International Migration and Sending Countries Perceptions, Policies and Transnational Relations
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International Migration and Sending Countries Perceptions, Policies and Transnational Relations
Edited by Eva Østergaard-Nielsen
International Migration and Sending Countries
Also by Eva Østergaard-Nielsen TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS: Turks and Kurds in Germany
International Migration and Sending Countries Perceptions, Policies and Transnational Relations Edited by
Eva Østergaard-Nielsen Marie Curie Research Fellow Migration Research Group Department of Geography Autonomous University of Barcelona
Editorial matter, selection and Chapters 1, 4 and 10 © Eva Østergaard-Nielsen 2003 Chapters 2–3 and 5–9 © Palgrave Macmillan Ltd 2003 All rights reserved. No production, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2003 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 1–4039–0251–8 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data International migration and sending countries: perceptions, policies and transnational relations/edited by Eva Østergaard-Nielsen. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–0251–8 1. Emigration and immigration. 2. Transnationalism. I. Østergaard-Nielsen, Eva, 1969– JV6032.I573 2003 325’.2—dc21 2003045692 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne
Contents Preface
vii
Notes on the Contributors
viii
List of Abbreviations
Part I 1
3
4
5
Introduction
International Migration and Sending Countries: Key Issues and Themes Eva Østergaard-Nielsen
Part II 2
x
3
From Exit to Voice?
Los Olvidados Become Heroes: The Evolution of Mexico’s Policies Towards Citizens Abroad Jesús Martínez-Saldaña
33
Dominicans Abroad: Impacts and Responses in a Transnational Society David Howard
57
Turkey and the ‘Euro Turks’: Overseas Nationals as an Ambiguous Asset Eva Østergaard-Nielsen
77
Overseas Filipino Workers: Sacrificial Lambs at the Altar of Deregulation Mary Lou L. Alcid
99
Part III
Old Homelands, New Policies
6
Mother India’s Forgotten Children Marie Lall
7
Courting a Diaspora: Armenia–Diaspora Relations since 1998 Razmik Panossian v
121
140
vi
Contents
Part IV 8
9
Long-Distance Nationalism and the Responsible State: The Case of Eritrea Khalid Koser
171
Priming the Diaspora: Cyprus and the Overseas Greek Cypriots Madeleine Demetriou
185
Part V 10
Sending Countries in Conflict
Conclusion
Continuities and Changes in Sending Country Perceptions, Policies and Transnational Relations with Nationals Abroad Eva Østergaard-Nielsen
209
Bibliography
225
Index
236
Preface This volume originates in a workshop organized at the London School of Economics and Political Science in July 2000. The result of this workshop and subsequent discussions between the editor and the contributors is a volume that focuses on eight sending countries, from the Americas, Europe, Africa and Southeast Asia. Drawing on the expertise and recent research of the eight contributors, the volume’s primary aim is to highlight sending countries’ role and influence on migration management and relations with emigrants or established diasporas, in particular the extent to which these countries facilitate overseas nationals’ engagement in the national economy and political sphere. It shows the differences and parallels between sending countries previously involved in labour export but now trying to include these emigrants in the national polity from afar; homelands who, after gaining independent statehood, struggle to find the right balance between support from and interference by already established diasporas; and sending countries in conflict who may or may not turn to their overseas nationals for support. Some of the original contributions to the workshop are, for various reasons, not included in this volume, but have been replaced with other chapters by authors joining the project at a later stage. I am grateful to all contributors for their enthusiasm for this volume and for going through several rounds of revisions so carefully. I would like to thank the Economic and Social Research Council’s Transnational Communities Programme and the International Relations Department at the London School of Economics for their financial and logistic support during the initial stages of this project. I am grateful to those colleagues and friends, in particular William Wallace, Rebecca Golbert, Alisdair Rogers and Christian Thune, who have provided thoughtful comments on earlier versions of the general chapters of the volume. EVA ØSTERGAARD-NIELSEN
vii
Notes on the Contributors Mary Lou L. Alcid is Assistant Professor at the Department of Social Work, College of Social Work and Community Development at the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City. She is also the Executive Director of KANLUNGAN Centre Foundation, a nongovernmental organization that works for the promotion and protection of the rights and welfare of overseas Filipino workers, especially women, and their families, and President of the Network Opposed to Violence against Women Migrants (NOVA). She has been involved in issues relating to international labour migration as a social worker and activist since 1986. Her published articles include ‘Remittances: the new empowering tool of overseas Filipinos’ (co-written with Andres G. Panganiban), in Helping Build Local Economies: A Framework for Microfinance Practitioners (New Rural Bank of San Leonardo, 2002); ‘The impact of the Asian economic crisis on women migrant workers’, and ‘Trends in the overseas employment of Filipina workers four years after the Asian financial and economic crisis’, in Carrying the Burden of the World: Women Reflecting on the Effects of the Crisis on Women and Girls (J. Illo and R. P. Ofreno (eds), University of the Philippines, 2002). Madeleine Demetriou received her PhD from the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Kent in Canterbury in 2002. The thesis was entitled ‘Politicising the Diaspora: Contested Identities Among the Greek Cypriot Community in Britain’. On diasporic politics, she has published: ‘Beyond the nation-state? Transnational politics in the age of diaspora’, ASEN Bulletin, no. 16, 1999. David Howard is Lecturer in Human Geography at the University of Edinburgh. His principal research and teaching interests focus on the social and urban geographies of Caribbean and Latin American societies, with a particular emphasis on issues of international migration, racism and multicultural policies. Recent publications include Cities of the Imagination: Kingston (Signal Books, 2003) and Coloring the Nation: Race and Ethnicity in the Dominican Republic (Lynne Rienner, 2001). Khalid Koser is Lecturer in Human Geography at University College London, and a member of the Migration Research Unit. He is co-editor viii
Notes on the Contributors ix
of The New Migration in Europe (Macmillan, 1998), The End of the Refugee Cycle? (Berghahn, 1999) and New Approaches to Migration? (Routledge, 2002). Marie Lall is a research associate at the Social Science Research Unit in the Institute of Education, London. She finished her PhD at the London School of Economics in 1999. Her thesis was published by Ashgate under the title India’s Missed Opportunity in 2001. Since then she has undertaken a study on the Punjab and the Punjabi Diaspora and has worked and published on a variety of issues relating to diaspora/ migration studies, education policy and social exclusion. The focus countries have included Britain, Portugal and India. Jesús Martínez-Saldaña is Assistant Professor at the Department of Chicano and Latin American Studies at California State University, Fresno. A native of Michoacán, Mexico, he belongs to a family with a strong and old tradition of migration. He received a BS in Political Science from Santa Clara University, an MA in Latin American Studies from the University of California at Berkeley, and a PhD in Ethnic Studies from the same institution. His works on Mexican immigration have been published in Mexico, the United States and Europe. His most recent work is La dimensión política de la migración Mexicana (The political dimension of Mexican migration) (Mexico: Instituto José María Luis Mora), co-authored with Leticia Calderón Chelius. Eva Østergaard-Nielsen is a Marie Curie Research Fellow at the Migration Research Group, Department of Geography, at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. She is author of Transnational Politics: Turks and Kurds in Germany (Routledge, 2003) and has published several articles on the issue of migrants’ political participation, transnational networks and international relations. Razmik Panossian teaches at the Department of Government at the London School of Economics. He has published a number of articles on Armenia–diaspora relations, and his forthcoming book is on Armenian nationalism and the diaspora.
List of Abbreviations AK Party AMEND
Justice and Development Party (Turkey) Alliance of Migrant Workers and Advocates for the Amendment of RA 8042 (The Philippines) ANAP Motherland Party (Turkey) ARF Armenian Revolutionary Federation BJP Bharatia Janata Party (India) CDU Christian Democratic Union (Germany) CFO Commission of Filipinos Overseas CHP Republican People’s Party (Turkey) DoLE Department of Labour and Employment (The Philippines) DSP Democratic Left Party (Turkey) ELF Eritrean Liberation Front EPLF Eritrean People’s Liberation Front ERA Eritrean Relief Association EZLN Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Mexico) FERA Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (India) GNP Gross National Product HPSA Hawaii Sugar Planters Association IFE Federal Electoral Institute (Mexico) ILO International Labour Organization IMF International Monetary Fund IOM International Organization for Migration IRCA Immigration Reform and Control Act (USA) JCE Central Electoral Board (Dominican Republic) KLA Kosovo Liberation Army MHP National Movement Party (Turkey) MIT Turkish Secret Service NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement NRI Non-Resident Indian OECD Organization for Economic Cooporation and Development OWWA Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (The Philippines) PAN–PVEM National Action Party–Green Ecological Party of Mexico PFDJ People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (Eritrea) PIO Person of Indian Origin x
List of Abbreviations xi
PIO PLD POEA POMAK PRD PRD PRI PRSC PSEKA RBI SG SP SPD SRE TRNC UNCTAD ZfT
Press and Information Office (Cyprus) Dominican Liberation Party Philippine Overseas Employment Administration World Federation of Overseas Cypriots Dominican Revolutionary Party Party of the Democratic Revolution (Mexico) Institutional Revolutionary Party (Mexico) Christian Social Reform Party (Dominican Republic) International Coordinating Committee Justice for Cyprus Reserve Bank of India Secretary of Governance (Gobernación) (Mexico) Happiness Party (Turkey) Social Democratic Party (Germany) Secretariat of Foreign Relations (Mexico) Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Zentrum für Türkeistudien
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Part I Introduction
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1 International Migration and Sending Countries: Key Issues and Themes Eva Østergaard-Nielsen
This volume offers a comparative study of the policies of sending countries (and homelands) towards their nationals abroad. In so doing it bridges a gap in comparative research on migration and integration politics on the one hand and the rapidly emerging research field of transnational communities on the other. Within migration studies, research has favoured the policy choices and constraints on receiving countries’ immigration control and migrant incorporation. Comparative research has traced the particular historical, structural, political and socio-cultural factors in different receiving countries in order to account for similarities and differences in immigrant identification and incorporation. But such studies rarely include the policies of sending countries in a similar systematic way. Sending countries are viewed in the context of the migration problems that they are thought to pose for recipient countries. Indeed, sending country governments are often presented as pawns rather than players in issues of migration management, since the receiving countries are decisive in formulating the rules for visa policies, asylum or return of clandestine migrants. By contrast, sending countries (or homelands) stand central in the rapidly burgeoning literature on transnational communities and diasporas which examines the ties and relations between these groups and their country of origin. Still, there are few comparative studies that allow us to understand differences and similarities in the perceptions and policies of sending countries beyond the Americas. Nonetheless, throughout the world, sending countries, an increasing number of which are now also receiving countries, are emerging as complex and significant actors in migration politics. International migration 3
4
International Migration and Sending Countries
has the effect of making territorial and personal boundaries incongruous (Bauböck 2001). In response, most sending countries seek not only to tap into the economic resources of citizens abroad but increasingly also to incorporate them in their domestic and foreign policy and to appeal to their love for, and sense of duty towards, their country of origin. Their three main interests are usually considered to be (a) to secure continuous inflow of economic resources, (b) to mobilize political support and control subversive political dissidence and (c) to promote the upward social mobility of overseas nationals (see among others, Guarnizo 1998; Portes 1999; Itzigsohn 2000). In this way migration provides sending countries, both centrally and, in particular, peripherally positioned in the global economy, with new options for reconfiguring the reach of the nation-state through transnational economic, social and political ties with nationals abroad. However, observations like this raise more questions than they answer. First, we have little comparative understanding of why some sending states are more reluctant than others to engage in sustained dialogue with citizens abroad and to involve them in their economic development or domestic or foreign politics. Second, by no means all examples of sending countries trying to engage nationals abroad in homeland affairs are successful. So why do some sending states succeed in these endeavours while others fail? In part, as will be discussed in greater detail in the Conclusion, the answer to both these questions lies in the particular constellation of the country’s emigration trajectory, domestic resources and position in the global system. Importantly, the opening up of the ‘black box’ analysis of states as unitary actors highlights the domestic controversy which often is crucial to the formulation and implementation of sending country policies towards nationals abroad. This volume on sending country policies therefore raises the general issues of state ‘responsibilities’ and ‘capabilities’ in the transnational spaces between migrants and their country of origin. To what extent and for how long does a sending country have any responsibilities towards its citizens abroad? While sending countries are quick to call for their expatriate population’s economic and political contribution to development in the country of origin, it is clear that most expatriates and their representative organizations expect this to be a two-way deal. Emigrants want their country of origin to support their struggle for equal rights and against discrimination in the labour market. More established migrant and diaspora groups demand more transparency and good governance in order to feel that their remittances and foreign direct investment are spent in the best possible way. And if migrants are expected to be good
Eva Østergaard-Nielsen 5
representatives and to do some lobbying for their country of origin abroad, then they would often like some influence on the homeland policies that they are expected to represent. The other dimension worth looking into is the issue of sending country capabilities, that is, the extent to and conditions under which sending country rhetoric of inclusion of overseas nationals is translated into actual policies. At many a congress of overseas nationals, leaders from the country of origin have linked calls for economic and political support with promises of extended rights and benefits. However, the socalled ‘capability gap’, launched to describe the discrepancy between goals and outcomes of receiving countries’ migration control in the early 1990s (see Cornelius et al. 1992), can also be applied to sending countries’ efforts to reach out to nationals abroad. Only to some extent does this have to do with the balance of power between the government in the country of origin and the overseas migrant or diaspora community. In particular, promises of overseas citizens’ right to vote and stand in elections of their country of origin have often proved difficult to push through national parliaments, because some domestic actors see more disadvantage than advantage in allowing this or it simply proves too difficult and costly to implement in practice. Thus, closer scrutiny of sending country capabilities to implement their promised policies of inclusion may prove an important reality check on the idea of sending state institutions as key mobilizers of transnational relations between migrants and their countries of origin. It is relevant to explore issues of sending country willingness and ability to formulate and implement policies towards citizens abroad from not only an academic but also a public policy point of view. Relations between sending countries and overseas migrant and diaspora communities go to the heart of two major current debates on migration and public policy. On the one hand, migrants’ transnational links with their country of origin are central to migrants’ social and political incorporation in their countries of settlement, an issue high on the agenda of Western receiving countries (Guarnizo 1998: 57; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a). On the other hand, levels of migration and migrants’ remittances are increasingly linked to concerns with development aid and humanitarian relief to less developed countries. Recent studies argue for increased attention to the developmental potential of migrants’ economic and social remittances as well as foreign direct investment in their country of origin (Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 2002). Reports from important international agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) indicate that this argument is being
6
International Migration and Sending Countries
taken increasingly seriously.1 However, one must be careful not to gloss over the relations between citizens and their country of origin, not to assume a mutual level of trust between migrants and their country of origin, and not to take sending countries’ policies and incentives for granted. It is therefore important to understand these migrants’ level of engagement, their sense of commitment and their confidence in local and national authorities. And it is also essential to explore the other side of the equation, the extent to which sending countries feel that emigrants and citizens abroad are truly committed to the well-being of their place of origin. Sending country governments may question if emigrants are just interested in personal economic gain or – even worse from the perspective of the sending state – are looking to support a change of political regime. A more nuanced and textured understanding of relations between sending countries and their emigrants and diasporas is relevant for both academic and public policy debates on issues of migration control and development and the wider issues and implications of cross-border membership, dual allegiances, and the interaction between migrants’ transnational practices and state policies. In the rest of this introduction we locate the comparative study of sending countries in its empirical and theoretical context through discussions of the relevant key concepts and dynamics, and we introduce the common themes and questions addressed in the subsequent case studies. We argue for a reconsideration of the role of sending countries in international migration that includes but does not overestimate their role in creating transnational economic, social and political spaces and in turning emigrants and diasporas into a part of national development and democratization.
Types of sending countries Sending countries, by no means a uniform category, are as different as their various emigration trajectories and policy-responses. Indeed, there seems to be no consensus on the terminology used to describe migrants’ place of origin. Emigration states, sending states or countries, countries of origin, source countries and homelands are often used interchangeably, although there are clearly huge differences between those countries which have engaged in emigration management and those homelands without sovereign governance with whom stateless diasporas may identify. In this volume three main groups of sending countries are included: labour exporting countries, countries which have gained independent statehood after a major exodus of nationals, and sending countries ‘in conflict’.
Eva Østergaard-Nielsen 7
The first category, labour exporting countries, is perhaps the most conventional. The term ‘sending countries’ is ambiguous since few states actually ‘send’ or ‘export’ their citizens abroad through unilateral policies or bilateral labour ‘exchange’ programmes such as those set up between Southern and Northern or Eastern, and Western European countries in the 1960s or the so-called Bracero Programme set up to regulate Mexican migration to the US in 1942. Instead, the vast majority of migration takes place largely independent of sending country emigration policies (see below). While many migrants eventually return home, a significant proportion stays abroad or continuously moves back and forth. Consequently sending countries have added a set of policies aimed at reaching out to their overseas communities to their policies of migration management. A second category consists of countries whose post-colonial independent state has come into existence after out-migration and settlement of parts of the population elsewhere. These countries are more accurately referred to as ‘homelands’ or ‘countries of origin’ than as sending countries. Countries like Israel or Armenia never sent those nationals abroad who form the backbone of their established diasporas. Similarly, their overseas nationals more accurately fit the definition of a ‘diaspora’ as a group of emigrants or exiles among whom ‘a fiction of congregation’ has taken hold (Levitt 2001a: 203).2 The transformation from a ‘homeland’, with which the overseas diaspora had an emotive attachment and perhaps a state-building agenda, to a state with a policy agenda of its own certainly impacts relations with nationals abroad.3 Relations are often ambiguous as new and perhaps democratically and economically fragile states find themselves at the weaker end of relations with their overseas nationals. Few such countries can ignore a politically and economically powerful diaspora, but to get the balance right of attracting economic support without undue political interference is not easy. Close to this category is the set of states which existed before, but whose radical regime change either alienates emigrants in the diaspora or means that a previously alienated diaspora now wants to lend its support to democratization and development. Several Eastern European countries after the end of the Cold War are cases in point. A third category consists of sending countries in conflict. In these countries, independence movements, which claim but do not yet represent statehood, draw on either settled diasporas or recently exited refugees in gathering domestic and in particular international support for their right to self-determination. Governments try to curb overseas opposition and instead mobilize support to settle an international dispute
8
International Migration and Sending Countries
or, as is increasingly the case, an intra-state conflict. For instance, the 1911 revolution in China was primarily financed by overseas Chinese (Esman 1986: 132). Factions of the Irish diaspora in the United States supported the Irish Republican Army (IRA) financially. Croats in Germany were known to smuggle weapons to support Croat dissidents in former Yugoslavia, and Albanians in Western Europe to use proceeds of crime and pressures on the expatriate community to support the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) (Adamson 2002: 166). Overseas groups of contemporary refugees, especially those who have recently fled, are often much less resourceful than more established diasporas or migrant communities. Still, even groups with very limited means, such as Bosnian and Eritrean refugees residing in Western Europe, go out of their way to extend political and economic support to their countries of origin in order to intervene in an ongoing conflict or help in post-conflict reconstruction work (Al-Ali et al. 2001). In some cases these groups can further democratization in their country of origin (Portes et al. 1999), but they can also prolong or even worsen conflicts through support for parties that reject negotiation and settlement (Collier 2000; Maney 2000). In either case the diaspora can be difficult to control and satisfy by fragile opposition groups or new governments. These three groups of sending countries are not clear-cut categories but overlap in various ways. One sending country may be both labour exporting, have a large overseas diaspora which settled before the country gained independence, and have a domestic or international conflict which serves to mobilize nationals abroad. India and Armenia are both cases in point, as will be fully explored in the two chapters on these countries in this volume. Moreover, in all three groups of sending countries we can find examples of countries which create institutions aimed at orienting migrants towards return, and countries which seek to encourage migrants to stay abroad but stay in touch (see R. Smith 1997). The latter, Smith argues, engage in ‘global nation policies’ offering various types of extra-territorial membership to citizens and former citizens abroad. A whole host of countries, including Mexico, the Dominican Republic and Turkey, have been observed to make the transition from ‘export and return’ policies to ‘global nation policies’. Moreover, several countries may engage in both types of policies at the same time, not least those who have both short-term workers and more established diasporas abroad. In the following section, we will take a closer look at these different types of policies in which sending countries may engage, and then return to the three types of sending countries at the end of the chapter.
Eva Østergaard-Nielsen 9
Migration management, protection of overseas workers and return policies The number of migrants, or people living outside the country of their birth, doubled from 75 million in 1965 to 120 million in 2000. Previous eras have witnessed larger-scale migrations, such as European migration to the New World, but what is new is the global nature of migration.4 One major change is that the number of sending and receiving states in the world has grown. Equally important, the number of countries which are both suppliers and receivers has increased as well. By 1990, 15 countries, including Mexico, Thailand, Indonesia and South Africa, were both major suppliers and receivers of international migrants as opposed to only 4 in 1970. Any analysis of migration systems has to take this complexity of migration patterns into account.
Migration management In theory, of the neoliberal kind, migration should be a win-win situation. It is therefore in the interest of sending countries to control who leaves and who does not, to ensure that migrants return with skills that are relevant to developing the local economy or that their flow of remittances and investment continues. One of the factors contributing to the increase in migration in the last five decades is the liberalization of exit rules first from post-colonial countries and later from postcommunist states (Zolberg 2001: 11). Yet, sending countries, argues Mahler (2000), ‘patronize rather than interdict the movement of people across borders’ (Mahler 2000: 200). Sending countries may use emigration as a safety valve to defuse political unrest as those critical of the regime are encouraged to improve their livelihood elsewhere (Shain 1989: 147–9). More commonly, sending countries have promoted labour export as a means to alleviate unemployment rates, receive foreign currency in the form of the remittances and later benefit from the human capital and skills that migrants bring back with them. For these reasons sending countries are often pro-emigration, developing administrative tools to regulate the outflow of workers, or even, as has been found to be the case in Bangladesh, to pursue active export policies by exploring markets beyond those traditionally receiving Bangladeshi migrants (Shah 1998: 24). Yet, sending countries may also wish to halt labour migration because they fear ‘brain drain’, which taps from the labour market those with a costly and useful education, who will rarely return once they experience better and more
10 International Migration and Sending Countries
challenging working conditions abroad. It is, for instance, estimated that one-third of the most highly qualified African nationals live outside their country of origin – indeed, outside their continent of origin, as they have settled in Western Europe and the USA (Ammassari and Black 2001: 15). Although migration pressures lie mostly within emigration countries, migrants rarely take off because sending country policies encourage them to do so. Nor is migration a function of a straightforward economic imbalance between poorer and richer countries meaning that the poorer the country the higher the out-migration. Instead, migrants have been found to leave when the economic situation is within the so-called ‘migration hump’. This term refers to the observation that in the short run migration is more likely when economic and social development in a country is undergoing rapid improvement as it is being incorporated into the global economy. This means that migration does not stem from lack of development but from development itself (Martin and Taylor 2001: 105–7).5 The political economy of north–south (or west–east) disparities, colonial or so-called ‘near colonial’ ties between countries, has tended to determine the direction of migratory flows, although, as mentioned, the flows of migrations have become truly global in the last two decades, including migration flows within the developing world and among countries with parallel levels of development. The logic of migration is closely tied to the micro, meso and macro networks between countries. This explains why so few migrate out of so many places while so many migrate out of so few places (Castles 2000; Faist 2000). Once a migratory system has started, it is virtually impossible for democratic nations with respect for human rights and international law to stop it (Massey et al. 1998). Worker export policies designed to alleviate unemployment and bring in foreign currency, even to train workers while they work abroad, were strongly promoted by international institutions such as the IMF and OECD in the postwar era as part of a broader liberal strategy of expanded exchange of goods and finances (Faist 2000). However, the influence of the sending country in both formulating and implementing these programmes is limited by the often asymmetric power relations between sending and receiving countries (Fawcett 1989). There can only be export as long as a country wants to import. Moreover, migration may reinforce already existing asymmetric interdependence between sending and receiving countries (Adler 1977; Faist 2000). When part of the source country’s labour force is employed abroad, domestic income and
Eva Østergaard-Nielsen 11
welfare are subject to income and employment conditions in the host country (Hatzipanayotou 1991: 50). Finally, it is important to emphasize that migration is increasingly irregular, a term that refers to illegal, undocumented migration including trafficking and smuggling of migrants. Sending countries, so it is felt at the receiving end, must be seen to make a genuine effort to curb this type of migration. Furthermore, migration, in particular after 11 September 2001, has been linked with transnational crime such as money laundering, drug smuggling and terrorism. As a consequence, sending countries are under increasing pressure to review their visa policies, introduce fingerprint databases and control exit and entry points on land and in sea lanes to increase the regulation of cross-border movement.6 Yet, as noted by Ghosh (2000a), the general attitude of sending countries to migration management is one of ‘indifference and neglect’ (Ghosh 2000a: 17).
