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International Tax Coordination
International taxation is a major research topic, and for a field of research at the intersection of so many disciplines there has been surprisingly little done across disciplinary boundaries. This book fills the gap by combining teams from business, economics, information science, law and political science to offer a unique and innovative approach to the issue of international tax coordination. All the chapters are written in collaboration between at least two authors from two different disciplines. This approach offers a rich and nuanced understanding of the many issues of international tax coordination. The book has seven chapters, each one a valuable contribution in itself, beginning with current problems of international taxation and finishing with potential solutions. The essays explore current EU legislation, tax avoidance and tax fraud, as well as double tax agreements, dividend repatriation and hybrid finance and tax planning. Providing methodological answers to the question of how to conduct interdisciplinary research, the book also gives an accessible introduction into research questions and answers that are important in related disciplines for scholars in various areas. This book will be of interest to postgraduates and researchers in the fields of economics, business, informational science, law and political science, as well as to professional accountants and tax lawyers. Martin Zagler is Associate Professor of Economics at WU (Vienna University of Economics and Business), Austria.
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Routledge international studies in money and banking
1 Private Banking in Europe Lynn Bicker 2 Bank Deregulation and Monetary Order George Selgin 3 Money in Islam A study in Islamic political economy Masudul Alam Choudhury 4 The Future of European Financial Centres Kirsten Bindemann 5 Payment Systems in Global Perspective Maxwell J. Fry, Isaak Kilato, Sandra Roger, Krzysztof Senderowicz, David Sheppard, Francisco Solis and John Trundle 6 What Is Money? John Smithin 7 Finance A characteristics approach Edited by David Blake 8 Organisational Change and Retail Finance An ethnographic perspective Richard Harper, Dave Randall and Mark Rouncefield
9 The History of the Bundesbank Lessons for the European Central Bank Jakob de Haan 10 The Euro A challenge and opportunity for financial markets Published on behalf of Société Universitaire Européenne de Recherches Financières (SUERF ) Edited by Michael Artis, Axel Weber and Elizabeth Hennessy 11 Central Banking in Eastern Europe Edited by Nigel Healey and Barry Harrison 12 Money, Credit and Prices Stability Paul Dalziel 13 Monetary Policy, Capital Flows and Exchange Rates Essays in memory of Maxwell Fry Edited by William Allen and David Dickinson 14 Adapting to Financial Globalisation Published on behalf of Société Universitaire Européenne de Recherches Financières (SUERF ) Edited by Morten Balling, Eduard H. Hochreiter and Elizabeth Hennessy
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15 Monetary Macroeconomics A new approach Alvaro Cencini
24 Financial Market Risk Measurement and analysis Cornelis A. Los
16 Monetary Stability in Europe Stefan Collignon
25 Financial Geography A banker’s view Risto Laulajainen
17 Technology and Finance Challenges for financial markets, business strategies and policy makers Published on behalf of Société Universitaire Européenne de Recherches Financières (SUERF ) Edited by Morten Balling, Frank Lierman and Andrew Mullineux 18 Monetary Unions Theory, history, public choice Edited by Forrest H. Capie and Geoffrey E. Wood 19 HRM and Occupational Health and Safety Carol Boyd 20 Central Banking Systems Compared The ECB, the pre-Euro Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve System Emmanuel Apel 21 A History of Monetary Unions John Chown 22 Dollarization Lessons from Europe and the Americas Edited by Louis-Philippe Rochon and Mario Seccareccia 23 Islamic Economics and Finance: A Glossary, 2nd edition Muhammad Akram Khan
26 Money Doctors The experience of international financial advising, 1850–2000 Edited by Marc Flandreau 27 Exchange Rate Dynamics A new open economy macroeconomics perspective Edited by Jean-Oliver Hairault and Thepthida Sopraseuth 28 Fixing Financial Crises in the Twenty-first Century Edited by Andrew G. Haldane 29 Monetary Policy and Unemployment The U.S., Euro-area and Japan Edited by Willi Semmler 30 Exchange Rates, Capital Flows and Policy Edited by Peter Sinclair, Rebecca Driver and Christoph Thoenissen 31 Great Architects of International Finance The Bretton Woods era Anthony M. Endres 32 The Means to Prosperity Fiscal policy reconsidered Edited by Per Gunnar Berglund and Matias Vernengo
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33 Competition and Profitability in European Financial Services Strategic, systemic and policy issues Edited by Morten Balling, Frank Lierman and Andy Mullineux 34 Tax Systems and Tax Reforms in South and East Asia Edited by Luigi Bernardi, Angela Fraschini and Parthasarathi Shome 35 Institutional Change in the Payments System and Monetary Policy Edited by Stefan W. Schmitz and Geoffrey E. Wood 36 The Lender of Last Resort Edited by F. H. Capie and G. E. Wood 37 The Structure of Financial Regulation Edited by David G. Mayes and Geoffrey E. Wood 38 Monetary Policy in Central Europe Miroslav Beblavý 39 Money and Payments in Theory and Practice Sergio Rossi 40 Open Market Operations and Financial Markets Edited by David G. Mayes and Jan Toporowski
41 Banking in Central and Eastern Europe, 1980–2006 A comprehensive analysis of banking sector transformation in the former Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Yugoslavia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Stephan Barisitz 42 Debt, Risk and Liquidity in Futures Markets Edited by Barry A. Goss 43 The Future of Payment Systems Edited by Stephen Millard, Andrew G. Haldane and Victoria Saporta 44 Credit and Collateral Vania Sena 45 Tax Systems and Tax Reforms in Latin America Edited by Luigi Bernardi, Alberto Barreix, Anna Marenzi and Paola Profeta 46 The Dynamics of Organizational Collapse The case of Barings Bank Helga Drummond 47 International Financial Co-operation Political economics of compliance with the 1988 Basel Accord Bryce Quillin
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48 Bank Performance A theoretical and empirical framework for the analysis of profitability, competition and efficiency Jacob Bikker and Jaap W. B. Bos 49 Monetary Growth Theory Money, interest, prices, capital, knowledge and economic structure over time and space Wei-Bin Zhang 50 Money, Uncertainty and Time Giuseppe Fontana 51 Central Banking, Asset Prices and Financial Fragility Éric Tymoigne 52 Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy Willi Semmler, Peter Flaschel, Carl Chiarella and Reiner Franke 53 Inflation Theory in Economics Welfare, velocity, growth and business cycles Max Gillman 54 Monetary Policy over Fifty Years Heinz Herrman
55 Designing Central Banks David Mayes and Geoffrey Wood 56 Inflation Expectations Peter J. N. Sinclair 57 The New International Monetary System Essays in honour of Alexander Swoboda Edited by Charles Wyplosz 58 Taxation and Gender Equity A comparative analysis of direct and indirect taxes in developing and developed countries Edited by Caren Grown and Imraan Valodia 59 Developing Alternative Frameworks for Explaining Tax Compliance Edited by James Alm, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Benno Torgler 60 International Tax Coordination An interdisciplinary perspective on virtues and pitfalls Edited by Martin Zagler
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International Tax Coordination
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An interdisciplinary perspective on virtues and pitfalls Edited by Martin Zagler
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First published 2010 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2010. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk. © 2010 selection and editorial matter, Martin Zagler; individual chapters, the contributors All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this has been requested ISBN 0-203-84902-7 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN10: 0-415-56948-6 (hbk) ISBN10: 0-203-84902-7 (ebk) ISBN13: 978-0-415-56948-4 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-84902-6 (ebk)
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Per Cristiana, l’amore infinito M. Z.
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Contents
List of figures List of tables Notes on contributors Acknowledgments List of abbreviations
1 Introduction: international tax coordination – an interdisciplinary perspective on virtues and pitfalls
xiv xv xvi xx xxi
1
M artin Z a g l e r
1.1 Motivation 1 1.2 Interdisciplinary research in international taxation 2 1.3 Chapter synopsis 10 2 Rethinking tax jurisdictions and relief from international double taxation with regard to developing countries: legal and economic perspectives from Europe and North America
13
P as q u a l e P iston e an d T imot h y J . Goo d sp e e d
2.1 Introduction 13 2.2 Economic views of international tax jurisdiction 14 2.3 The legal rationale of international tax jurisdiction in the light of European law 21 2.4 Rethinking tax jurisdictions: a possible new model 31 3 How to combat tax evasion in tax havens? A legal and economic analysis of OECD and EU standards on exchange of information in tax matters with a special focus on capital income Di e tmar A i g n e r an d M ic h a e l T u mp e l
3.1 Introduction 37
37
xii Contents 3.2 OECD standards on exchange of information 39 3.3 EU standards on exchange of information on capital income 47 3.4 An economic perspective 50 3.5 An economic evaluation 54 3.6 Conclusions 59
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4 Double tax avoidance and tax competition for mobile capital
61
M ar k u s L e ibr e c h t an d T h omas R ix e n
4.1 Introduction 61 4.2 Double tax avoidance as the institutional foundation of tax competition 63 4.3 Empirical evidence on the role of DTAV in tax competition 71 4.4 Summary and conclusions 78 Appendix 80 5 Intra-firm dividend policies: evidence and explanation
98
C h ristian B e l l a k an d N a d in e W i e d e rmann - O n d r e j
5.1 Introduction 98 5.2 A review of empirical results on dividend smoothing 99 5.3 Dividend smoothing in the intra-firm context: why parent companies do or do not smooth dividends of subsidiaries 101 5.4 Summary 112 6 Cross-border hybrid finance and tax planning: does international tax coordination work? Ewa l d A sc h a u e r , E v a Eb e r h artin g e r an d W o l f g an g P anny
6.1 Introduction 115 6.2 Cross-border hybrid finance and international taxation 117 6.3 Model 118 6.4 Results 126 6.5 Conclusion and future research 132 Appendix: list of abbreviations 133
115
Contents xiii 7 Investigating the shift toward a value-added-type destination-based cash flow capital income tax (VADCIT)
134
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K l a u s Hirsc h l e r an d M artin Z a g l e r
7.1 Introduction 134 7.2 The VADCIT model 135 7.3 Legal questions 139 7.4 Analysis of VADCIT 140 7.5 Statistical effects 145 7.6 Fiscal effects 146 7.7 Economic distortions 147 7.8 Conclusions 147 8 The case for and against an EU tax
148
M ic h a e l Lan g an d M artin Z a g l e r
8.1 Introduction 148 8.2 Corporate income tax (CCCTB) 154 8.3 Personal income tax 159 8.4 Modulated VAT 163 8.5 Excise duties on tobacco and alcohol 166 8.6 Energy taxation 169 8.7 Climate charge on aviation 171 8.8 Communication tax 173 8.9 A tax on financial transactions 174 8.10 Transfer of seignorage revenue 175 8.11 Summary 176
Bibliography Index
179 195
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Figures
2.1 Tax rates and FDI stocks, 2002 6.1 Taxation of cross-border hybrid finance without double tax conventions 6.2 Taxation of cross-border hybrid finance under double tax conventions 6.3 Decision tree cross-border hybrid finance without a double tax convention 6.4 Decision tree cross-border hybrid finance with a double tax convention 6.5 Consequences in the event of a tax audit 6.6 Results depending on the probability of a tax audit in the source state 6.7 Difference in the probability of non-, single, double, or triple taxation, depending on the probability of a tax audit in the source state 6.8 Results depending on the probability of a tax audit in the residence state 6.9 Results depending on the fine factor, γ 6.10 Results depending on the probability of a corporate tax in the source state 7.1 Group’s cross-border transactions (1) 7.2 Group’s cross-border transactions (2) 8.1 Monopoly taxation in a closed economy 8.2 Monopoly taxation in an open economy
17 119 120 122 122 123 128 129 129 130 130 143 144 151 152
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Tables
2.1 Comparison of FDI incentives in OECD and developing countries 2.2 US FDI stock abroad by country, 2003 ($ billions) 5.1 Summary of the results of earlier studies of dividend smoothing 6.1 Variables, withholding tax reduced by a DTC 6.2 Variables, withholding tax not reduced by a DTC 6.3 Results for E, depending on the corporate tax rate in SS and RS 6.4 Results for p, depending on the corporate tax rate in SS and RS 6.5 Results for var, depending on the corporate tax rate in SS and RS 7.1 Tax base and tax revenues according to the current legal situation 7.2 Tax base and tax revenues with VADCIT (1) 7.3 Tax base and tax revenues with VADCIT (2) 7.4 Tax bases of P Ltd and S Ltd 7.5 Tax bases of P Ltd and S Ltd (if the profit margin is low) 7.6 Profit and loss account of S Ltd 8.1 Economic evaluation criteria
19 20 100 126 127 131 131 131 136 137 138 143 144 144 154
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Contributors
Dietmar Aigner is Assistant Professor at the Johannes Kepler University Linz. He studied in Linz, Vienna and Graz. His research interests are European tax law, taxation of interest savings, corporate reorganizations and international tax law. He publishes in international journals and is the author of several books on the taxation of capital income, corporate reorganizations, etc. Ewald Aschauer is Assistant Professor at the Department of Finance, Accounting and Statistics at the WU (Vienna University of Economics and Business). His doctoral thesis focuses on business valuation in the case of involuntary separation (2008). His research interests are business valuation, accounting and tax law. Since 2009, he has been working on the International Taxation and Business Finance project of the SFB. Christian Bellak is Associate Professor at the Economics Department of the WU (Vienna University of Economics and Business), where he also earned his doctoral degree in Economics in 1992 and his habilitation in 2003. He was a visiting scholar at the University of Reading (UK), the Helsinki School of Economics, the Hamburg Institute of International Economics, the Leverhulme Centre for Research on Globalisation and Economic Policy (Nottingham, UK) and the Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation (Oxford, UK). His main research interests include foreign direct investment, multinational enterprises, taxation and industrial policy. He has published in international journals such as Management International Review, Multinational Business Review, Applied Economics Letters, the Journal of Business History, Economic Dynamics and Structural Change, Applied Economics Quarterly, the International Journal of Money and Finance, Transnational Corporations, The International Trade Journal, the Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, the Journal of Economic Surveys, the International Journal of the Economics of Business, Applied Economics, etc.). He is also author of 43 chapters in edited volumes. Eva Eberhartinger is Professor for Tax Management at the WU (Vienna University of Economics and Business). In her research, she focuses on hybrid finance and international taxation and on the relation between commercial
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and tax accounting. From 2000 to 2002, she was Professor at the University of Münster Institute for Accounting and Business Taxation in Germany. She held visiting positions at McGill University in Montreal, at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and at the HEC in Paris, France. In addition to her research activities, she has been the Vice-Rector for Financial Affairs of WU since January 2006. Tim Goodspeed has been Professor of Economics at Hunter College since 1994. From 1990 to 1994, he was Assistant Professor of Economics at Florida International University. After receiving his Ph.D. in 1986 from the University of Maryland, he worked as an economist at the US Department of the Treasury in the Office of Tax Analysis in both the Individual and the International Tax Divisions from 1986 until 1990. Since 2002, he has been an Adjunct Professor in SIPA at Columbia University and has also been a Visiting Researcher at the Fundación de Estudios de Economía Aplicada (FEDEA) in Madrid and a Visiting Professor at the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. His research relates to taxation, intergovernmental fiscal relations, state and local public finance, tax competition and international taxation, including the tax treatment of multinational corporations and transfer pricing. He has consulted for the OECD. Klaus Hirschler is Associate Professor at the Department for Finance, Accounting and Statistics, Tax Management group at the WU (Vienna University of Economics and Business), where he earned his doctorate degree in 1996 and his habilitation in 2000. His work experience is mainly in business tax law and accounting. Michael Lang is Professor of Tax Law at the Institute of Austrian and International Tax Law of the WU (Vienna University of Economics and Business) and has a special focus on international, European and business tax law. He has been Head of the Institute since 1998 and Speaker of the Special Research Project (SFB) “International Tax Coordination” since 2003. Michael Lang is also a member of the Global Law Faculty at the New York University (NYU) School of Law, has been Visiting Professor at, among others, Sorbonne, Georgetown University, Peking University and the University of São Paulo, and is currently Chair of the Academic Committee (AC) of the European Association of Tax Law Professors (EATLP). Markus Leibrecht is a senior postdoctoral researcher at the Special Research Project on International Tax Coordination at the WU (Vienna University of Economics and Business). His main research interests include the role of public policies for the attraction of mobile tax bases and the role of the state in international consumption risk sharing. He has published in journals such as Economics of Transition, World Economy, Open Economies Review, Applied Economics, Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Applied Economics Letters, Empirica, etc. He is also author of two books and several chapters in edited volumes.
xviii Contributors
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Wolfgang Panny is Professor of Applied Computer Science at the Institute for Information Business at the WU (Vienna University of Economics and Business) and is also affiliated to the research institute for computational methods at the WU. From 1986 to 1987, he held the position of Professor for Information Systems at the University of Bamberg, Germany. His main research and teaching areas are algorithms and data structures, analysis of algorithms, databases, and information retrieval. Since 1998, he has been a member of Working Group 3 of ISO/IEC JTC1/SC32, which is responsible for the further development and standardization of the database language SQL. Pasquale Pistone is EURYI-Award Professor of Tax Law at the Institute of Austrian and International Tax Law of the WU (Vienna University of Economics and Business). He has a special focus on international and European tax law. Since 2005, he has also been Professor of Tax Law at the University of Salerno. He is principal investigator of the Special Research Project (SFB), his topic of investigation being “Tax Coordination and Third Countries”. Pasquale Pistone is a faculty member of the Postgraduate Program in International Tax Law at the Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration. Thomas Rixen, political scientist and economist, joined the scientific staff of the research unit “Transnational Conflicts and International Institutions” at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB) in November 2007. He studied in Bonn, Hamburg, Paris and Ann Arbor, Michigan. Prior to his engagement at the WZB, he was a researcher with the Collaborative Research Center 597, “Transformations of the State”, at the Jacobs University of Bremen and a scientific staff member in the office of a Member of the German Federal Parliament (Bundestag). His research focuses on international political economy and the theory of institutions; his current research deals, in particular, with institutional (non-)change in international taxation. Michael Tumpel is Professor and head of the Department of Tax Management at the Johannes Kepler University Linz. He studied in Vienna and was a visiting researcher at New York University (NYU). His special research interests are VAT, European tax law, corporate reorganizations and international tax law. He publishes in international journals and is the author of several books on European and international tax law. Nadine Wiedermann-Ondrej works as a financial officer for the Austrian Ministry of Finance. From 2002 to 2008, she was Research Assistant at the Tax Management Department of the WU (Vienna University of Economics and Business) and earned her doctoral degree in 2006. Her research interests are hybrid financial instruments, multinational corporations and international tax law. Martin Zagler is Associate Professor of Economics at the WU (Vienna University of Economics and Business). He studied in Linz, Aix-en-Provence,
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Vienna and Florence and was visiting professor at the University of Rome 1 (La Sapienza), Harvard University, the Catholic University of Piacenza, the Free University of Bozen/Bolzano and the University of Sassari. He held fellowships at the European University Institute, University College London and the Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies in Florence. His research interests are macroeconomics, economic policy and public finance. He publishes in learned journals and is the author of two books on economic growth with Palgrave Macmillan and a Springer textbook on public finance.
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Acknowledgments
This book is a result of the Special Research Group (SFB) on International Tax Coordination, funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF ) and hosted at the WU (Vienna University of Economics and Business). We are very grateful for the substantial financial support from the FWF, and to the WU for providing a stimulating and supportive environment. An interdisciplinary endeavor of this size would not have been possible without this assistance. It gave the authors the possibility of discussing and interacting across disciplinary boundaries, to find a common language and to initiate joint research projects. You can find out more about the SFB on our website at www.sfb-itc.at.
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Abbreviations
ACE ACP AktG ALS APA AStG BEA BIT BRIC CBIT CCCTB CDU CEN CFC CIC CIN CIT DC DTAV DTC DTT ECB ECJ EEA EPA EUCIT FDI GDP GewStG GNI HIC ICAO
allowance for corporate equity African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States Aktiengesetz (corporate law) arm’s-length standard advanced pricing agreement Außensteuergesetz (international transaction tax law) Bureau of Economic Analysis (United States) bilateral investment treaty Brazil, Russia, India and China comprehensive business income tax common consolidated corporate tax base Christlich Demokratischen Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union (Germany)) capital export neutrality controlled foreign company/companies capital-importing country capital import neutrality corporate income tax developing country double tax avoidance double tax convention double tax treaty European Central Bank European Court of Justice European Economic Area European Protection Agreement European Union corporate income tax foreign direct investment gross domestic product trade tax law (Gewerbesteuergesetz) gross national income highly industrialized country International Civil Aviation Organization
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xxii Abbreviations ILADT Instituto Latinoamericano de Derecho Tributario KStG corporate income tax law (Körperschaftsteuergesetz) LATC Latin American Tax Convention (on income) LFTTD Linked/Longitudinal Firm Trade Transaction Database MC Model Convention MFN most favored nation MNE multinational enterprise NIC newly industrializing country NN national neutrality OECD MTC Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OLS ordinary least squares PE permanent establishment; permanent enterprise ROCE return on capital employed RS residence state SS source state TIEA Tax Information Exchange Agreement 2SLS two-stage least squares VADCIT value-added-type destination-based cash flow capital income tax WTO World Trade Organization
1 Introduction International tax coordination – an interdisciplinary perspective on virtues and pitfalls Downloaded by [INFLIBNET Centre] at 06:19 30 August 2012
Martin Zagler 1.1 Motivation International taxation is a major research topic. Indeed, scholars from business, economics, law, history, political science, sociology, psychology and a number of related fields have extensively investigated the issue of international taxation. For a field of research that is at the intersection of so many disciplines, it is surprising that very little has been done across disciplinary boundaries. This book attempts to fill the gap between some of these disciplines by presenting interdisciplinary research on international tax coordination. We believe that this book can contribute to the advancement of knowledge in each discipline through its interdisciplinary approach. Issues of international taxation are a growing concern in a world of integrating economies such as the enlarged European Union, and these issues have undergone an evolutionary process themselves. When the European Union was set up, we saw the Neumark Report’s vision of a single economic area where only economic parameters would be taken into account in individual allocative decisions. Differences in taxation are an obstacle to the optimal allocation of resources within the Union, which is why the harmonization of tax systems was the choice for international taxation at that time. Such a positive approach toward harmonization is still found in recent documents, mainly driven by anticipated effects such as a significant reduction of tax compliance costs and the “neutrality” and “efficiency” of tax regimes. The tax harmonization view interprets differences in taxation as a hindrance to the optimal allocation of resources. The opposing idea of tax competition has been extensively discussed by economists (Tiebout 1956; McLure 2001). However, European institutions started to consider this line of argument only in the early 1990s. In this concept, the idea of competition is extended to sovereign players that offer individuals or firms different ranges of tax costs. With both approaches – harmonization and competition – having potential benefits from an economic point of view, international tax coordination is seen to cover the whole range between tax harmonization and tax competition. Tax coordination differs from tax harmonization by allowing a certain degree of national freedom in designing the tax regime. International tax coordination is
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2 M. Zagler perceived to increase transparency, thus making competition more visible, which may bring markets toward equilibrium and may improve economic welfare. In this aspect, tax coordination may be superior to tax competition. However, tax coordination may also be superior to tax harmonization, in particular if different countries have different preferences for the size of the public sector. In this case, a harmonized level of taxation would induce one country to have a public sector larger than desired and the other to cut public expenditures below its social optimum. This book focuses on various issues in the area of international tax coordination, but has a clear research question: What degree of international tax coordination within the European Union and in relation to third countries is suitable for solving problems arising from national tax sovereignty, and what problems may arise from tax coordination itself? Measures of tax coordination fill the gap between tax harmonization and tax competition. The contributions in this volume will combine interdisciplinary teams from business, economics, information science, law and political science to offer a unique and innovative interdisciplinary approach on the issue of international tax coordination. All the chapters are written in collaboration between at least two authors from two different disciplines. The distinguishing feature of the book is its clear interdisciplinary approach. All the authors have been collaborating during the past six years in a special research program funded by the Austrian Science Fund. During this period, the authors have come to realize that the essence of many questions in international tax coordination cannot be solved within a single discipline. An interdisciplinary approach offers a strenuous but worthwhile approach to the understanding of many issues of international tax coordination. It must be emphasized that interdisciplinary tax research that goes beyond the mere coexistence of the disciplines that are involved is hardly ever found. In this regard, the book adds considerably to existing literature and gives new insights into international tax coordination. Further, the book contributes novel aspects to the understanding of international taxation. It provides methodological answers to the question of how to conduct interdisciplinary research, and introduces research questions and provides answers to those that are important to related disciplines.
1.2 Interdisciplinary research in international taxation Many current researchers have emphasized that the production of interdisciplinary knowledge is a major issue that needs to be considered in today’s “knowledge-based society” (Gibbons et al. 1994). The debate on interdisciplinarity is still young and the process of interdisciplinary research is still being developed. However, a growing community of interdisciplinary researchers stimulates vivid debate aimed at developing means to deal with ensuing challenges in research. Nowadays, interdisciplinary research is strongly promoted as a desirable direction in the development of sciences, in terms of both teaching and research.
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Introduction 3 This is true not only in the natural sciences but also in the social sciences, which are said to benefit tremendously from interdisciplinary approaches. These approaches may help overcome artificial boundaries and improve the overall quality of social science research. As Popper (1963) points out, “We are not students of some subject matter, but students of problems. And problems may cut right across the borders of any subject matter or discipline.” Sciences and society are confronted with problems that cannot be fully comprehended by a simple deterministic disciplinary view. The main issues nowadays have a high level of complexity that requires insights from multiple disciplines. Interdisciplinary research and education are mainly and traditionally inspired by the drive to solve complex questions and problems generated by scientific curiosity or by society. They guide researchers from different disciplines to meet and work at the interfaces and frontiers of those disciplines, and even cross such frontiers to create new disciplines. Obviously, not all subjects lend themselves to interdisciplinary research. International taxation, however, has always been a topic of interest in more than one discipline. Because taxes are introduced by law, legal scholars certainly have an interest in the issue. Taxes influence business decisions, so researchers in business administration examine it. Moreover, in turn, taxes have an impact on the economy. Hence, economists, too, have an interest in the subject. The growth of scientific and technical knowledge in recent decades has prompted researchers from various disciplines to address complex problems that require deep knowledge from different perspectives. The results obtained so far confirm the high level of productivity and effectiveness of research teams composed of partners with diverse expertise. On the one hand, the attempt to solve complex problems on the one hand may be considered the main factor that has led to the growth in the application of interdisciplinary research methods. On the other hand, increasing social interest in such research may be attributed to the following factors: •
• • •
It is argued that research performed in an interdisciplinary context is likely to be more creative and innovative. Mixing people with different backgrounds and/or ideas from different fields is likely to generate “breakthrough” and “innovative” research results. Second, interdisciplinary research has been emphasized as being more likely to lead to applicable results because it is compatible with problem-solving approaches (Foray and Gibbons 1996). Moreover, there is concern that disciplinary research has become too narrowly specialized, leading to diminishing returns for this traditional research approach. Furthermore, it is now increasingly recognized that the prevalent tendency in most disciplines for narrow, deep specialization tends to make research less relevant to laypeople or to society, fosters imperialism rooted in ideological thinking and limits the exchange of ideas across disciplines, ultimately impeding the progress of science.
