Islam and the Securitisation of Population Policies

Islam and the Securitisation of Population Policies

There are many people who have made the completion of this book possible. Adrian, Madeleine and Phoebe Taber: my wonderful (sustainable) family. This book is for you. Associate Professor Samina Yasmeen, supervisor, mentor, teacher, friend. It is an honour and pleasure working with you. From one of your many ‘children,’ thank you. My parents, Patricia and Stephen Riddell. My sister Aimee, brother-in-law David and nephew, Emlyn. Thank you for all for your love and support. Dr Safieh Shariari and Ms Zara Azizzi (Iran), and Mr Malik and the late begum Safraz Iqbal (Pakistan), thank you for making me your family when I was so far from home. There were so many people who helped in ways both large and small, in Perth, Tehran and Islamabad. I can’t thank you all individually. Please know that I am extremely grateful to you for your time and assistance. To everyone, this book is as much your work as it is mine.

Islam and the Securitisation of Population Policies Muslim States and Sustainability

Katrina Riddell Centre for Muslim States and Societies, University of Western Australia, Australia

© Katrina Riddell 2009 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Katrina Riddell has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the author of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Ashgate Publishing Company Wey Court East Suite 420 Union Road 101 Cherry Street Farnham Burlington Surrey, GU9 7PT VT 05401-4405 England USA www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Riddell, Katrina. Islam and the securitisation of population policies : Muslim states and sustainability. 1. Population policy. 2. Population policy--History. 3. Population policy--Religious aspects--Islam. 4. Pakistan--Population policy. 5. Iran--Population policy. I. Title 363.9'091767-dc22 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Riddell, Katrina. Islam and the securitisation of population policies : Muslim states and sustainability / by Katrina Riddell. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7546-7571-6 (hardback) -- ISBN 978-0-7546-9688-9 (ebook) 1. Islamic countries--Population policy. 2. Islamic countries--Population. 3. Population policy--Religious aspects--Islam. I. Title. HB3660.5.A3R53 2009 363.90917'67--dc22 ISBN 978 0 7546 7571 6 (hbk) ISBN 978 0 7546 9688 9 (ebk.V)



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Contents List of Figures and Tables Preface and Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations

vii ix xi

Introduction

1

1

Population: From Low to High Politics in the Twentieth Century

9

2

Population and Family Planning in Islamic Jurisprudence

55

3

Islam and Fertility: Twentieth Century Myths and Realities

75

4

Islam, Politics and Population: The Iranian Debate from 1953–1989

97

5

Islam, Population, Sustainability and Security: The Iranian Debate from 1989–2006

119

6

Islam, Politics and Population: Debate in Pakistan 1947–1988

153

7

Islam, Population, Sustainability and Security: The Pakistan Debate 1988–2006

177

Conclusion

213

Bibliography Index

217 249

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List of Figures and Tables Figures 4.1 Basic organogram of the Islamic Republic of Iran government 6.4 Pakistan population, total, rural, urban (in millions) Tables 1.1 Major international population conferences 5.1 Percentage increase in family planning spending per year 5.2 Percentage of government budget allocation, by spending type, according to year, Iran  5.3 Population growth rate and total fertility rate for Iran by year 5.4 Unemployment rate of 15–24 year olds (%) 5.5 Unemployment rate as percentage of productive population 5.6 Predicted and actual PGR and TFR for Iran by year 6.1 Total population, PGR, and TFR Pakistan 1950–2006 6.2 Contraceptive prevalence rate, current and ever use, % 15–49 years women, for Pakistan, by year 6.3 Unemployment figures: total, rural, urban in millions 7.1 PGR and TFR regional and most populous countries 7.2 Unmet need for family planning Pakistan 1990–1991, % age group 7.3 National spending on population welfare, by FYPD, million rupees 

108 175

10 125 125 131 136 144 148 158 168 174 178 182 182

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Preface and Acknowledgements Iran and Pakistan are places many Westerners think they know, but in reality they do not. What we know comes via the media and is coloured by the political agendas and relations of our respective governments. Too often we make the mistake of equating people with politics. For the most part, Iran and Pakistan are shrouded in myth: hostile, repressive, backward. My experience is that this is not the case. Rather, the people, the societies, are warm, hospitable, intelligent, and sophisticated. I have never been made to feel so welcome and wanted. So many people went to great lengths to assist me in my research and make my stay in Iran and Pakistan comfortable and enjoyable: From cups of tea in libraries and newspaper offices, to fully catered, personally accompanied field visits to villages and facilities away from Islamabad and Tehran. Most of all, it was the extension of friendship and the welcoming into lives and homes that will stay with me for life. Inshallah, I will have the chance to return to both places one day. The global imagination has been captured by the possibility of an impending civilisational conflict between the Western and Muslim worlds. Post 9/11, political, public, and even academic, discourses on both sides have become dominated by apocalyptic imaginings of the other. My hope is that this book will go some way toward deconstructing this myth by highlighting an area of global politics where there is a great deal of co-operation between the Western and Islamic worlds, where conflict is expressed discursively rather than militarily: global sustainability. Rather than looking at the relationship between Islam and the West through the dichotomising ‘with us or against us’ prism, this book demonstrates aspects of the relationship where we stand together. What I have found, and what I will demonstrate, is that Muslim states and societies can and do internalise contemporary population-sustainability-security norms, and in doing so stand as effective partners in global sustainability efforts. There are many people who have made the writing of the book possible. I would like to thank the Centre for Muslim States and Societies, School of Social and Cultural Studies, at the University of Western Australia, for providing me with a home and the facilities to finish my manuscript. The Iranian and Pakistani experts and individuals quoted in this book, and listed throughout, for granting me interviews and taking the time to share your knowledge. To staff at the Ministry of Health and Medical Education, Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Ministry of Population Welfare, Pakistan, for arranging access to people and facilities necessary to my research. The people I met in Iran and Pakistan who made my stays memorable.  Katrina Riddell

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List of Abbreviations AIWC All India Women’s Conference BPO Budget and Planning Office, Government Islamic Republic of Iran CFP Council of Family Planning CII Council of Islamic Ideology, Pakistan DPA Draft Plan of Action ECAFE Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East ECOSOC Economic and Social Commission, UN FAO Food and Agricultural Organisation FP Family Planning FPAIRI Family Planning Association, Islamic Republic of Iran FPAP Family Planning Association of Pakistan FYPD Five Year Plan of Development ICPD International Conference on Population and Development ILO International Labour Organisation IPPF International Planned Parenthood Federation IRC Islamic Research Council, Pakistan IRIB Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting IUSSP International Union for the Scientific Study in Population IWO Iranian Women’s Organisation JeI Jamaat-e-Islami MDGs Millennium Development Goals MoH Ministry of Health, Iran MoHME Ministry of Health and Medical Education, Islamic Republic of Iran MPO Management and Planning Office, Islamic Republic of Iran MPB Ministry for Planning and Budget, Islamic Republic of Iran NBFP National Board of Family Planning, Pakistan NIPS National Institute of Population Studies NGO Non-Government Organisation NPB National Planning Board PRB Population Reference Bureau PGR Population Growth Rate TFR Total Fertility Rate UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Program UNEP United Nations Environment Program UNESCAP United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific

xii

Islam and the Securitisation of Population Policies

UNESCO United Nations Economic and Social Commission UNFPA United Nations Fund for Population Activity USAID United States Agency for International Development WAT Women’s Aid Trust WCED World Commission on Environment and Development WHO World Health Organisation WPA World Plan of Action WPPA World Population Plan of Action

Introduction Over the course of the twentieth century population growth became an international political and then security concern. Prior to this, concern about population growth of an anti-natalist kind were largely absent from politics. Rather, most governments, if at all concerned about population issues, focused their attentions on the geostrategic advantages of a large population which would afford it an endless supply of manpower (read ‘cannon fodder’). Perhaps the only, and certainly most famous, anti-natalist dissenter was the nineteenth century essayist Thomas Malthus who, in On Population (1803), warned against unchecked population growth. NeoMalthusianism emerged in the early twentieth century, revived by a number of non-governmental agents, primarily demographers and the birth control leagues. It was through this and concurrent, sometimes overlapping, conceptual shifts in the field and practice of security, and through the discursive interactions of a milieu of interested actors and change agents that population growth has been elevated to a national and international security issues and produced a securitised global population discourse. In the twentieth century, the study and practice of security was largely dominated by the realist/neo-realist and idealist/neo-liberalist paradigms. These traditional paradigms approached security in a state-centric manner, focused on reconciling the security aims of states, primarily deterrence of or defence against external attack, with the concerns of the international community as a whole (Ayoob 1986: 261–62). A number of paradigmatic shifts in the late twentieth century – the Oil Shocks of the 1970s and the end of the Cold War – prompted a process of revisionism with regards to the study and practice of security, particularly of the utility and validity of state-centrism. The resultant re-conceptualisation of security from its traditional forms gave rise to broader understandings of threat – both source and object – and of what it means to be secure. Areas once considered the realm of low politics, were elevated to the high political status of security. This includes issues such as the environment, disease, economics and population. Security is understood more fundamentally: it is about survival. At the international level, population growth has been securitised. To securitise an issue is to present and elevate it, initially discursively, to security status; to place it above the simply political. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) in Security: A New Framework for Analysis, argued that “In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from non-politicised … through politicised … to securitised.” During this final stage political actors attempt to convince other change agents that population threatens the existence of a given object, and should therefore be securitised. This notion of and approach to security emerged



Islam and the Securitisation of Population Policies

out of debates within the field of security studies that critiqued the limitations of realism and widened the concept of security to include non-military and internal sources of threat, based on an understanding of security as being fundamentally about survival. This approach rests on a particular type of discursive interaction between actors (individuals with immense social capital), agents (experts who do not necessarily possess social capital), and audience (the public). Through this, a sense of threat is inter-subjectively constructed, meaning that enough of agents and audience members agree with the subjective threat assessment made by the actor to arrive at a consensus concerning the security situation. In looking at international and national discourses in this way, we can begin to understand how and why population has emerged as an international and national security concern. Out of those critical debates on the nature, study and practice of security, population growth emerged with other non-military issues, as a potential threat to security at all analytical levels. This threat is exacerbated by a number of factors, including age and gender composition, poor national socio-economic indicators, and environmental degradation. Regions, states and societies where these factors prevail are considered more vulnerable to population based threats than those where these factors are absent. These areas are predominantly in the developing world and include South Asia and the Middle East. In these areas high rates of population growth past and present, coupled with other exacerbating factors, could cause political and state instability, violence, and fundamentalism (Steinbruner 1997: 18, Hughes 1998, pp. 2–4; Demko 1994: 183; Sarkesian 1989: 558). Over time a milieu of interested change agents have engaged to produce a generally accepted set of population norms, concepts and conclusions that connect it to national and global sustainability, stability and security. The United Nations (UN), particularly the United Nations Fund for Population Activity (UNFPA), have provided the main global forum for this debate process. Global sustainability norms were first codified in the document Our Common Future, also known as the Brundtland Report, produced by the UN Commission on Environment and Development, in 1987. It decided sustainable development to be “development meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987). The report extended development beyond meeting basic-socioeconomic needs, and established a universal working paradigm that became foundational to all UN conferences, commissions and conventions pertaining to development and associated areas. Emerging from the UN’s last World Population Conference (WPC), the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) at Cairo in 1994 was a population-sustainability paradigm infused with norms, concepts and conclusions pertaining to global peace and security, reproductive rights, female empowerment and sustainable economic development, and a realisation that “... if we do not deal with rapid population growth, we will not reduce poverty – and development will not be sustainable” (Preston 1994). The global population-sustainability-securitydevelopment is this: “... we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development ...” (Annan 2005). The global population

Introduction



currently stands in excess of six billion people: its growth shows no sign of slowing or stabilising in the near future. Without population control, a sustainable global future cannot be secured. A number of temporal factors shape and shift opinion and thus debate on population: these include ideology, socio-economic status, gender, ethnicity, culture and religion. Religious agents and opinions have long influenced localised and domestic responses to population questions, often encouraging high fertility. Reverence of children as deified gifts and the encouragement of fertility as a matrimonial duty are common to many religions: Catholicism, Judaism, Hinduism and Islam. Religious influence has only recently manifested at the international level, largely in opposition to global population stabilisation objectives. Indeed, one commentator has asked whether religions, the traditional “nurturers of group life ... in praying for health and fecundity ... are now abetting rather than preventing ‘the population bomb’ or ‘population explosion’” (Trompff 1998: 206). At Cairo Muslim states and Islamic opinion emerged front and centre, having been absent or peripheral until this point, despite the resurgence of Islam in national and global politics some twenty years before. Muslim contributions demonstrated the diversity of Islamic population opinions ranging from the ultra-conservative and seemingly obstructionist, to moderate interpretations which accommodated yet critiqued Western liberal viewpoints. The moderate viewpoint preserved moral and religious sanctity in the pursuit of global objectives. The milieu of Islamic opinion demonstrates that religious agents can either enable or hinder national and global objectives. Partly because of this, the influence of Islam over national and international population debates has attracted academic and political attention. Patterns of fertility and population growth in many Muslim states, coupled with vocal objections to national and global agendas from within the Islamic world, have fostered myths equating Islam with population growth. Iran and Pakistan were chosen as case studies to assess the validity of the myths surrounding Islam and population, and to develop a nuanced understanding of Muslim states’ interaction with global debates and emergent norms. Iran and Pakistan are neighbouring Muslim states with Muslim majority societies. Islam is central to the identity and polity of each. Pakistan was created in the name of Islam. Iran’s revolution shifted it from monarchy to Islamic theocracy. Both have experienced high fertility and population growth rates. How did the governments of these states conceptualise high growth and control: problematic or beneficial? Did they engage with global population discourses and norms? Did they accept the securitised global population logic and, if yes, how? Did they engage the society in this process and what was the reaction? Has Islam played a role in this process? About this Book In writing this book, I consulted a wide body of primary and secondary sources of data and discourse: discourse is understood here as any written or verbal data



Islam and the Securitisation of Population Policies

comprising “speeches, reports, manifestos, historical events, interviews, policies, ideas” (Howarth, Norval and Stavrakakis 2000: 4). The body of academic literature analysed, by Muslim and non-Muslim authors, was multi-disciplinary, coming from the disciplines of international relations, security studies, strategic studies, political science including environmental and feminist politics, environmentalism, religion and theology, socio-economic development, economics, history, demography, reproductive health and linguistics. Primary sources included official demographic and fertility reports, and policy documents and papers pertaining to population, foreign affairs, economics, development and security, from national governments, global organisations and regimes, and non-governmental agencies and think tanks. This included for example the Ministries of Health and Population in Pakistan and Iran, the UN and UNFPA, Population Reference Bureau (PRB), the National Institute of Population Studies in Pakistan, and the Family Planning Association of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Additional, and issue specific primary sources included fatwas on population and family planning issued by Islamic clergy, media statements from Pakistani and Iranian officials concerning population growth, policy and family planning, and news articles – the public discourse – on population growth and control, family planning, international norms and objectives, and on interrelated factors such as the environment, youth, women, unemployment, urbanisation and security. The internet proved an invaluable source providing access to contemporary and historical documents, reports, statements, and academic and news articles relating to population, Islam and security. In addition, I visited Iran and Pakistan from June to August 2002, where I personally conducted interviews with a number of actors and change agents, individually identified at the end of the book, including government officials and ministers in the fields of health, population and family planning, academics in the disciplines of demography, political science, health, sociology and development economics, local ulema and Ayatollahs, and staff and clients at family planning and health clinics, non-government organisations and civil society groups, in Pakistan and Iran. In addition, I personally attended the World Population Day Conference in Tehran, 11 July 2002, jointly convened by the UNFPA Iran and the Ministry of Health and Medical Education (MoHME), and the launch of the National Population Policy of Pakistan, 2002, in Islamabad, organised by the Ministry of Population Welfare and attendee by government ministers, bureaucrats, academics and experts and the media, people who are securitising actors, such as government officials and office holders, and Islamic groups, and secular and liberal Islamic NGOs and special interest groups. This book comprises seven chapters. Chapter 1 examines the emergence of an international population-sustainability-security discourse, demonstrating how population has been conceptualised and re-conceptualised, by whom and with what result. It shows the emergence of a neo-Malthusian international population discourse perpetuated by European, North American and South Asian birth control leagues: persistent campaigning, even agitation, by these groups forced the transition of population from a non-political to political issue. By the late

Introduction



1940s, population had been inducted into the UN’s agenda, thus making it an international issue. It will demonstrate that the population-sustainability-security nexus has evolved over the course of the twentieth century through a number of global forums and the input of a milieu of change agents: the link between population and development, sustainable development and security is identified and explained. The League of Nations and UN are chosen as the focus of analysis because the population and associated debates that have taken place within them have served as microcosms of global political, academic, technical and religious developments. Through these forums the perspectives of agents representing different interest groups – state, sub-state and non-state – merged. Subsequent debate and negotiation produced global consensus on population and interrelated issues, evident in final conference documents. These documents embodied globally defined norms, objectives, concepts and conclusions. In this chapter, alternative academic and political perspectives to dominant global norms are acknowledged and discussed. With reference to the ICPD, it demonstrates the emergence of Islamic agents and perspectives as important to global debate. Chapters 2 and 3 examine Islamic discourses on population and related issues, looking at how Muslim states, societies and agents perceive issues of population growth and control. In doing so, these chapters demonstrate that Islam is not inherently hostile toward family planning and population control. Rather, that a variety of nuanced interpretations, ranging from orthodox to modernist, have manifested nationally and internationally with varied effect. Chapter 2 focuses primarily on the Islamic teachings and jurisprudence pertaining to population and family planning, recognising that these are foundational to Muslim responses to national concerns and international objectives. What arises is a mixed picture that is contrary to persistent political and academic assumptions of Islam as conservative and monolithic: Islam, it is shown, is diverse. Because of this, there is no singular Islamic opinion on, or experience regarding, population. This is a product of a milieu of factors of Islamic and non-Islamic origin, and is demonstrated with reference to historical debates within Islam, jurisprudential positioning, and the contemporary application of these arguments by Muslim states and societies, nationally and globally. Chapter 4 focuses on Iranian discourse from 1953–1988, looking at governmental responses to national population and development issues. The primary objective of the discussion is to demonstrate consistencies and inconsistencies between global and national population concepts, conclusions, norms and objectives, and to highlight the responses of change agents, particularly Islamic ones, and the public to government discourses. It finds that although Islam did not inform government responses prior to the Islamic revolution, it was a factor in agent and public responses. Moreover, Chapter 4 demonstrates, rather surprisingly, that although threats and security did not factor into the concerns of the monarchical regime, they came to feature prominently in the thinking of the Revolutionary government by the late 1980s: by this time the Iranian government spoke of population growth as a threat through a discourse wholly consistent with the emerging international



Islam and the Securitisation of Population Policies

securitised one. It examines the religio-political context in which population growth was debated in Iran, demonstrating that a century of political upheaval, caused by coups and revolution, fomented shifts in societal-religio-political relations that significantly shaped national conceptions of population. It will further demonstrate that population first emerged in the 1950s through a geostrategic pro-natalist discourse, which in the 1960s shifted to anti-natalist under the rubric of socio-economic development and the influence of external actors. International norms were inducted and internalised. Following a period of initial confusion immediately after the revolution, geo-strategic pro-natalism was revived in the context of war and international isolationism, joined with the discourse of Islamic identity and nationalism. International norms were ignored. 1986 stands as a critical juncture because the census of the year demonstrated that the growth of the population was such that the newly developed Five Year Plan of Development (FYPD) would not succeed. Bureaucrats engaged first the elite, then the public and ulema, in a debate as to the socio-economic merits of population control. Family planning was revived, pro-natalist and international norms were adopted, and a nascent population-security discourse emerged. Chapter 5 focuses on Iranian population discourse from 1989 until the present. In this period, post-Khomeini, the supreme leadership was resolved in favour of religious pragmatists who advanced political and economic reconstruction, international re-engagement and a more liberalised societal sphere. This produced an Iranian discourse wholly consistent with the global population-sustainable development-security paradigm. By this time, Iranian government had become fully cognisant of the threat population growth posed to nation, society and Islam, and that this threat would manifest through social unrest. What emerged in Iran was a high level of elite-public engagement through the communication channels of the media, experts, education facilities and the clergy that, after some initial hesitation, resulted in a national consensus on population, development and security. Moreover, Iranian discourse engaged Islam – its teachings, symbols and the identification of it as a security referent – to produce a discourse with wide reaching social appeal. In Iran Islam enabled the development of a discourse on population-sustainability-security that was, and remains, consistent with global norms and objectives. Chapter 6 examines governmental responses to population in Pakistan from 1947–1948, illustrating periods of consistency and inconsistency between global and national population concepts, conclusions, norms and objectives. It finds a mixed picture response from change agents, including Islamic ones, and the public to government discourses. From the 1970s, Islamic ideas become highly informative to government, agent and public responses to population, often resulting in overtures to conservatism which disguised actual commitment to population control. The religio-political environment in which Pakistan’s population debate has occurred was marred by pre-partition politics which left a legacy of confusion in which the rightful political place of Islam was debated and remained unresolved. Political division and upheaval led to pseudo and then actual

Introduction



Islamisation in Pakistan. Population control and family planning emerged in nongovernment circles at a time of political moderacy and international engagement. It was politically adopted under the rubric of economic development, consistent with international discourse. Initially Pakistan was actively engaged with and involved in international debate. Pakistan’s religio-political orthodoxy was particularly opposed to family planning and population control thus, as the power of this group grew the political profile of population declined. Pakistan eventually turned its back, if only rhetorically, on domestic and international population objectives. Chapter 7 examines Pakistani discourse from 1988 to the present, finding elite understandings to be consistent with the global population-sustainable development-security paradigm. Moreover, Pakistani governments came to conceptualise population growth as a threat to security, and this was particularly the case under President Musharraf. Although Pakistani elites attempted to engage the public on population, their strategy was lacklustre and excluded a number of influential agents and groups, in particular the clergy. The public were largely unresponsive to macro scale messages on population at odds with their reality, and some agents were resentful of being alienated. In addition to this, there are a number of experts in Pakistan who, whilst cognisant of international population-development-security discourses, reject them in favour of alternative socio-economic development perspectives. Only recently has Islam been joined to Pakistani discourse, with President Musharraf inviting scholars and ulema to participate as stakeholders in national debates and programs. Until this point, Islamic agents and symbolism were major obstacles to reconciling Pakistani discourses to international ones, but it must also be understood that these were not the only ones. From the late 1980s Pakistani governments have attempted to redress religio-political orthodoxy through moderate Islamic discourses and modernisation policies. Cognisant of the influence of Islamic opinions and agents, governments have countered orthodox objectionism with Islamic language and symbols. Population, revived as a national socio-economic concern in the late 1980s, has been prioritised and discursively elevated to security status since 2000. The government implemented a social mobilisation strategy aimed at elevating the societal profile of its securitised population conception, paying particular attention to Islamic opinion and agents, and engaging them in debate through a number of enabling initiatives. Twentieth century international population discourse – the product of debate and engagement between political, academic, technical, non-governmental and religious actors – demonstrates that population transitioned to political and security status. Through their involvement in this, Pakistani and Iranian actors have been exposed to global concepts, norms and conclusions on population, including those linking population to sustainability and security.

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Chapter 1

Population: From Low to High Politics in the Twentieth Century Precursors to Contemporary Debate In the twentieth century, population issues, particularly those pertaining to the growth of the global human population, were internationalised, politicised and securitised. It is from this that we have arrived at the twenty-first century understanding of population growth as being inextricably linked with global sustainability and security. The milieu of factors contributing to these shifts and the alternative concepts they have given rise to is the subject of this chapter. Over the course of the twentieth century population evolved from its long standing demographic conception, to a broader, holistic one that encompasses, amongst other things, development, environmental, human rights and security concerns. This is not to say that ‘population’ is an entirely modern concern: Contemporary population-security discourse originates from the discourses of ancient civilisations. Ancient Chinese, Middle Eastern and Greek discourses on optimal population size – such as Plato’s theory on overpopulation and war – are foundational to contemporary population conceptions (Mann 1993: 25; Wolfe 1929). The numbers and thinking may have changed, but the central themes endure: the question of numbers; the costs or benefits of large or small populations; the link to security; and the establishment of pro and anti-natalism as the overarching demographic paradigms. European scholars in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries revisited ancient arguments in response to national population concerns; the most famous was Thomas Malthus. Malthus revived and popularised anti-natalist thought with his pessimistic tract On Population. In it, Malthus argued that population growth would cause food and agricultural shortages that the modes of production at the time could not meet. Fertility and therefore population control was, he argued, the only solutions. This is the essence of Malthusianism. An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798) was his response to the utopian population tracts of his predecessors William Godwin and the Marquis de Condorcet in 1793 (Boserup 1978, pp. 133–34; Himmelfarb 1960; Mann, 1993). Godwin and Condorcet, influenced by French egalitarianism, argued that proper education and guidance would enable men to make sensible fertility choices. Godwin stated that “Every man will see, with ineffable ardour, the good of all,   Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, 1793.   Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind, 1793.

