International Politics

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

R. K. Pruthi

SARUP & SONS NEW DELHI - 110002

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lnternalionaf Politics

to Reserved 1st Edition - 2005 ISBN 8 I -7625-545-9

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Preface

International Politics has entered a period of pr9foll,nd unsettling change. It is riven by discord, cultural diversity, economic inequality and political fragmentation. Revolution in information technology, regiooalizalian of world economy, transformation in Eastern Europe, new axes of conflict and alignment suggest that the world is on the edge of a new historical epoch. Our lives are increasingly influenced by activities and events happening away from the soc ial context in which we carry on our day~to·day activities and emerging trends and patterns of interaction in global politics reveal the complexity of the contemporary international political order. In thi s complexity and di versity, intense patterns of interact ion, the permeability of the nation state, rapid and cascading change, and the fragility of order and governance, the five characteristics features of the international political system can be understood in proper history perspective is the aim of this book. Effort is made to provide to our readers, the important and innovati ve material on the subject, oriented specially for students and teachers. We take this opportunit y to reco rd our g rateful acknowledgements to the authorities on the subject. Librarians and their staffmcmbers have rendered aU poss ible help, we thank them all.

vi

Co-operation, kindness and hard work of my publisher Shri Prabhat Kumar and his staffmembers have been immense. We sh311 all feel adequately rewarded if our humble labour promotes further thining on the subject and also if our readers find the book

useful for them.

Contents

Prefa ce

,

I.

Towards A New Geopolitics

2.

The Place of Political Science

15

J.

Principles of Government

28

4.

The State

49

5.

Thomas Paine 's Political Writings

74

6.

The Evo lution of the Slate

III

7.

The Rights of Man

129

8.

The Politics of Southem Africa

168

9.

West Asia and the World Order

191

10.

Non-Alignment

208

11.

Changing Contours of World Politics

225

12. The Coming International Order

242

13.

268

International Relations : Concept and Application

14. The United Nations and International Politics Index

295 310

1 Towards A New Geopolitics

'A new era is emerging in the life history of the international system' wrote Saul Cohen after the momentous events of 1989 and 1990. He went on to express his optimism that, following the end orlhe Cold War, the whole system would be able to move to a higher stage of development in 1991 . I

Optimism of this kind is inherent in the hope, frequentlyexpressed since 1989, of the dawning of a 'new order' in which that

confrontation which was the keynote of the Cold War would he replaced by an era in which peace and harmony would prevai l. However, in a paper published at about the same time as that of Cohen, Pierre de Senarclens struck a more sombre note when he observed that 'the international scene is still the place where all the crises. conflicts and relations of domination and violence ... appear in their starkest guise' .l

He observed that what Raymond Aron referred to as 'the state of nature' has periodically prevailed over 'the rule of law' thus upsctting the delicately balanced international system. In the aftermath of the Cold War, a new order with its own particular ' rule of law' is in the course of coming into being, but in many parts of the world the convulsions which have accompanied the collapse of the old order appear also to have produced a reversion to something like a 'state of nature'. In the past, the collapse of one order and its replacement by a new one has normally taken place after a regional or global war, a massive rnal of strength among the powers resulting in profound changes in Ihe geographical distribution of power. As a result of th is, the hierarchy ofi ntemational power relationships

2

buernj:uional Polirics

has been transformed. Some great powers have been toppled from their

dominant positions, others have moved up to replace them, while yet others, once great, have fallen completely out of the power rankings. Whatever may have been the individual motivations for their behaviour, the function of the great powers in relation to the

international system as a whole has been to establish and maintain a degree of order. This they have done both individually within their

particular territorial spheres and collectively through the establishment of a 'concert' of powers, a balance of coercive forces which, for a period at least, has brought stability, or at least the appearance of it. The successful maintenance of a concert of this sort has been dependent upon the continuing good will of all the major participating powers. Should one of the powers seek unilaterally to bring about substantial change, and so challenge the system, the concert will be unable to survive. Challenges of this sort are motivated initially by attempts to achieve positions of primus illter pares within the existing system and, shoul.d such a development prove intolerable to the other powers, to replace the system by a new one centring entirely on the power itself. Such moves constitute bids to attain positions of dominance and they have nonnally been undertaken in certain clearly identifiable geopolitical circumstances.} The effect of this on the international system has been to link together ' the state of nature', that assertion of unrestricted physical power, with 'the rule of law', the curbing of such power. In the European theatre, the response to a bid by one or other of the great powers to attain a position of dominance has usually been the assembling of countervailing force by a coalition of the other powers. This has had the effect of setting limits to the success oftne aspirations of the would-be dominator. The ' newness' of new international orders has thus largely consisted of changes in the geographkal distribution of the centres of power rather than in the nature and disposition of the power itself. The princ ipal objective of the wielding of such power has been the achievement and consolidation of greater territorial control. Paradoxically this situation has had two opposite effects. It has underpinned a kind of ' rule of law' and at the same time it has pennitted resort to a 'state of nature'.

Towards A New Geopolitics

3

The fonner is a consequence of the exercise of authority; the latter of the persistent ri val ries among those who have aspired to exercise it and conflicts with those who have been its objects. It is the tensions which thi s situation has produced which ha ve been responsible for the eventual breakdown of each new order. Each has, in tum, been replaced by one having a different political geography but with the same basic objectives and relying on the same methods for attaining them. Real innovation within the international system entails far more than changes in its spatial patterns. It necessitates a complete shift away from domination to non-domination as the governing principle within it. There have been times and places when non-dominating forms of international organisation have existed. The Hanseatic League, the United Provinces and the Helvetic Confederacy are examples. However, there has not been an overall regional system in which domination, in one form or another, has not been inherent. The relationship of the dominator to the dominated may at times have softened and even come to be virtually imperceptible. Yet, every system has remained fundamentally coercive and the threat of the use of overwhelming physical force to sustain it has been held in reserve. In the periodic transfonnations of the system, those peoples which have been dominated at one period may themselves become dominators in the next. Thus, relief from one domination has signalled not an end of the process but the beginning of a new one. Actual situations of oppression may have been brought to end, but the domination mode has been subsequently resumed. In assessing, from a geopolitical perspective , whether the establishment of an international system based entirel y on nondomination is a realistic possibility, it is necessary to identify that characteristic particular to geopolitical phenomena which has given the political map one essential difference from those maps depicting the other principal anthropo-geographical phenomena. Whil e the spatial distributions of the phenomena of populati on, industry, and commerce have tended to change fairly gradually over periods, oftime, the spatial arrangements of the phenomena depicted by the political map have tended to change fa r more unevenly. Over considerable periods of time the political map has remained relatively static, and thi s fact may give rise to the impression that fairly unchanging and

4

Internarional Politics

even stable situations pertain. However, this illusion of stability has

proved temporary and periods of relative quiescence have been terminated suddenly and explosively. When the dust has settled, the political landscape is seen to have considerably altered, sometimes beyond all recognition, and this fact is reflected in a very different

political map . Thus. while the behaviour of the other anthropogeographicaJ phenomena has usually been gradualist, that of

political phenomena has been catastrophic. It has been less like a river gradually transforming the landscape through which it flows than a quiescent volcano suddenly erupting with the most devastating effects on other terrestrial phenomena in its vicinity. In order to understand the causes of this behaviour, it is necessary to consider further the nature of the geopolitical s urface and the forces which have produced it. The overall effect of the existence of the geopolitical s urface is to segment the phenomena of the other anthropogeographical surfaces so separating them into territorial compartments. The boundaries of these compartments may be impenneable enough to produce distortions in the behaviour of the phenomena located within them. These compartments are the states, and their basic function is.to provide order and protection. The most fundamental concern of the state is to ensure its own self-preservation, and above all this entails safeguarding its territory and the physical bases of its power. A consequence of this is that states possess a built-in propensity to view change with some suspicion . This particularly applies to change which produces alterations, and especially dimunitions, in its size. While extensions of territory are likely to be welcomed, contractions, which have the effect of diminishing available resources and so overall power, are resisted fiercely. The state is thus basically a conservative phenomenon, most particularly in respect of its territorial integrity, and it seeks to consolidate is position through the attainment of a high Icvel of internal hom ogeneity. The most signi fi cant aspect of this is cultu ral homogeneity which is the essence of the concept ofthe 'nation state' . This has been defined as being an attempt to weld 'national community and territorial state imo coextensive e nt ities'.~ It has been frequently expressed anthropomorphi call y by the use of images and icons depicting the state as a person, for instance, John Bull, Marianne. and

Towards A New Geopolitics

5

Uncle Sam. Yet complete 'congruity' of this kind is, in practice, extremely rare and incongrui ty has been far more usual. The state may even have the effect of exacerbating the dissatisfactions of those section s of the population whic h have been margi nali sed by thf' dominant group. Older and more mature states, for instance France, have come to proximate most closely to a situation of congruity in territory and population. The concept of the French ' Hexagon' has come to possess a natural, even sacred, character. Geometry has been invoked to reinforce geography in imparting a sense of morphological rightness, and attempts by foreigners to detach a portion of the sacred territory have been treated as causes for national grief and chagrin. However, in less consolidated states, such as Yugoslavia. the ' national ' character failed to develop and the older nationalities of which the country was composed, such as the Croats and the Slovenes, remained powerful human realities and evoked greater loyalty than the artificially constructed state. With the collapse of communism-that ideological cement which held together many ramshackle political edifices-the underlying internal tensions surfaced and brought about the complete dismembennent of the Yugoslav state. The ' nation-state' nonnally

seeks identification wifh the dominant cultural group as the ' nation ' and in its own defence it appeals to it for support. This it does by invoking the defence of the state, masquerading as 'nation ', from either external or internal perils. It is the c reation of this cultural identity, which has been the most important single factor in state consolidation. In this the state ceases to be merely the local government of one particular segment of territory and enters the realms of the sacred and the mystical. In the defence of its claims to territorial inviolability and invoking divine sanction for its destiny, the sacred soil of the state may need to be enriched with the pure blood of its martyrs. Indeed, blood appears to be the particular ingredient, above all others, which has imparted to the geopolitical surface its singular rigidity. States, said Leopold Kohr, are the products, ' not of nature but This is essentially because they are products of the assertion of the dominance of one section of the population over the others, the geographical expression of this being the control exercised by the core region of the state over its peripheries. The core is both the centre from which political power is exercised and also the centre of the dominant nation. From this combination may arise an ideology tailored to justify offorce '.~

6

International Politics

the destiny of the nation-state on the world scene and the defence of

the values which it claims to espouse. Such defence can easily tum into aggression if further territorial acquisition is deemed to be necessary in the interests afthe state. Above all, an ideology can justify the assertion of dominance over other states and the necessity of reforming the international system to promote this.

'Any system ', writes AJ.R Groom, 'must have the wherewithal to accommodate change and conflict; only by change can a changing environment be accommodated without conflict or catastrophe' ,6 Since the most individual characteristic of the geopolitical surface is its rigidity, together with the instability and violence associated with this, the creation of a genuinely new international order necessitates the 'nonnalisation' of this surface in tenns of the others. The essential prerequisite for this nonnalisation is the introduction ofa capacity for gradual and non·violent change. Kohr maintained that the 'nation states ' being 'artificial structures masquerading as nations' require 'consuming efforts to maintain themselves' and these efforts are directed principally towards the achievement and maintenance of control over the 'real ' nations. Addressing the problems of Europe in particular, he proposed a new political map made up of these 'real' nations. The ' real ' Europe, concealed for so long beneath the strident and chauvinistic colours of the political map, would then at long last show through. A continent would emerge, Kohr asserted, which was made ' up not of artificial imperialist constructs such as France, Spain and Britain but out of the 'real' nations: Brittany, Catalonia, Scotland and so on. This, said Kohr, is 'Europe's natural and original landscape'.' Thi s would be all the more acceptable as an alternative because, by virtue of their smallness if nothing else, these nations would be more likely to advocate associative rather then dissociative means in the solution of international problems. This idea is founded both on the idealistic belief in what Andre Gide described as 'the virtue of small nations' and on the empirical observation that, because of their weakness, small nations are more likely to see themselves as being gainers rather than losers from a successfully functioning internationalism. How does this proposed transfonnational solution address the panicular problem of the singular rigidity of the geopolitical surface?

Towards A New Geopolitics

7

If, as Kohr argued, the new political map would reflect the ' natural and original landscape' then the new surface could prove to be more rather than less rigid. It presents a possible scenario in which an 'eternal' France would be replaced by an 'eternal ' Brittany, Alsace and Languedoc. Likewise, an 'eternal' India could be replace by an ' eternal ' Bengal. Punjab and Kashmir and many 'eternal ' nations might also replace the former Soviet Union. If it is a sustainable argwnent that change must be accommodated, then it·is hardly logical to exclude certain phenomena as being too sacrosanct to be included in this. Indeed, the evidence casts doubt on the automatic virtue of small nations. Small states are by no means immune from aggressive behaviour and consequently from contributing directly to the violence characteristic of the geopolitical surface. After all, the great powers were themselves once small states and their territorial expansion was associated with the presence within them of a particular set of geopolitical characteristics. This spatial equivalent of the aggressive gene nurtured the propensity for territorial expansion.' The central question, then, is not simply about the merits of one particular political map as compared to others. Nor is it a question of one fragile pretence to eternity as opposed to another one. It is how a fundamental change may be made from a rigid geopolitical surface which can be altered only by violent mcans to a dynamic one which incorporates the capacity for non· violent change. Saul Cohen made . the link between the two concepts of small states 'and geopolitical change. As a result of the present tendency towards 'deconcentration of political power' he foresaw a continued 'proliferation' of new states. Important among these were 'gateway states', similar to Rosecrance's ' mediative states ', which were the agents for converting 'zones of conflict' into 'zones of accommodation '.9 [n contrast to Kohr's vision which, although incorporating such profound changes, is ultimately a static one, Cohen's is dynamic . Words like 'change', 'cvolution ' and 'emergence' recur. However, the main stumbling block in converting this potential dynamism into reality lies in making it acceptable to'the principal international actors. Such a development, Cohen maintained, need not be regarded as necessari Iy weakening existing powers. On the contrary, there can be positive advantages to them in allowing the new states to emerge.

8

Intern.ational Politics

Building a capacity for change into the world 's geopolitical surface was advocated by the French political geographer, VanMorvran Goblet, before World War II. In The Twilight of Treoll·es. Goblet proposed that the stalic political geography of Europe, sanctified as it had been by periodic treaties, should give place to a political geography which was 'living and evolving' . He condemned 'Ies lin/ires lIuturelles' (natural frontiers) and ' the emptiness of mystical nationalisms' . 10 Indeed, Goblet regarded the concept of the 'nation' as being essentially something developed by states to further their own interests. Such nations were produced by a method akin to alchemy. the selected ingredients being mixed together-adding fog as well, as did the Celts, he observed wryly. II II was imperative that, given the capacity for self-
Towards A New Geopolitics

9

World War I that the geographical di stribution of physical resources was very uneven and, viewed from a national perspective, there was a direct relationship between this and the strength of the European powers. While viewed from a state-centred perspective this pointed to a geopolitics of confrontation, viewed from a continental or macroregional pers pect ive the s ituation looked rathe r differe nt. A transnational industrial centre was seen to be emerging which extended over parts of the territories oftive states. Within this ' heavy Industrial Triangle' the overwhelming proportion of the coal, iron and steel of the original six member states of the European Community was being produced . This Triangle was identified as being the embryonic economic core region of a transnational unit encompassing the greater part of continental Western Europe. 11 It was the perception of this geopolitical fact which gave Jean Monnet the realisation that lasting cooperation was not a fun ction of idealism alone but wou ld be most effective when fmnly grounded in the realities of geography. I •• The subsequent development ofthe transnational core concept led to the coining in the 1960s of the term ' Lotharingian axis ' for a broad zone linking the North Sea to the Mediterranean . Within this zone the greater part of the commercial and industrial power of the European Community was concentrated, and from it the greater part of the physical strength of the grouping has derived. Lotharingia, of course, was the name given to the transient ' Middle Kingdom ' of the declining Caro lingian Empire which predated the emergence of the Westphalian states system. It represents a spat ial li nk between the concepts of Kohr and Monnet: on the onc hand, a return to a past political geography in which many of the geopolitical elements of unity were already present; on the other the creation of the structures to help bring about future integration. Thus, past and future have been revealed by the weakening of the polychromatic geopolitical surface and the diminishing role of the stales. The geopolitical concept of th e ' Lotharingian axis' , like those of the ' Heavy Industrial Triangle' and 'Golden Triangle'- the latter linking together southern Britain with the adjacent continentconceptualises the spatial dimension of the transnational alternatives which now exist to the Westphalian map of Europe. However, there is evidence that some of the transnational spatial structures which are

10

International Politics

in the course of emerging are replicating on a continental scale spatial structures found in the states themselves. A notable example of this is the centre-periphery dichotomy, which has now developed a European dimension. This could signal the emergence of a 'natural and original landscape' on a continental scale having the same potential for rigidity as Kohr's small states scenario. The dangers to dynamism inherent in the idea of 'real' nations must certainly also be present in that of a ' real' Europe having its own geopolitical structures and, pot~ntially, its own 'limiles naturelles'. 'New Presbyter is but old Priest writ large' commented John Milton on the religious changes taking place in his day. Likewise, the new Europe may justify itself by developing a new geometry to replace the old and in so doing make use of new versions of old hexagons. A ' new' Europe constructed along these lines could well prove to be but a larger version of the old one.

Similar considerations to these also apply in Southern and Eastern Asia, the other two most important macro-regions of the old world. The central geopolitical question there is whether the large political units which characterise them are, either actually or potentially, states of a Westphalian type 'writ large' having the basic behavioural patterns associated with such states in Europe. Or are they political units of an entirely different order, with their own spatial structures and, as a consequence, possessing a different range of possibilities for developing lasting cooperation? On the answer to this question depends the effectiveness of regionalism as a component part of any new world order. Does it represent something radically 'new' in tenns of the transfonnation of the world's geopolitical surface or is it just the old order transferred to a new international dimension? The contention of this paper has been that a genuinely 'new' order can only be founded on the principle of non-domination. This in tum necessitates the introduction of dynamism into the existing rigid geopolitical surface. To effect this requires a paradigm shift in attitudes to geopolitics. It entails the shedding of those trappings of eternity which have enveloped states and an acceptance of the transitory nature of a ll geopolitical phenomena. Together with thi s there has to be recognition that states have a speci fic raison d'etre at a panicular time and place. Thus, they have a beginning and an end, a birth and a

Towards A New Geopolitics

11

death; there can be no ' eternal' geopolitical space. In this respect, at least, they can be regarded as having some of the characteristics associated with natural phenomena. Such a paradigm shift would be akin to converting states into something like those ' limited life corporations' which have been proposed by some economists in the interests of economic rejuvenation. The gerontocracy of ex.isting states, led by the great powers, has invariably resisted even the smallest of geopolitical changes. They have behaved as though they were, in Murphy's phrase, ' untransmutable spatial givens' ." The notion of territorial change or dismembennent has been as taboo a subject as death. Indeed, it has been the death of states which has been most fiercely resisted. Against all the evidence to the contrary, a belief in the eternal life of the state has persisted and the idea of resurrection to guarantee this has been a built-in feature of national mythologies. King Arthur, Prince VacJav ('Good King Wenceslas' ) and Holger Danske, amongst others, have waited in readiness to defend their nations when in mortal peril. When states have died, their death agonies have been protracted and the associated disruption to the system a whole has been considerable.

as.

In the closing months of 1991 the world witnessed the singular occurrence of the end of one oftbe great powers, the Soviet Union. It was singular both because it was swift- the Ottoman Empire had taken over a hundred years to die-and also because it took place in peacetime and was replaced by a Commonwealth of lndependent States based on the acknowledgement of the sovereignty of its component parts. This singular occurrence does not, on its own, invalidate the perceived nonns of great power behaviour. Russia, the avatar of the Soviet Union, remains one of the great powers of the world. It has, in most respects, become the inheritor of the fallen state. Yet, despite this, what happened in 1991 also resembled in some respects the first attempt at the establishment of a non-
Il

International Politics

systems which replace the principle of dominance with that of 000-

dominance. The geopolitical structures associated with non-domination. and the change which facilitates it, need to be bener understood so that they may be of use in developing models of non-dominating systems having the potential for more general applicability.

Groom pointed 10 the futility of those 'hopeless idealists waiting for the light to shine on the road to Damascus' and Halford Mackinder urged that ' democrati c ideals' should always be tempered with 'reality'.17 Reality, to Mackinder. consisted of those facts of geography which underlie all international situations. II Geopolitical realism has much in common with Groom's ' problem solving' approach, but there is one essential difference. This is that the end product is not the management of the existing system but putting an entirely new one in its place. There are two linked methods by which this may be broUght about. First, there is the possibility ofhamessing the powerful emotions engendered by nationalism for the purpose of bringing about change rather than of shoring up existing power structures. The prerequisite for this is the removal from the states of that culture identification, that statism masquerading as nationalism, which has been used as the most effective justification for their continuation. Such inculcated nationalism aims to make phenomena which are actually transitory and therefore dynamic, appear to be fixed and permanent. The most effective counterweight to this ideological nationalism of the slates has been the nationalism associated with Kohr's 'real' nations themselves. This has already been instrumental in bringing about important changes in the geopolitical surface. As catalysts for change, sub·state nations have a proven track record. As a method of introducing fluidity into an otherwise static surface this is to be seen as being a means rather than an end and its success in this depends on the existence of certain particular characteristics in small state behaviour. The second, and related, approach to converting ideal into reality is to encourage the existing states, and the great powers in particular, to see that their own best interests may be served by facilitating rather than preventing change. Both Cohen and Groom stressed the need for this. Groom questioned whether the ' drive to domination ' is actually inherent or whether it is, in fact , a response to ' perceived environmental situations'. The problem-solving approach led him to the conclusion

Towards A New Geopoli/ics

\3

that in the circumstances of today's strong mutual dependency, the dominating-dominated relationship is not only irrelevant but counterproductive. What is required, said Groom, is the inculcation of 'a noncoercive attitude to change' .19 Barbara Tuchman, in The March of FoJ/y , identified the attempt to hang on desperately to old or fallen structures as being on facet of the non-rational behaviour of states which so often runs counter to their own best interests. This behaviour she considered to be one of the most bizarre and fascinating paradoxes in history.21) She called it ' HumptyDumpty folly' since it was, she maintained, as futile an endeavour as anempting to reconstruct a broken egg, yolk and all. The greatest violence on the world's geopolitical surface has owed much to HwnptyDumpty folly. The perpetuation of domination has ultimately proved ~o be unsuccessfu l and to be counter-productive for those who have made the anempt. It has invariably ended up like that ofOzymandias, ' King of Kings ' in Shelley's poem of that name. His colossal statue stood in the desert, but Nothing beside remains. Round the decay Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare The lone and level sands stretch far away. She lley's image of the desert is particularly evocative in the nuclear age which began in the Arizona desert and could end by converting the rest of the world into something similar. ' In a higher world it is otherwise' , said Cardinal Newman, 'but here below to live is to change and to be perfect is to change often'. The establi shment of a dynamic international order which will have the in-built capacity to change and, if necessary, to change often, requires a paradigm shift not only within the existing states but within humanity itself. Such a shift could well now be a necessity ifhumanity is to have any future at all. NOTES l.

Saul B. Cohen. 'The Emerging World Map of Peace', in N. Kliot and S. Waterman, cds., The Political Geography of Conflier alld Peace ( London: Belhaven Press, 1991), p. 35.

2.

Pierre de Senarclens, 'The Real ist Parndigm and International Conflicts" International Social Science Journal 127 (1991 ), p. 17.

International Politics

14 3.

Geoffrey Parker, The Geopolitics of Domination (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 64-75.

4.

c.H. Williams, 'National Congruence', in PJ. Taylor and R. Johnson. eds., A World in Crisis (London: Longman, 1989), p. 229.

5.

Leopold Kohr, Th e Breakdown of Nations (London: Roulledge and Kegan Paul, 1957).

6.

AJ .R. Groom, 'No Compromise: Probl em-Solving in a Theoretical Perspective', International Social Science Journal 127 (1991), p. 85.

7.

Kohr, The Breakdown of Nations, p. 57.

8.

Parker, The Geopolitics of Domination, pp. 64-75.

9.

Cohen, 'The Emerging World Map of Peace'.

to. Y.M. Goblet,

The 'TWilight o/Treaties (London: Bell. 1936), pp. 1-21.

II . Y.M. Goblet, Political Geography and the World Map (London: George Philip, 1956), p. 106. 12. Goblet, The 'TWilight o/Treaties. p. 256.

13. Geoffrey Parker, The Logic of Uni ty ( London : Longman, 1981) , pp. 75-90. 14. Geoffrey Parker, The Political Geography of Community Europe (London : Butterwonh's, 1983), p. 140. 15. A.B. Murphy, 'Territorial Ideology and International Connict: The Legacy of Prior Fonnalions', in Khot and Watennan, eds. , The Political Geography o/Conflict and Peace, p. 126. 16. Parker, The Geopolitics 0/ Domination, pp. 147·59. 17. Groom, 'No Compromise', p. 78, and Halford mackinder. Democratic Ideals and Reality (London: Constable, 1919). 18. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality. 19. Groom. 'No Compromise'. 20. Barbara Tuchman, The March of Folly (London: Michael Joseph, 1984).

2 The Place of Political Science

The specialisation of knowledge has been one of the most remarkable mental phenomena of the Age, and more and more, as accurate knowledge afthe facts of the world around us increases in amount, it has been found necessary to divide large areas of study into smaller ones, and to classify the smaller according to common resemblances, assigning to each class a name of its OWO. Thus Biology. the Science of Living things, has been divided into

Zoology and Botany; and Zoology into Invenebrates and Vertebrates. and these again we study nOI only in smaller classes, but from another

view·point. in their inner compOsition and their mental equipment, under Anatomy. Physiology and Psychology, our field becoming less in extent and but more intensively cultivated.

Similarly Political Science is a subdivision of History, and also of Psychology, founded on a certain class of facts contained in the first, and on observation of the workings and evolution of the human mind. These facts relate to the organisation of men into groups, their interrelations and external relations, their methods of government, their laws, their evolution as a group, the aggregation of groups into a larger group for a common purpose, and the like. The Science, itself results from this innate tendency in men to live together. Man is called by Aristotle "a political animal", from his point of view "a city animal"; in Biology he is called "a social animal". The temperament of the beast of prey leads him to live apart, or with his mate, though smaller beasts of prey, being weak, combine into hunting packs; the "social animal " not living on fles h- though man has departed from this wholesome rule-prefers company, feeding

16

International Politics

together, to solitude. The beast of prey growls and snarls over his food,

if another comes near him; the social animal grazes in friendly contact with his fellows .

Man's need for society is shown in tbe fact that human nature does not grow, expand, become beautiful , in isolation. Language itself

is the result of the social instinct, the desire to communicate with others. Emotion cannot give any happiness except where it flows outward to another or to others. Without this, it causes only pain of the most acute kind, and is a continual source of misery. Love, friendship, the joy of comradeship, offcllow-feeling- all that renders fertile the desert of life, making it blossom into beauty~all these depend on contact with another. The family, originally beginning in pass ion, is sublimated by mind into lasting emotion, and this one universal and stable institution, springing from the deepest wells in human nature, is the foundation of society. Moreover the capacity and the need for love is most developed in the finest types of human nature and is least in the lowest; it is the former who pour it out most richly, and they who suffer most from its absence. Solitary confinement maddens, and is the heaviest punishment known to human law. At all times and in all places man seeks companionship; he cannot live, nor develop to his highest, alone. Says Aristotle: As we see Ihat every city is a society, and every society is established fo r some good purpose-for an apparent good is lhe spring of all human actions-it is evident thai this is the principle upon which they are everyone founded. and this is more especially true of that which has for its object the best possible, and is itself the most excellent, and comprehends all the rest. Now lhis is called a City, and lhe society thereof a political society. I (A Treatise 01/ Government. Trans., from the Greek of Aristotle by William Ellis in 1776. Edition of 1888. Book I, Chap. i. p. 9. G. Routledge. The book is more often named Politics. )

Inductive and Deducth'e Sciences Political Science in the West is a very modem product, so modern that Sir J.R. Seeley complains that no satis factory textbook existed on the subject. For a modem science, we now it, begins with tbe observation and collection of facts; the n foll ows the classification of the facts, their arrangement into groups; to these the mind applies itself studying their juxtapositions and arri ves at certain underlying general

The Place of Political Science

17

connections, sequences, similarities amid diversities; finall y, disregarding the irrelevant and accidental and clinging to the relevant and suggesti ve, by a process of induction a hypothesis or theory is reached, which illumines the hidden interrelations and shows them as coherent and intelligible. Working wit h that theory as guide, experiments to test it are devised, which gradually eliminate the irrelevant and link together the relevant, and a great generalisation emerges, or some hitherto unknown law, thereafter recognised as a truth. Through these processes the modem man builds up his science. In ancient times another process was foll owed: certain l"'1lths were recognised by the intellect as congruous with its own nature---"whose nature is truth" says an Upani shat- and therefore as self-evident, needing no external proof. The imellect recognises these as true when they are presented to it, by a direct intellectual vision, far more reliable than the vision of the physical eye. Sciences, such as mathematics, were developed by deductions from such truths, by sheer intellectual effort, long sustained. Modern nomenclature has classified as Science the concrete study which leads up to general , or abstract, truthsj the abstract truth is reached by stripping away from the concrete truths all the differences by which we distinguish them, and uniting that which they have in common . Where thi s is the method, we call it scientific. Where an abstract truth is first seen by the intellect, and its results are thought out speculatively, we speak of Philosophy, a nd th e meth od as philosophical. The end sought alike by Science and Philosophy is onc- Truth. The methods vary. One ascends, the other descends, but they meet and coalesce on a common ground, the synthetic Truth. Both methods are useful , even necessary; the use of the first evolves mental faculties-observation, analysis, judgment, and the like; the use of the second develops the Intellect. They are not really enemies, as they used to be in Gennany; they are complements. Plato, in his Republic, Aristotle, in his Treatise on Government, crea1e by their intellecrual imagination an ideal State, perfect, beautiful. They then lay down its laws, its methods, its customs, such as would train the citizens to the ideal as conceived, and carry out its purpose. (Professor Seeley, we shall find , objects to the view that we are to seek for a purpose in Soc iety; he would examine only the facts, and

18

International Politics

not trouble about any purpose, any object aimed at.} Similarly wrought

Sir Thomas More in his Utopia. Then we have another class of thinkers, using imagination to construct that which they think must have existed. Hooker, in his Ecclesiastical P.olity, Locke. in his Civil Government; Hobbes, in hi s Leviathan ; Jean Jacques Rousseau, in his Contrat Socia l- The se all imagine unobserved primitive conditions, out of which the State emerges by conb"act-a theory which is in the air, not fonned out of facts by induction, nor deduced from truths self-e'/ident to tbe intellect. and thus without a scientific basis, however sc ientifically it may be worked out from the supposed contract. Political Science and History

If we are to built up a Political Science, whence can we collect our facts save from History? History gives the material for the Science; the Science illuminates History, and readers it intelligible. Professor Seeley puts this very well: This Science is not a thing distinct from History, but inseparable from it. To call it a part of History might do some violence to the usage of language, but I may venture to say that History without Political Science is a study incomplete, truncated, as on the other hand Political Science without History is hollow and baseless---or in one word: History without Political Science has no fruit: Political Science without History has no root. (Lecture i, pp. 3, 4.)

Professor Sidgwick says in his Preface to this book: As regards the general view that these lectures enforce and ilIustrate- · the two-aided doctrine (1) that the right method of studying Political Science is an essentially historical method, and (2) that the right method of studying Political History is to study it as material for Political Science-I think it may be said that this was one of his deepest and most permanent convictions (pp. x, xi).

That Professor Sidgwick is right in this view is shown not only in the passage above quoted, but also in another passage in which Professor Seeley pleads that the first modem attempts at a Political Science arc based on a wrong method, and "that States can be treated in the same way as plants or as animals". He proceeds:

The Place of Political Science

19

Let us now enquire what aspect our science wOL!ld wear ifit pursued this method. Inductively pursued, Political Science would live and move among historical facts. It would begin by collecting these facts with great industry, and verifying them with most scrupulous care, for it would be keenly alive to the danger of confounding mere rumour, or legend, or pany-statement with such facts as science can recognise. Next it would not attempt to bolster up with the facts so obtained some preconceived theory; all such theories it would put on one side, and honestly wait to see what theories arose naturally out of the facts. For this purpose it would begin by grouping and classifying the facts, placing together, for example, such facts as bear on the internal growth of States, and in another group such as relate to their external action, or the interaction of States on each other.... Everything here depends upon a large supply of- what shall I say? I was going to say historical facts-factS carefully observed and exactly registered. (Lecture i, pp. 21, 22 .) Further, it must be remembered that Political Science is meant to be applied in practice, as well as studied in theory, that it is an An as well as a Science. Professor Sidgwick truly says in his Preface that «in order to know what England ought to be and do now, they must study what she has been and done in the past". Similarly President Wilson Writes: Each people, each Nation , must live upon the lines of its own experience. Nations are no more capable of borrowing experience than individuals are. The histories of other peoples may furnish us with light. but they cannot furnish us \!I'ith conditions of action. Every Nation must constantly keep in touch with its past. (The State. Woodrow Wilson, Ph.D., LL.D. Revised Edition. (Chap. xvi, § 1535. Heath & Co., London.) A Nation is a growth, with its roots deeply buried in its Past, and that Past is to be found in its history. National self-respect, pride of country, patriotism, all grow out of the knowledge of ancestral virtue, ancestral achievement, ancestral greatness. Noblesse oblige"Nobility compels"-is as true of Nations as of men. The intense patriotism of the Scotch grows out of and is nourished by their intimate knowledge of their history, interwoven with the places, town s, mountains, rivers, fields of heir native land. Here a battle was fought; there some martyrs died for freedom; yonder a Highland charge swept all before it; in that glen a massacre took place; in this spot Bruce

20

International Po/ilics

was hidden; in that fort Mary was imprisoned; so will a Scot talk to you, if you travel with him through his country. If countries have nol

a long past of their ~wn, their people look for it in the Past of the land whence they came. The British Colonies look back to their Mother Country for historical inspiration. The United States with pride nurse the memories of the land whence the "Mayflower" brought their fathers. This is why every boy and girl should grow up in the atmosphere of their own country's history, and be fed with the stories of the heroes and heroines, of the sages and saints of their race. The history of foreign Nations should be read for instruction, but the history of one's own country should be the daily food, until it is assimilated into the life of the boy and girl, grows with their growth and strengthens with their strength. Thus can Patriotism become an overpowering emotion. Only when they grow up thus, can Indians know what India "ought to be and do now," what institutions will best suit her, what lines of progress can best be chosen by her, what are the directions in which she can best advance. The fundamental reason why a foreign Government can never be either successful or stable is that it has no common Past with the Nation over which it rules. It is, therefore, continually blundering, however well-intentioned it may be. It has no "feel" for the suitable, the acceptable, and wonders at its own failures, regarding the Nation it rules as being to blame, and ungrateful. If it invades and conquers, it must settle down, it must become National, part of the Nation, assimilated to the Nation, one with the Nation, or it must pass away, and leave the Nation to come to its own. Individuals of Graded Complexity One other principle of Evolution we must grasp, still as a generalisation, before we enter on the details of our special subject. It is the well recognised scientific idea of graded Bodies, or organisms, becoming more and more complex as they ascend the ladder of evolution, but retaining their own individuality, even when entering into a higher organism as forming part of it. Every organism is a Life embodied in a Fonn. The conception is a familiar one in the East, each Life being recognised as a fragment of the Life Universal, that shapes

The Place of Political Science

21

for itself, through innumerable stages, the forms suited to its unfolding powers. Each such life is technically called by the Hindu a Jiva, or a Jivatma, a Living Being, or a Living Self, and is seen as the cause of evolution, by slow and gradual changes creating from the surrounding matter the organs necessary for the more and more complete working of his latent powers, or functions. In the familiar presentation by the Chhandogyopanishat (VlH, xii, 4) it was the will of the self to see, to smell, to hear, to think, that brought about the appropriate organs of enjoyment. That luminous generalisation was reached by Modem Science towards the latter part of the nineteenth century, when we find it laid down that in the simplest organism, the plastid, the functions of the Life- taking in food, digestion, respiration, circuiation- are all performed by any part oflhe plastid; there are no organs. As the Lifefunctions go on, the part of the body which is most conveniem for the carrying on of a particular function becomes appropriated by that function , and is shaped inlo its organ by the exercise of the function through it. Thus, the taking in of food fabricates in the course of ages a mouth and aesophagus; the function of digestion slowly builds a stomach and intestines; the function of respiration gradually forms lungs; and the function of circulation a heart. It may be noted that while the·plastid is floating freely in all directions, no mouth forms, since food particles may touch il anywhere. When it becomes fixed, the part of the body opposite the fixed point in that which touches food constantly, and there gradually the mouth is fonned, and there senseorgans develop. Very curious and interesting are the many transformations through which these organs pass, were they reach their, at present, highest forms- a most fascinating study. Out of it ali , Science definitely says that the exercise of the Life-function creates the organ; the exact opposite of he position taken by Science in the middle of the nineteenth century, that the organ produced the function. It is the Life, with its will to live, that creates a form for its own use and more efficient exercise. Even before Biological Science had recognised life as being, as Sir William Crookes said, the shaper and organiser of Form, it had seen graded organisms on an ascending ladder, and had regarded each as an individual, that is, as a life embodied in a Form, the Fonn being composed of less developed lives also embodied in forms , thai is of

22

International Politics

less evolved Individuals, the place of the individual being higher or lower according to the greater or less complexity of the Form, and

the more or less numerousness of the aspects of the life. (Organs are not biological individuals. because they are differentiations within a body, and neither have, nor have had. any separated existence.) The life which inhabits the Form is the controlling, directing. hannonising,

and co-ordinating power, holding the organism together, whether it be simple or complex, and using the fonn to express its Will. its intelligence and its Activity. Th~ we have as Biologicallndividuals: A simple Cell. A group of Cells forming an Organism.

A simple or complex Organism up to a Human Being. A group of Human Beings, forming a Family. A group of Families, fonning a Tribe. A group of Tribes., fonning a Nation. A group orNalions, forming an Empire or Conunonwealth. A group of Commonwealths or Empires. fonning Organised Humanity.

The first six of these are patent and can be studied. The seventh in its imperfect fonn as Empire has existed, and in its higher form of Commonwealth is in the process of making at the present time. The eighth is, as yet, in the future, in the scientific imagination as in the religious vision. The point for us to realise in our study is that there is a Life, a Jiva, a Jivatma, a fragment of the Divine Life, with more and more of its latent powers unfolded in each successive fonn, each such form being a true Individual. In this individualised life, or Jivatma, inhere the characteristics, or unfolded powers, brought out by the special evolution of the successive forms in which it dwells, family characteristics, tribal characteristics, national characteristics. This family, tribal, national, Life or Jivatma, is not a mere word, a metaphor; it is a fact in Nature. It is the controlling, directing, hannonising and c(H)rdinating power as much in the family, the tribe, and the Nation, as in the single human being, for they are all -alike Individuals, a life embodied in a form. This idea is very familiar in the west from the use made of it by S. Paul, who speaks of it as a " mystery" to the Ephesians, and who points out to' the Corinthian Church: As the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of

The Place of Political Science

23

that one body, being many, are one body, so also Christ. .. .That there should be no schism in the body, but that the members should have the same care one for another. And whether one member suffer all the members suffer with it; or one member be honoured, all the mem!>ers rejoice with it. Now ye are the body of Chrisl, and members in particular (/ Cor., xii, 12-27.). The Gennan writer, Professor J.K. Bluntschli, has put this idea very strongly and well. ''The State," he says, "has a moral nature" (Book I, Chap. iii, p. 2). He writes : The Slate is in no way a lifeless insuurnent, a dead machine; it is a living and therefore organised being. This organic nature of the Slate has not always been understood ... Jt is the especial merit of the German school of historical jurists 10 have recognised the organic nature of the Nation and the State. This conception refutes both the mathematical and mechanical view of the stale, and the atomistic way of treating it, which forgets the whole in the individuals... .ln the state spirit and body, will and active organs. are necessarily bound together in one life. The one National Spirit, which is something different from the average sum of the contemporary spirit of all citizens, is the spirit of the state; the one national will. which is di fferent from the average will of the multitude, is the will of the state. The eonstitution .. .is the body of the state. it is the fonn in which the nation manifests its common life. Individual states differ like individual men in spirit, character and fonn . The progress of mankind depends essentially on the emulation of its component Peoples and States .... While history explains the organic nature of the State, we learn from it at the same time that the state does not stand on the same grade with the lower organisms of plants and animals but is of a higher kind: we learn that it is a moral and spiritual organism, a great body which is capable of taking up into itself the feelings and thoughts or the Nation, or a uttering them in laws, and realising them in acts; we are infonned of moral qualities and of the character of each State. History ascribes 10 the state a personality which. having spirit and body, possesses and manifests a will orits own. The glory and honour of the state have always elevated the heart of its sons, and animated them to sacrifices . For freedom and independence, for the Rights of the State. the noblesl and best have in all times and in all Nations, expended their goods and their lives. To extend the reputation and the power of the State. 10 further its welfare and its happiness, has universally been regarded as one of the

24

International Politics most honourable duties of gifted men. The joys and sorrows of the state have always been shared by all its citizens. The whole great idea of Fatherland and love of country would be inconceivable, if the State did nOI possess this high moral and personal character.... The State is, par excellence a Person, ill the sense of public Jaw. The purpose of the whole constitution is 10 enable the Person of the S iale to express and reali::;e its will, which is different from the individual wills of all Individuals, and different from the sum of them. (Book I, Chap. i, pp. 18. 19. 20.22.)

This conception of the State, fundamentally true, has been wrought into the mind ofthe German people, and has given them the

marvellous coherence, endurance under suffering and power to sacrifice aUlhat makes life dear, which they are manifesting in the present War. So powerfully do idea work out in the conduct of a Nation .. so important are literature teachings to the state. The German error lies, as we shall see, it making the state supreme, and in sacrificing everything to it. a Machiavelli taught. even morality, truth, justice, righteousness. We need to add to this the Indian idea, that above the state is the Supreme Law, Dharma, the expression of the Divine Nature. The most absolute Indian monarch was regarded as the administrator, not as the creator, of Law, and ifhe disregarded it, so the Shastras taught, the law he disregarded wou ld sweep him away, he and his house with him. But for the moment, we are concerned only with the state as an organism- natuml, because inherent, as said, in universal human nature, but also, in a sense, artificial, because shaped and modified by human intelligence. Some writers. in recognising the immense work of the latter have overlooked the former, as though a race-horse ceased altogether to be a natural product, because carefully bred by human in te lligence selecting certa in parents, so as to develop certai n characteristics. Professor seeley presses this same idea, asking: "Are not States living organisms?" He points out that "it is a characteristic of life, which has been made very prominent in recent science, that substances infonned by it (I would substitute 'infonned by life at a certain stage of its unfoldment') receive what is call ed organi sation, that is, the different parts acquire different capacities and adapt themsel ves to perform different functions. Each park becomes more or less a living

The Place of Political Science

2S

tool or organ." Then he proceeds: But Ihis is precisely what characterises a state. A State is a number of human beings not merely c rowd ed or massed together, Ihal organised. This is so strikingly true that all the technical terms applied to physical and political organisation are interchangeable, and the word organi sation itself is applied in both departments alike without metaphor. We say a man is a member of a State. Whal does the word member mean? It means " limb". We say the eye or the ear performs a function. What does function mean? It is a political term, meaning the discharge of a public office. These e:
When we speak of a man being public spirited. we mean that he feel s a wrong inflicted on another as keenly as though it had been inflicted on himself; that he resents a general injustice as though it were done to himself personally; that he protects the weak, though the person protected be neither a friend nor a relative; that he regards a public duty as more imperative than a private one. In such a man the State-consciousness is active; he has realised himself 8S one with the State, hi s life as identical with the life embodic:d in the state. It is the parallcl of the Reali sation of the Self, thc "I am Brahman" of the Yogi. The love of country, the pride in country, the composite emotion that we call Patriotism. already spoken of, it. then, not an emotion directed to a Nothingness, but to a Reality- to that fragment of the Life Universal. the Divine Life, which is the self, the Jivatma. of the State to which we belong. Professor Seeley, in his favourite Socratic way, has put this very well : When I say, " I am an Englishman," what do I mean? Does it refer to my parentage or family? Well, I cannot absolutely say that it does not.

26

International Politics I regard myself as being of some sort of kin to other Englishmen, as though we were all alike descended from some primitive Anglus. I feel this very strongly in the presence of foreigners, for I find that they speak a different language and seem both mentally and bodily of a somewhat different type. But whether it reaUy is so, is after all of no practical importance. I am an Englishman, and should be so just as much if my ancestors were Frenchmen . And yet that J am an Englishman and not a Frenchman is all.important to me. (Lecture it p. 15.)

I have been using the word "State" as though we all knew exactly what is its content; yet probably the ideas of most of us are very hazy on the subject. We shall have to discover a definition for the word State, which will apply to it in the Family. the Tribe, the Nation, the Empire or Commonwealth, and finally in organised Humanity, or the World-State. We shall try to find such a definition in the next lecture. We shall also, probably next week. trace the origin of the state and try to understand its essential nature. Conclusion In concluding this Introductory Lecture, I would earnestly ask you to make an effort to understand clearly any principle or generalisation which may be new or unfamiliar to you, because these will govern all I say, and if they be not thoroughly comprehended the whole subject is likely to remain dim and vague, Jacking in clearness and accuracy of thougbt. You need to grasp the long and laborious method of establishing a scientific truth-the 'sublime patience of the investigator," as W.K. Clifford rightly called it. You need also to remember the weakness of the method-the likelihood that all relevant fact s may not have been collected. You need to think over very carefully the meaning of the Biological Individual , to realise its two factors, Life and Form, and to understand the building up of higher Individuals out oflower ones, and the functions of the Life in the higher Individual, controlling, directing, hannonising and co-ordinating .the lower individuals who form his body. You will then come to our Science well prepared to study it. One di ffercnce between East and West should be noted, though it does not affect our actual study of the facts. In the East the-State is

27

The Place of Political Science

regarded not only as inherent in human nature, but a1so, as the creation ofmeo who were superhuman in their knowledge, and the existence of its life, with its controlling, directing, hannonising and organising powers rests on their authority, and this on their knowledge of Ishvara, of God. In Greece, Nature is the authority, and that which is nearest to the Order of Nature is best. In modem days, these powers are sometimes regarded as the inherent life-forces, belonging to what Professor Seeley called the "political vital principle", and there can hardly be said to be any authoritative basis for the views taken, since they are still in the region of an imperfect theory, not having yet been based on sufficient research into facts, nor subjected to experiment for final verification. Still, as I said. the origin of the organising force in the state need not affect our study of the facts which result from it. NOTE I.

Po/is. a cil}', hence political society - the society of a city. To the Greek

that was "the best possible," and to him it was the State.

3 Principles of Government

There is no subject more interesting 10 every man than the subject of government. His security, be he rich or poor, and in a great measure his prosperity are connected therewith; it is therefore his interest as well as his duty to make himself acquainted with its principles' and what the pl1lctice ought to be.

Every art and science, however imperfectly known at first, has been studied. improved, and brought to what we call perfection by the progressive labours of succeeding generations; but the science of government has stood still. No improvement has been made in the

principle and scarcely any in the practice till the American Revolution began.

In all the countries of Europe (except in France) the same fonus and systems that were erected in the remote ages of ignorance still continue, and their antiquity is put in the place of principle; it is forbidden to investigate their origin or by what right they exist. If it be asked tiow has this happened, the answer is easy: they are established on a principle that is false, and they employ their power to prevent detection. Notwithstanding the mystery with wh ich the science of government has been enveloped, for the purpose of enslaving, plundering, and imposing upon mankind, it is of all things the least mysterious and the most easy to be understood. The meanest capacity cannot be at a loss if it begins its inquiries at the right point. Every art and science has some point or alphabet at which the study of that art or science begins and by the assistance of which the progress is facilitated. The same method ought to be observed with respect to the science of government.

Principles of Government

29

Instead, then, of embarrassing the subject in the outset with the numerous subdivisions under which different forms of government have been classed, such as aristocracy, democracy, oligarchy, monarchy, etc., the better method will be to begin with what may be called primary divisions, or those under which all the several subdivisions will be

compl
First, government by election and representation. Secondly, government by hereditary succession. All the several forms and systems of government, however numerous or diversified, class themselves under one or other of those primary divisions; for either they are on the system of representation or on that of hereditary succession. As to that equivocal thing called "mixed government, "I such as the late government of Holland and the present government of England, it does not make an exception to the general rule because the parts separately considered are either representative or hereditary. Beginning then our inquiries at this point, we have first to examine into the nature of those two primal)' divisions. If they are equally right in principle, it is mere matter of opinion which we prefer. If the one be demonstratively better than the other, that difference directs our choice; but if one of them should be so absolutely false as not to.have a right of existence, the matter settles itself at once, because a negative proved on one thing, where two only are offered and one must be accepted, amounts to an affinnative on the other. The revolutions that are now spreading themselves in the world have their origin in this state of the case, and the present war is a conflict between the representative system founded on the rights of the people and the hereditary system founded in usurpation. As to what are called monarchy, royalty, and aristocracy, they do not, either as things or as terms, sufficiently describe the hereditary system; they are but secondary things or signs of the hereditary system and which fall of themselves if that system has not a right to exist. Were there no such terms as "monarchy," "royalty," and "aristocracy," or were other terms substituted in their place, the hereditary system, if it continued, would not be altered thereby.·

30

International Politics

It would be the same system under any other titulary name as it is now. The character therefore of the revolutions of the present day distinguishes itself most definitely by grounding itself on the system of representative government, in opposition to the hereditary. No other distinction reaches the whole of the principle. Having thus opened the case generally, I proceed, in the first place, to examine the hereditary system because it has the priority in point of time. The representative system is the invention oftbe modem world; and that no doubt may arise as to my own opinion, Jdeclare it beforehand, which is that there ;s not a problem in Euclid more mathematically true than that hereditary govemmelll has not a right 10 exist. Wh en there/ore we lake from any man the exercise of hereditary power, we take away that which he never had the right to possess and which no law or custom could or ever can give him a title to.

The arguments that have hitherto been employed against the hereditary system have been chiefly founded upon the absurdity of it and its incompetence to the purpose of good government. Nothing can present to our judgement or to. our imagination a figure of greater absurdity than that of seeing the government of a nation fall, as it frequently does, into the hands of a lad necessarily destitute of experience and often little better than a fool. It is an insult to every man of years, of character, and of talents in a country. The moment we begin to reason upon the hereditary system, it fall s into derision; let but a single idea begin, and a thousand will soon follow. Insignificance, imbecility, childhood, dotage, want of moral character-in fine, every defect, serious or laughable-unite to hold up the hereditary system as a figure of ridicule. Leaving, however, the ridiculousness of the thing to the reflections of the reader, I proceed to the more important part of the question, namely, whether such a system has a right to exist. To be satisfied of the right of a thing to exist, we must be satisfied that it had a right to begin. If it had not a right to begin, it has not the right to continue. By what right, then, did the hereditary system begin? Let a man but ask himself this question, and he will find that he cannot satisfy himself with an answer.

Principles of Government

31

The right which any man or any family had to set itself up at first to govern a nation and to establish itself hereditarily was no other than the right which Robespierrel had to do the same thing in France. Ifhe had none, they had none. If they had any, he had as much; for it is impossible to discover superiority of right in any family, by virtue of which hereditary government could begin. The Capets, the Gulephs, the Robespierres, the MaraIs,' are all on the same standing as to the question of right. It belongs exclusively to none. It is one step toward liberty to perceive that hereditary government could not begin as an exclusive right in any family. The next point will be whether, having once begun, it could grow into a right by the influence of time. This would be supposing an absurdity; for either it is puning time in the place of principle or making it superior to principle, whereas time has no more connection with or influence upon principle than principle has upon time. The wrong which began a thousand years ago is as much a wrong as ifil began today, and the right which originates today is as much a right as if it had the sanction of a thousand years. Time with respect to principles is an eternal now; it has no operation upon them, it changes nothing of their nature and qualities. But what have we to do with a thousand years? Our Iife~ime is but a short portion of that period; and if we find the wrong in existence as soon as we begin to live, that is the point of time at which is begins to us, and our right to resist it is the same as if it never existed before.

As hereditary government could not begin as a natural right in any family, not derive after its commencement any right from time, we have only to examine whether there exist in a nation a right to set it up and establish it by what is called law, as has been done in England. I answer "No," and that any law or any constitution made for that purpose is an act of treason against the right of every minor in the nation at the time it is made and against the rights of all succeeding generations. I shall speak upon each of those cases. First, of the minor at the time such law is made. Secondly, of the generations that are to follow. A nation, in a collective sense, comprehends all the individuals of whatever age, from just born to just dying. Of these, one pan will

32

International Politics

be minors and the other aged. The average of life is no exactly the same in eve!)' climate and country. but in general the minority in years are the majority in numbers; that is, the number of per<'...ons under twenty-one year is greater than the number of persons above that age.

This difference in number is nol necessary to the establishment of the principle I mean 10 lay down, but it serves to show the justice of it more strongly. The principle would be equally as good if the

majority in years were also the majority in numbers. The rights OfmiDOrs are as sacred as the rights of the aged. The difference is altogether in the difference age of the two parties, and nothing in the nature of the rights; the rights are the same rights and are to be preserved inviolate for the inheritance of the minors when they shall come of age. Ouring the minority of minors, their rights are

under the sacred guardianship of the aged. The minor cannot surrender them. the guardian cannot dispossess him; consequently the aged part of a nation, who are the lawmakers for the time being and who, in the march of life, are but a few years ahead of those who are yet minors and to whom they must shortly given place, have not and cannot have the right to make a law to set up and establi sh hereditary government , or, to speak more distinctly, a hereditary succession of governors, because it is an attempt to deprive every minor in the nation, at the time such a law is made, of his inheritance of rights when he shall come of age and to subjugate him to a system of government to which, during his minority, he could neither consent nor object. If a person who is a minor at the time such a law is proposed had happened to have been born a few years sooner, so as to be of the age of twenty-one years at the time of proposing it, his right to have objected against it, to have exposed the injustice and tyrannical principles of it and to have voted against it, will be admitted on all sides. If, therefore, the law operates to prevent his exercising the same rights after he comes of age as he would have had a right to exercise had he been of age at the time, it is undeniably a law to take away and annul the rights of every person in the nation who shall be a minor at the time of making such a law, and consequently the right to make it cannot exist.

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I come now to speak of government by hereditary succession, as it applies to succeeding generations and to show that in this case, as in the case of minors, there does not exist in a nation a right to set it up. A nation, though continually existing. is continually in a state of renewal and succession. It is never stationary. Everyday produces new binhs, carries minors forward to maturity and old persons from the stage. In this ever-running flood of generations there is no part superior in authority to another. Could we concei"e an idea of superiority in any, at what point of time, or in what century of the world, are we to fix it? To what cause are we to ascribe it? By what evidence are we to prove it? By what criterion are we to know it? A single reflection will teach us that our ancestors, like ourselves, were but tenants for life in 'the great freehold of rights. The fee absolute was not in them, it is not in us; it belongs to the whole family of man through all ages. If we think otherwise than this, we think either as slaves or as tyrants. As slaves, if we think that any former generation had 8 right to bind us; as tyrants, if we think that we have authority to bind the generations that are to follow.

It may not be inapplicable to the subject to endeavor to define what is to be understood by a "generation" in the sense the word is

here used. As a natural tenn, its meaning is sufficiently clear. The father, the son, the grandson are so many distinct generations. But when we speak of a generation as describing the persons in whom l~gal authority resides, as distinct from another generation of the same description who are to succeed them, it comprehends all those who are above the age of twenty-one years at the time that we count from; and a generation of this kind will continue in authority between fourteen and twenty-one year, that is, until the number of minors, who shall have arrived at age, shall be greater than the number of persons remaining of the fonner stock. For example, if France at this or any other moment contains twenty-four millions of souls, twelve millions will be males and twelve females. Of the twelve millions of males, six millions will be of the age of twenty-one years and six will be under, and the authority to govern will reside in the first six.

34

International Politics But everyday will make some alteration, and in twenty-one years

everyone of those minors who survives will have arrived at age. and the greater part of the former stock will be gone; the majority of persons then living, in whom the legal authority resides. will be composed of those who, twenty-one years before, had no legal existence. Those will be fathers and grandfathers in their tum; and, in the next twenty-one years (or less), another race of minors arrived at age will succeed them. and so on.

As this is ever the case, and as every generation is equal in rights to another, it consequently follows that there cannot be a right in any to establish government by hereditary succession. because it would be supposing itself possessed of a right superior to the rest, namely, that of commanding by its own authority how the world shall be hereafter governed and who shall governed and who shall govern it. Every age and generation is and must be (as a matter of right) as free to act for itself in all cases as the age and generation that preceded it. The vanity and preswnption of governing beyond the grave is the most ridiculous and insolent of all tyrannies. Man has no property in man ; neither has one generation a property in the generations that are to follow. tn the first part of the · Rights of Man I have spoken of government by hereditary succession, and I will here close the subject with an extract from that work. which states it Wlder the two following

heads.The history of the English Parliament furnishes an example of this kind, and which merits to be recorded as being the greatest instance of legislative ignorance and want of principle that is to be found in any country. The case is as follows: The English Parliamenl of 1688 imported a man and his wife from Holland, William and Mary, and made them King and Queen of England. Having done this, the said Parliament made a law to convey the government of the country to the heirs of William and Mary, in

B.

[Th e quotation from Rights of Man omitted rrom this text of the "Dissertation" appears on pages 102-104 or the present work. The passage begins. "Firsl, the right or a particular ramily..... and doses (with some necessary differences in phrasing), "good Lord, deliver the world."]

Principles of Government

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the following words: "We, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal. and Commons, do, in the name of Ihe people of England, most humbly and faithfully submit ourselves, our heir.t and posterities, to William and Mary, their heirs and posterities, forever." And in a subsequent law, as quoted by Edmund Burke, the said Parliament. in the name of the people of England then living, binds the said people, their heirs and posterities, to Williams and Mary, their heirs and posterities, 10 the end of time.

It is not sufficient that we laugh at the ignorance of such lawmakers; it is necessary that we reprobate their want of principle. The Constituent Assembly of France, 1789, fell into the same vice as the Parliament of England had done, and assumed to establish a hereditary succession in the family of the Capets as an act of the constitution of that year. That every nation,for the time being. has a right to govern itself as it pleases must always be admitted; but government by hereditary succession is government for another race of people, and not for itself; and as those on whom it is to operate are not yet in existence, or are minors, so neither is the right in existence to set it up for them, and to assume such a right is treason against the right of posterity. I here close the arguments on the first head, that of government by hereditary succession, and proceed to the second, that of government by election and representation, or, as it may be concisely expressed, represenrQlive government, in contradistinction to hereditary governmenl. Reasoning by exclusion, if hereditary government has not a right to exist, and that it has not is provable, represenlative government is admitted to course. In contemplating government by election and representation, we amuse not ourselves in inquiring when or how, or by what right, it began. Its origin is ever in view. ~an is himself the origin and the .evidence of the right. It appertains to him in right of his existence, and his person in the title deed. The true and only true basis of representative government is equality of rights. Every man has a right to one. vote and no more in the choice of representatives. The rich have no more right to exclude the poor from the right of voting or of electing and being elected than

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International Politics

the poor have to exclude the rich, and wherever it is attempted or proposed on either side it is a question of force and not of right. Who is he that would exclude another? That other has a right to

exclude him. Thai which is now called aristocracy implies an inequality of rights, but who are the persons that have a right to establish this inequality? Will the rich exclude themselves? No. Will the poor exclude themselves? No. By what right then can any be excluded? It would be a question if any man or class of men have a right to exclude themselves, but be this as it may. they cannot have the right to exclude another. The poor will not delegate such a right to the rich nor the rich to the poor, and to assume it is not only to assume arbitnuy power but to assume a right to commit robbery. Personal rights, of which the right of voting for representatives is one, are a species of property of the most sacred kind; and he that would employ his pecuniary property or presume upon the influence it gives him to dispossess or rob another of his property or rights uses that pecuniary property as he would use fireanns and merits to have it taken from him. Inequality of rights is created by a combination in one pan of the community to exclude another part from its rights. Whenever it be made an article of a constitution or a law that the right of voting or of electing and being elected shall appertain exclusively to persons possessing a certain quantity of property, be it little or much, it is a combination of the persons possessing that quantity to exclude those who do not possess the same quantity. It is investing themselves with powers as a self-created part of society, to the exclusion of the rest. It is always to be taken for granted that those who oppose an equality of rights never mean the exclusion should take place on themselves; and in this view of the case, pardoning the vanity of the thing, aristocracy is a subject to laughter. This self-soothing vanity is encouraged by another idea not less selfish, which is that the opposc;rs conceive they are playing a safe game, in which there is a chance to gain and none to lose; that, at any rate, the doctrine of equality includes them and that, if they cannot get more rights than those whom they oppose and would exclude, they shall not have less.

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This opinion has already been fatal to thousands who, not contented with equal rights, have sought more till they lost all , and experienced in themselves the degrading inequality they endeavored to fix upon others. In any view of the case, it is dangerous and impolitic, sometimes ridiculous and always unjust, to make property the criterion of the right of voting. Ifthe sum or value of the property upon which the right is to take place be considerable, it will exclude a majority of the people and unite them in a common interest against the government and against those who support it; and as the power is always with the majority, they can overturn such a government and its supporters whenever they please. . If, in order to avoid this danger. a small quantity of property be fixed as the criterion of the right. it exhibits liberty in disgrace by putting it in competition with accident and insignificance. When a broodmare shall fortunately produce a foal or a mule that, by being worth the sum in question, shaH convey to its owner the right of voting or by its death take it from him. in whom does the origin of such a right exist? Is it in the man or in the mule? When we consider how many ways property may be acquired without merit and lost without crime. we ought to spurn the idea of making it a criterion of rights. But the offensive part of the case is that this exclusion from the right of voting implies a stigma on the moral character of the persons excluded, and this is what no part of the community has a right to pronounce upon another part. No external circumstance can justifY. it; wealth is no proof of moral character, nor poverty of the want of it. On the contrary; wealth is often the preswnptive evidence of dishonesty and poverty the negative evidence of innocence. If therefore property,' whether linle or much, be made a criterion, the means by which that property has been acquired ought to be made a criterion also. The only ground upon which exclusion from the right of voting is consistent with justice would be to inflict it as a punishment for a certain time upon those who should propose to take away that right from others. The right of voting for representatives is the primary right by which other rights are protected.

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International Politics

To take away this right is to reduce a man to slavery, for slavery consists in being subject to the will of another, and he that has not a vote in the election of representatives is in this case. The proposal,

therefore, to disfranchise any class of men is as criminal as the proposal to take away property.

When we speak of right, we oUght always to unite with it the idea of duties: rights become duties by reciprocity. The right which I

enjoy becomes my duty to guarantee it to another, and he to me; and those who violate the duty justly incur a forfeiture of the right.

and

In a political view of the case, the strength pennanent security of government is in proportion to the number of people interested in supporting it. The true policy, therefore. is to interest the whole by an equality of rights. for d1e danger arises from exclusions. It is possible to exclude men from the right of voting, but it is impossible to exclude them from the right of rebelling against that exclusion; and when all other rights are taken away. the right of rebellion is made perfect. While men could be persuaded they had no rights, or that rights appertained only to a certain class of men, or that government as a thing existing in right of itself. it was not difficult to govern them authoritatively. The ignorance in which they were held and the superstition in which they were instructed furnished the means of doing it. But when the ignorance is gone and the superstition with i~~-···· they perceive the imposition that has been acted upon them. when they reflect that the cultivator and the manufacturer are the primary means of all the wealth that exists in the world beyond what nature spontaneously produces, when they begin to feel their consequences by their usefulness and their right as members of society, it is then no longer possible to govern them as before. The fraud once detected cannot be reacted. To attempt it is to provoke derision or invite destruction. That property will ever be unequal is certain. Industry, supe.;oiiiY · of talents,. dexterity of management, extreme frugality, fortunate opportunities or the opposite, or the means of those things, will ever produce that effect, without having recourse to the harsh, ill-sounding names of avarice and oppression; and besides this there are some men

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who, though they do not despise wealth. will not stop to the drudgery or the means of acquiring it nor will be troubled with it beyond their wants or their independence, while in others there is an avidity to obtain it by every means not punishable-it makes the sole business of their lives, and they follow it as a religion. All that is required with respect to property is to obtain it honestly and not employ it criminally, but it is always criminally employed when it is made a criterion for exclusive rights. In institutions that are purely pecuniary, such as that of a bank or a commercial company, the rights of the members composing that company are wholly created by the property they invest therein, and no other rights are represented in the government of that company than what arise out of that property; neither has that government cognizance of anyihing but property. But the case is totally different with respect to the institution of civil government, organized on the system of representation . Such a government has cognizance of everything and of every man as a member of the national society, whether he has property or not; and therefore the principle requires that every man and every kind of righ, be represented, of which the right to acquire and to hold property is but one, and that not of the most essential kind. The protection of a man 's person is more sacred than the protection of property, and besides this the faculty of performing any kind of work or services by which he acquires a livelihood or maintaining his family is of the nature of property. It is property to him; he has acquired it, and it is as much the object of his protection as exterior property, possessed without that faculty, can be the object of protection in another person. I have always believed that the best security for property, be it much or little, is to remove from every part of the community, as far as can possibly be done, every cause of complaint and every motive to violence, and this can only be done by an equality of rights. When rights are secure, property is secure in consequence. But when property is made a pretense for unequal or exclusive rights, it weakens the right to hold the property, and provokes indignation and tumult; for it is unnatural to· believe that property can be secure under the guarantee of a society injured in its rights by the influence of that property.

40

Inlernalional Politics Next to the injustice and ill-policy of making property a pretence

for exclusive right is the unaccountable absurdity of giving to mere sound the idea of property and annexing to it certain rights, for what else is a title but sound? Nature is often giving to the world some

extraordinary men who arrive at fame by merit and universal consent, such as Aristotle, Socrates, Plato, etc. They were truly great or noble. But when government sets up a manufactory of nobles. it is as absurd as if she undertook to manufacture wise men. Her nobles are all

counterfeits. This wax-work order has assumed the name of aristocracy, and the disgrace of it would be lessened if it could be considered only as childish imbecility. We pardon foppery because of its insignificance, and on the same ground we might pardon the foppery of titles. But the origin of aristocracy was worse than foppery. It was robbery. The first aristocrats in all countries were brigands. Those oflater times, sycophants.