Protection of emigrants’ rights Migration policy stands out as a policy area because it is a transnational issue which spans the borders between states, blurs the distinction between domestic and foreign policy, and goes to the heart of the twoway relationship of obligations and rights between state and citizens. One of the central issues in that respect is the protection of overseas migrant workers. The vast majority of migrant workers end up in ‘3D employment’ (dirty, dangerous and difficult). Moreover, migrants and their descendants may experience discrimination in countries with antimigrant sentiments. Domestic and illegal workers, those employed in the informal economy, have few protections and rights and in the case of illegal workers lack the possibility of trade union membership. Accordingly, migrants and their organizations repeatedly call for the authorities in the country of origin to aid them in their struggle for equal rights in the labour market. Sending countries have occasionally responded to such calls. Policymakers may be concerned with the exploitation of citizens working abroad, in particular if the issue is also the concern of a substantial part of the domestic electorate (see Alcid, this volume). Discrimination and mistreatment of citizens may also hurt sending countries’ post-colonial national pride, as international asymmetrical power relations are mirrored in mistreatment or stereotyping of migrants as backwards and unwelcome (Adler 1977; see also Østergaard-Nielsen, this volume). However, the ability for sending countries to protect workers abroad is
12 International Migration and Sending Countries
relatively limited, as it is mainly the receiving country authorities that implement and enforce such protection. Sending countries have sought to include protection of overseas workers in bilateral labour exchange programmes, such as those between Turkey and EU member states or Mexico and the USA. But in both cases migrant workers have been suffering due to the lack of enforcement of these provisions (see Walraff 1988; Martínez-Saldaña, this volume). Similarly, more recent efforts clearly aimed at already settled emigrant groups, such as the Mexican ‘Programme for Mexican Communities Abroad’ or the Turkish ‘Council for Turkish Citizens Living Abroad’, suffer from the sending country’s lack of ability to impose its will within the host country (see ØstergaardNielsen, this volume). In any case these provisions do not include the vast number of migrants who work in the informal economy.
Assistance in return Migrants’ return is usually cited as highly beneficial for sending countries. Return halts remittances, but in theory migrants bring home with them human capital in the form of education and new skills, financial capital in the form of accumulated savings and professional capital in the form of professional and personal contacts which may useful for new enterprises (Ammasari and Black 2001). In practice these benefits clearly depend on who returns and how successful their migrant experience was.7 Many migrants who have worked as unskilled labourers abroad do not bring back any qualifications or find those skills acquired difficult to put to use after their return. Still, in those cases where migrants have to return as part of a labour exchange agreement or as part of repatriation of de facto refugees, it has repeatedly been found and advocated that the better organized the return the better the impact on development as sending countries make use of economic and human capitals that migrants bring home (Ghosh 2000b: 224). Unfortunately there are few available examples of such policies emanating from sending countries as compared to the policies on migrants’ return formulated by receiving countries, particularly in the West. Indeed, Rogers (1991) argues that in Europe ‘return programmes … were established unilaterally without serious consultation with the sending state’ (Rogers 1991). Among the exceptions in this volume is the Mexican Paisano Programme, which aimed to improve the treatment that returning migrants receive at the hands of the Mexican officials by reducing corruption and abuse (de la Garza et al. 2000).
Eva Østergaard-Nielsen 13
Among the main reasons for this lack of sending country return policies are, first, that it is not really in the interest of sending countries to welcome back migrants, in those cases where migrant remittances are crucial to national and local economies. Instead it is in the interest of these governments to promote the continued inflow of remittances. Second, sending country governments increasingly recognize that many migrants, if they return, may not return for good. Return is no longer necessarily the end of the migration cycle but a step in a continuous movement back and forth (Ammassari and Black 2001: 18).
The transnational perspective Migration is no longer observed to be a one-way journey. Migrants do not go abroad to start a new life elsewhere but to better the one they already have back home (Kyle 2000). Nor is migration necessarily a twoway journey. Instead, migrants bridge here and there by continuously going or coming, or by engaging economically, socially or politically in their region or country of origin while residing abroad. In both cases migrants or refugees do not make a sharp break with their homeland. So-called ‘trans-migrants’ have been found to ‘forge and sustain simultaneous multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement’ (Glick Schiller et al. 1995: 48).8 The focus on migrants’ transnational practices has become more prominent in migration research throughout the last decade although mainly in the West (Rogers 2000). In particular, US-based studies have revealed how migrants from Latin and Central America and Southeast Asia engage in cross-border activities (Smith and Guarnizo 1998; Portes 1999; 2001). The significance of migrants’ transnational practices has not been understated. In one of his several contributions to the field of study, Portes (2001) predicts that although the number of migrants engaged in transnational practices is limited at present, then: ‘In the future the number and scope of such activities can be expected to expand significantly because … immigrant transnationalism is not driven by ideological reasons but by the very logic of global capitalism’ (Portes 2001: 187). It has been argued that research on migrant transnationalism does not establish the scope of the research field. Most research consists of case studies, which ‘sample on the dependent variable’; that is, they document why and how some migrants are involved in transnational practices but not why most migrants are not (Portes et al. 2002). Indeed, those studies which try to address this criticism have found that only
14 International Migration and Sending Countries
a small proportion of migrants engage in consistent transnational practices, so-called ‘narrow’ or ‘core’ transnational practices (ibid; Itzigsohn et al. 1999; Guarnizo 2000). A second objection is that migrant transnationalism is not a new phenomenon. A rereading of European migration to the United States at the turn of the twentieth century shows how then-migrants also used migration as a strategy to improve their livelihood in both their country of immigration and their country of origin (Foner 1997; Gjerdes 2001).9 Yet, as has repeatedly been pointed out in the literature on migrant transnationalism, one of the key differences between now and then is that the revolution of electronic communication, air travel and globalization of media render geographical distances relatively insignificant. Air transport costs per mile had dropped to 20 per cent of their 1930 level in 1990. The cost of a three-minute telephone conversation between London and New York fell from US$300 to US$1 between 1930 and 1996.10 Migrants and refugees may therefore retain or develop links with their country of origin with greater intensity than previously. And it is exactly the intensity of the field which makes migrant transnationalism more interesting for other actors, in particular those in the sending countries, which therefore show greater interest in and involvement with their emigrants and diasporas than before. Indeed, while sending country policies are hardly given a prominent place in analyses of migration management or protection of migrant workers’ rights, political actors from sending countries, as mentioned, stand central in the literature on migrants’ transnational relations with their country of origin (Portes et al. 1999). Again, such measures have historical precedents (Shain 1989; Glick Schiller et al. 1995; R. Smith 1997), but the greater involvement of the various institutions of the sending countries means that they are seen as the main non-migrant actors engaged in shaping the field of migrants’ transnational ties and practices (Itzigsohn 2000; Mahler 2000; Levitt 2001a). Government, state-bureaucracies, political parties and religious institutions engage in transnationalism ‘from above’, that is, they attempt to promote migrants’ transnational practices and align those transnational practices which are already happening ‘from below’ with the various national interests in the country of origin (see Guarnizo and Smith 1998). In practice, as the contributions in this volume clearly illustrate, the distinction between migrant transnationalism ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ is difficult to impose on the complex empirical dialectic between sending countries and emigrants or diasporas.
Eva Østergaard-Nielsen 15
This dialectic can be observed in three main policy areas in which sending countries engage in dialogue with their citizens and diasporas abroad: economic, socio-cultural and political fields of interaction.
Incorporating migrants in the national economy Economics is usually the most important dimension in sending countries’ relations with emigrants and diasporas. Indeed, migrant remittances and foreign direct investment are considered the raison d’être for sending countries’ interest in their migrants and diasporas. In terms of foreign investment, sending states may try to use their overseas communities as an alternative to dependency on multinational corporations or international lending agencies (Lessinger 1992: 109). But more importantly, remittances to developing countries more than doubled between 1988 and 1999 to an official total annual estimate of US$65 billion (Gammeltoft 2002). Official estimates of remittances suggest they surpass the overall development assistance, and unofficial estimates claim that they may be double the size of development aid (NybergSørensen et al. 2002; Olesen 2002). The growth in remittances to developing countries (low-income as well as lower-middle-income) is not distributed equally across regions. Sub-Saharan Africa’s share of global remittances has been halved from 8 to 4 per cent in the last decade, and South Asia’s share has fallen from 34 to 24 per cent. By contrast, Latin and Central America, the Caribbean, and Eastern Europe and Central Asia have increased their share of global remittances (Gammeltoft 2002). Consequently a growing number of economies, in particular lowincome countries, are growing more dependent on the monetary transfers sent by their migrant populations working overseas. The income from remittances represents more than 10 per cent of the GDP in six Latin American countries – Haiti (17 per cent), Nicaragua (14.4 per cent), El Salvador (12.6 per cent), Jamaica (11.7 per cent), the Dominican Republic (10 per cent) and Ecuador (10 per cent).11 In countries such as Mexico – the receiver of the largest amount of remittances – this may not represent such a large portion of the national income but it is still among the top three sources of foreign currency.12 Most official reports on remittances and their part of national economies only give a ‘tip of the iceberg’ picture of their significance (Puri and Ritzema 2000). First, remittances sent through informal channels, such as self-carry, handcarry by friends or family members or in-kind remittances of clothes and other consumer goods, are considerable in countries such as Pakistan and the Philippines, where it is estimated that remittances would at
16 International Migration and Sending Countries
least double, possibly triple official figures. Most remittances are reportedly not sent through official channels because migrants seek to minimize transaction costs or perhaps do not possess the required identification required by banks in the case of opening an account or transferring money. Second, within national economies there may be huge variances with regard to the impact of remittances at local level. Some local regions with high rates of out-migration are more developed than others because of remittances, as in the case of Fuijan and Guangdong in China (Bolt 1996; Thunø 2000). These regions may, however, also be more dependent on remittances than others. Finally, remittances can also have wider impact than their immediate financial injection into local communities. They can sustain war efforts, they can restructure local status hierarchies and transform gender relations (Vertovec 2000). Studies conducted in different parts of the world have produced quite contradictory interpretations of the migration–development nexus, which makes it difficult to draw any general conclusions. The impact of migration differs according to the unit of study (remittances may benefit the individual household but harm the national economy), the longitude of study (migration may be beneficial in the short run but not in the long run) and, most importantly, according to the type and volume of migration (Ammassari and Black 2001). Thus some studies concluded that remittances are beneficial (Stahl and Arnold 1986), while others find that migration leads to development distortion, which overshadows the temporary advantage for a fortunate few (Keely and Tran 1989). For sending countries in conflict such as Sri Lanka, remittances are, according to van Hear (2001), particularly important as they sustain families during time of hardship. They also, however, reinforce the inequality between those families with emigrant kin and those without. Moreover, remittances seem to do little to alter fundamental weaknesses in local and national economies (van Hear 2001). In practice, remittances have gained a more favourable reputation of fuelling local economic activities through so-called multiplier effects. Recently, important international agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank have started proposing measures to channel remittances more effectively into development at local level and, in the long-term, also national level.13 They support reforms in sending countries, which can reduce the cost of money transfers and thereby maximize the amount received by the originally intended recipient (Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 2002). Sending countries are urged to encourage remittances and foreign investment through reforms of the local and national financial
Eva Østergaard-Nielsen 17
sector and warned not to ‘kill the goose that laid golden eggs by hounding their migrants with taxes and squandering the revenue on ill-conceived projects’.14
(Re)including migrants in the nation Migrants and refugees’ relationship with their country of origin is ever changing. Loyalists may become dissidents and dissidents stark defenders of the homeland regime. In both groups the sense of and attachment to the place of origin may disappear over time, although, as studies of diasporas and trans-migrants show, this is by no means always the case (Portes et al. 2002). Sending countries reach out to their citizens or former citizens in order to remind them of their national or ethnic heritage and evoke loyalty to the government and state. A range of activities serves to connect emigrants with their origins such as celebration of national days, teaching programmes, religious education and services, and the like. An interesting and well-researched example of its kind is China which, except during the Cultural Revolution, has illustrated an unrelenting official preoccupation with the retaining of Chinese identity among Chinese living outside China. Traditionally aimed at the ethnic Chinese, these policies lately also include the so-called ‘new migrants’ (see Thunø 2000; Nyiri 2000). The Chinese attempt to forge cultural and national patriotism is full of intriguing examples. Thunø (2000) reports how a World Overseas Chinese Cemetery has been laid out just one kilometre from the historically significant area of Qing Dynasty Emperor Guang Xu’s Grave. Also the construction of an overseas Chinese Museum is meant to symbolize the PRC’s (People’s Republic of China) concern with its ‘lost kin’ (Thunø 2000). And investors who return to their ancestral villages are received as heroes, sometimes with greetings ‘by several hundred school children, a parade, and fire-crackers’ (Bolt 1996: 479). Similarly, other countries try to redefine the role of migrants in their country of origin. Shain (1989) describes how the fascist Italian government in the 1930s tried to redefine the image of Italians abroad as pioneers, and several examples in this volume document how sending country governments re-brand previously expendable emigrant labour as a valuable part of the nation, even as heroes (see Martínez-Saldaña; Alcid; and Østergaard-Nielsen, this volume). There are several explanations for this type of identity politics within the literature (see below). Beyond the evident need for economic and
18 International Migration and Sending Countries
political support, these policies and activities are related to sending countries’ interest in what Bauböck (2001) has called the ‘social capital upgrading’ of citizens abroad. This is not just because emigrants’ social mobility increases their scope for economic and political support but also because this process in and of itself reflects well on the image of the country of origin. Migrants become good ambassadors for their country of origin. In any case, this type of identity politics of the various sending countries should, as the case studies in this volume amply illustrate, be located in the way that nationhood enters in the country of origin’s domestic political processes.
Tying migrants into foreign and domestic policy processes Closely linked to the policies trying to evoke loyalty and a sense of obligation among emigrants, refugees and diasporas, sending countries seek to align the political transnational practices of nationals abroad with the policy agenda of the government in the country of origin. Sending states may wish to have a supportive lobby among their nationals abroad. Latin American countries, for one, want their nationals abroad to play the same role in relations with the US that Irish, Greek and Jewish minorities have played regarding US policies towards their respective home countries (de la Garza et al. 2000). Several chapters in this volume address such aspirations. This can take the form of promoting an actual lobby organization, but it can also amount to encouraging overseas nationals to consider their homelands’ interests when voting in elections in their new country settlement, to write letters of opinion against critical articles about their country of origin in the press and, in general, to be good ‘ambassadors’ for their sending country. Similarly, sending countries usually want to counter long-distance intervention by dissidents. The transnational political practices of migrants is not usually viewed as a challenge to the political regime and order of the country of origin. Admittedly migrants’ transnational support can strengthen local community institutions which again may challenge more central authorities (Portes 1999: 473–4), but the emancipatory or ‘counter-hegemonic’ character of migrants’ transnational practices, including their economic support, should not be overstated (Guarnizo and Smith 1998: 7; Mahler 1998; Itzigsohn 2000). Those exiles who return to be part of the political leadership in their country of origin usually blend into already existing power hierarchies (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a), or assist in the process of political and economic transition as in the case of ex-Communist states of the Baltic
Eva Østergaard-Nielsen 19
countries, Croatia or Serbia. Still, in terms of exiles or migrants turned dissidents, history is full of examples of regimes overthrown with the aid of such groups (Esman 1986; Sheffer 1986; Shain 1991). No sending country is interested in having its overseas nationals use their abroadness as a platform for critical information campaigns about the country of origin, or perhaps even as a stepping stone for direct subversive intervention in the political affairs back home. But sending states have few means to counter exile dissidence. Withdrawal of citizenship, or denationalization, has been repeatedly used to punish citizens abroad for dissidence or simply not fulfilling their duties towards their country (Shain 1989: 147). A central issue in that respect is the failure to carry out military service – indeed, avoidance of military service, traditionally one of the key obligations for (male) citizens, has been a motive for emigration, and an inhibitor of return, throughout history. However, it is the extension rather than withdrawal of citizenship which is the trend among sending countries. Offering dual nationality or citizenship is a way for sending countries to kill two birds with one stone. They encourage their emigrants to seek naturalization, integration and increased political influence in their country of settlement, and they offer a set of rights promoting their engagement in the sending country. Jones-Correa (2001) in his survey of dual nationality in Latin America reminds us that although the terms of dual citizenship and dual nationality are often used interchangeably they are not the same. Nationality is the formal legal status of state membership, while citizenship denotes the specific character of a member´s right and duties within the national policy. That is, dual nationality does not include access to all the rights and benefits of national citizenship, such as voting and the right to hold office ( Jones-Correa 2001: 998). At least ten Latin American countries (and several countries from the Caribbean basin) have introduced dual nationality. Dual nationality is recognized in several southeastern countries such as Thailand and Indonesia, and in 15 African countries with more to follow (such as Ghana).15 Moreover, the change of regimes throughout Eastern and Central Europe, and the many diaspora, exile, and emigrant communities has resulted in an inconsistency between nationalities and state borders which means that these countries continuously debate the pros and cons of dual citizenship. Russia, for example, does recognize dual citizenship as a way for the Russians in the near abroad to gain citizenship; most other post-Soviet states like Ukraine reject dual citizenship for precisely this reason: that many Ukrainians might seek Russian citizenship and allow Russia to meddle with internal politics.
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However, granting dual nationality does not mean that emigrants’ or diasporas’ participation in domestic politics of the sending country is necessarily welcomed. A range of countries do allow for absentee voting. In the case of Peru it is even required by law for non-resident citizens to vote, and somewhat uniquely, Croatia until recently allowed for non-resident nationals to stand for office in Croatian elections.16 Nonetheless, in the majority of cases, even sending countries that already allow for dual nationalities are more restrictive when it comes to actually extending citizenship rights such as overseas voting or the right for non-resident citizens to run for public office. The reasons for this reluctance are multiple and will be further discussed in the conclusions of this volume. For now it should be noted that emigrants and diasporas find many other ways to participate in politics in their country of origin even if overseas voting is not allowed. For instance, in countries such as Turkey and Israel, certain political parties are known to fly in voters for national elections. In the 1999 Israeli election, both President Netanyahu and Ehud Barak organized cheap flights from at least eight major US and Canadian cities.17 Similarly, the Turkish Welfare Party (closed in 1999) has been rumoured to fly in voters for the 1995 election in Turkey (see Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b: 156). In other cases emigrants and diasporas play a role in homeland elections through economic support to political parties in return for consultative meetings on how these parties can help further the interests of the diaspora. Such incidents illustrate how states or governments are by no means the only sending country actors trying to reach for support among citizens and former citizens abroad. Although the following chapters focus on government policies mainly, they also show how political parties, religious organizations and movements, NGOs and hometown associations may precede and provoke state action in the field of transnational relations with emigrants (see also Guarnizo and Smith 1998; Levitt 2001a).
Sending countries as de-territorialized nation-states? The decoupling of territory, nation and citizenship (in the broader sense of ‘state membership’) brought about by migration is seen as a challenge to the nation-state as we know it. For instance, based on the way that receiving countries treat their newcomers, post-nationalists argue that because ‘rights’ (including migrants’ rights) are guaranteed by human rights regimes across national borders, the convergence of nation and state is challenged (Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1996). For post-nationalists, transnational movements of people ‘unpack’ the nation-state and allow
Eva Østergaard-Nielsen 21
a supranational legal and political order based on human rights to take over ( Jacobson 1996). Human rights regimes and discourse certainly underwrites both immigrant political and diaspora political campaigns, as in the cases of Oaxacans of Mexico or the Kurds of Turkey (see Soysal 2000; R. Smith 2001: 33; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b: 80, 130), but at the same time the nation-state is still the main, if not the only, guarantor of citizenship rights and obligations, and participation in politics still mainly takes place within state boundaries. In contrast to the post-nationalist discourse, sending countries are observed to ‘recouple’ territory, nation and citizenship in the face of international migration. In one of their often-cited articles Glick Schiller et al. (1995) have used the term ‘de-territorialized nation-states’ to describe those states that claim their dispersed emigrant populations as part of not only the nation but even the state (Glick Schiller et al. 1995: 50). State boundaries are defined in social rather than geographic terms, and sending states engage in what is perhaps more adequately termed ‘reterritorializing’ (Louie 2000) their overseas citizens by launching policies which re-include them not only in the nation but also in the national economy and political life of their country of origin. Two main points temper the use of ‘de-territorialized’ in the description of sending state reaching-out policies towards nationals abroad. R. Smith (2001) argues that the concept of ‘deterritorialized nation-state’ is inadequate because it equates the relationship between a state and its extra-territorial migrants with territorially bounded state–civil society relations. Migrants possess a different palette of resources from those of their homelandbased co-nationals and the state command a much more limited, although not insignificant, power over extra-territorial citizens compared with those residing within the geographical state boundaries (ibid: 34). Equally important, while sending states may perceive themselves as ‘de-terrorialized’ nation-states, their efforts to develop constructions that encompass migrants should not be overestimated. As the chapters in this volume demonstrate, these types of sending country policies are still in their early stages and are not always as successful as intended. Thus, to some extent the question of whether we are witnessing processes of de-territorializaton (or re-territorialization) depends on how we evaluate the incorporation efforts of sending states in the face of growing migrant transnationalism. In any case, issues of migration management, dual citizenship, expatriate voting, and migrant and refugees’ involvement in and influence on processes of democratization in their homelands are central to the wider
22 International Migration and Sending Countries
debate on the scope and powers of the state in a period of globalization. As literature on other non-state actors (including anything from NGOs to multinational corporations) and transnational forces in international relations is growing in leaps and bounds (see Keck and Sikkink 1998; Josselin and Wallace 2001), it seems timely to pursue the interests, aims and policies of sending countries towards their nationals abroad.
Structure and content of this volume Perceptions, policies and transnational relations In the context of the preceding general discussions and analyses, the chapters in this volume seek to identify the main developments and changes in eight sending states’ discourses on and policies towards emigrants and emigrés. Each chapter addresses questions concerning the changes and continuities in perceptions and policies and transnational relations with nationals abroad, and the contributors have therefore been invited to consider the following issues: (a) Perceptions: How have sending country perceptions of emigrants and diasporas transformed over time? How do these overseas nationals feature in their homelands’ domestic and foreign policy considerations? Are they perceived as a threat to the reputation or security of the current political regime or as a valuable or potentially valuable economic and political support? (b) Policies and activities: How have migration policies changed or not changed? To what extent does the sending country engage in the plight of its citizens or former citizens abroad? Which activities and political measures have been launched to introduce new ways of belonging and political and economic engagement in homeland affairs among migrants and diasporas? These include socio-cultural activities (such as celebration of national days and sponsoring of educational programmes) aimed at fostering continued loyalties among citizens abroad; political activities (such as extending political rights to citizens abroad, transnational electoral campaigns, establishment of overseas political organizations); and economic activities (such as introducing favourable investment schemes). Through which institutions (media, party political, traditional diplomacy, religious institutions) does the sending country try to reach its citizens abroad? (c) Transnational relations: To what extent have these policies and activities managed to promote and channel economic, socio-cultural and
Eva Østergaard-Nielsen 23
political relations between sending countries and their nationals abroad? Do migration and migrants’ transnational practices take place independently of these efforts? Is there a sustained dialogue between the sending country and its nationals abroad on issues of concern to both the emigrants and the sending country?
Why the different responses? The comparative scope of this volume also aims to uncover some of the national and international structural factors relevant to understanding the changing perceptions and policies of sending states in general and the extent to which they reach out to their nationals abroad in particular. Importantly, the chapters open up the ‘black box’ analysis of sending countries by presenting them as a more complex set of actors – often with diverging perceptions of and policies towards nationals abroad. Several studies have traced common points in the responses of sending countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (Guarnizo 1998; de la Garza et al. 2000; Itzigsohn 2000), and also the very different responses of Bosnia and Eritrea (Al-Ali et al. 2001) and the remarkably similar responses of Mexico and Italy (R. Smith 2001; see also Shain 1989; 1991). While some conclude that there is no clear pattern in the complexity (de la Garza et al. 2000) or stop short of a systematic comparison of sending countries (Al-Ali et al. 2001), several studies point to more generally relevant structural or historical factors. Previous migration system theory correlated state capability with the state’s position in the world capital system (Schmitter Heisler 1985). More recent analyses, however, agree that there are many more and multi-level factors to consider in the analysis of the particular sending country’s relationship with and policies towards emigrants and citizens abroad. These include the sending country’s particular emigration trajectory. Descriptions of ‘bottom-up transnationalism’ or ‘grassroot transnationalism’ ascribe certain changes in sending country policies to the influence of overseas migrant or diaspora organizations (Guarnizo and Smith 1998; Jones-Correa 2001: 1000–1). It is therefore relevant to ask if emigration is a long-standing or recent phenomena. Did emigration begin before or after national independence or a radical regime change? Did citizens leave for political or economic reasons or a mixture of both? In particular, the relative and absolute size of the emigrant community is likely to be significant for relations with the country of origin, as is its economic, social and political capital in its country of settlement (see Shain 1999; Itzigsohn 2000).
