International political science review, vol. 22, no. 2 (Apr., 2001). Paradigm shift: from rational choice to perspective

Paradigm Shift: From Rational Choice to Perspective Kristen Renwick Monroe International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique, Vol. 22, No. 2. (Apr., 2001), pp. 151-172. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0192-5121%28200104%2922%3A2%3C151%3APSFRCT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique is currently published by Sage Publications, Ltd..

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international Political ScienceReyim (2001),Vol22, No. 2, 151-172

Paradigm Shift: From Rational Choice to Perspective

ABSTRACT. Rational choice theory can be replaced as the leading paradigm in political science by the theory of perspective, which argues that how we see ourselves in relation to others sets and delineates the range of options actors find available, not just morally but empirically. The author begins by discussing the basic assumptions underlying the theory of rational choice or rational action, discusses the main criticisms of the theory, and argues that these criticisms, when taken in conjunction with rational choice theorists' response to them, provide us with a classic Kuhnian example of a paradigm in stress. The author then argues that the debate over rational choice has become unnecessarily acrimonious because of the lack of a viable alternative theoretical structure. Political psychology can provide such an alternative in a theory of perspective on self in relation to others, and she suggests several ways in which this theory will need to be developed as it grows and expands in the manner described by Kuhn. She concludes that rational choice works well for certain kinds of political phenomena, but does not work in all circumstances. The discipline's attention should now focus on trying to understand and to specify the conditions under which rational choice theory will apply, and on distinguishing them from situations and conditions under which perspective may provide a more valuable theoretical framework. Keywords: Paradigms

Perspective theory Political psychology Rational choice theory

My central thesis can be stated succinctly: rational choice is a paradigm under stress, one whose dominion continues because no satisfactory alternative theory has been offered. In this article I present such an alternative, one drawn from political psychology and focusing on identity. I call this a theory of perspective. The theory suggests our perceptions of ourselves in relation to others effectively delineates and sets the domain of options we find available. I argue that rational choice can effectively be treated as a subset of a theory of perspective. 0192-5121 (2001/02) 22:2,151-172; 016355 O 2001 International Political Science Association SAGEPublications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)

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The article is organized in three sections. In the first section, I define what I mean by rational choice theory or rational actor theory-I shall use the terms interchangeably-and summarize the theory's main assumptions. In the second section, I discuss the main criticisms of the theory and argue that these criticisms, when taken in conjunction with rational choice theorists' response to them, provide us with a classic Kuhnian example of a paradigm in stress. In the final section, I argue that the discussion over rational choice has become unnecessarily acrimonious because of the lack of a viable alternative theoretical structure. Political psychology can provide such an alternative, however, and I present one example of an alternative theory, the theory of perspective on self in relation to others. I conclude by suggesting ways in which this theory will need to be developed as it grows and expands in the manner described by Kuhn.

Origins and Central Assumptions

Intellectual Origins in Economic T h e q Rational actor theory originated in the classical microeconomics of Adam Smith.' In its purest form, it refers to behavior by an individual actor-a person, a firm, or a political entity-designed to further the actor's perceived self-interest, subject to information and opportunity costs. The genius of Smith's invention-the market mechanism, regulated by an invisible hand--solved a problem that had troubled philosophers since Hobbes made his famous argument that there was one basic human nature and that this nature was self-centered: how can a society of selfish citizens produce collective welfare without authoritarian government?' Smith's answer provided a venue through which the pursuit of individual welfare could result in collective well being. Smith did not intend to describe political behavior. Indeed, he found clear and important reasons why his economic approach would not explain political action. As Smith's work was revised, however, especially during the marginalist revolution in economics, the broader philosophical context of his political economic thought became less salient and economists introduced other, often more technical, meanings into their basic conceptualizations of rational action (Whitehead, 1991).

Distinguishing a separate specialty of rational choice within the general field of rational actor theory is difficult because the term "rational choice theory" is so frequently used interchangeably with "rational actor theory." Rational choice theory might most aptly be applied to Simon's reformulation of rational actor theory since it refers more properly to a decision-making process rather than to actions themselves. But many analysts working in the field do not make this distinction and use the two terms simply as verbal alternatives. During the middle part of the twentieth century, rational actor theory blossomed into the subdisciplines of rational choice, public choice, and social choice theory. Public choice theory emphasizes the way in which decisions are made through non-market mechanisms.' Social choice theory originated in the attempts by welfare economists and mathematicians to develop a formal, axiomatic, and deductive method for analyzing the problems of social decision-making. It focuses on the rules by which individual preferences are

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aggregated. Typical problems concern the intransitivity of preferences and the construction of formal models of political phenomena, such as voting systems and justice. Its concern with social welfare gives it a strong normative ~ o n t e n t . ~ As rational actor theory gave birth to the above-mentioned subspecialties, it also expanded its range of topical purview. There was widespread dissatisfaction with behavioralism's treatment of the mind as the mysterious "little black box" into which inputs disappeared and outputs emerged, and social scientists yearned for a theory that described the psychological process by which decisions were made and inputs processed, (see Almond, 1991; Easton, 1997.) By the 1970s, rational actor theory had developed into one of the dominant paradigms of social science, precisely because it offered insightful, rigorous and parsimonious explanations of this process. Analysts used the theory to explicate socio-political phenomena as diverse as voting (Downs, 1957), coalition formation (Riker and Ordeshook, 1973), peasant revolts (Popkin, 1979), group formation and interactions (Olson 1965, 1982), law (Posner, 1973), and discrimination and marriage (Becker, 1976). In the last thirty years, rational actor theorists have expanded their original political concerns from arenas such as voting, where it could easily be argued that individual preferences could be aggregated to express the common good, and turned to political puzzles where the economic approach might not appear so immediately relevant. The role of institutions (Fiorina, 1989; Shepsle, 1979; and Weingast, 1979), and norms and culture (Axelrod, 1984, 1986), were introduced into rational models and analysts have moved from applications within postindustrial democracies to broader forms of comparative analysis (Bates, 1988; Levi and Cook, 1990; North, 1990).

Key Assumptions Throughout this process, distinctions over the definition of the basic concept b l ~ r r e d In . ~ addition to its original meaning, rational action came to refer to the crude pursuit of material self-intere~t,~ to utility maximization,' to purposive behavior,' and to goaldirected b e h a v i ~ r .Even ~ allowing for this difference in usage, however, it is possible to identify seven key assumptions that tend to underpin the theory. (1) Actors pursue goals; (2) these goals reflect the actors' perceived self-interest; (3) behavior results from a process that actually involves (or functions as if it entails) conscious choice; (4) the individual is the basic actor in society; (5) actors have preference orderings that are consistent and stable; (6) if given options, actors choose the alternative with the highest expected utility; and (7) actors possess extensive information on both the available alternatives and the likely consequences of their choices. The traditional rational actor is thus an individual whose behavior springs from individual self-interest and conscious choice. He or she is credited with extensive and clear knowledge of the environment, a well-organized and stable system of preferences, and computational skills that allow the actor to calculate the best choice (given individual preferences) of the alternatives available.