4 M. Zagler
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For all these reasons, interdisciplinary research has become a real subject of interest for science policy in recent times. The following statement explains why interdisciplinary research is highly relevant in the current scientific debate: Interdisciplinary research is an appropriate form of research when searching for science based solutions to problems in the lifeworld with a high degree of complexity in terms of factual uncertainties, value loads and societal stakes. Through bridging different scientific and social knowledge components, it can significantly improve the quality, acceptance and sustainability of such solutions. However, deliberation about facts, practices and values are ongoing when bringing results to fruition in the lifeworld as well as in scientific communities. (Wiesmann et al. 2008) Interdisciplinary research can be one of the most productive and inspiring human pursuits in the sense that it provides the connections that can lead to new knowledge. The potential of conducting research this way is very useful in terms of new discoveries and technologies. 1.2.1 A brief historical overview Interest in interdisciplinary research has not been always so vivid. In ancient times, education and philosophy were interdisciplinary in the sense that philosophers did not accept any boundaries or limitations to the validity of their truths. Aristotle was the first to introduce a division of knowledge by splitting it into the theoretical and the practical, thus balancing “pure” thinking (rhetoric, logic, mathematics, ethics, etc.) with the observation of nature (physics, astronomy, etc.). This first division of “philosophical” knowledge paved the way for the further division of knowledge into more and more specialized fields of science. It seemed that the unity of knowledge had been irrevocably lost. In the early twentieth century, a new philosophical school of thought under the name “logical positivism” emerged in Germany and Austria. Some of the logical positivists were committed to the idea of a “unified science” based on the development of a universal scientific language. Science was considered to be an interdisciplinary enterprise. This led to the question of how the knowledge of the natural sciences could have been used to further understanding in the social sciences. For the positivists, all the academic disciplines share the same universal scientific rationality. Another development in modern philosophy of science has been the rise of the “descriptive history of science”. Postmodernists who felt it important to divide scientific knowledge for the purpose of serving the interest of their respective knowledge communities placed serious limits on the possibility of interdisciplinarity. In the late 1980s, a new school of thought, so-called social epistemology, claimed that the disciplines are efficient in producing new knowledge and in maintaining rigor of inquiry, which would be lost in an interdisci-
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Introduction 5 plinary science (Bridges 2006). All these theories argued that the rules of testing and validating hypothesis are different among disciplines and that there are obvious constraints in doing disciplinary synthesis. By contrast, in the social sciences the new school of the so-called interdisciplinarians (Newell 2001; Thompson Klein 2004) focuses on the problem that academic work generally happens within narrow and arbitrary or artificial disciplinary boundaries, which sometimes prevents academics from seeing the close connections between different phenomena and the different disciplines. Moreover, they claim that complex discipline-transgressing phenomena cannot be understood adequately by using reductionist disciplinary approaches. According to this new orthodoxy, scientists should aim to develop fruitful relationships with disciplines other than their own and perhaps should even transcend disciplinary thinking altogether. The natural sciences were the first to introduce the concept of complexity to shape their methodology (Prigogine 1980; Casti 1994). The idea was that knowledge is no longer simple, and this raises the need to combine different kinds of knowledge or different points of view to describe a phenomenon. Different disciplines have to work together to outline objects in a scientific way. In addition, a phenomenon has to be seen as a whole whose parts work together. Despite this apparent mutual interest, joint interdisciplinary research is rare in international taxation. In Central Europe, law and economics were historically thought of as Staatswissenschaften (state sciences). The division into Nationalökonomie (national economics) and law came before interdisciplinarity emerged as a modern approach to conduct science. By that time, public economists were following the Anglo-Saxon tradition in economics, and ignored most of legal science. Only recently have the disciplines moved closer to each other. This book is certainly a step in this (in our view, correct) direction. 1.2.2 Definition and measurement While there is agreement that interdisciplinarity is in principle desirable, there is still a good deal of disagreement on what interdisciplinarity means in actual practice and on the identification of a universally accepted definition of the word “interdisciplinarity”. There are difficulties in including the diverse range of activities described under the heading of “interdisciplinary research” in a single definition. Understanding the real concept of interdisciplinary research remains difficult even if a number of recent studies (e.g. Sanz-Menendez et al., 2001) have sought to improve its comprehensibility. The term “interdisciplinarity” is loosely and insufficiently defined such that it is made almost meaningless. The most general definition of “interdisciplinarity” found in the literature is “any form of dialogue or interaction between two or more disciplines” (Moran 2001). This is certainly too vague a definition but at least it captures what the word “interdisciplinarity” brings to mind for most people. It means crossing disciplinary boundaries, which could be considered a starting point to fix the basic idea.
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6 M. Zagler The main problem with the notion of “interdisciplinarity” is that people who use it do not explicitly state what they understand to lie within a particular discipline, when a disciplinary boundary is being crossed and what the consequences are. Following this approach means that any useful definition of “interdisciplinarity” would require a workable definition of the academic disciplines first – which is certainly not easy. The term “academic discipline” incorporates many elements. At the same time, it has also become a technical term for the organization of learning and the systematic production of new knowledge. Often disciplines are identified with taught subjects, but, clearly, not every subject taught at the university can be called a discipline. There is more to a discipline than the fact that it is a subject taught in an academic setting. In fact, there is a whole list of criteria and characteristics that indicate whether a subject is indeed a distinct discipline. Some try to define “interdisciplinarity” without the use of the concept of disciplines. Among the numerous definitions found in the literature, the following are the ones that in our view seem best to address the complexity of the issue: Interdisciplinary research (IDR) is a mode of research by teams or individuals that integrates information, data, techniques, tools, perspectives, concepts, and/or theories from two or more disciplines or bodies of specialized knowledge to advance fundamental understanding or to solve problems whose solutions are beyond the scope of a single discipline or field of research practice. (National Academy of Sciences et al. 2004) Interdisciplinary research is research that includes cooperation within the scientific community and a debate between research and the society at large. Interdisciplinary research therefore transgresses boundaries between scientific disciplines and between science and other societal fields and includes deliberation about facts, practices and values. (Wiesmann et al. 2008) These definitions make it clear that research is truly interdisciplinary only when it is not merely a combination of two disciplines to create one product but is rather an integration and synthesis of different ideas and methods. Along with the difficulties in defining what interdisciplinary research is, interdisciplinarity is made up of a range of very different concepts such as inter- or supradisciplinarity, multidisciplinarity, crossdisciplinarity, transdisciplinarity and megadisciplinarity, which are often talked about as though they are just one concept. Some authors (Tabak 2004; Krishnan 2009) have attempted to clarify these different concepts: •
Inter- or supradisciplinarity: this means that researchers work together on common questions or problems. This interaction may create a new research
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Introduction 7
•
•
•
field or scientific discipline. In the inter- or supradisciplinary approach, disciplines collaborate on developing some common perspective. Several chapters of this book fall into this category. A good example is the contribution by Aschauer, Eberhartinger and Panny (Chapter 6), who use probability trees to analyze the complexity of international taxation in hybrid finance. Another example is Hirschler and Zagler (Chapter 7), who use accounting techniques to discuss the impact of introducing a new corporate income tax. Finally, Bellak and Wiedermann-Ondrej (Chapter 5) look at dividend payments from both an economic and a tax accounting point of view within a common framework. Multidisciplinarity is probably the most common approach in collaborative research and does require some limited collaboration of researchers from different disciplines. It means that the researchers work together on particular common problems. In multidisciplinary research, a team of researchers work toward a common aim or problem, but each discipline represented works independently or in sequence. The final product of this way of working normally consists of a compilation of disciplinary research on a common theme or object. Alternatively, this collaboration may result in an integrated research product that synthesizes the disciplinary perspectives into a coherent picture. Several chapters fall into this category. Pistone and Goodspeed (Chapter 2) analyze international development from an economic and legal perspective, Leibrecht and Rixen (Chapter 4) investigate double tax agreements from both an economic and a political science approach, and Lang and Zagler (Chapter 8) analyze economic and legal (dis)advantages of EU taxes. Crossdisciplinarity is in some sense the easiest form of interdisciplinarity. It does not actually require the collaboration of researchers with various disciplinary backgrounds, or in fact any collaborative research effort. The general idea in practicing crossdisciplinarity is to look at what other disciplines have to say about a particular phenomenon or object within the scope of their own discipline, or, alternatively, to apply concepts and methods of their own discipline to phenomena or objects of other disciplines. The researcher then applies instruments belonging to other disciplines without actively collaborating with other researchers. No contribution in this volume strictly falls into this category. While Aigner and Tumpel (Chapter 3) are clearly interdisciplinary between law and business, their chapter also uses economic concepts extensively. Transdisciplinarity involves seeking research collaborators outside of the academic or university context and producing research that is primarily for the purpose of application, for example the development of new technology or the formulation of policy. This phenomenon is still more common in the natural sciences, engineering and computer science. Even so, there are opportunities for academics from the social sciences to venture outside the university and the academic funding system and do contract research for the public, private or non-profit sectors.
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•
Megadisciplinarity: Each discipline has increasingly deepened its scope during the twentieth century. This phenomenon is so widespread that there is a large overlap among the different disciplines. Traditional disciplinary divisions do not seem to make much sense anymore and it is now common for researchers to cross disciplinary boundaries to collaborate with members of other disciplines who share the same specialization. This phenomenon has fueled the debate about the opportunity to merge many of the current disciplines into a few super- or megadisciplines that could more effectively organize the accumulated knowledge of existing disciplines. The few remaining superdisciplines could not only integrate several social sciences into a unified social science discipline, but also bridge the traditional division between the natural and the social sciences.
1.2.3 How to practice interdisciplinary research We have stated how important it is nowadays to adopt an interdisciplinary approach in research. At the same time, practicing interdisciplinarity is fraught with difficulties. When one tries to define “interdisciplinarity”, the ambiguity of the definition itself has an impact on the understanding of the analytical approaches adopted by interdisciplinarians. The overlap of different disciplines leads to the increased use of the interdisciplinary research approach. Because of overlapping subject areas, disciplines are now identified through the methodology they apply to certain topics or research fields, rather than through the topics or research fields themselves. A very clear example is the field of international taxation, which lies at the crossroads of several disciplines. For this reason, several interdisciplinary centers have emerged. This book is special as it is the first effort to combine interdisciplinary research from three disciplines: business, economics and law. However, it is also more common for scientists belonging to different disciplines actually to use the same methodologies to analyze a topic. This could indicate that the distinction among disciplines is artificial and an accident of history rather than the result of any scientifically substantial difference. In this volume, we present papers by accountants using econometrics, and economists who use accounting case studies. According to Gibbons et al. (1994), the production of knowledge is organized outside disciplinary and academic contexts and is focused on creating knowledge directly related to its application. Traditional discipline-specific knowledge production within academic departments is becoming increasingly obsolete and less relevant for society. The many possibilities for understanding disciplines and disciplinarity lead to rather different conclusions on the value of disciplines and the practicality of interdisciplinarity. The starting point on whether to use a traditional disciplinary approach or an interdisciplinary one greatly depends on the problem that the researchers are aiming to solve. One way of conducting interdisciplinary research is by mixing methods to ask distinctive and intersecting questions.
Introduction 9
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In order to run an interdisciplinary research project, team members should adopt the following steps: • • • • • • • •
Define common project goals. Define a project design that works. Find a common language. Build trust. Overcome epistemological barriers. Develop interdisciplinary theory. Engage in interpersonal communication. Facilitate integration.
It is important to clarify the specific characteristics of interdisciplinarity to better understand how this type of research can be conducted in practice. •
• •
Adopting an interdisciplinary approach involves recognizing that the social world and the issues to be studied are multidimensional, and that different dimensions might exist and coexist, rather than being integrated within a single plane or dimension. Moreover, as interdisciplinary research analyzes complex empirical questions, it aims to deal with problems better and investigates how existing practices can be changed or improved. Interdisciplinary research is committed to developing scientific innovation. It is driven by the tension between specialization in interdisciplinary methods and triggers the transformation of disciplines. Therefore, interdisciplinary researchers form a mixed college of peers.
From a practical perspective, this type of approach is challenging because by definition it pushes knowledge and practice to the boundaries of the social science philosophy. Practicing interdisciplinary research demands certain requirements due to its specific nature. This type of approach requires: •
• • •
Considerable skill and commitment from researchers and teams, who need to have the capacity and inclination to see beyond disciplinary, epistemological and ontological distinctions, without simply seeking to critique others from a single perspective, or to subsume all other perspectives into one. Taking intellectual risks and being interested in alternative approaches without fear of reprisal or contradiction by other members of the working group. Respecting the distinctive nature of the different approaches so that it is allowed to flourish, rather than by reducing all to a bland lowest common denominator which is assumed to be “interdisciplinarity”. Creative tension between the different disciplines. This means that the final output of the research should not be an integrated account or explanation of
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•
•
whatever is being researched, or a series of parallel accounts, but a multinodal explanation based on the dynamic relation of more than one way of seeing and researching. This requires that researchers include the different ways of asking and answering questions. A research design that is basically a recursive and negotiation process (structuring, searching for solutions, bringing results to fruition, etc.). Interdisciplinarity implies that the precise nature of a problem to be addressed and solved is not predetermined and needs to be defined cooperatively by actors from science and beyond. During the research process, bodies of knowledge have to be integrated to produce different types of knowledge. Interdisciplinarity thus changes the traditional sequence leading from scientific insight to action. The potential to stimulate innovation in participating disciplines, which is intrinsically implied by interdisciplinarity, is brought very fruitful. This requires an emerging college of peers who are able to link disciplinary and interdisciplinary specialization.
Practicing interdisciplinary research is complex work that implies a number of important critical aspects. There are some recurrent roadblocks that researchers have to face when working with an interdisciplinary approach. True collaboration and participation of all the members of an interdisciplinary group is fundamental for the success of this approach. True collaboration does not imply the denying of a diversity of goals, values and expectations among different scientists. Good and concrete interdisciplinary practice must be integrated through its scientific foundations and its scientific recognition. Such efforts must go beyond systematizing interdisciplinary research procedures and aim at theoretical, methodological and topical development and innovation at the interface with participating disciplines to benefit both sides. Facing these challenges requires the development of extended peer networks and other collaborative networks that bridge interdisciplinary and disciplinary reference and quality control systems.
1.3 Chapter synopsis This book attempts to fill the gap between several disciplines by presenting interdisciplinary research on international tax coordination, in particular its virtues and pitfalls. This book is a collection of seven chapters, not counting this introduction, that in themselves are novel and innovative in international taxation. The book begins with the current problems of international taxation and ends with potential solutions. Chapters 2 and 3 show how current well-intended efforts of tax coordination can exhibit unwanted side effects. Pasquale Pistone and Tim Goodspeed in Chapter 2 show how economic development could be fostered by altering allocation rules and introducing standards of legal protection equivalent to the ones applied within the European Union. Dietmar Aigner and Michael Tumpel in Chapter 3 look at measures to combat tax avoidance and tax
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Introduction 11 fraud in tax havens. They analyze EU and OECD measures, with a special focus on capital income. Three issues of coordination are also investigated. First, Markus Leibrecht and Thomas Rixen in Chapter 4 investigate double tax agreements and their effect on decisions by multinational enterprises concerning where to locate. Christian Bellak and Nadine Wiedermann-Ondrej in Chapter 5 consider dividend repatriation, and Ewald Aschauer, Eva Eberhartinger and Wolfgang Panny in Chapter 6 analyze hybrid finance and tax planning. All these three chapters investigate concerns about current efforts of tax coordination, which may have suboptimal side effects for capital flows, dividend payments and tax planning compliance costs. The final two chapters investigate potential future directions of tax coordination. First, Klaus Hirschler and Martin Zagler in Chapter 7 look at a different way to tax corporate income with a value added-type destination-based cash flow capital income tax. The last chapter, by Michael Lang and Martin Zagler, analyzes the logical next step in international taxation, supranational taxes. The interdisciplinary approaches chosen by the authors provide a fresh perspective on these issues. We believe that we can contribute to the advancement of science in each discipline through this interdisciplinary approach. The first main chapter in this volume, by Pistone and Goodspeed, uses economic arguments to investigate potential gains from changes in legislation. The authors ask how European tax law can contribute to the fostering of economic growth in developing countries. The combination of researchers from law and economics allows the analysis to go into the legal details of the credit and exemption method, which were previously beyond economic consideration. The authors go further by applying sound economic principles in investigating legal issues. The merit of this chapter is that it both communicates legal issues to economists and sensitizes lawyers to the economic consequences of legal aspects. Chapter 3, by Aigner and Tumpel, looks at the implications of information exchange for tax fraud. The authors search for collective or individual solutions appropriate for national governments in order to combat tax evasion and tax fraud in tax havens. They find that economic channels that act through detection and penalties do not prevent tax evasion, as legal loopholes allow agents to circumvent taxation. In fact, moral suasion is more likely to prevent tax evasion. Once again, interdisciplinarity between economic, legal and business studies has generated a result that would not have been derived if the problem had been considered only from the viewpoint of one scientific field. In Chapter 4, Markus Leibrecht and Thomas Rixen use institutional analysis typically adopted in the political sciences to discuss both the legal and the economic literature on double tax agreements. The authors manage to establish a point that has not yet been raised in the economic and legal literature: that double tax agreements may foster tax competition instead of reducing it, because they provide a legal framework for tax planning to investigate the intended and unintended loopholes of national tax codes.
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12 M. Zagler In Chapter 5, Bellak and Wiedermann-Ondrej examine what happens after capital has moved across borders. They provide empirical evidence on dividend policies of multinational firms and discuss the determinants of dividend smoothing within the firm. The analysis is unique as it is the first attempt to look at dividend payments from an economic and accounting point of view. Interestingly, it is not so much the relationship between the parent and the affiliate, as suggested by the principal–agent theory but, rather, tax accounting that can shed light on dividend streams, particularly when dividends are subject to high withholding taxes. The contribution by Aschauer, Eberhartinger and Panny (Chapter 6) uses mathematical tools of probability trees to analyze the uncertainty surrounding the taxation of hybrid instruments. The authors show that the taxation of hybrid instruments of finance has a major effect on yields. They also demonstrate that double tax agreements can substantially reduce the yield volatility associated with hybrid instruments. Interestingly, the authors find that the presence of double tax agreements also reduces the expected tax burden. The innovative crossdisciplinary methodology adopted in this chapter will certainly have an impact on the tax accounting literature as well as the economic literature on double tax agreements. Chapter 7, by Hirschler and Zagler, applies methods of accounting science to scrutinize an economic concept. The authors use a balance sheet case study to analyze the impact of the introduction of a value added-type destination-based cash flow capital income tax. The concept itself has stirred some interest in the debate about the reform of corporate income tax. However, the authors convincingly demonstrate a series of pitfalls that render this particular tax infeasible. Once again, the use of methods of one discipline, in this case tax accounting, can shed new light on the question raised in another discipline, here economics, and thus render novel insights. The final chapter of this book looks at the final step toward tax coordination in Europe, the introduction of taxes collected by the European Union itself. Currently, the Union depends on transfers from its Member States to finance its budget. A proposal by the European Union to introduce taxes itself could change this. This is the first attempt in a single piece of writing to investigate both the legal and the economic virtues and pitfalls of the introduction of EU taxes. The authors conclude that only VAT and ecological taxes are qualify as candidates for the European Union’s own taxes.
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2 Rethinking tax jurisdictions and relief from international double taxation with regard to developing countries Legal and economic perspectives from Europe and North America Pasquale Pistone and Timothy J. Goodspeed 2.1 Introduction Countries have historically claimed the right to tax all income generated within their boundaries. With respect to the income generated by domestic factors (labor or capital) outside of their borders, countries have followed one of two approaches. One approach is to effectively cede jurisdiction to the foreign country by exempting such income from domestic taxation; this is termed territorial taxation. The second approach is to claim jurisdiction and subject such income to domestic tax as well as to give a credit for foreign taxes paid (up to what would have been paid if the income had been generated domestically). The credit method maintains domestic tax jurisdiction but cedes the revenue generated by the foreign tax rate to the foreign country. If the tax obligation owed to the foreign country is less than the obligation that would have been owed to the home country, then the home country collects the difference under the tax credit method, whereas no home tax is owed under the territorial method. Thus, the method of relief of international double taxation is central to the effective tax jurisdiction claimed by the home country. Furthermore, the specifics of double taxation relief also often depend on bilateral tax treaties, and sometimes on multilateral tax agreements or legal rulings (as in the case of the European Union, for example). The credit method allows for taxation in the country of source, as well as allowing taxation of the overall income or capital in the taxpayer’s country of residence (Cnossen 1987). The latter characteristic is argued to be important in ensuring capital export neutrality and consistency in a nation’s application of the ability-to-pay principle (Surrey 1965). Capital export neutrality implies efficiency in the worldwide allocation of capital; however, other sorts of neutralities and efficiency criteria have come to the fore in recent discussions. With respect to the ability-to-pay criterion, it is argued that without additional tax levied by the home country, those with high ability to pay may evade correspondingly high tax by locating themselves in low-tax jurisdictions. However, this rationale is not universally accepted. High-tax jurisdictions applying the exemption
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14 P. Pistone and T. J. Goodspeed method implicitly accept any inconsistency in the ability-to-pay principle embodied in their system. The ability-to-pay view has also been questioned in the legal literature (Fleming et al. 2001), and additional criticism can be raised in the light of European law as well as in the context of economic globalization.1 Although taxation is important for the location of foreign direct investment (FDI) in developed countries, it is probably not the most important factor influencing FDI in developing countries.2 More fundamental aspects, such as low corruption and good infrastructure, are probably more important. Nevertheless, the international tax policies of one country have an impact on the revenue and international tax policies of other countries, and this external impact is particularly acute (at least in a political sense) when one country is developed and the other is developing. Given that developed countries use various tools, including direct aid to developing countries, the role of tax jurisdiction is worth rethinking (Barker 2007: 365; Hines 1998; OECD 2001). In this chapter, we review and reexamine the issue of international tax jurisdiction from economic and legal viewpoints, with particular emphasis on the impact of developed country rules on developing countries. We also consider the impact of European law on the relations with non-EU Member States (hereafter, “third countries”). The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section examines the economic views of tax jurisdiction and how it affects the relationships between developed and developing countries. This section also examines how the recent US proposals to change the way in which the United States taxes foreign income might impact developing countries. Surprisingly, two recent proposals head in exactly opposite directions: the 2005 Bush Tax Reform Commission recommended moving toward a territorial system, while the recent Obama administration proposals appear to tighten worldwide taxation. The following section presents a legal view of tax jurisdiction, with particular emphasis on the way in which European law and recent European Court cases affect the developing country’s relationships with Europe. The final section argues that a move toward territorial taxation with respect to developing countries would be consistent with the recent European court rulings, would give more autonomy in tax matters to developing countries and could be seen as an alternative development tool. However, the biggest problems would involve cross-border flows of passive income and maintaining domestic ability-to-pay goals because of the difficulty of taxing wealthy taxpayers, and we have made several suggestions concerning ways to minimize this problem.
2.2 Economic views of international tax jurisdiction 2.2.1 Tax jurisdiction and efficiency Economic views of tax jurisdiction tend to center around questions of world efficiency (how can tax jurisdictions be defined to maximize world income?) versus national goals (how can countries define tax systems to maximize national income?). Initial studies concluded that worldwide income could be maximized
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Rethinking tax jurisdictions 15 by taxing worldwide income and allowing a credit for foreign taxes, while national income could be maximized with a deduction system (Richman 1963; Hines and Gordon 2002). These results follow from highly stylized models. For instance, the advantages of a worldwide system are most easily thought of in the context of a world of two countries where one is a capital exporter and the other is a capital importer. In this context, the worldwide system with an (unlimited) foreign tax credit will lead to the efficient allocation of capital in the world. This is because no matter where a company invests, it will pay the tax rate of its home country on the margin. If the company invests at home, it will pay the home tax rate on its investment income. On the other hand, if it invests abroad, then it will first pay foreign taxes. However, if the foreign tax rate is less than the tax rate at home, then the company will owe the difference to the home country; if the foreign tax rate is higher than the home tax rate, then the company will get a refund of the difference (assuming an unlimited tax credit). Hence, no matter where the company invests, it will pay exactly the same tax on the income generated and will have no tax-induced incentive to invest in one country over another. This is called capital-export neutrality and results in an efficient allocation of capital across countries. A second view is that the territorial system leads to an efficient allocation of savings across different countries. A territorial tax system exempts foreign- source income from tax, and consequently all investors in a country face the same tax rate on the margin. For this reason, it is said to comply with capital import neutrality. From an economic perspective, it is viewed as promoting savings efficiency, because any international saving (interest from foreign bonds for instance) is not influenced by the tax system. Both of these views have some validity. Worldwide residence taxation promotes investment efficiency but distorts saving decisions. A territorial system promotes the efficient allocation of savings but distorts investment decisions. A third view, developed primarily in the literature on subnational taxation, is the benefit view. Under this view, taxes are payments for the provision of public goods and services. People and companies willingly pay taxes in exchange for goods and services provided by the government. As people and businesses tend to consume public services where they are located, the tax jurisdiction should also be defined with respect to where they are located. A territorial system approximates this situation, and thus, under the benefit view, the territorial system may lead to efficient location decisions. Tax competition promotes efficiency in this view, because it tends to force governments to provide goods and services such that the marginal benefit of the public good is just equal to the marginal cost of the tax payment. A fourth view that has recently been raised is termed capital-ownership neutrality (Desai and Hines 2003; Devereux 1990). According to proponents of this view, ownership of assets is important, because owners who are better able to run certain types of companies can generate a higher return. Hence, it is important to distribute owners of capital to the type of capital in which they have a comparative advantage. This view sees efficiency as requiring the tax system to
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16 P. Pistone and T. J. Goodspeed be neutral with respect to the ownership of capital. Capital-ownership neutrality can be achieved if all countries use the same tax system, whether it is a worldwide system or a territorial system. To summarize, economic views of tax jurisdiction have concentrated on various types of worldwide efficiency criteria. These include capital-export neutrality, capital-import neutrality, capital-ownership neutrality and the benefit view of taxation. Capital-export neutrality is associated with a worldwide tax system and implies efficiency in the allocation of capital across countries. Capital-import neutrality is associated with a territorial system and implies efficiency in international savings decisions. Capital-ownership neutrality can be achieved under either a worldwide or a territorial system, and implies efficiency in the matching of assets and owners. The benefit view requires those who benefit from public services to pay the associated costs, which are closely approximated by a territorial division of tax jurisdictions. 2.2.2 Tax jurisdiction and ability-to-pay principles One reason that countries may prefer to use a worldwide system and extend tax jurisdiction abroad is to preserve domestic progressivity of the tax system and the ability-to-pay principles. Highly taxed factors that are not compensated with correspondingly good public services will have an incentive to evade the high taxes by positioning themselves in low-tax localities. However, the degree to which this is possible probably differs between persons and companies. Many countries that have territorial taxation with respect to corporate income maintain worldwide taxation with respect to personal income. In addition, even in countries with corporate territorial systems, corporate passive income is usually subject to special rules that effectively tax such income at the home rate. Hence, territorial tax systems tend to have many exceptions that attempt to preserve domestic ability-to-pay concerns. 2.2.3 Tax jurisdiction and foreign investment in developing countries 2.2.3.1 The importance of all public policies The empirical literature on taxes and FDI has in general found significant tax effects, though the estimated elasticity varied significantly between them, depending on the data set used and whether the study was cross-sectional or panel (Hines 1999). A set of papers from the 1980s used a time series of aggregate Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data and found significant effects of taxation on FDI with an elasticity of about −0.6 (Hartman 1984; Boskin and Gale 1987; Young 1988). Others found significant effects when using the cross-sectional depth of the BEA data to examine FDI across different countries for a given year (Hines and Rice 1994; Grubert and Mutti 1991). These studies also found significant effects, though with more variation in the point estimate of the effect of taxes. Other studies used firm-level data, usually in a panel, and again observed significant tax effects.3
Thus, public finance literature, in general, found significant effects of taxes on FDI. Furthermore, studies also found that the impact was greater on developed countries than on developing countries, and the important factors for developing countries may include both the provision of adequate infrastructure and lower corruption.4 Figure 2.1 is illustrative and shows that the average FDI stocks are higher when taxes are lower in both developing and developed countries, though the impact is somewhat greater on developed countries. This suggests that the benefit view of tax effects may be particularly important in the case of developing countries: developing countries need to pay close attention to providing the right kinds of public inputs and business environment (such as low corruption) that will foster foreign investment, and not be concerned solely with low taxes. 2.2.3.2 The developing country problem in designing tax incentives Developing countries can have difficulties designing tax policies to attract investment when major foreign investors use the worldwide system of taxation. Suppose, for instance, that a developing country attempts to use a tax holiday to attract investment. A tax holiday is a period of time (usually several years) during which a company enjoys a reduced (usually zero) rate of tax. In the simplest case, a foreign investor from a country that practices worldwide taxation will not benefit from the tax holiday. This is because any profits generated from the investment that are repatriated would be subject to the home country tax. 200,000 180,000 160,000 140,000 $100 million
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Rethinking tax jurisdictions 17
120,000 100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000 0
Average FDI stocks for low-tax-rate developed countries
Average FDI stocks for high-tax-rate developed countries
Average FDI stocks for low-tax-rate developing countries
Average FDI stocks for high-tax-rate developing countries
Figure 2.1 Tax rates and FDI stocks, 2002 (source: Updated chart based on Goodspeed et al. (2009)).