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Among the features at the national level, the domestic economy is rendered most important in the literature on emigration countries. As already outlined above, the central questions are to what extent the national and local economy depend on a continued inflow of the foreign currency remitted by migrants or the foreign direct investment which an established diaspora is potentially able to undertake. This economic ‘dependency’ is not just related to the particular country’s proactive policies to attract remittances and foreign investment by nationals abroad, but to the general palette of activities aimed at consolidating relations with citizens abroad. The other main feature at the national level is the type of political regime. Put crudely, the question is to what extent migration policies and transnational policies depend on whether the sending country is ruled by a democratic or totalitarian regime. Itzigsohn (2000) argues that while totalitarian regimes may simply seek to capture remittances, those countries with competitive party politics cannot do so without also opening the political field (Itzigsohn 2000: 1149, see also Levitt 2001a). In the Americas, Cuba is a case in point, but there are many other examples. The Kingdom of Morocco, which is certainly very keen to attract economic support from its 1.2 million large overseas community in EU member-states, does not engage in any real dialogue on extending political influence to citizens abroad.18 From this follows the notion that democratization – in particular, the increased scope for popular input to decision-making and the emergence of competitive party politics – serves as an incentive for sending country political actors to engage with overseas nationals (Itzigsohn 2000; R. Smith 2001). One way of nuancing the issue of domestic political regime is to add questions regarding the stability of the sending country political regime, its policies towards ethnic and religious minorities, and its location in the nation-building processes. What difference does it make if a country is at war or not? Do sending countries in conflict turn to their overseas nationals for economic and political assistance? How do domestic minority policies affect policies towards and relations with citizens abroad, many of whom may belong to these minorities? Indeed, do a sending country’s policies towards inflows of migrants have an impact on their relations with their own citizens abroad? To what extent are overseas diasporas allowed to participate in nation-building processes? How are homeland–diaspora relations a reflection of conceptions of national and cultural identities in the country of origin (see also Shain 1989)? It has also been argued that the particular type of national membership in the country of origin is decisive for a sending country’s perceptions of, policies towards and transnational relations with
Eva Østergaard-Nielsen 25
overseas nationals (see Shain 1989). However, as discussed above, national membership has proven to be a dependent and not just an independent variable in relations between states and nationals abroad. International factors include the sending country’s position and participation in the world economy and its bilateral and multilateral relations with host-countries. The central question is to what extent sending countries consider bilateral and multilateral relations in their emigration policies and policies towards citizens abroad? Do former colonial/metropolitan links or current asymmetric power relations with receiving countries influence sending country attitudes to emigration and relations with overseas nationals? Are emigration policies largely determined by the receiving countries? Are sending governments aware of fifth-column accusations against their nationals abroad if they offer them dual nationality or try to exercise control over them? For instance, the Chinese policies towards overseas Chinese were facilitated by changes in the international environment initiated by the US recognition of the People’s Republic of China in the early 1970s. This meant that China no longer had to subordinate policies towards Chinese abroad to ward off accusations, particularly by host countries in Southeast Asia, of expansionist fifth-column policies. The Chinese now adhere to principles of non-interference and react with caution in matters of discrimination against ethnic Chinese living in Southeast Asia (Thunø 2000). Another example is that in 1999 Korea tried to offer dual nationality only to those overseas Koreans not living in China out of fear that Chinese authorities would think of it as promoting separatist tendencies among its Chinese minority.19
Outline of the book The chapters in this volume, researched within a variety of social science disciplines, are geographically spread out over the continents of the Americas, Southeast Asia, Africa and Europe. The list of countries that it would also have been relevant to include in this volume, is long. Israel, China, Portugal and Italy, among others, are all countries with interesting and significant policies towards and relations with citizens abroad (see Shain 1989; 1999; Gabaccia 2000; Nyiri 2000; Thunø 2000). The following chapters present a mix of well-known and lesser-known sending countries grouped in three main categories according to their history of migration and the main themes pervading their relations with nationals abroad: ‘From Exit to Voice?’; ‘Old Homelands, New Policies’; and ‘Sending Countries in Conflict’.
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‘From exit to voice?’ The chapters on Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Turkey and the Philippines present cases of more ‘classic’ labour-exporting countries. In some of these cases, relations between sending countries and citizens abroad are changing ‘from exit to voice’; that is, overseas communities are increasingly engaging themselves in the economic, social and political life of their country of origin, while the sending state and other political actors are trying to channel this engagement to their own advantage. However, all four case-studies, each in their different way, show the limits to sending country capability and responsibility towards nationals abroad. The trend is particularly evident in the case of Mexico. In Chapter 2, Jesús Martínez-Saldaña carefully locates the development of Mexican migration policies and policies towards Mexicans abroad in its historical, political and international context. Since the late 1980s, Mexican authorities have reached out to the estimated 23 million people of Mexican origin in the US. In particular, Mexican President Vincent Fox has called migrants ‘our heroes’ and declared their plight as well as migration in general a policy priority. Martínez-Saldaña shows how these developments are brought about by a number of factors including the importance of migrant remittances, pressure from US Mexican organizations, and processes of democratization in Mexico. The author is, however, cautious in his final evaluation of the reforms of Mexican migration policies and policies towards citizens abroad. The same rhetoric of more inclusive policies towards nationals abroad can be observed in the case of the Dominican Republic, albeit on a much smaller scale. David Howard describes in Chapter 3 how the migration of Dominicans to the United States has dramatically shaped the country’s development over the last four decades. However, despite the enormous impact and the economic, political and demographic dependence which migration entails, the Dominican government has not been very active in tapping into these resources. Although the Dominican government has employed a supportive attitude towards emigration, and there has been a transnationalization of electoral campaigns in recent years, actual policies are largely laissez-faire. By contrast, Dominican initiatives and policies towards especially Haitian immigrant workers in the national economy are restrictive and interventionist. The next two chapters deal with sending countries outside of the Americas. Eva Østergaard-Nielsen (Chapter 4) presents the case of Turkey and its policies towards its citizens in EU member-states. The case
Eva Østergaard-Nielsen 27
of Turkey is in many ways remarkably similar to that of Mexico, although the scope of migration, the intensity in Turkey–migrant relations, and, not least, the institutionalization of these relations is much smaller than in the case of Mexico. While political parties and religious movements have been active in mobilizing the Turks abroad for decades, the Turkish state and governments are latecomers to this type of transnational engagement. Turkish authorities are certainly aware that the more than 3 million Turkish citizens who have migrated to, or have been born in, the EU since the 1960s occupy an increasingly important part of Turkish–European relations. Yet, legislative changes and activities aimed at reaching out to these ‘Euro Turks’ have proved difficult to implement in practice. Chapter 5, on the Philippines, contrasts with the other three chapters in this section in that it is more focused on the ‘exit’ than on the ‘voice’ of emigrants – that is, the chapter focuses on the Philippine government’s export of Filipino workers to labour markets throughout the world. Currently, an estimated 7.29 million Filipino workers abroad are spread out in more than 180 countries and destinations, and their remittances are crucial to the Philippine economy. For this reason Filipino migrant workers have been heralded as heroes by several presidents, but the promises of political rights remain at the level of electoral rhetoric. Indeed, the case of the Philippines provides a ‘reality check’ to that literature which views sending countries as offering their overseas nationals rights in exchange for remittances and investments. Mary Lou Alcid critically examines the recent policies of deregulation and argues that these policies leave recruitment procedures and the protection of often very vulnerable overseas workers to market forces and foreign governments. ‘Old homelands, new policies’ The cases of India and Armenia deal with issues similar to those of the previous chapters, but at the same time present very different responses of homelands dealing with diasporas settled before their homeland gained independent state-hood. Homeland–diaspora relations in these two cases are inseparable from the homeland’s processes of nationbuilding. In Chapter 6, Marie Lall argues that India is a very unusual case when it comes to state–diaspora relations. Only very recently has the Indian government begun a serious campaign to woo Indians abroad. Previously such efforts faltered on domestic opposition, unmanoeuvrable bureaucracy, corruption, red tape and, importantly, a post-independence
28 International Migration and Sending Countries
ideology deeming diasporic support unwelcome. The fact is, this author argues, India has pushed its diaspora away since independence, and despite recent changes (with the 1991 reforms and the current BJP government) the reality is still not very much different from 50 years ago. While there are strong transnational family relations and private interests, the actual dialogue between the central government and the diaspora as a whole is still influenced by the old ideals of non-interference and suspicion. The relationship between Armenia and its diaspora has also historically been marred by tensions and difficulties, although relations have eased after the coming into power of president Robert Kocharian in 1998. Razmik Panossian (Chapter 7) uses the first ever Armenia–diaspora conference organized by the Armenian government in 1999 and its followup in 2002 as lenses through which to analyze the complicated relationship between Armenia and its diaspora (the two fundamental entities which make up the Armenian nation). The Armenian state has historically seen itself as the patron of the diaspora whose existence it has traditionally viewed as a regrettable historical ‘aberration’ due to unfortunate events. The diaspora largely rejects this approach and insists on the unity of the homeland and the diaspora, and that the politics and policies of the former should to a greater extent reflect the interests and views of the latter.
‘Sending countries in conflict’ Sending countries in ‘conflict’ highlights the way in which states such as Cyprus and Eritrea seek to engage their emigrants and diasporas in domestic or international conflicts, or post-conflict reconstruction. In Chapter 8, Khalid Koser describes how the Eritrean government has vigorously sought to mobilize refugee and other migrant communities abroad to support and fund the conflict with Ethiopia. The government has included overseas nationals in the political process, established formal representations within the major host countries and facilitated a variety of ways for the diaspora to make economic contributions. Yet the author warns that these short-term processes of ‘inclusion’ may serve to alienate, or ‘exclude’, the diaspora in the long term, as the Eritrean government exacerbates political differences, and intensifies economic strains within the diaspora. Madeleine Demetriou (Chapter 9) presents the more long-standing case of how Cyprus has engaged its overseas communities in a formidable campaign to boost the Cypriot state’s efforts to convince world opinion of
Eva Østergaard-Nielsen 29
what Greek Cypriots see as the injustice of the 1974 Turkish ‘invasion’ of the island. The chapter goes beyond the carefully cultivated image of intimate ties presented to the outside world to expose some of the chronic difficulties that mark Cyprus–diaspora relations. It identifies mutual misperceptions and strains experienced over the years between the overseas Greek Cypriots and their respective governments. The author concludes that the engagement of overseas Cypriots in the national question is dwindling as younger generations are not motivated by the conflict and also because the Cypriot government has failed to offer any practical support to aid the diaspora in their lobbying efforts on behalf of their homeland. Finally, in Chapter 10 Eva Østergaard-Nielsen reviews some of the major findings of the contributions, with a view to providing answers to the questions outlined earlier in this present chapter. Among the conclusions reached are that the variety of responses among all three ‘types’ of sending countries serves to underscore the importance of employing a more complex analytical framework for the understanding of sending countries’ new role and policies, which moves beyond functionalist analyses concerning attempts to maximize the continued flow of remittances and fifth-column political representation abroad.
Notes 1 Peter Bate, ‘A river of gold’, IDBAmerica, Magazine of the Inter-American Development Bank, October 2001. 2 It is beyond the scope of this introduction to refer to the lengthy debate regarding which migrant groups constitute diasporas and which do not. For summaries of these debates, see Cohen (1997) and Østergaard-Nielsen (2003b: 13–15). 3 The term ‘homeland’ is even more ambiguous. Often found in literature on diasporas, exiles and transnational communities, a ‘homeland’ does not necessarily refer to a state but to that region of origin to which the emigrants are emotionally attached – and in which the diaspora may support nation and state building processes (Shain 1987a; Cohen 1997; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b). 4 ‘World migration tops 120 million, says ILO’, Press Release, 2 March 2000, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/pr/2000/2.htm. See IOM (2000) for the more generous estimate of 150 million. 5 Olesen (2002) introduces the term ‘migration band’ as an aggregate expression of the migration hump for individual countries with the income bracket US$1,500–1,800. Below this band the population is too poor to move, and above they are rich enough not to need to move (Olesen 2002). 6 Traces, no. 18 (2002), edited by A. Rogers, Transnational Communities Programme, http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/traces.
30 International Migration and Sending Countries 7
8
9
10 11
12 13
14 15 16 17 18
19
Indeed, Ammassari and Black note that the only recently booming literature on return migration lacks common methodology and that the general picture of return migration is still very incomplete (Ammassari and Black 2001: 17–23). Some scholars have argued that so-called ‘methodological nationalism’, that is, ‘taking the nation state society as a natural social and political form of the modern world’, is so intrinsic to social science theory and methodology that it long blocked the view of the scope, durability and importance of migrant transnationalism (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2001: 1–2). For instance, Italian and Eastern European migrants in New York at the turn of the (last) century engaged in the same transnational economic, social and political activities as today (Foner 1997). They sent back remittances, they maintained transnational networks with family and friends, and they engaged in diaspora political lobbying on behalf of their country of origin or tried to influence politics back ‘home’. Even Scandinavian migrants, whose rates of return migration were among the lowest, made significant imprints on their homelands through their remittances and ‘diffusion of foreign ideas’ (Gjerdes 2001). See ‘World migration tops 120 million, says ILO’, Press Release, 2 March 2000, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/pr/2000/2.htm. These figures are estimates by the Multilateral Investment Fund, an autonomous fund administered by the Inter-American Development Bank, quoted in Traces, no. 14 (2001), edited by A. Rogers, Transnational Communities Programme, http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/traces. Peter Bate, ‘A river of gold’, IDBAmerica, Magazine of the Inter-American Development Bank, October 2001. The formalization of remittance transfers has received unexpected support after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. To prevent funding of terrorist organizations, US authorities are clamping down on underground banking systems and trust-based networks which are used by migrants to send home remittances, in particular those linked with Islamic countries (Susan Sachs, ‘Immigrants facing strict new controls on cash sent home’, New York Times, 12 November 2002). Peter Bate, ‘A river of gold’, IDBAmerica, Magazine of the Inter-American Development Bank, October 2001. Traces, no. 12 (2000), edited by A. Rogers, Transnational Communities Programme, http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/traces. Traces, no. 5 (1999) and no. 10 (2000), edited by A. Rogers, Transnational Communities Programme, http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/traces. Traces, no. 6. (1999), edited by A. Rogers, Transnational Communities Programme, http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/traces. Author’s observations based on reading of Arabic News transcripts of speeches of the Moroccan King and government (see Arab News, http:// www.arabicnews.com). Traces, no. 3 (1998) and no. 16 (2001), edited by A. Rogers, Transnational Communities Programme, http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/traces.
Part II From Exit to Voice?
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2 Los Olvidados Become Heroes: The Evolution of Mexico’s Policies Towards Citizens Abroad Jesús Martínez-Saldaña
Mexican policies dealing with the millions of people who migrate to the United States have left much to be desired, making migrants feel they are los olvidados, a forgotten social sector whose needs, interests, and rights do not matter much to the authorities of their home country. At present, we are witnessing what appears to be a new phase in the evolution of this relation. This change has historical precedents but it became more evident at the end of the 1980s, when Mexican political developments stimulated intense migrant activism in various parts of the US. A more recent factor has been the arrival of Vicente Fox to the Mexican presidency. Fox has sought to redirect Mexican foreign policy and relations with citizens abroad, declaring that migration is a policy priority. His arrival to power and the courting of nationals abroad has had repercussions and forced opposition forces to escalate the competition over real and potential migrant support. The stakes are not insignificant: at present there are an estimated 23 million people of Mexican origin in the US, including the native and foreign born.1 Mexico’s National Population Council estimates the number of the Mexican-born in the US totalled 8,173,689 in 2000. The estimate for the year 2030, assuming constant rates of migration, is 16,885,995 people (CONAPO 1999: 45). The economic influence is also considerable. The Bank of Mexico reports migrant remittances to Mexico were US$8.895 billion in 2001, while the Inter-American Development Bank estimated the amount at US$9.23 billion, making it the third source of foreign capital, only behind oil exports and foreign investment.2 33
34 Mexico’s Policies Towards Citizens Abroad
This migration of Mexicans to the US does not take place in a vacuum. The asymmetrical nature of the bilateral relation establishes the broader context in which migration occurs and national governments find the latitude to develop and implement desired policies. As a factor, the unequal character of the bilateral relation helps to explain the Mexican government’s position but is also insufficient. Another factor to take into account is the character of the Mexican regime, which for most of the past century was authoritarian and presidentialist, subordinating citizen concerns to the national interests, as defined by the forces in power. The response of the Mexican government towards nationals abroad corroborates the arguments of scholars like Castles and Miller (1993), who suggest that ‘governmental obligations’ towards migrant populations ‘are shaped by the nature of the political system’ of the nation in question (Castles and Miller 1993: 263). In the case of Mexican migration, it may be more appropriate to argue that the policies are defined by the nature of the political systems in both the sending and receiving nations, as well as by the nature of the relation between them. In addition, the Mexican case allows us the opportunity to see the successes and failures of migrants seeking to redefine the relations with the political system of the sending nation.
The creation of the heroic migrant On 22 March 2002, Vicente Fox travelled to Fresno, California, to hold his first presidential encounter with a large Mexican immigrant community. Thousands of immigrants gathered at the city’s new convention centre to see the man who had put an end to 71 years of continuous rule by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). After being welcomed by thunderous applause and moving testimonies by immigrant women, Vicente Fox delivered a speech that produced cheers and ovations from the crowd. The applause was particularly intense when he referred to them as ‘heroic countrymen’ and declared support for the right of Mexicans abroad to vote in future presidential elections (Fox 2001). An article by California journalists captured the essence of the historic encounter: Fox told them he admired their dignity and the quality and productivity of their work. If in the past they had been made to feel like turncoats for grabbing a chance on this side of the border, Fox said, he regarded them as the finest ambassadors of Mexico’s culture and work ethic. ‘You are the cultural engine, the permanent ambassadors of Mexican culture,’ he said. ‘You are important, believe me, you are
Jesús Martínez-Saldaña 35
very important. In addition to missing you, we are very grateful to you.’3 The construction of the heroic migrant contrasts with a long tradition of neglect, disdain, and denial that historically characterized the policies of the Mexican government towards emigrants and their US-born descendants (Mexican Americans or Chicanos). This practice was reflected in the words and actions of authorities, as well as in the views expressed by notable sectors of Mexican society.
Immigration, emigration, and revolution Migratory flows to the north began and evolved during periods of Mexican history when the nation suffered the absence of democracy. Massive movement to the north came about during the military dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz (1876–1911), it increased during the violent stages of the Mexican Revolution (1910–17), and was perpetuated and magnified by the policies of the authoritarian, presidentialist, and stateparty regime established in the post-revolutionary era (1929–2000). In the absence of democracy, the respect for the rights of migrants and the nation as a whole was a frustrated ideal. Holding authorities accountable to citizens was also largely a dream, continuously undermined by corruption and the imposition of candidates and authorities representing the state-party (PRI). Mexican emigration became a massive phenomenon due to the growth of the American market economy, its demand for foreign labour, and the availability of Mexican workers who were being affected by the economic modernization policies and political repression of the Díaz dictatorship, or Porfiriato. Ironically, the massive emigration took place in an era when many considered Mexico an under-populated nation that actually required immigration, preferably from Europe, in order to achieve the level of economic development suggested by its abundant resources. According to the census of 1895, there were only 12.7 million Mexicans (Inegi 2002: 1), far below the 30 million people some demographers estimate lived in Mexico before the arrival of the Europeans (Meyer et al. 1999: 85). The modernization of Mexico carried out during the Porfiriato produced an exacerbated concentration of land. Domestic and foreign investors received favourable treatment, while the rural communities saw their possessions fall under the control of a few individuals and corporations. Cordova (1988) reminds us that in 1910 small property owners possessed only 2 per cent of all land in Mexico, while only 1 per cent of the total land
36 Mexico’s Policies Towards Citizens Abroad
surface belonged to the predominantly indigenous rural communities. In contrast, 9 per cent of all land was under the control of haciendas and ranchos. Ninety-six per cent of the rural population was composed of peons but 40 per cent of the total land area in the country was distributed among half a dozen large landholdings (Cordova 1988: 64–5). European immigrants were actively recruited by the government through colonization policies that offered them access to extensive grants of ‘public lands’. As Cardoso (1980) indicates, these lands were actually the common lands of peasants but were confiscated by the government and offered to foreigners as part of a grand design to modernize the countryside (Cardoso 1980: 6). Despite such generous policies, Mexico never became as attractive a destination to Europeans as the US or Argentina. Instead, Mexico was on its way to becoming a nation of emigrants. At this time, thousands of Mexicans were gradually incorporated into the American labour market thanks to favourable US immigration policies, the active recruitment by employers and their agents, and the establishment of a railroad system that linked the more densely populated central region of Mexico with the expanding economy of the American Southwest. The construction of the railroads facilitated the movement of people and goods between the two nations, intensifying the economic and socio-cultural ties across the international border. Cardoso (1980) indicates that Mexican emigration during this period ‘was largely one of rural people’, the social sector that suffered the most under the Porfiriato. He estimates that 80 to 92 per cent of the Mexicans who entered the US at the end of the nineteenth century and first decades of the twentieth were agricultural and household labourers (Cardoso 1980: 2, 82). Gamio (1971) reveals that the majority of migrants originated in a few states, mostly located in the central-western region (Michoacán, Jalisco, Guanajuato) and along the border with the US (Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León). In the US they found employment in agriculture, mining, railroads, industry and also a variety of urban service occupations. They were primarily concentrated in the Southwest (Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, and California) but were also found in Illinois, Indiana, Kansas and other midwestern states (Gamio 1971: 13–19, 23–9). While the migration to the US was largely economic in nature, the repressive policies of the Porfiriato also added a political dimension that became more significant in the years immediately preceding the 1910 Revolution. Critics of the Díaz regime who wished to avoid jail or a worse fate fled across the border, seeking haven in the growing Mexican
Jesús Martínez-Saldaña 37
communities. Díaz responded by creating an elaborate system of espionage that relied on the work of the consulates, private detective firms, informants, and the collaboration of US authorities. From 1906 to 1911 Enrique Creel headed the Díaz espionage efforts carried out on American soil, targeting exiles such as the anarcho-syndicalist Flores Magón brothers (Ricardo, Jesús, and Enrique), as well as the liberal Francisco I. Madero (Raat 1981: 175–99). Despite the impressive system of espionage, Madero succeeded in generating widespread support among Mexicans on both sides of the border. On 20 November 1910 he and his followers crossed from Texas into Mexico to lead the armed struggle against the Díaz dictatorship. Six months later, on 25 May 1911, Díaz resigned and fled to Europe. After Díaz left, Mexico elections were held to select a new president. Madero won easily and assumed office at the end of the year. However, he was unable to complete his term because in 1913 a counterrevolutionary military coup toppled him from power, carried out his assassination, and made the ruthless General Victoriano Huerta Mexico’s new dictator. A key participant in the plot against Madero was the US Ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson, an arrogant figure whose opinions carried weight in Washington and influenced President Howard Taft (Meyer 1985: 104). While it is generally believed that the ambassador’s participation in the plot did not have official approval from the White House, he nevertheless became a symbol of everything that the American government could do wrong in Mexico during and after the revolutionary era. The ambassador believed Mexico was not ready for democracy and set out to abort a democratically elected government. The opposition against him grew and by July 1913 he was removed, leading to a shift in US policies towards Mexico. This and other serious forms of US intervention in Mexican affairs became an important contributing factor in the adoption of an ideology of revolutionary nationalism, which is a defensive version of nationalism, designed to promote national unity to ward off foreign threats, particularly from the US. It is a vision of the world that is embodied in the Constitution of 1917. It reached its climax during the nationalist administration of Lázaro Cárdenas, who expropriated foreign-owned oil companies and distributed land to peasants, thereby promoting important ideals of the Revolution of 1910. Revolutionary nationalism reached a crisis of legitimacy in the 1980s due to economic and political instability, as well as the adoption of neoliberal policies by the technocrats who had gained control of the national government. According to Bartra (1989), revolutionary nationalism became nothing more than a catchphrase to the new political elite that held power at the
38 Mexico’s Policies Towards Citizens Abroad
end of the twentieth century because they were anything but suspicious of the US government (Bartra 1989: 55–85). As an ideology and interpretation of political reality, it continues to play a role in contemporary Mexico, rising and declining in significance with the ebbs and flows of political change. At present, in light of the PRI’s defeat in the 2000 presidential election, some (but not all) elements within this and other opposition parties have returned to rely on such a discourse in an attempt to regain popular support lost to Fox. The new president is depicted by opponents as being pro-American and willing to sacrifice national sovereignty in order to promote greater integration with the US. Fox’s migration policies are regarded as part of this process of yielding to the interests of a powerful neighbour that requires exploitable foreign labour and has a shameful history of interventionism in the domestic affairs of Mexico and other countries. Jorge G. Castañeda, head of the Secretariat of Foreign Relations (SRE), has been a preferred target of the attacks by opposition party members, who have called for his resignation on repeated occasions.4
Migrants and the constitution of 1917 During the Revolution many people fled to the US. The exodus was also influenced by another factor: the First World War American demand for foreign labour. This demand was institutionalized by a unilateral US programme to import Mexican labour. According to Alanís Enciso (1999), during this period 72,000 workers went to work in the US, attracted by favourable immigration policies and the efforts of labour recruiters operating in Mexico (Alanís Enciso 1999: 7). This project established a historical precedent for another labour recruitment policy that was negotiated by both national governments in 1942 and lasted until 1964, when the US ended it unilaterally. The First World War migration was opposed by the Venustiano Carranza presidency (1914 and 1915–20), which organized publicity campaigns warning of the abuses and racial discrimination the migrants would face north of the border. According to Alanís Enciso (1999), for example, in 1918 the federal government advised the authorities in the central region of Mexico to avoid, ‘to the extent possible’, the departure of workers to the north (Alanís Enciso 1999: 70–5). To accomplish this, governors were asked to impede the exodus ‘by all means possible’, including the denial of passports. Campaigns to repatriate migrants and offer them the protection of consulates were also carried out but the migration continued.
Jesús Martínez-Saldaña 39
The increasing xenophobia found in the US during the First World War and the recurring discrimination against Mexican migrants caused alarm among other sectors of the Mexican nation, including the revolutionary forces gathered to draft a new national constitution. In an attempt to protect potential migrants, the authors of the Constitution of 1917 wrote section XXVI of Article 123, which stipulates that all contracts between a worker and a foreign entrepreneur require the approval of the proper Mexican municipal authorities and the consulate of the foreign nation. It also indicates that the costs of repatriation of the worker are the responsibility of the contracting party (Constitución 1998: 68). The application of this article proved problematic. A major reason was an incompatibility with American immigration legislation. While Mexican law required a contract before departing, ‘American laws forbid the entrance of workers who had been previously contracted. In other words, those who wished to leave the country in compliance with Mexican law violated American legislation’ (Alanís Enciso 1999: 68). Notwithstanding the wishes of Mexican authorities and the creators of the 1917 Constitution, migration to the north continued and grew. The demographic changes brought about by a continuing exodus transformed the Mexican-origin population in the US. According to one estimate, at the time of the 1846–8 war there were some 84,000 people of Mexican origin in the Southwest. By 1900, the combined figures of the native and foreign-born Mexican Americans totalled 463,000. In 1910 the figure rose to 718,000, then to 1.21 million in 1920 and 1.729 million in 1930. In contrast, Mexico’s total population was 15.1 million in 1910, 14.3 million in 1920, and 16.5 in 1930 (Díaz de Cossío et al. 1997: 300–1).
