‘deindustrialization’ already going on in Western Europe. Apart from the fact that, once again, this applies just as much to services, it is far from clear whether or not low effective tax rates (combining the statutory rate with the tax basis; see, for example, Devereux, Griffith and Klemm, 2002) compensate for relatively unfavourable location or other handicaps in Central Europe and whether (many) other determinants of direct investments are decisive. The three cross-cutting issues selected to be elaborated here are the following: does EU industrial policy amount to ‘competitiveness’ policies, do services matter for industry and, if so, does the EU approach to services matter for industrial policy, and what can Europe do about infrastructure and how critical is that for industrial policy? 2.1 Competitiveness policies for industry? The European Union has a Competitiveness Council, combining the previous Councils for the internal market, research and industry. Art. 157, EC,10 under the title ‘Industry’, specifies that the Union and the member states ‘shall ensure that the conditions for the competitiveness of the Union’s industry exist. For that purpose, in accordance with a system of open and competitive markets, their action shall be aimed at (a) speeding up the adjustment of industry to structural changes; (b) encouraging an environment favourable to initiative and to the development of undertakings throughout the Union, particularly small and medium-sized undertakings; (c) encouraging an environment favourable to cooperation between undertakings;11 (d) fostering better exploitation of the industrial potential of policies of innovation, research and technological development’.
European industrial policy 53 This is to be done in two ways, as the third part of this article indicates: first, the Union ‘shall contribute . . . through the policies and activities it pursues under other provisions of the treaty’ which is what Figure 3.1 essentially depicts; second, ‘The Council, acting unanimously . . . may decide on specific measures in support of action taken in the Member States.’ Interestingly, the draft constitution has added to the last phrase on specific measures: ‘excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States’. This competitiveness clause for industry was inserted during Maastricht. One can view it as a confirmation of the essential message hidden in Figure 3.1, following the debate on and the backing of the 1990 Bangemann report. In any event, art. 157, EC, is inconsistent with the remnants of interventionist industrial policy still around during the conclusion of the Maastricht treaty. Since the Maastricht treaty came into force (November 1993), Commission and Council have displayed a new style of activism in policies related to EU industry and its competitiveness. The main tools are, first of all, analysis, a flurry of horizontal and sectoral policy papers as well as all kinds of networks for horizontal (innovation, new forms of standardization, SMEs and so on) and sectoral (technology, structural adjustment of certain industries and so on) stimulus; and, second, reliance on EU policies and regulation (including the huge area of the internal market itself) other than selective intervention for industry, which is what art. 157, EC, requires. From an economic point of view, therefore, it would seem to make sense to integrate the three old Councils of the internal market, industry and research into a single, more strategic competitiveness Council.12 There are pros and cons of the Union’s shift to competitiveness policies as restrictively defined by the treaty and elaborated since 1993. First, the pros. The strategic advantages are crucial and may well dominate. They include the (virtual) termination of short-sighted and distortive interventions to rescue failing firms or sectors in decline owing to comparative disadvantage as well as the very high barriers against a policy reversal in this respect.13 The focus is on being competitive in Europe and worldwide and this mind-set, even more than treaty texts, has pervasively changed the policy landscape in the Union. The economic advantages, especially in the long run, are obvious. Compared to the more interventionist landscape, one should expect structural adjustment both to be better anticipated by companies and sectors – knowing that the political market is largely taboo – and to be faster if severe problems nevertheless arise. In turn, this will raise productivity overall, hence growth, while presumably reducing the costs of intersectoral labour flows. Other advantages include the more strategic economic perspective of industry as a whole rather than the crisis-prone ad hocery of interventions and a politicized state aids regime. This perspective is (a) profoundly market-oriented,14 (b) far more explicitly focused on how to improve the economic performance of all sectors, not least the ones already doing well, (c) emphasizing future growth sectors in a horizontal fashion (via innovation policies, framework programmes for R&D, attention to ‘entrepreneurship’ and risk capital and so on) and vertically (via strategic High Level Groups and stimulus of standardization, networking, benchmarking, special studies and so on), without ‘picking winners’. Finally, a co-benefit of the competitiveness orientation of the Union is undoubtedly that numerous regulatory and other measures are better scrutinized as to their impact on competitiveness. This might imply additional support for liberalization (for example, in the case of network industries or services, more generally) or an extra form of discipline on regulation before imposing costs on European industry.
