Interpreting China’s Military Power
Although inter-state tensions have generally been easing after the Cold War, milit...
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Interpreting China’s Military Power
Although inter-state tensions have generally been easing after the Cold War, military power remains a dominant factor in Asian regional politics. As China, operating the world’s largest army, grows stronger, there are ongoing debates over the implications for Asian regional security. This book argues that it is imperative to look beyond the empirical observations and conventional materialist reading of Chinese military development to understand its dynamics and directions in doctrinal terms and put it in a readiness context for evaluation. Military doctrine has long been under-researched and is often treated as a subject separate from force development. But, as this study contends, this factor is necessary for interpreting the making and purposes of China’s military power because it forms the intellectual foundation of military structural and hardware development. Without being loaded with political rhetoric, it also communicates to us for what military power is intended. The role of doctrine is reinforced in the context of military readiness, which defines what the army is getting ready for, and how. Force development is evaluated in structural and operational terms. The importance of this analytical framework based on military doctrine and readiness is demonstrated in a survey of the evolution of Chinese military doctrine and force development. As the Chinese People’s Liberation Army has continued to adjust its military structure and operation to follow the doctrinal lead, its switches between local war and total war doctrines have seen corresponding changing emphasis between operational and structural readiness. The current high-technology local war doctrine dictates that China has to focus more on operational readiness. In the information age, this means that, though geographically localised, military conflicts in fact see an expanding battlespace and, buttressed by information technology, operation has to be efficient as well as precise. Ka Po Ng is an associate professor at Aichi Bunkyo University, Japan.
Interpreting China’s Military Power Doctrine makes readiness
Ka Po Ng
First published 2005 by Frank Cass, an imprint of Taylor & Francis 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Frank Cass 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Frank Cass is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2005 Ka Po Ng All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. The publisher makes no representation, express or implied, with regard to the accuracy of the information contained in this book and cannot accept any legal responsibility or liability for any errors or omissions that may be made. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-32590-7 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0-714-65548-1 (Print Edition)
In memory of my father, Tim, and for my mother, Kam
Contents
Preface and acknowledgements
vii
1
Introduction
1
2
Military doctrine, military readiness and military power
15
3
The genesis of the Chinese local war doctrine
38
4
Towards a local war doctrine
62
5
The advent of local war
83
6
‘High-technology local wars’ and beyond
105
7
Conclusion
151
Appendix 1 The military readiness conceptual framework
156
Appendix 2 The Chinese structure of military science
157
Appendix 3 Chinese military actions, 1949–2002
158
Appendix 4 Major events in PLA doctrinal development
165
Notes Select bibliography Index
172 223 245
Preface and acknowledgements
This book is the result of my interest in the political science programme of international relations and an utterly under-researched field, China military studies. The debate over ideational factors in international relations has produced many seminal books related to military and strategic studies; to name a few, Elizabeth Kier’s Imagining War and Iain Johnston’s Cultural Realism. On another front, although no one would dispute the importance of understanding China’s military, especially in view of its growing power, few would undertake this research. As David Shambaugh observes, the ‘dearth of university-based PLA specialists’ is obvious; the hardly encouraging job prospect, lack of appropriate supervisors to train students, and limited fieldwork and publication opportunities have deterred dedicated research in China military studies.1 Still, it has been served well, albeit small in quantity, with such classics as William Whitson and Huang Chen-Hsia’s The Chinese High Command, Allen Whiting’s Chinese Calculus of Deterrence and Ellis Joffe’s The Chinese Army after Mao. The recent Modernizing China’s Military authored by David Shambaugh is likely to become a set reference for its comprehensive study of the PLA. However, despite the publications surveyed in Chapter 1 of this work, little book-length research has been done on China’s military doctrine. Even fewer go further to integrate it into force development analysis. This project is not to make a paradigmatic shift in this overlapping field of international relations and China military studies. Rather, it tries to undertake a research that is simply overdue and to offer an analytical tool. When we see China modernising its military force and being more assertive in the exercise of its military power, we have to ask why this happens, how and why in this direction. My work, on the theoretical side, wishes to use the ideational factor of military doctrine to interpret China’s military power in the context of ‘readiness’. Empirically, this book aims to fill a gap in academic literature on the PLA’s doctrinal evolution from the establishment of the People’s Republic of China to the present day. In fact, past decades have seen the Chinese army evolving from a peasant guerrilla force to a regular army trained on the Soviet model. Then the revolutionary fervour and emphasis on
viii
Preface and acknowledgements
Chinese characteristics returned to form the backbone of a total war doctrine. It was only in the 1980s, when a local war doctrine was adopted, that the PLA began to adapt itself to fighting modern conventional warfare. This doctrine was soon added to the ‘high technology’ predicate, showing an intention to apply the revolution in military affairs to China. It is likely that, as the Chinese army enters the information age, it has to continue modifying its military doctrine in order to direct its structural and operational reforms. These dramatic doctrinal changes in the past decades should not escape our attention because they shape force development and communicate to us its direction and military intentions. This research has benefited from the support of many people and institutions. Above all, I must thank William Tow, C.L. Chiou, Ellis Joffe, Chi-kong Lai and three anonymous reviewers who read earlier versions of this manuscript and gave me very helpful comments. Their insights into international relations, China military studies and history have showed me directions for improvement. Bill Tow, in particular, has constantly reminded me of applying results of international relations theoretical debates to empirical analysis. Chiou has offered me alternative perspectives of looking at China and, no less important, his humour was cherished. They, along with other teachers and students at the University of Queensland, have given me many academic benefits and fond moments. I am also grateful to Greg Austin, Stuart Harris and other scholars in the Department of International Relations of the Australian National University for their advice and exchanges when I was on a National Visiting Scholarship in 1997. Although this took place at an early stage of my research and there have been personnel changes in the department, that visit left me with a wealth of expert opinions and documentary sources. Arthur Ding of the Institute of International Relations at Taiwan’s National Chengchi University and Su Hao of the Foreign Affairs College in Beijing have helped arrange my interviews at various stages. Andrew Yang of Taipei’s Chinese Council for Advanced Policy Studies has been supportive and willing to share information. I owe a special debt to a number of military specialists who through the years helped me understand key concepts and the process of military policy-making, and alerted me to important developments in Chinese military affairs. Although they requested anonymity, their contribution must be acknowledged. Since documentary searches constitute an important part of this research, working at research centres and libraries has been part of my life. I wish to extend my gratitude to staff at the Queensland University Library, Australian National University’s Menzies Library, the National Library of Australia, the University of Hong Kong Library and, in particular, to those at the Universities Service Centre for China Studies in the Chinese University of Hong Kong not only for their professional support
Preface and acknowledgements
ix
and their dedication to maintaining one of the world’s best contemporary China collections but also for their hospitality and readiness to help. At my present Aichi Bunkyo University, I am fortunate to have helpful colleagues. Their logistics support is indispensable. Still, despite the assistance of all the above-mentioned people and institutions, this book would be impossible without the help of Andrew Humphrys, senior book editor at Frank Cass. He has been professional and considerate. I would like to also thank Miss Gail Welsh, production editor at Wearset, for her dedication to help make this book a better project. It is indeed a pleasure to cooperate with them. Academic research can hardly leave one’s life unaffected. Understanding and encouragement from family are the necessary force to keep a researcher moving. My parents have given all this to me. My wife, Serena, has been always ready to translate her support into deeds. When I decided to begin my research as a Ph.D. student in Australia, she gave up her career in Hong Kong and stayed with me to give me all practical assistance. But the most important of all was her sharing a plain life with me. As I continued my research in Japan, her supportive attitude and willingness to sacrifice did not diminish. Finally, I wish to imitate a practice by J.S. Bach, whose music has given me much inspiration, by finishing with this acknowledgement: Soli Deo Gloria.
1
Introduction
The collapse of the communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe between 1989 and 1991 signified the end of the Cold War and, at the same time, the gradual emergence of a new international security order. In Asia, however, the direction of strategic change and the implications are far from clear. The region remains a hot-bed of conflicts – rife with age-old fault lines left by the Cold War and new rivalries based on economic interests and competition for greater power. A Commander-inChief of the US Pacific Command once described Asia as a ‘tough neighbourhood’.1 Against such security background, few would dispute that China, given its booming economy, improving military capability and the sheer size of its territory and population, is a critical factor even though one may be wary of the fallacy of linear projection. ‘The way in which China views the use of force and, conversely, its willingness to seek peaceful resolution of other territorial and resource disputes’ is crucial to regional stability.2 Heated debates have been going on in both the academic and policy circles on whether this country will contribute to or disrupt regional stability and how other countries should respond to its growing power.3 This is not surprising, since there seem to be conflicting signals. On the one hand, there has been an obvious trend of Chinese integration into the global and regional economies which was manifested in their accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 and their attempts to follow the international practice of increasing transparency by publishing documents on major policies. China has also actively participated in international institutions and has been increasingly willing to work through multilateral security regimes. In 1996 it signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and in 2001 ratified the International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights. After the ‘September 11’ terror attack in New York, China was quick to join the international community in combating terrorism by acceding to a series of conventions. In 2002, China promulgated and revised legislation to regulate the export of chemical products and technologies and arms, and signed a code of conduct in the South China Sea. On its own initiative, China instituted the
2
Introduction
Shanghai Cooperative Organisation (formerly the ‘Shanghai Five’) to promote regional cooperation. No less prominent is its continuous effort to mend relations with former adversaries and to maintain cordial relations with neighbouring countries.4 On the other hand, China’s military buildup is unmistakable and its record of using force disturbing. The modernisation of military hardware, acquisition of advanced weaponry from Russia and the double-digit increase in Chinese defence spending since the late 1980s are among the most oft-cited examples in polemics warning against a restless China.5 Indeed, even after the confrontational Cold War years, the Chinese PLA troops were deployed in 1992 and 1995 to occupy the Johnson Patch and Mischief Reef which were claimed by Vietnam and the Philippines, respectively. Beijing has also threatened Taipei with a series of military actions ranging from ‘missile testing’ in the Taiwan Strait to large-scale offshore military exercises and continuous military buildup on its east coast. Obviously, taken individually, these events generate only conflicting signals and reinforce both those arguing for and against the possible emergence of the so-called ‘China threat’. Unless more consistent, longrange behaviour patterns as reflected in Chinese policy are examined, any understanding of China’s future role in regional security will remain elusive.
Objectives and arguments Among International Relations theories, the realist school better describes post-Cold War Asian security, and identifies correctly and justifies military power as the main variable in inter-state relations. Moreover, military power is clearly an important factor in analysing China’s strategic behaviour in an anarchical international system. However, this book argues, because of the realist’s materialist bias, the concept of military power, by itself, is not self-evident nor sufficient to understand the implications of China’s growing military power for Asian regional security. A central issue is the meaning underlying that material power – military power requires an ideational interpretation and context. This study aims to make sense of China’s military modernisation by applying two concepts to examine the purposes and development of its military power; namely, military doctrine and military readiness. Military doctrine is particularly useful when one considers that China has not fought any major wars since 1979 and thus offers few cases for study. Besides, the centralised nature of the Chinese regime suggests that an official military doctrine affords glimpses of China’s military plans.6 Being the intellectual foundation of defence policies, doctrine provides guidance to the development of Chinese military structure and operations in such ways as to determine the forms which military power may be used as well as the efficiency and effectiveness of that power. While there are ample
Introduction
3
studies on the content of Chinese military doctrine both from theoretical and comparative perspectives,7 the question of how it affects the making and use of military power has received insufficient attention. Military doctrine, as this book will demonstrate later, is constitutive of military power and guides its making. At the same time, it is informative. Military doctrine communicates to others the purposes of the buildup and what this military power is ready for. Here, we have to bring in the concept of military readiness to contextualise this power. When Dennis Blasko reviews literature on PLA force structure, he cautions that analysis must be put in context and must take into consideration doctrine and tactics.8 Substantively, the concept of military readiness deals with the force structure (mainly organisation and military hardware) and operations (mainly military training and command and control) of the Chinese army. Conceptually, this restores the relational aspect of the concept of power; that is, an actor exercises power in relation to an object. This analysis is particularly important as China continues to modernise its army and assert its political interests and objectives. This study aims to address these questions: How does this country plan to use its increasing power? What is China’s military power getting ready for? Is it targeted at any specific states or groups of states or non-state forces? Is it ready? Based on this conceptual framework, this study finds that Chinese force development has oscillated between emphases on structural readiness and operational readiness as the army moves between total war and local war doctrines. The current doctrine of local war under high-technology conditions dictates that operational readiness dominates in People’s Liberation Army (PLA) planning and development. Finally, I add a caveat on this book’s argument. By accentuating the critical role of military doctrine, this book has no intention of getting itself embroiled in the debate of technology-push or doctrine-push military modernisation, nor does it intend to deny separate sets of dynamics of technological progress. It advocates that doctrine is an integral and leading component of China’s military power and is key to making sense of its force development and military training programmes. Doctrine is not a dependent variable of technology. Rather, for any technologies to produce something ‘meaningful’ and ‘usable’ on the battlefield, their development must be guided by military concepts.
Sources, methods and approaches Any attempts to understand China’s military power must confront the problem of the lack of transparency of its military policy. Despite more than two decades of economic reform and opening up, the same attitude is slow to spread to military affairs. Interviews with active PLA officers and researchers without official escorts are virtually impossible unless personal networks have been diligently cultivated. Their increasing exchanges with
4
Introduction
foreign specialists and scholars at conferences and other programmes mainly benefit US-based analysts. This study acknowledges the weakness of limited opportunities of interviewing these Chinese sources. After all, it is important to bear in mind the issue of the quality of interviews. Thus verifying and cross-checking with other sources are necessary. Interviewing scholars and analysts outside China certainly helps build up a bigger and more objective picture. But perhaps a no less rewarding exercise is traditional documentary research. As the Chinese army becomes more ‘intellectual’ and allows more lively debates, its views are disseminated by a thriving publishing industry, including army publishers. A wealth of books, including those for ‘domestic distribution’ (neibu faxing) and ‘army distribution’ (junnei faxing), is readily available, as are army newspapers and periodicals. But their supply to readers outside China depends very much on the flexibility of individual booksellers and is thus unstable. Due to possibilities of error and disinformation, it is imperative to compare the documentary sources. Matching books and essays on doctrinal debates and ideas with developments covered in the news is particularly useful. This requires continuous reading. Of course, military doctrine must be distinguished from official rhetoric and propaganda. Such statements as those put in the Chinese national defence policy White Papers need to be scrutinised. These empirical data serve little purpose if they are not organised and put into perspective. This research finds the realist school of International Relations theory useful in establishing the working environment and identifying the subject of Chinese military power as a key factor in Asian regional security. Realists see states engaged in constant struggle for power because only power is effective to check power.9 According to Kenneth Waltz, a main proponent of neo-realism, ‘among states, the state of nature is a state of war’.10 In addition, the first sentence on page 1 of a book by two prominent realists reads as follows: ‘Military power plays a crucial role in international politics because states coexist in a condition of anarchy’.11 For realists, the threat of violence is inherent in the anarchical international system. Even though there are international laws and norms, the lack of a supra-national government and enforcing agencies leaves states little option but to help themselves by pursuing power.12 It is this power relationship that locks states in a power–security dilemma: ‘In seeking power and security for themselves, states can easily threaten the power and security aspirations of other states’.13 This theoretical perspective describes the Asian regional security environment. While Asia is currently preoccupied with trade and robust economic activities, institutional building, especially on security affairs, still seems remote in this region and the effect of interdependence is uncertain. First, concomitant with increasing economic contacts are additional dimensions of conflicts, such as trade disputes and border control.
Introduction
5
These are particularly serious for China as its development of commercial legislation lags behind the pace of its economic growth, and its new partnership still fails to dispel inherent suspicion. Second, interdependence can be simply a facade for ‘unevenly balanced mutual dependence’. States may use economic resources as a substitute for military power to impose their will on others by depriving and threatening to deprive others of economic goods. Third, interdependence is supposed to preclude aggressive behaviour because it raises the cost of such actions and any measures to change the existing rules of the game; but, by placing states in a web of interlocking interests, interdependence also expands their security concerns and thus precipitates a wider range of military capabilities and responses.14 The forces underwriting institutionalism and multilateralism that have worked for decades in Europe thus hardly apply to Asia. There, bilateral alliances and their antithesis – non-alignment – have been the dominant mode of security arrangements. The optimism in Europe may not be reflected as reality in Asia.15 Regional multilateral security dialogues began recently in Asia with such arrangements as the ASEAN post-ministerial conference and the ASEAN Regional Forum. But the ASEAN member states have diverse interests and harbour mutual suspicion towards each other. They do not have a shared identity nor do they have a common threat perception; as towards China, their divergent approaches bring them only to a loose consensus: to avoid provoking the region’s great powers. These factors have imposed severe limitations on achieving any effective and cohesive multilateral initiatives. It is unlikely that a NATOstyle alliance may appear in post-Cold War Asia.16 ASEAN states recognise that institutionalism can only complement traditional bilateralism, which remains dominant in Asia. They also realise that the support and participation of the major powers, even outside the ASEAN network,17 is essential for multilateral institutions to work and function properly, and that any such framework must be underwritten by a balance of power.18 Fundamentally, regional security regimes simply reflect the distribution of power and remain a product of national interests. Power Having reiterated the importance of the balance of power in understanding Asian security, it is now appropriate to discuss the concept of power itself as employed in this research. First, it is power relative to various units of analysis, not absolute power, that constitutes the main concern of this study. Power is understood here in relational terms. Second, power is also discussed in terms of attributes; for example, military power, economic power and so on. Since the concept of power is used here to analyse China’s strategic behaviour and its relations with other countries, power is discussed as a relationship.
6
Introduction
While power as a relationship is generally abstract, it becomes less so when it is conceptualised with reference to its attributes.19 In Politics Among Nations, Hans Morgenthau lists geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy and the quality of government as attributes of national power.20 Beyond doubt, as national interests become diverse in the contemporary world, states wield more instruments of power and build up a wide array of national attributes. However, since war remains a deadly threat to the survival of states, the military element, among other resources of power, is ‘not only the ultima ratio, but indeed the first and constant one’ in international politics.21 A major interest of this study is about how China applies its military power relative to other states as international politics undergoes radical structural changes. Military power Despite recognition of the special significance of military power in a conflict-prone international system, military ‘power’ is often confused with military ‘force’. Military power is not tantamount to the number of soldiers or the size of an arsenal; nor is it the quality of an army or the technological level of military hardware. These are components of military force, constituting only the resources of military power. They can be exercised with the use and non-use of the military force but they can only be converted into ‘power’ by the state.22 Military power thus cannot be understood without reference to relational terms: it ‘emphasises a political relationship between potential adversaries rather than a catalogue of military capabilities’.23 Jablonsky also points out the relational aspect of military power: ‘A nation may appear powerful because it possesses many military assets, but assets may be inadequate against those of a potential enemy or inappropriate to the nature of the conflict’.24 Here is why military doctrine is so important. On the one hand, military doctrine is shaped by threat perceptions of the state and an array of domestic factors; on the other, it converts military force into military power because it guides the overall development and employment of the force. Since military doctrine is the focus of this study, it will be discussed in depth in the next chapter. Suffice it to point out here that military doctrine is an integral part of military power.
Studying the Chinese military China, on many counts, deserves special attention. Economically, its rapid growth has continued for more than a decade. Although whether China can sustain its spectacular economic development and turn itself into a global power during the twenty-first century remains in dispute, analysts can hardly dismiss the economic vigour of the PRC when they factor it
Introduction
7
into their projections of regional security;25 there are various studies on expectations of a rising China.26 China’s growing economic power, moreover, is being translated into military might. Militarily, it has not only increased its spending since the late 1980s but it has re-allocated its limited resources in more efficient ways to improve its antiquated army structure and equipment.27 To reiterate the obvious, it owns and deploys nuclear weapons and maintains the largest armed forces in Asia. In the international arena, China is the only Asian state to have a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council and has a history of regional dominance which had spanned hundreds of years. Amidst the fluidity in the transition to a new international order, how this ‘candidate state for hegemony’ will behave is a matter of major regional and international concern. In the West, and particularly in the USA, there has been heated debate over whether a strategy of containment or engagement should be adopted towards China.28 When assessing and making forecasts about China’s future behaviour in regional security, some scholars tend to look at where China intends to go and whether China is a status quo or a revisionist power.29 A ‘status quo’ state is one that has interests in preserving the existing distribution of power and its advantages; whereas a ‘revisionist’ power wishes to improve its position in the international system and may even challenge the very structure of that system.30 Some analyses focus on the above-cited themes. They examine whether it is in China’s interest to be a status quo or revisionist power, and what China intends to do in the international arena. The following subsection evaluates whether these approaches help understand the meaning of Chinese military power in the context of regional security. Cultural explanations Perhaps one of the most important works to analyse Chinese military affairs by cultural theories is Alastair Johnston’s Cultural Realism. In this book, he attempts to derive explanations of Chinese strategic culture from a study of China’s Seven Military Classics (wujing qishu)31 and from an empirical examination of the Ming dynasty’s defence decision-making. He argues that China has a conflict-prone strategic culture which shares ‘many of the same assumptions’ as in Western Realpolitik. This discrepancy with the accommodationist heritage of the Confucian-Mencian tradition is bridged by a concept of ‘quan bian’, which emphasises flexibility in making strategic choices. China thus tends to favour offensive military solutions in dealing with security threats from adversaries.32 Johnston’s work highlights an important factor that shapes China’s strategic behaviour. As is often the case with other cultural studies in international relations, however, it is hard to differentiate strategic culture from other variables and to substantiate it as an ‘independent, explanatory
8
Introduction
variable’.33 Moreover, identifying a ‘culture’ can be highly contentious because the very concept implies social stratification and domination of one particular strand over other ‘subcultures’. Another question that invites reservation about cultural analysis is ‘sharedness’ – to what extent and among whom that culture is shared.34 Finally, the application of cultural analysis to China is flawed by cultural reasons themselves. Different cultures may have different understandings of a particular concept. The key point is the increase in Chinese power relative to other states, especially the United States, the only surviving superpower. Suffice it to reiterate here that states tend to maximise power and that the rise of one state implies the decline of the other. Thus what is at issue is not simply whether China wants to be a hegemon, but whether it can be. This condition obviously elicits a debate about the importance of intentions in international politics. The following is an examination of how much or how little the study of intentions may contribute to a better understanding in China’s use and development of military power. Gauging Chinese intentions Every Party member should know this truth: ‘political power grows out of the barrel of the gun’. . . . Some people ridiculed us for upholding ‘a theory of the omnipotence of war’, yes, we are subscribers to the theory of the omnipotence of revolutionary war; this is not bad but good, and is Marxist. So concluded Mao Zedong at the sixth plenum of the Sixth Central Committee in 1938.35 This teaching is highly familiar to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The use of force has been an important policy instrument for the Party from its struggle for power in the 1920s to the preservation of the regime today. In the some forty years of the People’s Republic, the CCP has attempted to unify the country by force and has fought wars with foreign armies. China’s military exercise off its east coast in March 1996 to intimidate Taiwan was a reminder of this. So too is its forceful occupation of Tibet. Another oft-cited factor for a possible ‘China threat’ in Asia is China’s resurgent nationalism. Nationalism espoused by the Chinese communists has been characterised by a very strong anti-imperialist fervour. The reversion of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 was treated in a very high-profile way because the concession of that part of the territory in 1848 marked the beginning of a page of humiliation in Chinese history. Besides, when international socialism is taken into account, China is always projected in a besieged state. In other words, Chinese nationalism, which is integrated with the international socialist movement, is premised on a conflictual weltanschauung. In 1949, Mao Zedong declared:
Introduction
9
From now on, the Chinese people, which account for one quarter of the human population, stand up. The Chinese have been a great, courageous and hard-working people but became backward only in the modern age. The backwardness is entirely the result of repression and exploitation by foreign imperialism and the reactionary government at home. In the past one hundred years, our fore-runners unyieldingly and incessantly struggled against these internal and external oppressors. . . . The imperialists and the reactionaries at home never accept failure, they will make a last effort to struggle. After the country is pacific, they will continue to sabotage and create disturbances.36 This is a traditional Chinese view of national insecurity – the country being attacked by both internal and external enemies (neiyou waihuan). Forty-one years later, Deng Xiaoping, a ‘second generation’ communist leader, emphasised the point: ‘The People’s Republic of China was established only after twenty-two years of war, and has grown up amidst blockade, economic sanctions and isolation . . . I am a Chinese, I know the history of foreign invasions to China. . . . [We] must know some Chinese history, this is an impetus for China’s development’.37 He did not feel more secure either in the contemporary world: ‘Perhaps a Cold War is over, [but] another two Cold Wars just begin. One is against the South and the Third World; and the other against socialism. Western countries are now waging a Third World War without the smoke of gunpowder. Without the smoke of gunpowder because [it is aimed at] the peaceful evolution of socialist countries’.38 When a ‘third generation’ leadership ascended to power, this notion of insecurity was still evident. An official Chinese Communist Party periodical, Seeking Truth (Qiushi), published an editorial in 1996: ‘The “Westernisation” and “splintering” directed at China by Western countries led by the United States will not change and the powerful, united conspirators will not relinquish their plot to contain China’s development. . . . They are plotting to destroy China as a fortress of socialism and subjugate China in an inferior position’.39 But these anxieties about insecurity are growing and are not limited to the leaders.40 China’s rapid economic development and population increase add a new dimension to insecurity – its existing resources will not be able to sustain such remarkable growth and feed all its people. An acute sense of awareness has been growing among Chinese policy-makers regarding their territorial claims or, in their own words, ‘actual occupation by foreign countries’. They give particular attention to maritime territories where, they believe, rich resources lie idle and already ‘plundered’ by foreigners. Thriving international trade also hints at the necessity for a secure sea lane.41 All this is entirely consistent with the realist argument that as a state’s international interests grow, it will expand and build up its capability to defend them. Throughout history, such great powers as Britain, the United States and Germany have adopted this pattern.42
10
Introduction
If not intentions, what counts? Much has been said about China’s intentions. But many scholars, while prescribing policy recommendations for engagement, defer definite assessment and point to mixed signals and domestic uncertainties.43 These reservations are not surprising because we can hardly comprehend Chinese intentions from reading official polemics or assimilating wellcrafted government propaganda. As one famous Western international relations theorist has observed, ‘Intentions can change and perceptions are unreliable’.44 Analysts may perceive the intentions and mindsets of those in Zhongnanhai, the seat of power in Beijing, in certain ways; yet reality may actually work otherwise. The intentions of the Chinese leadership may be altered overnight as a result of a change of government or simply a change of mind. We have seen many historical precedents of states in open hostility or even armed conflicts with former allies; to cite but a few examples, Americans held hostage in Iran in 1979 and Chinese fighting their former Vietnamese comrades in the same year.45 The exercise to fathom intentions does not work not only because its object of enquiry (intentions) is capricious but the process of communicating and understanding intentions is affected by ‘noise’. According to communications theory, noise is defined as any distortion of a specific message, any signal which is not transmitted by the sender and anything that hinders the recipient to decode the message.46 Many historical events in international relations show that reading intentions may be only misleading. Some historians argue that Japan’s military modernisation and eventually expansion, from the nineteenth century up until the end of the Second World War, was due to a sense of extreme vulnerability – first, sovereignty under threat; later, the danger of being denied access to the Chinese and Western market and resources. In the years between the two world wars, a disarmed and humiliated Germany, which had to face a coalition of adversaries, could hardly feel secure.47 However, their subsequent occupation of foreign territories in Europe and Asia was unquestionably aggression. Their intentions cannot explain away their behaviour in international affairs. But can the concepts of status quo and revisionism help in assessing a state’s behaviour? Hans Morgenthau cautions us to differentiate between a status quo and revisionist power and warns of the grave consequences in mistaking them: ‘While it would be fatal to counter imperialistic designs with measures appropriate to a policy of status quo, it would be only a little less risky to deal with a policy seeking adjustments within the status quo as though it were imperialistic’.48 Concomitant is a tendency to link a status quo state with defensiveness and a revisionist state with aggressiveness. In general, there is a deep-seated bias towards the status quo.49 We may be able to give the status quo and revisionism acceptable definitions in theory; however,
Introduction
11
when it comes to the question of measuring actual behaviour, these may not really apply. Morgenthau’s exhortation is, in fact, a recognition of ambiguity in behaviour. ‘Revisionist’ states may seek only partial changes in the existing pattern of international relations and may ally temporarily with status quo powers. They may also hide their intentions to change the organising principle of the international system and the current distribution of power simply because they do not have the capability at that moment. Hitler confused the British with his creeping expansionism because the latter could not substantiate whether he had a local or a global agenda. After splitting with the Soviet Union in the 1960s, China did not continue to push for a resolution of the territorial dispute and later did not hesitate to join the United States in containing the USSR only because it was incapable of opposing that Soviet adversary on its own.50 A further question is: Can a ‘revisionist’ power become satisfied? It is arguable that the Soviet Union may have planned only to preserve the status quo when it sent troops to Czechoslovakia and Hungary in the 1960s. On the other hand, status quo states can behave aggressively. In light of armed intervention during the Cold War, the United States had a comparable record with the Soviet Union.51 Thus, the exercise to verify intentions is elusive, at least. What members in the international community should care about is whether their security is jeopardised by the actions and behaviour of others. What is relevant to regional stability is not how Beijing thinks but what it thinks; what worries its neighbours is not its intentions, but its power.52 In the end, it is the relative power of states that counts. The distribution of power determines whether or not a state can pursue aggressive designs or defend itself against threats.53 In other words, the military power of an individual state can affect the course of international politics, and power is the link between domestic and international systems. As Kenneth Waltz argues, ‘structural change begins in a system’s unit, and then unit-level and structural causes interact’.54 Having reasserted the importance of military power in international politics, the next question is: How should we understand the implications of China’s growing military power? As noted in the introduction of this chapter, military power per se in fact does not tell how much and in what ways China can and will act. It needs military doctrine to show its purpose and direction of development and military readiness to give it a context. Chapter 2 will examine these two concepts and establish an explanatory model for the study of China’s military power.