Islam and the Securitisation of Population Policies

10

Table 1.1 Year 1928

1954

1965 1974

1984 1994

1999 2004

Major international population conferences

Conference World Population Conference Geneva

Themes/Agenda Population Control, Birth Control, Economics, Maternal Health

Attendees Birth Control Advocates, Health Experts, Demographers, Some League of Nations Officials First United Nations Demographic Data and UN Officials, World Population Indicators, Economic Demographers, Conference (UNWPC), Development Economists, Health Rome Experts 2nd UNWPC, Belgrade Demographics, Health, UN Officials, Economics, Family Demographers, Health Planning Experts, Economists 3rd UNWPC, Bucharest Demography, Health, State and UN Officials, Experts, Socio-economic Development, Human Non-Government Rights, Women’s Rights, Organisations, Academics Child and Maternal Health, Peace, World Population Plan Of Action (WPPA) Reaffirmed Bucharest, State and UN Officials, 4th UNWPC, Mexico City joined Environment, Technicians, NGOs, Female Empowerment Academics As Above 5th UNWPC, Reaffirmed Mexico International Conference City, joined Sustainable on Population and Development, Development, Cairo Reproductive Health and Rights, Female Empowerment, HIV/ AIDS, Religion As Above ICPD +5 Reaffirmed Cairo, joined Global Peace and Security ICPD at 10 Reaffirmed Cairo and As Above ICPD +5, Set 2015 Benchmark

free of the political, social and natural restraints upon him” (Malthus 1960: xv). Likewise, Condorcet argued that the “…duty of all men [is] to promote the general welfare of the human race or of the society in which they live or of the family to which they belong rather than foolishly encumber the world with useless and wretched beings” (cited in Himmelfarb 1960: xvi). Moreover, each was convinced that science and technology would enable man to master nature to his advantage, particularly in the agricultural sector; Condorcet speculated that with “new instruments, machines … a very small amount of land will be able to produce a

Population: From Low to High Politics in the Twentieth Century

11

great quantity of supplies” (cited in Mann 1993: 26, see also Boserup 1978: 134). Population and fertility control were, therefore, unnecessary. Malthus’ rejected the notion that man was capable of controlling nature, because “the power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for men” (Himmelfarb 1960, p. 9): this is his enduring legacy. Man is incapable of manipulating the earth to sustain geometric population growth thus population growth must be controlled to match arithmetic rates of food production (Malthus 1960, pp. 8–9). Furthermore, his moral conception of population control, in which he considered it “difficult to conceive any check to population which does not come under the description of some species of virtue or vice” (Malthus 1960: xxii), also endured. Malthus referred to natural constraints on population growth, such as disease, misery and immoral practices, which included the use of contraception, as vice. The second edition of On Population (1803) approved chastity as a control, serving as a “… restraint on a strong natural inclination, it must be allowed to produce a certain degree of unhappiness; but evidently slight, compared with the evils which result from any of the other checks to population” (Malthus 1960: xxix). Malthusianism, then, informed the dominant contemporary socio-economic paradigm, which posits population growth as an impediment to development, and demonstrates the historical foundations of moral objections to contraception and population control in twentieth century debate. Despite its initial popularity, Malthusianism declined as European conflict and instability gave rise to resurgent geo-strategic pro-natalism, advanced by military and strategic theorists who advocated policies enabling and encouraging population growth. Clausewitz, for example, argued “… superior numbers are becoming more decisive with every passing day. The principle of bringing the maximum possible strength to the decisive engagement must therefore rank higher than it did in the past” (Clausewitz 1968). Instability in Europe made this paradigm politically attractive. France, Belgium and Germany, reacting to declining national birth rates, institutionalised it through strategic pro-natalist policies with the explicit aim of growing their national populations to increase military and political power and security vis their adversaries (Johnson 1987: 3, Symonds and Carder 1973, pp. 3–4). Moreover, the simultaneous population and economic growth in Europe and North America strengthened academic and political beliefs that the former was casual to the latter, giving further impetus to pro-natalism, and the saliency of the strategic paradigm (Ehrlich 1991, pp. 158–59). The spectre of depopulation and its negative strategic implications, coupled with religious and moral sensibilities enabled the strategic paradigm to persist into the twentieth century in a majority of European states. France, Germany, Italy, Belgium and Sweden pursued pronatalism through economic incentives to encourage high fertility. Britain was the exception, where static birth rates gave no cause for depopulation concerns, allowing Malthusianism to re-emerge in national, and then international, debate.   For more on the specific policies of these countries see Symonds and Carder, 1973, pp. 3–7.

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An international discourse emerged in 1900, but at the non-state/nongovernment level, with no evidence of a concurrent intergovernmental discourse until 1910. Between 1900 and 1914, 304 neo-Malthusian and birth control leagues were established globally, which lobbied for service provision and ran clinics to service an unmet contraceptive need. In 1900, the first of several international neoMalthusian conferences was held by the Federation Universelle de la Regeneration Humaine in Paris. Here experts discussed the health and welfare benefits of birth control and the causal link between overpopulation and war. Essentially, these groups advanced the neo-Malthusian economic paradigm and established the nascent security and reproductive health paradigms that endure to this day. Whilst their ultimate aim, population control, remained a non-political issue, the importance of their work of, in the context of contemporary debate, lies in their internationalisation of debate and in establishing the now universally accepted socio-economic and reproductive health paradigms. The first intergovernmental discourse emerged as a product of the growth and influence of the birth control movements, and through national policies to restrict the propagation of information by subjecting the movement to restrictive obscenity laws. In 1910, governments convened to establish an international convention to suppress the trafficking of obscene material and publications, including contraceptive information in its remit. The omission of population discussion reflected the conceptual distinction between it and birth control that persisted at the state level (Symonds and Carder 1973, pp. 3–25; Johnson 1987). Population Debate Inter-War Through the League of Nations (hereafter League), established in 1919, the population debate was internationalised and institutionalised. The League enabled debate and interaction between states, and between state and non-state actors that developed into an international population discourse. Moreover, the absence of a dedicated population commission meant that debate was undertaken by various League organs, resulting in the merging of population concerns with other agendas. In short, these activities established enduring patterns of interaction, concepts and conclusions in international population discourse. Population matters, particularly sensitive ones concerning control and limitation, remained the preserve of the nongovernmental sector: the League’s hesitant direct involvement was a result of the unwillingness of many European governments to countenance sensitive population discussions (Johnson 1987, pp. 6–7). This was clearly demonstrated in 1922 when states convened at the League to reconfirm the 1910 International Obscene Material Convention. Through its delegate Mr Hannequin, France, where Catholic and Right Wing groups had successfully secured similar prohibitive legislation, argued, “Contraceptive propaganda is undoubtedly made the cloak of obscenity …” However, the British reaction demonstrated that the global anti-birth control consensus was decaying. In Britain, the activities of the birth control movement, sanctioned by

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the medical profession and Church of England, had metamorphosed into family planning or Planned Parenthood, which was understood to have socio-economic benefits and thus had attained a degree of moral respectability. Britain’s decision to distance itself from the stated conference aims reflected this perceptual shift. It stated that eventually “… circumstances would permit the consideration of an international agreement for the defence of all states against this social menace” (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973: 23, see also pp. 22–4, Wolfe 1929, pp. 93–4). State reluctance meant that the nascent population control agenda was largely driven by non-governmental actors, whose international influence was growing as a result of domestic support and the growing rift in the League’s anti-birth control consensus. Whilst the British Malthusian League was unsuccessful in its attempts to force population onto the League’s agenda, Margaret Sanger founder of the American Birth Control League, was instrumental in establishing the first World Population Conference held by the League at Geneva in 1927. However, the reluctance of some states to submit completely to this agenda resulted in diluted League participation, as demonstrated by the distance between Sanger’s vision and the conference proper. Sanger envisioned a conference attended by economic, sociological, demographic and biological experts, and League delegates, to identify and solve pressing population problems. However many high profile League, state and non-state delegates refused to attend a conference with a pro-birth control, neo-Malthusian agenda. Then League Secretary-General, Sir Eric Drummond, declined League representation fearing the conference would discuss issues “… which arouse the strongest national feelings and which were of a delicate character …” (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973: 13). Dissention within the League demonstrated the growing cognisance of the importance of birth and population control amongst high profile officials. Then Director of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Albert Thomas expressed to the organisers his hope that the conference would “be the beginning of an international movement which will contribute much to the solution of world problems which are largely the result of the bad distribution of the population of the globe” (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973: 14). Whilst the conference did not fulfil Sanger’s vision, it did institutionalise population as an international concern, albeit a technical one. Post-conference, two distinct agendas emerged: one upholding moral objections to, and the defining the conceptual distinction between, birth control and population matters, the other approaching population and its implications  This group unsuccessfully lobbied to restrict League membership to pro-birth control states, in 1919 and 1925.   I would like to acknowledge that Sanger has been largely criticised because of her overtly eugenicist agenda. However, in the context of this book, her work is important because, whatever her intentions, she played a crucial role in getting population and birth control issues onto governmental and international agendas.  For more on the League’s debates see, Johnson, 1987.

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from a pragmatic perspective. European states such as Italy were concerned over increasing domestic population pressures caused by restrictive post-war migration policies. At the 1927 International Economic Conference in Geneva, Italy’s delegate, Mr Belloni argued that this would have “serious repercussions on world peace,” (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973: 16), thus demanding demographic assistance from the League. However, this did not shift the distinction between population and birth control, which was reinforced at the League’s 13th session in 1932 where birth control was labelled “a practice abhorrent to a large section of religious beliefs and contrary to the national laws of certain countries” (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973: 1). In 1937, the Second Committee of the 18th Session of the Assembly agreed to request that the League Council: take the necessary steps to draw up a scheme of work for the study of demographic problems” and adopted a resolution requesting the Council establish “a special committee of experts to study demographic problems and especially their connection with the economic, financial and social situation and to submit a report on the subject which may be of value to governments in the determination of policy (cited in Symonds and Carder, 1973, pp. 18–19).

In 1939, the League established a Committee dedicated to the study of governmental problems relating to rapid population growth, diminishing population growth, and small populations relative to productive capacity, but its activity was disrupted by the outbreak of World War Two. However, the Committee was significant because it demonstrated the growing international cognisance of population factors and associated problems. The shifts in developing world debate, occurring concurrently with but external to those in the League would alter the course of the post-war international population debate. In India, for example, the world’s first government sponsored birth control clinic was established in Mysore: the first example of population politicisation. Moreover, in 1935 the Indian National Congress – which governed India post1947 – incorporated family planning and population policy into its post partition plan. It found “in the interests of social economy, family happiness and national planning, family planning and the limitation of children are essential, and the state should adopt a policy to encourage these” (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973: 8). In addition, India was highly involved during the 1930s in international birth control activities, with Indian experts and non-government groups, including the All India Women’s Conference, attending international birth control conferences, and by encouraging international advocates and experts such as Sanger to assist in national activities. The global significance of these developments became apparent in post-war United Nations debate and activities.

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The United Nations and the International Population Debate: 1945–2006 Post War to Rome, 1954 The shift from technical to political involvement was relatively slow, reflecting tensions and obscurantist tactics from within and outside the UN. Because of this population management was disorganised and mandates fragmented; the UN, its agencies, and member states could not agree on the complexity of the issue (Johnson 1987: 9) resulting in the establishment of multiple UN population agencies outside of the Economic and Social Commission (ECOSOC) and the Population Commission, such as the Population Division within the Department of Social Affairs. Whilst the developing world was demanding immediate action and involvement, the developed world, pre-occupied with the Cold War, was less concerned with involving itself and the UN in population activities and debates and, indeed, co-opted the latter as part of the East West ideological struggle, played out through GA meetings and the first World Population Conference in 1954. Despite these difficulties, UN debates enabled the expansion of pre-existing discourses and agendas and the establishment of nascent discourses and agendas alongside enduring patterns and themes of protest. Further, the increasing membership of developing states, the growth of academic population research and debate, and the influence of high profile appointees within the UN consolidated the merging of population and other agendas. The establishment of the Population Commission in 1946 demonstrated a shift toward a neo-Malthusian socio-economic paradigm that would later dominate international discourse. Whilst pro-natalism persisted in some developed states, such as France, the attentions of the United Kingdom and United States, developing states such as Transjordania and Ceylon, and non-governmental experts such as demographer Frank Notestein turned to the detrimental economic and environmental effects of rapid population growth in the developing world, caused by improved health, declining mortality and persistent high fertility. A joint Anglo-American proposal to the ECOSOC for the establishment of a Demographic Committee evolved into the Population Commission (un.org/popin/icpd/ conference/bkg/unpop.html; Sadik 1990: 193), under ECOSOC auspices, for the purpose of gathering and disseminating technical expertise. That the commission was mandated to only undertake demographic research and offer demographic advice reflected the reluctance of some members to politicise population. Further, in debating the Commissions’ function, some states demonstrated their suspicions of these socio-economic arguments, advocating a cautious UN approach that conflicted with the urgency amongst program and policy advocates. For example, Commission chairman Arca Parro’s 1947 report to ECOSOC reflected the cautious approach, stating that population was “too delicate to discuss in the abstract … the Commission realised that its real work was to formulate population policies; for the moment, however, the emphasis should be placed on laying the necessary factual foundations” (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973: 53). This contrasted with

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the urgency in United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), Director General Julian Huxley’s 1948 annual report which stated that “somehow or other population must be balanced against resources of civilisation will perish. War is a less inevitable threat to civilisation than is population increase” (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973, pp. 53–4). These overlapping tensions played out within and between UN agencies, such as UNESCO, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO). The resultant fence sitting was to the initial detriment of the population agenda and activities. For example, the 1946 International Health Conference demonstrated the ongoing struggle within the WHO to reconcile itself to population activities. The Polish and Transjordanian delegates urged immediate UN action; Poland proposed that the WHO’s agenda include “the important subject of population problems and vital statistics,” and Dr Tutunji of Transjordan, argued the need for “worldwide birth control as a prophylaxis against overpopulation and war” (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973: 59). The United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US) governments refused to extend the agenda until the WHO was more established. Likewise UNESCO, under Huxley, found itself in competition with the FAO, under the directorship of Norris Dodd, over the relationship between population growth and food production. Huxley’s proposed Food and Population conference produced research papers such as Aldous Huxley’s ‘The Double Crisis’ which suggested the agricultural and environmental impact of population growth was potentially more devastating than an atomic bomb, and advanced the need for population control. Dodd responded to this debate by rejecting the “propaganda that the world’s present resources are not sufficient to feed the present population, let alone any increased population. If this is true the FAO might as well fold up” suggesting institutional inertia and protectiveness of the agenda were strong motivators within UN debates. Furthermore, at the Asian Regional Conference of 1950, ILO Director General David Morse argued that there was a “…need for a positive population policy … only if population growth can be checked will workers in Asian countries be able to obtain substantial and lasting gains from programs of economic and social development” (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973: 57). In response, French delegate, Mr Tessier argued, “our social duty is to have confidence in life, not to place artificial barriers in its way” (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973: 58). Furthermore, the Cold War ideological rift entered the international population debate at the Commissions fifth session in 1950, establishing enduring, competitive socio-economic paradigms. The Determinants and Consequences of Population Trends, the product of an ongoing Population Division study stated:

  He was ineligible to make proposals due to his country’s observer status.

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where it is thought to be difficult to or impossible to achieve economic development on a large scale … governments may consider it advantageous to adopt policies to curb population growth … and early curtailment of population growth … would in many cases be advantageous … (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973: 71).

Yugoslav delegate Mr Vogelnick rejected the implicit neo-Malthusian premise that overpopulation caused poverty and prevented socio-economic development, and advanced instead a Marxist paradigm that held imperialism and exploitation as the cause of overpopulation. Outside of the UN, the population-security paradigm, introduced into organisational debate under aforementioned circumstances, was subject to increasing academic and non-governmental attention. In some instances, this was a direct response to UN work. The Division’s above mentioned report is cited as foundational to papers presented at the University of Nebraska’s 1953 seminar, The Crisis in World Population, where it was concluded, among other things, that “overpopulation or population pressure within nations … and marked socioeconomic differentials between nations suggest the relationship between these and such international disturbances as migration and war” (Hertzler 1953: 106). Moreover, American philanthropist Hugh Moore coined the term “population bomb” in a 1954 pamphlet. The pamphlet, a product of Moore’s personal interest in and concern for world peace and population, were rejected by the Population Council on the grounds it might cause public panic (infoshare1.princeton.edu/ libraries). The First United Nations World Population Conference, Rome 1954 Within this context, amongst these developments, the first World Population Conference was proposed and determined: all but the population-security paradigm featured heavily on the conference agenda. Huxley initially, but unsuccessfully, proposed a conference in 1950 to enable unrestricted professional and public dialogue on population. He however failed to draw governmental and agency support for a conference with a morally sensitive agenda (Chamie 2002). The Population Commission couched its objections in scientific terms arguing that it would prefer to wait for the results of the 1950 national censuses before making any decisions on conferences (Johnson 1987: 11). At its sixth session in 1951, the Commission proposed an international conference to be held in 1953 or 1954; permission to proceed would be based on the proposals scientific merits. At its 14th Session in 1952, ECOSOC passed Resolution 435, which decided the conference would be held in Rome in 1954, and stipulated, “… the sole purpose of the session was to provide an opportunity for the exchange of information and experience by experts” (Notestein, 1954: 242). This ruled out resolutions or recommendations for policy or action (Chamie 2002, Johnson 1987: 11, Symonds and Carder 1973,

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pp. 82–3, un.org/popin/icpd/conference) which assuaged members’ fears of sensitive discussion topics and maintained the population debate as scientific and non-political. To further this, ECOSOC, in collaboration with the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP), decided on a scientific, technical, and demographic agenda (Cliquet and Thienpont 1995: 55). Moreover, attendance was restricted to population specialists and technical experts, and those who did not represent bodies ‘concerned with the promotion of any particular theory or policy or a special social or religious interest’ (Symonds and Carder 1973: 83). Furthermore, they attended as private individuals and not as government representatives, contrary to requests by the USSR to include government delegates (Cliquet and Thienpont 1995: 55). Despite these deliberate limitations, Rome produced several unintended, but significant and enduring, outcomes. Firstly, discussions on the merits and successes of birth control by Egyptian, Indian, Indonesian, and Japanese delegates, (Johnson 1987: 12; Notestein 1954: 247) and American delegate Dr Abraham Stone’s paper advocating birth control (Symonds and Carder 1973: 83) introduced population control as a potentially useful solution to demographic problems. Secondly, Communist countries such as the USSR and Poland, continued to protest against a perceived bias in favour of the Western economic paradigm; a theme that endured until the post- Cold War era. Communists advanced their Marxist economic paradigm as superior to the capitalist model and one under which overpopulation could not exist; under such economic models birth control programs would be unnecessary, and population growth welcomed (Notestein 1954: 247; Symonds and Carder 1973: 83). Thirdly, the Catholic Church, which had established its influence via Catholic states’ delegates, was permitted attendance because of its observer status within the UN, and established itself as an independent and permanent actor in the global population debate. It supported, in theory, the Communist economic alternative, holding “… the optimistic views of the possibility of solving population growth through economic development” (Notestein 1954: 247). Furthermore, it directly voiced its moral and religious objections to birth control – and continues to do so to this day – which it had previously done through the representative of Catholic states such as France, stating that it opposed “the reduction of birth rates by methods which [it] held to be morally objectionable” (Notestein 1954: 247). Inter Conference Debates and Developments: Rome to Belgrade International population discourse between Rome and the second WPC at Belgrade in 1965 continued to be shaped by the ideological and moral considerations of UN member states, resulting in the further advancement of competing socioeconomic paradigms, the reluctance of the UN and member states to politicise the issue, and the competing interests of the developed and developing states. What becomes evident during this period is a puzzling, almost schizophrenic approach

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to population in which the issue becomes political but is not politicised. The ideological games of the superpowers hijacked population as a political tool, yet the majority of developed states, and thus effectively the UN, refused to make population a matter of government and policy. Administrative reorganisation within the UN affirmed this by increasing non-governmental influence over international population debate, effectively stymieing politicisation. Under instruction from the new UN Director General, Dag Hammarskjöld, the Population Division was downgraded as part of an administrative rationalisation program and its research outsourced to universities and other national institutions. On ideology, at the Commissions Eighth Session in 1955, the Soviet delegate Mr Ryabushkin, reaffirmed the Communist bloc view that Rome had demonstrated the presence of “two diametrically opposed trends …” (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973: 87): at the ninth session, this shifted to accusations of a neoMalthusian bias at the expense of the Marxist view. The Cold War ideological rift may also explain the reluctance of some members to politicise population. For example, the 1959 US Presidential Committee on American Foreign Aid Programs recommended that the US should “assist … countries … on request in the formulation of … plans designed to deal with the problem of rapid population growth” (cited in Johnson 1987: 15). President Eisenhower disputed this, stating he could not “imagine anything more emphatically a subject that is not a proper political or government activity or function or responsibility” (cited in Johnson 1973: xxiv), arguably because Cold War politics dominated the national agenda to the exclusion of other issues. For its part, the Commission reaffirmed its and the UN’s role as purely scientific, stating in its 1959 report that “It is not the task of the Population Commission to suggest policies that the Government of any Member state should pursue” (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973: 67). Moreover, the Cold War rift hampered efforts to consolidate population in the UN agenda. In 1962, Communist countries threatened to veto or abstain from the SwedenNorway proposal to include population on the GA agenda unless references to population control assistance were removed from the text as they claimed these were incompatible to Marxist ideology (Johnson 1987: 20). This is not to say that the global population debate stalled during this period, for many significant and enduring changes took place. The population-development paradigm was affirmed with the designation of the 1960s as the United Nations Development Decade, under GA Resolution 1710 (XVI) in December 1961 which determined to “mobilise and to sustain support for measures … to accelerate progress towards self-sustaining growth of the economy of the individual nations and their social advancement,” established a framework which legitimated and actualised developing states’ demands for population activity. Japan, India and Iran proposed a draft resolution demanding that the GA and Population Commission review developing states responses to ECOSOC’s 1964 report and “make   Politicised is understood here in the context of the securitisation spectrum outlined in the introductory chapter.

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recommendations with a view to intensifying the work of the UN in assisting … governments … to deal with the population problems confronting them,” which was later adopted by ECOSOC (cited in Johnson 1987, pp. 22–3). Also, outside of the UN, academics and politicians through publications, addresses and conferences, continued to develop and advance the populationsecurity paradigm. At an address to the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), at New York in 1963, US Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, applied nuclear discourse to the unmet expectations theory. He argued that the invention of nuclear weaponry had served to undermine traditional notions of strategy and security precisely at the time when they most needed because “…scientific discoveries have so extended the average span of life that population growth threatens to frustrate all our costly efforts to achieve significant improvements in living standards …” Furthermore, he linked this situation to national and international stability claiming, “ours is a world of multiple revolutions, of vast ferment, or pervasive change, or political turmoil” (Stevenson 1964, pp xiii-xiv). These papers appeared in The Population Crisis and the Use of World Resources complied by the World Academy of Art and Science. This publication demonstrated the nascent merging of the socio-economic and security paradigms and the growing global cognisance of the potentially destabilising effects of population growth on national and international security. Belgrade 1965 The UN intended the Belgrade conference to be non-political (Cliquet and Thienpont 1995: 55; Symonds and Carder 1973: 145). Its mandate, agenda and attendance requirements demonstrated the desire of the UN and some member states to maintain a strictly technical focus to the exclusion of policy discussions. The deciding conference resolution, ECOSOC 820C, 1961, which designated the World Population Conference at Belgrade in 1965, “specified that it would be a meeting of experts in demography and related disciplines and not a meeting of representatives of government. Therefore, it was not intended that the conference should pass resolutions or make recommendations” (Adams 1965: 436). Furthermore, in 1962, the General Assembly decided that although “the health and welfare of the family require special attention in areas with relatively high rates of population growth … it is the responsibility of each government to decide on its own policies and devise its own programs” (un.org/popin/icpd/conference), thus distancing itself from any political involvement in population. However, Belgrade, and preceding prep-coms and debates, became political and ideological battlegrounds over population. On the one hand were nonstate actor, UN delegates and developing state representatives pushing for organisational population assistance beyond technical activity. On the other were UN officials conscious of the need to maintain the organisation’s neutrality in the context of global ideological conflict, and ideological demagogues who would not

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compromise on their ideological perspectives for the sake of unified decisions, thus injecting a political flavour to the debate. For example, at Belgrade the neoMalthusian population-development paradigm was first introduced into the UN debate amid: mounting concern among Governments of developing countries of their rapid population growth rates. Goals of the United Nations Development Decade were not being met, and there was a conviction in many quarters that rapid population growth was a major impediment to the achievement of satisfactory progress (Adams, 1965: 443, see also Sadik, 1990: 194).