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There are significant drawbacks, too. The first seems academic, yet is likely to have profound implications for the policy-making process and to some extent its substance. Whereas competitiveness is a straightforward notion for a single company, it is more elusive for sectors and problematic, if not controversial for countries and the EU. It is not unfair to speak of a gulf between academic economists here, and national and international policy makers.15 For reasons of space, we shall merely refer to some of the implications. Competitiveness is now so widely defined that it serves as a ‘container’ in which almost any idea can be dumped. Not only are ill-defined policies rarely good policies, the nebulous approach acts as an open invitation for (industrial) lobbies and national ministers (not least, once they occupy the rotating EU presidency) to argue attention to almost anything, resulting in waves of ‘fashionable’ topics. This seems to capture what has happened at EU level.16 In fairness, the Commission understood early on that detached analysis and an apolitical organ suggesting agenda items with authority could counterbalance these risks. Thus it initiated a Competitiveness Advisory Group bringing out a series of special reports with the prominent help of Alexis Jacquemin. In 1997, it started annual Competitiveness Reports, largely written by independent economists, and gradually providing a far more reliable analytical basis than hitherto for EU policy making and for enterprises in Europe in their strategic thinking. Another manifestation of the ‘container fallacy’ is the unproductive ‘repackaging’ and relabelling of instruments and policies. At the symbolic level, the term ‘industrial policy’ went out of fashion in the mid-1990s and ‘competitiveness policies’ was the label employed, even though the two Bangemann reports, as the origin of the U-turn to competitiveness concerns in a pro-market approach, utilized ‘industrial policy’. In 1999, however, ‘entreprise policy’ suddenly appears as a new term,17 and seems to be employed, first, as a subset of competitiveness policy dealing with issues of special (but not exclusive) importance to SMEs,18 and, later, as a new label for that part of competitiveness strategy dealing with industry.19 The former idea was developed as policies for ‘entrepreneurship’ or ‘better environment for business’ in a range of activities20 which have stimulated member states to reduce the barriers to start-ups and selectively to cut red tape. The latter notion, that ‘enterprise policy’ would become the new label for competitiveness policies, was swiftly dropped when Chancellor Schroeder started calling for greater EU concern about manufacturing industry in a new industrial policy. The term ‘industrial policy’ was already back in late 2002 and more prominently in 2004.21 Repackaging also took place after the Lisbon goal of making the EU by 2010 ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’ had been set in 2000. The formulation of the goal, though vague, strongly suggests a similarity to the OECD/EU definition of competitiveness, mentioned above. But such a ‘holistic’ approach is likely to conflict with the call by Europe’s political leaders to have more specific regard to manufacturing industry as restated in the European Council in October 2003 and in earlier public letters by Schroeder, Chirac and Blair to Commission president Prodi. Their concern was caused by a fear of ‘deindustrialization’ in the light of globalization and of too costly regulatory initiatives such as REACH (the draft chemicals laws proposed in 2003). Courageously, the Commission preferred to dismiss the deindustrialization thesis on analytical grounds,22 while offering major concessions in unburdening the chemical industry in the REACH process. In doing so, it has stuck to what it calls an ‘integrated approach’ to industrial
European industrial policy 55 policy. This fits the holism of Lisbon but remains very hard to come to grips with, let alone to assess rigorously in terms of effectiveness. The treaty language of art. 157, EC and Lisbon concurs in that the direct policy influence of the EU level is modest and selective, at best, except insofar as the (open) internal market and competition policy is concerned. Lisbon is largely a matter of the member states (see Pelkmans and Casey, 2004, for elaboration). In other words, the container of industrial policy is not only filled with a great many disparate policies but most of these policies are effectuated at the national level. Starting at pure EU initiatives, without realizing this context, would be flawed. 2.2 Does EU services market integration matter for EU industrial policy? Services generate about 70 per cent of the value-added of the EU. Clearly, from the demand side the development of the services sector is important for industry as it is bound to be the largest aggregate customer. The question we address here is on the supply side. Do services matter for the dynamic economic performance of EU industry and, if so, does EU services market integration matter for EU industrial policy? Although all services may have some significance for efficiency, productivity trends and innovation in industry, it is useful first to distinguish government from market services and, in turn, business-related services from other market services. We focus on businessrelated services as they interact most intensively with industrial manufacturing.23 In the EU-25 of 2003, business-related services provided 37 per cent of all market employment, compared to 24 per cent for manufacturing and construction together. Although businessrelated services are active suppliers to each other and to other services sectors (and, to some extent, even government services), some 30 per cent of the intermediate output from business-related services is consumed by manufacturing services.24 In the EU-15 businessrelated services employment has grown from 32 per cent in 1980 to 41 per cent in 2001, whereas the share of manufacturing fell from 27 per cent to 17 per cent. Business-related services are also a growth sector in