Plan of the book In this chapter, we first examined the strategic environment in which China promotes military modernisation and makes its military plans. We
12
Introduction
briefly discussed how competitive perspectives may see the setting of Asian regional security and established that military power remains the most important variable in inter-state relations in the region. Given China’s increasing military power, it deserves an in-depth analysis. We also examined various approaches that may be used to study the Chinese military and concluded that we need to employ the concepts of military doctrine and military readiness to make sense of the development of China’s military power. The second chapter is devoted to building the analytical framework of this study which is built upon two key concepts – military readiness and military doctrine. Having asserted the importance of power and clarified the meaning, Chapter 2 takes a further step to put military power in the context of military readiness in order to evaluate China’s military power. But some important questions remain unanswered: What is its military power ready for? How far is it ready to achieve its purposes and implement its tasks? The key lies in military doctrine. Although Chinese taxonomy and conception of military doctrine differ from the two major AngloAmerican and Marxist-Leninist models and their army poorly documents its doctrine, Chapter 2 explains that, from a functional perspective, a military doctrine does exist. Chapters 3 to 6 will demonstrate how doctrine has performed its functions with the support of empirical evidence. Being the foundation of military development, it informs the purposes and shapes the buildup of power. A military readiness analysis model focused on military doctrine is necessary to study the development of Chinese military power. Chapter 3 starts the empirical investigations of this book by applying this doctrine-based military readiness model to examine how the evolution of China’s military doctrine has affected the exercise of its military power from 1949 to the late 1970s. It traces the origin of the concept of local/limited war which had made and is making a great impact on Chinese military thinking. However, an abrupt termination of local war study mandated by political factors in China deprived the PLA of an opportunity to research this new type of war in the nuclear age. Instead, Chinese military thinking and planning became dominated by the total war doctrine of Maoist People’s War. This approach sacrificed operational readiness for structural readiness. It emphasised mass and defence in depth. As a first step to explicate the argument, this chapter examines the various perspectives on the operating environment which forms the Chinese military doctrine. Chapter 4 continues the empirical analysis by reviewing the gradual return of local war doctrine during the post-Mao interlude until the mid1980s and its implications for rebuilding the Chinese army. It contends that the poor military performance by the PLA in the Sino–Vietnamese conflict in 1979 was a catalyst for regenerating Chinese military doctrine on local war as the Chinese army had prepared for a ‘wrong’ war. The
Introduction
13
1980s thus witnessed an attempt to revise Mao’s military dictum by stipulating the concept of a ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’ and a theory of an ‘initial phase of war’. Although the ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’ served mainly as a transition from the Maoist People’s War, it represented a doctrinal breakthrough that reoriented the direction of military development from building up the mass itself to restructuring to enhance operational efficiency. Chapter 5 analyses the beginning of a new era which is characterised by the official adoption of a local war doctrine in the mid-1980s and deals with the key question of how China understands ‘local war’ as opposed to ‘limited war’. This period saw a renewed interest in the operational level of war, not only for the whole army but also for individual services, including the Second Artillery, which began to expand its uses from strategic to operational and tactical levels. To adapt to this shift from total war to local war, the Chinese high command initiated a massive force reduction and restructuring in order to rationalise the PLA’s force mix and improve operational readiness. Rapid response and command and control reforms became major landmarks of this period. The local war doctrine was quickly rendered too vague by the kind of warfare demonstrated by the Gulf War of 1991. Chapter 6 focuses on the post-Gulf War period which is characterised by the military doctrine of ‘local war under high-technology conditions’ and intensifying research on campaigning. This development, coinciding with global interests in the ‘revolution in military affairs’, accentuates the application of technology to force building and its importance in the exercise of military power. In particular, information technology has been regarded as the catalyst for the emergence of this revolution and a new form of warfare – informationised warfare. All this logically prompts the Chinese military leadership’s advocacy for ‘strengthening the army with science and technology’ (keji qiangjun) to enhance the army’s combat effectiveness and operational efficiency. Paradoxically, as the PLA watches the world trend of RMA and learns the experiences of other armies in making use of scientific and technological means, it becomes more interested in developing asymmetric capability. When it weighs itself against its possible adversaries in the technological equation, it sees little prospect of catching up in every aspect. Sheer imitation is regarded as not feasible. Moreover, some analysts anticipate that science and technology, especially information technology, may revive the People’s War with new substance and give rise to a new form of operation – systemic joint integrated operation (yitihua lianhe zuozhan). But the PLA’s doctrinal focus on science and technology also leads to a highly questionable belief in the controllability of war. It is sliding close to a literal and dangerous understanding of ‘limited war’. The Conclusion (Chapter 7) sums up the arguments and findings. It reviews how the evolution of China’s military doctrine has caused shifts between emphasis on structural readiness and operational readiness, and
14
Introduction
how this has determined the direction of both aspects of force-building. It also demonstrates that military doctrine is a useful concept in understanding China’s buildup and exercise of its military power.
Conclusion The collapse of the Cold War bipolar system has led to a reconfiguration of power in international politics and profound changes in the security landscape in the Asia-Pacific. To understand the dynamics of current and future developments in that region, realism describes the situation better than does the liberal-institutionalist theory because it reflects the emerging power structure and finds the right focus – power. The transition period implies not only strategic uncertainty but also opportunities for aggression by applying military power. Since war still threatens states’ survival, military power remains the ultimate element among other attributes in the formula of national power. Military doctrine, which guides the development of military power, is the most important variable in studying Chinese strategic behaviour because it tells us what China can and probably will do. This will be elaborated in the next chapter. The beginning of a transition to a new security landscape in Asia opens the question of which contemporary great powers there will emerge as the stronger. It is against such a background that China is alleged to be a threat in the region. According to realist theories, China, in view of its differential growth rates, has overtaken many states in the accumulation of power resources and automatically becomes a candidate state for hegemony. In the international anarchical structure, states are bound to selfhelp and tend to maximise power; those that ‘fail to attain great power status are predictably punished’.55 While some scholars analyse and forecast Chinese behaviour in regional security matters by reading their intentions, this approach may prove to be questionable. Historical precedents in international politics show also that it is equally misleading to base one’s judgement on whether a country favours the status quo or revision of the existing international order. The subject for study is power and the key to its understanding is doctrinal ideas. An assessment of China’s role in regional stability – positive or disruptive – should hinge on whether it can sustain the growth of its power and how it uses that power. China’s military doctrine will show in which direction its military is heading and whether it is ready to reap the fruits of its growing power.
2
Military doctrine, military readiness and military power
Chapter 1, having considered various approaches to studying Asian security, argued that distribution of power remains a significant factor in Asia’s regional conflicts. It also identified China’s military power as the subject of analysis. This chapter attempts to build a model on the two concepts of military doctrine and military readiness to carry out this enquiry. It first examines the concept of military doctrine, assessing how and why it is the key ideational instrument for interpreting China’s military power. In other words, military power is treated as a dependent variable of military doctrine. Initially, a definition of military doctrine will be offered. It is a term often used but is subject to diverse interpretation and understanding. Why is doctrine so important? What makes up a doctrine and how is it derived? What functions does it have in explaining international security behaviour? Why and how does it matter for military power? These questions will be assessed in this chapter. Next we will turn our attention to another component of our analytical framework, the concept of military readiness, which is derived from Richard Betts’ book, Military Readiness.1 Although his work concentrates on US military policies, Betts’ generic definition and concept of military readiness may be usefully applied to other militaries. Military readiness, Betts asserts, is based on the building blocks of mass, speed and efficiency (‘effectiveness’, he notes, is a function of mass and efficiency). It has three aspects: structural, operational and mobilisation readiness.2 Since these concepts place military power in context by describing how resources are converted into military power in spatial and temporal terms, it is the ideational factor, military doctrine, that shows the direction. Military doctrine guides the development of force structure, the training of the force and even resource allocation in support of that force. In other words, military readiness is seen as the buildup and application of the mass of military force at a certain speed and in a specific direction. The analytical framework based on the concepts of military doctrine and military readiness is the focus of this chapter. It will be used to study Chinese military power in Asian regional security environment.
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Military doctrine, readiness, power
Military doctrine: the languages of war Defining military doctrine ‘Military doctrine’ is often associated with how soldiers fight in combat, dealing with the means and ways to be employed in war-fighting.3 But doctrine means more than just defeating hypothetical enemy on the battlefield and is not restricted to human and material concerns. It subsides in the mind of those planning, implementing and fighting wars: Doctrine is at the heart of military activity. As the central body of beliefs about the conduct of war it provides the guiding force for action, structure, organisation and development. Its influence should be evident to some extent in all practical activities. More than that, however, doctrine represents the highest expression of a defence force’s intellectual foundation.4 This approach to defining military doctrine points to an often-neglected intellectual dimension of doctrine and relevance of that enterprise. As conceived here, military doctrine goes beyond the mere purview of combat arms to encompass the whole military establishment of a state. It must be officially sanctioned in the sense that it is widely accepted among a state’s military leaders (though, in the process of dissemination, a doctrine may start from a relatively small circle). In this context, military doctrine is dynamic, reflecting what the current political and military leaders think. There are two common biases that tend to impede our understanding of military doctrine. First, doctrine is easily confused with dogma or ‘fundamental principles’. Doctrine is not necessarily ‘a sort of manual for action’ as understood by Clausewitz in his time.5 The fact that US military doctrine is always referred to an operational level of war requires its doctrinal documents to present a clear road map of action. To caution against rigidity in ‘following the books’, the US high command has repeatedly to remind its constituents of the importance of judgement in application. Second, doctrine is not a single document. A published manual is not the only method or, necessarily, the most effective way to convey doctrinal postulates.6 The Chinese PLA, among the major armies of the world, has poorly documented its doctrine. In fact, doctrine may exist in a variety of forms. Alfred Mahan, a nineteenth-century American naval thinker, observes that, ‘In military operations doctrine, if not given the name, has always existed’.7 It may be highly articulated, carefully structured and widely disseminated in a military, or ‘little more than ideas’ shared by the high command.8 Having said the ‘what-is’ and ‘what-is-not’ about military doctrine, we still have some hurdles to cross before we integrate the definition of military doctrine into an analytical framework for empirical study of the Chinese military. What is the substance of the Chinese con-
Military doctrine, readiness, power
17
ception of military doctrine? Why is military doctrine important? How can it contribute to the making of military power? Two major doctrinal models The Cold War divided the world into two military camps and, despite its demise, it leaves strategic studies with two main models of constructing military doctrine. According to the Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms of the United States Department of Defence, doctrine is: ‘fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application’.9 The above is clearly a lexicon explanation of ‘doctrine’; it tells us little about how the US military sees the concept itself. A more heuristic conceptual interpretation is found in the US army field manuals. The 1993 edition of FM 100–5 Operations defines doctrine as ‘the statement of how America’s Army, as part of a joint team, intends to conduct war and operations other than war . . . [and] the condensed expression of the Army’s fundamental approach to fighting, influencing events in operations other than war, and deterring actions detrimental to national interests’.10 The 2001 field manual emphasises the cornerstone role: ‘Doctrine touches all aspects of the Army’.11 A similar orientation is posited by the Australian air force, in the third edition of its doctrinal document, The Air Power Manual. It defines doctrine as ‘fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in its application’.12 When it discusses the strategic air power doctrine, it describes doctrine as ‘the central body of knowledge which . . . influences the way all members of the air force think and act in meeting their individual and collective responsibilities for the promotion of Australia’s security through air power’.13 Both the American and Australian versions of military doctrine, then, emphasise flexibility of doctrinal application in accordance with different combat environments. For the Soviet Union, military doctrine was ‘a nation’s officially accepted system of scientifically founded views on the nature of modern wars and the use of the armed forces in them, and also on the requirements arising from these views regarding the country and the armed forces being made ready for war’.14 Doctrine was shaped by the political nature of the government and the level of material development, especially economics, science and technology. Its two components, socio-political and military-technical, dealt with the nature and objectives of war as well as changes in military affairs and the conduct of war.15 Because war was viewed as part of a global struggle between two rival socio-economic systems, Soviet doctrine tended to emphasise more the socio-political component than was the case in the West.
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Military doctrine, readiness, power
While, given their historical and military alliance relationships, the resemblance between the United States’ and Australia’s doctrines is not surprising, the Soviet example illustrates that different militaries can have very divergent understandings of even one single term, which is, however, crucial. Indeed, in the heat of the Cold War, American strategists allegedly often neglected the differences in the ‘language of war’ between themselves and their Soviet counterparts.16 They often took it for granted that their rivals shared their taxonomy. Greg Austin, in his study of Soviet military doctrine, focuses in particular on how Western analysts have simply ‘mirror-imaged’ Soviet conceptions.17 This discrepancy is understandable. First, militaries of various models have different political-social-economic systems and experiences in the history of war and foreign relations. The Cold War underscored this phenomenon. Leading powers with proven records of success in international relations are always sources of aspiration and models for emulation. The USA and the former Soviet Union served that role and became models on which their respective allies built their own doctrines.18 Second, there is a problem of levels of war and structure of military science.19 The lineage of the concepts of strategy and tactics can probably be traced back to the Greek city-states but the evolution of warfare, technology and army organisation in the nineteenth century created a gap between the strategic and tactical levels of war. The German answer to this development was the introduction of a new level of war – operativ, which was borrowed by the Russians in the 1930s as operativnyi; that is, the operational level of war. This three-level concept of war was officially endorsed in the United States only in the 1982 edition of its army field manual.20 The doctrine for one level of war is sometimes confused with that applicable to other levels. At times, the term ‘doctrine’ is commonly applied to a particular level of war in one military organisation’s frame of reference but it may fall into a different framework when applied by other militaries. These two problems occur when we try to fit the concept of doctrine to Chinese military taxonomy. ‘Marxist-Leninist’ tradition with Chinese characteristics The Chinese understanding of American concepts of military doctrine may be seen in their translation of the term. Doctrine, when referring to the US military, is translated by researchers in the PLA as zuozhan tiaoling, zuozhan lilun, and NATO as jiben zuozhan yuanze.21 The common thread that brings these three translations together is the Chinese perceived emphasis on zuozhan which means ‘operational’ or ‘military operations’. The PLA has continued to study and plan for war according to an adapted military conceptual framework of Marxist-Leninist tradition. When Chen Zhou, a PLA researcher specialised in local war theories,
Military doctrine, readiness, power
19
attempts to define local war, he also follows the tradition by defining it in both socio-political and military-technical components.22 However, obviously, the structure of the Chinese framework is less well organised and less precisely delineated than that employed by the Soviet Red Army. Chinese doctrines are also poorly documented. But the main problem in comparing the concept of doctrine of the Chinese and Soviet militaries is that the PLA does not have an exact conceptual equivalent of Soviet ‘military doctrine’ (which is translated as junshi xueshuo in Chinese military literature). An early study of PLA doctrine by Georges Tan Eng Bok does include junshi xueshuo in China’s system of military thinking. According to PLA publications, however, the Chinese do not use such terms. ‘People’s War’ is too narrow and incomplete to be ‘military doctrine’, and is somehow misrepresented in Tan’s chart of hierarchy of Chinese military concepts.23 Junshi sixiang, commonly known as ‘military thought’ in the West, is a close equivalent of Soviet military doctrine but still remains more elaborate and complex. The Chinese definition of military thought reads: It is based on different political and philosophical values and reflects the values of different classes, countries, periods and people about war. It shows the nature of war and its law of development, establishes guiding thoughts and fundamental principles for the building and employment of armed forces. It has salient class colour.24 Official Chinese military thought is termed ‘Mao Zedong Military Thought’. Despite its namesake, the theoretical construct is not the sole work of Mao but is attributed to the collective wisdom of generations of Chinese communist military leaders.25 The label ‘Mao Zedong’ is more a matter of symbolism than of substance. After a process of evolution and refinement, Chinese military thought has been expanded from its traditional triadic structure of ‘People’s Army’, ‘People’s War’, ‘Strategy and Tactics of People’s War’ to include two more elements, ‘Methodology and Perspective on the Nature of War’ and ‘National Defence Building Theory’.26 Chinese military thought thus differs from Soviet military doctrine in its inclusion of a philosophical foundation which is to explain socio-political and military-technical elements. Significantly, the emphasis on the relationship between the elements seems to be interactive rather than hierarchical. In the Marxist-Leninist tradition, China’s military leaders believe they can discover the laws of war and military affairs by using the right methodology, that is, dialectic materialism. They also believe that how one fights a war depends on how one sees a war. It is thus imperative to ascertain the nature of war itself. Politically, war is not only, as Clausewitz points out, an extension of politics but, to be precise, of class politics; the class nature determines whether the war is just or unjust. Militarily, war is a matter of survival and enemy destruction.27
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Military doctrine, readiness, power
Requirements for armed forces in future warfare, as reflected in the Soviet definition of military doctrine, is ‘national defence-building thought’. For the PLA, this stipulation maps out principles of force development. Deng Xiaoping is credited with making a major contribution to refining this component to Chinese standards in light of his ‘army-building thoughts’ and ‘military reform thoughts’.28 The ‘People’s Army’ component of army-building thought is limited to discussions about the nature and general mission of the armed forces: serving the people and absolute allegiance to the Communist Party.29 The concepts of People’s War and the Strategy and Tactics of People’s War are probably the most controversial components in Maoist military thought. Individual PLA researchers argue that the ‘strategy and tactics of People’s War’ should be positioned as a lower level component under People’s War. This view is echoed by Lieutenant-General Jiang Siyi, former Deputy Commandant of the Academy of Military Science. Although Chinese military literature continues to treat them as two separate but parallel elements, the contention over their priorities is not unreasonable.30 Indeed, the title of ‘strategy and tactics of People’s War’ is inherently deceiving. It is not meant to be strategy and tactics as understood in either the Western or even Marxist (i.e. Soviet) model of military doctrine. Nor is it squared with the definitions commonly held in military literature. It is not an operational concept. The evolution of warfare has rendered it to be virtually defunct as strategy and tactics in any practical sense. The concept has instead become a dependent variable of People’s War and has been practically reduced to ‘strategy and tactics to be employed in fighting a People’s War’. Yet People’s War is being equally challenged. It has a dual character, carrying socio-political as well as military-technical meanings. When the Chinese insist on establishing continuous theoretical validity, they point largely to the socio-political tenets: moral and material support and actual participation of the people in the war effort, the justness of Chinese wars, the decisiveness of the ‘human factor’ and leadership of the Communist Party. Having faced the tests of time, People’s War, it is now claimed, provides ‘guidance’ and is not about the actual conduct of war. Recent PLA studies have referred to ‘fundamental principles’ (jiben yuanli) of People’s War. Yet its military-technical component has to be constantly revised and updated to respond to the challenges of perceived threats and types of warfare. In 1978, when Deng Xiaoping marked the twentieth anniversary of the Academy of Military Science, he urged his comrades to inherit the Mao Zedong military thought, to study ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’ and develop China’s military science. This was a call for injection of new military-technical substance into People’s War. But the picture of ‘modern conditions’ and the type of war that the Chinese army should prepare for remain unclear. It was only in the 1980s, as will be discussed in
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later chapters, that ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’ evolved towards operationalisation with the introduction of ‘Local War’, and later, ‘Local War under High-Technology Conditions’ (gaojishu tiaojian xia de jubu zhanzheng). Entering the twenty-first century, the Chinese high command became more specific about these high-technology conditions, calling for studying ‘People’s War under Informationisation Conditions’.31 In sum, it may be said, what the PLA is prepared to fight is a People’s War in the form of a ‘Local War under High-Technology Conditions’ with increasing attention to the application of information technology.32 Although it may not have a written manual, this concept is officially sanctioned to direct military preparation. Subordinate are a series of published combat regulations and a training programme. PLA force structure is also reformed to adapt to its requirements. Thus, ‘Local War under High-Technology Conditions’, similar to the doctrine of other militaries, serves as the intellectual foundation of military affairs and conveys the dynamic relevance of a changing international security environment. It is also the focus of this study.