However, their desire to pursue population control via family planning with UN assistance met with rejection from the organisation, which perceived an internal lack of “consensus as to the desirability of Government sponsored family planning programs aimed at moderating population growth rates” (Adams 1965: 443). The Secretary General insisted that the UN maintain a “neutral attitude on questions of family limitation, [but that] it was ready to respond to requests for assistance from Governments which had adopted, or were contemplating the adoption of, family planning programs” (Adams 1965: 443). Soviet delegates rejected the population control to development argument. They advocated a development to population control argument, which incidentally established the nascent female empowerment paradigm arguing, “attempts to introduce birth control would fail unless a sufficiently high level of education, employment, urbanisation and the status of women was first achieved” (Adams 1965: 442). Moreover, delegates at Belgrade expressed a desire to shift the debate to the political by extending discussion beyond demography. This had been the case at the 1963 Asian Population Conference where resolutions and recommendations on regional population problems had been adopted (Symonds and Carder 1973, p. 136). Opening the session on fertility, Julian Henderson, director of the Bureau of Social Affairs, expressed his hope that the Conference would “shed light on the paths of policy and action” (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973: 145). Moreover, the inclusion of family planning on the Belgrade agenda – following its omission at Rome – established its legitimacy in international population discourse (Adams 1965; Notestein 1954). Although delegates could not agree on the efficacy of family planning as a development tool, it was agreed that governments, but not the UN, should enable couples to fulfil their right to control their own fertility (Sadik 1990: 194), establishing it as a potential solution to population problems. Belgrade was significant for many reasons including the impetus to shift the agenda to the political and consolidating key concepts and conclusions, particularly the development paradigm and the right to fertility control.

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Belgrade to Bucharest: The Critical Decade International political developments between Belgrade and the fourth WPC, at Bucharest in 1974, shifted the internal workings of the UN and thus the population debate. For example, throughout this decade developing states membership increased; many were experiencing the detrimental effects of growth on development. They had integrated population programs into national development plans and were demanding greater UN assistance in population policy, planning, and programs. This was clearly demonstrated in Paragraph 4 of GA resolution 2211 (xxi) 1966, proposed by India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Sweden which: … called upon the Economic and Social Commission, the Population Commission, the Regional Economic Commissions, the United Nations Economic and Social Office in Beirut and the specialised agencies concerned to assist, when requested, in further developing and strengthening national services in the field of population bearing in mind the different character of population problems in each country and region and the needs arising there from (daccessods.un.org).

The developing states’ demand for assistance shifted the international population debate to the political. This led to UN internal restructuring which institutionalised the neo-Malthusian population-development paradigm, and because this was adopted as the UN’s operational paradigm, it came to dominate international population discourse at the expense of the Marxist alternative. The Population Trust Fund was proposed by UN Secretary U Thant, at ECOSOC’s 43rd Session in 1967, for “Governments and institutions [to] pledge voluntary contributions” (cited in Johnson 1987: xxvi) for Commission, Division and other agencies population activities. It was renamed the United Nations Fund for Population Activity (UNFPA) in 1969, and operated under the auspices of the UN Development Program (UNDP), reflecting the development- centred operational rationale. The fund’s purpose was to ensure that other development programs were not adversely financially affected by increasing state attentions to and reliance on, population control activities in national development plans (Johnson 1987, pp xxvi–xxviii, pp. 27–8). Moreover, the UNFPA mandate which authorised its involvement in population planning and programming activities reflected how the merging of population and other discourses shapes and shifts prior established concepts and conclusions. For example, the Tehran Conference on Human Rights, and its subsequent Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), codified the right of couples to plan, space and choose the number of their children. The UDHR designated family planning as a fundamental human right within the context of socio-economic development, particularly the individuals’ “struggle against hunger and poverty … and thus the full realisation of human rights …” (Tehran Declaration 1968). Population and human rights discourses merged under the UNFPA’s mandate which authorised the Fund to promote the

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implication of population growth on human rights alongside other issues such as social and economic development, and the environment. Furthermore, the UNFPA was mandated to provide assistance at the request of states in population and family planning activities and to promote and co-ordinate these activities within the UN. Through the UNFPA, the UN became more involved in and responsive to member demands for population assistance. By placing population under UNDP control, the UN institutionalised the population-development paradigm which, along with its conclusions, remains central to contemporary international discourse. The membership of developing states was further significant because they introduced alternative and enduring concepts and conclusions to international population debate, many of which were realised at Bucharest. For example, the establishment of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) in 1947, the Asian Population Conference at New Delhi in 1963, and subsequent conference follow-up at ECAFE’s Twentieth Session in Tehran, 1964 (Chandrasekharan 1968: 651) enabled developing states to discuss and establish practical solutions to their population problems. ECAFE agreed to assist in program development, and in doing so, developing states reconceptualised population as a political issue, introducing this to international debate through forums such as the WPCs. Further, the confidence and international status of developing states was strengthened by changing dynamics in international politics, particularly the formation of the G77, which was able to demonstrate its collective international strength vis-a-vis the developed world through events such as the 1970s, Oil Shocks, proving they had the capacity to force developed states to listen to their concerns. This was evident at the UN’s Sixth Special Session, held prior to the WPC, which hinted at the North/South divide that would shift the Bucharest debate. A more vocal, confident developing states bloc used the forum to express collective concerns on a number of issues; they demanded reformation of the international system to further the development process through the removal of artificial barriers resulting from global political and economic inequality. Furthermore, it argued that the WPC should include discussion on other aspects of development, not just population. These demands were carried to the Bucharest conference, thus shifting the context of the population debate (Finkle and Crane 1975, pp. 91–2), and introducing enduring concepts and conclusions to the international discourse. Moreover, the stated aims of the UN and its main agencies demonstrated increasing organisational cognisance of the seriousness of the global population problem at a time when many member states were still reluctant or refused to connect themselves to population control for moral or ideological reasons. U Thant’s 1969 statement is telling of his personal belief in the correctness of the dominant neo-Malthusian development paradigm and of his willingness to commit the UN to population activities – which were perhaps a result of the experiences  The G77 included oil-producing states. The oil crisis of the early 1970s, which had demonstrated the vulnerability and reliance of the developed world on the co-operation of the G77 states, bolstered their confidence.

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of his home country Burma. It also reflects his frustrations with the developed states, particularly the Superpowers, and their pursuit of ideological struggles at the expense of global population and development. He stated: I do not wish to seem over dramatic, but I can only conclude from the information that is available to me as Secretary-General that the Members of the United Nations have perhaps 10 years left in which to subordinate their ancient quarrels and launch a global partnership to curb the arms race, to improve the human environment, to defuse the population explosion and to supply the required momentum to development efforts. If such a global partnership is not forged within the next decade, then I very much fear that the problems I have mentioned will have reached such staggering proportions that they will be beyond our capacity to control (1969 statement by U Thant, then Secretary-General UN cited in Johnson 1987: xxi).

Likewise, the World Bank committed itself to the development paradigm, adopting it as the rationale for its own population activities, which included funding and support: to let the developing nations know the extent to which rapid population growth slows down their potential development … to seek opportunities to finance facilities required by our member countries to carry out family planning programs … to join others in programs of research to determine the most effective methods of family planning and of national administration of population control programs (cited in Johnson 1987: 41).

Within and without the UN, security references were increasingly embedded into academic and political population discourse. President Lyndon Johnson, in his 1965 State of the Union Address expressed his commitment to “…seek new ways to use our knowledge to help deal with the explosion in world population and the growing scarcity in world resources” (janda.org/state/politxts/State). In 1968, World Bank President Robert McNamara, in his Board of Governors Address, repeated Johnson’s sentiment, arguing that the Development Decades goals had been hampered by “the mushrooming cloud of the population explosion” (cited in Johnson 1987: 41) thus likening population to nuclear weapons. Demographer Paul Ehrlich’s seminal, though controversial, 1968 publication The Population Bomb, advanced this image and the security paradigm. This work identified many of the casual relationships and factors that would feature in later populationsecurity discourse: food crisis, environmental degradation, youth cohort, and human security issues. President Richard Nixon politically institutionalised the security paradigm. Firstly, he stated in his 1969 Special Address that “[o]ne of the most serious challenges to human destiny in the last third of this (20th) century will be the growth of the population” (cited in Mumford 1995: 36). Then, through National Security Study Memorandum 2000, 1974, “Implications of Worldwide

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Population Growth for US Security and Overseas Interests”, he expressed his concern with the potential for population growth to drive “disruptive foreign policies and international instability,” primarily via the spread of communism, in the under- and undeveloped world, specifying that the: study should focus on the international political and economic implications of population growth rather than its ecological, sociological or other aspects … population factors are indeed critical in, and often determinants of, violent conflict in developing areas. Segmental (religious, social, racial) differences, migration, rapid population growth, differential levels of knowledge and skills, rural/urban differences, population pressure and the spatial location of population in relation to resources – in this rough order of importance – all appear to be important contributions to conflict and violence … (cited in Mumford 1995: 42).

Through such statements, population was reconceptualised as a national and international security concern. Bucharest, 1974: Confirming Population as Political The Bucharest conference consolidated the developments outlined above and affirmed population as an international political issue. This was due partly to the politically charged nature of the debate and also through the designation of the resultant World Population Plan of Action (WPPA) (1974) as “a policy instrument within the broader context of the internationally adopted strategies for national and international progress” (UNFPA 1975: 163). This enabled further, and also recent, changes to the conceptualisation of population that were reflective of the wider global political agenda. A key international political concern at the time was the growing North/South divide which was partly informed by the overarching East/West ideological rift. The population agenda became fused with the wider economic and political conflicts inherent in these divides. Bucharest’s unintended significance was “…to be found in a new politicisation of population [in] the contemporary context of the struggle over the distribution of resources and power between the industrial nations and the developing world” (Finkle and Crane 1975: 89). Unintended because ECOSOC resolution 1484 (1970), in deciding on a third WPC, declared “…the conference be devoted to consideration of basic demographic problems, their relationship with economic and social development, and population policies and action programs needed to promote human welfare and development” (cited in Finkle and Crane 1975: 110): it was not intended as an international political or ideological battleground. The five regional pre-conference forums and four population symposia, where the Bucharest Draft Plan of Action (DPA) was debated, gave little indication of the imminent shift in the agenda and politicisation of the debate. The conferences and DPA Preparations centred largely on regional conferences and four population

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symposia. The symposia, in 1973 and 1974, discussed population issues in relation to development, the family, resources and the environment, and human rights: in doing so, seemingly disparate agendas were merged and many key concerns of contemporary debate were established (UNFPA 1975, pp. 163–64). Furthermore, prep-com attendees appeared in a private and professional capacity, not as government representatives, presenting their own, supposedly private and unofficial, opinions. This is important given that those in attendance at Bucharest were government officials, presenting governmental opinion (See Johnson 1987, pp 86–7). In this respect, these conferences were not representative of Bucharest proper, and could not provide a sufficient estimate of the outcome. However, because the DPA was approved at these conferences, the UN was under the impression that consensus, affirmation and the non-economic agenda would carry to the conference proper. This impression was reflected in the opening address of the Secretary General of the Conference, Antonio Carillo-Flores who stated explicitly “this is a World Population Conference and not a world economic conference” (cited in Finkle and Macintosh 1975: 97). What these prep-cons also enabled was the establishment of regional voting blocs that paralleled the global developed/developing division, and also the development of regional (read alternative) concepts and conclusions on questions of population and development. At Bucharest, the debate was divided along these geographical, developmental and conceptual lines. What emerged were competing and enduring conceptions of development and its relationship with population, demonstrating competing notions of causality. The aforementioned, prior-established neo-Malthusian socio-economic paradigm largely informed the developed states position. Development was primarily an economic function; structural readjustment would improve productivity and therefore national income, which would trickle down to the populace through improved individual income and services. The majority, primarily developed states, believed that population growth was causal to underdevelopment. The demands of large and growing populations outpaced supply producing unmet social expectation and basic needs. Population control and reduction, via family planning, ‘contraception-for-development,’ were posited as the means to development. Developed states insisted that developing states, with UN and external assistance, should adopt or increase national family planning programs, and that development projects and assistance should be contingent on commitments to population control. However, the Scandinavian countries, whilst committed to family planning, are said to have expressed their receptiveness to the developing states’ arguments, against the agenda of their American and Western European counterparts (Cliquet and Thienpont 1995: 58; Finkle and Crane 1975: 102–104). The developing states, particularly the G77 nations, in alliance with the Soviet bloc, revisited the prior-established Marxist alternative paradigm, merging it with a unique perspective on the causal relationship between development and population. This paradigm contrasted directly with that of the developed states, positing underdevelopment as causal to population growth. The catchcry of the

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G77 was ‘development is the best contraceptive’: global population problems, they argued, would be solved if the developing world committed to reordering the international system and creating a New International Economic Order (NIEO) that would establish an equitable political and economic environment that would enable development in the above context, through which the population growth problem would solve itself (Grimes 1998: 385). The socialist bloc aligned itself with this view, which mirrored its own, but couched its objections to the ‘contraception-for-development’ model in ideological rather than developmental, terms. Communist states argued that as capitalism and colonialism caused underdevelopment, and therefore rapid population growth, any global population initiative would require the developed states of the West to rectify the ills of capitalism and post-colonialism (see Finkle and Crane 1975, pp. 91, 104–106). The wider significance of these developments is the enduring impact on the international population debate. In propelling the NIEO onto the agenda and WPPA, which contained a stated recognition of the historical origins of the “situation of the developing states … in the unequal processes of socioeconomic development” (UNFPA 1975: 164), the South effectively shifted the focus of the conference from population and development, to development and the structure of the international system (UNFPA 1975, pp. 165–68). It was here that the nascent counter-development debate, which critiques global population and development agendas from localised and ‘South’ perspectives, was melded to the international population debate. The final 1974 WPPA reflected consensus through compromise: due to three hundred amendments to the DPA, it and the WPPA were two were very different documents (Finkle and Crane 1975: 88). The WPPA reflected growing international cognisance of the indivisibility of population and socio-economic development, declaring that “population and development are interrelated: population variables influence development variables, and are also influenced by them” (UNFPA 1975: 167, see also Sadik 1990: 198; Finkle and Crane 1975: 88). The concepts and conclusions remain central to current debates, policies and programs. Although the demanded NIEO did not emerge, a middle way fusing population policy and family planning with programs aimed at economic and social development did (Johnson, 1987: 106). Furthermore, the WPPA recognised that growth and consumption were equally to blame for a growing number of economic and environmental problems, declaring, “the demand for vital resources increases not only with growing population but also with growing per capita consumption” (UNFPA 1975: 167). Bucharest was instrumental in consolidating population and development, whatever the relationship, as indivisible.10 Although the WPPA reflected a fundamental shift in perception at the global level, the persistent pursuit of population control for development at the national level, in countries such as India, and as the underlying philosophy of donor programs, such as USAIDS’s, meant that the Western paradigm, slightly altered, 10 For example, food and agriculture, education and health, see Johnson 1987: 235.

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continued to dominate for some time. The final WPPA, in recognition of the stated desire and urgency to address global population problems, urged states to overcome their ideological and other differences in the belief that “international co-operation, based on the peaceful coexistence of States having different social systems, should play a supportive role in achieving the goals of the Plan of action” (UNFPA 1975: 180). Bucharest to Mexico: 1975–1984 In the decade between these conferences, population discourse merged with other agendas with enduring effect. Within the boundaries of the populationdevelopment paradigm, population was problematised and merged with multiple discourses. This reflected international cognisance of the indivisibility of population issues from women’s rights, the environment, and urbanisation, as developed through a number of UN sponsored conferences, including: the Independent Commission on International Development, 1977; The International Conference of Parliamentarians, Colombo 1979; International Conference on Population and the Urban Future, Rome 1980; Second World Conference on Women, Copenhagen 1980. The Colombo Declaration on Population and Development, essentially a +5 review of Bucharest, reaffirmed population goals and policies as critical to “... the principle aim[s] of social, economic and cultural development...” (Colombo Declaration 1979: 731). Further, the declaration identified the difference between declared and actual state commitment as detrimental to global population efforts, stating “today most countries have recognised that population and development are inextricably bound together … However, as far as the first UN review made since Bucharest makes clear, not enough progress in this direction has been achieved …” (Colombo Declaration 1979: 731). This sentiment was reiterated in North-South: A Program for Survival, also known as the 1980 Brandt Report, which emerged from the 1977 Independent Commission and stated that “international support for population policies is flagging at precisely the time when the commitment to, and political acceptance of, family planning policies is spreading in the Third World” (Brandt and MacNamara 1980: 337). Colombo also recognised the importance of non-state actors as participants in population activity and galvanisers of societal opinion and support. It called on religious leaders and non-governmental organisations to assist national and international population efforts. The Rome Declaration on population advanced an holistic concept of population policies, which continues to evolve to this day, recognising that it “will need to be fully integrated into the process of development, planning, with particular emphasis being given to health, education, housing, nutrition, employment and environmental conditions” (Rome Declaration 1980: 681). The Brandt Report injected a sense of urgency into population discourse and shifted conclusions from population balance to stabilisation by the year 2000. It warned

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that although fertility and growth rates in many developing countries had slowed since Bucharest, any future decline in fertility in the 1980s and 1990s is not likely to make a great difference to total numbers in the year 2000” adding that “whether the nightmarish vision of a hopelessly overcrowded planet in the next century can be averted depends gravely on what is done now to hasten the stabilisation of population (Brandt 1980: 337). During this period, academic and political enquiry and UN debates became increasingly concerned with links between population and security. This field of enquiry considered population a threat to national and international stability and a challenge to world peace: this was foundational to international securitising debates. This discourse was enabled by academic developments, particularly within the US, which resulted in expanded conceptions and definitions of security: redefined, for example, to include “… resource, environmental and demographic issues” (Tuchman Matthews 1989: 274). National security policies also consolidated the population-security interrelationship. For example, the Ford Administration upheld NSSM 200 because it considered “… United States leadership [was] essential to combat population growth, to implement the World Population Plan of Action and to advance United States security and overseas interests” (cited in Mumford 1995: 40), repeating, in implicit terms, Nixon’s intent to curb Communist takeovers in the developing world, using population control to mitigate socio-political destabilisation. Furthermore, the Declarations of several conferences advanced a globally endorsed understanding of the interrelationship between population and peace, identifying many of the factors and variables present in political and academic discourse. Colombo linked population and peace through development, citing social unrest as an intervening variable, stating, “[p]eace itself, which is the precondition of development, will be put in jeopardy. For one of the principal threats to peace is the social unrest caused by the accumulation of human fear and hopelessness” (Colombo 1979: 731). The Rome Declaration added socioeconomic variables to this, stating “unplanned urbanisation may generate tension between groups and classes within the city itself; it may also generate tension between urban and rural areas within national boundaries. Peace … may be put in jeopardy” (Rome Declaration 1980; 681). In 1983, Nazli Choucri, a pioneer of academic research on new security issues, published Population and Conflict: New Dimensions of Population Dynamics, a report sponsored by the UNFPA, which was essentially a critique of the detrimental lack of political attention to the population-security relationship. He stated, “[a]t a time when military expenditures are escalating and insecurities abound, the challenges mount in an already burdened international environment. It would be the height of myopia to continue to disregard the increasing evidence concerning the relationship of population variables to conflict dynamics” (Choucri 1983 [online]). The report’s introduction, written by UNFPA Director Rafael Salas, suggested increasing organisational cognisance of a broader conceptualisation of population. Salas stated:

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Islam and the Securitisation of Population Policies [w]hile the absence of population related pressures does not guarantee peace; these pressures could increase the probability of conflict. This [was] particularly true when such additional aggravating factors as widening economic disparities, worsening environmental conditions and dwindling natural resources [were] also present in countries (cited in Choucri 1983 [online]).

Choucri criticised the narrow understanding of population, which focused primarily on “…the consequences of high fertility in many parts of the world …” and the lack of interest in the effects of population beyond socio-economic ones. He stated: … evidence suggests that population problems include not only births and deaths, but also demographic change as it affects national and international politics. Conflict is a central feature of all political behaviour, at all levels of human interaction. Thus, the prominence of population variables in shaping political behaviour places population and conflict in close proximity (Choucri 1983 [online]).

Moreover, Choucri’s report highlighted what have come to be accepted variables in the population-security equation: age, composition, size, growth, ethnicity, migration, density, crowding, scarcity and pressure. Furthermore, he prescribed social institutions and population regulating policies as the best methods for inhibiting and controlling the destabilising potential of population factors. Mexico 1984: A Shift in Focus Developing states feared high political issues such as the arms race and the global energy crisis would obscure population on the international agenda; distracting the attentions of the developed world to the detriment of their national population concerns and efforts. However, the staging of the fourth WPC indicated the global importance of population issues. ECOSOC Resolution 1981/87 decided the Mexico WPC as “… devoted to the discussion of selected issues of the highest priority, giving full recognition to the relationship between population and social and economic development, with the aim of contributing to the process of review and appraisal of the [WPPA] and to its further implementation” (cited in Sadik 1990: 201). Mexico City reaffirmed the “full validity of the principles and objectives of the World Population Plan of Action” (UNFPA 1984: 755). This was reviewed and revised to ‘reflect the major demographic, social, economic and political changes’ (Cliquet and Thienpont 1995: 60) which had arisen since Bucharest through the aforementioned conferences and preparatory committees on fertility and the family; population distribution, migration and development; population, resources, environment and development; and mortality and health policy (See Cliquet and Thienpont 1995: 60; Sadik 1990: 202).

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Rafael Salas reconfirmed the UN’s commitment to population and development, and the urgency and goals of the Brandt report, stating “our goal is the stabilisation of global population within the shortest period possible before the end of next century” (cited in Johnson 1987: 250). This remains central to international and national policies, programs and debates. His statement, which recalled the findings of the various population declarations of the 1970s, implied that continued levels of high population growth, coupled with slow income growth and technological acquisition hampered the improvement of living standards in developing nations and exacerbated the North/South divide. He argued that stabilising population growth was crucial to rectifying this situation and that family planning was the key. Controlling growth was considered not only vital to national interests, but to those of the global community (Johnson 1987: 250), thus cementing the place of population in the international political agenda. Furthermore, Salas reaffirmed the problematic conception of growth, and control as the main solution. As with Bucharest, conference attendance influenced and shifted the debate. In addition to the one hundred and forty seven nations attending were a greater number of Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), particularly women’s groups. NGOs were permitted to address the conference, in recognition of their “continuing important role in the implementation of the World Population Plan of Action” (UNFPA 1984: 758); this decision further shifted the context of the debate with lasting effect (Johnson 1987: 250). As a result, emphasis in the debate shifted from specific population concerns to those that affected and were affected by population. Some of these issues, such as human and women’s right, were recognised in the Bucharest WPPA. Others, such as the environment, had gained recognition through the interim conferences. All were the concern of special interest groups such as NGOs. These ideas endure and are relevant to current population-development and population-security debates. Bucharest had confirmed family planning as a human right and as central to population policy, but interim studies demonstrated the failure to transpire into political action and the distance between stated and actual commitment. Mexico City identified “... unmet needs for family planning in many countries” (UNFPA 1984: 761) and impressed on governments the urgency of service provision, recommending they “make universally available information, education, and the means to assist …” couples to fulfil their reproductive rights (UNFPA 1985: 769, Johnson 1987, pp. 277–78).11 Bucharest had also identified the importance of female empowerment to population outcomes, which was codified in the Copenhagen Declaration which recommended that states ensure a woman’s “right to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children …” (Copenhagen 1980, Article 16). Advancing on this, the Mexico City WPA stressed that a woman’s right to control her own fertility was not only important in curbing 11  Note: it must be clarified that reproductive rights has been applied retrospectively in this instance. This particular terminology is generally accepted as arising from the Cairo ICPD in 1994, and is not generally used with reference to earlier WPCs.