11 is very wellknown thai in England (and the same will be found in other countries), the great landed estates now held in descent were plundered from the quiet inhabitants at the Conquest. The possibility did not exist of acquiring such estates honestly. If it be asked how they could have been acquired, no answer but that of robbery can be given. That they were not acquired by trade, by commerce, by manufactures, by agriculture, or by any reputable employment is certain. How then were they aC'quired? Blush, aristocracy, to hear your origin, for your progenitors were thieves. They were the Robespienes and the lacobins of that day. When they had committed the robbery, they endeavored to lose the disgrace of its 'by sinking their real names under fictitious ones, which they called titles. It is ever the practice of felons 10 act in this manner. They' never pass by their real names. As property, honestly obtained, is best secured "by an equality of rights, so ill-gotten property depends for protection on a monopoly of rights. He who has robbed another of his property will next endeavor to .disann him of his rights to secure that property; for when the robber becomes the legislator, he believes himself secure. Thai part of tbe government ofEngJand that is called the House of Lords was originally composed of persons who had committed the robberies of which I have

Prillciples of Govemmem

41

been speaking. II was an association for the protection ofthe property they had stolen. But besides the criminality of the origin of aristocracy, it has an injurious effect on the moral and physical character of man . Like slavery, it debilitates the human faculties; for as the mind bowed down by slavery loss in silence its elastic powers, so, in the contrary extreme, when it is buoyed up by folly it becomes incapable of exerting them and dwindles into imbecility. It is impossible that a mind employed upon ribands and titles can ever be great. The childishness of the objects consumes the man.

It is at all times necessary, and more particularly so during the progress of a revolution and until right ideas confinn themselves by habit, that we frequently refresh our patriotism by reference to first principles. It is by tracing things to their origin that we learn to understand them, and it is by keeping that line and that origin always in view that we never forget them. An inquiry into the origin of rights will demonstrate to us that righls are not gifts from one man to another, nor from one class of men to another; for who is he who could be the first giver, or by what principle or on what authority could he possess the right of giving? A declaration of rights is not a creation of them nor a donation of them. It is a manifest of the principle by which they exist, followed by a detail of what the rights are; for every civil righ t has a natural right for its foundation, and it includes the princ iple of a reciprocal guarantee of those rights from man to man. As, therefore, it is impossible to discover any origin of rights otherwise than in the origin of man, it consequently follows that rights appertain to man in right .-. of his existence only, and must therefore be equal 10 every man. The principle of an equality of rights is clear and simple. Every man can understand it, and it is by understanding his rights that he leams his duties; for where the rights of men are equal, every man must finally see the necessity of protecting the rights of others as the most effectual security for his own. But if, in the fonnation of a constitution, we depart from the principle of equal rights or attempt any modification of it, we plunge into a labyrinth of difficulties from which there is no way out but by

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retreating. Where are we to SlOp? Or by what principle are we to find out tbe point to stop at that shall discriminate between men afthe same country, part of whom shall be free and the rest not?

If property is to ,be made the criterion, it is a total departure from every moral principle of liberty, because it is attaching rights to mere maner and making man the agent of that matter. It is, moreover, holding

up property as an apple of discord, and not only exciting but justifying war against it; for I maintain the principle that when property is used

as an instrument to take away the rights of those who may happen not to possess property, it is used to an unlawful purpose, as firearms would be in a similar case. In a state of nature all men are equal in rights, but they are not equal in power; the weak cannot protect themselves against the strong. This being the case, the institution of civil society is for the purpose of making an equalization of powers that shall be parallel to and a guarantee of the equality of rights. The laws of a country, wben properly constructed, apply to tbis purpose. Every man takes the ann of the law for his protection as more effectual than his own, and therefore every man has an equal right in thc formation of the government and of the laws by which he is to be governed and judged. In extensive countries and societies, such as America and France, this right in the individual can only be exercised . by delegation, that is, by election and representation; and hence it is that the institution of representative government arises. Hitherto I have confined myself to matters of principle only. First, that hereditary government has not a right to exist, that it cannot be established on any principle of right, and that it is a violation of all principle. Secondly, that goverrunent by election and representation has its origin in the natural and eternal rights of man; for whether a man be his own lawgiver, as he would be in a state of nature, or whether he exercises his portion of legi slative sovereignty in his own person, as might be the case in small democracies where all could assemble for the formation of the laws by which they were to be governed, or whether he exercises it in the choice of persons to represent him in a national assembly of representatives, the origin of the right is the same in all cases. The first , as is before observed, is defective in power;

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the second is practicable only in democracies of small extent; the third is the greatest scale upon which human government can be instituted. Next to matters of principle are matters of opinion, and it is necessary to distinguish between the two. Whether the tights of men shall be equal is not a matter of opinion but of right, and consequently of principle; for men do not hold their rights as grants from each other, but each one in right of himself. Society is the guardian but nOI the giver. And as in extensive societies, such as America and France, the right of the individual in matters of government cannot be exercised but by election and representation, it consequently follows that the only system of government consistent with principle, where simple democracy is impracticable, is tbe representative system. But as to the organical part, or the manner in which the several parts of govemment shall be arranged and composed, it is altogether mailer of opinion. It is necessary that all the parts be confonnable with the principle of equal rights; and so long as this principle be religiously adhered to no very material error can take place, neither can any error continue long in that part which falls within the province of opinion. In all matters of opinion, the social compact, or the principle by which society is held together, requires that the majority of opinions becomes the rule for the whole and that the minority yields practical obedience thereto. This is perfectly conformable to the principle of equal rights; for, in the first place, every man has a right 10 give an opinion, but no man has a right Ihal his opinion should govern the rest. In the second place, it is not supposed to be known beforehand on which side of any question, whether for or against, any man 's opinion will fall. He may happen to be in a majority upon some questions and in a minority upon others, and by the same rule that he expects obedience in the one case he must yield it in the other. All the disorders that have arisen in France during the progress of the Revolution have had their origi.n, not in the principle ofequal rights, but in the violation of that principle. The principle of equal rights has been repeatedly violated. and that not by the majority but by the minority, and that minority has been composed of men possessing property, as well as of mell without property; property,

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therefore. even IIpon the experience already had, is no more a criterion of character lhall it is o/rights. It will sometimes happen that the minority are ri ght and the majo rity are wrong, but as soon as experience proves this to be the

case, the minority will increase to a majority. and the error will reform itsclfby the tranquil operation o f freedom of opinion and equality of rights. Nothing, therefore, can justify an insurrection; neither can it ever be necessary where rights are equal and opinions free.

Taking then the principle of equal rights as the foundati on of the Revolution, and consequently of the constitution. the organical part, or the manner in which the several parts of the government shall be arranged In the constitution, wi ll, as is already said, fall within the province of opinion. Various methods will present themselves upon a question of this kind; and though experience is yet wanting to determine which is the best, it has, I think, sufficie ntly decided which is the worst that is the worst which, in its del iberations and decisions, is subject to the precipitance and passion of an individual; and when the whole legislature is crowded into one body, it is an individual in mass. In all cases of deliberation, it is necessary to have a corps of reserve; and it would be better to divide the representation by lot into two parts, and let them revise and correct each other, than that the who le should sit together and debate at once. Representative government is not necessari ly confined to anyone particular form. The principl e is the same in all the forms under which it can be arranged. The equal rights of the people is the root from which the whole springs, and the branches may be arranged as present opinion or future experience shall best direct. As to that hospital of incurables (as Chesterfields calls it), the British House of Peers, it is an excrescence growing out of corruption; and there is no more affinity or resemblance between any of the branches of a legislative body originating from the right of the people and the aforesaid House of Peers than between a regular member of the human body and an ulcerated wen. As to that part of government that is called Ihe "executive," it is necessary in the first place to fi x a precise meaning to the word.

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There are but two divisions into which power can be arranged. first , that of willing or decreeing the laws; secondly, that of executing or putting them in practice. The former corresponds to the intellectual faculties of the human mind, which reasons and determines what shall be done; the second, to the mechanical powers of the human body that puts that determination into practice. If the former decides and the latter does not penorm, it is a state of imbecility; and if the laner acts without the predetermination of the fonner, it is a state of lunacy. The executive department therefore is official and is subordinate to the legislative, as the body is to the mind in a state of health; for it is impossible to conceive the idea of two sovereignties, a sovereignty to will and a sovereignty to act. The executive is not invested with the power of deliberating whether it shall act or not; it has not discretionary authority in the case, for it can act flO other thillg than what the laws decree and it is obliged to act conformably thereto; and in this view of the case the executive is made up of all the official departments that execute the laws, of which that which is called the "judiciary" is the chief. But mankind have conceived an idea that some kind of authority is necessary to superintend the execution of the laws and to see that they are faithfully performed ; and it is by confoundi ng thi s superintending authority with the official execution that we get embarrassed about the term "exec utive power." All the parts in the governments of the united States of America that aT!: called the "executive" are no other than authorities to superintend the execution of the laws, and they are so far independent of the legislative that they know the legislative only through the laws and cannot be controlled or directed by it through any other medium. In what manner this superintending authority shall be appointed or composed is a matter that falls within the province of opinion. Some may prefer one method and some another, and in all cases where opinion only and not principle is concerned the majority of opinions forms the rule for all . There are however somethi ngs deducible from reason and evidenced by experience that serve to gu ide our decision upon the case. The one is never to invest any indi vidual with extraordinary power;

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for besides hi s being tempted to misuse it, it will excite contention and commotion in the nation for the office. Secondly, never to invest

power long in the hands of any number of individuals. Th e inconveniences that may be supposed to accompany frequent changes arc less to be feared than the danger that arises from long continuance.

I shall conclude this discourse with offering some observations on the means of preserving liberty; for it is not only necessary that we establish it, but that we preserve it It is, in the first place, necessary that we distinguish between the means made use of to overthrow despotism, in order to prepare the way fo~ the establishment ofliberty, and the means to be used after the despotism is overthrown. The means made use of in the first case are j ustified by na:essity. Those means are, in general , insurrections; for while the established government of despotism continues in any country, it is scarcely possible that any other means can be used. It is also certain that, in the commencement of a revolution. the revolutionary party permit to themse lves a discretionary exercise of power regu lated more by circumstances than by principle, which, were the practice to continue, liberty would never be establis hed, or if establi shed would soon be ovel1hrown. II is never to be expected in a revolution that every man is to change his opinion at the same moment. There never yet was any truth or any principl e so irresistibly obvious that all men believed it at once. Time and reason must cooperate with each other to the final establishment of any principle. and therefore those who may happen to be first convinced have not a ri ght to persecute others on whom conviction operates more slowly. The moral principle of revolutions is to instruct, not to destroy. Had a constitution been established two years ago (as ought to have been done), the violences that have since desolated France and injured the character of the Revolution would, in my opinion, have been prevented. The nation would then have had a bond of union, and every individual would have known the line of conduct he was to follow. But instead of this, a revolutionary government, a thing without either principle or authority, was substituted in its place; v irtue and crime depended upon accident. and that which was patriotism one day became treason the next.

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All these things have followed from the want of a constitution: for it is the nature and intention of a constitution to prevem governing by party by establishing a common principle thai shall limit and control the power and impulse of party, and that says to all parties, thus far shalt thou go alld 110 further. But in the absence of a constitution. men look entirely to party; and instead of principle governing party. party governs principle. An avidity to punish is always dangerous to liberty. It leads men to stretch, to misinterpret, and to misapply even the best of laws. He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for ifhe violates tbis duty, he establishes a precedent that will reach to himsel f.

NOTES L

Charles I, who became King of England in 1625. was condemned as a traitor and enemy of the nation and was beheaded in 1649.

2.

The words of Jesus as reponed in Matthew 22: 21. Tory politicians and pamphleteers of the period frequently used this injunction as Biblical authority for the submission of the individual to the state.

3.

Gideon delivered the Israelites from the Midianites. as described in Judges 6: 1-27; 8: 1-23.

4.

Samuel's yielding to the people's clamor for a king is related in I Samuel: 8.

5.

William I, King of England, was the illegitimate son of Robert "Le Diable." Duke of Normandy. He invaded England in 1066, and acquired the throne as a result of his victory in the battle of Hastings.

6.

York and Lancaster were the two noble families whose rivalry for the throne of England brought on the Wars of the Roses, so called because the emblem of the House of York was a white rose and that of Lancaster a red rose. The contesting monarchs mentioned in this paragraph are Henry VI (reigned 1422-61 ) and Edward IV (reigned 1461-81).

7.

Henry VII reigned from 1485 to '509.

8.

Sir William Meredith, who died in 1790, was a lord of the admiralty under Rockingham's first ministry (1 765). He was also the author of several political works.

9.

This reference is too vague for positive identification. Paine probably has in mind one of two brothers, Henry Pelham (1695:'-1754) or Thomas

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international Politics Pelham-Holies ( 1693- 1768), both of whom. at various times, held mi nisterial positions in the English government. See Dictionary of National Biography.

10. On April 19. 1775, the battles of Lexington and Concord were fought. These batt les marked the opening hostilities of the American Revolution.

4 The State

What is a Stale? That is the question to which we must try to find an answer today. Let us begin with suggested and accepted definitions, and test them, so as to eliminate anything which we consider to be either superfluous or erroneous. The shorter a definition the better, provided its terseness does nol mar its clarity and sufficiency. It should contain the essentials oflhe term defined, and also its differential or specialties so as to separate it from cognate and allied tenus. Where the thing defined is complex, as is the case with the thing we call the

State, the difficulty of reconciling adequacy and terseness is obvious. THE EAST

India We tum first to India, as indicated in the last lecture, in our search for the definition of a state. We have to face here the difficu lty, that, as Bernouf- I think it was- said of Egypt, there are no "beginnings" in the modem sense; the state "springs forth on the stage of his lOry complete, as Minerva from the head of Jove". Nor is there anything surprising or unlikel y in this , if the traditions of Egypt and India are true, for in each case tradition tells of Divine Dynasties, of a superhuman Legislator, and in India the latter, named Manu. was literally the Father of his people. Thus. the race began in hi s Family, multiplied and spread for unknown periods of time in Central Asia. ultimately in vading India, conquering it and settling down therein, whi le other branches from the same Patriarchal Family went westwards in successive waves, reaching. and spreading

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over and settling in Europe, and carrying with them the early simple. Aryan polity of scII:govcming village communities, their ineradicable love of liberty, and the genius for democratic institution s so characteristic of the Aryan race. A fief explaining the Teutonic Mark (Village Communities . Lecture i. p. 10), or Township as an organised, sel f-acting group of TeUlOnic famili es, exercising a co mmon proprietorship over a defi nite tract of land, its Mark, cultivating its domain on a common system and sustaining itself by the produce,

Maine poi nts out that similar groups were "the political unit of the

earli est English soc iety," existed in Scandinavia, were observed in the Orkney and Shetland Islands by Walter SCOIt, and in England were later absorbed in larger aggregat ions. The " larger groups, in which Famil ies are found to have been primitively combined for the purposes of ownership o f land" (p. II), make the Village, living on its land, which can be fu ll y studied in India. He speaks of the individual property in land as disengaging itself from collective holdings, as shown in Teutonic and Scand inavian villages, and even in England, and notes that "these primiti ve European tenures and thi s primiti ve European tillage const itute the actual working system of the Indi an village commu nities, and that they detennine the whole course of Anglo-Indian administration" (p. 62). These vill ages li ved under customary law; the Council of village elders does not command anything; it merely deelares what has always been ... Their antiquity is by itself assumed to be a suffi cient reason fo r obeying them ... a person aggrie ved complains not of an individual wrong, but of the disturbance of the order of the entire little society. More than all, customary law is not enforced by a sanction. In th e almost inconcei va ble case o f disobedience to the award of the Village Council, the sole punishment, or the so le certai n punrshment, woul d appear to be universal disapprobation. (Leeture iii. p. 68.)

The importance of this to us is that we find in the West the view that the function of the government of a state is to give "command under penalty," but in this early village state there is no command, and no penalty save disapprobation. Maine once morc, compelled by his study of law, remarks on

The State

51

the ignorance of Eastern phenomena shown by the Western writers on this subject, and says: The Village Community of India exhibits resemblances to the Teutonic Township which are much 100 strong and numerous to be accidental; where it differs from the Township, the difference may be at least plausibly explained. It has the same double aspect of a group of famili es united by the assumption of common kinship, and of a company of persons exercising joint ownership over land. The domain which it occupies is distributed, if not in the same manner, upon the same principles, and the ideas which prevail within the group of the relations and duties of its members to one another appear to be substantially the same. But the Indian Village Community is a living and not a dead institution. The causes which transformed the Mark into the Manor, though they may be tlaced in India, have operated very feebly; and over the greatest part of the country the Village-Community has 'lol been absorbed in any larger collection of men, or lost in a territorial area of wider extent. For fi scal and legal purposes it is the proprietary unit of large and populous Provinces. It is under constant and careful observation, and the doubtful poiuls which it exhibits are the subject of the most earnest discussion and of the most vt'hemenl controversy. No better example could therefore be given of the new material which the East, and especially India, furni shes to the juridical enquirer.... {India) is the great repository of verifiable phenomena of ancient usage and ancient juridi cal thought. (Lecture i, pp. 12, 13, 22.) Sir Henry Maine refers to two books, one by Sir John Lubbock and the other by Mr. McLennan, who "conceive themselves to have shown that the first steps of mankind towards civilisation were taken from a condition in which assemblages of men followed practices which are not found to occur universally eVl!n in ani mal nature" (p. 16). These, he observes, may be found in India in some aboriginal tribes, driven into inaccessible recesses in mountainous districts, but some of these usages, referred to immemorial antiquity, " have been described to me as having been for the first time resoned to in our own days through the mere pressure of external circumstances or novel temptations" (p. 17). This view agrees, we shall see presently, with that of Dr. Wilson. We are on safer ground when, following the most ancient Indian literature, we see society origi nating in the Patriarchal Family, which is a "group of men and women, children and slaves, of animate and

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inanimate property, all connected together by common subjection to the Paternal Power of the chief of the household" (p. 18). Such families , growing up in Central Asia, forming villages and cities and spreading thence, would, when once sen led in Indi a, while keeping

the origina l type of the villages, readi ly develop into cities and kingdoms in the course of many generations, multiplying "for untold centuries," as Vincent Smith says, band becoming the highly civilised

communities we read of three thousand years before the Christian era. There are thousands of years for their growth before the books

on polity, now in our possession, were written, during which the history of the then existing States is at present lacking. Dr. Sayee, in his Hibbert lectures of 1887, mentions Indian trade with Babylon nearly five thousand years ago, in 3000 s.c., India being then a congeries of wealthy, highly civilised, and trading States. Vincent Smith speaks of sixteen States between the HimaJayas and the Nerbudda river, some monarchical , some aristocratic-republican, separated by forests, jungles, and unsenled lands. Forms of government were very various. Ajatashatru hereditary King of Magadha, was contemporary with Darius, King of Persia in the sixth century B.C. On the other hand, Dr. Radhakumud Mukerji, writing on the "Republics of Ancient India" (The Commonweal, June 20th, 1918) quotes Megastbenes as speaking of five Nations by name, as peoples "which are free, have no Kings, and occupy mountain heights where they have built many cities" . Curtius gives the name of "a powerful Indian people whose form of government was democratic and not real , who had no Kings, but were led by three Generals". Arrian mentions others who preserved their autonomy intact for a long time before Alexander's invasion. He also mentions Nysa, a City-State, such as we shall find described in Aristotle. ruled by three hundred wise men, fonning a Council with a President. When Alexander asked that one hundred men should be sent to him from the governing body, the president answered : "How, 0 King, can a single city, if deprived of a hundred of it best men, continue to be well governed?" Not only do we find in In dian the se manifold types of government, but we find also the state organism of a higher order, the Empire over many kingdoms. Chandragupta Maurya, 321-297 B.c., ruled from the Hindu Khush to the Nerbudda. from the Arabian Sea

The Stale

S3

to the Bay of Bengal. Bindusara extended his fathers empire to the south of Madras. Ashoka extended it sti ll further, and had four Viceroys under him for administrati ve purposes. The Empire lasted from-321 R C . to 232 S.c. Other and empire arose, earlier and latter; I select this one, ;becausc it was the first reckoned in the West as hi storical. The Chakravarti, or Ovcrlord, was a well-recognised monial , as a ll re aders of Indi an literature kno w. Th e la st "horse-sacrifice," the recognition o f the over:ordship, of the Lord Paramount, of India, was offered in the seventh century A.D., by Adityasena. The literature we have belongs naturally to the more advanced and complex conditions, the "full-grown 'State ' from the head of Jovc". The polity is laid down by authority, if we accept the literature concerned, and this, so far as known, dea ls with kingdoms, castes, classes, kings, councilors, officials, etc. , among the movables, vi llages, towns, di stricts, forts, etc .. among the immovables, all in full working order, or with directions how to create the villages, etc., where they did not exist, as when population was too dense, or additional terrilory was acquired, new villages had to be fonned. Fragments of his lOry in the early days are available, fro m travellers mostly, which show us many forms of government over areas of varying size. from a city 10 a large district and on to great kingdoms and empires. In these we have descriptions of stales, not definitions of "the State," and the word state as used in modem days in applicable to each of these areas. Thus, we .arrive at eliminating any special kind of government, and see onl y a government, not a fonn of government, as essenti al to the idea of a stale; moreover, it is a government over an organi sed people, settled in a definite rerritory. The Arthashastra of Kautilya (translated by R. Shamasastry, Mysore Government Orienta l Library Series, Government Press, Bangalore, 191 5), known also as VishnuguPla and Chanaicya, the great Minister of Chandragupta Maurya, w ho began to reign six. years before Alexander invaded Afghanistan, d eals with a compl icated and huge Empire, highly organi sed. I am not concerned with any details of these governments any more than of the villages- that will come later- and mention the ex istence of them in our search for definitions, merely to show that,

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as said, while a stale implies a government of some sort, the fonn of the government is non-essential. In the time of Kautilya the Science

ofGoverrunent had been much discussed, and in Book J, chap. ii, after mentioning that there were four sciences, of which Danda Niti, the science of government, was one, Kautilya mentions the schools of

Manu, Brahaspati, Ushanas, as all dealing with the Science of Government, on which. says Kautilya, the other three sciences depend (Book I, chap. iv, I, p. 10).

~

We do not find either in Manu or in Kautilya any discussions as to the nature of a State. But we are told that a kingdom has seven limbs, or constituent parts: "The King, his minister, his capital, hi s realm, his treasury, hi s anny and his ally" (Manu's Institutes. Chap. ix, v. 294, p. 395). Kautilya gives them as "The King, the minister, the country, the fort, the treasury, the army and the friend" as "the e lements of sovereignty". (Book VI, C hapter i, p. 318.) But this does not help us to a definition of the State. Manu 's laws are concerned with the inhabitants of a kingdom, their relationships, their offices, their functions, their duties, etc. The famil y is the unit; ''To be mothers were women created and to be fathers men" ; "Let mutual fidelity continue until death; this may be considered as the summary of the highest law for husband and wife" (Chap. ix, shl. 96, 101). " He only is a perfect man who consists of his wife, himself and his offspring .... The husband is declared to be one with the wife" (Ibid. , shl. 45}-a far nobler conception, as we shall find, than that of Aristotle, the Greek.

It is the duty of the King to unite families into Villages. " Villages," says Kautilya, consisting each of not less than a hundred families, and of not more than five hundred families of agricultural people ofShu.dra caste, with boundaries extending as far as a krosha or two and capable of protecting each other shall be formed . Boundaries shall be denoted by a river, a mountain, forests. bulbous plants. caves, artificial buildings. or by trees. (Book 11 , chap. i, para 46.)

Every aggregation of ten villages is to be protected by a sangrahana; in the centres of 200,400 and 800 villages, fortresses of different kinds are to the erected, and strong forts with boundary guards

The Slale

55

on the frontiers of the kingdom, which is also to have a fortified capital in its centre (chap, iii , 51). Manu directs that soldiers, commanded by a trusty officer, should

be placed in the midst of groups of vi llages to protect the people, and each village is to have its ruler, and there are rulers also for groups of villages, 10, 20, 100, 1,000 (chap. vii, 114, 15). The details of organisation, once more, will be studied later. Here, as I said, we are seeking for definition of the state. The Shukralli/i (tmnslated by Professor Seney Thamar Sarkar, Panini Office, Allahabad), contains minute detai ls for the d ischarge of the respective duties of the various classes of the people, and is purely practical. The state is the Kingdom "an organism of seven limbs" (chap. i, 121), the same as already mentioned; it is composed of "gramona. p urana, deshan" (ibid., 751) , villages, cit ies and districts; the villages may be arranged in groups of 10, toO, 1,000, 10,000 for the purposes of government. The word indicating the State is Rashtmn, equally used for kingdom, district, or region; it includes all immovable and movable objects within its ares, and "belongs to him under whose submission it comes"- its mler. The ten requisites in the administration of justice are the king, officers, counci llors, Smrti Shastras, accountant, clerk, gold, fire, water and one's own men (chap. iv, § v, 72). A court of justice is that place where the study of the social, and political interests of man takes place according to the dictates of Dhanna Shaslras (Ibid., 82). For definition these books yield: ~conomi e

"The state is an organism of seven limbs, under a Ruler and Counc il; it consists of villages, cities and districts, and has a body of laws and customs." No form of government except this, apparently, is contemplated. It is obvious from the langl,lage used that we are in the presence of highly organised kingdoms, and Ihis idea, arisi ng from the most superficial glance, will become absolutely established in our later study. Summing up the general results from the facts availabl e in ancient India we see a ladder of ascent. We have the rungs of Family, Vi llage, Groups ofYillages, becoming larger and larger integrations,

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living in definite areas wi th their rulers, reaching the Kingdom, or the

Republic. Eliminating differences, we find in all these four common fac tors: they are aggregations of human beings, of varied occupations, living on a fixed territory, with a government over each; that is, each

is an organised community-a community with organs for th e discharge of definite functions- and from a study of these we must fOrol

our Indian definition: A State is an organised community of human beings settled in a

defmite area, and directed by a government.

We find in India a Family-State, a Village-State, a MultipleVillage-State, a City-State, a Republic-State, a Kingdom-State, an Empire-State, the last three, a1t forms of the Country-State. But we do not find a Nation-State; there was a fundamental Unity, which made temporary aggregations under an Overlord easy, due to a common descent, "sons of Manu," a common religion, common basic laws, but not the sense of Nationality as now ~gnised. To Manu we owe the luminous idea that all human societies, like a family, consist of elders, equals, and youngers, to each of whom special duties should be rendered : reverence to the elders, friendship to the equals, protection to the youngers, and on the due discharge of these, the happiness of all States depends. The state should be founded on the fami ly, and State obligations are enlarged family obligations. The profound principle which emerges from this fundamental idea that man only becomes man in the family, that Man, the truly human being, is not a separate masculine being, but a husband-wi fe-child. raises Duty above Rights, obligations above claims; it substitutes mutual helpfulness for compdit ion, the law of sacrifice for the law of the struggle for existence. It is the recognition that man is a social, not an isolated being, and that the state should be moulded in accordance with this natural law. You will see the imponance of his conceptiC'n when you come to study the State. as conceived in modem Europe, until modem science reinforced ancient teaching, and thus gave binh to Socialism. The Hebrews In the Hebrew Nation we see the sequential development of the Slale from a Patriarch, Abraham, the head of a fam ily; fro m his twelve

57

The Slale

great-grandsons the multiplication into twelve Tribes, recognising a descent from a common ancestor; the welding of these Tribes into a Nation, and the establishment ofthe Nation on a Territory. The story is probably true in the main outline, and if so offers a case of the gradual building up of the successive types of the State. In addition to this, the Hebrews become a Theocracy, after the multiplication of the Families into Tribes, and the theocratic element is dominant through the monarchies that succeed. It also gives an interesting illustration, I think unique, of the perishing of the Nalion·State, by the destruction of its government and the loss of its territory, and the survival of the nation without country or ruler, preserving its national characteristics through its adherence to its national religion. It is a fact in favour of the view of a nation, as being an individual , a Spiritual Entity, a fragment of the divine, able to live and preserve its individuality, without some of the organs which nonnally constilute parts of its form, and are generally regarded as essentials of national life. THE WEST Greece Let us now tum away from the East to the West, and again seek for a definition of the State as conceived in Greece and Rome. In the western world Plato with his Republic, Aristotle with his Politics, are the commanding figures as regards the idea of the State. Bluntschli says of the last: His Politics, although written in that youthful "eriod of the world 's history which preceded the more advanced development of the state, has yet remained for two thousand years one of the purest sources of political wisdom. (Chap. ii, p. 7.)

Plato 's essential idea of the State was that it was an organi sm, not merely an artificial compound. It should follow the Law of Nature, and be, as it were, the Ideal Man: The best state is that which approaches most nearly to the condition of the individual. If a part of the body suffers. the whole body feels the hurt and sympathises altogether with the part affected. (Republic. quoted by Bluntschli, Book I, chap. iii. p. 36.)

Thc idea of the unit of the State as a solitary individual merely,

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nOI as in the Indian view, a family, lies at the root of many error in practice, for it is man as isolated, not man as a family, and leads to combat rather than to co-operation. The value of the Greek idea lies in recognising the state as an organism. Bluntschli well sums up his

teaching: The state, according to Plato, is the highest revelation of human vinue,

the harmonious manifestation of the powers of the human soul, humanity perfected. As the soul of man consists of a rarional, a spirited. and a desiring element, and as reason and spirit ought to rule the desires, so in the Platonic ideal, the wise ought to rule. the brave warriors should protect the community, and the classes which are occupied with material acquis ition and bodily work should obey the two higher orders. In the Body Politic, justice requires that each pan should do its own work. (Book I, chap. iii, p. 36.)

Aristotle does not in so many words give a definition of the State, but he identifies it with the city; he says that the best possible Society is a city, "and the society thereof a political society" (Book I, chap. i, p. 9). As a definition this is hardly satisfactory, since it comes to the statement that "the society ofa city is a city society," ''political'' being a deri vative of polis, a City; but the meaning is cltat, that only men who live in a city fonn a society worthy of the name, a city-man society. Such a "Political," or City-State, has a government adapted to the nature of free men, and "is the government of free men and equals" (Book I, chap. vii, p. 20). Aristotle does not ignore the fact that the family exists apart from the City, and that "Hesiod is right when he says, ' first a house, then a wife, then an ox: for the plough,'" but this society "which Nature has established for daily support is the domestic"; also he remarks that "the society of many families, which was first instituted for their listing mutual advantage, is called a village, and a village is most naturally composed of the descendants of one family," whence village government is the government of elders. But these, he does not regard as States, since States are governed by men who are free and equal. A City only arises as follows: When many villages so entirely join themselves together as in every respect to form but one society, that Society is a City, and contains in itself, if I may so speak. the end and perfection of government. fi rst

The Slale

S9

founded that we might live. but continued that we may live happily. (Book I. chap. ii. pp. 10-12.)

Also he has said: "A City is a community of free men" (Book III, chap. vii, p. 92). "A City, in one word. is a collective body of

such persons, sufficient in themselves to all the purposes of life," "such persons" being "citizens" or those who have a right to "share in the judicial and executive part of government" (Book II, chap. i, p. 81}--that being his very useful, ifnot complete, definition ofa citizen. Again he says: A City is a Society of people joining together with their families and their children to live agreeably, for the sake of having their li ves as happy and independent as possible; and for this purpose it is necessary that they should live in one place and intermarry with each other, hence in all cilies there are family meetings, clubs, sacrifices, and public entertainments to promote friendship, for, a love of sociability is friendship itself; so that the cnd then for which a City is established is that the inhabitants of it may live happy, and these things are conducive to that end; for it is a community of families and villages, for the sake of a perfect independent life. that is, as we have already said, for the sake ofliving well and bappily. 1t is nOI therefore founded for the purpose of men merely living together, but for their living as men ought. (Book III. chap. ix. p. 98.)

The last words recall those lately spoken by President Wilson: "To make the world fit for free men to live in." Aristotle 's purpose is ethical; the ideal city is a place in which the free man can develop to his highest possibility; the motive is to live "as men ought," for "with us," he says, "reason and intelligence are the end of nature." (Book vn, chap. xvi, p. 262.) To him, outside the city, the state, therefore, did not exist, and nearly all his treatise deals with government, its type and its duties- a matter, once more. that you will have to study in detail presently. We find , tben, in Aristotle, no clear definition of the State as a concept, and we can only make a definition out of the conditions he postulates. I suggest faT his idea: "A State is a Society of men inhabiting a City, with a government composed of men who are free and equal, and are capable of filling an office in the Government." It will be noticed that thi s definition does not include within the State women, children, or slaves. all of whom lived in the City. Women

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were under Domestic Government, as being by nature inferior to men, but were to be treated as citizens of a free State-though not coming within the definition of a citizen, that he must be able to fill an office in the state; children were under Domestic Government as being young and imperfect (Book I, chap. xii, p. 31); slaves as being " 8 particular

species of property" (Book I, chap. viii, 2 1). The confining of the State to men was the natural and logical outgrowth of aristotle's view of the family, as consisting of three aspects united in one man, who filled the "three parts of Domestic Government," as master---Qf the slaves; as father-ofthe children; as husband---Qf the wife. This view orthe

State colours European thought, the subjection of women being characteristic of European systems. and. as we shall see, it comes out strongly in Bluntschli's view of the state as a masculine entity. Shakespeare said truly that The evil which men do lives after them. Even in India it has degraded the higher view of the family as the unit of the state, with all the network of ideas of which the family is the centre. It has made the man everything, and in the household

all gives way to his convenience and comfort. thus making selfishness instead of sacrifice the pivot of family life. Only in the woman is the old ideal preserved, and her uner sacrifice to husband and son is apt to fncrease masculine selfishness. None the less, in her self-sacrifice lies the salvation of India. The future welfare of the Indian state depends on the re-establishment of the old idea of the family, with its mutual sacrifice and mutual service and mutual helpfulness. conditioned in their fonn, not in their essence, by the "elder, equal, and younger". Rome The Roman idea of the State was based on the Greek, but laid more stress on law; the Greek saw as the purpose of the state that men might have Happiness ; the Roman made pre-dominant the protective power of the State, and saw as its purpose that men might have justice. Bluntschli says of the Greeks: They base the State upon human nature, and hold that only in the State can man atjain his perfection and find true satisfaction. The State is for them the moral order of the world. in which human nature fulfil s

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61

its end. The Romans first distinguished law from morality, and gave it a definite form, and thus they brought out more distinctly the legal nature of the State. Thereby they limited the State, and gave it greater firmness and power. II no longer summed up for them the ethical ordering of the world, but was primarily a common legal organisation. (Book I, chap. iii, pp. 35, 38, 39.)

Moreover, in the Roman State, the masses were given a more distinctly recognised place than among the Greeks though I am not forgetting the meetings of the Athenian people in the Agora, or the laws of Draco, or the refonns of Solon. The Patricians, like the Greek Aristocrats, stood high in the State, the descendants of the Gens, or Family. The Gentes included no plebeian. The history of the city of Rome shows us that the nucleus of it was composed of a number of primitive clans living each in its separate settlement, but side by side. for the oldest districts of the city have the names of the ancient patric ian gentes. In short, a number of indications concur to show that Rome-though in the time of Cicero the fact had been quite forgotten-first took shape as a League of cognate but distinct clans, each clan being a conventional family, into which admission could only be procured through the action of adoption. (Seeley, Lecture iii, p. 38.)

But Cicero points out that when the people were organised they were part of the State; this does no include all men, but only those who are organised into a society; Lhen, but only then, the Popular Organism became the source of law; "Vox populi, vox Dei"- "The voice of the people is the voice of God". The proud Roman would have had supreme contempt for the idea that any shouting mob was the voice of God, though the phrase is so used occasionally in modem days. For the ignorant mob, " Bread and Games" was his prescription. For the Organised People, respect- for organisation is only possible with individual self-control. "Salus populi suprema lex," "The welfare of the people is the supreme lex," The struggle of the people to assert and organise themselves is full of interest, and they gradually became a recognised Order in the State. A further addition to the idea of the state, as existing in the West, was made by the Romans- its extension over many nations, thus carrying it into a higher order of individual. The Roman Eagles fl ew

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over the Western World, and invaded the Eastern, and Roman citizenship was extended to the borders of the Empire, and was obtainable both by birth and by purchase. The Roman view oflhe state may be summarised: The Slate is the People Organised, governed by its own assemblies and its elected officers; with its citizenship extended to

persons and families belonging to other nations, over whom the authority of the central City was exercised. The Social Contract

For our purpose we need not delay over medieval Europe, and need only pause very shortly on the new idea which emerges in the seventeenth century, and is discussed through the eighteenth. Hooker, Hobbes and Locke in the seventeenth century, and Rousseau in the eighteenth, are its typical exponents. Briefly outlined, the theory is: that the naturnllandholder and the landless, the capitalist and the wage~ earner, the millionaire and the pauper, appear over against each other, and the extremes of luxury and of poverty, divided by an unbridgeable gu lf, are the typical productions of modem civilisation. Had it not crashed down in a World War, it would have been tom into pieces in class convulsions. A return to the ideal of the Family as the unit of the State has reappeared in modem thought, and Political Science is re-establi shing on a scientific basis the higher Ideal. That Ideal. enlarged from the Family to the Nation, is what is called Socialism, and is the analogue, in the State, of Ethic or Morality in Society. As Ethic resides in making universal and nonnal the love-emotion, as revealed in the hannonious Family, so is Sociali sm the extension to the Stale of the principles of mutual helpfulness and sacrifice found in th happy and prosperous family. It has, as its axiom: "From every one according to his capacities; to everyone according to his needs" (Proudhon).

MODERN VIEWS In the nineteenth century began an effort to construct a true Political Science out of the fact s recorded in History, and in the first quarter of the twentieth century we find Professor Seeley complaining of the want of a text-book. He pointed out that

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As a mailer of course human beings like other animals are united together in families , and we might be prepared to find the family tie stronger and the family organisation somewhat more developed than in inferior animals. But we observe something more ... vel)' surprising and unexpected. We find that men have another bond of union beyond that of the family, and another higher organi sation ... Almost in any place, in any circumstances where a human being might be found, if you questioned him you would find that he considered himself to belong to some large corporation which imposed duties and conferred rights upon him ... .The English state may be held together in some degree by a common interest, still it is not a mere company composed ofvolunlal)' shareholders, but a union which has its root in the family and which has grown, and not merely been arranged, 10 be what it is. Now. it is surdy impossible not 10 admit that this phenomenon. vast and highly developed as it now appears, is in its large features similar to the most primitive and barbarous tribe. That, too, is a great association, to which its members are attached for life and death. For that. too. its members fight; about its interests they debate. In the tribe, tool. we can often discover that individuals may have no attachment by kindred to the whole; they may have come in as slaves and received emancipation, or as foreigners by adoption. In short. compare the most advanced State with the most primitive tribe, and you will see the Slime features. though the proportions are different. In the State there is more of mind; in the tribe more of nature. Free-w ill and intelligent contrivance nave more play in the fonner; blood and kinship rule in the laUer. Still the State has nOl ceased to be a tribe; kinship still counts for much in it, as the Nationality-movement of the present cenNI)' has strikingly proved. (Lecture i, p. 14. LecNre ii, p. 35, 36.) The Professor regards the principle of Government as essential to the State, and he regards the fact of Government as that on which "depends almost everything important in human history" (p. 37). This Government is to him the main characteristic of the State, and it is universal. "Everywhere the human being belongs to something which may be called a polity, and is subject to something which may be called a Government" (p. 3S). It is the making "use of the arrangement or contrivance called Government" (Lecture i, p. 17), which distinguishes the State, and so to him Political Science is co ncerned with Goverrunent, "as political econcmy deals with wealth, as biology deals with life, as algebra deals with numbers, as geometry deals with space and magnitude" (p, IS). Government he defines as "command enforced

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by penalty" (Lecture iii, p. 75}-a curiously narrow conception, for surely if the State be an organised community, and the Government the executive of its will, then every purpose that the organised community desires to carry out collectively becomes a duty of the State

to be carried out by its Executive. The organism specialises organs, for the discharge of its functions, its condition of men was one of war; to obtain order and security, men surrendered some of their personal inherent rights, and formed by contract a State in which they vested them, this State being an absolute Power, monarchical or other, responsible to none. This supposed contract is the origin of the State.

Grotius: The complete union of free men, who join themselves together for the purpose of enjoying law, and for the sake of public welfare. Hobbes: The State, therefore, is a single person, for whose acts a great multitude by mutual covenants, one with another, have made themselves everyone the author, to the end he may use the means and strength of them all as he shall think expedient for their peace and common defence. Rousseau: To find a form of association which defends and

protects the person and property of every associate with the common power of all and by which each, uniting himself with all, only obeys himself and remains as free as before; such in the fundamental problem resolved in the Contrat Social. In all these the State is not the Nation organised, but the Government. So also in the Encyclopedia Britannica, which has some iRieresting definitions: As currenlly employed in Ihat departmenl or Political Science which concerns itselr, not with relations or separate political entities. but with the political composition or society as a whole, the word State expresses the abstract idea or Government in general, or the governing authority as opposed to the governed, and is thus used by Herbert Spencer in all his discussions or Government and society. Louis XIV's 'Tetat, c'eSI moi," Rousseau's theory or the "contrat social," Bastiat's "donne it l'etatle strict necessaire et garde Ie resle pour 10i," all imply this opposition.

Yet thi s is the very idea we need to oppose. Again:

The State

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" In constinnionallaw, the Stale," says a leading English authority, " is the power by which rights are created and maintained, by which the acts and forbearances necessary for their maintenance are habitually enforced" (Anson, Law wid Custom of the Constitution, pI. i, p. 2). In France, where Ihe Stale embraces a hierarchy of bodies and authorities culminating in the President of the Republic, whose acts are the final fonn of a series of incomplete acts of the members of the hierarchy, it comes nearer to the theoretical meaning of the word... .

Hence a general definition: The State is a human corporation resting on >:ontract, which defends its members against aggression and preserves order by law. In this the idea of the State as an evolving organism has wholly disappeared, and it becomes an apparatus, manufactured by man in Society for his security and order, exercising the rights vested in it by him, and restricted within as narrow limits as are consistent with the purpose of its manufacture. Under these conditions, the State and the People are separate entities and are in a condition of vigilant and anned truce, the individual guarding against any invasion of the rights he has retained, and the government, as the embodied Power of the State, tending to become a tyranny. It is a veiled condition of War between the Government and the Individual, the Government resenting resistance, and the Individual fearing encroachment.

We thus continually ·find the State and the Liberty of the Individual regarded as in conflict, for the more the State does, the less it leaves to the lndividual. Hence the value of the State as a collective organisation largely disappears, and ownership by the State is looked on as an interference with individual cmerprise and initiative; collective help is regarded as a destruction of independence, and as a pauperisation of the Indi vidua l. The idea of the Family as the fundamental unit of the Statc is renounced, and the isolated man becomes the unit; combat, competition, struggle, form the recognised conditions of the people, and soc iety becomes an anarchy within a circle of laws; the exploiter of human labour and the proletarian, the life-acti vities. For the better exercise of its function of Justice, it specialises an organ composed of judges an lawyers; for its function of healing, it specialises an organ composed of doctors and nurses; for its function of commerce, it speciali ses an organ of merchants, and

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accountants, and sailors; and so on, as it becomes more and more specialised and complex. OUf illustration of the body and its organs is more than a metaphor- it is a reality. The "contrivance called

Govemment," or as I should prefer to call it, the Organ ofGovemment, is perhaps the first organ specialised in the organism named the State.

The State should not be thought of as over against the Nation, but as the Nation organised to perform all that is done more efficiently by it collectively than individually. If the State takes over, as in many countries, the management of railways, it is the Government that will manage them and collect their revenue, but its proceedings hardly come within "commands enforced by penalty". Moreover we have seen the Village State in the East, untroubled by commands and free from penalties. But then professor Seeley knew nothing of the East. We saw last week that the Professor considers the State as an organism not a machine, as a growth not a manufacture. We may then embody his view of the State in such a definition as the following: The State is an Organism, consisting of human beings, evolved from the Family through the Tribe, and controlled hy a Government. Characteristically, the Professor will not say that the State exists for any object. "We do not speak of the object of a tree or an animal" (Lecture ii, p. 40). He wishes to study facts and leave purposes aloneagain an unwise narrowing of view. Dr. Woodrow Wilson begins by remarking that it would be desirable to include all tribes, Hottentot or Iroquois, Finn or Turk, in a general survey, but that it is enough to study the "Aryan and Semitic races which have played the chief parts in the history of the European world" (Chap. i, § 2). It is not clear what he means by Aryan; it does not apparently, include Indians, for he goes on to say: In order to !race th e line age of the Europe an and American Governments, which have constituted the order of social life for those stronger and nobler races which have made the most notable progress in civilisation, it is essential to now the political history of the Greeks. the Latins, the Teutons and the Celts principally, if not only, and the original and political habits and ideas of the Aryan and Semitic races alone. The existing Governments of Europe and America furnish the dominating types of today. To know other systems which are defeated

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or dead would aid only indirecdy towards an understanding of those which are alive and triumphant. (Chapter i, § 2.)

India is apparently swept away with the Hottenlots and their similars.

Dr. Wilson sees in Kinship the origin of social organisation, and in the Paternal Authority the origin of Government. He contrasts the Patriarchal Family, as the original type institution in humanity, with the view that it emerged from an earlier condition of polyandry and polygyny, which were preceded by promiscuity. But he excludes these, because such conditions were not found in the European field. The Romans and the Greeks descended from the Patriarchal Family. Sir William Maine, as we have seen, gives a better reason. Says Dr. Wilson: No belief is more deeply fi xed in the traditions of the great peoples who have made modem history, than the belief in direct common descent, through males, from a common male ancestor, human or divine; and nothing could well be more numerous or distinct than the traces inhering in the very heart of their polity of an original Patriarchal organisation of the family as the archetype of their political order. (Chapter i, §§ 5, 6.)

It is c urious that Dr. Wil son states the Indian view, while ignoring India. Promiscuity belongs, he thinks, to "times of decadence, rather than 10 the origins of the race," polyandry where women were fewer than the men, polygyny among the wealthy (§ 7). Hence the Family ruled by the Father is the earliest unit, showing ''that clear authority and close organisation which was to serve in fullness of time as the prototype and model of the State" (Ibid) . In the Patriarchal Family sons and grandsons swelled the number, but "there was no majority for them while the father lived"; this group broadened into the Gens, and the Gentes into the Tribe, and "Tribes at length united to fonn a Stale" (§ 8). The State might be nomadic, "a travelling political organisation, a State without territorial boundaries onhe need of them" (§ 10). In this view of the State, Dr. Wilson remarks, that modem definitions do not concur with him; he says: .. , A State,' runs the modern definition, ' is a People organised by law within a definite territory "'. Dr. Wilson will nOl have this. He says: "The first builders of Govemment" saw no reason "why they might nol move their whole

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people, 'bag and baggage' to other lands" (§ (2). Dr. Wilson supports this novel view by the fact that the Franks were not confined to any

Frank-land, and their Kings were "Kings of he Franks," not of a territory. So there were "Kings of the English" for centuries. and John was the first who took the title of "King of England", Indian Kings preserved this idea as to towns and villages, we may note. We find

new towns, some miles from ruined or semiruined ones, whence the inhabitants had been bodily removed, not "hag and baggage," hut bundles and pots. Dr. Wilson urges: The original Governments were knit together by bonds closer than those of geography, more real than the bonds of mere contiguity. They were bound together by real 01 assumed kinship. They had a corporate existence which they recognised as inhering in their blood, and as expressed in all their daily relations with each other. They lived together because of these relations; they were not related because they lived together. (§§ II , 12.)

Not by Contract, Dr. Wilson decides, after glancing at that theory, but from the Family, arises the State. "The Family was the primal unit of political society, and the seed-bed of all larger growths of Government" (§ 22). Dr. Wilson quotes and agrees with John Morley' ~ standpoint in his criticism of Rousseau. In view of the observed and recorded experience of mankind, the ground and origin of society is not a compact; that never existed in any known case, and never was a condition of obligation either in primitive or developed societies, either between subjects and sovereign, or between the equal members of a sovereign body. The true ground is the acceptance of conditions which came into existence by the sociability inherent in man, and werc developed by man's sponlaneous search after convenience. (Rousseall. John Morley, Vol. ii. p. 183.)

Man dislikes loneliness., seeks his mate and his fellows. "Kinship and Religion operated as the two chjef fonnative influences" thinks Dr. Wilson (§ 25). Adoption into the Family admitted into the Family religious mysteries: And so too, Houses could grow by the adoption of families, through the cngrafting of the alien branches jOlo this same sacred stock of the esoteric religion of the kindred. Whether naturally. therefore, or artificially. Houses widened inlo tribes, and tribes into commonwealths, without loss of that kinship in the absence of which, to the thinking

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69

of primitive men, there could be no communion, and therefore no community at all. (§ 24.)

The Ancestors were worshipped as the Gods of the Family, and were accepted by the adopted member. In India this adoption survives, and the Family Pitrs are the Pitrs of the adopted son. As Tribes grew, lines of descent became obscured, and family government and race government became differentiated. The State continued to be conceived as a Family; but the headship of this huge and complex Family ceased to be natural and became political (§ 41). Dr. Wilson's definition of the State would seem to be: . The State is a body of persons descended from a common ancestor, and with a common Government. Sir Henry Maine, in his Anciellt Law, remarks that "the Unit of an ancient society was the Family, of a modem society the Individual" (Seventeenth impression, Chap. v, p. 126. John Murray, London). The elementary group is the Family. connected by common subjection to the highest male ascendant. The 'aggregation of Families forms the Gens, or House. The aggregation of Houses makes the Tribe, The aggregation of Tribes constitutes the Commonwealth. Are we at liberty to follow these indications, and to lay down that the Commonwealth is a collection of persons united by common descent from the progenitor of an original family? (Chap. v, p. 128.)

That was the view of Antiquity. and Maine accepts it, at least as it Legal Fiction, which permitted the useful practice of adoption. In later times, came in the principle of local contiguity, which has driven out the earlier, Bluntschli develops the idea of a descent from the common masculine ancestor into the unusual proposition that the State is masculine. And in this he is thorough and logical. To this the view of Aristotle distinctly leads; the citizen of the State is the man. Bluntschli says distinctly that a fa!11ily, a clan, may become the nucleus round which a State may in time form; but neither a family nor a horde is a State: "Without a Tribe, or, at a higher stage of civilisation, without a Nation, there is no State" (Book I, chap. i, p. 16). He is no way denies the line of evolution, Family, Tribe, etc. ; but he refuses the use of the word "State" to anything less than a Nation, and thus somewhat

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departs from his principle of reaching from historical facts to the

conception of a State, since he bids us survey the many actual States in the world 's history and discover "their common characteristics"

(p. 15). But when those are found and isolated. their presence in any aggregation of people should assign to that aggregation the name of

state. His speciality lies in the restriction of the State to masculinity_ You will remember his fin e description of the State, quoted last week on p. J 9 of my lecture. I recall only the points which I now need to emphasise: The State is in no way a life less instrument, a dead machine; it is a

living and therefore organised being... .!n the Slate spirit and body. wi ll and acti ve organs, are necessarily bound together in one life. The one National Spirit, which is something different from the average sum of the contemporary spirit of all citizens. is the Spirit of the State; the one National Will. which is different from the average will of the multitude. is the Will of the Slate .. ... 1t is a moral and spiritual organism, a great body which is capable of taking up into itself the feelings and thoughts of the Nation. of uuering Ihem in laws. and realising Ihem in acts; we are informed of moral qualilies and of the character of each State. History ascribes to the Stale a personality which, having spirit and body, possesses and manifests a will of its own... .. The State is par excellence, a Person. in the sense of public law. The purpose of the whole constitution is 10 enable the Person of the State to express and realise its will, which is different from the individual wills of all individuals, and different from the sum of them. (Book I, chap. i, pp. 18. 19,20. 22.)

He then proceeds to point out that the personality of the State is, however, only recognised by free people, and only in the civil ised Na tion-State has it attai ned to full efficacy.... .The same is true with regard 10 the masculine character of the modem State. This becomes first apparent in contrast with the feminine character of the Church." (Book I, chap. i, pp. 22. 23.)

Hence he defin es the State. after deSCribing its factors: To put together the result of this historical consideration. the general conception of the State may be determined as follows: "The State is a combination or association of men, in the fqnn of govemmem and governed. on a definite territory, united together into a moral. organised,

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71

masculine personali ly; or, more shortly-the Stale is the politically organised Natioml Person of a definite country." (Book I, Chap. i, p. 23.)

Now, the danger of this conception of the State, we have seen in the Germany of today. The State becomes the highest entity recognised by the People nnd Power becomes its chief characteristic. Whether the Power be embodied in a Person, as in the German "Allhighest," the representative of God on earth, or whether it be embodied in the Government of a Republic, or of a Parliament, it matters very little. For safety, we must resort to the Indian view, that above the scepter of Government authority, there is Dharma, the Law, establishing Righteousness, Justice, and Liberty, the fundamental principles on which the stability of the State itself it based. They must be recogni sed as essential to the unfolding of the Divine Nature in man, of the human Spirit. Brahman is free, righteous and just. and these qualities inh.ere in the Self, the Spirit. in man. Bluntschli looks forward to the Universal State, and points out that time is "bringing the Nations nearer to one another, and awakening the universal consciousness Of the community of mankind" (Book I, chap. ii, p. 31). Each State, he says, feels any disturbance in another State as an evil affecting itself. The European Nations, who "know their superiority over other Nations well enough," but "have not yet come to a clear understanding among themselves" as to how they shall "manage the world," must gain knowledge. Unit this has been done, the Universal Empire will be an idea after which many strive, which none can fulfil. But as an idea of the future, the general theory of the State cannot overlook it. Only in the Universal Empire wili the true human Stale be revealed. and in it intemationallaw will attain a higher fonn and an assured existence. To the Universal Empire the particular States ate related. as the Nations to Humanity.... The highest conception of the State-which, however, has not yet been realised- is thus: the State is Humanity organised, but Humanity as masculine, not feminine: the State is the Man. (Ibid. , p. 32.)

A rather curious and simple definition is that of Bodin: A righl Govemmeni. with sovereign power-~fseveral households and their common possessions.

This wou ld take us from a group of Families up to the Universal State.

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International Politics The Encyclopaedia Britannica remarks: In England, we may say, the notion of Slate, from the constitutional point of view, is sli\l inchoate, bUI the play ofintemational intercourse seems to be gradually leading to a clearer conception of the fact that

an increasing national responsibility requires a corresponding increase in the power of C
Much has been wrinen on the "science" of the Stale, or, as we prefer. in Anglo~Saxon Lands, to call it. "Political Science", In Germany the subject is dealt with as an independent branch of university education. Several of her universities have a slaatswisasa-schaflliche Facuillil. granting a special degree in the subject. In consequence of the great

auention paid to the subject in Gennany, her State polity has been largely the work of her political writers. The result has not unnaturally tended to a system bearing some resemblance to that of the American Union, with this very important difference, however, that whereas in the United States the federal power is derived from the democratic forces of the individual States, in Gennany it is derived from their aristocratic and absolutist force. GeJ/Il8n political thinkers. in fact, have worked out Staatsrecht as a comparative study, in which arguments in favour of absolute government have received as much careful consideration as those in favour of democratic institutions. and the Gennan State has developed upon lines based on the best theoretical arguments of these thinkers. There is • therefore. no anomaly in its practically absolutist government working out the most democratic refonns as yet put into legislative form. It follows, however. that Gennan theories are of lillie use in the consideration of the Stale problems with which British and American politicallhinkers have to deal. Anglo-Saxon institutions are following their independent development, and if the influence of foreign institutions is felt at all, it is probably that of the clear logical detail and cohesion of French institutions.

It is for you to study, to think over, to decide what "the State" should mean to you, how you mean to work out the State in India. Make some definitions for yourselves. I suggest the following as a fairly inclusive definition: A State is a multi-human organism, emOOdying a Life, inhabiting a definite Territory, with a Government as its executive, specialising o rgans fo r its activities, and shaping its evolution to achieve a common end.

,

Th e Stare

73

Ifwe lesllhis by each larger Slate successivc\y we find it true. In the Family we have severa l persons, elders, contemporaries, youngers, living together as an organised unit; it li ves in a house; it has a Family Life, with the parents as ruler, and the various members specialise their work, to achieve the common end of Family happiness. This is equally true of the Village·State, the Tribe-State, the City-State, the Nation-State, the Commonwealth-State, the World-State, and each point is true in each. But why not try to better it?

5 Thomas Paine's Political Writings

OF THE LI MITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Among thc incivilities by which nations or indi viduals provoke and

irritate each other, Mr. Burke's pamphlet on the French Revolution is an c>;:traordinary instance. Neither the people of France nor the National Assembly were troubling themselves about the affairs of

England or the Engli sh Parliament; and thai Mr. Burke should commence an unprovoked attack upon them. both in Parliament and in public, is a conduct that cannot be pardoned on the score of manners nor justified on thai of policy. There is scarcely an epit het of abuse to be found in the English

language with which Mr. Burke has not loaded the French nation and the National Assembly. Everyth ing which rancor, prejudice, ignorance, or knowledge could suggest are poured forth in the copious fury of ncar four hundred pages. In the strain and on the plan Mr. Burke was writing. he might have written on to as many thousands. When the tongue or the pen is let loose ina frenzy of passio n, it is the man and not the subject that becomes exhausted . Hitherto Mr. Burke has not been mistaken and disappointed in the opinions he had formed of the 3ffairs of France; but such is the ingenuity of his hope, or the malignancy of his despair. that it furni shes him with ncw pretenses to go on. There was a time when it was impossible to make Mr. Burke believe there would be any revolution in France. His op inion then was that the French had neither spirit to undcl1ake it nor fortitude 10 support it. and now that there is ("Inc he seeks an escape by condemning it. Not sufficiently content with abusing the National Assembly, a great ,ial1 of his work is taken up with abus ing Dr. Priee (one of the

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best-hearted men that lives) and the two societies in England known by the name of the Revolution Society and the Society for Constitutional Information. Dr. Price had preached a sermon on the fourth of November, 1789, being the anniversary of what is called in England the revolution, which took place in 1688. Mr. Burke, speaking of this sermon, says, The. political divine proceeds dogmatically to asset that, by the principles of the Revolution, the people of England have acquired three fundamental rights: I. To choose our own governors. 2. To cashier them for misconduct. 3. To frame a government for ourselves. Dr. Price does not say that the right to do these things exists in this or in that person, or in this or in that description of persons, but that it exists in the whole, that is it a right resident in the nation. Mr. Burke, on the contrary, denies that such a right exists in the nation, either in whole or in part, or that it exists anywhere; and, what is still more strange and marvelous, he says, "that the people of England utterly disclaim such a right. and that they wi ll resist the practical assertion of it with their lives and fortunes." That men should take up arms and spend their lives and fortunes 1I0t to maintain their rights. but to maintain they have 1I0t ri ghts. is an entirely new species of discovery and suited to the paradoxical genius of Mr. Burke. The method which Mr. Burke takes to prove that the people of England had no such rights and that such rights do not now exist in the nation, ei ther in whole or in part. or anywhere at al1, is of the same marvelous and monstrous kind with what he has already said; for his arguments are that the persons or the generation of persons in whom they did exist are dead. and with them the right is dead also. To prove this. he quotes a declaration made by Parliament about a hundred years ago to William and Mary, in these words: "The Lords Spiritual and Temporal , and Commons, do, in the name of the people aforesaid" (meaning the people of England then living), "most humbly and faithfully submit themselves, their heirs and posterities,forever."

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He also quotes a clause of another act of Parliament made in the same reign, the terms of which, he says, "bind us" (meaning the people of that day) , "our heirs and our posterity, 10 Ihem, th eir heirs ar..d posterity, to the end of time."

Mr. Burke conceives hi s point sufficientl y established by produci ng these clauses, which he enforces by saying that they exclude the ri ght of the nation/orever. And not yet content with making such declarations, repeated over and over again, he further says "that if the

people of England possessed such a right before the Revolution" (which he acknowledges to have been the case, not o nly in England

but throughout Europe, at an early period), "yet that the English na/ioll did, at the lime of the Revolution, most solemnly renounce and abdicate it, for themselves, and for all their posterity, forever." As Mr. Burke occasionally applies the poison drawn from his horrid principles, not only to the English nation, but to thc French Revolution and the National Assembly, and charges that august. illuminated, and illuminating body of men with the epithet of "usurpers," I shan, sans cel"emollie, place another system of principles in opposition to his. The English Parliament of 1688 did a certain thing which, for themselves and their constituents, they had a right to do and which it appeared right should be done. But in addition to thi s right, which they possessed by delegation, they sellip another right by assumptioll, that of binding and controlling posterity to the end of time. The case, therefore, divides itself into two parts: the right which they possessed by del egation, and the right which they set up by assumption. The first is admitted, but with respect to the second, I reply: There never did, there never will , and there never can exist a parliament, or any description of men, or any generation of men, in any count ry, possessed of the right or the power of binding and controlling posterity to the "end of time," or of commanding forever how the world shall be governed o r who shal1 govern it; and therefore al1 such clauses, acts, or declarations, by which the makers of them attempt to do what they have neither the right nor the power to do, nor the power to execute, are in themselves null and void.

Thomas Paine s Political Writings

17

Every age and generation must be as free to a..:t for itself, in all cases, as the ages and generation which preceded il. The vanity and presumption of governing beyond the grave is the most ridiculous and insolent of all tyrannies. Man has no property in man; neither has any generation a property in the generations which are to follow. The Parliament or the people of 1688, or of any other period, had no more right to dispose oflhe people oflbe present day, or to bind or to control them in any shape whatever, than the Parliament or the people of the present day have to di spose of, bind, or control those who are to live a hundred or a thousand years hence. Every generation is and must be competent to all the purposes which its occasions require. It is the living, and not the dead, that are to be accommodated. When man ceases to be, his power and his wants cease with him; and having no longer any participation in the concerns of this world, he has no longer any authority in directing who shall be its governors, or how its government shall be organized or how administered. I am not contending for nor against any fonn of government, nor for nor against any part here or elsewhere. That which a whole nation chooses to do it has a right to do. Mr. Burke says, No. Where then does the right e~ist? I am comending for the rights oflhe living, and against their being willed away and controlled and contracted for by the manuscript assumed authority of the dead ; and Mr. Burke is contending for the authority of the dead over the rights and freedom of the living. There was a time when kings disposed of their crowns by will upon their deathbeds and consigned the people, like beasts of the field , to whatever successor they appointed. This is now so exploded as scarcely to be remembered and so monstrous as hardly to be believed. But the parliamentary clauses upon which Mr. Burke builds his political church are of the same nature. The laws of every country must be analogous to some common principle. In England, no parent or master, nor all the authority of Parliament, omnipotent as it has called itself, can bind or control the personal freedom even of an indi vidual beyond the age of twenty-one

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years. On what ground afrighl, then, could the Parliament of 1688, or any other parliament, bind all posterity forever? Those who have quieted the world and those who are not yet arrived in it are as remote from each other as the utmost stretch of moral imagination can conceive. What possible obligation, then, can exist between them; what rule or principle can be laid down that two

nonentities, the one out of existence and the other not in, and who never can meet in this world, that the one should control the other to the end of time?

In England, it is said that money cannot be taken out of the pockets of the people without their consent. But who authorized, or who could authorize, the Parliament of 1688 to control and take away the freedom of posterity, and limit and confine their right of acting in certain cases forever, wbo were not in existence to give or to withhold their consent? A greater absurdity cannot present itself to the understanding of man than what Mr. Burkl! offers to his readers. He tell s them, and he tells the world to come, that a certain body of men, who existed a hundred years ago, made a law; and that there docs not now exist in the nation , nor ever will, nor ever can, a power to alter it . Under how many subtleties or absurdities has the divine right to govern been imposed on the credulity of mankind! Mr. Burke has discovered a new one, and he has shortened his journey to Rome by appealing to the power of this infallible Parliament of former days; and he produces what it has done as of divine authority, for that power must certainly be more than human which no human power to the end of time can alter. But Mr. Burke has done some service. not to his cause, but to his country, by bringing those clauses into public view. They serve to demonstrate how necessary it is at all times to watch against the attempted encroachment of power and to prevent its running to excess. It is somewhat extraordinary that the offense for which James II was expelled, that of setting up power by assumpliofl. should be re-acted, under another shape and form, by the Parliament that expelled him. It shows that the rights of man were but imperfectly understood at the Revolution ; for certain it is that the right which that Parliament set up by assumptioll (for by delegation if had it not, and could not

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have it because none could give it) over the persons and freedom of posterity forever was the same tyrannical, unfounded kind which James attempted to set up over the Parl iament and the nation. and for which he was expelled. The only difference is (for in principle they differ not) that the one was a usurper over the living and the other over the unborn ; and as the one has no better authority to stand upon than the other, both of them must be equally null and void, and of no effect. From what, or from whence, does Mr. Burke prove the right of any human power to bind posterity forever? He has produced his clauses, but he must produce also hi s proofs that such a right existed and show how it existed. It is ever existed, it must now exist; for whatever appertains to the nature of man cannot be annihilated by man. It is the natUre of man to die, and he will continue to die as long as he continues to be born. But Mr. Burke has set up a sort of political Adam, in whom all posterity arc bound forever; he must therefore prove that his Adam possessed such a power or such a right.

The weaker any cord is, the less it will bear to be stretched and the worse is the policy to stretch it, unless it is intended to break it. Had a person contemplated the overthrow of Mr. Burke's positions, he would have proceeded as Mr. Burke has done. He would have magnified the authorities on purpose to have called the right of them into question and the instant the question of right was started the authorities must have been given up. It requires but a very sma ll glance of thought to perceive that, although laws made in one generation often continue in force through succeeding generations, yct they continue to derive their force from the consent of the li vi ng. A law not repealed continues in force , not because it cannot be repealed, but because it is not repealed; and the nonrepealing passes for consent.

But Mr. Burke's clauses have not even this qualification in their favour. They become null by attempling to become immortal. The nature of In em precludes consent. Th ey destroy the right which they might ha ve by grounding it on a right which they callflot have. Immortal power is nOI a human righI, and therefore cannol be a right of Parliament.