The importance of military doctrine Since there has been a wealth of studies on the sources and formulation of military doctrine,33 we will not dwell on this aspect here but focus on factors related to the two functions of military doctrine outlined above; namely, communication and constitution. Military doctrine differs from ‘intention’ as an indicator of state behaviour. While the latter’s weaknesses and malleability are self-evident as discussed in the previous chapter, the former, guiding force of development and strategy is relatively stable and provides concrete material for examination. The communicative function of military doctrine lies in its value as a distillation of strategic culture, military organisational culture, the plans and perceptions of political-military leaders and national interests. It communicates to the outside world, given the resources and constraints of the country, how one’s own military high command is going to organise and apply military power. Political-military leadership and institutions certainly stand out as agents in the formulation of military doctrine. Civil–military relations and decision-making processes are among the foremost factors.34 Historically, some cases of military reform (such as the creation of the Royal Air Force and its strategic bombing doctrine) are attributed to civilian intervention. Others, such as the organisation of British air defence during the Second World War, result from the genius of military leadership.35 But doctrinal ideational factors are also apparent when the views of civilian and military planners converge. Illustrative was the development of the ‘cult of offensive’ on the eve of the First World War. The military organisations in Europe were biased towards offensive strategy because of
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Military doctrine, readiness, power
their institutional interests in self-image and expansion as well as their need to reduce uncertainty in future warfare. Civilian and military leadership both perceived opportunities to achieve a quick and decisive victory by seizing the offensive. The prevalence of this strategic bias throughout Europe contributed to the outbreak of war.36 Another ideational factor attracting attention in international relations and security studies is culture. Some scholars attend to the ‘strategic culture’ of the state while others care more about the military organisational culture which is based on ‘the collectively held beliefs within a particular military organisation’. It is advanced as an independent capable of explaining choice of military doctrine and defence policies.37 Besides, military doctrine is not articulated in a vacuum; it is defined by material constraints and the limits of other elements of national power (i.e. leadership, politics, economics, technology and population). It communicates the limit of a state’s strategic capabilities. A key factor, for example, is geography. Being sandwiched between strong neighbours, Prussia-Germany and Israel understandably have favoured doctrines promulgating for quick and decisive military solutions. In the tradition of Mackinder’s geopolitics, moreover, a state’s choice to be a land or sea power is very much determined by geography.38 Geography also determines the availability of a state’s resources. The quest for water and oil, among other factors, has contributed to the outbreak of crisis and wars. Recent competition for offshore resources in Asia has prompted many countries in the region to modernise their naval assets.39 A related environmental factor is the size of a country’s population. The supply of manpower in the armed forces and in the country as a whole largely confines what a state may deploy. Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson have both observed that, with the population of Australia or Canada, the United States could not have been a superpower.40 In fact, the small population of Australia determines that it has to exploit its geographical depth to a maximum extent.41 Economics certainly enters into the equation of military doctrinal formulation. Many examples exist of how a state’s level of economic selfsufficiency, industrial capacity and financing capability translate into military power. A recent example was the demise of the Soviet Red Army. In its last days, when the USSR could no longer afford huge and offensive armed forces, Soviet military doctrine was bound to change to one of ‘military sufficiency’. The Soviet armed forces were pruned to the ‘lowest necessary numerical level’.42 Technology is another materialist factor that substantially shapes military doctrine. Again, the USSR’s Red Army is a case in point. The Russians are among those who pioneered the concept of Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA) with a focus on the technological advances. When Khrushchev declared the advent of RMA in 1960, the path for subsequent development seemed bright. Marshall Malinovsky, then Minister of
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Defence, attributed RMA in the Soviet Union to its material foundation in terms of economic, scientific and technological levels.43 Other proponents of RMA, though more moderate about the potential of such military technologies, agreed that they would play a critical role.44 But military doctrine has additional value as a subject of enquiry. As the US army field manual 3–0 suggests, doctrine ‘facilitates communication among soldiers . . . contributes to a shared professional culture, and serves as the basis for curricula in the Army Education System. Army doctrine provides a common language and a common understanding of how Army forces conduct operations’.45 Military doctrine thus shapes the thinking of those who play a major role in planning the development and applying of military power. This is where the constitutive function should be brought into our discussion. Military doctrine affects the making of military power. When Martin van Creveld analyses why the wehrmacht had fought so effectively in the Second World War, he lists doctrine as one of the factors contributing to Germany’s ‘fighting power’.46 Harry Summers, in analysing the Vietnam War, attributes the problems the US armed forces suffered in that conflict to doctrinal deficiency.47 Doctrine is such a critical element in military affairs that an United States Air Force thinker, John A. Warden III, asserts, ‘[W]ar through the ages has been a battle of doctrines. The really decisive successes have come to those who adopted a new doctrinal concept to which their enemies were unable to respond’.48 In sum, military doctrine is not a mere ‘wish list’ but results from compromises reached between various interested parties and from the interactions of many inputs and constraints. It is also the product of the peculiarities of a particular state and a particular army. The weight of each factor in the doctrinal formulation process may vary among different militaries. The following sections, instead of recapturing the influence of those general factors in the Chinese context, will focus on experiences, threat perceptions, and institutional processes peculiar to China and which help shape Chinese military doctrine.
Sources of military doctrine in China Chinese experiences and threat perception A quick review of the first few decades after the establishment of the PRC easily leads one to the impression of the country’s engaging in chronic wars and armed conflicts of varying intensity. The Cold War was not that cold for China. Soon after its founding, the Korean War broke out. China was threatened by the use of nuclear weapons and the prospect of having a pro-US state on its northeast border.49 But the worst was not to come until the 1960s. China’s relations with its allies and friends began to collapse. It first fought a border war with its former non-alignment movement comrade
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Military doctrine, readiness, power
India, then saw the USA escalating its military operations in Indo-China, and later clashed openly with its former ally Russia. All this seemed to put China in a deadly encirclement by two nuclear-armed superpowers and their allies and to solicit its preparations for an enemy general invasion. As analysed in Chapter 3, the Chinese leadership under Mao Zedong resorted to a People’s War doctrine that focused on the imminence of a full-scale nuclear war. In reply, China combined in-depth defence and deterrence by denial, counting on a rudimentary nuclear deterrence capability and numerical superiority of its army and territorial expanse. This exclusive concern for national security and survival did not begin to relax until Kissinger’s and Nixon’s respective visits to China in 1971 and 1972. This defrosting of Sino–American relations proved to pave the way to a change of perception by the leadership succeeding Mao. Throughout the 1980s, China was actively seeking rapport with the superpowers. Sino–Soviet confrontation was mitigated amid a series of peace overtures by both sides which bore fruit in later years. China was ready to abandon its ‘single-thread’ strategy (yitiaoxian) to counter-contain the Russians.50 On the other hand, following the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between China and the USA in 1979, the relationship was further stabilised by the signing in 1982 of the Shanghai Communiqué, continual reciprocal visits between Chinese and American officials, augmentation of military cooperation, and easing of the conventional weapons transfer policy until the 1989 military suppression in Beijing.51 Despite limited rapprochement with the Americans, China emphasised a ‘coalition-style’ relationship with the USA over outright alliance relations lest it be relegated to the status of a superpower ‘card’. Beijing learned from its ‘one-sided tilt’ policy towards the Soviets in the 1950s and was instead determined to play the role of a mix of ‘balancer’ and ‘free-rider’ in a loose bipolar international system. Apart from emphasising its independence, China chose to identify itself with smaller powers and with the Third World. But this was a delicate brand of diplomacy. The PRC was not content to be only an equal among Third World countries in a united front against the two ‘hegemons’; it tried to ensure its ‘outstanding’ status by refraining from joining multilateral coalitions in favour of concentrating on bilateral diplomacy.52 Such Chinese thinking has been reflective of ongoing security trends in the Asia Pacific. As noted in Chapter 1, multilateralism has not yet taken root in the region. Henry Kissinger once argued that the relations between the major powers in Asia resemble the European balance of power system in the nineteenth century – characterised by an emphasis on competition and distinctiveness.53 Only converging national interests may bind Asia-Pacific states into security cooperation.54 Again, Chinese security policy should not be regarded as simply responsive to changes of threat perception. In fact, Beijing’s new policy course was undertaken even prior to Gorbachev’s perestroika and Russia’s military
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‘entrenchment’.55 In international security affairs, Chinese realist thinking logically leads to a focus on enhancing self-help capability. Although the intensity of threat has been diminishing on all fronts, China has not hesitated to strengthen its power and jealously guards its ‘independence and autonomy’ (duli zizhu).56 The four modernisations drive is illustrative. Chinese realism, since Deng Xiaoping returned to power in the late 1970s, prompted a reconceptualisation of Chinese security interests. The new concept had been liberated from the exclusive concern about state survival to embrace ‘national interests’, which, in the context of Chinese politics, are essentially extensions of concerns over sovereignty and territorial integrity. The ‘state’, for the Chinese, remains at the centre of international affairs. As a confirmed realist state, China is wary of changes in relative power and of others’ relative gains. Its leadership believes that China will be penalised if it refrains from being assertive – in line with what neo-realists contend.57 China has systematically built up its military power because its leaders believe in the utility of indigenous military capabilities, not in staking one’s survival on alliance affiliation.58 A statement by Deng Xiaoping clearly makes this point: the stronger China becomes, the more stable the world would be and the less likely major wars would break out.59 To summarise, China’s military buildup has been premised on and consistent with realist thinking on national interests. In other words, the ‘Dengist’ approach to national security distinguishes itself from its Maoist predecessor by adopting a more assertive pursuit of national interests, rather than being obsessed with state survival and security. National interest The concept of ‘national interest’ is actually a recent development in China’s strategic thinking. It received attention only in the 1980s.60 However, in Chinese communist tradition, conceptual continuity is important when justifying policy changes. Deng Xiaoping, for example, had to characterise his defence modernisation programme as ‘Maoist’.61 Applying the concept of national interest is no exception. Chinese policymakers had to ensure that it was sanctified by Mao and other revered ‘first-generation’ PRC figures so that it appeared to be consistent with orthodox ideological discourse.62 Although China is a multi-nation state, the concept of national interest is based on a notion of unitary nationalism. ‘National interest’ in the lexicon of China’s political-military leadership is not as sophisticated as that normally applied by academic researchers. Rather than taking care to differentiate between ‘state interests’ and ‘national interests’,63 they simply use the terminology interchangeably. First, the concept of national interests is used as if China is a unified nation-state. The single one ‘nation’ is the ‘Chinese nation’ (zhonghua minzu). Second, the concept is built on an
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appeal to nationalism, which is an easy and convenient term. The ‘national’ dimension is its ‘antithetical’ implications of globalism, especially imperialism.64 Being a communist country, China has to deal with an extra dimension of the concept of national interests – class interests. According to Marxism, the state is no different from the social structure and is only the executive arm of a ruling class that oppresses another class in the pursuit of its own interests.65 But the Chinese do not regard themselves as having any conceptual problems with this, as no line is really drawn between national interests and class. In their conception, Chinese national interests are congruent with state interests which, in turn, are equal to class interests.66 Chinese national interests are, for all practical purposes, state-centric and focused primarily on the institutions and physical base of the state.67 In terms of substance, the most fundamental ‘national interest’, for China, is the preservation of sovereignty and the pursuit of sovereigntyrelated interests.68 This thinking was especially dominant when the political and physical survival of the People’s Republic was thought to be at stake during the height of the Cold War. Sovereignty was equated to independence from foreign interference in the governance of the Chinese state.69 Even during the high tide of ‘internationalism’ in the 1950s, Beijing’s orientation towards sovereignty was explicitly state-centric. As Zhou Enlai emphasised at the time: ‘Our internationalism is independence and equality among all nations’.70 The sovereignty issue has not diminished in importance some forty years later. In fact, it has become a political weapon to defend China against Western human rights diplomacy.71 China insists that sovereignty is above human rights because it is about the preservation of territorial integrity and protection of the population and their property from foreign aggression. Without these, Beijing insists, human rights are not practical.72 At the same time, the concept of ‘national interest’ has undergone some significant changes in China on the assumption that external threats to state survival have been modified. First, the concept has been more clearly defined; second, it has been expanded; and third, it has become more important in security policies. Now the scope of national interest goes beyond China’s national boundaries. A stable international order, an equal footing in foreign affairs, expansion of export markets, and overseas resources are just some of its components. As China’s economic development is the overarching goal of the four modernisations policy, the safeguarding of Chinese economic interests clearly occupies a paramount position in the list of national interests. Industrial and agricultural programmes assure that China will remain a primary energy and natural resources consumer. Depleting resources and diminishing return of resources excavation are identified as bottlenecks of sustained Chinese economic growth. Increasing dependence on trade and
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resources outside the mainland have made open sea lanes and secure offshore energy resources critical dimensions of Chinese economic interests; at the same time, China’s political claims to offshore sectors of the East and South China Seas and its concern about Taiwan going independent have reinforced the traditional dimension of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Perhaps the most significant development is the introduction in China’s political lexicon of the concept of maritime territory (haiyang guotu) and maritime interests (haiyang quanyi).73 Therefore, the Director of the PLA Navy’s Military Art Research Institute, Jiang Zhijun, observes, China’s security challenges come mainly from the sea.74 Reconciling its growing interdependence with its sovereign prerogative will posit one of the greatest challenges to Chinese national security policy-making. Amid excitement from the general public, the PLA has been vigilant as to the impact of Chinese accession to the WTO, studying its security challenges and possible solutions.75 A more externally oriented national strategy demands a more assertive security posture. By the late 1980s, strategists at China’s Army Command Academy identified two tiers of national defence: (1) preservation of existing national interests; and (2) protection of future national interests. The former included preserving national sovereignty and territorial integrity, accruing natural resources on land and sea, developing national economic and industrial and trade systems, as well as protecting the people and their properties. The latter criterion was operationalised on the need to cultivate national development; thus resources that would enhance China’s national power fell into this category.76 This reinterpreted concept of ‘national interest’ was more encompassing both in spatial and temporal terms and thus more demanding for China’s military than the objective of ensuring survival. Since the end of the Cold War period, the concept of national interest has continued to expand. A study published by a PLA think-tank, the AMS Strategic Studies Department, defines national interests in six aspects: (1) territory: a nation’s living space and all natural resources in this space; (2) national security; (3) national sovereignty; (4) national development; (5) national stability; and (6) national dignity.77 Interestingly, globalisation, instead of diluting the weight of sovereignty in the Chinese conception of national interests, actually reinforces it. As it brings as much inter-penetration as expansion of national interests, it is the responsibility of a sovereign state to protect its ‘core interests’ border while expanding the peripheral.78 Such a view of the fluid border of national interests requires more versatile power. So far, the general content and specific Chinese definition of national interests have been discussed. While national interest is an important concept and an ideational factor at the higher level of grand strategy, this study is more directly concerned with military doctrine. The structure and discourse of the national interest concept in the context of international
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relations theory are considered in-depth by other studies. Suffice it to say here that this concept elicits a more assertive military doctrine to protect and enhance national interests in a dynamically changing world. Of course, the discussion of the role of experiences and threat perception in Chinese military doctrinal formulation must be complemented by an analysis of institutional factors. It is mainly the institutions mentioned below that articulate these abstract ideas into coherent military ones. The institutions Admittedly, due to the lack of transparency, we know very little about the precise process of how China forges its military doctrine, who are involved, and to what extent. Although China has recently been moving closer to international norms in foreign relations by publishing defence policy papers first in 1992 and, from 1998 onwards, seemingly at a twoyear interval, the fog shrouding the Chinese process of doctrine formulation has not been totally dispelled. There is, at best, scant literature and information on the subject. In view of the receding influence of army elders, the Central Military Commission is able to exercise its power as the highest military policymaking institution. The importance of this institution is accentuated by Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin’s managing to hold on to its chairmanship even after they retired from other powerful posts. Members of this organ and other senior defence planners are fed with analytical briefings, think-tank reports and advice channelled through the CMC General Office.79 The General Staff Department (GSD) is regarded as the first among equals, standing out from other general departments because it is the agent through which the CMC exercises operational command of the military regions, navy and air force (except for the Second Artillery which is under the CMC’s direct control) and sends down policies. Its subordinate units play key roles in strategic and analytical support. Among them are the Second and Third Departments which are responsible for military and signals intelligence respectively, while the Fourth Department is responsible for electronic counter-measures and communication.80 Military-related intelligence support is delivered by several army thinktanks. One is the China Institute for International Strategic Studies under the GSD Second Department (Intelligence) mainly for international security analysis. Related to the same GSD Department is another institute responsible, the Foundation for International Strategic Studies. Apart from research duties, it has an important role in establishing exchanges between the PLA and foreign defence organs and personnel. Military think-tanks of lesser importance include the Centre for Peace and Development under the General Political Department’s Liaison Department, which reportedly has particular strength in Hong Kong and Macau-related
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intelligence. As for weapons technological intelligence, this is the purview of the China Defence Science and Technology Information Centre which was transferred from the control of the former Commission for Science and Technology of National Defence to the General Armament Department created in 1998.81 It is believed that some civilian institutions also provide research and intelligence support in the formulation of Chinese military policy. They include the State Council, the Ministries of State Security and Foreign Affairs (and their research institutes), the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, especially its area studies institutes, and the New China News Agency. Most often, these units submit their advice through regularly published internal briefings and personal contacts. But they reportedly play virtually no part in determining actual military doctrine. This remains the exclusive domain of uniformed personnel.82 On doctrinal research and writing, the Academy of Military Science (AMS) seems to play the most important role. The AMS was created in 1958 to fill a void in PLA field regulations. On the eve of the Cultural Revolution, it completed the first generation of a series of PLA combat regulations on combined arms troops. When the AMS gradually recovered from that political turmoil, it quickly re-established and expanded its research arms, and updated the field services regulations. It operates a military operations analysis research institute and produces various combat simulation software to evaluate its military theories.83 In particular, the Second Research Office of its Strategy and Campaigning Research Department was responsible for the writing of the fourth generation of PLA Combat Regulations and other regulations released in 1999 as well as Military Tactics.84 Another major institutional contributor to doctrinal development is the National Defence University. The University was established in 1985 by merging the Military Academy, Political Academy and Logistics Academy, with a focus on both research and teaching. It is the highest institute of professional military education in the Chinese army, and is charged with the mission to train commanding officers at army corps level and related personnel in provincial governments. With its simulation systems, the University trains its students in strategic decision-making, campaign-level command and conduct of joint operations. It also provides consultation services to the CMC and general departments.85 Of course, service doctrines may require special institutional inputs. Senior service arm and branch academies, especially the command academies, actively participate in the publication of seminal works and course textbooks on operations involving the PLA’s respective service arms. The establishment of military art research institutes at service arms headquarters strongly suggests that the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery contribute regularly to doctrine formulation.86 Doctrinal development is also promoted by forming ad hoc research
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task forces on specific topics for each Five-Year Plan period. Recent important doctrinal research projects include an updated edition of The Science of Military Strategy and ‘The Employment of Mao Zedong Military Thought in Local Wars’ led by the AMS in the ninth Five-Year Plan period and the Joint Operations Series Research by the National Defence University in the tenth Plan with the participation of numerous service arms command academies. The service arms headquarters are also known to have organised task forces to develop combat regulations.87 Given the strong participation of political and military institutions and the centralised character of Chinese governance, military doctrine in China should have great significance in conveying the intentions and visions of the leadership. Moreover, as mentioned above, army building is closely integrated into the military-technical element, and doctrinal changes logically guide and cause adjustments in force development. While military doctrine helps to understand the making and planning of Chinese military power, a context of readiness is needed to create a framework so that we may evaluate this power against its purpose. Next, the concept of military readiness will be discussed and a model constructed.
Military readiness: contextualising military power The American high technology applied to the Gulf War in 1991 shocked PLA commanders into prioritising military readiness as a key issue for study and reform. China, of course, is not the first major power to be caught short in correctly assessing evolving strategic conditions. Germany’s poor performance in the Battle of Britain, as Barry Posen observes, was based on its failure to make a breakthrough from its successful blitzkrieg tactics that worked for it against France in 1940. Thus, ‘Germany won the war for which it had prepared and lost the one for which it had not’.88 When American strategists recall the Korea War, they dwell upon the spectre of a hollow and unprepared army as seen in the fate of Task Force Smith.89 The PLA, of course, realises how insufficient military readiness can be on the battlefield. The 1949 Jinmen (Quemoy) invasion setback is still a stigma in PLA war history.90 What exactly is ‘military readiness’? While strategists and generals virtually agree on the disastrous results of being caught unprepared, they focus their attention on different factors when they fathom what constitutes military readiness. Some understand ‘readiness’ as the business of training; others emphasise logistics, combat support, resource management and force structure.91 After surveying most definitions of military readiness, Richard Betts finds them to be generally too broad or too narrow.92 Given the importance of this concept, it may be that a single definition is insufficient. What is needed is a conceptual model.
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Military readiness: a function of speed and effectiveness For Betts, readiness has two main concerns: (1) ‘the relative military power needed to fight successfully’; (2) ‘conversion: the difference between forces available to fight immediately and those that can be made available after preparation at full throttle’.93 He thus proposes a three-part ‘generic’ definition of military readiness:94 1 2
3
Military readiness pertains to the relation between available time and needed capability. A country is militarily ready as long as the time needed to convert potential capability into actual capability needed is not longer than the time between the decision to convert and the onset of war. A country proves not to be ready when a gap between its actual and potential capability causes a gap between the supply of and the demand for capability.