Critiques, and a Paradigm under Stress

Bounded Rationali~ The first criticisms of this approach focused on the extent to which rational actor

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theory contains "no discussion about the nature of actors' particular preferences. It assumes little about the way in which actors make probability estimates of uncertain events. It assumes that actors choose the alternative with the highest expected utility, defined as the average of the utilities of all alternatives, each weighted by the probability that the outcome will ensue if the alternative in question is chosenn (Simon, 1984: 296). Because of these concerns, Simon developed what he called bounded or procedural rationality, a concept so quickly incorporated by most rational actor theorists that it might also be classified as a different variant of the basic theory.'0 Like traditional rationality, bounded rationality posits that behavior results from individual actors consciously choosing to pursue their perceived self-interest. Its inception in cognitive psychology, however, and that subfield's reaction against behaviorism, results in bounded rationality placing greater emphasis on culture, history, and context, and less on the external situation surrounding an actor. Bounded rationality's emphasis on mental representations or schemata makes rational choice as a method only as effective as the actors' decision-making and problem-solving means permit. To judge whether an act is rational according to bounded rationality, we need to know the chooser's goals, conceptualization of the situation, and abilities to draw inferences from the available information. Bounded rationality's emphasis on process-not outcome-makes it analogous to the legal concept of procedural due process, which asks whether the procedure that led to the result was fair, rather than whether the outcome itself is fair. This emphasis stands in contrast to the traditional economic concept of rationality, which stresses rational outcomes, that is, outcomes occumng not necessarily from a rational process but as if they had resulted from that process (Friedman, 1953). While it retained the four foundation assumptions (individualaction, pursuit of goals, conscious choice, and self-interest), bounded rationality differs from the traditional economic concept of rationality at several critical junctures. (1) Simon assumed actors possess limited computational abilities. For bounded rationality theorists, rational behavior is adaptive within the constraints imposed both by the external situation and by the capacities of the decision-maker; (2) it assumed uncertain and limited information, and that actors search for alternatives, consequences, and information selectively and incompletely; (3) Simon's concept of satisficing suggests decisions are reached once a satisfactory alternative is found; this alternative need not be the optimal one, merely one that satisfies some minimum requirement of the actor; (4) predicting behavior requires extensive supplemental knowledge of the actor, particularly the actor's goals and conceptual orientation to the world. This requirement stresses the cognitive component of decision-making; (5) process, not outcome, is stressed." Simon's bounded rationality is but the best-known illustration of work utilizing findings from cognitive and motivational psychology to explain political choices and decision-making. Such research consistently shows that people do not respond as specified in the traditional theory of rational choice when they form their preferences, process information, or select memories relevant to the decision-making process underlying political choice. Ironically, political psychology's very success in depicting the rich diversity of this human decision-making process has contributed to the lack of any one alternative model emerging as the counterpoint to the parsimonious model posited by rational choice, which assumes preferences as given and following a single decision-rule.

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General Critiques As rational actor theory became the leading paradigm in social science, critiques inevitably emanated from a wide variety of disciplines." Some criticisms were quite technical, focusing on explicitly stated postulates about human decision-making.13 Other criticisms were more general, attacking what were seen as implied and erroneous claims about a static human nature, particularly one so exclusively self-interested and bound to the individual as its basic explanatory tool.14 In general, criticisms fall into three clusters, in addition to the technical modifications at the intersection of economics and cognitive psychology, illustrated by bounded rationality and discussed above." One, cultural theorists (Almond, 1991; Barber, 1984; Eckstein, 1991; Mansbridge, 1980) argue that the theory ignores limitations on free choice imposed by culture in the form of tradition, institutions, habit, or societally imposed norms.16 They further maintain that the difficulties involved in crosscultural analysis limit the theory's claim to scientific objectivity and mask a Western, individualistic bias; two, empirical challenges from experimental psychology on the existence of preferences, the process by which preferences are pursued, and the evaluation of information in the basic decision-making process suggested that none of these is nearly as consistent or efficient as the rational actor theory posits (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982; Nisbett and Ross, 1980); and finally, three, political scientists pointed out the theory's failures when applied to collective political behavior and altruism (Green and Shapiro, 1994; Monroe, 1996).

Response by Rational Actor Theorists Rational actor theorists who were themselves increasingly critical of specifics within the approach but who sought revision within the general paradigm found themselves with the dual challenge of defending their general approach while seeking to modify its specifics. Notable examples here are economists such as Amartya Sen (1973) and Thomas Schelling (1984), and political scientists such as Robert Bates (1988),Jon Elster (1979, 1986b,c), Russell Hardin (1982, 1995), and Elinor Ostrom (1998). The excitement of all this intellectual ferment carries the richness of conceptual variety; it also entails some conceptual confusion, as rational actor theory now ranges from highly technical axiomatic formalizations to attempts to integrate Marxist and interpretivist theories of culture into the basic rational model.

Kuhn 5 Paradigm There are interesting parallels between the intellectual history of rational actor theory and Kuhn's arguments of the progress of science." Kuhn contrasts a textbook view of science-scientific advancement from gradual piecemeal accumulation of knowledge-with scientific progress characterized by competing paradigms in thought. Kuhn argues that because one paradigm ultimately fails to adequately account for all of the observed phenomena, we find upheaval in the discipline concerned and a revolutionary conceptualization of the phenomenon being studied. The history of rational actor theory follows the pattern described by Kuhn to a remarkable degree. We can understand the advent of rational choice theory as a