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growth, but formed “the basis for the enjoyment of other rights …” (UNFPA 1984: 764), and encouraged governments to implement programs of socio-economic integration conducive to this end (UNFPA 1984, pp. 764–65; Johnson 1987: 278). Likewise, the environment, which was legitimated as an international population concern by the Commission and the Urban Futures Conference, was consolidated on the global population agenda at Mexico City. The Plan of Action recognised that rapid population growth aggravated “environmental and natural resources problems [such] as soil erosion, desertification and deforestation, which affect food and agricultural production” (UNFPA 1984: 759). It recommended that where problems and imbalances existed, governments should “in the context of overall development policies, to adopt and implement specific policies that will contribute to redressing such imbalances …” (UNFPA 1984: 764, see also Cliquet and Thienpont 1996: 61). The inclusion of these issues on the conference agenda, as introduced by a variety of actors, illustrated the expanding conceptualisation of population as an issue, and realisation of its indivisibility from other concerns. These population norms have endured and are continually strengthened through international regimes and discourse. Mexico City was also significant because it codified the relationship between population and security, thus consolidating its place in population discourse. Furthermore, Islam emerged as influential over national perceptions, and moral obscurantism re-emerged. Mexico allowed state representatives and UN delegates to express their concerns regarding the population-security relationship. UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar stated to the conference that “… these activities are directly related to the first objective of the United Nations, the preservation of peace, since future political stability, like economic development, will depend heavily on the way in which population policies are handled” (cited in Johnson 1987: 254). In addition, Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal stated, “[p]opulation issues cannot be confined within national boundaries. They are closely related to the attainment of our ideals of peace, security and stability in the world” (cited in Johnson 1987: 244). Furthermore, the Plan of Action was the first to acknowledge the population-security interrelationship: Section Two, Peace, Security and Population, recognised “peace, security, disarmament, and cooperation [as] indispensable for the achievement of humane population policies …” (UNFPA 1984: 762). The Turkish delegation, through the statement of Health Minister Mehmet Aydın, injected modernist Islamic discourse into the conference. Aydın drew attention to the religious permissibility of family planning stating, “the Holy Koran in its Sura12 Enfal set out the family edict 14 centuries ago … [which] imposes on the parents the responsibility of proper upbringing of their children … parents should have no more children than they can appropriately care for” (cited in Johnson 1987: 270). 12 Literal translation: chapter.

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The shift in US position, from outright support at Bucharest, to obscurantism in Mexico, established a destabilising precedent in national opinion and policy that would re-emerge post 2000. Under the influence of the economic rationalism of Reaganomics and the moral objections of the religious right, the US delegation announced a new direction on population issues under the Mexico City Policy, also known as the Global Gag Rule. This policy, which remained in place until its rescinding by the Clinton Administration in 1993, dismissed the consensus of the 1960s and 1970s as the product of ‘demographic overreaction.’ Instead, the US advocated economic rationalism over population control, stating “population growth is, of itself, neither good nor bad. Its becomes an asset or a problem in conjunction with other factors, such as economic policy … people, after all, are producers as well as consumers” (cited in Johnson 1987: 255). Furthermore, under the Mexico City Policy, the US refused to “contribute to separate nongovernmental organisations which perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family planning in other nations” (US Government 1984). A number of international family planning associations, including the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), refused to bend to this ruling, and lost vital USAID funding as a result. Even the UNFPA was held accountable to this policy: the US had been the largest donor to the UNFPA, but it stipulated future funding would be “... conditional on ‘concrete assurances’ that no part of the US monies will be used to for abortion and that the Fund does not support abortion or coercive family planning programs” (US Government 1984). The Mexico City Policy was strongly criticised by international groups such as the European Parliamentary Forum on Population and Development, which claimed the US policy “undermine[d] internationally agreed consensus and goals” (www.iepfd.org). Mexico to Cairo The Cairo WPPA credits a number of interim conferences and occasions as foundational to its platform: The World Summit for Children, New York, 1990; UN Conference on Environment and Development and Agenda 21, Rio, 1992; World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 1993; International Year of the World’s Indigenous People, 1993; and the International Year of the Family, 1994. That each was the subject of a chapter in the WPPA indicated international cognisance of their interrelationship with the key themes of population and development. However, rather than focusing solely on these, the influence of which was duly noted by the UNFPA, this discussion turns to two other events highly influential developments, both of which significantly shifted and shaped the Cairo agenda and thus the course of international population discourse: the World Commission on the Environment and Development, 1987, and its subsequent report Our Common Future, and the UN Round Table on HIV/AIDS and Population, 1993.

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Our Common Future, known also as the Brundtland Report, established the concept of sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Brundtland 1987). It was subsequently adopted as the universal working paradigm by international conferences, commissions and conventions, including Cairo. The Report extended development beyond meeting basic socio-economic needs, establishing human equity and dignity as desired outcomes of and as essential to development, stating: the satisfaction of human needs and aspirations in the major objective of development. The essential needs of vast numbers of people in developing countries … are not being met, and beyond their basic needs these people have legitimate aspirations for an improved quality of life. A world in which poverty and inequity are endemic will always be prone to ecological and other crises. Sustainable development requires meeting the basic needs of all and extending to all the opportunity to satisfy their aspirations for a better life (WCED 1987).

Moreover, the report consolidated the interrelationship between population and development established through aforementioned conferences and declarations. It stated: an expansion in numbers can increase the pressure on resources and slow the rise in living standards in areas where deprivation is widespread … sustainable development can only be pursued if demographic developments are in harmony with the changing productive potential of the ecosystem (WCED 1987).

Furthermore, the report reaffirmed patterns of resource exploitation and consumption as equally deleterious, stating: the sustainability of development is intimately linked to the dynamics of population growth. The issue, however, is not simply one of global population size. A child born in a country where levels of material and energy use are high places a greater burden on the Earth’s resources than a child born in a poorer country (Brundtland 1987).

Finally, it repeated and reaffirmed established policy prescriptions, stating “[p]opulation policies should be integrated with other economic and social development programmes female education, health care, and the expansion of the livelihood base of the poor” (Brundtland 1987). HIV/AIDS added a new element to the population debate: it was partly in response to this that reproductive health discourse emerged at Cairo. Until the late 1980s, HIV/AIDS was largely conceptualised as a health issue and remained the preserve of national health sectors and non-governmental activist groups. The first concerted UN response came in 1987, through the WHO Global Program on AIDS

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and its Global AIDS Strategy, approved by the World Health Assembly in May that year. The Strategy established a blueprint for local, national and international action to prevent and control HIV/AIDS, which included the need for every country to have a “supportive and non-discriminatory social environment” (www. avert.org). By 1993, the conceptualisation of HIV/AIDS had expanded to include its interrelationship with, among other things, population and development. The 1993 UN Round Table on HIV/AIDS and Population appraised “the demographic impact of acquired immune deficiency syndrome, its impact on social and health development, and its implications.” At the time, it concluded “that AIDS will not have a significant impact on population growth, at global, regional or national levels”, a position which has subsequently been revised in light of the decimating effects of the virus in Africa. On development, the consensus was that HIV/AIDS had a detrimental impact because it: caused … growing rates of premature death among the most productive segments of the population – young and middle-aged adults” With regard to family planning participants decided that “programmes [had] a major role to play in HIV/AIDS prevention, particularly in helping women and young people to better protect themselves from infection. Substantial additional resources are needed for both family planning and AIDS prevention (ICPD Newsletter 1993).

Population and Security, the Academic Debate: 1984–1994 Academic interest in population as a security issue flourished between Mexico and Cairo, building on developments in the field during the 1970s, and as part of the general security and strategic revisionism in the final stages of, and then post-, Cold War. Furthermore, it built upon the increasingly pessimistic outlook on a range of issues, such as the environment and urbanisation, established under the conventions and declarations of the 1980s. Resultant academic research advanced the understanding of the population-security relationship through theoretical and empirical research, establishing a number of conclusions, concepts and methodologies. Scholars in the field acknowledged that the field of enquiry had its limitations, namely its speculative rather than predictive nature. They acknowledged the methodological difficulties in establishing definitive linkages and providing empirical verification (Leroy, 1986: 160; Wiarda, 1986: 159). Patricia Mische cited the work of the Ethiopian Relief Commission in 1975 as an example of the rare projects identifying population growth as causal to conflict (Mische 1994: 276). Scholars acknowledged the indirect causal linkage between population and insecurity, and the influence of exacerbating variables and factors. Moreover, they conceded that research was susceptible to contradiction and criticism under a burden of proof.

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However, this is not to say that population cannot or should not be analysed as a security issue; there are established methodological solutions to these problems. For example, Wiarda argued that “not all propositions need to be scientifically proven or provable for them to be valid. Common sense may be as valid a guide in this instance as the admittedly inadequate scientific evidence available” (Wiarda 1986: 159). Credible analysis has been enabled by the academic establishment of an accepted set of exacerbating factors and/or variables. It is because of this that analysis tends to focus on assessing threat potential or the retrospective location of demographic causes in conflicts. The methodological outcome was the establishment of causal analytical chains that enable the identification of exacerbating conditions and variables, and a clear assessment of threat/conflict potential. Marcel Leroy13 (1986) and Shaukat Hassan14 (1991), for example, demonstrated how growth can produce disruptive or violent behaviour that may undermine socio-political stability. Both are careful to demonstrate that these threats/causes are possible rather than probable, stressing that human agency and social effect ultimately determine outcomes. Analysts can assess the possibility of a population based threats or conflicts arising, but not predict the occurrence of either. Leroy established a direct link between population and insecurity (Leroy 1986: 159). Leroy, devoid of predictive pretence, concedes to methodological problems and the burden of proof (Leroy 1986: 160). He offered a plausible causal chain which posited social effect as a crucial variable. Population growth caused instability by exacerbating existing tensions and variables: in this case internal and external competition for resources, which could potentially catalyse events disruptive to the international status-quo. Leroy cautioned that this is not a given because temporal factors, such as population growth, decline or a changed resource base, could alter the outcome. Likewise, he was careful to demonstrate the potentially mitigating effect of socio-political management and policies, adding cultural perspective as a variable determinant of management strategies and outcome through influences over domestic decision making. Leaders must examine how demographic and cultural factors temper popular acceptance of larger goals, particularly economic and military responses. These considerations in turn influence how the domestic system relates its internal situation externally (Leroy 1986: 166–68). How states address the population-resource tension could cause domestic crises and instability at the international level. Leroy’s model is comprehensive in that it considers the positive and negative influence of intervening variables in security equations. 13  In 1986, when his referred to research was published, Michael Leroy was a Professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the University College of Cape Breton. He is cited as an ‘authority on international relations and demography’ (Westing 1986). The research referred to in this paper was an historical, qualitative analysis of the political and strategic implications of population growth and environmental degradation. 14  Dr Shaukat Hassan holds a PhD in International Relations. In 1991, at the time he published his above referred to research, he was a fellow at the International Institute of Strategic Studies.

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Hassan’s model was embedded in the environment-security paradigm that dominated alternative security discourse in the 1980s, which incorporated population as a variable in the environment-security chain. His work was premised on environmental degradation as causal to economic, social and political instability, and offered a number of possible outcomes, covering all levels of analysis. For example, environmental degradation could cause inter-state conflict by reducing economic opportunities, which forces demographic displacement internally and/ or trans-nationally. Displacement may also increase social pressure on a particular sub-national group, in turn shifting political allegiances and ultimately causing civil strife or even insurgency. Mitigating internal and external threats may induce policy choices which heighten existing tensions. Where the cause of degradation is trans-boundary, bi-lateral and multi-lateral relations may be undermined (Hassan 1991: 5). In identifying demographic factors as exacerbating variables, Hassan posited population as indirectly causal to insecurity (Hassan 1991: 5–7). Again, there was no pretence to predictiveness, rather the establishment of plausible outcomes and variables which enabled the identification of vulnerable groups and situations. These models illustrated tensions in the field concerning the degree of causality that can be assigned to population growth. Few posit population growth as an independent variable. Paul Ehrlich (1991) and Howard Wiarda (1986) posited population growth as the primary cause of instability and insecurity. Although they acknowledged the influence of other variables, such as resource scarcity and environmental degradation, they argued that these were caused, not exacerbated, by high population growth rates (Ehrlich 1991: 171; Wiarda 1986: 154). Population growth, then, caused insecurity because it created the factors contributing to instability. However, most observers believed “[t]here [was] no evidence to suggest that population growth alone as an independent variable can explain instability, violence, aggressive behaviour, and the rise of radical movements of the left and right” (Myron Weiner cited in Foster 1989: 23). The cautionary approach, positing these conditions as pre-existing, suggested population growth exacerbated, rather than caused, instability and insecurity. Furthermore, it recognised the variance between developed and developing societies, between countries with low population density and high density, and between different levels of economic growth and technological development; these were factors that temper the impact of population growth (Foster 1989: 19; Myron Weiner cited in Foster 1989: 23; Mische 1994: 276): Population growth then, is a factor rather than the factor that causes insecurity; other variables serve to heighten the threat posed. Wiarda offered a succinct commentary on this relationship and suggested: in focusing on population and internal unrest … we shall be treating the following topics: the relation between size, crowding and internal tension; the changing age profile … and whether younger means more radical; the pressures on the land and agriculture brought on by increased population growth; the effects of urbanisation and immigration and of cities that have grown beyond the size of liveability or governability; the prospects for increased emigration and

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Islam and the Securitisation of Population Policies spiralling refugee problems, the prospects for economic growth or, alternatively, contraction and negative growth; rising social tensions, riots, and revolutionary activities; the unravelling of political systems’ and finally, war, both civil and international” (Wiarda 1986: 158–59).

Population and Security: Exacerbating Factors, Intervening Variables Economic Variables The understanding that rapid population growth coupled with low socio-economic development could directly threaten state stability and therefore security embedded the population-development nexus in security discourse. The population-economicsecurity dynamic is complex. Economic factors enable states to safeguard against domestic unrest and instability through service provision, and are attributes to national power. By extending this logic in a simplified realist/neo-realist vein, more power equals more security, less power equals less security. A state’s position in the international system rests partly in its economic capabilities. Economic stability is therefore important to a state’s domestic stability and/or national security (Wiarda 1986: 171). Analysts consider weak economies as most vulnerable to this type of threat and the theoretical examples presented in the literature demonstrate how this relationship is understood. The complex technological foundations of modern economies require highly skilled workforces which can only be developed through sufficient investment in education and vocational training. However, states beset by population – resource imbalances have little to invest in social capital once basic needs are fiscally catered for (Tuchman Matthews 1989: 164, Wiarda 1986: 167). Because of this, governments face tough spending decisions, which could adversely affect state stability; they either invest in economic growth at the immediate expense of the people, or invest in the people immediately at the expense of long-term economic growth. The social and political outcomes of these tradeoffs are potentially detrimental. For example, reduced social infrastructure expenditure could exacerbate socioeconomic divisions with potentially violent and destabilising outcomes due to the “breakdown of governmental authority” leading to “increasingly repressive means that lead, in turn, to the decline in the perceived legitimacy of the regime in power” (Ullman 1995: 27–8). The trade-off shifts to security: whose security – the government or the peoples’? In the interest of state and administrative survival governments may turn on the people. Their security is then compromised by its usual provider: the state. Furthermore, an economic downturn may make radical solutions politically or socially attractive. For example, analysts speculate that unemployment and the accompanying depreciation in quality of life could compromise security where the disaffected unemployed are drawn to radical groups offering immediate solutions to their problems, thus increasing the presence and influence of groups seeking to challenge both national and international security:

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Communist and Islamist groups feature heavily in national assessments in this vein. States may also seek radical solutions in the form of increased militarisation to address rising unemployment. This may promote competitive militarisation with potentially destabilising effects at the regional and international levels (Foster 1989: 6; Saunders 1991). At the heart of these situations is the pressure brought to bear on vulnerable economies by rapid or high rates of population growth. Environmental Challenges Academics posit human population growth15 as one of three increasingly serious environmental challenges, and the degradation it causes as potentially destabilising at the national, regional and international levels. Environmental security literature is rich in hypothetical and empirical case studies of scarcity-based conflicts fomented by political decisions taken to sustain growing populations. For example, Fairclough, Homer-Dixon and Tuchman-Matthews demonstrated that intra-state conflicts could arise through expansionist policies designed to address domestic population-resource imbalances. Tuchman Matthews argued: Environmental decline occasionally leads to conflict … Generally, however, its impact on nations’ security is felt in the downward pull on economic performance and, therefore, on political stability. The underlying cause of turmoil is often ignored; instead governments address the poverty and instability that are its results (Tuchman Matthews 1989: 166. See also Fairclough 1991: 83; Homer Dixon 1994: 17).

Mische demonstrated this empirically and retrospectively using African and South American case studies. Firstly, the findings of the Ethiopian Relief Commission found human and animal population pressure caused environmental degradation and the subsequent 1975 famine resulted in social upheaval (Mische 1994: 276). Secondly, the forced migration from El Salvador to Honduras, due to environmental degradation, resulted in a Honduran political response which contributed to subsequent interstate conflict, and resultant Salvadoran anger which then morphed into civil insurgency. Both cases demonstrated population pressure as causal to intra and interstate instability and insecurity (Mische 1994, pp. 276–77). Other academics have hypothesised that urban environmental problems will result in dire security outcomes. For example the global trend of rapid growth and urbanisation has resulted in an increased demand for a range of social services and infrastructure: the incapacity of vulnerable and overburdened systems to meet societal needs could cause frustration, violence and disobedience, resulting in political instability and violence nationally and internationally (Demko 1994: 183; 15 Distinct from animal population growth, referred to by Mische 1994: 276.

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Foster 1989: 7; Sarkesian 1989: 558). Population growth is considered central to these scenarios.16 Migration Developed states have advanced an understanding of migration as a threat, amid growing fears of an influx of third world refugees fleeing conflicts and economic downturn, caused by a number of factors including population growth.17 For example North American concerns were that “the geo-political security and potency of America and its Western allies are likely to be threatened by a variety of population trends around the world” (Ben Wattenberg cited in Foster 1989: 24). This has prompted political demands for a pivotal states strategy on the understanding that “demographic forces will play a major role in the political and security prospects of developing countries” (Eberstadt 1998: 34), in the vein of NSSM 200. Whilst this conceptualisation posits migration – and therefore migrants and refugees – as causal to instability and conflict, it is also seen as a consequence of conflict and insecurity (Lynn Jones and Miller 1995: 8). Migration, including forced migration, is motivated by a number of manmade and natural factors, but primarily by the survival instinct (Hassan 1991: 24; Weinbaum 1992/93: 91).18 The UN’s former High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, legitimised this controversial assessment. She stated: “migration must be treated not only as a matter for humanitarian agencies of the UN, but also as a political problem which must be placed in the mainstream of the international agenda as a potential threat to international peace and security” (cited in Demko, 1994: 184). Moreover, academics have speculated that states may be internally 16  This logic has been applied to more recent conflicts. In 2007, the UNEP reported that the Darfur conflict in Sudan had been driven by climate change and environmental factors (www.unep.org press release 22 June 2007). This event is footnoted to recognise the continuing significance of such research, and to ensure chronological ordering of the chapter is not disrupted. 17 A similar logic was implied by the discourse of the Australian Government under John Howard (1996–2007), where the motivations of refugees was de-legitimised by the label ‘queue jumper’ and high ranking government officials speculated that Islamic terrorists would exploit the refugee process to infiltrate Australia (see for example, www. abc.net.au/am/am_archive_2001.htm). 18  Conflict is the primary man-made factor. For example, increased secessionist and irredentist activity post-Cold War has increased the flow of migrants and refugees on a global scale (Weinbaum 1992/3: 92). People are forced to move in search of security, political stability and to escape persecution (Ghosh 1997). Environmental degradation and economic hardship are also cause migration (Weinbaum 1992/3: 92; Ghosh 1997). For example, environmental degradation creates land scarcity thus undermining agricultural production. In turn, food shortages occur, forcing people from country to city in search of food, in order to survive (Wiarda 1986, pp. 160–64).

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destabilised by migration where it causes significant political demographic disequilibrium between religious, cultural, political and/or ethnic groups, which exacerbate existing tensions to give rise to new ones with destabilising effect, forcing harsh policy responses that ignite religious, ethnic and international conflict (Baral 1984: 103; Wood 1994: 12). Host and home states are considered equally vulnerable. The political stability of host states may be existentially threatened by political and societal challenges, or where home states use migrants for cross border covert operations. Home states are vulnerable to punitive actions taken by host states in reaction to adverse migrant behaviour (Ghosh 1997: 14, Weinbaum 1992/3: 103). Furthermore, the adverse pressure on social infrastructure and services caused by migration could cause socially disruptive and potentially destabilising behaviours. Developing, not developed, states bear the disproportionate responsibility for and burden of global refugee movements, and whilst some endeavour to accommodate new arrivals, mass influxes may strain already overburdened economic resources and physical infrastructure. Unmet needs of migrants and citizens could potentially lead to civil disobedience, protests and riots (Baral 1984: 104; Demko 1994: 183; Ghosh 1997: 12; Weinbaum 1992/93: 93; Wiarda 1986: 167; Wood 1994: 192). International political discourse and domestic policies reinforce and reflect academic enquiry into population and security. The Clinton Administration’s 1994, and subsequent, National Security Strategies of Engagement and Enlargement (www.fas.org) acknowledged the altered international security environment of the post Cold War where: the United States and its allies faced a radically transformed security environment. The primary security imperative of the past half-century – containing communist expansion while preventing nuclear war – was gone. Instead, we confronted a complex array of new and old security challenges America had to meet as we approached the 21st century … [where] trans-national problems which once seemed quite distant, like environmental degradation, natural resource depletion, rapid population growth and refugee flows, now pose threats to our prosperity and have security implications for both present and long-term American policy (cited at www.fas.org).

The National Security strategy not only identified population growth as a national security concern, but included population and development spending in its security and strategic policy prescriptions, earmarking international population assistance and global leadership at the ICPD. President Clinton expressed this concern internationally, addressing and Earth Day Convention in April 1994, just prior to the ICPD, stating that our fourth principle is that we have to understand the urgency and magnitude of this environmental issue as a global crisis. We have to work to stop famine and stabilize population growth and prevent further environmental degradation.

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Islam and the Securitisation of Population Policies If we fail, these problems will cause terrorism, tension and war (cited at www. fas.org).

The 1994 Cairo International Conference on Population and Development: Racing Toward 2000 The WPC at Cairo in 1994 was renamed the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) reflecting the global consensus on the indivisibility of population and development. Delegates anticipated that the ICPD would be devoid of the aforementioned ideological and moral hurdles of the Cold War Conferences (McIntosh and Finkle 230–31), hoping for a co-operative and consensual environment. In his opening address, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak stated “the importance of this Conference lies in the fact that it is held in a new world climate, in which humanity has great hopes of a possibly different world order, in which peace, justice and cooperation will prevail” (ICPD 2 1994: 10). However, whilst ideological rifts had dissipated, the newly emerging secular rift in international politics would influence the debate at Cairo in response to perceived Western liberal attacks on socio-cultural mores and the familial institution. Cairo built upon the outcomes of Bucharest and Mexico City, merging them with interim conference findings and arrived at a more nuanced understanding of population that has directed subsequent discourse and agendas. At the same time, it was plagued by the sense of urgency these conferences established when designating global population stabilisation by the year 2000 as the desired outcome of the international population-development agenda. The PA preamble stated that “ during the remaining six years of this critical decade, the world’s nations by their actions or inactions will choose from among a range of alternative demographic futures” (ICPD 1 1994: 4).19 The Cairo agenda was both a response to and reflection of the aforementioned international conferences, debates and conventions. For example the: conference was explicitly given a broader mandate on developmental issues than previous population conferences, reflecting the growing awareness that population, poverty, patterns of production and consumption and the environment are so closely linked that none of them can be considered in isolation (UNFPA 2 1994 [online]).