Military readiness is defined as a function of speed and effectiveness while effectiveness is the product of mass times efficiency. Betts proposes three stages of readiness after unreadiness – mobilisation, structural and operational consecutively. Assuming a discrepancy between potential and actual capability, operational readiness is about how soon a military unit can close that gap and reach full capability. Structural readiness focuses on mass. It imposes a ceiling on the capability of existing forces and asks ‘how soon a force of the size necessary to deal with the enemy can be available’. Central to achieving both operational and structural readiness is time. Operational and structural readiness are functions of speed, mass and combat efficiency. But Betts departs from these important building blocks and enters a new conceptual venue when he assesses mobilisation readiness. This is defined in terms of the conversion of national demographic and economic resources and the mobilisation of a military organisational base. Still, efficiency and speed matter, since civilian and military bases are to be converted constituting a critical ‘mass’.95 The military readiness model, as stipulated by Betts, claims to find a balance between overcoming military unpreparedness and striving for high mobilisation. The former causes losses on the battlefield, the latter may undermine a national economy. But maintaining a maximum-sized force or putting the forces on maximum alert does not necessarily achieve security. Costs and trade-offs are involved. These are explained by the two images of readiness. In the linear image, one type of readiness may be built up at the expense of the other, given the scarcity of resources and opportunity costs. Time is a positive factor here; the longer one prepares, the better one can convert potential capabilities into actual capabilities. In the cyclical image, however, time is not necessarily proportional to the
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level of military readiness. High military readiness today may imply lower military readiness in the future.96 However, a few points must be addressed before applying Betts’ military readiness model. First, according to his definitions, there should be no time conflicts between structural readiness, operational readiness and mobilisation readiness. Mobilisation readiness, in fact, is dependent on both structural and operational readiness because mobilisation is made up of both elements of force structure and operation. The three terms should not be conceptualised in time sequence or as stages. Second and related is that when this study applies the military readiness concepts to the Chinese military, it has to focus on only structural readiness and operational readiness for two main reasons: (1) mobilisation readiness, as stated above, can be explained by the concepts of operational readiness and structural readiness; (2) it is beyond the scope of this book to study the whole Chinese national defence mobilisation system. Third, there is too much emphasis on the size of mass when discussing structural readiness.97 Discussions about mass should entail concerns about ‘force mix’ or its composition. Having the right ‘mix’ is seen in terms of the types, technological level and uses of military equipment, the composition of service arms and human resources, and a judicious balance between equipment and manpower. For mobilisation readiness, this mix has a wider composition. For example, how many industries should engage in defence-related research and development as opposed to those devoted to consumer goods production for export? When the demand comes, the mass of a right mix is there. This relates to Betts’ question, ‘readiness of what?’ Fourth, efficiency is about the degree of ‘realising’ potential capability.98 But how to measure ‘degree’? The answer lies in gauging potential. It implies the execution of a plan to convert the mass from one form to another. There is an ‘envisaged’ capability that a state’s existing military forces are designed to reach. Operational readiness is realised when the discrepancy between the target and current strength in a specific time frame is closed. Mobilisation readiness also depends on the implementation of plans that bring a peacetime economy and national resources together to meet a planned level of wartime requirements. A strategic goal is even more important for the concept of effectiveness and is closely related to the question, ‘readiness for what?’ We may visualise military readiness as an internal transformation of an army and national resources in response to a security demand. Here, we have speed and mass operating in two tiers: the military and the state. Practically, they are about the physics of war. But something is missing. It is direction. Military readiness cannot be complete with only efficient conversion of the mass. This requirement for identifying proper direction falls into the doctrinal sector. Doctrine sets the pathway and target for movement and changes of the mass. In short, three elements of military power are closely:
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(1) structural on mass – force structure (size and mix); (2) operational on speed (training proficiency and command and control); and (3) ideas (doctrine and concepts). Doctrine and military readiness Doctrine forms the basis on which operational, structural and mobilisation readiness is built. As discussed above, military doctrine reconciles the demands for national security and limitations of resource inputs. It also identifies threats and contingencies. In his discussion about post-Cold War readiness, Betts examines the relationship between strategy and military forces. It is reasonable to point out the time lag between the time when decisions are made and the use of available forces, when there is a discrepancy between aims and assessments. Betts argues, ‘strategy, therefore, has to change to accommodate the means that happen to be available, rather than the other way round’.99 If strategy is about the conduct of war, this claim makes sense. But military doctrine is not just a wartime expedient. It is relatively stable and affects defence policies even in peacetime. Although it is possible that the doctrine which has shaped the forces may have been changed when the forces are actually applied in conflicts, the doctrinal imprint is still there. Moreover, the existing doctrine may well be replaced by a revised one. When the US military recovered from the trauma of the Vietnam War by successfully implementing Operation Desert Storm, much attention was paid to the pinpoint accuracy of smart bombs and cruise missiles, and the prowess of the soldiers. But what went largely unnoticed were the ideational aspects that unfolded during the nearly two decades preceding the latter military campaign. A study traces the origin of the 1991 victory to a doctrinal rethinking process which began in the 1970s. The engine of change was doctrinal reformulation. This does not mean that doctrine was the sole explanation of US military performance in the Gulf War but that it did comprise an integral part of the United States’ enhancement of its military capability.100 Technology, beyond doubt, is a critical factor in military affairs, but it requires doctrine to give it direction for development. In fact, it is hard to imagine that modern weapons result from mere random research and development, with military planners simply deciding to spend money to produce and procure whatever technology offers to them. A case which demonstrates the directional role of doctrine is the US development of armour during the Cold War. Identifying the Soviet Union as the most possible enemy, the US army envisaged that its armour divisions would bear the main thrust of a Soviet ground invasion in Europe; but the problem was their numerical inferiority. They could only endeavour to defeat the Red Army by gaining the technological edge. The equipment deployed, such as the M41 and M48 tanks, were designed to increase the
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capability of long-range shooting and first-round kill. The M48s ‘fulfilled their intended role by providing the Army with a tank able to hold its own against all but the heaviest of contemporary Soviet tanks’.101 However, technology requires doctrine to transform it into applicable military power. A good example is the development of tanks. The British in the First World War were the first to put the tanks into the battlefield. More important, they had the experience of how armoured forces could break through enemy fronts in the Battle of Cambrai of 1917, which was hailed as the ‘greatest British victory in the war’.102 On the eve of the Second World War, the British and French enjoyed qualitative and quantitative advantages over the Germans. But it was the German panzer forces, organised on the basis of a blitzkrieg combined arms doctrine, that overran the Allies in 1940. In fact, the British doctrine of using tanks for infantry support affected their design and performance. As of 1940, even the latest product suffered from slow speed and poor firepower. A recent study by a professor at the Royal Military College of Science on using tanks in urban warfare also points to the necessity of adapting the weapons to the way of their use. Obviously, the mere existence of a technology and its products does not guarantee capability improvement or military innovation. They need doctrine to organise, use and develop them.103 The argument about the impact of doctrine on force structure and training may be progressed further in the Japanese case. During the Second World War, when the Imperial Army was planning invasions of the Soviet Union, what it got were 370,000 horses with only 6,000 trucks and sedans. Certainly, this may be partly explained by the relatively low industrial productivity in wartime but a more important factor is ‘the correlation between doctrine and manufacture’.104 The time lag, instead of showing the irrelevance of ideational factors, shows the opposite. Doctrine demonstrates how it makes the forces structurally unfit and the national mobilisation bases unprepared for the war they are supposed to fight. Since the 1990s, technology has dominated military debates in the form of speculating about a ‘revolution in military affairs (RMA)’. As already noted in Chapter 1, this is not just a Western military phenomenon. The PLA has also participated in the heat of discussions about the importance of RMA technology.105 While Chinese commanders realise that the application of such technology definitely changes how combat is waged, this is not the sole element of consideration. Even as far back as the 1960s, a contemporary of Russian Marshall Malinovsky, General Sbitov, believed that, apart from economic and technological developments, political leadership and acquiring the military personnel needed to master the advanced equipment should constitute necessary preconditions for a RMA.106 RMA, then, should be built upon the interaction between technology, concepts and organisation to such a degree that the nature of warfare is changed to one’s own advantage.107 In his survey of RMAs, Williamson Murray, a military historian, finds that the crucial element in
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most of them has been conceptual in nature.108 This observation has a very practical meaning. The technological aspect of RMA is to be adapted by countries according to their specific security needs and technological limitations. Not all countries should seek to develop the whole range of high-technology equipment.109 This partly explains why Chinese RMA is concept-driven.110 Applicability to the Chinese military The doctrine-based concept of military readiness is relevant to China not only in light of RMA, as discussed above, but in its view on military affairs in general. In one of his most important speeches delivered in 1975 on military reforms, Deng Xiaoping, who was representing the CMC, made it clear that the PLA had two tasks: (1) rectification; (2) preparation for war.111 The first task was obvious. Deng pinpointed the five deficiencies of the Chinese army as they were in the 1970s – bloated, lax, arrogant, extravagant and slothful – and called for a more rational structure. Development and acquisition of military hardware, ranging from advanced weapons to the personal gear of individual soldiers, needed to be studied carefully. All this was to be ‘rectified’. The second task identified by Deng was about how to fight future wars. It was a matter of improving the art of war-fighting and command, and training. Of most concern were the size and ‘mix’ of the force structure, training and strategies. These two tasks were not and are not separate; they are interrelated. For example, modern commanders can no longer simply call for charges as they had done in the age of Mauser guns. The deployment of tanks and artillery as organic parts of military units now requires officers to be trained for combined arms warfare. According to Deng, ‘If we do not pay attention to military training, we would, at least, face setbacks at the early stage of war.’ In a study on Deng Xiaoping’s plans for war preparation, the analyst names five major elements: (1) an elite standing army with a rational structure; (2) advanced weapons and equipment; (3) strengthening of reserve forces; (4) training; and (5) advanced military theories.112 These factors essentially correspond to the three building blocks of our model – military doctrine, structural readiness and operational readiness. This view has already had its adherents. As early as the 1950s, Senior General Su Yu had asserted that a national military strategy and war planning must be first set down to provide a basis for national defence construction programmes.113 It is commonly held in the CMC that the development of military theories must be planned ahead of that of military training and hardware modernisation in order to ensure success in the latter two tasks.114 In the contemporary age when technology gains increasing attention, PLA researchers do not discount the importance of ideational factors but regard them as continuing to direct force development.115 In order to prepare for future warfare, force structure should be
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based on a rethinking of the complementary relationship between quantity and quality as well as the ‘dialectical relationship’ between human factors and hardware of the armed forces in order to work out a better balance. The methods and facilities of military training must also be reformed. This view, as demonstrated in later chapters, has been particularly prominent in military policies since the late 1970s. During Deng Xiaoping’s era, the objective of military reforms has been proclaimed as enhancing combat capability by building a strong ‘modernised and regularised revolutionary army’ (xiandaihua, zhengguihua gemin jundui). While being revolutionary is mainly a matter of civil–military relations, modernisation and regularisation are focused on the acquisition of advanced equipment, a rational force structure and proper management. Military education and training are regarded as in a ‘strategic position’. When Jiang Zemin was at the helm, he determined that the PLA, in order to prepare for the future war, must undertake simultaneous mechanisation and informatisation in both structural and operational aspects. But what steers these changes are military theories. Indeed, there have been plenty of discussions in the Chinese army that innovative military theories must precede China’s own RMA.116 In a conceptual paper to supplement the PLA’s military encyclopaedia, a group of army researchers assert that military theories set the direction, scale and structure of force development, and the way to conduct operations and reform the professional military education system.117
Conclusion On the premise that power shapes international security behaviour, this chapter has pursued the question of using the two concepts of military doctrine and military readiness to study and evaluate Chinese military power. The first imperative was to define military doctrine. After clarifying the various understandings of the concept and relating it to China’s system of military thinking, military doctrine emerges as an intellectual foundation for army building and national defence resources allocations. This ideational factor functions in international relations by communicating to other actors the intent and ways of the state to develop and use power. Doctrine makes an impact on a state’s security behaviour because it constitutes military power, but this power has to be put in the context of military readiness for evaluation. The question of how military power relates to international security is linked in particular to the concept of military readiness. Richard Betts assesses this by focusing on three aspects: structural, operational and mobilisation. While these aspects deal with the essential properties and physics of military affairs – mass, speed and efficiency – direction must also be addressed. It is where the concepts of military doctrine and mili-
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tary readiness meet. This exercise is not only useful conceptually but is critical in practical terms because the variations in resources among nations mean that adaptation in force development is necessary. While structural readiness is largely a function of force structure, and operational readiness depends upon training and command and control, military doctrine, as the intellectual foundation of a state’s army, shapes its structure and operation. It is the key to determining the level of the other two components – structural and operational readiness. Having built an analytical framework on military doctrine and military readiness, it will be applied in the following chapters to examine the evolution of China’s military doctrine and how it impacts on the development of Chinese military power.
3
The genesis of the Chinese local war doctrine
At the end of the Second World War, the Iron Curtain fell and divided the world into two camps headed by rival superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. When communist North Korea under Kim Il Sung ventured south in June 1950 for national unification, a new hot war commenced. It eventually involved, on the one side, a United Nations coalition force led by the United States and, on the other, communist forces of North Korea and China with the backing of the USSR. But the first large-scale postwar conflict between the world’s two rival ideological camps on the Korean peninsula turned out to be different from what had been anticipated.1 In the course of the three-year conflict, both sides had tried to limit the scope of the conflict instead of seeking total annihilation of the enemy. On the eve of the Korean War, the United States observed a policy endorsing nothing short of total victory in conflict.2 But the Korean War changed this posture. American scholars and analysts began to articulate an outcome short of a complete military triumph. A growing and flourishing literature on limited wars emerged. The names and works of such civilian proponents as William Kaufmann, Robert Osgood, Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn and Henry Kissinger became predominant in the field of strategic studies.3 Limited war even became the Kennedy administration’s official military doctrine, only to be called into question during the Vietnam fiasco.4 The Russians at first devoted little attention to limited wars which they preferred to call ‘local wars’. As reflected in their choice of terminology, they initially viewed limited wars differently from the Americans. By the 1960s, however, they had followed the United States and began to explore the concept more systematically. Beginning with a study on foreign military research dealing with local wars, the Russian military gradually developed its own work on the subject and such efforts received the official blessing of the Soviet government. Over time, its publications showed increasing interest and demonstrated greater sophistication on the subject.5 Despite their participation in the Korean War and their support for
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pro-Chinese communist factions in Southeast Asian insurgencies, the Chinese lagged far behind the two superpowers in developing limited war concepts. In fact, China viewed its very national survival to be at stake with Cold War politics and thus focused on resisting full-scale superpower aggression. Initially under Soviet influence and protected by the USSR’s nuclear umbrella, Beijing adopted a doctrine which was based on a theory of the ‘initial phase of war’ (zhanzheng chuqi).6 The Chinese army was thus able to concentrate on fighting a conventional war, in which operational readiness was the key to repelling possible enemy invasion. When the Sino–Russian alliance broke down and the Americans intensified their military intervention in Indo-China in the 1960s, the Chinese military under Mao Zedong decided to purge foreign influence and fall back to a revolutionary People’s War doctrine. Mass, as emphasised in structural readiness, became more important for China to survive a nuclear war and overwhelm enemy troops on the ground. It was not until Deng Xiaoping took over China’s leadership in the late 1970s that the PLA began to review its military doctrine. In the mid-1980s, the Chinese army began to take a keen interest in local wars (jubu zhanzheng)7 and to incorporate its views on that subject into its own military doctrine. In retrospect, China may well have followed the Russian lead in developing a local war doctrine if not for the breakdown of the Sino–Soviet alliance and the Chinese leaders’ intensified fear for a nuclear war following that development. Thus, for over three decades, China had not prepared for local wars, which were at the opposite end to ‘total war’ in the spectrum of conflict. Most studies on the PLA characterise evolution of China’s military doctrine in a four-phase process – the People’s War, People’s War under modern conditions, local/limited war and local/limited war under hightechnology conditions. What is always overlooked is an important, albeit short-lived, period immediately after the establishment of the Korean War until the return of the reinforced dominance of Maoist military tradition in the late 1950s. Under Soviet doctrinal influence and the protection of a superpower, the PLA almost adopted a path that would have made itself a very different force. In fact, even though Maoist thinking had moulded the Chinese army for nearly twenty years, traces of the Soviet legacy embedded in individual military leaders were still visible when the doctrinal shambles was removed in the late 1970s. This chapter will initially review the development of limited/local war doctrines in the West and the Soviet Union to illustrate different experiences in China formulating its own doctrine and, as importantly, the intellectual origins of Chinese local war doctrine. An overview of the historical context of Chinese doctrinal development of the local war outlook will then be followed by an examination of the communicative and constitutive functions of Chinese military doctrine. The conceptual framework will be predicated upon the postulates discussed in Chapter 2. Of central
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importance are the ramifications for China’s military readiness when it reversed the early postwar trend towards the local war doctrine in the late 1950s to favour an emphasis on total war.
Doctrinal development of the limited/local war United States limited wars: the beginning of modern limited/local war studies The Chinese winter offensive in 1950 rolled back the UN forces in Korea. To reverse this trend, General MacArthur asked President Truman for permission to spread the war beyond the Yalu River to Chinese territory and to bring in Chinese Nationalist (Kuomingtang or KMT) reinforcements from Taiwan. He even favoured the use of American nuclear weapons. However, his requests were refused by President Truman because the latter believed the introduction of a nuclear element would escalate the war to an unacceptable threshold. As a result, the level of force and geographical scope of the Korean conflict remained limited. As the war dragged on, the USA began to settle on an outcome short of a unified pro-Western Korea and of North Korea’s unconditional surrender. Washington also imposed geographical limits on United Nations troop advances in accordance with this revised, more limited strategic objective. In 1953, the conflict was concluded by the signing of an armistice at Panmunjom.8 The Korean War was obviously an important precedent for limited war. It not only prompted the Americans to rethink their ‘all-or-nothing’ attitude to the use of force but also demonstrated limited war in its modern form which distinguished itself from pre-world war experiences.9 But this conflict alone could not explain the rapid development of the limited war concept in the USA. What really mattered was the contemporary international security landscape that underscored the Cold War. Set in the context of East–West confrontation, US containment strategy was designed to thwart communist expansion by preventing and punishing communist aggression. Any local aggression was interpreted as a direct challenge to American security, since it might trigger further conflict escalation even to the scale of a global conflict.10 But this policy also highlighted a growing gap in Western and Soviet military power. Due to downsizing policies adopted by Western governments and various demographic reasons, Western armies were increasingly outnumbered by communist bloc forces. The Korean conflict reminded the West of the danger of overstretching its resources in its quest to implement strategic containment against the USSR. In fact, the Korean War was, at times, read in Washington to be a diversionary move by the communist camp to lure the USA and its allies to go east as Moscow prepared for a real blow in Europe.11
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At this juncture, the atomic bomb, which represented unprecedented destructive power, looked very attractive in solving the strategic resource dilemma posed by the containment strategy. A solution was put forward by John Foster Dulles who in 1952 had advocated ‘instant massive retaliation’: ‘the free world [is] to develop the will and organise the means to retaliate instantly against open aggression by Red armies, so that if it occurred anywhere, we could and would strike back where it hurts, by means of our choosing’.12 Appointed as Secretary of State by President Eisenhower in 1953, the pair came to a consensus on lifting the ‘taboo’ on the use of atomic weapons. Their policy also found support in the US capacity to develop a range of bombs, from ‘tactical’ to ‘strategic’.13 One year later, Dulles, speaking at the Council of Foreign Affairs in New York, clarified the ‘massive retaliation’ posture: ‘Local defence must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power’.14 To fend off political criticism, the US Secretary of State subsequently modified this rhetoric but the spectre of an automatic and rigid nuclear response to future communist adventures remained a key point in American nuclear strategy during the height of the Cold War. Of course, massive retaliation would have looked more credible had the Americans maintained a monopoly of, or, at least, a lead over, the production and delivery of nuclear weapons. Bernard Brodie in a 1957 RAND research memorandum observed, ‘This [American] insistence on using nuclear weapons appears partly to reflect an unconscious assumption that we are still in a monopoly position, and that our use of them will be unilateral. The moment we start visualizing them as being used reciprocally, the use of them ceases to look overwhelmingly advantageous to us’.15 There was never an American renunciation of applying nuclear forces in conflicts in Brodie’s work. Rather than ruling them out, he emphasised ‘restraints’ on the employment of the bombs. Indeed, restraint was important because the Russians had demonstrated their own reprisal capability by exploding their first atomic bomb in August 1949. Since total war in such a context would be unthinkable, limited war began to appear as a more attractive alternative. It may be said that the American limited war debate was triggered as a reaction to massive retaliation.16 To sum up, American limited war doctrine was a product of fear of nuclear war, a growing belief in the necessity of conflict limitation and a logical outcome of America’s containment foreign policy.17 The end of the United States’ nuclear monopoly meant that there were limits to what the USA could do to contain communist aggression. It had to impose ‘deliberate restraints’ on the use of force in order to avoid triggering nuclear exchanges. This self-imposed restraint was viewed by US policy planners as the key that differentiated limited wars in the nuclear era from those prior to its advent. Thus the US definition of limited war tended to include only wars involving a superpower; small wars between states without nuclear weapons were viewed as ‘local wars’.18
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Origin of Soviet local wars The Russians started from a different premise to study limited wars in the 1950s. They did not have the firsthand experience in a limited war with a nuclear option, as did the Americans in the Korean War. They also had a different understanding about this type of war. Their early interest in small wars was seen in their analysis of the Russo-Japanese War of 1905; of the Spanish Civil War, the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War itself.19 At the time when American strategists were debating how to conduct and win limited conventional and nuclear wars, the Soviet Union, as reflected in its military literature, was observing and studying local wars in the context of foreign military experiences. It was only during the 1960s that the Red Army began to look at the implications of limited war for its own military planning.20 The timing was not coincidental. As a result of Stalin’s death in 1953, Soviet military theorists gradually discarded the straitjacket of military doctrine forged by Stalinism and proceeded to re-examine traditional doctrinal approaches. There began an era of so-called ‘Zhukov reforms’, with the Red Army embarking upon a force restructuring to achieve greater mobility and survivability in a nuclear environment.21 This was essentially a response to the US introduction of weapons of mass destruction to the battlefield. Although the Soviets enjoyed a clear quantitative superiority in conventional weaponry, Western tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and American weapons deployed in Asia posed a new dilemma – the Soviet Union’s concentration of force, a classic operational principle in the conduct of conventional warfare, would only be suicidal.22 With the support of Marshall Zhukov and the military, Nikita Khrushchev ascended to power in the USSR during 1955/56. The new Russian leader was convinced that nuclear weapons had been increasingly important in modern warfare. A simultaneous debate was occurring over the utility of missiles versus ground forces and this discussion received Khrushchev’s blessing. The final prevalence of missile forces over the conventional ground forces was induced by positive results in the Soviet space programme. Previous problems related to the limited availability of nuclear weapons, and virtual dependence on a single delivery platform – strategic bombers – were gradually solved. The successful launch of the Sputnik I in 1957 and Yuri Gagarin’s space flight four years later signalled major breakthroughs in developing alternative nuclear delivery systems to manned bombers.23 Speaking to the Supreme Soviet in January 1960, Khrushchev concluded that sizeable conventional forces were obsolete and acknowledged that a ‘revolution in military affairs’ (RMA) had taken place with the invention of nuclear weapons.24 For the Russians, the technological breakthrough had revolutionised the conduct of war. Military organisations and views on warfare were adapted accordingly. In the same year, a new
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command, the Strategic Rocket Forces, was established.25 The General Secretary also declared a three-tier categorisation of wars: world wars, local wars and national liberation wars.26 Despite his eventual political demise in 1964, Khrushchev’s legacy on Soviet limited nuclear war strategy endured. It was against a background of RMA that Soviet military doctrinal debates took on a new look and literature on local wars boomed. Among the most representative of such publications was Military Strategy, edited by Marshall V.D. Sokolovsky, a former Chief of General Staff.27 The book continued Soviet scepticism on the possibilities of limitation in war but warned that local wars could be sponsored by the USA in the form of proxy wars and would be aimed at a ‘quick victory’. Conventional arms would remain dominant in the battlefield. The use of tactical nuclear weapons as advocated by Western strategists, the book warned, would escalate into a nuclear world war.28 The Soviet perspective on local wars, discussed in Chapter 2, bears the imprint of Marxist-Leninist ideology. This is particularly obvious in the political aspect of its doctrine. Not surprisingly, some Kremlinologists have doubts about Russian publications and declaratory doctrine; they tend to regard them largely as propaganda and attempts to deceive and misinform the West; but an indiscriminate disregard is not warranted. What is required is careful reading to separate rhetoric from the militarytechnical elements. These Russian works remain useful for understanding Soviet strategic intentions and how the USSR planned to use its forces.29 The Russian case is particularly relevant to the study of Chinese military doctrinal development. First, Russian military concepts, together with American limited war theories, had formed the basis of Chinese research which underlined the PRC’s own local war doctrine in later years. Second, Russian military theories have the same structure as those later developed by the Chinese. Also in the Marxist-Leninist tradition, China’s military doctrine is composed of both socio-political and military-technical elements, similar to the Soviet version. While the socio-political component has remained relatively stable, the military-technical component has undergone tremendous changes over the past half century. This doctrinal evolution will be analysed below in the military readiness framework advanced by this study. The communicative function of military doctrine tells how the Chinese leaders’ security concerns and their intentions as to the use of force during Mao Zedong’s rule had changed from stopping enemy aggression in the ‘initial phase of war’ to fighting a protracted war. The constitutive function brings the actual military power to the potential in the ways and directions set by the doctrine, and ideas, through an educating process of the military officers, are put into practice. Before proceeding to examine empirically the implications of Chinese doctrinal changes on their military readiness in the Maoist era, an overview of the key characteristics in China’s military history as it relates to the country’s military doctrine will be presented.
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Overview of Chinese military history The advent of the local war concept in China went through a long dialectical process of evolution as it followed the tortuous track of Chinese politics. The period immediately following the Korean War was a ‘golden age’ of Chinese military intellectual development. As shown below, the concept articulated in the late 1950s bore stark similarities with that advanced in the late 1970s when Deng Xiaoping was reinstated. But this was ephemeral. The development of a doctrine based on regular/conventional warfare (zhenggui zhan) and defence at the doorway was almost aborted in its infancy as the general direction of military modernisation turned inward and ‘backward’. Despite weighing the possible uses of force in local wars and low intensity conflicts, the Chinese high command was more interested in the PLA’s own historical legacy and thus adhered to a doctrine of general total war which envisioned the Chinese people in arms. The benchmark for change emerged when Deng Xiaoping put the PLA to test in a local war in 1979. The Chinese army received a baptism of fire, and suffered humiliating setbacks from a smaller but more modernised Vietnamese force. It was only through a subsequent reassessment of security threats that the development of local war picked up again from where it had left off in the late 1950s and proceeded to operationalisation. Historical context and army-building models Official Chinese accounts adopt two perspectives to classify the history of the PLA. The first classifies military affairs after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China into four stages: (1) transition to peaceful period (1949–53); (2) socialist construction (1954–65); (3) the Cultural Revolution (1966–76); and (4) rectification of past mistakes and socialist modernisation (post 1977).30 The second view argues that there were four ‘strategic changes’; three prior to 1949 and one during the Korean War.31 The first change (1930–35) was from guerrilla warfare to conventional warfare; the second (1935–circa 1945), from domestic conventional warfare to anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare; the third (circa 1945–49), from anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare to domestic conventional warfare; the fourth (1950–53), from domestic to international conventional warfare. These two accounts have both their strengths and weaknesses. The first shows mainly the impact of political changes on military affairs. While they provide helpful information about the political context, the classifications fail to capture the essence of Chinese military thinking and operations. The second is informative about overall Chinese strategic thinking, but it is still inadequate to demonstrate the sharp contrast in military doctrinal changes before and after 1949. It fails also to point out the dynamics of doctrinal evolution.