The increasing US demand for Mexican labour The US immigration laws adopted at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth contributed to making Mexicans the principal foreign labour force in the American Southwest. Mexican labour was attractive because it was abundant, cheap, and located next door. The demand was altered during the Great Depression, when the economic decline was accompanied by strong nativist policies. When this occurred, Mexicans became scapegoats. Approximately half a million Mexican immigrants and US-born Mexican Americans were repatriated, most of them forcibly (Massey et al. 1987: 42). The deportations were justified by the arguments that the Mexicans took jobs from American citizens and also represented a fiscal burden to the government.
40 Mexico’s Policies Towards Citizens Abroad
In Mexico, the migration policies were guided by the General Population Law of 1936, which reflected the official belief that the nation was still under-populated. However, instead of promoting immigration as in the past, the new law suggested that the solution to under-population was ‘the reduction of mortality and the promotion of marriage and large families’ (García y Griego et al. 1990: 206). The government also sought to promote repatriation and the deterrence of additional emigration to the US ‘by dissuasion and by application of fines against labour recruiters who smuggled Mexican workers out of the country without recording labour contracts with Mexican authorities’ (ibid: 206), as had been determined by the Constitution of 1917. The American demand for Mexican workers returned with a vengeance during the Second World War. As the war effort unfolded, farm interests lobbied for the passage of a new labour importation programme that was originally designed to fill a purported war-time shortage of workers in agriculture. The project, popularly known as the Bracero Programme, was formulated in conjunction with the Mexican government and went into effect in 1942. This bilateral accord underwent several revisions but survived until 1964. While bilateral at its inception, recurring disputes by the two national governments led to its degradation into a unilateral US policy. During its 22 years of existence it awarded some 4.6 million seasonal contracts to Mexicans willing to work in American agriculture and railroad industries. At its height during the mid-1950s, there were over 400,000 braceros hired per year (Cross and Sandos 1981: 44). The programme is significant because it incorporated an unprecedented number of Mexicans into the process of migration to the US, and because the majority of the participants came from the same regions where migration had originated in the late nineteenth century. The institutionalization of these flows deepened the tradition and matured already present social, cultural, and economic ties between sending and receiving communities. In addition, Cross and Sandos (1981) suggest that the Mexican government deliberately selected regions that had played an important role during the 1910 Revolution and still constituted sites of potential rural unrest (Cross and Sandos 1981: 42–3). A key target was the Sinarquista movement, which combined conservative Catholicism and fascism with a critique of the rural impoverishment created by the Revolution. By the mid-1940s the Sinarquistas generated much support in Guanajuato and Jalisco states, mobilized thousands of supporters in a series of rallies, and attempted to create a political party.
Jesús Martínez-Saldaña 41
As commented by Cross and Sandos: While the Mexican government moved to deny the party national juridical existence, it had simultaneously worked to destroy the movement’s base by exporting its manpower. The labour contracts for braceros … heavily favored the sending region, the area of greatest Sinarquista support. Unable to provide rural opportunity for the braceros in Mexico, the government sought that opportunity in the United States. (ibid: 42) The accord established wage, housing and working standards for the migrants. It indicated that they would not be used to displace domestic workers, nor utilized in states where Mexicans suffered discrimination. The latter stipulation was particularly applicable to Texas, where continuous offences led to the blacklisting of several counties by a Mexican government unwilling to certify contracts for those regions (Galarza 1964: 46–51). Once the war ended, employer demand for its continuation led to the first of several extensions of the accord. Despite the initial optimism, the programme was plagued with problems and contract violations that harmed the workers. Migrants were mistreated, cheated in payment, offered less than the contracted work days, given poor housing and food, and faced other abuses. They were also unable to join unions and there was inadequate governmental supervision of employers. A leading critic of the programme was Ernesto Galarza, a Mexican immigrant scholar and activist who researched the programme extensively and found that Mexican consular enforcement was characterized by serious shortcomings: Of the seven consular districts in California, one, that of Sacramento, had jurisdiction over 18 counties. The San Diego and Calexico consulates were assigned much smaller areas but neither was small enough to permit a single official to supervise effectively the thousands of men hired at the peak of the harvests. The consulates did not receive special appropriations for bracero protection. Consuls sometimes referred complaints to the associations or to the Bureau of Employment Security. Some used form letters and check lists to refer grievances. Unannounced field and camp visits were discouraged by the American authorities, who preferred that they be arranged in advance. By and large the idea of a Mexican consul acting the part of a truculent and self-assured business agent of an American union was a fanciful one. Consuls were persuaded that this was not their role under the law. (Galarza 1964: 232)
42 Mexico’s Policies Towards Citizens Abroad
Another fundamental criticism of the migration policies during the era of the Bracero Programme is that unregulated migration increased dramatically, encouraged by the desire of employers to hire them and, at times, even put them to work alongside the braceros. When the accord was terminated by the US due to the pressures of unions and groups concerned with the exploitation of the migrants, the Mexican government lobbied unsuccessfully for its extension. The end of the programme did not bring about a reduction in Mexican migration. Instead, many of the former braceros crossed the border without the benefit of documents and found jobs with eager employers. The passage of the 1965 Immigration Act by the US Congress permitted the legal migration of thousands of Mexicans, who also benefited from the family reunification goals promoted by the law. During the following decades, the perpetuation and growth in the number of undocumented Mexicans became the principal point of discussion in the American debate over immigration. After the Bracero Programme ended, Mexico was unable or unwilling to negotiate a bilateral accord that would ensure fair treatment of the migrants who were incorporated into the growing American economy. The US debate reached a milestone with the approval of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). The new law created sanctions against employers who knowingly hired undocumented workers, extended amnesty to those unauthorized immigrants who had resided for a defined period, and created special programmes to continue to recruit much desired seasonal agricultural labour. IRCA legalized a total of 2.9 million immigrants but its overall success was only limited. As Portes and Rumbaut (1996) indicate, employer sanctions did not end undocumented migration ‘but merely rechanneled it into new forms’ (Portes and Rumbaut 1996: 278–80). In addition, the reform did not take into account the social dimension of migration, leaving many relatives of the legalized migrants without possibility of regulating their status. To address this flaw, the Immigration Act of 1990 established a visa category designed to benefit the forgotten family members. Even this reform was inadequate, leaving millions of Mexicans with an irregular status in the US. The policy of not having a policy After the passage of IRCA the debate in the US over Mexican immigration actually became more fierce and polarized. It included the expression of extremist views, the consideration of restrictionist immigration policies,
Jesús Martínez-Saldaña 43
and an increased militarization of the border. In this context, Manuel García y Griego published a study that called attention to the serious limitations of the Mexican approach to migration policy. The study found that since the mid-1970s the Mexican government had followed a strategy of not having a clear and explicit policy on the emigration of nationals to the US. According to García y Griego (1988), the policy of not having a migration policy may have had some success in the early years but by the late 1980s was facing an assortment of new challenges that made it decreasingly viable (García y Griego 1988: 145–52). The Mexican government’s position at the time was guided by the official interpretation of the principle of non-intervention established in Section X of Article 89 in the Constitution of 1917 (Constitución 1998: 76). Mexico relied on this principle to guide foreign policy and to try to limit US involvement in Mexican domestic affairs. In the late twentieth century, the principle of non-interventionism was also utilized to justify Mexico’s unwillingness to enter the US internal debate over IRCA or any other proposed law. The fear of endorsing an American law that could have adverse effects on migrants made the decision to not express an explicit position on migration attractive to policy-makers at the time. An historic opportunity to formulate innovative approaches and solutions to the issue of migration was deliberately missed by Carlos Salinas de Gortari during his term as president (1988–94). Salinas made the approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the US and Canada the priority of his administration. In interviews with American journalists and during visits to the US to lobby for NAFTA’s passage, he stated that his government wanted to export goods, not people. Nevertheless, instead of addressing migration issues directly and incorporating the issue into the agenda, Salinas agreed to omit labour flows from the trilateral accord, fearing that the inclusion of migration would lead to NAFTA’s defeat in the US Congress. The negative, although indirect, consequences of this decision did not take long to materialize. On 8 November 1994, only eleven months after NAFTA went into effect, the California electorate passed Proposition 187, an initiative created to deny access to public services (including education and health) to undocumented immigrants and their children. California’s governor, Pete Wilson, was a leading proponent of the initiative. Proposition 187 received 57 per cent of the vote and polarized the state electorate along racial lines, as reflected by the fact that it was supported by 64 per cent of whites, 57 per cent of Asian Americans, 56 per cent of African Americans, and 31 per cent of Latinos (Martin 1995: 259).
44 Mexico’s Policies Towards Citizens Abroad
The post-NAFTA anti-immigrant hysteria affected documented and undocumented Mexican immigrant families. They responded by participating in established or newly created organizations to defeat the initiative, but even among the mobilized sectors there was a feeling of abandonment by the Mexican government and organizations and leaders who claimed to represent Latinos. For example, Francisco Ortiz, a resident of Long Beach, declared that Proposition 187 harmed immigrants like himself. To him, it also revealed that ‘we really don’t have anyone to represent us’. He questioned the role of established organizations and leaders: ‘Where are they? What else are they waiting for? When are they going to intervene?’5
Migration: attitudes and policy implications The feeling of abandonment manifested by Ortiz has been shared by many Mexicans in the US. Remarkably, the tradition of neglect and disdain for migrants is not limited to Mexico’s authorities. It is also found in other sectors of society, including the most enlightened intellectuals, whose works shape national culture and influence the formation of generations of leaders and policy-makers. A case in point is Octavio Paz, the winner of the Nobel prize for literature in 1990. In his landmark Labyrinth of Solitude, Paz examines the Mexican character and ventures into philosophical and sociological discussions. The noted writer begins his analysis in a peculiar way: by looking at Mexicans in a foreign context, specifically the US. Paz examines mexicanism, the manifestation of the Mexican character, in Los Angeles, California, in the aftermath of the Second World War, at a time when he was serving in the local Mexican consulate. He offers an interpretation that depicts the Mexican-origin population as a social group that has lost its language, culture, identity and spirit, becoming a marginal and alienated group. The Mexicans one sees in the streets of the city, wrote Paz, ‘have lived in the city for many years, wearing the same clothes and speaking the same language as the other inhabitants, and they feel ashamed of their origin; yet no one would mistake them for authentic North Americans’ (Paz 1985: 13). Paz is also implying that such people have also ceased being ‘authentic’ Mexicans. This unflattering portrait reinforced pre-existing stereotypes in Mexico about the Mexican-origin population in the US, influencing national policies and social perceptions for decades to come. To many people in Mexico, but obviously not to remaining family members dependent on remittances, the migrants and their descendants were traitors who abandoned the homeland to live in the US. Following this
Jesús Martínez-Saldaña 45
logic, the inability to retain the Spanish language and other national cultural traditions transformed migrants and Mexican Americans into pochos, individuals who reject their Mexican culture and roots, preferring instead to become assimilated Americans. Other notable Mexican interpretations of the migrants can be found in the works of Gilberto López y Rivas and Jorge A. Bustamante, two scholars who contributed to the development of academic and political interest in issues related to Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants. López y Rivas (1979) is the author of a book, first published in 1971, which offered a serious interpretation of the growing Mexican-origin population in the US. Reflecting the trends of the time, the book portrays Mexican Americans as a ‘national minority’ that is exploited due to its national origin. The exploitation has its roots not in race but in the economic base, in the capitalist structure, which on the one hand makes impossible the integral development of the Mexican people and on the other conditions the existence of a ferocious economic exploitation and a politics of discrimination in all aspects of life. (López y Rivas 1979: 113) López y Rivas finds revolutionary potential in the Chicano movement of the 1960s and early 1970s and calls for the establishment of unity with other exploited groups. Overall, it suggests that real solutions are only possible with the substitution of capitalism by another, presumably socialist, system. The studies produced by Bustamante exhibit the influence of Marxist thought and revolutionary nationalism. His perspective changes in some ways with the passage of time, surviving during populist, conservative, and neoliberal administrations. Nevertheless, he consistently points out both the benefits that the US obtains from the use of migrant labour from Mexico and the role that the America nation has played in deliberately promoting the importation of workers. He argues that US policy towards Mexican immigration has been ‘the politics of supplying a labour force to meet the requirements of economic expansion, particularly in the Southwest of the United States’. However, it is not just the supply of any labour force, but only that ‘which permits the reduction of the costs of operation to its maximum expression’ (Bustamante 1976: 20). From this perspective, migrants appear as exploited and exploitable workers, victimized by capitalism. Migrants require the assistance of the Mexican government to defend their rights in the US and reduce their exploitation at the hands of employers. While much of Bustamante’s attention has been focused on what needs to be done in American territory, the continuing abuses of migrants when they return to Mexico
46 Mexico’s Policies Towards Citizens Abroad
eventually drew his attention as well. In his capacity as president of the Colegio de la Frontera Norte, the noted scholar promoted studies that documented extortion at the hands of Mexican authorities and other problems. He has claimed authorship of projects such as the Paisano Programme, which emerged from a campaign promise made by Salinas in order to reduce official abuses against returning migrants (Bustamante 1994: 259–60). Despite these accomplishments, the existence of the Paisano Programme confirmed the arguments of scholars who claim that during the PRI era decisions were created by political elites with little or no citizen participation, reproducing the authoritarianism of the presidentialist regime. Decisions may be influenced by interest groups or power brokers, but ‘the president himself is the key initiator and shaper of all major public policies’ (Craig and Cornelius 1989: 351). An additional perspective, which gained influence in recent years, considers migrants a cultural and political threat. People holding such views believe that when migrants return home, they carry with them an assortment of questionable beliefs, values and habits acquired in the US. A representative example is Jorge Carpizo, a leading scholar with an expertise in constitutional law who served as director of the Mexican Commission on Human Rights and, subsequently, became Attorney General in the Salinas administration. Carpizo emerged in the late 1990s as a leading opponent of the migrant demand for the right to vote while residing abroad. He considers the migrant vote dangerous for many reasons, including the belief that they may become the decisive factor in a presidential election. He argues that many migrants have severed ties to Mexico and constitute a vulnerable group subject to the influence of the America mass media and the potential pressures of anti-Mexican employers. Allowing them to participate in the national electoral process paves the way to the degradation of Mexico and the loss of independence. Mexico can conceivably become a territory under the control of the US (Carpizo 1998). In other words, the formal political participation of Mexicans abroad in the affairs of their homeland represents a threat to Mexican society, national culture, the electoral process and national sovereignty.
Migrant activism and the context of political change in Mexico As Daniel Cosío Villegas (1974: 22–35) argued in a seminal work, the federal executive enjoyed broad legal and extralegal powers that made all other authorities subordinate to the presidential will. In recent years,
Jesús Martínez-Saldaña 47
no president became as powerful as Salinas. He took office in a difficult environment due to the unprecedented showing of opposition candidates in the presidential race. In fact, many national and foreign observers were unconvinced that he had actually defeated Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, son of the revered former president Lázaro Cárdenas. Once in power, the new president proved to be a quick learner and within a few months elevated his popularity with arrests of public figures accused of corruption. He also embarked on an ambitious plan to gather foreign support, particularly from the US, through the pursuit of projects promoting economic liberalization and free trade. NAFTA became his principal priority and he devised an innovative approach to influence the US Congress. This included hiring top lobbyists and courting the support of prominent Mexican American leaders and organizations. The cultivation of relations with Mexican Americans also had the objective of undermining the support that Cárdenas had found among Mexican immigrants established in the US. The migrant cardenistas developed intensive campaigns in key American cities, calling attention to the fraudulent 1988 presidential election, the abuses carried out by Mexican authorities against returning migrants, the inadequate services offered by consulates, the accumulating deaths of opposition sympathizers in rural and urban Mexico, and the migrant desire to vote in future presidential elections. They found Cárdenas supportive of their demands, leading to the strengthening of relations and the eventual incorporation of migrant activists into the formal structure of the newly established Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) (Martínez Saldaña 1993: 223–85). Salinas de Gortari’s response also included the extension to the migrant communities established in the US of corporatist practices through projects such as the Programme for Mexican Communities Abroad and Solidaridad Internacional. The Programme for Mexican Communities Abroad was created to develop the relations with organized migrants, particularly home town associations from Zacatecas, Jalisco, and other states with migration traditions. In the case of Solidaridad Internacional, the bonds with migrant groups were constructed on the basis of governmental matching grants for public works projects in sending communities. Simultaneously, representatives of the PRI, including people employed in consulates, set out to explore the possibilities of creating chapters of their parties in the US. When this began to cause alarm among conservative American sectors, and possibly affecting the passage of NAFTA, the establishment of the PRI in the US was scaled back, practically
48 Mexico’s Policies Towards Citizens Abroad
disappearing from the public eye. Nevertheless, the consulates were perceived as maintaining a strongly partisan character, generating much mistrust among politically active migrants. Migrant activism and criticism of the Mexican government entered a new phase with the emergence of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) in Chiapas on 1 January 1994. The Zapatista demands for political change and better treatment of the indigenous peoples were seen favourably by many migrants, including those ideologically opposed to the neoliberal policies, human rights advocates, union leaders critical of NAFTA, sympathizers of opposition parties, and indigenous Mexicans from Oaxaca and other states. Impressive mobilizations and organizational efforts took place in many American cities, overshadowing the upcoming 1994 presidential election but often converging with the growing migrant demands for the right to vote. Zapatista supporters extended the US-based networks of support for change in Mexico, incorporating religious, human rights, and indigenous rights advocates. Like the cardenistas before them, the EZLN supporters in the US proved effective in drawing attention to their cause, creating a public relations nightmare for a Mexican government which had attempted to portray Mexico as an emerging first world nation. A solution to the political and economic crises that Mexico faced after 1994 was to reduce political pressures by negotiating with the opposition parties represented in Congress the approval of a package of electoral reforms. Negotiations continued until 1996 and in the summer of that year the reforms received unanimous congressional endorsement. Surprisingly, one of the reforms included in the package at the insistence of the PRD was designed to permit Mexicans abroad the opportunity to vote in presidential elections. The new reforms made the migrant vote legal, although Congress left for another occasion the approval of secondary laws to make the electoral participation of migrants a reality. According to Transitory Article 8 of the new federal electoral code (COFIPE), the migrant vote was conditioned to the existence of a new voters registry, a new national identity card, and a study delegated to the now independent Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) in order to define the necessary electoral reforms (Instituto Federal Electoral 1996: 301–2). The first two tasks were assigned to Gobernación (Secretary of Governance or SG), the powerful cabinet office in charge of domestic politics. Many migrant vote advocates believed their long struggle for suffrage rights, which dates back to at least 1929, had been won and expected to be able to vote in the 2000 presidential election. However, SG failed to carry out its tasks and, as time passed, launched a campaign criticizing
Jesús Martínez-Saldaña 49
the migrant vote. By 1998 the head of SG, Francisco Labastida Ochoa, was declaring that the costs of implementing the migrant vote would be one billion dollars, prohibitively high for a nation like Mexico. The political rights of migrants were also attacked from another front. On December 1996, at the insistence of the presidency and the PRI, Congress approved a reform to permit the non-loss of Mexican nationality, a concept that in Mexico is differentiated from citizenship and is meant to refer to membership in the national community. The reform was drafted to promote among Mexicans in the US the idea of becoming naturalized American citizens. To encourage them, the new law allowed such migrants to retain economic and cultural rights in Mexico, thus remaining a part of the nation they left behind. However, the law’s proponents consistently opposed the idea of including the enjoyment of political rights in Mexico, including the right to vote or to run for public office. Critics argued it was a measure designed to create confusion among migrants and reduce their political influence by shrinking the potential electorate abroad. As an alternative, migrant activists had proposed the idea of a dual citizenship law that would allow them to enjoy political rights in both nations. The migrant right to vote movement initiated a new phase of its development in February 1998, when a delegation of activists travelled to Mexico city to put pressure on the federal government, national political parties, and the IFE, urging them to make it possible for Mexicans abroad to vote in 2000. The group succeeded in drawing public attention to the issue, as they managed to receive widespread coverage in the Mexican and American media. They also obtained support from opposition figures, designed a strategy to continue lobbying, and adopted a name, Coalition of Mexicans Abroad Our Vote in 2000. In the next year and a half, the coalition pioneered activist efforts to influence the Mexican government. Other groups followed the example and even co-sponsored conferences and activities on both sides of the border. Concrete results of the coalition included proposing a citizen petition in Congress to have the lower house (Chamber of Deputies) agree to begin to move on the issue by calling for reports from involved agencies, including IFE and SG. Also, thanks to the initial visit by the delegation, the IFE created the commission of experts stipulated by Transitory Article 8 of COFIPE, in order to study the viability of the migrant vote. The study was completed and released to the public on 16 November 1998. The results were far more positive than the activists even anticipated. The commission of experts found that the migrant vote was technically viable, that there were dozens of possible ways to carry it
50 Mexico’s Policies Towards Citizens Abroad
out, and that the cost was reasonable: the most expensive option cost 356 million dollars and the least expensive only 76 million. Moreover, in a survey conducted by the commission it was found that 83 per cent of all migrants interviewed expressed a desire to vote from abroad if they were permitted to do so. In addition, the experts estimated that the total potential electorate residing abroad during the 2 July 2000 presidential election was 10.787 million people, 99 per cent of them living in the US. Surprisingly, among those included in this estimate were migrants who had naturalized in other countries because, in the opinion of the commission, the 1996 non-loss of nationality was written in such a way that it did not actually exclude political rights for those people who had adopted another citizenship. Overall, the commission estimated that the potential electorate abroad represented 15.38 per cent of the national electorate for the 2000 presidential election (IFE 1998: 8–16). Only two months earlier, in his 1998 state of the nation address, President Zedillo proclaimed to the nation and the world: Mexico already lives in a democracy. Democracy in Mexico is already lived authentically and actively in bodies of representation and decision-making, in the public plazas, in the social and political organizations, in the mass media; above all, in the conscience and attitudes of the citizens. Never before had democracy been so present in the life of the country as it is today. (Zedillo Ponce de León 1998: 1) At the same time, key members of his cabinet, including the head of SG, were working to undermine and discredit the migrant right to vote. The much-celebrated democratization of Mexico that the Zedillo government promoted within and outside of Mexico proved exclusionary of the migrant population, thereby continuing a tradition over a century old. Partly as a result of unprecedented lobbying by migrant groups, the opposition-controlled lower house of congress approved a very modest extraterritorial suffrage reform, as it was designed to benefit only those migrants already possessing voter identification cards, a subgroup estimated by the IFE to number about 1.5 million people (IFE 1998: 18). Yet, even this limited proposal was fiercely opposed by the PRI, which, following the logic of individuals like Carpizo, vowed to reject this and two other reforms in the PRI-controlled Senate. On 1 July 1999, the scheduled day for the Senate vote, and the constitutional deadline for electoral reforms applicable to the 2000 election, the PRI senators displayed their disregard for the electoral rights of migrants by not even showing up at the legislative chamber. The constitutional deadline
Jesús Martínez-Saldaña 51
passed, eliminating any possibility for migrant Mexicans to enjoy a basic citizenship right already guaranteed by dozens of other countries to their respective citizens residing abroad. Activists vowed to punish the PRI by supporting the two principal opposition candidates, Cárdenas of the PRD and Vicente Fox of the National Action Party–Green Ecological party of Mexico (PAN–PVEM) coalition, and by working to persuade their relatives and friends in Mexico to vote against the PRI. Both opposition candidates visited Mexican immigrant communities in the US as part of their campaigns, endorsing the right to vote and other measures. The Fox candidacy, in particular, began to draw unprecedented support. This was reflected in symbolic elections carried out in a few US communities on the same day (2 July 2000) elections were held in Mexico. In these modest mock elections, Fox received 10,985 out of the 16,318 votes cast. In turn, the PRI candidate, Francisco Labastida Ochoa, received 1,759 votes and Cárdenas 2,673.6
Migration and the new axes of Mexican foreign policy According to Jorge G. Castañeda, the arrival of Fox to the presidency permitted a much-needed change in foreign policy. The new international strategy emphasizes two axes: a strategic relationship with the US and a more active participation in the international system. With respect to the US, there are three major objectives: ‘the inclusion of new issues on the bilateral agenda; second, the incorporation of new political actors and, third, the establishment of a new general framework for the long-term relationship’.7 Within this context, Castañeda indicates that the priority in the bilateral agenda is the ‘comprehensive negotiations on the migratory phenomenon.’ From his perspective, migration has always been part of the relationship, but it was never part of the agenda of negotiations. Even in the case of the 1942 ‘bracero agreement’, which some consider to be the precedent in this area, it can be argued that this was really an agreement designed by the United States to obtain cheap labor during the Second World War, in which Mexico’s room for negotiation was quite limited. In contrast to that ephemeral precedent, currently both governments have recognized the need for an orderly framework for migration that guarantees humane treatment, adequate legal protection and dignified working conditions for the migrants. Today both governments conceive of the migratory issue as a source of challenges and opportunities, as one of the principal links that join our nations.8
52 Mexico’s Policies Towards Citizens Abroad
The change in direction pursued by Fox after becoming president yielded results. He found the George W. Bush administration receptive to the call to redefine bilateral relations. The legitimacy of Fox’s electoral victory brought the new president international prestige due to the advances made in moving Mexico towards a democratic regime. The victory also provided Fox with a political capital unmatched by any of his predecessors. It proved useful in the attempts to establish a bilateral agenda with the American government. In a joint statement made after Bush’s visit to the Fox ranch in Guanajuato state in February 2001, the leaders declared the beginning of a new era in US–Mexican relations: We believe our two nations can now build an authentic partnership for prosperity, based on shared democratic values and open dialogue that bring great benefits to our people. We want to move beyond the limitations of the past and boldly seize the unprecedented opportunity before us. In order to achieve these goals and follow up on the commitments we made today, we have agreed to meet frequently, as necessary, over the course of our respective terms of office. We will do so as friends, in a spirit of mutual trust and respect.9 The era of the American bogeyman seemed to be approaching its end in Mexico, while the era of an unreliable Mexican neighbour appeared to be receding in the high circles of power in Washington. As a result of Bush’s visit, the two governments created a high-level working group on migration, including the heads of SG and SRE of Mexico and the Secretary of State and the Attorney General of the US. Unlike other administrations that avoided negotiations over migration or regarded it as a problem, the Bush and Fox governments claimed to view the bilateral negotiations in the area of migration as ‘an exercise of shared responsibility, with a long term perspective, to ensure that migration of Mexicans to the United States is of mutual opportunity and benefit’.10 The Fox government also contributed to recasting the image of the Mexicans abroad, seeking to make them an integral and welcome component of the national community. Fox himself mentioned repeatedly that he represented 123 million Mexicans, 100 million at home and 23 million in the US. In addition to the work performed by the SRE, the Fox government’s relations with the migrant population and Mexican Americans were to be carried out by a newly created Presidential Office for Mexicans Abroad, headed by Juan Hernández, a native Texan born to a Mexican father and an American mother. This office was symbolically set up within the presidential house to reflect Fox’s commitment to
Jesús Martínez-Saldaña 53
migrants. To further symbolize his desire to establish ties with Mexicanorigin people, Fox invited some 200 Mexican Americans to his December 2000 presidential inauguration in Mexico City. The intensity of the Fox relations with migrants and Mexican Americans, as well as his historic electoral victory, has been accompanied by important changes in other political forces and institutions, which now appear to be competing to see who outdoes the others in proposing policies favourable to the Mexicans who participate in the process of international migration. The most dramatic case is that of the PRI. Since Fox’s victory, the PRI has repositioned itself, proclaiming to be the staunchest defender of migrant rights and national sovereignty. The PRI’s newly expressed concern for migrant interests and rights has contributed to the on-going consideration by Congress of key reforms, including those dealing with the migrant right to vote as well as their formal representation in the federal legislature. However, the discourse has yet to translate into tangible results, leading to renewed disappointment among migrants activists who see Congress and the Presidency as unproductive and perpetually engaged in partisan confrontations that results in legislative paralysis. In its new role as an opposition force, the PRI has often resorted to the discourse of revolutionary nationalism and joined the left-of-centre PRD in expressing constant criticisms of the Fox government’s foreign policy, particularly in the areas of relations with the United States and the defence of migrant rights. The Fox government is portrayed as subservient to the White House and feeble in the protection of the migrant population. Moreover, in light of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the opposition forces fear the Fox government is willing to endorse the US government’s anti-terrorist policies, which includes increased militarization of the border shared with Mexico. Tension between the legislative and executive branches escalated to the point that on 9 April 2002, the opposition-controlled Senate denied Vicente Fox permission to travel to Canada and several US states, including Texas. Among the key reasons presented for the historic denial of a presidential trip abroad was the argument that the Fox government had not responded in a dignified manner to a decision by the US Supreme Court, which found that an undocumented Mexican immigrant who had been fired by his employer after attempting to unionize at his workplace had no right to receive back pay due to his irregular migratory status in the country. PRI Senator Genaro Borrego spoke in favour of the denial of permission to President Fox, declaring that the federal executive had been completely passive and condescending
54 Mexico’s Policies Towards Citizens Abroad
‘before the imminent risk of massive violations of the labour rights of undocumented immigrants’.11 Migrants, including those actively involved in campaigns for the right to vote and related causes, have taken positions on both sides of the debate, at times allying with the political force that is closer to their particular preference, on other occasions criticizing all parties and authorities equally for the lack of progress in the development of key migrant reforms or acceptable bilateral accords. Renewed concerns over Mexico’s policies towards citizens abroad surfaced in August 2002, when the presidency formally announced the disappearance of the Presidential Office for Mexicans Abroad, the transfer of its responsibilities and projects to the SRE, and the creation of a new National Council for Mexican Communities Abroad that would make policy recommendations. The decision, considered by some to be the outcome of an internal power struggle with the SRE, was not well received by important migrant activists, who argued that it represented a historical regression and the loss of priority of migration in the Fox agenda. It was pointed out that Fox had acted without consulting migrants, recalling the authoritarianism of the past. Migrants who expressed these views feared that migration would once again be lost in the bureaucratic labyrinth of the SRE. Moreover, it was not clear what actual powers the new council would have, nor was there confidence in the process by which members would be selected. Newspaper reports and accounts of migrants who accepted an invitation to travel to Mexico City to hear the announcement reflected the lack of clarity in the new decision. More dramatically, a newspaper published in Los Angeles by immigrants from Oaxaca state recognized Fox’s good intentions but proclaimed his new immigration project had ‘no future’.12 The official portrayal of migrants as heroes appeared increasingly hollow to many observers at home and abroad. Desperate to save face and present proof of his government’s commitment to the promotion of human rights and the defence of migrants in the US, the Fox government responded to criticisms by calling attention to its defence of Javier Suárez Medina, a Mexican immigrant prisoner awaiting execution in Texas for killing an undercover police officer. President Fox personally became involved in the much-publicized campaign, taking a stance in favour of a confessed murdered based on Mexico’s opposition to the death penalty. He asked the governor of Texas and also President Bush to commute the sentence or delay the execution in order to present additional evidence of trial irregularities that violated international accords. The efforts proved futile and Suárez
Jesús Martínez-Saldaña 55
Medina was executed on 14 August 2002. That same day, Fox cancelled a planned visit to Texas that included a meeting with President Bush. He also cancelled other trips to the US programmed for later in the year. On this occasion, Fox received widespread support from opposition figures, who expressed indignation at the execution of another Mexican citizen by US authorities, although other observers pointed out he had wasted valuable political capital on a lost cause. In any event, it was evident that domestic reforms and bilateral accords dealing with migration now seemed more distant than when Fox took office.