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The Parliament of 1688 might as well have passed an act to have authorized themselves to live forever as to make their authority 10 live

forever. All therefore that can be said of them is that they are a fonnality of words. ef as much import as if those who used them had addressed a congratulation to themselves and, in the oriental style of antiquity, had said, 0 Parliament, live forever! The c ircumstances of the world are continually changing, and the opinions of men change also ; and as government is for the living, and not for the dead, it is the living only that has any right in it. That

which may be thought right and found convenient in one age may be thought wrong and found inconvenient in another. In such cases, who is to decide, the living or the dead? As almost one hundred pages ofM. Burke's book are employed upon these clauses, it will consequently follow that if the clauses themselves, so far as they set up an assumed, usurped dominion over posterity forever, are unauthoritativc and in their nature null and void, that all his voluminous inferences and declamation drawn therefrom or founded thereon are null and void also, and on thi s ground I rest the maUer.

OF THE NATURAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS OF MAN I have now to follow Mr. Burke through a pathless wilderness of rhapsodies and a sort of descant upon governments. in which he asserts whatever he pleases, on the presumption of its being believed, without offeri ng either evidence or reasons for so doing. Before anything can be reasoned upon to a conclusio n, cen ain facts, principles, or data to reason from must be established, admitted, or deni ed. Mr. Burke, with hi s usual outrage, abuses the Declaration of the Rights o f Man: published by the National Assembly to France, as the basis on which the Constitution of France is built. This he calls "paltry and blurred sheets of paper about the rights of man." Does Mr. Burke mean to deny that mall has any rights? Ifhe does, then he must mean that there are no such things as rights anywhere and that he has none himself, for who is there is the world but man? But if Mr. Burke mea ns to admit that man has rights, the a.

(See pp. 96 ff.)

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question then will be, what are those rights, and how came man by them originally? The error of those who reason by precedents drawn from antiquity, respecting the rights of man, is that they do not go far enough into antiquity. They do not go the whole way. They stop in some of the intermediate stages of a hundred or a thousand years and produce what was then done as a rule for the present day. Thi s is no authority at all. If we travel still further into antiquity, we shall find a directly contrary opinion and practice prevailing; and if antiq:Jity is to he authority, a thousand such authorities may be produced, successively contradicting each other; but if we proceed on, we shall at last come out right: we sha ll come to the time when man came from the hand of his Maker. What was he then? Man. Man was hi s high and only title, and a higher cannot be given him. But of titles I shall speak hereafter. We have now arrived a Ine origin of man and at the origin of his rights. As to the manner in which the world has been governed from that day to this, it is no further any concern of ours than to make a proper use of the errors or the improvements which the history of it presents. These who lived a hundred or a thousand years ago were then moderns as we are now. They had their ancients, and those ancients had olhers, and we also shall be ancients in our turn . If the mere name of antiquity is to govern in the affairs of life, the people who are to li ve a hundred or a thousand years hence may as well take us for a prcceden!, as we make a precedent of those who lived hundred or a thousand years ago. The fact is that portions of antiquity, by proving everything. establish nothing. It is authority against authority all the way, till we come to the di vine origin of the rights of man at the creation. Here our inquiries find a resting place and our reason finds a home. If a dispute about the rights of man had arisen at a distance of a hundred years from the creation, it is to this source of authority they must have referred; and it is to the same source of authority that we must now refer. Though I mean not to touch upon any sectarian principle of religion. yet it may be worth observing that the genealogy of Christ is

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traced to Adam. Why then not trace the rights of man to the creation of man? I will answer the question . Because there have been upstart governments thrusting themselves between the presumptuously working

to unmake man. If any generation of men e ver possessed the right of dictating

the mode by which the world should be governed forever, it was the first generation that existed; and if that generation did it not, no succeeding generation can show any authority for doing it, nor can

set any up. The illuminating and divine principle of the equal rights of man (for it has its origin from the maker of man) relates not only to the living individuals, but 10 generations of men succeeding each other. Every generation is equal in rights to the generations which preceded it, by the same rule that every indi vidual is born equal in rights with his contemporary. Every history of the creatio n and every traditionary aCCOUnl, whether from the lettered or unlenercd world. however they may vary in their opinion or belief of cenain particulars, all agree in establishing one point. the unity of man ; by which I mean that men are all of olle degree, and consequently that all men are born equal and with equal natural rights, in the same manner as if posterity had been continued by creatioll instead of generation. the latter being only the mode by which the former is carried forward ; and consequently every child born into the world must be considered as deriving its existence from God. The world is as new to him as it was to the first man that existed, and his natural right in it is of the same kind. The Mosaic account of the creation, whether taken as divine authority or merely historical, is fully up to this point, the unily or equality o/mall. The expressions admit of no controversy. "And God said, let us make man in our own image. In the image of God created he him; male and female created he them." The distinction of sexes is poinled out, but no other distinction is even implied. If this be not divine authority, it is at least his torical authority and shows that the equality of man, so far from being a modem doctrine. is the oldest upon record. II is also to be observed that all the religions known in the world are founded, so far as they relate to man, on the unity ofmati, as being

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all of one degree. Whether In heaven or in hell , or in whatever state man may be supposed to exist hereafter, the good and the' bad are the only distinctions. Nay, even the laws of governments are obliged to slide into this princi ple, by making degrees to consist in crimes and not in persons.

It is one of the greatest of all truths, and of the highest advantage to cultivate. By considering man in this light, and by instructing him to consider himself in this light, it places him in a close connection with all his duties, whether to his Creator or to the creation, of which he is a part; and it is only when he forgets hi s origin, or, to use a more fashionable phrase, hi s birth and/ami/y, that he becomes dissolute. It is not among the least of the evils of the present existing governmenls in all parts of Europe, that man, considered as man, is thrown back to a vast distance from his Maker, and the artificial chasm filled up by a succession of barriers, or a sort of turnpike gates, through which he has to pass. I will quote Mr. Burke's catalogue ofbaniers that he has set up between man and his Maker. Putting himself in the character of a herald, he says: "We fear God: we look with awe to kings, with affection to parliaments, with duty to magistrates, with reverence to priests, and with respect to nobil ity." Mr. Burke has forgotten to put in "chivalry." He has also forgotten to put in Peter. The duty of man is not a wilderness of turnpike gates, through which he is to pass by tickets from onc to the other. It is plain and simple and consists but of two points: his duty to God, which every man must feel ; and with respect to his neighbour, to do as he would be done by. If those to whom power is delegated do well they will be respected, if not they will be despised; and with regard to those to whom no power is delegated, but who assume it, the rational world can know nothing of them. Hitherto we ~a ve spoken only (and that but in part) of the natural rightS of man. We have now to consider the civil rights of man and to show how the one originates from the other. Man did not enter into society to become worse than he was before, nor to have fewer rights than he had before, but to have those rights better secured. Hi s natural rights are the foundation of all hi s civil rights. But in order to pursue

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this distinction with more precision, it is necessary to make the different qualities of natural and civil rights. A few words will explain th is. Natural rights are those which appertain to man in right of hi s existence. Of this kind are all the intellectual rights, or rights of the mind, and also all those fights of acting as an individual for his own comfort and happiness which are not injurious to the natural rights of others. Civi l rights are those which appertain to man in right of his being a member of society. Every civil right has for its foundation some natural right pre-

existing in the individual, but 10 the enjoyment of which his individual power is not in all cases sufficiently competent. Of this kind are all those which relate to security and protection. From this short review it will be easy to distinguish between that class of natural rights which man retains after entering into society and those which he throws into the common stock as a member of society. The natural rights w hich he retains are all those in which the power to execute is as perfect in the individual as the right itself. Among this class, as is before mentioned. are all the intellectual rights, or rights of the mind; consequently religion is one of those rights. The natural rights which are not retained are all those in which, though the right is perfect in the individual, the power to execute them is defective. They answer not his purpose. A man, by natural righ t, has a right to judge in his own cause, and so far as the right of the mind is concerned he never surrenders it; but what avails it him to judge ifhe has not power to redress? He therefore deposits hi s right in the common stock of society and takes the ann of soc iety, of which he is a part, in preference and in addition to his own. Society grams him nothing. Every man is proprietor in society and draws on the capital as a matter of right. From these premises, two or three certain conclusions w ill follow:

First, that every civi l ri ght grows out of a natural right ; or, in other words, is a nalural right exchanged. Secondly, that civil power, properly considered as such. is made up of the aggregate of that class of the natural rights of man wh ich

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becomes defe(;tive in the individual in point of power and answers not his purpose, but when collected to a focus becomes competent to the purpose of everyone. Thirdly , that the power produced from the aggregate of natural rights, imperfe(;t in power in the individual, cannot be applied to invade the natural rights which arc retained in the individual and in which the power to executi ve is as perfect as the right itself. We have now, in a few words, traced man from a natural individual to a member of society and shown, or endeavored to show, the quality of the natural rights retained and those which are exchanged for civil rights. Let us now apply those principle to governments. OF THE NATURE OF GOVERNMENT In casting our eyes over the world, it is extremely easy to di stinguish the governments which have arisen out of society, or out of the social compact, from those which have not; but to place this in a clearer light than what a single glance may afford, it will be proper to take a review of the several sources from which the governments have arisen and Oil which they have been founded. They may be all compreheuded under three heads. Firs/, superstition, Secolldly, power. Thirdly, the common interests of society . and the common rights of man. The first was a government of prieslcraft, the second, of conquerors, and the third, of reason. When a set of artful men pretended, through the medium Q{A oracles, to hold intercourse with the Deity, a5 familiarly as they now march up the backstairs in European courts, the world was completely under the government of superstition. The oracles were consulted, and whatever they were made to say became the law ; and this sort of government lasted as long as this sort of superstition lasted. After these a race of conquerors arose whose government, like that of William the Conqueror, was founded in power, and the sword assumed the name of a scepter. Governments thus established last as long as the power to support them lasts; but that they might avail themselves of eVl!ry engine in their favour, they united fraud to force

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and set up and idol which they called "Divine Right." and which, in imitation of the Pope, who affects to be spiritual and temporal, and in contradiction to the founder of the Christian religion, twisted itself afterward into an idol of another shape, called "Church and State." The key of Saint Peter and the key of the treasury became quartered on one another, and the wondering. cheated multitude worshiped the invention. When I contemplate the natural dignity of man, when I feel (for

nature has not been kind enough to me to blunt my feelings) for the honour and happiness of its character, J become irritated at the attempt to govern mankind by force and fraud, as if they were all knaves and fools, and can scarcely avoid disgust at those who are thus imposed upon. We have now to review the governments which arise out of society, in contradistinction to those which arose out of superstition and conquest. It has been thought a considerable advance toward establiShing the principles of freedom to say that government is a compact between those who govern and those who are governed, but this cannot be true, because it is puning the effect before the cause; for as a man must have existed before governments existed, there necessarily was a time when governments did not exisl, and consequentl y there could origina lly exist no governors to form such a compact with.

The fact therefore must be that the individuals themselves, each in his own personal and sovereign right, entered into a compacr w;r" each other to produce a government; and this is the only mode in which governments have a right to arise and the only principle on which they have a right to exist. To possess ourselves of a clear idea of what government is, or ought to be, we must race it to its origin. In doing this, we shall easily discover that governments must have arisen either out of the people or over the people. Mr. Burke has made no di stinction. He investigates nothing to its source, and therefore he confounds everything; but he has signified hi s intention of undertaking at some future opportunity a comparison between the constitutions of England and France.

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As he thus renders it a subject of controversy by throwing the gauntlet, I take him upon his own ground. It is in high challenges that high truths have the right of appearing; and I accept it ~ith the more readiness because it affords me. at the same time, an opportunity of pursuing the subject with respect to governments arising out of society. But it will be first necessary to define what is meant by a "constitution." It is not sufficient that we adopt the word; we must fix also a standard signification to it. A constitution is not a thing in name only. but in fact. It has not an ideal. but a real existence; and wherever it cannot be produced in a visible form. there is none. A constitution is a thing anlecedefll to a government, and a government is only the creature of a constitution. The constitution of a country is not the act of its government. but of the people constituting a government.

It is the body of elements to which you can refer and quote article by article, and which contains the principles on which the government shall be establi shed, the manner in which it shall be organised, the powers it shall have, the mode of elections the duration of parliaments or by what other name such bodies may be called, the powers which the executive part of the government shall have, and, in fine, everything that relates to the complete organisation of a civil government and the principl es on which it shall act and by which it shall be bound. A constitution, therefore, is to a government what the laws made afterward by that government are to a court of judicature. The court of judicature does not make the laws, neither can it alter them; it only acts in conformity to the laws made. and the government is in like manner governed by the constitution.

OF ARISTOCRACY The French constitution says. " there shall be no titles," and of consequence all that class of equivocal generation which in some countries is called "aristocracy" and in others ''nobility'' is done away, and the "peer" is exalted into "man." Titles are but nicknames. and evcry nickname is a title. The thing is perfectly harmless in itself, but it marks a sort of foppery in the human character which degrades it. It renders man diminutive in things

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which are great, and the counterfeit of woman in things which are little. It talks about its fin e blue "riband" like a girt, and shows its new "garter" like a child. A certain writer, of some antiquity, says, "When I was a chi ld, I thought as a c hild; but when I became a man, I put

away childish things." It is, properly. from he elevated mind of France that thc foll y of titles has been abolished. It has outgrown the baby clothes ar"caunt"

and "duke," and breached itselfin manhood . France has not leveled, it has exalted. It has put down the dwarf to set up thc man . The insignificance of a senseless word like "duke," "count," or "earl " has ceased to please. Even those w ho possessed them have disowned the g ibberish and as they outgrew the rickets have despised thc rattlc. The genuine mind of man, thirsting for its native home, society, contemns the gewgaws that separate him from it. Titles are like c ircles drawn by the magician 's wand to contract the sphere of man 's felicit y. He livt:s immured with in the Bastill e of a word and surveys at a distance the envied life of man. Is it then any wonder that titles should fa ll in France? Is it not a greater wonder they should be kept up anywhere? What are they? What is their wort h and "what is their amount?" When we think or speak of a "judge" or a "genera l," we associate with it the ideas of office and c haracter, we think of gravity in the one and bravery in the othcr; but when we use a word merely as a title, no ideas associate with it. Through all the vocabulary of Adam, there is no such an animal as a duke or a count; neither can we connect any idea to the words. Whether they mean strength or weakness, wisdom or fo ll y, a child or a man, or a rider or a horse, is all equi vocal. W hat respect then can be pa id to that which describes nothing and which means nothing? Imagi nation has given figu re and character to centaurs, satyrs, and down to all the fai ry tribe, but titles baffle even the powers of fancy a nd are a chimerical nondescript. But this is not al l. If a whole country is disposed to hold them in contempt, all their value is gone and none wil l own them. It is common opi nion only that makes them anyth ing or nothing, or worse than nothing. There is no occasion to take titles away, for they take themselves away when society concurs to ridicule them. Thi s species

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of imaginary consequence has visibly declined in every part of Europe. and it hasteos to its exist as the world of reason continues to rise. There was a time when the lowest class of what are called nobility was more thought of than the highest is now. and when a man in armour riding through Christendom in search of adventure was more started at than a modem duke. The world has seen this folly fall, and is has fallen by being laughed at, and the farce of titles will follow its fate. The patriots of France have discovered in good time that rank and dignity in society must take a new ground. The old one has fallen through. It must now take the substantial ground of character, instead of the chimerical ground of titles; and they have brought their titles to the altar and made of them a burnt offering to reason. Ifno mischiefhas annexed itself to the folly of titles, they would not have been worth a serious and formal destruction, such as the National Assembly have decreed them; and this makes it necessary to inquire further into the nature and character of aristocracy. That, then, which is called aristocracy in some countries and nobility in others arose out of the governments founded upon conquest. It was originally a military order for the purpose of supporting military government (for such were all governments founded in conquest); and to keep up a succession of this order for the purpose for which it was establi shed, all the younger branches of those families were disinherited and the law of primogenitureship set up. The nature and character of aristocracy shows itself to us in this law. It is a law against evcry law of nature, and nature herself calls for its destruction . Establish family justice, and aristocracy falls. By the aristocraticallaw ofprimogenitureship, in a family of six children. five are exposed. Aristocracy has never more than one child. The rest are begotten to be devoured. They are thrown to the cannibal for prey, and the natural parent prepares the unnatural repast. As everything which is out of nature in man affects, more or less, the interest of society, so does this . All the children which the aristocracy disowns (which are all except the eldest) are, in general, cast like orphans on a pari sh, to be provided for by the public, but at

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a greater charge. Unnecessary offices and places in governments and courts are created at the expense of the public 10 maintain them. With what kind of parental reflections can be father or mother contemplate their younger offspring? By nature they are children and by marriage they are hei rs, but by aristocracy they are bastards and orphans. They are the flesh and blood of their parents in one line, and

nothing akin to them in the odler. To restore, therefore, parents to their chi ldren and chi ldren to their parenls--relalions to each other and man to society-and to cxtenninate the monster aristocracy, rOOI and branch, the French co nstitution has destroyed the law o f primogenitureship. Here then lies the monster; and Mr. Burke, if he pl eases, may write its epitaph. Hitherto we have considered aristocracy chiefly in one point o f view. We have now to consider it in another. Bul whether we view it befo re or behind, or s ideways, or anyway else, domestica ll y o r publicly, it is still a monster. In France, aristocracy has o ne feature less in the countenance than that it has in some other countries. It did not compose a body of hereditary legislators. It was not "a corporation of aristocracy," for such I have heard M. de Lafayette d escribe an English House of Peers. LeI us then examine the grou nds upon which the French constitution has resolved against having such a House in France: Because, in the first place, as is already mentioned, aristocracy is kept up by family tyranny and injustice.

Secondly, because there is an unusual unfitness in an aristocracy to be legislators for a nation. Thei.r ideas of "distributive justice" are corrupted at the very source. They begin life by trampling on all their younger brothers and sisters and relations o f every kind, and are taught and educated so to do. With what ideas of justice or honour can that man enter a house of legislation who absorbs in his own person the inheritance of a whole family of children or doles out to them some pitiful portion with the insolence o f a gift? Thirdly. beca use the idea of hered itary legi slat o rs is as inconsistent as that o f hereditary judges or hereditary juries, and as absurd as a hereditary mathematician or a hereditary wise man, and as ridiculous as a hereditary poet-laureate.

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Fourthly, because a body of men holding themselves accountable to nobody ought not to be trusted by an ybody. Fifthly, because it is continuing the uncivilized principles of the governments founded in conquest and the base idea of man having property in man and governing him by personal right. Sixthly, because aristocracy has a tendency to degenerate the human species. By the universal economy of nature it is known, and by the instance of the Jews it is proved, that the human species has a tendency to degenerate, in any small number , of persons, when separated from the general stock of society and intermarrying constantly with each other. It defeats even its pretended and end becomes in time the opposite of what is noble in man. Mr. Burke talks of nobility; let him show what it is? The greatest characters the world has known have risen on the democratic fl oor. Aristocracy has not been able to keep a proportionate pace with democracy.

The artificial noble shrinks into a dwarf before the nobl~ of nature; and in the few instances of those (for there are some in all countries) in whom nature, as by a miracle, has survived in aristocracy, those men despise it.

OR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM The French constitution has abolished or renounced lo/era/ion and intolerance also, and has established universal right of conscience. Toleration is not th e oppos ite of intol erat ion , but is the cOllllterfeit of it. Both are despotisms. The one assumes to itself the right of withholding liberty of conscience, and the other of granting it. The one is the Pope anned with fire and faggot , and the other is the Pope selling or granting indulgences. The fonner is church and state, and the latter is church and traffic . But toleration may be viewed in a much stronger light. Man worships not himself but hi s Maker; and the liberty of conscience which he claims is nOI for the service of himself but of hi s God. In this case, therefore, we must necessarily have the associated idea of two beings: the mortal who renders the worship, and the immortal being who is worshiped.

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Tolcnltion therefore, places itself not between man and man. nor between church and church, nOT between onc denomination of religion and another, but between God and man- between the being who worships and the being who is worshiped; and by the same act of assumed authority by which it tolerates man to pay his worship, it presumptuously and blasphemously sets up itself to tolerate the Almighty to receive it. Were a bill brought into Parliament entitled, "An act to tolerate or grant liberty to the Almighty to receive the worship of a Jew or a Turk" or "to prohibit the Almighty from receiving it," all men would startle and call it blasphemy. There would be an uproar. The presumption of toleration in religious maners would then present itself unmasked; but the presumption is not the less because the name of man only appears to those laws, for the associated idea of the worshiper and the worshiped cannot be separated. Who, then, art thou, vain dust and ashes! by whatever name thou art called, whether a king, a bishop, a church or a state, a parliament or anything else, that obtrudest thine insignificance between the soul of man and his Maker'? Mind thine own concerns. Ifhe believes not as thou believest, it is a proof that thou believest not as he believeth, and there is no earthly power can detennine between you. With respect to what are called denominations of religion, if everyone is left to judge of his own religion, there is no such thing as a religion that is wrong; but if they are to judge of each other's religion, there is no such thing as a religion that is right, and therefore all world is right or all the world is wrong. But with respect to religion itself, without regard to names and as directing itself from the universal family of mankind to the divine object of all adoration, it is man bringing to his Maker the fruits of his heart; and though these fruits may differ from each other like the fruits of the earth, the grateful tribute of everyone is accepted. A bishop of Durham, or a bishop of Winchester. or the archbishop who heads the dukes will not refuse a tithe sheaf of wheat because it is not a cock of hay, nor a cock of hay because it is not a sheaf of what, nor a pig because it is neither the one nor the other; but these same persons, under the figure of an established church, will not pennit their Maker to receive the various tithes of man 's devotion.

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One of the continual choruses of Mr. Burke's book is "church and state." He does not mean some one particular church or some one particular state, but any church and state; and he uses the renn as a general figure to hold forth the political doctrine of always uniting the . church with the state in every country, and he censures the National Assembly for not having done th is in France. Let us bestow a few thoughts on this subject. All religions are in their nature mild and benign and united with principles of morality. They could not have made proselytes at first by professing anything that was vicious, cruel, persecuting, or inunoral. Lik.e everything else, they had their beginning; and they proceeded by persuasion, exhortation, and example. How, then, is it that they lose their native mildness and become morose and intolerant?

It proceeds from the connection which Mr. Burke recommends. By engendering the church with the state, a sort of mule animal, capable only of destroying, and not of breeding up. is produced called. "the church established by law." It is a stranger, even from its birth. to any parent mother on which it is begotten and whom in time it kicks

out and destroys. The Inquisition in Spain does not proceed from the religion originally professed, but from thi s mule animal engendered between .'. the church and the state. The burnings in Smithfield proceeded from the same heterogeneous production; and it was the regeneration of this strange animal in England afterward that renewed rancor and irreligion among the inhabitants and that drove the people called Quakers and Dissenters to America. Persecution is not an original feature in any religion. but it is always the strongly marked feature of all law religions, or religions established by law. Take away the law establishment, and every religion reassumes its original benignity. In America, a Catholic priest is a good citizen, a good character, and a good neighbour ; an Episcopal minister is of the same description; and this proceeds, independently of the men, from there being no law establishment in America. If, also, we view this mattcr in a temporal sense, we shall see the ill effects it has had on the prosperity of nations. The union of

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church and state has impoveri shed Spain. The revoking the Edict o f Nantes drove the silk manu facture from France into England, and church and state are now driving the cotton manufacture from England

to America and France. Let then Mr. Burke continue to preach hi s antipolitical doctrine o f church and state. It will do some good. The National Assembly will not fo llow his advice, but will benefit by his folly. It was by observing the ill effects o f it in Eng land that America has been warned against it; and it is by experiencing them in France that the National Assembly have aboli shed it and, like America, have established universal righ, of conscience and universal right of citizellship.b b.

When in any country we see extraordinary circumstances taking place, they naturally lead any man who has a talent for observation and investigation to inquire into the causes. The manufactures of Manchester, Binningham, and Sheffield are the pri ncipal manufactures in England. From whence did this arise? A little observation wi ll explain the case. The principal and the generality of the inhabitants of those places are not of what is called in England "the church established by law"; and they or their fathers (for it is within but a fe w years) withdrew from the persecution of the chartered towns, where test laws more particu larly operale, and established a sort of asylum for themselves in those places. It was the only asylum that then offered, for the rest of Europe was worse. But the case is not changing. France and America bid a ll comers welcome, and initiate them into all the rights of citizenship. Policy and interest. therefore, will, but perhaps too late, dictate in England what reason and j ustice could nOI. Those manufactures are withdrawing and are arising in other places. There is now (1791) erecting at Passy, three mites from Paris, a large cotton milt. and several are already ere<:ted in America. Soon after the rejecting th e bill for repea ling the test law, one of th e richest manufacture rs in England said in my hearing, "England. Sir, is not a country for a Dissenter to live in-we must go to France." These are truths, and it is doing justice to both parties to tell them. It is chiefly the Dissenters who have carried English man ufactures to the height they are now at, and the same men have it in their power to carry them away; and though those manufactu res would afterward continue to be made in those places, the forei gn market would be losl. There are frequentl y appearing in the London Gazette extracts from certain acts to prevent machines and, as fa r as it can extend to, persons from going out of the country. (Coll/d.)

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The conspiracy being thus dispersed, one of the first works of the National Assembly. instead of vindictive proclamations. as has been the case with other governments, published a Declaration of the Rights of man, as the basis on which the new constitution was to be built, and which is here subjoined.

DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF CITIZENS BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF FRANCE The representatives of the people of France, formed into a National Assembly. considering that ignorance, neglect, or contempt of human rights are the sole causes of public misfortunes and corruptions of government. have resolved to set forth in a solemn declaration these natura l, imprescriptible. and unalienable rights; that, this declaration being constantly present to the minds of the members of the body social , they may be ever kepI attentive to their rights and their duties; that the act of the legislat ive and executive powers of government, being capable of being every moment compared with the end of political institut ions, may be more respected; and also Ihal the future claims of Ihe citizens, being directed by simple and incontestible principles, may always tend to the maintenance of the constitution and the general happiness. For these reasons the National Assembly does recognize and declare, in the presence of the Supreme Being. and with the hope of His blessing and favour, he following sacred rights of men and of citizens: I. Mell are bom , and always cOlltinlte.free alld equal ill respect of their rights. Civil distillctiolls. therefore. call be foullded ollly on public utility.

b. (Collld.) It appears from these that the ill effects of the test laws and church establishment begin to be much suspected. but the remedy of force can never supply the remedy of reason. In the progress of less than a century. all Ihe unrepresented pan of England, of all denominations. which is at least a hundred times Ihe most numerous, may begin to feel the necessity ofa constitution. and then allihose matter will come regularly before them.

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n. The end of all political associations is the preservation of the nalural and imprescriptible rights of man; and these rights are liberty, property, security, and resislance of oppression. Ill. The nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty; nor can any individual or any body of men be entitled to any authority which is nOI expressly derivedfrom it. IV. Political liberty consists in the power of doing whatever does not injure another. The exercise of the natural rights of every man has no other limits than those which are necessary to secure to every other man the free exercise of the same rights, and these limits are detenninable only by the law. V. The law ought to prohibit only actions hurtful to society. What is not prohibited by the law should not be hindered; nor should anyone be compelled to that which the law does not require. VI. The law is an expression of the will of the community. All citizens have a right to concur, either personally or by their representatives, in its fonnation. It should be the same to all, whether it protects or punishes; and all being equal in irs sight are equally

eligible to all honours. places, and employments, according to their different abilities. withoul any olher distinction than that crealed by their virtues and talents. VII. No man should be accused, arrested, or held in confinement, except in cases detennined by the law and according to the forms which it has prescribed. All who promote, solicit, execute, or cause to be executed arbitrary orders ought to be punished, and every citizen called upon or apprehended by virtue of the law oUght immediately to obey and renders himself culpable by resistance. VIII . The law ought to impose no other penalties but such as are absolutely and evidently necessary, and no one oUght to be punished but in virtue of a law promulgated before the offense and legally applied. IX . Every man being presumed innocent till he has been convicted, whenever his detention becomes indispensable, all rigor to him- more than is necessary to secure his person--ought to be provided against by the law.

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X. No man oUght to be molested on account of his opinions,. not even on account of his religious opinions, provided his avowal of them does not disturb the public order established by the law.

XI. The unrestrained communication of thoughts and opinions being one of the most precious rights of man, every citizen may speak, write, and publish freely, provided he is responsible for the abuse of this liberty in cases determined by the law. XU. A public force being necessary to give security to the rights of men and of citizens, that force is instituted for the benefit of the community, and not for the particular benefit of the persons with whom it is entrusted.

XIII. A common contribution being necessary for the support of the public force and for defraying the other expenses of the government, it ought to be divided equally among the members of the community, according to their abilities. XIV. Every citizen has ~ right, either by himself or his representative, to a free voice in detennining the necessity of public contributions, the appropriation of them, and their amount, mode of assessment, and duration.

Xv. Every community has a right to demand of all its agents an account of their conduct. XVI. Every community in which a separation of powers and a security of rights is not provided for wants a constitution. XVII . The rights to property being inviolable and sacred, no one ought to be deprived of it, except in cases of evident public necessity, legally ascertained, and on condition of a previous just indemnity.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE DECLARATION
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conformable to rights a lready declared. But it is questioned by some very good people in France, as we ll as in other countries, whether the

tenth article sufficiently guarantees the right it is intended to accord with; besides which, it takes off from the divine dignity of religion and weakness its operative force upon the mind to make it a subject ofhurnan laws. It then presents itselfto man like light intercepted by a cloudy medium, in which the source of it is obscured from his sight, and he sees nothing to reverence in the dusky ray.c The remaining art icl es, beginning with th e twelfth, are substantially contained in the principles of the preceding artic les; but in the particular situation in w hich France then was, having to undo what was wrong as well as to sct up what was right, it was proper to be more particular than what in another condition of things would be necessary.

Wh ile the Declaration of Right s .was before the National Assembly, some of its members remarked that, if a Declaration of Rights was publi shed, it should be accompanied by a Declaration of Duties. The observation di scovered a mind that reflected, and it only erred by not reflecting far enough. A Declaration of Rights is, by reciprocity. a Declaration of Duties also. Whatever is my right as a man is also the right of another, and it becomes my duty to guarantee as well as to possess.

c.

There is a single idea which, if it strikes rightly upon the mind cither in a _. legal or a religious sense, will prevent any man or any body of men or any government from going wrong on the subject of religion, which is thaI before any human institutions of government were known in the world there existed, if I may so express it, a compact between God and man from the beginning of time; and that, as the relation and condition which man in his individual person stands in toward his Maker cannot be changed or any ways altered by any human laws or human authority, thai religious devotion which is :l pan of this compact cannot so much as be made a subject of human laws and that all laws must confonn themselves to this prior existing compact and not assume to make the compact confonn to the laws, which, besides being human, are subsequent thereto. The fi rst act of man, when he looked around and saw himself a creature which he did not make and a world furnished for his reception, must have been devotion; and devotion must ever continue sacred to every individual man as it appears right to him, and governments do mischief by interfering.

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The three first articles are the basis of liberty, as well individual as national ; nor can any counuy be called free whose government does not take its beginning from the principles t}ley contain and continue to preserve them pure; and the whole of the Declaration of Rights is of more value to the world and will do more· good than all the laws and statutes that have yet been promulgated. In the declaratory eX.Qrdium which prefaces the Declaration of Rights, we see the solemn and majestic spectacle of a nation opening its commission, under the auspices of its Creator, to establi sh a government; a scene so new and so transcendently unequaled by anything in the European world that the name of a revolution is diminutive of its character, and it rises into a regeneration of man. What are the present governments of Europe but a scene of iniquity and oppression? What is that ~f England? Do not its own inhabitants say it is a market where every man has his price, and where corruption is common traffic , at the expense of a deluded people? No wonder, then, that the French Revolution is traduced. Had it confined itself merely to the destruction of flagrant despotism, perhaps Mr. Burke and some others had been silent. Their cry now is, "It is gone too far"- that is, it has gone too far for them. It stares corruption in the face, and the venal tribe are all alarmed. Their fear discovers itself in their outrage, and they are but publishing the groans of a wounded vice. But from such opposition the French Revolution, instead of suffering, receives a homage. The more it is struck, the more sparks it will emit; and the fear is it will not be struck enough. It has nothing to dread from attacks; truth has given it an establishment, and time will record it with a name as lasting as his own. Having now traced the progress of the French Revolution through most of its principal stages, from its comnlencement to the taking of the Bastille and its establishment by the Declardtion of Righls, I will close the subject with the energetic apostrophe of M. de Lafayette: "May this great monument raised to Liberty serve as a lesson 10 the oppressor and an example to the oppressed!''
See page ( 182) of this work.- N.B. Since the taking of the Bastille, the occurrences have been published; but the mailers recorded in this narrative

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OF HEREDITARY GOVERNMENl' Notwithstanding the nonsense--for it deserves no better name-that

Mr. Burke has asserted about hereditary rights and hereditary succession, and that a nation has not a right to fonn a government for itself, it happened to fall in his way to give some account of what government is. "Govemment," says he, "is a contrivance of human wisdom." Admitting that government is a contrivance of human wisdom,

it must necessarily follow that hereditary succession and hereditary rights (as they are called) can make no part of it, because it is impossible to make wisdom hereditary; and on the other hand. that

cannot be a wise contrivance which in its operation may commit the government of a nation 10 the wisdom of an idiot. The ground which Mr. Burke now takes is fatal to every part of his cause.

The argument changes from hereditary rights to hereditary wisdom; and the question is, Who is the wisest man? He must now show that everyone in the line of hereditary succession was a Solomon, or his title is no good to be a king. What a stroke has Mr. B!Jrke now made! To use a sailor's phrase, he has 'swabbed ~e deck" and scarcely left a name legible in the list of kings, and he has mowed down and thinned the House of Peers with a scythe as fonnidable as death and time. But Mr. Burke appears to have been aware of this retort. and he has taken care to guard against it by making government to be not only a contrivance of human wisdom but a monopoly of wisdom. He puts the nation as fools on one side and places his government of wisdom. all wise men of Gotham, on the other side; and he then proclaims and says that "men have a right that their wants should be . provided for by this wisdom." Having thus made proclamation, he next proceeds to explain to them what their wants are, and also what their rights are. In this he has succeeded dexterously, for he makes their wants to be a want of wisdom; but as this is but cold comfort, he then infonns are prior to that period. and some of Ihem, as may be easily seen, can be but very lillie known. e.

(From " Miscellaneous Chapter," Part I.)

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them chat they have a right (not to any of the wisdom) but to be governed by it; and in order to impress them with a solemn reverence for this monopoly government of wisdom and of its vast capacity for all purposes, possible or impossible, right or wrong, he proceeds with astrological, mysterious importance to tell them its powers in these words: The rights of man in government are their advantages; and these are often in balances between differences of good; and in compromises sometimes between good and evil, and sometimes between evil and evil. Political reason is a computing principle; adding, sub-tracting, multiplying, and dividing, morally and not metaphysically or mathematically, true moral demonstrations. As the wondering audience whom Mr. Burke supposes himself talking to may not understand all this learned jargon, I will undertake to be its interpreter. The meaning then, good people, of all this is thaI governmem is govemed by no principle whatever; that it can make evil good, or good evil, just as it pleases. In short. lhat governmelll is arbitrary power. But there are somethings which Mr. Burke has forgonen. First, he has not shown where the wisdom originally came from; and, secondly, he has not shown by what authority it first began to act. In the manner he introduces the matter, it is either government stealing wisdom or wisdom stealing government. It is without an origin, and its powers without authority. In short, it is usurpation. But, to arrange this matter in a clearer view than what general expressions can convey, it will be necessary to state the distinct heads under which (what is called) a hereditary crown or, more properly speaking, a hereditary succession to the government of a nation can be considered,r which are:

First, the right of a particular family to establish itself. Secondly, the right of a nation to establish a particular family. With respect to the firsl of these heads, that of a family establishing itself with hereditary powers on its own authority and independent of the consent of a nation , all men will concur in calling f.

(5« p. 161.)

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it despotism; and it would be trespassing on their understanding to attempt to prove it.

But the secolld head, that of a nation establishing a partioular family with heredilary powers, does not present itself as despotism on the first reflection; but if men will permit a second reflection to take place and carry that reflection forward bUI one remove out of their

own persons to that of their offspring, , they will then see that hereditary succession becomes in its consequences the same despotism to others which they reprobated for themselves. It operates to preclude the consent of the succeeding generations, and the preclusion of consent

is

despot~sm.

When the person who at any time shall be in possession of a government, or those who stand in succession to him, shall say to a nation, I hold his power in "contempt" of you, it signifies not on what authority he pretends to say it. It is no relief but an aggravation to a person in slavery to refiectlhat he was sold by his parent; and as that wh ich heighten the criminality of an act cannot be produced to prove the legality of it, hereditary succession cannot be established as a legal thing. In order to arrive to a more perfect deci sion on this head, it will be prop·er to consider the generation which undertakes to establish a family with hereditary powers, apart and separate from the generations which are to follow ; and also to consider the character in wh ich the first generation acts with respect to succeeding generations. The generation which first selects a person and pUIS him at the head of its government, either with the titl e of king or any other di stinction, acts its OWI/ choice, be it wise or fooli sh, as a free agent for itself. The person so set up is not hereditary, but selected and appoi nted; and the generation who sets him up docs not live under a hereditary government, but under a government of its own choice and establishment. Were the generation who sets him up and the person so set up to live forever, it never could become hereditary succession; and, of consequence, hereditary succession can only fo llow on the death of the first parties. As therefore hereditary succession is out of the question with res pect to the first generation, we have now to consider the character

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in which ,hal generation acts with respect to the commenci ng generation and to all succeeding ones.

It assumes a character to which it has neither right nor title. It changes itselffrom a legislator to a testator and affects to make its will , which is to have operation after the demise of the makers, to bequeath the government; and it not only attempts to bequeath but to establish on the succeeding generation a new and different form of government under which itself lived. Itself, as is already observed, lived not under a hereditary gove rnmen t but under a gove rnm e nt of its own choice a nd establishment; and it now attempts, by virtue of a will and testament (which it has not authority to make), to take from the commencing generation and all future ones the rights and free agency by which itself acted. But, exclusive of the right whic h any generation has to act collectively as a testator, the objects to which it applies itself in this case are not within the compass of any law or of any wi ll or testament. The rights of men in society are neither devisable nor transferable nor annihilable, but are descendible only; and it is not in the power of any generation to intercept finally and cuI off the descent. If the present generation, or any other, are disposed to be slaves, it does not lessen the ri ght of the succeedi ng generation to be free; wrongs cannot have a legal descent. When Mr. Burke attempts to maintain that the English Ilalioll did allhe Revolution of / 688 most solemnly renounce and abdicate their right for themselves and for all their poslerity forever, he speaks a language that merits not repl y and which can only excite contempt for his prostitute principles or pity for his ignorance. In whatever light hereditary succession, as growing out of the will and testament of some fonner generation, presents itself, it is an absurdity. A cannot make a will to take from B the property of Band give it to C; yet thi s is he manner in which (what is called) hereditary succession by law operates. A certain fonner generation made a will to take away the rights of the commencing generation and all future ones, and to convey those rights to a third person, who afterward comes forward and tells them, in Mr. Burke's language, that they have flO rights, that their rights are

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already bequeathed to him, and that he will govern in conlemp' of them. From such principles and such ignorance, good Lord, deliver the world! CONCLUSION

Reason and ignorance, the opposites of each other, influence the great bulk of mankind . If either of these can be rendered sufficiently extensive in a country, the machinery of government goes easily on. Reason shows itself, and ignorance submits to whatever is dictated to it.

The two modes of government which prevail in the world are. first. government by election and representation; secondly, government by hereditary succession. The former is generally known by the name of republic; the latter by that of monarchy and aristocracy. Those two distinct and opposite forms erect themselves on the two distinct :and opposite bases of. reason and ignorance. As the exercise of government requires talents and abilities, and as talents and abilities cannot have hereditary descent, it is evident thai hereditary succession requires a belief from man to which his reason cannol subscribe and which can only be established upon his ignorance; and the more ignorant any country is, the better it is fined for this species of government. On the contrary, government in a well-constituted republic requires no belieffTom man beyond what his reason can give. He sees the rationale of the whole system, its origin and its operation; and as it is best supported when best understood, the human faculties act with boldness and acquire, under this form of government, a gigantic manliness. As, therefore, each of those forms acts on a different base-the one moving freely by the aid of reason, the other by ignorance-we have next to consider what it is that gives motion to that species of government which is called mixed government, or, as it is sometimes ludicrously styled., a government of this, thaI. and I'olher. The moving power of this species of government is, of necessity, conuption. However imperfect election and representation may be in mixed governments, they still give exercise to a greater portion of

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reason than is convenient to the hereditary part, and therefore it becomes necessary to buy the reason up. A mixed government is an imperfect everything, cementing and soldering the discordant parts together by corruption to act as a whole. Mr. Burke appears highly digested that France, since the had resolved on a revolution, did riot adopt what he calls "a British constitution" ; and the regretful manner in which he expresses himself on this occasion implies a suspicion that the British constitut ion needed something to keep its defects in countenance. In mixed governments, there is no responsibility; the parts cover each other till responsibility is lost, and th e corruption which moves the machine contrives at the same time its own escape. When it is laid down as a maxim that a king can do 110 W/"olIg, it places him in a state of similar security wi th that of idi ots and persons insane, and responsibility is out of the question with respect to himself. It then descends upon the minister, who shelters himself WIder a majority in Parliament, which, by places, pensions, and corruption, hc can always command; and that majority justifies itself by the same authority with which it protects the minister. In this rotary motion, responsibility is thrown off from the parts and from the whole. When there is a part in a government which can do no wrong, it implies that it does nothing and is only the machine of another power, by whose advice and direction it acts. What is supposed to be the kind in mixed governments is the cabinet ; and as the cabinet is always a part of the Parliament and the members justifying in one character what they advise and act in another. a mi xed government becomes a contin ual enigma, e ntaili ng upon a cou;,try, by the quantity of corruption necessary to solder the parts, the expense of supporting all the (onns of government at once and finally resolving itself into a government by committee, in which the advisers, the actors, the approvcrs, the justifiers, the persons responsible, and the persons not responsible are the same persons. By this pantomimical contrivance and change of scene and character, the parts help each other out in matters which neither of them singly would assume to act. When money is to be obtained, the mass of variety apparent ly dissolves, and a profusion of parliamentary praises passes between the parts. Each admires with astonishment the

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wisdom, the liberality. the disinterestedness of the other; and all of them breathe a pitying sigh at the burdens of the nation. But in a well-constituted republic, nothing of this soldering, praising. and pitying can take place; the representation being equal throughout the country and complete in itself, however it may be arranged into legislative and executive, they have all one and the same natural source. The parts are not foreigners 10 each other. like democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy. As there are no discordant distinctions, there is nothing to corrupt by compromise nor confound by contrivance. Public measures appeal of themselves to the understanding of the nation, and, resting on their own merits, disown any flattering application to vanity. The continual whine of lamenting the burden of taxes, however successfully it may be practiced in mixed governments, is inconsistent with the sense and spirit of a repUblic . If taxes are necessary, they are of course advantageous; but if they require an apology, the apology itself implies an impeachment. Why then is man thus imposed upon, or why does he impose upon himself? When men are spoken of as kings and subjects , or when govemment . is mentioned under the distinct or combined heads of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, what is it that reasoning man is to understand by the terms? If there really existed in the world two or more distinct and separate clements of human power, we shou ld then see the several origins to which th,?se terms would descriptively app!y; but as there is but one species of man, there can be but o ne clement of human power, and that element is man himself. Monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy are but creatures of imagination; and a thousand such may be contrived. as well as three. From the revolutions of America and France and the symptoms that have appeared in other countries, it is evident that the opinion of the world is changed with respect to systems of government, and that revolutions 3re not within the compass of political calculations. The progress of time and circumstances, which men assign to the acc'?mplishment of great changes, is too mechanical to measure the force of the mind and the rapidity of reflection by which revolutions are generated. All the old governments have received a shock from those that already appear and which were once more improbable, and

s

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are a greater subject of wonder than a general revolution in Europe would be now. When we survey the wretched condition of man under the monarchical and hereditary systems of government, dragged from his home by one power or driven by another, and impoverished by taxes more than by e~emies, it becomes evident that those systems are bad, and that a general revolution in the principle and construction of governments is necessary. What is government more than the management of the affairs of a nation? It is not and from its nature cannot be the property of any particular man or family, but of the whole community, at whose expense it is supported; and though by force or contrivance it has been usurped into an inheritance, the usurpation cannot alter the right of things. Sovereignty, as a matter of right, appertains to the nation only, and not to any individual ; and a nation has at all times an inherent indivisible right to abolish any form of government it finds inconvenient and establi shed such as accords with it s interest, disposition, and happiness. The romantic and barbarous distinction of men into kings and subjects, though it may suit the condition of courtiers, cannot that of citizens, and is exploded by the principle upon which governments are now founded. Every citizen is a member of the sovereignty and as such can acknowledge no personal subjection, and his obedience can be only to the laws. When men think of what government is, they must necessarily suppose it to possess a knowledge of all the objects and matters upon which its authority is to be exercised. Tn this view of government, the republican system, as established by America and France, operates to embrace the whole of a nation; and the knowledge necessary to the interest of all the parts is to be found in the center which the parts by representation fonn . But the old governments are on a construction that excludes knowledge as well as happiness; government by monks, who know nothing of the world beyond the walls of a convent, is as consistent as government by kings. What were fonnerly called revolutions were little more than a change of persons or an alteration of local circumstances. They rose and fell like things of course and had nothing in their existence or their fate that could influence beyond the spot that produced them. But what

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we now see in the world, from (he revolutions of America and France,

is a renovation of the natural order of things, a system of principles as uni versal as trUlh and the existence of man, and combining moral with political happiness and national prosperity:

I. Men are born and always c011linue free and equal in respect to their rights. Civil distinctions, therefore, can be founded on ly on

public utility. II. The end of all political associations is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man; and these rights are liberty,

property, security, and resistance of oppression. III. The nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty; nor can any individual or any body of men be entitled to any authority which is not expressly derived from it. In these principles there is nothing to throw a nation into confusion by inflaming ambition. They are calculated to call forth wisdom and abilities and to exercise them for the public good and not for the emolument or aggrandizement of particular descriptions of men or families . Monarchical sovereignty, the enemy of mankind and the source of misery, is abolished; and sovereignty itself is restored to its natural and o riginal place, the nation. Were this the case throughout Europe, the cause of wars would be taken away. It is anributed to Henry IV of France, a man of an enlarged and benevolent heart, that he proposed, about the year 1610, a plan of abolishing war in Europe. The plan consisted in constituting a European congress or, as the French authors style it, a pacific republic, by appointing delegates from the several nations, who were to act as a court of arbitration in any disputes that mighl arise between nation and nalion. Had such a plan been adopted al the time it was proposed, the taxes of England and France, as two of the parties, would have been at least ten millions sterling annually to each nation less than they were at the commencement of the French Revolution. To conceive a cause why s uch a plan has not been adopted (and that, ins tead of a congress for the purpose of preventing war, it has been ca lled on ly to terminate a war after fruitless expense of several years), it will be necessary to consider Ihe interest of governments as a distinct interest to that of nations.

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Whatever is the cause of taxes to a nation becomes also the means of revenue to a government. Every war tenninates with an addition of taxes, and consequently with an addition of revenue; and in any event of war, in the manner they are now commenced and concluded, the power and interest of governments arc increased. War, therefore, from its productiveness, as it easily furnishes the pretense of necessity for taxes and appointments to places and offices, becomes a principal pan of the system of old governments; and to establish any mode to abolish war, however advantageous it might be to nations, would be to take from such government the most lucrative of its branches. The frivolous matters upon which war is made show the di sposition and avidity of governments to uphold the system of war and betray the motives upon which they act. Why are not republics plunged into war but because the nature of their government does not admit of an interest distinct from that of the nation? Even Holland, though an ill-constructed republic, and with a commerce extending over the world, existed nearly a century without war; and the instant the fonn of government was changed in France, the republican principles of peace and domestic prosperity and economy arose with the new government; and the same consequence would follow the same causes in other nations. As war is the system of government on the old construction, the animosity which nations reciprocally entertain is nothing more than what the ·policy of their governments excites to keep up the spirit of the system. Each government accuses the other of perfidy, intrigue, and ambition as a means of heating the imagination of their respective nations and increasing them to hostilities. Man is not the enemy of man, but through the medium of a false system of government. Instead, therefore, of exclaiming against the ambition of kings, the exclamation should be directed against the principle of such governments; and instead of seeking to reform the individual , the wisdom of a nation should apply itself to refonn the system . Whether the fonns and maxims of governments which are still in practice were adapted to the condition of the world at the period they were established is not in this case the question. The older they are, the less correspondence can they have with the present state of things. Time and change of circumstances and opinions have the same

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progressive effect in rendering modes of government obsolete as they

have upon customs and manners . Agriculture , commerce, manufactures, and the tranquil arts, by which the prosperity of nations

is best promoted, require a different system of government and a different species afknowledge to direct its operations than what might

have been required in the fonner condition of the world. As it is not difficult to perceive, from the enlightened state of mankind, that hereditary governments are verging to their decline and that revolutions on the broad basis of national sovereignty and government by representation are making their way in Europe, it would be an act of wisdom to anticipate their approach and produce revolutions by reason and accommodation, rather than commit them to the issue of convulsions. From what we now see, nothing ofrefonn on the political world ought to be hcld improbable. It is an age of revolutions, in which everything may be looked for. The intrigue of courts, by which the system of war is kept up, may provoke a confederation of nations to abolish it; and a European congress to patronize the progress of free government and promote the civilization of nations with each other is an event nearer in probability than once were the revolutions and alliance of France and America.

6 The Evolution of the State

We have dealt with the definition of a State, and, for the purpose of these leclUres, the definition given in the last lecture will govern the use of the word. Thai definition was: A State is a multi-human organ ism embodying a Life, inhabiting a definite Territory, with a government as its executive, specialising organs for its activities, and shaping its evolution to achieve a common end.

Wherever we find the whole of these characteristics, we have a State: wherever we do not find them, there is no State. In this lecture, I propose to trace the Evolution of the State from the Family to the Commonwealth or Empire, in a genera l way, from the simple to the complex, defining the Icnn used in each case, and thus making a framework for OUf future study, into which we shall have to fit a large number of details. Such an outli ne is necessary for clear comprehension and orderly thinking, and by your later reading, when your time for technical studenlship is over, you will be able, by intensive s tudy of any part of it, to acqui re as much more of detail as you like, without "losing sight of the forest because of the trees". We begin then with the need for definitions, and proceed to the s upplying of that need, showing also the place of the thing defined in the evolution of the State. DEFINITIONS Now there are certain terms used in Political Science which need careful and exact definition , for they are connected with the idea of the State, sometimes form constituents of the State, but are not identical

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wi th it. Hence, for useful di scussion, we must define each of them, for half the controversies which are carried on among us lend to be futile, because of the mi sunderstandings which arise from the lack of a common meaning attached to the terms used. One of the objects of Education is to substitute clear for confused thinking, and cl ear

thinking demands the use of a word to denote on thought and one thought only; for this we need accurate perception of the similarities and the differences between things. Similarities show the relation between two or more th ings, uniting them; differences show the peculiar characteristics of two or more things, separating them. Thus, the term Biped marks a similarity, a uniting relation, between birds and men; both are two-legged. The beak, wings and feathers of the bird, to name but three differences, mark it off as compared with the lips, arms, and skin of the man, into a smaller group, a subdivision of Biped. Science classifies by similarities, and separates its main divisions into smaller and smaller groups by differences, thus reducing into ordered relations and separati ons the confused masses of individual s of all sorts, sizes, a nd shapes. The theory of evolution is based on a discovery of hidden similarities under patent differences, as the fore-limbs of the bird and the man have a common fundamental structure, modified into a wing in the one, into an ann in the other. So also in our subject, since it is a Science-Political Science--we must use the scientific method with its admirable clarity, and therefore we must define the meaning of our terms. This lucidity in the use of words is one of the characteristics of the Keltic branch of the widely spread Aryan root-stock, the artistic type of the Aryan; the Kelts are arti sts in words, as in colour and fonn- words being verily the form of thoughts. As was said of the French: "Ce qui n'est pas clair, n'est pas francais" ; "That which is not c1ear-or, better, lucid--is not French." There are a number of words: Family, Tribe, Nation Empire or Commonwealth, Society, Government, Race, Society, Pecple, all of which have something in common- they are aggregations of human beings, the last being so vague that it needs some additional words to mark the sense in which the speaker is using it. These terms, down to the term "Society," precedi ng "Government ," have a common

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characteristic, they all have a Government, but the term "Society" is used in two senses, hence it is repeated after "Race". Let us now try to define each, and mark its passage into the next, and thereby its place in the evolution of the State. FAMILY Husband-wife-child- the latter born or lega ll y adopted. The Family subsequently includes younger generat ions, grand-children , greatgrandchildren, etc. Intermarriage is normally forbidden in e:lch generation between children of the same parents, but the rule varies as to intermarriage between later generations. Descent is normally recognised along the male line, the daughter of a family married into another family becomes a member of the latter. The Government resides in the Father; as generations increase, the eldest male ancestor is the common Father, then styled Patriarch, and the rule remains in hi s eldest male descendant. The Family House is the Territory. Separation into allied Families comes with multiplication of members, but the common Ancestor remains as a tie, rendered the more binding by Ancestor-worship, or commemoration of Ancestors by religious ceremonies, as of the Family Pitrs , or Fathers. These separated Families when aggregated, are sometimes called a C lan, or, as in Rome, a Gens. h is worthy of notice that the recognit ion of obligations is, at this early stage, restricted within the limits of the Family. There is a Family Dharma, a Family Duty. There must, for Family peace and comfort, be no cheating, no robbery, no rape, no murder, within the Family limits. The stronger must not deprive the weaker of his share in thl.! common possessions and comforts of the Family. These obligations do not hold with regard to olher Families. Morality is within the Family. As multiplication increased the numbers in the Family, and they outgrew the Family House, other houses would be built, more land would be brought under cultivation, and the Family territory would cover a larger area. As numbers conti nued to grow and territory to spread, a stronger Family would come into touch with a smaller and

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therefore weaker one, or one of about equal strength, with the same

or a different Patriarch. If intermarriages had taken place, with the exchanges of daughters within famil y memory, i.e., tradition. and convenience of contiguity pointed that way, as increasing defensive power, the Families might amalgamate peaceably for mutual benefit,

forming a Clan, or Tribe. (fthere were no recognised alliances, the stronger Family- Family Morality not including any duty, any obli gation, to another Family- might attack the weaker, rob it of its territory and other possessions, reduce the inhabitants to slavery, and

thus obliterate it as an independent Family, and strengthen itself. Thus by peaceabie amalgamation or by conquest, Families became joined into a Clan , and Clans into Tribes. The difference between Clan and Tribe is vague; in the Clan a common Ancestor is recognised, as a rule, while in the Tribe this mayor may not be. I am not sure that the use of the term is not largely influenced by the number of the aggregation. In any case, it does not form a regular and inevitable stage. Later we shall see how in India the orders of the Patriarch became Laws, quickening the evolution of the Moral Sense, and how kinship and contiguity and common law bound into a Nation the descendants of the original Patriarch, with many accretions from outside with invasions ofa land already civi lised, with conquests and amalgamations, and the suffering of invasions in tum. But here, in followir.g the general evolution ofthe State from the Family through more complex stages to the Empire or the Commonwealth, we cannot delay on the story oflhe Aryan root-stock. We shall return to it. Meanwhile we have our definition of the Family: A group, origina lly consisting of husband-wi fe-ch ild and developing by multiplication and adoption into a group of men, women and chi ldren, with common movable and immovable property, all united in obedience to the eldest male descendant of a common paternal ancestor, dividing the family work for the promotion of family happiness and prosperity. We have here the State in its simplest form, becoming more complex by increase of numbers, but preserving recognisably the Family Idea.

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THE TRIBE The Tribe is formed of aggregations of Families, who may, or may not have fonned the earlier aggregations termed Clans . It is an interesting speculation, but one which has not been tested, much less verified, by any research into the matter, whether monarchic forms of government may not have appeared in Tribes which were formed out of Families looking back to a common Patriarch, in which the idea of authority from above, descending from an elder Ancestor, would be familiar. Perhaps we might regard China as such an instance; it is, indeed, spoken of as a Patriarchal State, and Bluntach li writes of it as holding "to the fiction that the Head of the State is Father of his people," and he quotes Gobinean, "who has shown grounds for believing that the State was first founded by Aryans," and who "ascribes the patriarchal idea to their suggestion" (Book II, chap. xix , p. 197). Dr. Woodrow Wilson regards the early Greek monarchies as "P:ltriarchal Presidencies," the Kings being chief nobles rather, the ·'first among equals," presidents of councils of peers... .! have called this presidency of the King in State affairs a "pauiarchal" presidency, because it belonged to him by hereditary right as chief elder by direct descenL..He was the high priest of his people. perfonning all those sacrifices and leading in all those ceremonials which s poke the fami ly oneness of the Nation . He was the representative of the Nation in its relations with the gods. He was also commander-in-chief in War, here again representing the unity of the people over whom he presided. But here the kingly prerogatives erded. These presidential and representative functions of the early Greek King contained the sum of his powers. (Chap. ii. §§ 44, 46, 47.)

Secondly, Conquest- by making the new distinction between conqueror and conquered, gi ving rise to the classes of propertied and unpropenied, landlord and slave-labourer, aristocrat and plebeian, alicn from the Fami ly Idea- might produce, in common with the peaceful amalgamation of Families with different Patriarchs, a Government of equal Elders, presumably of the Best, the Aristocrats, over the general body of the youngers of the Families, who would be equal citizens, with the conquered classes below them as slaves. Or, thirdly, the Families, as equals, might give ri se to democratic, republican ,

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institutions. This would be most likely to happen where Tribes were isolated, and where therefore conquests had not occurred. It would be the outcome of undisturbed and peaceful lives.

In India we find traces of all these three types.

The Patriarchal fonn gave rise in India to Monarchies, the originals, in the Aryan rootstock, of the Kingships desc ribed by Dr. Wilson in one of its Keltic branches, the early Greek. There also we have a King, surrounded by a Counci l, for as Manu says ofa Kind: (The Law) cannot be properl y enforced without a Ministry, for he (the King) may be greedy. inexperienced and attached to worldly desires. (Chap. vii, 30.) T he Mi ni stry varied in number; a typical constitution is given in the Mahabltarata : 4 Brahmanas, 8 Kshattriyas, 2 1 Vaishyas. 3 Shudras and one Suta (Shanti Parva, chap. 85). The "Sutas" were classes born of mixed marriages. and included s uch person s as carpenters, charioteers, singers, etc. The Aristocratic and Republican forms are generally mentioned as governments of Tribes, but his wi ll be dealt with more fully after. Professor Radhakumud Mukerji mentio ns from Greek and Latin hi storians the Maltecorae, Singhae, Marohae, Rarungae, Moruni , Sabarcae, Gedrosii. Siboi, Agaiassoi, Yandheyas, Malloii, Oxydrakai, Adrastai, Kathaioi and Sudrakas. One of these, the Sabarcae, do not, however, appear to have been peaceful, since they were ruled by three Generals. C urtius describes them as "a powerful Indian people, whose form of government was democrati c and not regal. who had no Kings but were led by three Genera ls." He speak s also of "the Gedrosi i as a free people with a Council for discussing important maUers of State". The city of Nysa, with its Council of three hundred "best men," was clearly aristocratic, while the Empi res and Kingdoms, of which so many details are given, are clear descendants of the Patriarchal Family, with Monarchs bound by the Law which originated in the Patriarch, and surrounded by a Council composed of the four castes. We read in ancient literature ofa condition in w hich all were equal, India's Golden Age, and of the institution of Kingship to correct abuses, as the children of the Family developed the passions of youth . The Puranas tell of this Golden Age, when there were no castes, and when Nature supplied

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the simple wants ofa simple united people. And they tell how gradually "egoism and a sense of mineness" appeared, "and the trees which had given them a ll they needed, dwelling, food and raiment, died out because of that sin"; and how the people began to make "the first artificial dwellings ... and they also began to work for food," and there grew up "trees, bearing various kinds of fruit at fixed seasons, and wi ld cereals of fourteen kinds". "But loves and hates and jealousies and mutual hurting increased yet more among them, and the stronger took possession of the trees and cereals, excluding the weaker; for inequa lities of mind and body had appeared." Then came "industry and agriculture and horticulture... laws and conventions, differentiating the people gradually, more and more, into castes and colours, according to their different capacities and tendencies" (Markalldeya PW'ana, as translated by Bhagavan Das, in his Science of social Organisatioll, Lecture ii, pp. 64-66. Theosophical Publishing House, Adyar, Benares and London. Ed. 1910). The Vis/llw-Bltagavara tells of the first King, Prthu, who taught the people agriculture, and buildings and the working of mines and quarri es (Ibid. , pp. 68, 69). A very interesting account is also given in the Yoga-Vasislrtlw, in which the Sage, addressing Shri Ramachandra. tells of the ending of the Golden Age, "the Age when infant humanity simply moved and acted always and as bidden by the Elders of the Race, and so grew towards maturity- then , because the growing egoism struggled with the old innocent obedience, humanity suffered confusion, as does the child passing into youth. Then as I was sent, so were other Sages ... these Sages then established Kings in various regions of the earth to guide the perplexed people, and formulated many Laws and Sciences" (Ibid .. pp. 88, 89). These admirable accounts trace out the emergence of the Aryans from the simple Fami.1y life onwards into Tribes and Nations, and the reason for the arising of Kingship out of the Patriarchate. We may further notc that the warrior Tribe, often engaged in War, would necessarily fo r the most part range itself under its most capable fighter as Chief, as indeed happened even as late as the decadent days of the Roman Empire in the election of Emperors by the anny. In Tribes remaining today there are traces of old Family origins. Each of the Hebrew Tribes- two of which remai n- traced its origin to one of the twelve sons of the Patriarch Jacob-the descendants of

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one son were omitted from the territorial Tribes, and two grandsons of Jacob made up the twelve, but this is immaterial- and this. as mentioned in Lecture II, p. 10, gives an interesting case of single Families multiplying into Tribes. As a Family becomes more and more numerous, family ties weaken; a seventeenth cousin, several times removed, is but a shadow relative, and the blood tie has worn very thin. In fact, the difference between Families and Tribes is largely one of number, and though there may be a common Ancestor of Families that ha ve forgotten him , the non-recognition of him makes the separation of the Family into Families, arid their union makes the Tribe. A noticeable trace of consanguinity is found in some socalled savage Tribes, really the decaying relics oflong-past great civilisations. Just as certain degrees of consanguinity bar intermarriage, so does the totem. The real social unit of the Australians is not the tribe; but the totem group .... The totem grollp is primarily a body of persons distinguished by the sign of some natural obj~1 such as an animal or a tree, who may not intermarry wi th one another. "Snake may not marry Snake. Emu may nOl marry Emu ." This is the first rule of savage social orga·nisation. (His/O/ )I of Politics. E. Jenks. Edition 1900. Quoted by Stephen Leacock, B.A., Ph.D., Elements of Political Sciellce, Pan I, chap. iii, p. 42 . Revised Edition. Constable & Co., London.)

On the connection between the Family, the Tribe, the Nation and the State, Bluntschli introduces confusion, probably due to hi s desire to make the State a "masculine personality"; this he could not do, if he started. with the Family. Hence he refuses to include the Family and the Tribe as States. He remarks: Ancients and modems alike have found in the family the pattern of the State. The State. they say, is an extension of the family. the head of the State being the father, the people his children. The comparison is only true in a limited sense; it only applies 10 the patriarchal State, not 10 the higher forms of Ihe Stale. which are based on Nationality or humanity. (Book II, chap. xix, p. 195.)

To say that the Family is the foundation , the beginning of the .... State, is not to say that it is its highest fonn, any more than to say that the roots of a tree are its-branches, flowers and fruits. The argument (p. 106) that the State consists rather of individuals than of

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families , lies at the basis of the warring civili sation of Europe. However, he gives away his contention by sayi ng: Even in the Aryan Nations the beginnings of the State are connected with the head of the Family and the tribe. It was here that the fi rst leaders, judges and magistrates found the necessary support for their authority : and it was only gradually that a political order arose which outgrew these limits. The tribal constitution served as a bridge between the family and the State, and fell away as soon as the State was assured. (p. 196.) I pointed to thi s refusal in Lecture II , p. 25 , and he also rejects the Clan and the Horde. He says: We cannot talk of a State until we get beyond the circle of a single family, and until a multitude of men (i.e.. families. men, women and children) are united together. A family, a clan like the house of the Hebrew Patriarch, Jacob. ean become the nucleus round which. in time, a greater number gathers, but a real State cannot be fonned until that has happened, until the single family has broken up into a series of families, and kindred has become extended to the race. The horde is not yet a Tribe. Without a Tribe. or. at a nigher stage of civilisation, without a Nation, there is no state. (Book I. chap. i, p. 16.) But this distinction is arbitrary. If a Family, a Clan, a Tribe, has a fixed territory and a govem ment, it is a State (see p. 23). He may exclude the nomadic horde, fo r that has no fixed territory. Bluntachli. however, gives a useful suggestion on the Tribe, and gains it, curiously enough. by looking at a Tribe as a di vision of a " People". Tribes, he says, "express the inner differences of a people". and they "are the product of hi story, which tends to develop and bring to light int e rnal differences" ; " they are only fract ion s of a people .. .expressions, variously coloured or accentuated, of the common national spirit. They thus perpetuate their separate existence, and keep alive the inner differences which influence the character of the people" (Book II, chap. vi , p. 112). He points out that the ancient constitution of the Germans "was nothing but an organisation of tribes," and that "even now the opponents of German unity make use of tribal prejudices to embarrass, if they cannot prevent, the national development. " He also remarks that a Tribe "may furnish the starting point for the fonnalion ofa new nation," may " become a nalion, and fonn a new State, howe ver sma ll" (p. 11 3).