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As pointed out in the previous chapter, the formulation of doctrine is affected by an array of demands and constraints. William Whitson and Chen-Hsia Huang, in their seminal work The Chinese High Command, interpret Chinese ‘military style’ or the ‘organisation of military power’ as assuming three different models – warlord, Russian and peasantry.32 Whitson and Huang contend that, while the warlord and Russian models are rooted in Western military theory, the peasant army model is ‘legitimately’ Chinese.33 In a post-Korean War study Alexander George finds the ‘Chinese Reds’, though conforming to the Marxist tradition, differ from their Soviet counterparts in light of organisation and doctrine.34 That is, the peasantry influence has always been with the PLA even when it has borrowed from foreign experiences. These models are intrinsically linked to two modes of warfare – guerrilla and conventional warfare (although it is arguable whether guerrilla characteristics or ‘guerrillaism’ [youji zhuyi] have ever disappeared from Chinese military thinking). In operational terms, guerrilla warfare is an integral part of Mao Zedong’s version of People’s War in the conduct of total war. The People’s War as espoused by Mao during the revolutionary and anti-Japanese war years is, by and large, a doctrine for putting people to arms.35 It is based on recognition of China’s inferior military capability to potential adversaries.36 It counts primarily on the quantitative superiority of China’s armed forces, which are predominantly peasantry, and improvisation of primitive equipment. To increase the Chinese army’s numerical strength, People’s War relies heavily on the political mobilisation of the masses to deliver military might – to provide logistics, intelligence and manpower for both the guerrillas and ‘regulars’ in the conduct of guerrilla warfare. Emotion, in the form of revolutionary spirit, ideology and nationalism, also constitutes a crucial driving force. It is comradeship and personal respect, rather than bureaucratic procedures and rules, that command the army. Guerrilla warfare is also characterised by small unit organisations, attacks on soft targets and reliance on indigenous resources and strategic depth.37 The Maoist principles – ‘retreat when enemies advance; harass when halt; strike when tired; pursue when retreat’ and ‘lure enemy into the deep’ – are essentially products of in-depth defence and strategic interior line operations.38 For guerrilla strategists, the key to success lies in cumulative effects to change military balance to their favour before launching counter-offensives. As a result, the conduct of war is usually made up of ‘lesser actions’ and an ‘accumulation of more or less random individual victories’.39 In temporal terms, it must be a protracted war.40 In contrast, modern conventional warfare requires defence against enemies before they enter one’s own territory and, to accomplish this task, a professional standing army capable of responding quickly. Leaders cannot afford to sacrifice territories and cities of political-economic importance for the sake of interior line operations. Military actions usually
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involve larger military formations. They are ‘sequential’ in the sense that they form ‘a series of discrete steps or actions, with each one of this series of actions growing naturally out of, and dependent on, the one that preceded it’.41 In communist China’s case, conventional warfare concepts were derived largely from Russian postulates until the end of the 1950s. It was the interplay of peasantry-guerrilla and Soviet-conventional models that characterised the doctrinal evolution in China during the entire Maoist period. This stage ended with China’s adherence to a total war doctrine of People’s War. Ideas without practice China’s doctrinal development posed a sharp contrast to its post-1949 war experiences. As shown in Appendix 3, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been engaged in conflicts of varying scales and intensity – from the show of force across the Taiwan Strait in the mid-1990s to the more intense Korean conflict. These military actions were completely different from those prior to the establishment of the PRC. Although spanning over a time frame of decades, they share some notable common characteristics: (1) none of them call for total mobilisation; (2) except for the ‘national liberation wars’, none aim at unconditional surrender of adversaries; and (3) all are conducted at the peripheries of Chinese territories or traditional ‘buffer’ areas. In Chinese terminology, these are ‘local wars’.42 The Korean War, in particular, was a watershed. It called the attention of the Chinese high command to the concept of ‘compellence’ – making an adversary do something that it otherwise would not do.43 Compellence was demonstrated by American threats to introduce nuclear weapons into the conflict (after General MacArthur was dismissed and President Eisenhower assumed office) unless the PRC and North Korea observed a truce and negotiated an armistice. The American use of force was wedded to limited strategic objectives – a ceasefire – which saw war terminated in a state short of total victory. Obviously, the wars in which China was involved after 1949 were completely different from the Sino–Japanese War and China’s Civil War which had been fought by the Chinese for survival and with mobilisation of all their national resources. In those years, Chinese communist leaders were determined to achieve a total victory and military security was a real concern. Thus, Chinese military doctrine developed further and further away from the type of wars the PLA had actually fought. Although the PLA has since had numerous experiences in local wars, it was slow in developing a doctrine to explain them. The study of local war was further inhibited by the prioritisation of Maoist People’s War. Local war theory largely disappeared from Chinese military literature until the 1980s. The problem was complicated by the rigidity of the People’s War doc-
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trine. China was too focused on one point in the spectrum of war, namely total war. This inflexibility proved to be militarily costly in the post-Mao years. The following subsections trace how this inflexibility evolved.
Ready for a war that was not fought Challenges to Chinese guerrilla warfare Even before the KMT and communists parted company, the Russians had left an indelible mark on the Chinese military. The Whampoa Military Academy was founded in 1924 with Soviet financial and personnel assistance. A training centre for KMT generals as well as for communist political-military leaders, it became an important channel of Soviet political-military influence in China. Future PLA marshals, including Liu Bocheng, Ye Jianying, Nie Rongzhen and Chen Yi, were instructors there while Lin Biao was one of 7,000-plus graduates.44 Some of these individuals went to the Soviet Union to study military affairs. For example, Liu Bocheng studied at an advanced infantry school and later at the Frunze Military Academy in Moscow from 1927 to 1930; while the first PLA Navy (PLAN) commander, Xiao Jingguang, was a student at the Leningrad Political-Military Academy in the late 1920s.45 General Blücher (alias ‘Galin’) was another key source for introducing Russian military theories to China in the 1920s. He was appointed by Frunze to head the delegation of Russian military advisers to Whampoa and continued to exercise influence among the communists even after the 1926 KMT–CCP split.46 On the eve of the Nanchang Uprising in 1927, when the Red Army, the PLA’s precursor, was formed, Blücher was still advising the Chinese communists on military decisions.47 After the general’s departure that year, the only foreign military adviser to make his name was Otto Braun (known as Li De in China), a German Communist International agent who had been trained with military skills in Russia and was sent to the underground military advisory committee in Shanghai. Having failed to defend against the fifth ‘extermination campaign’ by KMT troops in 1933, he and other ‘Russian returned students’48 were disgraced at the Zunyi Conference two years later. Mao Zedong was given chairmanship of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission and began his predominant role in Chinese communist military and political affairs.49 Yet important tenets of ‘conventional warfare’ and ‘mobile warfare’ doctrine had been spread to China even before Mao Zedong came to power in the Zunyi Conference. This was contrary to Mao’s insistence that his own edicts regarding guerrilla warfare should prevail.50 His scepticism about the application of the Soviet military doctrinal model to China was demonstrated by his landmark essay in 1936, ‘Strategic Problems about China’s Revolutionary War’. He contended that the Chinese revolutionary war had a ‘law’ of its own. His Red Army could not copy outright the
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Soviet model and needed its own strategy and tactics. Mobile warfare, he insisted, should not abandon the ‘guerrilla characteristics’.51 On the eve of the final showdown with KMT troops during China’s Civil War in the late 1940s, the Red Army had very little experience in fighting conventional warfare. However, the Civil War prompted Mao Zedong and his Red Army to make the so-called third ‘strategic change’ to ‘domestic conventional warfare’ in which the Red Army returned to mobile warfare tactics. The Korean War closely followed and witnessed a fourth change – towards ‘external conventional warfare’. After waging five campaigns of mobile warfare, the Chinese People’s Volunteers decided positional warfare best fitted the times and their needs.52 While Mao and other leaders perceived the type of war confronting them to be different from the guerrilla, protracted warfare they had known so well, their army was slow to change. In fact, questions arose in Beijing about how much the PLA was actually fighting a conventional war. Mao had already complained in 1948 that there were remnants of guerrilla characteristics in the PLA main force.53 A US marine corps account of the Korean War described the United States’ Chinese adversaries as using ‘semi-guerrilla tactics’.54 Then US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Omar Bradley, also testified to the Congress that his army had been ‘up against one type of warfare which we never had before, and that is the guerrilla type’.55 New experience in conventional local wars While the guerrilla war characteristics of the PLA lingered on, ongoing changes in the type of warfare and the nature of potential adversaries had prompted its senior commanders to adapt their military thinking. The Civil War gave the army a taste of how to fight in formations as large as an army group and to launch exterior line strategic operations. The PLA also had to learn the conduct of positional warfare.56 The Korean War was an experience even more at variance with the Sino–Japanese War and antiKMT operations in the 1930s. It particularly exposed the Chinese weaknesses in C3 (command, control and communications). Tactics which had previously focused on the infantry and had brought the communists to victory in the Civil War thus proved to be deficient in the face of highly mobile enemies who were adept at joint operations. These turned out to be also suicidal in Korea amidst the PLA’s unprecedented exposure to destructive firepower and air power. Even organising logistical supplies was no longer a matter of interior line movement. By contrast, the UN forces’ strategic logistics was mainly seaborne and thus stayed out of reach of Chinese military power.57 Ultimately, the Korean War did instigate some fundamental changes in Chinese military doctrine. The PLA had aimed to destroy totally KMT military forces. The strategic objective was total victory.58 It was only their setback in Jinmen (Quemoy) that prevented the extinction of KMT forces.
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The communist army was thus fighting a war of annihilation. The type of war fought on the Korean peninsula was new for the PLA. Mainland Chinese leaders now ‘carefully limited in [the] scope, intensity and duration’ of their military actions fought a conventional limited war.59 When Mao Zedong commented on the ‘victory’ in the war and its implications, he did not mention expelling the United States and its allies from the Korean peninsula. Instead, he hailed the importance of rolling China’s enemies back to the 38th Parallel and stabilising the strategic balance there.60 Mao and Marshal Peng Dehuai, the commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers in Korea, claimed success in compelling the United States to agree to peace.61 In this case, force complemented diplomacy to reach limited Chinese strategic objectives. The Korean War thus began a new page in the PLA’s doctrinal history. In a condensed time frame of about ten years, it changed from a total war posture which allowed for guerrilla operations in an in-depth defence environment to a conventional limited war outlook which demanded the ability to conduct positional and manoeuvrable warfare as well as to operate in a combined arms mode. While it is unfair to assert that the PLA made no effort to articulate war experiences before 1949, serious and productive attempts at doctrinal revision were not really made until the mid1950s. The interlude was filled by limited war efforts against the West in Korea, giving the Chinese army no real time to develop its own doctrines. Despite winning decisive military victories over its rival Nationalist regime, the PLA in its early years remained preoccupied with preventing any possible Nationalist counter-attack. In China’s south and southwest, the PLA carried on campaigns involving forces of over tens of thousands of troops (see Appendix 3). In the meantime, the Chinese air force was established almost overnight in November 1949; and the navy in April 1950. Without exception, they bore a Soviet imprint. Institutionalising Soviet doctrinal influence: educating the people In the pre-1949 period, military doctrinal development could only take the form of some rudimentary military studies. A military editorial committee and mobile libraries were formed to disseminate military knowledge. ‘Military schools’, as they were called, were formed during the revolutionary years and were best suited for drilling and officer education. Curricula were often prepared in haste. Although there were attempts to organise lessons learned from combat and to import foreign military thought – from Japanese war-fighting guidelines and French field regulations as well as Russian drilling regulations – military theory remained essentially underdeveloped.62 Mao Zedong thought and specifically his army-building theory were mentioned in communist literature, but indigenous doctrinal development was so rudimentary that the PLA had to turn to foreign sources as an alternative for intellectual guidance.63
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Given this context and the overall time frame, the Soviet model was bound to be the logical choice. Due to his training in Moscow, Liu Bocheng played a key role in consolidating Soviet influence in Chinese military thinking. When the Red Army Military-Political Academy was founded in Ruijin in 1931, it remained a ‘guerrilla warfare training class’.64 But Liu, in his capacity as the president of the school, began systematically to translate Russian documents and these soon became the PLA’s first operational regulations (zuozhan tiaoling). He also brought in other Soviet-trained comrades, including Wu Xiuquan and Zuo Quan, to help with translation and revision.65 Three times, in 1942, 1946 and 1967, the Soviet Red Army’s Combined Arms Tactics were translated and published. In 1948, a translated work, On Soviet Army Pincer Offensives, was also disseminated. Throughout its formulating years, the PLA did not articulate its combat experiences into coherent military doctrine. It had to rely mainly on the Russian Combined Arms Tactics and Army Group Tactics for developing its own military theories.66 Following the establishment of the communist republic, military schools mushroomed. In 1950 there were already ninety-six such academies, including those of newly formed service arms.67 The first senior institution charged with some indigenous research responsibilities was the PLA Military Academy in Nanjing which began classes in 1951. On the one hand it was a breeding ground for instructors of junior schools. It was also responsible, however, for organising combined arms and joint operations exercises and drawing upon these lessons to investigate military art. Liu’s emphasis on military theories could hardly be exaggerated; a research conference and a research office on military art were formed even prior to the opening of the Academy itself.68 The influence of Soviet naval thinking was also institutionalised in the PLAN. The Soviet-trained Xiao Jingguang was appointed not only as its first commander but also as head of its first surface warfare school, Dalian Naval School, which later became the cradle of many senior navy officers. Another key person was Zhang Xueshi, who had been sent to learn at the naval schools in Moscow and Leningrad in 1949, when the Central Military Commission (CMC) conceived of building the school. He was subsequently appointed deputy head of the school. Soon after he had finished his study at the Russian Voroshilov Naval Academy in 1958, he was appointed the PLAN Chief of Staff. As a matter of fact, by 1953, there were already 500 to 2,000 Soviet advisers in China to help build the navy.69 Interestingly, the Sino–Soviet split did not drastically reverse the direction of Chinese naval planning largely because the Soviet model of building a small navy for coastal defence (jin’an fangyu) fitted in well with the Maoist guerrilla warfare thinking. As the next chapter will discuss, this changed only after the Maoist doctrine was jettisoned in the 1980s. But Soviet influence was even more remarkable in China’s rush to build its air force. In August 1949, the Chinese leadership reached an
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agreement with the Soviet Union, by which they would help build six aviation schools, sold to China 434 aircraft, and supplied 878 advisers. Similarly, the first PLA Air Force (PLAAF) commander, Liu Yalou, and many other senior officers had Soviet connections. Liu was trained at the Frunze Military Academy in 1939. Among them, a deputy commander, Chang Qiankun, who had been sent twice to study at different Soviet air force academies and served at a Soviet aviation unit, played a key role in setting up PLAAF schools and planning education. Against such a background it is not surprising that Chinese air force doctrinal documents in the early 1950s were little more than Soviet copies.70 The Soviet model continued its dominance in the Chinese military education system long after 1949. As of 1956 there were 592 Russian military advisers and specialists in China, preaching on topics from atomic protection to territorial air defence principles.71 The pervasiveness of Soviet influence was exemplified in virtually all aspects of PLA development, from concepts and institutions to hardware. The USSR was the primary source of technological support for China’s infant national defence industry and weaponry supply and imitation production. According to the Sino–Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1950, Moscow was to equip sixty Chinese infantry divisions. Military organisations, including the establishment of PLA headquarters, were ‘Sovietised’. The first generation of PLA Common Regulations produced by the Training Department of the CMC reflected this practice. Field regulations for the infantry, air force and navy were translated from Russian.72 Special emphasis was placed on learning from the advanced military science and experiences of the Soviet Red Army.73 In an address to the General Senior Infantry School in January 1953, Mao argued: In order to protect the motherland from imperialist aggressions, it is not good enough to rely on the equipment and tactics that we have employed to fight the relatively backward internal enemies. We must grasp firmly latest equipment and tactics. We must learn from the military science of the Soviet Union in order to raise our army to a level sufficient to win in modern warfare.74 The Yijiangshan Islands invasion of 1955 is arguably regarded by the PLA to be its first joint operations. Its success seemed to vindicate the type of warfare envisaged in the Soviet model. In November of the same year, the Chinese army conducted in Liaoning a front army-level joint service exercise to simulate an anti-amphibious attack with the enemy using atomic and chemical weapons. In 1957, the PLA joined the Soviet and North Korean armies in a command post exercise on joint operations.75 Early postwar Chinese doctrinal evolution culminated in a CMC enlarged conference in 1956 during which the high command resolved to adopt ‘a strategy of active defence (jiji fangyu) at the initial phase in future
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anti-aggression wars’ and postulated the forms of operations (zuozhan xingshi) in accordance with this strategy. The strategy was elaborated in a speech by Marshal Peng Dehuai one year later,76 and was based on a combination of positional and manoeuvrable offence:77 Strong defensive constructions must be built along key coastal areas, plans to defeat enemy strategic and operational level airborne made operation, reconnaissance means strengthened. [We] should endeavour to detect in advance any signs of enemy waging war and use of weapons of mass destruction in order to minimise the damages and losses caused by enemy surprise attack, to make sure that our troops in the frontline and in depth are combat ready timely and to cover the country for transition from peacetime to wartime setting. We must strategically deploy massive and strong manoeuvre troops so that we can organise in time counter-offensives and attacks, destroy and wear down enemies in coordination with coastal garrison units and destroy enemy airborne troops. Then we accomplish the task of strategic active defence. Marshal Peng’s remarks painted a picture which had negligible, if any, connotations for guerrilla warfare. There was no mention of ‘luring the enemy into the deep’. The PLA was to stop enemy advances in pre-designated areas at the initial phase of war in order to stabilise the battlefront and provide cover for national transition to a wartime state. The strategy was also focused on thwarting any enemy surprise attack and strengthening combat capabilities at short notice.78 All this mirrored the strong influence of the Soviet Red Army style of conventional warfare. By the mid-1950s, Mao began to be sceptical of Khrushchev’s ideological orthodoxy and Russian military policies, since they went too far in revising his version of People’s War. The conceptual conflict between the two notions was vividly illustrated in a conversation between Mao and his Soviet comrades. When Mao met Khrushchev in 1957 during a visit to Moscow, he disagreed with Marshal Zhukov’s argument for counter-strike in case the communist bloc was attacked by the West. He instead contended that the Soviet Union should instead ‘fall back’ – retreat and hold out for years.79 Towards strategic ‘guerrillaism’ The Mao–Khrushchev disagreements were only the tip of an iceberg of fundamental tensions between Maoist doctrine of People’s War and the Soviet model. Other strains included: (1) the arguments about whether technology or human factor was decisive in war; (2) whether conventional or guerrilla warfare should be dominant in the conduct of war; (3) whether regular forces or the masses/militia formed the decisive military
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force; and (4) whether bureaucratisation and institutionalisation or revolutionary spirit should be the avenue to proper army building.80 Indeed, the same clashes between the Chinese and Russian leaders took place in the larger context of China’s nation building. These were given full reign economically in the Great Leap Forward and politically the Cultural Revolution.81 China’s tilt towards the Soviet model, it will be recalled, had been initially sanctioned by the leadership and by Mao himself. Speaking in 1949, the Chairman saw only two options for China’s future: imperialism or socialism. He emphatically ruled out the possibility of a third path. The outcome was not surprisingly ‘leaning to one side’ (yibiandao) – the Russian-led socialist side.82 A CMC publication also urged the PLA to learn not only Soviet military theory and military science but also to assimilate its military technology and organisation.83 But Mao began to rethink this policy in the mid-1950s. If he had followed the Russians because of ideological affinity, ideological revulsion turned him away from it. Khrushchev’s de-Stalinisation campaign in 1956 drove home the question about ideological leadership and solidarity. Later in the same year, the CCP Central Committee cautioned all Party members against ‘dogmatism’ (jiaotiao zhuyi) in learning from foreign experiences.84 The Soviet refusal to risk a nuclear war with the United States in the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis as well as Moscow’s reluctance to provide China with nuclear weapons deepened the Sino–Soviet rift. Mao became increasingly suspicious of Russian foreign policy; Moscow was, he concluded, losing its revolutionary zeal and turning into a status quo power.85 Although allegedly instigated by Lin Biao, China’s Anti-Dogmatism Campaign became inevitable. At an enlarged CMC meeting in 1958, the intellectual foundation of the PLA was challenged. Senior officers, with ties to the Soviets and responsibility for military training and education, including Xiao Ke, Liu Bocheng and Song Shilun, were attacked and reprimanded for departing from the basic tenets of the People’s Army and People’s War. At the same time, Mao deplored the absence of indigenous field regulations and declared that the Chinese army must gather ‘comrades with ample working and combat experiences’ to work out its own regulations.86 This ‘China-centred’ (yiwo weizhu) approach was put forward with an emphasis on the importance of China’s experience in the direction of military modernisation. The Lushan Conference in July 1959 completed the final assault on the dominance of the Soviet model in the PLA. This time, even the Minister of National Defence, Marshal Peng Dehuai, and Chief of General Staff, Senior General Huang Kesheng, were disgraced for following ‘bourgeois military lines’.87 From 1959 onwards, Lin Biao took charge of the CMC’s daily operations. With the purge of Soviet influence, Maoist military thought was systematically introduced to the army and eventually assumed an absolute position in Chinese military doctrine.