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response to behavioralism's failure to deal adequately with the human decisionmaking process, thereby reducing much of thk interesting aspects of political choice to the infamous little black box (Easton, 1997). Much of the emotional intensity surrounding the growth of rational choice theory also can be seen as a normal part of science, rather than something peculiar to rational choice theory. Rational choice theorists were for years cut out of the Academy; they had to be particularly aggressive, metaphorically banging at the doors to gain entry. Once they established a bulkhead, they raised their flag triumphantly. But, again quite naturally if we adopt the Kuhnian view of scientific advance, rational choice theorists had not answered all the questions, had not worked out all the parts of their theory. Once critics raised objections or pointed out important issues left undiscussed or unaccounted for, rational choice theorists humed to deal with these problems. Their response was not some kind of nefarious backpedaling, as critics have often seemed to imply, but rather the normal practice of any scientific paradigm attempting to deal with the challenges presented to it once it becomes a leading intellectual power. What happened, however, as the evidence against the theory continued to mount? Kuhn suggests that theories and their supporting paradigms are not abandoned when contradictory observations are made. Instead, analysts working within the paradigm attempt to redefine the theory, to render precise the specific conditions that account for the anomalous phenomena. Paradigms often survive such contradictory evidence and reworking of relevant theories. As evidence that the rationality paradigm as an approach to understanding man is at this stage, consider just three important developments in rational actor theory. One, Simon's satisficing model was accepted as an important modification in resDonse to the evidence that actors do not always seek to maximize their priferences; two, the growth of the new institutioklism or rational choice's excursions into comparative politics was a recognition that institutions and culture shape the reality within which political choices are made. Bringing in institutional factors as "rules of the game" that set the stage for strategic actors to pursue their desired ends allowed rational actor theorists to apply the paradigm in diverse contexts. But it also highlighted the fact that the rational choice paradigm, to the extent that it leaves preferences determined exogenously to the model, cannot analyze the ways in which institutional change shapes actors' preferences and identities themselve~;'~ and finally, three, rational actor theory's intellectual shifts toward goaldirected behavior and away from self-interest as the heart of the theory should be seen not as an intellectual sleight of hand but rather as an attempt to respond to the overwhelming evidence that collective and altruistic behavior flourishes (Margolis 1982, 1991). As I have argued elsewhere (Monroe, 1991,1996), however, this move may have weakened the theory irreparably insofar as it reduces the heart of the theory to a tautology (Myers, 1983). All this is classic Kuhn, who argues that advances in scientific understanding occur when the anomalies become so overwhelming that it becomes obvious that the paradigm is deficient in certain areas. Repeatedly in the history of science a group of researchers will zero in on the anomalies and make these their center of study. This is precisely what has occurred in the three illustrations mentioned above. Such behavior, taken as a whole, characterizes a paradigm in stress. Given the emotional intensity that has too often permeated the debate over rational actor theory, I want to be very clear on one point. I am not arguing that the rationality paradigm should be discarded entirely. But we should now

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recognize the theory's limitations and focus our efforts on seeking to define those conditions under which the rationality paradigm will work and to distinguish them from conditions in which rational actor theory will have more limited value. Just as Einstein's theory of relativity is inclusive of Newtonian physics, we should expect any alternative paradigm for the study of human beings to include the specification of a set of circumstances under which behavior is primarily utilitymaximizing in the sense described by the rational actor theory.Ig

Perspective: A Viable Alternative Paradigm? Perspective and Political Psychology Ofer Alternative Paradigms What is political psychology and why should we look to it for a new paradigm? Political psychology studies the "patterns of political thinking, feeling, and identity, the interaction of these patterns, and their impact on political choice and other forms of political behavior. All political psychologists.. .share the assumption that human cognition and emotion mediate the impact of the environment on political action" (Stein, forthcoming: 2). It is the obvious discipline to provide an alternative paradigm since rational choice theory was designed initially to describe the human psyche.20We find glimpses of what I call the theory of perspective in many works of political psychology-including my own--even though it has never before been offered as an alternative paradigm. Let me try to capture the essence of perspective as succinctly as rational theory has been stated. In doing so, I focus on explaining political behavior, although I believe the theory also can be usefully applied to other domains of action within social science. Essentially, the theory I propose argues that our perceptions of ourselves in relation to others sets and delineates the range of options we find available, not just morally but empirically. This effectively makes choice a function of identity and, more particularly, our self-perceptions. This theory of perspective reduces rational choice theory to a subtheory, best utilized for certain kind of choicetheoretic situations, specific kind of conceptualizations of the self, and certain research methodologie~.~' Both psychology and economics were conceived in the rich intellectual ferment at the seventeenth-century dawn of the Age of Science, as scholars like Hobbes, Locke and Smith began their attempts to construct a science of politics and political economy and to study, in a more scientific manner, how the human mind works and affects behavior. Rational choice theory itself was born in the fertile period of social scientific advances of the post-World War 11 period, when analogous strides in social science occurred. In contrast, perspective draws heavily on twentieth-century advances in psychological research that provides us with more scientifically verifiable information about the human psyche, information that in turn provides more empirically-grounded answers to questions about the psyche that have occupied philosophers since Plato. Psychoanalytic theories alerted us to the importance of the unconscious and pre-conscious forces that drive behavior (Freud, 1938). Developmental psychology has taught us more about the acquisition of political beliefs and the importance of both genetics and early childhood experiences in shaping our sense of who we are and how we see the world (Winnicott, 1986). Cognitive psychology focuses on our mental processes, including how we first

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interpret the myriad bits of information that bombard us and then weave these strands together into a narrative that allows us to make sense of reality (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). It points us in the direction of how we form beliefs and attitudes and how these perceptions and interpretations about people and events feed back into our interpretation of others' actions (Aronson, 1998; Stein, forthcoming). This interpretation in turn affects our acts. Work on cognitive maps suggests that representations of objects, acts, events, or other actors relate to each other, forming an organizing framework of causes and effects, with positive and negative implications for decision-making, much as a road map gives us an organizing framework for our geographic movements (Axelrod, 1976). Social psychology greatly increased our understanding of how the social environment, especially the behavior of others, influences our behavior, often through perceptions (Taylor, Sears, and Peplau, 1997). Recent work on social perceptions and social cognition underlines the importance of social influences on our behavior (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). The importance of constructs and construals of reality, as cognitive representations and processes basic to all our human responses, cannot be ignored as we seek to understand political actions. Learning theory has increased our understanding of how our present behavior is influenced by prior learning. This cognitive process works through classic forms of political socialization as well as through the kind of Bayesian processes that economists posit. Work in all of the above fields has helped political psychology understand the importance of perception for the complex interrelationships among political choice, political action, and thinking and feeling about politics. The importance of perceptions also is evident through a phenomenon that may not be immediately obvious: political science's recent flirtation with postmodernism.22 While postmodernism may be a natural response to the knowledge that reality is perceived differentially, it also canies serious negatives, and does not, in the long run, offer a fruitful solution for social scientists concerned with this legitimate problem of differential interpretation of a shared reality. Political psychology offers a more productive response, one grounded in a commitment to scientific process (Suedfeld, forthcoming). Consider one illustration of how political psychology can reveal the extent to which there are systematic processes by which reality is perceived differentially. Social representations theory (Moscovici, 1988) suggests that a person's unique experiences lead to a set of individual representations of the world and that these representations, in turn, influence the perception, interpretation and evaluation of incoming information. This theory suggests behavior is highly dependent on the perception of the situation and is influenced by affect and motivation (Bar-Tal, forthcoming; Jenis, 1976; George, 1969). But it allows for this behavior in a way that analysts can hope to eventually discern and understand. It can provide clues about how cultural factors, for example, may shape social representations in consistent and predictable ways for certain groups of people, or perhaps tell us if there are certain ways in which all people perceive reality.23It is this kind of consideration that I have tried to incorporate into my initial formulation of the theory of perspective, and on which I hope others will build as the theory is tested and refined. Let me now suggest ways in which perspective incorporates rational choice theory into a broader framework. This claim can be made best by contrasting the two theories in terms of differences in assumptions and methodologies. Two caveats are in order here: the first, although I conclude that rational actor theory