Conclusion Despite some significant developments, Mexico, a major sending nation with a tradition of emigration over a century old, has not yet developed a clear, coherent, strong, democratic, and viable state migration policy. The existence of an undemocratic regime for most of the last century, the current paralysis in advancing much needed reforms, as well as an asymmetrical and often conflictive relation with the principal receiving nation, the US, are factors which help to explain this historical failure. In addition to their economic and numerous other contributions to Mexico, migrants have played an active role in the transition to democracy, combated offensive stereotypes, and managed to insert their demands into the national agenda. Yet, their role and influence are destined to remain limited and dependent on the irregular goodwill of authorities until they are able to exercise their citizenship rights in the Mexican polity. When Mexico’s international migrants are allowed to formally participate as voters and candidates to public office a qualitative leap will have been made to make the emerging Mexican democracy, and the national definitions of citizenship and nationality, finally reflect the long-repressed fact that Mexico is a nation of emigrants. More than heroes, Mexico’s international migrants deserve to be treated as citizens.
Notes 1 C. Avilés, ‘Prevén que en este sexenio 2 millones emigren a EU’, El Universal, 19 March 2002. 2 F. Robles, ‘Remesas de mexicanos establecen nuevo record’, La Opinion, 9 March 2002. 3 J. F. Smith and M. Arax, ‘Fox barnstorms across state’, Los Angeles Times, 23 March 2001. 4 J. M. Venegas, C. Pérez, and R. Garduño, ‘Frena Fox demanda de diputados de que renuncie titular de SRE’, La Jornada, 3 May 2002.
56 Mexico’s Policies Towards Citizens Abroad 5 6 7 8 9
10 11
12
F. Robles, ‘Nace un espontáneo intento de oposición a la iniciativa 187’, La Opinion, 6 October 1994. Coordinadora Nacional de las Elecciones en EU, ‘Resultados finales de las elecciones ciudadanas en los Estados Unidos’, 3 July 2000. J. G. Castañeda, ‘The axes of Mexico’s foreign policy’, document posted in 2001 on the Secretary of Foreign Relations website, http: //www.sre.gob.mx Ibid. The White House, ‘Joint statement by President George Bush and President Vicente Fox towards a partnership for prosperity’, 16 February 2001, Washington. State Department, ‘Joint statement of US–Mexico working group on migration’, 5 April 2001. ‘Discurso del senador Genaro Borrego Estrada sobre la negativa del PRI a que viaje el Presidente Fox.’ Statement from G. Borrego Estrada distributed via email 9 April 2002. ‘Sin futuro, proyecto de Fox para migrantes’, El Oaxaqueño, 17 August 2002.
3 Dominicans Abroad: Impacts and Responses in a Transnational Society David Howard
Migration has been the hallmark of Caribbean societies and remains so today. The inflow of peoples from the mainland during the first millennium, and subsequent invasion by European colonists since the late fifteenth century, accompanied by enslaved Africans and indentured labour, created societies that were clearly products of immigration. Movement of people, capital and culture between and beyond the islands has similarly dramatically shaped regional economic and social structures. Following emancipation and the evolution of free labour economies during the nineteenth century, migration within and between islands and the mainland became not only a significant economic and demographic factor, but a statement of individual and national progression: Migrating away for wages, although the earliest destinations were often other plantation islands, was an assertion of independence. It was not a complete escape from the larger plantation sphere, but neither did it represent a docile willingness to accept local conditions dictated by former plantation masters. (Richardson 1983: 6) The latter half of the nineteenth century witnessed a notable increase in labour circulation among Caribbean populations. Steamboat passages brought labour from the islands to mainland banana plantations or to the canal building efforts in Panama. The large sugar plantations of the Dominican Republic and Cuba attracted significant numbers of workers from within the Caribbean, and confirmed the importance of flexible and mobile labour markets for a region that had developed in an externally 57
58 Dominicans Abroad
driven, dependent framework. By the middle of the twentieth century, with thousands heading for the United States and Europe, emigration was established as an economic necessity by governments and workers alike: ‘Leaving home in order to return with enhanced means had become an accepted turn in the life course – and perhaps even an expected life experience – for millions of Caribbean people’ (Martínez 1995: 31). This chapter focuses on the realities and expectations concerning migrants from the Dominican Republic.1 The scale of Dominican emigration to the United States has grown particularly during the last four decades as the country emerged from a dictatorship and has actively sought integration into regional economic organizations and trade agreements. Migrant remittances constitute the country’s largest source of externally derived income, accounting for at least 10 per cent of the annual Gross National Product since the 1970s. Proximity and the expanding web of transnational familial, social, political and economic ties facilitate an array of linkages that play an important part in everyday lives (Levitt 2001b). Most families in the Dominican Republic have some experience of emigration, either directly or via relatives. While disputing the commonly projected notion that the majority of Dominicans are in a constant state of airborne flux, commuting regularly between households and countries, the connections between Dominicans on the island and those Stateside clearly form a crucial backbone to Dominican society.2 These networks, however, fall outside the remit of current government policy, despite the enormous impact and economic dependence which emigration entails. Although the Dominican government has employed a supportive attitude towards emigration, its policies are largely laissez-faire. By contrast, Dominican initiatives and policies towards immigrant workers in the national economy are restrictive and interventionist. The following pages describe the impact of both emigration and immigration on Dominican politics, economy and society and address Dominican governments’ consistent contradictions between their laissez faire emigration policies and restrictive immigration policies.
The history of Dominican emigration to the United States Expanding mercantile links during the late nineteenth century incorporated Dominican commodities and trade more directly into the world economy, preparing the ground for the international migration of Dominican labour. While Dominican migrant communities have developed throughout the region and in parts of Europe, notably the Netherlands and Spain, the United States remains the dominant
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destination. The dictatorship of Leónidas Trujillo between 1930 and 1961 restricted emigration as a means to maintain maximum control over domestic labour, with fewer than 10,000 Dominicans going to the United States during the 1950s. Following his assassination, however, emigration restrictions were lifted and the number of Dominicans migrating overseas grew rapidly. Between 1960 and 1963, Dominican documented emigration to the United States increased from just over 5,000 to 66,919 (Georges 1990: 37). Emigration was, and continues to be, perceived by Dominican governments as a primary safety valve to relieve social and economic pressures, but one which is restricted by externally imposed entry quotas (Mitchell 1992). The demise of the dictatorship opened up political spaces during the early 1960s, but political unrest and the upheaval of a democratically elected government by a military junta led to civil war in 1965 and a subsequent invasion by the United States to restore a government sympathetic to Washington. Political violence and an accompanying ruthless secret police forced many opponents of the new government into exile. The United States consulate in Santo Domingo introduced a period of less stringent visa policies during the 1960s that further promoted the exodus of political radicals, thus reducing opposition for future conservative and United States-friendly governments, while also easing fears of ‘another Cuba’ appearing on the doorstep of the US political psyche. The number of legal visas issued in 1966 increased by 74 per cent to 16,503, compared with 9,503 during 1965 (Georges 1990: 39). Those who feared repression as a result of their opposition to the new United States-backed government paradoxically found themselves seeking exile within the Dominican community of New York. During this period the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), populist opponents of the conservative government, set up an office in New York City, thus establishing a political and financial platform abroad. Although strategic decision-making remained on the island, parties increasingly looked for monetary support from the expanding New York community. The uneasy domestic political situation further promoted emigration to the United States after 1966 and 1978. Both years reflect political turning points, when a change of government provoked the emigration of political opponents. After the PRD finally gained power in 1978, many conservatives left the country fearing financial ruin. During that year, 19,458 Dominicans were admitted as residents to the United States. A deteriorating economy, the prospect of a more radical government and changing networks of patronage following three terms of the Christian Social Reform Party (PRSC) government, induced a 60 per cent increase in legal residency applications and approvals.
60 Dominicans Abroad
Between 1990 and 1998, 401,646 Dominicans were documented as entering the United States, almost double that of any other Caribbean state (Castro and Boswell 2002). In recent years it has become increasingly difficult for Dominicans to obtain any form of entry visa to visit relatives or reside in the United States. Numbers declined after 1996 when new laws raised the financial requirements to sponsor the immigration of relatives. An increase in the expulsion of non-documented migrants, usually those who have overstayed the limit of a temporary visa, has further contributed to a slight slowing of the demographic increase since the mid-1990s. Migration tallies today, however, reveal only a part of the Dominican demographic influence in the United States today. A growing proportion of the Dominican population in the United States, estimated at 43.6 per cent of Dominican residents, were born outside the Dominican Republic (Castro and Boswell 2002). With over a million Dominicans and Dominican Americans now resident off the island, the emphasis among the Dominican community abroad is increasingly one of settlement and longevity while Dominican society faces the need to reconfigure the practical requirements for a fragmented territorial nationhood. The following section considers the changing perception of and reaction to emigration within the Dominican Republic.
Perceptions of emigration in the sending society The dramatic and highly evident impact of contemporary international migration on Dominican society has frequently been described in terms of flexible and renewable transnational political, economic and social linkages, particularly with respect to the North American mainland (Georges 1990; Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; Pessar 1995; Guarnizo 1997; Itzigsohn et al. 1999; Levitt 2001b). Transnational migrants have generated new forms of consumption and investment within the Dominican economy through the flow of material commodities and hard currency, but also by influencing cultural transitions and popular opinion in the arts, music and media. Reaction among the non-migrant Dominican population has varied as the majority households in the country have become connected both financially and emotionally to the dominant impact of transnational linkages. Returning migrants have received various salutations and criticism since the beginning of large-scale emigration to the United States, through its peak during the 1990s, and now today as the island and mainland society adjust to new economic and political frameworks. Rural and urban perceptions of the returnees have
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often reflected stereotyped images of North American lifestyles and influences. Largely positive images of those Dominicans who migrated to the United States during the 1960s and early 1970s have become more mixed. Dominican governments have rarely openly eulogized the importance of international migration and communities overseas as invaluable components of national economic development, despite the obvious importance of inward capital flow. International migration provided an outlet for the movement of ‘excess’ population from a relatively frail national economy with high levels of formal unemployment and under-employment (Wiarda 1994). The labour situation on the island has been described in the context of a ‘middle-class bottleneck’ for which emigration became the means of releasing skilled workers who had limited possibilities of employment on home soil (Bray 1984). The perception of emigration as a demographic and economic pressure valve was therefore more an indirect result of government indifference to stemming the flow, rather than a clear lead of direct action or overt development policy. Nonetheless, earlier migrants were perceived in popular discourse as pioneers who had made the move to uproot temporarily and to pursue industrious lives overseas, saving and sending home a proportion of their income, before ultimately returning to the island. International migration, thus, represented the proven possibility of economic advance through the process of self-sacrifice, thrift and entrepreneurship. Concomitant with the eventual increased economic standing and improved opportunities for dependants came the assumed aspiration for, or expectation of, higher personal social status on return. Emigration to the United States, and less so to Europe, is a prominent theme in everyday life. Telephone calls, e-mails and remittances, combined with United States’ television and media awareness underpin the network of personal, business and political connections. While temporary visas or any form of permission to enter the United States are increasingly rare commodities, they are still perceived as popular and necessary travel accessories en route to personal or economic advancement. Patronising comments in the New York Times highlighted increased levels of Dominican emigration at the start of the 1970s and suggested that there were only three ways in which to escape poverty in the Dominican Republic: ‘winning the lottery, presidential patronage or a visa to travel to the United States’ (cited in Aponte 1999: 90). As the 1970s progressed, an increasingly hostile, or at least sceptical, reception awaited returning Dominican migrants whose image, having
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often been slurred in the North American press, now faced a similar kind of humiliation on the island. The initial positive image of migrants waned, as the relatively rapid accumulation of wealth among a few migrants became associated directly with the growing drug trade in New York. The main Dominican neighbourhood of Washington Heights in upper Manhattan provided the vital ingredients of easy and open access via the Hudson and East River road bridges and a large pool of potential employees. Ostentatious displays of wealth by some visiting or returning migrants fuelled doubts on the island, supported by the evident involvement of a minority of Dominicans in the drug trade on the mainland. The Dominican community’s external image in the United States became increasingly intertwined with illegal activities and anti-civil behaviour, particularly during the 1980s and early 1990s in upper Manhattan. The head of the North Manhattan drug squad made an implicit correlation between the two: ‘It is unfair to assume that all Dominicans peddle drugs … although eighteen months in the drug trade will earn you enough to go back to the Republic.’3 Social problems in Dominican society, notably the rise in violent crime and guns during the 1990s, were blamed on influences brought to the island from the United States. In 1996, a change in United States migration law allowed the authorities to extradite Dominicans who had been involved in criminal activities up to ten years before. Repatriations that year numbered 2,541, of which 967 were for drug-related offences and 909 for undocumented passage, largely by boat from the Dominican Republic to Puerto Rico (Infotur-RD 1998: 28). There was a clear sense that deported criminals, ‘trained’ or forced into crime in the United States, were returning with suitable skills and contacts to continue their activities in the Dominican Republic. During the 1990s, the non-migrant Dominican elites were rivalled in economic status by a younger, similarly affluent but transnational generation of nuevos ricos. Popular rhetoric reproduced images of this emergent class as villains or ne’er-do-wells involved in illicit trading, generating inflation, promoting economic and social vices, and bringing problems back to the Dominican Republic which had not existed before. Terms such as dominicanyork and cadenú became disparaging phrases. The former refers to more recent migrants who have been ‘Americanized’, typically suggesting an upstart or someone who has lived so long in the United States that an essential Dominicanness or dominicanidad has evaporated. The latter term makes jest at the heavy gold jewellery often bought and worn by returning migrants. Additional
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studies reveal that earlier migrants separated themselves personally from the new wave of dominicanyorks during the 1980s and 1990s, who they deemed to be ill-educated Dominicans who emigrated to the United States and got drunk on that culture. They scraped around to make easy money and so spent it without any care. They live, dress and act to catch the attention of others. The dominicanyorks are discriminated against because of their scandalous behaviour and because they change quiet neighbourhoods for the worse. (Returning migrant, interviewed by Bueno 1995: 24) The negative image of affluent returnees, especially if their wealth is deemed to be flashy or pretentious by everyday standards, occasionally leads to difficulties when negotiating access to established business circles, associations or schools. Although social tensions are inevitable in many instances, it remains paradoxical that having helped to even out socio-economic or income inequalities among many Dominican households by transferring capital through remittances and savings since the 1960s, returned migrants now face a class-based or cultural rejection. There continues to be admiration for many lower-income migrants who have returned to the Dominican Republic after supporting their families and relatives throughout the duration of their transnational initiative, but the pejorative image of dominicanyorks still lingers (Guarnizo 1997). Non-migrant Dominicans interviewed by the author largely concurred with negative perceptions of the term, linking it with ‘bad news’, ‘drug peddlers’ and ‘crooks’. Many lamented the wealth inequalities that these more recent migrants highlighted, underpinned by an apparent rejection or loss of dominicanidad – they were allegedly neither Dominican nor North American. The illegal or undocumented nature of migrants’ movements between the United States, Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic has contributed to the unfavourable image of dominicanyorks. To enter legally into the United States, a valid immigrant or temporary visitor’s visa is required. Since Puerto Rican nationals have United States citizenship, a well-known ploy among some Dominicans has been to attempt entry into the North America using false Puerto Rican papers. The dominance of demand over supply has made the visa a potent icon and valuable commodity, exemplified by the commonly heard phrase, ‘To have an American visa is to have a profession.’ A returned migrant in the study by Bueno commented on the importance of having residency status in
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the United States, but lamented her misfortune at not ‘getting’ citizenship. A citizen has access to the benefits of welfare and pension programmes, and this provides a concrete basis for the establishment of a transnational household: We kept our residents’ visa, and I would have liked to get citizenship, but I didn’t qualify for it because during my time living there, I visited here more than I remained there. My children won’t forgive their dad for not getting residency for them. Both of them are mad to get away. For me citizenship is important – when you reach retirement age you can claim a pension. (Returning migrant, interviewed by Bueno 1995: 10) The significance of obtaining a visa to visit the United States remains as evident today as it was four decades ago during the infamous ‘Day of Grace’ on 22 November 1966 when Thanksgiving and the anniversary of President Kennedy’s assassination coincided on the same day (González 1970). Rumours emanating from a radio broadcast suggested that unlimited visas were to be issued to commemorate the day. Within the first few hours of an otherwise routine morning in Santo Domingo, over one thousand expectant Dominicans had gathered around the United States’ consulate. The queue for visa applications, swelling fivefold from normal numbers, was only slowly dispersed as reality and disappointment rifled the crowd’s hopes. While these false words had failed, myths surrounding the procurement of visas have traditionally placed heavy emphasis on networks and cultivating useful contacts. González (1970) reports that favouritism and the value of having an ‘inside’ recommendation accompanying a visa application to the consulate were important aspects to consider, although strict application procedures and the sheer pressure of numbers mean that such potential opportunities are irrelevant for the vast majority of applicants. Visas to visit or reside in the United States remain potent symbols for a better future, despite the increasing difficulty of securing legal entry. Ninety-eight per cent of all documented Dominican immigrant entries to the United States are permitted on the basis of family reunification (Martin et al. 2002). The exceedingly high improbability of being granted a visa outside these criteria has fuelled the rise of undocumented migration. Several popular films have highlighted the importance of emigration in Dominican society and brought its often precarious or dangerous nature to the attention of international audiences. El Pasaje de Ida (1991) was based on the true story of a dozen
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Dominican stowaways who hid in the ballast tanks of a Puerto Rican merchant ship, subsequently drowning when the tanks were flooded. Nueba Yol (1995), and its sequel by the same name (a colloquial Dominican pronunciation of ‘New York’), recounted the life of Balbueno, a Dominican migrant who struggled to find work, but eventually makes a successful return to the Dominican homeland. Trading heavily on stereotypes, the film nevertheless provides an engaging and highly popular portrayal of a migrant’s journey, focusing on the need to support non-migrant relatives and their expectations, the implicit stresses placed on Dominican household units, the pressures of gaining and maintaining employment as an undocumented worker, and the insecurities surrounding return. Agents, brokers and lawyers have all gained financially from the aspirations of potential migrants and their families. Formal and informal businesses in both countries have responded to the demand for legal visas or clandestine entry into the United States. In Santo Domingo, several legal consultancies now advise clients specifically on how to obtain residency in the United States. Brokers, or buscones, are paid to arrange illegal entries into the United States and false papers for aspirant migrants via Puerto Rico, making use of Puerto Ricans’ US citizenship to pass through mainland immigration control. The passage to Puerto Rico is usually by boat, or sometimes by light aircraft. Regular reports in the Dominican media tell of failed attempts, resulting in the deportation of migrants or occasionally death en route.
Policy responses: dual citizenship and migration law Despite the fundamental impact of emigration on Dominican society, few policies have explicitly addressed the nature and transition of its influence during recent decades. Instead, government legislation has focused almost entirely on the repression of immigration, primarily that of Haitian workers to the Dominican Republic. Forced expulsions of Haitian workers, people of Haitian descent and even Dominicans caught up in the military round-ups have been a regular occurrence since Haitian labour was first contracted to work on Dominican plantations in the early twentieth century (Plant 1987; International Human Rights Law Clinic 2002). Clear contradictions exist in governmental approaches to migration issues. Emigration occurs largely in a policy void, indirectly supported by the recognition of dual citizenship, while immigration, widely perceived as an economic and demographic threat, is the subject of much policy rhetoric and direct action.