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The ‘China-centred’ approach and the emphasis on ‘indigenousness’ should not have conflicted with PLA professionalisation. Under the aegis of Marshall Ye Jianying and with the support of the Academy of Military Science which was founded in 1958 and which he controlled, the Chinese military was able to produce its own doctrinal documents. In 1963, for example, the CMC promulgated the General Principles of Combined Arms Army Combat Regulations, Infantry Combat Regulations, Combined Arms Army Corps and Divisions Combat Regulations, Combined Arms Regiments and Battalions Combat Regulations, and Headquarters Works Regulations and other regulations.88 The major problem was restriction of doctrinal progress due to political reasons. The army became indoctrinated with Maoist writings. In conjunction with the publication of Volume 4 of Mao Zedong Xuanji (The Selected Works of Mao Zedong), the General Political Department urged every soldier to push the study of Mao’s writings to new heights. Senior military academies even jointly compiled and published Mao Zedong Tongzhi Lun Renmin Zhanzheng yu Renmin Jundui (Comrade Mao Zedong on the People’s Army and People’s War). The reading campaigns were intensified with the election of model students on Mao’s works. The high point came naturally after the two releases of the ‘Little Red Book’ – Mao Zhuxi Yulu (Quotations from Chairman Mao).89 These changes, however, should not be regarded simply as a matter of ‘red vs. expert’. Doctrinally, Mao was bringing his country back to the days of ‘guerrillaism’ – defence in depth and destruction of enemy, rather than holding territories – but with modern weapons. This ‘new’ path may also be seen as an important counter-measure to external threats which China and international communism encountered at the time. Mao Zedong is so often remembered as a nationalist that it is easy to forget his internationalist side. As seen in Appendix 3, immediately following the Korean War, China continued to support international communist and Third World insurgencies. One of the most illustrative examples was Beijing’s military assistance programmes to anti-French forces in Vietnam. In response to the United States’ initiatives to create the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) for containing communist and national liberation movements and signing of a mutual defence treaty with Taiwan in 1954, China shelled Jinmen and invaded Yijiangshan Island.90 These incidents precipitated the first Taiwan Strait Crisis and brought the world to the brink of war. The confrontation was ‘more than a contest for the offshore islands remaining in Nationalist hands or even for Taiwan itself. It constituted a direct test of strength between the People’s Republic of China and the United States’.91 Structural readiness for total war The crisis again reminded Mao of the changes in warfare brought about by the introduction of the atomic bomb. The obsolescence of his army’s
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strategies and equipment had become increasingly self-evident.92 Soon after the Korean War armistice, the CMC Training Department, upon receipt from the Soviet Union of some equipment for protection from atomic radiation, produced China’s first atomic defence instruction manual and instructors. Anti-chemical warfare units which had been formed in 1950 were placed in the central command. In 1955, a headquarters for anti-chemical warfare was formed. In the same year, the PLA also began to install facilities to shield Chinese forces from atomic, chemical and bacterial contamination in national defence construction projects.93 By 1959, the CMC decreed that the PLA should study how to wage combat and training under enemy atomic and missile attacks.94 Yet the Chinese leaders were not content with these measures. When the government decided to develop a nuclear industry in 1955, the first priority was its military applications.95 Despite his ‘strategic contempt’ for his American enemies, Mao remained ‘tactically’ vigilant.96 He was determined to defeat future US ‘nuclear blackmail’ by possessing his own atomic bomb. As of 1956–57, the Chinese seemed to anticipate Russian help in atomic weapons development and entered into a series of agreements with them for technology transfer.97 During his 1957 visit, Mao was no less jubilant over the launch of Sputnik than his Moscow hosts and declared that the ‘East wind’ now prevailed over the ‘West wind’. In his eyes, there occurred a decisive swing of military advantages to the cause of communism. Mao precipitated another Taiwan Strait Crisis during the following year. He was prepared to gamble on fighting a ‘local war’ with the United States over Taiwan, and to involve the Russians in case of escalation into a general war and nuclear showdown.98 Mao’s enthusiasm for Soviet nuclear and missile advances, however, soon gave way to abject disappointment. The Russians initially helped the Chinese to develop nuclear and missile programmes by providing personnel training, exporting technology and supplying weapon prototypes. But they never actually supplied a ‘finished’ atomic bomb and they turned lukewarm in 1959 amidst a general souring of Sino–Soviet relations. The Soviets finally broke off military aid in 1960 by recalling all specialists and technicians. The Chinese decided to end their dual policy of exploiting Russian aid and pursuing ‘self-reliance’, settling instead on the latter as the dominant national security strategy. In October 1964, China exploded its first atomic bomb; three years later, it tested a hydrogen bomb.99 Parallel to the research on nuclear weapons was the development of delivery platforms to launch them. Like their Soviet comrades, the Chinese accorded special importance to ballistic missiles.100 The first Chinese missile agency was the Fifth Research Institute under the Ministry of National Defence. This was established in October 1956, following the formation of a coordinating body, the Aviation Industry Commission, six months earlier. According to the GSD’s Ten-Year (1958–67) Plan Outline for National Defence Science and Technology Research in 1957, development priority
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was given to intermediate-range surface-to-surface ballistic missiles (SSM), surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and electronic technology. Another area that received attention was unmanned aircraft.101 In December 1957, China’s very first missile units were formed; and two years later, the first SSM battalion.102 In 1960, China recorded its first successful missile launch. But the missile was a copy of the Soviet R-2 rocket (known as model 1059 and later renamed DF-1) which had a very limited range of 600 km and poor accuracy. Only a limited number of DF-1s were produced for experimental and educational purposes. In 1964, China’s first operational intermediate-range ballistic missile, DF-2, with a range of 1,450 km, made its debut test flight.103 In fact, one year after the Russian launch of Sputnik in 1957, Mao declared that China should also have its own satellite. But this was not a mere scientific quest. It was made clear in a State Council report that the research was to make Chinese missile delivery systems operational.104 As in nuclear energy development, military applications came first. China’s nuclear weapons development programme should recall earlier discussions in this chapter about Soviet influence in the Chinese political-military realm – the study and translation of Russian military literature, doctrinal documents, joint military drills and exercises and personnel training.105 The priority of missiles over other forms of nuclear weapons delivery was confirmed in a 1963 decision by the Central Special Commission:106 ‘Missiles should be the main research direction of nuclear weapons; air drop only auxiliary’.107 The duality of the People’s War doctrine: deterrence and defence Even with the development of more advanced military hardware and more sophisticated organisations, there seemed to be a lack of doctrine to operate these in war. Yet it is problematic for Lewis and Xue to assert that no ‘overarching strategic doctrine informed Chairman Mao’s decision to proceed with the strategic missile program in the mid-1950s’ (emphasis added). The development of China’s nuclear forces in the early years, they argue, was technologically driven and doctrines for missile forces only began to emerge in the early 1980s.108 The problem lies in the failure of Lewis and Xue to distinguish strategic from operational doctrines. Admittedly, military theoretical studies of the Second Artillery began only in the late 1970s (with the formation of a military art research department in November 1978). The focus of such studies was on force development and combat.109 That is, the units and weapons had been developed without an operational doctrine for the strategic missile forces. The interruption in operational doctrinal development, however, was not unique to this service arm. Mao’s disdain for military professionalism certainly aggravated the problem. PLA military theoretical studies, as a whole, came to almost a complete halt during the political turmoil of the
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Cultural Revolution. The number of army academies and research institutes was drastically slashed and eventually discontinued.110 However, this lack of theoretical studies on the operational use of nuclear weapons and missiles should not be construed as if their development were without strategic doctrinal guidance and were decided by available technology. Earlier analysis in this chapter of Soviet influence in Chinese military policies in the mid-1950s underscores that the decisions to develop nuclear bombs and missiles (not other delivery systems) were not made in a doctrinal vacuum. Beijing asked Moscow for the nuclearrelated technology transfers. When China made an about-turn to Maoist People’s War, it was prepared to use its limited nuclear capability to reply in kind to Western nuclear attacks. Even Lewis and Xue themselves agree that each model of China’s Dongfeng missiles had ‘a different range based on a specific imaginary target’.111 There was indeed a strategic doctrine for nuclear weapons development, though not an operational doctrine for their employment in war. It may thus be argued convincingly that China’s initial development of nuclear weapons was political-military. Mao Zedong argued in 1958 that, without nuclear weapons, the international community would not take China seriously.112 The day following China’s first nuclear explosion, Zhou Enlai pledged a ‘no-first-use’ policy in an open letter to all heads of government in the world. He explained the Chinese move as a defensive act against nuclear threats from the United States.113 The Chinese thus claimed to develop nuclear capability to break nuclear monopoly and defeat ‘nuclear blackmail’ by the two superpowers.114 A second component of Chinese nuclear weapons development complementing their political utility was related to deterrence. Initially, the Chinese government despised the concept of deterrence which was derided as ‘nuclear blackmail’. But the evolution of the Dongfeng strategic missiles programme underscored the concept of deterrence by punishment which emphasised retaliation.115 China’s small nuclear arsenal was mainly aimed at an enemy’s ‘soft targets’ (i.e. cities and industrial centres). In order to ensure a Chinese second strike capability, nuclear force survivability became the overarching concern.116 As revealed by Marshall Nie Rongzhen, then a member of the Central Special Commission, China’s primary interest in developing the missile programme was to deploy medium-range and long-range missiles directed towards regional targets.117 These would be able to reach US bases in Asia. Only later would intercontinental ballistic missiles be deployed capable of hitting the United States homeland.118 The third idea that shapes China’s nuclear programme was deterrence by denial. This, however, works in a different context from usual deterrence posture. While deterrence by punishment is usually associated with nuclear retaliation; deterrence by denial with conventional forces is denying enemies the chance of ‘winning’ a nuclear war.119
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Deterrence by denial was underscored by China’s total war doctrine – Maoist People’s War – which links deterrence to battlefield defence. Conventional war-fighting, Mao believed, and not nuclear weapons, would decide the result of war. Although the Chinese political-military leaders of the 1960s envisioned that an ‘imminent, all-out nuclear war’ (zaoda, dada, da hezhanzheng) would be the most likely scenario, and even a local war would inadvertently escalate into a nuclear total war, the decisive factor in battle would not be nuclear weapons. A nuclear preventive strike would only be a prelude to full-scale ground invasion.120 Mao Zedong later endorsed this version of People’s War.121 In fact, this doctrinal approach was given full reign in the mid-1960s when China’s strategic principles were confirmed as ‘luring enemy into the deep, fighting People’s War and wars of annihilation’. The core idea was ‘luring enemy into the deep’.122 The Chinese military was confident of surviving enemy preventive nuclear attacks and retaliating in kind. Thus, as noted above, the focus of war would be in the conventional battlefield. China would be organised into three lines of defence. The troops deployed at the first line were for scouting, and would disperse to conduct guerrilla warfare when it was clear where enemy penetration was taking place. But ‘garrison units’ in the second line would resist initial enemy assaults. In this war of attrition, the enemy would find its lines of supply and communications exposed and overextended. China’s adversaries would be harassed by the guerrillas and worn down by the garrison troops even before they reached the third line of defence. China’s field armies deployed at the third line of defence would generate strong resistance to the invader and would not easily give up an inch of land. The regular Chinese army, in conjunction with guerrilla forces and masses of Chinese citizens, would eventually overwhelm and annihilate the enemy inside Chinese territory.123 In this scenario, People’s War would deny the enemy any chance of success and, if properly conveyed in advance, might even deter it from attacking. In short, the Chinese concept of deterrence was a combination of punishment and denial.124 Sacrificing operational readiness As noted above, while the ‘Anti-Dogmatism Campaign’ represented a departure from the Soviet model, the 1959 CMC enlarged meeting completed the change and announced a return to People’s War with guerrilla characteristics – a ‘nation-in-arms’ doctrine. Among the main features of the Maoist concept were the superiority of political enthusiasm over military professionalism and the ‘human factor’ over military hardware.125 While political education was in full swing, military training was nevertheless compromised. By 1971, China had thirteen army corps in strategic reserve, seventeen specialised services divisions, and some military region divisions were put in ‘combat ready’ category.
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But none of these divisions were fully trained. The yearly flight hours of interceptor pilots, for example, averaged only thirty-eight from 1966 onwards. This situation was somewhat mitigated with Lin Biao’s demise in September 1971, but China’s standing army remained seriously underequipped. Even by 1973, 70 per cent of Second Artillery missile regiments were underequipped, and one-third of China’s tank regiments were deploying only forty to fifty operable tanks. According to statistics released in 1975, only 40 per cent of the vessels in the navy and 60 per cent of aircraft in the air force were operational.126 The lack of operational readiness of the PLA was disastrous. Apart from military subordination to political ideology, a second byproduct of the Maoist doctrine was building up the militia. Following the CCPCC resolution to intensify militia work and Mao Zedong’s urgings to ‘[make] a great effort to develop militia divisions’ to counter imperialism, almost 35 per cent of the Chinese population formed militias and the number of militiamen exploded from 40 million to 220 million within a few months. The strategic importance of militias in future nuclear and missile wars was also defined in a 1959 CMC report. It mandated that the militias should make up the bulk of China’s military forces in future wars.127 A third policy that exemplified Mao’s People’s War was the ‘Third Line’128 (sanxian) construction programme. Since the CMC perceived the United States and the KMT in Taiwan as the main threat to communist China’s existence, it created a ‘strategic readiness system’ of frontline troops deployed to China’s southeast coast.129 The bulk of China’s national defence science and technology infrastructure and industrial establishment, however, was retrenched to China’s strategic hinterland – subsequently known as the ‘third line’ area. US military intervention in Vietnam seemed to confirm Chinese suspicion about the aggression of US forces deployed proximate to China’s southern borders. As Sino–Soviet relations deteriorated and culminated in the Zhenbao (Damansky) Island skirmish, China turned its attention northward. The main defence perimeter was in the three ‘norths’ – northwest, north China, northeast.130 The ‘third front’ was viewed by Mao and other Chinese military planners as the ultimate line of defence, allowing the infrastructures of both the Chinese state and the CCP to survive even if China were to be invaded on two different fronts by the USSR and USA respectively. Mao’s People’s War doctrine extracted serious costs to China’s military readiness. Among other liabilities, it sowed the seeds of China’s Vietnam disaster in 1979 when the PLA prepared so poorly against its Hanoi adversary. The militia, the institutional icon of Maoist People’s War, was elevated to a position even higher than the PLA.131 It became the so-called ‘second armed force’ and was regarded as more politically ‘reliable’ than the regular, if not yet professional, army.132 Its numerical superiority and political zeal gave the militia a higher priority than the regular forces. Its
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demand for resources compromised the quality of the standing army, including the PLA’s strategic forces. Development in operational doctrine, organisation, training and hardware was likewise impeded. Interestingly, Deng Xiaoping, when referring to the Second Artillery in 1978, proposed the concept of ‘fighting guerrilla warfare with modern equipment’.133 Even this late in the PRC’s existence, its leadership generally viewed a high-technology arm of the regular army as only capable of guerrilla warfare.
Conclusion The evolution of Chinese local war doctrine has followed a track very different from the military doctrinal development that occurred in the United States and the Soviet Union. Practical war experience was overshadowed by ideological reasons and political leadership perception. China’s ‘golden age’ of military doctrinal development commenced in the years immediately following the Korean War. The Chinese high command had firsthand experience of modern warfare in that conflict, and access to institutional resources that it had not enjoyed during the revolutionary years. A doctrine evolved which focused on Soviet-modelled conventional warfare and which combined positional defence with manoeuvre offensive. Those years also saw the professionalisation of the standing army, research and development and acquisition of modern weaponry, and rapid growth in military education and research institutes. Emphasis was placed on operational readiness to deal with threats from the US-led ‘imperialist’ forces. But the issue of how to fight a nuclear war – a war of mass destruction – proved to be the catalyst which transformed China’s limited war outlook and doctrine. During the 1950s and early 1960s, Mao Zedong had perceived the nuclear-armed American imperialists as China’s arch-enemy. He planned to answer the threat by nuclear balancing – with China possessing its own nuclear force. The United States would, he reasoned, then be deterred by China’s retaliatory capability. But this only created a new security dilemma for China: its nuclear arms could well invite pre-emptive American attacks. The ‘nuclear blackmail’ prospect was further complicated by the ambitious KMT forces, who had long waited to roll back communism on the mainland by launching a ground invasion. The Sino–Soviet split in the 1960s posed an even greater danger. The long, common Sino–Soviet border on land put China in a vulnerable condition against a militarily superior foe. Thus, ‘deterrence by punishment’ had to be supplemented with ‘deterrence by denial’. The nuclear weapons programme was only part of the continental-oriented Maoist People’s War – a total war of annihilation, conducted by ‘luring enemy into the deep’ and then wearing it down through protracted warfare. Obviously, the PLA’s high command favoured structural readiness that emphasised the
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mass of force. Mass was regarded as important, in the first stage of nuclear exchanges, to survive possible enemy nuclear strikes and, in the second stage of conventional war, to overrun enemy invasive forces on the ground. While a general war with nuclear exchanges continued to preoccupy the two superpowers during the Cold War years, both the Soviet Union and the United States developed limited/local war theories as an alternative means of violence to resolve conflicts. China, however, placed undue emphasis on total nuclear war fighting despite frequent trouble along the borders which was inapplicable to nuclear escalation. By doing so, it lost an opportunity to develop a more flexible army during the Cold War. The PLA was not ready for the challenges of modern localised conflicts when it faced one against Vietnam in 1979. As will be discussed in the next chapter, that conflict was used by Deng Xiaoping to test the war-fighting capability of his army, which had been built on Maoist People’s War. The PLA’s poor performance during the Sino–Vietnamese border conflicts illustrated the inadequacy of this doctrine. It was left to Deng and his generals to revise the doctrine and to modernise the PLA in accordance with changing strategic requirements.
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As discussed in the previous chapter, China’s leaders during the Cultural Revolution perceived the security landscape as capable of fostering wars that would threaten the very survival of the state. Its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was intended to fight ‘imminent, all-out nuclear war’ – total war, or local war which would quickly escalate into a total war against a major power and its allies in a nuclear environment. The Chinese answer was People’s War. This was a doctrine of Maoist guerrilla warfare which was characterised by emphasis on political enthusiasm, the ‘human factor’ and comradeship; military training and hardware and the formal chain of command were relegated to secondary status. The army had expected to fight protracted wars of attrition rather than relatively short campaigns, and to conduct defensive rather than offensive operations. All this seemed to justify an infantry-centred military structure, and combined arms warfare appeared less important. The application of this doctrine sowed the seeds of the 1979 Vietnam disaster – China launched a punitive attack against Vietnam. The PLA had been built for a different type of war and was not ready to confront the modern tools supplied to the Vietnamese by the Russians.1 Yet even the Sino–Vietnamese conflict was not the reason for China ultimately effecting doctrinal change. Rather, it should be viewed as a testing ground to demonstrate force readiness and to justify the need for reforms when that readiness proved not to be sufficient. The call for new doctrinal innovation within the PLA had, in fact, preceded that war. People’s War had failed to answer the challenges posited by new security threats and to help achieve national military-political objectives. It had instead resulted in the PLA becoming an obsolescent force. Military doctrinal change in China during the late 1970s in many ways resembled that country’s experience in the 1950s. Both time frames should be read in a larger context of nation-building and political-military leadership. The experiment to build a ‘new China’ immediately after the establishment of the People’s Republic was Soviet inspired. If the Cultural Revolution symbolised a protest against foreign influence and a radical return to China’s past (especially during the revolutionary years) the mili-
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tary modernisation programmes undertaken in the 1970s represented a search for a middle ground in China’s continuing quest for power and security. National defence, together with agriculture, industry, and science and technology, formed the four modernisations launched by then Premier Zhou Enlai in 1975. The programme was soon aborted when he died one year later. But China’s new leadership under Deng Xiaoping decided to pick it up again in 1978. This meant expanding and ‘upgrading’ Deng’s military reforms originally proposed in 1975. These were largely about force restructuring and were too piecemeal to achieve really fundamental reforms.2 A new direction in military planning was clearly needed. A ‘doctrinal spring’, resembling that of the 1950s, re-emerged. Both periods focused on the ‘initial phase of war’ (zhanzheng chuqi) and both promoted ‘active defence’. The concept of ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’ of the late 1970s was only a remedy to the defunct Maoist People’s War which operated with ‘active defence, luring enemy into the deep’. This concept, moreover, was only ‘reactionary’ and transitional. While the socio-political meaning of People’s War was retained in the 1970s version, the military-technical element of the new doctrine underwent substantial revisions – it was gradually replaced by an updated version of local war. This ‘new doctrine under an old label’ was not established, however, until China’s new leadership made a reassessment of threats to national security in 1985. At that time, the PLA underwent one of the most substantial overhauls in its history. This chapter will commence with a discussion about how the Maoist People’s War lost touch with modern warfare as demonstrated in the Sino–Vietnamese border clash. In order to redress China’s military readiness problem, the PLA’s high command had to push for doctrinal reform. The doctrinal evolution from ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’ to local war will be examined closely. The concept of local war itself and how it has impacted on Chinese military power will also be assessed.
The 1979 border war: catalyst for Chinese doctrinal reform The ‘self-defence counter-offensive’ On the eve of the Sino–Vietnamese conflict, the PLA had successfully exploded nuclear devices and launched intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) as well as satellites. It had also demonstrated an indigenous military industrial capacity for producing conventional weaponry. However, the possession of these ‘characteristics of a great power’ did not mean China was ready for a bloody war with Vietnam, a Third World state, when Chinese leaders decided to put their country’s army to the test. That is, absolute military power is not equal to military readiness. Even though the Chinese claimed ‘victory’, the price tag comprised huge PLA casualties.
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Indeed, the PLA continued to have clashes, albeit less intense, with the Vietnamese over the Sino–Vietnamese land border well beyond 1979, and more substantial skirmishes occurred in 1981 and 1984 to 1987. Except in 1984 when division-level contingents took part, these other episodes involved mainly regiments/battalions or smaller units.3 According to the Xinhua News Agency (China’s official mouthpiece), PLA border defence troops decided in early 1979 to confront rather than to appease Vietnamese provocations and armed harassment which had intensified since 1977.4 But if the two years of ‘bullying’ was intolerable, the forging of a formal security alliance between the Soviet Union and Vietnam in November 1978 was even more unacceptable. So too was Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, a Chinese ally, and its eventual occupation of the Cambodian capital, Phnom Penh, in January 1979. These developments were perceived by the Chinese leadership as associated with a threatening Soviet move to sandwich it from both the north and south.5 On the eve of the war, about thirty Chinese divisions had been deployed along the Sino–Vietnamese border. On 17 February 1979, the PLA executed an order issued by the CMC five days earlier. Some 80,000 to 100,000 soldiers, under the respective command of Yang Dezhi in the western sector and Xu Shiyou in the east, crossed the border and attacked the Vietnamese enemy. Their strategic targets were Lao Cai, Cao Bang and Lang Son. After 27 February, intensive fighting was also carried out in the Lang Son area, which was about 16 km from the Friendship Pass and over 135 km from Hanoi.6 On 5 March, Beijing announced it would withdraw its troops. This was accomplished a week later to conclude the PLA’s twenty-eight-day expedition into Vietnam.7 In its official media, the Chinese government propagandised stories of valour instead of discussing the ‘lessons’ learned from the conflict or even disclosing facts about it. The Chinese high command only admitted casualties of approximately 20,000 on the Chinese side as compared to 50,000 Vietnamese casualties. In contrast, Hanoi claimed a much lower figure for its own army vis-à-vis its Chinese adversary. Foreign analysts estimated that over 26,000 Chinese soldiers were killed, another 37,000 wounded and 260 taken prisoner. On top of that, the PLA suffered considerable damage to its equipment and weaponry. Chinese ground forces were barely mechanised and motorised in the Sino–Vietnam war. The PLA’s four million-plus soldiers possessed only some 2,000 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) as of 1980. Moreover, the PLA had deployed about 1,200 tanks on the border but only in regimental-size units during the Vietnam conflict. Indeed, about 420 tanks and armoured vehicles were lost. This was the result of poor coordination between the PLA’s infantry and the armour, both in terms of force structure and operations.8
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Sounding the alarm of doctrinal failure A brief review of the PLA’s performance reveals that it was operationally and structurally not ready. Its soldiers’ lack of professional education and training had made the supply of qualified and experienced officers an acute problem. In fact, some of them were engaged in agricultural activities when the mobilisation call reached them. The specialised arms were barely proficient in their trade. A smooth chain of command became a serious issue when the war took a heavy toll on junior officers. But the Maoist legacy, which sacrificed the military ranking system for the sake of comradeship, caused the most fundamental problem. Officers not only lacked the professional pride of their Western counterparts but were confused in giving and receiving orders. There were even reports of fratricide within PLA units due to a failure to identify friend or foe amidst the heat of battle.9 Weaknesses in the PLA’s C3 (command, control and communications) were also a matter of concern. Equipment was outdated and susceptible to both jamming and terrain blocking. In fact, the Chinese army was barely equipped to wage any type of electronic warfare.10 According to some reports, army corps had to receive engineering units from military region headquarters to construct camouflaged command posts and bridges.11 Overall, the Chinese were unable to bring the PLA’s full military power to bear on their Vietnamese enemy. The root of failure was in doctrinal shortcomings. China’s expedition into Vietnam was mainly an infantry operation. There was little trace, if any, of combined arms and joint operations because their doctrinal postulates had long been buried in deference to an infantry-focused People’s War, reflecting Mao’s revolutionary war tradition. PLA foot soldiers had the experience of fighting with artillery in their early days and gradually became proficient during the Civil War. However, by 1979, they knew little about modern armour. Not surprisingly, even at small unit operations, infantry and armour did not coordinate well, resulting in significant tank casualties.12 At the joint level, the PLA navy (PLAN) was largely irrelevant in the Vietnam conflict. The PLA air force (PLAAF) was important but failed to score any kills. Although the air force assets were controlled by air force commanders in the Guangzhou military region and Kunming military region, joint services command posts were formed on the basis of key airfields in each operational direction (zuozhan fangxian). Thus, the PLAAF played no real combat role. It reportedly flew 8,500 sorties in 3,131 groupings to ‘patrol’ Chinese air space, mainly for ‘air cover’, reconnaissance and early warning. Even these tasks were not completed satisfactorily. More importantly, the air force lacked the capacity to provide the PLA ground forces in Vietnam with fire support. Perhaps the most active PLAAF units in the Vietnam campaign were
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transport units which delivered materiel and personnel to the frontline and implemented medical evacuation. Outdated equipment partly explained the PLAAF’s poor performance. In contrast, with Russian aid, Vietnam’s comparatively modern arsenal of aircraft, surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) proved decisive as a force multiplier; China had to hurriedly transfer J-7 fighters to the border area to compensate for the obvious qualitative inferiority of its invasion force. The self-imposed geographical limit of how far that force could advance coincided with Chinese SAM ranges.13 But there was a more important doctrinal consideration. The dominance concern for air superiority over the actual combat area was no more clearly illustrated than by the type of Chinese aircraft sent to the war theatre and the air-to-air missiles under their wing pylons.14 The service doctrine of the PLAAF had been ‘defensive’ and focused on air supremacy over its own territory for fear of enemy surveillance and strikes. However, it lacked a close-air support doctrine and received little training and hardware for any such mission. PLAAF research actually revealed that there were too many interceptors in China’s force structure and this was reflected in its inability to initiate offensive action against Vietnamese forces.15
The impact of modern conditions These Chinese force deficiencies were not difficult to understand when we consider the basic tenets of Maoist People’s War. Even the militia, it will be recalled, had been regarded as a sacred cow in Maoist People’s War but this generated inherent limitations in offensive action. According to Chinese accounts, the militia’s roles ranged from actual combat to services support in the Vietnam conflict. Militiamen also helped in the repair of roads, vehicles and tanks, as well as in medical evacuation and logistical supplies. Their actual combat support role included diffusing mines, demolishing enemy obstacles, reconnaissance and guiding, but their actual combat operations were essentially defensive, such as security screening and repulsing enemy assaults. These were mainly inside Chinese territory or in a short depth adjacent to China.16 Thus, as noted earlier, the Chinese military action against Vietnam served mainly as a test for the PLA rank-and-file to gain combat experience. Troops involved included the PLA’s main forces17 from the Kunming and Guangzhou military regions as well as from other military regions. They were not mere border defence forces as reported by the Chinese press.18 The exercise was a step towards understanding how much Chinese military power needed to be re-invigorated. The need for reforms was not only derived from the Vietnam experience but also from other military conflicts assessed by Chinese observers.19 In 1982, two battles, one in the Middle East and the other in
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the South Atlantic, caught the attention of PLA analysts by demonstrating how modern warfare was evolving. The Israeli forces, with a declared aim of protecting the Galilean settlements from terrorist artillery fire, stormed across the Lebanese border on 6 June 1982. After five days, the Israelis were able to advance 90 km deep into Lebanon, wipe out Syrian air defence missile bases in Bekaa Valley and encircle West Beirut where the headquarters of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation were situated. Israel’s immediate military objectives were quickly achieved. On the other side of the world, a small British task force was able to overrun an Argentine force of over 10,000 soldiers and recapture South Georgia, short of one month after it was seized by Argentina. The British reoccupied the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) less than two months after initiating combat. The British displayed substantial acumen in the art of electronic warfare and in joint force operations and blockading. They also established unquestionable air and sea control over the combat area and carried out highly efficient mobilisation.20 The fast tempo, huge costs and high intensity of these wars, combined with the lethal nature of the weapons used, alerted the PLA to just how different modern warfare was from that envisaged by Mao. The discrepancy was so wide that the Chinese army even published a special supplement to Junshi Xueshu (Military Art), a PLA internal publication, to analyse these two wars.21 In a concluding essay, Yu Qifen22 took into consideration the two above-cited conflicts along with two additional ‘local wars’ – the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran–Iraq War – to highlight four points: 1 2 3 4
The speed of response to attack: this is critical to modern wars which are characterised by sudden strikes. Strategic assessment: this is critical to minimise losses and absorb shocks in the initial phase of war. Protracted war: political and military preparation for a long conflict may defeat the blitzkrieg of an aggressor. Logistics: in view of the huge consumption of materiel in these skirmishes, the production, storage and supply of war materiel would become more important.