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18 P. Pistone and T. J. Goodspeed However, the same may not be true for foreign investment from a country that uses a territorial tax system. As the territorial country exempts foreign- source income, any tax holiday or other tax incentive would not be offset by home-country taxes. Indeed, tax holidays and tax exemption are common tax incentives used in developing countries. However, these policies are ineffective when investment comes from countries with worldwide tax systems. Thus, the overall impact of a developing country’s tax incentives on inbound investment will depend on the extent of foreign investment from territorial or tax-sparing countries (versus worldwide countries) as well as the general impact of taxes on foreign investment. Developed countries with worldwide tax systems have varying policies with respect to tax holidays of developing countries. Some countries, such as Japan, preserve the incentive created by the tax holiday by allowing a credit for taxes that would have been paid in the absence of the tax holiday (a policy called tax sparing); however, other countries, most notably the United States, do not. Thus, foreign investment from these latter countries cannot take advantage of any tax incentive offered by the developing country. 2.2.4 Tax jurisdiction as an optional tool to aid developing countries Developed countries have explicit policies with the goal of increasing investment and incomes in developing countries. Direct aid is an often-used tool, and indeed the United Nations has established a goal for overseas aid to developed countries at 0.7 percent of GDP. By some accounts, direct aid has not been particularly successful in increasing the incomes of developing countries (Easterly 2001, 2003). In part, this may be because important components of market systems are absent or flawed in many developing countries. For instance, expropriation of assets and high corruption levels are not uncommon. The same might be said for taxation in developing countries. As was argued earlier, a good business environment (low corruption) and use of public funds for public inputs desired by foreign investors are probably more important than tax jurisdiction per se. Nevertheless, the tax system may be one underutilized tool, especially for investment coming from certain developed countries such as the United States that have a worldwide tax system but do not allow tax-sparing provisions in their tax treaties. Ironically, US domestic social policy has increasingly moved from direct programs to aid through the tax system. This is exemplified by the earned income tax credit, a refundable tax credit that has become the largest welfare program in the United States. Of course, it is more complicated to use the tax system to try to encourage capital investment, and particularly to try to direct more investment towards low-income countries. Nevertheless, Table 2.1 shows that developing countries tend to use tax holidays and lower tax rates to try to attract investment. It may be possible to lead developed countries toward more efficient and effective means of attracting foreign investment through more coordinated policies between developed and developing countries.
Rethinking tax jurisdictions 19 Table 2.1 Comparison of FDI incentives in OECD and developing countries FDI incentive
% OECD countries
% Developing countries
Tax exemption/holiday Lower tax rate
20 5
55 45
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Source: Goodspeed (2006).
Although the United States has historically rejected tax sparing, it is reconsidering its international tax policies (as noted below), and this may be a time for it to rethink tax sparing as well. Tax sparing can be criticized on a number of fronts. These include the fact that it encourages investment only for profitable companies, and hence does not provide much incentive for new start-up companies, which typically incur initial losses, possible transfer-pricing problems, and the possibility that tax sparing can change repatriation patterns, encouraging a more rapid repatriation of profits. However, probably the most serious set of issues is the more general problem associated with tax havens, which stems from the implied low tax rates of tax- sparing agreements. A multinational can abuse a worldwide tax system (or indeed a dividend exemption system) when one country has a zero or very low tax rate on capital, while others have significantly higher rates. Among the games that can be played are loans from a low-tax country that can be deducted in the high-tax country and be counted as income in the low-tax country; hybrid transactions, particularly when debt in one country is viewed as equity in another; and pure abuse of transfer pricing rules. This is a serious and difficult problem and would probably be the single most important aspect in any tax- sparing proposal. This is underlined by data in Table 2.2 which show that roughly 84 percent of US FDI stock in developing countries is in Latin Amer ican and Caribbean countries, of which 40 percent is located in the British Virgin Islands. Recently, there have been a flurry of proposals to reform the US international tax system, and any discussion should first underline the possible ways in which US international taxation may change. First, President Bush appointed a bipartisan Tax Reform Panel that made recommendations on reforming the US international taxation in 2005. Second, President Obama named a bipartisan Tax Reform Commission that is due to release recommendations in December of 2009. Third, the US Treasury and President Obama issued a press release on 4 May 2009 that began to detail certain aspects of the President’s plan to reform US international tax laws and enforcement. Perhaps surprisingly, the 2005 recommendations of the Tax Reform Panel and the proposals of 4 May 2009 from the Treasury would move the US tax system in exactly opposite directions. In 2005, the President’s Tax Reform Panel recommended changing the US tax system to a territorial system. President Obama has suggested reforming the US tax system by limiting deferral, and hence moving the United States more toward a strict worldwide tax system. The differences are striking. By and large, the
20 P. Pistone and T. J. Goodspeed Table 2.2 US FDI stock abroad by country, 2003 ($ billions)
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Total developed Western Europe Other
1,272 978 294
Total developing Latin America and Caribbean South America Venezuela Other British Virgin Islands Netherlands Antilles Panama Mexico Bermuda Bahamas Asia Africa
83 70 6 5 64 28 4 8 7 6 1 12 2
Other
23
Total
1,378
Source: UNCTAD, www.unctad.org (accessed March 2009).
2005 proposal would exempt foreign-source income from US tax, while the 2009 Treasury proposal would apply US tax more heavily to foreign-source income. How would all this affect developing countries? At first glance, one would think that a move toward a territorial system by the United States would make investment in low-tax developing countries more attractive for US multinationals. A territorial system would exempt dividend repatriations, and thus would seem to encourage investment in these countries. Surprisingly, recent studies suggest that a move to a territorial system would not greatly impact US investment in low-tax countries (Altshuler and Grubert 2001; Grubert 2006).5 In part, this is because multinationals are fairly adept at repatriating income without triggering additional US tax. However, this conclusion also depends on what developing countries and multinationals do in reaction to such a change. If multinationals restructure agreements to lower royalty payments and increase dividend payments, or if developing countries change their tax rates (or bases), it could make investment in low-income countries more attractive. In contrast to the 2005 report by the President’s Tax Reform Panel, President Obama and the US Treasury appear to be favoring a stricter version of worldwide taxation, arguing that such a change would increase investment in the United States. The Treasury proposal suggests: (i) reforming deferral rules to disallow deductions for expenses (except for research and experimentation) on foreign-source income until taxes are paid on the profits; (ii) closing certain loopholes associated with the foreign tax credit; and (iii) eliminating “check-thebox” rules that enable multinational firms to choose their organizational form by checking a box, which can facilitate the use of hybrid entities to avoid US tax.
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Rethinking tax jurisdictions 21 The details of these reform proposals are important (but not yet available). However, it is safe to say that they would constitute a stricter version of worldwide taxation. This would probably increase the difficulties of developing countries in attracting FDI. If the United States moves toward a stricter version of worldwide taxation, which appears possible, one option would be “partial” tax-sparing agreements with developing countries. “Partial” tax sparing not only encourages investment in developing countries but also minimizes the problems that can arise with tax- sparing agreements. The idea would be to discourage tax holidays per se, but still try to allow a developing country’s tax system to encourage FDI, by allowing credit of a certain percentage of US-owed tax. For instance, the United States might allow tax sparing of, say, one-third of the US marginal tax rate. Hence, if the US tax rate was 33 percent, the repatriated profits that had been earned under a zero-tax holiday would be subject to a 21 percent tax when repatriated to the United States. This could be made available to developing countries that negotiate a tax treaty with the United States, along with an exchange of information agreement to limit abuse in tax-haven countries. Such credits could be kept in a different basket or carried out on a per-country basis to avoid using those credits to shield income coming from high-tax countries. Furthermore, developing countries would have an incentive to implement, say, a 21 percent tax, rather than a complete tax holiday, because otherwise the United States would receive the revenues. This might lead to higher revenues in the developing country, which could be used for infrastructure investment needs and could serve the dual purpose of encouraging investment in developing countries and limiting transfer pricing or other problems with tax havens (because of both the limit to the lower tax rate and the exchange of information agreement). One could also attach conditions related to good governance – limitations on corruption and expropriation of assets, for instance – although good measures for such conditions might be difficult to obtain.
2.3 The legal rationale of international tax jurisdiction in the light of European law 2.3.1 The exercise of national taxing powers within the European legal system The impact of European law on direct taxation only began to be analyzed in the early 1990s – that is, after the European Court of Justice started to set a growing number of limits to the exercise of taxing powers retained by the EU Member States. However, the attention paid to such issues has generally been focused on their dimension within the internal market, thus almost showing that European law is a matter for Europeans and within Europe. In contrast, for a long time an aura of uncertainty has surrounded various scenarios involving third countries, almost ignoring the fact that the evolution of European law, in particular since the
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22 P. Pistone and T. J. Goodspeed liberalization of capital movements, has given it an external dimension. Its repercussions in the field of direct taxation, mainly due to how the European Court of Justice interpreted fundamental freedoms in its case law, represent an important element for the purposes of our studies as well as to achieve a critical revision of the interjurisdictional allocation of taxing powers with regard to developing countries. Preliminarily, for the purposes of our study, one should consider that (at least from a tax and legal perspective) third countries are not a single homogeneous block, but rather represent a complex category made up of countries that share the element of not being Member States of the European Union, despite being, in fact, very different with regard to their respective features and needs, including the degree to which they share the goals of the internal market. This characterization in function of European law is required, because from the perspective of EU Member States such countries are obliged to exercise their tax sovereignty in such a way as to ensure the supremacy of European law, and from the perspective of non-EU Member States they may have to agree, on the basis of an agreement under public international law, to limit their sovereignty in line with the goals of the internal market not only as regards the EU Member States, but also as regards the European Union itself. Accordingly, previous research has grouped third countries into several categories, ranging from countries that are members of the European Economic Agreement and share the goals of the internal market almost entirely, to countries that do so in a more limited way.6 For the purposes of our study, it seems essential, though, to go beyond the traditional label of “developing country” and search for elements that define the complex features of such category in a more precise way. On the other hand, such elements should reflect the growing difference in economic growth and international tax policy needs arising within this category, as well as comply with the legal requirements set by European law for the exercise of national tax sovereignty by its Member States. The first specification plays a particularly important role for the purpose of justifying whether, and to what extent, developed countries should pursue goals of fostering economic development without paying specific attention to a reciprocal tax treatment, whereas the second is required to allow for a more favorable treatment toward nationals than that which would apply to EU nationals within the internal market. 2.3.2 Developing countries: a complex category Several states traditionally considered to fall within the category of developing countries have recently been included in economic steering groups, such as G20, showing that their role in the globalized economy is no longer marginal, but rather essential for achieving effective international coordination. Some of them still import capital from developed countries, while being net capital exporters to less developed countries (such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China, which make up the so-called BRIC group, as well as several other coun-
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Rethinking tax jurisdictions 23 tries, like South Africa and Chile, which have been given full OECD membership after adapting their international tax policy to the new role). This shows that the traditional general differentiation between capital-importing and capital- exporting countries would be inappropriate for our purposes. Hence, some developed countries have terminated previously concluded treaties, including elements (such as notional credit) that were aimed at supporting economic development.7 Furthermore, from the perspective of European law, some of them enjoy preferential treatment on the basis of European international agreements, through which Europe attempts to increase their economic development on a non-reciprocal basis. All these arguments suggest that for the purposes of this study, instead of considering such countries as a single category it would be more appropriate to split them into two subcategories: those that could be defined as newly industrialized countries (NICs), comprising countries with a so-called economy in transition (such as the former Member States of the Soviet Union), and the remainder, which are truly capital-importing countries (CICs). Thus, each of the two categories may require a different analysis according to whether or not they have concluded European international agreements. NICs are extremely active in broadening their tax treaty network to further increase their competitiveness on the worldwide scene, which is already enhanced by their low labor costs and moderate budgetary needs, thus making it possible for them to afford more moderate corporate tax rates than those applied by highly industrialized countries (HICs). The old treaties of NICs with HICs currently boost their economic development when including mechanisms like notional credits, giving a tax incentive for capital investment. Such conditions generally do not raise significant problems of compatibility from the perspective of European tax law, though problems may arise in some specific situations. The most relevant example can be seen by looking at the combined action of tax treaties with European international agreements, including a most-favored-nation clause, which has so far received little attention from legal and tax scholars. We believe that relations with third countries should be protected from compensatory measures, extending the same line of arguments as those applied by the European Court of Justice to the controlled foreign companies (CFC) legislation within the internal market, with regard to the Cadbury Schweppes decision. On the other hand, CICs mainly seek to attract international capital to their territory to have sufficient resources available to foster their economic growth, thus having a very limited negotiating power with respect to multinational enterprises (MNEs). CICs include several territorial jurisdictions,8 have ultra-low labor costs and often possess insufficient financial resources to cover their budgetary needs. Fostering the economic development of CICs should still represent a priority for HICs, making it extremely important for such countries to master their own tax decisions, including those concerning the grant of tax incentives, without compensatory countermeasures by HICs. The same conclusion could be reached with respect to the policy that NICs should follow in their relations with CICs.
24 P. Pistone and T. J. Goodspeed
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No problem of compatibility with European law should arise even when EU Member States provide relief for taxes not effectively paid in the CICs, such as in the case of notional credits, provided that such measures are applied in a non- discriminatory way. The main reason for such a conclusion is that European law acknowledges the importance of promoting economic development. Furthermore, it can be argued that the conclusions reached by the European Court of Justice in the Cadbury Schweppes case can be applied to any tax measure by the EU Member States compensating lower taxation applicable on the basis of measures pertinent in CICs. 2.3.3 The exercise of taxing powers by EU Member States in compliance with European law within the internal market and in relations with developing countries The exercise of taxing powers can be considered with respect to three specific issues, namely (i) the scope of personal taxation, (ii) the exercise of taxing sovereignty on non-residents, and (iii) the relief for foreign taxes. The goal of such analysis is to describe how taxing powers should be exercised in such situation from a legal perspective, according to the common understanding in international taxation, as well as to evaluate the impact of European law on such rules, including some consideration on the relations with third countries and, in particular, with developing countries. 2.3.3.1 The scope of personal taxation Insofar as taxes are levied on a personal basis, a tax system will exercise its jurisdiction on any personal economic event related to the taxpayer. Accordingly, on the one hand the taxpayer’s global income and capital will be linked to the taxing jurisdiction of his or her country of residence (or, in some cases, nationality), whereas on the other hand, that country will be obliged to allow for deductions that are related to the taxpayer’s personal situation. European law has pushed this obligation even further, disconnecting it from the revenue taxed by the country of residence and rejecting the idea that the loss of tax revenue could constitute a valid justification for violating EU fundamental freedoms. Currently, no elements exist to exclude that the same conclusions may not be reached with respect to the relations with third countries, including NICs and CICs. Similarly, considering that losses will immediately affect the overall situation of the taxpayer, they should be taken into account by any system that exercises tax sovereignty on a personal basis. However, many systems currently take into account foreign-source losses only to the extent that the tax jurisdiction is correspondingly exercised on foreign profits. This is based on a symmetry theory that tax treaties support, and yet prevent, the taking of losses into account whenever international double taxation is not relieved by the state of residence through the credit method, but rather by means of exemption. It turns the worldwide system in the latter situation into some kind of proxy for a territorial system, despite the
Rethinking tax jurisdictions 25
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structural differences that should exist on the basis of their different rationale. In the Marks & Spencer case, European law has supported the obligation for the state of residence to import final losses even when incurred by a foreign subsidiary in the presence of a group taxation regime. Although this case was decided on the basis of the right of establishment, similar conclusions could be reached in relations with third countries (including developing countries) on the basis of the free movement of capital. However, the current evolution of European law seems to show that the potential for application of the Marks & Spencer decision is very limited. 2.3.3.2 Objective taxation and comparison with residents of source state The legal basis of territorial taxation is objective, or in rem, thus linking income (or capital) as such to the taxing jurisdiction, because of its place of origin or source, and regardless of any further circumstance that may be related to the person who produces (or owns) it. This legal difference has often been invoked to reject any possible comparison between taxation of residents and taxation of non-residents under international tax law, with the former being liable to tax on a personal basis and the latter on an objective basis. This view is also reflected in Article 24 of double tax treaties based on the Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital drafted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (hereafter, OECD MTC), affecting the very foundation of the non-discrimination principle contained therein. Thus, such treaties admit a comparison between residents and non-residents only to a very minor extent. In contrast, a much broader comparison is possible in the light of European tax law, with respect to the Schumacker (ECJ, decision of 14 February 1995, case C-279/93, Schumacker) and Saint-Gobain (ECJ, decision of 21 September 1999, case C-307/97, Saint-Gobain) decisions. Insofar as the situation of a non- resident EU national in an EU Member State other than that of his/her/its residence is equivalent to that of the resident taxpayers of that Member State (a matter which is usually determined by means of their relation to what part of their income or capital is subject to the taxing sovereignty of such country), then he/she/it shall also be entitled to national treatment in such country, regardless of whether he/she/it is entitled to the benefits of a double tax treaty under international tax law. This conclusion is necessitated by the primacy of European law over national law (including double tax treaties). In contrast, whenever no such similarity exists, the taxpayer neither enjoys the right to national treatment within the internal market, nor – under the current stage of evolution of European law – could he/she/it claim equal treatment among non-residents under a most-favored-nation (MFN) approach (ECJ, decision of 5 July 2005, case C-376/03, D., paras 61–62). However, the right to MFN exists with respect to some third countries, namely whenever European international partnership agreements, especially with developing countries, explicitly acknowledge it.9 As
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26 P. Pistone and T. J. Goodspeed such treaties do not explicitly exclude taxation, and no good arguments have so far been put forward for their doing so implicitly at the level of interpretation, third-country nationals may in fact enjoy a better situation than that of any EU national whenever none of such persons are entitled to invoke national treatment.10 Although one may question whether granting such better tax treatment to non-EU nationals is in fact consistent with the rules and goals of the internal market, a valid reason for doing so with respect to developing countries may be represented by the intention to foster their economic growth. However, different reasons should be sought with respect to other countries, such as strengthening economic links or opening up their markets to the Europeans. However, a more circumscribed analysis of such goals is beyond the scope of our chapter and should also be sought on the basis of factual elements existing at the time of the concluding of such agreements.11 As the current development of European law has caused it to have an immediate impact on cross-border direct taxation, including in relations with third countries, attention should be paid in the future when including MFN clauses within European international agreements, at least insofar as such agreements do not specifically exclude taxation from the scope of clauses of this kind. Various reasons support this conclusion. First, MFN clauses often have undesirable tax implications as regards consistency with the international tax policy of a country, and in particular with its treaties, which are often negotiated as package deals. Second, the implications of case law of the European Court of Justice in the absence of a coordinated European tax policy can be very far-reaching: removing obstacles to cross-border international situations may not necessarily comply with the need to consistently support a sound and well-structured practice of fostering economic development. Third, the contracting states to such European international agreements must comply with the rules contained in those agreements even when exercising their jurisdictions on the basis of the applicable tax treaties with EU Member States. Finally, a fourth argument arises from a completely different perspective, insofar as one considers that the very existence of such European international agreements may represent, in terms of European law, the legal basis for indicating that (at least a mixed) competence has been shifted to the Community level. Additional issues arise with respect to non-EU Member States that have not concluded the European Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the European Union. Under such circumstances, the impact of European law is mainly circumscribed to the scope of free movement of capital,12 whose worldwide scope puts an obligation on the EU Member State that is not connected to a condition of reciprocity. The decision of the European Court of Justice seems to support the view that the external dimension of such freedom expands whenever the right of establishment is not applicable (ECJ, decision of 18 December 2007, case C-101/05, Skatteverket v. A.). Furthermore, the need to ensure an objective entitlement to such freedom should represent an important element to ensure its consistent application, thus also opening it up to non-EU nationals who own such capital or derive income from it. Accordingly, one could conclude that the free
Rethinking tax jurisdictions 27 movement of capital may be invoked with respect to the measures put forward by EU Member States to dissuade investment in developing countries. However, the European Court of Justice has not yet reached these conclusions, possibly because it has not yet been asked to reach a judgment on a case raising a similar issue. It has instead rejected the external scope of free movement of capital in cases that were also relevant for the free movement of services, considering that the external dimension of the latter freedom lacks a direct effect.
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2.3.3.3 Relief for double taxation When tax treaties do not allocate exclusive taxing powers to one contracting state, further problems may arise from the perspective of European law as to how relief for international double taxation is given. Relief methods can be applied on a bilateral (i.e. through the provisions contained in the tax treaty itself ) or unilateral basis (i.e. on the basis of domestic tax law), usually in the form of exemption (sometimes with progression), or credit for foreign taxes. The two methods have different impacts on the conditions for tax neutrality with respect to foreign-sourced income, as will be more clearly analyzed from an economic perspective. However, also from a legal perspective a number of relevant issues arise that require a proper evaluation of the impact of European law on the relief of double taxation. The use of either method by the state of residence for the giving of relief on taxes levied in the source state is mainly an issue that each state decides in conformity with its own tax policy. However, from the perspective of European law the impact of such relief methods on cross-border situations within the internal market could create some compensatory effects of lower taxes that would not arise with respect to fully domestic situations – that is, cases that fall under the tax sovereignty of a single Member State. On the basis of the arguments employed by the European Court of Justice with regard to the CFC legislation as a restrictive measure for its compensatory effects on lower taxes levied by the foreign tax jurisdiction,13 one may therefore support the view that giving relief through credit would affect locational neutrality insofar as the residence state offsets the more advantageous tax treatment that could be available in the source country, thus making it impossible for the investor to compete on an equal footing in the latter EU Member State. Arguments to support this view could be drawn by looking at how the UK High Court of Justice (UK High Court, decision of 11 November 2008, case [2008] EWHC 2893 [CH]) implemented the FII decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ, decision of 12 December 2006, case C-446/04, FII) on the use of different methods for relieving economic double taxation in domestic and cross- border situations. Insofar as the exemption and credit always have a different impact on income received by the shareholder, Member States may be free to choose either of them (and this reading is also confirmed by the Parent–Subsidiary Directive), but are obliged to apply the same method to both domestic and cross- border situations. One may therefore wonder whether national tax sovereignty
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28 P. Pistone and T. J. Goodspeed could create such difference in treatment by using a relief method, such as credit that, when applied with respect to juridical double taxation, structurally has the effect of compensating foreign taxes levied on the same income.14 Within the internal market, the issue is not just whether a taxpayer having cross-border income can bear the same tax burden as applies to any other taxpayer in the state of residence deriving the same amount of income from the sources located within such country. It is likewise important to allow any taxpayer to compete on an equal footing with the residents of other EU Member States without there being tax measures in their state of residence that might dissuade him/her from investing his/her capital in countries other than that of his/her residence. The restrictive implications of foreign tax credit are particularly evident in the presence of per- country limitations and tax-rate differentials, which prevent an effective consideration of the taxpayer’s overall ability to pay at the level of the internal market. Despite acknowledging that in some cases disparities among the tax systems can play a significant role, the need to remove tax obstacles within the internal market may lead the European Court of Justice to gradually remove the dissuasive effect created by the foreign tax credit. However, such issue is not an exclusive matter for the internal market, but also affects third countries in particular, owing to the broader geographical scope of the free movement of capital in the EC Treaty. When considered in relation to developing countries, such compensatory effect may turn a preferential tax treatment given by the source state – for the purpose of fostering investment on its territory – into additional revenue for the state of residence of the taxpayer. Thus, beyond any issue concerning whether such tax incentives should be given by the state of source, from a legal perspective one can conclude that the use of credit to relieve juridical double taxation is as such structurally inadequate to pursue a tax policy that supports economic development and does not interfere with the source state’s own decisions. Such issues do not arise (or do so only to a lesser extent) whenever a notional credit is given by either tax sparing at nominal rates of the source state regardless of the tax actually borne by the taxpayer, or matching credit at fixed rates. Accordingly, from the perspective of European law, no credits of such type would have compensatory features and raise a problem of compatibility with the fundamental freedoms with respect to third countries. Exemption would also make the tax policy decisions of the developing country become the final ones, as it does not imply an actual exercise of the taxing jurisdiction over economic events taking place outside the territory of the state of residence. However, for this very reason, exemption does not allow for the deduction of foreign losses, which can instead be creditable against the domestic profits of the state of residence under tax sparing or matching credit. Possibly, this reason would make notional credit more desirable than exemption with a view to supporting economic growth. However, the issue here is not regarding whether economic growth should be enhanced by giving tax incentives or subsidies, but rather whether tax treaties should still include clauses that make developed countries deprive developing countries of their own tax policy decisions or, in contrast, let the latter countries have their fair share of revenue from income sourced within their territory.
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Rethinking tax jurisdictions 29 Until now, the rationale of worldwide taxation with relief by the credit method has been to support capital export neutrality, as opposed to capital import neutrality being pursued through the exemption method. However, the issue is one regarding whether developed countries may consider giving up their worldwide taxation in their tax treaties with developing countries to foster economic growth. This matter is particularly sensitive in Latin American countries that support territorial-based taxation (but is also perceived in India, especially with respect to taxation of royalties and the justification of taxing powers based on the definition of their source), which often presume that they are being expropriated of their own wealth by the tax systems of developed countries that in fact associate with their taxing jurisdiction economic events that take place outside their territory. Shifting back to a purely territorial taxation could be a fairly complex issue to accept and implement for developing countries, at least in the present scenario of international taxation. Changing the existing tax rules with regard to one or more developing countries, perhaps on the basis of international treaties, could be a more realistic alternative. Exemption is possibly the less sophisticated way to implement such innovation without implying a major revolution.15 Many feared that such a method might automatically open up the way to low or no taxation on cross-border business, especially considering the strong negotiating power of some MNEs with governments of some developing countries wishing to attract international capital to their territory. However, the significant reduction of corporation tax rates over the past decade, in Europe in particular, may lead to reconsideration of the impact of the issue on cross-border business. Two further arguments can be mentioned to support a shift toward exemption. First, insofar as the developing country reduces the level of its corporation taxes for all taxpayers (thus, without giving rise to ring-fenced regimes for international capital), it would be perfectly in line with European law if tax treaties did not include measures to compensate for such lower levels of taxation.16 Second, from a legal point of view a revised strategy to support economic growth could simply sever the legal connection between the taxing jurisdiction of the developed country and income that is sourced in the developing country and, through the applicable tax treaty, is exclusively subject to the latter’s jurisdiction. In such a situation, it should not be a major problem for the developed country to obtain all the information that is required for enforcing its own jurisdiction effectively. This conclusion seems to be supported by the dramatic change in the international tax cooperation that is currently opening up an unprecedented worldwide expansion of mutual assistance in gathering information and collecting taxes. Various alternative paths for exemption have been suggested in the tax literature, though two are particularly interesting for our purposes, and hence will be specifically addressed subsequently. According to one proposal (Barker 2007: 347–377), instead of sharing taxing powers on income from capital that MNEs export into developing countries,
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30 P. Pistone and T. J. Goodspeed such countries could slice the tax base of such income, possibly in agreement with HICs, to enjoy exclusive taxing powers on its parts. In particular, such a proposal suggests that mobile rents – that is, those derived from mobile factors of production that can be exploited in many different locations because the market for consumption is worldwide – should be taxed only in the country of residence of the MNE, whereas locational rents – that is, net income arising from the factors of production belonging to a host country and consisting in the remuneration of capital exceeding the normal rate of return – should instead remain within the exclusive jurisdiction of the developing country, considering the important role that that country plays in the production of such income. The author also suggests the latter rent as the object of tax-sparing provision in HICs. Attributing an exclusive jurisdiction to tax on cross-border income represents, in principle, a positive development in taxation of cross-border income, thus removing some of the problems related to the existing relief methods and achieving the important result of preventing double taxation, rather than completely or partially removing its effects. Another proposal (Avi-Yonah 1996) also supports the need to eliminate forms of shared taxation on cross-border income, by assigning exclusive taxing rights to source countries on cross-border active business income and to residence countries of MNEs on portfolio income. Both theories undoubtedly play a significant role in the research activity related to our study, in particular with respect to the output that is being drafted for the application with regard to the Latin American countries. Preventing double taxation represents an especially important element to simplify the rules of taxation on cross-border income and remove the potential exposure to (also temporarily) unrelieved double taxation, while keeping a reasonable degree of fairness that can be positively (and with limited costs) handled by unsophisticated tax authorities. This reduces the possible exposure to (also temporarily) unrelieved double taxation, which represents a potential obstacle in the light of European law with respect to capital movements also in relation to third countries. All such reasons lead to the question of whether the former theory is in fact a good alternative to the latter one, especially if considering that (especially when applied unilaterally by the developing country, but, in fact, also in the presence of agreements with HICs) significant difficulties may arise in slicing the tax base in a way that exactly prevents double taxation. Furthermore, both theories perhaps underestimate the reluctance of several developing countries (in particular, CICs, but also the BRIC countries such as India, in the case of royalties) to give up their sovereignty on what they consider as income totally produced on their territory. Hence, some form of compromise between simplicity and fairness might be considered to achieve a solution that is also reasonably feasible to implement. Formulae could in principle be a good solution (Avi- Yonah 2007), though their determination by common agreement could give rise to the same problems that the separation of locational from mobile rents is likely to cause. Furthermore, their compatibility with European law might sometimes be difficult to defend on a legal basis, taking into account that the European
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Rethinking tax jurisdictions 31 Court of Justice has so far shown a preference for ascertaining the existence of obstacles on the basis of effective situations. A constructive solution could be provided by making use of some form of revenue sharing which allows for the payment of a fee for the information gathered by the state of source and makes it possible for the latter country to maintain some revenue from cross-border income yielded by the capital imported into its territory. Although economists (e.g. Keen and Ligthart 2006b: 88) have questioned its efficiency, from a legal perspective its application in the European common system for taxation of cross-border savings payments to EU beneficial owners made by paying agents located in Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg, as well as in Switzerland and a few other countries, seems fairly successful. Another possibility is the use of notional tax credits or “tax sparing”,17 which maintains the levels of taxation of developed countries without depriving the developing country of the positive effects of its own tax policy decisions. However, the main obstacle with respect to shifting toward such a method in developing countries lies in the traditional opposition developed in the 1960s by the United States and its scholars (Kuhn 1963: 262), which considers that relieving taxes regardless of their actual payment to the revenue of the developing country can have several undesirable effects. The European scenario, however, provides for a significant number of treaties, including forms of notional relief for foreign taxes, though some countries have recently departed from such a pattern. Two examples provide evidence of this trend. First, Sweden terminated its treaty with Peru, considering that notional tax credit was leading to some undesired forms of tax arbitrage and abuse. Second, Germany terminated its treaty with Brazil, because it no longer regarded Brazil as a developing country and thus concluded that the rationale for such favorable treatment did not exist. Little attention has been paid to the possible implications of European law, in particular with regard to Brazil, whose treaties with several other European countries include forms of relief by notional tax credit similar to the one contained in the treaty terminated by Germany. In such a scenario, the right for a German company to enjoy national treatment in any of such European countries (e.g. when having a permanent establishment (PE) on their territory18) would automatically entitle it to national treatment, and thus to a relief by means of notional tax credit equivalent to that which would apply under the treaty of such a country with Brazil.19 In other words, the implications of European tax law for the international tax policy of the EU Member States show the need for better international tax coordination to break the wall of silence that has so far surrounded this domain. However, one may argue that the issue is not so much tax sparing as such, but how such a policy is actually drafted, structured and implemented.