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Changes in the law concerning citizenship, which took twelve years to pass through the legislature, came into force in 1994 and allowed Dominicans to obtain citizenship of another country, without loss of their Dominican passport. The current and previous presidents of the Dominican Republic both have citizenship of the United States, and have suggested that all Dominicans resident in the United States should claim dual citizenship.4 Such statements, however, are infrequent and are more usually than not informal comments, rather than elements of a coherent policy framework. In contrast to the slow uptake among Dominican politicians to harness the overseas vote in a formal electoral procedure, politicians in the United States are more actively courting the vote of Dominican Americans by bringing their campaigns to the island. Recent candidates for the governorship of New York both paid visits to Santo Domingo to illustrate their solidarity with the Dominican and latino/a vote in their home constituencies.5 The importance of an increasing transnational electorate, intertwined the debate concerning dual citizenship and the introduction of an absentee voting system are perhaps the clearest issues which the Dominican government has been forced to confront in recent years. Despite political connections between Dominican parties and their support bases among communities in the United States, the links tend to be informal and ad hoc, concentrating in intensity during election periods in the Dominican Republic. In 1994, José Fernández, a resident of New York City was elected as a candidate for the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) to the Dominican Congress. This is one of the most evident indications of the migrant community’s close involvement with politics on the island, beyond the plethora of political posters which garnish upper Manhattan sidewalks during Dominican elections, key money-raising programmes and parades and long-established political offices in New York. In this respect, the initiatives for political linkage are often derived within the overseas communities, rather than from activists on the island. Despite these political implications, it remains evident that such activities are largely developed on a local or individual basis outside government initiatives. Levitt (2001b) completes a detailed and insightful account of the interconnections between the city of Boston and the Dominican village of Miraflores by emphasizing the impact of local and migrant actors. The Miraflores Development Corporation, for example, raised funds for the provision of facilities such as a park and health clinic, but without support or involvement at the governmental level.
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In 2002, of the 4.6 million Dominicans eligible to vote in the island’s elections, almost one million lived overseas. Dominican politicians frequently make campaign visits to various parts of the United States, but the system of overseas voting is at present in stasis, despite stated intentions to introduce an absentee ballot by 2004. Constitutionally all Dominicans have the right to vote, wherever they live, even if they have never been to the Dominican Republic but have attained Dominican citizenship via their parents. There are increasing tensions between political parties who want to open up this overseas vote and the Central Electoral Board (JCE) who have spent five years delaying the introduction of overseas voting mechanisms. While the majority of political parties are largely in favour of absentee voting, there remains a strong fear that this vote would create an imbalance of power in the long term, allowing nonresident Dominicans to eventually elect the island’s government from afar. A similar concern has stalled attempts to facilitate the citizenship claims of Haitians and their offspring resident in the Dominican Republic. The Haitian occupation of what is now Dominican territory between 1822 and 1844 underpins a politically and popularly expressed anxiety that an increasing Haitian-origin population may reproduce this invasion today by ‘stealth’. The prospect of a fully enfranchised Haitianorigin population in the Dominican Republic is openly perceived by many as a severe threat to Dominican sovereignty. The context of current debates about immigration can therefore not be considered without reference to the Dominican government’s consistent stance towards Haitians and people of Haitian descent living in the country. Both Haiti and the Dominican Republic share the island of Hispaniola, although five centuries of feuding and uneven economic development have often shrouded relations at state and individual level with a cloak of enmity. Social discrimination on the basis of alleged racial and cultural incompatibilities have long marked Haitian– Dominican antagonisms. Overt racism comes to the fore especially when employment and immigration are entwined. Particular cases are evident in the sugar and construction industries where Haitian-origin labour forms the majority of the workforce, but seldom has the opportunity to reach senior managerial levels. Changes in the Migration Law (95-39) have been an ongoing source of deliberation, following a proposal first put forward in 1995 to alter the basis of Dominican nationality from jus soli (birth in the country) to jus sanguini (birth to a Dominican national). The reform aims to control the ability of children born to Haitian parents to claim Dominican citizenship, and thus to gain legal residence. The constitution previously
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held that all infants born in the Dominican Republic could legitimately claim Dominican citizenship, with the exception of children born to foreigners on diplomatic service or those in transit. Of principal importance was the ability of the child to claim Dominican citizenship, regardless of the nationality of the parents. The change to the law meant that those children born on Dominican territory to foreign parents could no longer claim Dominican citizenship. The new proposal essentially widened the scope of those parents classified as ‘in transit’ and removed the birthright of children whose parents were Haitian or Haitian–Dominican. The changes to the migration law make unrealistic expectations of document provision, which include passports, health and penal certificates. Few Haitian or Dominican families of Haitian descent either have access to the bulk of necessary formal papers or the power to enforce civil and labour protection. In the case of registering contract labour, the law requires documents to be sent by the hiring company thirty days before the entry of a worker. It also demands the fulfilment of the Dominican Labour Code for all migrant workers, which includes access to social security, fair working hours and equitable conditions of payment, yet requires no individual contracts, offers no supervisory or enforcement mechanisms and details no penalties for failure to comply. The law clearly fails to protect those undocumented labourers of Haitian origin, many of whom were born in the Dominican Republic, speak Spanish and have little contact with Haiti. An international court case in 2001 brought to attention the inherent contradiction between the government’s lack of policies towards the emigration of its own citizens and the bureaucratic and often physically violent measures to restrict Haitian settlement in the Dominican Republic. The Inter-American Human Rights Court made a landmark decision against the systematic deportation of migrants and their families, criticizing the Dominican government for the de facto state policy of racism and xenophobia.
Impacts of emigration: households and remittances While emigration from the Dominican Republic has operated very much in a policy void, its economic and social impacts are evident within Dominican society. Remittances sent by migrants back to the Dominican Republic are crucial to the Dominican economy as a major source of foreign exchange and an aid to the balance of payments. Estimates placed the value of these remittances at between US$230 and US$280 million per year during the 1980s, and a greater source of export
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earnings than the once dominant sugar industry (Georges 1990). Residents of the Dominican community studied by Levitt (2001b) have been receiving financial assistance from relatives overseas since the 1950s. Today, 60 per cent of these households in Miraflores gain remitted funds from the United States. A similar study a decade earlier indicated that one-third of the selected community’s income was generated by remittances (Georges 1990). Most of the money went towards household consumption rather than investment, and remittances were often sent on a regular basis as a dependable source of household income. González (1970), again signifying the importance of citizenship, indicates that after a migrant’s death the dependants may receive benefits from the United States’ social security system if the migrant had obtained citizenship. Only income generated by tourism now challenges the importance of migrants’ money in the Dominican Republic. By 1989, remittances at the national level equalled the sum of the three traditional exports from the Dominican Republic, sugar, coffee and tobacco. The significance of this capital inflow continued to increase during the 1990s as the Dominican economy deteriorated. Throughout the last decade, money sent from abroad has been the largest source of hard currency, amounting to an estimated US$795 million per year (World Bank 1997). Remittance cheques may be cashed informally, and thus avoid the formalized investment routes of the bank system. As a result, the precise source and size of remitted capital is difficult to ascertain on a national basis. The International Labour Organization advises that although remittances selectively aid some families in the sending society, the net positive effects are debatable. A returned migrant solemnly suggested that the majority of families in the Dominican Republic depend on work in the United States, outlining the growing reliance of households on external sources of finance: ‘The Dominican Republic has always been dependent on other countries – the second city is not Santiago at all, but New York. Everything comes from there.’6 Grasmuck’s (1984) study of three sending communities in the Dominican Republic suggested that remittances provided only temporary relief for individual households. The negative effects included a growing dependency on these payments and the undermining of the productive base of communities. Inequality among household incomes has increased when those outside the remittance loop are considered, and highly unequal land tenure patterns have worsened in rural areas as more affluent households are able to consolidate and expand. Middle to large landholders, it is argued, are most likely to receive remittances,
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enabling them to cut back on low-return investments in farming. The demand for occasional or seasonal labour, important for many lowincome households, is then reduced, further raising the significance of access to external funding. An alternative view is stated by Georges (1990), who argues that emigration has had little effect on the class structure in Dominican society, particularly in the rural area she studied. Remittances have maintained, rather than created, the middle class, since most migrants in her sample originated from privileged households. Emigration, thus, represents a ‘holding strategy’ for the middle strata and reinforces communities rather than promoting their breakdown. The movement of people, information and ultimately capital has undoubtedly allowed many middle-class families to maintain their status, but such a position would seem to be relatively transitory given the expansive social and economic dynamics inherent in transnational change. An irrefutable outcome of a remittance-based local economy is the growing wealth disparity between those with external funds and those without. Household structures and the ability access to external income sources are fundamentally altered by the ubiquitous impact of international migration over time. Households and extended family relations are continually restructured to incorporate the changing transnational employment and caring structures. Transnational migration has led to the formation of a special type of household, involving the spatial dispersion of the domestic unit across two or more countries and the creation of multinuclear families. Pessar (1985) argues that the social mobility of a migrant is usually achieved at the level of the household rather than the individual. Patriarchal norms are invariably challenged with the changing structure of migrant households. Household structure is therefore an important factor when assessing the effect of transnationalism on gender relations, and one of the key aspects when assessing the social impact of international migration. Women who have migrated still suffer from discrimination when compared to their male counterparts in terms of occupational and economic attainment. They still tend to assume responsibility for childcare and domestic tasks, acting out support roles essential for migration. Bueno (1995) emphasizes the sacrifices that women make for the family, working in productive and reproductive spheres to make re-migration possible. They are, however, more likely to work beyond the domestic sphere which provides the basis for a relatively more independent lifestyle (Guarnizo 1997). In migrant or transnational households, relations of patriarchy may, thus, be less restrictive, since more women work outside the household, earn separate wages and share experiences other
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than the normalized gender roles in Dominican society. Conversely, the return to the Dominican Republic for many women has meant regression to a more repressive patriarchal system. Pessar’s (1985) study showed that many Dominican women in the United States were reluctant to come back to the island. They valued the freedom to work independently and feared that return to the island would limit work opportunities. Transnational household restructuring has helped to challenge traditional domestic codes, though it has been viewed as a significant factor of reduced family solidarity – one of the most reliable sources of social capital. Stress may fracture familial bonds when expectations are placed on migrants to provide remittances for extended families, or when relatives are forced to care for non-migratory or returning family members.
Impacts of emigration: changing identities Beyond the restructuring of household and personal relationships, international migration has changed the range of migrant and nonmigrant identities. Of particular note has been the social context shaping racialized and national identities. Dominicans confront a sharper racialized segregation in the United States. Given the strong negation of African Caribbean or black identities in Dominican society, migrants who would not consider themselves as negro/a or mulato/a find themselves being considered as black Hispanics or African Americans. Racialized antagonism with Haiti has underpinned the denial of African ancestry throughout Dominican society. Dominican nationalism remains tied to territorial and racialized expressions of belonging which promoted a European bias in popular discourse, in direct contrast to the African ancestry of the Haitian nation. While over time Dominicans living in the United States ‘invariably overcome the legacy of denial regarding the African part of their heritage’ (Torres-Saillant and Hernández 1998: 145), the dynamics of transnationalism seem to have impinged little on the wider re-evaluation of racialized identities, both on the island and within the United States. Thousands of Dominicans migrated to the United States during the 1960s when issues of race and racism were at the forefront of the civil rights movement and widespread pressures existed for social change. Several scholars predicted that on encountering these tensions, a reworking of racialized concepts could ensue among Dominicans. Moya Pons (1981) contended that the ‘discovery of Dominican negritude’ might occur along two avenues. Firstly, Dominicans were meeting other
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groups with similar concerns and interests within the civil rights movement. Secondly, professional and intellectual groups were allying the economic plight of many Dominican workers in the United States with the discrimination experienced by African Americans. Jiménez further predicted that more enlightened attitudes might be disseminated on the island as a result of the liberalizing influence of these intellectual and personal encounters among Dominican writers and the intelligentsia.7 Despite the dense network of social and cultural linkages and evident experiences of discrimination, many Dominican migrants retain a pejorative view of African ancestry. Dominican migrants who were interviewed in a study by Bueno (1995) tended to adopt racist stereotypes of other groups, despite their own negative experiences of racism. Of those returned migrants interviewed by the author, several migrants expressed highly racist sentiments, despite, or perhaps because of, several years of living in New York. Old antagonisms with Haiti were quick to surface. One woman vehemently protested against Haitian immigration to the Dominican Republic, despite spending several years herself as a migrant worker in the United States: ‘Each to their own place. I’m not giving away my nationality to anyone.’8 Although ready to acquire United States’ residency or citizenship, interviewees aggressively defended Dominican sovereignty, most vigorously in the context of Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic. Over a third of the returned migrants who were interviewed by the author believed that Haitians should not be allowed any form of residency in the Dominican Republic. Governmental policy contradictions over migratory flows are clearly mirrored by the migrants themselves. Among migrants who were interviewed by the author, the ability to claim dual citizenship further rattled the ambiguous relationship which they expressed with respect to Dominican–United States relations. Strident expressions of nationalism and civil responsibilities rested uneasily with personal concerns for self-advancement. The Dominican national flag was commonly used as an inanimate but provocative metaphor during conversations. One interviewee vociferously suggested: ‘The United States is the only hope for our country. We’re only missing the flag here!’9 Her friends expressed a strong conviction that the Dominican Republic should become a dependency of the United States like Puerto Rico, further enflaming a passionate discussion which traded national sovereignty for economic gain in the United States. All respondents, however, placed much pride in being Dominican. Only one interviewee, with thirteen aunts already working in the United States, had no hesitation about migrating or rejecting his citizenship by
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birth. He would burn the flag and never return to Santo Domingo if he had the chance: ‘Here, there’s no future for anyone.’ An older woman during a subsequent interview added sanguinely: ‘We’ve lost much of our dominicanidad. We’ve lost our Dominican identity. No Dominican nowadays wants to be part of this country.’10 The paradoxical standpoint which Dominican interviewees took concerning nationalism, sovereignty and migration underpinned the involuntary aspect of many migrants’ decisions. In order to survive a worsening economic situation in the Dominican Republic, economic logic consistently challenges emotional ties. The wealth of the United States is the primary factor when interviewees described the regional context: ‘It’s the biggest power (potencia) that there is – with the most money in the world.’11 Individual lives and household structures are constantly reshaped by the necessities of emigration and settlement in the United States, but the upheaval is largely expressed with resentment. The economic power of the North American market, even during signs of recession, leads to an ambiguous perception of Dominican identity for some interviewees. Years of emigration, necessitated by a failing Dominican economy, have weakened a sense of national pride in which economic realism overpowers cultural resilience. The Dominican government stands muted in the context of overwhelming economic and, by default, political servitude. The roots of economic dependency were planted at the beginning of the twentieth century when the United States government assumed formal control over the country’s finances in 1907, occupying the country from 1916 to 1924. Military occupation firmly oriented the island to the North American market. By the 1920s, 95 per cent of the sugar production was exported to the United States and twelve United States-owned companies controlled three-quarters of the sugar-producing land (Castor 1983). Since then, over a half of all Dominican imports have come from the United States.
Conclusion Compared with states such as Mexico, the governments of the Dominican Republic have made only marginal attempts to direct policy or to harness strategically the economic and political power of their overseas citizens. The introduction of dual citizenship in the mid-1990s was an important step onto the transnational policy stage, but the principal policy concerns surrounding migration have focused on immigration, in particular, the restriction of rights for Haitian labourers and their offspring.
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For much of the twentieth century government policy was largely inward-looking. Not until the mid-1990s, under the presidency of Leonel Fernández (1996–2000) did the Dominican Republic effectively seek a wider role in regional economic and political organizations. Fernández himself grew up as a Dominican American, and his experiences of living and studying in the United States undoubtedly influenced the style and contents of his politics. Before gaining the presidency he looked to the positive aspects of international migration and transnational connections: ‘If I win the presidency, I will turn the Dominican Republic into a little New York.’12 The cosmopolitan outlook, focusing on outward-looking economic policies and political orientation, was not reflected in practical policies concerning emigration and Dominican communities overseas. Despite an election campaign which highlighted his own transnational roots, showing him shooting baskets in Chicago Bulls colours, he remained remarkably quiet with respect to Dominican migration to the United States (Atkins and Wilson 1998: 231). In a collection of key speeches, ostensibly addressing modernization and globalization, the former president failed to mention the Dominican community in the United States (Fernández 2000). Similarly, the current president, Hipólito Mejía, has made few statements concerning the 10 per cent of the Dominican population who are resident in North America. There appears to be an almost conscious effort to downplay the significance of Dominicans living overseas, despite courting their political favour and finances. The reluctance to formulate policies which recognize the country’s economic dependence on emigration has been maintained by Hipólito Mejía. Only the tragic crash of American Airlines flight 587 in November 2001, en route from New York to Santo Domingo, has been a momentary stimulus for the government to acknowledge the importance of emigration for the country. The overwhelming reliance of the Dominican economy on the United States’ market, most markedly as a source of employment for an emigrating workforce, pegs Dominican emigration firmly to United States’ immigration policy. This particular form of economic, political and demographic dependency has been welded to the Dominican context since the United States first laid claim to internal tax issues at the start of the twentieth century. This fiscal interest was followed up by an eight-year occupation in 1916, during which the political and economic roots for North American-led development were cultivated. Unable to control or direct emigration, contemporary Dominican government energies have pursued vigorous attempts to close off the country to immigration by restricting the settlement of Haitian workers,
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despite the economic demand for their presence. Media and political discourse recognize ‘foreign labour’ as Haitian, a problem for Dominican sovereignty. While reliant on remittances from Dominicans abroad, national governments have strengthened the Labour Code to limit the influence of migrants in the Dominican economy. No more than 20 per cent of the labour force in any industrial sector is permitted to be ‘foreign’, although at the time of announcing the new law, the Secretary of Public Works acknowledged that at least 60 per cent of the construction labour force was Haitian and deemed to be indispensable for the state’s building programme.13 The contradictions in Dominican society evident in personal and state responses to issues of migration look set to remain. Individual and household remittances dominate the capital inflow. Transnational initiatives funded by private investments, tied between sending communities in the Dominican Republic and specific individuals or neighbourhoods in the United States will also continue as selective forms of investment. In sum, enduring transnational ties between households and individuals have not been replicated or acted upon by Dominican governments whose policies confront the fear of a perceived demographic threat from immigration, rather than enhance the economic possibilities for migration-led development.
Notes 1 Interviews by the author with returned migrants in the Dominican Republic between 1994 and 1996, and with Dominicans living in New York City between 1999 and 2000 form the basis for much of the following discussion. For further details, please refer to Howard (2001). 2 The news media in New York, for example, have often portrayed the city’s Dominican population as a constantly mobile, entrepreneurial, and to some extent ‘unsettled’ community. Many of the reports have been ill received by Dominicans due to their negative stereotyping and sensationalism. See D. González, ‘Unmasking the roots of Washington Heights violence’, New York Times Metro B, 17 October 1993; M. Junco, ‘For Dominican immigrants the American dream lives on’, Daily News, 9 January 1997; L. Rohter and C. Klauss, ‘Dominicans allow drugs easy soil’, New York Times, 10 May 1998; L. Rohter and C. Klauss, ‘Dominican drug traffickers tighten grip on the North-East’, New York Times, 11 May 1998; D. Sontag and C. W. Dugger, ‘The new immigrant: a shuttle between worlds’, New York Times, 19 July 1998. 3 New York Times, 16 September 1991. 4 Hoy, 6 December 2001. 5 New York Times, 20 February 2002. 6 Interviewed by the author in Santo Domingo, 29 July 1995. 7 Interviewed by the author in Santo Domingo, 24 September 1995.
76 Dominicans Abroad 8 9 10 11 12 13
Interviewed by the author in Santo Domingo, 18 August 1995. Interviewed by the author in Santo Domingo, 2 August 1995. Interviewed by the author in Santo Domingo, 17 July 1994. Interviewed by the author in Santo Domingo, 9 June 1994. El Siglo, 9 August 1997. Pérez, M. M. Fernández, ‘Hay que acogerse al Código de Trabajo para la contratación de mano de obra’, Listín Diario, 11 June 1999.
4 Turkey and the ‘Euro Turks’: Overseas Nationals as an Ambiguous Asset1 Eva Østergaard-Nielsen
The export of Turkish labour in the 1960s and early 1970s was in many ways a disappointment for Turkey. Although remittances clearly benefited the individual migrant families, they did not set off the intended economic local or, indeed, national development (Martin 1991; Abadan-Unat 1995). And the guest worker experience certainly did not facilitate important foreign policy priorities such as Turkey’s quest for full membership of the EU (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b). However, both the recent Turkish governments and the state are seeing the benefits of having an overseas community in the West. There is an increasing awareness among Turkish policy-makers that Turkish citizens who left for work in Western Europe are not going to return. From being referred to as ‘our workers abroad’, they are now increasingly called ‘our citizens abroad’.2 This awareness is reflected in more than just a change of semantics. The debates, policies, and administrative efforts towards the citizens abroad have changed from offers of temporary assistance and return programmes to support for their integration and social mobility abroad. Yet, Turkey wants its citizens abroad not to assimilate into their receiving countries, but to settle as Turks. Accordingly a range of measures has been employed in order to strengthen the economic, political and cultural ties between the Turkish citizens abroad and the homeland. Among the reasons for this is not only that a settled Turkish community in Europe constitutes an important economic resource-base, but also that it could play a role in Turkish bilateral and multilateral relations with EU member states. However, at the same time, Turkish political authorities are also concerned with groups of Turks and, in particular, Kurds, who support 77
78 Turkey and the ‘Euro Turks’
opposition within Turkey from abroad and lobby receiving country political actors with their version of domestic political conflicts in Turkey. Besides the pro-active attempts to strengthen the relationship with citizens abroad, the Turkish political authorities have taken several steps to curb such dissidence. They have put pressure on the political authorities in the receiving countries to ignore or ban such movements and organizations, and they have used their diplomatic missions and the secret service to control the dissident movements directly, sometimes bringing themselves in conflict with authorities in EU memberstates. The following pages explore Turkey’s changing although continuously ambiguous perceptions of overseas Turks and Kurds, and the way emigrants and asylum-seekers figure in Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy considerations.
Emigration from Turkey Currently an estimated 3.6 million Turkish citizens, that is, 6 per cent of the total Turkish citizenry, live outside the borders of Turkey, with just over 3 million living in Western European countries (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 2001: 252).3 Contrary to other classic examples of mass migration from one country to another, there are no colonial ties between Turkey and EU countries, as in the case of France and the Mahgreb countries, nor are the these countries geographically close, as is the case with Mexico and the US. Instead the Turkish citizens and former Turkish citizens in EU member states originate in post-war labour recruitment, followed by family reunification, inflows of asylum-seekers and clandestine migration. In the 1950s and in particular the 1960s there was a match in expectations between labour market policies in Western Europe, in particular Germany, and Turkey. Germany needed foreign labour and Turkish leaders saw emigration as a way to solve unemployment. Close to 800,000 Turkish workers participated in the labour exchange agreements signed between these countries from 1961 to 1973 (Martin 1991; Irbec 1993: 1).4 Of these, one-quarter were women and almost 30 per cent were skilled workers (Martin 1991: 25), although the fact that so many skilled workers left was outside the plan of using labour export to educate low-skilled workers. The end of this labour exchange was imposed by the receiving countries in 1973. Turkey had not anticipated this. The 1973–7 five-year plan anticipated the export of 350,000 workers, but only 190,000 were officially recruited because of the European-wide halt to labour import (ibid: 17).
Eva Østergaard-Nielsen 79
After the halt of labour recruitment, an unexpectedly large proportion of the guest workers did not, despite the intentions of most, return to Turkey (Zentrum für Türkeistudien (ZfT) 1997: 8–9). Instead workers chose to bring their families to Western Europe thereby completely changing the socio-demographic profile of Turkish citizens abroad. This practice of family reunification has continued as Turkish citizens (or former citizens) continue to recruit spouses in their regions of origin. Just over half of the 75,000 emigrants who left for the main Western European destinations in 2000 were family reunifications (OECD 2001: 251). In Denmark, a recent survey found that 80 per cent of women and 90 per cent of men from Turkey residing in Denmark for more than 10 years have married someone from Turkey (Pittelkow 2002). Besides family reunification Turkish citizens continue to emigrate in two main ways: as asylum-seekers and through clandestine migration. Between 1992 and 2001 Turkey was one of the top three source countries of origin for asylum-seekers arriving in EU member-states with a total of 283,278 first-time applications.5 Asylum-seekers have fled in connection with the 1980 military coup in Turkey, and, in particular since the late 1980s, in connection with the Kurdish conflict in southeast Turkey. It is, however, not the case that Kurdish migration is solely politically motivated while Turkish migration is solely economically driven. Many Kurds (estimated to constitute between one-quarter and one-third of everyone originating in Turkey living in EU member states) arrived as guest workers, while a number of Turks arrived as asylum-seekers. Receiving country governments, and Turkey, also argue that the increase in asylum-seekers from Turkey is related to the fact that this is one of the few ways of entering Western European countries. A second mode of migration is clandestine migration, whereby Turkish citizens either arrive illegally or become illegal immigrants by overstaying their tourist or student visas. This is by no means a new phenomenon. It is estimated that at least 20 per cent of the Turkish workers in EU member-states were illegal workers at the time of the labour exchange agreements (Martin 1991: 29). Turkey has also become an important transit country for migrants, many of whom are trafficked from countries further east. So although Turkey is no longer a sending country it is certainly a country of origin of continued emigration to Western Europe. As opposed to actively promoting migration through bilateral agreements between Turkey and EU member-states, migration from Turkey has become a highly politicized issue, both in bilateral relations between Turkey and European states and between Turkey and the EU institutions.