cross-border trade, especially in the internal market, despite the persistence of a range of barriers: measuring intra-EU trade from the import side, the average annual growth of business-related services trade over 1996–2002 was 14.8 per cent (compared to 9.5 per cent for goods). Their significance for the internal services market is overwhelming given that, in 2002 for EU-15, these services represented no less than 61 per cent of intra-EU services trade, with tourism (24 per cent) being second. The rapid growth of business-related services is usually attributed to outsourcing, implying that a good deal of the fall of manufacturing jobs represents in fact a migration of jobs to services. This is undoubtedly the case, resulting from a search for cost cutting and a focus on ‘core’ business, but there are several other, more deep-seated reasons for this growth as well. Certain relatively new services have become vital for industrial performance, IT services and software above all, but also logistics (with scale-driven production, logistics are critical to performing in the entire internal market both for deliveries and for just-in-time processes). Furthermore, with production ‘europeanizing’ in Europe-wide firms, a range of professional services and selected other ones no longer have to be sourced locally because these providers may ‘follow’ the europeanization of the MNCs either by local establishment or by cross-border services on request (but based on a relationship of trust, indispensable for services supply). It is therefore important for the competitiveness of European industry that the internal markets for services function properly. The recent liberalization of network industries in
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the Union has thus far selectively helped business (industry and services) to cut input costs such as in lower telecoms, postal, air transport and energy bills for a given set of services. The liberalization of financial markets has been favourable to wholesale customers (sizable business clients) but far less, unfortunately, for SMEs and private clients. And there is a hesitant beginning of greater market pressures for professional services and more liberal regulation for example on entry. In marketing and advertising, serious restrictions in some EU countries have remained (despite vigorous efforts, led by the Commission, to overcome them) on the grounds of consumer protection.25 It is probably inappropriate to generalize about the development of service quality and of the emergence of innovative services but it is possible to identify submarkets where EU liberalization has improved the quality of services26 and significantly widened the range and innovativeness of services.27 So the internal market for services matters to industry and a deepening, widening and better functioning of it is crucial for the competitiveness of manufacturing in Europe. The deepening and better functioning of the internal services market is currently hindered by a great many barriers and restrictive regulations. To a large extent they are tackled or at least consistently brought into an EU framework (say, for harmonization where justifiable) in the so-called ‘services draft directive’ in COM (2004) 2 of 13 Jan. 2004, also known as the Bolkestein directive. In particular, for SMEs this directive is crucial. More generally, after a long adjustment period, the scope for arbitrary protection and new restrictions would become minimal once this framework directive was in force. Remaining regulation would have to be justified or liberalized under free movement or establishment. It would improve economic performance, too. Both CPB (Kox, Lejour and Montizaan, 2004) and Copenhagen Economics (2005) expect greater cross-border services trade and establishment (by up to 35 per cent more) in the Union, counting only the direct effects, not the long-run impact of competitive exposure. However, European industry should not focus solely on the internal market for services. A very dynamic subset of services, namely ICT services, turn out to be distinctly less dynamic than their counterparts in the USA,28 and this is not so much due to defects in the internal market as to other restraints of competition and attitudes being more riskaverse, besides less deep ICT investment and a skill gap (see Denis et al., 2005). In this sense, horizontal policies which would probably benefit both services and industry are relevant here, but most of these issues (such as educational; skill gaps; subtle restraints of competition in services via excessive reliance of consumer protection; hindering rapid change because of employment protection laws) have to be addressed at the member states level, given the current assignment of powers to the EU level. 2.3 Is European infrastructure crucial for European industry? In a trivial sense, of course, infrastructure matters greatly for any modern economy. The questions for this contribution are, first, whether it matters in a special way for (European) industry, and, second, whether the EU does or should have a role in (European) infrastructure in a way especially of interest to industry. It is good to realize that the second question was long taboo in European integration. Before the Maastricht treaty, no provision about or reference to infrastructure could be found in the treaties. Consider the sharp contrast with the internal ‘economic integration’ of Canada and of the United States. Both countries only began to integrate after major infrastructural investments (especially, East–West, both railroads and highways) had been initiated. In Europe, post-war