The Chinese army’s interest in and awareness of modern warfare was not in question. What was needed was someone to kick-start the process of doctrinal revision and steer the course of modernisation down the right path. As happened in the 1950s, the direction of change had to come from the top. Deng Xiaoping was the key player in bringing the PLA back to the track of modernisation. He initially reassessed China’s security environment and revised these threat perceptions that had originally justified Maoist
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People’s War. Speaking at a CMC general meeting in December 1977, Deng reiterated a view that he had made at a larger meeting of the same establishment two years earlier.23 While not totally dismissing the possibility of fighting an ‘early and all-out war’, he argued that ‘major wars could surely be postponed’. For him, speaking in his capacity as the PLA’s Chief of General Staff, ‘sudden and localised incidents’ which could hardly be predicted were more threatening.24 Attention was thus shifted to scenarios other than those which had preoccupied Mao’s defence planners in the 1960s. Moreover, Deng sanctioned doctrinal debates within the PLA. His remarks at the twentieth anniversary of the Academy of Military Science in March 1978 called openly for studying ‘the People’s War under Modern Conditions’.25 Nor was he alone. His determination to bring the military-technical component of the People’s War doctrine up to date with modern warfare was shared by his contemporaries. Another CMC vice-chairman, Marshall Ye Jianying, pointed to the necessity of studying ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’. The socio-political environment, threat and form of future warfare, he asserted, were different from the vision that had shaped Maoist military thought.26 A consensus was gradually building up in the PLA’s high command. Senior General Su Yu, giving words of encouragement to graduates of the Military Academy in January 1979, went beyond signalling general change to urge reforms in actual details of operational methods, including the initial phase of war. It is noteworthy that this senior officer had been the first to publicise the concept of ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’ in August 1977. He also emphasised conventional warfare in the nuclear age and the building of a modern air force.27 Of course, the PLA’s high command recognised that the ‘modern conditions’ which demanded a new doctrine were not limited to international security considerations. China’s domestic political-economic environment would not allow it – now an established sovereign state with permanent territory and a huge population – to trade its economic centres for tactical mobility or space for time. Cities became strongpoints to be defended. National ‘rebuilding’ processes envisioned by Deng and others to redistribute scarce resources rationally would not support an economy based on planning for imminent war. Accordingly, such concepts as the ‘third line’ became outdated and expendable. Military technology developments – the advent of more advanced nuclear arms, missiles and electronic devices in particular – were reshaping future battlefields.28 It was in recognition of the changing environment that the Chinese leadership began its search for new military answers. The above-cited debates soon bore their first fruits in a CMC enlarged meeting in 1980. The military leaders concentrated their attention on research relating to the initial phase of war. They resolved that the ‘active defence, luring enemy into the deep’ strategy which had been enshrined
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by Maoist People’s War was to be scrapped. In its place, they retained only ‘active defence’ but gave it a new context. It was to be integrated with a ‘theory of the initial phase of war’.29 This development was monumental and was an important step away from total war doctrine. It must be emphasised that back in 1977 (the first post-Mao year), the Chinese military still insisted on an ‘active defence, luring enemy into the deep’ strategy to deal with a possible Soviet general invasion. It calculated that it must take advantage of interior operations and fight a war of annihilation in its own territory.30 Entering the 1980s, the concept of the ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’ was given added content by a more systematic integration of active defence strategy with ‘initial phase of war’ theory. According to this new, integrated doctrine, a Soviet adversary, with superiority in manoeuvre capability and firepower, could easily control the air space in any invasion of China; Soviet forces would start a blitzkrieg with a joint services attack on a wide front and in depth. In order to stop Soviet advances and to stabilise the situation, the Chinese PLA, in the initial phase of war, was to take advantage of preselected strongholds to wage positional warfare against an enemy intent upon achieving a quick and decisive victory. ‘Luring enemy into the deep’ was replaced by ‘standing up to the enemy’ (dingzhu diren).31 Similar to the thinking which emerged in the 1950s, this doctrine anticipated that PLA would provide strategic cover for China to shift into a wartime mobilisation. Positional warfare had other advantages. Defence of cities of strategic importance could ambush and wear down enemy forces, and a Battle of Stalingrad-type scenario could change the momentum against a Soviet invader. Chinese forces were not to concentrate on strongpoints but were to maintain a huge reserve for counter-strokes and small mobile warfare.32 Learning also from their enemies, the Chinese studied Moscow’s painful experience during the early part of the Second World War. They understood the importance of organising strongpoints in strategic depth to prevent enemy advances after breakthroughs in the first line of defence.33 Where such breakthroughs did occur, mobile warfare would no longer mean one had to retreat to the rear but could outflank enemy troops to disrupt their logistical supply.34 These tasks were as much a matter of conducting successful guerrilla warfare as of the use of special operations even on enemy soil.35 ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’ attempted to integrate the old with the new to the PLA’s maximum advantage. For the regular army, Beijing’s military leaders realised that future warfare would be combined arms and joint operations.36 While there was obvious interest among PLA strategists in conventional warfare and little had been actually written by Chinese strategic analysts about nuclear war scenarios, the spectre of nuclear war was never too far away in the PLA’s collective mindset. If the enemy blasted its way through to China’s interior by using nuclear weapons, the PLA would respond by
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applying firepower judiciously to fill the gaps.37 Indications suggested that the Chinese were still preparing to fight protracted wars of attrition to wear down their enemies, but they would do so by applying revised operational concepts and methods emphasising the application of massive firepower.38 More profound changes were evident in Chinese views on the concept of ‘defence’. The active defence strategy was reinterpreted so that it squared more closely with emerging offensive strategies and with Chinese military operations that might be conducted beyond the nation’s border. This approach was politically appealing because it could justify China’s recent ‘punitive’ attacks against Vietnam.39 The three defining stages of active defence – (1) strategic defensive; (2) strategic stalemate; and (3) strategic counter-offensive – thus assumed additional meaning. According to PLA strategists, the ‘strategic defensive’ has special importance. An enemy would try every way to break through and advance deep into Chinese territory. Planning would thus need to be consummated with the initial phase of war, namely the period extending from the start of war to the completion of the mission of strategic cover. As noted above, however, the strategic defensive is also interpreted in a political context. A claim to be on the defensive against enemy disruption on the border is regarded by the Chinese as justification for future offensives. Assuming the attack momentum is broken, the war would enter the stage of ‘strategic stalemate’. This is the point where the balance of military forces would change to favour the defensive side (i.e. China) as the invasive enemy became weaker. During this period, the Chinese leadership would rally the people behind it to form a staunch political front, reinvigorate its army and win international support. Political and diplomatic pressure would thus be combined with military efforts in war prosecution. Seizing upon changed circumstance in the balance of forces, Chinese commanders would then begin a strategic counter-offensive. At this stage, the PLA would hurl enemy troops out of Chinese territory or, if necessary, chase them beyond the border and hit their home bases to seek decisive victory. Although the operations are militarily offensive, they are regarded politically as counter-offensives.40 This is in line with the Marxist-Leninist tradition which emphasises the political nature of armed conflicts, and with the Chinese practice of claiming the moral high ground in war. The active defence strategy, in this context, explains China’s 1979 ‘punitive’ adventure against Vietnam. War, for the Chinese, had started when the Vietnamese allegedly harassed China’s border areas. China was thus ‘on the defensive’. Since the ‘soldiers and people’ (junmin) refused to surrender an inch of soil, they brought the confrontation to a stalemate. During this time, Beijing on the one hand mobilised international support and on the other planned for military operations. When it saw an appropriate moment, it ‘counter-attacked’.
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This military-technical component of ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’ – ‘active defence’ and the theory of the initial phase of war – bridged the gap between China’s national security objectives and its military doctrine. It revised the premises on which Maoist People’s War had been formulated and recognised that future warfare would be executed in different ways. But even this doctrinal approach was bound to be transitional. Although the speculation about preparing for an ‘imminent all-out nuclear war’ has been modified, the overall concept of war remains vague. The revised doctrinal theory only retained a focus on protracted, general war and national mobilisation. It seemed to emphasise only wars’ operational aspects.41 The problem of maintaining large armed forces on high alert during peacetime was yet to be solved. This will be assessed more fully later in this chapter. Perhaps the most significant Chinese doctrinal change at the turn of the 1980s was to break from the past and pave the way for military reform, both in structural and operational terms. Before the consequences of this trend are explored, it may be useful to summarise the doctrinal tenets of the military-technical component of ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’. They are: • • • • • • • •
sudden attacks with ensuing large-scale ground invasion perceived as the main threat; ‘stand up to the enemy’ (dingzhu diren), instead of ‘luring the enemy into the deep’; the concentration of force at strongpoints to foil enemy attempts at a quick and decisive victory; maintaining a huge army reserve to sustain defence; the primacy of positional warfare, with supporting mobile and guerrilla operations; the importance of stabilising the situation in the initial phase of war in order to provide cover for mobilisation; protracted war; an emphasis on the offensive at operational and tactical levels with an allegedly strategic defensive stance.
Military readiness under modern conditions Structural readiness I: The force mix One of the most notable benchmarks of Chinese military policy in the years immediately following Deng Xiaoping’s return to power was the streamlining and restructuring of the PLA. The national economy had been overstretched to support a large war machine commensurate with preparing for an ‘imminent all-out nuclear war’. It was made clear by
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Deng at an enlarged meeting of the CMC standing committee in 1980 that the PLA’s high command was to reallocate the money saved from manpower downsizing of the army to upgrade equipment and reduce military expenditure.42 In 1985, the PLA underwent a major demobilisation, transferring its internal security troops and railway corps to the Public Security Ministry and Railway Ministry respectively. Capital construction units were simply abolished. Headquarters of the artillery, armour and engineering corps were consolidated under the GSD.43 These force reductions were complemented by reforms in the PLA’s force mix. The revised concept of active defence underscored the importance of strengthening the PLA’s offensive capabilities and its potential for force projection operations. In the late 1960s, as Sino–Soviet hostility intensified, motorised infantry corps and divisions were created.44 However, their enhanced mobility still did not measure up to modern warfare standards. Under Deng’s new doctrine espoused in the late 1970s, the PLA was directed to improve its firepower and survivability. In December 1983, it formed its first mechanised infantry divisions which received armoured infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs) and armoured personnel carriers (APCs) as well as more tanks and SP (self-propelled) guns to enhance assault capability.45 Depending on the type of climate, geography and terrain in which they were operating, and the specific nature of combat missions, these units were divided into two sections – south and north – so that they were better equipped to deal with conflicts in a wide array of environments and situations.46 However, such mechanised infantry divisions were too small to conduct independent military campaigns. Deng Xiaoping had already emphasised in 1980 the necessity to form combined arms group armies (jituanjun)47 which should have organic specialised arms.48 The border clash with Vietnam in 1979 had underscored the limitations of old-style PLA formations in fighting modern combined arms battles. In September 1982, two army corps (lujunjun) were converted into pilot group armies for the Beijing military region and Shenyang military region but it took another three years for the army-wide reorganisation to be completed.49 The primacy of positional warfare in the initial phase of war determined that a high concentration of forces and firepower was necessary to conduct frontal engagements. The perceived enemy preference for sudden attacks would ensure a very fast tempo of operations in future conflicts. In theory, the guerrilla forces of the militia and masses would be caught off-guard and their uses in war would be marginalised. The ‘people’ would no longer be expected to provide direct support to their regular forces which would have to conduct exterior operations.50 Another aspect of People’s War was thus relegated to history by the PLA’s doctrinal transformation to a new form of active defence. Indeed, if the militia was to keep itself ‘combat effective’ in rear opera-
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tions, it needed to be overhauled. Militia organisations which had proliferated substantially during the Maoist years were slashed and scaled down. By the end of 1982, the militia was reduced by 60 per cent to about 100 million soldiers. China’s traditionally extensive network of militia organisations as well as PLA’s bloated chain of command were effectively consolidated.51 Despite experiencing these force reductions, the militia was still a potent military force due to its sheer size. Expected high attrition rates in future warfare meant that the standing army, in any case, would need a large pool of manpower replenishment.52 The PLA, after all, remained qualitatively inferior to its most likely foe. Yet the militia would only be useful after being integrated into a reserve system. China’s reserve forces had been organised initially in 1955 but were abolished two years later. They were reinstated in 1983. The more capable ‘basic militia’ (jigan minbing) formed the bulk of Category A reserve forces, the ‘ordinary militia’ (putong minbing), Category B, which would be mobilised in wartime to reinforce the regular army and make new formations.53 The People’s Armed Police (PAP) were situated between the PLA and the reservists to replace the local forces in China’s three-tier armed force structure. Former PLA internal security units were not simply disbanded; some were transferred to the new police contingent which formed its headquarters in 1983 by virtue of a CCPCC decree the previous year. The PAP was established as a prolific organisation: it fielded units responsible for internal security, border defence, guard security as well as some specialising in fire-fighting, hydro-electric power, gold prospecting, traffic and forestry. It also comprised special police forces and training academies. In line with its primary duty of internal security, however, the internal security units formed the bulk of the PAP. Border defence troops were created for border control and combating cross-border crimes, not for fighting with foreign armed forces. Although the PAP was charged with wartime duties, it was mainly to ensure security in rear areas. Since the Armed Police had been restored for the maintenance of internal order, this should have contributed to professionalisation of the regular army for external defence. It was only because the PAP failed its important test in quelling protests at Tiananmen Square in 1989 that regular PLA units were called upon for suppression. Since the PLA, officially blessed as a ‘People’s Army’, got its hands dirty killing the people, Chinese military leaders were eager to remedy strained civil–military relations and bring it back to professional training. Thus, despite performing badly, the PAP was strengthened so that it would be capable of internal security tasks.54 Structural readiness II: The hardware Advances in military hardware and technology are probably the most visible indicator of military modernisation. Extensive analysis of China’s
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massive equipment and weapons upgrade programmes will not be offered here. A broad overview will be presented, however, on the research and development (R&D) component that allows such programmes to materialise. Between the immediate post-Mao years and the ‘strategic changes’ in 1985, Beijing had stipulated short- and medium-term plans for the R&D of military hardware. When Deng Xiaoping was reinstated in 1977, the CMC leadership moved to enact the Sixth Five-Year Plan for national science and technology. It also decided that the focus of weapons R&D should be on antitank and anti-air equipment, interceptor aircraft, submarines, computers and electronic counter-measures. Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and satellite communications were demarcated as the three key strategic weapons projects. A full-scale Soviet invasion continued to dominate China’s strategic planning, but there were subtle changes. While the Chinese high command was determined to complete the testing and R&D of these three programmes, it began to shift its attention to conventional arms.55 This signalled a gradual departure from the ‘imminent all-out nuclear war’ scenario. Entering the 1980s, according to the 1983 CMC documentation now available for review, ground forces equipment was assigned greater priority, although strategic nuclear weapons were still to be improved.56 The conventional weapons projects immediately following Mao’s rule were understandably oriented towards the ground forces. Both threat assessments of clashes with the Russians and experience in fighting the Vietnamese seemed to confirm the central importance of land warfare. Insufficient mobility and firepower had placed the Chinese army in a disadvantageous position against their adversaries. To mitigate these and to facilitate coordination between the infantry and tanks, China has increased its R&D of both APCs and AIFVs. Most of the prototypes for these systems were vintage in the early 1980s.57 Another important advance was in self-propelled (SP) weaponry. The 152 mm Type-83 SP cannon-howitzer was China’s first such system. This plus other SP systems definitely enhanced the suppressive firepower of the PLA’s mobile forces.58 The air force made only incremental improvements. It had four key projects – the J-7 II, J-8 day model, J-8 I all-weather model and Q-5. They were essentially upgraded rather than new series R&D. Even the J-8 was, in fact, a product of the 1960s technology and concept. From 1979 to 1986, there was an unprecedented number of prototypes finalised and models improved in China’s aviation industry; but these materialised only from the revival of previously suspended projects.59 It should be noted that the hardware development during the early 1980s reflected a dominant Chinese concern for defensive air operations and air superiority.60 Even when the CMC pushed for doctrinal revisions of Maoist People’s War, the air force was slow to change and articulate
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doctrine. China’s air doctrine was thus still very much a legacy of the 1960s. Emphasis remained in neutralising enemy invasions through counter air attack, especially strategic air attacks, air defence and air superiority, and by the employment of the interceptor and air defence units. While limited resources impelled a conservative use of air assets, deficient command and control rendered other tasks such as air interdiction and close air support almost impossible. The only major changes were found in the appreciation of time factor – the initial phase of war.61 Operational readiness tended to be addressed, rather than structural issues. This imbalance in the force structure of the air arm continued to frustrate most Chinese military planners in the late 1980s who argued for more offensive capability.62 The PLAN in the late 1970s concentrated on the refitting and remodelling of its first-generation vessels, especially with electronic warfare capability and automation. Five components were at the core of the programme: (1) attack nuclear-powered submarines; (2) guided missile destroyers; (3) conventional attack submarines; (4) missile patrol boats; and (5) submarine chasers. Upon completion of these projects, the PLAN began to conceive of the procurement of new attack submarines, destroyers, guided missile frigates, corvettes, missile boats and anti-submarine torpedoes. This time, Chinese leaders, having learned from the mistakes in the 1960s, made sure that these platforms were given corresponding weapons systems.63 Due to financial constraints, the upgrading of the naval armaments programmes was mainly to right past wrongs, and they indicated a confirmation of changes from land-based coastal defence (jin’an fangyu) to a green water offshore defence (jinhai fangyu).64 During the Maoist period, in line with the People’s War doctrine and reflecting the influence of Soviet naval strategy, coastal defence had to exhibit a strong continental outlook and clear guerrilla characteristics – dependence on cumulative effects of small victories, targeting isolated forces, emphasis on surprise assaults and camouflage, and short-duration combat. The idea was to turn islands and the coast into command, observation, berth and logistical posts for a small naval force.65 Marine militias and fishermen occupied an important position within the force structure to implement this doctrine. Regular naval forces, moreover, were to rely upon a naval air arm to provide cover, submarines for assault and small torpedo boats in groups to fight (the so-called ‘trio’ of kong-qian-kuai).66 This doctrine of ‘maritime assault guerrilla warfare’ (haishang poxi youji zhan) was confirmed and refined in 1957 by Xiao Jingguang, then commander of the PLA navy, who himself was Soviet-trained.67 The position of the above-mentioned ‘force trio’ became further consolidated when it was deemed suitable for various mission requirements related to achieving mobility, stealth and surprise.68 As national development strategy and threat perceptions evolved in the
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late 1970s, the guerrilla coastal defence doctrine began to give way to offshore defence. This may be attributed to the direction of Deng Xiaoping and the PLAN’s then commander, Liu Huaqing. Subordinated to the active defence strategy, naval forces were now to launch operational and tactical offensives – despite being on the defensive strategically. The objective was to attack the depth of intruding enemies by organising operations in the outer waters.69 Not surprisingly, the focus of hardware was gradually shifted from small patrol craft to medium and large ships. In 1976, the first destroyer zhidui (a division-level formation) equipped with domesticmade guided missiles was formed.70 Operational readiness The doctrine of ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’ not only deals with the problem of operational mass but also with combat timing. China’s armed forces are required to execute combat orders proficiently and rapidly to accomplish their missions. Two factors are critical: training, and command and control. The focus on sudden attacks and the requirement to ‘stand up to the enemy’ in the initial phase of war demanded high operational readiness of the army. For PLA soldiers, this meant proficiency through training. The function of doctrine was to guide the direction of training – a factor long emphasised by the PLA.71 With his return to power in 1977, Deng Xiaoping emphasised the ‘strategic importance’ of military education and training.72 The first effect of this translated into a CMC decree that, starting from 1978, two-thirds of army divisions plus all combat-ready troops, artillery, tank, air force, navy and Second Artillery units would be fully trained every year.73 Although the GSD handed down a new military training programme in February 1981, the years between 1980 and 1983 were barely more than a period for ‘putting things back to order’. Anti-tank, anti-air and anti-airdrop operations and combined arms training continued to be the focus of combat. The threat of sudden Soviet attacks and in-depth strikes with armour and airborne forces remained uppermost in the minds of the Chinese leaders at the time. The ‘five war-fighting capabilities’ (wuzhong zuozhan nengli) in joint services and combined arms combat, rapid response, electronic warfare, logistical support and field survivability therefore remained at the top of the agenda.74 The North China confrontational war-game held in August to September 1981 proved to be a ‘showcase’ of doctrine-driven training reform.75 With over 1,300 tanks and armoured vehicles, some 1,500 artillery pieces and almost 300 aircraft, about 110,000 personnel from the army and air force as well as combat services support units participated. The event was unprecedented both in terms of the scale and number of service arms involved. While the ‘blue forces’ simulated mass tank breakthroughs and
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airdrop assaults, the ‘red forces’ implemented anti-airdrop combat and their infantry divisions waged a staunch positional defence. The red forces’ strategic reserves, in coordination with the air force and militia, ‘destroyed’ blue forces inserted into the defence perimeter.76 In sum, the main objectives of this front army-level defensive campaign were: • • • • • • •
defend against enemy sudden attack; conduct operations in campaign covered areas; defend against attacks of enemy tank formations and prevent breakthroughs; defend against enemy assaults; defend against envelopment; defend against airborne operations; conduct mobile warfare under favourable conditions.77
This exercise represented a demonstration of a new Chinese blueprint for its military operational readiness. At a troop inspection following the war-game, Deng Xiaoping summarised the general objective of this army building: to succinctly build a ‘modernised and regularised revolutionary army’ (xiandaihua zhengguihua de geming jundui).78 This dictum captured the main features of ensuing Chinese defence policy that eventually made a huge impact on PLA readiness. The meaning of ‘revolutionisation’ (geminhua) is self-evident and its mandate is clearly applicable to the PLA, a communist army. The concept of ‘modernisation’ (xiandaihua) was implemented with equipment and weapons primarily in mind, which was dealt with earlier in this chapter under force structure. It is ‘regularisation’ (zhengguihua), however, that may have had the most widespread effect on PLA readiness. This postulates that standardisation of operational procedures and training as well as re-establishment of institutions and rules are paramount.79 For China in the early 1980s, this meant standardising training according to evolving doctrinal documents and regulations as well as reinstatement of the officer corps. Continuities in PLA training were sustained but, increasingly, reforms and changes became prevalent. Innovations were effected in the method, form, content and target of training. They were stipulated in various documents but were especially apparent in the new 1981 training programme. This trend towards regularisation was confirmed after a conference on training reform in 1983.80 Perhaps the most notable development in the method of training was an increased use of simulation. In Chinese terminology, there are basically two types of simulation: tactical and technical. Given its late start in applying simulation, the PLA’s training in this technique was very primitive and was hardly popular in the 1980s; it could only move slowly from technical to tactical level. Shooting simulation facilities were constructed only in the
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early years of that decade; the first simulated confrontational forces and atomic bomb explosion simulation devices were in training fields only after the mid-1980s. As of 1985, the navy and air force had released projectors only to division-level units; it was common for PLA troops to raise funds themselves to procure simulation facilities. Despite these constraints, it was obvious that simulation training was promoted increasingly on an army-wide basis, from armour to engineers. The equipment produced was mainly laser and electronic simulation systems for confrontational exercises in the field and command headquarters operations. In 1984, hardware procurement was facilitated when the CMC set aside 650 million yuan (about US$ 78.5 million) to sanction its five-year plan for simulation facilities.81 The design of simulation equipment showed that military training had moved from staged war-games to confrontational exercises. One of the most important milestones was the creation of China’s first specialised simulated foreign army unit in Nanjing military region. Other troops also began to operate their own simulated detachments for confrontational exercises. But the most important development was the rejection of staged exercises, in which a ‘red force’ was only to execute pre-set procedures to defeat its ‘blue’ opponents. Instead, the two opposing forces would no longer exchange their plans prior to the exercises in order to impart more ‘realism’. In the PLAAF since 1982, the military region air force had distributed equipment to its ‘blue forces’ which was close in quality to that used by simulated ‘red’ (i.e. Chinese) forces.82 With regard to the content of training reforms, emphases were shifted from techniques to tactics, single service arms to combined arms, from mobile warfare to positional warfare. The PLA’s high command decided that, following the Nanjing military region experiment, each operational area (zhanqu) should have its own combined arms tactical training field.83 Combined arms tactical training coordination zones were set up where troops of different arms were deployed.84 The Second Artillery also moved to revise its programme and began to focus on the ‘operationalisation’ of strategic weapons. In August 1983, under the guidance of a doctrine of ‘limited nuclear retaliation’, it conducted an operational-level exercise in northwest China with over 2,600 troops. This involved the commanders of arms branches, bases and zhidui and culminated in the successful launching of four IRBMs. One year later, launching battalions became the core unit in combined arms training and received priority in hardware procurement.85 There were also increasing studies in the PLAN on coordinating its surface fleet and its aviation arm. Between 1979 and 1984, the navy had organised combined arms exercises (some with real troops) in striking enemy surface warship formations, blockade, air defence, bombing and counter-bombing, reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance. Soviet capabilities and combat methods were simulated. For example, in air