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can be treated as a limiting case of perspective because perspective allows for a more fully variegated sense of self, both theories have certain weaknesses that must be recognized by the analyst. What is critical for future analysts, I suspect, will be delineating the domain of action for which each theory is best suited and I will, throughout my discussion, suggest questions I believe will facilitate this delineation. Second, since I am effectively arguing that we need to move beyond self-interest in constructing our most basic theories, I concentrate much of my discussion on the different views of the self offered by perspective and rational choice theory. I nonetheless believe the other ways in which perspective differs from rational choice theory may be just as important, even though they are but mentioned briefly here.

Contrasts with Rational Actor Theory Conc@tualization of the SelJ: Self-interest clearly explains much of human behavior. We should not discard this construct as part of our theory of perspective. But we need to recognize that rational theory's limits are exceeded when it is applied to situations in which individual self-interest is not the dominant force behind behavior and that many significant political acts, in particular, fall into this domain. While self-interest can remain a basic part of our political theories, it should be balanced by human needs for sociability, defined as a feeling of belonging to a group or collecti~ity.'~ To understand when and why we pursue self-interested behavior and when we exhibit more public-spirited behavior-surely a question of some concern to political scientists-we must understand the complex linkages between the actor's attempts to further his or her self-interest and an actor's perception of himself or herself in relation to others. Why is individual self-interest sometimes pursued and group interest pursued at other times? The answer may depend on which of the actor's identities is made most salient by external conditions. One way to solve this problem is through an emphasis on framing and social contexts. Such an accentuation responds positively to both the cultural and the cognitive critiques of rational actor theory. Another more basic response, however, is simply to focus on the self as the central pillar of a theory of political behavior. For this reason, I pass over other psychological theories that might profitably be applied to politics and focus on identity theory, particularly the literature on the self in relation to others. I do so because I believe the assumption of self-interest is the heart of economic man (Myers, 1983; Hirschman, 1977). Attempts to shift the emphasis of the theory to goal-directed behavior reduce the theory to a tautology in which behavior emanates from preferences that are, in turn, revealed through behavi~r.'~ The theory of perspective is based on the complexity of the personality and the external factors that draw one particular part of this complex identity into political salience. Perspective assumes that the self is highly complex and variegated, far more so than the simple actor assumed in rational choice theory. Perspective assumes that actors have multiple identities, whose importance varies in response to cultural and situational context^.'^ The key to understanding political behavior would then lie in delineating the actor's constant shift between these identities and the manner in which the actor's perception of his or her identity in relation to others defines the domain of relevant options. To determine when an actor pursues strategies to further individual self-interest

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and when an agent will act to further interests as a member of a group, we must understand how the perception of a critical identity will affect action. Traditional political economists concerned with collective action have argued that individuals join groups because the group mediates resources for that individual or provides side benefits (Olson, 1965).But other forces also determine group memberships (e.g., parental-offspring bonds or socialization). The logic of social and political (as well as economic) competition is often mediated by a group; and the group to which you give allegiance at a particular moment may be determined by the problems you confront at the time and the way you view yourself in relation to others in the group. The marital relationship offers an instructive example. Husband and wife are a couple, a single unit to deal with mutual problems. But during a fight, each conceives of him or herself as an individual with conflicting interests. Political negotiation may resolve many marital arguments, but just as many may be resolved by each actor simply deciding whether to remain a part of the marital group. While an economic calculus may explain part of this group behavior, understanding why the group forms and exists is certainly more complex. To understand group formation, we must focus on how groups mediate interests and then act to replicate successful strategies. In this process, the perception of one's central identity, and the way actors shift between their individual and their group identities, are cru~ial.~' Parsing out the relevant part of the process by which actors shift from individual to group identity necessarily involves our understanding the cognitive frameworks of different actors. This process allows for both internal stability and for changing conditions. It again allows for cultural variations, especially in that most critical variable: the actor's view of the relationship between the individual and so~iety.~' A viable successor to rational actor theory should allow for the complex ties among individuals, groups, and society in general." There is no one magical methodological solution to this problem, but the focus on identity perception seems the right route to pursue, not the least because it will reduce the individualistic bias of rational actor theory, and will allow us to focus on the polity's role in shaping both public and private identities. We thus need to allow for a conceptualization of the self that allows not only for the times when the actor will respond as a self-interested individual but also for those times when the actor conceives of himself or herself as part of a collective or even as an altruist. Doing so will focus us on the individual, rather than on preferences, and will encourage analysts to seek to understand how external stimuli shift our perceptions of ourselves in relation to others. For example, in certain situations Bert may see himself as in conflict with Ernie, and thus presumably will act as the simple self-interested actor. At other times, Bert may see that he and Ernie have collective interests. At others, Bert may even act altruistically toward Ernie. Why? What external conditions alter Bert's basic view of himself in relation to Ernie? And how does that view in turn influence Bert's behavior toward Ernie? Such a conceptualization allows us to draw on the richness of personality psychology, which might in this example help us understand why Bert has an average position along a continuum running from self-interested to altruistic behavior. But this conceptualization also allows us to benefit from work in social psychology, which suggests how environmental factors help shift Bert along different points on this continuum, as one aspect of Bert's identity is selected as more salient than others.'O