European industrial policy 57 cross-border infrastructure was weakly coordinated, on a voluntary basis, in the framework of the UN–ECE in Geneva and/or bilaterally. Both approaches often failed, remained suboptimal or suffered from long delays. Infrastructure was regarded as a national, not in any way as a European, issue for reason of domestic sensitivity, because of budgetary burdens and, not least, because of a perceived or actual discrepancy between payment for and use of the facilities (especially in case tolls were rejected as a user charge). The taboo was broken in 1984 by the European Round Table of Industrialists in its report on ‘Missing links’ (ERT, 1984). Member states, trapped in their inward-looking inhibitions, failed to appreciate that broader free trade, investment and, later, services trade as well, let alone the deepening of the internal market, necessitated a European perspective on infrastructure, besides national and local networks. Transiting countries was often unnecessarily costly because links were missing or inefficient routing was imposed by a purely national outlook. This applied to roads and freight rail but also to network infrastructure in (then not yet liberalized) public utilities. A European market with business quickly ‘europeanizing’ required European infrastructure without having to rely solely on national investments for local needs. Writing more than two decades later, the view has meanwhile been widely accepted, but its consequences seem too painful for member states’ governments for a wholehearted embrace of the idea. The first question hinges on the role of the state and on the specificity of industry as a user of infrastructure. Because of profound structural changes in the economy and increasing congestion problems, European industry often complains nowadays that (public) infrastructure suffers from neglect and underinvestment, in turn worsening the business climate in Europe and acting as a threat to long-run productivity and economic growth. This would apply in particular to Western Europe. In addition, the special problems of cohesion in countries such as Portugal and Greece (and, until recently, Spain) as well as the Central European member states and the candidates Romania and Bulgaria, necessitate additional infrastructure investments as a condition for catch-up growth, since the lack of it would reduce the attractiveness of FDI and make exports as a handmaiden of their growth more difficult. Of course, this is linked to the second question by arguing for pan-European investment schemes facilitating their exploitation of the opportunities provided by market integration. Insofar as Western Europe is concerned, the problem of neglect requires the answer to three difficult empirical questions. First of all, has there been an actual downward trend in real EU-15 infrastructure investment by governments? The careful survey by Valila, Kozluk and Mehrotra (2005) brings out that indeed there has been a downward trend in this public investment for decades but public investment was still growing (albeit slower than GDP) such that the stock of public capital has grown significantly. The authors empirically reject a number of popular assertions about why the down trend happened, including the strictness of EMU rules, the decreasing need for infrastructure, or privatization. What remains as a statistically significant explanation are long-drawn-out periods of fiscal consolidation long before EMU and disconnected from it (the UK being the most severe case). For Central Europe, they find that, during transition, infrastructure investment did not collapse and that the absence of reliable estimates of public capital stock render it impossible to state whether it is too low for their development at this stage. Another implied question to be answered is the relation between public capital and economic growth. This complicated issue has generated a huge literature. The survey by
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Romp and de Haan (2005) finds that the recent, more sophisticated, analyses do find a positive relationship but far more modest than the influential one in Aschauer (1989). The heterogeneity amongst countries is also great, for reasons of the size and quality of the existing capital stock, non-linearities caused by network effects and institutional and political factors. The authors warn that additional investment, though perhaps politically more rewarding, is no good measure if it pulls away money required for a proper maintenance of the physical stock in place, a problem not rarely encountered in Europe. A third question to be answered is whether the EU-15 suffers from a lack of public capital, that is, whether the stock of public capital is ‘suboptimal’. Again, this cannot be a pure industry or even a pure business issue. Both modelling (see, for example, Romp and de Haan, 2005) and empirical analytical problems (see Kamp, 2005) explain why it is so difficult to come up with authoritative answers. Kamp holds that, in 2000, all EU-14 countries but two had ratios of public to private capital that exceeded the growth-maximizing value; the same is true for the EU-14 average. Taking uncertainty margins into account, Kamp suggests that ‘in most EU countries there is neither a shortage nor an excess of public capital . . . relative to private capital’ (2005, p.85). If long-run trends are extrapolated, the author finds that Austria, Belgium and the UK currently seem to grossly underinvest in public capital. Recent public–private partnerships in the UK might compensate but this is not at all guaranteed. Thus, if European industry insists on infrastructure spending being increased in EU-15 (for Central Europe, this is not controversial) as a precondition for improved competitiveness in general, it would seem that economic analysis does not support such an argument. It is not excluded, however, that specific elements or sectoral shortcomings might have to be addressed because the ‘public capital’ literature deals with larger aggregates. The question for horizontal EU industrial policy is whether the EU level should be involved to ensure or at least foster a European perspective and the development of ‘European’ infrastructure in the sense of missing links, greater overall (EU) network efficiency and cross-border (seamless) interconnections for network industries sharpening competition in such former ‘national’ utilities. It is here that subsidiarity strongly suggests a justified EU role (see Pelkmans, 2005b) given cross-border externalities and, sometimes, scale. This was hesitantly recognized in the Maastricht treaty as TransEuropean Networks (TENs), but without much