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This method of studying the modified portion in a later structure, its cnrry into which has caused the modifications, is somewhat peculiar. It is more usual to study the portion when it was independent and selfcontained, before it was modified by becoming a part ofa larger whole. In that way it is more clearly understood, and the later modifications are seen as re~ ul lS of the interplay between the whole and its part. In seeking for the reason of the " inner differences" which mark

the Tribe, may we not reasonably look for thl!m in the types of the Families that united to fonn any particular Tribe? These are innate, the persistence of Fami ly pecul iarities, and when we see the qualities of Famili es reappearing in the Tribe, and the qualities of the Tribes in the Nation, we do not speak of hi story developing and bringing to li ght inner differences, but of inner Family qualities persisting in the Tribe which has been fonned by their union, and in the Nation which has been fonned by the union of Tribes. It seems to me to be a mistake to say thaI "as the races of mankind divide into peoples. so peoples di vide into tribes" (p. 11 3). It is historically true that races divide into Peoples- a People to him being the depositary of an "accumulated culture" handed down " from generation to generation," implanting hereditary characteristi cs {chap. ii , p. 87)-bul it is historically fa lse that Peoples divide into Tribes, seeing that Tribes are united inlo Nations and Peoples- tenns and we have yet to define. Aga in it is worthy of notice that Tribal obligations are restricted within the limits of the Tribe, but transcend the Family, since the Tribe includes many Families. A Tribesman must not cheat. rob. rape, nor murder within hi s Tribe; ifhe does, the Tribe will puni sh him. These obli gations do not hold with regard to other tribes. Morality is Tribal. Let us now define our Tribe: A group composed of the descendants of a Family or Families, under any fonn of Govcmment, completely united together, organised for existence and defence, within a definit e area. We must note that thi s excludes nomadic hordes, to whom the tenn "Tribe" is often assigned. But it is better to restrict the lenn to those who are settled, just as we do not include wolves among soc ial animals, though they hunt in pack s.

The Evolutioll of the State

121 THE NATION

The word Nation, from lIascere, to be born, indicates a unity of birth, an ethnic unity, and thus it is naturally used in the ascending series of larger and larger aggregations of human beings in a settled order, Families merging into Tribes, Tribes in to Nations. Primarily, a Nation descends from a common Ancestor, but inlo this main stream of descent flow, in the course of lime, many other conrri bulory streams, which swell the river the National Life. A common religion, in tht: early days of an evol ving Nation, is a larger factor in fonning its unity, so large, indeed, that even in comparatively modem times, rejection of the National Religion was regarded and punished as treason to the State. Just as there were Family Deit ies, so there were Tribal Deiti es, and National Deities: these arc recognised in the Hebrew Testament as the celest ial rulers of the Nations against whom the Hebrews and their National Dei ty battled, with vary ing success: they are the Devas, or Shini ng Ones, of the Hindu and thc Buddhist, the Archangel s of the Christian, with thei r subordinate hosts. The early members of the National root-stock of the Aryan Race were united by thei r Aryan birth and by their Vaidik religion, and when they migrated from Central Asia into Ind ia, and spread over il by conquest, subduing its inhabitants of an earl ier Race, these two strong lies , the ethni c and the religio us, bound them together as a Nation. The c ivilisation they found and that whi ch they brought with them interpenetrated each other, the latter finally dominating; intelmaniage played its part, especially in Southern India, only a minority of famili es preserving jealously the pure Aryan blood; the earl ier rel igion took on the Aryan fonn ; the slow process of amalgamation enriched, instead of deslroyin!;, the National Life. Gradually, from the Himalayas to Cape Cornorin the same mantrams were chanted, effacing differences and intensifying likenesses. Many were the invasions: Assyrians, Egypt ians, Persians, Greeks-they all came and went away, leaving traces of their blood, their thought, th~ir art, to enrich the growing culture of the Indian Nation. Then came the great stream of the Muhammadan invaders, bringing new elements into India, but as the great ri vers of Jumna a nd Ganga now into each other at Prayag. and run side by side, distinguished by their colours, yet fann ing one mightier river, so did the invaders senle down and become Indians, an integral part of the Indian nation. This unifying force , the

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Spirit of the Nation, assimilates the elemenls congruous with itself, enriching its own Life, and casts forth the unassimilable; it takes the gold. stamps it with its own image and superscription, and sends il OUI into the National currency, casting forth the dross. The Nation forms organs for the discharge of its life-functions, executive. legi slative, judicial, educational, commercial, industrial, agricultural, and has its corporate Life, hannonising al l. Only one difference sometimes separates it from a State: it may be without a territory. The Nation oflhe Franks, before-mentioned. migrated into France and there became a State.

Lei us consider the various conditions which are often sa id to be essential parts of a Nation, and see whether they are really essential. These arc: a geographical area, or territory ; a common language; a govcmment; organisation; a common religion; a common ethni c type; all these, by different authors have been regarded as necessary for a Nation. But is it so? The Hebrew State was lost in the Babylonian Captivity, rose again on the return of the Nalion to Palestine, fell with the fall of Jerusalem, but the Hebrew Nation surv ived a ll changes and still survives. A Nation then can exist without a territory. Nor need it have a common language, though such a language is necessary in the early stages of its growth, and is later a binding tie, as with the Hebrews; witness the Bretons and Basques, who are parts of the French Nation, yet keep their own tongues; the Swiss, who have French, Gennan and Italian languages, and no Swiss language. Again on the other hand, the Canadians and the citizens of the Un ited States are two Nations, though their language is the samc. Nor is even a govemmcnt necessary, as is seen in the widely scattered Hebrew nation. Th is therefore lacks two of the essential factors of the State, territory and government, and is viable without them; but ifit lost three of the binding ties, territory, languagc, government, it is doubtful if the Nation would not become weak. and if it lost a fourth, organisation, and a fifth , religion, it seems to me that it would inevitably pass away. Moreover, for such a Nat ion to preserve its individuality, the religion must fqrbid intennarriage with other Nations, otherwise the six th strong tie, ethnic uni ty, wou ld go. In the United States, intennan'iage is destroying the ethnic types of the Hebrews. and many are becoming Americans. It is true thai there

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are Nations composed of many ethnic types, as the English Nation, in which are still recognisable Saxon. Dane, Nonnan, and perhaps other types; but they are subsidiary to the English type which has grown out of their intermingling, and which now dominates them . In the Republic of the United States are Finni sh, Gennan, Dutch, Italian, English, Iri sh, and other ethnic types, but they are gradually changing into a common American ethnic type, the beginning of a new Race. But if a Na tion loses all it s bindin g tie s, territory, language, organisation, government, religion, ethnic type, it seems as though its Spirit would be compelled to leave a body so mutilated, and seek reincarnation elsewhere. What is it th en that makes a Nat ion ? It is, as wi th other Individua ls, a fragment of God Himself, a Ji vatma, a li ving Self, with innate qualities which gradually appear and form its Character. Contrast the Indian and the Englishman, and you will see the difference in the Nat ional Character: the Indian, spiritual, courteous. polished, keenl y inlellectual, inclined to philosophy and poetry, with an acute sense of duty, of obligation, to hi s surroundings; the Engli shman, somewhat blunt and abrupt, strong mentality scientific and practical , publ ic-spirited. C limate, environment. soci al customs, all act on physical peculiarities, and through them on character also. A Nati on is distinctly an Individual with a Character, and that character depends on the nature of the Spirit at its core, and its gradual unfolding to play its part in humanity as a whole. It draws into itself and assimilates all that is congruous with its inner Self, its Spirit, and it is the Spirit that unites, that harmoni ses, that evolves the Nationality which embodies it. Anything special may go, only mutilating the National body, but if all goes, the Spirit must find another home. Therefore have Nations died in the past, as other Individuals have died, and die. Where is Egypt, where Assyria, where ancient Greece, where ancient Persia? In the hybrid modem peoples who bear some of the ancient names, the Spirit of the ancient Nation does not dwell . The fellaheen of Egypt show the ethnic type of the Egyptian in the days of his glory. The Parsis of Indian show much of the ethnic type of Iran , ancient Persia . And if India still survive all who were her contemporaries five thousand years ago, it is because the same Spirit lives in her National body as li ved in it then; she has passed through

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many valleys of humiliation, but never has she entered the valley of the shadow of death; she has been invaded, and has assimilated her invaders; her et hnic type, the Aryan, still survives in a minority, though

she has wrought into it many others; her ancient language in still living, although it has given birth to many dialects which have become great languages; her governments have changed their fanns, and she has passed through periods oflocal, but only local , anarchy. and today she

is renewing her youth like the phoenix, and from the pyre of temporary subjection she is arising, the same Nation, but purified, enriched, to a future greater than her past.

Once morc, I must call your attention to the fact that National obligations arc restricted within the limits of the Nation; a man must not cheat, rob, rape, nor murder his country folk ; ifhe does, the Nation will puni s h him. But he may cheat men of other countries, ca lling it diplomacy: he may rob them, calling it annexation ; he may rape and he may murder, call ing it war. Morality is now National , and is beginning to grope outwards towards other nations, and to become International. But sti ll the less cvolved praise as manly vinues in relation to other Nations that which they punish as crimes within their own. For our definition of a Nation we have: A group composed of a much-multiplied Tribe, or of Tribes, closely united i~ a common life, with organ developed for the discharge of its li fe-functions, ready to become a State by the addition of a fixed territory and a government, where either, or both, are wanting.

AN EMPIRE OR COMMONWEALTH On this we need not delay; it is enough to define it, and to point to such examples as the British Empire and the Republic of the United States. The first incudes Self-Goveming States, and autocratically ruled Dependencies and Colonies, the Imperial authority resid ing in the here ditary King , the Lords and Com mon s of Great Britain. The second consists of a number of States. federated together under a common Government, the Federal authority residing in the President, the Congress, and the Supreme Court.

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These are therefore the next higher State Individual , the first comprising free Slates and subjcct d('-pcndencies. the second comprising free States federated together. We need, therefore, two definitions: An Empire is an assemblage of free and subject Nations. with a common GoY~mment , which may be autocratic, or partly democratic. A Commonwealth is an assemblage of free Slates, federated together under a democratic govemment.

SOCIETY

This word is used in such different meanings that I insert it here, before government, as I shall havc to insert it again later, merely to avoid confusion. We need not delay on its narrow meaning. In this narrow sense it is merely: A voluntary group of human beings associated together for a common purpose, with its own govemment and Laws. exercising 110 authority except over its own members. It may, or may not, be recognised and partially controll ed by the Government of the country in which it exists,

GOVERNMENT

An essentia l organ in every State is a Government, in which resides the sovereignty, or supreme power, of the State. It is the organ through which is expressed and carried out the Will of the State, which directs the forces of the State. and supplies the machinery for doing all those things which can be beller perfonned by the Nation collectively. than by voluntary societies within it, or by individual activities. Ari stotle deals fully with fonns of government. and classifies them: II is evident that every form of Government or administration. for the words are of the same impon. must contain a supreme power over the whole State, and this supreme power must necessarily be in the hands of one person, or a few, or many. (Book [II, chap. vii. pp. 92. 93.)

These are monarchic, aristocratic, and "the citizens at large," and these "may degenerate into a tyra nny, an oligarchy. and a democracy," of which the fi rst seeks only the good of one man, the second con siders "only the rich," and the third "only the poor" (Ibid., p. 93).

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This maHer of government we shall have to study; meanwhile I had better say that I include under the term Government the three great Departments wh ich must exist in it, the Legislature which makes the laws, the Judiciary, which interprets the laws, and the Executive, which administers the laws.

We have, then. as the definition of government: A tripartite group, legislative, judicial and executive, in which resides the supreme power of the Slate. RACE

A Race descends from a common Ancestor, and Races form the great successive divisions of Humanity, marked off from each other by broad

physiological and psychological peculiarities. As they multiply, they di vide into branches, or S ub~ Races, and these again subdi vide as they migrate, and are largely evolved, differentiated and moulded by climate and environment generally, while preserving the fundamental type. As definition we have: An ethnic type, disting ui shed by marked physical , mental, emotional, and spiritual characteristics, consisting later of a rootstock and its branches.

SOCIETY Society, in the large sense oflhe lerm, is rooled in the nature of man, and is, as be fore pointed oul, necessary to hi s evolution. The study o f it includes all human inter-relation s, customs, habits, trad ition s, institutions. religions and cultures. subdivisions into classes, castes, communit ies, a ll of whi ch arc included under the head of Social Science. All the groupings we have seen are included in Society in thi s large sense; il is co-extensive with organised Humanity. but also includes all organised subdivisions within any of these groupings. It is therefore vague as a term, but is useful as drawing out the idea of the ties which unite human begins together and specialising these for study, men as men . Leacock says:

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The teml Society has no reference to territorial occupation: it refers to man a lone, and not to hi s environment.. .. It applies to all human communities, whether organised or unorganised. It suggests not only the political relations by which ' men are bound together, but the whole range of human relations and collecti ve activities. The study of society involves the study of man's religion, of domestic instilUlions, indusuial activities, education. crime, etc. (p. 16.)

The description is a good one, but I quarrel with the phrase "to man alone a nd not to his environment"; il is inacc urate though intelli gible, as emphasising the human not the spatia l relations. And surely there cannot exist an unorgan ised cOllllllllnity. We may take as definition : All relations of human beings in organised association with each other. PEOPLE

In normal use thi s is the most indefinite oflerms, and yet we need it. It requires an affix or suffix of some SOl1 to render it precise. "The people" of a town, a countlY, a race, a nation, that we understand, and in th is sense it means "persons belonging to". Bluntschli deals very cl early with the conception which to him is implied in the term. It " impl ies a civ ilisation, not a pol itical idea": To form a People, the experiences and fortunes of several generations must co-operate. and its pcmlanencc is never secured until a succession of families, handing down its accumulated culture from generation 10 generation. has made its characteristics hereditary. (Book II . chap. iii. pp. 86, 87.)

A People, he says, must have "common spirit, common interests, and common customs" (p. 87). The essence of a people lies in thc civilisation (Kultur); its inner cohesion and its separation from foreign Peoples spring mainly from development in c ivili sation, and express themsel ves chieny in innu e ncing it s condition s. It can on ly be understood from a psychological point of view: its essence is to be seen in the common spirit and common character which inspire it. (p. 89.)

Giving to the word thi s specific sense, it becomes a valuable

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lenn. Persons of the same People would understand each other; persons of the same Nation vel)' often would not. For a People may be scattered among different Nations, as the Slavs, the Gennans, the Greeks. The tenn thus used becomes a subtle psychological tic.

We may define it: A psychological entity, which mayor may not be ethnically or politically one, united by a common spirit, common interests, and aspirations.

7 The Rights of Man

What Archimedes said of the mechanica l powers may be appl ied to

reason and liberty: "Had we," said he, "a place to stand upon, we might raise the world." The Revolution of America presented in politics what was only theory in mechanics. So deeply rooted were a ll the govcmmcnls of the Old World, and so effectually had the tyranny and the antiquity ofhabil established itself over the mind thai no beginning could be made in Asia, Africa, or Europe to refonn the political condition of man. Freedom had been hunted round the globe; reason was considered as rebellion; and the slavery of fear had made men afraid to think. BUI such is the irresistible nature of truth that all it asks and a ll

it wants is the liberty of appearing. The sun needs no inscription to d istin guish him from darkness, and no sooner did the American governments display themselves to the world thou despotism fell a shock and 111011 begal/ to contemplate redress. The independence of Amenca, considered merely as a separation from England, would have ucen a matter but of little importance, had it not been accompanied by a revolution ill (he principles alld practice of governments. She made a sland, not for herself only, but for the world, and looked beyond the advantages herself could receive. Even the Hessian, though hired to fight against her, may li ve to bless hi s defeat; and England, condemning the viciousness of its government, rejoice in its miscarriage. As America was the only spot ill rhe political world where the principles of universal reformatioll CQuld begill , so also was it the best in the natural world. An assemblage of eirc~mst ances conspired.

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not only to give binh, but to add gigantic maturity to its principles. The scene which that country presents to the eye of a specl alOf

has something in it which generates and encourages great ideas. N~lture appears to him in magnitude. The mighty objects he beholds act upon hi s mind by enlarging it, and the partakes of the greatness he contemplates. Its first settlers were emigrants from different European nations and of di versified profess ion s of religion, retirin g from the governmental persecutions of the Old World and meeting in the new,

not as enemie s but as brothers. The wants whi ch necessar ily accompany the cultivation of a wilderness procluced among them a state of society, which countries long harassed by the quarrels and intrigues of governments had neglected to cherish. In such a situation man becomes what he ought? He sees his species, not with the inhuman idea of a natural enemy, but as kindred; and the example shows to the artificial world that man must go back to nature for information. From the rapid progress which America makes in every species of improvement, it is rational to conclude that if the governments of Asia, Africa, and Europe had begun on a principle similar to that of America, or had not been very early corrupted therefrom, that those countries must, by this time, have been in a far superior condition to whal they are? Age after age has passed away for no other purpose than to behold their wretchedness. Could we suppose a spectator who knew nothing of the world and who was put into it merely 10 make his observations, he would take a great part of the Old World to be new, just struggling with the difficulties and hardships of an in fant seltl ement. He could nol suppose that the hordes of mi serable poor, with which old countries ab.Jund, could be any other than those who had not yet had time to provide for themselves. Little would he think th ey were the conseq uence o f w hat in such cou ntries is call ed government. If, from the more wretched parts o f the Old World. we look at . those which are in an advanced stage of improvement, we still fin d the greedy hand of government thrusting itself into every comer and crevice of industry and grasping the spoil of the multitude. Invention

The Rights o[ Man

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is continually exercised to furnish new pretenses for revenue and taxation. It watches prosperity as its prey and permits none to escape without tribute. As revolutions have begun (and the probability is always greater against a thing beginning than of proceeding after it has begun), it is natural 10 expect that other revolutions will follow. The amazing and still increasing expenses with which old governments are conducted, the numerous wars they engage in or provoke, the embarrassment they throw in the way of universal civilization and commerce, and the oppression and usurpation they practice at home, have wearied out the patience and exhausted the property of the world. In such a situation, and with the examples already existing, revolutions are to be looked for. They are become subjects of universal conversation and may be considered as the order oltlle day. 'fsystems ofgovemment can be introduced less expensive and more productive of general happiness than those which have existed, all attempts to oppose their progress will in the end be fruitl ess. Reason, like time, will make its own way, and prejudice will fall in a combat with interest. If universal peace, civilization, and commerce are ever to be the happy lot of man, it cannOI be accomplished but by a revolution in the system of governments. All the monarchical governments are military. War is their trade, plunder and revenue their objects. While such governments continue, peace has not the absolute security of a day. What is the history of al monarchical governments but a di sgustful picture of human wretchedness and the accidental respite of a few years ' repose? Wearied with war and tired with human butchery, they sat down to rest and called it peace. This certainly is not the condition that heaven intended for man ; and if this be monarchy, well might monarchy be reckoned among the sins of the Jews. The revolutions which fomleriy took place in the world had nothing in them that interested the bulk of mankind. They extended only to a change of persons and measures, but not of principles, and rose or fell among the common transactions of the moment. What we now behold may not improperly be called a "counterrevolution".

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Conquest and tyranny, al some early period, dispossessed man of his rights, and he is now recovering them. And as the tide of all human affairs has its ebb and flow in directions contrary to each other, so also is it in this. Government founded on a moral theory, on a system oj universal peace, on the indefeasible. hereditary rights of man, is now revolving from West to East by a stronger impulse than the government of the sword revolved from East to West. It interests

not particular individuals but nations in its progress and promises a new era to the human race. The danger to which the success of revolutions is most exposed is that of attempting them before the principles on which lbey proceed, and the advantages to result from them, are sufficiently seen and understood. Almost everything appertaining to the circumstances of a nation has been absorbed and confounded under the general and mysterious word government. Though it avoids taking to its account the errors it commits, and the mischiefs it occasions, it fails not to arrogate to itself whatever has the appearance of prosperity. It robs industry of its honors by pedantically making itself the cause of its effects, and purloins from the general character of man the merits that appertain to him as a social being. II may therefore be of use in Ihis day of revolutions to discriminate between those things which are the effect of government and those which are not. This will best be done by taking a review of society and civilization and the consequences resulting therefrom as things distinct from what are called governments. By beginning with this investigation, we shall be able to assign effects to their proper cause and analyze the mass of common errors.

OF SOCIETY AND CIVILIZATION' Great part of that order which reigns among mankind is not the effect of government. It had its origin in the principles of society and the natural constitution of man. It existed prior to government, and would exisl if the formality of government was abolished. The mutual dependence and reciprocal interest which man has upon man and all parts of a civilized community upon each other create that great chain of connection which holds it together. The landholder, the fanner, the a.

(Chapter I, Part II .)

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manufacturer, the merchant, the tradesman, and every pccupation, prospers by the aid which each receives from the other and from the whole. Common interest regulates their concerns and foons their laws; and the laws which common usage ordains have a greater influence than the laws of government. In fine, society performs for itself almost

everything which is ascribed to government. To understand the nature and quantity of government proper for man, it is necessary to attend to hi s character. As nature created him for sociailife, she fitted him fo r th e station she intended. In all cases

she made his natural wants greater than his individual powers. No one man is capable, without the aid of society, of supplying his own wants; and those wants acting upon every individual impel the whole of them into society, as naturally as gravitation acts to a centre. But she has gone further. She has not on ly forced man into society by a diversity of wants, which the reciprocal aid of each other can supply, but she has implanted in him a system of social affections which, though not necessary to his existence, are essential to his happiness. There is not period in li fe when this love fo r society ceases to act. It begins and ends with our being. If we examin e with attention into the composition and constitution of man, the diversity of his wants, and the diversity of talents in different men for reciprocally acconunodating the wants of each other, his propensity to society, and consequently to preselVe the advantages resulti ng from it, we shall easily discover that a great part of what is called government is mere imposition. Government is no farther necessary than to supply the few cases to which soc iety and civili zation are not conveniently competent; and instance are not wanting to show toat everything which government can usefully add thereto has been performed by the common consent of society without government. For upward of two years from the commencement of the American war, and to a longer period in several of the American States, there were no established forms of government. The old governments had been abolished, and the country was too much occupied in defense to employ its attention in establishing new governments; yet during thi s intelVal order and harmony were preserved as inviolate as in any country in Europe.

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There is a natural aptness in man, and more so in society, because it embraces a greater variety of abilities and resources, to accormnodate

itself to whatever situation it is in . The instant fannal government is abolished, society begins to act. A general association takes place, and common interest produces common security.

So far is it from being true, as has been pretended, that the abolition of any fannal government is the dissolution of society, that it acts by a contrary impulse and brings the latter the closer together. All that part of its organization which it had committed to its government devolves again upon itself and act through its medium. When men, as well from natural instinct as from reciprocal benefits, have habituated themselves to social and civilized life, there is always enough of its principles in practice to carry them through any changes they may find necessary or convenient to make in their government. In short, man is so naturally a creature of society that it is almost impossible to put him out of it. Fonnal government makes but a small pan of civilized life; and when even the best that human wisdom can devise is established, it is a thing more a name and idea than in fact. It is to the great and fundamental principles of society and civilization- to the common usage universally consented to, and mutuall y and reciprocally maintained- Io the unceasing circulation of interest, which, passing through its million channels, invigorat~s the whole mass of civilized man--it is to these things, infinitely more than to anything which even the best instituted government can perform, that the sa fety and prosperity of the individual and of the whole depends. The more perfect civilization is, the less occasion has it for government, because the more does it regulate its own affairs and govern itself; but so contrary is the practice of old governments to the reason of the case that the expenses of them increase in the proponion they oUght to diminish. It is but few general laws that civilized life requires, and those of s uch common usefulness that whether they are enforced by the form s of government or not the effect will be nearly the .same. If we consider what the principles are that first condense men into society and what the motives that regulate their mutual intercourse afterward, we shall find, by the time we arrive al what is

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called government. that nearly the whole of the business is perfonned by the natural operation of the parts upon each other. Man, with respect to all those matters, is more a creature of consistency than he is aware or that governments would wish him to believe. All the great laws of society are laws of nature. Those of trade and commerce, whether with respect to the intercourse of individuals or of nations, are laws of mutual and reciprocal interest. They are followed and obeyed because it is the interest of the parties so 10 do, and not on account of any formal laws their governments may impose or interpose. But how often is the natural propensity to society disturbed or destroyed by the operations of government. When the laner, instead of being ingrafted on the principles of the former, assumes 10 exist for itself and acts by partialities of favour and oppression, it becomes the cause of the mischiefs it oUght to prevent. If we look back to the riots and tumults which at various times have happened in England, we shall find that they did not proceed from the want ofa government, but that government was ilselfthe generati ng cause; instead of consolidating society, it divided it; it deprived it of its natural cohesion, and engendered discontents and disorders which otherwise would nol have exisled. In those associations which men promi'icuously fonn for the purpose of trade, or of any concern in which government is totally out of the question and in which they act merely on the principles of society, we see how naturally the various parties unite; and this shows by comparison that governments, so far from being always the cause or means of order, are often the destruction of it. The riots of 1780 had no other source than the remains of those prejudices which the government itself had encouraged. But with respect to England there are also other causes. Excess and inequality of taxation, however, disguised in the means, never fail to appear in their effects. As a great mass of the community are thrown thereby into poverty and discontent, they are constantly on the brink of commotion and, deprived as they unfortunately are of the means of information, are easily heated to outrage. Whatever, the apparent cause of any riots may be, the real

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one is always want of happiness. It shows "that something is wrong in the system of government that injures the felicity by which society is to be preserved. But as fact is superior to reasoning, the instance of America presents itself to confirm these observations. If these is a country in the world where concord, according to common calculation, would be least expecicd, it is America. Made up as it is ofpeopJe from different nalions,b accustomed to different Conns and habits of government, speaking different languages, and more different in their modes of worship. it would appear that the union of such a people was impracticable; but by the simple operation of consuucting government on the principles of society and the rights of man, every difficulty retires and all the parts are brought into cordial unison. There the poor are not oppressed, the rich are not privileged. Industry is not mortified by the sp lendid extravagance of a court rioting at its expense. Their taxes are few because their government is just; and as there is nothing to render them wretched, there is nothing to engender riots and tumults. A metaphysical man like M r. Burke would have tortured his invention to discover how such a people could be governed. He would have supposed that some must be managed by fraud, others by force, and all by some contrivance; that genius must be hired to impose upon ignorance, and sho·w and parade to fascinate the vulgar. Lost in the abundance of hi s researches, he would have resolved and re· resolved, and finally overlooked the plain and easy road that lay directly before him. b.

That part of Americ& which is generally called New England, including New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, is peopled chiefly by English descendants. In the State of New York, about half are Dutch, the rest English. Scotch, and Irish. In New Jersey, a mixture of English and Dutch, with some Scotch and Irish. In Pennsylvania, about one third are English. another Gennans, and the remainder Scotch and Irish, with some Swedes. The states to the southward have a greater proportion of English than the middle states. but in all of them there is a mixture; and besides those enumerated. there are a considerable number of French and some few of all the European nations lying on the coast. The most numerous religious denomination is the Preshyterian; but no one sect is established above another, and all men are equally citizens.

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One of the great advantages of the American Revolution has been that it led to a discovery of the principles and laid open the imposition of governments. All the revolutions till then had been worked within the atmosphere of a court, and never on the great floor of a nation. The parties were always of the class of courtiers; and whatever was their rage for reformation, they carefull y preserved that fraud of the profession. In all cases they took care to represent government as a thing made up of mysteries, which only themselves understood; and they hid from the understanding of the nation the only thing that was beneficial to know, namely, Ihar government is 1I0thillg mo,.e Ihall a lIaliollal association actillg Oil (he prillciples of society. Having thus endeavored to show that the social and civilized state of man is capable ofperfonning with in itself almost everything necessary to its protection and government, it will be proper, on the other hand, to take a review of the present old governments and examine whether their principles and practice are correspondent thereto. OF THE OLD AND NEW SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT<

Nothing can appear more contradictory than the principles on which the old governments began and the condition to which society, civilization, and com merc'! are capab le of ca rrying mankind. Government on the old system is an assumption of power for the _ aggrandizement of itself; on the new, a delegation of power for the common benefit of society. The former supports itself by keeping up a system of war; the latter promotes a system of peace as the true means of enriching a nation. The one encourages national prejudices; the other promotes uni versal soc iety as the means of universa l commerce. The one measures its prosperity by the quantity of revenue it extorts; the other proves its excellence by the small quantity of taxes it requires. Mr. Burke has talked of "old and new Whigs". Ifhe can amuse himself with childish names and distinctions. I shall not interrupt his c.

(Pan II. Chapter Ill • .)

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pleasure. It is not to him. but to Abbe Sieyes, that I address Ihis chapter. I am already engaged to the latter gentleman to discuss the subject to monarchical government; and as it naturally occurs in comparing the old and new systems, l make thi s the opportunity of presenting to him

my observations. I shall occasionally take Mr. Burke in my way. Though it might be proved that the system of government now called the "new" is the most ancient in principle of all that have existed, bei ng founded on the original inherent rights of man, yet, as

tyranny and the sword have suspended the exercise of those rights for many centuries past, it serves better the purpose of distinction to call

it a "new" than

10

claim the right of call ing it the old.

The first general disti nct ion between those two systems is that the one now called the old is hereditary, either in whole or in part; and th e new is entirely represelltative. It rejects all hereditary government:

First, as being an imposition on manki nd.

Secolldly, as being inad eq uate to the purposes fo r wh ich government is necessary. Wit h respect to the first of these heads. It cannot be proved by what right hereditary government could begin; neither docs there exist within the compass of mortal power a right to establish it. Man has no authority over posterity in matters of personal right, and therefore no man or body of men had or can have a right to set up hereditary government. Were even ourselves to come again into existence, instead of being succeeded by posterity, we have not now the right of taking from ourselves the rights which would then be ours. On what ground, then, do we pretend to take them from others? All hereditary government is in its nature tyranny. A heritable crown or a heritable throne, or by what other fanciful namq such things may be called. have no olher significant explanation than that mankind are heritable property. To inherit a government is to inherit the people, as if they were fl ocks and herds. Wi th respect to the second head, that of being inadequate to the purposes for which government is necessary, we have only to consider what government essentially is and compare it with the ci rcumstances to which hereditary succession is s ubject. Government ought to be a

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thing always in maturity. It oUght to be so constructed as to be superior to all the accidents to wbich individual man is subject and, therefore, hereditary succession, by being subject to them all, is the most irregular and imperfect of all the systems of government. We have heard tbe rights of man called a leveling system, but the only system to which the word " leveling" is truly applicable is the hereditary monarchical system . It is a system of mental leveling. It indiscriminately admits every species o f character to the same authority. Vice and virtue, ignorance and wisdom, in short, every quality, good or bad, is put o n the same level. Kings succeed each other, not as rationals, but as animals. It signifies not what their mental or moral characters are. Can we then be surprised at the abject state ofthc human mind in monarchical countri es when the gove rnment itself is fonned on such an abject leveling system? It has no fixed character. Today it is one thing; tomorrow it is something else. 1t changes with the temper of every succeeding individual and is subject to all the varieties of each. It is goverrunent through the medium of passions and accidents.

It a ppears und er a ll the va ri o us c haracters of c hildhood, decrepitude, dotage. a thing at nurse, in leading strings, or on crutches. It reverses the wholesome order o f nature. It occasionally puts children over men, and the conceits of nonage over wisdom and experience. In short, we cannot conceive a more ridicu lous figure of government than hereditary succession, in all its cases, presents. Could it be made a decree in nature or an edict registered in heaven, and man could know it, that virtue and wisdom should invariably appertain to hereditary succession, the objections to it would be removed; but when we see that nature acts a if she disowned and sported with the hereditary system, that the mental characters of successors in all countries an: below the average of human understanding, that one is a tyrant, ano ther an idiot, a third insane, and some all three together, it is impossi ble to attach confidence to it when reason in man has power to act. • It is not to the Abbe Sieyes that I need appl y this reasoning; he has: already saved me that trouble by giving hi s own opinion upon the case. " If it be asked," says he, "what is my opinion with respect to hereditary right, I answer without hesitat ion that, in good theory, a

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hereditary transmission of any power or office can never accord with the laws of a true representation. Hereditaryship is, in thi s sense, as

much an attain! upon principle as an outrage upon society_ But let us," continues he, "refer to the history of all elective monarchies and

principalities; is there one in which the elective mode is not worse than the hereditary succession?" As to debating on which is the worse of the two is admitting both to be bad, and herein we are agreed. The preference which the

Abbe has given is a condemnation of the thing he prefers. Such a mode of reasoning on such a subj ect is inadmissjble, because it finally amounts to an accusation upon Providence, as if she had left to man no other choice with respect to government than between two evils, the best of which he admits to be "an attaint upon principal and an outrage upon society." Passing over, of the present, all the evils and mi schie fs which monarchy has occasioned in the world, nothing can more effectually prove its uselessness in a state of civil governmell1 than making it hereditary. Would we make any office hereditary that required wisdom and abi lities to fi l1 it? And where wisdom and abilities are not necessary, such an office, whatever, it may be, is superfluo us or insignificant. Hereditary succession is a burlesque upon monarchy. It puts it in the most ridiculous light by presenting it as an office which any child or idiot may fill. It requires some talents to be a common mechanic, but to be a king requires only the animal figure of a mana sort of breathing automaton. This son of superstition may last a few years more, but it cannot long resist the awakened reason and interest of man. As to Mr. Burke, be is a stickler for monarchy, not altogether as a pensioner- ifhe is one, which I believe-but as a political man. He has taken up a contemptible opinion of mankind, who in their tum are taking up the same of him. He considers them as a herd of beings that must be governed by fraud, effigy, and show; and an idol wou ld be as good a figure of monarchy with him as a man. I will , however, do him the justice to say that, with respect to America, he has been very complimentary. He always contended, at least in my hearing, that the people of America are more enlightened than those of England or

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of any other country in Europe, and that, therefore, the imposition of show was not necessary in their government Though the comparison between hereditary and elective monarchy which the Abbe has made is unnecessary to the case, because the representative system rejects both, yet, were I to make the comparison, I should decide contrary to what he has done. The civil wars which have originated from contested hereditary claims are numerous, and have been more dreadful and of longer continuance than those which have been occasioned by election. All the civil wars in Fnmce arose from the hereditary system; they were either produced by hereditary claims or by the imperfection of the hereditary fonn, which admits of regencies or monarchies at _ nurse. With respect to England, its history is full of the same misfortunes. The contests for succession between the houses of York and Lancaster lasted a whole century, and others of a similar nature have renewed themselves since that period . Those of 1715 and 1745 were of the same kind. The succession war for the crown of Spain embroiled almost half of Europe. The disturbances in Holland are generated from the hereditaryship of the stadtholder. A government calling itself free, with a hereditary office, is like a thorn in the flesh that produces a fennentation which endeavors to discharge it. But I might go further and place also foreign wars, of whatever, kind to the same cause. It is by adding the evil of hereditary succession to that of monarchy that a pennanent family interest is created whose constant objects are dominion and revenuc. Poland, though an elective monarchy, has had fewer wars than those which are hereditary; and it is the only government that has made a voluntary essay, though but a small one, to refonn the condition of the country. Having thus glanced at a few of the defects of the old or hereditary system of government, let us compare it with the new or representative system. The representative system takes society and civi lization for its basis; nature, reason, and experience for its guide.

Experience, in all ages, and in all countries, has demonstrated that it is impossible to control nature in hcr distribution of mental

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powers. She gives them as she pleases. Whatever is the rule by which she, apparently to us, scatters them among mankind, that rule remains a secret 10 man . It would be as ridicu lous to attempt to fi x the hereditaryship ofhurnan beauty as of wisdom. Whatever, wisdom constituently is, it is like a seedless plant; it may be reared when it appears, but it cannot be voluntari ly produced. There is always a sufficiency somewhere in the general mass of society for all purposes; but with respect to the parts of society, it is continually changing its place. It rises in one today, in another tomorrow, and has most probably visited in rolation every family of the earth and again withdrawn.

As this is the order of nature, the order of government must m.'cessari ly follow it, or government will , as we see it does, degenerate into ignorance. The hereditary system, therefore, is as repugnant to human wisdom as to human rights and is as absurd as it is unjust. As the republic of letters brings forward the best literary productions by giving to genius a fair and universal chance, so the representative system of government is calculated 10 produce the wi sest laws by collecting wisdom where it can be found . I smile to myself when I contemplate the ridiculous insignificance into which literature and all the sciences would sink were they made hereditary, and I carry the same idea into governments. A hereditary governor is as inconsistent as a hereditary author. I know not whether Homer or Euclid has sons, but I will venture an opinion that if they had, and had left their works unfinished, those sons cou ld not have completed them.

Do we need a stronger evidence of the absurdity ofhercditary government than is seen in the descendants of those men, in any line of life, who once were famous? Is there scarcely an instance in which there is not a total reverse of character? It appears as if the tide of mental faculties flowed as far as it could in certain channels, and then forsook its course and arose in others. How irrational then is the hereditary system which establishes channels of power, in company with which wisdom refuses to flow! By continuing this absurdity, man is perpetually in contradiction with himself; he accepts for a king or a chief magistrate or a legislator a person whom he would nOI elect for a constable.

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It appears to general observation that revolutions create genius and talents. but those events do no more than bring them forward. There is existing in man a mass of sense lying in a donnant state and which, unless something excites it to action, will descend with him. in that condition, to the grave. As it is to the advantage of society that the whole of its faculties should be employed. the construction of government ought to be such as to bring forward. by a quiet and regular operation, all that extent of capacity which never fails to appear in revolutions. This cannot take place in the in sipid state of hereditary government, not only because it prevents. but because it operates to benumb. When the mind ofa nation is bowed down by any political superstition in its government, such as hereditary succession is, it loses a considerable portion of its powers on all other subjects and objects. Hereditary succession requires the same obedience to ignorance as to wisdom; and when once the mind can bring itself to pay thi s indiscriminate reverence. it descends below the stature of mental manhood. It is fit to be great only in little things. It acts a treachery upon itself and suffocates the sensations that urge to detection. Though the ancient governments present to us a miserable picture of the condition of man , there is one which, above all others, exempts itself from the general description . . 1 mean the democracy of the Athenians. We see more to admire and less to condemn in that great. extraordinary people than in anything which history affords. Mr. Burke is so little acquainted with constituent princ iples of government that he confounds democracy and representation together. Representation was a thing unknown in the ancient democracies. In those the mass of the people met and enacted laws (grammatically speaking) in the first person. Simple democracy was no other than the common hall of the ancients. It signifies the form as well as the public principle of the government. As these democracies increased in population and the territory extended, the simple democratical form became unwieldy and impracticable; and as the system of representation was not known, the consequence was they either degenerated convulsively into monarchies or became absorbed into such as then existed.

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Had the system of representation been then understood as it now is, there is no reason to believe that those forms of government, now cal led monarchical and aristocratical would ever have taken place. It was the want of some method to consolidate the parts of society, after it became too populous and too extensive for the simp le democratical form, and also the lax and solitary condition of shepherds and herdsmen in other parts of the world, that afforded opportunities 10 those unnatural modes of government to begin.

As it is necessary 10 clear away the rubbish of errors into which the subject of government has been thrown, I shall proceed to remark on some others.

It has always been the po litical craft of courtiers and court governments to abuse ~omething which they called "republicanism," but what republicanism was or is they never attempt to explain. Let us examine a little into this case.

The on ly forms of government are the democratical , the a ri stocratical , the monarchical, and what is now called the representative. What is call ed n "republic" is not any parlicular form of government. It is wholly characteristical of the purport, matter, or object for which a government ought to be instituted and on which it is to be employed: res publica, "the public affairs," or ''the public good"; or, literally translated, the "public thing." It is a word ofa good original, referring to what ought to be the charactcr and business of govern'ment; and in this sense it is naturally opposed to the word "monarchy," which ha s a base original signification. It means arbitrary power in an indi vidual person, in the exercise of which himself, and not the res publica, is the object.

Every government that dos not act on the principle of a republic, or in OIher words that does not make the res publica its whole and sale object, is not a good government. Republican goven:ment is no other than govemment established and conducted for the interest of the public, as well indi vidually as coll ectively. It is not necessarily connected with any particular fonn, but it most naturally associates with the represenlative fonn, as being best calcu lated to secure the end for which a nalion is al the expense of supporting it.

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Various form s of government have affected to style themselves a republic . Poland calls itself a republ ic. which is a hereditary aristocracy with what is ca lled an elective monarchy. Holland calls itself a republic which is chie fl y aristocrat ical with a hereditary stadtholdership. But the Government of America, whil.'h is wholly on the system of representation, is the on:y real republic in character and practice thai now exists. hs government has no other object than the public busi ness of the nation, and therefore, it is properly a re:public; and the Americans have taken care that this, and no other, shall always be the object of the government, by thf:ir rejecting everything hereditary and establishing government on the system of representation only. Those who have said that a republic is not aform ofgovemment calculated for countries of greal extent mistook, in the fi rst place, the business of a government for a form of government; for the res publica equally appertains 10 every extent oflenitory and population. And, in the second place, if they meant anything with respect toform, it was the simple democratical form, such as was the mode of government in the ancient democracies, in which tberc was no representation. The case, therefore, is not that a republic cannot be extensive, but that it cannot be extensive on the simple democratical forin; and the question naturally presents itself, "What is the best form of government for conducting the res publica, or the public business of a nation, after it becomes too extensive and populous for the simple democratical fonn?" It cannot be monarchy, because monarchy is subject to an objection of the same amount to which the si mple democratical form was subject. It is possible that an indi vidual may lay down a system of principles on which government shall be constitutionall y established to any extent o f territory. This is no more than an operation of the mind acting by its own powers. But the practice upon those principles, as applying to the various and numerous circumstances of a nati on, il s agriculture , manufacture, trade, commerce, etc., requires a knowledge of a different kind and which can be had only from the various parts of society.

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It is an assemblage of practical knowledge which no one individual can possess, and therefore, the monarchical from is as much

limited in useful practice from the incompetency afknowledge as was the democratica l form from the multiplying of population. The one

degenerates, by extension, into confusion; the other, into ignorance and incapacity, of which all the great monarchies are in evidence. The monarchical form, therefore, could nOI be a substitute for the democratical, because it has equal inconveniences. Much less could it when made hereditary. This is the most effectual of all fonns to preclude knowledge. Neither could the high democratical mind have voluntarily yielded itself to be governed by children and idiots, and all the motley insignificance of character which altends such a mere animal system, the disgrace and the reproach of reason and of man. As to the aristocratical form, it has the same vices and defects with the monarchical, except that the chance of abilities is bener from the proportion of numbers, but there is still no security for the right use and application ofthem.d Referring, then, to the 01 iginal simple democracy, it affords the true data from which government on a large scale can begin. It is in capab le of exte ns ion, not from its principle, but from the inconvenience of its form; and monarchy and aristocracy, from their incapacity. Retaining then democracy as the ground, and rejecting the corrupt systems of monarchy and aristocracy, the representative system naturally presents itself, remedying at once the defects of the simple democracy as to form and the incapacity of the other two with respect to knowledge. Simple democracy was society governing itself without the aid of secondary means. By ingrafting representation upon democracy, we arrive at a system of government capable of embracing and confederating all the various interests, and every extent of territory and population; and that also with advantages 3S much superior to hereditary government as the republic of letters is to hereditary literature. d.

For a character of aristocracy. the reader is referred to Righ t of Mall , Pan I, page 88.

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It is on this system that the American £ovemment is founded. It is representation ingrafted upon democracy. It has fixed the form by a scale parallel in all cases to the extent of the principle. What Athens was in miniature, America will be in magnitude. The one was the wonder oflhe ancient world; the other is becoming the admiration and model ofthe present. It is the easiest of all the fonns of government to be understood and the most eligible in practice, and excludes at once the ignorance and insecurity of the hereditary mode and th e inconvenience of the simple democracy. It is impossible to conceive a system of government capable of acting over such an extent of territory and such a circle of interests as is immediately produced by the operation of represcntation. France, great and popular as it is, is but a spot in the capaciousness of the system. It adapts itself to all possible cases. It is preferable to simple democracy, even in small territories. Athens, by representation, would have outrivaled her own democracy.

That which is called government, or rather that which we ought to conceive government to be. is no more than some common centre in which all the parts of society unite. This cannot be accomplished by any method so conducive to the various interests of the community as by the representati vc system. It concentrates the knowledge necessary to the imerests of the parts and of the whole. It places government in a slate of constant maturity. It is, as has been alrcady observed, never young, never old. It is subject neither to nonage nor dotage. It is never in the cradle nor on crutches. It admits not of a separation between knowledge and power, and is superior, as government always ought to be, to all the accidents of individual man, and is therefore, superior to what is called monarchy.

A nation is nOI a body the figure of which is to be represented by the human body, but is like a body contained within a circle, having a common center in which every radius meets, and that centre is formed by representation. To connect representation with what is called monarchy is eccentric government. Representation is of itself the delegated monarchy of a nation and cannot debase itself by di viding it with another.

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Mr. Burke has two or three times, in his parliamentary speeches and in his publications, made use of a jingle of words that convey no

ideas. Speaking of government, he says, "it is better to have monarchy for its basis and republicani sm for its corrective than republicanism for its basis and monarchy fo r its corrective." If he means that it is better to correct folly with wisdom than wisdom with folly, I will not

otherwise contend with him than that it would be much better to reject the folly entirely. But what is this thing that Mr. Burke calls monarchy? Will he explain it? All men can understand what representation is, and that it must necessarily include a variety afknowledge and talents. But what securi ty is there for the same qualities on the part of monarchy? Or, . _ when this monarchy is a child, where than is the wisdom? What does it know about government? Who then is the monarch, or where is the monarchy? Ifit is to be performed by regency, it proves to be a farce. A regency is a mock species of republic, and the whole of monarchy deserves no better description. It is a thing as various as imag ination ca n paint. It has none of the stab le character that government ought to possess. Every succession is a revolution, and every regency a counterrevolution. The whole of it is a scene of perpetual court cabal and intrigue, of which Mr. Burke is himself an instance. To render monarchy consistent with government, the next in succession should not be born a child, but a man at once, and that man a Solomon. It is ridiculous that nations arc to wait and government be interrupted till boys grow to be men. Whether I have too linle sense to see or too much to be imposed upon, whether I have too much or too little pride or of anything else, I leave out of the question ; but certain it is that what is called monarchy a lways appears to me a sill y. contemptible thing. 1 compare it to something kept behind a curtain, about which there is a great deal of bustle and fuss and a wonderful air of seeming solemnity; but when, by any accident, the curtain happens to open and the company see what it is, they burst into laughter. In the representati ve system of govemment. nothing of this can happen. Like the nation itself, it possesses a perpetual stamina, as well of body as of mind, and presents itself on the open theatre of the world

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in a fair and manly manner. Whatever are its excellences or its defects, they arc visible to all. It exists not by fraud and mystery, it deals not in cant and sophistry, but inspires a language that, passing from heart to heart. is felt and understood. We must shut our eyes against reason we must basely degrade our understanding, not to see the folly of what is called monarchy. Nature is orderly in all her works, but this is a mode of government that counteracts nature. It turns the progress of the human facu lties upside down. It subjects arc go to be governed by children and wisdom by foll y. On the contrary, the representative system is always parallel with the order ad immutable laws of nature and meets the reason of man in every pan. For example: In the American Federal Government, more power is delegated to the President of the United States than to any other individual member of Congress. He cannot, therefore, be elected to this office under the age ofthiny-five years. By this time the judgcqlent of man becomes matured, and he has lived long enough to be acquainted with men and things, and the country with him. But on the monarchical plan (exclusive of the numerous chances there are against every man born into the world of drawing a prize in the lottery of human faculties) the next in succession, whatever, he may be. is put at the head of a nation and of a government at the age of eighteen years. Does this appear like an act of wisdom? Is it consistent with the proper dignity and the manly character of a nation? Where is the propriety of calling such a lad the father of the people? In all other cases a person is a minor until the age of twenty-one years. Before thi s period he is not trusted with the management of an acre of land, or with the heritable property of a flock of sheep or a herd of swine; but, wonderful to tell! he may, at the age of eighteen years, be trusted with a nation. That monarchy is all a bubble, a mere court artifice to procure money, is evident (at least to me) in every character in which it can be viewed . It wou ld be impossible, on the rational system of representative government , to make out a bill of expenses to such an enonnous amount as this deception admits. Government is not of itself

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a very chargeable institution. The whole expense of the Federal Government of America. founded. as I have already said, on the system of representation and extending over a country nearly ten times as large

as England, is but six hundred thousand dollars. or one hundred and

thirty thousand pounds sterling. . I presume that no man in hi s sober senses will compare the character of any of the kings of Europe with that of Ge neral Washington. Yet in France, and also in England, the expense of the civil list only for the support of one man is eight times greater than

the whole expense of the Federal Government in America. To assign a reason for this appears almost impossible. The generality of people in America, especially the poor, are more able to pay taxes than the generality of people either in France or England. But the case is thai the representative system diffuses such a body of knowledge throughout a nation on the subject of government as to explode ignorance and preclude imposition. The craft of courts cannot be acted on that ground. There is no place for mystery, nowhere for it to begin. Those who are not in the representation know as much of the nature of business as those who arc. An affectation of mysterious importance would there be scouted. Nations can have no secrets; and the secrets of courts, like those of individuals, are always their defects. In the representati ve system , the reason for everything must publicly appear. Every man is a proprietor in government and considers it a necessary part of his business to understand . It concerns his interest, because it affects hi s property. He examines the cost and compares it with the advantages; and above all, he does not adopt the slavish cusiom of following what in other governments are called leaders.

It can only be by blinding the understanding of man, and making him believe that government is some wonderful mysterious thing, that excessive revenues are obtained. Monarchy is well calculated to ensure this end. It is the popery of government, a thing kept up to amuse the ignorant and quiet them into-paying taxes. The government of a free country, properly speaking, is not in the persons but tn the laws. The enacting of those requi res no great expense; and when they are ad mini stered , the whole of civil government is perfonned- the rest is all court contrivance.

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lSI OF CONSTITUTIONS'

That men mean distinct and separate things when they speak of constitutions and of government is evident, or why are those terms distinctly and separately used? A constitution is not the act of a government, but of a people constituting a government; and government without a constitution is power without a right. All power exercised over a nation some beginning. It must be either delegated or assumed. There are no other sources. All delegated power is trust, and all assumed power is usurpation. Time does not alter the nature and quality of either. In viewing this subject, the case and circumstances of America present themselves as in the beginning of the world, and our inquiry into the origin of government is shortened by referring to the facts that have arise n in our own day. We have no occasion to roam for information into the obscure fi eld of antiquity, nor hazard ourselves upon conjecture. We are brought at once to the point of seeing government begin, as if we had lived in the beginning of time. The real volume, not of hi story but of fact s, is directl y before us, unmutilated by contrivance or the errors of tradition. I will here concisely state the commencement oftne American constitutions, by which the difference between constitution and government will sufficiently appear. It may not be improper to· remind the reader that the United States of America consist of thirteen separate states, each of which established a government for itself after the Declaration of Independence, done the fourth of July, 1776. Each state acted independently of the rest in forming its government, but the same general principle pervades the whole. When the several state governments were formed, they proceeded to form the Federal Government, that acts over the whole in all maners which concern the interest of the whole or which relate to the intercourse of the several states with each other or with foreign nati ons. I will begin with giving an instance from one of the state governments (that of Pennsylvania) and then proceed to the Federal Government. e.

(Chapter IV, Pan II.)

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The stale of Pennsylvania, though nearly of the same extent of territory as England, was then divided into only twelve counties. Each of those counties had elected a committee at the commencement of the dispute with the English government; and as the city of Philadelphia, which also had its committee, was the most central for intelligence, it became the center of communication 10 the several

county committees. When it became necessary to proceed to the formation of a government, the committee o[Philadelphia proposed a conference of all the county committees, to be held in that city. and which m~t the latter end of July, 1776. Though these committees had been elected by the people, they were not elected expressly for the purpose, nor invested with the authority of forming a constitution and as they could not, consistently with the American idea of rights, assume such a power, they could only confer upon the matter and put it into a train of operation. The conferees, therefore, did not more than state the case and recommend to the several counties to elect six representatives for each country, to meet in convention at Philadelphia, with powers to form a constitution and propose it for public consideration. This convention, of which Benjamin Franklin was president, having met and deliberated and agreed upon a constitution, they next ordered it to be published, not as a thing established but for the consideration of the whole people, their approbation or rejection, and then adjourned to a stated time. Wher. the time of the adjournment was expired, the convention re·assembled; and as the general opinion of thl! people in approbation of it was then known , the con stitution was signed, sealed, a nd proclaimed on the authoriry a/the people, and the original instrument deposited as a public record. The convention then appointed a day for the general election of the representative who were to compose the government, and the time it should commence; and having done this, they dissolved and returned to their several homes and occupations. In this constifUtion were laid down, first, a declaration for rights. Then followed the fonn which the government should have and the powers it should possess: the authority of the courts of judicature and of juries; the manner in which elections should be conducted and the

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proportion of representatives to the number of electors: the time which each succeeding assembly should continue, which was one year; the mode of levying and of accounting for the expenditure of public money, of appointing public officers, etc. No article of this constitutio n could be altered or infringed at the discretion of the government that was to ensue. It was to that government a law. But as it would have been unwi se to preclude the benefit of experience, and in order also to prevent the accumulation of errors , it a ny should be found , and to preserve a uni son of government with the circumstances of the state at all times, the constitution provided that, at the expiration of every seven years, a convention should be elected for th e express purpose o f rev ising the constitutIOn and making alterations. add itions, or aboliti ons therein, if any such sho uld be found necessary. Here we see a regular process- a government issuing out of a constitution, formed by the people in their original character; and that constitution serving, not only as an authority, but as a law of control to the government. It was the 'p olitical bible of the state. Scarcely a family was w ithout it. Every member of the government had a copy; and nothing was more common when any debate arose on the principle of a bill , or on the extent of any species of authority, than for the members to take the printed constitution out of their pocket and read the chapter with which such a rnaner in debate was connected. Having thus given an instanc e from one of the states, I will show the proceedings by which the Federal Constitution of the United States arose and was fonned . Congress, al ils two-first meetings in September 1774 and May 1775, was nothing more than a deputation from the legislature of the several provinces, afterward Slates, and had no other authority than what arose from common consent and the necessity of its acting as a public body. In everything which related to the internal affairs of America, Congress went no fath er than to issue recommendation to the several provinc ial assemblies, who at discretion adopted them or not. Nothing on the part of Congress was compul sive; yet, in thi s situation, it was more fait hfull y and affectionatel y obeyed than was any government in Europe. This instance, like that of the National

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Assembly of France, sufficiently shows that the strength of government does not consist in anything within itself, but in the attachment of a nation and the interest which the people feel in supporting it. When this is lost. government is but a child in power; and though, like the old Government of France, it may harass individuals for a while, it but facilitates its own fall .

After the Declaration of Independence, it became consistent with the principle on which representative government is founded that the authority of Congress should be defined and established. Whether that authority should be more or less than Congress then discretionally exercised was not the question . II was merely the rectitude of the measure. For thi s purpose, the act called the Act of Confederation (which was a son of imperfect federal constitution) was proposed and, after long deliberation, was concluded in the year 1781. It was not the act of Congress. because it is repugnant to the principles of representative government that a body should give power to itself. Congress first infonned the several states of the powers which it conceived were necessary to be invested in the union. to enable it to perfonn the duties and services required from it; and the states severally agreed with each Olher and concentrated in Congress those powers. It may not be improper to observe that in both those instances (the one of Pennsylvania and the other of the United States) there is no such thing as the idea of a compact between the people on one side and the government on the other. The compact was that of the people with each other, to produce and constitute a government. To suppose that any government can be a party in a compact with the whole people is to suppose it to have existence before it can have a right to exist. The only instance in which a compact can take place between the people and those who exercise the government is that the people shall pay them wh ile they choose to employ them. Government is not a trade which any man or body of men has a right to set up and exercise for hi s own emolument, but is altogether a trust, in right of those by whom that trust is delegated and by whom it is always resumabl e. It has of itself no ri ghts; they are altogether duties.

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Having thus given two instances of the original formation of a constitution, I will show the manner in which both have been changed since their first establishment. The powers vested in the governments of the several states by the state constitutions were found , upon experience, to be too great; and those vested in the Federal Government by the Act of Confederation too little. The defect was not in the principle, but in the distribution of power. Numerous publications, in pamphlets and in the newspapers, appeared on the propriety and necessity of new modeling the Federal Governmenl. After sometime of public discussion, carried on through the channel of the press and in conve rsations, the state of Virginia, experiencing some inconven ience with respect to commerce, proposed holding a continenlal conference. in consequence of which a deputation from five or six of the state assemblies met at Annapolis in Maryland in 1786. This meeting. not conceiving itself sufficiently authorized to go into the business of reform, did no more than state their general opinions of the propriety of the measure, and recommended that a convention of all the states should be held the year following. This convention met at Philadelphia in May, 1787, of which General Washington was elected President . He was not at that time connected with any of the state governments or with Congress. He delivered up his commission when the war ended and since then had lived a private citizen. The convention went deeply into all the subjects, and having, after a variety of debate and investigation, agreed among themselves upon the several pans of a Federal Constitution, the next Question was the manner of giving it authority and practice. For thi s purpose, they did not, like a cabal of courtiers, send for a Dutch stadtholdcr or a German elector, but they referred the whole matter to the sense and interest of the country. They first directed that the proposed Constitution should be published. Secondly, that each state should elect a convention expressly for the purpose of taking it into consideration and of ratifying or rejecting it; and that as soon as the approbation and ratification of any nine states should be given, Ihat those states should proceed 10 the

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election of their proportion of membe rs to the new Federal Government; and that the operation of it should then begin and the fonn er Federal Government cease.

The sev eral states proceeded accordi ng ly to elcct th eir conventions. Some of those conventi ons ratified the Constitution by very large majorit ies, and two or three unanimously. In others there were much debate and division of opinion . In the Massachusetts Convention, wh ich mel at Boston, the majority was not above nineteen or twenty in about three hundred members, but such is the nature of representative government that it quietly decides all matters by

majority. After the debate in the Massachusetts Convention was closed, and the vote taken, the objecti ng members rose and declared: That though they had argued and voted against it, because cer1ain par1s appeared to them in a different light to what they appeared 10 other members: yet, as the vote had decided in favour of the Constitution as proposed, they should give it the same practical suppor1 as if they had voted for it.

As soon as nine states had concurred (and the rest foll owed in the order their conventions were elected), the o ld fabric ofttle Federal Government was taken down and the new one elected, of wh ich General Washington is President. In this place I cannot help remarking that the character and services of thi s gentleman are sufficient to put all ~hose men called kings of shame. While they are receiving from the sweat and labours of mankind a prodigality of pay, to which neither their abilities nor the ir services can entitle them, he is rendering every service in his power and refusing every pecuniary reward. He accepted no pay as Commander-in-Chief; he accepts none as President of the United States. After the new Federal Constitution was established, the state of Pennsylvan ia, conceiving that some parts of its own constituti on required to be altered, elected a convention for that purpose. The proposed alternations were published, and the people concurring therein, they were established. In form ing those constitutions or in altering them. li ttle or no inconvenience took place. The ordinary course of things was not

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interrupted, and the advantages have been much. It is always the interest of a far greater number of people in a nation to have things right than to let them remain wrong; and when public matters are open to debate, and the public judgement free, it will not decide wrong, unless it dec ides too hastily. In th e two instance s of c han ging the constitution s. the governments then in being were nOI actors either way. Government has no right to 'make itself a party in any debates respecting the principles or mode of fa nning or of changing constitutions.

It is not for the benefit of those who exercise the powers of government that constitutions and the governments issuing from them are established. In all those matters the right of judging and acting are in those who pay, and not in those who receive. A const itution is th e property ofa nation, and not of those who exercise the government. All the Constitutions of America are declared to be establ ished on the authority of the people. In France, the word " nation " is used in stead of " the people ," but in both cases a constitution is a thing antecedent to the government and always distinct therefrom. In England, it is not difficult to perceive that everything has a constitution except the nalion. Every society and association that is established first agreed upon a number of original articles, digested into fonn , which are its constitution. It then appointed its officers, whose powers and authorities are described in that constitution , and the government of that society then commenced. Those officers, by whatever, name they are call ed, have no authority to add to, alter, or abridge the original articles. It is only to the constitut ing power that this right belongs. GOVERNMENT BV REPRESENTATION VERSUS GOVERNMENT BY PRECEDENT

From the want of a constitution in England to restrain and regulate the wi ld impulse of power, man y of the laws are irrational and tyrannical, and the administration of them vague and problematical. The attention of the Governmenl of England (for I rather choose to call it by thi s name than the Engl ish government) appears, since ils

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politica l connection with Germany, to have been so completely engrossed and absorbed by foreign affairs and the means of raising

taxes that it seems to exist for no other purposes. Domestic concerns arc neglected; and with respect to regular law, there is scarcely such a thing. Almost every case must now be detennined by some precedent, be that precedent good or bad, or whether it properly applies or not; and the practice has become so general as to suggest a suspicion that it proceeds from a deeper policy than at fi st si ght appears.

Since the Revolution of America, and morc so since that of

France, this preaching up the doctrin~ ofpreccdcnts, drawn from times and ci rcumstances antecedent to those events, has been the studied practice of the English government. The generality of those precedents are founded on principles and opinions, the reverse of what they ought to be; and the greater distance of time they are drawn from, the more they are to be suspected. But by associating those precedents with a superst itious reverence fo r ancient things, as monks show relics and call them holy, the generality of mankind are decei ved into the design. Governments now act as if they were afraid to awaken a single reflection in man. They are softly leading him to the sepulcher of precedents, to deaden his faculties and call his altention from the scene of revolutions. They feel that he is arriving at knowledge faster than they wish, and their policy of precedents is the barometer of their fears. This political popery, like the ecclesiastical popery of old, has had its day and is hastening to its exit. The ragged relic and the antiquated precedent, the monk and the monarch, wi ll moldet together. Government by precedent, without any regard to the principle of the precedent, is one of the vilest systems that can be set up. In numerous instances the precedent ought to operate as a warning and not as an example, and requires to be shunned instead of imitated; but instead of this, precedents are taken in the lump and put at once for constitution and for law. Either the doctrine of precedents is policy to keep a man in a state of ignorance, or it is a practi ca l confession that wisdom

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degenerates in governments as governments increase in age and can only hobble along by the stilts and crutches of precedents. How is it that the same persons who would proudly be thought wiser than their predecessors appear al the same time only as the ghosts of departed wisdom? How strangely is antiquity treated! To answer some purposes, it is spoken of as the times of darkness and ignorance; and to answer others, it is put for the light of the world. If the doctrine of precedents is to be followed , the expenses of government need not continue the same. Why pay men extravagantly who have but little to do? If everything that can happen is already in precedent, legislation is al an end, and precedent, like a dictionary, delennines every case. Either, therefore, government has arrived at its dotage and requires to be renovated, or all the occasions for exercising its wisdom have occurred. We now see all over Europe, and particularly in England, the curious phenomenon of a nation looking one way and the government the other- the one forward and the other backward. If governments are to go on by precedent while nations go on by improvement, they must at last come to a final separation: and the sooner and the more civilly they detennine this point, the better it will be forthem .f Having thus spoken of constitutions generally as things distinct from actual governments, let us proceed to consider the parts of which a constitution is composed. Opinions differ more on thi s subject than with respect to the whole. That a nation ought to have a constitution , as a rule for the f.

In England, the improvements in agriculture, useful ans, manufactures, and commerce have been made in opposition to the genius of its government, which is that of following precedents. It is from the enterprise and industry of the individuals and their numerous associations, in which, tritely speaking, government is neither pillow nor bolster, that these improvements have proceeded. No m~n thought about the govemmenl, or who was in or who was out, when he was planning or executing those things, and all he had to hope with respect (0 government was that it would let him alone. Three or four very si lly ministerial newspapers are continually offending against thc spiril of national improvement by a!>Cribing il to a minister. They may with as much truth ascribe this book 10 a minister.

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conduct of its government, is a simple question to which all men, not directly courtiers, will agree. It is only on the component parts that questions and opinion multiply. But tbis difficulty, like every other, will dimini sh when put into a train of being rightly understood. The first thing is that a nation has a right to establish a constitution. Whether it exercises tbis right in the most judicious manner at first, it is quite anotber case. It exercises it agreeably to the judgement

it possesses; and by continuing to do so, all errors will at last be exploded. When this right is established in a nation, there is no fear that it will be employed to its own injury. A nation can have no interest in being wrong. Though all the constitutions of America arc on one general principle, yet no two of them are exactly alike in their component parts or in the distribution of the powers which they give to the actual governments. Some are more and others less complex . In fonning a constitution, it is first necessary to consider what are the ends for which governm ent is necessary; secondl y, what are the best means, and the least expensive, for accomplishing those ends. Government is nothing more than a national association ; and the object of thi s association is the good of all, as well individually as collectively. Every man wishes to pursue his occupation and enjoy the fruits of hi s labours and the produce of his property, in peace and safety, and with the least possible expense. When these things are accomp li shed, all the objects for which government o ught to be establi shed are answered. It has been customary to consider government under three distinct general heads: the legislative, the executi ve, and the judicial. But if we permit our judgement to act unencumbered by the habit of mu ltiplied temls, we can perceive no more than two divisions of power of whi ch civil government is composed, namely, that of legislating or enacting laws, and that of executing or admini stering them. Everything, there fore, appertaining to civil government classes itself under one or other of these two divisions.

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So far as regards the execution of the laws, that which is call ed the judicial power is strictly and properly the executive power of every country. It is that power to which every individual has an appeal and which causes the laws to be executed; neither have we any other clear idea witi) respect to the official execution of the laws. In England, and also in America and France, this power begins with the magistrate and proceeds up through all the courts of judicature. I leave to couniers to explain what is meant by calling monarchy the executive power. It is merely a name in which acts of government are done; and any other, or nOI\e at all, would answer the same purpose. Laws have neither more nor less authority on this account. It must be from thejustncss of thei r principles and the interest which a nation feels therein that they derive suppon; if they require any other than this, if is a sign that something in the system of government is impetfect. Laws difficult to be executed cannot be generally good. With respect to the orga ni zation of the legislative po we,., different modes have been adopted in different countries. In America, it is generally composed of two houses. In France it consists of but one; but in both countries, it is wholly by representation. The case is that mankind (from the long tyranny of assumed power) have had so few opponunities of making the necessary trial s on modes and principles of government, in order to discover the best, tlEat government is bUI now beginning to be known, and experience is yet wanting to determine many particulars. The objections against two houses are, first , that there is an inconsistency in any pan of a whole legi slature coming to a final determination by vote on any matter, whilst ,"mll/atter, with respect 10 that whole, is yet only in a train of deliberation, and consequently open to new illustrations. Secondly, that by taking the vote on each, as a separate body. it always admits of the possibi li ty, and is often the case in practice, that the minority governs the majority, and Ihat: in some instances, to a greal degree of inconsislency. Thirdly, that two houses arbitrarily checking or controlling each other is inconsistcnt, because it cannot be proved, on the principles of just representation, that either should be wiser or better than the other.