This reflected not only the global consensus regarding the indivisibility of these issues, but also to the sustainable development paradigm established by the Brundtland Report. Moreover attendee diversity was greater at Cairo than previous conferences, and this was critical in shaping and widening the debate. Furthermore, it reflected 19  See also Chapter 1, paragraph 1.21.

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prior acknowledgement of the crucial role played by non-government actors in population and sustainable activity programs and their participation in a number of preparatory conferences and committees. Chapter 15 of the WPPA, Partnership with the Non-Governmental Sector, committed states to greater participation with the NGO sector and recognised the unique role such organisations play as “important voices of the people, and … an effective and efficient means of better focusing local and national initiatives …” (UNFPA 1994 [online]). NGOs were instrumental in transforming the conference and its subsequent international agenda. Demographic concerns, once the rationale for WPCs, gave way to the “broad issues of interrelationships between population, sustained economic growth and sustainable development, and advances in the education, economic status and empowerment of women” and injected into the debate “the environment and consumption patterns; the family; internal and international migration; prevention and control of [HIV] and [AIDS]20; technology, research and development; and partnership with the non-governmental sector” (Sadik 1995, pp. 1, 6). These issues were considered inextricably linked to population. The interrelatedness of these issues to population had been established at a number of prior inter-governmental and non-governmental conferences, and their manifestation in the WPPA reflected the consultative process between these two groups. The ICPD agenda reflected a conceptualisation of population greatly removed from its demographic origins. For example, the introduction of reproductive health and rights discourses built on and advanced the Mexico City conceptualisation, where population had been interwoven with human rights, environmental, female empowerment, and development discourses. Reproductive health discourse affected a reformulated concept of family planning and caused divisions between nonsecular and secular delegates that almost derailed the conference. This discourse came courtesy of women’s groups, the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, and the 1993 Roundtable on HIV/AIDS and Population. Reproductive health was defined as: a state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, in all matters relating to the reproductive system and to its functions and processes. Reproductive health therefore implies that people are able to have a satisfying and safe sex life and that they have the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when and how often to do so (ICPD 1 1994: 30).

20 HIV/AIDS fostered reproductive health discourse, resulting in a re-examination of taboo subjects through the reproductive health lens. At Cairo, abortion was included in the final document for the first time, and with the approval of religious leaders. Changing the context from a method of lowering fertility/family planning to one of public/reproductive health and a means to lowering maternal deaths, abortion became morally acceptable to its previous opponents (McIntosh and Finkle 1995, pp. 245–49).

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In the context of this discourse, particularly the safe sex provision, HIV/AIDS shifted the concept of family planning from fertility control to a human right. Moreover, having been designated as detrimental to development, health, human rights, and quality of life, specialists and policy makers at the Roundtable had to rethink accordingly their conceptions of contraception and therefore fertility control. Family planning shifted from a population control measure, to a population and development safeguard.21 WPPA chapter seven urged governments to: provide accessible, complete and accurate information about various family planning methods, including their health risks and benefits, possible side effects and their effectiveness in the prevention of the spread of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases (UNFPA 1 1994: 35).

Until Cairo, ideological considerations had overshadowed international population debates and conferences, marginalising religious and cultural concerns. The absence of an overarching international ideological battle by the time of Cairo enabled cultural and religious perspectives to shift from the periphery to the centre of debate (Bowen 1997: 162; Davis 1995: 189; 195, Mertens 1995). The resultant Secular/Non-Secular divide brought tension, dissension and alternative concepts and conclusions to the debate, threatening the much anticipated global consensus. Conference organisers anticipated but did not intend for this to happen. This was evident in the opening addresses by a number of high profile delegates, such as UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who pleaded for tolerance “for we cannot allow a given philosophical, moral or spiritual belief to be imposed upon the entire international community or to block the progress of humanity” (UNFPA 2 1994: 7). However an uneasy, but nonetheless disruptive secular bloc emerged preconference in August 1994 between the Vatican, Muslims, and Baptists, the Ad Hoc Coalition for Cairo (Obaid 1 2002, www.skepticfiles.org) – united in their opposition to Western liberal perspectives on abortion, family formation, sexual relations, and sexuality. Some members of the religious alliance interpreted this as condoning abortion as a substitute for family planning – as well as homosexuality, pre- and extra marital sex – counter to Islamic, Catholic and Christian family and sexual norms. The Baptists, from the United Sates, attended the Cairo conference as an NGO; their position did not reflect that of the then Clinton Administration, which by 1994 had rescinded the Mexico City policy of the Regan/Bush administrations. Although the official US position was one of open and unequivocal support for the ICPD, the presence of Baptists dissenters demonstrated that religious objections were firmly entrenched amongst some Americans. A number of Catholic Latin

21 There is little discussion of the impact of HIV/AIDS in the literature reviewed, however for further discussion of the indirect impact of the virus on issues related to population see Cliquet and Thienpont 1995: 64.

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American countries expressed similar concerns. Honduras, for example, reservedly supported the majority of reproductive health provisions, stating: one accepts the concepts of ‘family planning’, ‘sexual health’, ‘reproductive health’, ‘maternity without risk’, ‘regulation of fertility’, ‘reproductive rights’ and ‘sexual rights’ so long as these terms do not include ‘abortion’ or ‘termination of pregnancy’, because Honduras does not accept these as arbitrary actions; nor do we accept them as a way of controlling fertility or regulating the population (UNFPA 2 1994 [online]).

However, the willingness of Muslim delegates to reformulate draft abortion references enabled universal, though reserved, endorsement of the final document (Bowen 1997: 177). In the draft document, abortion references were made primarily in Chapter 7, Reproductive Rights and Family Planning, reaffirming the “consensus of the 1984 International Conference on Population that governments should “take appropriate steps to help women avoid abortion, which in no case should be promoted as a method of family planning …” (UNFPA 1 1994: 36). Whilst this paragraph was included in the final document, the primary difference between it and the draft was that the majority of abortion references were shifted to Chapter 8 Health, Morbidity and Mortality, more specifically in section three Women’s Health and Safe Motherhood, where it was stated in paragraph 8.25 that In no case should abortion be promoted as a method of family planning. All Governments and relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations are urged to strengthen their commitment to women’s health, to deal with the health impact of unsafe abortion as a major public health concern and to reduce the recourse to abortion through expanded and improved familyplanning services. Prevention of unwanted pregnancies must always be given the highest priority and every attempt should be made to eliminate the need for abortion. Women who have unwanted pregnancies should have ready access to reliable information and compassionate counselling. Any measures or changes related to abortion within the health system can only be determined at the national or local level according to the national legislative process. In circumstances where abortion is not against the law, such abortion should be safe. In all cases, women should have access to quality services for the management of complications arising from abortion. Post-abortion counselling, education and family-planning services should be offered promptly, which will also help to avoid repeat abortions (UNFPA 2 1994 [online]).

This shifted abortion from the context of reproductive rights. Religious delegates accepted the specification of abortion use only to safeguard maternal health or as a last resort. The Vatican reservedly joined the consensus, endorsing those chapters of the document it could reconcile with its own convictions, whilst reserving the right to formally dissent on a number of topics, particularly abortion. It chose to:

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Islam and the Securitisation of Population Policies associate itself with this consensus in a partial manner … without hindering the consensus among other nations, but also without prejudicing its own position with regard to some sections. Nothing that the Holy See has done in this consensus process should be understood or interpreted as an endorsement of concepts it cannot support for moral reasons … or has in any way changed its moral position concerning abortion or on contraceptives or sterilization or on the use of condoms in HIV/AIDS prevention programmes (UNFPA 2 1994 [online]).

Post Cairo: 1994–2015 2015 is allocated as the end point for this chapter because it is the year by which the UN expects the ICPD and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to be fully implemented. Furthermore, it is the year when the current population-sustainable development paradigm will once more be subject to international review. Since Cairo, the international community has reaffirmed its commitment to the ICPD agenda and consolidated the ongoing process of agenda merging through a number of conferences and declarations, such as the Beijing Fourth World Conference of Women, 1995, the ICPD +5, 1999, the Millennium Summit and Millennium Development Goals, 2000, and the ICPD +10 follow up meetings. Building on the global momentum and consensus established at Cairo, these conferences reaffirmed population, reproductive health, women’s rights and empowerment, and poverty eradication as interrelated and indivisible aspects of sustainable development. However review documents and declarations reveal a substantial gap between stated commitment to international population and sustainable development goals and actual implementation. Furthermore, these conferences demonstrated the endurance of religious and cultural influence since Cairo, through UN dedication to tailoring plans, programs and activities to localised religio-cultural norms, and the detrimental shift in the US position under the Bush administration to accommodate domestic religious conservatism. The ICPD +5 and +10 conferences reinforced the ICPD agenda and reaffirmed global commitment to the full realisation of its outcomes, yet also demonstrated the distance between stated and actual commitment to the implementation of the ICPD agenda and the centrality of religious perspectives as had emerged at Cairo. The unanimous adoption of the +5 document, Key Actions for the Further Implementation of the ICPD, by UNGA reconfirmed global commitment to the ICPD agenda. This review, however, revealed the process of implementation since Cairo to be bittersweet. The +5 acknowledged that “the five year progress of review shows that implementation of the recommendations of the Plan of Action has shown positive results” but conceded that “in some countries and regions, progress has been limited and, in some cases, setbacks have occurred” particularly with regard to female empowerment and the containment of HIV/AIDS. Moreover, the adoption of the document demonstrated that religious opposition had shifted

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from obstruction to reserved conciliation since Cairo. The US strengthened its resumed leadership role in global debate – which had been rescinded under Regan and Bush – sending First Lady Hilary Clinton as the honorary head of its official delegation (http: //www.commondreams.org/pressreleases/feb99/020599a.htm). Muslim countries, such as Libya, Kuwait, Qatar, Yemen, the UAE, Jordan and Iran, continued to play an important leadership and brokering role. Whilst expressing reservations on certain provisions they endorsed the document and desired to join the global consensus. The Holy See too expressed its reserved desire to join the +5 consensus, repeating its Cairo qualifier that nothing the Holy See has done in this process should be understood as an endorsement of concepts it cannot accept for moral reasons … the intention therefore of the Holy See is to welcome the consensus decision of the Assembly … by welcoming the adoption of the final document wishes to express its understanding of the document just adopted (UNFPA 1999 [online]).

Interim events were as influential over international population discourse as the conferences themselves. Between the +5 and +10, the implementation of the MDGs and the election of the George W. Bush administration in the US were significant in shaping international population discourse. Moreover, the UN consolidated its position on religion and culture established at the ICPD, reconfirmed at +5, further legitimising the place of religio-cultural norms, considerations and actors in international population discourse. The ICPD and +5 were foundational to, and reinforced by the MDGs, through their overlapping goals regarding, poverty, education, gender, mortality, health, HIV/AIDS, the environment, and global development partnerships, and through the human-centred approach to sustainable development they endorsed. With regard to population and family planning, all recognised and reaffirmed the interrelatedness between these and sustainable development. Moreover, UNGA Resolution 55/2, 2000, The Millennium Declaration, merged a number of UN agendas, most notably sustainable development and global security. It established the concepts and conclusions of each as interrelated and indivisible. The Millennium Declaration determined to: establish a just and lasting peace all over the world … respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the equal rights of all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion and international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character (UNGA 2000 [online]).

The centrality of population and family planning to this end was confirmed in a 2004 ECOSOC report which stated “evidence from the Asian and Pacific region shows that the implementation of the ICPD and ICPD+5 continues to be important as they are essential to the achievement of the MDGs” (ECOSOC 2004: 1).

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Furthermore, the report cited a 2004 UNFPA finding that “the MDGs, particularly the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, can no be achieved if questions of population and reproductive health are not squarely addressed” (ECOSOC 2004: 2). Within the context of the ICPD and MDGs, the UN has also recognised religious actors and cultural norms as essential to the full implementation of sustainable development goals. For example, in an April 2002 address at Georgetown University, UNFPA President Thoraya Obaid acknowledged the importance and influence of religious partnerships and opinion, in and over UN activities and debates. She stated: religion counts because the dialogue within the United Nations between North and South, and East and West has been about culture and religion, as well as about the politics of power. Thus, the tension ends up being a political confrontation over religious beliefs and cultural values; conflict between the belief and value systems of the various societies (Obaid 2002 [online]).

However, with the exception of the +5 Conference, some states have coopted religion to obstruct debate and the institution of constantly evolving population norms and initiatives. This has particularly been the tactic of the US since the election of George Bush in 2000 and his administration’s revisiting of Reagan’s Mexico City Policy, dubbed the Global Gag Rule. This is a concession to domestic conservative religious opinion which restricts global family planning funding where it could be used for abortion provision, promotion, counselling and lobbying (www.pai.org). This has contributed to the US decision to de-fund the UNFPA due to its support for coercive family planning and abortion practices in China. Furthermore, the Global Gag Rule has also resulted in obstructionist tactics by US delegates at global population forums. For example at the 2004 Parliamentarians Meeting on the ICPD +10, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Kelly Ryan stated: The United States is unable, however, to endorse the world leaders’ statement on supporting the ICPD. The statement includes the concept of sexual ‘rights,’ a term that has no agreed definition in the international community, goes beyond what was agreed to at Cairo and is not a component of the ICPD (Obesity, Fitness and Wellness Week, 6 November 2004).

Despite this, the 2005 +10 Conference, The World Reaffirms Cairo, demonstrated the agenda’s universal endorsement. Yet, once again, the UN was forced to concede the gap between stated and actual commitment. The UN’s confident proclamation that “countries throughout the world continue to use the ICPD Programme in forging the strategies and policies with which they hope to address population issues and achieve the Millennium Development Goals. And they are making substantial progress, building on the achievements of earlier decades” contrasted

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with its concession that “any satisfaction we may feel at the expansion of rights and freedoms involving population issues must be tempered by an acute awareness of the unfinished agenda, the fact that parts of the world are not sharing in this progress, and the daunting challenges that have emerged in the meantime (UNFPA 2005 [online]). Since, and perhaps because of, Cairo, the population-security agenda has advanced and expanded, through the convergence of academic and political discourses. Through theoretical and empirical research, scholars and practitioners have expanded the 1980s discourse and have merged the population-securitysustainable development discourses through attention to and the prescription of concepts and conclusions embedded in the ICPD and MDGs. Scholars such as Mumford (1995), Ullman (1995), Ehrlich (1996), Eberstadt (1998) and Cincotta, Engelman and Anastasion (2003) emphasised that under the right conditions and with the adequate resources, states could mitigate potential population based threats. Their prescriptions were embedded in sustainable development discourse. For example, in The Security Demographic: Population and Civil Conflict After the Cold War (2003), Cincotta, Engelman and Anastasion empirically and retrospectively located a number of demographic factors – mortality, fertility, age, distribution and disease – as contributing to conflict and insecurity. Amongst the policy prescriptions they made is the need for “greater recognition of the demographic transition as a security-relevant process [which] could … encourage policy makers to become familiar with foreign policies and international programs that have influenced the speed of demographic transition” (Cincotta, Engelman and Anastasion, 2003: 23). Likewise, in Breeding Insecurity: Global Security Implications of Rapid Population Growth (2005) Katherine Weiland added to existing populationsecurity knowledge by arguing: Rapid population growth in developing countries creates national security problems, including civil unrest and terrorism. In particular, population growth leads to large youth bulges, rapid urbanization, and resource scarcity, all of which can lead to insecurity and instability (Weiland 2005: 3).

Moreover, through this and the prescription that “comprehensive family planning programs, as part of an integrated development strategy, will reduce the security risks associated with rapid population growth” (Weiland 2005: 1), Weiland demonstrated the interconnectedness of population, security and sustainable development. This interconnectedness was also expressed in international political discourse. In his 2005 report In Larger Freedom, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan argued “[n]ot only are development, security and human rights all imperative; they also reinforce each other … we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights” (Annan 2005 [online]). In reaffirming the aforementioned Millennium Declaration, UNGA resolution 60/1, adopting the 2005 World Summit

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Outcome, decided “many threats are interlinked, that development, peace, security and human rights are mutually reinforcing” (UNGA 2005 [online]). Population-Development-Security: The Counter Debates This chapter has acknowledged throughout the dissenting voices, most notably ideological and religious, and their alternative population paradigms. Through debate, the international community has arrived at a hard fought and much negotiated consensus understanding of a workable population paradigm. Even this is not without its critics. Post Cairo, a number of academic challenges have been mounted against this paradigm and its underlying assumptions. Critiques range from accusations of racism, paternalism gender bias, and neo-colonialism, through to the lack of academic rigour and empiricism, and the validity of interconnecting population, sustainable development and security. For example, a common criticism of the population-development paradigm is that it marginalises, homogenises and demonises the global South. Postmodernists and feminists argue that the starting point should be the broadening of the development agenda beyond its neo-classical framework which conceptualises development as a globally homogeneous process controlled by states through their economic institutions. It assumes uniformity of perceptions and experiences within and between states. Whilst their focuses may be on different problems of the neo-classical approach, what unites post-modernist and feminist critiques is their emphasis on the micro aspects of development, particularly the need to consider the myriad and disparate voices of the poor, as well as ethnic, religious, gender perspectives (Thomas-Slayter 2003). Urban (2001) and Grimes (1998) argue that the global debate has constructed blame for overpopulation and ills to be the fault of the Third World, leading to the imposition of insensitive homogeneous population policies and the marginalisation of localised concerns and perceptions in the pursuit of a global, read Western, good. Urban highlights the dichotomy between the conception of population and proposed solutions, arguing that whilst the global debate talks of “our shared problem” and “our overcrowded planet” resultant research and policies, by focusing their attentions on conditions in the developing world, serve to blame and subsequently, demonise the South as the cause if global disasters. Population control in the developing world is thus constructed as the only solution to global problems. Grimes critique extends this argument, suggesting, amongst other things, that the construction of blame hides a more insidious agenda embedded in Western foreign and security policy fears, generating a desire to control Third World growth and expansion. This resulted in what he termed “paternalistic humanitarianism” the imposition of insensitive population control policies, from contraceptive use to the small family norm, for the supposed benefit of the developing world, in order to safeguard the developed. Hartmann (1998, 2001), Krebs and Levy (2000) and Gilbert (2000) question the validity and necessity of constructing population as a security issue, criticising

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the lack of intellectual rigour and empiricism in a number of foundational research projects. Hartmann is particularly critical of Homer-Dixon’s ongoing research into environmental causes of conflict, which include references to population. She questions whether security is the right framework for discussing these issues because their solutions lie in international co-operation which she says is traditionally antithetical to security. Like Urban and Grimes, she highlights the blame game being played out through the environment/population-security agenda, the focus of which is predominantly Third World Scarcity conflicts. She argues that this distracts attention from other causes, such as the effects of poverty caused by global inequity, and shifts blame away from the developed world and state governments, onto the people, mainly the global poor. Moreover, she criticises the intellectual rigour of Homer-Dixon’s work, labelling it assumptive and reduction for failing to consider the paradox in his proposals; for example, conflict can be as much a cause of environmental degradation as degradation is a cause of conflict. As to the saliency of the population-security agenda, Hartmann stated “[i]t is important to remember that national security agencies need an enemy, and who is the enemy when violence and instability are blamed on population pressures and resource scarcities? Implicitly, if not explicitly, the enemy becomes the poor people” (Hartmann 1998: 127). Gilbert, like Hartmann, was critical of the reductive and assumptive nature of empirical studies. His empirical research on urbanisation and security led to the conclusion that there is no “consistent or meaningful relationship” between the two, and the dispelling of a number of pessimistic myths. He found the assumptions that social anomie, radicalism, revolution, rioting and the magnification of tension are the outcomes of rapid urbanisation to be false and that, in a number of cases, the opposite was generally true, urbanisation was generally of societal and political benefit. Conclusion Contemporary population-security discourse originates from the discourses of ancient civilisations. Consistent historical debate produced two overarching paradigms: pro- and anti-natalism. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Thomas Malthus revived and popularised anti-natalist thought with his pessimistic population tract On Population. In it, Malthus argued that population growth would cause food and agricultural shortages that the modes of production at the time could not meet. Fertility and therefore population control was, he argued, the only solutions. This is the essence of Malthusianism. Despite its initial popularity, Malthusianism declined as European conflict and instability gave rise to resurgent geo-strategic pro-natalism in the form of policies enabling and encouraging population growth. In the twentieth century, population was internationalised and securitised. Initially it was a non-political issue, and was largely the preserve of non-governmental neoMalthusianism birth control leagues. These groups convened several international

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conferences, the first in 1901, and lobbied national governments for birth control facilities. The basis of their arguments were economic and health concerns. In this, they served as the foundations for later socio-economic and health paradigms. Most states were reluctant to involve themselves with birth control advocacy or activities for moral reasons. Many attempted to silence neo-Malthusian groups through legislation against, and prosecution for, perceived obscenities in birth control literature. This common interest led to the first international, inter-state conference on population in 1910. The League of Nations and then the United Nations involvement transformed the international agenda. Initially reluctant to engage in anything other than technical activities, demonstrated at the 1927 and 1954 conferences as well as debates with these organisations. However, through the forum of general and specialised agencies debate, states, experts, and non-government agencies engaged and debated the national and international aspects of the growing global population. Competitive demands and agendas were negotiated and then merged, giving rise to a politicised global population agenda. This debate, which emerged out of the Belgrade World Population Conference of 1965, established the economic-development paradigm as globally dominant. The UN involved itself in national policy and program assistance, primarily to the developing world, assisting developing states in population control in the pursuit of economic development objectives. Alongside this discourse, the nascent securitised and alternative critiques were established in political, academic and non-government circles, within and external to the UN. From Belgrade in 1965 to the present, numerous change agents have shifted and shaped global population discourse by melding and merging a number of issues and agendas to it. This has included human rights, health, female empowerment, the environment, sustainable development and reproductive health. Also during this time, population – particularly growth – was securitised at the international level. National securitising discourses emerged in the late 1960s, which posited population growth as a threat to national and international peace and security. In the 1970s concurrent with, and because of, re conceptualisation in the field of security studies, the securitised notion of population emerged in academic discourse. It also found its way into global population and development agendas through global UN conferences and declarations. In the 1980s, an academically, politically and internationally recognised population-security paradigm emerged. This paradigm understood population growth as a potential threat to national and international security, because of its causal relationship with a number of other destabilising factors such as environmental degradation, economic stagnation and unemployment. Where states were unable to mitigate these conditions through political and economic means, the paradigm prescribed population control as the best solution. However, at the 1994 Cairo Conference a previously peripheral and potentially obstructive factor emerged in the debate: religion. Incensed by a perceived agenda to impose Western sexual mores as the global norm, Catholic and Muslim states – conservative and moderate – sought to inject their own understandings of

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population as linked to sustainable development, into conference discussions. Whilst conservative agents, such as the Holy See and Al-Azhar, gained press and prominence for their obscurantist tactics, moderate state and non-state delegates engaged with their secular liberal counterparts to produce what now stands as the blueprint of the global population-sustainable development agenda: the 1994 ICPD World Population Plan of Action. With regard to Islam, Cairo, and subsequent follow-up and interrelated conferences, has shown that on population the Muslim world was divided. There is no singular Islamic position on population growth and control, rather there are multiple and nuanced positions that are informed by a milieu of factors including religion.