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defence training, Chinese sailors were to practise manoeuvres, and the tracking and shooting of low-flying enemy aircraft both by radar and the naked eye. At the joint level, war-games were also conducted with other service arms in affiliated military regions. Another major development in naval training was traversing distant sea lanes. In 1976, submarine 252 was the first to cross the first island chain.86 Later, another submarine, 256, crossed the second island chain.87 Surface fleets soon followed suit. Chinese attempts to extend their reach at sea were amply demonstrated by the naval air force’s first air patrol over the Spratlys in 1979 and a voyage of two ships to the southern tip of the same island group four years later.88 Following the example of the Nanjing and Beijing military regions in 1985, air force units in other regions formed their own ‘tactical coordination zones’. Service arms under different chains of command in an area were brought together for combined arms confrontational training.89 The officer corps had long been identified by Deng and his CMC colleagues as a main target for improvement in command and control and training reform. This was nothing new but, again, a continuation of the 1950s experience when officers were, in the Soviet tradition, the main targets of training. In the post-Mao years, however, there were additional reasons for emphasising it. The officers were deemed to be unfit to command in modern warfare, especially combined arms and joint operations.90 In 1981 alone, the PLA’s ground forces participated in over 1,000 combined arms command post exercises, and exercises with real troops involving officers of regiment level and above. The navy also organised campaign training for its corps-level cadres. New doctrine, foreign military experiences and operational art were all reviewed.91 However, such training would not automatically make the officers more ready for operating in modern warfare unless the institution of officer corps itself was rebuilt for the execution of combat orders. The above sections have intimated how a poor officer corps could cost military operational performance. The ranking system, which is a matter of honour and command relationship to all militaries, was abolished in 1965 in the PLA as a sacrifice to comradeship, a component of Maoist People’s War. By 1981, however, Yang Dezhi acknowledged that China was considering restoring the military ranking system. The system was finally restored in 1988 through legislation. As a result, the professionalism of PLA officers was enhanced by recognition of individual competence and the chain of command became more efficient.92 Interdependence of operational and structural readiness Operational and structural readiness are two distinct analytical concepts but not completely separate. They are interdependent in regard to their effect on military readiness. In line with the CMC’s decision in 1977 to
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prioritise the automation of C3I systems, territorial air defence radar systems, field command systems and military computers were among the key aspects of PLA’s force structure development during the first half of the 1980s. By the middle of that decade, automated systems to process radar intelligence and to direct aviation corps were deployed in Hebei and Guangxi.93 This was a clear example of how hardware can contribute to operational efficiency. Yet hardware alone was proved to be not enough to achieve operational proficiency. Combined arms training and unit reorganisation were also vital components in the overall modernisation process. Like the process of doctrinal revision and force structure adjustments, its C2 chain and training in modern warfare were far from complete by the mid-1980s. The PLA spent the post-Mao years initially eliminating traces of guerrilla war doctrine and, later, searching for a successor that could facilitate army building. But political resistance and logistical obstacles remained substantial. Deng Xiaoping and his contemporaries were proven correct to target the cadres in the lists of reforms. They systematically pushed for a ‘revolutionary (geminghua), rejuvenated (nianqinghua), intellectual (zhishihua) and professional (zhuanyehua)’ officer corps.94 Many units, however, remained tied to the old ways. The army was criticised for ‘three too much, three too little’ (sanduo, sanshao) – too much training on exterior line offensives for quick and decisive battle but too little on defensives to ‘stand up’ to enemy attacks; too much on mobile warfare with advances and fall-backs in big strides, too little on a combination of positional defence, mobile and guerrilla warfare; too much on single service arms training, too little on joint services and combined arms training.95 No wonder an all-army training conference in November 1983 still called for a ‘deepening’ of training reform, even though the new programme had been promulgated two years before.96 A thorough reform to eradicate the Maoist ways would certainly involve the weeding out of the Cultural Revolution’s influence through the sacking of some officers promoted under its guidelines and the promotion of other more deserving cadres. Inevitably, these measures met resistance in the PLA.97 The intensification of political indoctrination to correct the influence of the Gang of Four in the PLA was a convenient diversion of attention and resources from genuine military reform. Such campaigns did not end until the Twelfth CCP Congress in 1982.98 But even more destabilising and disturbing were the consequent purges. When coupled with a series of downsizing measures, ‘job security’ was definitely a concern among PLA cadres. In 1979 and 1980 alone, almost 400,000 cadres left the PLA.99 However, the officer corps was not to take the blame alone. The high command itself did not have a clear vision in responding to modern warfare. The strategists were keen to pick up and learn from foreign military experiences but were unable to formulate a new doctrine for their
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own army based on those experiences. ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’, as argued earlier, was at best a signal of a departure from the Maoist legacy and a return to something resembling PLA orientations in the 1950s. There were indeed signs of interest and research in local war – and an obvious break from the guerrilla warfare model. However, it was not until 1985 when the CMC announced a complete reassessment of the security environment that the studies of this military-technical component of military doctrine fully intensified.100 Speaking at an all-army working conference on training in late 1984, Han Huaizhi, then assistant to the Chief of General Staff, demarcated several key problems: (1) a narrow knowledge base; (2) training which still fell short of the requirements of combined arms and joint operations; and (3) modern operational art and tactics not practised actually in training.101 Learning was a critical problem which could not be solved by simple streamlining and personnel changes. PLA officers, after years of neglecting professional military education and research, were, not surprisingly, out of step with the development of modern warfare and combined arms operations. Even though they were keen to carry out training according to the book, their limited knowledge prevented them from doing a proper job. For example, the navy adopted an offshore doctrine in place of coastal defence to reflect a different view and interest in ‘maritime security’. The term was used but may not have been understood, even among China’s rank-and-file strategists.102 Reforms driven by ideational factors can be successfully implemented only when an idea is grasped and digested before being translated into actions and policies.
Conclusion Because of Mao’s tendencies to aggrandise ‘guerrillaism’, human factors were placed above hardware, masses above regular forces, comradeship above formal command and control, mobile warfare above positional defence, protracted war above quick, decisive battles, strategic interior line operations above interior line, and in-depth defence above offensive. The ideational factor had marred the PLA’s readiness for tasks other than fighting a total war. Despite China’s breakthroughs in strategic weapons development, military hardware was relegated to a secondary position. ‘Deterrence’ was a vague concept, leaving military outcomes to a protracted defensive war of numbers, but this model soon became outdated as modern warfare evolved. Deng Xiaoping’s generation of leaders was keen to consolidate and boost China’s position as a major power in the international security system.103 ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’ was given substance by China’s adoption of an active defence strategy which comprised the military-technical component of that doctrine. This set the terms for which
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the PLA was to make ready. Structurally, the army had to change not only its hardware but also its mix of forces. Operationally, it had to upgrade and emphasise training while streamlining its chain of command. But an incomplete doctrine led to incomplete reform. By the mid1980s the Chinese leadership was still preoccupied with fighting a total war. Campaigning was addressed but never conceived of as a separate issue; it was always viewed as part of an all-out war. Operational offensive and force projection capabilities were still compromised by emphasis on strategic defence. Although the theory of an initial phase of war addressed the time dimension of warfare, the Chinese focus on positional defence and protracted war inevitably gave structural readiness preference over operational readiness. Only when the CMC bestowed upon the local war doctrine its official blessing in 1985 did the PLA become more flexible and versatile in the preparation for fighting modern wars which are characterised by spatial and temporal uncertainty, and by the quest for quick and decisive victories.
5
The advent of local war
If the doctrine in the first decade after Mao resembled that put into effect during the early 1950s, this proved not to be true after 1985. Instead of sustaining the Maoist People’s War, Chinese military thinking evolved into generating a new doctrine of local war. The People’s War reflected thinking about war and security as a matter of survival; local war was a matter of power. This is not to say that the communist regime in mainland China after 1985 regards the problem of national survival as solved, but that it no longer views an external security threat to China as ‘imminent’. At an enlarged Central Military Commission (CMC) meeting in 1985, the PLA’s high command announced a force reduction of one million servicemen and other streamlining measures. Thereafter, China entered a stage of ‘army building in peacetime’, anticipating that any conflict would not be general invasion by an external adversary but localised clashes over contending national interest. While this change in threat perception was, beyond doubt, significant enough to precipitate doctrinal change, the most important reason was the post-Mao leadership’s – and especially Deng Xiaoping’s – new approach to improving China’s military power. In Deng’s own words, ‘even though the international situation deteriorates, this force reduction would remain necessary and more necessary’, because it was a way to enhance military capability.1 According to state-centric realism, this decision to improve self-help capability is simply logical in an anarchic international system. This change has proven to be critical. The PLA shifted its objective and mission from an initial defensive-building posture designed to fight a total war of survival to one more offensive in nature in order to enhance power and assert national interests. During its early years, China could only resort to a strategy of the weak – protracted war. Mass was important to overcome initial damage as well as to eventually overwhelm the enemy. Local war, by contrast, emphasises time and efficiency. It calls for a quick response to seize or regain the initiative because conflicts could erupt at short notice and last for only a short time. With this doctrine, operational readiness tops the priority list. However, it should be noted that the 1985 doctrinal change signified
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only the first phase of a longer doctrinal evolution. It was a clear departure from the Maoist way of warfare but it did not yet offer a crystallised vision: the intensity, duration and form of localised wars. The Gulf War served to confirm to the Chinese that technology had reshaped the battlefield. Not surprisingly, when debates on military technology and Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) were revived in the West in the 1990s, they captured the attention of the PLA. But these debates also shocked PLA commanders into the realisation that they had not yet applied RMA to the Chinese situation in a systematic way. This chapter will examine PLA structural and operational readiness as a result of doctrinal changes after the mid-1980s. It will assess how the PLA has adapted its force mix and size as well as training and command and control (C2) to execute such changes. It will examine the actual operationalisation of this new doctrine, particularly at the operational and tactical level. Ambition, of course, should not be confused with capability. This is precisely where doctrine relates to the question of what constitutes military power. The Chinese military has tried very hard to close the gap between potential and actual military capability as envisioned by the local war doctrine. However, the limitation of the doctrine itself in dealing with a spectrum of conflicts and escalation scenarios has restricted Chinese military readiness to a range of contingencies.
The local war doctrine As discussed in the previous chapter, the 1979 conflict with Vietnam shocked the Chinese military as to how deficient PLA capabilities were in relation to modern warfare. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the Falkland/Malvinas War in 1982 further demonstrated how future wars would be fought by modern armies more prepared than the PLA to embrace these complexities. These episodes of local war aroused keen interest among PLA strategists. In fact, the PRC never lacked experience in fighting local wars. According to a list compiled by a Chinese researcher, the PLA fought thirteen local wars between 1945 and 1985, including the civil wars against the Nationalists and counter-insurgency operations in Tibet.2 Beyond that period, the most significant incident is probably the Chinese naval clash with Vietnam in 1988 over the Spratlys. A cursory review would show that Chinese local wars had varied substantially in their intensity. The civil wars of 1946 to 1949 and the Korean War of 1950 to 1953 were at the high-intensity end of the spectrum. Low-intensity conflicts included skirmishes with the Soviets in the 1960s. Although the forces employed by the PLA have been predominantly infantry, recent experience reveals a trend moving away from land skirmishes to maritime clashes and from the north to the east and south. This tendency is manifested in the evolution of China’s concept of the local war.
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The return to the operational level of war One recent and important study by Chinese military analysts argues that the root of the local war concept may be found in the thinking of such early leaders as Mao Zedong and Ye Jianying. Local wars were products of bipolarity and mutual assured destruction.3 However, while these leaders had some ‘understanding’ of local wars, it was far from precise and substantial. Their contributions were limited in general terms and there was nothing operational in their military thinking. Serious and systematic studies on local wars came only in the 1980s.4 The 1980 edition of the PLA Military Glossary (junyu) defined local wars as ‘wars limited to a certain area’.5 The inadequacies of this definition are evident because it deals with only a geographical dimension. However, fighting at a level short of a total war was already capturing the attention of the PLA’s high command. War planning was no longer locked in at only the strategic level. In the last chapter, the implications of ‘People’s War under Modern Conditions’ and the theory of the ‘initial phase of war’ were assessed. Despite China’s ultimate concern that it may be subject to a general invasion, the PLA concentrated upon establishing and sustaining positional defence against surprise attacks in order to allow time for national mobilisation. Combat units were expected to fight independently and the organisation of war-fighting would be at the operational level.6 The return to the operational level of war was clearly demonstrated in the renaissance of campaigning studies and eventual Chinese adoption of a comprehensive local war doctrine. ‘Campaign’ is defined in the 1980s by China’s Encyclopaedia of Military Affairs as: ‘a sum of a series of combats conducted by the army in a particular zone or direction in war and in particular time, as defined in an overall war plan, to achieve part of the war objectives or the general objectives in accordance with the tasks entrusted under strategic considerations’.7 Other Chinese publications broaden this notion by citing additional dimensions. Some specifically mention the conduct of campaigns with the group army as a basic combat unit; some emphasise an intermediate level of fighting between war and combat (zhandou); some underscore the importance of manoeuvre alongside combat.8 While the concept of campaigning is expanding, the study of it is becoming more sophisticated. Because campaigning is a central component of local war, early Chinese treatises on this subject written in the 1950s have recently been dusted off. As early as 1952, the Military Academy under Marshal Liu Bocheng offered China’s first course on campaigning. When the Academy of Military Science was founded in 1957, campaigning was one of its four research departments, alongside those dealing with war history, the theory of war and tactics. The Academy introduced the science of campaigning (zhanyixue) as a component in Chinese military studies (junshi xueshu) and
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revised ten campaigning principles into twelve new ones, which were still regarded as valid in the late 1980s.9 The specific twelve principles are: • • • • • • • • • • • •
Know yourself and your enemy, match subjective guidance with objective reality. Annihilate the enemy, protect yourself. Decide your operational method on the basis of objective assessment. Be agile and flexible, and seize and preserve campaign initiatives. Make war planning and campaigning preparation careful and efficient. Camouflage concentrated forces on a timely basis, and strive for advantageous campaigning deployment. Achieve precise and uninterrupted campaigning coordination. Ensure surprise, and pay special attention to close combat and night combat. Strive for centralised, uninterrupted and efficient campaigning command. Strengthen political work and amplify good combat style. Make efficient use of manpower and materiel in the rear. Grasp every opportunity to rest and replenish the army.10
While these principles may be somewhat abstract, the PLA nevertheless applied them to produce a set reference for conducting campaigns – a text prepared by the Advanced Military Academy, Operational Art (zhanyifa). On the basis of the first 1960 edition, the Academy published a second edition three years later. The latter, instead of focusing on general principles, was obviously more sophisticated in discussing operations in various types of campaigns. The content of the two editions is listed in Table 5.1. Although we cannot review the texts themselves, this table of respective works at least indicates the interests and concerns of the authors. The 1963 edition moved beyond the previous edition which focused more on typologies, principles and other basic concepts in campaigning. Instead, it offered separate chapters on methods of executing campaigns. It was interested in the operational level of war. Another major work produced by the PLA in the 1960s was a draft of The Science of Campaigning (zhanyixue). This draft was never published in final form. Its production was abruptly halted as a result of the Cultural Revolution. Only in 1981 was a revised edition completed. In the mid1980s, yet a third version was prepared for CMC approval. The content includes: • •
Overview: Concepts, characteristics, categorisation and brief history of campaigning Fundamental principles of campaigning
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Table 5.1 A comparison of two editions of Operational Art 1960 Edition
1963 Edition
Chapter 1 Major characteristics and fundamental principles of future national defence wars (weiguo zhanzheng)
Chapter 1 General principles: Major characteristics of campaigns in future national defence wars Fundamentals of campaigning Command in campaigning
Chapter 2 Categorisation of campaigns
Chapter 2 Political work in campaigning
Chapter 3 Roles and tasks of operational army groups
Chapter 3 Offensive campaigning: Mobile campaigns Offensives against enemies in positional defence
Chapter 4 Functions and employment principles of atomic missile weapons in campaigns
Chapter 4 Defensive campaigning: Positional defence Mobile defence Anti-landing
Chapter 5 Command in campaigning Chapter 6 Fundamental issues in political work in campaigning Chapter 7 Comprehensive campaigning support
– –
–
Source: Sun 1990, pp. 191–2.
• • • • • • • •
Operational army group actions in sudden counter-attacks Defensive campaigns Offensive campaigns Campaigning in special terrain and climate Marching and transportation Campaign support Campaign rear works Structure and system of campaign political work.11
Despite their significance in Chinese doctrinal development, these writings were marred by a major drawback: they dealt almost exclusively with campaigning on land and ground forces operations. The air force, navy and Second Artillery are left to develop their own campaigning theories.12 The PLAN development of campaigning theories was not exempt from such disruptions. Given the still strong Russian influence on Chinese naval thinking, the process was stymied by the Anti-Dogmatism movement in
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1958 and was stopped in 1964. However, by and large, ‘coastal defence’ (jin’an fangyu) remained to dominate Chinese naval planning. In the postMao era, the PLAN was able to resume conducting doctrinal studies only under the guidance of a new concept, ‘offshore defence’ (jinhai fangyu). During the early 1980s, the PLAN command, with the apparent blessing of its commander, Liu Huaqing, began to investigate the operational level of naval warfare and linked it to campaigning. A Campaign Theory Research Team was established in the Third Research Office at the Naval Academy Research Department. Publications on campaigning theory by this group and other research institutes also flourished. These included Naval Campaigning Principles (haijun zhanyi gaize), the Science of Naval Campaigning (haijun zhanyixue) and Course Text on Naval Campaigning (haijun zhanyixue jiaocheng).13 As discussed in the previous chapter, the PLAAF doctrinal research had been conducted at a slow pace due to its traditional emphasis on territorial air defence and the entrenched dominance of ground forces within the Chinese military. In its draft on combat operations (zhandou tiaoling) in 1962, for example, the PLAAF was instructed to ‘take the victory of the ground and naval forces as its victory and take these forces as the dominant consideration for coordination’. This posture of apparent PLAAF inferiority was rectified only in the document entitled Air Campaigning (kongjun zhanyixue), produced in 1988. It envisioned the PLAAF as serving ‘general objectives’ (daju) in joint operations and defined its quest for military victory in terms of the achievement of those objectives.14 Little is known about campaigning and doctrinal development in the Second Artillery. Before the researchers in that service arm could produce anything official, their efforts were terminated. Doctrinal research was not resumed until the late 1970s with the establishment of a military art research department. Several documents were published in ensuing years, including the Second Artillery Combat Principles (dier paobing zuozhan gaizhe). Continuous research soon culminated in the publication of Combat Regulations (zuozhan tiaoling) and a work on campaigning in 1984 and 1985 respectively.15 Here, obviously, the course of Chinese doctrinal development in relation to campaigning theory can only be charted in general terms. This brief historical survey has been offered to demonstrate how China has returned (rather than moved forward) from a strategic level of war planning to an operational level. Smaller scale military operations began to receive attention in the immediate post-Mao years despite the crudeness and rudimentary framework of such discussions. No more imminent world wars The studies on campaigning have bridged the conceptual gap, as it previously existed in China, between the conduct of a total war and local war.
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Although the Chinese had inherited an interest in the operational level of war from the Russians, Maoist People’s War doctrine overshadowed it. Wars were regarded by the Chairman and his cohorts as life-and-death struggles. However, the resurrection of campaigning helped Chinese military leaders to use the PLA in dealing with threats not necessarily involving state survival but conflicts over national interest which required more assertive military action. Campaigning, however, provides only operational-level doctrinal guidance and lacks the overall directional status. It also drives home a concern for the deficiency of the stop-gap doctrine of the ‘initial phase of war’ which still embraced total war as its focus. The emergence of the ‘national interest’ in Chinese grand strategy and the return of campaigning doctrine, with its emphasis on the operational level, rendered the ‘initial phase of war’ too defensive and its emphasis on resolute positional defence impractical.16 With accelerated national economic development and intensified threat reassessment, the outlook of total war inevitably became obsolete and was gradually replaced by one emphasising local wars. Before local wars were treated as a separate conceptual entity, they were labelled ‘small wars’ or ‘sudden incidents’. Open reference to these types of conflict had been rare prior to 1985. An oft-quoted example was Deng Xiaoping’s speech at a CMC meeting in December 1977 when he was justifying his proposed military reforms: ‘All-out wars could of course be postponed but certain sudden and localised incidents could hardly be predicted’.17 Another occasion was General Yang Dezhi’s explanatory note to the revised draft of the 1984 Military Service Law: ‘The superpowers, in their struggles for world hegemony, have been expanding and committing aggression everywhere. In general, after the World War II, small wars have never stopped’.18 But such statements retained China’s ultimate concern about total wars and failed to make a clear break from Mao’s old concepts – Deng argued that China should prepare for ‘imminent and all-out strikes by the enemy’, and Yang cautioned that the future anti-aggression war would be in the form of large-scale modern warfare.19 The formal doctrinal transition was made at an enlarged CMC meeting in May/June 1985.20 The high command in effect communicated to the world that China had renounced the Maoist doctrine of People’s War and no longer regarded a full-blown world war as an imminent danger. Encoded also in this message was that different military planning and doctrinal formulation would be employed to build up military power. However, the leaders refused to openly acknowledge what the ‘replacements’ would be. It should be noted that Deng and his marshals and generals had referred to ‘large-scale world war’ (daguimo de shijie zhanzheng). This use of terminology, as will be discussed below, hinted at the infancy of the Chinese concept of local war and its differences from Western theories about limited war.
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Local wars? Limited wars? Immediately following the 1985 CMC meeting, lively discussions ensued over local wars in both Chinese open and internal sources. The first booklength publication in the debate was on limited wars by An Tian, an army researcher in the Chengdu military region. The author ascertained differences between local wars (jubu zhanzheng) and limited wars (youxian zhanzheng). But he argued that viewing a ‘local war’ as conflict short of a world war was too loose and vague conceptually, and that the existing Chinese definition of a local war as one ‘limited in a given geographical region’ was insufficient. He treated local war as a category of limited war and devoted most of his study to the ‘limitations’ in war.21 An Tian’s study was heavily influenced by American theories of limited war. His characterisation thus reflected the late development and primitive conceptualisation of the local war in China. Surprisingly, the AMS, in its 1987 internal edition of Encyclopaedia Sinica military affairs volume, implied that there was an equivalent between local war and limited war.22 This definition was not accepted readily by other PLA analysts who preferred to regard it as a separate concept, but there was a common frame of reference – a departure from a world war focus. This is crucial because the spectrum of war is exactly where the concepts of limited war and local war part company. While US strategists prefer one type of two-tier model, namely limited war–total/world war, the Chinese adopt a different two-tier concept: local war–world war.23 First, for the PLA, ‘local total war’ (jubu quanmian zhanzheng) is a legitimate concept but a ‘limited total war’ would be contradictory in the American version of limited war. The logic is that the USA looks from the perspective of its war effort, and any war that requires mobilisation of US total resources would be on a global scale. By contrast, China is more concerned about power asymmetry in war – a limited war for a great power or superpower can be