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They may check in the wrong as well as in the right; and therefore to give the power where we cannot give the wisdom to use it, nor be assured of its being rightl y used. renders the hazard at least equal to the precaution.'

The objection aga inst a single house is that it is always in a condition of committing itself too soon. BUI it should at the same lime be remembered that when there is a constitution which defines the power and establishes the principles within which a legislature shall

act, there is already a more effectual check provided and more powerfully operating than any other check can be. For example:

Were a bill brought ir.to any afthe American legislatures si milar to that which was passed into an act of the English Parli ament, at the commencement of the reign of George I, to extend the duration of the assemblies to a longer period than they now sit, the check is in the constitution, which in effect says, thus far shalt thou go and 110 further.

g.

With respeoct to the two houses of which the English Parliament is composed, they appear to be effectually influenced into one and. as a legislature, to have r.o temper of ils own. The minister, whoever, he at any time may be, touches it as with an opium wand, and it sleeps obedience. But if we took at lhe distinct abi lities of the two houses, the difference will appear so great as to show the inconsistency of placing power where there can be no certainty of the judgment to use it. Wrelched as lhe state of representation is in England, il is manhood compared with what is called the House of Lords; :lnd so little is thiS nicknamed house regarded that the people scarcely inquire at any time what it is doing? It appears also to be most under influ ence and the fulthest removed from the general interest of the nation. In lhe debate on engaging in the Russian and Turkish War, the majority in the House of Peers in favour of it was upward of ninety, when in the other house, whicn was more than double its numbers, the majority was sixty-three. The proceedings on Mr. Fox's bill, respecting the rights of juries, merits also to be noticed. The persons called the peers were not the objects of that bill. They are already in possession of more privileges than that bill gave to others. They are their own jury; and if anyone of lha! house were prosecuted for a libel, he would not suffer, even upon conviction, for the fi rst offense. Such inequality in laws oUght not to exist in any country. The French Constitution says that the law is tile same to every individual, whether to protect or to punish. All are equal in its sight.

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But in order to remove the objection against a single house (that of acting with too quick an impulse) and at the same time to avoid the inconsistencies, in some cases absurditi"!s, arising from the two houses, the following method has been proposed as an improvement on both:

First , 10 have bUI one representation. Secondly, to di vide that representation by lot into two or three parts.

Thirdly, that every proposed bill shall first be debated in those parts, by succession, that they may become hearers of each other, but without taking any vote. After which the whole representation to assemble for a general debate and delerminalion by vote. To thi s proposed improvemem has been added another for the purpose of keeping the representation in a state of constant renovation. which is that one third of the representation of each county shall go out at the expiration of one year, and the number be replaced by new elections. Another third at the expiration of the second year, replaced in like manner, and every third year to be a general election.h But in whatever, manner the separate parts of a constitution may be arranged, there is one general principle that distinguishes freedom from slavery, which is that all hereditary govemment over a people

is ro them a species of slave/y. and representative government is freedom . The presidency in America (or, as it is sometimes called, the executive) is the only office from which a foreigner is excluded, and in England it is the only one to which he is admitted. A foreigner cannot be a Member of Parliament, but he may be what is called a "king?" If there is any reason for excluding foreigners. it ought to be from those offices where most mischief can be acted and where, by uniting every bias of interest and attachment, the trust is best secured. But as nation s proceed in the great bu si ness of forming constitutions, they will examine with more precision into the nature h.

As to the state of representation in England, it is 100 absurd to be rcasoned upon. Almost all the represented parts are decreasing in population, and the unrepresented parts are increasing. A general convention of the nation is necessary to take the whole stale of its government into consideration.

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and business of that depanmcnt which is called the "executive", What the legislative and judicial departments

afC

everyone can see; but with

respect to what, in Europe, is ca.lled the "executive," as distinct from those two, it is either a political superfluity or a c~aos of unknown things. Some kind of official department, to which reports shall be made from different parts of the nation or from abroad, to be laid

before the national representatives, is all that is necessary; bUI there is no consistency in calling this the executive; neither can it be considered in any other light than as inferior to the legislature. The

sovereign authority in any country is the power of making laws, and everything else is an official department. Next to the arrangement of the principles and the organization of the several parts of a constitution is the provision to be made for the support of the persons to whom the nation shall confide the administration of the constitutional powers. A nation can have no right to Lhe time and services of any person at his own expense whom it may choose to employ or entrust in any department, whatever; neither can any reason be given for making provis ion for the support of anyone part of the government and not for the omer. But , admitting that the honour of being entrusted with any part of a government is to be considered a sufficient reward, it ought to be so to every person alike. If the members of the legislature of any country are to serve at their own expense, that which is called the executive, whether monarchical or by any other name, ought to serve in like manner. It is inconsistent to pay the one and accept the service of the other gratis. In America every department in the government is decently provided for, but no one is extravagantly paid. Every member of Congress and of the stale a<;sembli es is allowed a sufficiency for his expenses. Whereas in England a most prodigal provision is made for the support of one part of the government and none for the other, the consequence of which is that the one is furnished with the means of corruption and the other is put into the condition of being cOiTUpted. Less than a fourth part of such expense, applied as it is in America, would remedy a great part oflhe corruption.

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Another reform in the American Constitution is the exploding all oaths of personality. The oath of allegiance is to the nation only. The putting any individual as a figure for a nation is improper. The happiness of a nation is the first object, and therefore, the intention of an oath of allegiance ought not to be obscured by being figurati vely taken to or in the name of any person. The oath, called the civic oath, in France, viz., the "nation, the law, and the king," is improper. If taken at all , it ought to be as in America, to the nation only. The law mayor may not be good; but, in this place, it can have no other meaning than as being conducive to the happiness afthe nation and therefore is included in it. The remainder of the oath is improper, on the ground that all person oaths ought to be abolished. They are the remains of tyranny on one part and slavery on the other, and the name of the Creator ought not to be introduced to witness the degradation of his creation; or if taken, as is already mentioned, as figurative of the nation, it is in this place redundant. But. whatever, apology may be made for oaths at the first estab li shment of a government , they ought not to be permitted afterward. If a government requires the support of oaths, it is a sign that it is not worth supporting and ought not to be supported. Make government what it ought to be, and it will support itself. To conclude this part of the subject: One of the greatest improvements that has been made for the perpetual sec urity and progress of constitutional liberty is the provi sion whic h the new constitutions make for occasionally revi sing, altering and amending them. The principle upon which Mr. Burke fonned his political creed, that "of binding and controlling posterity to the end of time, and renouncing and abdicating the rights ofall posterity forever," is now become too detestable to be made a subject for debate; and, therefore, I pass it over with no other notice than exposing it. Government is but now beginning to be known. Hitherto it has been the mere exercise of power, which forbade all effectual inquiry into rights and grounded itself wholly on possession. While the enemy of liberty was its judge, the progress of its principles must have been small indeed.

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The constitutions of America, and a1so that of France, have either fixed a period for their revision or laid down the mode by which improvements shall be made. It is perhaps impossible to establish anything that combines principles with opinions and practice which the progress of circumstances, through a length of years, will not in some measure derange or render inconsistent; and therefore, to prevent inconveniences accumulating till they discourage reformations or provoke revolutions,

it is best 10 regulate them as they occur. The rights of man are the rights of all generations of men and cannot be monopolized by any. That which is wonh following will be followed for the sake of its worth; and it is in this that its security lies, and not in any conditions with which it may be encumbered. When a man leaves property to his heirs, he does not connect it with an obligation that they shall accept it. Why, then, should we do otherwise with respect to constitutions? The best constitution that could now be devised, consistent with the condition of the present moment, may be far shon of that excellence which a few years may a.fford. There is a morning of reason rising upon man, on the subject of government, that has not appeared before. As the barbarism of the present old governments expires, the moral condition of the nations with respect to each other will be changed. Man will not be brought up with the savage idea of considering his species as enemies because the accident of birth gave the individuals existence in countries distinguished by different names; and as constitutions have always some relation to external as well as domestic circumstances, the means of benefitting by every change, foreign or domestic, should be apart of every constitution. We already see an alteration in the national disposition of England and France toward each other, which, when we look back only a few years, is itselfa revolution . Who could have foreseen, or who would have believed, that a French National Assembly would ever have been a popular toast in England or that a friendly alliance of the two nations should become the wish of either?

It shows that man, were he not corrupted by governments. is naturally the friend of man and that human nature is not of itself

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vicious. The spirit of jealousy and ferocity which the governments of the two countries inspired, and which they rendered subservient to the purpose of taxation, is now yielding to the dictates of reason, interest. and humanity. The trade of courts is beginning to be understood, and the affectation of mystery, with all the artificial sorcery by which they imposed upon mankind, is one the decline. It has received its death wound; and though it may linger, it will expire. Government ought to be as much open to improvement as anything which appertain.s to man, instead of which it has been monopolized from age to age by the most ignorant and vicious of the human race. Need we any other proof of their wretched management than the excess of debt and taxes with which every nation groans and the quarrels into which they have precipitateri the world? Just emerging from such a barbarous condition, it is too soon to determine to what extent of improvement government may yet be carried. For what we can foresee, all-Europe may form but one great republic, and man be free of the whole. - Thomas Paine

8 The Politics of Southern Africa

The politics of the Southern African region have undergone qualitative changes since the I980s. Interrelated developments, such as the phased withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, th e independence of Namibia, the multilateral efforts of global as well as regional forces to end the civil war in Angola, the imminent possibility of a postapartheid state in South Africa, and the virtual collapse of the socia list experiments in the' Afro-Marxi st' Stales of Angola and Mozambique, ofTer gli mpses ora change of course in Southern Africa. Most of these developments, to a considerable extent, have been cumulatively shaped by the changing contours of soc ial and political movements within the regIOn as well as unprecedented even ts in world politics- the end of the Cold War, the declining sig nifican ce of sociali sm, and the disappearance of the Soviet Union from the world map. However, the sheer pace of events in Southern Afri ca, in particular, and world politics. in general, complicate interpretation of the changes in the region. Such an interpretation requires untangling the web of complex interconnections between regional and global forces which remain in a high degree of flux . Nevertheless. this paper will venture to draw a tentative portrait of some of the current and likely developments in Southern Africa by placing the politics of th~ region in hi storical perspective. The politics of Southern Africa can be divided into two distinctly discernible phases si nce the early 1970s. In the first phase, which began with the intensification of the Angolan liberation struggle during the early 1970s and lasted till Gorbachev's rise to power in the Soviet Union in 1985, the politics of the Cold War influenced politica l events in Southern Africa. The politics of this region , during the Cold War phase. witnessed a dialectical russle between the forces of imperiali sm

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on the one hand and those of liberation on the other. I The central actors within the politics of Southcrn Africa and their regional and global alignments could be perceived and placed in fairly unambiguous tenns. Broadly speaking, there were four kinds of actors operating within the politics of South em Amca. The first category, spearheading the forces of imperialism, included the Republic of South Africa and its Western allies such as the US, Britain, France, West Gennany, and Portugal. They already had well~entrenched interests in the region and a capacity to fracture the forces of liberation by supporting pro~ West movements, such as the National Un ion for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the Movement for the National Resistance (MNR) of Mozambique. The forces from thi s category have often been averse to the idea of upsetting the status quo in the region. Most of the liberation movements, such as the popular Movement for the National Liberation of Mozambique (FRELlMO), the Patrioti c Front (PF) of Zimbabwe. the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa and the South- West Africa Peoples' Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia, were in the second category. These anti status quo movement s endeavoured to release their respective slates and peoples from the sufTc)Cating grip of imperialism. Se lf~de tenninat ;on continued to be the root of their existence. The third category of forces was represented by the frontline states such as Angola and Mozambique. In the process of building a socialist society, the Afro-Marxist regimes in Angola and Mozambique often encountered innumerable hurdles.! These hurdles arose from the unequivocal support of the Afro-Marxist regimes to the liberation struggles in the region. By and large, the obvious incapaci ty of the anti status quo regimes and movements to counter the forces of imperialism prompted them to seek external assistance. The states and tbe movements which offered this assistance represcnted the fourt h category. Among them the erstwhile Soviet Union, its East Europe&n alli es, and Cuba played a prominent role in sustaining the anti-status quo forces by offering them moral and material support. Funhcnnore, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in general and the important NAM states suc h as India , Algeria, Nigeria , and Yugoslavia , in particular, strengthened the anti status qllo cmancipatory movements. The politics oflhe Southern Afri can region was continuously shaped by the interactions among these four categories of actors.

170

Illternational Politics The participation of a multiplicity of actors from diverse parts

of the globe underscored the magnetic potential of the region to internationa list: conflicts which were essentially regional.) However,

the intensity of conflicts was steadil y reduced from the beginning of the second phase in Southern African politics. This phase coinc ided

with detente between the superpowers. Consequently, the dialectical tussle between imperiali sm and liberation within the region became less acute. Co nfl icts, to a large exte nt. were resolved through negotiatory settlements which were offshoots of reconciliation between

erstwhile adversaries. The politics of negotiatory settlements were directly connected with the inauguration of detente between the two superpowers after the uneasy phase of the new Cold War in the first term of the Reagan administration (1980-84). The overstretch of their capabi lities in a ga lvanised anns race, the maintenance of overseas bases, and troop deployments in tension prone areas a lmost forced detente on the US and USSR. These commitments were a heavy drain. The economies of the US and USSR were in poor shape, and deteriorating economic conditions, in tum, adversely affected the capacity of the superpowers to lead their respective blocs. Under these conditions effons to promote detente boiled down to restraining the arms race and avoiding confrontations in tension prone areas including West Asia, South-West Asia. Central America, the Hom of Athca. and Southern Africa.4 International politics after the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union is likely to shape th ~ course of events, forces , emerging ideologies. and inter-state relations in the Southern African region. Since most of the regional as well as global forces in the postCold War phase are operating in a state of transition, it is difficult to delineate the future of events, forces, ideologies and relations with any measures of precision. I shall venture to analyse the politics of Southern Africa with an approach that takes recourse to the notion of 'space', and, funher suggest, that the politics of the region during the two major phases, i.e .. Cold War and Post-Cold War, can be perceived as an ongoing struggle for mastery over space. Viewing Southern Africa in thi s perspective will throw fre sh li ght on the changing face of imperia li sm/capitali sm and of emancipatory movements as a lso developmental projects within the region . Before proceeding funher, it will be essential to present some of the connotations of the term 'space' .

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'SPACE' IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN CONTEXT The term 'space', as employed in thi s paper, is flexible enough to accommodate the nuances of the struggle for mastery in the Southern African region. First, at the most fundamenlallevel. 'space ' refers to a geographic region Ihat houses different types and stages of conflict. As ideologies are actuaJly enacted (i.e., given form) in geographic space, the nature and scope of diverse conflicts can be perceived in opposing policies and military strategies. Second, 'space' refers to land and resources over which there is an ongoing tussle between contending forces. In other words, strategically significant areas with ports or precious mineral s, in themsel ves, constitute 'space ' for adversaries in their battle for supremacy. Finally, 'space' understood in a sli ghtl y more imaginative manner, demarcates and underscores the constraints that govern the par1icipation of all actors. Each actor is constrained in its ability to manipulate circumstances and conflict. For example, despite the urge of all the emancipatory movements to control resources, the lack of advanced technology limits control over the resources they aspi re to master. Conversely, the ambition of tcchnologically advanced states to control resources can be restrained by the assertion of sovereign rights by the states which recei ve their technology. rn order to appraise the term 'space' more meaningfully or concretely, 1 shall highlight a few important fact s concerning the geopolitical significance of Southern Africa. First, in terms of geographical area, Southern Africa is as large as the US. It has a population, though, of only ninety million. S The space of thi s region is well endowed with precious resources, such as uranium, gold, diamonds, oil, coal, copper, chromium, manganese, platinum, and vanadium pemoxide. Owing to its large area, sparse population, precious mineral wealth, and almost powerless native population, Southern Amea has anracted forces from outside its spatial limits. Second, Southern Africa is strategically located between the Indian Ocean and the Southern Atlantic Ocean. The Cape rout.: has become, over the years, most significant in Euro-Asian tradc. It importance was highlighted durin g the Arab-Israel War of 1967 and the conscquent closure of the Suez Canal. With the closure of the Canal , all-Euro-Asian trade had to takc the Cape routc.1> The Suez Canal in any case offered a narrow passage fo r Euro-Asian trade which

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grew substantially during the 19805. Thus, the large oil tankers from

the oil producing countries of West Asia passed through the Cape route to reach their destination in Europe. In light of the growi ng Euro-Asian and African Trade, ports such as Maputo and Beira in Mozambique,

Richards Bay, Durban, Cape Town in South Africa, Walwis Bay in Namibia, and Luanda and Labilo in Angola have acquired greater Significance. Third, a corollary to the second, practically all the major powers in the world have a stake in bujlding ties with the coastal states in the

region. They have two major strategic concerns: the protection of trade routes; and the positioning of naval forces to protect these routes. The US base in Diego Garcia and the French presence in the Reunion Islands are evidence of this proposition. The major powers can reinforce their naval presence in the Indian Ocean or the Atlantic Ocean by cultivating allies among the coastal states of the region. With these three feature s as a backdrop, let us examine the struggle for mastery over space in Southern Africa. I shall attempt to draw a composite picture of the struggle for mastery over space by turning to three important themes, namely, the natio·nal liberation struggle in Angola, the struggle against apartheid in South Africa, and the efforts of the post-colonial states in Angola and Mozambique to master resources within their boundaries. The choice of these three themes has been governed by two considerations. First, probing the issues surrounding these themes will throw sharper light on the ongoing duel between imperialism and liberat ion in the Cold War and postCold War phases. Second, such an investigation will delineate the role of the changing but major ac tors that have staked their claim to mastering regional space.

THE NATIONAL LIBERATION STRUGGLE IN ANGOLA The national liberation struggle in Angola (1961-75), because it attracted the panicipation of the then dominant forces in global politics, was one of the important milestones in the history of the struggles for mastery over space in Southern A friea. The fierce battle between the contending forc es in Angola can part ly be explained by the country's geopolitical significance. Ango la has an area of about 1,246,7000 sq.

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km.7 Its population in 1970 was 5,646, 166 and in 1983 it rose to around. eight million.' Angola is among the wealthiest states in Africa. Due to its huge offsh ore oi l reserves, the Central Intelligence Agency (C IA) included Angola on its oil reserves chart.9 The Western countries have increasingly depended on the o il supply from the Cabinda oil fi elds. Following the hike in oil prices towards the end of 1973, the importance of Cabinda oil further increased. The US, prior to Angolan independence (1975), was the largest consumer of Cabin dan oil. In addition to oi l, Angola has been a promising source of strategic minerals such as uranium, cobalt, chrome, phosphates, and diamonds. Its main exports though have been crude oil, coffee , and diamonds. In addition to these mineral and agrari an resources, Angola's location on the South Atlantic has added to its strategic significance. The ports of Luanda and Lobilo provide important trade outlets to landlocked states like Zambia and Zaire. The minerall y wealthy and strategica lly significant territory of Angola was under Portuguese colonia l rule until \975 . Metropo litan Portuga l, in relation to other European colonial powers, was economically backward and po liti ca ll y react ionary. II) G iven its economic backwardness, Portugal was incapable of either exploring or controlling the resources of Angola. O il in Angola was di scovered and extracted by the US finn, GulfOi\' the Gennan finn, Krupp, mined Angolan iron ore. De Beers of South Africa opened the first diamond mine in Angola. The Portuguese colonialists, to a large extent, played the role of an intcnnediary between international finance capital from the various countries of the West on the one hand and African subjects on the other. In facl , African subjects in Portuguese colonies were primaril y treated as cheap labour. Metropolitan Portugal ann ually contracted out unskilled labour from Angola and Mozambique to South African mines in order to eam gold. 11 Portuguese colonia l admin istration was repressive. Sa lazar'S fascist rule in Portugal , which lasted for almost four decades, did very little towards the development of the colonies. Three different liberation struggles sprang up against Portuguese colonial ru le in Angola. Of them, the MPLA , wh ich emerged as the genuine a ntithesis of imperial ism, was sociali st in o rientat ion. Secular in its out look, Aug ustino Neto's party endeavoured to marry nascent nati onalist sentiments to socialism. The MPLA aspired to smash the colonial

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capitalist state and bring about a drastic change in the processes of production, distribution, and exchange in Angola. 11 [n essence, the

MPLA wanted to restore the land and resources of Angola to its

people. The other two liberation movements were UNITA and the Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA). UNITA was led by

Jonas Savimbi. It drew support primarily from the Ovambundu tribal group of South em Angola. The Ovambundus are a major tribal group constituting almost )0 per cent of the Angolan population. The FNLA, led by Holden Roberto, operated from Northern Angola. Roberto was quite blatantly tribali st, and he drew support from the Bakango tribal

group which is spread over Northem Angola, Zaire, and Gabon. Irrespective of ideological orientations, the three liberation movements relied on guerrilla warfare to overthrow colonial ru le. In fact, metropolitan Portugal encountered mounting guerrilla resistance in all its colon ies. In retal iation, Portugal deployed large contingents of troops in its colonies. During the 1970s, the colonial regime deployed roughly 130,000 troops in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau and unleashed its military machineY Nearly 60,000 Portuguese soldiers operated in A n gol a. '~ Portugal also invoked the support of its Western and other allies to manage the escalating crises withi n its colonies. In the context of South em Africa, the Republic of South Africa was an obviousally. South Africa was, and continued to be, the hub of imperialist forces in the region. The apartheid state in Soulh Africa not merely reinforced Western dominance in the region but, on the basis of Western support, tried to dominate the political economy of the region. South Africa in tum was in league with the white minority ru le of Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia. Portugal's other important ally was the United States. Owing to its assoc iation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Portugal received military support from the US. I!! At the same lime, US policymakers were m:epti ve to the gro\...,th of liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies. Reali sing that the days of traditional empire were numbered, the US accelerated the process of decolonisation in Angola. It acti vely supported the two pro-West movements, i.e., the FNLA and UNITA. In fact, when the Kennedy administration took

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!lver in 1960, the CIA chose to culti vate Ho lden Roberto, with the hope that he would succeed in capturing power in independent Angola. After 1962, Roberto was on the C IA payroll. He received a persona l stipend of about $ 100,000 a year main ly to keep the Americans ' info rm ed ' of w hat was going on in the Ango lan resistance movement?16 Roberto 's FNLA was supported by President Mobutu of Zaire. Mobutu 's Zaire, in its tum, was an ally of the US. The US also cultivated Jonas Savimbi of UN ITA. Furthennore, by backing UNITA from the south, South A frica tried to subvert the gains of MPLA. As the leader of the imperiali st camp, the US offered not merely material support but orchestrated its moves through regional allies like Zaire and South Africa. It offered S 80 mi llio n to the FNLA and UN ITA. !1 ln US calculations. the advent ofa pro-West regime could help protect American financial investments. particularly those of Gulf Oil (a subsidiary of US Chevron) in Angola. Such a regime, of course. could also have p rov ided sea access to landlocked allies like Za ire. China joined the US in support ing the anti-MPLA forces. The SinoUS detente o f the 1970s, coupled with the ami-Sovietism of China, partl y explain Beiji ng 's stance. In vicw of this combination of fomlidablc adversaries, the MPLA had to seek external assistance. It was already being backed by the Soviet Union (since 1951). In the early 1970s, the Soviet Union could not afford to ignore the moves of its p ri me adversaries led by the US in Ango la. A socialist ori entation and the broad mass base of the MPLA prompted the Soviets to intensify their assistance to the MPLA. In 1975, when civil war broke out between the three contending liberation movements, the Soviet Union provided the MPLA with mi li tary equipment worth $ 200 mill ion. IS In a bid to fight the imperialist forces in the region. Cuba sent over 20,000 soldiers to assist the MPLA Guerrillas. Eventua lly, massive Soviet assistance coupled with the active support of Cuban troops contributed to the triumph of the MPLA in the civil war. The advent ofthe MPLA regime under President Neto in Angola proved profi table for the Soviet Union and its allies in two ways. First, the Sov iets got a foothold in the regi o n due to the pro-Soviet stance of the new regime and constra ints of US pol icy. At this historical juncture, scathing criti cism of US policies in Vietnam and Chile

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prevented the US from confronting the Soviets wholeheanedly. Second, the Organi sation of African Unity (OA U) recognised the MPLA

regime and thereby showed willingness to accept Soviet-Cuban intervention in Africa. The Soviet role in A fri ca thereby acquired a

certain element of legitimacy. The liberation struggle in Angola otTered conspicuous evidence of the inextricably intertwined character of regional and global powers and forces, operating through diverse kinds of alignments. Its success

intensifi ed the liberation struggles elsewhere in Southern Africa. Liberation Movements in Zimbabwe and Namibia began to fi ght

imperiali sm with new zeal. The anti-racist struggle in South Africa gathered momentum •. particu larly with the Sowelo riots of 1967. We now proceed to examine the anti·racist struggle in south Africa.

THE ANTI-APARTHEI.D STRUGGLE IN SOUTH AFRICA The Republic of South Africa is perhaps the most powerful state in Afri ca. It has an area of 1,221 ,037 sq. km.I' Its populatio n is 32 million. South Africa has a multiracial soc iely. The four maj or rac ial groups constitute the foll owing proportions of the population: blacks 73 per cent , whites 15.3 per cent, coloureds 8. 9 per cent, and Indians 2.8 per cent.l(I In tenns of precious mineral resources, South Africa is among the wealthiest countries in the world. Its minera l wealth includes substantial reserves of uranium, chromium, manganese, platinum, and vanadium. The Western countries, includi ng the US. have been quite dependent on the supply of these five key minera ls fro m South Africa. In addi tion, South Africa h as substanti a l deposits o f gold and diamonds. Furthermore, its strategicall y Significant locati on in the Indian as we ll as South Atlantic Ocean has greatly bolstered its actual, as well as potential, power in global politics. As long as the Cape route remams significant in international trade, South Africa wid continue to enj oy a pre·em inent geopoliti cal position among the Southern African States. Any analysis pertaining to the usc of South African land and resources wou ld be incomplete without understanding the system of apanheid and racism in South Africa. Racism was institutionalised in

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South Africa after 1948. Institutionalised rac ism was designed to ensure the preponderance of the whites over all other racial groups. The ruling white classes conti nued to monopoli se all the major resources by taking advantage of legally-backed inequality. The white minority held on to 87 per cent of the fertile land. The apartheid system encouraged the separate evo lution of races a nd pushed the overwhelming black population into the ' homelands' or ' Bantustans'. The ten proposed Bantustans we re not viable economically. Consequent ly, to earn their livelihood, the population from the homelands was compelled to stay in the overcrowded townships sun'ounding major industrial ci ties like Johannesburg. The Ruling National Party. through the system of apartheid, consciously worked to promote the interests of the white Afrikaner community. By thc 1970s, the politica l economy of Soutb AfTica witnessed the growth of powerful Afrikaner economic enterprises. Till recently, capitalism in South Africa fl ourished because the economy had absorbed heavy doses of foreign capital. South Africa's mineral wealth and the prospect of earning substantial profits out of investments proved temptation enough for foreign capital to penetrate the South African economy on a massive scale. During the early 1980s, there were more than 2,000 foreign finns operating in South Africa. Of these, 1,000 were from Britain, 400 from the US, followed by West Gennany, France, Japan, Australia, Holland, and Sweden.21 Foreign capital boosted South Africa's military self-sufficiency and indirectly defended the apartheid sys!em. By mobi li sing it s own resources and attracting support from foreign capital, South Africa grew to be a middle economic power. The function ing of Anglo-American, the biggest capitalist concern in South Africa, was evidence orthe financial strength of South Africa. A giant company like Anglo-American was a symbol of the symbiotic relationship between the western transnational corpordtions and banks, on the one hand, and South African State and private capital, on the otherY Anglo-American has a well sp read out network of 200 compan ies operating in diverse branches of production in countries suc h as Zimbabwe, Kenya , Tanzania , Za ire, Malawi , Bot swana, Mauritania, Austra li a, the US, Canada, and Britain. It controls the exploitation of gold and diamonds.

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The growth of capitalism, of a unique variety, became feasib le in South Africa due 10 a conspicuous alliance between the military and capital or industrial complexes. This alliance bloomed on account of the venical linkages between the South African economy and the

leading capita li st countri es in matters pertaining to trade and investments. Moreover, by exporting sophisticated military equipment and helping South Africa build its nuclear programme, countries like France strengthened apartheirl.n The network of milital)' and economic linkages between South Africa and the Western powers obviously have had a geostrategic dimension. In essence, complementary Western and Soulh African interests prompted them to put up a joint front against the possibilities of Soviet expansionism in the region. The unjust system of apartheid and its protagonists had to face severe opposition within South Africa. The ANC emerged as the most potent emancipatory movement. Its main a im was to establi sh a democratic, egalitarian and non-racial society.H During the course of its protracted struggle, it pleaded for the equitable di stribution of resources and abolition of socio-economic inequalities between the races. In spite of being an exile movement, during the course of its longdrawn Guerrilla struggles, the ANC grew in strength, size, and range of operations.!S Important developments in Southern Africa such as the advent of anti -raci st regimes in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe contributed to this p rocess. The termination of South Africa's illegal ru le in Namibia a:ld the advent of Sam Nujoma 's rule in the latter helped the ANC in confronting white power. The ANC was also helped by the support of various sympathetic governments and organisations. For example, the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic trained its Guerrillas and offered them sophisticated weapons. The Non-Aligned Movement consistently supported it too. Furthermore, left and liberal circles in the UK and the black lobby in the US offered concrete moral and material support. Over the years, the ANC emerged as the principal multi-class and multiracial movement. It attracted support from a wide variety of groups such as trade unions, churches, and communi sts. It grew in strength with the proclamation of the emergency in South Africa in 1985 and the consequent formation of the United Democratic Front

Th e Politics o/Southern A/rica

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(UDF). The UDF is an ama lgam of social, politica l and religious organi sations. The combined opposition of the ANC and the UDF, coupled with the assaults on apanheid from t~e frontline states, steadily eroded the legitimacy of white power. In a desperate bid to preserve wh ite hegemony, the Botha regime con solidated the repressive apparatuses of the state and launched a de s tabi li sa~ io n campaign in Southem Africa. UNITA and the MNR were used by apartheid South Africa as instruments to topple the Afro-Marxist regimes in Angola and M07..ambique. However, from the mid 19805, the tide of liberation and mass resistance within Southern Africa ebbed out of the control of the apartheid regime. Mounting internal unrest, stiff opposition from the hostile frontline states, the constantly deteriorating economy due to mandatory sanctions as well as the divestment campaign, the growing international isolation of South Africa, and the pressure on the part of the capitalist states, in general , to refoon apartheid, compelled the ruling white regime to consider refonn. The Ruling National Party acknowledged the necessity of bringing about change in South Africa when it took progressive measures like releasing Nelson Mandela and li fting the ban on the ANC. By February 1990, the capitalist classes in South Africa too were keen 10 bring about rcfonn. In vicw of the growing incompatibi lity between the policy of racial discrimination'and ~apitalism., some leading industrial magnates (like Oppenheimer of Anglo-Ameri can) openly opposed the racist laws which obstructed the growth of private capital.26 To ensure the survival of the capitali st system. the capital ist classes were increasingly willing to do away with raci sm. After February 1990. the policy of reform which gave impetus to the process of dismantling apartheid gathered unbelievable speed. Some of the major legal Acts, such as the Group Areas Act, the Population Registration Act, the Land Act, as well as regulations and laws that gave constitutional sanctity to apartheid were repealed. Through the Convention for a Democratic South Africa held in December 199 1, the South African government formally unleashed a negotiatory process to bind most of the major non-white parties in a dialogue with the government. What is more, in a historic all-white referendum on 17 March 1992, the white electorate endorsed the

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process of reforms Icading towa rd s a post-apartheid state in South Africa. The changing domestic en vi ronment in South A frica won sympathy for the de Klerk regime from all over the world. The US, Great Britain, Japan , Germany, and France lifted sanction s. The capitali st world, in general , normalised trad"e, commercial, and diplomatic ties with South Africa. The reformist initiatives of President de Klerk boosted South Africa's business, trading, and commercial activities in neighbouring states like Ango la, Mozambique, and Zambia, in particular, and Africa in general. ll

The phase of rcfanns as well as qualitative transformations in South Africa gathered furth er momentum in the post-Cold War phase. The US -USS R detente after the advent of Gorbachev reduced the frequency of confrontation between the two global adversaries and their regional allies. In fact, an ANC spokesman complained that the ANC faced more pressure to negotiate fTom Moscow than fTom London or Washington.lI The ANC's importantally, namely, the South African Communist Party (SACP) was a lso compelled to review its stance regarding capitalism in South Africa in the light of East-West detente. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the ANC and the SAC P lost a major external friend . In the absence of support from the fornler Soviet Union and its allies, the two were forced to rework their strategy. Obviou.;ly. the strugg le for mastery over space between contending forces had to take a new turn . The course o f this struggle can be sketched as follows. In the process of detennining control over land and resources, President de Kl erk and Nel son Mandela were forced to wa lk a tightrope between white conservatives, black radicals, and tribal-based movements like the lnkatha Freedom Party (I FP). The dream ofwhite conservatives led by the Conservative Party (CP) and its allies like the Afrikaner Resistance Movement to carry South Africa back towards classical apartheid was frustrated by the referendum. And yet. the CP and its allies had a base among white planters, workers, and the lower middle classes and were able to th row irritants into the negotiatory process. However, the majority of whites, partl y to sa ve the capitalist system and partly out of sheer despair and insecurity. opted 10 support the ruling party. ~

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The black radicals, led by Pan African Congress (PAC) and the Azanian People's Congress (AZAPO), became apprehensive of the compromising stance of the ANC. In their perspective, a militant and confrontationist stance vis-a-vis white power was necessary if the majority blacks were to attain a Just and legitimate place for themselves in South Africa . Finally. the Inkatha movement. with its growing support from the Zulus, stimu lated intra-black violence and thereby undennined the ANC's hold over the black population . The current attnosphere of dialogue, despite occasional deadlocks in the negotiatory process, cleared the way for the liquidation of apartheid in the fonnal sense. Nevertheless, dismantling the socioeconomic structures which have promoted inequality and exploitation will be fea sible only in the long run . In post-apartheid South Africa, the whites continue to enjoy more or less the same powers and privileges in the economic and soc ial sphere. In the political sphere, however, thanks to their enfranchisement, the blacks have emerged as a powerful group. The proces s of reforms initiated by de Klerk aimed at reorganising capitalism in South Africa by eliminating institutionalised racism. As capitalism is being reorgani sed, and in the midst of the rising tide of privatisation and support to market forces the world over, the ANC and its allies will be forced to dilute their crusade for the nationali sation ofkey industries. A variant ofwclfare capitalism will handle the problems of inequality and exploitation in South Africa. Furthermore, the Western capitalist countries and Japan are likely to bolster and consolidate their interests in the South African economy. This will certainl y tighten their control over land and resources in the 'space' of South Africa. DEVELOPMENT PATTERNS IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE The unceremonious exit of Portugal led to the establishment of AfroMarxi st regimes in Angola and Mozambique . The geopolitical significance of Angola has been mentioned earli er. I shall highlight a few sa lient features of the spatial profile of Mozambique before analysing pattems of development in these two states.

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Mozambique has an area of 799,380 sq. km. and a population of roughly 16.8 million.J(I It is primarily an agrarian country. Its

principal agrarian products have been maize, copra, cotton, sugarcane, lea, and cashewnuts. Jt has estimated coal reserves of about 1.000 million tonnes. Its important ports like Maputo and Scira provide trade

outlets to the landlocked states of Zimbabwe and Malawi. In addition, South Africa uses Mozambique's ports. The Portuguese colonialists, with the help of South African parastalals and transnational

corporations, constructed the huge Cabora Bassa hydroelectric project in Mozambique. Independent Mozambique earns substantial revenues through the supply of electricity to South Africa.

After achieving independence, the Afro-Marxist regimes in Angola and Mozambique devoted themselves to the task of bringing about a socialist transformation in their respective societies. Obviously, thi s task appeared gigantic in the light of the massive presence of Western capital in the region and a hostile South Africa. Both regimes aspired to attain their objectives without sac rifici ng the basic ingredients of their hard-won political sovereignty. The effort to retain control over land and resources has generated complex pauerns in their developmental processes. These patterns can be described with reference to the Cold War and post-Cold War phases. THE COLD WAR PHASE Both Angola and Mozambique, during the initial stages of their independence, had to rely on the Soviet Union for their security. The Soviet Union, in its tum, was keen to accommodate Angola and Mozambique in its global strategy. Ideologically, the Soviet Union treated Angola and Mozambique as states with a sociali st orientation and chose to forge closer ties with them.ll In the process, the Soviet Union signed a twenty year 'Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation ' with Angola and Mozambique in 1976 and 1977, respectively. These treaties incorporated clauses on military aid and joint consultations in the event of a threat to security.l1 However, the Soviets offered no finn commitment to defend the gains of socialism in these two statcs. As a result of these treaties, the Western powers had reason to be apprehensive about the likely role of the Soviet Union in the Sou th Atlantic Ocean and the Indi an Ocean . To a certa in extent, the Soviets

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succeeded in undernlining Western influence in the region. From the Soviet standpoint, it was difficult to woo Mozambique because of their connections with China . Mozambique's att itudes towards Ch ina changed due to Beijing's support of Ihe anti-MPLA movements in , Angola. Eventually, Mozambique opted to sign the treaty with the Soviet Union. Despite these treaties, both Angola and Mozambique tried to assert their independence. Angola opted to pay for Soviet military and reconstruction aid with Angolan products and hard currenciesY It denied Moscow basing facilities on Angolan territory. Soviet warships merely received visit ing rights. Like Angola, Mozambique did not yield, in any substantia l manner, to the Soviets. In dependence brought in its wake severa l developmental problems in Angola and Mozambique. With the dcpanure of sizeable numbers of Portuguese expatriate person nel, it became difficult to reconstruct the war-ravaged economies. However, the treaties of cooperation ensured that both Angola and Mozambique were able to draw on the services of teachers, technicians. advisors, and military personnel from the Soviet Union, its East European allies, and Cuba. The Afro-Marxist regimes of Angola and Mozambique were persistently threatened by protracted civil wars in their re!ipective states. The US-South Africa backed UNITA, operati ng under Savimbi 's leadership, did great hann to the Angolan economy. Significant amounts of diamonds were mined and smuggled out by UNITA forces. Angola had to sign a cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union in December \987 to cover the mining of diamonds and quartz. )~ Furthermore , since 1985, o il companies from France, Belgium, Brazil, and haly had invested substantially in the exploration and development of Angolan oil reserves.H UNITA forces often attempted to sabotage such ventures. For instance, the UN ITA Guerrillas attacked the installat ions of the Chevron Corporation. 3fo The Beneguela railway, 3 strategic out let for the expons of copper and zi nc, was vulnerable to UNITA attacks. Like Angola, the Ci;onomy of Mozambique suffered at the hands ofthe rebels. The CaOOra Bassa Dam 's capacity to generate elCi;tricity was hampered by guerri lla sabotage. Moreover, ports and key railways in Mozambique were con stantly vu lnerable to MNR attack s.

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Irrespective of the Nkomati accords (1984) between South Africa and Mozambique, the MNR rebels found a patron in South Africa. In order

to protect their regimes from internal subversion and external aggression, Angola and Mozambique had to rely heavily on Soviet

military aid,l1 Without the presence of 50,000 Cuban soldiers. it would have been impossible for the MPLA regime to survive. The successful

resolution of the Namibian problem and the phased withdrawal of

Cuban troops offered the possibility of peaceful change in the region. 38 These two events reduced the military dependence of the two states upon the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, as a price of thelT military

dependence upon the Soviet Union, both regimes had to defend the Soviet role in Afghanistan and Vietnam 's aggressive ventures in Cambodia.

THE DETENTE/POST-COLD WAR PHASE With the inauguration of detente in the mid-1980s both Mozambique and Angola began to depend, increasingly, upon Western assistance for economic development. Considering the relevance of the Western world in terms of developmental assistance, dependence was, to an extent, inevitable. Mozambique forged cordial ties with a number of capitalist countries. Particularly after Samora Machel's visit to the US and the UK during \985. Mozambique strengthened its relationship with the West. 39 Western finance capital is steadily making inroads in Mozambique. Angolan dependence upon western finance capital can hardly be underestimated. Chevron Oil , an American company, with assets totalling over $ 600 million has been the largest foreign investor· in Angola. 40 In fact, Angola managed to pay for the Cuban troops and Soviet military equipment largely from the revenue earned from oil production. Ironically, the Soviets and the Cubans were used to protect American finance capital. This paradox was essentially a product of the transition in the developmental pattern of Angola. It represented, in operational form , Soviet-American detente. Detente between the superpowers facilitated the process of conflict resolution in the civi l wars in Angola and Mozambique. Angola, since its birth, was ravaged by civil war. The US-South African backed UNITA continued to destabilise the MPLA regime through its subversive activities. The withdrawal of Cuban troops from

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Angola and the independence of Namibia resolved one major conflict in the region . Even after NamibIan independence, the civil war in Angola cOnlinued for a while. The total loss in the civi l war was estimated to be approximately $ 25 billion!! Angola, on account of such heavy damage, was in cri sis. The contending force s in Angola, thanks to detente and the detennination of the superpowers to resol ve regional conflicts, signed an agreement in May 1991 to end the civil war. Angola is presently in the process of establishing a civilian democratic regime with the acti ve involvement of the United Nations. Unlike Angola, the civil war in Mozambique has not yet ended. But its intensity has been considerabl y reduced. The possibi lity of a negotiated settlement between FRELIMO and the MNR rebels cannot be ruled (JuL Detente as well as the constantly deteriorating Soviet economy led to a net decrease in Soviet assistance to Angola and Mozambique. Both states were given considerable economic and military assistance by the erstwhile Soviet Union. During the 1980s, of its total debt of SIO billion , Angola owed $ 4 .5 billion to the Sov iet U nion . ~ l The Soviets were criti ca l of Angola 's inability to repay its debt according to schedule. Similarly, by 1989, Soviet aid to Mozambique was cut by 40 per cent. The Soviets withdrew their military advisors. Before the political changes in the Soviet Union, Mozambique recei ved 75 per cent of its petroleum from the Soviets under a favoured customer arrangement. 4 1 With the decline in Soviet power, Ango la and Mozambique were left to seek other sources of aid. This requirement marked the beginning of the change in the developmental models of Angola and Mozambique. Finally, the change in the developmental model s of Angola and Mozambique has to be understood in the context of global politics. The diminishing support of the Soviet Union to radical regimes, its eventu al collapse, and the dec linin g credibility of the sociali st alternative as a mode of development the world over have had a profound impact on developmental models throughout the Third World. In addition, the recurrent failures of sociali sm in Angola and Mozambique in bringing about soc ial transfonnation forced the two slates to make changes. Thus, the MPLA regime in Angola is trying to rep lace its centrally planned economy with a market o riented

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JlllernariollaJ Politics

economy. It is building managerial and technical assistance with the help afthe United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).+i Apart from seeking membership afthe International Monetary Fund (IMF). Angola is desperately trying to improve its ties with the US.~s Similarly, FREUMQ in Mozambique has started placing emphasis on family farms by putting an end to collectivisation programmes.-'6 It has received aid from South Africa. the US, and other Western countries. What is more, it has adopted the austerity programmes recommended by the IME In a word, the advanced capi talist countries have already occupied the 'space' thai is Angola and Mozambique. The imperatives of development have prompted these erstwhile radical states to come to terms with world capi tal ism and launch development projects by incorporating their economies into the world capitalist economy.

CONCLUSION The struggle for mastery over space in Southern Africa, as analysed above, is replete with complexities due to the active participation of a multiplicity of actors from diverse parts of the globe. Our analysis has brieny sketched a few major themes and the outlines of this struggle. These concluding remarks are based on surface level probings of the underlying issues that formed the core of this paper. First, it is evident that the region has witnessed a relentless struggle between the forces of Western imperialism and those of liberation . A t a c rud e level , thc demarcating lines between the con tending forces can be perceived in as clear terms as Lenin would ha ve drawn . The liberation struggle in Angola demonstrated the tenacity of imperialist forces operating through UN ITA and the FNLA. However, the MPLA, in a bid to restore the control of natives over the land and resources of Angola, opted to fight agai nst imperialist domination. East-West tensions were mirrored in the entire course of the liberation struggle. Second, the anti-racist struggle in South Africa, with Ihe mounting tide of liberation within the region, began to threaten the interests of the capita list world in general. With its ferocious and sustained attack on Ihe system of apartheid, the ANC was able to swing world public opinion in its favour. Even the traditional allies of South Africa in the West opled to implement mandatory sanctions against

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187

South Africa, albeit half-heartedly. The divestment campaign and the withdrawal of foreign capital damaged the South African economy. In view of the growing internal unrest and the deteriorating State of the South African economy, the capitalist class appeared to be willing to refonn or even sacrifice apartheid in the long-term interest of capitalism. It preferrcd the control of 'class ' rather than 'race' over the resources of South Africa. With the release of Mandela and the lifting of the ban on the ANC, a new phase began in the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa. Eventually, the destiny of South Africa was shaped by the negotiations between the powerful Afrikaners of the National Party on the one hand and the ANC and its allies on the other. However, in the absence of the Soviet Union, the advanced capitalist countries with the hel p of the post-apal1heid regime will indulge in a scramble for the precious 'space ' of South Africa . Finally, it is not easy to grasp the complcx developmental process in post-colonial Angola and Mozambique. The pattern that such processes have generated defy simple categorisation. That is to say, if in the Cold War phase, the Western capitalist countries under US leadership were trying to hold on 10 Ihese IWO Slales, the Soviet Union was extending its sphere of influence in Southern Africa through its East European allies and Cuba. In supporting the socialist experiments in Angola and Mozambique the Sov iet Un ion paid a substanti al economic price for political gains. In the Post-Cold War phase, the demi se of the Sov iet Union was preceded by the collapse of Afro-Marxist regimes in Angola and Mozambique. Angola and Mozamb iqu e are in the process of being fully integrated wilhin the world capitali st economy. This wi ll certainly intensify the control of the advanced capitalist countries over their land and resources. The two states ca n master the space within their boundaries only by preserving and consolidating their political sovereignty in an interdependent world. Pol itical sovereignty may be preserved, or a measure of autonomy won, if they unite with the rest of the South in refonning the structures of the world economy. REFERENCES I.

Instead of defining the tenn . imperiali sm'. I would prefer to describe irs anatomy in the comex! of South em Africa.

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2.

See Rajen Harshe , ' Mozambique : Hurdles to Soc ialist Transition' , International Studies 25 (April-June 1988), pp. 141-60.

3.

Chester A. Crocker, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, often high-l ighted the geopolitical significance of the region. See hi s statement before the Sub-Committee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives Hearing on 'United Stales Policy Towards Southern Africa: Focus on Namibia, Angola, and South Africa', 16 September 198 1 (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1983).

4.

Rajen Harshe, 'Systemic UpheavalS and C rises: Lessons for India ', Economic alld Political Weekly. 12 October 199 1, pp. 2348-352.

5.

The area includes eleven African states: Angola, Namibia, Botswana, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland, Tanzania. and Malawi.

6.

Between 1967 and 1975, the flow of oil from the Cape route increased 20 times. In 1975, 24,000 ocean going vessels passed through the Cape. See Kenneth L. Adelman, African Realities (New York: Crane, Russak, 1980).

7.

Africa South of the Sahara 1988 (London: Europe Publications, 1988). p. 219.

8.

Ibid .• Also see Ann Seidman, The Rools of Crisis ill Soullt Africa (Trenton : Africa Wo rld Press, 1984), p. 147.

9.

Michael Wol fers and Jane Bergerol, Allgola ill the Frontfilw (London: Zed Press, 1983), p. 2.

10. Ponugal was the second poorest country in Europe; 'only Albama was poorer. 11 . The role of contrac t labour in Mozambique is lucidly brought Ollt in James H. Miuleman. 'Alternative to Conventional Strategies of Development: Mozambique Experience', Alternatives 5 (November 1979), p. ] 10. 12. Moscow strongly endorsed the MPLA as a Revolutionary Democratic Party. See L Hamilton. 'Angola After Independence: Struggle for Supremacy', Conflict Studies 64 (November 1975). pp. 10~ 11 . 1]. Hars he, 'Mozambique: Hurdles to Socialist Transition', p. 146.

14. For an account of liberation movements in act ion see Ian Greig, The Communist Chal/ellge 10 Africa (Surrey: Foreign Affairs Compan y Ltd.. 1977), pp. 165-210.

15. See William Minter, Portuguese Africa alld the West (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972).

16 . Anhur Gavshon, Cril'is in Africa (Harnlonds .....onh: Penguin Books, 198 1), p.236.

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17. The aid was offered through the C IA. Cover! and oven aid to these movements was quite substantial. The figure of US $ 80 million is taken fro m Africa Soulh oflhe Sahara /988. (See pp. 219-29 for a detailed account of Angola's evolution.) 18. Christopher Stevens, 'The Soviet Rule in Southern Africa', in John Sei ler, ed., SoU/hern Africa Since the Portuguese Coup (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), p. 45. 19. See Africa South of the Sahara /988, p. 909. 20. Seidman, The Roots of Crisis, p. 32. 21. Mai Palmberg, cd., The Struggle for Africa (London: Zed Press, 1983), p.26O. 22. See Rob Davies, Dan O'Meara, and Sipho Dlamini, The Struggle for South

Africa: Referel/ce Guide to Movements. Organizations and II/stitl/tions, Vol. I (London: Zed Press, 1984), pp. 65-70.

23. The nature of Franco-South African military cooperation is analysed in Rajen Harshe, 'France, Francophone African States and South Africa: The Complex Triangle and Aparth eid', Alternatives 11 (March 1983), pp. 51-72. 24. See the Freedom Chaner of the ANC in E.S. Reddy, cd., Oliver Tamoo and the Struggle Against Apartheid (New Delhi : Sterling Publishers, 1987), pp. 146-52. 25. Tom Lodge, 'State of Exile: The African National Congress of South Africa, 1976-86', in Philip Frankel, Noam Pines, and Mark Swilling, eds., State. Resistance and Change in So uth Africa (New York: Croom Helm, 1988), pp. 229-58. 26. Michael Mann, ' The Giant Stirs: South African Business in the Age of Reform ', in Frankel, Pines, and Swi lling, eds., State, Resis tance and Cha nge in soulh Africa, p. 64.

27. To understa.nd recent developments in South A frica, see Colleen Low Morna. 'The Pariah's New Pals', Africa Report 36 (May-June 1991), pp. 28-30; and Patrick Lawrence, 'Land and the Landless', Africa Report 36 (May·June 1991), pp. 3 1-34. 28. See Daniel R. Kempton, 'Africa in the Age of Perestroika', Africa Today 38 ( 199 1), pp. [9-2 1.

29. See Kate Manzo and Pal MacGowan, 'A frikaner Fears and the Politics of Despair: Understanding Change in South Africa', International Studies Quarterly 36 (March 1992), pp. 1-24. 30. For details, see Africa Sollll! of the Sahara 1988, pp. 700-20. 3 1. The basic prerequisites of states with a socialist orientation are discussed

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Internatiollal Politics in Richard F. Staar, USSR Foreign Policies After Demente (Stanford: Hoover Institulion, 1985). p. 12.

32. See Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 10 (London and New York; Africana Publishing House, 1977-78), pp. 17-19.

33. Thomas H. Henri ksen, 'Angola, Mozambique and the Soviet Union: Liberation and the Quest for Influence'. in Warren Weinstein and Thomas H. Henriksen. eds., Soviet and Chinese Aid 10 African Nations (New York: Praeger, 1980), p. 67.

34. See African Soulh of rhe Sahara 1988, pp. 238-42. 35. Ibid.

36. Ibid. 37. For a fascinating analysis of Soviet Arms transfers. see Robert D. Grey, 'The Soviet Presence in Africa: An Analysis of Goals', JO:lrno/ a/Modem African Studies 22 (1984), pp. 511-27. 38. See Geoffrey Berridge, ' Diplo macy and the AngolalNamibia Accords'. Il1Iernationa{ Affairs 65 (Summer 189), pp. 463·8 1. 39. See Harshe, 'Mozambique: Hurdles to Socialist Transition', p. 158.

40. Keesings Contempormy Archives 31 (Jul y 1985 ), 33762. 41. See Anita Coulson, 'Angola: Constructing Capitillism" Aldea Report 36 (November·December 1991), pp. 61·65.

42. Ibid. 43. See Virginia Curtin Knight, 'Mozambique's Search for Staility', Current History 90 (December 1990). pp. 217·20.

44 . African Recorder (8·21 April 1992 ), p. 8627. 45. On Angola's economy, see Anita Coulson. 'Angola: The Paradox of Peace', Africa Report 36 (September·October 1991), pp. 42·43 . 46. Kempton, ' Africa in the Age of Perestroika ' , p. 18.

9 West Asia and the World Order

The world order has undergone a structural transformation in the past fi ve years. This was heralded by sweeping domestic changes in the erstwhile USSR. The result was not only the end ofthc Cold War but also the breakup of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the post-World War II geopolitical structure in the industrialised North has had serious impact upon the South. The disintegration of the existing structure in the Nonh has prompted a search for a new world order. Despite the rhetoric, the new world order is yet to emerge. Today. we are in the phase of transition

from the post-Second Worl d War order to a post-Gu lf War order. This period needs to be carefully analysed so as to help in eva luating the forces that will shape the new order. Though the new order, like the previous one, will largely be shaped by forces in the North-West Asia, wi th its oi l, the unresolved Arab- Israeli problem, recurrent waves of religious fundame ntalism, and its central geopolitical location on the ' rimland ' will play an important role.

THE ENO OF THE COLO WAR ANO THE GULF CRI SIS Though the Kuwaiti crisis and the response of the North to Iraqi aggression dramatised the changed geo-po litical equation and the emergence of the US as the dominant power, developments during the past decade were already pointing towards these changes in the region. The New Cold War, that had begun by the end of the 1970s, coincided with the Afghan crisis and the Iranian Revolution. While the dispatch of So viet troops to Afghanistan isolated the USS R in th e region,

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Islamic fundamentalism orlhe Iranian variety, as opposed to the earlier Saudi variety, led to a new alignment of regional force s. The US and other members of NATO had already emerged as the dominant forces in the Gulf, and their political and military presence was not only accepted bUI even welcomed by several regional powers. All that was before Iraq challenged this combination on 2 August 1990 when it

occupied Kuwait and rejected all-UN Security Council resolutions. The Soviet Union 's Gulf policy, especially towards Iraq after the Kuwaiti crisis, was governed by several factors.) Soviet-Iraq relations, at least since 1958, had flu ctuated between friend ship and near hostility. Iraq had depended upon the USSR for economic and mi litary help . But , the post-1 973 oi l boom enlarged Iraqi options and considerably reduced its dependence upon the USSR. The long-drawn out Iraq-Iran War and the support of the GeC members to Iraq further reduced that dependence. Moreover, the USSR remained unhappy over the suppression of Iraqi communists by the Baath regime. The result was that relations between the USSR and Iraq did not improve during a nd after the Gorbachev e ra despite the pre va ili ng Cold War environment.

The USSR was also searching for new options in the Gul f. It had not only kept its links with Iran intact despite the Islamic revolution but had also begun to cultivate the oil-rich states of the GCe. It had come closer to Kuwait since the 1980s when it sold sophisticated missiles to it and provided three tankers at the height of the ' tanker war' in the Gulf. The USSR had sought loans from these hard currency rich states and was willing even to woo Saudi Arabia. Once the withdrawa l of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was complete, steps were taken to establish diplomatic relations between them. Thus, the USSR had no great interest in Iraq when President Saddam Hussein sent his troops in to occupy Kuwait. The Soviet press, under the influence of glasnost and perestroika, con tributed to the sha pin g of Soviet poli cy toward:; Iraq. It s condemnation of Iraq refl ected newly-won freedom and a newlyacquired high moral tone. 2 There was also an element of guilt at work because Iraq had occupied Kuwait mostly with Soviet weapons. Moreover, the Kuwaiti cri sis prov ided the press with an opportunity to question the very basis of Soviet policy towards West Asia.} At the

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height of the Kuwaiti crisis, some writers even criticised the USSR for not fully supporting coalition policies. 4 The ethos of the new detcme, at least during the first few days of the Kuwaiti crisis, was demonstrated by the wide publ icity given to the meeting between Secretary of State Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Moscow on 2 August 1991. The US was keen to project the image of a detente but also of the newly-emerging entente between the two former enem ies, to create an image of solidarity both within the UN and outside it, and thereby to acquire added legitimacy for its actions in the Gulf, especially ils coercive actions against Saddam Hussein. It must be remembered that the USSR had refused to go along with anti-Iranian measures proposed by the US when Iran had refused to implement the UN ceasefire resolutions. However, now the impact of the end of the Cold War was more apparenl. s Soviet policy vacillated between caution and commitment to demonstrate Moscow's solidarity with !he West. Thus, it tried to restrain US action but finally succumbed to pressure and voted for the American stand in the Security Council (especially on Resolution 678 on 30 November 1990 which authorised the use of force agai nst Iraq). While Moscow made a last minute attempt to avert war through the mediation efforts of its special envoy, Evgeny Primakov, it not on ly condoned the coal ition'S military attack and the associated destruction of Iraq but also agreed to the all-embracing ceascfire resolution (number 687) which legitimised continued coercive diplomacy vis-a-vis Iraq even after the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Though the USSR (and later Russia) condoned the coalition's military action, it did not actively participate in the military operations. Shevardnadze, in his speech at Houston on 12 December 1990, had publicly made clear that the USSR would nOI gel militarily involved in action against Iraq.6 There might have been several reasons for this: the desire not to enter into another Afghanistan-type situation, pressure from the Muslim population of Central Asia. and the refusal, at least psychological, to work militarily under US leadership. Indeed, the USS R did not even invoke Articles 46 and 47 of the UN Charter which deal with the creation ofa Military Staff Committee when the UN is contemplating military action under Chapter VII . If invoked and acted upon, the USSR, as a permanent member of the Security Council, would have been involvcd in military operations against Iraq.

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While the USSR was searching for a viable policy during the Kuwaiti crisis, the US exploited the opportunity to furth er its national

interest. The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait was an opportunity to strengthen United Stalcs; position in West Asia. According to Joseph S. Nyc, oil, order and weapons proliferation were the three most serious reason for US involvement. 7 According to another author, US involvement

' neutralized a principal enemy of Israel, Iraq. It revealed the importance of the Soviet Union as a patron of the radical Arabs,

exposed the dependence of moderate Arabs on Washington, and finally demonstrated that the United States could defend its interest in the area by forc e, if necessary' " Peter W. Rodman summed it up thus: 'The American role in the Middle East is at its zenith; a thief who played the anti-American card was made into a sony example. Soviet mischief was frustrated. The oi l weapon against the West will probably be considerably weakened. ' 9 The Gulf War had certain negative consequences for the US as well. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski , Iran was the immediate beneficiary of the Iraqi downfall. He added that Iran was openly hostile to the US and to America 's 'satellite regimes' in the Arabian Peninsula. Ethni c, religious, and tribal animosity had increased. The reliance on air warfare might give the impression that, for the US, its Arab allies were worthless. He also argued that the Gulf War raised a very controversial issue, namely, the moral question of a 'j ust war ' and the proportionality of response. The large scale destruction of Iraq by bombing was questionable. The scale of bombing was difficult to justify especially when the war was being waged against an enemy considerably inferior to the coalition forces . Iraq was not Hitler 's Gennany but a poor developing state. 10 There is no doubt that the coalition 's victory was a bitter lesson for the region. Destruction of suc.h magnitude in so shan a time was scarcely imagined in the South, though several wars had been fought among regional powers. The extent of destruction during the Iraq-Iran war paled into insignificance before the coalition attacks on Iraq which were reminiscent of the carpet bombing of Germany and the atomic strikes on Japan during the Second World War, Clearly. there were lessons here for the South.

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DETENTE, THE GULF CRISIS, AND THE UN The new detente had its effect upon the UN, p3.rticularly upon the new pattern of action of the Security Council. Some experts have high praise for the way the UN handled the Kuwaiti crisis. They argue that the Gulfaction became possible because the pennanent members of the Security Council cooperated on a matter of peace and security in the way originally foreseen when the United Nations was founded '. 11 If that was indeed so, why did China and the USSR not join the coalition in milital)' action? There we re others who saw UN action fro m a different perspective. While the UN, in this view, should reflect world opinion, only a few countries played any role in fonnulating the UN's course of acti on in the Gulf. The ten non-pennanent members of the Security Council expressed frustration over the fact that the pennanent fi ve met on their own under the leadersh ip of the United States and then presented them with a/ait accompli. For the more than nine-tenths of the UN's total membership, the system seemingly afforded no say at all. They were not involved and their assent was deemed unnecessary.ll Even the role of the Secretary-General, so vital in crisis management, was sidelined. Thus, the way the Security Council functioned during the Gulf crisis did not inspire confidence for the future. The UN's actions in the Gulf crisis are unique from other angles as well. It is probably the firs t time in the hi story of the UN that one of its members remains perpetually under the threat of military attack by the great powers under a highly in trusive resolution- number 687-legitimised under Chapter VII of the Charter. A ceasefire resolution, which should be the beginning of a de-escalation of tensions, has been converted int o an in strument of continuing confrontation and coercion. Not onl y military but also non-military measures exist under Chapter VII and yet the use of military force by the great powers was sought to be legitimised even on issues like border demarcation, the sa le of oil , and human rights. This is a dangerous precedent especiall y when human targets (like Saddam Hussein) are selected for action under the UN banner and a state and its people are made to pay the price. The functioning of the UN raises grave misgivings about the implications of the recent proposal s of Secretary~Gener.a1 Boutrous-

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Ghali on preventive/preemptive diplomacy. Boutrous-Ghali, in his fifty-page document, made certain recommendations for an enhanced

UN role in the post-Cold War era . Among other things, he recommended the creation of demi litarised zones as part of preventive

action. He also suggested the creation of ' peace enforcement unils' under Articles 42-43 of the UN Charter, which are to be more heavily armed than the 'peacekeeping units' used so far. The function afthe peace enforcement units would be to restore and maintain a ceasefire. Since the force is to be constituted under Articles 4243, it comes under the control afthe Security Council under Chapter VII . The misuse of

that chapter during the Kuwaiti crisis and after the defeat of Iraq raises serious doubts about the ultimate objective of such 'peace enforcement Wlits' , especially if they are used by the Security Council selectively against ' targets ' in the South. Though the invocation of the chapter might add UN legitimacy to the unilateral acts of the North vis-a-vis the South. it is likely to erode the credibility of the UN in the long run.