financial funding (mainly feasibility studies and minor subsidies) and no other competences than voluntary agreements in TEN projects. The EC White Paper on Growth and Competitiveness of December 1993 (see EC, 1993) contained the first economic underpinning of the TEN approach, followed by the Christopherson report of 1994 and the Essen European Council decision about a range of TEN projects. As a generalization, it is not unfair to say that TENs have generated more disillusions than concrete improvements in European infrastructure.29 Nevertheless, the awareness of a number of serious shortcomings in the ‘Europeanness’ of networks or the absence of them has undoubtedly increased. Of course, the regulatory, environmental, spatial planning and budgetary constraints lead to enormous delays even for projects which tend to be supported in the wider EU interest. In network industries such as gas and electricity, markets themselves normally pay for infrastructure. The question here is mainly whether interconnectors across borders are built (and by whom), knowing that this would invite more competition given third-party access. In freight rail the relevance for industry is probably most obvious. Rail freight in
European industrial policy 59 Europe is expensive, slow and of mixed quality as far as business customers’ wants are concerned. Liberalization (see di Pietrantonio and Pelkmans, 2004) should help improvements on all three accounts. One critical condition for that to happen is access to crossborder, long-haul freight rail corridors. Thus freight rail liberalization began with freeing the TEN RF corridors for competition and free entry. Still, owing to the dual use of rail track for freight and passengers in Europe, which is very costly for freight (some 40 per cent cost increase only on that account), capacity problems are expected once a modal shift to rail at lower cost and better quality takes place. A somewhat different issue played in air transport, where delays and expensive rerouting of planes were due to the absence of a common air traffic infrastructure (with tremendous inefficiencies as a result) and a routing system where national interests (usually the military) were allowed to assume a very large part of the air corridors without any weighing of competing European civil aviation interests. In telecoms and the Internet, in contrast, the liberalization of the former has generated major expenditure on B2B high-speed networks (indeed, with excess of so-called ‘dark fibre’) and Europe is rapidly responding to the broadband challenge for B2C and C2C connections (see COM (2004)759 of 2 Dec. 2004 on telecoms), especially in the EU-15. A special case of electronic networking, where the EU has assumed a true European perspective, is the powerful GEANT network for universities (with terabit speeds by 2010) and some 10 per cent of direct EU subsidies. The GALILEO satellite GPS system (with a major EU contribution) should allow surface and maritime navigation and facilitate logistics and freight tracking systems. Finally, for road networks, the revised Eurovignette system, adopted in 2005, allows mark-ups for expensive bottlenecks (more often than not, cross-border ones like the Brenner Pass), thereby reducing a significant obstacle to upgrading precisely of cross-border infrastructure. More generally, the ‘missing links’ idea would seem to be better pursued after October 2003, when the European Council of government leaders agreed that the cross-border segments of infrastructure could receive much higher percentages of EU support.30 Except perhaps on a case study basis, the author is not aware of analytical work singling out the (special?) relevance of industry for TENs. Should one call the TEN approach a kind of horizontal industrial policy, with co-benefits for consumers, and more indirectly for growth? This seems to go too far and, moreover, fails to take into consideration that TENs might crowd out other investment that, perhaps, might have a higher social marginal productivity. The latter problem has sometimes played a role in EU cohesion policies which emphasize infrastructure investments with a view to improving the capacity of poor regions to participate in the internal market. Depending on how this is done (see, for example, Martin, 1999; de la Fuente and Vives, 1995) it may or may not aggravate agglomeration effects and might boost economic growth in poor regions at the cost of growth in a country as a whole. In Central Europe, if multinational investors look for a production base with main outlets in Western Europe, clearly, the quantity and more often the quality of infrastructure will have to be improved over a period of decades. EU cohesion and structural funds can provide so much support that the risks of crowding out could be minimized (although co-financing will always imply some risk in this respect). 3 EU framework conditions for industrial policy Both national and EU industrial policies are severely constrained by the EU framework of the internal market, complemented by its common policies and cohesion. This is not
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surprising as it reflects the fundamental choice of member states to achieve economic progress, formulated in the EU’s economic objectives, via a deep and well-functioning internal market. The internal market is governed by far-reaching instruments such as free movement and free establishment which purposefully reduce national policy autonomy in areas which might affect, actually or potentially, cross-border economic intercourse. Article 4, EC, speaks about the internal market being governed by the principle of an ‘open market economy with free competition’. Even without entering into the details of internal market governance, including competition policy and different degrees of common regulation where justified, it should be clear that there is not much scope for a direct impact on industrial activity. Indeed, (1) EU industrial policy cannot itself be inconsistent with this ambitious regime, even if the additional constraint of art. 157, EC (see section 2.1) did not exist; (2) the notion, implied in art. 157, EC, that