2.4 Rethinking tax jurisdictions: a possible new model This final section contains the combined output of research aimed at developing a new approach to the problems of international taxation in relation to developing
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32 P. Pistone and T. J. Goodspeed countries. Such an approach is drafted in such a way as to combine legal standards currently set by European tax law (in terms of an effective removal of obstacles on international movements of capital) with a sound international business tax policy from an economic perspective, and make it possible to foster economic development through taxation. Far from supporting the use of tax incentives for such purpose with new arguments, the goal of our work is to stimulate debate in tax-related legal and economic literature on a possible reconsideration of the boundaries of tax jurisdictions and methods for relieving double taxation in relation to developing countries. More specifically, this section will focus its attention on the particular situation of Latin America, considering that most Latin American countries share the same legal and tax tradition20 despite the fact that economic development (of NICs in particular) has led some of them to abandon the traditional territorial boundaries of their national jurisdiction. The application to Latin America considers the relations among NICs and CICs of that region, as well as the relations of all such countries with HICs, with special emphasis on EU Member States bound by European law to ensure free movement of capital with respect to third countries on a unilateral basis.21 As a preliminary, we should recall the importance of European law in transforming the international tax scenario from a mere matter of allocation of taxing powers among the states – without any international rights for taxpayers – to an area in which the exercise of national sovereignty in the field of direct taxation is subject to conditions which seek to avoid tax treatments that actually discriminate against cross-border situations or otherwise dissuade taxpayers from investing their capital abroad. The broad scope of prohibition of discrimination and restriction in the direct tax case law of the European Court of Justice, and the immediate right of EU nationals to activate legal remedies against violations by the Member States, represent a Copernican revolution in international taxation, which is now gradually expanding to non-EU Member States also. From such a perspective, upgrading the legal standards of international taxation in the external relations of the EU and its Member States will soon become a necessity from the legal perspective. Applying this pattern to non-EU Member States as well would represent a significant step for international taxation from a legal perspective, because it would bring about an effective dimension of rights in cross- border situations; in addition, also from an economic point of view, it would be significant because it would foster a spontaneous trend of economic integration that corresponds to the needs of the globalized economy. Such a scenario should be ideal for making taxation play a new role in fostering economic development: instead of giving financial subsidies or tax incentives, developed countries could reconsider allocation rules with respect to developing countries. In particular, a general shift toward territorial or exclusive allocation of taxing powers in cross-border situations could be pursued with respect to developing countries. Exposure to international double taxation represents a considerable burden for MNEs, often leading them to set up complex schemes to operate in specific countries. Removing the risk of unre-
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Rethinking tax jurisdictions 33 lieved double taxation for international business, or the possibility that HICs might compensate lower taxation in the state of source, could perhaps stimulate the investment of international capital in developing countries and significantly contribute to their economic growth. An additional issue could arise from the perspective of preventing abusive practices in cases of shared allocation of taxing powers with a view to minimizing the tax burden in the state of source. Such practices, better known as treaty-shopping techniques, would simply disappear as a consequence of the exclusive allocation of taxing power to one single state. This certainly would not remove the need to include measures to counter other types of abusive practices, though clear signs now indicate that this may be carried out by means of exchange of information22 without giving rise to disproportionate reactions by the tax systems; all such clauses (anti- abuse as well as broad clauses on exchange of information and assistance in collection of taxes) represent an essential tool for modern tax treaties, including those with developing countries. This proposal could alter tax-competition incentives, in particular as far as it is concerned with corporation tax rates. However, to some extent this phenomenon has already occurred following the US 1986 tax reform, reforms in other European countries and the widening of the European Union to 27 states, as a consequence of the more moderate budgetary needs of the new Member States, their intention to attract foreign capital, and the obligation for all Member States to apply non-discriminatory tax treatment in corporation–shareholder relations.23 This gave rise to a generalized reduction in corporation tax rates throughout the European Union, bringing down the average rates to well below 30 percent.24 One way to implement a move toward territorial taxation with respect to developing countries is presented in the current studies on a Draft Model Latin American Tax Convention on Income (the Draft LATC) (Quiñones 2010). An approach to balance out a surrender of taxing powers by HICs would be to give them exclusive taxing powers on passive income (dividend, interest, royalties and capital gains). However, a debate carried out on the framework of the preparation of the Draft LATC has shown that this objective is simply unrealistic because of the strong resistance, in particular within Latin American countries, to the idea of not taxing the income produced on their territory (Tenore 2010). A possible solution to the problem would be to admit a system of revenue sharing with respect to such type of income, while developing countries tax such income at source and then pass on the revenue to HICs after retaining a portion. The mechanism is similar to the one contained in the transitional regime set by Art. 11 of the EU Savings Directive and in the EU international tax agreements with Switzerland, Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino, but the function is partly different. Instead of being a mere instrument to keep track of cross-border flows of passive income, this mechanism is a way to replace shared taxing powers with sharing the tax revenue from such income (ibid.). For other categories of income, whenever an exclusive allocation of taxing powers is not possible, relief from international taxation could be given by the
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34 P. Pistone and T. J. Goodspeed state of residence in a way that does not produce compensatory effects – hence by either exemption or tax sparing. Partial tax sparing, as proposed earlier in the chapter, could be a convenient way to avoid some of the drafting problems that tax sparing has produced in some of the existing double tax treaties. The adoption of the proposed rules on exclusive allocation of taxing powers and of methods for relieving double taxation other than foreign tax credit could indeed complicate the achievement of domestic ability-to-pay principles. However, countries that use territorial taxation also tend to maintain their own ability-to-pay criteria with respect to personal taxation and passive income. In other words, many countries that have opted for territorial taxation maintain their own home tax rate for income perceived to be particularly susceptible to tax avoidance (such as passive income) as well as for income deemed to be particularly important for domestic ability-to-pay concerns (such as personal taxation). Achieving satisfactory arrangements for all countries is difficult and complex, especially with regard to developing countries, and taxation is no exception.
Notes 1 The European Association of Tax Law Professors analyzed the European dimension of the ability-to-pay principle in its 2008 Congress, held in Cambridge. More details on this can be found at www.eatlp.org. 2 See, for instance, Goodspeed et al. (2009). Several studies suggest that taxation is not an important instrument with which to promote economic growth. See, for instance, McKenzie et al. (1997) and Easson (1999). Measuring the effectiveness of tax incentives has always been problematic, though perhaps their main weakness lies in the fact that they increase the complexity of a tax system. Accordingly, the IMF and the World Bank have generally opposed their introduction in developing countries, which should keep the tax system simple enough to be administered by unsophisticated tax authorities. See on this, among others, Gupta and Tareq (2008) and Bergsman (1999). 3 These studies used a variety of data sources. For instance, Compustat data were used by Auerbach and Hassett (1993) and by Cummins and Hubbard (1995). Commerce data were used by Ondrich and Wasylenko (1993). Altshuler et al. (2001) used US Treasury data. Hines (1996) also used a panel, but exploited state-level tax differences using BEA data and found significant tax effects for foreign investment in US states. 4 For instance, Wheeler and Mody (1992) found a significant effect for agglomeration (as measured by infrastructure quality) and an insignificant effect for taxation. This study used pooled data, however, which could bias the results if there are significant country-fixed effects. In another preliminary piece of work, Goodspeed et al. (2009) found a negative impact of taxes, a positive impact of infrastructure, and a negative impact of corruption on inbound FDI. These effects differ between developing and developed economies, however, with the tax effects being significantly larger for developed countries and insignificant for developing countries. 5 Altshuler and Grubert (2001) and Grubert (2006) indicate that it depends on how the territorial system is implemented. However, assuming some allocation of expenses and current taxation of royalties and interest, both studies suggest that not much would change. 6 A categorization of seven groups of countries has been put forward by Pistone (2006): (i) European Economic Area (EEA) countries, (ii) EPA countries, (iii) Switzerland, (iv) developing countries, (v) the United States, (vi) tax havens, and (vii) all other countries.
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Rethinking tax jurisdictions 35 7 As in the case of the German double tax convention with Brazil. 8 However, not all territorial jurisdictions are CICs. See, for instance, the case of Singapore, an international financial center with good economic development, whose territorial tax system has a different justification. 9 This seems fairly clear from the wording of the agreements with several African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, economies in transition (notably the former Member States of the Soviet Union), and countries of the Euro-Mediterranean agreements, which include a significant number of directly applicable most-favored-nation clauses, especially on aspects involving the secondary right of establishment, but sometimes also involving the supply of services. See further on this in the appendices to Bezborodov (2007: 708–710). Surprisingly, to date, no case law exists on the matter, which has also been unduly neglected by legal scholars. 10 Such a situation would, in our view, affect the entitlement to lower withholding taxes and give rise to a number of inconsistencies. See further on this in Pistone (2002: 130–131) and, for an example of the possible inconsistencies arising in tax treaties, Vogel (1995: 264). 11 Good examples of this kind are the agreements with Russia and Croatia. A paradox arises with respect to Croatia, where an exception is made for the free movement of services (currently not included in the European international agreement), and accession to the European Union would worsen its situation, downgrading it from MFN to national treatment for the right of establishment. 12 Nevertheless, relevant issues for the right of establishment could also arise in triangular cases involving non-EU Member States. 13 ECJ, decision of 12 September 2006, case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes, paras 45–46. Such a decision was applied to the right of establishment for the same reason that the European Court of Justice had previously applied in tax and non-tax cases, for example with respect to the free movement of services in the decision of 26 October 1999, case C-297/97, Eurowings, paras 44–46. 14 Surprisingly, the European Court of Justice took a different view in ECJ, decision of 6 December 2007, case C-298/05, Columbus Container Service, para. 40, with respect to the application of German unilateral switchover clauses in a case concerning a Belgian coordination center and its German partners. This decision creates tax fragmentation within the internal market, and was not motivated on the grounds of seeking to achieve a proportionate reaction to abusive practices. 15 The shift to exemption has been argued in tax literature by Brown (2002), though McDaniel (2003) provided arguments to support investment in developing countries through a revised version of the US foreign tax credit rules, which are regarded (see McDaniel 2007) as better on the grounds of simplicity, efficiency and equity. 16 Although European law does not interfere in principle with the allocation of taxing powers, the outcome of such allocation should nevertheless be compatible with the primacy of European law (see ECJ, Saint Gobain, paras 56–58), thus possibly excluding measures that compensate for lower taxes levied in another country (leaving aside the case of abusive practices, of course), which in our opinion should also include third countries. 17 Advocates for tax sparing include Hines (1998) and Brooks (n.d.). 18 A clear-cut case of such implications can be found in the decision of 9 May 2007 by the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court (KHO:2007:30), which, on the basis of the Saint-Gobain decision of the European Court of Justice, applied to cross-border royalties earned in China by a Luxembourg company with a permanent establishment in Finland a treatment equivalent to that provided by the China–Finland double tax convention (DTC). 19 Such a result is nonetheless possible to the extent that Germany exempts the income of the foreign permanent establishment.
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36 P. Pistone and T. J. Goodspeed 20 From a legal perspective, their tax systems are reasonably homogeneous, owing to the structural influence exercised on their current wording by the Latin American Model Tax Code (Modelo de Código Tributario para América Latina) drafted by the experts of the Latin American Institute for Tax Law (Instituto Latinoamericano de Derecho Tributario, ILADT) in the late 1950s. 21 Our study backs up a project for the drafting of two model tax conventions for Latin America, which is being conducted by an international research group (made up by legal experts and headed by Jacques Malherbe, Pasquale Pistone and Heleno Taveira Tôrres) on behalf of the Latin American Institute for Tax Law (ILADT), whereas preparatory studies have been presented at a seminar held in Montevideo on 11–12 May 2009 (on which see further Mazz and Pistone 2010). In particular, such a project supports the conclusion of a multilateral tax convention among Latin American countries, as well as a model bilateral tax convention for assisting tax treaty negotiators of Latin America when concluding their treaties with HICs. 22 Over the past couple of years, the OECD has undertaken a strategy to put significant pressure on all countries to cooperate to conclude tax treaties including broad exchange of information clauses. Now the effects of this policy can also be seen among countries that previously preserved banking secrecy and were considered tax havens. 23 The latter phenomenon is relatively well known among legal experts as the outcome of legal interpretation by the European Court of Justice. See ECJ, decision of 6 June 2000, case C-35/98, Verkooijen; decision of 15 July 2004, case C-315/02, Lenz; and decision of 7 September 2004, case C-319/02, Manninen. 24 In the case of some old EU Member States such as Germany, corporation tax rates have been lowered to as little as 15 percent. This indicates that the traditional big gap between EU HICs and developing countries is no longer what it used to be decades ago.
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3 How to combat tax evasion in tax havens? A legal and economic analysis of OECD and EU standards on exchange of information in tax matters with a special focus on capital income Dietmar Aigner and Michael Tumpel 3.1 Introduction The liberalization of international capital movements has made significant progress in recent decades inside and outside the European Union (see Council Directive 88/361/EEC, June 1988). Although it is widely accepted among economic scholars that free trade of goods and services and free movement of capital is in principle the superior trade policy and can foster economic development, a “borderless world” with free movement of capital investments facilitates tax evasion (Bacchetta 1992; Gläser and Halla 2006). The global economic crisis and recent tax evasion scandals have spurred calls for fairness and transparency in the tax system. Removing practices that facilitate tax evasion is part of a broader drive to clean up one of the more controversial sides of a globalized economy. Combating tax evasion, which mainly arises from income on cross-border investments, has been an issue within the European Union since the 1960s. It has become increasingly important because so-called tax havens are being intensively used for aggressive tax planning. They deprive governments of revenues needed for vital infrastructure and undermine the confidence that citizens have in the fairness of their tax laws. National governments need to take action to ensure that taxpayers do not abuse this borderless world to evade their tax liabilities (Gläser and Halla 2006). The harmful effects of tax havens result from their lack of transparency, reliance on excessively strict bank secrecy, and the opportunities that they provide taxpayers to avoid or evade tax in their home countries. The European Commission mentions that fraud accounts for approximately 2–2.5 percent of GDP in the European Union (European Commission IP09/201 2009). Therefore, the interests at stake in the case of fiscal fraud are extremely important. Although the challenge of combating offshore tax evasion has grown more complex and more serious, given the increased scope for illicit use of the international financial system in a globalized world, the functioning of fiscal
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38 D. Aigner and M. Tumpel systems is still primarily the responsibility of the Member States. They are responsible for fiscal administration, tax auditing and the recovery of taxes. When countries take firm action to stop the above-mentioned loss of revenue, they need to rely on international organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) or the European Union to take action in a coordinated and integrated manner (see IP/09/201 2009). At the OECD level, the work on harmful tax practices has developed standards of transparency and exchange of information, which have been widely accepted as an international norm. The initiatives aim at eliminating harmful tax practices of preferential tax regimes by identifying “tax havens” and seeking their commitments to the principles of transparency and effective exchange of information. So far, all the countries identified as tax havens by the OECD have made formal commitments to implement these principles. The OECD principles are laid down in an OECD Model Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters and in Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital. At the EU level, the European Commission considers that tax evasion could better be controlled through joint action by the Commission and the Member States. As a part of the so-called tax package, the European Union has enacted the Council Directive 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments (referred to hereafter as the “Savings Directive”). Furthermore, measures equivalent to or the same as those provided for by the Savings Directive have also come into effect in Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, Switzerland and certain relevant dependent or associated territories of the Member States.1 The ultimate aim of the Savings Directive is to enable savings income in the form of interest payments made in one Member State of the European Union to the so-called beneficial owners, who are individuals residing in another EU Member State, to be made subject to effective taxation in accordance with the laws of the latter Member State. This is to be achieved through an automatic exchange of information on cross-border interest payments to individuals. However, owing to structural differences that are mainly caused by national banking secrecy, Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg are permitted, for a transitional period, to levy a withholding tax on the savings income of residents of other Member States, instead of providing the other Member States with information. This will guarantee a minimum effectiveness in the field of savings taxation. Therefore, the main objective of the Savings Directive is to reduce tax evasion by EU residents who gain interest income from assets abroad and fail to report this income to their domestic tax authorities (Gläser and Halla 2006). In this chapter, we have evaluated the effectiveness of OECD and EU measures to combat tax evasion concerning capital income from a legal and an economic point of view. We have to conclude that there exist restricted scope and loopholes within the OECD and EU measures. Furthermore, as tax-related information exchange is a strategic variable of the countries to alter the attractiveness of their financial markets, it is at least debatable whether the existence of loopholes is due to hidden non-cooperative behavior by the Member States.
How to combat tax evasion in tax havens? 39
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This chapter is organized as follows. After a review of the background and the general principles of the OECD and EU measures to combat tax evasion concerning capital income in sections 3.2 and 3.3, respectively, in section 3.4 the economics of tax information exchange and contrasts of the OECD measures and the Savings Tax Directive with the former are examined. In section 3.5, the effectiveness of the OECD and EU measures in reducing cross-border tax evasion and tax avoidance is discussed. The final section concludes the chapter and discusses broader policy implications.
3.2 OECD standards on exchange of information 3.2.1 Model agreement on exchange of information in tax matters 3.2.1.1 Background Under common international law and the principle of sovereignty, states are allowed to tax income if there is a genuine link to their territory. Nearly all states make use of the resident taxpayer as the genuine link to their territory. According to the principle of residence, these states are allowed to tax the worldwide income of taxpayers who have their permanent residence within their territory. Even income derived from investments in a source state is subject to tax in the state of residence, if the beneficiary of this income is a resident of the latter state. Because the state of residence has no information on this income, the taxpayer is generally obliged to declare the worldwide income to the competent tax authority of the state of residence. Clearly, the principle of residence requires that tax authorities have comprehensive information about all the sources of income of their residents in foreign states. A problem that often arises is that taxpayers do not declare their income from foreign sources. As capital is a very flexible commodity and there is generally no (automatic) tax-related information exchange outside the European Union between the state of source and the state of residence, investing in foreign countries appears to be a straightforward way to evade taxes (Gläser and Halla 2006). The OECD launched its work to address harmful tax competition in its 1998 report Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue. This report describes the lack of effective exchange of information as an important factor in determining harmful tax practices (Oberson 2003). The OECD advocates exchange of information between tax authorities on request in cases of specific tax inquiries to better equip tax authorities to tackle tax evasion, and released a model agreement on exchange of information in tax matters (hereafter “Model Agreement”) on 18 April 2002. The Model Agreement represents the standard for effective exchange of information for the OECD’s initiative on harmful tax competition. At the same time, the OECD published a list of seven “uncooperative jurisdictions”. However, 31 other jurisdictions decided to cooperate with the OECD and have bound themselves either directly or indirectly to the Model Agreement. The purpose of this Agreement is to promote international
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40 D. Aigner and M. Tumpel cooperation in tax matters through exchange of information. It was developed by the OECD Global Forum Working Group on Effective Exchange of Information. The Working Group consisted of representatives from the OECD member countries as well as delegates from Aruba, Bermuda, Bahrain, the Cayman Islands, Cyprus, the Isle of Man, Malta, Mauritius, the Netherlands Antilles, the Seychelles and San Marino. The lack of effective exchange of information is one of the key criteria in determining harmful tax practices. The mandate of the Working Group was to develop a legal instrument that could be used to establish effective exchange of information. The Model Agreement is a non-binding instrument that provides the basis for an integrated bundle of bilateral treaties. A party to the multilateral Agreement would only be bound by the Agreement vis- à-vis the specific parties with which it agrees to be bound. Thus, a party that seeks to be bound by the multilateral Agreement must specify, in its instrument of ratification, approval or acceptance of the party or parties to which it wishes to be bound. The Agreement then enters into force, and creates rights and obligations, though only between those parties that have mutually identified each other in their instruments of ratification, approval or acceptance that have been deposited with the depositary of the Agreement. The bilateral version is intended to serve as a model for bilateral exchange of information agreements. As such, modifications to the text may be agreed in bilateral agreements to implement the standard set in the model (Oberson 2003). The Agreement is intended to establish the standard of what constitutes the effective exchange of information for the purposes of the OECD’s initiative on harmful tax practices. However, the purpose of the Agreement is not to prescribe a specific format for how this standard should be achieved. Thus, the Agreement in either of its forms is only one of several ways in which the standard can be implemented. Other instruments, including double taxation agreements, may also be used, provided both parties agree, given that other instruments are usually wider in scope. A number of bilateral agreements have already been based on this Agreement. 3.2.1.2 Key regulations According to Article 1 of the Model Agreement on Exchange of Information in Tax Matters, competent authorities of the contracting parties shall provide assistance upon request through exchange of information that is foreseeably relevant to the administration and enforcement of the domestic laws of the contracting parties concerning taxes covered by the Model Agreement. The agreement is limited to information that is foreseeably relevant to the determination, assessment and collection of taxes covered, the recovery and enforcement of tax claims, or the investigation or prosecution of tax matters. Information is to be exchanged in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement and shall be treated confidentially. The standard of foreseeable relevance is intended to provide for exchange of information in tax matters to the widest possible extent, and at the same time to clarify that contracting parties are not at liberty to engage
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How to combat tax evasion in tax havens? 41 in fishing expeditions or to request information that is unlikely to be relevant to the tax affairs of a given taxpayer. Parties that choose to enter into bilateral agreements based on the Model Agreement may agree to an alternative formulation of this standard, provided that such alternative formulation is consistent with the scope of the Model Agreement (Oberson 2003). The rights and safeguards secured to persons by the laws or administrative practice of the requested party remain applicable to the extent that they do not unduly prevent or delay the effective exchange of information. Such rights may include, depending on the circumstances, a right of notification, a right to challenge the exchange of information following notification, or rights to challenge information-gathering measures taken by the requested state. Such procedural rights and safeguards also include any rights secured to persons that may flow from relevant international agreements on human rights, and the expression “unduly prevent or delay” indicates that such rights may take precedence over the Agreement. Therefore, Article 1 of the Model Agreement strikes a balance between the rights granted to persons in the requested state and the need for effective exchange of information. It ensures that the rights and safeguards are not overridden simply because they could, under certain circumstances, operate to prevent or delay effective exchange of information. However, Article 1 obliges the competent authority of the requested state to ensure that any such rights and safeguards are not applied in a manner that unduly prevents or delays effective exchange of information. For instance, a bona fide procedural safeguard in the requested state may delay a response to an information request. However, such a delay should not be considered as “unduly preventing or delaying” the effective exchange of information unless the delay is such that it calls into question the usefulness of the information exchange agreement for the applicant’s competent authority. Another example is with respect to the notification requirements. A requested party whose laws require prior notification is obliged to ensure that its notification requirements are not applied in a manner that, in the particular circumstances of the request, would frustrate the efforts of the party seeking the information. For instance, notification rules should permit exceptions from prior notification (e.g. in cases in which the information request is of a very urgent nature, or when the notification is likely to undermine the chance of success of the investigation conducted by the applicant party). To avoid future difficulties or misunderstandings in the implementation of an agreement, the contracting parties should consider discussing these issues in detail during negotiations and in the course of implementing the agreement, to ensure that information requested under the agreement can be obtained as expeditiously as possible while ensuring adequate protection of taxpayers’ rights. Agreements on Exchange of Information in Tax Matters in Article 3 cover, at a minimum, four categories of direct taxes (i.e. taxes on income or profits, taxes on capital, taxes on net wealth, and estate, inheritance or gift taxes), unless both parties agree to waive one or more of them. Article 5 of the Model Agreement on Exchange of Information in Tax Matters provides the general rule that the competent authority of the requested party
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42 D. Aigner and M. Tumpel must provide information upon request for the purposes referred to in Article 1. The paragraph makes clear that the Agreement only covers the exchange of information upon request (that is, when the information requested relates to a particular examination, inquiry or investigation) and does not cover automatic or spontaneous exchange of information. However, contracting parties may wish to consider expanding their cooperation in matters of information exchange for tax purposes by covering automatic and spontaneous exchanges and simultaneous tax examinations. The reference in the first sentence to Article 1 of the Agreement confirms that information must be exchanged with respect to both civil and criminal tax issues. Information in connection with criminal tax issues must be exchanged irrespective of whether or not the conduct being investigated would also constitute a crime under the laws of the requested party. National tax authorities have to take action to obtain the information requested and cannot solely rely on the information possessed by its competent authority. Reference is made to information “in its possession” rather than that “available in the tax files”, because some contracting parties do not have tax files because they do not impose direct taxes. Upon receipt of an information request, the competent authority of the requested party must first review whether it has all the information necessary to respond to a request. If the information in its own possession proves inadequate, it must take “all relevant information gathering measures” to provide the applicant party with the information requested. The term “information gathering measures” is defined in Article 4, para. 1 of the Model Agreement on Exchange of Information in Tax Matters. An information-gathering measure is “relevant” if it is capable of obtaining the information requested by the applicant party. The requested party determines the information-gathering measures that are relevant in a particular case. Para. 2 further states that information must be exchanged irrespective of whether the requested party needs the information for its own tax purposes. This rule is needed because a tax interest requirement might overwhelm the effective exchange of information, for instance in cases where the requested party does not impose an income tax or the request relates to an entity not subject to taxation within the requested party. Article 5, para. 3 includes a provision intended to require the provision of information in a format specifically requested by a contracting party, to satisfy its evidentiary or other legal requirements to the extent allowable under the laws of the requested party. Such forms may include depositions of witnesses and authenticated copies of original records. Under Article 5, para. 3, the requested party may decline to provide the information in the specific form requested if such form is not allowable under its laws. A refusal to provide the information in the format requested does not affect the obligation to provide the information. By referring explicitly to persons who may enjoy certain privilege rights under domestic law, Article 5 makes clear that such rights cannot form the basis for declining a request unless otherwise provided in Article 7. For instance, the inclusion of a reference to bank information in Article 5, para. 4, subparagraph a) rules out any possibility that bank secrecy could be considered as a part of
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How to combat tax evasion in tax havens? 43 public policy (ordre public). Similarly, Article 5, para. 4, subparagraph a), together with Article 7, para. 2, makes it clear that information that does not otherwise constitute a trade, business, industrial, commercial or professional secret or trade process does not become a secret simply because it is held by one of the persons mentioned. In accordance with the OECD report Improving Access to Bank Information for Tax Purposes (2000), access to information held by banks or other financial institutions may be, by direct means or indirectly, through a judicial or administrative process. As stated in the report, the procedure for indirect access should not be burdensome and time-consuming, such that it acts as an impediment to access to bank information. Typically, requested bank information includes account, financial and transactional information as well as information on the identity or legal structure of account holders and parties to financial transactions. Furthermore, Article 5, para. 4 mentions information held by persons acting in an agency or fiduciary capacity, including nominees and trustees. A person is generally said to act in a “fiduciary capacity” when the business that he/she transacts, or the money or property that he/she handles, is not his/her own or for his/her own benefit, but for the benefit of another person related to him/her, implying and necessitating confidence and trust on one part and good faith on the other part. The term “agency” is very broad and includes all forms of corporate service providers (e.g. company formation agents, trust companies, registered agents, lawyers). The competent authorities of the contracting parties must have the authority to obtain and provide ownership information that the other contracting party may legitimately expect to receive in response to a request for ownership information so that it may apply its own tax laws, including its domestic definition of beneficial ownership. In connection with companies and partnerships, the legal and the beneficial owner of the shares or partnership assets will usually be the same person. However, in some cases the legal ownership position may be subject to a nominee or similar arrangement. In cases where the legal owner acts on behalf of another person as a nominee or under a similar arrangement, that person, rather than the legal owner, may be the beneficial owner. Thus, the starting point for the ownership analysis is legal ownership of shares or partnership interests, and all contracting parties must be able to obtain and provide information on legal ownership. Partnership interests include all forms of partnership interests: general, limited, capital or profits. However, in certain cases legal ownership may be no more than a starting point. For example, in any case where the legal owner acts on behalf of any other person as a nominee or under a similar arrangement, the contracting parties should have the authority to obtain and provide information about that other person, who may be the beneficial owner, in addition to the information about the legal owner. An example of a nominee is a nominee shareholding arrangement where the legal title-holder, who also appears as the shareholder of record, acts as an agent for another person. Within the constraints of Article 2 of the Agreement, the requested party must have the authority to provide information about the persons in an ownership chain.