THE GULF WAR AND REGIONAL SECU RITY The Gulf War seriously damaged two core political variables in the region: Arab nationalism and Arab unity. and Islamic unity and the associated concept of ' Ummah ' . Both stood discredited. Not only was the Arab League by passed but the Organisation of Islamic Conference was totally ignored by the Arab-Islamic States that were parties 10 the dispute. Both met in Cairo before the North began to implement its policies towards the Gulf. M.S. Rajan, in his critical analysis of the Gulf crisis, goes to the extent of saying thai inviting Western military forces to liberate Kuwait and defend Saudi Arabia brought Western nco-colonialism back into the Gulf.ll The military success of the coalition forces against Iraq, instead of leading to regional peace, has posed serious questions about the future security of the region. Several options are being suggested. A.A . Yativ offers three options: a rcgional Arab-Islamic forcc, the UN option , and a US-dominated security structure directed by Washington . 14 Elaborating upon the Arab-Islamic option, Vativ suggests thai some regional powers like Egypt and Pakistan could play a fruitful role. Both had the military capability to commit about 50,000

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troops or more, a long with heavy annour. 'S Yati v prefers Egypt to Pakistan on the ground that Egypt is more moderate than Pakistan and less susceptible to domestic pressure from Islamic fundamentalism. Richard W. Murphy also prefers Egypt to Pakistan and says that even the Saudis might welcome some strengtbening of their forces and those of the Gee states through the long-tenn addition of Egyptian units. 'These would have the advantage of being both Arab and Muslim, two characterist ics that the Saud is will likely insist upon in any quasipennanent foreign mi lilary presence ' .16 1n fact, the Gee states, Egypt, and Syria did come to some conceptual understanding on that question soon after the Gulf War, as reflected in the Damascus Declaration of 6 March t 99 1. The Arab-I slamic option was, however, not adopted. Accordi ng to Yati v ' 10 expect a combination of diverse Islamic states to cooperate over the iong-tenn after the furo re over Iraq's invasion dissipates is naively optimi stic ' . He adds, 'From the US standpoint, it wou ld be dangerous to assume that a diverse Arab-Islamic force would suppon long-tenn US interests ' .17 Yativ also rejects the UN and the fragile coalition as inadequate. Instead, he suggests a three-tier strategy. The first tier would be a UN . presence with a symboli c peacekeeping role. The second tier would consist of GCC members and one or more Arab- Islamic states, preferably Egypt or Pakistan. In the third tier, the US would playa back-up role to ensure against major anack in case the GCC and other Arab-Islamic forces fell apall due to domestic political developments. For that purpose, Washington should mainta in a significant rapid deployment and weapons. 18 In other words, Yativ advocates the continuation of the present RDF/CENTCOM strategy. Several other writers also advocate a more aggressive role for the US in the Gulf. Brzezinski argues that after the destruction of Iraqi mil itary capability, Iran emerged as the strongest regional power in the Gulf. Iran has been hostile to Saudi Arabia and to the Emirates, and Brzezi nski suggests that an American military presence will be required to offset that possible threat. A US military presence could be based either in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait or both. He adds, that 'The countries arc after an client regimes. They are very ri ch but very vulnerable. They are very dependent upon the US and will probably be the object of itensified Arab hosti lity' .'~

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Richard W. Murphy provides an operative framework for a US military presence in the Gulf. He suggests that the US should negotiate agreements with the Gee states to provide for future joint military c)(crcises and access to local ports and airfields. He also suggests that

these be through executive agreements which do not need the approval of the US Senate. He feels that it is unlikely that the Gulf States will ask for, or that the Senate would approve, more formal arrangements

such as mutual defence treaties.:!O US Defence Secretary; Dick Cheney, after his four -day Gulf visit, said that some of the new security alTangements reached between the US, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf nations would be kept secret because of Arab sensitivities about being .... publicly identified with the US.21 Subsequently, Cheney, in a statement before a Congressional Committee on 4 February 1992 said that·the US was going to expand its presence in West Asia and also its Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) for swift. deci sive victory, 'if the US has to fight against any Third World country in regional war' .ll Iran was speci fically hinted at in that context. It is important to note that in the post-Cold War era the target lor the RDF is publicly defined as the Third World. Interestingly, few American experts see the possibi lity of including NATO or other European countries in the security of the Gulf. This is despite the fact that the resources of NATO and also of France were directly and indirectly used in imposing not only economic but also military sanctions against Irdq. It is also significant to note that, probably for the first time, these NATO allies of the US acted outside official NATO auspices. How will these European states. as also Japan, which depend much more than the US lipon Gulf oi l. view US leadership over Gulf security issues? Some writers have drawn attention to the pitfalls of current US strategic thinking in the Gulf and the possible consequences of the USSaudi Arabian/Sheikhdom alliance versus the regional have nots. According to Graham E. Fuller, the US could easily find itself partners with the new ' victors' of the Gulf who, instead of being chastened and enlightened by the cataclysm of war, tum inward, exact vengeance on erstwhile enemies. and tighten security for the ruling families. ' The causes of the next war may. Thus, already be at work. It is for this that America went to war? Simply backing the winners wi ll not safeguard the peace ' .n Fuller advocates a new regional order based

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upon the sharing of regional wealth. He also draws attention to the 'specter of democracy' that is stalking the Gulf and argues that the US faces a fundamental philosophical choice: to focu s on short-tenn stability, or to support the growth of democratic values and practices, leading ultimately to a more durable sta bility.2~ THE GULF WAR AND ARMS CONTROL

Iraq 's misadventure in Kuwa it and the subsequent response in the UN and outside it proved a God-sent opportunity to impose strict anns control measures not only upon Iraq but also on other states in the region. Though Iraq was the main target of anns control (virtual disannament) under paras 8·1 3 of Security Counc il Resolution 687, the resolution also states that those paras ' represent steps towards the goal of establishment in the Middle East a zone free frem weapons of mass destruction and all mi ssi les for thei r deli very and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons' . Thus, one could argue that the use of anns to enforce Resolution 687 against Iraq also applies in the case of all other states in the region . These new developments pose serious threats to the security of the South, especiall y when Russia and China, as pcnnanent members ohhe Security Council , are parties to such resolutions. Another post-Gulf War development is the tendency to impose selecti ve a rms control , especially in the field of nuclear nonproliferation and missile technology. McGeorge Bundy puts it most strongly by sayi ng that states gove rned by leaders like Saddam Hussein, Kim II Sung and Muammar al-Qaddafi do not deserve nuclear bombs: ' ... it is not good for the world that such men should have the bomb'.ll States led by Shamir or Sharon are evidently acceptable as nuclear or missile-anned states. This division of the South into 'good guys' and ' bad guys' is also evident in the case of conventional weapons. Those designated as 'good guys' receive anns while others are denied. Whereas, the North publicl y threatens to restrict arms transfers to West Asia, ' friends ' such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Gulf States, and Israel currently have a staggering $ 30 billi on worth of weapons on order tram the US.MMost of these are weapons that have proved th emsel ves during the G ul f War. The US-Saud i deal is reportedly worth $ 20 billion. According to William Hartung, an expert on US anns sa les policy, the Bush administration made more than $ J 5

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IlItemariOflal Politics

bill ion in arms deals with the West Asian States in one yeaT. n There are, however, reports that some of these are being held back pending prc..gress in the Arab-Israeli peace talks and the group meeting to

discuss peace and security in the region. Senator John McLain propounds an interesting argument in seeking to justify a dual standard in arms sales policy. According to him, the policy of the Carter administration to deny anns to all , friend and foe alike, was wrong. He argues for identifying target countries ('rogue nations ' ) for the application of arms control measures. The rogues include Iraq. Iran, C uha, North Korea , Vietnam, Afghan istan, Syria, and Libya. S~nator McLain proposes that the US should exercise the right to detennine which countries threaten world peace and then to restrict arms transfers to them.2i THE GULF AND BEYOND Events in the neighbourhood also had great impact upon the Gulf The Gulf War, which symbolised the fallout of the new detente al a regional level, was followed by the disintegration of the USS R into several indep e ndent states. This deve lopment had multiple repercussions upon the South in general and South-West Asia in particu lar. Above all, the disintegration of the USSR mean t that the Gulf was no longer threatened by the large Soviet military presence on its northern flank. The newly-formed Cenbal Asian republics, which do not pose any mil itary threat te South-West Asia, serve as a buffer between South-West Asia and Russia. The Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO), consisting of Turkey, Iran nd Pakistan, has been expanded to include the new republics. The US has limited stakes in the region but does not want to sec Iranian influence grow there. Turkey and Pakistan acquire new relevance in the context of Central Asia. The newly-fonned republics are Musl im states and thus enlarge the Organisation of Islam ic Conference, which is dominated by Saudi Arabia. It is natural that Saudi Arabia should also take an active interest in these states. Thus, the disintegration of the USSR has in fact geopolitically [inked Central Asia to We!>t Asia and extended the scope of South- West Asia. This is bound to affect the long-term regiona l poliey of the great powers, especially that of the United States.

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Recent developments also affect tne Mediterranean coast of Wesl Asia where tne issue of Arab- Israeli peace nas been nanging fire for years. During Ine second nalfoftne 1970s, Egypt initiated tne peace process under US mediation. Thougn Egyptian action was condemned by tne Arab-Isla mic bloc , Arab parties directl y invo lved in the confrontation have, over the years, agreed to a negotiated settlement. Interestingly, the more the Arabs were willing to negotiate, the greater became the intransigence of Israel 's leaders. As long as superpower perceptions of the Arab-Israeli question were influenced by Cold War considerations, the US could justify its wholeheaned support 10 Israel. But that relationship began to come under increasing pressure as the Arab-I sraeli issue began to be del inked from the Cold War. Over the past few years, the Soviet position 100 has undergone perceptible change. More than the new detente, it was the change in domestic politics that influenced Soviet policy towards Israel. There was a marked improvement in Soviet·J sraeli relations after 1987. Ye~, the Soviet Union did not abandon the Palesti nian cause. It crit icised Israel for its ha rsh supp ression of the IlItifadah. It offered full recognition to the State of Palestine, announced at the Palestinian National Council Summit in Algiers in November 1988. In 1990, the form er USSR up'graded the PLO's office in Moscow to the level of an embassy. It even sought to reassure Vasser Arafat that Jewish immigrants from the USS R to Israel would not be settl ed in the occupied Arab territories. Yet, on the question of Jewish imm igration it opened its flood gates, more to please the Zioni st lobby in the US than to please Israel. The exodus of Soviet Jew3 began with a trickle in 1986 and increased substantia lly by 1989, even before the Ku\vaiti crisis. However, by 1990, the former USS R had become a side issue even in the Arab-Israel i question, and the US had emerged as the dominant actor to whom most of the Arabs, including the Palestinians, were looking fo r mediation . That .put tne US in a very awkward position because it was forced to fin d a way out of the long-term, almost historical, commitment to Israel, and to meet the expectations of its Arab friend s and allies. While the 19805 saw it show of great overt solidarity between the US and Israel , that decade also so wed the seeds of future di scord which led to a gradual erosion of the ir bonds. According to Thomas

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L. Friedman, the 1982 Israeli Invasion of Lebanon, the Israeli crackdown on Palestinian uprisings. and the rise to power of a Likud government driven by a religious-nationalist agenda, combined to make it hard for some Americans to feel the sense of shared values that they once did.N He also argues that the new team of President George Bush, Secretary of State James Baker and the National Security Adviser. Brent Scowcroft, 'all came from a wing of the foreign policy establishment that never believed that Israel was a strategic assetan assumption they feel was confirmed by the Gulf War, when they had to spend lheir energy keeping Israel out oflhe fighting so that they could keep the Arabs in. >30 The US still needed Israel but in a different context. It wanted to change their mutual relationship from one based on a shared enemy to one based on a shared opportunity to build peace. The US establishment was most unhappy when it found that Israeli ruling elites rejected the new relationship. Washington is not used to its offers being rejected even by friends and allies. There were two issues on which the Bush administrdtion's stand was inflexible and which put great strains on US~ I srael relations since 1988. They can be summarised as ' land for peace ' and ' halt to settlements'. The Likud-Ied coalition not only refused to negotiate the rcturn of the occupied Arab territories but also insisted upon building more Jewish settlements there so as to consolidate Israeli hold over the territories. According to reports, more than 250,000 Jews have been settled since 1967 in the occupied Arab territories. It is in thi s context that the US administration decided to put economic pressure on Israel by refusing 10 authorise a $ 10 billion loan guarantee as long as sen lem ~nt activities were not halted. On the eve of the historic Madrid Conference of October 1991 , Presidcnt Bush even threatened to veto any bill, approved by the US Congress, favouring a loan guarantee.]1 Bush did not win favour in Israel. But it is significant that an American President could reject loan guarantees for Israel during an election year and find adequate support for his position in national~ level polls. The Arab-Israeli peace process that did not take off despite the end of the Cold War was given a new push after the Kuwaiti crisis, especially after President Saddam Hussein linked Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait with Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories. Though the cO::Jl ition forces, including all their Arab-Islamic members.

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publicly rejected that Iinkag~, its logic could not be totally ignored. The linkage had a great impact upon the Arab psyche. According to some writers, Arabs believed that America punished Iraq for aggression but rewarded Israel for conquest and annexation . J2 The American administration also had to react to this new challenge. President Bush in his speech at the UN General Assembly on 1 October 1990, i.e., after Saddam Hussein 's linkage offer, said that if the opportunity arose he would settle other West Asian conflicts, including the Arab-Israeli one. The net result of these developments was a determined attempt by the US to arrange for Arab-Israeli peace talks after the defeat of Iraq. Baker 's shuttle diplomacy between April and August 1991 ultimately paved the way of the Madrid Conference of October 1991. The US and USS R were co-sponsors of the Conference. Representati ves from the UN and the European Community attended to give it the semblance of an ' international ' conference as demanded by the Arabs. The PlO was ' publicly' kept out in deference to Israeli wishes. If the Madrid Conference was designed to break down the psychological bamer between Arabs and Israelis, it did not serve the purpose because of the intransigence of the Likud-Ied Israeli team. Ifit was meant to demonstrate US capability in bringing the two parties together in a meaningful dialogue, it was onJy marginally successful because the Madrid Conference and the successive meetings in Moscow and Washington failed to evolve a formula for a pacific settlement of the dispute. The diplomatic impasse was broken when the extreme right-wing fundamentalist Jewish groups withdrew their support from the Likud-I ed coalition because ofLikud 's willingness to discuss very limited autonomy for the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, something which had been conceded as far back as 1978 during the Camp David Accord between Egypt, Israel, and the United States. The elections to the Israeli Parliament, held on 23 June 1992, brought the less intransigent Labour Party to power. It remains to be seen if the peace process will gain momentum. Islamic fundamentalism was already an important force in West Asia. The Gulf War and the wanton destruction of Iraq in the bombing exacerbated the growing hostility between the Islamic world

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and what is now being tcnned as the Judea-Christian world? According to one author, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism reinforced the view among Muslims that a 'collective anli-Islamic gang-up of the West' , now considerably strengthened by a weakened

Soviet Union and a non-communist Eastern Europe, was under way. These former Communist regimes were seen as eager to portray themselves as part of the Christian Western civilisation.l l While some may seek to project Islam as a challenge to the Judeo-Christian world, mostly to legitimise continued support to Israel against the Arabs, one wonders whether the Judeo-Christian divide, which is a part of the history of the North, has been bridged, or whether anti-Semitism still remains a force . If the latter is true, there are limits to which the Judea -Christian 'coalition' can be employed against the Arabs. CONCL USION The end of the Cold War, coincid ing with the Gulf War, marked yet another turning point in the history of the post-World War II era. According to Henry Kissinger, ' That war marked a glorious sunset to the Cold War world, not a new dawn for the period of American predominance'.}4 The new world order has yet to be conceptua li sed, despite all the political rhetoric of the American administration. The shape of the new world order and how West Asia in general, and the Gulfin particular, will fit into it has sti ll not been decided. Clearly, though, for the time being, the US continues to be primus inter pares among the powers of the industrialised North, and its perception will prevail over others in dea ling with West Asian problems. As noted earlier, the US has been the main actor not only in the Arab-I sraeli peace process bUI also in the security of the Gulf. Oil remains the primary reason for US interest in the region. Now that the Cold War rationale of oil security is no longer valid, regional threats are being highlighted. be they directly from Iraq, or indirectly from Islamic fundamentali sm. There is not doubt that, in the coming decades, Gulf oil will dominate the field of world energy, especiall y of crude oil. The Persian Gu lf region contai ns almost 65 per cent of global oil reserves. The three GCC states, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and UAE, account for 45 per cent of global o il reserves.

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205

Control over resources and markets will p!ay a great role in the emergence of the new world order in the years to come. New panems of power politics and alliances are bound to emerge in due course of time. Already, old theories of geopolitics are being reviewed and reinterpreted to seek a new framework for US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. However, it is being argued that there is need for a continuing US role in the Eura sian landmass to prevent the emergence of new hegemons.3' Behind all this is the lurking fear of autonomous power centres in Europe dominated by a unified Germany, and in the Far East, by Japan, which might pose challenges to US leadership. If the future energy requirements and, therefore, economic prosperity of Western Europe and Japan depend to a large extent upon access to Gulf oi l, then US dominance over oil wi ll help America retain its hold over the industrialised north. The Arab-I slamic world in general, and the Gu lf in particular, the core of the ' rimland', thus assume a new geopolitical significance for the US as well as for other members of the north in the emerging world order REFERENCES I.

The limes, 22 June 1989.

2.

See the commentary by Konstantin Geivandov in /z'vestia, 3 August 1990, reprinted in Current Digest a/ the Solliet Press, 5 September 1990, p. 4.

3.

Leonid Mlechin, 'The Friends We Did Not Choose ' , New limes, 21-27 August 1990, pp. 6-7. Pavel Bayer, 'The Gulf War's Echo in the West', New limes, 11 -\7 September 1990, pp. 6-7, and Vladimir Nosenko, ' Ever Wiser Thanks to Saddam Hussein' , New limes, 25 Septcmber- IO October 1990, pp. 14- 15.

4.

See the article by Aleksandr Bovin in Izvestia, 5 September 1990.

5.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'Selective Goal Commitments'. Foreign Affairs (Fall 199 1), p. 17. According to Brzezinski, the end of the Cold War provided the freedom of action that the United States enjoyed in conduc ting the war against Ir:lq. 'The Soviet Union had little choice but to play the role of a benevolent even if increasingly frustrated spectator'.

6.

limes 0/ India, 13 De1:emher 1990.

7.

Jose ph S. Nyc Jr., ' Why the Gu lf War Served the National Interest', Atlantic Monthly, July 1991, p. 57.

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8.

Wi ll iam G . Hy land, ' The Case for Pragmatism ', Foreign Affairs (wimer 199 1-92), p. 51.

9.

Peter W. Rodman, 'Middle East Diplomacy after the Gulf Wa r', Foreign Affairs (Spring 1991), pp. 171-8.

10. Zbgniew Brzezinski, 'The US Victor has an Obligation to the Middle East', Imemational Herald Tribune, 22 April 1991.

II. B. Russett and James S. Sutterlin, 'The UN in a New Wo rld Order' , Foreign Affairs (Spring 1991), p, 75, 12. Edward C. Luck and Toby Trister Gali, ' Whose Collecti ve Security ' , Washington Quarterly (Spring 1992). p. 45. 13 . M.S, Rajan , ' What Price Forc ible Kuwait Liberation '? Review of International Affairs, 20 May 1991, p. 17. 14 . S.A. Yativ, 'US Security in the Persian Gulf: Planning for the Future' , Strategic Review (Fall 1990), p. 30.

15 . Ibid., p. 36. 16. Richard W. Murphy, 'Remaki ng the Mideast', World MOllitor, April 1991 , pp. 29-30. 17. Yafiv, ' US Security in the Persian Gulf, p. 33.

18. Ibid., pp. 33-36. 19. Jerusalem Post, I March 199 1. 20. Murphy, ' Remaking the Mideast', p. 30. 21. International Herald Tribune, 11 May 199\.

22. limes of Indio, 5 February 1992 . 23 . G raham E. Fuller, ' Respecti ng Regiona l Realities' , Foreig ll Policy (Summer 1991), p. 43.

24. Ibid., pp. 40-41 . 25. McGeorge Bundy, 'Nuclear Wea~ns and the Gulf', Foreigll Affairs (Fall 1991), p. 90. 26. Fran k Barnaby, 'Arms control afte r the Gulf Wa r ', Conflict Swdies (April 1991), p. 24.

27. Illtenloliollal Herald Tribulle, 24 September 1991. 28. John Mclain, 'Controlling Arms Sales of the Thi rd World', Washington Quarterly (Spring 1991), pp. 80-8 1. 29. Thomas L. Friedman, ' Israel at a Loss in Post-Cold War Era', New York Times, reproduced in Internationol Herald Tribune, 25 March 1992.

30. Ibid. 3 1. Indian Express, 2 1 September 199 1.

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32. Muhammad Muslih and Augustus Richard Norton. 'The Need for Arab Democracy', Foreign Policy (Summer 1991), pp. 13-14. 33. Mushahid Hussain, 'The Persian Gulf Crisis: Impact on the Muslim World', Strategic Studies (Islamabad), Autumn-Winter 1990-91, reproduced in Strategic Digest (New Delhi), August 1991 , p. 1420.

34. Henry Kissinger, ' What Kind of New World Order?' Washington Post, 3 December 1991.

35. Thus, it is being reiterated that America 'has a vital interest in assuring that the key ponions of the Rimland do not fall into hostile hands.. .. ' See Henry C. Bartlett and G. Paul Holman. 'Force Planning for the Post-Gulf War World: What Can We Learn from Geopolitics', Strategic Review (Winter 1991), pp. 35-36.

10 Non-Alignment

Non·alignment as a foreign policy principle for the newly independent countries has been recognised as a realistic option. In the early years of the post-World War JJ epoch, most of the powerful nations were

unhappy with Indi a's activities as a~ independent state and the complications of non-alignment. Slowly, they learned 10 recognise this new posture as a useful , secondary instrument in the settlement of disputes, especially when UN arrangements had broken down.

The pioneers were few in those years, and the term ' nonalignment ' only gradually came into usc. The earliest manifestation of the desire for gr.::aler freedom of action was in the new countries of Africa and Asia. The Slogan of Afro-Asian. post-colonial solidarity was the precursor to non-alignment. However, the ' From Bandung to Belgrade ' formula of solidarity was accepted in only a few former European colonies and, in time, in Latin America. The Lati n American republics had become pol itically free from US control a centu ry ea rli er. US economic dom ination , th e preoccupation of the European powers with their own continental civil war, and consequent colonial, rivalries in Africa and Asia had made the Monroe Doctrine relevant in an era when the US was a struggling middle powe r in st rategic term s. Geographica l iso lation , the neutra li sation of ri va l imperial ambit ions, and the much greater relevance of China, Japan, and the West Pacifi c from the point of view of markcts and commodit ies led to the tacit acceptance by the Europeans of thi s rather ambitious ' legislation' by a newcomer to the international game of all iances and spheres of infl uence. By the late 1950s, however, the Latin American countries had become restive under the Monroe Doctrine which had assured peace

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and freedom from extra-continental intrusion. The costs of this peace and freedom were economic stagnation and political reaction. Latin restiveness was a powerful, evolving process, strongest in the larger and more advanced countries- Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Chi le. It was in the Caribbean, however, that ' national' restiveness discovered an extra-continental source of strength, namely, non-alignment. Cuba and Guyana led the slow march of the Latin Americans into the nonaligned movement. More significant for the 'trade union' of weak countries was Yugoslavia. Its attraction to a neutral policy in the Colo:l War was the result of its impatience with Soviet control. Several years of a solitary posture in the European confrontation had made it a pioneer in crafting .. a strong-wi lled policy of autonomy and a globa l philosophy of coordinated action among the weak on selected issues. Thus, by the end of the 1950s, Afro-Asian solidarity had assumed trans-continental proportions. Non-alignment as a strictly limited response to two anned and competing ideologies became strong enough to act as a ginger group in the United Nations. Gradually, its existence as a fluid but discernible group, and its role in major world issues such as disarmament and decolonisation, came to be accepted. The Belgrade Summit ( 1961) was an attempt to give a certain sol idity and coherence, philosophically and strategically, to a group of medium powers and small states wishing \0 act in concert. The binding factors were mostly political and defensive in those early years. During the more complex decades which followed Belgrade, the Cuban crisis (1962) and the grow ing violence in Vietnam, the movement became more reali stic. It turned its gaze increasingly to inequities in the economic and technological arrangements of the world system. In the I 970s and the 1980s, the by-thcn Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) became as much a barga in ing lobby on economic issues as a negotiating forum for unresolved regional conflicts. Today, NAM secs itselfas much more than a negative organisation: it had an ambitious programme for democratising th e wo rl d 's economic , political , communication, and technOlogical structures. This programme was added to the earlier, more famil iar agenda of nuclear and conventional di sarmament and th e reallocation of arms expendit ures into development activities.

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With the end of the Cold War, NAM appears to stand at a crossroads. There are those who see little future for the movement.

On the other hand. the group continues to exist, to hold meetings. Its quest for greater equity in the international system, its desire to

playa role in disarmament, and its availability as a forum for regional con flict resolution hold out the possibility of continuing viability. As NA M stands al a crossroads, it seems worthwhile to go back to its origins and examine where the Afro-Asian states stood in the late 19405 and early 19505. In particular, it seems worthwhile to go back to one of the principal architects of non-alignment, lawaharlal Nehru, and to explore how he stood and confronted the choices at the crossroads of the 1940s.

NEHRU AND NON-ALIGNMENT: BEFORE NON-ALIGNMENT In September 1927, during a bricfhoJiday in Switzerland, l awaharlal Nehru jotted down some ideas on a foreign policy for India if and when she became independent. As in everything he wrote, there was an effort to be comprehensive, reasonable and up-to-date. The threat of a PanIslamic bloc, for instance, was dismissed as fan ciful: Islamic countries, Nehru reasoned, were developing on ' intensely national lines ', I The Soviet Union and European Nations were discussed . Even if India decided to reject state sociali sm on Soviet lines as a policy, Nehru felt that it was possible, indeed necessary, to culti vate ' friendly relations with Russia. '2 It s hould be remembered that thi s was the decade of mindless anti-Bolshevism in many parts of the world, particularly the United States and Great Britain. Nehru himself would visit Moscow for the tenth anniversary celebrations so the Revo lution within a few weeks of writing this note. In general, hi s approach to the Soviet Union was sympathetic but non-committal.

It was in Nehru's discussion ofa future war involving Britain that the foreshadowings of non-alignment can be faintly discerned. Nehru saw in the British Empire's North West Frontier Po li cy preparations for a war with Russia. ' India has no quarrel with Russia; she has considerable sympathy for her, and there is much in her that s he admires'. he wrote. ' Why then should we be dragged into a war against Russia for the benefit of British imperialis m' ',)) Nehru went

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on to notice that the British Dominions had 'established their right not to join~ ngland in a war or not to do so as they chose'.4 As for lndia, '(s)he should also declare unequivocaJly thaI sbe will be no party to any war without her express consent .... We must have thi s declaration made and repeatedly made and it should be made known to the people as widely as possible by press and platfonn. We have nothing to gain by being parties to such a conflict and we have a great deal to lose'. 5 This is an interesting fonnulation.ln 1927, the great examples of neutrality during wartime were the United States in the earlier phase of World War I and European neutrals like Switzerland and the Scandinavians. Nehru built upon these few precedents a philosophy of neutrality for a future war in which Britain, and, by extension, Indian might be involved. His neutralist philosophy was to provide a basis for the Congress Party 's decisions in J 939, 1941 , and 1942 not to join either the; Imperialist War ' or the ' People's War ' against Nazi Germany. Neutrality is the negative part of non-alignment. There are more positive aspects to it, rooted in Afro-Asia 's long liberation struggle against Western imperialism. In 1936, during his next visit to Europe, in an article for a Paris journal, Vendredi, Nehru expressed his vision of a new, organically linked world community where the oppressed nations of the world, specifically India and China, would be at the centre of any re-design of the world system: Events in the deserts and waste lands of East Africa echo in distant chancelleries and cast their heavy shadow over Europe; a shot fired in Eastern Siberia may set the world on fire... It may well be that the future historian, with a truer perspective will consider China and India as the most significant problems of today, and as having a greater influence on the future shaping of world events.' Looking to the future international policies of free India, Nehru noted that 'India both historically, and by virtue of its importance, has been and is the classic land of modern imperialism'. He assured his European audience: ' A free India would inevitably playa growing part in international affairs, and that part is likely to be on the side of world peace and against imperialism and its offshoots' .7 The anti-imperialist, anti-colonial component of the non-aligned agenda is anticipated here.

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More interesting, perhaps, was Nehru's recognition of the dilemma

facing new India. namely. the choice between capitaJism and socialism, the ideological conundrum which would confront the non-aligned in the Cold War: The old culture ofTers no solution to modem problems: the Capitalist West. which shone so brightly in the nineteenth century, has 10s1 its

glamour, and seems to be ine xtricably involved in its own contradictions; the new ci.vilization being built upon the Soviet

countries altracts, in spite of some dark patches, and offers hope for world peace, and a prospect of ending me misery and exploitation of millions. If may be that India will resolve this crisis of the spirit by turning more and more to the new order, but when she does so, it will be in her own way. making the structure fit in with the genius of her people.'

Capitalism? No. Socialism? Yes. But with an Indian face. The eve of war was a time of lost illusions, dead dreams and receding mirages. Nehru was familiar with the ideas of H.G. Wells, Norman Angell, and Aldous Huxley and, later, the ' Union Now' and 'One World ' manifestos of Clarence Streit and Wendell Wilkie. These ideas led to the Atlantic Charter, the Charter of the United Nations, the end of the war and the unexpected new ideological-cum-strategic confrontation which replaced the warti me alliance. There is an intriguing. though necessarily vague, anticipation of the post-war situation in a tener Nehru wrote to H.N. Spalding in 1940, after the War had begun: ' I do not believe in a United Sates of Europe or of Europe and America. This will mean ultimately either the exploitation by Europe and America of Asia and Africa or the building up of vast groups of nations hostile to each other. · 9 A most interesting bit of intelligent anticipation, for the exploitation of Asia and Africa by economic means continued throughout the post-imperial epoch. It became the j ob of the non-ali g ned movement to countcr it by persuasion, negotiation, and propaganda. The formation of hostile groups of nations led to the political need for non-alignment as policy and organisation. Before the actual challenge of formulating foreign policy in 1947, Nehru had occasion to think in depth and at ease about the problems of the post-war world, the panem of power politics which might emerge

213

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out of the chaos of victory and defeat. and the geostrategic realities of the future. O ne chapter in the Discovery of India dealt with these and other related subjects, including Russia and America, [ndla and Asia. and the British Empire and C hina. It is actually only a sub· chapter. and is entitled ' Realism and Geopol itics. World Conquest or World Association. The USA and the USSR t . Written in 1944, it is remarkable for it s contemporaneity, freedom from prejudice, prescience. No student of India's Foreign Policy or of Nehru 's personal contribution can afford to ignore this lucid survey of what was, and his prognostication of what could be'! After discussing the popular theories of geopolitics launched by the Englishman, Mackinder, and developed out of proportion by Gennan scholars like Haushofer, Nehru took note of the American variation of the old ' Heartland' theory. Mackinder had concluded that the power which controlled the heartland of the Eurasian land mass would control the planet. But the rimlands had to be controlled before control of the interior could be achieved. Nazi Gennany and the Soviet Union, Nehru noted, we re primarily motivated by the fear of encirc lement by a combi nation of enemies in the rimlands . The American refinement ofMackinderian and Haushoferian geopolitics was contained in a remarkable theoretical contribution made during the war years by a brilliant and innovative strategic ' thinker, Nicholas Spykman. He injected a fear of encirclement into the American mind at the moment of its greatest involvement with the world. Nchru noted: •And now even the United States of America are told by Professor Spykman in his last testament that they are in danger of encirclement. that they should ally themselves with a " rim land" nation. that in any event they should not prevent the "heartland" (which means now the USSR) from uniting with the rimland' .!O

a

This was a seminal idea, flash of analytical insight. It explained the basis for the containment paranoia of Truman, itself a response to the encirclement paranoia of Stalin. Nehru 's analysis was remarkably free of ideology and was borne of intellectual honesty, reali sm, and shrewdness. The division of Europe imo two power blocs, Nehru clearly understood, was based on the percei ved geostrategic interests of two regional powers flexing their muscles in the atomic age to become quasi·global or global powers.

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International Politics

Nehru went on to consider the preponderance of the USA and USSR after the war. His assessments were friendly and balanced in both cases, but without illusions: The two outstanding facts emerging from the war are the growth in power and actual and potential wealth of the USA and the USSR. The Soviet Union actually is probably poorer tban it was prior to the war... bul its potential is tremendous... Jn physical and economic pOwer there will be no one to challenge it on the Eurasian Continent. Already it is showing an expansionist tendcncy.... Thc tendency to expand. if not in territory then in other ways, is evident.... its present leaders have an unchallengeable position, and everything depends on their outlook for the future ... .(T)he United States of America have astonished the world by their slUpendous production and organising capacity.... Much will inevitably depend on American and Soviet policy, and on the degree of coordination or conflict between the two and Britain .... Everybody talks loudly about the necessity of the Big Three to pull together in the interests of world peace and cooperation, yet rifts and differences peep out at every stage, even during the course of the War. Whalever, the future may hold, it is clear that the economy of the USA aner the War will be powerfully expansionist and almost explosive in its consequences. Will this lead to some kind of imperialism? It would be yet another tragedy if it did so, for America has the power and an opportunity to sct the pace for the future. The future policy of the Soviet Union is yet shrouded in mystery, but there have been some revealing glimpses of it a lready. It aims at having as many friendly and dependent or semi--dependent countries near its borders as possible. Though working with other powers for the establishment of some world organizations, it relies more on building up its own strength on an unassailable basis. That is not a hope ful prelud e to world cooperation. II

After assessing problems at the higher rungs of world politics, Nehru asked: 'Where do the hundreds of millions of Asia and Africa come into the picture? They have become increasingly conscious of themselves and their destiny, and, at the same time they are also world conscious .... They welcome anempts at world cooperation, and the establi shment of a world order, but they wonder and suspect if this may not be another device for continuing the old domination '. 11 The realities of world power as represented by the three major powers of the time, and the other, submerged reality of what we now call the Third World are all indicted here in broad brushstrokes : the

Non-Alignment

21S

inevitability of non-aligned posture of disengagement from blocs, of collective resistance to exploitation, and of cooperative engagement had already crystallised in Nehru 's mind. NON-ALIGNMENT AND THE COLD WAR

The use of the teon 'non-alignment' to describe the decision of a group of smaller or medium states in the global system to keep aloof from the two power blocs became accepted by the mid-1950s. A famous, early instance of the anxious desire of the partisans of the new cause not to be confused with neutralism was articulated in the Tito-Nehru joint statement of 1954. Long before that formal announcement, however, Nehru had quite consciously moved on towards a new policy for India, a policy of detachment, di st3nce, and non-alliance, but not of neutralism in its negative aspect. It has become necessary to formulate the country's response to the dramatically changed world situation coterminous with India 's independence. By the time the Interim Government was in position, the Nuremberg judgment had been delivered. The Nazi war criminals had been executed on 16 October 1946. Within a week. the General Assembly had convened in Paris. The League of Nations h~d already been wound up earlier in the year; and it seems, in retrospect, that with the war behind them, at least in Europe the partners in the vi ctorious wartime alliance fell free to resurrect their buried antagonisms. The rejection of the Marshal Plan by the Eastern Bloc countries, the Com:nunist takeover in Czechoslovakia, and the Berlin cri sis of 1948 unravelled the alliance, spawned containment, and led to th e decision on both sides to fonn military alliances. India had to react to these developments. It had to decide whether to go along with past habit and practice and vote in disputes in the UN with the Western Bloc (to which it belonged in political and economic tenns) or to explore ways and means of detaching itself from total identification with the west. Indian reaction can be traced through the brief, tense pronouncements in the period from the fonnalion of the Interim Government to Independence. When we read them today, what is apparent is the lack of rhetoric, the absence of a desire to impress, and, at the same time, a clear appreciation of the need for the new nation to be cautious and wary in a demanding environment.

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International Politics

The famou s September 1946 broadcast is mosl memorable for its carefully articulated assessment orlhe importance oflhe two major powers. There is, however, another sentence in that broadcast which is equally significant : ' We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which

have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale ' :13 This cast a worried look back to

the atom bomb and was directly influenced by the new chill in Europe. More significant, the world ' aligned' is used here in a specific sense.

Nehru clearly was searching for a strategic conception and commitment which would be less binding than a wartime alliance or a political association of stales like the Commonwealth. Quite consciously, perhaps, Nehru had in mind the-example of another newly independent country, in another century and continent, which had faced the same conflictual international environment. The founding fathers of the United States had faced a simi lar problem: geographical realities had attenuated the impact of the great European conflict on America, but it had not disappeared, In Washington's farewell address, never forma lly delivered, but drafted by almost all the members of the coll ective leadership, including Jefferson and Hamilton, the problem facing the young state was expressed thus: ' The nation which indulges towards another an habitual hatred, or a habitual fondness, is, in some degree, a slave. It is a slave to its animosity, or to its affection either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its intere s t ',' ~ This is phrased in the lean, muscular prose of an earlier period. It says, in so many words, that no nation state can afford permanent friendships or enmities. Such a 'habitual ' poli cy would lead, in modem te'll1inology. inexorably to compromises with its ' ideology' or ' national interest', Another famous American fonnu lation echoes this determination to avoid involvement, namely, Jefferson 's inaugural address, which finnly pledges 'entangling al liances with none', and only 'peace, honest friendship and commerce with all nations'." These well-known ideas, revised and refashioned to suit a new context, were expressed in the new thesis that a country like India should ' keep away' from groups which were becoming ' aligned ' with each other, alignment meaning a pre-bell igerent , pre-alliance understanding between stales based on shared beliefs or a perceived

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217

common threat. The word 'alignment' thus entered Nehru 's lexicon almost indirectly in an attempt to understand the new vag uer sympathies which cut across the old wartime alliance. A few months later came a rather unusual occasion for Nehru to articulate his views. Mr. John Foster Dulles, who was then a member of the US Administration, in a speech on 19 January 1947 referred to the 'strong influence in India' of the Soviet leaders through ' the interim Hindu Govemment'.1 6 In a press statement , Nehru commented: ' Our policy is to cuhi vale friendly and cooperative . relations with all countries, notably the USA , and not to align ourselves with any particular Power grouping. Our policy is going to be an independent one.' 17 It is evident that, by now, the link between the absence of 'alignment' and independence in foreign policy was clearly established in Nehru's mind. The word 'a lignment' described a particular relationship between nations. which led to the formation of ' blocs' or 'groupings' or ' groups' . A country like India deliberatel y chose ' not to be aligned'. Nehru was to go on 10 stress that there was another side to non·alignment: not isolation but responsive invol vement in the world. Peace, freedom, prosperity, disaster, all these were indi visi ble in an increasingly interconnected world, and India and others who chose not to be aligned must of necessity be responsibly engaged.

The months leading to independence had given Nehru ample occasion to dwell on Afro·Asian Unity in an age of transition, an idea which would, in its formulation as anti·colonialism, be one of the core ideas in the content of non·alignment. The famolls sentence in hi s address during the Asian Relations Conference in March 1947 is relevant: 'For too long have we of Asia been petitioners in western courts and chancelleries. That story must now belong to the past. We propose to stand on our own legs and to cooperate with all others who are prepared to cooperate with us. We do not intend to be the playthir.gs of others ' . IS On 9 August, a few days before the transfer of power, the theme of Asia 's new role was again stressed. In a rather euphoric spirit, Nehru spoke about the need for a Monroe Doctrine for Asia against the background of Dutch intran sigence in Indonesia; ' In connection with the Indonesian questi on, I have already said that fo~ign annies have no business to stay on the soi l of an Asian country.

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Internationrzl Politics

The doctrine expounded by President Monroe had saved America from foreign aggression for nearly a hundred years and npw tbe time has come when a similar doctrine must be expounded with respect to Asian

countries.' 19 Brave words. which read rather pathetic today. The point, however, is that non-alignment in Nehru's mind meant detachment from blocs, cooperation with all . and a special agenda of freedom for Asia and Africa.

In the first three years after Independence, on various occasions, Nehru referred to this basic principle oflndia's policy: the word ' nonalignment' was never used; the refusal to be ' aligned' was stressed. In various speeches in the Constituent Assembly the idea cropped up. For in stance. in March 1948 Nehru explained: Now I am not talking in tenns of this bloc or that bloc: I am talking independently of the blocs as they have appeared on the world stage .. .. J do not think that anything would be more injurious to us from any point ofview...than for us to give up the policies that we have pursued, namely, the choice of standing up for cenain ideas in regard to the oppressed nations. and try to align oursel ves with this great power or that and become its camp foll owers in the hope that some crumbs might fall from their table.lQ

In March 1949, he reiterated the strategy: ' So our policy will continue to be not only to keep aloof from power alignments, but try to make friendly cooperation possihle'.ll Earlier. in the same speech he had traced non·alignment to genuine self·govemment. ' What does independence consist of? It consists fundamentally and basically of foreign relations. That is the test of independence. All else is local autonomy'.l1 At the same lime, also, in March 1949, Nehru began 10 see for the non-aligned state a new, positive role in a world wracked by disputes. In a major speech to the Indian Council of World Affairs, he claimed: I think we are mere ly trying not to gel excited about these problems and anyhow there is no reason why we should not try (to mediate). It follows. therefore, that we should not align ourselves with what are called Power Blocs: we can be of far more service in doing so, and I think there is just a possibility- and I shall not put it higher than that- that at a moment of crisis our peaceful and fri endly effotts might make a difference and aven that crisis. lJ

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India and Nehru were not totally isolated as they deployed this unfamiliar .and disconcerting approach. Burma was almost always supportive in those years, as also the Indonesian National Movement before and after Independence. In fact, the Indonesian struggle was the focal point in the evolution of the Afro-Asia and non-aligned movements. Independently, in Europe, inspired by different motivations, there was simi lar thinking in Yugoslavia. From 1944 it had been clear that the Yugoslav socialist government under Tito would be unwilling to accept total hegemony from Moscow. Almost always, the point of friction was over national interest not ideology. In 1944, Yugoslav criticism of the ill-treatment of the civilian population in Belgrade by Soviet soldiers was the first signal. Stalin reacted angrily. In 1945, along wit h the Soviet-Yugoslav mutual aid pact, there occurred the Trieste crisis. Stalin refused to help Yugoslavia face an Anglo-American ultimatum and the threat of Western Military Action. The crisis occasioned Tilo's famous statement indicating the shape of things to come. Controverting suggestions in the western press that Yugoslavia was laying claim to the Adriatic port to hand it over to the Soviet Union, Tito made his country's position clear: ' We have no wish to be dependent on anyone, whatever, may be sa id or published .... We do not want to be small change; we do not want to be involved in any policy of spheres of influence. '2~ The rest is well-known including the problems with the Cominfonn, the formal break with Moscow, and the eupboric welcome of Yugoslavia to the Western side. That Tito was able to resi st these blandishments, that he did not give up soc ialism within Yugoslavian territory, but that he was willing to enter into political and economic understandings with the western world, all these made a unique contribution to the theory and practice of non-alignment. The word was never used in Belgrade; the idea had not yet clarified altogether. That would have to wait for several years until Nasser came to power in Egypt and the historic Nasser-Nehru-Tito meeting took place at BrionL As far as India 's own policy was concerned, th e major developments were India 's evenhanded approach to the establishment of diplomatic relations with countries belonging to both all iance groups, and, more specifically, her uninhibited cooperation and

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understanding with the socialist countries. This feeling ofneamess and

understanding was accompanied by a process of alienation from America and Britain.

By the end of 1949, India 's decision 10 remain in the British Commonwealth- but as a republic-had made an impression . No one in the white Commonwealth and no one in Moscow or Peking believed that Nehru and Krishna Menon could pull it off. The Commonwealth

dec ision was immediately noticed in Moscow where, a week before the estab li shme nt of the new republi c, Stalin m el the lndian

Ambassador in a rare gesture. There was even desultory conversation about a possible agreement a l a middle and non-committal level between the two countries. The next six months were crucial in India 's foreign policy. India was the second non-socialist forei gn country to recognise Communist China. The decision to recognise China was understood wi th all its implications both in Washington and Moscow. During the next fo ur or fi ve months, whenever, Chinese membership of the United Nations was discussed, India supported China, sometimes with o nl y the assistance of Burma from the non-socialist nations. On 13 January 1950, the Soviet resolution in the Security Council to remove the Nationali st C hinese delegation was rejected. Only India an d Yugoslavia voted in its favour. On 1 August 1950, the President of the Security Council ruled that the National ist delegation could not participate in the Counci l's meetings. This was supported only by the Soviet Ur.ion, India, and Yugoslavia. In a more important development, immediately after the start of the Korean conflict, India 's representative, B.N. Rau, made a proposal to reduce tension on the issue. He suggested that the ' the Security Council appoint a committee of its non-permanent members to study all peace proposals and resolutions and submit its recommendations by a specified date.'1j The proposal was abandoned because of the lack of support from the Security Council, though France, Yugoslavia, and Egypt were supportive. The United States' representative wanted a plan to be based on the resolution of 25 June 1950 which was not agreeable to Rau and the Sov iet representative. Later, when the reso lution branding China as an aggressor was brought forward in February 1951 by the United States and its friends, Burma and India

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were among the seven countries which opposed the resolution. Sweden, Yugoslavia and seven Asian and Arab states abstained. By the early 1950s, therefore, the idea of non-alignment was a part of Indian Foreign Policy. In fact , as Nehru claimed again and again, in articulating and insisting on non-alignment he only represented a national viewpoint. There is interesting evidence of the wider Indian acceptance of the word ' non-alignment '. In Shankar's Weekly, dated 25 June 1950 (irony of ironies, the day the Korean conflict broke out), the famous cartoonist, Shankar, drew a long street procession carrying a banner with the slogan ' No Alignment With Blocs'. Shankar had the leaders of the two Blocs, Truman and Stalin, looking down angrily and sulkily from their respective balconies. At the head of the procession, carrying the banner was Jawaharlal Nehru, immediately following him were two or three recognisable Asians, Indonesians, and Bunnese.26 Nehru used non-alignment in its distinctive, negative sense several times during those years. The following is one of the earliest recorded instances in the Lok Sabha. On 12 June 1952, he discussed the risks and perils of India 's policy: I submit again that, so far as our policy is concerned. in spite of the fact that we deal largely with the United Kingdom and the USA- we buy our things from them and we have accepted help from them- we have not swerved at all from our policy of non·alignment with any group. We stuck 10 our policy even though we had to deny ourselves the offered help....Thcre have been times when one word from us would have brought us many of Ihe good things of life. We preferred not to give that word- not a few individuals but millions in this country. If at any time help from abroad depends upon a variation, howsoever, slight, in our policy, we shall relinquish that help completely and prefer starvation and privation to taking such help; and. I think, the world knows it well enough.11

NON-ALIGNMENT AFTER THE COLD WAR

This investigation of the origins and development of the concept of non-alignment in India's foreign policy is of more than historian interest. Today, after extreme claims have been made about the end of the bipolar world and the disappearance of ideology, non-alignment is being treated rather dismiss ively in the same quaners where it was

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viewed with suspicion and dislike. OUf review of non-aligrunent during its gestation in Nehru's mind, from the 19305 and the 19405 to the post- Independence period, has shown that the

COfe

of the polil.!Y is

autonomy in decision-making. The policies of other countries are important. What is really importanllhough is absolute fealty to one's own national interest and the refusal to be seduced by the policies of

another country, however, admirable they may be. This was the lesson Nehru drew from the long hours spent in prison contemplating the history of modem civilisation. It was, therefore, well-nigh inevitable that, when the United Nations was effectively split and military blocs were fanned, lndia would refuse to give up its power of decisionmaking to either bloc. All the options- understanding, friendship, sympathy, alignment and alliance-were possible with the powerful nations of the world. It was necessary and useful to be flexible in one's policies toward s anyone country at any particular moment. No pennanent surrender of positions was advisable.

It is necessary to go back to these basis ideas to understand the relevance of non-alignment in the post-Cold War, post-military blocs period. In this next stage of world politics it wi ll be as necessary as before to avoid too much attachment. A certain friendly distance, an independence of action without alienation, along with a willingness to involve our country in all the activities of the world outside, is indicated. In this sense, the idea of non-alignment is essential not only for India but for others in the developing world. Non-alignment is nothing more or less than a finn assertion of sovereignty by the post-coloniai state. In modem psychology, there is a di stinction between inner-directed and other-directed motivations. In the first case, actions are the result of inner resources, inner strengths, inner desires. In the second case, they are the reactions of the weaker, the more passive members of the group to the dominant. Non-ali gnment, it has been claimed by the theoreticians of the developed world, is merely reactive to the jealousies and confrontations between the powerful countries. In this sen se it is a theory of equidistance. But non-alignment is much more. The non-aligned state has to learn to be unfriendly with unfriendly countries and friendly with those who are willing to be helpful at any moment of time. There may be continuity, but there is no certainty ofpennanent 'anachment '.

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In a world where there are no blocs to be aligned with or non-aligned from , the sma ll or medium power st ill has to avoid too much identification with any big power, even the single superpower. Nehru would not have been uncomfortable in analysing the post-Cold War situation. He would have prescribed the continuation of an elegant, simple. precise programme of diplomatic autonomy and economk and technological engagement with all the countries in the world.

REFERENCES 1.

Jawaharlal Nehru, Selected Works, First Series. Yol. 2 (New Delhi: Orient Longman. 1972), p. 361.

2.

Ibid., p. 362.

3.

Ibid .. p. 363.

4.

Ibid.

5.

Ibid .• pp. 362-63.

6.

Jawaharlal Nehru, Selected Works, First Series, Vol. 7 (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1975), pp. 52-53.

7.

Ibid.• p. 55.

8. 9.

Ibid., p. 58. Jawaharlal Neh ru, Selected Works, First Series, Vol. 11 (New Delhi : Orient Longman. 1978). p. 43.

10. bwaharlal Nehru. The DiscovelY of India (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1981), p. 540. •

II . Ibid., pp. 541-46. 12. Ibid., pp. 546-47.

13. Jawaharlal Nehru, Selected Works, Second Series, Vol. I (New Delhi : lawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1984), p. 405. 14. George $eldes, ed., The Great Quotations.{New York: Pocket Books, 1966),

p.l l . IS . Ibid. 16. Jawaharlal Nehru, Selected Works , Second Series, Yol. 2 (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Ne hru Memorial Fund, 1984), p. 573. 17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., p. 506. 19. Jawaharlal Nehru, Selecfed Warks, Second Series, Vol. 3 (New Delhi : Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1985), p. 133.

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20. lawaharlal Nehru. Selected Works. Second Series, Vol. 5 (New Delhi: lawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund. 1987). p. 498. 21. Jowaharlal Nehru s Speeches, Vol. I (New Delhi: Government of India Publications Divisions, 1949), p. 24 L 22 . Ibid" p. 237.

23 . Ibid., p. 256. 24 . Quoted in Fernando Claudio. The Communist MOloemellf: From Comjntern to Camin/onn (London: Penguin Books, 1975), p. 488.

25. lawaharlal Nehru, Letlers to the Chief Ministers, Vol. 2. ed. G. Panhasarathi (New Delhi: lawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1986), p. 183 fn. 26. Reproduced in Don 'r Spare Me, Shankar: A Compilation of Shankar Cartoons all Nehru (New Delhi : Children's Book Trust, 1983), p. 43.

s

27. Quoted in lawaharlal Nehru, Indias Foreign Polic)'.' Selected Speeches. September. I 946-April. 196/. New Delhi : The Publication Division, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, 1983. p. 63.

11 Changing Contours of World Politics

The contours of international politics have been thoroughly changed by the end of the Cold War. Hi story is again, to use Arnold Toynbee's phrase, on the move. Thought is especially mandated given the everso-sudden change from initial optimism to eventual pessimism, that is, from "transitions from authoritarian rule", "new world order", and

..the end of hislOry", to "the breakdown of democratic regimes", "new world disorder," and ''the return of the repressed"-evclI. indeed. to

"the clash of civilizations" (Huntington 1996). Equall y important, however, is the claim that the currencies of world politics arc cbanging: military power is held to have lost its

efficacy in an era of globalized gea-economic competition, concern with human rights seems set to undennine the norm of non-intervention, whilst " the state" is sometimes considered 10 have lost salience, as it is supposedly hollowed out both from above and from below. We are approaching not just the end of a century but the closing of a mill ennium, something which may well occasion the gloomiest of prognostications. The purpose is to in crease understand ing of the changi ng contours ('If world politics. We are concerned with a myri ad of analytical and prescri pti ve issues. What docs international order mean in the changed context of world politics? Can elements of the existing approaches to o rder be utilized--on their own or in various syncretic mi xtures- to find concrete solutions to pressing problems in world politics? What rol e do major powers playas makers and chall engers of a given international order? Can rising major powers and regional

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powers be integrated into the international order without conflict? Can order and change be achieved simultaneously without violence? Can international governance become more democratic and humane? DEFINING INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Attempts to define international order produce immediate controversy. "Order" is a tenn that carries normative and jojeological connotations, as it bears particular conceptions about how social . political, and economic systems are and ought to be structured. Order and peace to one group afnations may be perceived differently by another. For instance, the long periods of peace oflhe nineteenth century and the post-I 945 era were viewed differently in the East and the West, and in the South as compared to the North. Differences also arise due to the nonnative concern as to whether order implies a minimum condition of co-existence in which nation-states are able to avoid destructive warfare or a larger conception in which all can " live together relatively well" and " prosper simultaneously" Avoidance of armed confl iets must be the primary function of any international order, as without the control of violence many ofthe other values states and individuals seek can be disrupted, especially in an age when nuclear and other lethal weapons have spread to several nations and sub-national groups . Still the success of an international order is predicated on the extent to which it can accommodate change without violence. The conceptualization of international order can be summarized in a series of points:

1. The initial focu s of interest must be that of whether the international system is or is not orderly. The historical record sees lulls, less of peace than of the regulation of conflict, between vicious escalations to the extremes. Hedley Bull tended to conceptualize the difference between these two ty pes of period in terms of a contrast between a "society of states" and mere anarchy. 2. Orderliness needs to be explained. A distinction can usefully be drawn here between general principles of order and the mechanisms which operate within them. General principles have varied across the historical record, but it is easy to see that feudali sm and empire stand

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227

as ahernate systems to the system of states to which most attention has been given by occidental scholars. It can clearly be said that th e fo cus here is firml y on the mechanisms at work within a multipolar system of states. There is an obvious justification for thi s: Europe had the power to extend to the whole world the system whose essence was more or less codified at the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Some of the mechanisms at work within thi s general principle endorse, others seek to amend, the logic of Westphalia.

3. Bull proved to be a fertile source of ideas in large part because he wobbled, in interesting ways, on a number of key issues. This is particularly so in regard to the morally loaded notion of order. On the one hand, Bull 's famous distinction between world order and international order. that is. between a world of full justice in which every state would recogni ze a stranger as a citizen and one in which there is simply a system of settled expectations, points firmly to a realization that order is not being admired uncritically. Thi s deserves underscoring, and extension. For one thing. none of the authors belong to any party of order; all recognize that every system of order benefits some at the expense of others. The general purpose of much of thi s volume can uscfully be seen as that of calcu lating costs and benefits, and of emphasizing the ways order appears from different vantage points. This sort of felicific calculus may assure us that the long peace of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were, despite differential costs and benefit s to vary in g national actors , considerable pos itive achievements-in contrast, very probably, to the international order that might have been establi shed had Hitler won the Second World War. 4. Kalevi Holsti 's magnificent Peace and War(1991) has made it absolutely apparent that the designs of statesmen and other active agents, themselves often believers in the mechanisms to be identified, have played a major role in the creation of particular international orders. Still, designs only have force when backed by structures of power, just as structures of power have their greatest impact when they benefit from clearly articulated ideas. Differently put, an appreciation of agency should never be allowed to introduce, as it so often does,

International Politics

228

any form of licentious voluntarism. Key hi stori cal fi gure s a re

themselves "macro" actors embodying social structural powers; if this gives them the capacity to affect events, it remains the case that their actions are never unconstrained.

THE MECHANISMS OF THE WESTPHALIAN ORDER

Seven familiar mechanisms of the state system. moving roughly from realist to liberal camps, can usefully be distinguished. These are grand affairs: each offers plans for limiting war (and sometimes for establishing peace) as well as theoretical reasons explaining why wars _ take place in the first place. Most of these mechanisms aim to sustain the primary goals afthe society of states, i.e., war avoidance and the maintenance of states as sovereign entities. Every order attempts to deal with the negative effects of anarchy, although some claim to transcend thi s condition whi le others simply attempt to manage its consequences. Each order emphasizes either the individualistic, sovereignty-oriented clements of state behaviour or the collectivistmuhilateralist vision of order designed to cunail unbridled pursuit of self-inte rest. While some give prominence to military means, others assign imponance to economic and institutional mechanisms. Each one ofthesc approaches has descriptive and nonnative components, making it necessary to judge them in practical as well as theoretical terms. They involve in varying degrees the juridico-political conceptions defined by the principles, pragmatism, and self-interest of the leading actors of an era. They also attempt to give legitimacy to a given politico-military and economic distribution of power ofa winning state or coalition of states after a maj or con nict by enshrining what is permissible and what is considered threatening to the state system? In addition, they revolve around certain norms, rules, and values of behaviour among national actors and their success depends upon how these rules, norms, and values are imbibed and observed by all major and a large number of minor (especially regional) powers. A given order fails when one or more key actors within it violates its norms through forceful actions.

It should be noted right at the start that these sev~n mechanisms are often in mutual contact with each other, making hybrid fonns- as

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229

will later be demonstrated in the form of our own synthetic model- a di stinct possibility. Second ly, not every conceivable approach is considered here, the claim being that no other approach has a fundamental claim on our attention. The main tenet of realism (whether classical or neo-realist) is that slates li ve in an anarchical system, one which lacks the central governing authority familiar to us in the domestic sphere. In this competitive system, self-help is taken for granted with every state being responsible for its own security and economi~ welfare (Wa ltz 1979). States, seen as rational entities, seek to maximize their national interests, but worry about the losses and gains they make relative to other actors, friends, or foe s. Wars and conflict are natural outcomes of thi s state of affairs as states seek power, territory, and resources, sometimes at the cost of other states. The temptation to dominate other states increases with the growth of power capabilities. Cooperation is rare and it is anyway likely to be evanescent given the inevitabi lity of changes in national interest. While classical realists and nco-realists agree on these basics, the latter gi ve importance to system structure, defined in terms of the distribution of power among major power actors, in determining war and peace. A bipolar structure with nucleararmed superpowers is favoured by the latter, while multipolar power structures are viewed as likely to occasion war (Waltz 1979; for classical views, see Morgenthau 1967). The major prescription of both types of real ism for creating and sustaining order is through the attainment of a balance of power, both internationally and regionally. The mechani sms for obtaining balance vary, but states are held to ally together in the face of a rising power with hegemonic pretensions. Balance of power is predicated on the assumption that peace is preserved only when an equilibrium of power exists among great powers as well as among regional powers, otherwise the strong will be tempted to attack the weak. Countervailing power is essential in curtailing the power aspirations of a threatening state: Parity in power capabilities preserves peace, as the aspiring state cannot achieve its objecti ves militarily and would therefore desist from using force even if the opportunity arosc. In the classical accounts, it was necessary for powers to shift from one side to another in order for a balance to be achieved; no

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pennanent set of allegiances could be allowed, for to admit them would be to rigidify the system. and so to cause disaster. In the modem

versions. balance of power is buttressed by strategies such as deterrence and containment of challenging states. Status qllO states align and deploy military forces to prevent a revisionist state being able to upset the balance, while political and military efforts are made to contain the aspirations of such states. When key actors imbibe the norm of non·aggression and smaller states align against a rising power, a balance of power system emerges. There are, however, disagreements as to whether states align in order to balance in the face of rising power capabilities or only in response to increasing threats from such an entity (Walt 1987). In many historical situations, states failed to balancewith balance of power anyway being only one among several strategies of war avoidance that were utilized. A more general difficulty with this approach is, of course, that much violence can be involved in order to discover exactly where the balance lies- with nuclear weapons accordingly putting the whole strategy somewhat into question. A concen of great powers representsla second mechanism for international order. It too is broadly realist in spirit. Thus, Mettemich sought to convince his colleagues that revolution could be arrested were they to deal with international crises a nd territorial change by means of concerted action (Kissinger 1964). This system was meant to persuade rather than confront. that is, to make the then great powersFrance, Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia- realize their collective responsibility for peace. The concert system has been credited with preventing major power wars in Europe in the nineteenth century. The rules and noons of the concert made conference diplomacy the chief instrument to deal with international crises, with all territorial changes subject to the sanction of the great powers. Further, all the major powers of the system had to be protected, whilst no great power could be humiliated, nor their vital interests and honour be challenged (Elrod 1976). In the Post·Cold War era, a new concert system has been effectively resurrected by having five pennanent members of the UN Security Council play the leading role in maintaining international order. Elements ofa concert in specific issue areas are equally evident in the efforts by the nuclear weapon states to prevent the ri se of new nuclear states. A clear example of this was evident in their attempts to cap the nuclear activities of India and Pakistan following their open

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nucl ear tests in May 1998. Great power concert was simi larly manifested during the 1991 Persian Gulf War and in the Dayton Peace Accords of December 1995 that ended the Bosnian conflict. Yet, at the tum of the new century, the apparent solidarity of the great powers is marred by lingering suspicions, panicularly by Russia's opposition to the expansion of NATO. Concen systems are often criticized for their lack of goals broader than that of simple management of great power relations. The European concert system failed to deal with issues embarrassing to any of the great powers, and it violated the basic principle of democratic governance by lending the great powers the right to determine the fate of small states without their consent (Elrod 1976). Further, a concert could tolerate high levels of repression within the system and treat "v iolence outside the framework of great power relations as acceptable" (Falk 1975). More generally, in the past great power cooperation often lasted only for short periods, and it was often followed by violent rivalries.

Hegemonic stability tlleO/y offcrs a final broadly reali st approach to international order. The starting point ofthis school is the insistence that uneven development within capitalism causes terrible adjustment difficulties for international politics. Capitalism works effectively if and when a hegemonic power provides leadership-above a ll , in supplying the public goods of free trade, a top currency, and capital for development. Nineteenth-century Britain and the United States after 1945 are seen as having acted as such benign hegemons (Kindleberger 1973). Modern realists have appli ed this theory to the arenas of peace and security. Accordingly, a hegemonic power such as the United States provides collective security (e.g., Gilpin 1982) by imposing positive and negative sanctions towards challengers. The decline of tile hegemonic state or its withdrawal from global affairs is seen as likely to lead to disorder and chaos. Efforts by American scholars and statesmen to maintain American primacy in the Post-Cold War era are often driven by such convictions. Criticism of hegemonic stability theory has concentrated on two points. First, the air of Anglo-Saxon self-congratulation has been punctured by sc holarl y awareness that hegemons often end up exerc ising their undoubted powers in a predatory manner. Second, it

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is by no means the case that peace within advanced capitalism has always depended upon hegemonic leadership. Nineteenth-century order

rested most of all upon a balance of power, making it 8tleast possible io hope that any future decline of the United States would be peaceful. The centre of capitalist society has never remained in the same place

for long. and the ability to develop and use the most up-ta-date equipment and methods tends to diffuse throughout capitalist society,

inevitably creating relative decline of the hegemonic power. Hegemonic decline can also be the result of geopolitical exhaustion and selfinflicted overextension (Kennedy 1988). However, the growth path of the most advanced state can remain strong and its economy healthy even as its share of total world pr.,oduct diminishes- as the United ~tates attests at the dawn of the new century. Before specifying three full-scale liberal mechanisms of international order, it makes sense to say something about Marxism for the simple reason that it stands between the two broad currents of thOUght to which attention is being drawn. On the one hand, Marxism at times resembles realism, panicularly in the fonn of hegemonic stabi lity theory, in suggesti ng that war is inevitable within capitali st society. On the other hand, Marxism envisages the possibility of an entirely new world, based on a non-antagonistic mode of production able to abolish states and war. Obviously, the belief that the solidarity of an international class was of more importance than allegiances within states has taken a severe beating due to the collapse ofsocialism in Eastern Europe. However, Marxist thinking still dominates some alternate conceptions of order. and its influence is strongly felt in the developing world-and still more so in the western academy. But Chan demonstrates in this volume that China, the remaining Communist great power, behaves more according to the dictates of Realpolitik than to those of Marxism: power and interest seem to matter more here than does international working-class solidarity. Whereas, realists take anarchy and war for granted, enlightenment thinkers hope to transcend or change them. Their contempt for politics as nonnal i~ beautifully expressed in Kant 's insistence that the idea that peace will be achieved by the ba lance of power is pure illusion, "like Swift's story of the house which the builder had constructed in such perfect hannony with all the Laws of equilibrium that it collapsed

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as soon as a sparrow alighted on if' ( 1970: 92). Although there are several strands to liberal thinking, in genera l liberals believe that human nature is malleable and that, despite obstacles, order, just ice, and freedom can be achieved gradually through the creation of proper economic conditions and institutional mechanisms. Cooperation among nations is neccssary "to maximize the possible benefits and minimize the possible damages of interaction s and interdependencies and to capture opportunities for realizing greater peace, welfare and justice". Kant gave us th e mo st striking of a ll liberal th eo ri es of international order. His 1795 proposal for Pelperuai Peace enshrines the notion of a republica" order spreading globally. His proposal rests on three "definitive articles". First, governments mUEt be republican, offering legal equa lity to citizens on the basis of represen tati ve government and separation of powers. Second, liberal states will fonn a paci fi c union or a fed eration among themselves that respects the rights of each member slate. Third, liberal states wi ll establish a cosmopolitan law of hospitality whic h respects the rights of the foreigner while allowing free exchange of goods and ideas among themselves. After seve.ral trials and tribulations th is liberal order wi ll spread, adding new adherents to it until it reaches the far corncrs of the world so as to create pcrpelUal peace. To proponents of this order, Kant 's philosophical arguments have been validated by the rise of a separate democrat ic peace. As Doyle ( 1986) pointcd out, empirical evidence shows the preva lence of a distinct peace among democracies as democratic states have rarely fought each other. Although the Anglo-Du tch wars of the seventeenth century, the American-British War of 18 12, and the Spani sh-American War of 1898 a re coun ter-e xa mple s, in the twen tieth century democracies have desisted from engaging in war aga inst each other. Conti nued analysis (e.g. , Russett 1993) draws a useful di stinction between institutional and nonnative explanations for this remarkable achievement. Yet questions remain whether it is the pol itica l system or other factors such as the structural and ideological competiti on in the international system that cause peace among democracies. The test for the theory lies ahead as the number of democratic polilies increases worldwide and in whether democracies in troubl ed spots avoid warlike behaviour between one another.

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Another approach to order enshrined in classical liberalism but

very much in vogue among contemporary liberal theorists is one based on economic interdependence between stales, arising oul of the expansion of capitalism and international trade (Rosecrance 1986). Deepened interdependence increases the mutual costs of war, as fear of vulnerability to each other's actions generates cautious behaviour

among states. Case studies show states in interdependent relationships as less apt to give priority to milltary security or high politics in their dealings vis-a-vis one another (Keohane and Nyc 1989). However, the interdependent relationship between Britain and Germany before 1914 did not of course generate peace, bUI it may be that a genuine international division of labour is now creating domestic constituencies for peace in such a way as to lend credence to the theory (Milner

1987). A final m ec hani s m of order is be st termed liberal International institutions can both provide a muchneeded avenue for cooperation and act as constraints on predatory national policies. The United Nati ons provides collective security whilst the World Trade Organization (fonnerly GATT) facilitates free trade. Woodrow Wi lson's ideas (Knock 1992) typified an extreme version of Ihis order whi le modem reg ime analysts have provided a more realistic, functional basis to this conception of order. To the laner, even if institutions and regimes are the creation of a particular dominant power, they acquire a life of their own, often creating rules and regulatory mechani sms for the behaviour of all adhercntsincluding the powerful- long after the decline of the hegemonic state (Keohane 1984). Institutions help to develop new nonns of conduct, enforce these nonns, create confidence among a multitude of actors, and help deepen inter-state collaboration. Multilateralism flourishes under such an order since it allows states to conduct their relations and pursue their interest jointl y, based on certain shared rules of conduct. illSlilllliollOlislII.

In the secu rity rea lm , lib eral institutionali sts focu s on mechanisms design ed to preve nt wars. Although the origins of coll ecti ve security can be traced to idealists who founded the League of Nations, it is valued and maintained under the United Nations Charter. The rationale behind collective security is that it can function

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as a deterrent against aggression, and if aggression ever takes place, rescue the target state before much damage is done. The problem though is that institutions work slowly, especially in the absence of powerful actors leading the way- for all that such leadership is often self-interested. And it is worth nothing that if many liberals believe in the collective security system, so too do supporters of new versions of a concert of great powers.