80 Turkey and the ‘Euro Turks’
Migration, or rather Western European fears of massive potential migration, were among the key issues stalling the implementation of the third stage of the Ankara Association Agreement signed by Turkey and the EEC in 1963. Similarly, it played into the lack of German support for Turkey’s EU-candidacy at the Luxembourg Summit in 1997. In addition, the inflow of asylum-seekers contributes to EU’s interest in political and economic stability in Turkey and its continuous pressure on the Turkish government for further reforms. Yet at the same time the presence of a large community of Turks and Kurds (from Turkey) in Europe, the so-called ‘Euro Turks’, link Turkey with the receiving countries and provides an argument for further integration between these countries (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b). Turkish leaders are therefore interested in the social capital upgrading of its overseas citizens so that they can represent Turkey in the best way possible. The process of settlement of Turks has, however, taken on its own dynamics over the last three decades. The term ‘Turkish migrant’ initially brought to mind the image of a factory worker catapulted from an Anatolian village to a big European city on a temporary basis. This was not just the perception within the receiving countries. The political elite in Turkey has long regarded the ‘Turkish worker’ as representing the more traditional rural Turkey rather than the more modern urban Turkey. Indeed, the Turkish guest workers have been patronized with a term such as ‘Almanc¹’, literally meaning ‘doing German’, which refers to the new rich cousins who come home to display their wealth during the holidays. Even returned migrants themselves do not see migration as an end in and of itself. In Martin’s (1991) survey among return migrants most returned migrants informed him that they were glad that their remittances and savings put them in a situation whereby their children could get education and skilled work in Turkey and would not have to work as manual labourers in an EU country. In the same survey, however, key informants estimated that 20–40 per cent of the 20–35-year-old workers in their area would migrate if they could (Martin 1991: iix–ix). Today the Turkish emigrants and their descendants have become a very heterogeneous group in terms of socio-economic status as well as ethnic, religious and political orientation. EU member-state social statistics paint a picture of slow general improvement in levels of education and employment, particularly with regard to Turkish youth. General aggregates are, however, somewhat deceptive compared to the very differentiated development among Turkish migrants. Alongside the fast-growing business community there are staggering high youth unemployment rates which in several countries are not only more than
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double the national average, but also supersede those of other labour migrant descendants (ZfT 2001: 395). Alongside the increase in Turkish youth in higher education are the still high numbers of young people leaving school with no qualifications. Importantly, in the last three decades ‘Turkish migrants’ have become a more visibly heterogeneous collection of ethnic (Kurdish, Laz, Zaza, etc.), and religious (Sunni, Alevi) sub-groups. Indeed, a host of ethnic and religious, not to mention party political, associations and their European-wide federations, engage in a multi-level agenda with Turkish authorities on three inseparable issues: (a) homeland political opposition or support for Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy; (b) immigrant political claims for further rights in the countries where they reside; and (c) emigrant political demands for further influence in Turkish politics such as absentee voting rights (see Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b: 46–69). Turks and Kurds can easily keep in touch with Turkey from wherever they are. During the last two decades an extensive market for electronic communication has come about. The Turkish media is readily available in every major European city, and finally most major European cities have direct flights not only to Ankara or Istanbul but to other provinces of Turkey as well. The yearly number of planes taking off for a Turkish airport from Germany is close to 30,000 (that is approximately 80 planes a day), and the number of persons travelling to Turkey by plane every year rose from less than half a million in 1980 to 4.3 million in 2000 (German Federal Department of Statistics 1980; 1997; 2001).
Changing policies towards emigrants Turkey’s post-Second World War strategy of labour export was accompanied by political and administrative measures to accommodate the citizens working abroad and facilitate their return. Indeed, the basic principles for emigration policy are laid down in the Turkish constitution of 1982 (amended in 1995), which states: The state shall take the necessary measures to ensure family unity, the education of the children, the cultural needs, and the social security of Turkish nationals working abroad, and shall take the necessary measures to safeguard their ties with the motherland, and to help them on their return home. (Turkish Constitution §62) With reference to this, a long range of administrative measures was adopted, including the quite elaborate social security arrangements for citizens abroad via bilateral or multilateral agreements with the receiving
82 Turkey and the ‘Euro Turks’
countries. Additionally, in particular from the 1980s, minor armies of Imams and Turkish teachers were sent out from the Directorate of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Education, respectively. The Imams, paid by the Turkish state to serve around 775 mosques in Germany alone, are meant to accommodate the religious needs of the emigrants in general and to represent the Turkish version of secularism in particular.6 More than 470 teachers transmit the Turkish language and the Turkish version of Turkish history, state and society to Turkish children in Germany alone.7 Last, but not least, there has been a continuous introduction of measures to channel remittances back into the Turkish economy, such as investment schemes and favourable exchange and interest rates for depositing remittances in Turkish banks (see Abadan-Unat 1995). Migrant remittances constitute an important source of foreign income for Turkey, which suffers from economic instability and high inflation rates. In 1964, Turkish citizens abroad sent home a total of US$45 million. This rose to US$1.2 billion in 1973, equalling 90 per cent of the commodity exports and approximately 60 per cent of the commodity imports of Turkey in the same year. Throughout the 1990s, Turkish remittances rose steadily from US$3.2 to US$4.5 billion, making Turkey the third largest receiver of remittances in the world – with Germany as the third largest payer (IMF 2001). Added to this, money is invested, collected or transferred to Turkey for more specific purposes, such as to aid the victims of the August 1999 earthquake, to participate in Islamic banking, or to support political and ethnic movements or village associations in the home region. Thus, not surprisingly both state-run and private economic agencies in Turkey woo the Turkish citizens abroad for their spare funds. Here they are in competition with commercial banks and companies in the West. During the 1970s, the Turkish government did try to channel remittances into employment-generating activities through encouraging migrants to open foreign currency savings accounts with public banks. Moreover two development programmes, the Village Development Co-operatives and the Turkish Workers Companies, were launched. The former was meant to promote rural development but ended up being a ‘migration fee’ because membership of the Co-operatives put migrants ahead in the queues for labour at the recruitment agencies. The Turkish Workers Companies mainly opened only to fail, need rehabilitation by a Turkish bank or, if successful, abandon the migrant shareholders. Martin (1991) argues that the Turkish bureaucracy and in particular the fast declining value of the Turkish lira proved major obstacles for those
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returned migrants who wished to turn their hard-earned savings into employment-generating businesses (Martin 1991: 36). These policies and activities reflected the notion of Turks abroad as temporary guest workers, whose income was, and continues to be, a valued part of the Turkish national economy. Indeed, there is a widespread perception among Turkish emigrants that for many years the Turkish authorities have merely regarded them as a ‘döviz makinesi’ (remittance machine), and have not cared about their struggle for equal rights and against discrimination in their new countries of residence. However, since the late 1980s and 1990s, Turkish authorities and policy-makers have become aware that their citizens are not going to return. Military service, traditionally one of the key obligations for citizens, has been changed for Turkish citizens resident abroad. The duration of military service has been reduced and can be further reduced in exchange for a monetary fee (see also Freeman and Ögelman 1998: 783). Yet the most important piece of legislation reflecting this awareness is the introduction of dual citizenship in 1995, as well as a range of economic and legal rights for those former citizens who have had to give up their Turkish citizenship because dual citizenship is not allowed by the receiving country. Those who have given up their Turkish citizenship with the permission of Turkish authorities can live and work in Turkey without further permission (law 4112). They can obtain a so-called ‘Pink Card’, a type of identification card introduced in 1995 which also allows for certain rights to import without duty, facilitates recognition of marriages abroad and exemption of military service. This type of quasi-dual citizenship has been questioned by in particular the Republican People’s Party (CHP) who advocates putting pressure on the receiving countries’ governments to introduce dual citizenship instead.8 This situation notwithstanding, Turkish overseas diplomatic representation in the receiving countries have clearly changed their attitude to the de-nationalization of Turkish citizens over the last two decades. Cem Özdemir, the first ‘guest worker child’ to enter the German Bundestag, describes how, when he wanted to give up his Turkish citizenship in order to obtain a German one, the Turkish consulate staff demanded that he bring his father who was then told off for not bringing his child up properly (Özdemir 1997). By contrast, consulate staff throughout EU member-states are now encouraging migrants, not least those embarking on a political career, to obtain the citizenship of their country of settlement. As commented by a representative of the
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municipal council in Copenhagen: Previously it was difficult to get rid of your Turkish citizenship. But today it is different. When you talk to practically any embassy staff member today he’ll say: ‘Are you a Danish citizen?’ And if you are not, he’ll say: ‘But why are you not a Danish citizen? You can easily keep your Turkish citizenship and then you’ll have more rights and all that.’9 In tandem with these changes, parliamentary and media debates have increasingly emphasized that Turkish authorities should begin actively working to understand and solve the problems of Turks abroad. For instance, in 1995, a special commission was set up in order to assess critically the situation of citizens abroad. The report, like the debates preceding and following it, places great emphasis on the economic and social situation of Turkish citizens abroad. This concern centres around two aspects. First, Turkish citizens in Western Europe, particularly in Germany, are being treated as second-class citizens, and are the targets of general discrimination and frequent outbursts of racist attacks. This concern was linked up with calls for improving the socio-economic and legal plight of Turkish citizens abroad and has resulted in a long series of recommendations by working groups and individual parliamentarians, including that unemployment among Turks abroad be eliminated, discrimination put to an end, and local voting rights granted in countries such as Germany where non-EU citizens are not allowed to participate in local elections. Such recommendations are, however, mainly gestures, as the most the Turkish government can do is to put pressure on the receiving country governments to solve these issues. Second, Turkish leaders are concerned that the ‘ties with the homeland’ are becoming weaker, and citizens abroad are ‘losing their Turkish culture’; particularly the third generation is found to be ‘wavering between cultures’ and ‘being in an identity struggle’.10 And here the Turkish government feels that it does have some scope for action. Proposals put forward in order to ensure that Turks abroad do not lose their sense of Turkish culture and national heritage include making it easier for Turkish artists to exhibit abroad, that the Turkish state TV (TRT-INT)’s broadcasting schedule should be adjusted to the customs and usage of the citizens living abroad, and that more teachers and religious officials should be sent to the receiving countries. It has been further suggested that the Turkish government should ensure the ‘economic and moral support’ of the organizations and cultural
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centres of Turks abroad and strengthen their resources in terms of Turkish culture.11 However, policy recommendation is one thing, and the implementation into new policies is another. In order to ensure the implementation of and follow up on all these recommendations, the inadequacy of the current structure for implementing policies towards citizens abroad has been scrutinized. Previously, the Turkish diplomatic representation was the main point of contact between citizens abroad and the Turkish authorities. Yet there has been an uneasy feeling among Turkish leaders about the costly and large diplomatic representation in general and the relationship between the diplomatic representatives and the Turkish citizens living abroad in particular. The report of a commission set up under Turkish national assembly deputy Kamuran Inan in 1996 concluded that there is a ‘distance’ between the consulates and the Turkish citizens.12 In order to better this situation, there have been many attempts to formulate a more convincing institutional structure for coordinating aid to citizens abroad. Several ministries have their own special department for these issues, and both right and left-wing Turkish parties have nurtured the idea of a special ministry for Turkish citizens living abroad. However, there has been more in the way of a continuing debate about the inadequacies of the administrative structures than in the way of concrete institutional changes. On this background, it was widely welcomed when the 55th government of the Democratic Left Party (DSP) and the Motherland Party (ANAP) (1997–9) set up the so-called Consultation Commission (Dan¹s¸ma Kurulu) for citizens living abroad.13 The Consultation Commission consists of the state minister responsible for citizens abroad, three of his bureaucrats, politicians from each of the political parties represented in parliament, and, particularly important in this context, forty-five Turkish citizens living abroad.14 The Turkish citizens come from every country where they have settled, and the amount of representatives corresponds to the size of the community in the country. Hence, the Turkish citizens from Germany comprise more than half of the commission. The aim of the Consultation Commission is to work on the administrative and legal issues and problems pertaining to the situation of Turkish citizens living abroad. The special composition is meant to facilitate a dialogue between the citizens living abroad and the Turkish state and parliament. In terms of content the Commission hopes to help raise the education and economic standard of the citizens abroad, and to aid
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their integration while preserving their national identity in their new countries of residence.15 Certainly the Commission is also used to disseminate information on the domestic and foreign policy priorities of the Turkish government. For instance, one of the later consultations took place in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and all delegates were briefed on the Turkish government’s version of the Cyprus issue and its possible solution.16 Although the Consultation Commission includes representatives from citizens abroad, it has been criticized for its top-down approach to dialogue with emigrants, by the migrant organizations abroad. The positions on the Commission were advertised on Turkish State TV and in Turkish newspapers, and the recruitment took place through the Turkish consulates. The applicants were not to be unemployed or receiving any social aid in their countries of residence, nor could they have been jailed or condemned for ‘shameful acts’. Instead, they were to be well educated (preferably in law) and ‘outstanding among their fellow countrymen’ in their country of residence.17 Migrant organizations, which for years had called for Turkish government action to better the situation of Turks abroad, were completely bypassed when the commission was set up. Their reaction was, not surprisingly, very critical. Moreover, critical voices argue that most of the concerns of the citizens living abroad relate to the political and legal structures of their receiving country. On these matters, the Turkish government has little power to change anything and in fact little has been heard of the commission in recent years. Nonetheless, the gesture of inviting Turkish citizens living abroad to Ankara for consultations on their situation was at the time of significant symbolic value. The speeches and press-releases surrounding the first meeting of the Consultation Commission included assurances from the three top DSP leaders (then deputy prime minister Bülent Ecevit, foreign minister Ismail Cem and state minister Refat Serdarog„ lu), such as: ‘Ankara will not forget its Turkish citizens of Europe’; ‘We will teach Europe a lesson on racism.’18
Transnational participation in Turkish elections Another recent political measure aimed at reinforcing the ties between the citizens abroad and their homeland is the attempt to include citizens abroad in the electoral process. The Turkish electorate in Germany alone is approximately 1,400,000 and hence constitutes approximately 4 per cent of the total Turkish electorate, capable of electing between 20 and 25 Turkish parliamentarians.19 However,
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Turkish citizens living outside Turkey cannot participate in elections in Turkey from afar. Only by returning to the homeland may they vote at the border crossings. Accordingly, the participation in elections of Turkish citizens living outside of Turkey has been low – approximately 50,000 in 1987 and 1991, approximately 85,000 in 1995, and 65,254 in 1999.20 Turkish migrant organizations abroad have demanded such rights for decades. In Turkey, one of the first long parliamentary debates on this issue appeared in 1986, and demands for voting rights for citizens abroad have frequently appeared in parliamentary debates and party political programmes since then.21 Yet any efforts to improve the situation were stalled by the fact that it was not constitutionally possible to allow voting from abroad because of the technically complicated judicial requirements in Turkish election laws. This was rectified with the amendments to the constitution in 1995, which now state that ‘necessary measures should be taken to facilitate the voting of citizens living abroad’ (Turkish constitution §67). Still, even by the time of the most recent Turkish general election in November 2002, this constitutional change had not resulted in the implementation of the appropriate legislation. This is because of the complexity involved in having such a large number of citizens vote from abroad. Most of the obstacles are technical in nature. For instance, should the citizens abroad vote by mail, in ballot boxes at the consulates, or through representatives? How is it possible to uphold the particular Turkish system, in which an independent judge presides over each constituency, in elections abroad? In this respect, the electorate in Germany constitutes the main problem because of its size. With only fourteen consulates, it is not possible for everyone to vote in ballot boxes at the consulates, and German authorities are not willing to make alternative facilities available for Turkish elections in Germany. Indeed, there is a general reservation from German political authorities regarding the potential wider effects of Turkish elections in Germany on the political integration of Turkish citizens and concerns for domestic security during the elections. Hence, in terms of technical solutions, Germany prefers voting by mail.22 Turkish authorities, on the contrary, have reservations regarding the reliability of voting by mail because pressure from family, peers, or even political or religious organizations may make independent voting difficult (see also K¹l¹ç 1996: 212). Thus, transnational voting rights have remained an electoral promise, as it is easier said than done to implement them.
88 Turkey and the ‘Euro Turks’
Transnational party-politics One side-effect of the necessary constitutional changes to allow voting rights for citizens abroad was the legitimization of Turkish political parties’ transnational links with organizations abroad. Until 1995 it was forbidden for Turkish political parties to have any formal party-political branches abroad. With the amendment of the constitution in 1995, the first step was taken towards legalizing such transnational links, but no political party has yet formally engaged in such activity by setting up an overseas party office as such. This is in part because most parties have worked abroad since the 1970s through an intricate transnational network of ‘informal’ contacts between political actors in the homeland and various Turkish or Kurdish associations abroad along party-political, ethnic, and religious lines (see Özcan 1992; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b). Turkish political parties have different levels of interest in and engagement with the emigrants in Western Europe. Smaller marginal parties in opposition to the Turkish state certainly use the overseas communities as a platform for uncensored political dialogue and a source of economic support, as do religious movements (Alevi and Sunni), and NGOs with a critical attitude to the Turkish state (see Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b: 46–69). The Turkish state has a narrow definition of when a political party or other actor threatens the security of the Kemalist Republic. If a party is found to do so it is shut down and its leaders possibly prosecuted. This has happened to a succession of Kurdish and Sunni Islamic parties. Among the bigger parties represented in parliament it is mainly those with a religious or nationalist political agenda such as the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), the smaller Happiness Party (SP)23 and the National Movement Party (MHP) which are most active outside Turkey. Both of these parties make explicit reference to citizens abroad in their political programmes. Leading politicians from these parties attend mass meetings of the Sunni-Muslim Milli Görüs¸ or the nationalist Türk Federasyon in order to attract economic and political support. In turn, and in some cases in exchange, leaders of the European-based organizations run as candidates in Turkish elections. Most famously, the long-standing leader of Milli Görüs¸, Osman Yumakog„ ullar¹, was elected for the Welfare Party in a safe seat in Istanbul in 1995. In addition, a number of other high-ranking supporters from Europe have stood as candidates in Turkish elections, but only a few have been elected. By contrast, the transnational dialogue of the mainstream social democratic and conservative liberal parties has mainly been initiated
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and conducted through individuals with a particular background in the communities abroad. It has been these individuals, such as Ercan Karakas¸ from CHP or Bülent Arkacal¹ from ANAP, who attend meetings organized by like-minded organizations abroad and who raise questions or initiate debates regarding ‘our citizens abroad’ in the Turkish Parliament. These more sporadic practices have only lately been replaced by more comprehensive measures, such as expressing support for citizens abroad in the party programmes, or assigning special deputies with the task of communicating with citizens abroad. Most of these parties – in particular, a party like the social democratic DSP – are not as grassroots-oriented as the religious AKP or the MHP or several smaller left-wing and Kurdish parties, and this shows in their transnational reach as well. The more reserved attitude of the mainstream parties is also related to their perception of where the party political preferences of Turks abroad lie. General surveys show that the large majority of Turks abroad would actually vote for the mainstream social democrats and conservative liberal parties (Zf T 2000). Yet those who turn up for political rallies abroad or, indeed, travel to the Turkish borders to vote, are rumoured to support the religious or nationalist parties. However, the discrepancy between general surveys and voting patterns at the border may also reflect ‘long distance’ voting patterns. That is, those willing to drive or fly to Turkey to vote are not ordinary voters but those with a stronger homeland political commitment, which in this case is evoked by the nationalist or religious parties. In any case this has reinforced the perception of Turkish citizens abroad as supporters of these parties only.
Turks abroad as good representatives for Turkey The processes of administrative and political integration of Turkish citizens abroad with the homeland are generally justified as the duty of any emigration country. However, there are plenty of incentives for Ankara to strengthen the ties with citizens in EU member-states, to listen to their problems and to re-include them as part of the electorate. Like most sending countries, Turkey welcomes the continued flow of remittances and investments from citizens abroad, who, despite their high unemployment rates, are still much more affluent than the homeland. Moreover, it is not against Turkey’s interests if Turks abroad become good and loyal representatives of their country of origin. Already, citizens abroad constitute an integral part of the foreign relations with
90 Turkey and the ‘Euro Turks’
Western Europe, in particular the EU. As expressed by one Turkish national assembly deputy: ‘Their presence is a lobby in and of itself.’24 Within this line of reasoning, there is a keen interest to support the ‘social capital upgrading’ of citizens abroad. Hitherto the Turkish workers abroad have been regarded as giving Western European countries the wrong image of Turks and Turkey. Although this is a sensitive issue, there is a widespread concern in Ankara that Turkish citizens in Western Europe do not represent the modern secular Turkey of Ankara, but rather the more traditional rural life of Anatolian villages. Therefore Ankara places great emphasis on the social mobility of the communities abroad, especially the growth of private enterprises owned by emigrants abroad, and the increase in Turkish citizens attending German universities. Thus the foreign ministry has posted on its website that: ‘Turkey encourages its citizens to do their best for enhancing their social, economical, cultural and political status’.25 This they should do first and foremost for their own sake, but it is clearly also in Turkey’s interest. Beyond the issue of emigrants as ‘good representatives’ is the more contentious question of Turks abroad as a foreign policy lobby for Ankara. ‘Everybody wants a Jewish lobby’, one national assembly deputy commented during an interview. He then continued to outline how Turks abroad could serve to counter the information campaigns of dissident Turkish and Kurdish movements abroad as well as other ‘antiTurkish’ groups including the Armenian and Greek lobbies in Europe and the US.26 Another national assembly deputy outlined how Turkish citizens abroad should mobilize firstly to defend their own rights and secondly to: Be a kind of public relations for Turkey, and if possible a lobby for their own country. This should be one of the tasks of a more efficient diplomacy – to mobilize the people abroad. If you look at antiTurkish activities by Turks in Western Europe these are developed on a large scale and also sponsored by local forces … political activity on behalf of Turkey – as usual it is very quiet and not well organized. And so this is one of the major issues, which should be on the agenda of any government and parliament in this country.27 However, the notion of a Turkish lobby in Europe – the conscious instrumental use of Turkish citizens abroad – is also treated with much caution in Ankara. Turkish citizens abroad are not viewed as very powerful because of their lack of political rights and economic power in their countries of residence. Similarly, the migrant organizations are viewed
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as weak in terms of political influence in receiving country politics. It is rather the potential of Turkish citizens which is estimated to be of great value to Turkey. The more established and influential the ‘Euro Turks’ in EU-countries get, the more they may represent Turkey and Turkish interests abroad. Several measures originating from Turkey can be interpreted as intentions to mobilize citizens abroad: Diplomatic representations organize and fund the celebration of national days abroad. They meet with migrant organizations to encourage them to counter ‘anti-Turkish’ activities. More importantly, the Turkish media abroad does not just serve to report events in Turkey. Since the early 1980s, major Turkish dailies with a large distribution within the communities in Europe have run fax-campaigns urging citizens abroad to fax their protests against local and national politicians who have criticized Turkey regarding the Kurdish issue, human rights deficiencies, or Turkish relations with the EU. One columnist in the European pages of the Turkish daily Hürriyet has been named one of the most important opinion-makers in Europe.28 In particular the Turkish media has scrutinized Turkish-descent representatives in local and national parliaments to determine whether they are too critical of their homeland. The first Turkish representative in a European national assembly, Cem Özdemir, has thus engaged in a yearlong argument with the Turkish press, which has depicted him as ‘The dagger in our back’.29 Özdemir in turn has stated that he wants ‘to free Turks from the reins of Ankara’.30 Leading Turkish policy-makers have also voiced their opinion on the way Turkish-descent voters should vote in the 1998 Federal election in Germany. Several party leaders, such as the leader of the social democratic CHP, told Turks to vote for the German Social Democrats (SPD) because this party would implement citizenship reforms including dual citizenship and in general improve German integration policies. More famously, the then prime minister, Mesut Yilmaz (ANAP) stated, ‘I am sure that Turks in Germany will vote in favour of those who favour Turkish membership of the EU.’ He then proceeded to hold then Chancellor Kohl of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) responsible for the EU failure to grant Turkey the status of candidate to EU membership at the Luxembourg Summit in 1997.31 That Ankara wishes to have a lobby in EU member-states in general and in Germany in particular is the firm conviction of most leaders of migrant organizations abroad. It is also noted by receiving country policymakers and authorities as counterproductive to the political integration of Turks. In Germany, for those against dual citizenship, interventions
92 Turkey and the ‘Euro Turks’
by Turkish media and politicians in German elections confirm their fear of Turkey’s influence on German politics through the Turkish minority in Germany. For others, Turkey’s intervention is regretted as stigmatizing Turks in the eye of the German public and hence damaging their general and political integration. However, the influence of Ankara on its citizens abroad should not be overestimated. Indeed, more often than not, Turkey is criticized by migrant organizations for asking for something for nothing. As one leader of a migrant organization formulates it, Turkey clearly wants an Armenian or Jewish lobby, but they forget that You have to take care of your people if you want their support, and Turkey never did. People here were faced with a lot of Turkish government and state discrimination … Even here when they go to the consular departments … And this creates an atmosphere where Turkey cannot say: ‘So I did this for you and now you do something for me.’32 Turks and Kurds in Western Europe engage themselves in the political developments in Turkey and in Turkish–European relations. Many are critical of the Turkish government’s handling of domestic and foreign policy, but at the same time it is not against these associations’ interest to try to counter the negative image of Turkey in the receiving countries’ press and public opinion since this also reflects on the perception of the migrants and their descendants, themselves. Yet Turkish migrant organizations continuously emphasize that they are not the ‘tool of Ankara’. When Prime Minister Yilmaz told Turkish-descent voters not to vote for the CDU, this intervention was immediately decried by leaders of migrant organizations in Germany, in particular those organizations working more closely with the CDU. ‘We are not a fifth column’, stated one head of a migrant organization. ‘We are not remote-controlled by Ankara’, stated another.33
Perceptions of long-distance dissidence Political dissidence abroad constitutes another reason for Turkey to seek to strengthen the ties with the communities abroad. The less opposition is tolerated in a country, the more it is likely to unfold within the diaspora (Shain 1989). From the point of view of the Turkish state, there has been much concern with the activities of dissident movements among, in particular, Kurds, communist Turks and certain Sunni Islamic organizations (see Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b). Since the 1980s, Western Europe
Eva Østergaard-Nielsen 93
has received not only economic migrants seeking work but also political refugees seeking asylum. The number of asylum-seekers peaked around the time of the 1980 military coup in Turkey, and then again in the early 1990s, with the escalation of the Kurdish conflict in south-east Anatolia. Turkey finds it awkward that Turkish citizens arriving in Western Europe claim to be politically persecuted and in need of asylum. Indeed, Turkey criticizes EU countries accepting asylum-seekers from Turkey for hosting anti-Turkish state forces, tolerating Kurdish separatism and disregarding Turkish territorial and political integrity. Political dissidence is furthermore not just a matter of asylum-seekers. Political identity within the communities abroad is constantly renegotiated. Some Turkish migrants become more defensive about their homeland not least because of the very critical media coverage of Turkey in Western European media. Others become more sceptical towards the Turkish political regime from afar. There is much awareness among Turkish politicians that one of the main obstacles to creating a Turkish lobby abroad is these differing homeland-oriented agendas within the community. Turkish and sometimes also Kurdish organizations have tried to come together on issues on immigrant political concern but this has often faltered on irreconcilable party-political, ethnic or religious differences. While most receiving country politicians ascribe this to the influence of Turkish politics, Turkish politicians blame the receiving country’s political authorities for the lack of unity. Indeed, there is a consensus among the representatives from Turkish political parties interviewed for this research. In particular, German authorities are said to have realized that the community is easier to handle if it is divided, and hence they are ‘playing with the ethnic and religious feelings of the community’. Importantly, Turkish politicians suggest that not enough is done to curb anti-Turkish terrorist organizations, in particular in those countries such as Denmark or the Netherlands where no Kurdish, communist or Islamic organization has yet been banned. Similarly, the financial support (in Western Europe) to religious migrant organizations is viewed with much annoyance, even suspicion, among Turkish politicians. It is, for instance, pointed out that constitutional provisions in Holland ensure state aid to religious groups, forcing the Turks to organize along religious lines. Sunni-Muslim or Kurdish organizations are by no means actively supported by Western European authorities. Their immigrant political demands are often not met. Still, Turkish perception that Western European countries wish to ‘divide and rule’ is also replicated in the argument against the ‘multicultural strategies’ of, say, Dutch or German local authorities. Multi culturalism is, in other words, only
94 Turkey and the ‘Euro Turks’
acceptable in so far as it does not question Turkish minority policies. The fact that Kurdish, Alevi, various Sunni-Muslim, and party-political organizations are being funded through local or federal authorities is seen by Turkey as a means to compartmentalize the Turkish community.