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44 D. Aigner and M. Tumpel Article 7 identifies the situations in which a requested party is not required to supply information in response to a request. If the conditions for any of the reasons for declining a request under Article 7 are met, then the requested party is given the discretion to refuse to provide the information; however, it should carefully weigh the interests of the applicant party with the pertinent reasons for declining the request. However, if the requested party does provide the information, then the person concerned cannot allege an infraction of the rules on secrecy. In the event that the requested party declines a request for information, it should inform the applicant party regarding the reasons for its decision at the earliest opportunity. Article 10 establishes the requirement for contracting parties to enact any legislation necessary to comply with the terms of the Agreement. The contracting parties are obliged to enact any necessary legislation with effect from the date specified in the Agreement, as well as, implicitly, to refrain from introducing any new legislation contrary to their obligations under this Agreement. 3.2.2 Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital 3.2.2.1 Background Before the introduction of tax information exchange agreements, international exchanges of information regarding direct tax issues had, since the 1990s, basically been carried out within the context of double taxation treaties. Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention (OECD MTC) provides the most widely accepted legal basis for bilateral exchange of information for tax purposes. More than 3,500 bilateral tax treaties are based on the OECD MTC. The provision creates an obligation to exchange information that is foreseeably relevant to the correct application of a tax convention as well as for the purposes of the administration and enforcement of domestic tax laws of contracting states. Countries do not have the autonomy to engage in “fishing expeditions” or to request information that is unlikely to be relevant to the tax affairs of a given taxpayer. In formulating requests, the requesting state should demonstrate the foreseeable relevance of the requested information. In addition, it should also pursue all domestic means to access the requested information, except those that would give rise to disproportionate difficulties (Engelschalk 2008). Since the 2005 update of Article 26, it has been made clear that a state cannot refuse a request for information solely because it has no domestic tax interest in the information or solely because a bank or other financial institution holds the information. Bank secrecy is not incompatible with the requirements of Article 26, and virtually all countries have bank secrecy or confidentiality rules. Meeting the standard of Article 26 requires only limited exceptions to bank secrecy rules, and would not undermine the confidence of citizens in the protection of their privacy. Finally, where information is exchanged, it is subject to strict confidentiality rules. It is expressly stated in Article 26 that information communicated
How to combat tax evasion in tax havens? 45 shall be treated as a secret and that it can only be used for the purposes provided for in the convention (see Article 26, paras 4 and 5 OECD MTC).
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3.2.2.2 Key regulation As mentioned earlier, the competent authorities of the contracting states shall exchange information that is foreseeably relevant for carrying out the provisions of this Convention, or to the administration or enforcement of the domestic laws concerning taxes of every kind and description imposed on behalf of the contracting states, or their political subdivisions or local authorities, insofar as the taxation there under is not contrary to the Convention. According to the Commentary on the OECD MTC, the standard of “foreseeable relevance” is intended to provide exchange of information on tax issues to the widest possible extent, and, at the same time, to clarify that contracting states are not at liberty to engage in “fishing expeditions” or to request information that is unlikely to be relevant to the tax affairs of a given taxpayer. Contracting states may agree to an alternative formulation of this standard that is consistent with the scope of Article 26 (e.g. by replacing “foreseeably relevant” with “necessary” or “relevant”). The scope of exchange of information covers all tax issues without prejudice to the general rules and legal provisions governing the rights of defendants and witnesses in judicial proceedings. Exchange of information on criminal tax issues can also be based on bilateral or multilateral treaties on mutual legal assistance (to an extent, they also apply to tax crimes). To retain the exchange of information within the framework of the Convention, a limitation is set so that the information is given only insofar as the taxation under the domestic taxation laws concerned is not contrary to the Convention (Commentary on Article 26, para. 1 of the OECD MTC). Article 26 of the OECD MTC embodies rules under which information may be exchanged to the widest possible extent, with a view to lay the proper basis for the implementation of the domestic tax laws of the contracting states, as well as for the application of specific provisions of the Convention. The text of Article 26 makes it clear that the exchange of information is not restricted by the scope of the OECD MTC as defined in Articles 1 and 2, and that the information may include particulars about non-residents and may relate to the administration or enforcement of taxes not referred to in Article 2. Before 2000, Article 26 only authorized the exchange of information and the use of the information exchanged in relation to the taxes covered by the Convention under the general rules of Article 2. As drafted, the paragraph did not oblige the requested state to comply with a request for information concerning the imposition of a sales tax, because such a tax was not covered by the Convention. The paragraph was then amended so as to cover the exchange of information concerning any tax imposed on behalf of the contracting states, or their political subdivisions or local authorities, and to allow the use of the information exchanged for the purposes of the application of all such taxes. The rule laid down in Article 26, para. 1 of the OECD MTC allows information to be exchanged in three different ways:
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on request, with a special case in mind, and understanding that the regular sources of information available under the internal taxation procedure should be relied upon in the first place before a request for information is made to the other state; automatically, for example when information about one or various categories of income having their source in one contracting state and received in the other contracting state is transmitted systematically to the other state; spontaneously, for example in the case of a state having acquired information that is considered to be of interest to the other state, as a result of certain investigations.
Any information received under Article 26, para. 1 by a contracting state is to be treated as a secret in the same manner as the information obtained under the domestic laws of that state, and is to be disclosed only to persons or authorities (including courts and administrative bodies) concerned with assessment or collection, enforcement or prosecution, determination of appeals in relation to the taxes referred to in Article 26, para. 1, or the oversight of all the above- mentioned roles. Such persons or authorities are to use the information only for such purposes. They may disclose the information in public court proceedings or judicial decisions. In no case are the provisions of Article 26, paras 1 and 2 to be construed so as to impose the obligation on a contracting state: • • •
to carry out administrative measures at variance with the laws and administrative practice of that or the other contracting state; to supply information that is not obtainable under the laws or in the normal course of the administration of that, or the other, contracting state; to supply information that would disclose any trade, business, industrial, commercial, or professional secret or trade process, or information disclosure that would be contrary to public policy (ordre public).
If the information is requested by a contracting state in accordance with Article 26, then the other contracting state is to use its information-gathering measures to obtain the requested information, even though that other state may not need such information for its own tax purposes. The obligation contained in the preceding sentence is subject to the limitations of para. 3, but in no case are such limitations to be construed as permitting a contracting state to decline to supply information solely because it has no domestic interest in such information. This paragraph was added in 2005 to deal explicitly with the obligation to exchange information in situations where the requested information is not needed by the requested state for domestic tax purposes. Prior to the addition of Article 26, para. 4, this obligation was not expressly stated in the article but was clearly evidenced by the practices followed by the member countries. According to Article 26, para. 5, in no case are the provisions to be construed as permitting a contracting state to decline to supply information solely because
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How to combat tax evasion in tax havens? 47 the information is held by a bank, other financial institution, nominee or a person acting in an agency or a fiduciary capacity, or because it relates to the ownership interests in a person. Article 26, para. 5, added in 2005, represents a change in the structure of the article, and should not be interpreted as suggesting that the previous version of the article did not authorize the exchange of such information. The vast majority of the OECD Member Countries already exchanged such information. Article 26, para. 5 does not preclude a contracting state from invoking Article 26, para. 3 to refuse to supply information held by a bank, financial institution, a person acting in an agency or fiduciary capacity, or information relating to ownership interests. However, such refusal must be based on reasons unrelated to the person’s status, such as a bank, financial institution, agent, fiduciary or nominee, or the fact that the information relates to the ownership interests. Austria, Switzerland, Luxembourg and Belgium have reserved the right not to include Article 26, para. 5 in their double tax conventions (DTCs). However, Austria is authorized to exchange information held by a bank or other financial institution where such information is requested within the framework of a criminal investigation carried out in the requesting state concerning the commitment of tax fraud. Switzerland has proposed to limit the scope of Article 26 to information necessary for carrying out the provisions of the OECD MTC. This reservation may not be applicable to cases involving acts of fraud subject to imprisonment according to the laws of both contracting states. Belgium reserves that in conventions in which Article 26, para. 5 is included, the exchange of information held by a bank or other financial institution is restricted to the exchange on request of information concerning both a specific taxpayer and a specific financial institution. The current edition of the OECD MTC, updated on 17 July 2008, indicates that Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland have entered reservations to Article 26. However, in March 2009 each of these countries notified the OECD that they were withdrawing those reservations (see the Commentary to Article 26, paras 4 and 5 of the OECD MTC).
3.3 EU standards on exchange of information on capital income 3.3.1 The savings tax directive 3.3.1.1 Background Within the European Union, awareness of the problem of tax evasion concerning capital income emerged in the 1960s (Debatin 1965; Fischer 1968; Groeben 1962; Grund 1965; van Themaat 1966). At that time, it was widely accepted that the best way to combat these opportunities for tax evasion would be the introduction of a tax-related system of information exchange between the national tax authorities, and the abolition of existing withholding taxes. Other, different
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48 D. Aigner and M. Tumpel systems, such as the then current withholding tax procedure, were considered as conceivable but imperfect (van Themaat 1966). By the implementation of Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988, the free movement of capital between Member States of the European Union and between Member States and third countries was further increased. Article 6, para. 5 of this directive authorized the Commission to submit proposals aimed at eliminating or reducing risks of distortion, tax evasion and tax avoidance linked to the diversity of the various national systems for the taxation of savings and for controlling the application of these systems. After several proposals, the Council agreed on Directive 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments (Gläser and Halla 2006). 3.3.1.2 Key regulations According to Article 1, the ultimate aim of the Savings Directive is to enable savings income in the form of interest payments made in one Member State to beneficial owners who are individual residents in another Member State for tax purposes, subject to effective taxation in accordance with the laws of the latter Member State. This aim will in principle be achieved by providing the beneficial owners’ state of residence with sufficient information regarding the interest payment by the state from which the interest was paid. With reference to banking secrecy, Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg are allowed to operate a withholding tax system instead of the information system during a transitional period when interest payments are made from paying agents within their territory to beneficial owners who are residents of other Member States. The withholding tax rate currently is 20 percent and will rise to 35 percent by July 2011 for the remainder of the transitional period. Three-quarters of the withholding tax levied by Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg must be transferred to the states of residence of the beneficial owners. The remaining quarter may be kept by the withholding tax states. Nevertheless, the other Member States are obliged to provide Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg with information regarding interest payments made to their residents. The three withholding tax states are free to change to the information procedure at any time during the transitional period (Gläser and Halla 2006). According to Article 10 of the Savings Directive, the Council has to agree on the fulfillment of several conditions to oblige the three withholding tax states to change to the information procedure. While Belgium may switch to the information procedure before the end of the transitional period (Eynatten 2006; Springael 2004), Austria, on the other hand, may not (Kuttin 2003). To our knowledge, there is no evidence that Luxembourg is likely to switch before the end of the transitional period. Nevertheless, considering the conditions2 that have to be fulfilled, the end of the withholding tax procedure seems to be far in the future (Gläser and Halla 2006). Under the rules of the Savings Directive, the paying agents (any economic operator who pays interest or secures the payment of interest for the immediate
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How to combat tax evasion in tax havens? 49 benefit of the beneficial owner) is responsible for the identification of the beneficial owner and his/her state of residence, calculation of the amount of interest paid and forwarding the information or deduction, and forwarding the withholding tax to the national tax authority. Beneficial owners may only be individuals who receive interest payments for their own benefit. Interest payments made for the benefit of companies or legal persons are not within the scope of the Savings Directive. The regulations of the Savings Directive are only applicable if the beneficial owner is a resident in a Member State other than where the paying agent is established. If the withholding tax needs to be deducted in Austria, Belgium or Luxembourg, then the beneficial owner has to be offered an opportunity to avoid this deduction. Therefore, the Savings Directive offers two procedures,3 of which the withholding tax countries are required to implement at least one (Gläser and Halla 2006). The deduction of the withholding tax under the regulations of the Savings Directive does not release the beneficial owner from his/her tax liability in the state of residence. Rather, it is the state of residence that is obliged to eliminate any double taxation that might result from the imposition of this withholding tax, along with any national income tax on the interest payment. The state of residence is obliged to grant a credit equal to the amount of the tax withheld in accordance with its domestic law. If the deducted withholding tax exceeds the amount of tax due in accordance with domestic law, then the state of residence is obliged to refund the excess amount of tax withheld to the beneficial owner (Article 14 of the Savings Directive). 3.3.1.3 Equivalent measures in third countries and dependent territories The application of the Savings Directive is conditional on the simultaneous application of treaties providing for equivalent measures in third countries such as Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino and Switzerland, as well as the dependent and associated territories of the United Kingdom (Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Jersey, Montserrat, the Turks and Caicos Islands) and the Netherlands (Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles). The British Virgin Islands, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Jersey, the Netherlands Antilles and the Turks and Caicos Islands exercise the withholding tax procedure, while Anguilla, Aruba, the Cayman Islands and Montserrat provide the state of residence with information regarding the interest payment. The detailed provisions are equal to those of the Savings Directive. Remarkably, only Aruba, the British Virgin Islands, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Montserrat and the Netherlands Antilles receive information or a part of the deducted withholding tax when interest is paid from the paying agents established in the Member States of the European Union to their residents, while Anguilla, the Cayman Islands, Jersey, the Turks and Caicos Islands and all the third countries get neither the information nor a part of the withholding tax (Gläser and Halla 2006).
50 D. Aigner and M. Tumpel
3.4 An economic perspective From an economic perspective, there are at least two aspects of the OECD and EU principles on exchange of information that are discussed in the economic literature. The first aspect is the analysis of administrative mechanism of the tax- related information exchange system, and the second aspect deals with individual tax evasion.
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3.4.1 Exchange of information in tax matters and tax competition From an economic point of view, it is interesting to analyze the conditions under which a country is willing voluntarily to exchange tax-related information with other countries. Keeping in mind that economic theory basically assumes that all agents (including countries and their tax authorities) act in their own interest, it has to be considered that providing information to a foreign tax authority makes a country less attractive to foreign investors (Gläser and Halla 2006). Moreover, the administrative costs that arise during the gathering and transmitting of information are not compensated. From this point of view, a tax-related exchange of information seems to be a serious drawback for participating countries. On the other hand, a country providing information to others could expect to receive tax-related information in return to enforce its own taxes. Considering this trade-off, it is a priori not clear whether a country should engage in a tax- related information exchange system (ibid.). Gläser and Halla assumed that if all countries were identical, signifying that investors would be indifferent regarding where to shift their assets, then a tax- related exchange of information would be the preferred strategy by all the countries. However, by introducing heterogeneity, the benefits from a tax-related information exchange system may not accrue equally to all participating countries. This denotes that the net exporters of capital (net importers of information) might gain from information exchange, whereas the net importers of capital (net exporters of information) might not (Gläser and Halla 2006). Tanzi and Zee (2001) argued that a tax-related information exchange system can never be self-enforcing in a decentralized world with asymmetric countries. Bacchetta and Espinosa (1995, 2000) as well as Keen and Ligthart (2006a) highlighted the strategic elements of a tax-related information exchange system, which might promote non-cooperative solutions. They showed that governments may have a further incentive to transmit information through strategic motives if commitments on the degree of information exchange are made prior to the choice of the tax rate. If all countries were to agree on information exchange, then investors could not simply evade taxes by investing abroad. This would reduce the incentive for investors to invest abroad, and therefore soften the extent of tax competition. As a result, countries would be able to increase their own tax rate. According to Gläser and Halla (2006), these additional strategic considerations permit a system of tax-related information exchange to be optimal in situations of non-cooperation.
How to combat tax evasion in tax havens? 51
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In summary, the existence of information exchange systems between asymmetric countries can be explained by certain strategic motives (Keen and Lig thart 2006b). However, there are at least two persistent facts underlying all these models that have to be considered. First, there are few fundamental incentives for governments to participate officially in a tax-related information exchange system and to provide information to foreign tax authorities. Therefore, loopholes in the information exchange systems and uncooperative behavior by countries are basically severe problems. Furthermore, one has to consider that net importers of capital (typically, small countries) can never gain from information sharing as much as can net exporters of capital (Gläser and Halla 2006). 3.4.2 Individual tax evasion In an economic context, the term “tax evasion” includes illegal activities to reduce personal tax liability (e.g. the under-reporting of income) and tax avoidance, which is consistent with the existing law (e.g. taking advantage of tax loopholes) (Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2002; Cross and Shaw 1981). In the following section, we will focus on tax evasion, but many of the considerations do equivalently apply to tax avoidance.4 Since the first formal economic analysis of tax evasion (Allingham and Sandmo 1972), an overwhelming number of studies have been carried out (e.g. Cowell 1990; Andreoni et al. 1998; Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2002). In this study, we first present the fundamental findings of the economic literature, especially the traditional determinants of tax evasion and tax morale, and then evaluate whether an exchange of information in tax matters based on OECD or EU principles is capable of reducing cross-border tax evasion (Gläser and Halla 2006). 3.4.2.1 The economics of crime and the traditional model of tax evasion The economics-of-crime approach is based on the assumption that criminals are rational people (Becker 1968). Therefore, whether or not a person will commit a crime is analyzed in a similar way to any other economic decision. In making an economic decision, economic agents are confronted with different combinations of costs and benefits. A decisive element of this approach is that all criminal behavior is characterized by uncertainty. Economists traditionally examined individual behavior under uncertainty within the so-called expected utility framework. Under the assumption of the expected utility framework, an economic agent always chooses the alternative with the maximal expected payoff.5 Therefore, to increase the deterrence of criminal activity a state can either increase its expenditures on police and courts to catch a larger proportion of offenders or can impose more severe punishments. Of course, in a wider approach toward individual criminal behavior, the amount of crime is determined not only by the legal framework but also by the economic and social environment, such as opportunities for legal employment, schooling, and living
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52 D. Aigner and M. Tumpel conditions in general (Becker 1997). The optimal policy for combating illegal activity is the problem of finding an optimal allocation of resources, and is therefore at the heart of economics. Tax evasion is a particular form of crime that can be analyzed within such a framework (Gläser and Halla 2006). Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974) carried out the first formal economic analysis of tax evasion (see also Srinivasan 1973). These models differ only in their assumptions on the penalty structure of tax evasion. Allingham and Sandmo presumed that the penalty depends on the income understatement, while Yitzhaki presumed that the tax understatement is decisive (Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2002). To sum up, the Allingham–Sandmo–Yitzhaki (referred to as “ASY” hereafter) model of tax evasion predicts that tax evasion decreases with an increase in the probability of detection and with an increase in the penalty rate; and if preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion, then tax evasion also decreases with an increase in the tax rate and a falling income (Gläser and Halla 2006). Evidently, this simple, static model is in some respects a sharp simplification of the real world and the taxpayer’s decision problem. First, it is uncertain whether the taxpayer really knows the probability of detection. In reality, the tax authority might not announce the number of audits that are to take place in the upcoming year. Second, the taxpayer might not know the penalty rate. Many institutional settings to some extent leave it to the discretion of a distinct authority to set the actual penalty rate. Third, it is not realistic that the probability of an audit is constant for all taxpayers. Usually, a taxpayer has to pay taxes in consecutive years. This time dimension will probably influence the taxpayer’s behavior as well as the state’s enforcement policy. Prudent tax authorities might be more likely to screen a former tax evader than a citizen who has been honest for many years. An evader who has been detected might anticipate this strategy. Finally, it is not clear whether an audit can always help the state to find out the exact amount of the taxpayers’ actual income, and this model does not allow for intrinsically motivated taxpayers (Gläser and Halla 2006). The basic ASY framework has been generalized and extended in many directions (Andreoni et al. 1998); however, in particular, two results of the ASY model have been strongly criticized. First is the predicted negative influence of the tax rate on the income evaded. Probably not many economists would suggest that a positive relationship between the tax rate and tax evasion is much more in accordance with intuition and common sense. In fact, most of the empirical and experimental analysis conducted reports that tax evasion rises with an increase in the marginal tax rate. To solve this problem, a more recent study attempted to analyze tax evasion within the so-called non-expected utility frameworks (Starmer 2000). The expected utility framework has been the working horse for economists to study decisions made under uncertainty for decades. However, there exists accumulated evidence that people do not behave in accordance with it. Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2005) employed Kahneman and Tversky’s cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992), which is probably the most important non-expected utility framework for modeling an individual’s decision
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How to combat tax evasion in tax havens? 53 regarding tax evasion. Their model predicts that an increase in the tax rate will lead to an increase in evaded income. This result is contrary to the prediction made by the ASY model under the expected utility assumption, but in accordance with intuition and common sense (Gläser and Halla 2006). The second heavily criticized result of the ASY model concerns its quantitative prediction of tax evasion. To square the predicted degree of tax evasion of the ASY model under the expected utility with empirical and experimental evidence, taxpayers would need to be risk-averse to an absurd degree. The realistic audit probabilities may be very low, ranging from 0.01 to 0.03, and the actually observed penalty rates may be between 1.5 and 2. Given these parameter values, one has to assume a coefficient of relative risk aversion of about 70 to obtain realistic estimates of evaded taxes predicted by the ASY model. However, realistic magnitudes of relative risk aversion lie between 1 and 2 (Alm et al. 1992). In general, it seems that incorporating non-economic motivation, such as psychological and sociological variables – especially this intrinsic motivation to pay taxes – is a decisive point in solving this quantitative puzzle. The evidence from experimental work showing that this intrinsic motivation to pay taxes (called tax morale) affects compliance behavior is overwhelming (Torgler 2002). For instance, Baldry (1986) reported that some individuals do not act as gamblers and never evade taxes, even though doing so would be rational for them. Frey (1992) used the term “ipsative possibility set” to capture the idea that individuals may have a personal set of potential actions that does not coincide with the objective set (Gläser and Halla 2006). 3.4.2.2 Policy implications to combat tax evasion What can policymakers do to combat tax evasion on the basis of the results from economic research on tax evasion? First, if one takes the ASY model seriously, the determinants of tax evasion are found to be the probability of detection, the penalty rate, the tax rate and the individual income. If they refrain from using individual incomes and the tax rate as potential policy instruments to reduce tax evasion, policymakers can only directly use the probability of detection and the penalty rate to affect tax evasion. In addition, they can try to reduce tax evasion via an increase in tax morale. This leaves us with two questions: (i) What combination of audit probability and penalty rate should be chosen? (ii) How can politicians encourage a high level of average tax morale in the population? To answer the first question, one has to recognize that the two direct policy instruments differ in respect of the cost of making changes. Although it is in principle virtually costless to increase the penalty rate, an increase in the probability of detection involves a considerable cost. Increasing the probability of detection is equal to auditing a larger fraction of the population. Therefore, the state faces a trade-off between higher expenditures on audits and lower tax revenues because of tax evasion. On the basis of this reasoning, the optimal policy would be not only to audit only a very small fraction of the population, but also to impose very high fines – or, as Kolm (1973) strikingly put it, “hang tax
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54 D. Aigner and M. Tumpel evaders with probability zero”. However, in reality there are legal and social constraints on the upper limit of the penalty. If one takes an upper limit for the penalty into account, it turns out that the optimal policy will imply at least some tax evasion (ibid.). The only possible attempt to answer the second question is to take a look at the empirical literature on tax morale. By roughly considering only the factors that the policymakers may influence, these results tell us that when more citizens trust the state, they become more satisfied with the work of their government and their tax morale becomes higher. However, policymakers may not gain much from this, as they should try to do a good job anyway. Moreover, the question of the direction of causality clearly is: do “good” people have “good” governments, or do “good” governments have “good” people? There is probably no simple way, if any, to identify the true direction of causality. However, in any case it seems natural that any policy intervention that attempts to increase awareness (in a “benevolent” way) of the problem of tax evasion should at least not increase tax evasion via a deterioration in tax morale (Gläser and Halla 2006). In the next section, we will evaluate the OECD and EU standards on exchange of information in tax matters on the basis of the results from economic research on individual tax evasion.
3.5 An economic evaluation 3.5.1 OECD principles on exchange of information in tax matters 3.5.1.1 Aim of the OECD principles The OECD Model Agreement on Exchange of Information in Tax Matters and Article 26 of the OECD MTC basically provide for an exchange of information between the competent authorities of the contracting parties upon a request that is foreseeably relevant to the administration and enforcement of the domestic laws of the contracting parties concerning taxes covered by the Model Agreement. In both cases, the agreement is limited to the exchange of information that is foreseeably relevant to the determination, assessment and collection of such taxes, the recovery and enforcement of tax claims, or the investigation or prosecution of tax matters. However, the OECD principles on exchange of information in tax matters only provide for an exchange of information upon request; they do not implement automatic exchange of information. The standard of foreseeable relevance is intended to provide for the exchange of information in tax matters to the widest possible extent, and at the same time to clarify that contracting parties are not at liberty to engage in fishing expeditions or to request information that is unlikely to be relevant to the tax affairs of a given taxpayer. In this respect, one has to notice that the state of residence needs to have some kind of more or less detailed information about resident taxpayers who may evade taxes by, for
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How to combat tax evasion in tax havens? 55 example, making capital investments in foreign capital markets. As fishing expeditions are not intended either by the regulations of the OECD Agreements on Exchange of information in tax matters or Article 26 of the OECD MTC, national tax authorities need to have personalized information about their resident taxpayers to fulfill the requirements for an exchange of information upon request that meets the standard of foreseeable relevance. Therefore, the OECD rules on exchange of information do not necessarily lead to a substantial improvement in national tax administrations. Resident taxpayers can easily evade taxes on capital income as long as the state of residence does not have any idea of foreign capital investments. Successful avoidance of the information transfer due to a complete lack of information in the state of residence simply enables taxpayers to conceal interest income from their state of residence, as if the OECD rules had never been introduced. However, in that case the introduction of the OECD rules on exchange of information in tax matters does not cause any increase in the probability of detection. In the following section, we will point out situations where an exchange of information according to the OECD standards on exchange of information can be revised. 3.5.1.2 Refusal of exchange of information upon request Article 7 of the Model Agreement contains the customary reasons for declining a request, which can also be found in other instruments for exchange of information. However, Article 7 also contains several important innovations and more precise formulations. As mentioned earlier, the Model Agreement does not allow a request to be denied solely because the requested party does not need the information for its own administrative practice. If the conditions for any of the reasons for declining a request under Article 7 are met, then the requested party is given discretion to refuse to provide the information; however, it should carefully weigh the interests of the applicant party with the pertinent reasons for declining the request. If the requested party does provide the information, then the person concerned cannot allege an infraction of the rules on secrecy. In the event that the requested party declines a request for information, it must inform the applicant party of the reasons for its decision at the earliest opportunity (Barnard 2003). The first sentence of Article 7, para. 1 makes it clear that a requested party is not required to obtain and provide information that the applicant would not be able to obtain under similar circumstances under its own laws for purposes of administration or enforcement of its own tax laws. This rule is intended to prevent the applicant party from circumventing its domestic law limitations by requesting information from the other contracting party, thus making use of greater powers than it possesses under its own laws. For instance, most countries, under their domestic laws, recognize that information cannot be obtained from a person to the extent that such person can claim the privilege against self- incrimination. Therefore, a requested party may decline a request if the applicant party is precluded by its own self-incrimination rules from obtaining the
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56 D. Aigner and M. Tumpel information under similar circumstances. Article 7, para. 2 states that a contracting party is not obliged to provide information that would disclose any trade, business, industrial, commercial or professional secret or trade process. Most information requests will not raise issues of trade, business or other secrets. For instance, information requested in connection with a person engaged only in passive investment activities is unlikely to contain any trade, business, industrial, commercial or professional secret, because such a person is not likely to be conducting any trade, business, industrial, commercial or professional activity. Financial information, including books and records, does not generally constitute a trade, business or other secret. However, in certain limited cases the disclosure of financial information might reveal a trade, business or other secret. For instance, a requested party may decline a request for information on certain purchase records, where the disclosure of such information would reveal the proprietary formula of a product. The Agreement overrides any domestic laws or practices that may treat information as a trade, business, industrial, commercial or professional secret or trade process merely because it is held by a person identified in Article 5, para. 4, or merely because it is ownership information. Thus, in connection with information held by banks, financial institutions, etc., the Agreement overrides domestic laws or practices that treat the information as a trade or other secret when it is in the hands of such a person, but does not afford protection when it is in the hands of another person, for instance the taxpayer under investigation. In connection with the ownership information, the Agreement makes it clear that information requests cannot be declined merely because domestic laws or practices may treat such ownership information as a trade or other secret. A contracting party may decline a request if the information requested is protected by attorney–client privilege. However, when the equivalent privilege under the domestic law of the requested party is narrower than the definition contained in para. 3 (for example, the law of the requested party does not recognize a privilege in tax matters, or it does not recognize a privilege in criminal tax matters), a requested party may not decline a request unless it can base its refusal to provide the information on Article 7, para. 1. The attorney–client privilege attaches to any information that constitutes 1 2 3 4
“confidential communication” between “a client and an attorney, solicitor, or other admitted legal representative”, if such communication “is produced for the purposes of seeking or providing legal advice” or is “produced for the purposes of use in existing or contemplated legal proceedings”.