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The Impdance of Others. Perspective posits the self as a central conceptual pillar but not as the only pillar supporting the theory. Perspective does not assume the lone actor of social contract theory, ,. an actor that dominates rational choice theory because of its origin in classical economic^.^^ Perspective conceptualizes the individual as the basic actor, but conceptualizes this actor as an individual existing in a social world populated by others whose behavior has direct and profound conseauences on -the actor's behavior. including. " the actor's sense of self. This broader conceptualization allows us to introduce both psychoanalytical and sociological influences, including culture. It draws on social psychological work that seeks to emphasize the affective aspect of the cognitive processes of individuals. It also suggests the important interactive effect of human behavior. Scholars critical of rational actor the^$^ have noted this omission, and rational actor theorists have responded by trying-mostly unsuccessfully-to incorporate these interactive effects into the basic theo~-y.33 Such effects clearly exist, and need to be allowed for in a myriad of ways. Jervis has demonstrated one response to this need in his work on signaling at the international level. He argues persuasively that actors need to pay attention to the cognitive predispositions of the people to whom they are sending signals. If the United States wants to know whether one of its acts will be interpreted as hostile by Russia, it needs to know how it is viewed by Russia. Does Russia have an image of the United States as a country that means well? Or does Russia view the usas a hostile actor? Jervis argues that "whether a promise or a threat will be viewed as credible, it is crucial to understand the perceiver's theories and beliefs about the actor. This shows the psychological naivete of economics-based signaling theories which, although acknowledging the importance of preexisting beliefs, argue that new information is combined with old as specified by Bayesian updating of prior beliefs on the basis of new information" (Jervis, forthcoming: 28-29). Jervis points out that we all do this. We perceive events in light of how we perceive the sender of the signal. "Even what might seem to be the clearest signals will make no impression if the perceiver's mind is made UQ or his focus is elsewhere" (ibid.: 30). This phenomenon occurs at the most intimate level of personal relationshipssuch as the trust we place in others because of their past behavior-as well as in politics at both the domestic and the international We need to ask more about how the behavior of others affects us. Such interactive effects are critical parts of our own perceptions of our self in relation to others. They affect both how we interpret others' behavior, and how we construct our own responses toward others. There is yet a further important aspect of the intermingled relationship of self to others. How do our acts, designed to influence others, affect us in turn, even if these acts originally are designed only to deceive or manipulate others, and thus can be said to be "false" to our sense of who we truly are? Our attempts to influence the behavior of others may end by changing us, as Kurt Vonnegut suggests in Mother Night, or as is depicted in the movie Johnny Brassco. In both these fictional instances, the main character pretends to be something he is not. Vonnegut's Howard W. Campbell, Jr. is- an American spy, posing as a radio propagandist for the Nazis while secretly sending coded messages to the Allies. Johnny Brassco is an FBI agent working undercover with mobsters. In both instances, however, the character ends by becoming what he has pretended to be. Campbell becomes the Nazi's most valued propagandist and Brassco ends

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by committing the horrendous deeds of the mobsters he has been sent to infiltrate. A concept of the self should be the cornerstone of our theory of perspective. But it is important to emphasize the self in relation to others, for all the reasons mentioned above; this is immediately evident when we consider one of the most famous set of experiments in psychology, the Milgram (1974) experiments on authority. Inspired by the belief that Nazism could be explained through German authoritarianism, the experiments ended by revealing the alarming extent to which situational factors can influence most people to obey authority, even when doing so flies in the face of human decency. The Milgram experiments suggest that when we underestimate the power of social influence, it gives us a feeling of false security. (For example, if the Germans were more authoritarian than other nationalities, then Americans would not ever have to worry about committing genocide. But if Milgram's studies were correct, then we must fall back on some other protection against such evils.) Furthermore, by failing to fully appreciate the power of the situational factors, we tend to oversimplify complex situations. Oversimplification decreases our understanding of the causes of a great deal of human behavior. And among other things, this oversimplification can lead us to blame the victim in situations where the individual was overpowered by social forces too difficult for most of us to resist. By emphasizing the individual set firmly within a social context, and by attempting to understand how that context shapes the individual and his or her action, perspective hopes to avoid such errors.

Construals and Percqbtion. Rational choice theorists would argue that we need only spec* the objective properties of the situation, such as how rewarding a particular choice is to the people concerned, and then document the behaviors that follow from these objective properties.35 They thus avoid dealing with issues like cognition and feeling, concepts that are vague, mentalistic, and certainly not sufficiently anchored to observable behavior. But years of work in psychology reminds us that cognition and feeling are, indeed, critical to the human social experience; we thus must allow for them in our theories and models, no matter how challenging their detection turns out to be empirically.36 Doing so responds to the trenchant criticisms of the rational choice approach by scholars such as Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, whose criticisms suggest the importance of heuristics and shortcuts in the basic decision-making process (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982). Other scholars (Ross and Nisbett, 1991) argue that we need to look at the situation from the viewpoint of the people in it, to understand how they construe the world around them. This emphasis on what social psychologists call construals has its roots in Gestalt psychology (Aronson, Wilson, and Akert, 1974). This school originally stressed the importance of studying the subjective way in which an object appears in people's minds, rather than the objective, physical attributes of the object.37Lewin (1943) applied Gestalt principles beyond the perception of objects, to social perception, to ask how people perceive other people and their motives, intentions, and behaviors. Lewin was the first scientist to advocate detecting the perspective of the people in any social situation to understand how they construe-that is, perceive, interpret, and distort-their social environment. Social psychologists now routinely focus on the importance of considering subjective situations, that is, how they are construed by people. Indeed, social psychology is less concerned with social situations in any

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objective sense than with how people are influenced by their interpretation or construal of their social environment. Political scientists need to follow this lead, and ask how people perceive, comprehend, and interpret the socio-political world since this may be more important than understanding the objective properties of the social world itself (Aronson, Wilson, and Akert, 1974: 7). Perspective suggests that we pay a great deal of attention to the origin of people's interpretations of the social world and try to discover whether there are certain recurring patterns in construals for all people, or if particular patterns exist among certain groups, according to ethnicity, religion, gender, and so on." Methodology. Because it is not wedded to a cost/benefit calculus, perspective is less committed to quantitative data than is rational choice theory. Because perspective seeks to understand how the actor views reality, and because the actor's conceptual framework may differ significantly from that of the analyst, the obvious question is how best to discover how different people construe reality! Direct questions posed via survey questionnaires are probably not the best research methodology since people are not always aware of the origins of their own responses (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977) and thus have a limited understanding of their own motives. Instead, the stories people tell that help them organize and make sense of reality and others' behavior-their narratives-are a better tool for revealing the tacit assumptions underlying people's behavior, especially when the actors may not be fully aware of their motives at a conscious If perspective wants to bring in the importance of our view of others, how do we do this? How do we measure the social situation? UTe can turn here to social cognition research, which has developed elaborate techniques to suggest how people think about themselves, about the social world and, more specifically, how people select, interpret, remember, and use social information (Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Nisbett and Ross, 1980). Constructing more systematic measurements of these phenomena will prove exciting new ground for the inquisitive scholar, and I look forward to much innovative methodological research in this area. Reconceptualization of Choice. Rational actor theory is constrained by its overemphasis on conscious choice based on a rank ordering of preferences. Future scholars should broaden the conceptualization of choice, redefining it so that it also includes the following facets as well. (a) Choice as a reflection of self. This facet makes choice a reflection of our entire life experience, a natural outgrowth of who we are. Empirical work on altruism (Oliner and Oliner, 1988; Monroe, 1991, 1996, inter alia) and genocide (Monroe, 1994; Malbon, 2000) found that both genocidalists and rescuers of Jews during Nazi-occupied Europe had no choice in their actions because of the kind of people they were. This phenomenon is not restricted to such extraordinary situations; it occurs at more mundane levels as well. Suppose we are mugged in a town where we know no one to call for assistance. U'hat will most of us do? Even though we know that people mug others to get money-since it has just happened to us-few of us would even consider mugging someone else as an option. Why not? Because it is not something that "people like us" do. Our sense of who we are constrains the options we find available. (b) Nonnative and positive domain. These situations frequently have normative overtones. Indeed, this conceptualization builds on the idea in virtue ethics which,