national industrial policy has more degrees of freedom and greater choice than EU industrial policy must be understood against these framework conditions resulting from the internal market regime. Of course, since member states have explicitly agreed with this set-up, one could interpret the framework as a quasi-constitutional denial to fall back on interventionist industrial policy in the future. In Figure 3.2 the EU framework governing industrial policy is spelled out in some detail. Both so-called ‘negative integration’ (the establishment of the internal market via prohibitions for member states to intervene with cross-border flows – see top of the figure) and ‘positive integration’ (that is, where member states cooperate or regulate together or centrally – see middle and bottom of the figure) constrain the industrial policy of member states and of the Union in numerous ways. Most of these aspects are under a ‘hard’ legal regime, ultimately enforced by the Commission as the ‘guardian of the treaty’ and, where necessary, by the European Court of Justice. All the main areas have been specified. Attention should also be called to the column of guiding principles. Several of those principles are of a constitutional nature and can suffice, depending on the case, to nullify specific measures of national industrial policy. Two are more policy-oriented. The ‘better regulation’ principle has been embraced by the Union as a fundamental approach for all EU regulation, be it ‘new’ or when reviewing packages of the existing regulatory ‘acquis communautaire’. It is briefly discussed in section 4. Moreover, member states are already bound by the legal duty to respect ‘proportionality’, which says that measures should go no further than what is needed to accomplish the objective. The notion of ‘cooperative federalism’, coined by political science, is meant to express the idea that the two levels of government are not effectively separated (as is often the case in the USA) but, in contrast, often work together to pursue specific objectives or implement rules or codes. This is important for horizontal industrial policy where joint initiatives with a view to complementarity are routine. For reasons of space, further study of Figure 3.2 is left to the reader.31 It is important, however, to appreciate the systemic obstacles this framework generates against a return to old, interventionist and politicized industrial policy. For a while the probability of a policy reversal seemed slim. But, since 2004, if not before, leading politicians in countries such as France, Germany and Italy, and sometimes industrialists, have occasionally called for a return to industrial policy. These calls tend to be vague because it is well known that national autonomy is greatly circumscribed and, in addition, the European mind-set is much more pro-competition or pro-market than several decades
European industrial policy 61 Key Aspects Establishment of internal market
Proper functioning of internal market
Regional/ structural & cohesion policies
Substantive Elements
Principles
Free movement • goods • services • capital • codified technology • workers (host c.c.) Free establishment • entrepreneurship • FDI
– non-discrimination – proportionality – no frontiers
Overcoming market failures (a) via rules & codes • harmonization/approximation – old & new approaches – global approach (C.A., risk-based) • common regulation – uniform rules (and selected, autonomous agencies) • mutual recognition (no EU rules) • competitive public procurement • standards and voluntary C.A. Overcoming market failures (b) via competition policy • complementarity EU & member states • EU → anti-trust → network industries (see (a)) → state aids prohibition/control Common EU policies • transport (link with infrastructure) • trade (see ‘specific industrial policy’) • agriculture (link with cohesion/ environment) • environment (IM priority, cost/benefit & competitiveness tests)
– subsidiarity – ‘better regulation’ – ‘cooperative federalism’
– measures strengthening hard & soft infrastructure (locational attractiveness) – measures for retraining/skill enhancement – support for adjustment after industrial decline/rural stagnation – cross-border regional facilitation – removing environmental legacies
– long-run catch-up growth – co-financing & additivity
– ownership (EU neutral)
– ‘open & competitive’
Notes: C.A. = conformity assessment (testing, certification, accreditation); host c.c. = host country control (protectionist).
Figure 3.2
EU framework governing industrial policy
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ago. Looking at Figure 3.2, national industrial policies cannot affect free movement and free establishment. The case law in this area goes very far and severely limits policy action that is in some sense discriminatory (for companies from other EU countries) or distorts free movement/establishment. Thus ‘golden shares’ of national governments in privatized former utilities have been condemned by the ECJ as going against the free movement of capital, here, the equal opportunity of all potential shareholders in the Union. Similarly, in overcoming market failures of the internal market (see (a) in the second row, second column), all five items greatly limit national discretion, even if full uniformity of EU rules is not applicable. Thus mutual recognition even dispenses with common rules, but it imposes equivalence and otherwise falls back on the strict requirements of free movement (see, for example, Pelkmans, 2002). Overcoming market failures via competition policy exercises equally constraining effects (see (b)). In industrial policy one tends to think that this applies with particular force to state aid control (which is correct) but one should not forget that the Commission has taken a restrictive view on crisis cartels, that network industries (where interventionist industrial policy was routine only 20 years ago) are being or have already been liberalized,32 and that merger control (begun at EU level in 1990) has further reduced the options for national policy makers. Last but not least, the internal market being ‘open’ to the world economy (at least, for industrial products) further curtails the toolkit of national industrial policy, if ever one should wish to return to interventionism. Quotas have been abolished in GATT and cannot come back. Industrial tariffs are low or zero and are ‘bound’ in Geneva, which means that any increase beyond the bound level will cause an upheaval and, in any event, will have to be compensated. In rare instances, a trade measure of ‘damage control’ (think of the 2005 restraints on China for selected clothing items) is possible for a short period, but one cannot build a true policy on that. Just before this book went to the press, France announced that it had selected ten sectors which must be prevented from falling into ‘foreign’ hands. The reader should note that the way this was suggested as being compatible with European law was that national security and military goods were involved, so that art. 296, EC would apply as well as an escape clause in the EC Takeover Bid directive 2004/25. This escape route is so extreme that its use is already a powerful signal of how strong the constraining effect of the EU framework is.33 4 Horizontal EU industrial policy The main emphasis nowadays in the Union is on horizontal industrial policy. A sharp definition of what ‘horizontal’ means in actual practice is not easy. The term probably originates from the desire not to intervene sectorally (vertically) and to defend policy makers against ad hoc pressures for rescue operations and direct interventions in single enterprises. Such ‘specific’ industrial policy, another term often used, is not desirable in case declining industries or badly performing companies ask to be helped by the state, nor is the state any better than market players at ‘picking winners’ for the future. At the same time, the boundaries between the framework conditions (see section 3) and horizontal policy are not always clear-cut and the distinction between the two is, at times, fluid. Another problem in setting out a proper picture of EU horizontal industrial policy is that the overall scope of this approach is vast, too vast for a chapter like the present one. To get around this difficulty, this section will employ two summary representations of crucial EU policy papers which give a rich impression of the EU horizontal approach
European industrial policy 63 • EU industry has improved its competitiveness • but faces mounting international competition, emergence of the information society, continued needs in less developed regions, inadequate European networks, and demand for intangible investment
Drive
→ European Information Society action plan → four horizontal priorities (see below)
Priorities
Promote intangible investment – general support for intangibles in investment (via tax) – research, with regard to market needs & spin-offs – promoting alliances – promoting quality – promoting clean technologies, with economic incentives – incorporate vocational training in other policies
Develop industrial cooperation
Ensure fair competition
Modernize role of public authorities
– removal of legal/ fiscal obstacles to industrial cooperation – facilitate (BC Net) – round tables – various cooperation schemes for cooperation with companies in Latin America, MED countries and Asia – energy & standards cooperation with Central Europe
– a post-Uruguay Round (EU) agenda on international competition rules – rendering contingency protection in EU trade policy more efficient – stricter & more coherent EU state aids regime – pursuing the internal market for network industries
– regulatory reform – greater simplification EU laws (later Molitor report and SLIM) – improve administrative cooperation between member states & Commission (that is ‘cooperative federalism’) – streamlining EU industrial policy decision making in various councils
Note: Horizontal aspects only. Source:
COM(1994) 319 of 14 September 1994.
Figure 3.3
EU horizontal industrial policy proposed in 1994
and which can be used for annotations in the text. Elaboration of the economic analysis underlying the initatives (or the lack of it) is impossible for reasons of space. Doing justice to the many interesting initiatives and their rate of success is equally unfeasible. In Figures 3.3 and 3.4, the Commission papers on industrial policy of 1994 and of 2004 are summarized. After the treaty revision from Maastricht came into force the EU did not wait a moment before taking multiple action on the industrial policy front. Late 1993 and 1994 yielded no fewer than three major initiatives (not counting the Christopherson group on TENs, see section 2.3). First, the White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment of December 1993 links industrial policy with macro variables such as growth and employment. It stresses how crucial it is for the EU to be present, if not strong, in the markets ‘of the future’ (for example, telecoms, biotech, environmental protection, new materials and energy). Commissioner Bangemann personally led a group on the Information Society,
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working out an action plan in the autumn of 1994. At about the same time, the Commission published its first post-Maastricht industrial policy paper which is largely of a horizontal character. Extracts from the latter are shown in Figure 3.3. The idea is to articulate further the current ‘unprecedented effort to restructure and innovate’ in the EU, induced by EC-1992 and greater trade openness. The European Information Society can be seen as ‘sectoral’ although it is of course an extremely broad and elusive concept. Otherwise, four priorities are identified, all clearly ‘horizontal’. The first, labelled ‘intangible investment’, turns out to be a collection of initiatives which would seem to have in common that they are formulated in a pro-market fashion (for example, research with more regard to market needs and aiming at spin-offs; economic incentives for clean technologies; promoting quality). As could be expected given art. 157, EC, the EU level has little more than persuasion and some, rather limited, funding available, whereas selected results will have to come from the member