Article 7, para. 5 clarifies that an information request must not be refused on the basis that the tax claim related to it is disputed. Another innovation is that Article 7, para. 3 states that information which would breach attorney–client privilege need not be provided. This establishes a
How to combat tax evasion in tax havens? 57 very important principle and ensures that there is no loophole enabling a country to use creative regulations and/or interpretations to circumvent its duty to provide information (Barnard 2003).
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3.5.1.3 Limits to exchange of information according to Article 26 of the OECD MTC Under Article 26 of the OECD MTC, the competent authorities of contracting states may exchange the information necessary for the correct application of the treaty or the domestic laws of contracting states.6 This system, however, has its limits. First, it includes only countries with a treaty network and does not work in relation to countries, notably tax havens, that have not concluded any tax treaties, in particular because they do not levy any significant taxes. For these countries, the issue of international double taxation does not arise. Second, even in a treaty context the requested contracting state is notably not obliged to carry out administrative measures at variance with its laws and administrative practice, or to supply information that is not obtainable under its laws or in the normal course of the administration of that state (see Article 26 para. 2 (a) and (b) of the OECD Model). Therefore, the requested state is not bound to go beyond its own domestic laws and administrative practice in putting information at the disposal of the other contracting state. Third, some countries, such as Switzerland, have made a reservation on Article 26 of the OECD MTC and consider that Article 26 only obliges a state to grant information necessary for the correct application of the treaty, and not for the application of domestic law (see para. 24 of the Commentary on Article 26 of the OECD Model). However, based on recent negotiations with treaty partners, a new development in this respect is for Switzerland to grant assistance also in the case of “tax fraud” (see Article 26 of the 1997 United States–Switzerland treaty and the protocol of 7 December 2001 to the Germany–Switzerland treaty; Oberson 2003). In general, Article 26, para. 5 of the OECD MTC states that provisions of a contracting state which permit it to decline to supply information solely because the information is held by a bank, other financial institution, nominee, or person acting in an agency or a fiduciary capacity, or because it relates to ownership interests in a person, may not be in line with the aims and purpose of the OECD MTC. However, Article 26, para. 5 does not preclude a contracting state from invoking Article 26, para. 3 to refuse to supply information held by a bank, financial institution, a person acting in an agency or fiduciary capacity, or information relating to ownership interests. Such a refusal must be based on reasons unrelated to the person’s status, such as a bank, financial institution, agent, fiduciary, nominee, or the fact that the information is related to ownership interests. 3.5.1.4 Interim results on OECD principles on exchange of information The traditional economic model of tax evasion states that tax evasion is determined by the probability of detection, the penalty rate, the tax rate and the gross
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58 D. Aigner and M. Tumpel income of the investor. By accepting these as the relevant factors influencing tax evasion, the OECD principles on exchange of information impact only the probability of detection. As OECD principles only provide for an exchange of information upon request, it is uncertain whether there will be a significant increase in the probability of detection. As fishing expeditions are not allowed under OECD rules, the state of residence of the taxpayer may need to have information about unreported income from other sources to be able to apply for an exchange of information under the Tax Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA) or Article 26 of the OECD MTC. Furthermore, existing possibilities to refuse an exchange of information based on the OECD information exchange systems and uncooperative behavior by the tax havens may have a negative impact on the probability of detection (Gläser and Halla 2006). By considering these factors, it can be predicted that the introduction of the OECD principles on exchange of information will not cause a significant increase in the probability of detection. If this is true, then the OECD principles will not lead to a decrease in tax evasion, because beneficial owners willing to evade taxes are not confronted with a significant increase in the probability of detection (Gläser and Halla 2006). Furthermore, the fact that small countries that are net importers of capital (typically tax havens) can never gain from information sharing as much as net exporters of capital will be an important issue in the future. Although all tax havens identified by the OECD have made formal commitments to the OECD principles on exchange of information in tax matters, an effective exchange of information would require the full cooperation of low-tax jurisdictions. As tax havens providing full information to a foreign tax authority will face allocative disadvantages, because they will become less attractive to foreign investors than those that are less cooperative, a tax-related exchange of information seems to be a serious drawback for tax havens. As there is almost no profit from tax- related information that they receive in return, and as the administrative costs of gathering and transmitting information are not compensated, there is almost no incentive for a low-tax jurisdiction to engage or fully cooperate in a tax-related information exchange system. The partial existence of loopholes and the possibilities to refuse an exchange of information may result in these countries showing a slightly hidden non-cooperative behavior. 3.5.2 Savings Directive 3.5.2.1 Aims of the Savings Directive The automatic exchange of information under the Savings Directive aims to guarantee that the state of residence of an individual gets information about interest payments that the individual receives from paying agents in other Member States of the European Union. Contrary to this so-called information procedure, Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg are operating the withholding tax procedure during a transitional period. In these countries, the deduction of with-
How to combat tax evasion in tax havens? 59 holding tax on cross-border interest payments will guarantee a minimum of effective taxation by avoiding non-taxation if the interest income is not declared by the beneficial owner in his/her Member State of residence. Hence, the basic aim of the Savings Directive is to minimize the opportunities to evade taxes, and thereby to decrease effective tax evasion while increasing public revenues.
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3.5.2.2 Interim results on the Savings Directive As the Savings Directive basically provides for an automatic exchange of information, it seems to be more effective in avoiding tax evasion by individuals than the above-mentioned OECD principles. However, literature on the savings tax directive has shown that there are plenty of legal and illegal ways to circumvent the information procedure or withholding tax procedure under the Savings Directive. By considering the basic aim of the Savings Directive, one has to note that the legal or illegal circumvention of the regulations of the Savings Directive does not necessarily mean an effective evasion of taxes by the beneficial owner. A successful circumvention of these rules only enables the beneficial owner to conceal interest income from his/her state of residence, as if the Savings Directive had never been introduced. The beneficial owner has the option to fully declare or conceal the interest income. However, in that case the introduction of the Savings Directive may not cause any increase in the probability of detection (Gläser and Halla 2006). There are plenty of loopholes provided by the Savings Directive itself and its national implementations which enable investors, irrespective of whether or not they prefer European financial markets, to circumvent the regulations to avoid the intended information transfer or withholding tax deduction (Aigner 2009; Gläser and Halla 2006). Therefore, it can be concluded that the Savings Directive will not lead to a significant decrease in tax evasion, because beneficial owners willing to evade taxes are not confronted with an increase in the probability of detection. Furthermore, the Savings Directive has no influence on the penalty rates in the Member States and does not lead to an increase in the tax rates in the Member States.
3.6 Conclusions The traditional economic model of tax evasion states that tax evasion is determined by the probability of detection, the penalty rate, the tax rate and the gross income of the investor. Empirical and experimental evidence has shown that the addition of moral aspects can fruitfully extend the standard economic model. If one accepts these as the relevant factors that influence tax evasion, the OECD principles on exchange of information and the Savings Directive of the European Union do affect the probability of detection. Nevertheless, the OECD principles and the measures of the Savings Directive might not necessarily have succeeded in increasing the probability of detection. Considering the highlighted possibilities to refuse an exchange of information and the loopholes provided by the Savings Directive itself and its national implementations, investors, whether they
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60 D. Aigner and M. Tumpel prefer European financial markets or not, have plenty of opportunities within the European financial markets to circumvent the regulations to avoid the intended information transfer. As tax-related information exchange is a strategic variable used by the EU Member States to alter the attractiveness of their financial markets, it is uncertain whether the partial existence of loopholes in the national implementations is due to slightly hidden non-cooperative behavior on the part of the countries involved. Unless the OECD and the European Union do not enforce cooperative behavior, an outflow of funds may not necessarily take place (Gläser and Halla 2006). However, in their content the OECD and EU principles on exchange of information are a balanced and refined instrument. A significant advantage of exchange of information and, by extension, assistance in recovery, etc. is that there is less need to harmonize national tax systems. An exchange of information would be far more effective for countries than modifying their respective national tax systems (Barnard 2003).
Notes 1 Anguilla, Aruba, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Jersey, Montserrat, the Netherlands Antilles and the Turks and Caicos Islands. 2 According to Article 10, para. 2, the transitional period will end at the end of the first full fiscal year following the later of: (i) the date of entry into force of an agreement between the European Community and the last of the key third countries (the last of the Swiss Confederation, the Principality of Liechtenstein, the Republic of San Marino, the Principality of Monaco and the Principality of Andorra) to provide exchange of information upon request as defined in the OECD Model Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters, released on 18 April 2002, with respect to interest payments, as defined in this directive, made by the paying agents established within their respective territories to beneficial owners residing in the territory to which the directive applies, in addition to the simultaneous application of a withholding tax, by those same countries, on such payments at the rate defined for the corresponding periods referred to in Article 11 para. 1; or (ii) the date when the European Council unanimously agrees that the United States is committed to the exchange of information upon request as defined in the OECD Model Agreement, with respect to interest payments, as defined in this directive, made by paying agents established within its territory to the beneficial owners residing in the territory where the directive applies. 3 This option may be either the authorization for the paying agent by the beneficial owner to report the interest payment to the state of residence, or the presentation of a certificate issued by the competent authority of the state of residence, which proves that the beneficial owner declared the existence of foreign income. 4 Tax evasion and tax avoidance may significantly differ if one introduces moral aspects into the analysis. Empirical evidence on that is given by Kirchler et al. (2003). 5 The expressions “payoff ” and “utility” are used interchangeably throughout this text. 6 Before 2000, Article 26 para. 1 of the OECD Model authorized the exchange of information only in relation to the taxes covered by the OECD Model under the rule in Article 2. Article 26 para. 1 has been amended so as to apply to any taxes imposed by a contracting state (see para. 11.1 of the Commentary on Article 26 of the OECD Model).
4 Double tax avoidance and tax competition for mobile capital
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Markus Leibrecht and Thomas Rixen
4.1 Introduction Capital tax competition has received increasing attention in recent years, not least because capital mobility, both de jure and de facto, has risen. It is frequently argued that the attraction of mobile capital, other things being equal, creates welfare gains for a country as additional tax revenues accrue and/or the domestic capital and technology stocks increase. Thus, it is not surprising that countries strive to increase the capital stock within their borders. There are two largely distinct bodies of literature and corresponding research areas in international taxation. On the one hand, there is a large and continuously growing body of theoretical and empirical literature on tax competition (see, for example, Wilson and Wildasin 2004; Hochgatterer and Leibrecht 2009), mainly in the field of economics; on the other, there is a large body of mostly legal literature dealing with international double tax avoidance (see, for example, Lang 2003). The fact is, however, that there are only very few contributions that address both issues at the same time (see, for example, Roin 2008). This chapter tries to narrow the gap. Specifically, it shows why measures of double tax avoidance, even though they comprise measures of bilateral tax coordination, may actually act as instruments of tax competition.1 The rules of double tax avoidance (DTAV) are contained in bilateral double tax treaties (DTTs), in domestic tax rules and, in the European Union, in supranational tax laws. All these different levels of rules are influenced by conventions promoted by international organizations. This set of rules is designed to ensure that international investments are not over-taxed in comparison with national investments. The goal is to achieve “single taxation” by coordinating different countries’ taxing rights so as to avoid jurisdictional overlap. However, one consequence of the way DTAV rules are constructed and the way the various elements interact may be “double non-taxation”: sophisticated taxpayers can use the rules in a way that helps them to minimize their tax payments. They engage in so-called tax arbitrage across different jurisdictions and DTAV rules. However, the fact that taxpayers exploit differences in the rules in order to minimize their tax payments is by itself not sufficient to diagnose tax
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62 M. Leibrecht and T. Rixen competition. An additional condition is that governments use taxpayers’ arbitrage activities to attract capital investments.2 This becomes clear if one considers that horizontal tax competition is defined as non-cooperative tax setting by independent governments, where each government’s respective policy choices influence the allocation of mobile tax bases among the regions or jurisdictions represented by these governments (Wilson and Wildasin 2004). This means that independent jurisdictions interact strategically in setting taxes. Moreover, it implies that at least three conditions must be met in order for tax competition to exist. First, governments use tax rules intentionally to attract capital or to keep it in the country. This condition can be met in various ways such as a discretionary reduction in tax rates, fashioning preferential tax regimes for foreign investors or creating (or not closing) tax loopholes. Second, capital tax bases must be sensitive with respect to tax law differences, so that there is a real effect of governmental actions on the allocation of mobile tax bases. Third, capital mobility must be de jure possible and it must de facto occur (see also Bellak and Leibrecht 2008). As has already been noted, an extensive body of empirical literature exploring the presence of tax competition has emerged,3 but this literature focuses upon just one tax policy instrument to attract mobile capital, namely, statutory or effective tax rates on corporate income. Yet tax competition might occur via more subtle channels (see also Altshuler and Grubert 2005). In particular, we argue that there is a direct link between DTAV and tax competition. The most obvious link is that if double taxation is curbed, the net rate of return on, say, a foreign direct investment (FDI) is increased. This phenomenon is expected to be particularly pronounced in the case of tax-sparing rules in some treaties between developed and developing countries, as these rules ensure the advantages granted by specific tax provisions. Hence, with DTAV rules in force there is an increased propensity among firms to make foreign investments, and thus cross-border capital flows are induced. A more interesting link is based on the fact that DTAV rules generally rely on legal form rather than economic substance. Thus, these rules may leave open or create opportunities (“loopholes”) for tax arbitrage, enabling businesses to shift paper profits. Although it is likely that some of these loopholes are unintended, it is also conceivable that governments actively use DTAV rules to tailor specific offers to taxpayers’ needs in order to attract tax base. For example, governments can offer corporations the possibility to set up brass plate (“letterbox”) companies or other artificial legal entities; this encourages these enterprises to engage in tax residence “shopping”. Alternatively, governments may be reluctant to include thin capitalization measures in their DTAV rules in order to make their country more attractive for real capital investments (see, for example, Haufler and Runkel 2008). Thus, in addition to statutory and effective tax rates, governments may also use DTAV rules as instruments for competing over mobile tax bases. This chapter is structured as follows. In section 4.2, we outline the principles and rules of international double tax avoidance and explain how they can be
Double tax avoidance 63 used for purposes of tax arbitrage. Moreover, we outline why DTAV rules can provide an important institutional foundation of tax competition. After that, we review in section 4.3 the empirical literature suggestive of the role of DTAV rules in tax competition. Finally, we summarize our analysis and draw some preliminary policy conclusions.
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4.2 Double tax avoidance as the institutional foundation of tax competition In this section, we show how DTAV rules provide an institutional foundation of tax competition. We first describe the principles and rules of DTAV that operate on the domestic, bilateral and multilateral levels (subsection 4.2.1). We then move on to show how the complex set of DTAV rules can be used for purposes of tax arbitrage by taxpayers (subsection 4.2.2). Subsection 4.2.3 will then illustrate how governments react to taxpayers’ arbitrage activities and position themselves in the resulting tax competition. This description also provides a stylized historic account of the development of the international tax system. 4.2.1 Principles and rules of double tax avoidance Double taxation is defined as the imposition of comparable taxes in at least two countries on the same taxpayer with respect to the same subject matter and for identical periods (Baker 2001). It results from an overlap of jurisdiction to tax between a residence state, where the recipient of income lives, and a source state, where the income was generated. If both states exert their power to tax to the full extent, the total burden on trans-border economic activities is prohibitively high. In order to obtain the benefits of international liberalization, governments have a common interest in avoiding double taxation. The basic conflict is: which country has the right to tax the income, and which country must restrict its tax claims (see, for example, Li 2003)? While there were some domestic provisions and a few DTTs in continental Europe prior to World War I, after the war the problem became more pressing when many countries put taxation on a broader basis, including general income taxes. In the 1920s, the International Chamber of Commerce put the issue of double taxation on the international agenda. In response to this, the League of Nations commissioned reports by experts and convened several conferences of technical experts and government officials. During the League years, the basic principles and rules were developed that have guided the avoidance of double taxation up to today. In the 1950s and 1960s, the OECD took over the position of the League of Nations (and briefly the United Nations) as the main multilateral policy forum for discussions of international tax issues (Rixen 2008: 86–99; Picciotto 1992: 14–35). Initially, the objective of these activities was to draft a multilateral tax treaty. But governments persistently rejected the idea of a binding multilateral treaty. They were nonetheless supportive of developing a model convention (MC) that
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64 M. Leibrecht and T. Rixen could be employed as a template for bilateral DTTs. They insisted on keeping the MC non-binding to allow the necessary flexibility to make nationally differing tax systems compatible with one another (Rixen 2008, 2010). The development of the MC was marked by a conflict over the allocation of taxing rights. Should the MC be based on the residence or the source principle? Both principles can be normatively justified. Those emphasizing the principle of ability to pay will favor residence taxation because the residence country is in a better position to assess the taxpayer’s worldwide income. Conversely, if one regards the benefit principle as the more appropriate standard, this would suggest source taxation because the source country provides infrastructure that allows the generation of income in the first place. Both of these arguments are simple and intuitive. None of the scholars who have discussed the issue of a desirable allocation of taxing rights has come out in favor of one or the other principle; rather, they have favored some solution that accords different weights to these considerations (see, for example, Musgrave 2006; Li 2003). This normative indeterminacy was further aggravated by a distributive conflict between net capital importers and net capital exporters. Exporting countries favor the residence principle, whereas importers favor source taxation. In each case, the respective principle would result in the allocation of a bigger share of the international tax base to one or the other country (see, for example, Dagan 2000; Davies 2004).4 Accordingly, it has not been possible to achieve a general consensus on either principle. Instead, the solutions embodied in the various MCs that have been developed since the 1920s (which have remained fundamentally unchanged from that time right up to today) represent a compromise. Broadly speaking, the primary (or exclusive) right to tax active business income is granted to the source country (Article 7 of the OECD MC) if there is at least a “permanent establishment” (Article 5 of the OECD MC) – that is, a fixed place of business – in that country. The residence country, by contrast, has the primary right to tax passive income – that is, income from financial investment such as interest, dividends or royalties – with the source country having the right to levy withholding taxes (Articles 10–12 of the OECD MC).5 Overall, the MC differentiates between various kinds of income and assigns each to either the source country or the residence country. In general, the OECD MC places greater emphasis on residence taxation.6 For passive investment income, the rates for royalties are different from those for dividends or income. The OECD MC is thus based on a schedular system of taxation. The residence country is obliged to provide relief from double taxation in cases of full or limited source taxation. This can be done by granting either a foreign tax credit for the tax paid at source on the tax due in the home country or a full exemption of that income from home tax. In addition, bilateral treaties contain provisions on information exchange between tax administrations (Article 26 of the MC). This is the only provision of DTTs that is not primarily concerned with the avoidance of double taxation but focuses instead on the problem of potential tax evasion and avoidance.
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Double tax avoidance 65 In parallel to the drafting of the non-binding multilateral MC (and in some cases even prior to it), governments have developed domestic tax rules to avoid double taxation (Rixen 2008). Basically, all countries provide for relief of double taxation unilaterally. Their respective national tax codes contain provisions for exempting foreign income from taxation, crediting the taxpayer or granting a deduction (partial relief ) for taxes paid on such income in the source country. In addition, governments conclude bilateral DTTs on the basis of the MC. Basically, all of the more than 3,000 bilateral tax treaties adopt the basic structure and the provisions of the MC (Owens 2008). Thus, most DTTs are similar in terms of the topics covered, their structure and even the language used. Seventy- five percent of the wording in any given DTT will be identical to that of any other DTT (Avi-Yonah 2007). Often, technical innovations that come up in bilateral treaties or in domestic provisions are integrated into the multilateral MC so that experience gained at the national and bilateral levels can be disseminated multilaterally to all parties. Other innovations are initiated by the OECD, which constantly strives to modernize and adapt the MC. Through this interaction of domestic, bilateral and multilateral activities, a common understanding of double tax avoidance is developed.7 In other words, the complex of rules which we summarily refer to as DTAV rules consists of domestic rules of international taxation and of binding bilateral DTTs, both of which are informed by the principles developed within multilateral policy forums, most importantly the OECD (Rixen 2010). In line with the interests of governments, the particular solution embodied in the MC is sovereignty-preserving – that is, it ensures that countries are as free as possible to apply their own national tax laws (Rixen forthcoming). The MC defines a series of legal constructs intended to allocate the right to tax among the jurisdictions involved (see, for example, Bird 2000). For example, the concept of a permanent establishment (PE) codifies what is taxable as a separate entity of a multinational enterprise (MNE) in the country of source. This and other constructs are chosen in such a way as to interfere as little as possible with national tax laws. They merely allocate the right to tax to governments, without prescribing whether or how they ought to exercise this right. Governments retain full authority to design all elements of their respective tax regimes – namely the tax base, rate and system – independently of other governments. The idea is that of territorial disentanglement of different tax systems. There is no harmonization of national tax systems, but only coordination of different regimes. In this sense, the term “international tax” is a misnomer, since there is no overriding international law of taxation, but only rules of allocation that operate at the interfaces of different national tax systems (Li 2003). Emblematic of the sovereignty- preserving setup of international taxation are the rules for allocating the profits of MNEs to the various countries in which the MNE operates. Under the “separate entity approach”, the allocation should be the same as would result if the different entities of a multinational group were independent actors transacting on a market. This so-called arm’s-length standard (ALS) makes it unnecessary to agree on a common tax base.
66 M. Leibrecht and T. Rixen Thus, while the interfaces of different tax systems in the form of DTAV rules have been harmonized to a considerable extent – even though important differences remain among bilateral tax treaties – national tax rules remain dissimilar.