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Chapter 2

Population and Family Planning in Islamic Jurisprudence Contraception, birth and population control are long standing Islamic and Muslim concerns. The Hadith and Sunna contain references to the practice of al-azl, withdrawal, by the Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) which, joined with Quranic interpretations, are foundational to past and current debates on religious permissibility. There are two essential Islamic positions, pro- and anti-natalist and family planning, with overarching varying degrees of permissibility, limitation, and applicability. This diversity is a product of historical debates on interpretative practices, the validity of sources, and the fallibility of the Prophet, joined with localised non-Islamic practices and norms, and a milieu of other temporal factors, such as political and economic circumstance. What is evident is that there is no singular Islamic opinion or experience with regards to family planning and population, and this diversity serves to dispel persistent assumptions of Islam as monolithic and conservative. Interpretation, experiences, and the influence of Islam vary between states, and within. Contemporary international debates have been partly informed by religious concerns, primarily Catholic ones, however despite this, long standing Muslim tradition, and the adoption of global norms by a number of Muslim states and societies, Islam remained at the periphery of international debate until the Cairo ICPD: This absence and then shift warrants is investigation in this chapter. Here, the literature on Islam and family planning is examined, in order to understand the religious position on population growth, family planning and contraception, to gauge how this might manifest in national level debates, and whether this necessarily means that debates in the Muslim world will be different from international ones. This chapter begins by exploring the historical and theological origins of jurisprudential arguments, which are many and often conflicting. Although all are based on the same central sources and

 Sayings of the Prophet.  Examples set by the Prophet.  Literal translation: withdrawal method.  Due to word limit restrictions, further references to the Prophet will not be followed with this blessing. This initial inclusion applies to all following references to the Prophet, out of respect for the reverence Muslims afford him.

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interpretive practices – Quran, Hadith, Sunna, Qiyas, and Ijma, permanent and temporal influences – the lack of religious hierarchy, a tradition of interpretation, and the existence of divergent schools of thought, have shaped interpretations and created diverse opinion. The chapter concludes by examining the domestic and international manifestations of Islamic population discourse. Although Islam is important to population debates it is not the only determinant of fertility in the Muslim world. Religion is one of many factors acknowledged as influential by fertility studies; these same studies further indicate that local level religious leaders have their own interpretations on fertility, family planning and population issues which they promulgate throughout their communities. Moreover, a variety of data confirm that some ulema are vocal in population debates, supporting or opposing local, national and/or international programs and policies. Although we cannot conclusively prove the degree of influence they have over fertility patterns, the fact that they are vocal on these issues means that they have an important role play in the debate. This book is more concerned with the role of the ulema within the debate, rather than determining the exact level of influence they have over fertility decision making. This requires an understanding of Islamic opinion – from jurisprudential to political – concerning subjects such as population growth, family planning and contraception; namely the concepts and conclusions central to international population debate. International opinion holds that population growth is problematic, thus it is important to establish an Islamic jurisprudential position on the question of population growth and optimum size. Where population growth is considered problematic, finding solutions draws us into the morally sensitive areas of family planning and contraception; if these are not acceptable, how should the problem then be approached? It may be that population growth is not considered problematic from a jurisprudential perspective, therefore population control is unnecessary and the utility of family planning shifts to the personal level. Why Religion? Why Islam? Religion can, and does, influence population opinion and subsequent debate. This is clearly manifest at the domestic level where religious opinion has influenced political and personal decision making. Religious influence only recently manifested in international population debate, but the expression of religious concerns at Cairo prompted the belief that religion could work against global population goals: , whether religions, the traditional “nurturers of group life … in praying for health and fecundity … are now abetting rather than preventing ‘the population bomb’ or  Analogical reasoning.   Consensus of learned scholars (traditional/orthodox) or the Muslim community (liberal/modernist).   Cultural, political, economic, and societal influences.

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‘population explosion” (Trompf 1998: 206). This oppositional trend, long observed in domestic debate, suggests that where religious groups and figures are socially influential and are important to political legitimacy, states cannot ignore religious opinion in debate, policy and planning. It follows that where religious opposition to family planning and population control are strong, policy and programs are either abandoned or made covert. Reverence of children as deified gifts, and the encouragement of fertility are not unique to Islam; they are also part of Catholic, Judaic, and Hindu traditions (Hassan 1996: 64; Maguire 2001; Trompf 1998, pp. 220–23). Moreover, most religions and traditions were founded at a time when overpopulation was not even a local, let alone global, concern, and many have been ‘caught off guard’ by the relatively quick advance of global concerns and pressures for control (Trompf 1998: 207). However, whilst global population control efforts have focused on the developing world in a broad sense, Muslim fertility and pro-natalism in particular garnered considerable academic, and more recently political, attention, possibly in a response to the rise of radical Islam: fears of revolutionary exportation coupled with increasing numbers have pervaded Western political thinking (Teitelbaum and Winter 1998: 221). Early Islamic Opinion and its Origins: 1st (AH)/7th (AD) Century – 12th (AH)/18th (AD) Century Text and Interpretation: The Debates Although all Islamic interpretations on contraception, family planning and population derive from the same sources – Quran, Hadith and Sunna, Qiyas, and Ijma – there is no uniformity of interpretation. This is as much to do with historical processes as it is to do with the nature of the texts. Scholars of the various schools generally agreed on broad, descriptive definitions of these sources, the importance of, adherence to, and privileging of some sources over others reflected the outcomes of post-Prophetic debates within Islam. This produced orthodoxy, created the Sunni-Shia divide, led to the establishment of jurisprudential schools, and later caused an orthodox-modernist schism. The Quran is the word and book of God as transmitted to the Prophet. It is the code for the Muslim way of life, as well as the intellectual and moral foundation of Islamic law, the Shariah. Its text is implicit rather than explicit, and codifies social and societal ethics; as Piscatori explains, “… the Quran invites questioning, and therefore interpretation, when it admits – with remarkable candour – that certain verses are ‘obscure’ or ‘ambiguous’, and that only God knows what they really mean (3: 7)” (Piscatori 1991: 3, see also A. Rahman 1992: 5; Nasr 2 1994: 41–3; F. Rahman 1979: 30). Sunna is a pre-Islamic  Establishment of authoritative theological doctrine. See below for further explanation of this process in Islam.  Literal translation: the straight path. This is the collective term for Islamic law.

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tradition of non-verbal authoritative example set by revered groups or individuals. Under Islam, this practice came to be associated with the Prophet, his Companions and the Caliphs as the authoritative figures in Islam. The validity and authority of certain Sunna came into question during the 3rd (AH)/9th (AD) century (Brown 1996, pp 6, 8; F. Rahman 1979: 54–6). Hadith is the verbal traditions of the Prophet, his answers to and directives on certain situations as they arose, as interpreted from the Quranic teachings. Hadith was transmitted by the Companions and Caliphs who served as authoritative witnesses to Hadith. In the 1st (AH)/7th (AD) century, the process of isnad,10 supportive authority or referencing to a legitimate and reliable transmitter, was introduced to substantiate and validate the proliferating Hadith. The authority and validity of Hadith were also later brought into question (A. Rahman 1992: 6; F. Rahman 1979: 54). Ijma is an interpretive practice, offering authoritative interpretations of the Quran, Hadith and Sunna through the unanimous consent of learned scholars, embedded in the Prophetic directive my community shall never agree in error (Nasr 1994: 100). It includes the practice of ijtihad, independent reasoning on the part of learned scholars with full knowledge of the sources and in consultation with other scholars. Ijma should be a gradual rather than an immediate process, and should only operate where the Quran and Hadith offer no substantial clarification or guidance on a particular matter (A. Rahman 1992: 7; Nasr 1994: 100). Qiyas, or analogical reasoning, are the application of principles to contemporary problems. It is the preserve of the ulama who, with full knowledge of the sources, can find comparatives in these to answer questions not previously encountered (A. Rahman 1992: 8; Nasr 1994: 100). Over time the authority, validity and primacy of the religious texts changed as a result of developments within the community, and subsequent shifts in the use and authority of the sources, falling under four periods: early Islamic from the time of the Prophet until the establishment of orthodoxy around 3rd (AH) /9th (AD) century; Islamic orthodoxy from 3rd (AH) /9th (AD) century until around 12th (AH)/18th (AD) century; Orthodox-Modernist schism in the 12th (AH)/18th (AD) Century; Islamic revivalism beginning in the 13th (AH)/19th (AD) century. During each of these periods, the sources were shaped and used to suit the religiopolitical needs and agendas of authoritative figures in the Islamic world. The need for codification in order to establish religious authority and preserve religious cohesiveness and distinction did not arise until after the death of the Prophet. During the early Islamic period, the Quran, Hadith, and Prophetic and companion Sunna11 were used conterminously based on acceptance of their divine origins and thus equity, and for personal moral, rather than political, reasons (Brown 1996: 6–8, 10–13; F. Rahman 1979: 54–6). Living tradition during the time of the Prophetic exemplar produced a fluid notion of uncontested Prophetic and religious 10 Chain of transmitters 11 According to Brown, Sunna predates Islam, referring to the word of revered groups or individuals (Brown 1996: 8).

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authority which negated the need for codification, and “an unsystematic approach prevailed until the completion of Quranic compilation in the early post-Prophetic era” (Lapidus 1991: 21). The lack of recorded material meant no sources could be confidently proclaimed the Prophetic word. In an “increasingly complex religious and political environment” (Brown, 1996: 13) besieged by external and internal conflicts, in a vacuum of religious authority, coupled with an environment of uncertainty, scholarly interpretation was being made expediently to establish personal legitimacy and discredit opponents: the need for codification arose (Brown 1996: 13). The question of rightful succession, on the basis of direct lineage or religious piety, produced the Shia-Sunni schism. Furthermore, the growth and migration of the Umma away from Mecca and Medina, particularly during the Umayyad years, brought Muslims and Islam into contact with other customs and traditions. The conversion of people to Islam, coupled with flexible interpretive practices, and the development of regional schools under the guidance of various Companions and Caliphs, enabled these customs and traditions to be embedded into Islamic practice and thought. Jurisprudential codification began under the Abbasids to avert religious dilution (Nasr 1994: 100–103) which led to the establishment of the first two Sunni schools of law – the Maliki in Medina and Hanafi in Kufa (Nasr 1994: 103). The move toward orthodoxy reflected debates over source and transmitter fallibility and the need for textual authoritativeness. Around the 3rd (AH)/9th (AD) centuries, suspected transmitter fallibility brought Sunna authority into question. Three disciplines emerged: living tradition scholars who favoured the existing early period practices; Speculative theologians who accepted only the Quran; AlShafii’s perspective, which prevailed, rejected non-Prophetic Sunna and Hadith, and distinguished Quran and Hadith as the primary, and Ijma and Qiyas as the secondary sources of Islamic thought, and formed the third school of Sunni law. Shafii formalised textual hierarchy and co-extensiveness, based on Prophetic infallibility and divine connection. The Quran was the superior devotional and spiritual source and the Sunna its jurisprudential equal. Distinction was in form only; the Quran as recited revelation, the Sunna as unrecited. Prophetic Hadith and Sunna were used to ‘amplify’ the Quran, and to ground its implicit directives in human experience (Nasr 1994: 99; Brown 1996: 10–16; F. Rahman 1979: 59–64). Moreover in the 2nd (AH)/8th (AD) century, following the appearance of “… a large body of Hadith, claiming to emanate from the Prophet …” (F. Rahman 1979: 76), Hadith became the accepted representation of the Sunna, thereby generally replacing Ijma, and by extension Qiyas and Ijtihad, as the methodology for Quranic interpretation. Orthodoxy produced an authoritative textual base, rendering further interpretation unnecessary. This served as the basis of the Hanbalite School, the fourth in Sunnism, founded by Al Shafii’s student Ahmad bin Hanbal. The Sunni finalisation of Ijma in the 4th (AH)/10th (AD) century marginalised and almost extinguished ijtihad, confining scholarly and juristic interpretation and reinterpretation to within one’s own school, rather than across schools, described

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by Rahman as ‘relative ijtihad’ as opposed to ‘absolute ijtihad’ (F. Rahman 1979: 79, see also pp. 74–6; Nasr 1994: 103–104; Piscatori 1991: 4–9). Ijtihad was kept alive by the Jafari Twelver Shiite, whose mujtahids served as living interpreters of the law in the absence of the unrevealed Imam. The Schools of Thought and a ‘Spectrum of Permissibility’ In the early Islamic period, the majority of schools permitted family planning; differentiations on the question of consent produced a spectrum of interpretation and conditional permissibility. This section draws heavily on Omran’s Family Planning in the Legacy of Islam (1992), which is the most comprehensive English language study12 on interpretation from the major schools13 of Islamic thought, and is a primary source for Muslim and non-Muslim scholars and practitioners of Islamic fertility.14 Omran found that the early findings of the major schools conform to the above described pattern in that there is a relative consensus as to the centrality of the Quran and Sunna, but differentiated interpretations (Omran 1992: 146). Natural methods of contraception, such as rhythm and withdrawal, were generally permitted because they were analogised and akin to al-azl, practiced by the Prophet’s companions with his consent and thus having a degree of religious legitimacy. There is a multitude of substantiated traditions in numerous Hadith compilations that refer to this practice, which Omran classified into nine major categories: experience of the companions; tacit Prophetic approval with the predestination caveat; verbal Prophetic sanction; women as tilth; permitted with wife’s consent; equivocal language; pregnancy whilst nursing; hidden infanticide; denial of infanticide (Omran 1992: 115). For example, Hadith 1.1 from Jabir claimed that “on the authority of Jabir Ibn Abdullah he said ‘we [Companions] used to practice al-azl during the time of the Prophet while the Quran was being revealed” (cited in Omran 1992: 115). The spectrum of permissibility arose out of minor interpretive variations on the question of consent. On family planning, Omran observed only minor differences between the schools, noting more agreements than disagreement regarding permissibility. Contemporary interpretations as to the permissibility of population control and family planning are partially derived from 12 Although there is a large body of literature on Islam and family planning, it focuses on Islamic influence over family planning policies and programs, rather than Islamic jurisprudence on the subject. 13 Omran stresses that the theistic divisions within Islam are schools of thought rather than sects because, unlike Christian denominations whose religious beliefs and practices differ, Islam’s schools share the same fundamental principles; their differences are generally variations in custom. They are unified in their belief in the centrality of the Quran and Sunna, but differentiated by their interpretations of these sources (Omran 1992: 146). 14 See for example, al-Hibri 1993; Bowen 1997; Demriel 1996; Obermeyer 1994; Roudi-Fahimi 2004.

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the findings of these early scholars. Fundamentally, the majority of Sunni and Shia scholars permitted couples to practice al-azl, and, by extension, other natural methods of contraception, only if both partners consented15 (Bowen 1997: 165; Mohaghegs-Damad 1996: 21; Omran 1992, pp. 152–53). The question of consent produced a multiplicity of enduring interpretations. Sunni Schools The Hanafi School permitted the use of al-azl and natural contraceptive methods but cited consent as conditional. For some Hanafi scholars, such as Al-Kasani (AH6th/AD12th), husbands had to seek their wife’s consent to al-azl, as its use contravened her childbearing right. Others, such as Ibn al-Humam (AH9th/ AD15th) and Ibn Nujaimi (AH10th/AD16th), argued that in times of ‘religious decline’ al-azl could be used non-consensually for prudential reasons, based on the Prophetic Hadith such as that regarding a child’s right to future security that “to leave your heirs rich is better than leaving them dependent upon people’s charity” and on parental obligation for religious training and good upbringing by “establish[ing] regular prayer, enjoin[ing] what is just and forbid[ding] what is wrong, and bear[ing] with patient consistency whatever betide you, Lo! That is the steadfast heart of things” (31: 17) (Omran 1992, pp, 35–6, 154, 183). The position of the Maliki School, more nuanced than the Hanafi, included natural and barrier methods of contraception, and drew conclusions based on reproductive mechanics and spousal rights and consent. Maliki scholars permitted al-azl with the wife’s consent, a position formalised by Imam Malik who stated “No man shall practice al-azl without the (free)16 wife’s consent” (cited in Omran 1992: 155). Maliki School interpretations included barrier contraceptive methods: Ointments and suppositories were used in early Muslim societies to prevent conception by barring or expelling semen from the uterus. Al-Qurturbi (AH 654/ AD 1272) clarified the Maliki school’s position, stating that “[T]he drop of seed is not a thing in actual fact, and therefore no wrong [was] done by the woman if she expel[ed] it, unless it [had] already lodged in the woman’s uterus. It [was] for all purposes as though it [was] still in the man’s loins” (cited in Omran 1992: 156), which derived from the Hadith “On the authority of Abu Sa’id: The Prophet was queried about al-azl and he said ‘Not out of all the semen [was] a child formed, 15 A wife must consent to al-azl because, as a contraceptive method, it may contravene her right to childbearing. 16 Note the reference to ‘free wife’. Men could have sexual relations with their slaves, who, being their property and not party to a marriage contract, did not have the same rights to childbearing as a free wife. Non-consensual al-azl did not contravene any personal rights in such cases. Men were permitted to have sexual relations with slaves, being their property and given that Islam does not condone abstinence, and in this relationship coitus interruptus could be used without the woman’s consent as there was a danger that the man could lose the use of his property should she become pregnant (Bowen 1997: 165).

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and if Allah willed to create something nothing would stop him from doing it” (cited in Omran 1992: 120). The distinction was made between preventing conception and termination. The sperm in itself was nothing and can be expelled and destroyed to prevent conception. Once conception has taken place then it becomes a ‘life’, and interpretations shift into the realm of abortion and elimination of life. Prior to conception, the sperm was of no purpose and could be dealt with as the couple saw fit, and this included the use of contraception. Maliki School interpretations embodied the holistic approach that most Islamic schools took toward family planning: it is not simply about preventing births and family limitation. The essence of the Islamic concept17 of family planning is that it is about planning all aspects of family life, not just the number and spacing of children. Hanbali School interpretations, like those of those the Hanafi and Maliki schools, ruled consent to be conditional. Hanbali scholars permitted the use of al-azl in marriage with the wife’s consent, but identified situations where it was prudent to bypass consent, for example al-azl was mandatory when men engage in intercourse with women in enemy territory because if a child was conceived and born it would then become a slave or captive to its father’s tribe (Omran 1992: 162). Ibn Qudama (AD 5th/AH 11th) stated that “if, however, there is a justification, such as being in enemy territory and there is a need to have relations, the he can practice coitus interruptus …” (cited in Omran 1992: 162). This would have negated the child’s aforementioned right to future security, and also its rights to legitimacy and good name from the Prophetic Hadith “the child belongs to the marital bed and the right of a child on his parent is to be given good breeding and good name” (cited in Omran 1992: 34). The position was similar to the Hanafi school obligation to use al-azl in times of religious decline, and the Maliki school one differentiating between free wives and slaves and the need for consent – whereby the man was left to contextually and prudentially decide on al-azl. The Shafii School permitted the use of al-azl without the wife’s consent, taking a different view of her reproductive rights (Omran 1992: 159). Interpretations were informed by the traditions of its founder, Imam Shafii who permitted the use of al-azl due to its practice by the Companions, and later by Al-Ghazali (d AH 493/AD 1111). On consent, both likened al-azl to a legal contract, which was validated by an offer and its acceptance: when an offer was made but withdrawn prior to acceptance, no breach of contract had occurred. Intercourse was reasoned to be similar. It offers semen and the chance for conception, but if the offer is withdrawn before ejaculation into the uterus, no breach of contract took place; a wife’s right to conception was not broken. This contrasted with other schools that believed wives’ to hold an inalienable right to conception and must consent to its abrogation through al-azl. Al-Ghazali also made the distinction between contraception and termination to justify al-azl; arguing that no living thing comes 17 And here it is acceptable to generalise an Islamic position, because at the heart of all interpretations is an holistic approach to family planning.

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to any harm through al-azl: life was not destroyed, simply prevented (Omran 1992: 159–60). The similarity between the Shafii School and other schools lay in permitting al-azl because of its preventative qualities, but differed in interpreting reproductive rights as alienable and consent as unnecessary. Shia Schools Zaydi scholars, such as Ibn al-Murtada (AH 9th/AD 15th) permitted al-azl with a wife’s consent because “the Prophet prohibited it except with her permission” (cited in Omran, 1992: 165). Ismaili scholars also permitted al-azl with consent. Al-Nu’man (AH4th/AD10th) cited Imam Ali as practicing al-azl. The Ismailis also established that spousal permission should be included in marriage contracts, citing Abu Ja‘far Ibn Mohammad Ali18 who reported that “I dislike it in the case of a free wife unless this has already been agreed upon at the time of marriage contract” (cited in Mohaghegs-Damad 1996: 22; Omran 1992: 167). Furthermore, Ismaili scholars advised on al-azl with nursing mothers, citing Ibn Mohammad Ali’s report of the Prophetic Hadith “it is also advisable to practice al-azl with a nursing woman, lest she get pregnant and the child may be harmed. Such was reported from the Prophet” (Mohaghegs-Damad 1992: 22). To do so is to uphold the Prophetically ordained right to breastfeeding from the Hadith “and mothers should suckle their children two full years, for those who wish to complete breastfeeding” (cited in Omran, 1992: 35). Ibaddi19 scholars (Kharjirite) also permitted al-azl conditional on a wife’s consent (Omran 1992, pp. 163–65). The Imami of the Twelver School permitted al-azl with consent, and recommended that this be codified in the marriage contract as a legally binding condition of the relationship. Further, some scholars ruled that wives were entitled to monetary ‘compensation for the sperm’ if the husband violated the contract. Al-A‘amili (AH10th/AD16th), for example, ruled that “al-azl [was] not permitted with a free wife without agreement during the marriage contract” (cited in MohaghegsDamad 1996: 22), and bound both spouses to consent, arguing that a wife could not practice al-azl, by pessaries or other methods, without her husband’s consent. The Zahiri School, described by Omran as short-lived,20 was the only one reported to have prohibited the use of al-azl, based on the Hadith of Judama who reported that the Prophet described it as akin to hidden wa’d (infanticide) (Omran, 1992, pp, 86–7, 165–67). Furthermore, the Zahiri scholar, Ibn Hazm (d. AH 445/AD 1063), prohibited any further interpretation on al-azl, believing that once something was committed to text as a sin, all other verses concerning it were nullified. 18  Neither Omran (1992) or Mohaghegs Damad (1996) offer an explanation of who Ibn Mohammad was or of his time of death. It is possible that they are referring to Ja‘far Ibn Mohammad, the Sixth Imam if Shiism, and the father of Ismail, the spiritual leader of the Ismaili School, and hence Ibn Mohammad’s centrality to Ismaili opinion. 19 Spelling from Omran 1992: 147. 20  Founded by Ibn Hazm (d. 1063) in Spain.

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Twentieth Century Interpretations and their Origins Text and Interpretation: The Debates Contemporary Muslim interpretations merge early rulings with the interpretative practices and arguments from the periods of Islamic revivalism. The first period, the ‘reformation’ (Brown, 1996), was rooted in the orthodox-modernist split that emerged out of the late eighteenth century Prophetic infallibility debates. The question of Prophetic fallibility/infallibility brought the validity and authority of the primary sources into question, leading modernist interpreters to reformulate textual applicability. This process began in 18th century post-Moghul India where, under conditions of social and political turmoil, and missionary and Orientalist intrusion, Indian Muslims sought a pragmatic, restorative model of reformation and counter-colonialism from within Islam. Resultant debates on the utility of Islam in a contemporary context produced Modernist counter-interpretations regarding the infallibility of the Prophet and textual authority. Modernists reformulated the Prophet as a social and political reformer, leader and authority, removing him from his Divine orthodox construct and thus producing an exemplar for reformist leadership. Moreover, the fallibility of the Prophet removed barriers to interpretation enabling Modernists to lay claim to interpretive authority. The Ahl-i-Quran movement, for example, distinguished the texts on the basis of eternality and temporality, arguing that the Quran, as eternal, was unchangeable and binding, and the Sunna, as temporal, was non-binding. The Quran embodied unchanging legal principles, analogous to a constitution, and the Sunna as the practical and changeable application of the law, analogous to a set of by-laws. The Hadith ceased to be binding as its association with the Prophet made it fallible. Moreover, because the Hadith of the Companions had contested and sometimes prevailed over Prophetic ones, there was no guarantee of their Prophetic legitimacy. Convinced of Prophetic infallibility, the Orthodox upheld the validity and authority of the Hadith and Sunna through the logic that to doubt the sources is to doubt the Prophet and to doubt his mission is to doubt the Quran; in this way they defended the universality of the Sunna. A middle ground emerged espoused by Jafar Shah Phulwarawi, which upheld the modernist human/divine textual distinctions but accepted all as products of the Divine Revelation. Sunna and Hadith were further distinguished into binding and non-binding depending on whether their origin was in the revelation and Prophetic mission, or as the product of ijtihad by the Human prophet, or a reflection of his personal habits and preferences. This classification operated in concert with the historical distinction between obligatory, recommended, forbidden, reprehensible, and optional acts (Brown 1996, pp. 18– 75; Piscatori 1991, pp. 7–10).