states, such as tax treatment of intangibles and economic incentive measures promoting clean technologies (with possible exemptions at EU level). Some initiatives, such as quality (which should be driven by market incentives), vocational training and business alliances, are mainly at the enterprise level. Indeed, a quality policy at the EU level was resisted later as inappropriate even if voluntary certification and testing are (weakly) encouraged via EOTC. On alliances, the EU level walks a tightrope between strong powers disciplining individual (anti-competitive) alliances and soft, non-interventionist encouragement of high-tech alliances in general. This is also evident from the second priority, where the EU level can mainly try to remove legal and fiscal barriers to ‘industrial cooperation’ (which requires directives) and otherwise little more than encouragement, a ‘marriage bureau’ (like BCnet) and active liaison functions in other continents under trade and cooperation agreements. The third priority (fair competition) is remarkable because it is mainly about a post-Uruguay agenda for worldwide competition rules, a wish meanwhile removed from the Doha agenda under the pressure from developing countries. Other items, such as a stricter and more coherent state aid regime,34 and the pursuit of the internal market for network industries, have been taken up with vigour and much has been achieved in the meantime. The desire to render contingency protection (such as anti-dumping) more efficient seems benign but one can ask questions about the ‘fair competition’ nature of EU anti-dumping. It has often been suggested that, at least in part, EU anti-dumping serves as the last instance of protectionist and selective industrial policy (see Evenett and Vermulst, 2005, for a survey). The fourth priority (modernizing public authorities) is mainly about regulatory simplification and reform, which has grown into a major plank of EU (and increasingly of national) policy making. The 1994 Commission paper anticipates the Molitor report (1995) on regulatory simplification for competitiveness as well as the SLIM programme (on simplification, see Pelkmans, Labory and Majone, 2000, for a critical review), initiatives which have since been completely overtaken by a far more intrusive and broader approach of RIAs. The prudent idea of streamlining industrial policy decision making has served as a prelude for the eventual merger of the internal market, industry and research councils with the Competitiveness Council, a decade later. The overall impression of the 1994 Commission paper is that the EU was still searching for an effective common approach between the member states, the EU level and EU industry as the principal actor. The horizontal approach of 2004, summarized in Figure 3.4, is definitely wider in scope and almost certainly better equipped with ideas,
European industrial policy 65
Drive
• worrying combination of (too) slow structural change and selective (but not general) ʻdelocalizationʼ • disappointing EU performance in productivity growth, research and innovation • too weak risk taking & entrepreneurship • EU still has assets and many opportunities (for example intra-branch) • Eastern enlargement → reorganize value-chains for competitiveness and growth
Priorities
→ ʻbetter law-makingʼ approach, combining a ʻdeeperʼ internal market, with a lower regulatory ʻburdenʼ → ʻintegrated approachʼ to competitiveness, in five areas (knowledge, the IM, cohesion, sustainable development, worldwide dimension)
Integrated (multi-policy) approach competitiveness
Better EU law-making – IM and one-stop-shop regulations benefit industry → pursue – RIAs – alternative methods to regulate – a fresh look at competitiveness impact of existing acquis – verify cumulative effects of regulation
– European Research Area (IM for R&D) (more funding, reversing brain-drain, better framework conditions for business R&D) – innovation policy (business-driven, diffusion, funds, innovation systems) – human capital & skills – competition policy for innovation & tech. transfer and new merger control (with ʻefficiency testʼ) – deepening/widening internal market (services, standards, financial markets, company law, fiscal) – cohesion/industrial clusters, TENs – incentives for ʻgreen businessʼ, clean energy/tech. – facilitating access-to-markets outside the EU (worldwide; neighbourhood strategy)
Notes: Horizontal aspects only; IM = internal market. Source:
COM(2004) 274 of 20 April 2004.
Figure 3.4
EU horizontal industrial policy proposed in 2004
funds and (sometimes) instruments. This contrast is not to be interpreted as that, therefore, it is more ‘effective’ in accomplishing goals or somehow ‘better’. Such an assessment is very difficult to make, given the vast areas of activities, the constraints in terms of powers specified in Figure 3.1 and the potential or actual gaps between the desired results in policies and the genuine impact on European business. It is good to see the main
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International handbook on industrial policy
reasons for the greater ambition in horizontal EU industrial policy after the turn of the century. The instrumental reasons include (a) larger funding over time for research and for technology in the respective framework programmes; (b) a more useful composition of these funds, with greater concentration on fewer areas, better exploitation of crossborder networking and the links between researchers/engineers and business strategists more systematically pursued; (c) a focus on ‘hard’ instruments where possible (that is, legal or financial rather than talkshops); (d) an increase in funds for cohesion, which can be used for horizontal industrial policy (and only since the enlargement of 1 May 2004 has there been a threat of decline per country/region). But there were also reasons emerging from the very top of European politics, such as the fear of delocalization or deindustrialization (in particular, China and India have not failed to leave a deep impression on political leaders). An explicit public appeal was made by three leading prime ministers (an initiative of Chancellor Sch