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4.2.2 How double tax avoidance enables tax arbitrage Although rules of double tax avoidance explicitly address only governments and tell them how to structure their international tax relations, the same rules (implicitly) pre-structure taxpayers’ avoidance or planning strategies. There are several techniques of tax arbitrage, which is defined as “tak[ing] advantage of inconsistencies between different countries’ tax rules to achieve a more favourable result than that which would have resulted from investing in a single jurisdiction” (Shaviro 2002: 319). First, the manipulation of arm’s-length transfer prices is a method of avoidance that builds on an important aspect of the DTT regime. According to Article 7 (2) of the OECD MC, the profits of an MNE have to be attributed to the different affiliates as if their transactions with each other were those of independent enterprises exchanging their products and services at regular market prices. However, it is often difficult to determine the “correct” market prices, since there is no regular market on which the goods in question are traded.8 Accordingly, taxpayers enjoy legal maneuvering room to set transfer prices in a way that leads to the allocation of larger shares of profit to low-tax countries. A second tax planning technique is treaty shopping – that is, the “accessing of treaty benefits by persons who are not resident of either treaty state through the use of an entity that qualifies as a resident of one of the states” (Li 2003: 106). For example, if a company wishes to get access to cheap capital from residents of a country with which there is no tax treaty, it may be advisable to let a financial subsidiary in a treaty partner country issue the bonds (see, for example, Papke 2000). Third, the schedular structure of DTTs allows taxpayers to reclassify their financial flows in a tax-optimal way. Most importantly, they can substitute debt for equity. Very often, this reclassification is facilitated by the possibility of hybrid financing and hybrid entities, which we discuss here in more detail for three reasons. First, the use of hybrid financial instruments provides a vivid illustration of how the structure of DTTs can be utilized to reclassify financial flows tax optimally. Second, hybrid financing can be interpreted as a sophisticated way to substitute debt for equity with the intention of circumventing thin capitalization rules (see the following subsection, subsection 4.2.3) – in many cases without actually increasing the debt to equity ratio. Third, although hybrid instruments may be issued for a variety of non-tax reasons (Duncan 2000), taxation issues do have considerable impact on management’s financing decisions. What makes hybrid instruments such a potent tool in tax planning is the simple fact that in the majority of countries, financial instruments must be treated either wholly as equity or wholly as debt for fiscal purposes.9 In other words,
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Double tax avoidance 67 income is treated either as a distribution of profit (or dividends, in a broad sense), or as interest. This in turn is crucial for two reasons: first, the classification generally determines whether or not the issuer can treat the payments as tax deductible; second, in many cases it determines whether the income from the instruments is tax-exempt in the hands of the recipients (Eberhartinger 2005; Helminen 2004; Six 2007; Wittendorff and Banner-Voigt 2000). Only in rare cases is the fiscal treatment of an instrument split. De facto, a wide variety of financial instruments incorporate elements of both equity and debt.10 Because these financial tools usually cannot be classified clearly as either one or the other, they are referred to as “hybrid instruments”, or collectively as “mezzanine financing”. The spectrum of hybrid instruments ranges from corporate shares with features typical of loans (such as certain preference shares) to loans with features usually associated with equity investments (such as participation in profits and losses). Such equity-type loans include, among other things, jouissance rights, silent partnerships, participation bonds, convertible bonds, warrant bonds, profit-participating loans and preference shares. For fiscal authorities, the wide variety of hybrid instruments in use and their rapid evolution makes an unambiguous classification of any given hybrid instrument all but impossible. The need to apply general criteria in the classification of hybrid instruments opens up significant opportunities for tax planning. Evidently this is even more important for cross-border transactions. Hybrid instruments are used effectively as flexible, tailor-made forms of finance because in cross-border situations both countries involved must decide on the classification of the instruments and could, in some cases, decide differently. Thus, if a payment is deductible as interest in the source state and exempt as remuneration of equity (dividend) in the parent company’s state of residence, the result will be double non-taxation. In the opposite case, where the hybrid instrument is treated as equity in the source state and as debt in the state where the parent company resides, the difference in classification may result in double taxation, with the payment subject to withholding tax in the source state and to income tax in the parent company’s state of residence. This is where the DTTs should step in to prevent double taxation. The relevant distributive rules in DTTs for the treatment of income derived from hybrid financial instruments are Articles 10 (on dividends) and 11 (on interest). Articles 10 and 11 of the OECD MC give the residence state an unlimited right to tax the income received; at the same time, these rules do not deny the source state a right to tax that same income by levying a withholding tax. To avoid double taxation, the OECD MC therefore obliges the state of residence to credit the taxpayer with the tax withheld by the source state against the corporate tax that the former desires to levy. Articles 23A and 23B of the OECD MC provide for the use of the standard credit method with a per-country limitation in these cases. The OECD MC curtails the rights of the source state by limiting the amount of withholding tax it may levy: Article 10 limits it to 5 percent in the case of associated companies11 and to 15 percent in all other cases; Article 11 limits the
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68 M. Leibrecht and T. Rixen permitted withholding tax to 10 percent. These limits are the subject of bargaining in treaty negotiations, and individual conventions may differ considerably from the OECD MC.12 Similarly, it is also possible for a specific DTT to deny the source state the right to levy withholding tax; this is more frequently the case with interest payments than with dividends.13 Whereas the actual levels of withholding tax provided for in a specific DTT are relevant in practice, it is important to point out that DTTs may give the source state the right to levy withholding tax on both dividends and interest, on neither of them or – most importantly – on only one of them. This last case is clearly important for hybrid finance because the classification of the return as dividend or interest then determines whether withholding tax can be levied or not.14 In the standard case where both countries apply the same classification criteria to decide whether the return on a certain hybrid instrument falls under Article 10 or Article 11, it is merely a matter of tax planning to choose hybrid instruments whose returns fall under the more favorable of the two articles. More difficult to resolve is the situation where a DTT provides for a withholding tax in accordance with only one of the articles but the countries concerned do not apply the same article to the return of a particular hybrid instrument. In one particularly problematic case, the source state (country X) applies the article that provides for withholding tax (say, the dividend article) and levies the appropriate tax. The recipient’s state of residence (country Y), on the other hand, applies the article that does not provide for withholding tax. Must Y then credit the taxpayer with the tax withheld in X, even if according to Y’s interpretation of the treaty no such withholding tax is permitted?15 Although the prevailing German legal opinion (see, for example, Wassermeyer 2004) in part seems to suggest that the state of residence is not obliged to credit the taxpayer in this case, which would result in double taxation of the return despite the DTT, the issue remains unresolved. It seems reasonable to assume that some countries will credit the withholding tax while other countries will decline to do so in these circumstances. In any event, this problem makes it clear why the application of the two relevant articles is important when hybrid instruments are used, particularly if the accepted view is that the DTT must be interpreted autonomously (Lang 1993, 1998, 1999). The essential criterion for distinguishing between these two distributive rules is the existence of a corporate right. The yield of a hybrid instrument qualified as a corporate right under Article 10 is defined as a dividend in accordance with the purposes outlined in that article. In all other cases, the yield constitutes interest under Article 11. In order for an investment to qualify as a corporate right under the OECD MC, the investor must accept the risk of possible loss of the investment in a way comparable to the risk assumed by a regular shareholder. According to the prevailing German doctrine, this is the case if the investment involves participation in both the profits and the liquidation proceeds of the issuing company. Only if these two conditions are satisfied is the investor’s risk of loss comparable to that of a regular shareholder.16 The OECD MC, however, does not explicitly mention these conditions or indicate how they can be satisfied for purposes of qualifying a financial
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Double tax avoidance 69 instrument as equity. Hybrid financial instruments have numerous possible characteristics regarding participation in entrepreneurial risk, which makes it difficult to determine whether these conditions are satisfied in a particular case. This in turn will inevitably lead to situations where two contracting states disagree on whether the characteristics of a hybrid instrument are such as to qualify that instrument as a corporate right and thus as generating dividends. It is therefore possible that, in the situation of a particular taxpayer and a given form of hybrid finance, one state applies the dividend article (Article 10) while the other applies the interest article (Article 11). Depending on the relevant tax treaty, this might result in double taxation or double non-taxation of the taxpayer’s income.17 From the perspective of tax planning this situation holds considerable potential because it implies that a group in a given set of countries may be able to choose an appropriate hybrid instrument that allows for double non-taxation, thus creating in fact tax-free income. An enterprise or business group with particular financial needs would be able to choose appropriate countries for its subsidiaries in order to optimize or even eliminate the tax burden on payments received (treaty shopping). With these and other similar techniques, taxpayers make sure that profits are taxable in low-tax countries, while losses occur in high-tax states. What these methods have in common is that none of them relies on the relocation of real business activities, but rather on the mere shifting of paper profits and losses. This form of tax arbitrage is possible because the DTT regime gives states the freedom to design their own national tax laws. The sovereignty-preserving approach to double tax cooperation creates an opportunity structure for taxpayers to engage in tax arbitrage. 4.2.3 DTAV rules as instruments of tax competition The sovereignty-preserving character of DTAV rules creates not only an opportunity structure for taxpayers but also one for governments to engage in tax competition. This manifests itself in different ways. To begin with, since DTTs may reduce the overall tax burden on international investment but at the same time contain provisions that increase investors’ legal certainty, governments may want to conclude such treaties in order to signal the attractiveness of their respective countries as a location for international investment (see, for example, Dagan 2000). Whereas this would make DTTs important instruments in the competition for mobile capital, clauses on the exchange of information might reduce the possibilities for tax avoidance, which could hamper FDI. But there are other ways to use DTAV rules in tax competition. Most importantly, tax haven governments make special offers to satisfy taxpayer demand for tax minimization. This is possible because DTAV rules set no limits on how governments can design their national tax legislation and because, in general, legal form and not economic substance is sufficient for establishing tax residence. Also, governments actively design solutions that can help taxpayers to play out the differences among different DTTs or different domestic laws and
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70 M. Leibrecht and T. Rixen DTTs. This is most easily visible if one considers the role tax havens play in the tax competition game. Tax-haven governments offer very low or zero tax rates in combination with tailored solutions, making it easy for businesses to establish legal tax residence under their jurisdiction. One way of doing this is to allow the incorporation of brass plate businesses which serve no substantive economic purpose, merely the tax-privileged holding of assets for a multinational group. Tax havens actively search for market niches and try to specialize in different tax planning activities.18 This illustrates that tax havens are in competition with each other and with high-tax countries for the assignment of so-called paper profits. This also implies that high-tax countries come under competitive pressure; they must take the threat of the erosion of their tax base into consideration in the design of their tax systems.19 Many high-tax countries reacted to tax arbitrage with a combination of trying to curb it and efforts to remain competitive vis-à-vis other countries. With respect to curbing tax arbitrage, governments have developed unilateral measures against tax avoidance. One example is the so-called controlled foreign companies (CFC) legislation, which targets the use of foreign subsidiaries as base or conduit companies in tax havens. In the 1960s, the United States was the first country to introduce unilateral anti-avoidance legislation. Resident shareholders, for example the parents of an MNE, controlling a subsidiary in a tax haven are taxable on the passive income (e.g. interest incurred from the lending of liquid funds) of the subsidiary in the current period, regardless of whether that income is actually distributed to them or not. Thus, CFC rules stretch the original DTAV principle of treating all parts of an MNE as separate national entities20 and in so doing pierce the “corporate veil” of the tax haven entity. In the meantime, such rules have diffused via the OECD to all major capital-exporting nations (see, for example, Arnold 2000). Another example of an attempt to curb tax arbitrage is so-called thin capitalization rules. These rules identify a threshold of excessive debt on the basis of the debt–equity ratio. The rules only apply to non-resident lenders holding a significant percentage of the shares of the resident corporation.21 If the criteria are met, then the debt is treated as “hidden equity” and the interest payment is not deductible.22 A final example of an area in which efforts at curbing abuse have been made is transfer pricing. Again the United States was the first country to push for changes. In the 1990s, it adopted new transfer pricing guidelines; OECD recommendations were subsequently also reformed. Since then, the guidelines have been in a state of almost perpetual adaptation. Overall, the new guidelines move the actual rules closer to considering the consolidated profits of the MNE but take great care to formally reinforce the principle of separate entity accounting on a transactional basis. With the introduction of advanced pricing agreements (APAs) in many countries and their promotion by the OECD, this trend has become even more pronounced.23 However, the effectiveness of these measures is questionable. In the case of transfer prices, for instance, the manoeuvring room for taxpayers remains high
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Double tax avoidance 71 because the range of permissible prices is large. At the same time, the procedure imposes serious administrative costs on the taxpayer. As for the unilateral anti- avoidance measures, what can be observed is that they generally target certain circumscribed tax arbitrage schemes which taxpayers can simply circumvent by designing more sophisticated schemes. For example, CFC rules are often sidestepped by creating hybrid entities.24 What is observed in practice is a kind of proliferation spiral. Taxpayers react to anti-avoidance rules by devising more sophisticated techniques of tax arbitrage; these in turn are then targeted by new anti-avoidance rules by governments, and so on. In effect, governments continue to react to taxpayers’ arbitrage activities. A likely reason why governments do not design broad and effective rules against tax arbitrage is that they are under competitive pressure vis-à-vis other high-tax countries which are willing to leave loopholes open for their taxpayers.25 One recent example of this is the introduction of a so-called Zinsschranke (i.e. a unilaterally binding boundary on debt financing of affiliates) in German corporation tax law. Originally, the finance minister planned to introduce a thin capitalization rule that foresaw the non-deductibility of 50 per cent of interest expenses. However, this proposal met with opposition from business interests and parliamentarians of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), one of the parties making up the coalition government. Eventually, the Zinsschranke passed by the government only foresees the non-deductibility of 30 per cent of net interest expenses (those expenses above interest receipts), and this only if none of three exceptions (small company clause, group clause and escape clause (see Homburg 2007: 605) is applicable (Jarass 2007). Very recently, following continuous lobbying of business interests against the rule, the small company clause has been extended as part of the government’s stimulus package against the global recession: instead of the rule being applied to interest expenses above €1 million, the threshold has been increased to €3 million. To summarize, DTAV rules not only achieve the avoidance of double taxation but also provide an institutional foundation of tax arbitrage (for taxpayers) and, further, DTAV rules become instruments of tax competition (for home and host-country governments).26 Some evidence for a role of DTAV rules in tax competition is presented in the next section.
4.3 Empirical evidence on the role of DTAV in tax competition In section 4.2, we outlined several channels through which DTAV rules can result in tax minimization by MNEs and thus can be used for tax competition by governments. This section tries to assess the empirical relevance of these channels. Unfortunately, no direct evidence is available, underscoring the role of DTAV rules in tax competition for mobile capital, so we must rely on indirect evidence here. Following Griffith and Klemm (2005), direct evidence for tax competition is based on empirical models relating a country’s tax rate on
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72 M. Leibrecht and T. Rixen corporate income to the weighted tax rate of competitor countries (i.e. on reaction-function approaches). The seminal paper in this respect is Devereux et al. (2004). A direct study would, thus, relate rules of DTAV by one country to that of competitor countries.27 However, the papers surveyed can provide indirect evidence for the role of DTAV rules in tax competition as they focus on a precondition for tax competition to set in, namely the sensitivity of mobile capital (especially FDI and paper profits) with respect to tax conditions. Specifically, we survey (i) empirical papers about the effect of DTTs on FDI, (ii) papers on the relevance of tax-sparing rules for FDI to developing countries, and (iii) studies dealing with the empirical relevance of profit shifting, whereby a particular focus is put on transfer pricing and the impact of thin capitalization rules on debt financing of foreign affiliates. Finally, we present (iv) the main results of a study dealing explicitly with the role of “hybrid entities”. 4.3.1 Preliminary remarks The papers surveyed are structured along several dimensions (main outcomes, databases used, estimators applied, etc.).28 A particular focus is put on the derivation of the implied semi-elasticities. Semi-elasticities represent the percentage change in the endogenous variable (FDI, pre-tax profit, etc.) when the exogenous variable of main interest (statutory tax rate on corporate income, dummy variable for DTT in force or not, etc.) changes by one unit (e.g. a change of 1 percentage point in the tax rate or the change of a dummy variable from 0 to 1). The derivation of semi-elasticities is intended to make the results of the heterogeneous studies surveyed somewhat more comparable (see also De Mooij 2005). The empirical models used in the papers do not usually lead directly to semi- elasticities. Thus, the regression coefficients shown in the papers need to be suitably transformed in a first step. The empirical models applied in the various papers are usually based on “level-level” or on “log-level” specifications. Level- level specifications relate the endogenous variable in levels (e.g. FDI in millions of euros) to the independent variable of main interest, also measured in levels (e.g. the statutory tax rate on corporate income measured as a percentage or a dummy variable indicating the presence of a DTT). In contrast, log-level specifications have the dependent variables in logarithmic form (e.g. log(FDI)). The advantage of the latter specification is that the implied semi-elasticity is made directly visible by multiplying the regression coefficient by 100.29 In the case of level-level specifications, the implied semi-elasticity can be deduced by: ε(s) = â/(y_mean) × 100
(1)
with â being the regression coefficient and y_mean the sample mean value of the endogenous variable.
Double tax avoidance 73 Moreover, some empirical models are based on elasticities (ε) as regression coefficients (“log-log specifications”). In these cases the implied semi-elasticities are derived as:
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ε(s) = ε/(x_mean) × 100
(2)
with ε = elasticity = regression coefficient and x_mean being the sample mean value of the independent variable of main interest Not all papers provide the information necessary (e.g. the mean values of y and x) to derive the semi-elasticities from the regression coefficients. Therefore, only papers providing this information are included in the survey. 4.3.2 A brief summary of empirical studies 4.3.2.1 Double taxation treaties and foreign direct investment Empirical papers dealing with the impact of DTTs on FDI are quite scarce. This is even more so for studies analyzing the impact of tax-sparing rules contained in DTTs on FDI to developing countries. Basically, signing a DTT might on the one hand lead to more FDI because double taxation of income is avoided and uncertainty is reduced. On the other hand, however, DTTs might also reduce the possibilities for tax evasion and avoidance (Egger et al. 2006). Thus, empirically speaking, the effect of DTTs on FDI is ambiguous a priori. Concerning studies dealing with FDI and DTT,30 the early paper of Blonigen and Davies (2000) concludes that the signing of DTTs does not have relevant effects on the volume of FDI because most regression coefficients lack statistical significance. Thus, a semi-elasticity of zero is plausible. In a follow-up study (Blonigen and Davies 2002), the same authors find that FDI is lower if a new treaty is signed. This suggests that the possibilities for evading taxes via FDI are fewer if a viable tax treaty is in force.31 The analyses of Blonigen and Davies are based on level-level specifications. In more recent work (Blonigen and Davies 2004b), the same authors argue in favor of using a “log-level” specification. Applying the latter leads the authors to conclude that new treaties do not seem to impact positively or negatively on FDI because the regression coefficients are not statistically different from zero. To sum up, the papers of Blonigen and Davies imply that DTTs do not impact on the level of FDI. However, two aspects of the Blonigen and Davies studies are worth mentioning. First, they rely largely on data for developed economies; and second, they consider the signing of a DTT to be an exogenous event. Concerning the first aspect, Neumayer (2007) provides evidence that the presence of a DTT increases FDI in middle-income developing countries; thus, he finds a positive impact of DTTs on FDI. Egger et al. (2006) allow the signing of a DTT to be an endogenous event. Specifically, it is more likely that countries will sign a DTT in cases where bilateral FDI is already present. Using a rather sophisticated two-step approach, they find that the signing of a new DTT reduces FDI significantly.
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74 M. Leibrecht and T. Rixen This result is consistent with the view that DTTs effectively reduce the possibilities to avoid taxes via FDI. If we turn to recent studies on the topic, Barthel et al. (2008) conclude that DTTs lead to substantial and significantly higher FDI stocks. The distinguishing feature of this study is the usage of a large dataset containing both developed and developing countries. Finally, Davies et al. (2009) again find little evidence for an effect of DTT on the level of total sales acting as proxy for foreign investment. However, they do find evidence supporting the contention that treaty formation has a positive impact on the probability of new investment in a country. Thus, tax treaties seem to have no effect on the volume of investment (given that a firm has already invested in a country), but they do seem to have an impact on the location of the investment.32 So what can we conclude from these papers with respect to our assertion that DTAV rules create an institutional foundation of tax competition? Since the more recent studies find evidence that DTTs positively impact FDI (especially to developing countries) and new investments, then one precondition for tax competition to set in – namely, the sensitivity of FDI to changes in the taxation environment – seems to be fulfilled. Put differently, without DTTs, less capital would move across borders, and tax competition for FDI between countries would be of less importance.33 However, one must bear in mind that the results of Egger et al. (2006) are evidence against our assertion. Their results imply that DTTs are effective in reducing the possibilities for MNEs to avoid taxes and that DTTs are not instruments of tax competition for governments. To sum up, the available literature supports our assertion if developing countries are included in the sample and if the impact of DTTs on new investments is considered. 4.3.2.2 Tax-sparing clauses and foreign direct investment Tax-sparing clauses are sometimes included in DTTs signed by developed countries, in particular if applying the credit system in international taxation (e.g. Japan or the United Kingdom), and developing countries. These rules have the aim of allowing foreign investors to partake of the special tax advantages provided by the host countries of FDI. Put differently, if a tax-sparing clause is included in a DTT, then the home country of FDI calculates the residual tax liability of the investor as if the special tax advantage were not provided by the host country (see Hines 1998). Only two empirical papers on this issue are available so far. Both are based on Japanese FDI data and both find a huge impact of tax-sparing rules on FDI (see the semi-elasticities contained in Appendix A2, p. 86). This evidence is consistent with the results of Neumayer presented above, which show a significant impact of DTTs on FDI to developing countries. Thus, the studies surveyed provide fairly solid evidence for the positive impact of DTTs on FDI to developing countries, especially if they include tax-sparing clauses. Hence, overall the evidence is in favor of DTTs making capital mobile across borders. Thus, DTAV rules are capable of spurring tax competition, which supports our assertion that these rules are an institutional foundation of tax competition.
Double tax avoidance 75
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4.3.2.3 Tax-motivated profit shifting As has already been outlined, various means to shift profits from high‑ to low- tax countries exist. These include transfer pricing, debt financing of affiliated companies or the location of intangible assets. Profit-shifting incentives are exerted by differences in statutory tax rates on corporate income across countries (see, for example, Weichenrieder 2009). These differences lead to tax- motivated changes in the location of pre-tax profits via the various means to shift profits. The papers surveyed here are separated into three categories: (i) papers dealing with profit shifting in general, (ii) papers dealing with profit shifting via transfer pricing or the location of intangible assets, and (iii) papers dealing with the effect of thin capitalization rules on debt financing of firms. The papers summarized in Appendix A3 relate a proxy for a firm’s declared profits (pre-tax or net of tax, depending on the study) to the relevant (home or host country) statutory tax rate on corporate income.34 De Mooij’s paper (2005) also includes a survey of empirical studies. The author calculates a semi- elasticity of −2, meaning that a 1 percentage point shift in the relevant tax rate changes declared profits by about 2 percent. More recent studies (Weichenrieder 2009; Huizinga and Laeven 2007) broadly confirm this evidence even if the implied semi-elasticities are somewhat lower (about +1 and −1.30).35 Concerning our assertion, these results imply that profit shifting is an empirically relevant phenomenon and that DTAV measures are not effective in curbing it. However, not curbing profit shifting might be in the interest of governments because this could lead to an inflow of tax revenues (in a low-tax country) or because profit-shifting opportunities probably make real capital less sensitive to differences in statutory tax rates across countries.36 The papers whose results are shown in Appendices A4 and A5 shed more light on the various channels of profit shifting (transfer pricing, location of intangibles and thin capitalization of foreign affiliates). Clausing (2003) was among the first to address the transfer pricing issue directly. Clausing relates the export and import prices of US multinational firms to the statutory tax rate on corporate income of the host country of a foreign affiliate. She finds substantial evidence for tax-motivated transfer pricing in US intra-firm trade prices. Specifically, the lower a host country’s tax rate, the lower are US intra-firm export prices and the higher are US intra-firm import prices relative to corresponding arm’s-length prices. Based on Clausing’s results, semi-elasticities of about +4 for export prices and −4.7 for import prices are derived (cf. Appendix A4). Bernard et al. (2008) also give direct evidence for the importance of tax- motivated transfer pricing. Their paper shows that the wedge between the arm’slength export price and the intra-firm export price of US-based multinationals is negatively related to the taxation of corporate income in the foreign import country. This response indicates that tax-motivated transfer pricing is present in the intra-firm export prices of US-based multinational companies. The mean semi-elasticity derived is −1.25. This value implies that a 1 percentage point
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76 M. Leibrecht and T. Rixen increase in the host country’s tax rate on corporate income leads to a decrease in the wedge between arm’s-length export prices and intra-firm export prices of 1.25 percent. Dischinger and Riedel (2008) analyze the tax sensitivity of the location of intangible assets with respect to the statutory tax rate on corporate income. They show that the location of holdings and investments in intangible assets is indeed inversely related to the statutory tax rate on corporate income. This relationship can be considered as indirect evidence in favor of tax-motivated transfer pricing in the intra-firm trade of intangibles. The derived semi-elasticity is −1.20.37 Concerning our assertion, these results collectively imply that profit shifting via transfer pricing is an empirically relevant phenomenon and that stipulations concerning transfer pricing contained in DTAV rules are by no means effective in curbing it. However, as in the case of profit shifting in general, it might be in the interest of governments not to inhibit profit shifting through transfer pricing. Turning to papers dealing with the impact that thin capitalization rules exert on the financing structure of affiliated companies, we see that such rules do indeed have a significant effect on the level of debt financing (cf. Appendix A5). The results indicate that the introduction of thin capitalization rules has a pronounced effect on the debt-to-asset ratio of an affiliated company. This means that governments could reduce the amount of profit shifting via debt financing with relative ease.38 But even in the European Union, as of 2007 seven Member States had not applied thin capitalization regimes. Worthy of note here is that among those countries which have not applied such rules are many smaller nations that are known to be among the more aggressive tax competitors (see Haufler and Runkel 2008; Dourado and de la Feria 2008). Furthermore, the rules in operation in the other EU member countries vary according to the method adopted, the scope of application and their effects (see Dourado and de la Feria 2008). Not applying thin capitalization rules might be considered as an effort by governments to attract foreign real capital (see also Altshuler and Grubert 2005; Haufler and Runkel 2008), most likely coupled with a positive effect on the domestic capital stock and with positive technology spill-over effects.39 Again, these results favor our conjecture. 4.3.2.4 The role of hybrid entities As is suggested above (in section 4.2), tax minimization using hybrid entities or hybrid securities is likely. But empirical evidence on the role of hybrid instruments is scarce. One notable exception is the paper of Altshuler and Grubert (2005), who analyze the effects of a specific amendment to CFC rules in the United States in 1997. In particular, new regulation in 1997 introduced “hybrid entities”. Altshuler and Grubert describe these as “business operations that are regarded as corporations by one country while being an unincorporated branch to another” (ibid.: 5). Hybrid entities allow US companies to
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Double tax avoidance 77 avoid the current tax under the CFC rules on intercompany payments (e.g. interest and royalties) made from an affiliate in a high-tax country (H) to another affiliate in a low-tax country (L). At the same time, country H also allows such payments to be deductible. The new regulations are usually referred to as “check-the-box” rules because they give firms the possibility simply of checking a box on a tax form to either identify an entity as a separate corporation or classify it as the branch of another corporation (see Altshuler and Grubert 2005 for details). The introduction of these rules in 1997 provides sufficient varience to distill the empirical importance of hybrid entities. On the basis of this change in US national tax law, Altshuler and Grubert provide evidence that MNEs could save huge amounts of taxes by using hybrid entities. One piece of evidence in this respect is based on the comparison of the tax- rate sensitivity of declared pre-tax profits by US foreign affiliates with respect to the statutory tax rate on corporate income in the host country before and after the introduction of check-the-box. Altshuler and Grubert show that the tax-rate sensitivity in 2000 (i.e. after the introduction of check-the-box) was higher in absolute value than it was in 1996 (the year before the introduction). The corresponding semi-elasticities given in Table A6 are −1.48 for 1996 and −2.07 for 2000, respectively. This difference in the magnitudes of the two mean values is suggestive evidence in favor of an increase in tax-motivated profit shifting via hybrid entities after the 1997 rule change. Specifically, according to Altshuler and Grubert, it is possible that highly profitable subsidiaries in high-tax countries became part of a consolidated hybrid entity based in a tax haven or that “high- tax host countries may have reacted to the increasing tax sensitivity of investment by easing up on their transfer pricing and thin capitalization rules in order to attract mobile corporations” (2005: 17). Another piece of evidence contained in Altshuler and Grubert which is consistent with the increasing importance of hybrid entities is that “there are less CFCs in the 2000 sample than in 1996” (2005: 16 footnote 3). Moreover, the authors find that the total tangible capital in all locations grew by 28 percent from 1996 to 2000. But in five low-tax countries, tangible capital grew by almost 200 percent. According to Altshuler and Grubert, most of this growth “reflects the consolidation of the low-tax CFC with the operations of a high-tax affiliate” (ibid.: 18). Concerning our assertion that DTAV rules provide an institutional foundation of tax competition, the example of the 1997 check-the-box change in US CFC rules suggests that unilaterally applied measures (in this case by the home country of FDI) make it easier for MNEs to avoid taxes. The introduction of check-the-box can also be considered as a home-country instrument to attract – or at least to avoid losing – firms because the ability to hide profits makes it more likely that a company will not opt to relocate its headquarters. To sum up, the indirect evidence provided in this section suggests that DTAV rules do indeed serve as an institutional foundation of tax competition: DTTs seem to increase the propensity of firms to become multinational via FDI. DTAV without
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thin capitalization rules, despite their effectiveness in curbing profit shifting, can be seen as an example for host countries using not only statutory tax rates to compete for mobile capital but also more subtle channels. The presence of tax-motivated transfer pricing via intra-firm trade or through the location of intangibles, despite the existence of DTTs and transfer pricing regulations, is another example in this respect. The check-the-box regulation represents an example for the role of unilateral DTAV rules introduced by a home country as instrument of tax competition (for the latter, see also Altshuler and Grubert 2005).
4.4 Summary and conclusions This chapter explores the role DTAV rules play in tax competition for mobile capital. We first sketched various channels, introduced by DTAV rules, through which taxpayers can minimize tax payments and which also constitute channels for governments to compete for mobile capital. Second, the overview of existing empirical research provides indirect evidence for our assertion that tax competition via subtle DTAV-related channels exists. We may conclude that DTAV rules play a prominent role in the tax competition game. The deeper reason for this lies in the patchwork structure of DTAV rules. The fact that there are differences among the various domestic and bilateral rules creates possibilities for tax arbitrage, which in turn creates tax competition among countries and thus reinforces the differences among the tax rules. What policy conclusions follow from these findings? Specifically, since DTAV rules also comprise measures of tax coordination (e.g. DTTs), what conclusions can then be derived concerning the discussion on the virtues and pitfalls of tax coordination and tax harmonization? The answer depends on the welfare effects of tax competition. If one sees tax competition as a process to restrain selfish governments or to induce policy innovations, then the answer would probably be “do nothing because there are no virtues of tax coordination”. However, if one sees tax competition as a process leading to welfare decreases, then it is clear that the current sovereignty- preserving approach to tax coordination is insufficient to address the issue of tax competition effectively. As long as governments remain free to determine central aspects of their respective tax systems independently, they will always have an incentive to tailor their tax regimes to the specific needs of taxpayers wishing to optimize their international tax payments. Neither unilateral measures (which governments will often also use as strategic instruments in tax competition) nor bilateral tax treaties can be effective instruments to address the inherently multilateral problems of tax arbitrage and tax competition. What would be needed instead is tax coordination by delegation40 – that is, central parameters of tax systems would have to be determined and administered by an organization equipped with supranational taxation authority. Specifically in the European context, tax laws could be coordinated at the EU level. The focus of supranational tax policy should be on curbing tax competition for paper profits, since these are more mobile than real capital. Further, profit
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Double tax avoidance 79 shifting is a more obvious violation of minimal fairness norms than real tax competition.41 Under real tax competition, a taxpayer would have to pay the actual “price” demanded by the respective government, even though that price may also be under harmful competitive pressure (see, for example, Sinn 1997). This would not be the case, however, if paper profits could be shifted. In that case, taxpayers become partial free riders: they enjoy the services offered, but avoid paying the price for them by shifting their profits out of the country. Although the supranationalization of tax policy sounds utopian, in Europe discussions about just such a solution are already under way. Indeed, the Treaty of Nice has made the implementation of such measures easier. Specifically, some of the proposals for a common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB) foresee, inter alia, a solution to the problems linked to tax competition for paper profits:42 the tax base would be defined and administered by the European Union, whereas individual Member States would remain free to set their own respective tax rates. Thus, a central part of national tax sovereignty would be supranationalized. Alternative measures that could reduce tax competition for capital – paper profits in particular – include, for instance, the introduction of an “EU CIT” – that is, an EU-wide corporate income tax law and tax administration with the tax and fiscal sovereignty based at EU level.43 Another measure would be the introduction of a minimum level for the statutory tax rate on corporate income as suggested in the Ruding Report (see Ruding Report 1992). But, as the current debate on the implementation of the CCCTB shows, the political will among the EU member countries to delegate even a part of their taxation rights to a higher level authority is low. Thus, given the current political environment in the European Union, supranational measures, in order to have any realistic chance of being adopted, will need to preserve member countries’ national sovereignty in taxation matters as far as possible. This, however, implies that tax competition will not be curbed effectively in the near future. Moreover, to increase the likelihood of adoption, supranational measures should be considered that target primarily tax-induced distortions which, though not directly related to horizontal tax competition for mobile capital, nevertheless have side effects on it. The incentive to introduce measures of this type might be larger for governments. A notable example in this respect is the reduction of the distorting effects the accrual-based classic corporate income tax system exerts, inter alia, on financing and investment decisions of firms. Several changes in the traditional corporate income tax system were suggested, discussed and in some cases even implemented (see OECD 2007 for an overview). The focus of those measures has been on eliminating the different tax treatment of equity and debt finance, for instance by introducing an allowance for the remuneration of equity finance (allowance for corporate equity, ACE) or by abolishing the deductibility of the remuneration for debt finance (CBIT, comprehensive business income tax). These measures result in increased efficiency in corporate income taxation because they achieve neutrality vis-à-vis investment and/or financing decisions. One side effect of this is that tax planning and governmental tax competition
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80 M. Leibrecht and T. Rixen aiming to exploit the differential treatment of debt and equity financing (e.g. the use of hybrid instruments) would become less effective under such systems. Providing members states with information concerning possible welfare impacts resulting from the coordinated introduction of a more neutral corporate income tax system by the European Commission is an important first step in this direction.44 In any case, the sorts of far-reaching measures mentioned – in particular, a minimum statutory tax rate on corporate income, a more neutral corporate income tax system or an EU-wide corporate income tax law and tax administration with tax and fiscal sovereignty at EU level – must be seen at present, in light of the current political environment, as long-term options only. In the medium term, it is more likely that tax competition in the European Union will get fiercer (Genschel et al., 2010). To conclude, the given patchwork structure of DTAV rules is a good example of how tax coordination can lead to tax-induced distortions instead of eliminating them. This is an example of a pitfall of tax coordination. The solution to such problems requires appropriate supranational action. Unfortunately, however, these are currently unlikely, given present political constraints.