TRYING NOT TO PREPARE FOR THE LAST WAR: THE CONTENTS OF THIS VOLUME We have no desire to be the equivalent of French generals who, the standard quip has it, always prepare for the last war. Differently put, understanding the past may not be the same thing as being able to master the future. For it may be argued that the world has changed, that we are now faced with a new context. The Westphalian system was dominated by a small group of European states possessed of fairl y strong state structures whose intense conflictual internctions demanded that war and peace be accorded the primary place on the international agenda. New actors and issues now bestride the stage of world politics. What will the future be like? That is the question that this volume addresses, and it has led us to a particular orgnizalional structure that deserves to be highlighted. The first part of the volume naturally begins with realism and liberalism, the two overarching mechanisms at work within the Westphalian system. Michael Mastanduno's central argument is that realist calculation is as present now as it was in the past, for all that the stakes at issue are different- as is the exceptional strength of the United States. The libera l strategy of peace through democrati zation is endorsed by Michael Doyle, in contrast, on the grounds of its increasing global relevance. Our own chapter offers a sociology which first explains the circumstances which all ow realism to work effectively before then suggesting, in consequence, that realism and liberali sm, especially in modem circumstances, should be considered allies rather than enemies. These positions by no means exhaust all possibi lities. Hence, Lisa Martin offers an account ofliberal institutionalism, both because of its significance in resolving collecti ve action problems and its scholarly interest. In addition, we include a chapter by Steve Smith

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that springs from criticailheory, and which questions the very idea of international order. We dissent from this post·positivist approach in our concluding chapter. The second section of the book turns to an examination oftcading

states. There is an obvious justification for this. Even if the globalization thesis proves in time to be correct, the behaviour of great powers in the short run still matters cnonnously. Differently put, we

need some assessment of the contenders for power, even admitting that their struggles may occupy only a transitional period. Furthennorc, some of the challenges identified in thi s volume may well be s uch as to undennine the structure of world power. Is it not the case that the Sov iet Union, whose demise has caused so much re·thinking of strategy, lost the Cold War because it could not compete in a globalized world economy? Can the United States maintain its supremacy in the face of economic rivals, di fferently advantaged both on the periphery and in the core, and in the face of the potential spread of nuclear weapons? Do the conceptions of order held by these major power states vary and, if so, how will they clash in the ideational and strategic realms? What conceptions of order do they hold and how can they be compromised to allow for peaceful systemic and sub-systemic changes? The third section of the book analyzes seven key challenges to the Westphalian system. World politics in the twenty-first century is likely to be more complex than in previous eras. Both centrifugal and centripetal forces are at work simultaneously in the international system. In classical international politics, the main goals of the society of .states, as Bull stated, included: prese rvation of the system; maintenance of internal and external sove reignty of states; peace between stales-as well as the limitation of violence habitually caused by inter-state warfare (1977: 16·19). While these main goals of the society of states remain, they are by no means exhaustive as we enter the new century. This is because challenges or threats to the new international order may be coming from non· traditional sources, some as a result of increased economic interactions and global ecological changes among nation-states and the acceptance of new conceptions about equality, especially in terms of gender and race. We do not by any means assume that the seven topics we identify are the only challenges that the future wi ll bring. Issues relating to

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poverty, uneven development, human right~ violations, and ethnic genocide of various forms may generate considerable pressure on nation·states and, in tum, international order in the coming century. However, we believe that the challenges we identify have the highest immediate salience for international order. The contributors do not necessarily agree on the precise way in which these challenges will affect international order, but all concur that the following challenges have the potential to upset order in varying degrees. First, is it indeed the case, as so many take for granted, that the world is now .so globalized that the sovereign state-that is, the central pillar of the Westphalian system-has lost its importance? The second issue addressed is closely related in that the specific claim most often made about globalization is that the power of the state has been hollowed - out from above quite as much as from below. This is meant to refer to nationalism, unexpectedly so much in the news in the last decade. And are these two forces related? Is it the case that the appeal for identity rises in the face of international forces? This in tum leads to a third issue. The Westphalian order rested upon the activities and designs of the great powers. One change in the international system has been the emergence of new states, through the process of decolonization: where just two decades ago it seemed that an orderly challenge from cartels of such states might change world politics, our current fear .is of chaos, brought on by anarchy resulting from the weaknesses of what now often seem to be mere pseudcrstates. All three of these challenges suggest a fourth, namely the rise of religious fundamentalism so central to Samuel Huntington 's best se lling The Clash o/Civilization (1996). The fifth challenge comes from that of environmental degradatioj:!. There is a great deal to be said in favour of the view that the advanced core of capitalist society eventually found social peace through industrial progress, that is, by replacing the politics of redistribution with a system of universal bribery. The cost of that to the environment has been huge. If the politics of growth are needed for most of humanity, then the environment may throw up challenges that states cannot deal with. In any case, by what right should rich countries presume to tell the poor not to aspire to what they already possess. The sixth challenge is related to this, and indeed to most of the challenges identified. Scienl ific breakthroughs in the North have

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provided medica l tec hno logy which has sometimes resu lted in demographic exp losions of fo rce sufficient to undermine state structures. What pri ce does Westphal ia exert in societies where threequarters of the population is below the age of twenty? Finally, we fccl it necessary to consider again nucl ear weapons and other weapons of

mass destructi on. The exemplar of modem science did not initially undennine the Westphalian system because such weapons were hard to acquire. That is no longer the casco The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998 and the cOlltinuing search/or such weapons by several other countries show that these capabi lities are likely to spread. Will great power status, with all that means for international order, be altered when additional smaller powers possess the ultimate weapon? NOTES I.

Bull 's position has been interestingly criticized by proponents of " world order", notably Falk (1977).

2.

There is an extensive literature on international and world order, as well as criticisms of both concep ts. A panial list includes: Mueller (1989), Miller ( 1990), Rosenau and Czempiel (1992), Singer and Wildavsky (1993), Dewitt, Haglund and Kinon (1993), Falk (1995), Hall (1996), and Cox and Sinclair (19%).

J.

It must be remembered, as Doyle recognizes, that despite their pacifi c record with each other, liberal states have fough t both often and with extreme cruelty against non-liberal states. If one can see touches of this mentality in the history of British foreign affairs, it has equally affected the conduct of American foreign policy- most obviously, in the crusade against communism.

4.

This quip stands at the heart of Holsti 's magnificent treatise on war and peace (1991), since it argues that the makers of international order fai led to prepare for the future because they were so obsessed with the recent past.

S.

The rationale for selecting only these states needs to be specified. Of the fi ve permanent members of the UN Security Council, we include the US, Russia, and China , as states whose mi lita ry behaviour has the la rgest consequence for international order. The other two members, the UK and France, along with Germany are included in the European Union umbrella as thcir unilateral security behaviour is partiall y constrained by their

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participation in European institutions. We include Japan as its economic and military behaviour have significant consequences for international order and it is a likely candidate for nuclear acquisition in the future, especially since the East Asian region does not contain institutional mechanisms to manage regional conflicts. The inclusion o f India is based on the fact that, among the developing countries, it is likely to be the leading candidate for major power status. Its economy is already the world's fifth largest, measured in temlS of purchasing power parity. The test explosions of nuclear and hydrogen bombs in May 1998 and acquisition of missile capability altest to India's growing power position in the military realm as well .

REFERENCES Bull, Hedley 1977. The Al1or('/,ical Society: A SIIIr!.l' of Order in World Politics, New York : Columbia Uni versity Press. Bush, George 1990, Address to the Uniled Nations, September 11 . Cox, Robert W. and Sinclair, Timothy 1996, Approaches to WarM Orc/er, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dewitt, David, Haglund , David and Kirton, John (eds.) 1993, Bllilding a Nell" Globlll Order. Toronto: Oxford Uni versity Press. Doyle, Michael 1986, " Li beralism and World Politics." American Political Scieuce Rel·iew 80: 1151-69. Elrod, Ri chard B. 1976, "The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System," World Politics 18: 159-74 . Falk, Richard 1975. "Towards a New World Order: Modest Methods and Drastic Visions," in all the Creation of a JIISt World Order, Saul H. Mendlovitz (ed.). New York : Free Press, 2 11 -58. 1977. "Contending Approaches to World Order.·' JOI//"ll a/ of b,tel"llatioJlal Affairs 31: 171-98.

1995. On Humane GOl·eJ"lWllce: Toward a Nell" Global Politics. University Park PA : Pennsylvania State Uni versity Press. Fukuyanm. Francis 1992, Th e End of His/ol)" lind th e Las/ Man, New York: The Free Press. Gilpin, Roben 1982, '~II· and Change ill Wo r/(/ Poli/ics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hall, John A. 1996, In/emational Orders, Ox ford: Polity Prcss. Hoffmann, Stanley (cd.) 1970, Conditions of World Order, New York: Simon and Schuster. Holsti. Kalevi J. 199 1, Peace alltl War: Armed Conflict and Imerna/iOllal Order /648-1989. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Huntington, Samuel P. 1996, The Clash of Civilizatiol/s alld the Re/lluki,lg of WorM OrtlCI', New York: Simon and Schuster. Igna tieff, Micha el 1993, Blood ond Belonging: Journey into the "'"Cll' NaliOIl(lIi.t lll ,

Toronto: Viking.

Kant, Immanuel 1970, Kant's Polil icallVdfillgs. H. Reiss (cd.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kennedy, Paul 1988, The Rise al/d F(11l of the Grcal Powers, New York: Random House. 1993: PIY!paringfol' the 21s1 CenllllJI, New York: Random House.

Keohane, Robert O. 1984, After Hegemol/y. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Keohane, Robert 0, and Nyc, Joseph S. 1989, POlI"el" and IlIferdepelldcllu. 2nd edition, New York: Harper Col lins. Kind lcberger, Charles P. 1973, The World ill Depressioll. 1929-39, Berkeley: University of Califomia Press. Kissinger, licnry A. 1964, A World ReSlOred: MeaI'm/eli, Casrle/'eagh and the Problems of Peoet' 181 ]-}}, Boston: Houghton Mimin. Knock, Thomas J. 1992, To End All Wars: WOQ(iI'Qw WilSOIr alld the Quest for u New World Orde/', Ne w York: Oxford Univcrsity Press. Krasner, Stephen D. 1993, "Westpllalia and All Tha t," in Ideas GIld Foreign Polic.\', Judi th Goldstein and Roben O. Keohane (eels.), Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 235-64 . Latham, Roben 1997, Tire Liberal Moment: Modernity. Security alld the Making of Post- War illlem atiul/al Order, New York: Columbia Uni wrsity Press. Linz, J uan J. and Stepan, Alfred (eds.) 1978, 77rl! Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Uni versity Press. Miller. Lynn H. 1990, Global Order: Values (Jlld Power ill interrraliOllol Politics, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Milner, Helen 1987, " Resisting the Protection ist Temptation," InternatiOllal Organi:atioll 41: 639-65. Morgenthau, Hans J. 1967, Politics Among Natiolls, 4th edition, New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Mouzeli s. Nicos 1995, Sociologica l Theory: What Weill Wrollg? London: Routledge. MueHer, Jo hn 1989. Retreat from Doomsday: Tire Obsolescl'lIce of Major War, New York : Bas ic Books. O'Donnell, G., Schmitter, P. and Whitehead, L (eds.) 1986, Transition from AlItlrQl'itarian Rille. Baltimore: The Jo hns Hopkins University Press.

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Qhmae, Kenichi 1995. The End of the Natioll Slate. New York: Free Press. Rosecrnnce, Richard 1986. Th e Rise of Ihe TrlIdil1g Stale, New York: Basic Books. Rosenau, James N. and Czempiel. Ernst-Ono (cds.) 1992, Govemal1ce wilflOw Govel"llmel1l: Ortier and Challge ill World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ruggie, John G. 1993. " Multilatera lism: The Anatomy of an Institution:' in MII/lilaleralism Malter.~, Ruggie (ed_l, Yew York: Co lumbia University Press, pp. 3-50. Russett, Bruce 1993, Grasping Ihe Democralic Peace, Princeton: Princeton Univer.;ity Press. Singer, Max 1993, The Real World Order: Zoncs of Peace. Zones of Turmoil, Chatham. NJ: Chatham House. Spruyt, Hendrik 1994, The SovereigN Stale and ill Competitors, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Wah, Stephen 1987, The Origins o/Alliances, it!1aca: Cornell University Press. 1996. Reso/lltion and War, Ithaca: ComelllJniversilY Press. Waltz. Kenneth N. 1979, Theory, of Inlel"llotiollal Politics. New York: Random House. Zacher, Mark W, and Mattl1cw, Richard A. 1995, "Liberal International Theory: Common Threads. Divergent Strands," in COlllroversies ill IlIternatiol1al Relations Theol)', Charles W. Kcgley (ed.), New York : St. Manin's Press. pp. 107-50.

12 The Coming International Order

Thi s chapter proceeds to contrast three rea list images of the international order that are emergi ng in the wake orlhe Cold War: 1. The first highlights economic competition among major industrial powers as the central feature of the post-Cold War environment. 2. The second fore sees a return to a traditional multipolar balance of power system. 3. The third depicts an American-ccnlcred order, in which the United States contin ues to play the dominant role in a unipolar international system.

The se competing model s con lains a ba seli ne degree of plausibility. The same is true of several non-realist images, including the clash of civilizations thesis put forth by Samuel Huntington, the vision ofa liberal international community stressed by Michael Doyle, the predicted withering of the nation-state in the face of environmental and demographic stress popularized by Robert Kaplan, or the depiction ofa world di vided into "zones of peace and zones of turmoi l;' in the words of Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky ( Huntington 1993a ; Doy le this volume; Kaplan 1997; Kaplan 1994; and S inger and Wildavs ky 1993). My purpose is not to survey all plausible models, but to distinguish among the leading realist contenders analytically and ident ify which has the most promi se empiri cally. After a brief examination of the common fea tures of realist thought, I discuss each realist image of the emerging order in terms of its underlying logic and assumptions, its expectations fo r the behaviour of major actors in the system, and its fit with the preliminary empirical evidence available si nce the end oflhe Cold War.

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My overall argument is that neither geoeconomic competition nor the multipolar balance of power adequately captures the current dynamics of relations among major powers. The third image-that of an American-centered international order- bt:st characterizes the contemporary system. I analyze the features of that system-the roles and behaviour of the United States and other major powers, and the manner in which order is maintained. I also assess the durability of this international order in light of a series of challenges. 1 conclude that although unipolarity will not last indefinitely, US officials have the opportunity to prolong the " unipolar moment" by managing s imultaneou s ly external relat ions and internal co nstrai nt s. Put differently, the durability of the curren t order will depend significan tly on US statecraft, or in the words of the editors of this volume, on the "capacity to calculate" of US officials. REALISM: WORLD VIEW AND ASSUMPTIONS

As a way of thinking about the world, realism is distinguished by its "pessimism regarding moral progress and human possibilities" (Gilpin 1986: 304). Reali sts view hi story as cyc lical rather than progressive. They are skeptical that human beings can overcome recurrent conflict and establish cooperation or peace on a durable basis. This pessimism is rooted in both human nature and the international system. Classical realist s emphasized the fonner. Thucydides, in accounting for the catastrophic Greek war, assured his readers that "human nature being what it is," these tragic event s would be repeated in the future (Thucydides 1954: 48). Hans Morgenthau began his classic text by observing that the conflict- ridden international arena was the consequence of "forces inherent in human nature," and that the best humanity could hope for was the "real ization of the lesser evil rather than of the absolute good" (Morgenthau 1978: 3-4). For contemporary real ists, pessimi sm is more apt to be rooted in the nature of the international system. The absence of a higher governing authority leads to insecurity, conflict, and the routine resort to organized violence. States can mitigate the consequences of anarchy by rel ying on time-honoured instruments such as diplomacy and the balance of power. But they cannot escape it altogether. Statecraft is more a matter of damage limitation than of fundamental problemsolving.

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Both classical and contemporary realists would accept the following set of assumptions as central to their intellectual and scholarl y endeavour. I Fi rst, the most important actors in international

politics are "territorially organized entities"-city-states in antiquity, and nation-states in the contemponuy era (Keohane 1986; Gilpin 1986:

304-5). Nation-states are not the only actors on the current world scene, but realists assume that more can be understood about world politics by focusing on the behaviour of and interaction among nationstates than by analyzing the behaviour of individuals , classes , transnational firms , or international organization. Realists assume further that the state-the central decision-making apparatus of the nation-state-continues to be a '.liable poiitical actor and meaningful analytic construct. Stephen Krasner articulated this realist assumption clearly in 1976: "In recent years, students of international relations ha ve multinationali zed, tran s nationalized, bureaucratized and transgovernmentalized the state until it has virtually ceased to exist as an analytic construct. This perspective is at best profoundly misleading" (Krasner 1976: 317). Second, realists believe that relations among nation-states are inherently competitive. Nation-states compete most intensely in the realm of military security, but compete in other realms as well, in particular in economic relations. To say that nation-states "compete" means that states care deeply about their status or power position relati ve to other states, and that this concern guides state behaviour. Competition is a consequence of anarchy, which force s states ultimately to rely on themselves to ensure their survival and autonomy. This does not impl y cooperation is impossible, onl y that states will approach cooperati ve ventures with a concern for their impact on relative power positions (Grieco 1990). Third, realists emphasize the close connection between state power and interests. States see k power in order to achieve their interests, and they calculate their interests in tenns of their power and in the contex t of the international environment they confront. While all states seek power, it is not necessary to assume that states seek to maximize power. Not every state needs or wants nuclear weapons, for example. Similarly, although security and survival arc the highest priority in tcnns of stale interest, there is no need to assume that states

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always strive to maximize security at the expense of other goals. States pursue an array of interests. The key point for realists is that in defining the so called national interest, state officials look "outward," and respond to the opportunities and constraints of The international environment. Fourth, realists assume that state behaviour can be explained as the product of rational decision-making. As Robert Keohane puts it, for the realist "world politics can be analyzed as if states were unitary rational actors, carefully calculating the costs of alternative courses of action and seeking to maximize their expected utility, although doing so under conditions of uncertainty" (Keohane 1986: 165). States act strategically and instrumentally, in an arena in which the "noise level" is high. The problem of incomplete infonnation is compounded because states have incentives to conceal or misrepresent information to gain strategic advantage. Consequently, stales may miscalculate, but for realists not with such frequency as to call into question the rationality assumption (Mearsheimer 1994/5: 9). These assumptions constitute the starting point for reali st

analysis. They do not lead to a unified understanding of contemporary world politics or to a single theory of state behavior. Each realist image below embraces these core assumptions. But, by making additional assumptions and emphasizing different features of contemporary international politics, they arrive at different assessments of the emerging international order.

GEOECONOMIC COMPETITION The traditional realist depiction of the international system emphasizes securi ty competition among sovereign states under the ever-present threat of war. Military force is a routine instrument of statecraft employed by states to gain territory, extract resources, or enhance prestige. Limited military conflicts among major powers can become costly and protracted, and can escalate into the all-out struggles typified by World Wars I and II. From thi s perspective, hegemonic wars are a reflection of and a reaction to the changing distributi on of power and prestige among the great powers in the international system (Gi lpin 1981; Levy 1983).

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To many observes, however, contemporary world politics presents a very different picture. Developments in military technology.

most obviously the nuclear revolution, have raised the costs of warfare among great powers to almost prohibitive levels (Mueller 1989; Jervis 1989). The acquisition of territory o r resources by force is no longer

recognized as a legitimate "right" even of the great powers. Territorial acquisition in any event may be of diminishing utility as knowledge resources overtake natural resources as the principal stimulant to national wealth and power (Rosecrance 1986).2 Great power war no

longer plays the role it once did as the primary mechanism for adjustments in the balance of power. The intense rivalry of the Cold Wa r ended peacefully and the Soviet empire collapsed without precipitating a major international conflict. Many believe that the possibility of hegemonic warfare among great powers has become exceedingly remote. Put differently, in the post-Cold War world the military security and survi val of the major powers are not challenged as they have been in the past. Randall Schweller recently argued that the key concept for understanding great power competition is not security but scarcity (Schweller \999). In some international environments, military security is a scarce commodity. But in others, it is not. The key question arises as to w hether reali sm is still a useful a nalytica l construct in an international environment in which military security is plentiful because great power warfare is unlikely. The answer given by "geoeconomic" realists is yes. Thcy contend that the diminution of great power mi/ital)1competition does not signify the end of great power competition. Positional competition shifts to other arenas, most imponantiy to the world economy. Nationstates remain the principal actors, and their competition fo r markets, raw materia ls high value-added employment, and the mastery of advanced technology becomes a surrogate fo r traditional military competition. Success in geoeconomic competition brings the nationstate economic prosperity and di scretion in its foreign policy. It also enables the state to remain at the cuning edge of military research and development. Geoeconomic realists be lieve that economic and technol ogical competition will remai n at the centre of great power relations until traditional security competition reassens itself. Military

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security may once ag<.r.in become a scarce commodity if militarJ technology changes radically or if and when revisionist states assert themselves as great powers seeking to change the international status quo. Numerous examples of geocconomic realism can be found in the academic and policy-oriented literature after the Cold War. Kenneth Waltz wrote in his 1993 assessment of the emerging intcmationaI order that "economic competition is often as keen as military competition, and since nuclear weapons limit the use of force among great powers at the strategic level, we may expect economic and technological competition among them to become more intense" (Waltz 1993: 59). Samuel Huntington similarly claimed that " in the coming years, the principal confli cts of interests involving the United States and the major powers are likely to be over economic issues." He went on to assert that the idea of economic relations as a non-zero-sum game "has little connection to reality," and that Japan has "accepted all the assumptions of realism but applied them purely in the economic realm" (Huntington 1993b: 7 1-3). Richard Samuels and Eric Heginbotham develop the latter line ofargumenl into the concept of··mercantile realism," and associate with it the ideas that security threats arc as much economic as military, that powerful states will engage in "('conomic balancing" and that geoeconomic interests may be pursued at the expense of traditional political and security interests (Heginbotham and Samuel s 1998: 190-4). Popular versions of these and related arguments are evident in recent books by Lester Thurow (1992), Jeffrey Garten (1992), Laura Tyson (1992), and Edward Luttwak (1993). Proponents of the geoeconomic model of international order associate the following types of behaviour with their worldview. First, they expect great powers to mobilize for intemalional economic competition. Since Ihat competition is vital to national security, states are likely to shape their national economic systems in a way that creales or reinforces advantages for their national firms. Partnerships between government and industry in research and development, expon promolion, industrial politics, seleclive prolectionism, and lhe shedding of costly military commitments are all plausible strategies depending on the competitive position of any particular nation-state. Second, geoeconomic reali sts expect g.overnments to be sensitive

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to relative gains or relative position in their foreign economic policies.

Contemporary great powers recognize that international economic

relations produce economic benefits for all concerned. But they remain wary of the fact that in any situation or relationship, some states may benefit morc than others. States will therefore seek to adjust policies

or minimize relationships that bring disrroponionate gains to other major powers, and emphasize those that bring disproportionate gains La themselves.) Geoeconomic realists believe that states will be

sensitive to relative gains regardless of whether the potential for military warfare is proximate or remote. 4 Third, geoeconomic realists expect powerful stales to organi ze their relations with their weaker neighbours in order to enhance their position in great power economic competition. This expectation usually manifests itself in the familiar projection of a post-Cold War world divided into three competing economic blocs. Thurow, for example, foresees compelition among a US-led bloc centered around NAFTA, a European bloc led by Gennany and extending into Eastern Europe, and an Asian bloc organized by Japan (Thurow 1992). Even though these blocs are unlikely to be completely exclusionary. geoeconomic realists expect that the dominant power in each region will assure that the bulk of economic advantages will accrue to it rather than to its economic competitors. The antic ipated systemic conseq uence is that the forces of regionalism wi ll gradually undermine the commitment to global liberalization in the world cx:onomy. Assessment The geoeconomic model has inspired considerable criticism. Economic liberals contend that at best it exaggerates the zero-sum aspects of what is fundamentally a non-zcro-sum activity, and at worst it encourages governments to pursue, in the name of national security, short s ighted and ultimatel y destructive economic policies. Paul Krugman argues that concern over national competitiveness is a "dangerous obsession." Individual firms compete, and mayor may not be competitive; nation-states do not compete or have competitiveness in the same way (Krugman 1994) . Miles Kahler finds fau lt with the idea that the end of the Cold War necessarily leads to a destructive economic reg ionali sm (Kahler 1995 : 5). Others question whether

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multinational corporations retain any meani ngful national identity and take issue with the image of these firms lining up with part icular nation-states in international competition .I Still olheT'-', including Joseph Nyc and Henry Nau, believe that the geoeconomic modelers have been too quick to dismiss traditional security and alliance concerns that are still prevalent after the Cold War (Nye 1992). Debate s over the ana lyti c a l and polic y wi sdom of the geoeconomic model w11l continue. But to what extent does this image of international order accurately characterize great power relations after the Cold War? The model appeared most promising in the immediate aftennath of the Cold War. The Soviet Union collapsed becau se it failed economi cally more than militaril y. The ri sing power, Japan, was an economic rather than military superpower. Japan 's success was directly associated with its national system of political economy, which equated international economic competition with war and forced government, finance, and industry to collaborate with a long-term focu s on the conquest of foreign markets. The states of Western Europe, struggling to compete with the United States and Japan, developed an ambitious regional integration scheme to create a market the size of America's, joint industrial policies to emulate Japan 's, and a common currency to counter the dom inance " fthe dollar. Europe 's integration plan came on the heel s of the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement which was subsequently expanded to include Mexico. These regional initiatives coincided with the stalemate and 1990 collapse of the Uruguay Round talh intended to accelerate multilateral trade liberalization . The main protagonists in the GAIT conflict, the United States and European Union, indi cated by their behaviour that regionalism was a viable alternative. The seeming emergence of regiona l blocs in Europe and Nonh America created anxiety in Asia. One politically charged reaction came in the form of Malaysian Prime Mini ster Mahathir's proposal to create an East Asian Economic Caucus (EA EC) wh ich wou ld exclude the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. Japan 's polit ical reaction to thi s proposa l was muted, but Japan 's trade and investment patterns in any event had gradually been shifting to Southeast Asia as the yen appreciated and US-Japan trade conflicts mounted. Between 1986 and

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1990, the US share of Japan 's exports dropped from 38.5 to 31.5 per cent and the East Asian share increased from 24.7 to 30 ..9 per cent (United States Embassy, Tokyo 1992).

A fwther indicator of geoeconomic competition was the changing role of the United Stales. For most of the postwar era, US foreign economic policy emphasized the multilateral system and placed broad

diplomatic and security interests ahead of the pursuit of particularistic economic interests. By the late 19805, the United States had shifted to "aggressive unilateralisrn" in pursuit of its economic interests (Bhagwati and Patrick 1990). During the FSX crisis of 1989, the economic agencies oflhe US government forced the security agencies

to rec onsider, at considerable diplomatic cost, a military codevelopment agreement with Japan because it might be conunercially disadvantageous to the United States (Mastanduno 1991). In 1992, President Bush turncd a traditional head-of-state visit to Japan into a commercial sales mi ssion on behalf of the US auto industry. In its firsl tcnn the Clinton administration went even further and elevated export promotion and the pursuit of economic interests to the very top of the US foreign policy agenda (Strem lau 1994/5; Mastanduno 1997). Administration officials embraced explicit ly the use of industrial policy for commercial as well as military applications, and launched a series of government-business partnerships to assist US firm s in international competition. The Defense Adva nced Research projects Agency (DARPA) dropped "Defense" and changed its name to ARPA as a symbol of the administration's new emphasis. The Commerce Department dedicated a "war room" to tracking the progress US firms made in competing for major export contracts around the world. In li ght of these developments, it is not surprising that a flurry of books heralding the new geoeconomic order emerged in the early 1990s. Yet almost as quickly, the appeal of this model has faded. Developments at the national , regional, and global levels have undennined geoeconomic competition 'as a compelling vision of postCold War international order. After what proved to be a brief experiment, the United States returned by thc mid-1990s to it postwar norm of granting priority to international security concerns. This is apparent in US policy toward

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both Europe and Asia. US offic ials have downplayed economic conflicts and aggressive unilateralism, and instead have employed foreign economic policies to reinforce broader security concems. 6 The United States has initiated a New Transatlantic Agenda with the European Union designed to resolve ex isting trade conflicts, deflect future ones, and seck out opportunities for mutualJy beneficial economic collaboration. The thrust of US policy toward Japan since 1995 has not been market access, but the strengthening and expansion of the US-J apan security Treaty. US officia ls have viewed and responded to the Asian financial crisis less as an opportunity to make relative gains and more as a threat to regional security and global financial stability. They have sought to engage Russia and China economicall y, even at the risk of strengthening those states as future economic competitors. And, despite constant criticism from the US business community, the United States continues to resort routinely to unilateral economic sanctions, even though those sanctions hurt US finns in internalional competition (Jentleson 1998). Two factors accou,nl for the US shift away from geoeconomic competition. First, the initial euphoria that the post-Cold War world would be stable and peaceful gave way to a realization by US policy makers of threats to regio na l security that required carefu l management. The United States almost went to war over the North Korean crisis of 1994, and faced another series challenge in Ihe Taiwan Straits crisis of 1996 (Oberdorfer 1997). The conflict in Bosnia, which US officials initially considered Europe's problem, became America 's problem as it threatened to lear NATO apart. The US response in both regions has been to strengthen existing alliances and de-emphasize disruptive economic disputes. Second, by the middle of the 1990s the United States seemed to have,regained some measure of international economic primacy. Muen of the United States' aggressive unilateralism had been directed at Japan's challenge to US commercia l, technological , and financial hegemony. By the late 1990s the Japan challenge seemed to have collapsed, and US officials became more concerned with bolstering a weak Japan than with beating down a strong one. The image of geoeconomic blocs in conflict also wanted by the mid-1990s. The anticipated "yen bloc" did not materialize. Japan,

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pressured by the United States, never signed on to the EAEC and instead supported APEC, a n institution that supports economic liberalization and "open regionalism," i.e., a regionalism that includes the United States as a major player (Grieco 1999). Similarly, initial expectations (and fears) of a "Fortress Europe" proved exaggerated. The European Union has generally remained open to US and Japan trade and investment. The United States, in tum, has supported the emergence of a single European currency, even though the Euro has the potential to challenge the dominant international role of the dollar. The GAIT did not collapse ; the Uruguay Round was completed successfull y and a more prominent institution, the WTO, replaced the GATT. Regionalism exists, but regional blocs have proved to be neither a substitute for multilateral ism nor the defining feature of post·Cold War international economic interaction. Finally, the deepening of interdependence has limited both regional blocs and the extent to which states can engage in zero· sum geoeconomic competition. The integration of global commercial and financi al markets has made economic "blowback" a serious concern to major powers. Because Japan is a major player in the world economy, it is not surprising that the main concern of US officials in the 1997·8 Asian finan cial crisis was to prevent its spread to Japan. The United States cooperated with Japan in strengthening the yen, and prodded Japan to revive its domestic economy so that it could help to accelerate regional recovery. A MULTIPOLAR BALANCE OF POWER Multipo1arity charac terized internati onal politics between 1648 and 1945. Diplomatic and economic interaction among great powers was routine in thi s cl assic balance of power system. No single power dominated and alliance commitments were flexible. The bipolar system that emerged after 1945 was an historical anomaly. The United States and Soviet Union were deemed "super" powers to indicate their extraordinary rank. They were large, economically self-suffic ient by historical standards, possessed weapons of mass destruction, and faced off in an ideological Cold War in which alliance commitments remained fixed. For many realists, the collapse of bipolarity in 1989 signaled a

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return to a traditional and more normal multipolar system. The elimination of the Soviet Union left the United States as tbe sole superpower, but in realist and especially neorealist theory, a unipolar order is even more of an anomaly than a bipolar one. The reasoning, laid out most systematically by Kenneth Waltz, is that states balance power, and thus the accumulation of preponderant capabilities in the hands of any single state will stimulate the rise of new great powers, or coalitions of powers, determined to balance the dominant state (Waltz 1979). The logic of international interaction suggests that tbe unipolar moment is at most a brief transition to a renewed multipolar system. The theme of incipient multipolarity is common in post-Cold War realist writings. John Mearsheimer stated in 1992 that "bipolarity will disappear with the passing of the Cold War, and multi polarity will emerge in the new internationa l order" (Mearsheimer 1992: 227). C hristopher Layne expects the same, and writes that " in a unipolar system, states do indeed balance against the hegemon's unchecked power" (Layne 1993: 13). Waltz's 1993 article explored the prospects and potential ofthe emerging great powers- Japan, Germany, China, the European Union, and a revived Russia (Waltz t 993). Henry Kissinger predicts that the United States will remain the most powerful but wi ll become a "nation with peers" in the emerging infernational order (Kissinger 1994: 805). Proponents of the multipolar image have stated clear behavioural expectations. Multipolarity win emerge fairly quickly because states will not tolerate preponderance over an extended period. In direct contrast to the geoeconomic model , military or sec urity competition among great powers w il1 remain the distinguishing feature of international politic s. Relations among great powers, and in the international system more generally, will be characterized by confl ict and instability rather than harmony and stab ility (Mearsheimer 1992: 214). This is true regionally as well as globally. 7 Nuclear weapons will proliferate, not only to less powerfu l states but also to Japan and Gennany who will wish to avoid being blackmai led nuclear great powers (229). We should expect Japan and Gennany to abandon their Cold War staLus as "trading states" and become independent great powers that

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are not subordinate to the United States. As Layne asserts, "a policy of attempting to smother Germany's and Japan 's great power emergence would be unavailing because structural pressure will impel them to become great power.; regardless of what the United Slates does or does not do" (Layne 1993: 46-7). Russia and China, singly or as part of a larger coalition, will balance the United States. Cold War alliance systems will collapse or fade; recall Waltz's often-quoted statement that NATO's days are not numbered, but its years are. Security alignments will become more fluid on the familiar realist premise that loday's friend may be tomorrow's enemy.

Assessment The geoeconomic model appeared most plausible immediately after the Cold War, but became less plausible as time passed. For the multipolar model , the opposite is likel y to be true. Its principal expectations were not met in the first post-Cold War decade, and may not be in the next decade or two either. As more time passes, however, the international system is likely to move closer to that model.

To be sure, some expectations of the multipolar model have been borne out, at least partially. The pessimism of multipolar realists has proven well-founded in that recurrent conflict has characterized the post-Cold War world, most dramatically in the Balkans but elsewhere as well. Nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998 revived concerns of inadvertent nuclear war and the specter of widespread proliferation. Japan and Germany have become somewhat more assertive. Each desires a permanent seat on the UN Security Counci l and both have contributed peacekeepers to regional conflicts. Government officials, particularly from France, Russia, and several Middle Eastern states, have expressed uneasiness about the dangers of a one superpower world and at times have directed their resentment explicitly at US officials or policy. But the central expectations of the multipolar model have not been fulfi ll ed. T~ere has been no meaningful effort to balance the preponderant power of the United States. A fluid system of alliance committnents has not emerged. Instead, the G:old War all iance systems dominated by the United States have been reaffirmed and strengthened.

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Fonner adversaries of the United States have been more interested in integration into the US-centered international order than in challengi ng the legitimacy of that order. Japan's foreign policy since the end of the Cold War has centered on the strengthening of the US·Japan Security Treaty, including maintenance of US ground forccs and the US nuclear guarantee. Japanese politicians rarely question the nec<;:ssity or US ground forces , and when they do they arc quick to emphasize the cri tical importance of the bilateral alliance itself (sec, e.g., Hosokawa 1998). Japan has not opted for an independent defense force, and in 1995 reaffinned its status as a non·nuclear power by signing on to a pennanent extension of the Nuc lear Nonproli feration Treaty. For Germany, the US-led NATO all iance remains the cornerstone of national security strategy. Germany deflected French demands for a European defense fo rce independent of NATO, and German officials continue to view the US military presence as essential to the security and stability of Europe (Art 1996). Other European states, France in particular, have sought to bind themselves to their powerful German neighbour rather than balance it. The vulnerable states of Centra l Europe, ca ugh t between Gennany and Russia, have not sought to acquire nuclear weapons as anticipated by proponents of the mUhipotar model. Instead, they have lobbied to join an expanded NATO. Despite having their differences with the United States, neither Russia nor China has sought to organize a balancing coalition against it. Each has fle xed its power close to home; Russia in the " ncar abroad," and C hina in the Ta iwan Straits and South Chi na Sea. But neither has staked out a position of global revisionism. Each has soug ht recognit ion as a respo ns ible member of th e ex isting international conununity and integration into its economic and security institutions. Revi sioni st challenges since the end of the Cold War have in volved lesser powers ralher than great powers. Iraq upset the balance of power in the Midd le East and was struck down by a US- led coalition. North Korea defied the nonproliferation regime and was bought off with a compensation package. Serbia expanded in the Balkans in the early 199Os, but since 1994 has been contained uneasily by a US-sponsored peace plan and NATO deterrent threats.

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For its part, the United Stales has in no way accepted the inevitab le multipolar world envisioned by its reali st proponents. Instead, the United States has dedicated its post-Cold War foreign policy to preserving the status quo in security relations with its Cold War allies, and to engaging and integrating its Cold War adversaries

into an order that reflects the design and preserves the dominant position a Cthe United States. A UNIPOLAR, US-CENTERED SYSTEM

Most realists would accept that the international system since 1990 has been unipolar. They would disagree with respect to its durability. advocates of the mUltipolar model anticipate the inuninent collapse of unipolarity; others believe that the unipolar moment has the potential to last longer, say for a total of twenty to thirty years.' Two arguments underpi n th e be lief in the durability o f unipolarity. One focuses on US capabilities. The United States emerged during the 1990s with a commanding lead in the technologies of the information revolution, in the same way that Britain dominated the new technologies of the industrial revolutio n at the beginning of the nineteenth century. America's "infonnation edge" has enabled it to lead and exploit a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) that involves the utilization and integration of intelligence and reconnaissance, command and control, and the precision u se of force (Nye and Owens 1996). Mastery of the same information techno logies supports US economic dominance, particularly in computer software, telecommunications, financia l services, and arms production. Technological primacy, military and economic power, and ideological appeal combine to offer the United States strong potential to remai n the world 's onl y superpower in the years ahead. The second argument concerns threat perception. I have argued elsewhere that unipolarity can on ly endure if balancing behaviour is a response to threat as well as to capabilities (Mastanduno 1997).9 If balancing is a response solely to capabilities, then by now we should have w itnessed other states attempting to counter US preponderance. But if balanc ing behaviour is a lso triggered by threat, then whether or not states balance aga inst a dominant state will depend on the international environment and o n the foreign po licy behaviour of the

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dominant state. An international environment that is dangerous or threatening is likely to prompt potential great pow.::rs 10 mobilize military capabilities. Similarly, a dominant state that is aggressive or provocative is more likely to inspire balancing behaviour than one that is reassuring or accommodating. A dominant power can shape the internati onal environme nt in a way that reassures rather than provokes potential challengers. By its own behaviour, the unipolar power can affect the calculations of other states and help to convince them that it is neither necessary nor desirable to engage in a balancing strategy. Implications for the behaviour of the dominant state follow from the logic of the unipolar model. We should observe it making a consistent effort 10 preserve its privi leged position. Security threat<; to the dominant power are minimized and its foreign policy autonomy is maximized in a unipolar world. That situation is preferable to being -- one of many great powers in an uncertain multipolar world, or to facing off against the concentrated hostility of an adversary in a bipolar world. Unipolarity is the best of all possible posi tions in anarchy; it is consistent with realist logic that any great power should prefer to be a unipolar power regardless of whether or not it possesses expansionist ambitions. We should expect the unipolar state to engage and integratein effect, to try to co-opt- potential great powers who do not have clear revisionist intentions. Unambiguous revisionist challengers are impervious to accommodating behaviour, and thus in relations with them we shoul d antic ipate that tbe dominant slate will adopt a confrontational stance. But, in relations witb status quo states and states whose intent ions are unclear, we should find that the dominant power adopts policies of reassurance, engagement, and accommodation intended to reinforce the belief that the existing international order is desirable and acceptable.1o Specifically, we should expect the dominant state to assure that its own behaviour is not threatening; to use its foreign policy to help deflect other threats to the security of potential challengers; to stabilize regional conflicts that involve other great powers; and to find opportunities to confer international prestige on other powers as a substitute for full great power status. It is also reasonable to expect the unipolar state to rely on

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multilateral decision-making in its foreign policy. Powerful states are tempted to act unilaterally, and the temptation is greatest for a unipolar power. But multilateral procedures are more reassuring to other states and may help to convince them that their preferences matter and that

they are not simply being directed to follow the dictates of the dominant state.

Assessment Some would argue that US foreign policy since the end of the

Cold War has lacked an overall strategy and has been indecisive and inconsistent (see, e.g., Lieber 1997). That criticism has some validity,

especially if one focuses on the early years of the Cli nton administration or on particular foreign policy problems such as the aborted intervention in Somalia. In general, however, the US has followed a consistent strategy of seeking to preserve its preponderant position. As Benjamin Schwarz recently put it, "America's foreign policy strategists have hoped to keep the realjty ofintemational politics pennanently at bay" (Schwarz 1996: 100). This US objective, for obvious reasons of diplomacy, has not been emphasized in foreign policy rhetoric, which has focused instead on the liberal goals of promoting democracy, indi vidual rights, and open markets. But occasionally, it does slip in ~o public discourse. [n 1992, for example, the grand strategy of preserving unipolarity leaked out in the form of a subsequently much-discussed Pentagon planning document whi~h concluded that, following the defeat of the Soviet Union, "our strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any future global competitor" (cited in Mastanduno 1997: 66). The strategy of preserving preponderance has been clear in the US approach to other major powers. US policy has been dedicated to dissuading Japan from becoming a nonnal great power with full and independent military capabilities. The Asian stl1ltegy of "d eep engagement" calls for the United States. over the indefinite future , to maintain the forward deployment of US forces, stabilize regional security, and strengthen the security commitment to Japan for a new era (Nye 1995). US officials took the initiative in responding to the Korean crisis of 1994. They attempted to dissuade North Korea from obtaining nuclear weapons-a step that could plausibly have led Japan

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to obtain them as well. In 1996, as regional and bilateral tensions mounted, the Clinton administration assured that US economic disputes with Japan were set aside to that the two gov~rnments could focu s on deepening their security preparations in the event of a future crisis. In Europe, US officials have continued the Cold War strategy of harnessing the great power potential of a now unified Germany while simultaneously providing for its security. NATO is the key element, and US officials have made clear their intention to expand the alliance into the historically turbulent zone of Central Europe and maintain it indefinitely. II When the United States finally took the lead in Bosnia, one crucial objective was to repair the damage to NATO caused by sharp disagreements between the United States and its major European partners over how to handle the con flict. US policy toward Russia has been dedicated to forestalling a revisionist challenge and encouraging Russian support for the international status quo. US officials have offered the prospect offul! integration into the institutions of the capitalist world economy in exchange for domestic political and economic reform. In a move designed in part to bolster its battered prestige, the 07 summits of advanced industrial states now include Rus sia. The Clinton administration also worked out a compromise to allow Russian forces to participate in the Bosnian peacekeeping effort under US command, when it became obvious that Russia was unwilling to serve under NATO command. Russia clearly has perceived NATO expansion as a political affront and security threat, so US officials have sought to reassure Russia by searching for formulas and institutions that might make NATO expansion more politically palatable to Moscow. The central thrust of the Clinton strategy toward China"comprehensive engagement"-is to offer a US~Chinese partnership, with China as the junior partner, as long as China behaves responsibly and meets its international obligations in the judgment of the United States. The United States would prefer that China be a liberal state, but appears to consider a non ~liberal China acceptable as long as China accepts a subordinate role in the existing international order. President C linton revived head-of-state s ummitry with China in 1997, and with Great fanfare in 1998 made the first visit to Beijing of a US President since the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989.

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In relations with all major powers, the United States has tTied to demonstrate that greater benefits accrue from accepting rather than from challenging the unipolar order. It has reinforced that message by punishing lesser po wers, such as Iraq, who exhibit revisionist ambitions at a regional level. US officials have also relied heavily on multilateral mechanisms to promote their objectives and develop an international consensus behind them. The military and diplomatic efforts to restore international order in the Persian Gulf, Korean

peninsula, and the Balkans were .led by the United States but involved multilateral coalitions. The response to the Asian financial crisis of 1997-8 reflected US preferences for domestic deregulation and open markets. but was orchestrated by the IMP.

The United States has managed during the first post-Cold War decade to preserve its preeminent position in a global order that reflects its preferences. Bu.t will it be able ·to do so for another decade o r more beyond that? The future durability of the international order depends on the ability of the United States to meet three challenges. Each will be difficult in its own right, and the three must be met simultaneously. The fi rst and most important is to continue to discourage the risc of states that combine fonnidable economic and military capabi lity with global ambition. The task was relatively easy in the first unipolar decade. Japan and Germany showed little inclination to abandon their identity as "trading states." Europe emerged as a potential economic powerhouse, but witho ut a uni fi ed foreign and defense po licy. Russia remained devastate econo mically and unprepared mililarily. China received considerab le attention as the mosl likely challenger, but only on the assumption that it woul d maintain over an extended period the econom ic development, political stability. and mili tary modernization needed to fulfill its potential. Several Middle Eastern states harbored deep resentment of US hegemony, but none was sufficiently powerful individuall y, and coll ectively Middle Eastem slates have proven incapable of the political uni ty required 10 produce a great power chalJenger. n Nevertheless, as anyone who witnessed the end of the Cold War can attest, the international system can change dramatically in a decade. Korean unification could leave Japan paradoxica lly feeling both more vulnerable and less willing to support the conti nuat ion of a

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us defense presence in the region. Russian economic recovery could be accompanied by the mobilization of nationalist sentiment and a desire to make amends for the humiliation of the Cold War settlement. China might fulfill its potential a nd demand the respect and influence it believes it is owed by the West. Other challengers- a .nuclearcapable India or Brazi l, for example----could move from the middle ranks to become major players with conceptions ofintemational order that differ significantly from that of the United States. The challenge for US diplomacy in this uncertain environment

will be to acconunodate and co-opt states that lean towards the status quo, confront revisionist states, and, most importantly, distinguish between the two. Hans Morgenthau wrote in his classic realist text that the ability to distinguish and respond appropriately to status quo and revisionist states was the "fundamental question" of statecraft, and that the answer determined the "fate of nations" (Morgenthau 1978: 67-8). The second US challenge is to manage and minimize what has been tenned the arrogance of powerY The dominant state in any international order faces strong temptations to go it alone, to dictate rather than consult, to preach its virtues and to impose its values. In the case of the United States, these temptations are compounded by a democratic political tradition that blurs the distinction between state and society and imbues foreign policy with the values of society. Efforts to impose values or to "preach" to other states create resentment and over-time can prompt the balancing behaviour that the US engagement strategy is seeking 10 forestall. As the Bush administration learned, when the top officials of the world's most powerful state begin to proclaim " 3 new world order" after a military victory, other governments, even friendly ones, become very uneasy. The Clinton team has had simi lar experiences. The President began with strident pubic pronouncements and a determination to place the protection of human rights at the centre of US China policy. He was forced to retreat amid charges of US arrogance and with the fear that his policies were alienating a country with great power ambitions and the world's largest population . Similarly, the Clinton administration angered its trading partners by supporting legislation that extends American sanctions unilaterally and extraterritorially

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against foreign firms that do business with Cuba, Iran, and Libya. "This is bullying," complained Canada's Foreign Minister, "but in America you call it global leadership." One US official responded to the chorus of criticism in 1996 by stating that "we're America, and they ' ll get over it" (quoted in Erlanger and Sanger 1996). The administration apparently recognized subsequently that it was wrong to assume others have no choice but to accept their place in a UScentered order. By 1998, it found a face-saving way to diffuse the

conflict and retreat without imposing any sanctions. The thjrd challenge is for US officials to maintain domestic support for the political and economic policies needed to preserve preponderance. This may prove to be the greatest challenge. It is difficult to mobilize and maintain public support, after the war has been won, for the task of "preserving stability" in the absence of a clearly defined, unifying threat. Significant parts of the US Congress and public have become increasingly reluctant to bear the political risks and economic costs of the US global engagement strategy. With the Cold War over, they are skeptical of the need for US military intervention in distant lands, and intolerant of casualties when intervention takes place. They resent what they perceive as the "free ride" that America 's closest allies still enjoy in military operations and economic relations. They resent free trade and globalization whel) it seem to lead to the loss of US employment. And they do not have the patience for a comprehensive partnerships, over the long term, with a communist state that does not respect the human rights of its citizens in a way that is fundamental to the American political tradition. Preserving preponderance requires US officials to manage the internal as well as the external environment. During the first Cold War decade, the Bush and Clinton administrations deflected the formation of a protectionist coalition and kept some momentum in the direction of freer trade. In military intervention, they sought to avoid extensive commitments, minimize costs and casualties, and develop "ex it strategies" even at the risk of leaving unfinished business. They extracted resources from other major powers to assure the US public that the United States was not bearing the financial burden of maintaining international order on its own.

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US officials, in effect, adopted a two-sided strategy, They attempted to accommodate foreign powers, but not in way that provoked or mobilized potential domestic opponents. They also tried to accommodate domestic opponents, but without provoking a challenge from foreign powers. Whether thi s dual balancing strategy can be maintained and for how long remains to be seen. CONCLUSION The end ofth~ Cold War has not meant the end ofrealism. But it has provided a worthwhile opportunity to recognize that realism, like any other rich research program, offers neither single unified theory of state behaviour nor a single vision of the emerging international order. In this paper 1 have offered three realist vision of international order. The model of geoe.-:onomic competition looked promising initia lly but has been overtaken by events. The unipolar model best characterizes contemporary international relations. Its durability will depend significantly on the effectiveness of US statecraft. When the wlipoJar order sooner or later gives way, it will most likely be replaced by multipolar world politics. But a multipolar system in which the great powers may be nuclear-armed and may at the same time be interdependent, peaceful democracies will pose new challenges of interpretation for realist and non-realist analysts alike. NOTES I.

The discussion drawn on Mastanduno and Kapstein (1 999).

2.

A challenge to this position is Liberman (1996).

3.

Grieco (1990) argues that states are "defensive positionalists", more concerned to avoid disproportionate gains by others than to make such gains themselves.

4.

See Mastanduno (1991). Traditional realists trace relative gains concerns to the ever-present threat of war. Geoeconomic realists attribute those concerns to 'he threat of war, but also to the desire for foreign policy autonomy or the purs uit of economic prosperity.

5.

Roben Reich (1990) popularized this critique. A powerful rejoinder thai stresses the di sti nctive nat ional character of multinational firm s is Doremus, Keller, Pauly, and Reich (1998).

6.

1 develop this argument in greater detail in Mastanduno (1998).

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7.

On Asia , see Friedberg (1993 /4 ) and Betts ( 199314). On Europe, see Mearsheimer (1990).

8.

Krauthammer ( 1990) expects it wi ll be "decades" before unipolari ty collapses. See also Nye (1 990) and Kapstein (1999).

9. The general argument that states balance lhrcats in Walt (1987). 10. A good discussion of this logic is Nordlinger (1995), ch. 6. I I. Bany Po~en and Andrew Ross (1997: 117) argue that the United States is pursu ing NATO expansion to preserve and widen its role in European affairs and to " forestall even a hint of an independent German foreign poli(y " 11. For the reasons why, see Lustick (1997).

13. This discussion borrows from Mastanduno ( 1997).

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The Coming Internatiollal Order 1992, "What New World Order?" Foreign Affairs 71: 83-96. 1995. "The Case for Deep Engagement," Foreigll Affilirs 74: 90- 102.

Nye, Joseph S. and Owens, William 19Q6, "America's Information Edgc" Foreign Affairs 75: 20-36. Oberdorfer. Don 1997. The 711'0 Ko/'eas : A COlllemporary HistOlY , Reading, MA; Addison Wesley. Posen, Barry and Ross, Andrew 1997, "Competing US Grand Strategies," in Lieber (ed.), pp. 100-34. Reich, Robert B. 1990, "Who Is Us'?" Han'alTi Business Rel'iell' 90: 53-64. Rosecrance, Richard 1986, TIJe Rise of Ih e Trading Stale: Cummerce an d Conquest inlhe Modem World, New York: Basic Books. Schwarz, Benjamin 1996, "Why America Thinks It Has tv Run the World:' The At/all/ic mOlllh~1' 277: 92-6. Schweller. Randall 1999, " Reali sm and the Present Great Power System: Growth and Positional Conflict over Scarce Resources," in Kapsteill and Masta nduno (cds.), pp. 28-68. Singer, Max and Wildavsky. Aaron. 1993. The Real World Oilie r: ZOIlI:,\' of Peace. ZOI/('S of Turmoil, Chatham. NJ: Chatham I-louse Publishers. Strem lau, John 1994/ S. "Clinton's Doll ar Diplomacy," Fo/"dgll Polic.' · 97: 18-35. Thucydides 1954, The Peloponnesial/ 11'(11'. Rcx Warncr (trans.). New York: Penguin Books. Thurow, LeSler 1992, Head to Head ' Til(! COII/ing ECOllomic Battle Among iapa". Europe, alld All/erica, New York: Morrow. Tyson, Laura D'Andrea 1992, JIIllo~' Bashillg WhvlII? Trade Conflier ill HighTee/Illology Indusl ries, Wash ington , DC: Institute for Internationa l Economics. United States Embassy, Tokyo 1992, "Japan's Aggregate Foreign Trade in CY 199 1," Document #220223Z, January. Walt, Stephen M. 1987. The Origins of Allial/ces, Ithaca: Cornell Press.

Unive~i ty

Waltz. Kennelh. 1979, Them)" o/llllel'l1atiollal Politics. Reading: AddisonWesley. 1993, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," Illternatiollal Security 18: 45-73. Wayman, Frank W. and Di~hl. Paul F. (cas_) 1994, Recollstructillg Realpolitik. Ann Arbor: Unjvc~ity of Michigan Press.

13 International Relations: Concept and Application

There is no major and definitive key outlook on world affairs. Instead of viewing human life and history from the perspective of a single "out look," the hazy discipline ofintcmational relations consists morc of a series of "vanlagc poi nts" or "approaches." These attempt to interpret the various facets of world politics and to systematize the loosely related force s and factors that have chardcterized the recent develo pment of the relations of nations. Prior to the twentieth cent ury it would have been premature and erroneous 10 talk in terms of a well-defined disc ipline of International Relations.

Indeed, the history oflhe subject is surprisingly brief, vague, and frequently irrational. In the nineteenth century it had largely bogged down in super-sophisticated, highly Icgalistic, and philosophically oriented disscl1ations. which only occasionally revealed bricf glimpses of international relations and deal! wit h practical political material s in a purely haphazard and incidental manner. Ulltil the pioneering work of stich political geographers as Ritter a nd Ratzel, who successfully injected notes of down-la-earth reali sm into nincteenthcentury social sc ience, international relations was marc or less compelled to hide behind the cloak of some other di scipline. Thi s "ponmanteau comp lex" was evident even in the brilliant writings of Mahan . whose significant pronouncements on international political mailers we re carefully camouflaged behind [aye rs of diplomatic hi story or internationallaw.

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The turning point came with the new century, which brought a tremendous upsurge of interest in international affairs as well as a healthier and more reali stic approach to problems of modern diplomacy. In retrospect it is obvious that the climactic age of IOtal wars has helped to usher in what Dean Acheson so aptly described as the age of " lola1 diplomacy." The revitalizing influence asserted itself from two different and wholly unrelated sources. On the one hand, certain notable Anglo-American writers sparked this progress. Singling out two representative names from among the many pioneers, one must mention Mackinder and 1. Parker Moon, whose massive Imperialism alld World Politics, first published in 1904, served as a useful general textbook and who for the first time in American educational history held the title of"Professor of Intcmational Relations." Simultaneously, a number of Marxist writers, some closely linked to Western European fonns of sociali sm. others clearly the forerunners of Russian Bolshevism, began to expound Communi st doctrine s on international politics and offered concrete applications of Marxist dogmas to the realities of twentieth-century world politics. No student of this discipline can afford 10 neglect the early writings of Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin, or the differently oriented literary products of Kaulsky or Bergson. For American purposes, thc first truly systematic and penetrating study of the entire field was prepared by Frederick L. Schuman. whose monumentalllllen/atiollal Politics first appeared in 1933. This work had a broad impact on the teaching and rescarch of internalional relations in the United States.

FOUR MAJOR APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 1. The Legalistic School This approach is derived from the study of intemationallaw and is imbued with legal systems, juridical values. and expectations. Its principal emphasis is on the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and its overriding obj::ctive, the maintenance and perpetuation of regional a nd global peace. It optimistically sets out to survey international relations primarily as a set of restraints imposed upon

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the individual nation -state by the community of civilized nations.

This attitude assumes exceptionally high standards of international behaviour and methods ofthe day-by-day operation even when there

seems to be little ground or few practical reasons for making such starry-eyed assumptions.

In order to insure a peaceful status qllO, exponents of thi s school urge individual nation-states, as participants in international disputes or crises. to resort to certain complex and highly developed techniques of confl ict resolution. The three methods most frequently discussed in

the literature are arbitration, adjudication, and- last but not least negotiation. Arbitration in thi s co ntext implies the voluntary submission of dispu tes by the individual states to a judge or group of judges of their own choice. It further implies the unanimous acceptance of the judicial award as binding and postulates a continuing deep respect for the law. Important methods "approaching arbitration" have developed as parallel procedures of dispute resolution. These involve the use of Mixed Com mi ssions, Commissions of Inquiry and of Conciliation, and have been widely employed throughout the nineteentwenties and thirties. Adjudication assumes that t he dispute is submitted ·to a permanent international court, which, acting as the strong arm of a truly international judiciary, has firm powers of imposing sanctions upon the participating governments. Unhappily, both the Permanent Court to International Justice of pre- World War II vintage, and more recently the International Court of Justice, are merely pale replicas of the forceful image of a strong and independent seal of international judicial power. Of overriding importance are the well-established senlement techniques of international negotiation, whieh-at their best--can be defined as diplomatic bargainin g processes based on the mutual assumption of successful settlement. Within the framewo:-k of such "Conference Diplomacy", whether secret or open, each side will strive to attain max imum national advantages with minimum concessions to the other sidc. Nevertheless, diplomacy by conference also presumes a friendly and constructive atmosphere in which workable intcrnational soluti ons can readily be hammered out w ithout violations o f that untouchable "taboo" of world affairs, the selfish national interest.

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This last poinllcads to the most relevant criticism of the legalistic school. Its exponents tend to live in [he clouds, hopefully anticipating both high moral standards of international conduct and selfless law. abiding patterns of national behaviour. It is safe to state that tbe era of such high expectations disappeared irretrievably on June 28, 1914, when the tragedy at Sarajevo set off the new age of total wars. Other approaches to international politics had to emerge from the bolocaust of World War I, as logical aftereffects and consequences of world·wide sentiments of disillusionment and despair.

2. The Organizational-Idealistic Approach As a reaction to the tragedy of World War I, thi s school of thought expressed a growing sense of the need for collc.:tive action against aggressor states. Stecped in the spirit of intcrnational organization, it carried the earlier and strictly legalistic approach a long step further by advocaling the "tinning up" and invigoration, first oflhe League of nations, and later of the Un itcd Nations. At its besl, Ihis approach also placed emphasis on such regional organizations as the Pan·American Union, the OAS, and more recently on NATO and SEATO. Its exponents engaged in a continuing argument concerning the primacy of regional vis-a-vis uiliversal types of organization, an argument that could nol be properl y resolved in vicw of thc many intangible considerations on both sides. The idealism of thi s school was most apparent when il professed that the mere existence of a broad internationa l organization was a sufficient safeguard for the maintenance of peace and hannony. It thus tended to ignore the impa ct of the nation-state and th e many complicating ethni c, religious, demographic, or geopolitical forces which- whether divisivc or cohesive in character--<:ertainly have a large detenninant share in the make-up of the relations of nations. Proceeding on the unexamined assumption that everything international was per se better than anything national, adherents of this approach overstudied such issues as disannament or the pacific settlement of di sputes, while the problems of national security, national interest, and legitimate national policy objectives were largely ignored. Coupled with this omi ssion was the broadly shared feeling that deplorable nationali stic attitudes were responsible for producing such

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vague evils as imperialistic foreign policies and conspiratorial groups of "munitions makers" or oi l interests. Nationalism, equated with moral evil , was therefore to be exorc ised from the rea lm of international relations.

In the interwar period, researchers imbued with this approach concentrated primarily on fOUT major study areas: international organization, international law, international trade and finance , and recent diplomatic history. On the whole, as William T.R. Fox observed in World Politics, the analytical model these scholars used for their case-study investigations was the image of a "world commonwealth" characterized by permanent peace.

In the course of the past fifteen years the organizational approach placed a great deal of well-justified emphasis on analyzing the unsung and unpublicized but tremendously important work of such technical U.N. agencies as UNESCO, IRO , ILO, WHO, FAa, and the Human Rights Commission. Numerous useful and comprehensive surveys have ably presented the great humanitarian achievements of these agencies, wh ich have succeeded in cutting across national boundaries and promoting world peace- if not by solving the deadlocks on the most vital pol itical or military issues, at least by "nibbling away" at the edges of international tensions or confli ct areas. To the extent that this recent literature keeps analyzing the speci fic , well-defined, and substantive functions for which these technical agencies have been estab lished, it can well be described as the functional method or perspective ofintemational politics.

3. The Strategic-Realistic Approach Mov in g from the relati ve ly si mple expose to the more complicated, this approach must be viewed from a double perspective: first a comment on methodology is in order, then its principal areas of concern have to be analyzed. The strategic-realistic school rel ies on the pragmatic method which postulates that the value of all political institutions is relative, and that the ultimate test of very government lies in its abi lity to rule effect ively regardless of its political philosophy. Pope's famous couplet is conveniently cited in this context:

For forms of govemmenrlet fools contest; Whale 'er is best administered. is best.

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The pragmatic method has a basically antitheoretical orientation. As Morgenthau observed, it seeks to "meet the day-by-day issues of international politics by trial and error", and devises a pattern of international relations more in keeping with al1 empirical image than an abstract ideal. Its importance to the student lies precisely in that practical concern which wants to grapple directly with cases and issues rather than with an explicit theory of international politics. Writing a 1958 editorial for Borba, the Belgrade daily of the Communist Party, a Yugoslav social scient ist summari zed thi s approach in the following manner: " Politics is neither an abstraction nor a science. Its objectives and its methods must be carefully fined for a world which constantly changes ... Politics and political doctrines come and go, but only peoples li ve forever." The combi nation of practica l concern and abhorrcnce ofthcory logically propels thi s mode of thought toward power concepts and ideas. It stresses the importance of the political power of individual states in order to insure their survival, which thus becomes both a goal and a technique of diplomatic operation. Pragmatism in international relations postulates that the fundamental source of a lmost all the tension that. arises between nations is fear, based on insec urity. Thus, the entire history of international politics may well be viewed as a continuing series of attempts by individual nation-states to meet their need for security and allay their institutional fears. The obvious device to accomplish this objt!{;tive has been the fonnation of alliances which in tum produced counteralliances, and eventually led to various balance-of-power systems. The historic balance-of-power theories of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries fit perfectly into the framework of strategicrealistic thinking on international politics. In a more primiti ve era of world affairs, the object of bilateral alliances was to bring preponderant strength 10 bear on a third party as a deterrent; it was then the nonnal state of affairs for European co untries to be di vided into two
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As described by Desmond W. Crowley. the balance of power system could be effective only under two seriously limiting conditions:

a. I f the opposing alliances generall y se ttled down at approximately equal strength, and thus prodllced a po liti cal~military deadlock, which helped to preserve peace, at least temporarily, or h . If it was possible for the leaders of the two major all iance systems to agree on some workable compromi se. As long as the governments involved were of an absolute, dictatorial character, implying that the leaders were free to act largely as their own desires or calculations directed, such agreements seemed to be generally feasible. As long as "the leaders came to know each other personally, and were often able to develop relations of mutual personal trust," remarks Crowley, the delicately tuned balance of power system seemed to be adequate enough. I In the long run, it is of course obvious that this pragmat ic "by touch and by fee l" operation ofi ntemational diplomacy would prove to be insufficient and unsatisfactory. The horror of modem warfare, the rise of belligerent twentieth-century nationalism, and the emergence of a new fonn of "total diplomacy" combined to cause a temporary fade-out of other approaches and schools of thought, and helped 10 push Cold War concepts and maneuvers into the foreground.

4. Contemporary Approaches to Cold War Problems In the main, current approaches 10 the political problems of the Cold War have tv.'o common chamcteri stics: they focus on the great, all-transcending problems of war and national policy, and they are usua lly based on narrowly constructed and wholly negati ve initial definitions. All of them assume, however, that war- which in this particular context becomes "hot" or "shooting" war in contradistinction to "cold" war type confl icts-is the supreme exerc ise of national power. In certain situations, so the reasoning runs, there is no obv ious substitute for resorting to war. War settles a number of problcms that are primarily in the political-diplomatic sphere. War determines which combatant shall have the chance to write th e peace treaty, and it will also crystallize the nation 's relati ve position in the postwar powerbalance on the regional, continental. and intercontinental levels.