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beginning with Aristotle, has argued that to understand moral choice you have to understand the entirety of a person's life.40We need to ask whether other, more mundane choices reflect our sense of self. Consider the example of an Olympic figure skater, deciding whether or not to attempt the third twirl of her jump. There is indeed an option concerning the alternative to be followed: whether or not to attempt the third twirl or stop at only two. The choice is probably reflexive, reflecting the years of practice and the skater's instinctive sense of how much momentum she has and whether or not this momentum will cany her through a successful third jump. A sense of self enters this choice (tojump or not to attempt the jump) although in a manner that differs from the moral choices discussed above. While I suspect that many of the situations in which sense of self limits choice will have normative overtones, the skating example suggests they are not limited to the normative domain. (c) Conflicts of core values. A discussion of the normative aspect of choice reminds us of the agonistic choice that drives much moral theory, wherein an actor is tortured by the difficulty of choosing between two options. Do I sacrifice my son in a war to protect my country? Or, at a far less dramatic level, how do I balance the demands of scholarship with those of family? Such choices are often so wrenching precisely because they strike at our most basic sense of self, especially when they reflect unresolved conflicts within our fundamental personality structure. Psychoanalysts have long noted the potent force of such conflicts, suggesting the constructive conce tualization out of these conflicts can provide the driving force behind creativity. These choices also reflect back onto our sense of self. This conceptualization is articulated in literature in Frost's "two roads diverged in the wood, and I took the road less traveled by, and that has made all the difference." In Styron's literary depiction of Sophie's Choice, a woman forced to choose between her two children, eventually kills herself; the choice strikes so deeply at her central core that she cannot live with having been forced to choose. Empirically, cognitive dissonant theorists have built such conceptual intricacies into their basic theory. Cognitive dissonance refers to the feelings of discomfort that occur when Bert, for example, holds two or more inconsistent cognitions and/or when Bert's acts deviate from his stated beliefs, especially when Bert's action is discrepant from his customary, typically positive self-conception (Aronson, Wilson, and Akert, 1974: 91). Originally, theorists thought this dissonance was caused by any two discrepant cognitions (Festinger, 1957; Festinger and Aronson, 1960; Brehm and Cohen, 1962; WicMund and Brehm, 1976). Later work, however, suggests that not all cognitive inconsistencies are equally troubling. Dissonance seems most powerful and upsetting when people behave in ways that threaten their self-images, because such behavior forces them to confront the discrepancy between who they think they are and how they have acted (Aronson, 1968, 1969, 1992, 1998; Aronson, Wilson, and Akert, 1974; Thibodeau and Aronson, 1992; Harmon-Jones and Mills, 1998. See also Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter, 1956; Brehm, 1956; Gilovich, Medvec, and Chen, 1995; Aronson and Mills, 1959; Gerard and Mathewson, 1966.). (d) Choice versus strategy.42Another option may be to deemphasize choice entirely. Explicit choices may well be less important than strategies that lead to successful outcomes. Furthermore, choices need not be conscious. A successful strategy can originate in unconscious choices, emotions, or chance. The conscious element may enter when the success of a strategy is recognized or learned. Even

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learning does not require consciousness, however, although in many cases (perhaps even most), consciousness will exist ex post in recognition of the strategy's successful outcome. While this recognition may be conscious, it need not be; it must be conscious only insofar as it is reproducible in the future, either by the same actor or by another. This approaih posits a close relationship bekeen outcomes and strategies and emphasizes both of these instead of individual choice. Such a treatment would allow for nonconscious forces in behavior (such as emotions and intuition), factors that now have to be introduced exogenously in both traditional and bounded rational models (Damasio, 1999). And it would provide perspective with a vitality that rational choice lost when it de-emphasized the emotionally rich passions in preference for the more sterile, albeit quantifiable, concept of preferences after the Marginalist revolution in economics (Whitehead, 1991). If we design a theory of perspective to include learned strategies that further particular outcomes, rather than just focusing on the process of choice, we also allow a role for culture in replicating the strategy that led to optimization. The critical variables thus would not be the actual decisions and choices taken by an actor but would instead become the outcomes, intended or fortuitous. The critical component of behavior then would be the process of evolving toward some stationary optimal point, not an actual decision itself. In this process, critical distinctions should be made between the long term and the short term. Strategies need not be the best (optimal) at any one particular moment, but they must be good enough to allow the individuals following them to survive, or at least survive long enough to reproduce. Behavior thus need not maximize in the short term, although over the long term it must optimize and do better than all other existing possibilities in order to survive. Optimal strategies, not individual choices, thus would be the key. By emphasizing strategies in addition to choices, then, perspective can allow for strategies that lead through adaptation to survival. Such an approach would incorporate the "muddling through" we all know so well and brings in some of the evolutionary considerations that scholars such as Axelrod (1984) have introduced into their discussions. This approach resembles Simon's (1982) satisficing rather than maximizing behavior, but an emphasis on constant movement and local adaptation would set a theory of perspective apart from bounded rationality's emphasis on the internal process of choice instead of the outcome of a process and the forces that induce action.