Long-distance policing Turkish or Kurdish emigrants or refugees engaged in Turkish politics from afar may find themselves withheld for questioning and sometimes arrested when returning to Turkey if their activities are perceived as sufficiently subversive by Turkish authorities. This is one of many indications that Turkish authorities try to monitor political dissidence abroad. Yet the case of Turkey illustrates how it is not so straightforward to exert control abroad as it is at home. In order to curb political dissidence abroad, Turkish political authorities have repeatedly urged Western European governments to control the activities of opposition groups. Such pressure has been exerted on every single level of governance. Turkey voices its opinion on these issues in international meetings, meetings with heads of state, or communication with national and local governments. Besides seeking to influence the receiving state authorities, one of the means by which the homeland may seek to curb opposition movements abroad is through diplomatic representations. Embassies and consulates have attempted to influence the pattern of organizations and events organized by the movements in the diaspora. Another means by which Turkey has sought to control the citizens living abroad has been through the umbilical cord between its citizens abroad and the state: the passport. Particularly in the beginning of the 1980s (and before), there were numerous cases of Turkish citizens, who, because of their political activities abroad, lost their passport – becoming illegal aliens and sometimes being forced to apply for asylum in the receiving country where they had already been living for years. People suffering from this type of ‘passport harassment’ included trade union activists, dissidents supporting political parties and movements banned in Turkey and those whom the Turkish authorities wanted to force to return to Turkey to complete their military service. Although the ‘passport harassment’ did not take place on a large scale, it reinforced the hostility between the consulates and the left-wing movements in Germany. The suspicion with which the consulates were regarded was confirmed by the frequent rumours concerning the work of the Turkish Secret Service (MIT) through the consulates as well as the
Eva Østergaard-Nielsen 95
branches of the Turkish Directorate for Religious Affairs. For instance, in 1990, a diplomatic crisis was triggered after a claim on the German television channel ARD’s programme Panorama that thirty MIT agents were working undercover in Germany as officials at the consulates. According to Panorama, two such agents had tried to force a young man in a pub in Hamburg to be an informer. It suggested further that MIT generally worked to include members of religious, nationalist, or political groups in their ranks. Fifteen Turkish diplomats were expelled from Bonn, and later Ankara retaliated by expelling eight German diplomats on the grounds that they ‘were tied up in activities not related to their mission’ – that is, they were accused of being intelligence officers as well.34 Thus, while Turkey views the work of dissident movements in Western Europe as strengthening dissident forces inside Turkey, and damaging Turkey’s image in Western Europe, the instruments and leverage with which Turkey may control political dissidence abroad are relatively limited.
Conclusion Turkish citizens in Western Europe (and the USA and Canada) are being urged to integrate and obtain the citizenship of their receiving country, but, at the same time, are being admonished never to forget their homeland. The gradual accommodation of the Turkish administration and electoral system to include Turkish citizens residing outside of Turkey follows Ankara’s realization that these citizens are no longer ‘remittance machines’ but ‘Euro Turks’, who are unlikely to return. The largely economic project of labour export on a rotational basis has been supplemented by a largely political project of tying these citizens back in with the state. While these reaching-out efforts clearly have an economic dimension in so far as remittances and foreign investment are still a very welcome contribution to the ever-fragile Turkish economy, the foreign policy dimension of the relationship between Ankara and its overseas nationals is of significance. The over three million Turkish citizens living within the EU reside in a region with which Turkey has an important and highly coveted relationship. Therefore, a Turkish lobby, particularly in EU member-states, may constitute a powerful advocate for Turkey’s interests in Western Europe. Moreover, the concern about discrimination against Turkish citizens in Western Europe which Turkey’s leaders have shown is inseparable from the bilateral and multilateral relations between Turkey and the EU. In Turkey, exclusion of Turkish citizens
96 Turkey and the ‘Euro Turks’
from host-societies is seen in tandem with the exclusion of Turkey in the EU. Both are illustrations of the EU as a ‘Christian Club’ with no room for Turkey or its emigrants already living within the EU. Similarly, Turkish leaders have been quick to make parallels between discrimination against Turkish citizens, in particular, in Germany, and the human rights deficit in Turkey. Nevertheless, while Ankara’s changing perceptions of its citizens abroad are interesting in and of themselves, it is important not to overstate the effectiveness of the policies directed at these citizens. First of all, these perceptions are not easily translated into political agency. Indeed, the case of Turkey illustrates that the relationship between sending states and emigrants is often ambiguous. Turkish bureaucratic practices are not easily coordinated or streamlined, and the complexities of transnational electoral law are difficult to implement to the satisfaction of both German and Turkish authorities. These processes are further complicated by the fact that ‘Turkey’ is not a unitary actor. Different political parties have their own perceptions, links and agendas vis-à-vis Turkish citizens abroad. While some promote their party political agendas abroad other policy-makers take note of the fact that host-country authorities regard Turkey’s political relations with its citizens abroad as highly counterproductive to their integration. At the level of the state and government institutions, the mobilizing measures are changing from being reactionary to being more pro-active. Still, policies are as much about controlling as mobilizing emigrants’ and refugees’ engagement in Turkish politics. Pro-Turkish sentiment is promoted in a range of ways, including the media and diplomatic representations, but actual calls for lobbying are met with scepticism among migrant organizational leaders abroad. Generally, Turks and Kurds abroad are by no means remote-controlled by the Turkish state. And for those already critical of the Turkish political regime, the image of the controlling state casts a long shadow of mistrust on the image of the mobilizing state.
Notes 1 Parts of the material and argument in this chapter have previously been published in Østergaard-Nielsen (2003b), in particular pp. 107–21, and are here reproduced with the kind permission of Routledge. 2 The change in semantics from ‘our workers living abroad’ (yurtd¹¸s¹nda yas¸ayan is¸cilerimiz) to ‘our citizens living abroad’ (yurtd¹¸s¹nda yas¸ayan vatandas¸lar¹m¹z) is not entirely consistent when looking at parliamentary debates and newspaper articles between 1980 and 2000. However, there is a trend towards mainly
Eva Østergaard-Nielsen 97
3
4
5
6 7
8
9
10 11 12 13
14 15
16
17 18 19
referring to them as ‘citizens’. Another much used term is ‘gurbetçi’, meaning those who live in foreign countries. The website of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs puts this figure at 3.9 million with 3.5 million living in Western Europe (see http://www.mfa. org.tr). Turkey signed its first labour exchange agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1961, followed by similar agreements with the Netherlands, Austria and Belgium in 1964, with France in 1965, and with Sweden in 1967 (Abadan-Unat, 1995: 279). UNHCR, Population Data Unit: Asylum applications submitted in the European Union: top 10 origins, 1992–2001, http://www.unhcr.ch (accessed September 2002). Interview by author with Diyanet, Ankara, 29 July 1998. Ministry of Education, Republic of Turkey (T.C. Millet Eg„ itim Bakanl¹g„ ¹), Information on Teachers Abroad (in Turkish). Online. Available HTTP: http: www.meb.org.tr (30 November 2001). The Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM), ‘Question to the State Minister on the application of dual citizenship’, 20/63, 23 January 1998, Ankara. Interview by author with representative from Copenhagen Municipal Council, January 2000, Copenhagen. Note that dual citizenship is in principle not tolerated by Danish authorities but that it has been common practice for Turks to keep their Turkish citizenship anyway. TBMM, ‘Report on our workers working abroad’, 19:883, 28 July 1995, Ankara. Ibid. TBMM, ‘Report on the diplomatic representations abroad’, 20:242, 27 February 1997, Ankara. At the outset, part of this construction was a ‘High Commission’ (Yurtd¹¸s¹nda yas¸ayan vatandas¸lar üst kurulu), consisting of the prime minister, the foreign minister, and state minister responsible for citizens living abroad. This construction is intended to allow for swift legislative changes if the citizens abroad have a certain pressing need. Interview by author with the State Ministry, 6 July 1998, Ankara. Ministry of State, Republic of Turkey (T.C. Devlet Bakanl¹g„ ¹), ‘Information about High Commission and Consultation Commission for citizens living abroad’, 17 July 1998, Ankara. More than 20-page-long briefing material on the Cyprus issue printed especially for members of the Consultation Commission was handed out to author during interview with representative from State Ministry, 18 October 2000, Ankara. Ministry of State, Republic of Turkey, ‘Personnel and principles for Consulation Commission for citizens living abroad’, 1998, Ankara. Hürriyet, 17 July 1998; Sabah, 17 July 1998; and own observations at inaugural meeting 16 July 1998. This figure is based on the number of Turkish citizens above 18 years of age in Germany by the end of 1999, the electorate in Turkey in the general elections in April 1999 (ZfT 2001), and the fact that the Turkish parliament consists of 550 parliamentarians.
98 Turkey and the ‘Euro Turks’ 20
21
22
23 24 25 26
27 28 29 30
31 32 33 34
State Statistical Institute (1996) (T.C. Bas¸bakanl¹k Devlet Istatistik Enstitüsü), Milletvekili Genel Seçimi Sonuçlar¹, reports for 1996 and 1999, Ankara: Devlet Istatistik Enstitüsü. TBMM, ‘On changes in law on political parties’, 17/26, 26 March 1986, Ankara; and TBMM, ‘On changes in law on political parties and election laws’, 19/95, 26 October 1995, Ankara. Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Briefwahl des in Deutshland lebenden Türken bei der geplanten türkischen Parlamentswahl am 24 December’, Drs 13/3352, 11 December 1995, Bonn. Both parties originate in the former Virtue Party (FP) and before that the Welfare Party (RP). Interview by author with national assembly deputy for ANAP, 23 October 2000, Ankara. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey, Turks living abroad. Online. Available HTTP: http://www.mfa.org.tr (30 November 2001). Interview by author with national assembly deputy for DSP, 20 October 2000, Ankara. Armenian and Greek lobbies pertain to two historically rooted conflicts which manifest themselves in the diaspora. The Greek lobby, in particular in the US, has tried to influence US policy against Turkey because of the historical territorial disputes (Cyprus and the Aegean islands) between Greece and Turkey. This was particularly the case in the 1980s, but persists until this day (see Constas and Platias 1993). The Armenian lobby, notably in the US and France, wants government and international institutions (like the European Parliament) to recognize and condemn that a genocide took place against Armenians in the Ottoman Empire in 1915–16. The work of both lobbies is the concern of Turkish authorities who try to publicize and promote their version of these events to both Western governments and Turkish communities abroad. Interview by author with national assembly deputy for ANAP, 6 December 1996. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 17 October 1998. Hürriyet, 16 December 1994. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 17 October 1998. Some Turkish press in Germany has local correspondents and journalists and publishes separate ‘European pages’ covering events throughout Europe which are only distributed outside of Turkey. Besides Hürriyet there are much more moderate newspapers as well as critical newspapers such as Evrensel or indeed newspapers such as the proKurdish Özgür Politika which is only published outside Turkey. Hürriyet, however, dominates the European market with as many daily copies as all other newspapers together. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 19 August 1998. Interview by author with Milli Görüs¸, 13 October 2000. Welt, 21 August 1998. Tageszeitung, 4 April and 21 April 1990.
5 Overseas Filipino Workers: Sacrificial Lambs at the Altar of Deregulation Mary Lou L. Alcid
The Philippines and Mexico are the top labour-exporting countries in the world. But while Mexico’s workers are land-based and concentrated mainly in the United States, the estimated 7.29 million Filipino landand sea-based workers abroad are spread out in more than 180 countries and destinations (Kanlungan Centre Foundation 2000). These workers constitute more than 10 per cent of the total Philippine population and at least a fifth of its labour force. San Juan (1998) describes this situation as the ‘unprecedented Filipino diaspora, a phenomenon analogous not to the Jewish but to the African and Chinese dispersal around the world’ (San Juan 1998: 2). This diaspora has become a vital social concern, mainly due to the country’s loss of its professionals, and skilled workers, the adverse impact on the family (e.g. children growing up without fathers or mothers or both), and the problems arising from the fact that ‘in the racially stratified or ethnically segmented labour market of the United States as well as the rest of the world, Filipinos occupy the lower strata, primarily in service occupations such as food, health, cleaning … .’ (ibid: 9). Such problems include de-skilling, racist and discriminatory laws and policies in the receiving countries, and violations of overseas workers’ human and labour rights. Overseas Filipinos who leave mainly for economic reasons fall under two general categories: (a) emigrants (population: 2.37 million), that is, those who go abroad for permanent residence, mainly in the United States of America; and (b) migrant workers (both documented and undocumented), referring to those who have gone abroad for contractual, temporary employment. Documented migrant workers are estimated by the Commission of Filipinos Overseas (CFO) to number 2.98 million 99
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while there are 1.94 million undocumented ones. Undocumented workers, in the eyes of the Philippine government, are those who leave the country for work abroad without the government-issued Overseas Employment Certificate, or are working abroad after their visas have expired. As of July 2002, Filipino women comprised almost three-quarters of the land-based workers.1 They are concentrated in the service sector as domestic workers and caregivers in countries such as Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Italy, and in the entertainment industry of Japan, Brunei, Malaysia and Cyprus. This trend reflects the growing feminization of the labour export industry. With annual remittances averaging US$6,359 billion from 1999 to 2001 (Kanlungan Centre Foundation 2001), overseas Filipinos are the single biggest source of foreign currency for the country.2 They have kept the economy afloat, serving as buffer to economic and financial crisis. In 1999, they remitted a total of US$6,794 billion through official channels, a 38 per cent increase from the previous year’s US$4.9 billion (Kanlungan Centre 2000: 19). The net remittances in 1999 contributed 0.9 percentage point to the 2.0 per cent growth of total Gross National Product (GNP). It is because of their remittances that former President Corazon C. Aquino (1986–92) hailed overseas workers as Bagong Bayani (New Heroes), while incumbent President Gloria M. Arroyo calls them ‘Overseas Filipino Investors’, stressing their potential as investors. Yet no Philippine government has offered any real incentives and benefits for overseas Filipinos to invest in the country. At the provincial or town level, there is also hardly any government support for families of overseas workers to engage in entrepreneurial activities aimed at developing the local economy. Moreover, despite their significant contributions to the Philippine economy, overseas Filipinos – both emigrants and migrant workers – have yet to receive commensurate government recognition and protection. They remain politically disenfranchised as Congress has still not enacted a law granting them the right to suffrage. Overseas Filipinos, in particular the more established diaspora in the USA, have been lobbying for legislation which allows them to hold dual citizenship and the right to vote in national elections in the Philippines for many years. Politicians from different parties, including President Arroyo during her meetings with migrant organizations in the USA and Southeast Asia, have pledged to support these measures. However, although absentee voting was made legal in the 1987 Constitution, Congress has yet to enact an enabling law because of logistical hurdles and domestic
Mary Lou L. Alcid 101
opposition. Those in opposition argue that dual citizenship would create divided loyalties and give emigrants rights without corresponding responsibilities. In a later development, the appropriate bills were introduced to the Philippine Congress in 2001, but they have not yet become law.3 Consequently, migrant workers, in particular, are in an especially precarious situation as the Philippine government enforces the policy of deregulation of the labour export market. This chapter focuses on Filipino migrant workers. It examines how the Philippine government, within the framework of neoliberal globalization, proactively and systematically facilitates the globalization of Filipino labour while paradoxically leaving workers’ rights and protection to the vagaries of market forces. It argues that the current policy of deregulation is not only premature; it also exacerbates the commodification of Filipino migrant workers, especially women, as the government sacrifices workers’ rights to global competitiveness.
More than a century of Filipino overseas labour migration Filipino overseas labour migration has been traced to as early as 1565 when Filipino seafarers were recruited to work in foreign ships plying the Manila–Acapulco trade route. In the nineteenth century, some welloff Filipino patriots such as the national hero Jose Rizal escaped to Europe in the face of political persecution by the Spanish colonial government. From there, they continued to wage their campaign for social and political reforms in the motherland (Samonte et al. 1995). However, the year 1900 is deemed as the official start of the deployment of Filipinos for overseas employment (Philippine Overseas Employment Administration 2002). Spain had just ceded the Philippines to the United States of America after three centuries of colonial rule. The impoverishment of the population was aggravated by the Philippine–American war (1898–1902), as well as the free trade policies that promoted export-oriented agricultural production, and made the Philippines a market for American surplus goods. There was also a shortage of agricultural workers in the sugar and pineapple plantations of Hawaii, and in the fruit orchards and canneries in the United States mainland, which opened the way for the importation of foreign workers from US colonies. The Hawaii Sugar Planters Association recruited the first batch of 200 predominantly male Filipino workers in 1908. The workers were exempt from US immigration rules, because the Philippines was a US colony then. Thousands of other workers followed, so that by 1934, at least
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120,000 Filipinos were working in Hawaiian plantations. At one point, Filipinos comprised 70 per cent of the labour force of the plantations. The Filipino plantation workers in Hawaii were described as ‘severely exploited and confined to squalid barracks’ (San Juan 1999: 1). They joined Japanese, Chinese and other nationalities in a series of militant strikes in 1920 and 1924 (ibid). The migrant workers who left between 1900 and 1945 are invariably referred to as the first wave of migrants. They were concentrated in Hawaii and California. The majority were single, male farmers from Northern Luzon. They had the option to stay in the US for good or to return to their motherland. Despite the racism and discrimination they experienced, ‘poverty, ill health and demoralization’ forced the majority to stay on, with some moving on to the US mainland (San Juan 1998: 22). They subsequently facilitated the immigration of family members. The second wave of migrants spanned the years 1946–70. The US remained the top country of destination. Despite the US government’s national origin quota system allowing only 50 Filipino workers into the US annually, the Hawaii Sugar Planters Association (HPSA) in 1946 managed to bring in 7,000 Filipino workers. HPSA only had to show proof that there was a labour shortage. US military facilities in Guam, Okinawa and the Wake Islands also recruited Filipino workers for rehabilitation and construction work in the aftermath of the Second World War. Years later, the US was among the traditional immigration countries that changed their selection criteria for immigrants in favour of skilled and professional workers (Lycklama 1994). Thus, unlike the first wave, Filipino migrant workers during this period were professionals, usually in the medical field. Nurses comprised the biggest number of medical professionals deployed abroad. By 1975 more than 250,000 Filipinos had migrated to the US, resulting in the emergence of ‘brain drain’ as a national concern. The Philippines was virtually subsidizing the health care of other countries. It invested in the education and training of medical professionals only to export them. The exodus of doctors and nurses to foreign shores continues to the present. The third wave of labour migration came about as an offshoot of the labour shortage in oil-rich West Asian countries, particularly in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The construction industry was among the top importers of Filipino workers. The Department of Labour and Employment (DoLE) records show that 3,694 workers were deployed in 1969. Fourteen years later, the number had ballooned to almost half a million. In the 1980s, the demand for labour in West Asia was complemented by the demand for service workers, specifically domestic
Mary Lou L. Alcid 103
workers in Hong Kong, Canada, Singapore and European countries. Unlike the first two waves, the third wave of migrants did not have the option to stay on in their countries of origin. They were migrant guest workers, that is, contractual workers who had to go back to the Philippines after completion of their employment contract. Since the 1970s, the number of migrant workers has increased geometrically. From the annual deployment of 1,863 workers in 1971, the number grew to 47,835 in 1976, 434,207 in 1983, 719,602 in 1994 and 866,590 in 2001. Recent statistics released by the DoLE show that from 1 January till 15 April 2002, a total of 280,882 were deployed abroad.4 This means a daily average of 2,748 workers as against only 2,551 for the same period the previous year. If this continues, the government will not have any difficulty meeting, even surpassing, its minimum annual target of deploying a million workers overseas. In the 1990s the main destinations of labour migration changed from West Asia in the 1970s and 1980s to East Asia, particularly Taiwan, Japan, Hong Kong and South Korea, and Southeast Asia (Malaysia and Singapore, Brunei). Thus, the top 10 destinations in 2001 were Saudi Arabia, Hong Kong, Japan, the United Arab Emirates, Taiwan, Singapore, Italy, Kuwait, the United Kingdom and Brunei.5 Filipino labour migration to these countries is characterized by a dominance of women in domestic work, care-giving, nursing (United Kingdom) and entertainment ( Japan and Brunei). Indeed, since the 1990s, Filipino overseas labour migration may be characterized as being increasingly feminized, and dominated by jobs in the service sector (specifically domestic work and care-giving). In 1987, women comprised only 47 per cent of land-based workers. As of July 2002 they constituted 73 per cent of annual legal labour deployment of land-based workers.6 The 1990s also saw an increase in irregular or clandestine labour migration, as Filipino workers leave without a work permit, with falsified travel documents, and through human smuggling. This situation is a function of the restrictive immigration policies of labour-receiving countries and the emergence of private recruitment agencies as a dominant force in the transnational labour export industry that can operate even independently of the states. Despite labour shortages, countries such as Japan, and the newly industrialized South Korea and Taiwan, until recently, refused to officially allow the entry of foreign workers. But there has been tacit tolerance for clandestine workers, with occasional arrests and deportations. Nevertheless, the president of an association of private recruitment agencies attributes the rise in clandestine migration to what is perceived
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to be an over-regulated industry. He avers that even legal recruitment agencies have had to circumvent the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) regulations and red tape to be able to efficiently respond to the demand for Filipino workers and thus stay in business. The POEA agrees that the labour export industry is indeed weighed down by regulations. Hence, among other reasons, there is now a move to deregulate labour export.
A structural overview of the labour export industry According to Rosewarne (1998) ‘labour migration reflects the failings of the domestic economy’ (Rosewarne 1998: 4). This is true in the Philippine case. The Philippine economy has remained stagnant, heavily indebted, export-oriented and import-dependent after 21 years of implementing the structural adjustment programmes of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The National Statistics Office April 2002 Labour Force Survey showed an increase in the unemployment rate – from 13.3 per cent in April 2001 to 13.9 per cent.7 The under-employment rate also grew from 17.5 per cent in April 2001 to 19.26 per cent a year later. The situation is such that a recent survey by the magazine Pulse Asia showed that one out of five Filipinos would opt to go abroad if the opportunity arose.8 And no less that President Gloria Ma