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"Cold War" concepts are concerned wilh the nature and identifying characteristics oflmal war. In general terms they suggest that the major techniques which have transformed modem war into an ad horrendulII last resort, or ultimate weapon in a nalion 's political and military an;enal, are the folLowing: (I) its depel1dence on the complex scientific discoveries of contemporary technolog!'. (2) its incredibly high degree of industrialization and mechanical complexity, (3) the compelling factor of popular mass partiCipation, and (4) its enormously increased total cost. This is thc modem monster that has to be avoided, circumvented or, in tum, chained down by a vigorous assortment of diplomatic, economic, and politica l weapons . These weapons must then be employed as para11el means of national action and policy. The principal feature of th e Cold War is thus a lIegative assertion: War must be avoided at almost all cost! Here one enters the twilight (the double negative world) of Leon Trotsky'S ori ginal remark about a peculiar kind of in-between situation : "No peace, no wart" Most recent definitions are merely variations on this negative theme. In Hans J. Morgenthau's opinion : "The political relationship called the Cold War signifies the absence of peace between the two blocs in that there has been no moral and legal agreemem upon their relationships and, more particularly, upon the boundaries between them. Ralher these political relationships are the result of the provisiollal de facto seulemefl/ established at the end of the Second World War primarily 011 military grounds."~ To ill ustrate the significance of recent Cold War thinking, this study first offers three brief clusters of definitions, and then present its own appraisal of the multifaceted Cold War process. MILLS, MANSFIELD, AND STEIN ON COLD WAR' While big theoretical issues of a tomic energy, military unification, and defense budget werc being debated on the congressional leveL the years 1947 and 1948 began to introduce into American public life many minor but typically Cold War issues. It was a complex pattern

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with many loose ends. The "new d ifficulties" implied mostly that major wartime dec isions had to be made in times of non·war. Military policy thus had 10 be hammered out mainly in the conferences of budget officers and the hearing rooms of the military affairs comm ittees. A cruc ial non-war difficulty was to detenninc the proper all ocation of production between civi l and m il itary demands. It is symptomatic of a Cold War period that usually a nati on's economic and military policies arc badly out of adjusunenl with the actualities of the perilous world confronted by the protagonists. l The a uthors rightfully stress that in such a period all great national issues are intimately related. They must be taken together and call for a broad, correlated, a nd "globa l" policy; they cannot be handl ed in a piecemeal and ad hoc fashion, which is the lUxury token of nonnal political times. The Cold War era thus clearly demands a newly formulated national political military strategy different from the routine actions oflhe previous era. In the Cold War context, assert the authors, basic pol icies are obviously neither "purely military" nor " purely civilian" in their inspiration. Many different factors go into the construction of such a Cold War posture, and many men and institutions participate in the result- soldiers, diplomats, admini strators, economi sts, congressmen. the press, and public opinion. The authors' approach is particularly helpful in focusing anemion on the multiple impact of the Cold War era on the decision-making process in government. Non-war circumstances surrounding wartime measures, and the need for mobilization procedures in the midst of an outwardly clam poli tical atmosphere-these are some ofthe peculiar characteristi cs that Mill is, Mansfield, and Stein emphasize in Arms

and the Slate. RAYMOND ARON AND THE CENTURY OF TOTAL WAR' In this excellent wOlk, Raymond Aron fo rcefu ll y asserts that the class ical definitions of war are va lid but inadequate. As a new development, the Cold War is largely the result of World War II and of the revolutionary acti ons waged by the Soviet-dominated and controlled Cominfonn since 1946. Thi s Cold War silUation can be

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characteri zed by two ..:Iosely related background phenomena : the fonnation of the two opposing camps or blocs, and the depressing fact that these two camps are engaged in a seemingly permanent and irreconcilable struggle. In thi s world political context Cold War means limited warlimited, however, not as to the stakes, but as to the means employed by the belligerents. The mid-twentieth-century Cold War uses four major techniques. namely pro paganda, espionage and sabotage, agitation and mass movements, a nd civil war. These four "typical fomls" appear usually in combination with each other. The most salient illustration of the Cold War is the "Sov iet programme of world conquest," which is anxious to avoid open war or precipitate a serious military incident. Whi le meticul ous ly avoiding a casus belli. the U.S.S.R. is intent on bu ilding up a military superiority, which j ll ilself is onc ofthc major weapons in the Cold War. Aron also has an important discussion of the objectives of the Cold War. In military perspective, the Cold War appears primarily as a quadruple race for: (a) bases, (b) all ies. (c) raw matcrial s. and (d) prestige Bases must be secured from which the antagonists can anack or counterattack. The number and resources of potential allies must be increased and the number and resources of potential enemies reduced. Attempts must be made to retain or regain control of the sources of raw material s that are indi spensable to the tecllllological operati on and upkeep of modem war. And fin ally, the morale oftbe hostile world must be shaken and the prestige of one 's own ideas and strength vigorously spread, thus implying that "the goddess of history has already decided on the ultimate triumph" of one's own side. Reach;ng over to the side of Free World. Aron then offers a spec ific illustration for each of the four ingrediems of the Cold War as applied to American foreign po li cy. In its strategy, he claims, the United States has looked to the Pacific for bases, to Europe fo r allies, to the Near East fo r raw materials, and "more or less everywhcre" in thc world fo r reassurance and prestige.

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Although the CW:: LW (cold war is limited war) formu la may not be a startlingly novel contribution to the mushrooming literature on the Cold War, it does have the merit of focusing attention on the

limited, bllt al/·oul features of such a psc udomilitary situatio n. In addition, it offers a ncal and systematic sct of categories for both the components and the objectives of th~ Cold War. Whi le the four elements analyzed under each heading are truly sign ificant, they do not constitute either an exhaustive or a complete listing oflhe multiple

. . ariables that make up the 101al, 360-degree vicw of modem Cold War. However, in stressing the essential functions of such intangibles as propaganda, agitation, and prestige, Aran has perfonned a useful service in clearing away the underbrush and blazing a new trail in the jungle of semantics and political ideas.

KENNETH W. THOMPSON·S VIEWS ON THE CO LD WAR' Kenneth W. Thompson present an eloquent ana lysis of the present conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States in several of his recent articles. Being more than a decade old by now, the Cold War--in Thompson's opi nion--is plainly visible as a conflict with at leasttwQ dimensions. At one level, it is a struggle fo r men 's minds involvi ng the confli ct between democracy and Communism, with both ideologies claiming vitality and universa lity. AI the other level, '"the struggle engages two great configurations of power who by reason either of necessity or of design reach out to influence others." Thus, the author points up the moral aspects oftoda y's Cold War picture, intimately involving the comparative strengths and weaknesses of democracy and Communism. The Cold War, in this context, can readily be viewed as a continuin g conflict between morality and the "national interest" facto r. The principal issues is this: to what extent can a broader international community (in more precise tenns. fo r example, the United Nations) harness, beguile, or deflect the more limited, narrower national purposes of a single stale, a single unit? Or can it cver transcend them? It is obv ious that aspiring to justice, to a peacefu l international o rder, implies one set of values, whi le maintaining a semipennanent Cold War posture in a deeply troubled

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political worl d requires an entirely different set of standards and panems ofbchaviour. Fundamentally, these two guide-lines ale in irreconcilable conflict. Paraphrasing Thompson 's analysis, onc perceives that beyond a relatively substantial inner core of the "Vital National [ntcrest" lies the much slimmer and less obvious outer circle of" lnteOiational Law, Order, and Morality." By necessity, a Cold War situation directs public anenlion to the more relevant inner core complex of national interests. Despite this imbalance between the national interest factor and the role of order and morality, Thompson 's analysis does not neglect to emphasize the moral aspects of intcOiational politics. "Every legal or socia l refonn," he remarks, ''that wou ld be successful must take account of the moral infrastructure. The failure of collective security, of the outlawry ofwar...are all examples of thinking that suffers from the illusion that moral foundations are unimportant. The political

community has ils roots ill moral fa ctors unhappily sometimes missing ;n many of the areas tlrat have recellily become impor/allt in American foreign reiariolls ."1J The phrase "moral infrastructure" is a fe licitous one indeed since it points to the ever present-although occasionally nebulous-ethical criterion of politics without at the same lime disputi ng the primacy of national interesl cons iderat ions. Thompson thus rightfully views the Cold War situation as a fluctuating combination of purely political (interest) forces vis-a-vi.. the legal or ethical issues and imponderables that must enter inlo the national decision-making process.

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International Politics A FOUR-POINT EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT COLD WAR

Although there are many complex and academically abstract ways of "'presenting the problem and issues related to the contemporary Cold

War, we shall endeavour to single out four major and distinctive phenomena that might help to illuminate and further define the characteristics of the East-West struggle.

1. An " Agreement to Disagree" Between the Two Superpowers

This crucial feature reaches to the core of the Cold War problem and involves a tacit agreement between the two protagonists not to engage in broad, general negotiations or di scussions concerning the issues of disagreement. Such a Cold War posture, therefore, assumes the absence ofa formal . full-dress, and across-the-board conference-whether of the "sununit" or "below the summit" character- which would engage in a comprehensive review or reappraisal of the basic military and political problems separating the two camps. Particularly, such sensitive issues as atomic and conventional di sarmament, the unification o£Germany, or the renegotiation of the veto in the United Nation s wo uld be class ifi ed as "u ntouchable" in thi s context , automatically reducing the area o fnegoli ation to peripheral problems of far less signi ficance or relevance. Thus, even if a "summit" type conference were held in the near future. it would be largely ineffective and be concerned primarily with empty posturing for global propaganda purposes and for amateur, rather than profess ional . "consumption." Thi s process of a hardening of diplomatic arteries wi ll then result in two major and inevitable consequences. It will, first of all, produce a near-permanent, and highly frustrating, stalemate of diplomacy. which subsequently tends to sharpen the further polarization of political and military power. Thus we emerge in a world in which two blocs of nations keep glaring at each other across " iron curtains" and barbcdwire barricades.

2. Covert Forms of Warfare Overt resort to force is quite exceptional in the contemporary context of the Cold War, and limited primari ly to geographicall y

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marginal, but characteristically Rimlandic areas or to civil -war type revolutionary situations of an unusual emergency character. Such localized although politically not really remote or distant conflicts occur, for example, in Greece. Malaya, Korea, Indo-China, Algeria, or Laos. These rimland cri ses can become extreme ly signi ficant whenever, they directly involve the leaders of power blocs in world affairs. The Cold War generally speaking utilizes all the non-military aspects of war. The entire gamut of highly refined economic. political , and psychological warfare techniques is fully mobilized and used either in a meticulously planned chronological sequence, or- in most casesparalleling each other and employed in close combi nations. In a world of relentless psychological warfare campaigns the Cold War stresses the myriad nonmilitary aspects of what has traditionally been an excl usively military venture? Indeed, the Cold War has successfully demilitarized war itself!

3. Propaganda, Violence, lind the Threat of Terror The localized brush fire situations, which characterize Cold War incidents and conflicts, appear to be sharply limited in terms of the space, techniques, and methods of operation involved. They seem to develop and explode on two levels simultaneously. The first level clearly invo lves the visible impact of mob violence and unrul y demonst rations touched off by the unchecked flames of mass propaganda and by the reckless manipulation of modem media of mass communication. The second level is only subtly observable; is based on the invisi ble impact of a secret police-induced terror situation in which therc are two possible alternatives. People are either dri ven forward by this terror in the direction desired by the government, or th e continual threat of terror ope rates in reverse, and a popular explosion occurs against the hated police apparatus. In the latter case, an angry popul ace is seeking an outl et for its pent-up emotions and revenge for years offear, bitterness, and frustration. Although the Cold War history of the Soviet Union and satellite Eastern Europe abounds with jl1ustrations of each type of incident, since 1945 the hi ghest number of mixed-patte01 revoluti ons have actually occurred in the Middle East and South-East Asia Shatterbelt . Visible and invisible forces have combined, for example, to set off the frighte ning eruption

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of July \4 and 15, 1958, in Baghdad, where the King and Prime Minister of Iraq were ruthlessly murdered by irate street mobs. 4. The lntern_tional Civil War This characteristic carries the previous story a step further by injecting the notion of externally fomented and encouraged revolutionary situations. Cuning across national boundaries, local political parties, and regional sets of economic interests, these familiar acts of indirect aggression add up to a veritable "international civil war," to quote Sigmund Neumann 's prophetic phrase. In lenns of the techniques employed, one wiblesses here an immensely broad spectrum of operation with such seemingly minor incidents as individual acts of subversion, fifth column work, and infiltration at one end of the scale, and landing of troops on foreign soil. invasion attempts. temporary seizures ofterrilory and mass riotings encouraged by foreign agents at the other end. The common denominator of unusual interest to the student is the emphasi s on trans-national acts of aggression, both of a direct and an indirect character. The revolutions of the modem era, commonly regarded as merely internal upheavals, have become real world phenomena. Their true significance must be measured in teons of their international effect. "Radical upheavals, as all great revolutions are," observes Sigmund Neumann. " must be played on an international stage. Every region has become sensitive to the developments offar-distant lands.'" Areas that have been geographically and historically far apart have now been politically compressed to the point where one major ideological movement immediately provokes revolutionary reactions in seemingly distant and unrelated regions. Cold War situations and contemporary revolutions are inextricably interwoven: they cannot be isolated in neat and separate compartments, since they parallel each other and cut across traditional lines of political demarcation . This pattern of inevitable parallelism is particularly pertinent in areas that directly adjoin the Communist world. Yugoslavia, Greece, Tibet, Laos, and the Congo loom as sharp reminders of the continuous relevance of transnational or indirect aggression. This fourth feature of the Cold War spectrum emphasizes the confluence of external and internal factors in a given situation. The

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Soviet Communist blueprint of such situations is actually based on the scientific mobilization of this "double pincer," in which two forces are employed in joint and overlapping operation: CW = ICW :: EX (Iv) + In (V) R, where the Cold War is equated with an international civil war composed ofan external (frequently invisible) and an intema1 (always visible) revolutionary pattern. Where the two patterns meet and overlap, there emerges a full-blown intern ational incident frequently approximating lukewann or even hot war. Nobody is more acute ly aware of the complexities of the contemporary Cold War than our Communist opponents. Not for a moment can the Western public indulge in hopeful illusions concerning the naivete of Soviet statement or the primitive views of Communist political writers in assessing the true character of Cold War situations. If anything, they approach this aspect of world politics probably more realistically and soberly than we do. Writing on " Disannament and [nternational Tension" in the December 1958 issue of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Soviet Academician A.v . Topchiev made the following illuminating remark: " It is in the interests of international confidence that the 'cold' and the ' psychological' wars be done with, once and for all, with their artificial increase in international tension, propaganda of power politics. and of hatred and animosity toward other countries."

\ External

Impact

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Intemal Revolutionary Situation

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There are myriads of more or less latent forces and problems which have directly affected the lon g ~term development of international diplomacy and its day-by-day conduct among individual stales. In order to present a profile of these problem areas, four major issues have been selected for brief treatment. I. The Changing Nature of Modern Diplomacy There have been numerous revolutionary changes in the nature of modern diplomacy- both of a quantitative and a qualitative character. One of the most challenging recent developments has been the gradual decline in the TOle and importance of the professional diplomat and professional diplomacy itself.

At first blush thi s broad statement appears to be highly questionable. International politics, after all, is made by men and for men , and since among men the lines of communication and

interpenetration can never be drawn sharply or permanently, there would seem to be an ever increasing need for highly skilled and truly professional communicators on the international level. Despite this need, however, there has been a steady and obvious depreciation of professional diplomacy since World War I. Hans 1. Morgenthau has offered three primary reasons for this decline. The most obvious factor has been the development of modem communications. Speedy and regular communications in the fonn of the airplane, radio, telegraph, teletype, and long-distance telephone have immensely broadened the scope of direct negotiations between governments at the expense of the permanent representatives stationed abroad . Often the most sen sitive negotiations have been carried on , not by diplomatic representatives, but by special delegates, who may be the foreign ministers themselves or highly placed technical experts. A related facet has been the world-wide condemnation of secret diplomacy, which forcefull y espouses the view that the secret machinations of diplomats shared a great deal, if not the major portion, of responsibility for World Wars I and II. Thi s opinion, as Morgenthau remarks, also stresses that "the secrecy of diplomatic negotiations was an atavistic and dangerous residue from the ari stocratic past, and that

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international negotiations carried on and concluded under the watchful eyes of a peace loving public opinion could not but further the cause ofpeace.''3 Whatever, the moral implications, it is clear that a concerted campaign against secret negotiations has been successful in restricting both the fonnal scope and the substantive range of action of the professional diplomat. "Open covenants openly arrived at "was no empty or ineffective Wilsonian slogan, but one that had a continuing impact on the history of the subsequent thirt y years. Secret intergovernmental discussions were thus equated with evil intentions and conspiratorial political techniques. Few experts phrased this public revulsion more forcefully than the professional diplomat and exambassador, Hugh Gibson, who made the following remarks in his The Road to Foreign Policy : "As a matter of fact, there is such a thing as secret diplomacy, and it is reprehensible. This might be defined as intergovernmental intrigue for wrongful ends, resulting in obligations for future action of which the people are kept in ignorance ...There are also secret negotiations between governments to infringe the rights of another.'" Interestingly, however, even Ambassador Gibson has to admit that "open diplomacy" is often close to being a contradiction in teons, and that the glare of "pitiless pUblicity" can wreck the most promising international negotiations. He is also convinced that secret diplomacy might frequently involve the "systematic exploration of a subject in private by trained negotiators." (Italics mine.) This admission, then, brings him around the full circle, and attempts to vindicate the mueh maligned professional diplomat in his role as secret agent or negotiator for his government. The third reason for the over-all disintegration of diplomacy. closely related to the previous two-is the evolution of a new,.· parliamentary-type diplomacy, which has succeeded in introducing a major qualitative change into the area of international political intercourse. The League of Nations and the United Nations developed this pattern, as ably described by Hans J. Morgenthau. "International problems requiring solution are put on the agenda of the deliberative bodies of these organi zat ions. The delegates of the different governments discuss the merits of the problem ;/1 public debate.

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A vote taken in accordance with the constitution of the organization

disposes of the matter. " 10 This new diplomacy "by parliamentary procedures" seems to be dedicated to two principles acting in close co-operation: openness of

deliberation, and teamwork of technical experts. Both tend to restrict and qualify the traditional, historical scope of diplomatic operations. Even iran occasional screen of transparent semi secrecy is drawn in

front of these "newfangled".conferences, world public opinion is still allowed to follow the principal phases of the debate, as reported by

the various delegations to the competing media of modem mass communication. 2. Emphasis on Political Flexibility

•

This important attribute of modern international politics injects both the short-lived human and the more long range ideological aspects into our discipline. The richness of human nature and the gamut of desires and capabilities it displays gives the statesman an infinite number of opportunities to combine, adjust and realign humanity. thus trying to stri ke balance between the need for stability and the desire for cffange. In a fluid field such a tenuous balance can be accomplished only ~· by ulQ10St flexibility in the focus of research. in the over-all objectives sought for. and in the means employed to reach these goals. Years ago, Harold Lasswell talked in terms of alternating currents of national (or international) attitudes of satisfaction and dissatisfaction as useful units of "thermodynamic measurement" in international relations. Since Lenin 's time, Communist revolutionary autho~ have freely used such military phrases as "Advance and Retreat," "Strategy and Tactics," etc., denoting the need for diplomatic-political flexibility. More recently. Quincy Wright attempted to circumscribe the role of the individual as the subject ofintemational politics from a fourfold perspective. lndividuals, be suggested, are influenced at the "biological level," the "social level," the "psychological level" and at the "action level." Within this field, the individual cho ices, decisions, and actions important for international relations must be measured by various and complex political, economic. psychological. sociological, and ethical criteria, in order to arrive at systems ofintemational political action.

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Undeniably this fonnalistic strato~phere is not very useful to the student in search of practical infonnation. More concretely speaking, it is clear that in the contemporary world, beset by the Cold War and a continuing competition between rival power blocs, the focus of international relations must be centered on the concepts of "friend" and "enemy" in the political sense. Our Communist opponent has no staked-out monopoly on the baltle cry, "Know Your Enemy!"---closely linked in these times of political warfare to the slogan, "Know Your Friend (or Ally)!" The flexibility ofintemational politics breaks down at this point. There must be a strong and continuing emphasis on the image of the "enemy" (or opJXlnent) whose built-in picture seems to characterize the contemporary foreign policies of the major powers. Just as the United States has largely replaced Great Britain in the focus of Soviet Russian antagonism, so has our diplomacy centered around the allpervasive and seemingly permanent image of the Soviet bloc as our arch-opponent in the Cold War. These are truly fl exible categories limiting our field of international vision, our complex political horizon.

Only slowly and painfully do the se "built-in" national images fade and dissolve. Nicholas Spylanan was bitterly criticized in 1942 when he prophetically stated that after World War II, Germany and Japan would become the close allies of the United States while the allies of yesterday might become the mortal enemies of.a post-war tomorrow. Despite the obvious geostrategic relevance ofSpylanan 's remarks, it took Amerialn public opinion at least six or seven years from the end of the war to familiarize itself with the newly focused images of a friendly, allied West German and a Far Eastern bulwark, Japan.

3. Se(urity: The Strategic Focus of International Politics Despite the evident fluidity of subject-matter and haziness in problem areas, twentieth-century international politics has a distinct and well-outlined focal point: the concept of national security. In the present age of thermonuclear weapons, security as a truly national goal must be accorded top billing and top primacy in a country's diplomacy. Even the most conflict-ridden I~adership groups of a given society must admit that the national community ought to identify itself with the complex requirements of national security, cutting across the fab ric of the entire country as a universal goa l.

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Although theoretically uni versal within the boundaries of the nation-stale itself. security is also a curiously relative concept in many ways. Is it possible to specify more precisely whose security it to be protected against whom? Assuming a primitive "state of nature" for the world, the search for s~u rity by each state would be the single

dominating factor, and since the search for security by one implies the future insecurity of the others, the search for security by one state would be almost automatically countered by the power policies of other stales. Hence, the relativity of one nation 's security and the inevitability

of conflict, as a result of the opposing interests of nations--each searching for its own version of national security. tn other cases, the security concept remains relative if it cannot be equated with the will or the interest of the whole nation. Only in theory does the principle of national security always imply unanimous agreement on the immutable needs of the nation. In practice, it is frequently subject to the fluctuating interpretations and understandings of the particular social groups concerned. Security may, therefore, imply the particular conception of interest for given groups in the nation at a given time, but not necessarily for the whole nation for all time. Specific group aims may thus frequently prevent the solid formation or crystallization of broader national interests. In practice there is seldom a permanent, all-inclusive, and universally valid definition of security for anyone state over a long period of time. As the strategic focus of international politicpfme concept of national security is apt to create international insecuritY... British author, Desmond W. Crowley, ties the entire history and development ofintemational organization to the ubiquitous phenomenon of political insecurity. Crow ley asserts th at the traditional and historically acceptable methods used to obtain national security have proved ineffective in recent times. II The fundamental source of almost all the tension that arises between nations is fear, based on insecurity. Ever since the emergence of the nation state as a typical fonn of political organization, nations in small or large groupings have tried to formulate security devices of various types. The author briefly summarizes two major attempts: (a) the "balance of power" system, and (b) the concept of the United Nations as a "fresh attempt" to organize internationally against collective insecurity.

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a. The balance-of-power system fights insecurity by means of an obvious device-the fonnation of al Liances. But alliances 'produce counteralliances, and thus lead to a balance-of-power system. [I has therefore been the normal stale of affairs for European Nations to be divided into two antagonistic groups. The result has been to multiply tension and fears , rather than to reduce them. This system works only if the opposing alliances arc generally of equal strength, thus producing a deadlock, or if the leaders of two alliances agree on some compromise relating to vital issues, such as strategic territories. b. The emergence of modem nationalism h3s rendered the process of continual compromise-making between nations much more difficult. Diplomacy has lost its past effectiveness precisely because the conduct and day-by-day shaping o f foreign policies has become much more impersonal at a time when the world has become smaller and complicated by many more conflicting national interests. In this context the real value of the League of Nations and United Nations efforts is seen in tenns of replacing the dubious alliance systems by "collective security." This concept has been defined as the deterrent force of an unchallengeable alliance consisting of the great majority of all the nations. Unhappily, this novel-type alliance failed in its principal purpose-that of providing true national security for ils member-states. When faced with a crisis, the league was unable t& operate the machini ry with sufficient vigour and effectiveness. the .middle of the~'30's the individ~1 member nations had reverted o an old-fashioned ba ance-of-powcr system. It was World War Illhat re-emphasized the urgency to devise a better and more meaningful method than the hi storically discredited balance-of-power system. Thus, the decision was taken to project a new world organization, which could approach the haunting dilemma of collective security by attempting to bring the combined resources of all its members to bear against armed aggression. Whether the United Nations has successfully laid the specter of global as well as national insecurity remains to be seen.

».

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4. The Restraints on VloleDce--National and Intenational One of the principal and seemingly insoluble problems of international politics is the absence of any legal or institutional restraints on the use of power. Since the application of power leads to

violence, both latent and obvious, the crucial issue is to construct

tangible restraints on the assertion of violence in international relations. In legal tenns this is impossible. It has been frequently slated that the

only legal limitation of sovereignty is its duty to admit of no legal limitations.

Side-stepping the pennanenl dilemma of state sovereignty. the student must search for other instnunents acting as restraining forces on the indiscriminate uscs of violence. Two major types are worth noting here: ideological and institutional restraints on violence.

Ideological reSlrainl$ imply a recourse to certain political belief-systems or sets of ideas opposing the limited or unlimited use of force in international relations. Pacifi sm, for example, has been a major and successful ideology opposing violence. Isolationism, the systematic nonin volvement in the affairs and conflicts of other countries, has operated as an effective deterrent to numerous countries from the active participation in wars, The ideological restraint is most effective when coupled with moral and spiritual considerations. In such situations, aggres's ors are made to realize that .the use of force simply "does not pay," and there are such intensive emotional barriers erected against the assertion of .... • violence that the would be aggressor shrinks back from open challenge. These restraints are self-contained within the ideologies and myths of the individual nation-states or of the various social groups within the nation. They are never in
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Russian People's Great Patriotic War." Thus, ideologically motivated symbols can play a n enormous ly important role in organizing or restraining the massive use ofviolencc on the international scene. Institutional restraints comprise specifically defined procedures by which governments can settle disputes without using their military establishments. In addition to arbitration, mediation, and conciliation, discussed above, one must consider here the institutional aspects of international organization. Ifany one of the United Nations members chooses to disobey the legal limitations of the Charter, "enforcement action" Or sanctions will be app lied against it. Force in such a case is not truly restrained, but merely rechanneled or redirected: it is utilized by the soc iety of states rather than by single states. In successful situations, as in effective UN police actions or in the uses of UN emergency police force, the institution of international organization is actually able to act as a restraining force against the ready appeal to arms in criscs in which the unilateral action of single states would not have deterred the use of violence equally well . In reality, however, institutional restraints are exceedingly weak and mostly, in an embryonic state. The ··enforcemem actions" of the United Nations have been infrequent and largely ineffective. Behind the facade of "institutional" restraints there hides, not a majority of UN members, but only a few nations, supporting the specific action or sanction fo r reasons of their own and motivated by their own national interests.

MAJOR CONCLUSIONS One of the principal conclusions to be drawn from our survey is that imernational politics presents a particularly fluid and dynamic field of study. There are several reasons for thi s continuing state of flux and for the uncertainties of scope and content. First of all, it seems to be impossible to slate concisely or "codify," as it were, the principles and problems of international pol itics. Vague and somewhat unprecise in character, International Relations has no tangible laws, no closely identifiable body of rules or prescriptions that could be handed down from generation to generation, from student to student. The whole setting of the discipline changes almost continua lly and the political environment in which it has to operate is steadily exposed to major seismographic shocks and revolutionary upheavals.

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It has been frequently. and quite accuratel y, slaled that international politics suffers from chronic exposure to a cultural and political lag, which keeps it approximately twenty-five to fifty years behind the contemporary setting and day-by-day sweep of history. Thus, it is clear that the French Anny was ready by 1870 to fe-fight and win the battle of Waterloo, was set by t 914 to correct the military disasters of 1870-71. and was fully prepared by 1940 to profit from the strategic and tactical lessons of the 1914-18 period. Unhappily. it is also true of world politics that by the time a new military conflict

or severe diplomatic crisis arises, it is usually ready to cope with the previous wave of wars or crises, and willing to apply several years later the lessons derived from past difficulties. While history may teach us a great deal, it obviously cannot offer a complete blueprint for the next wave of problems. Hence, the chronic state of semibankruptcy in the academic discipline of international politics ! In addition to this "historic gap," the vagueness of scope and content must. be stressed again. In the field of international diplomacy, two and two seldom add up to fur, but seem to vacillate in a truly quixotic manner anywhere between three and eight. Albert Einstein undeniably spoke his frank opinion when he remarked that "Politics is harder than physics." It was the great fa llacy of medieval natural law scholars to concentrate on, and attempt to codify, a set of immutable laws governing the political relations of both individuals and nations. Such unwavering principles do not exist in world politics. Even the experts who keep referring to a " law of political vacuums" (asserting that the place of a weak, practically nonexistent or defunct political system will promptly be taken up and filled by a stronger and mow aggressive regime or governing elite) have to qualify and generously footnote their slowly evolving principle in order to give it a degree of relati ve va lidity. Even the most modest political generalizations have to be surrounded by defensive "if's and but 's" to the point where their pedagogical value and historic significance may rightly be questioncd by student and scholar alike. One of the few tenable generalizations, whic h ought to be fonnu lated here, is that every facet, aspect, and operational detai l of international politics is focused today on the climatic and all-pervasive struggle between democracy and totalitariani sm. The globa l conflict

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between these two opposing ideologies affects every analysis, discussion, and rcsearch project in this field. While Cold War studies may be only incidental and somewhat peripheral phases in the sweep of history, the emergence of totalitarianism itself is truly a historically unique and sui gelleris political fonn, and quite possibly the most distinctive single contribution of the twentieth century to the world of politics. The all'pervasive conflict lies between the challenge of Free World democracy on the one hand and totalitarian dictatorships on the other. The challenge is complicated by the political fact that this monster is a "beast of many spots." All fascist and Communist totalitarian dictatorships are basically alike, or at any rate, more nearly like each other than like any other system of government. Thus a new, revolutionary type of political ideology, subject to a single power centre, moves into the realm of international affairs with a systematic and ruthJess challenge of any other way of life or personal belief. The ensuing global struggle casts a deep and dark shadow over the New World, the Old World, and the Soviet Communist bloc; over international conferences, whether in the United Nations or outside of it, over military and political negotiations, whether top-secret, highly sensitive or open to public knowledge; and, most importantly. illcnds to be of a truly divisive character, giving our political world an unnatural black and white coloring on a seemingly pennanent basis.

REI'ERENCES I.

See Desmond W. Crowley, The Background 011 CwTtm t Affairs (London: Macmillan. 1958), p. lID.

2.

See Hans J. Morgenthau, Oi/emmas of Polilics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 199·200. Italics added.

3.

This is a summary of Chapter 5 (Cold War) from Arms and the Stale by Walter Millis, Harvey C. Mansfield, and Harold Stein, published as a volume in the Project on Civil-Military Relations by 11Ie Tl1'emielh Century FUlld. New York. 1958.

4.

The Century of To/af War; Beacon Contemporary Affairs Series. The Beacon Press. Boston. 1955 . See especially Chapter LX, pp 169-80.

5.

S~ K.W. Thompson, "Reflections on the Study of Foreign Policy in the Context of the Cold War." in Chapter I, Foreign Policy in World PolitiCS,

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Roy C. Macridis. ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J .: Prentice-Hall, 1962), pp. 21-27. 3nd "The Limits of Principle in Inlemaliona] Politics," The Journal 0/ Politics , August 1958, pp. 437-67. 6.

See K.W. Thompson, "The Limits of Principle in International Politics," loe. cit., pp. 437-67, passim.

7.

See Sigmund Neumann. ''Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties," In Modern Political (Chi cago: Un ivers ity of Chicago Press, 1956),

B.

Sce Hans 1. Morgenthau, Polilics Among Nations; The Struggle fo r Power and Peace, 3rd edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1960), p. 547.

9.

See Hugh Gibson. The Road To Foreign Policy (New York: Doubleday, 1944), p. 77.

p. 41 8.

10 . Sce Hans J. Moregenthau. Politics Among Nations, p. 548.

11 . See Desmond W. Crowley, The Background to Current Affairs (London: Macmillan. 1958), Chapler Six. "The Uniled Nalions, " especiall y pp.108·1I1.

14 The United Nations and Intemationl Politics

Eighteenth-century developments in politics, economics, international law, science. and conceptions of individual rights led to what some

have called modem liberal democratic nationalism. I In tum, influenced by liberals in the American and French revolutionary traditions, and by Gennan philosopher Immanuel Kant, thinkers envisioned a peaceful world that would be characterized by democracy, economic interdependence, and international law and institutions.!

Such notions may strike the 2151 century reader as commonplace examples of what the current age calls "globalization." But it would

take some two centuries, sanguinary conflict, and agonizing efforts to effect a world organization that conformed to the prescriptions of enlightened notions of diplomacy. And still the world would not be perfect. However, with the subtle deception nonaligned history can on occasion tease, world affairs by the early I 990s conspired to suggest the triumph of Kant 's vision. The year 1989 brought the end of the Berlin Wall, the Warsaw Pact, and the cold war. A United Security Council authorized military action against Iraq , pushing the aggressor out of tiny Kuwait. U.S. President George Bush proclaimed a "New World Order," by which he and his listeners meant a world more nearly conforming to the politicaJ and economic nonns we associate with enlightened Western society: the rule of law, democratic elections, market economics, rising standards of living, and

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the advancement of human rights, all within the context of a world of

interdependent, cooperating sovereign nations. The Uni ted Nations was seen as the energizing institution of that new world, just as its founders had intended, and just as it had on ly recently, against the aggressor Saddam Hussein, proved it could be. By 2002 the United Nations could COWlt 190 member states and

numerous international organization and non-governmental organizations that considered themselves part of the UN family. composed of and dependent on individual nation-states, it nonetheless seemed poised to transcend distinct state desires for more wide-ranging global purposes.

CRISIS AT THE MILLENNIUM Yet, at the tum into the new millennium such a heady assessment seemed premat ure. Early unpleasantness in Somalia, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Cambodia was followed by the specter of other states around the globe disintegrating- in Indonesia, the former Yugoslavia, and elsewhere in AfTica. The Arab·lsraeli dispute, calmed by the Oslo Agreement of 1993 and mutual Palestinian·lsraeli recognition and the onset of negotiations, degenerated by the end of the decade into a mutual bloodbath. World economic and financial crises emerged in Asia and Latin America, AIDS became an epidemic in much of sub· Saharan Africa. and angry protesters showed up in larger and larger numbers at meetings of international financial and economic organizations to voice strong opposition to globalization. Violence accelerated at these international meetings and then, on September 11, 2001. the unimagi nabl e happen ed as terrorists commandeered four American airplanes on the east coast and slammed two of them into New York 's World Trade Centre and one into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., causing unspeakable death and destruction. Within the month U.S. and British aircraft were bombing Afghanistan, protests against the bombings were spreading throughout the Islamic world, and anthrax, a deadly biological agent, was showing up in a number of mailboxes in the Uni ted States. The United Nations remained as an institution accepting of appeal to still the noise and to medicate the victims. But the euphoric

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moment of the early 1990s seemed long ago, and much more pessimistic appraisals of international possibility entered the public discourse. Some, such as former U.S . secretary of state Henry Kissinger, simply dismissed the United Nations as an insignificant factor for addressing the world's pains.} Professor Samuel P. Huntington provtded an even darker assessment, beginning Y{ith his stunning essay '"'The Clash of Civilizations?" Huntington challenged the notion of a univerul ·liberalism ever organizing the world. Instead he offered a more disquieting suggestion, namely, that the future world would be plagued by serious clashes between and ~ng deeply different "civilimions" and cultures. Western civilization was but one of some seven or eight distinct civilizations, each with its own unique cluster of political and social ideas, standards of behaviour, and. above· all, religion. He predicted the certain and perilous collision of incompatible and suspicious civilizations and urged an end to soft optimism, including any expectation that a flawed United Nations could somehow gJoss over such differences:' HuntingtOn experienced something of a revival in 200 I, as, despite vigorous efforts of the Americans and others to maintain wide cooperation-including within tbe United Nations-.tension between Islamic and Western nations seemed to materialize following the terrorist actions in the United Sta,es and the U.S. military response, the Arab·lsraeli situation deteriorated, n:liJious and.ethni<: violence erupted in South-East Asia, and the Balkans split along religious lines. Other Ctjtics- were equally depressing. Princeton professor Paul Kennedy. in his Widely read book Preparing/or the Twenry-.firsl Century/' offered a dreary recital of unmanageable worldwide demographic exptoston, rampant environmental despolialion, risky biot..hnoIogicaI advances. malnutritioo, _ diseases, ethnic Slrife, and more. JournaJist Robert Kaplan's The Ends of the Earth added more misery to the picture. Traveling in remote areas in Afiica, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia, Kaplan found a nether . world in perilous disintegration, plagued by overpopulation, lack of education, disease, environmental disasters. rampant crime and corruption, anarchy. and civic collapse. "The idea," he insisted, "that a"global elite like the UN can engineer reality from above is... absurd."6

up

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Internationp/ Polilics TOWARD INTERNATIONALISM

Undoubtedly, as we proceed to face the new century more crises will occur and more voices will be raised to find wanting any claims that human society collectively and through international organizations can reasonably address world problems and make life for the world's inhabitants a bit better. We must concede that conflict in the [onnal relations between and among nations, empires, and peoples has characterized human activity since the millennia before the common era. 7 The diffusion and ultimate availability of texts and treaties dealing with such relations suggests a pattern in world history, however, of cross-cultural intercourse among political elites the world over that led in time to what might be called international relations? Basic principles and precedents emerged as different communities sought to impose order on their mutual relations and to resolve disagreements without the resort to force, unless those principles or their interests might allow or require it. EMPIRE

Still, for most of history public order was maintained by hierarchical imperial administrations whose dominance was punctuated by sporadic uprisings and dissolution, 100 often resulting in violence.' As a rule the great periods of Chinese history are considered to be those times when powerful consolidating empires brought pervasive peace, some prosperity. Confucianist (or later, Maoist) standards of conduct, artistic grandeur. and systematic ·rule to a society that nonetheless intermittentl y plunged into chaotic and disruptive civil. strife. The Roman Empire is the prototyPical administrative unit of the Western legacy. Rome brpught stability, peace (the Pax Romana), law, intTastructure. a common language, and eventually Christianity to the known Western World. Byzantium was the imperial reflection of Rome in much of Eastern Europe. and it lasted longer and left an impressive legacy of Slavic orthodox culture neither nationalist nor liberal in configuration. The Ottoman Empire imposed a flexible bureaucracy on a wide swath of land with an extremely diverse population. And great Russian empires, whether Romanov or Bolshevik, brought to heel the squabbling mcdley of ethnic groups covering its large landmass. As a rule. when the imperial power was challenged the consequence

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was unwelcome disruption (the 19th-century Taiping rebellion in China provides an example). Empire, whether imposed willingly and brul8.lly or reluctantly and benignly, seemed the common so lUI ion to international disorder. In fact, as late as the lum of the last century, international diplomacy was something characlmslically conducted amoag empires (Romanovs in Eurasia., Manchus in China, Ottomans in I>.. Middle East, IIapobwgs in South-Centrai Europe. Hohenzollems in Germany and eas..-central Europe, Hohenzollems in Germany and East-Central Europe, and the British and French world wide). 4

NATION-STATES What might be lenned the "'post~mpirc" era of political organization is more familiar 10 the modern world. The idea of "national sovereignly" provided nation states the ultimale authority over populations within discernible boundaries. The nation·state, considered to have originated in Europe in the 15th and 161h centuries, heralded what some scholars have called "international anarchy." Since no commanding sovereign authority rested above the nations, international order depended on the good faith of its individual sovereign members. In the West this phenomenon led 10 the development of modem international relations and international law. Scholars and practitioners such as Hugo Grotius (1583 1645) and Emmerich de Vanel (1714 67) sought to codify rules of international behaviour, on the understanding that each sovereign state would determine whether to abide by them. This "state of nature" in international matters posited an underlying possibility of conflict. An initial response to this problem was the theory of "balance of power." This meant thai if anyone nation were to gain overwhelming power so as to represent a danger to others, they would join together 10 restrain-that is balance-the powerful entity. In addition to balance of power, early European theorists proffered notions of what we might call international human rights law? The earliest approaches to this issue came from alann about the tteatment of civilians during the brutal religious wars, particularly the Thirty Years' War (1618-48). Grotius and Vattel, and their readers in Europe and America. sought to codify into an embryonic international law accepted practices against what we have come 10 call "war crimes." Moreover, by way of the Peace 4

4

4

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of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years' War, sovereignty became the criterion for authority in any poJiticai entity. Thus, sovereign rulers were authorized to determine the religion of any state, in order to avoid internal wars between competing religions.. which too often had drawn in outside forces. As a consequence, by the "Westphalian" settJement, Europe came to be characterized by sovereign nation-states _ I y abiding by an intemationallaw r
Following WQrld War I, new nation-states surfaced in centtal Europe. In 1947 India and Pakistan became independent of Gral Britain, while various states emerged out of tile fonner Ottoman Empire and Ibe mandates administered there by Britain and France. By the 19605 many new states in the "developing world" gained independence. The nation-stale had become the accepted mode of . political organization. THE CONCERT OF EUROPE

The American and French Revolutions brought to world politics the idea of universal principles applicable at all times and to all peoples. The idea that all buman beings w..... by nature, equal inspired but also diSlUtbed existing politics. The French Revolution culminated in along world war and the age of Napoleon. The victorious allies who finally defeated thO French general met at V ...... during 1814-15 and restructured ~ and ita diplomatic pnctices in an .......,. to bring order to the continent and avoid another descent into violence. The Congras ofVoenna crafted • complex plan to build a peacelid Europe. Diplomau agreed on a new and transfonncd balance of power, complemented by territorial eompromise among all the former belligerents, monarchical legitimacy and restor"IIioo, and an ......_ to meet in the futuR 10 consult on actions 10 take 10 meet disrvplive crises (signaling the oo-eaIled Congress system of Ewopean affairs).' Often considered a conservative settlement. the Vtcnna prograrrme was followed by a reasonably tranquil 19th century, which experienced a creative expansion of international organizations. Early River Commissions, such as the Central Rhine Conunission (1815) and the European Danube Commission (1856) were examples. The International Red Cross was in place by the middle of the century. and the International Telegraphic Union (1865) and the Universal

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301

Postal Union (1874) paved the way for numerous future international agencies in fields as diverse as narcotic drugs, agriculture, health, weights and measures, railroads, time zones, and tariffs. The 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Propeny and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886) brought issues of protecting patents and copyrights into the larger realm of international law. In 1899 and 1907, the Hague Conferences marked a culminating phase in the arbitration movement, establishing the Pennanent Court of Arbitration and expanding rules governing arbitral procedures.

TWENTIETH-CENTURY CRISIS But crises challenged the arrangements of the Concert of Europe and the progress in international cooperation right up to the plunge into the Great War of 1914-18. When that disastrous war ended, a new participant encroached into the club of the more traditional great powers to attempt a solution to the di sorder that had caused the war. American President Woodrow Wilson joined others at the Paris Peace Conference in 1918-19. He brought with him positions he had earlier articulated in his Fourteen Points, including an outline for a new world-wide organization- a League of Nations-committed to collective security and to the elimination of war. When the peacemakers arrived in the Paris suburb of Versailles to sign the completed agreement, there were several compromises that troubled Wilson's most resolute supporters. Wilson, who had been welcomed to Europe as a savior, became by the end of the negotiations the larget of nationalist frustrations abroad and partisan bickering at home. Almost no one was happy with the final national boundaries, and opponents in the United States complained that the president had made too many compromises in Paris and feared that he had overcommitted the country to international collective security. In September 1919, campaigning for Senate approval of the League, the president collapsed following a stroke in Colorado. His resulting illness and the growing opposition to his plans resulted in the Senate's refusal to ratify the peace agreement and thus deny U.S. entrance into the new League of Nations. Still, without doubt the Wilsonian principles of "selfdetermination" and "internationali sm," though from a certain

JOl

International Politics

perspective ominously antipodal, had been clearly presente<J.to the world's peoples. The Versailles settlement may have been doomed to failure irrespective of the American snub. Statesmen at Paris had before them a dangerously disintegrating world. Most of the major organizing empires of the previous century were gone. The Manchu dynasty in China had collapsed in 1911, replaced by a weak republican government, and a disruptive civil war followed. In Russia, 8 Bolshevik revolution ended the rule of the Romanovs but found itself in control of a truncated state, the former empire having lost considerable territory to the Germans months before the war ended. By war's end, the Hohenzollems in Germany and the Hapsburg rulers of the AustroHungarian Empire were likewise gone, as was the Onoman Empire, now completely dissolved. Within the resulting vacuums in the centre of Europe, in the Middle East, and elsewhere left by these disappearances were a variety of religions and a myriad of ethnic entities that now demanded sovereign national independence along religious and ethnic lines. From a cenain perspective, world leaders have since 191 8 been trying to restore order out of the chaos left by World War I. Despite the American rebuff, the League, guided by its Covenant (its founding document), came into being and functioned until-the world descended into the next round of world discord in the late 19305. Three permanent organs marked the originality of the new experiment- an Assembly with equal representation from all member states, a Council of four permanent members (Britain , France, Italy, and Japan) comprising at first·four and then six nonpermanent seats, and a Secretariat. Each of these signified advances in the development of international institutions. Although earlier international conferences had made some use of secretariats. the League Secretariat, providing centralized administration. expert advice, and day·t
The Uniled Nalions and InlernolionJ Politics

303

By the end of the 1930s the League became effectively inoperative and World War II erupted. Seeds for a new organization were planted in the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941, issued by U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. The document obliquely referred to the future "establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security." On January I. 1942, with the United States now in the war, 26 nations joined in signing a Declaration by United Nations (a tenn coined by Roosevelt), reaffirming the principles of the Atlantic Charter and committing themselves to defeat of the Axis powers. At a meeting in Moscow in October 1943, the foreign ministers of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China signed the Moscow Declaration on General security, explicitly recognizing "the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization." Planning for the new body had been centered in the U.S. State Department, where Secretary of State Cordell Hull organized a special committee of advisers to draft a proposal as the new organization's governing document. The committee 's draft charter became the outline that subsequently was crafted into the final UN Charter. Talks in August and September 1944, at Dumbarton Oaks, an estate in Washington, D.C., furthered platUling. At the crucial Yalta Conference, held in the Russian Crimea in February 1945, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin hammered·out the final compromises that became the basis for the San Francisco Conference on International Organization, which, in June 1945, witnessed the signing of the completed charter. With sufficient ratifications, the United Nations came into being at 4:50 p.rn. on October 24, 1945. The challenges confronting the UN 's founders were not the same as those facing the world community at the start of the 21st century, but they were ,no less momentous: Western leaders needed to assuage Russian suspicions of any Western-bred organization to which Moscow would be asked to commit: the United States was obliged to convince its own people and the rest of the world that it would not again retreat from leadership in thi s post-war period; Britain required encouragement to complete the Wilsonian dream of the dismantling of world-wide empires, the largest of which was administered from London; the defeated nations needed to be reconstructed and fused into the new global framework; urgent rebuilding and rehabilitation of a

304

International Politics

war..
a general, broad, and forceful commitment to those fundamental human rights so long promised by enlightened liberals and so clearly desecrated in recent times. Whatever, criticisms can be mounted against the early United Nations, we must remark that it-and its associated organs- met and resolved every one of those challenges within a few short years following the most destructive war in history. TO THE MILLENNIUM Although the League of Nations was a model for the United Nations in important respects the new organization was different from its predecessor. The League had been ensconced in the full Treaty of Versailles; thus 10 reject the League a nation had to reject the entire peace agreement, as was the case in 1919 with the United States. The United Nations, conversely. was purposely separated from the peace treaties that ended World War II ; President Roosevelt, informed by Wilson 's lack of success, determined on a separate process of ratification to assure U.S. participation in the new world organization. The League Covenant had been a traditional agreement among governments, called in the Covenant "The High Contracting Parties." The preamble of the later Cbarter beings, " We the peoples of the United Nations."lo The League required unanimous votes in both the Assembly and the Council, but decision-making in the United Nations is more flexible. 11 Parties to a di spute before Ihe League were prohibited from voting because of the obvious conflict of interest. In the United Nations, in a concession to the realities of power politics, member states had no such limitations. When coupled with the veto, this meant that a permanent member of the Security Council could block UN action. The organization of the United Nations, which was initially something of a mystery to Soviet leader Stalin, rings familiar to citizens of the Western World or those conversant with presidential or Westminster-style parliamentary systems of government. For example there are legislative (the General Assembly), executive (the Secretariat combined with the Security Counci!), and judicial (the International

The United Notions and Intemation! Politics

305

Court of Justic~) branches, and the Charter emphasizes equal trade and the "territorial and administrative integrity" of sovereign states (Article 2) and, supplemented by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, individuatfreedoms, All this notwithstanding, the United Nations too often is marginalized in discussions of world affairs, Part of this disregard undoubtedly is due fO certain misconceptions about the organization. It is useful to remember that the United Nations is a "confederation," not a unitary or federally organized government. That is, it is made up of sovereign members; it has no overarching authority apart from those states, and it is then only what its members make of it? Thus it acts effectively only by way of consensus, not majoritarianism. Moreover, it cannot fulfill ''utopian notions" of world peace and order because, as fonner Israeli representative Abba Eban has reminded, it is an "i_nternational organization ... a mechanism, not a policy or principle."12 Or, as Secretary-General Oag Hammarskjold once explained: "The United Nations is noLa superstate, able to act outside the framework of decisions by its member governments. It is an instrument for negotiation ... (it) can serve, but not substitute itself for the efforts of its member governments,"13 Also, it may be instructive to note that in the aftennath of the cold war, the United Nations is not alone at a pinnacle above all other institutions that connect the world; rather, it se'rves as a consolidating axis for all those organizations. The intricate international order purpOsely crafted following World War II has proved durable and mature. By 2002, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) had become the World Trade Organization (WTO); the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) had extended their activities; at Vienna in 1993 human righlS were proclaimed and accepted by most nations as ''universal''; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was expanding its membership far to the east; other regional groupings from the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) to the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation Organization (APEC) to the European Union (EU) linked sovereign slates into ever-widening and more closely knit international units, And the United Nations, unlike any comparable multistate organization in history, remained operative for

306

International Politics

an unprecedented half century, expanding its: membership to virtual universality. As this expansion continued to the tum afthe millenniwn,

the organization found itself at the forefront in some of the most significant international developments. Apart from the oft-remarked activities of UN agencies in bringing about social and health reforms, consider, just for example, the following: (I) Israel came into being by the Jewish Agency's unilateral implementation of UN resolution, initiating the modern Middle East quandafy; the UN has been the central institution in defining. in intemationallegal terms, the nature of the Middle East problem. From the establishment oftsrael to the

crisis of 1956, UN Resolutions 242 and 338, the Camp David Accords, the handshake at the White House in 1993, and the impasse of 200 I, the internationally recognized legal basis of any possible resolution of this seemingly intractable dilemma rests in a long·tenn connection with the United Nations. (2) The remarkable developments in South Africa and Namibia over the last decade of the 20th century, resulting in the purging of apartheid and the introduction of democratic government in South Africa and full independence of Namibia. were conditional upon UN resolutions. (3) The 1993 elections in troubled Cambodia took place under the legal rubric of UN resolutions and with UN administration, and again in 1998 international monitors returned to watch over another election and the United Nations remained involved as part of the international effort to establish a war crimes tribunal to address the forced deaths of some 1.5 million Cambodians during the 1970s. (4) The ongoing negotiations to settle the Cyprus problem are based in UN Resoh;tions. (5) By the mid·l990s the United Nations, by passing resolutions and establishing observer groups to provide supervision, guided the end of civil wars and the ultimate general elections in three beleaguered Central American Countries: Nicaragua, EI Salvador. and Guatemala. (6) The Gulf War in 199 1, which removed Iraqi forces from Kuwait, was based on UN Security Council resolutions (particularly 678); thus, the war was a genuine "collective security" operation designed to uphold the sovereignty of a UN member. (7) The Dayton accords of 1995 were U.S.-led impositions to implement the UN's insi stence on ending the brutal fighting in the fonner Yugoslavia; as of the tum of the century, the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina was still in place, coordinating a wide range of responsibilities, including provision of humanitarian

The Uniled Nalions and Inlernalioni Polilics

307

and relief supplies, human rights enforcement, removal of land mines. monitoring of elections. and rebuilding infrastructure. (8) In Kosovo, the UN Kosovo Force (KFOR), starting in spring 1999, supervised the final peace settlement following the NATO war against Serbian domination of the province, and the UN Interim Administration for Kosovo, which monitored the relatively peaceful municipal elections in the province in October 2000, was considered an example of successful napon-building by the United Nations. (9) In 1999 the United Nations took over administration in the embattled tenitory of East Timor, setting up transitional authority in the area as it proceeded to separate from Indonesia: in late August, 2001. UN monitors administered a trouble-free election for east Timor. providing self-rule for its inhabitants for the first time since the Portuguese arrived 400 years earlier. (10) UN war crimes tribunals were. as of2001 , active in The Hague and in Arusha, Tanzania, prosecuting and trying alleged war criminals from the Balkan and Rwandan civil wars. It is almost trite to say that something called "globalization," which began long ago, has accelerated in our own time, conforming to a conscious policy initiated in the beak year of 1945 to attract the world into a cooperative international diplomacy. Today the world and individual nations are characterized by both integrating and fragmenting pressures, occasionally at the same time. Along with alarming evidence of ethnic tension, national rivalries, religious fanaticism, ancient prejudices, and powerful crievances, we also have centripetal forces such as the World Wide Web, extensive travel, CNN International and AI-Jazeera televic;ion networks, unprecedented mixing of peoples and cultures, and a substantive, developing, credible set of international norms, agreed to at least rhetorically by most nations. The United Nations finds itself at the pivot of this maelstrom.

Of course the human experiment is problematic. Whether we are on the verge of unmitigated disaster or not remains questionable. Whether we are capable of grasping with sharp discernment the challenges to our existence. and dealing with them sensibly, while providing a life just a little bit better for just a few more of our fellow human beings, remains open to debate. Cassandras always have the advantage, since misery and disappointment are constants. Idealists, or even realists who seek orderliness and progress in human affairs,

International PoUlics

308

can never be satisfied. And, of course, in the end, as J.M. Keync!), so famously reminded us, we are all dead. But we must insist on applll:\lding united efforts to relieve the downtrodden, expand opportunity to ever more of our earth's citizens, promote self-government, assure human rightS everywhere, and provide peace, so that all cfus, individually if we wish, and collectively if we will, can savor our moment on Earth.

The dense web of international connection represented by the United Nations and its affiliated institutions is, in our time, perhaps the principal mechanism for perfon:ning these commendable labours.

REFERENCES 1.

Jack C. Plano and Robc:rt E. Riggs, Forging World Order (New York: Macmillan, 1967),7.

2.

Bruce Russell and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace; Democracy, Interdependence. and International Organizations (New York: Nonon, 2(01), 10, 29, 35 .

3.

Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 249-50.

4.

Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

5.

Paul Kennedy, Preparingfor the Twenry-first Century (New York: Random House, 1993).

6.

Robert Kaplan. The Ends of the Earth (New York: Random House, 1996). 436.

7.

See Raymond Cohen and Raymond Westbrook, eds., Amarna Diplomacy: The Beginnings of International Relations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 2000); and James B. Pritchard, ed., Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), 199-206.529-41 .

8.

Here and elsewhere in this Introduction liberal use has been made of Chapter I of John Allphin Moore, Jr., and Jerry Pubantz, To Create a New World? American Presidents and Ihe United Nations (New York Peter Lang Publishers. 1999).

9.

Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994).

10. See the entries for "Chaner" and "Covenant."

The United Nations and Internationl Politics

309

II. See the entry for "VOling. .. 12. ''The U.N. Idea Revisited," Fore;g" Affairs (Seplember-Oclober 1995).

40. 13. New YorA: nmes MagOzi"~ (September IS. 1957).21. Quoted in Plano, Forgi"g World Order, 8.

Index A

Act Confederation, ~ Federal Government, 155 Group Areas, 129 Population Registration, 129 Land,129 Af~ican National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, l62 Afrikaner Resistance Movement,l8O Afro-Marxist, 1BZ Afro-Marxist States of Anglo and Mozambique, 168 Agreement to Disagree between the Two Superpowers,28Q Alexander 's Invension, 52 invaded Afghanistan, 53 America quakers and dissenters, 23 people, lAO government, 145.147. 150 federal government, ill Coustitution, 152

revolution, 158 central, 120 financial investment, l25 American furnish,66 union, Z2 ethnic, 123 revolution, 2&.29: government, 129:

independence, 122 States, 133 administration, ~ British War, 233 political tradition, 262 rebuff, 302 Anglo-Indian Administration,50 Anglo-Saxon Lands, Zb 231 Anglo-American Ul~atum. ill Anti-Sovietism of China, i l l Anti-Apartheid Stuggle in South Africa, 126

Arab-Israeli Problem, 121 Arabian Sea, 52 Aristotle, lQ. 52 Aristocracy, 8Z Arthashastra of Kautilya, 53

Index

3 JJ

Aryan, ~

66 polity, 50 rool-stock, 112 race. ill Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation Organization (APEC),305 Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 305 Azanian People's Congress (AZAPO), ill B

BabylOnian ·Captivity. ill Bay of Bengal. .5.3 Biological Individual, 26 Bluntschli, Prol. JK, 23 Brahman, 25 Britain. 6 British colonies. 20 House of Peers. 44 Constitution, 105 Empire, 124. 213 commonwealth, 220 Buddhist, 121 Bull, John, ~ Burke. Edmund. 3.5.. Z4 Bush, George (President of America). 202

C Central Asia, .42 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), i l l

Chandogyopanishad. 21 Chanakya, 53 Cheney, Dick (United States Defence Secretory), l.28 Christ, 23 City-State, Z3 Clifford, WK, 26 Cohen, Saul, 1 Cold War, L 168. 170, 172, 201 -02,22S. 112 phase, 182 Mills, Manslield Stein, 2Z5 Commander-in-Chief, 156 Commonwealth-State, 13 Communist World, 282 Concert of Europe, 300 Conservative Party (CP), 180 Constituent Assembly of France, 35. Constitutions, lS1 Contemporary Approaches to Cold War Problems, m Convention for a Democratic South Africa, 129. Convert Forms of Warfare, 28ll

Crisis at the Millennium. 2.26 Croakers, Sir William, 21

o Das,Bhagavan,llZ De Beers of South Africa, 113 Declaration of the Rights, 25 Man, and Citizen. ~ 25 rights and duties, 9B of independence, 151 Defense Advanced Research

International Politics

312

Projects (DARPA), 251

Agency

Defining International Order, 226 Detente/Post-Cold War Pha1\e, 184 Dentente, the Gulf Crisis and the United Nation, 195

European

community, 2.. 203 western, 9. tenures, 50 field,62 Congress, 110 F

Development Patterns in Angola and Mozambique,

lR1

Dharmashastras, 55 Divine nature, 24 life, 25 dyn~ties,

Family, III house is the territory, 113 Four Major Approaches to International Politics, 269.

Fox, William T.R., 2Z2 Four-Point C:old War. 280 i9

righl,86 E

East Asian Economic Caucus . (EAEC), l l i Ellis, Willia~, 16 Empire, 129. 228 End of Ihe Cold War and the Gulf Crisis, 121 Encyclopaediq BriftmiCll, 12 England Parliament, 35 people, 25 possessed, Z6 government, 151 English Parliament, ~ 16 society, 50 language, Zj nation. Z6 Europe Government, 66

Fre'nch Nation and the National Assembly, Z! Revolution and the National Assembly, 1fl National Assembly, 166

Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA), ill

G Garten, Jeffrey, German

:uz

people, :M political thinkers, Z2 language, 122 democratic republic. 128 Geoeconomic Competition,

:us

General Agreement on Tar· iffs and Trade (GAm, 305 Gide, Andre, 6 God, hl.. '12

313

Index

himself, l23 Golden Triangle, 9' age, 112 Gorbachev, 180. 19.2 Government by Representation versus Government by Precedent, 152 Greece, 52 Greek Monarchies, 115 Groom, A.J.R., 6 Gulf war, 306 war and regional security, 126

war and arms control, 192 Persian War, 231 and beyond, 20Q post-war, 191 oil, 173.2lM H

Hanseatic Language, 3 Heavy Industrial Triangle, 9' Hebrews Nations. ~ ill Helvetic Confederacy, 3 Hereditary Government, 100 Himalayas to Cape Comorin, ill Hindu

Jiva Uivatma), 21 Khush,52 government, i l l Hitlers Holy War against Bolshevism, 2.20 Holsti, Kalevi, 22Z Horn of Africa, 120 Human Right Commission,

ill Hussein, Saddam, l2.3

1 Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia, 124. Ideal Man, 52 Immanvel. Kant, 2M) Independence of Angola, 169 India, 4.2 Indian Monarch, 2! Indian Council of World Affairs, i l l Individuals of Graded Complexity,2O Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), 180

International Monetary Fund, (IMF) 186. 3115 court of justice, 220 civil war, 282 Red Cross, 3QQ telegraphic union, 300 Iranian Revolution, 191 Iraq-Iran War, 19.2 Israeli Invasion of Lebanon, 202 Parliament, 203 Italian Language, 122 j

jenks, E., liB Jivatma, 123 joseph, S., 205 Judeo-Christian, 2M

International PoliJics

314

K

Kautilya the Science of Government,54 Kennedy, 232 Kenneth W. Thompson's Views on the Cold War,

m

King

England, M. 68 Magadh,52 Persia, 52 English,6B King the Lords and Commons of Great Britain, 124 Kissinger, Henry, 20Z Knowledge of God (Ishvara), 'U Kohr, Leopold, 5 Krasner, Stephen, 2A4 Kuwait. l2Z

L Labour Party, 203 Latin America, 202 Law of Nature, 52 Liberation Movement in Zimbabwe, 126 Life Universal, 25 Limits of Constitutional Law,

Z4 Lok Sabha, 221 Lords Spiritual, ~ Z5 Lord Paramount, 53 Lords Temporal and Commons, Z5 Lotharingian, Axis, 9'

Luttwak, Edward, MZ M

Madrid Conference, 203 Maine, Sir Henry, 51 Maine, Sir William, 62 Mark, Teutonic, 50 Maurya, Chandragupt, 52 McLennan, Mr., 51 McLain, John, 200 Mechanisms of the Westphalian Order, 228 Member of Parliament, 163 Meredith, Sir William, 4Z Military Staff Committee, l23 Millennium, 304 Minerva from the Head of Jove, <12 Modern Views, 62 Monnet, Jean, 9 Movement for the National Liberation of Mozambique, l62 Movement of the National Residence (MNR), l62 Mukerji, Dr. Radhakumud, ~1l6

Murphy, Richard W., l.28 Multipolar Balance of Power, 252 Mysore Government Oriental Library Series, 53 N

Nation, ill

Index

315

Nation on a Territory, 51 Nation-States, U. 2.29 National Life, ill National Assembly of France, 25 National Root-Stock, l21 National Currency, 122 National Checter, 123 National Union, 169: National Liberation Struggle in Angola, 122 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) , 174 , 198. 251. 259. 3115 Nature of Government, 85 Natural and Civil Rights of Man, 80 Nehru and Non-Alignment, Before Non-Alignment, 210 Nelson, Mandela, 180 New Factors and Problem Areas in· International Politics, 2M Non-Alignment after the Cold War, 221 Non-Aligned Movement, l62. 209 Non-Alignment and the Cold War, 215 North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), 305 North Sea to the Mditerranean, 9. Nuclear Tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998, 23B

m

o Observations on the Declaration of Rights, 91 Old World, J22,3Q Old the and New Systems of Government, 13Z One World, 212 Oppenheimer of AngloAmerican, 129 Organ of Government, 66 Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Zti Organisation of Islamic Confrence, 200 Organiza tional- Idealis t ic Approach, 221 Ozymandias, 13 P Paine, Thomas, 162 Palestinian, National Council Summit, 2Q1 Pan African Congress (PAC), ll!l Patriotic Front (PF) of Zimbabwe, l62 Paul, S., 22 l'eace and War, 222 Pierre de Senarclens, 1 Post-Cold War, 170. 187.205, 231 Post-Second World War, 191. 208 President de Klerk, 180 Pre-World War Two, 2ZO Prince Vaclav, 11

316 Price, Dr.,

In/ernational Polilics ~

Propganda Violence the Threat of Terror, 2Bl

Secretary of State Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Moscow,

1'13 Q

Queen of England. 34 Quincy Wright. 286 R

Rapid Deployment Force (RDF),128 Raymond Aron and the Century of Total War, 2Z6 Religious Freedom 91 Republic of Ancient India, 52 Republic of South Africa, 174, ill Rjghts of Man, 34. Rome.6Q Roman State, 61 Ruling National Party, 177.

122 S Saudi Arabia, 192 Science political, lQ.. Z2.. 111 living things, 15 inductive and deductive, 16 political science and history, 18 modern, 21 biological. 21 Second World War, 194. 222

Seeley, Sir J.R" 16 Shamasastry, R., 53 Sidgwick, Prof" 18 Sieyes, Abbe. 112 Slogan of Afro-Asian, 208 Social Contract, 62 Society and Civilization, 132 South African Communist Party (SACP), 180 South Atlantic Ocean, 126 South-West Africa Peoples Organisation (SWAPO), of Namibia; 162 South-West Asia, 110 Southern African, 168

Southern Atlantic Ocean, 1Zl Soviet Union, ll. l6B.. 128 Soviet Role in Africa, 126 Soviet-America, lB4 Soviet Union'S: Gulf Policy, 192 Space in the Southern African Context, lZ1 State of Pennsylvania, 152 Supreme Love, 2.4 Supreme Being, 25 T

Teutonic Township, 51 Theosphical Publishing House, 112 Third, World, l28 Thurow, Lester, i l l

Index

317

Toward Internationalism, 22ll Tribe, 115 Tribe-State. Z3 T.ribal Deities, l21 Trying not to Prepare for the Last War, 235 Tuchman, Barbara, 13 Twentieth-Century Crisis, 301 Tyson, Laura, 24Z U

Uncle, Sam,S Union. of Soviet Socialist Republican (USSR), 170.180, ill United Nation (UN), 193. m 272. 303 United Nation Kosovo Force,

Canada Free Trade Agreement, lli Embassy, 250 Japan Security Treaty, 255 Chinese Partnership, 2..5.2 China Policy, 261 Unipolar, United States Centered System, 256 Universal Postal Union, 201

v Village Comm unities, 50 council, 50 Community of India, 51 State, Z3 Violence in Vietnam, 2.02 Vishnugupt, 53 Vox Populi, Vox Dei, 61 W

30Z

United Kingdom, 128 United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),186 United Provinces, 3 United States, 2Q. 122. 149. 169,178,180,203.301 President, 156 Chevron, 1Z5 Federal Constitution, 153 of Europe, 212 United States of America, (USA), ill

Westphalian Map of Europe, 2 West, The, SZ West Asia, 120 Western Writers, 51 Western World, 62 William. C.H .. 14 Wilson, Dr. Woodrow, ~

a

115,2.34

Women,6Q World-State, ~ Zl World War, 62 First, 2.. 245. 300 Two. !!. 245. 3Q5 World View and Assumptions, i l l

Inlernationa/ Politics

318

z

World Association, 213

World Trade Organization (WTO). 234. 305 World Wide Web. 3QZ

y Yogoslavia State,S Yoga-Vasishtha, liZ Yalta Conference, 303 Yativ, A.A., 126

Zacher, Mark W., ill Zaire, ill Zhigniew BrzezinsH, 194. 20S Zionist Lobby. 201 Zoology. IS

Zulus, 181