Conclusion I have argued that we need to move on, beyond self-interest as the critical driving force behind our political theories and embrace a richer conceptualization of the self in constructing our political theories. This one move will have profound repercussions for social scientific theories of human behavior. As a discipline, political science has wasted too much time debating the merits of rational choice theory, spinning our intellectual wheels in far too fractious a debate over whether rational choice provides the universal theory of human behavior claimed by its more extreme proponents or is merely the ideologically bounded and methoddriven dogma described by certain critics.43Its opponents should accept that rational choice provides a valid and useful theoretical framework for understanding certain kinds of political phenomena, has produced many valuable insights, forced us to consider old topics in fresh ways, and has generated the

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debate necessary to stimulate research illuminating important aspects of political life. Similarly, its defenders should concede that rational choice does not provide a universal theory of political life and that it su£Fers from critical limitations. Let us move beyond a debate grown tiresome to ask what we have learned that may be utilized in the next stage in constructing more realistic theories of political life. In arguing thus, my goal is ambitious. I wish to effect a paradigm shift within political science, away from rational choice theory-arguably the leading approach since the 1970s-and toward a theory in which we understand political actions as a function of how we see ourselves in relation to others. I call this a theory of perspective, and have argued that rational choice is effectively a limiting case of the broader theory, much as Newtonian physics is a limiting case of Einstein's theoretical world. Just as Newtonian physics works well under certain conditions, and as Einstein's physics allows for and specifies the nature of those conditions, so rational choice works well in certain circumstances. But it does not work under all conditions, and our attention should now focus on understanding and specifying the conditions under which the limiting case will apply and distinguishing them from situations and conditions under which it will not. A successor to rational choice has to be a theory about the human psychology if it wants to accurately predict political behavior. The power of rational actor theory comes from the accuracy of its understanding of the human psyche, particularly from the psyche's need to protect and nurture itself. What rational actor theory has omitted, however, is the role of others as firming, nurturing, and validating the self, and validating it in a manner that provides ontological security. Thus the concept of self in relation to others should play a critical part in constructing theories of human behavior. It is this critical factor-noted by Aristotle when he defined man as a social being-which reduces rational choice theory to a limiting case of a broader theory, of the theory of self. Rational choice theory captures only one aspect of this self, the aspect in which we see ourselves in a self-interested mode, and respond accordingly. In presenting my theory of perspective I have tried to allow for the complex nature of humankind. I suggested that our basic identities are intricate and multifaceted, and that what is critical for the analyst seeking to understand political action is to understand which aspects of our identities in relation to others come into play and in response to what outside stimuli. Only by understanding how people see themselves in relation to others can we begin to build a science of politics that allows for the complex interrelationship between the human needs to protect and nurture our self-interest and the needs for human sociability. Political science is a discipline looking for a new paradigm, a discipline ready for a new paradigm. Psychology and identity provide that paradigm through a theory of perspective on self in relation to others.

Notes 1. I have discussed the intellectual origins of rational actor theory more extensively in Monroe, 1991. This book is now out of print and I reproduce the essential argument here since I have received so many requests from scholars unable to obtain the volume. Parts of my discussion of the theory of perspective first appeared in Monroe, 1996. 2. See Mansbridge, 1990 or Myers, 1983 on the role of self-interest in social theory. 3. In economics, it is associated most closely with the work of James Buchanan and the

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Virginia School and in political science with the work of William Riker and the Rochester School of public choice. 4. Within economics, it is associated most closely with the work of Kenneth Arrow (1951, 1984) and Amartya Sen (1984). Its highly technical place within political science has been ensured by analysts such as Gerald Kramer, Peter McKelvey, and Norman Schofield. 5. I will argue in the next section that this is to be expected in the progress of normal science where there are a variety of different assumptions, methods and rules used within the general paradigm (Kuhn, 1962: 42-51). 6. Buchanan and Tollison, 1984: 13; Downs, 1957: 28. 7. Buchanan and Tullock, 1962: 25-30; Buchanan and Tollison, 1984: 13; Arrow, 1963: 3. 8. Riker and Ordeshook, 1973: 10. 9. Riker and Ordeshook, 1973. 10. Indeed, Simon won his Nobel Prize in economics for this work. 11. Emphasis on the decision-making process of the unit analyzed (e.g., person, firm, government) means that the process of decision-making itself, rather than the outcome of that process, is the hallmark of bounded rationality. 12. I focus my discussion on political science since that is the literature with which I am most familiar. 13. See Herbert Simon's early work on bounded rationality and satisficing. 14. See the democratic theorists who stress the polity's ability to transform the self through communal deliberation (Barber, 1984; Taylor, 1987; and Sandal, 1984). 15. Simon's concerns are shared by others (Kavka, 1991) who argue that utility maximization serves better as a heuristic than as a true representation of the human decisionmaking process. 16. See Barry, 1970 or Harsanyi, 1969 on the difference between cultural and rational choice models. 17. See Michael Struett, 1999. 18. See Bates, Johnson, and Lustick, 1997, Tsebelis, 1992 or North, 1990. Other theorists in the new institutionalists camp, who work largely outside the rational choice paradigm, have recognized that much of politics is conflict about institutional rules precisely because these are seen as influencing subsequent behaviors, not just in terms of strategies but by actually changing the ends actors wish to pursue and the ways that actors perceive themselves (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; and Olsen and March, 1989). 19. My interpretation of Kuhn may be overly sanguine, and the scientific enterprise may be more a choice between competing paradigms than the less confrontational route I have sketched above. Kuhn appears to endorse this latter view: "Let us then assume that crises are a necessary precondition for the emergence of novel theories and ask next how scientists respond to their existence. Part of the answer, as obvious as it is important, can be hiscovered by noting first what scientists never do when confronted by even severe and prolonged anomalies. Though they may begin to lose faith and then to consider alternatives, they do not renounce the paradigm that has led them into crisis. They do not, that is, treat anomalies as counter-instances, though in the vocabulary of philosophy of science that is what they are" (Kuhn, 1962: 77). 20. The existence of a viable alternative theory, even though preliminary, seems necessary for scientific advances to occur. "Once it has achieved the status of a paradigm, a scientific theory is declared invalid only if an alternative candidate is available to take its place. No process yet disclosed by the historical study of scientific development at all resembles the methodological stereotype of falsification by direct comparison with nature. The decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept another, and the judgment leading to that decision involved the comparison of both paradigms with nature and with each other" (Kuhn, 1962: 77). 21. These are discussed later in more detail. 22. Since postmodernism includes many different approaches, I should note that what I am objecting to is that aspect of postrnodern thought that rejects the idea of any objective reality. Political psychology accepts that people interpret this reality differentially but