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Twentieth century revivalism was intensified, sharpened and made dynamic by globalisation, modernity,21 conflict, and the imposition of foreign norms and ideologies on the Muslim world. Revivalist movements are unique and situated on a spectrum ranging from reactionary/anachronistic to particularist. The upshot is interpretive and conceptual multiplicity. This process, labelled Muslim politics, denotes the competition and contestation for control over the interpretation of religious symbols and the institutions that produce and sustain them; in some cases this has pitted religious and political figures against one another in the pursuit of power in a process of “public negotiation over the rules and discourse that morally bind the community” (Eickleman and Piscatori 1996). This process was and is used to demarcate and dichotomise socio-political boundaries, distinguishing good and bad, Muslim and non-Muslim. Women, the family, sexual norms and family planning became potent symbols in the politics of distinction played out in the Muslim world (Ehteshami 1996; Eickleman and Piscatori 1996; Esposito 1983; Esposito and Voll 1996; Lehmann 1998, pp. 607–15; Piscatori 1991). On Family Planning: For and Against in the Islamic Texts Sheikh Jad-al-Haq, a Grand Mufti of Egypt, argued that “nothing in the Holy Quran or in the reported utterances of the Prophet prohibits the planning or limitation of childbirth” (cited in Dardir and Ahmed 1981: 1). Quranic silence on issues such as population and family planning is not an omission of opinion rather the answers to these questions exist in hidden form for contemporary scholars to uncover. Both supporters and opponents of birth control and family planning seize this lack of direct prohibition or sanction in the Islamic texts as evidence and justification of their positions (al-Hibri 1993: 2; Obermeyer 1994: 42; Omran 1992, pp. 85–6). For example, Sheikh al-Sharabassi of Al-Azhar stated that “there is little doubt that the size of progeny, large or small, is not a fixed, rigid or uniform position, similarly, birth planning swings from one extreme to the other, taking various positions along the arc of the pendulum …” (cited in Omran 1992: 83). This is an important point to any discussion on family planning and population arguments in Islam. Modernist interpreters allow flexible Quranic interpretation. Through qiyas and ijtihad, Quranic principles are applied to demonstrate the religious compatibility of family planning. Orthodox scholars, the primary opponents of family planning, reject anything but literal interpretations of the texts, and privilege the Quran over other sources where possible. For example, orthodox Scholars recall Suras and aya22 such as “Kill not your children, on a plea of want” (Sura 6: 151, cited in 21 Distinct from modernisation. Modernity implies the desire for, and thus imposition of, uniform values, norms, and modes of socio-political organisation, whereas modernisation is the process of blending modern technological and scientific developments with different political and social models, which many Islamist groups have reconciled with their own political agendas. 22 Literal translation: verse.

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Omran 1992: 86) and others outlawing pre-Islamic infanticide to demonstrate the prohibition of family planning and limitation by comparing them to murderous practices. Islamic scholars derive permission and prohibition for family planning from the same texts and principles. The Islamic principles most often referred to in the family planning debate are: Islam is a religion for all times; Islam is a religion of ease, not hardship; Islam is a religion of moderation; Islam is a religion for organisation; Islam strives from the greater good or lesser evil; and, finally, Islam is about the primacy of God and a belief in his omnipotence (Mohaghegs-Damad 1996, Omran 1992). However, it is evident that for every interpretation of Islamic principles sanctioning family planning, counter interpretations are found in the same or other principles. Orthodox misuse of jurisprudential practice, particularly the interpretation of textual silence as a prohibition of family planning, has been criticised by authors such as Omran, who argue that Orthodox scholars hold an unreasonable expectation of textual inclusion of contemporary concepts unknown to early recorders of Islamic tradition. Omran’s counter to the Orthodox position is that Islamic tradition revealed both knowledge and acceptance of methods for preventing pregnancy, primarily through the tradition of al-azl: modern jurists could thus sanction the use of modern contraceptives, based on these traditions. Further, Muslim scholars have a responsibility to consider all texts in context, rather than relying solely on textual omission as the basis of opinions (Omran 1980, pp. 32–3). Hadith and Sunna complimentary to personal opinions and agendas may be used at the expense of contradictory ones, thus giving religious legitimacy to an individual’s argument. The ijtihadi tradition, practised mainly under Shiism and by modernists, through its three core principles; laws change with time and place, choosing the lesser of two evils, and preserving the common good (alHibri 1993, pp. 1–2; Omran 1992: 60), enables interpretive flexibility, adding to the multiplicity of opinion. Ijtihad is an important tool in contemporary times, enabling the historical and implicit edicts of the primary texts to be reinterpreted in light of current concerns. When this process fails, Muslims should seek the instruction of a trusted scholar (Sheikh Jad-al-Haq ‘Ali Jad-al Haq, Grand Mufti of Egypt in, Dardir and Ahmed 1981: 20), thus adding to the diversification process by allowing individual scholars to interpret religious sources and offer their own opinions. Orthodox scholars reject this process as an attempt to “conform the law to man arguing that these modern movements which seek to reform the Divine Law rather than human society are, from the Islamic point of view, in every way an anomaly” (Nasr 1994: 98). For the orthodox, the door to ijtihad is not necessarily shut, rather it should operate in the reverse to modernist practice, not “to change the law to suit the convenience of men but to face and solve every new situation in conformity with the teachings of the Shariah” that is, in accordance with the recorded tradition (Nasr 1994: 105).

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Family Planning in Islam: For and Against Islam as a Religion for All Time Islam was designated a religion for all times, in recognition of its position as the last of the revealed monotheistic traditions, implying that: … Islam is meant for all mankind and not restricted to a special population in specific area or to a circumscribed period in history … this religion should cater for … the requirements of future generations and different population groups until the end of time (Mohaghegs-Damad 1996: 21; Omran 1992, pp. 65–9).

For modernists, this is accepted as a directive to flexible and responsive reinterpretations of the texts under changed circumstances. Scholars such as Omran and Mohaghegs-Damad have argued that the Quran, Hadith and Sunna are not static proscriptions, rather the interpretive flexibility, inherent in traditions such as qiyas and ijtihad, permits continual textual reinterpretation to cater for the needs of successive Muslim generations. This suggests that if, when and where population control becomes necessary, scriptural interpretation could accommodate this need by permitting Muslims to use family planning with religious sanction. Furthermore, Omran has argued that modern demographic changes require scholars to rethink their position on family planning and population control. He noted that Islamic scholars had generally adopted a pro-natalist stance, derived from historical precedents that encouraged high fertility. However, contemporary demographic trends in the Muslim world are very different. The high mortality rates and siege mentality that prompted pro-natalist thinking are no longer relevant, therefore scholars needed to return to the texts and principles and adapt their thinking in line with current circumstances (Omran 1992, pp. 65–6). This practice was sanctioned by Sheikh Hasan Ma’mounm’s, former Grand Imam of Al-Azhar University, fatwa which stated: But now we find that conditions have changed. We find that the density of population in the world threatens a serious reduction of the living standards of mankind to the extent that many men of thought have been prompted to seek family planning. … I see no objection from the Sharia point of view to the consideration of family planning as a measure, if there is a need for it (cited in Omran 1992: 68–9).

This demonstrates the modernist textual approach which reconciles changed circumstances with Islam, in this case permitting the use of family planning and population limitation where required. Furthermore, arguments in favour of family planning based on this principle are substantiated by Sunna referring to al-azl (Dardir and Ahmed 1981; Obermeyer 1994; Omran 1992; Rafiabadi 2003). Contraceptive methods, particularly al-azl,

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are established Islamic practices, recorded in the Hadith and Sunna as practiced by the Prophet’s companions with his blessing. Muslim doctors are credited with the development of contraceptive methods and with transferring their knowledge and technology23 to Europeans (Maguire 2001) and there is reportedly textual evidence suggesting the use of barrier methods such as sponges and douches by early Muslims. Modernist scholars, using qiyas and ijtihad, have re-examined these historic examples and joined them with the requirements of ‘religion for all times’ to sanction all non-terminal modern contraceptive methods, to fulfil the growing need and demand for family planning in the Muslim world (Obermeyer 1994: 62). For example, Sheikh Jad-al-Haq, a former Grand Mufti of Egypt, issued the following fatwa on family planning: Question: Many Muslims … are unclear about the permissibility of birth planning in Islamic law and tradition. Can you give your authoritative opinion? Answer: No Quranic text forbids prevention of conception. The principle of preventing conception was accepted in those sayings of the Prophet which allowed some of his followers to practice ‘withdrawal’ … Most scholars of the Prophet’s traditions (‘hadith’) agree that this permission was granted (cited in Dardir and Ahmed 1981: 2, italics added).

Yet this principle is also used by orthodox scholars to legitimate a literal interpretation of the Quran in opposition to family planning. Maududi argued against family planning on the basis of the immutability of the Divine path. He cited the aya: Our Lord is He Who gave everything its peculiar form and nature, the guided it aright (i.e. showed it the way following which it can fulfil the purpose for which its creation was due) (20: 50) and effecting change in the scheme of God (khalqAllah) is a fiendish act (4: 119) (Maududi 1967: 82),

as proof of the Quran’s literal universality: everything has a divinely proscribed place that should not be altered. For Maududi, interpretation was dangerous because “deviation from the right course may on the face of it seem quite attractive and fascinating and advantageous. But the fact is that straying away from the path laid down by the Creator and violating the limits set by Him is bound to be harmful to man” (Maududi 1967: 75). The Quran, he argued, proscribed regulations on sexual activity and the procreative objective of marriage which are transcendent, and therefore demonstrated the prohibition of family planning and fertility control under Islam.

23 They developed barrier contraceptive methods, such as condoms fashioned from animal intestines and sponges which could be inserted into the vagina.

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Ease not Hardship v. Fear of Want/God’s Providence “Allah desires for you ease; He desires no hardship for you” (Sura 2: 185, cited in Mohaghegs-Damad 1996: 20; Roudi-Fahimi 2004: 3). Islam, a religion of ease rather than hardship, offers guidance to make life as easy and burden free as possible. Family planning proponents, such as Ayatollah Mohaghegs-Damad, have cited this to justify their position, arguing that this principle suggests “Islam would be sympathetic to family planning if spacing pregnancies and adjusting their number would make the mother more physically fit and the father more financially at ease …” (Mohaghegs-Damad 1996: 20). Omran, Sachedina and Tantawi have made similar arguments regarding the permissibility of family planning to ease physical and economic burdens (Omran 1980: 34, 1992: 59–60, Sachedina 1990, Tantawi 1996: 5). Omran has further demonstrated the compatibility of family planning with this principle, and therefore Islam, citing the 1971 declaration of Sheikh al-Sharabussy, of al-Azhar University – which derives from al-Ghazali24 and the Shafii School (Omran 1992, pp. 6–9) – in which Sharabussy identified circumstances under which it would be acceptable to use family planning to bring ease. These included: • • • •

where either parent caries a contagious, transmittable disease which would unduly burden both child and parents; where a woman may but cannot physically sustain further or multiple pregnancies family planning would ease the burden on her health, physical wellbeing, and overall quality of life; when a husband/father is unable to make adequate basic provisions;25 and to protect a wife’s beauty so that she may continue to be a pleasure to her husband (cited in Omran, 1980: 33), but does not state who bears the burden in this instance.

Al-Sharabussy’s opinion was a continuation of pro-family planning interpretations emerging from Al-Azhar University. For example, in 1953 the Al-Azhar fatwa committee issued the following statement in support of family planning: The use of drugs to prevent pregnancy temporarily is not forbidden (the principle of all times), according to the Shafi’is, and the committee endorses the views, seeing that it helps ease matters for people and relieves them from hardships, particularly if concern is felt for the woman’s life or health as a result of too frequent pregnancies, without long enough intervening space between one pregnancy and another (cited in Omran, 1980: 34).

24 A 6th/9th century scholar. 25  Basic provisions such as: food, clothing, shelter, health care and education.

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This particular ruling is important for two reasons. First, it further illustrates the permissibility of family planning under the ‘ease not hardship’ principle, explicitly permitting its use where a mother’s health and/or life will suffer as a result of pregnancy. Furthermore, it demonstrates that through qiyas and ijtihad modern contraceptive methods can be sanctioned by drawing on historic examples, in this case, the use of the contraceptive pill today is in keeping with Shafii rulings. Opponents of this justification take issue with the motives rather than methods, evident in rulings in favour of family planning for health, but not for other, reasons (Sachedina 1990: 108). Opponents have countered economic permissibility by invoking the Suras and ayas regarding ‘fear of want’ and on the basis of God’s providence. Maududi argued that “Islam’s economic system has struck at the very roots of capitalism … takes these and many other effective measures to remedy the ills that have been responsible for economic dislocation and disparity in the Western society” (Maududi 1967: 78). An Islamic economic system would render population control for economic reasons unnecessary. A 1987 ruling by the Council of Islamic Fiqh in Mecca also prohibited the use of family planning for economic reasons, finding: contraception is prohibited if it is because of the fear of want because Allah provides sustenance or on account of other factors prohibited by Islamic law. But if contraception is due to any risk or danger to a mother such as she cannot deliver her child in an ordinary manner and is subjected to operation; in such cases there is no harm in contraception (cited in Omran 1992: 216).

The Council permitted the use of family planning only where the hardship was a physical or medical one. Orthodox interpreters have rejected financial hardship as a valid justification for family planning, because it runs counter to the providential ideal of God: He will provide for those who are in need. This is derived from Sura such as “there is not a creature on earth, but its sustenance depends on Allah. He knows its habitation and its depository” (11: 6 cited in Omran 1992: 90). For example, this was the 1962 finding of Sheikh Abu Zahra of Cairo University who, citing the aforementioned Suras and ayas on infanticide, argued that this “indirectly applied to birth control because it implie[d] denying Allah’s ability to provide (rizq). If Muslims really believe in Allah they should leave their progeny and what support they expect for them to Allah” (Omran 1992: 204). To justify or use family planning for fear of economic hardship demonstrates mistrust in God’s providence, therefore it is forbidden. However, Abu Zahra conceded to fertility control to preserve maternal health and prevent the transmission of hereditary disease. On ‘ease not hardship’ and ‘fear of want’ it was generally agreed that where the hardship was medical or physical, the use of family planning was permitted. Economic circumstances however, were contentious. Some argued that where a family’s basic needs could not be financially met, family planning should be used to ease hardship. Likewise, where communal hardship was likely, family planning should be used to limit population growth. Others argued that there was

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no economic justification for the use of family planning: want is a moot point because God is providential. To think otherwise is to question God. Moderation/Quality v Quantity Proponents of family planning, who accept economic reasons as legitimate, recall the verses which designate Islam as a religion of moderation. For example, Mohaghegs-Damad has cited Sura 2: 286, “Allah takes not a soul beyond its capacity (or limits) (2: 286) and let not your hand [in giving] be chained to your neck, nor you open it to extreme lest you end up in rebuke, in beggary” (17: 29) (Mohaghegs-Damad, 1996: 20) as evidence that family planning is permissible for economic reasons where “pushing Muslims to continue their unregulated fertility in the face of hardships is rather harsh, for Islam sponsors moderation and discourages extremism …” (Mohaghegs-Damad 1996: 20). Implicit in this argument is the permissibility of state sanctioned population control, to limit growth to a level commensurate with a state’s capacity for socio-economic provision. Furthermore, moderation is joined with the pursuit of quality over quantity. Mohaghegs-Damad has argued that although Islam, like other faiths, had encouraged the growth of its community, this was done so under the “provision that their quality should not be compromised. If it is in either quantity or quality … Islam would certainly go for quality.” He substantiated this interpretation with the Sura: ‘the evil and the good should not be valued equal, even though the abundance of evil may dazzle you” (5: 100) and “How oft, by Allah’s will, has a small host vanquished a numerous host” (2: 249) (Mohaghegs-Damad 1996: 21). Omran joined moderation and quality to counter ‘quantity’ arguments based on historic circumstances very different from contemporary ones. He urged against indiscriminate procreation where ‘quality’ of life cannot be guaranteed, justifying family planning because it safeguarded the ‘quality’ of individual, familial, and community life. Moreover, he argued that pro-natalist directives, which coerced couples into high fertility, could increase personal and familial burden, thus contravening the ‘ease not hardship’ principle (Omran 1992, pp. 61–2). Likewise, Obermeyer identified justifications joining ease, moderation, and quality, arguing that small families are more economically viable, thus enabling the provision of a better quality of life, and that couples should aim for ‘better’ children, happier, healthier, well educated and loved, rather than many (Obermeyer 1994: 61). These interpretations are substantiated by the Al-Azhar Fatwa Committee’s finding that “in countries with lower resources than others, family planning is recommended together with other means that lead to its progress” (Al-Mashad 1988, pp. 15–16), which invoke both the ease not hardship and quality over quantity principles. Opponents of birth control have countered quality with quantity, by arguing that the Prophet exhorted Muslims to multiply, and that procreation is a marital obligation (al-Hibri 1993: 3, Omran 1992: 97, 203). This argument is rooted in historic circumstances under which early Muslim communities, such as the Zahiri in Spain, found themselves outnumbered and under siege from non-Muslims

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(Omran 1980: 33). Under such circumstances, the strategic applicability of a large population made sense. These arguments were revived in the twentieth century by fundamentalist and revivalist scholars who viewed contemporary circumstances as detrimental to the Umma and Islam. They took the seemingly pro-natalist injunctions of the texts as justification for population growth, and prohibition for family planning. For example, Maududi was convinced of the matrimonial procreative objective, citing ayas such as “your wives are a tilth for you, so go into your tilth as you like and do good before hand for yourselves” (2: 223) (Maududi 1967: 83) as evidence of Islamic pro-natalism. Omran highlighted some Quranic Sura utilised by pro-natalists as a justification for high fertility such as “O mankind! Be careful of your duty to your Allah who created you from a single soul, and from it created its mate, and from them twain, has spread a multitude of men and women” (4: 1) (Omran 1992: 99). Abu Zahra confirmed this in 1962, finding that multitude is required of Muslims and that procreation is a marital duty (Omran 1992: 205). In 1964, the Academy (High Council) of Islamic Research at Al-Azhar ruled that “Islam regards it as desirable to increase the number of offspring and multiply on the consideration that multitude is calculated to give strength to the Islamic nation, ‘socially, economically and militarily enhance its prestige and render it stoutly invulnerable” (cited in Omran 1992: 215). Organisation v God’s Will Mohaghegs-Damad has argued that Islam is a religion of planning which “aims to organise the life of its people and that Muslims are repeatedly urged to reflect on the divine plan in the pursuit of an orderly universe.” He cited ayas such as “it is not for the sun to overtake the moon, nor does the night outstrip the day. They all float along, each in its own orbit” (36: 40) (Mohaghegs-Damad 1996: 21). This aya offers implicit justification for population control where an imbalance between population and resources could have wider, detrimental effects. Scholars such as Mohaghegs-Damad and Omran join this with the principle of ease as further theistic justification for family planning. Omran’s interpretation of ‘organisation’ argued that Islam provides an organisational framework for its followers, which encourages planning in, and for, life. Moreover, he argued that the Quran legally binds Muslims into organising their lives to avoid individual, familial and/or community hardship, and then extends this reasoning to family formation and the use of family planning for these ends. Family planning, in this sense, is not simply the use of contraception to prevent or delay pregnancy, rather it starts with choosing a partner, deciding upon the desired and sustainable number of children, birth spacing, and whether their needs could be met financially (Omran 1992: 63– 5). Religious sanction could be extended to family planning where it was part of an overall life planning process that served the greater good of easing individual, familial and community hardship, in keeping with Islamic principles. Opponents counter by arguing that acts preventing the fruition of God’s Divine plan refute His omnipotence (see al-Hibri 1993: 3, Obermeyer 1994: 62, Omran

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1992, 204, Sachedina 1990: 109). They cite aya such as that relating to reports in which the devil said “and surely I will command them and they will change Allah’s creation” (4: 119, cited in Omran 1992: 207), as proof that family planning is a direct challenge to predestination: God wills the creation of a life and trying to prevent it demonstrates mistrust in His decision. However Sura such as “but you shall not will except as Allah wills, Master of the Universe” (81: 29) (cited in Omran 1992: 89) are used by both opponents and proponents as justification for their position. Opponents point to the futility of family planning because God can ultimately override the will of man. Proponents argue that if family planning can not negate predestination it is not a genuine refutation of God’s will, therefore there is no harm in practising it. Family planning proponents, such as Dardir and Ahmed, further refute the predestination argument claiming that man is incapable of overriding the will of God; we simply lack the power. Moreover, they have argued that God has gifted humans the ability to reason: utilising this is not a sign of disobedience but rather it indicates use of His gift (Dardir and Ahmed 1981: 4–5), citing the fatwa of Sheikh Jad-al-Haq, contraception through withdrawal or any newer method, does not mean mistrust in Allah’s generosity and mercy … Omar bin Khatab, the second Caliph of Islam, explained … the man who trusts Allah is one who believes that Allah will make the seed grow but he does not neglect to sow his crop (Dardir and Ahmed 1981: 4).

Al-Hibri also highlighted the futility predestination based objections, citing the Sunna which claims that humans are incapable of changing what God has willed: what God wills will be done26 (al-Hibri 1993: 3). Extending this to family planning, Al-Hibri argued that if God has planned a life, contraception will not prevent it. He rejected arguments to the contrary as flawed because human action is powerless against God’s will, concluding that objections to family planning based on this are, therefore, theistically invalid. Modernists add to their justifications for family planning, arguing that Islam obliges Muslims to use their deified gifts of reason and rationality in pursuit of the greater good or lesser evil, the lesser harm principle of jurisprudence (Omran 1992: 75), to improve the lives of themselves, their families, and the community. On the greater good, Al-Hibri argued that “If the existence or well-being of the community is being threatened for some reason, then the scholar and each member of the community must consider that fact which is subsumed under [the greater good], in reaching their own final conclusion” (al-Hibri 1993: 2) In this instance, Al-Hibri’s argument suggests there are two choices a community faces with regards 26  Representatives of the MMA presented this argument when interviewed in Pakistan, although they were arguing that it is futile to use family planning because of God wills a pregnancy, it will happen.

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to family planning and population: Is the greater good to be found in protecting the community against the hardships of population growth, or in rejecting family planning because it is considered by some to be un-Islamic? Likewise, Maguire has demonstrated that ‘lesser evil’ grants permissibility to permanent contraceptive methods. Sterilisation is sometimes forbidden in Islam because it means making an unalterable change to the human body, thus contravening God’s design. However, in situations where sterilisation is the lesser evil, for example, where parents carry an inheritable disease, sterilisation is considered preferable to a child being born burdened by disease27 (Maguire 2001). The same reasoning applies to the matter of population growth, where it threatens the existence of the entire state or society. The use of contraception and family planning is less harmful than uncontrolled growth, which could unduly burden a community.

27 This is the case in Iran where couples undergo pre-marital testing for such diseases, and are permitted to be sterilised if they are carriers.

Chapter 3

Islam and Fertility: Twentieth Century Myths and Realities Islamic jurisprudential findings are foundational to the discourses of Muslim states and scholars participating in national and international family planning and population debates, resulting in a multiplicity of opinions. Yet, a false essentialist perspective on Islamic and Muslim thought and behaviour persists amongst Western observers: Despite evident jurisprudential diversity and permissibility there has been, and remains, a tendency to essentialise Islam as pro-natalist, conservative, and monolithic. Furthermore, Islam is often posited as the critical explanatory factor for Muslim fertility patterns, which are attributed to the religions’ assumed conservatism and monolithic status. All of this has served to engender contestable assumptions about Islam and Muslim fertility. In Factors Affecting Moslem Natality Kirk argued that “factors contributing to high birth rates generally in these nations are linked in several ways with Moslem influences [which] … is strongly conservative … fatalistic … pro-natalist” (Kirk 1977, pp. 146–47). On the role of religion in population debates, Johnson has argued that “on the whole, the religious leaders of the world … have failed to grasp the meaning of demographic realities or … have resolutely ignored them … the prospect of major breakthroughs in attitude, at least as far as Islam and Catholicism are concerned, seems dim” (Johnson 1987: 324). Karim has identified demographers Caldwell and Caldwell (1987) as exponents of such essentialist assumptions, stating that they explained resistance to the two child small family norm in Sub-Saharan Africa as having “much to do with a religious belief system, that operates directly to sustain high fertility” (Karim 1997: 1). Seitz has argued that “religion is a powerful force in rural societies and some religions advocate large families. The influence of Islamic fundamentalism is strong in some Islamic states and it is a major force discouraging the use of contraceptives” (Seitz 1995: 35). These essentialised assumptions were, and remain, the product of several factors of Muslim and non-Muslim origin. First, fertility rates throughout the Islamic world were, and are, generally and comparatively high by global standards. Kirk asserted the “relative uniformity and high level of Muslim natality contrasts with that of all other major religious groups” (Kirk 1977: 146), and indeed, fertility in the vast majority of Catholic countries stands at replacement level despite pro-natalist directives from the Vatican (www. unfpa.org). Second, highly publicised Islamic clerical and political opposition,  The level of fertility at which a couple has only enough children to replace themselves (about two children per couple) Haupt and Kane 1998: 62.