Appendix A1: DTTs and foreign direct investment Blonigen and Davies (2000) Outcome(s): Bilateral double taxation treaties seem to exert a positive impact on FDI stock and affiliate sales with a time lag; US inbound and outbound FDI significantly increase with a treaty’s age Years and countries included: 1966–1992; the United States and (up to) 65 partner countries Specification and estimator applied: Level-level specification; pooled ordinary least square and country-pair fixed effects estimator Dependent variable: Affiliate sales in the host country, FDI stock, FDI flows Tax variable of main interest: Dummy variable equal to 1 if a treaty is in effect for the country pair in a given year (treaty dummy), Length of time a treaty has existed between the United States and a partner country in a given year (treaty age) Control variables: Gravity model and knowledge-capital model type variables like real GDP of home and host country of FDI, real GDP per capita in home and host country of FDI, bilateral distance between countries, openness to FDI and trade, sum of home and host countries’ real GDPs, squared difference between the home and host countries’ real GDP, dummy variable for the level of a home country’s skill endowment, difference in relative skilled- labour abundance between home and host country of FDI
Double tax avoidance 81 Semi-elasticities
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Table 1 Tax variable of interest
Semi-elasticity mean
Semi-elasticity min.
Semi-elasticity max.
Standard deviation
Treaty dummy
27.90a
−29.18
132.64
55.69
Treaty age
2.44
−12.55
11.62
5.51
b
Notes a The positive sign implies that signing a treaty increases FDI, yet most coefficients (especially those derived on the basis of the gravity model) are not statistically significant; only results contained in tables 3 and 4 of the paper are used. b The positive sign implies that FDI increases with the treaty age; using only tables 5 and 6 of the paper results in semi-elasticities between 1.40 and 8.61, which correspond to the information given in the abstract of the paper by Blonigen and Davies (2000); in Blonigen and Davies (2004b), the authors argue against the validity of these results as they pick up the effect of old tax treaties on FDI which suffers from endogeneity problems.
Blonigen and Davies (2002) Outcome(s): Recent treaty formation does not promote FDI; it may even reduce investment as possibilities to evade taxes are reduced Years and countries included: 1982–1992; 24 OECD countries (not included: Mexico, the Central and Eastern European OECD Countries, South Korea) Specification and estimator applied: Level-level specification; pooled OLS and country-pair fixed effects estimator Dependent variable: FDI outbound stock and FDI outflows Tax variable of main interest: Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when a bilateral tax treaty is in place between two countries. Dummy variables for “old” and “new” treaties (for example, the new treaty dummy has the value 1 if it comes into force after the starting year of the sample used and 0 otherwise) Control variables: Knowledge-capital model type variables, openness to FDI and trade, bilateral distance between countries, various interaction terms Semi-elasticities Table 2 Tax variable of interest
Semi-elasticity mean
Semi-elasticity min.
Semi-elasticity max.
Standard deviation
Treaty dummy (including old treaty dummy)
82.01a
72.43
90.84
6.52
New treaty dummy
−56.21b
−123.61
−7.25
44.27
Notes a A positive sign implies that FDI is higher if a treaty is in force; yet this estimate probably suffers from endogeneity problems. b The negative sign implies that FDI is lower if a new treaty is signed, pointing towards reduced possibilities to evade taxes via FDI in the case of a tax treaty in force.
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Blonigen and Davies (2004b) Outcome(s): No systematic evidence is found that bilateral tax treaties increase FDI activity if a preferred log-level specification is applied Years and countries included: 1980–1999; US inbound and outbound FDI from or to 88 partner countries Specification and estimator applied: Level-level and log-level specifications with preference for the log-level specification; pooled OLS and country-pairspecific fixed effects estimator Dependent variable: FDI stock and affiliate sales data in non-financial sectors Tax variable of main interest: Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when a bilateral tax treaty is in place between two countries, dummy variables for “old” and “new” treaties (e.g. the new treaty dummy has the value 1 if it comes into force after the starting year of the sample used and 0 otherwise) Control variables: Knowledge-capital model type variables, openness to FDI and trade, bilateral distance between countries, various interaction terms, trade costs of both home and host country, costs of investing in the host country), log(exchange rate), log(country average tax rate on corporate income) Semi-elasticities Table 3 Tax variable of interest
Semi-elasticity Semi-elasticity Semi-elasticity Standard mean min. max. deviation
Level-level specification: treaty dummy
−23.93a
−36.86
−10.99
12.94
Level-level specification: old 90.16b treaty dummy
58.72
121.61
31.45
Level-level specification: new treaty dummy
−107.49c
−167.50
−46.90
50.23
Log-level specification: new 19.45d treaty dummy
2.02
47.70
16.68
Notes a The negative sign implies that FDI is lower if a treaty is in force. b The positive sign implies that FDI is higher if a treaty is already in force at the beginning of the sample period; yet the estimates are likely to suffer from endogeneity problems. c The negative sign implies that FDI is lower if a new treaty is signed, pointing towards reduced possibilities to evade taxes via FDI in case of a tax treaty in force. d The positive sign implies that FDI is higher if a new treaty is signed; yet no underlying coefficient is statistically significant; therefore new treaties seem not to positively/negatively affect FDI either positively or negatively; this is the preferred specification of Blonigen and Davies (2004b).
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Neumayer (2007) Outcome(s): Developing countries (DCs) that have signed a tax treaty with the United States or with important capital exporters actually do receive more FDI from the United States and in total; however, tax treaties are effective only in the group of middle-income DCs, not in low-income DCs Years and countries included: 1970–2001 (bilateral US case and unilateral FDI flow case) and 1980–2001 (unilateral FDI stock case); US outbound FDI stocks in 114 host countries and FDI stocks and inflows to 120 DCs Specification and estimator applied: Log-level specification; random and fixed effects estimation (country and country-pair effects) Dependent variable: US outbound FDI stocks in less developed countries, total inbound FDI stocks in and FDI inflows to less developed countries, a country’s share in the total FDI stock (-inflow) in(to) all less developed countries considered Tax variable of main interest: Dummy variable for the existence of a tax treaty with the United States, FDI flow weighted cumulative number of tax treaties a DC has signed with OECD countries, where the weight is the OECD countries’ share of FDI outflows in total world FDI outflows Control variables: Dummy variable for the existence of a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with the United States, FDI flows weighted cumulative number of BITs a DC has signed with OECD countries, log(GDP per capita), log(population), economic growth rate, dummy variable indicating whether a country is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), number of bilateral trade agreements a DC has concluded with the United States, the European Union or Japan weighted by their respective shares of world trade, inflation rate, measure of natural resource intensity, political constraints index Semi-elasticities Table 4 Dependent variable used
Semi-elasticity Semi-elasticity Semi-elasticity Standard mean min. max. deviation
US outbound stock
29.43a
22.26
40.92
8.21
Inward FDI stock and FDI inflows in DC
0.54b
0.20
0.90
0.31
US outbound stock in lowincome DCs
−17.51c
−18.21
−16.81
0.70
Inward FDI stock and FDI inflows in low-income DCs
0.43d
0.00
0.90
0.43
US outbound stock in middle- 24.22e income DCs
16.65
31.78
7.57
Inward FDI stock and FDI 0.68f inflows in middle-income DCs
0.50
0.80
0.13
Notes overleaf.
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Notes a The positive sign implies that the US outbound FDI stock is higher if a tax treaty exists. b The positive sign implies that the inward FDI stock and FDI inflows to DC is higher the greater the number of tax treaties signed. c The negative sign implies that the US outbound FDI stock in a low-income DC is lower if a tax treaty exists; yet none of the underlying coefficients is statistically significant. d The positive sign implies that the inward FDI stock and FDI inflows to low-income DCs are higher the greater the number of tax treaties signed; however, none of the underlying coefficients is statistically significant. e The positive sign implies that the US outbound FDI stock in a middle-income DC is higher if a tax treaty exists. f The positive sign implies that the inward FDI stock and FDI inflows to a middle-income DC is the higher the greater the number of tax treaties signed.
Egger et al. (2006) Outcome(s): Significant negative impact of newly implemented tax treaties on outward FDI stocks once the endogeneity of tax treaties is accounted for Years and countries included: 1985–2000; OECD countries Specification and estimator applied: Log-level specification; two-step approach with a difference-in-difference approach in the second step Dependent variable: In the second step of the estimation the difference between bilateral outward FDI stock two years before and after a treaty is signed is used as the dependent variable Tax variable of main interest: Tax treaty dummy with entry one in the years after two countries have implemented a treaty Control variables: log(sum of GDPs), log(similarity index), absolute value of difference in log(capital to labor ratios), interaction terms, home and host countries’ government expenditures to GDP ratios Semi-elasticities Table 5 Tax variable of interest
Semi-elasticity Semi-elasticity Semi-elasticity Standard mean min. max. deviation
Exogenous tax treaty
−10.16a
−0.16
−0.62
6.78
Endogenous tax treaty
−19.97
−39.41
−9.90
5.91
b
Notes a The negative sign implies that new tax treaties reduce outward FDI stocks; yet none of the underlying coefficients is statistically significant. b The negative sign implies that new tax treaties reduce outward FDI stocks.
Barthel et al. (2008) Outcome(s): Tax treaties lead to substantial and significantly higher FDI stocks Years and countries included: 1978–2004; large dyadic panel data set from various sources (e.g. UNCTAD) with 30 FDI source countries (of which 10 are DCs), 105 FDI host countries (of which 84 are DCs) Specification and estimator applied: Log-level specification; country-pairspecific fixed effects estimator
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Dependent variable: Bilateral FDI stock Tax variable of main interest: Dummy variable with entry 1 if a bilateral tax treaty is in force and 0 otherwise (treaty dummy), number of years since a tax treaty has been effective (treaty age) Control variables: log(GDP of host country), log(GDP per capita of host country), log(inflation rate), openness to trade, dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the home and the host country have signed a common regional trade agreement, dummy with entry one if a bilateral investment treaty is in force and 0 otherwise Semi-elasticities Table 6 Tax variable of interest
Semi-elasticity Semi-elasticity Semi-elasticity Standard mean min. max. deviation
Treaty dummy
25.33a
5.34
66.53
18.80
Treaty age
4.43
2.00
9.00
2.24
b
Notes a The positive sign implies that tax treaties increase FDI. b The positive sign implies that FDI increases with the treaty age.
Davies et al. (2009) Outcome(s): Little evidence for an effect of treaties on the level of total sales, which act as proxy for foreign investment; however, a positive impact of treaty formation on the probability of newly investing in a country is found – that is, a tax treaty has no impact on the volume of investment but does affect the location of the investment Years and countries included: 1965, 1970, 1974, 1978, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998; Sweden as home country and 25 DCs as well as Australia and Luxembourg as partner countries Specification and estimator applied: Level-level and log-level specifications; panel probit estimator with various fixed effects (country, region, time and firm fixed effects) and fixed effects estimator Dependent variable: Micro-data from the Research Institute of Industrial Economics is used for total affiliate sales in a host country, dummy variable indicating whether a Swedish multinational has an affiliate in a host country or not Tax variable of main interest: Dummy variable equal to 1 if a treaty is in effect for the country pair in a given year (treaty dummy) Control variables: Statutory tax rate on corporate income, GDP, GDP per capita, openness to trade, R&D intensity, dummy variable indicating the participation in a trade agreement, indicator of the size of the Swedish MNE and its experience abroad, fixed costs in terms of plant scale, age of the affiliate, dummy variable to proxy the purpose of the establishment (sales company or production unit)
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Table 7 Dependent variable used
Semi-elasticity
Level of sales
−11.75a
Probability of investment
16.70b
Notes a Information only for one specification is available to derive semi-elasticities; the negative sign implies that the existence of a tax treaty reduces affiliate sales; yet the coefficient is not statistically significant. b Only for one specification are the implied marginal effects given in the paper; the positive sign implies that having established a tax treaty increases the probability of having an affiliate in the partner country.
A2: Tax-sparing rules and foreign direct investment Hines (1998) Outcome(s): Tax-sparing rules have a substantial and significant positive influence on the level of Japanese FDI Years and countries included: 1989 and 1990; Japan and the United States with 67 partner countries Specification and estimator applied: Level-level specification; OLS, two-stage least squares (2SLS) Dependent variable: Japanese share of FDI (equity investment) in developing countries to total Japanese FDI (equity investment) minus the corresponding US FDI (equity investment) share Tax variable of main interest: Dummy variable for tax-sparing rule in force (Yes/No) Control variables: log(GDP) Semi-elasticities Table 8 Dependent variable used
Semi-elasticity mean
Semi-elasticity min.
Semi-elasticity max.
Standard deviation
FDI share
304.76a
138.23
479.01
127.33
Equity share
196.69
159.4
266.51
37.890
b
Notes a Substantially higher values arise if the 2SLS estimator is used; the positive sign means that Japanese FDI is higher in countries with which Japan has tax-sparing agreements than with countries for which no such rules are in force. b Substantially higher values arise if the 2SLS estimator is used; the positive sign means that Japanese equity investment is higher in countries with which Japan has tax-sparing agreements than with countries for which no such rules are in force.
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Double tax avoidance 87 Azémar et al. (2007) Outcome(s): Tax-sparing provisions have a substantial and significant positive impact on the level of Japanese FDI Years and countries included: 1989–2000; Japan and 26 developing countries Specification and estimator applied: Log-level specification; random effects estimator Dependent variable: Total Japanese FDI flows into host country Tax variable of main interest: Dummy variable for tax-sparing rule in force (Yes/No) Control variables: GDP, labor costs, exchange rates, country risk, quality of infrastructures, natural resources, trade openness, geographical distance, regional dummy for East Asia and Pacific countries, proxy for agglomeration effects Semi-elasticity: 180.11* * Only column 2 of table 4 in Azémar et al. (2007) is used to isolate the impact of tax sparing rules on FDI A3: Profit shifting: general evidence De Mooij (2005) Outcome(s): Includes survey of earlier papers; a mean semi-elasticity of −2 is derived Weichenrieder (2009) Outcome(s): Empirical evidence is found for the net of taxes profitability of foreign affiliates in Germany being positively correlated with the home country statutory tax rate on corporate income; moreover, some evidence (i.e. when leverage is not considered as a regressor) is found for wholly owned German foreign affiliates being more sensitive to host-country statutory tax rates on corporate income than non-wholly owned affiliates abroad Years and countries included: 1996–2003; Germany and an unspecified range of host countries of German affiliates and foreign parent companies of inbound FDI in Germany Specification and estimator applied: Level-level specification; two-way fixed effects estimator (time- and firm-specific effects) in inbound case, firm- specific effects estimator in outbound case Dependent variable: Yearly data on the net-of-tax profit of an affiliate as a percentage of the affiliate’s total assets are used; items taken from the Midi database of the Deutsche Bundesbank, affiliates in the banking and insurance industries, holding companies as well as indirect participations are excluded (inbound case) Tax variable of main interest: Statutory tax rate on corporate income in the host country of a German affiliate, statutory tax rate on corporate income in the home country of a foreign affiliate in Germany
88 M. Leibrecht and T. Rixen Control variables: log(employment), log(sales), log(fixed assets), debt ratio, GDP growth of host country of German affiliates, domestic private credit to GDP ratio of the host country, dummy variable for ownership structure Semi-elasticity
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Table 9 Case
Semi-elasticity mean
Semi-elasticity min.
Semi-elasticity max.
Standard deviation
Inbound case
0.91a
0.72
1.23
0.17
Outbound case
−0.55
−0.67
−0.42
0.12
b
Notes a The positive sign means that the higher the tax rate in the country of location of the foreign parent company, the higher is the reported net-of-taxes profitability of the foreign affiliate in Germany. b The negative sign means that the tax rate responsiveness of net-of-taxes profitability for wholly owned German foreign affiliates is higher (in absolute value) than that for non-wholly owned German affiliates.
Huizinga and Laeven (2007) Outcome(s): For various European countries, empirical evidence on a substantial tax-rate sensitivity of pre-tax profits is found Years and countries included: Cross-section of firms for 1999; EU-27 less Cyprus, Malta, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Greece and Ireland but plus Norway Specification and estimator applied: Log-level specification; 2SLS estimator with the statutory tax rate on corporate income of a country being instrumented by the difference between log(population host country of affiliate) and log(population of home country of parent), industry fixed effects included, simulation of aggregated country-specific semi-elasticities Dependent variable: The dependent variable is log(earnings before interest and taxes); data are taken from the Amadeus database of the Bureau Van Dijk, only manufacturing-sector firms included Tax variable of main interest: Composite tax variable which summarizes all information about the tax rates and profits in all the countries a multinational enterprise is present in Control variables: log(fixed assets) of the affiliate, log(GDP per capita) of the country the affiliate is based in Semi-elasticity Table 10 Semi-elasticity mean Semi-elasticity min.
Semi-elasticity max. Standard deviation
−1.31
−2.92
−0.28
0.81
Note Mean value is mean over the 21 country-specific semi-elasticities; the negative sign means that the tax base (i.e. earnings before interest and taxes) is reduced if the statutory tax rate is increased.
Double tax avoidance 89 A4: Profit-shifting: transfer pricing evidence
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Clausing (2003) Outcome(s): Substantial evidence for tax-motivated transfer pricing in US intra-firm trade prices is present; specifically, the lower a host country’s tax rate, the lower are US intra-firm export prices and the higher are US intra-firm import prices Years and countries included: 1997–1999; the United States and 54 partner countries Specification and estimator applied: Log-log specification; pooled OLS with industry dummies, robustness checks with time fixed effects, country fixed effects and country random effects Dependent variable: Monthly data on US international export and import prices (intra-firm and non-intra-firm) at the product level from the Bureau of Labor Statistics are used Tax variable of main interest: log(1 − average tax rate on corporate income), log(1 − statutory tax rate on corporate income) Control variables: log(GDP), log(GDP per capita), log(US dollar exchange rate), various dummy variables (e.g. intra-firm dummy, dummy for dollar denomination of transactions, dummy for price imputation) Semi-elasticities Table 11 Dependent variable
Semi-elasticity mean
Semi-elasticity min.
Semi-elasticity max.
Standard deviation
Export prices
4.08a
2.54
5.51
1.35
Import prices
−4.73
−7.91
−1.99
2.38
b
Notes a The positive sign means that lower prices (relative to non-intra-firm prices) are charged on intrafirm exports to affiliated companies located in countries with lower tax rates. b The negative sign means that higher prices (relative to non-intra-firm prices) are charged for intrafirm imports from an affiliated company located in countries with lower tax rates.
Clausing (2006) Outcome(s): A substantial and significant impact of tax avoidance incentives on the pattern of US international intra-firm trade is found which is consistent with tax-motivated transfer pricing Years and countries included: 1982–2000; the United States and 51 partner countries Specification and estimator applied: Level-level specification; pooled OLS with industry dummies, robustness checks with time fixed effects Dependent variable: Yearly intra-firm trade data for US multinational firms and data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis are used; for evidence on the “price effect”, the intra-firm trade balance between the United States and the country hosting US affiliates is used as the endogenous variable
90 M. Leibrecht and T. Rixen Tax variable of main interest: The difference in statutory tax rate on corporate income in the host country of a US affiliate and the statutory tax rate on corporate income in the United States; the difference in average tax rate on corporate income in the host country of US affiliates and the average tax rate on corporate income in the United States Control variables: Share of sales, unaffiliated trade balance, dummy variables for Europe and Japan Semi-elasticities
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Table 12 Semi-elasticity mean Semi-elasticity min.
Semi-elasticity max. Standard deviation
4.81
7.32
1.81
1.82
Notes Only tables 3 and A2 in Clausing (2006) on the price effect are explored; the positive sign implies that the intra-firm trade balance, measured as exports to foreign affiliates minus imports from foreign affiliates, increases with an increase in the foreign tax rate on corporate income in the host country.
Overesch (2006) Outcome(s): If an affiliate does not have a loss, carry forwards intra-firm, then sales decrease with an increase in the host country’s statutory tax rate on corporate income; this is consistent with tax-motivated transfer pricing in German intra-firm sales Years and countries included: 1996–2003; Germany and 31 partner countries (the EU-27 without Bulgaria, Cyprus, Germany and Romania, the United States, Canada, Mexico, New Zealand, Australia, Japan, Norway, Switzerland) Specification and estimator applied: Log-level specification; 2SLS with parent, industry and time fixed effects Dependent variable: Yearly balance sheet data of German foreign affiliates; variables “accounts receivable from affiliated companies” and “accounts receivable from the parent company” made available by the Midi database of the Deutsche Bundesbank is used, majority-owned direct participations outside the financial sector and without holding companies are included in the sample Tax variable of main interest: Statutory tax rate on the corporate income in the host country of a German affiliate in the case of “accounts receivable from affiliated companies”, difference in statutory tax rate on corporate income in Germany and that of the host country in the case of “accounts receivable from parent company” Control variables: log(total capital of the affiliate) instrumented by log(GDP of the host country), log(lending rate of the host country), various dummy vari ables (e.g. for ownership structure, loss carried forward), log(turnover of the affiliate), log(bilateral distance between Germany and the host country of the affiliate)
Double tax avoidance 91 Semi-elasticities
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Table 13 Dependent variable Semi-elasticity mean
Semi-elasticity min.
Semi-elasticity max.
Standard deviation
Trade with parent
0.51
−3.22a
2.84
1.70
Trade with affiliates −1.00
−3.38
1.80
1.31
b
Notes a Negative values are found in cases when loss carry-forwards are available to the affiliate. b Positive values are found in cases when loss carry-forwards are available to the affiliate.
Bernard et al. (2008) Outcome(s): The paper shows that the wedge between the arm’s-length export price and the intra-firm export price of US-based multinationals is negatively related to the taxation of corporate income in the foreign import country; this response indicates that tax-motivated transfer pricing is present in intra-firm export prices of US-based multinational companies Years and countries included: 1993–2000; the United States and 140 partner countries Specification and estimator applied: Log-level specification; pooled OLS with product fixed effects Dependent variable: The dependent variable is the wedge between the arm’slength export price and the intra-firm export price of US-based multinationals; data from the Linked/Longitudinal Firm Trade Transaction Database (LFTTD), which is based on data from the US Census Bureau and the US Customs Bureau, are used Tax variable of main interest: Statutory tax rate on corporate income and average tax rate on corporate income in the host country of US-based multinationals’ affiliates Control variables: Tariff rate, log(employment of the affiliate), firm export share, log(real exchange rate with the US dollar), log(GDP per capita) Semi-elasticities Table 14 Semi-elasticity mean Semi-elasticity min.
Semi-elasticity max. Standard deviation
−1.25
−0.39
−4.18
1.18
Notes The negative sign implies that an increase in the host country tax rate on corporate income leads to a decrease in the wedge between arm’s-length export prices and intra-firm export prices.
92 M. Leibrecht and T. Rixen
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Dischinger and Riedel (2008) Outcome(s): The paper shows that the location of holdings and investments in intangible assets is inversely related to the statutory tax rate on corporate income; this relationship can be considered as indirect evidence in favor of tax-motivated transfer pricing in the intra-firm trade of intangibles Years and countries included: 1995–2005; the EU-27 less Cyprus and Malta Specification and estimator applied: Log-level specification; fixed effects estimator, first difference estimator, Anderson–Hsiao estimator, Arellano–Bond estimator, fixed effects logit and linear probability model estimator Dependent variable: Balance sheet item “intangible assets” plus 1 taken from the Amadeus database; dummy variable with entry 1 if an affiliate owns intangible assets and 0 otherwise Tax variable of main interest: Mean difference between the statutory tax rate on the corporate income of an affiliate and the statutory tax rate on the corporate income of all other affiliates of a common parent company Control variables: log(GDP per capita of host country), log(population of host country), log(unemployment rate in host country), log(total assets of affiliate) Semi-elasticities Table 15 Semi-elasticity mean Semi-elasticity min.
Semi-elasticity max. Standard deviation
−1.17a
−0.36
−2.04
0.45
Notes a The negative sign implies that an affiliate’s holdings of intangibles decrease, other things being equal, with an increase of the statutory tax rate on corporate income in the host country.
A5: Profit shifting: thin capitalization rules Büttner et al. (2006) Outcome(s): Thin capitalization rules are found to be effective in restricting debt finance Years and countries included: 1996–2004; Germany as home country of FDI and 24 partner countries Specification and estimator applied: Level-level specification; fixed effects estimator Dependent variable: Debt-to-asset ratio of German foreign subsidiaries (leverage); data are taken from the Midi database of the Deutsche Bundesbank Tax variable of main interest: Dummy for the presence of a thin capitalization rule, dummy variable for the presence of a thin capitalization rule interacted with the statutory tax rate on corporate income Control variables: log(lending rate for the private sector), log(turnover), statutory tax rate on corporate income, dummy variable indicating whether loss carry-forward is reported by the affiliate
Double tax avoidance 93 Semi-elasticities Table 16 Semi-elasticity mean Semi-elasticity min.
Semi-elasticity max. Standard deviation
−8.27a
−8.20
−8.34
0.06
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Notes a The negative sign implies that the debt to equity ratio is reduced when a thin capitalization rule is in force.
Overesch and Wamser (2006) Outcome(s): The German thin capitalization rule induces significantly lower intra-firm debt levels of inbound investments; hence, tax planning via intra- firm finance is effectively limited Years and countries included: 1996–2004; Germany as host country of FDI and 31 investor countries Specification and estimator applied: Level-level specification; difference-indifferences approach with affiliate fixed effects and time dummies Dependent variable: Intercompany loans as share of total affiliate capital; data are taken from the Midi database of the Deutsche Bundesbank Tax variable of main interest: Interaction term between “treatment group dummy” and “post-tax reform dummy” Control variables: log(turnover), dummy for loss carry-forward of affiliate available or not, difference in statutory tax rate on corporate income of Germany and the home country of FDI, treatment group dummy Semi-elasticities Table 17 Semi-elasticity mean Semi-elasticity min.
Semi-elasticity max. Standard deviation
−24.72a
−31.00
−31.86
6.49
Notes a The negative sign implies that the debt to equity ratio is reduced when a thin capitalization rule is in force; only results from tables 4 and 5 in Overesch and Wamser (2006) could be used, owing to lacking information on the mean of the endogenous variable.
Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008) Outcome(s): The change in German thin capitalization rules in 2001 induces significantly lower intra-firm debt levels of inbound investments (especially for affiliates which are very highly leveraged prior to 2001) Years and countries included: 2000–2002; Germany as host country of FDI and several investor countries Specification and estimator applied: Level-level specification; two-way fixed effects estimator (affiliate and time fixed effects