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posits that scholars can nonetheless study these differences in interpretation in careful &d systematic ways. 23. The fundamental attribution error may exemphfy this phenomenon. 24. This reflects the Aristotelian concept of man as a social being. 25. Ironically, Downs himself acknowledges this point in An Economic T h q of Democracy (1957: 6 7 . ) 26. See Elster, 1986a or the vast literature on the self reviewed in Monroe and Levy, 1999. 27. This argument was first advanced in Monroe, 1996. 28. Both traditional and bounded concepts of rationality reflect a post-Enlightenment framework that separates the individual from the collectivity. Interests are not identified this way in many non-Western societies, however; and even in Western society, individuals have conceptualized their relationships with society quite differently in other historical eras. This strict differentiation of the individual from society or critical groups may explain why so many Western decision models, based on individualistic assumptions, often fail to predict behavior outside the Western market system. 29. Ostrom's (1998) work on collective action constitutes an interesting and an important move in this direction. 30. See Batson, 1991; Eisenberg, 1986; and Fogelman, 1994 for discussions of how situational and personality factors influence altruism. 31. This speaks directly to the debate between communitarians and rational choice theorists. See Sandal, 1984; Hardin, 1995. 32. I would class* Jervis's (1976) research as work in this mode. 33. I would class* Axelrod's (1984, 1986) work on the evolution of cooperation as work in this mode. 34. We can easily m o w Jervis's work to illustrate this phenomenon at the level of domestic politics. Consider the Clinton impeachment crisis as an example. Assume that Clinton wanted to encourage other politicians to engage in behavior that was in Clinton's interests. Perceptions are also critical in this kind of strategic game. Clinton was effectively engaged in signaling designed to further his own interests. But what was revealed? How would others have interpreted the signals Clinton sent out? How did Clinton know that Gore, for example, had interpreted Clinton's act as Clinton intended it? Signals can portray a false or a true message or image in electoral politics as at a college mixer or during tense international negotiations. 35. This is not peculiar to rational choice theorists. Behaviorists followed the same tack. For example,John Watson (1930) and B.E Skinner (1938) suggested all behavior could be understood by examining the rewards and punishments in the organism's environment and that there was no need to study such subjective states as thinking and feeling. 36. This has been reinforced by work in neurobiology (Damasio, 1999) suggesting a more significant role for emotions in the making of consciousness. 37. See work by Kurt KO&, Wolfgang Kohler, Max Wertheimer, all Gestalt theorists, or work by Kurt Lewin, the founding father of modem experimental social psychology. 38. For example, when construing their environment, are most people concerned with making an interpretation that places them in the most positive light, as the fundamental attribution error in psychology suggests? 39. See Hirschman, 1977, for a description of how the worldview had to shift before capitalism could come into being. See Patterson and Monroe, 1997, on narrative as a general research methodology, including its drawbacks and limitations. 40. It is a frequent literary device to have action hang on the protagonist's character, a character that makes him blind to the consequences of certain choices or makes other choices less viable. Can we imagine Othello suggesting he and Desdemona go for marriage counseling, for example? 41. See work by Karen Homey (1945) as an example of this approach. 42. I use strategy not in the technical game theoretic sense but as evolutionary biologists utilize the term to refer to routines and procedures. 43. Critics include Green and Shapiro, 1994; proponents include Gary Becker, 1976.

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Biographical Note KRISTENR E M ~ C KMONROE is Professor of Political Science and associate director of the program in political psychology at the University of California at Irvine. Author of the prize-winning The Heart of Altruism (1996), Monroe works at the intersection of political science, political psychology and ethics. Her most recently edited volumes are Empirical Political %my (1997) and the forthcoming Political Psychology. She is currently working on two books suggesting how identity constrained choice during the Holocaust. ADDRESS:Department of Political Science, University of California, Irvine, CA 92697, USA. [e-mail: [email protected]] Acknowledgments. The Earhart Foundation provided generous financial assistance, and Dani Bar-Tal, Martha Crenshaw, Robert Jervis, and Janice Stein graciously allowed me to quote from their manuscripts in my forthcoming edited volume on political psychology. Michael Struett provided research assistance, funded through a generous grant from the School of Social Science at UCI. Finally, I am grateful to Princeton University Press for allowing me to reproduce the argument that originally appeared in The Heart ofAllruism (1996).

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You have printed the following article: Paradigm Shift: From Rational Choice to Perspective Kristen Renwick Monroe International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique, Vol. 22, No. 2. (Apr., 2001), pp. 151-172. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0192-5121%28200104%2922%3A2%3C151%3APSFRCT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A

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Rational-Choice Models of Political Behavior vs. Functionalist and Conformist Theories John C. Harsanyi World Politics, Vol. 21, No. 4. (Jul., 1969), pp. 513-538. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0043-8871%28196907%2921%3A4%3C513%3ARMOPBV%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6 18

Area Studies and the Discipline: A Useful Controversy? Robert H. Bates PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2. (Jun., 1997), pp. 166-169. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1049-0965%28199706%2930%3A2%3C166%3AASATDA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q 29

A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997 Elinor Ostrom The American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 1. (Mar., 1998), pp. 1-22. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28199803%2992%3A1%3C1%3AABATTR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F

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An Evolutionary Approach to Norms Robert Axelrod The American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4. (Dec., 1986), pp. 1095-1111. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28198612%2980%3A4%3C1095%3AAEATN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4

References The Return of the Repressed: Dissonance Theory Makes a Comeback Elliot Aronson Psychological Inquiry, Vol. 3, No. 4. (1992), pp. 303-311. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1047-840X%281992%293%3A4%3C303%3ATROTRD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U

An Evolutionary Approach to Norms Robert Axelrod The American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4. (Dec., 1986), pp. 1095-1111. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28198612%2980%3A4%3C1095%3AAEATN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4

Area Studies and the Discipline: A Useful Controversy? Robert H. Bates PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2. (Jun., 1997), pp. 166-169. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1049-0965%28199706%2930%3A2%3C166%3AASATDA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q

The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making Alexander L. George International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 2. (Jun., 1969), pp. 190-222. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8833%28196906%2913%3A2%3C190%3AT%22CANA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6

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Rational-Choice Models of Political Behavior vs. Functionalist and Conformist Theories John C. Harsanyi World Politics, Vol. 21, No. 4. (Jul., 1969), pp. 513-538. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0043-8871%28196907%2921%3A4%3C513%3ARMOPBV%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6

A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997 Elinor Ostrom The American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 1. (Mar., 1998), pp. 1-22. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28199803%2992%3A1%3C1%3AABATTR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F

Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models Kenneth A. Shepsle American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 23, No. 1. (Feb., 1979), pp. 27-59. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0092-5853%28197902%2923%3A1%3C27%3AIAAEIM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-X

Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science Herbert A. Simon The American Political Science Review, Vol. 79, No. 2. (Jun., 1985), pp. 293-304. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28198506%2979%3A2%3C293%3AHNIPTD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N

A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms Barry R. Weingast American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 23, No. 2. (May, 1979), pp. 245-262. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0092-5853%28197905%2923%3A2%3C245%3AARCPOC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Z

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