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as at Cairo, toward family planning and fertility control uphold perceptions of Islam as a pro-natalist religion. Third, local and external demographic studies tend to emphasise and isolate Islam as the major factor influencing fertility decision making, artificially substantiating this overarching assumption. However, this is changing as researchers shift their attention to factors other than, but not excluding, religion. They are also asserting the need to avoid the essentialist trap by accepting and understanding the Muslim world as diverse, and this includes accepting determinants of fertility and Islamic interpretation as diverse. Islamic fertility and its determinants are not homogeneous and cannot be essentialised. Carla Obermeyer has demonstrated that high Muslim fertility, particularly in the Middle East, was, and remains, a product of several interrelated factors: low female education, low contraceptive use, belief in male dominance, cultural preference for sons, and the high social status favoured upon mothers of many children (Obermeyer 1994: 63). Karim, Omran and Sheykhi have also warned against privileging Islam as the explanatory factor for Muslim fertility, arguing that temporal, regional, cultural and political factors can be as important determinants of fertility as religion: Knowledge and attitude studies from within Muslim countries substantiate such arguments. Karim and Omran have both demonstrated that economic status, for example, is more likely to influence fertility than religion. Moreover, Karim critiqued persistent academic emphasis on religious determinants of fertility citing a lack of empirical evidence. Furthermore, in comparing fertility patterns between geographically proximate Muslim and non-Muslim populations, Karim found differences that could only be explained by socio-economic and demographic determinants, not religious ones (Karim 1997: 1). Likewise, and in addition, Omran has suggested that the socioeconomic status of Muslim countries, rather than of individuals, best explains high fertility in the Islamic world. Muslim countries are predominantly developing, or between developed and developing, ones. Because of this, they, like non-Muslim developing countries, have experienced late onset fertility transition (Omran 1992: 67). Both Karim and Omran found that in countries where governments perceived rapid population growth to be a socio-economic challenge, family planning policies and programs were implemented (Karim 1997: 2; Omran 1992: 67): This further suggests that socio-economic rather than religious considerations inform Muslim opinions on fertility and population. Further still, in some Muslim countries, where national and individual socio-economic status improved fertility   For example, Dr Abdul Hakim and his colleagues at the National Institute for Population Studies (NIPS) in Pakistan.  Refer to Chapter 1 for more on the relationship between fertility and socio-economic development.  Demographic transition: Shift from patterns of high birth and death rates, to high birth and lower death rates, to declining birth and low death rates, to low birth and death rates. Late onset transition occurs when death rates decline, but birth rates take a considerable amount of time to fall (Haupt and Kane 1998, pp. 46–7).

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began to decline: Karim observed shifts from Total Fertility Rates (TFR) of 6 or more in the 1960s, to moderate TFRs of 4 or below (Karim 1997: 2). This demonstrates that there is no Muslim fertility trend, nor are there trends that can be attributed exclusively to religious influence. Because of textual ambiguity and interpretive flexibility there is no singular Islamic position on fertility. Varied interpretations of Islam inform fertility patterns, knowledge, and debate within countries as much as between them. The result, as argued by Bowen, is that this multiplicity and ambiguity enabled ulema to selfregulate local understandings of fertility issues, because: Unlike most Roman Catholics … Muslims are not well acquainted with Islam’s positions on these issues. This can be attributed partly to the gap in communication between the educated religious leaders (ulama) and the local or village religious leaders. Material mastered and taught by the ulama is often simplified and reduced by local religious leaders into lowest common denominators. Thus, family planning is forbidden, and abortion is forbidden. They are not aware of the minority opinions, the methods of juridical reasoning, or exceptions (Bowen 1997: 176).

Whilst multiple opinions must be considered healthy in a debate, when both the opinion and its recipients are ill informed, and the latter lacks the skills or resources to access alternatives, it can become problematic. Omran has argued that this results in a population debate that is not, in essence, purely Islamic, but one that has the pretence of being Islamic (Omran 1992: 202–203), and that this circumstance has contributed to the aforementioned problem of the essentialism. Moreover, local leaders may co-opt religion to substantiate an ill formed opinion, for the purpose of furthering a personal agenda, at the expense of programs that could be beneficial at the personal, local, national and global levels. The assumption that Islam causes and/or can explain high fertility is clearly false. Historical and contemporary literature suggests that there is great diversity in Muslim fertility patterns and perceptions. Most Muslim states and societies have experienced the late onset of fertility transition, shifting from high to moderate or low fertility levels. Socio-economic and political factors appear just as influential as Islam in influencing fertility trends. Likewise, the interplay between these factors was, and remains, important. Empirical research, such as that undertaken by Karim et al. in Pakistan, has found that Islam is an important factor influencing individual fertility decision making, therefore, whilst Islam may not be the defining factor it is certainly an important influence on fertility in Islamic countries. Regarding family planning and population, these factors can have positive and/or negative influences. Bowen considered textual ambiguity, which enables family planning debates between Islamic scholars, and within the Muslim world,  The average number of children that would be born to a woman during her lifetime (Haupt and Kane 1998: 63).

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as having a negative effect on population and fertility outcomes. She has suggested that whilst debate and diversity is generally considered healthy, it is not necessarily so with regard to these issues because, in the absence of a definitive opinion on population and family planning, the debate is ultimately shaped by the power relationship between political and religious interests. In general terms, where this relationship is relatively stable, as was the case in Indonesia in the 1960s, diversity of opinions is tolerated by both sides, permitting multiple interpretations of fertility causes and consequences, which then widen the courses of action available. However, Bowen has further observed that when this relationship is unstable, and the political side feels threatened by the religious, the need for accord rather than diversity often enables conservative, religious opinion to dominate (Bowen 1997: 166). This was the case in the Sudan, Nigeria and Tunisia, where, following periods of political instability caused by religio-political imbalance, conservative religious opinion came to dictate population/family-planning debates and policies (Mazrui 1994; Obermeyer 1994). With regards to the Sudan, Faour observed that “in addition to its poor socio-economic conditions, [it] suffer[ed] from political instability and internal strife. All of these factors discourage[d] the government from intervening to lower fertility” (Faour 1989: 261). It follows that if a definitive religious opinion did exist, Muslim governments would have the guidelines necessary to implement population and family planning policies and programs that would be compatible with Islam and thus acceptable to national clerics. Some religions, such as Catholicism, have top down structures through which an absolute religious opinion, from a recognised central authority, is delivered: Islam does not. Because of this, some commentators have argued that conflict arising from textual ambiguity will never be resolved. Diversity in opinion exists not only across schools and between societies, but within them as well: Localised interpretations of Islam are produced in the absence of a central source for interpretation and/or verification (Sachedina 1990: 107; Maguire 2001). Iran stands as an anomaly. More a product of politics than religion, Iran’s Vali-e-Faqih, or Supreme Leader, can establish a religious precedent on an issue, as was the case with family planning and population control, by issuing a fatwa. Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamanei both issued fatwas in favour of family planning for example, in response to a question by a thirty-nine-year-old woman with four children and in poor health seeking guidance as to the religious permissibility of tubaligation, Khomeini stated that “In The Name of GOD if sterilisation causes infertility, it is not allowed, however for a woman with your condition it is allowed” (Ministry of Health and Medical Education). This served as a directive on interpretation that was largely followed and accepted by Iran’s religio-political leadership and leading Shia ulema, and created accord in the nation’s population debate. However, in the majority of Muslim countries, and in the absence of a centralised interpretive authority, multiple localised interpretations remain the norm. These interpretations often reflect the influence of situational, rather than juristic, factors such as pre-Islamic practices, European legal traditions, and local

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cultural norms (Obermeyer 1994: 42; Omran 1992: 201; Yusuf 2005). Yusuf has demonstrated the influence and pervasiveness of pre-Islamic cultural practices in northern Nigeria. Here he observed that in the twelve states under Sharia rule, the practices of the predominant Hausa-Fulani culture are observed alongside Islam, fostering the presumption that all practices are “Islamic” and “creating a confusion among the less discerning about when sharia is being implemented and when it is laced with cultural practices” (Yusuf 2005). The evolution of such religio-cultural melds throughout the Muslim world works against the establishment of a definitive Islamic opinion on many matters, including family planning and population, between or within Muslim states. This only serves to further demonstrate that the Islamic world is diverse rather than cohesive. The persistence of monolithic and conservative assumptions amongst Western observers continues to engender equally false opinions of singular and enduring Muslim experiences. Yet the Muslim world is as open to temporal and other influences as the non-Muslim world, and because of this Islamic experiences with, and opinions on, population are neither singular nor static. Geographical, political, cultural, socio-economic and historical variances exist across the Muslim world. These inform Islamic practice and religious opinions at the national and local level and also inform the specific issues that Islamic scholars must respond to, which includes contraception, population and family planning. Obermeyer, Omran and others have cited the importance of historical and cultural factors, demonstrating the influence of pre-Islamic cultural influences on localised interpretations of Islam, which when fused with the Islam, have created distinct theological positions (Obermeyer 1994, pp. 59–60). This is evident in the persistence of son preference, which is also a pre-Islamic and non-Islamic preference, as attested to by the experiences of China and India, within some Muslim societies despite Islam’s positioning of women as equal to men. Faour and Omran have highlighted the political and socio-economic influences on Muslim interpretations on population control, observing “… less positive views coming from some rich countries with those from overpopulated countries, which are, in the main positive” (Omran 1992: 201). Faour has likewise, found that: No national programs exist in regions of high socio-economic status … Since none of these states wish to retain massive imported labor, they promote and reinforce pro-natalist norms and values and [took] all necessary measures to maintain the high fertility rates of the indigenous populations (Faour 1989: 261).

  It is important to distinguish Omran’s observation of religious interpretation from demographic theory: he did not suggest that fertility would necessarily be higher in wealthy countries – wealth is an accepted determinant of lower fertility – only that he had observed clerical and political opposition to family planning and population control in wealthier Muslim countries.

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Saudi Arabia exemplifies this: It offers socio-economic incentives and rewards for high fertility such as government subsidised housing initiatives. Furthermore, in 2000 the Saudi government indicated to the UNFPA its satisfaction with the national TFR, stating that although it would implement UN reproductive and adolescent health goals, it would not actively promote family planning and has indeed restricted access to contraceptives. The underlying rationale for Saudi pronatalism is to grow the indigenous Saudi population to reduce national reliance on foreign labor forces (Faour 1989, pp. 255, 258; Roudi 2004: 7; Winckler 1998, UNFPA 2000). Moreover, Islam has been used to justify this position: In 1975 the Saudi government banned the import of contraceptives on the grounds that they were contrary to religious teachings. In contrast, poorer and growing states, such as Yemen and Djibouti, are concerned by high fertility and offer direct support for contraceptive use (Roudi 2004: 7). These examples illustrate Muslim perspectives as diverse, and influenced as much by (differing) experience as religion. Another persistent, yet false, assumption is that Islam is conservative, and by extension, Muslim opinions on contraception, family planning and population must also be conservative. Kirk, for example, has asserted that: in many ways all religions are conservative, but it is often noted that this is especially true of Islam, in which religion and way of life are so intertwined as to be inseparable … the contribution of this general conservatism to the maintenance of pre-modern natality is diffuse, difficult to measure, but probably very important (Kirk 1977: 147).

This is not the case. Islam is diverse and, therefore so is theological interpretation and opinion on a number of issues, including population and family planning. Islamic opinions and interpretations range from liberal to conservative; this was clearly demonstrated at the 1994 ICPD in Cairo and through the success of family planning programs in a number of Muslim countries, expressed in low fertility rates, and through conflicting jurisprudential opinion on contraceptive use. The Cairo consensus made evident the diversity of Muslim opinion concerning family planning and population. For example, in approving the Plan of Action many Muslim states, along with the Vatican and a number of Catholic Latin American states, expressed their reservations over the language, principles and norms it codified. The diversity of Islamic opinion was evident in the varying degrees of reservation expressed; for example, the Yemeni delegation was uncompromising on the question of language, stating that: Actually, we want to delete the words ‘sexual activity’. And, if we cannot delete them, then we wish to express our reservations. In paragraph 8.25, concerning ‘unsafe abortion’, we find that the definition is unclear and is not in accordance with our religious beliefs. In Islamic Sharia there are certain clear-cut provisions on abortion and when it should be undertaken. We object to the expression

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‘unsafe abortion’. We wish to express our reservations on paragraph 8.35, relating to ‘responsible sexual behaviour (UNFPA 2 1994).

By contrast, Syria conceded that although some aspects were not consistent with its religious and social principles, the spirit of the document should be upheld for the greater good, stating: the Syrian Arab Republic [would] deal with and address the concepts contained in the Program of Action in accordance with chapter II and in full accordance with the ethical, cultural and religious concepts and convictions of our society in order to serve the unit of the family, which is the nucleus of society, and in order to enhance prosperity in our societies (UNFPA 2 1994).

The Population Reference Bureau’s (PRB) 2004 policy brief Islam and Family Planning, has demonstrated the diversity of fertility rates, government views on fertility, and government-assisted access to contraception in countries with Muslim populations of fifty per cent or more: 44 countries in total. Drawing on PRB, UNFPA, and UNICEF statistics, the report found amongst Muslim countries that: • • • •

32 per cent had low TFRs (<3); 20 per cent had medium TFRs (3<4); and 48 per cent had high TFRs (4<); The lowest TFR was 1.8 in Azerbaijan, and the highest 8 in Niger.

Government attitudes also varied: • • •

43 per cent perceived fertility to be satisfactory, this included Azerbaijan but also Chad with a TFR of 6.6; 57 per cent perceived fertility to be too high, this included Niger and Iran with a TFR of 2; The UAE was the only country to express concern that the TFR, 2.5, was too low,

and that 77 per cent of governments offered direct access to contraceptives, 6.5 per cent indirect assistance, and 6.5 per cent offered no access; this group included the UAE, three governments who were satisfied with fertility and two governments who were concerned with high fertility. On the surface, this report demonstrated diversity in fertility, opinions on fertility, and support for family planning in Muslim countries. More importantly, it demonstrated that high fertility is a concern for some states, such as Yemen with a TFR of 7, but considered satisfactory by others, such as Chad. Yet for others, low fertility is considered too high, such as Iran, Algeria, and Tunisia, but too low by the UAE. Further still, it demonstrated that even where fertility is considered too high,

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this concern does not always translate into policy, evident in high concern, but lack of government assisted access to contraceptives, as in Oman (Roudi 2004: 7). The interpretive flexibility enshrined in Islam, particularly in ijtihadi principles, creates fluid theological opinion and interpretation. That Islam was deemed a ‘religion for all time’ has been interpreted by some, such as Omran and Mohaghegs-Damad, as a directive toward responsiveness and adaptability in interpretation. Because of this, there can never be a definitive Islamic opinion on contraception, family planning and population: There is always the option for individual scholars and ulema to re-interpret the original sources to meet localised challenges or suit personal agendas. Omran has demonstrated this with reference to the retrograde ruling by the Orthodox Deobandi group in Pakistan, which once permitted the use of contraception, based on Deobandi fatwas, but shifted its position to one of opposition to Pakistan’s national family planning program (Omran 1992: 201–202). In March 1963, Mufti Mehmood of the Deobandi political party, Jamiat-Ulama Islam agitated against the National Family Planning Policy within the National Assembly and through a nationwide protest campaign (www.khyber.org) revisited the pre-partition minority mindset that equated power with numbers. Added to this was the widespread publication of Maududi’s Birth Control, originally published in the 1930s, and made widely available throughout Pakistan in the 1960s (Maududi 1967, pp vii–x). On birth control as a national policy, Maududi stated that: the pattern of life that Islam builds can have no place for birth control as a social policy. The Islamic culture strikes at the roots of the materialistic and sensate view of life and eliminates the motivating forces that make man abstain from fulfilling one of the most fundamental urges of human nature, that is, procreation (Maududi 1967: 77).

For Maududi, Islam made family planning irrelevant. Jones and Karim (2005) credit Deobandi opposition as contributing to the failure of Pakistan’s policy, by turning societal opinion against it. Obermeyer, Winckler, Naik and Curtiss have all illustrated the reverse process in Tunisia where the government Islamised its anti-natalist modernisation agenda to counter Islamist opposition. In the context of post-colonial revival, President Bourguiba (1957–1987) sought to transform Tunisia into a modern Islamic state by implementing a religiously compatible modernisation agenda which included family planning and population control to reduce the then national TFR of 7.2. Naik argued that Bourguiba “used Islam and his freedom-fighting credentials to win over religious leaders, who then issued Quranic statements favourable to his cause” (Naik 2003, italics added). Tunisia’s Personal Status Code had previously upheld male rights to polygamy, justified by literal interpretations of the ayas permitting a man to take four wives. Bourguiba instituted against polygamy, justified by ayas and clarifying polygamy as permissible only where wives can be treated equally, which Bourguiba argued negated “the possibility of [polygamy],

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since the condition upon which it is based can never be fulfilled” (Obermeyer 1994: 45, Naik, 2003). Today, Friday prayer services continue to promote national population and modernisation goals, and the national TFR has been reduced to 2.1. Obermeyer has observed that the Tunisian experience provides “an interesting example of how the ambiguity of the scriptures can be used to legitimate modern reforms” (Obermeyer 1994: 45), a sentiment echoed by a contemporary head of Tunisia’s national family planning, Ms Gueddana, who has stated, with regards to the Islamisation of the program, that “It’s all about interpretation” (cited in Naik2003). Both of these examples demonstrate how, under changed circumstances, interpretive flexibility enables established Islamic opinion to be overturned yet remain in keeping with Islam. Islam offers unique and holistic perspectives on family planning that are very different from pre-Cairo, Western liberal ones. Until Cairo, the dominant Western conception centred on fertility control and limitation to enable state population control objectives, through the imposition of population limitation and the small family norm at the global level. Omran has argued that Islam, as a religion for planning, caters for all types of family formation, through high or low fertility, and on planning the family based on needs and capabilities (Omran 1992: 67). Furthermore, most Islamic scholars conditionally permit family planning on the basis of consent. Indeed, this notion of religious, community and spousal sanction for a personal act is at odds with Western notions of individualism, individual decision making, and a woman’s right to independent fertility control. Ammar has demonstrated that Islam forbids the use of family planning and contraception for couples’ fertility limitation and state population control, but permits it for the individual couples’ birth planning and spacing. This is further demonstrated in her discussion on fertility control versus fertility organisation, which highlights the subtle semantic difference, yet significant conceptual distance, between Islamic and Western concepts. She has argued that Islamic scholars forbid fertility control because it implies an ongoing process to limit or prevent conception, but permit fertility regulation for health, birth spacing, and other reasons, because it is temporary in nature and has wider benefits for the mother and family (Ammar NPD: 1). Family planning proponents use this distinction – between temporary and permanent, prevention and termination – to distinguish it from abortion, and to counter the arguments of opponents. Abu Zahra, an opponent of family planning, citied an aya on infanticide, to argue that killing included “abortion since what is involved is the slaying of a human being which Allah has prohibited.” He claimed that this ‘indirectly’ “encompasses birth control because it implies denying Allah’s ability to provide” (Omran 1992: 204). Abu Zhara’s colleague at Cairo University, Sheikh Madkour, has countered this, stating that “birth control which involves no killing is not contradictory to predestination” (Omran 1992: 206). Sheikh Jadal-Haq has made similar arguments, for example, citing Al-Ghazali’s distinction between “avoidance of conception and prevention of birth through abortion. He accepted the first but rejected the second” as evidence to the permissibility of

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family planning (cited in Dardir and Ahmed 1981: 2). This distinction between prevention and termination is central to arguments concerning family planning and abortion across the schools: Many contemporary scholars extend this to sanction the use of modern contraceptive methods, including all barrier types and the contraceptive pill. Distinguishing control from regulation has important implications for national policy, with a knock on effect for global objectives. Because population control is generally considered antithetical to Islamic principles, then so too are population control policies, coercive or otherwise. For example, population control policies directly contravene the Islamic notion of mutual consent: This has prompted scholars to critique national programs and policies on the grounds that they enable states’ desires to dominate over familial ones; the process is non-consensual. Sheikh Jad-al-Haq has argued that “Islam goes to the extent of ensuring that one parent does not impose his or her will on the other … How can it sanction coercive laws which may ignore the needs and circumstances of individual families?” (cited in Dardir and Ahmed 1981: 3). Moreover, pro-family planning scholars are reticent about population policies because they institutionalise private decision making; for example, Dr Tantawi, a Grand Mufti of Egypt stated that family planning laws may not be useful because “family planning is one of the personal matters that belong to husbands and wives only: something that cannot be handled by laws” (Tantawi 1996: 5, see also Bowen 1997: 163; Dardir and Ahmed 1981: 3; Academy of Islamic Research in Omran 1992: 215; Omran 1992: 203). This has global implications: Muslim states could be unwilling to accept global population control norms and objectives, because they have tended to emphasise a state-centric model antithetical to Islam. Some Muslim states demonstrated this moral bind at Cairo, expressing their support for the WPPA, but reserving the right to implement goals only in so far as they complied with Islamic mores. For example, at the 1993 pre-conference NGO steering committee on religious and ethical population perspectives, Al-Hibri argued that “while Islam permits a family to plan its growth rationally in order to avoid poverty, this permission should not be distorted so as to discourage or deny poor people or less technologically developed countries their right to propagation” (al-Hibri 1993: 8). Al-Hibri’s statement offered both critique and alternative to the West-centric models of population and development that had operated pre-Cairo. The injection of such critiques resulted in a re-worked final WPPA under which the global community rejected coercive state policies and programs. The final Cairo Plan of Action stated that “reproductive health-care programmes should provide the widest range of services without any form of coercion. All couples and individuals have the basic right to decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to have the information, education and means to do so” (ICPD 2 1994). The global community expressed its rejection of the coercive operational norm of Western aid programs, under which incentives and rewards were offered to induce contraceptive use and fertility control, and its preference for non-coercive models

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that assuaged the moral and ethical concerns of the majority of participants, including Muslim ones. Yet it is false to assume that, on this basis, all Muslim countries are opposed outright to national family planning and population policies and/or global population objectives. Today, the majority of Muslim states have national population family planning and population policies and programs serving a variety of health, demographic and political objectives. Moreover whilst scholars have objected to coercive fertility policies and practices, many have accepted states’ responsibility to facilitate informed decision making via education, information and the provision of services and supplies for those wishing to use them. Sheikh Jad-al-Haq, whilst opposed to state policy per se, argued that: The state can, of course help people to take correct decisions, provide them with opportunities to act on these decisions and also create conditions which abolish the need for a large family. This means wider use of the mass media and other educational channels for showing the advantages of a small family; easier availability of contraceptives and of relevant information, technological changes reducing the family’s dependence on its manpower as an economic unit. The last is very important. Posters, slogans and TV programs cannot alter human behaviour if social and economic conditions obstruct the change (cited in Dardir and Ahmed 1981: 3).

Furthermore, most Muslim countries have reconciled their national population policies with Islam, having involved religious leaders in planning and development, as has been the case in Egypt, Indonesia and Iran, making for successful lowered fertility outcomes. In Indonesia, President Suharto’s proposal to institute family planning as part of a wider socio-economic modernisation and development strategy was initially opposed by Indonesia’s largest Islamic groups who claimed it was a refutation of God’s providence and design and was therefore un-Islamic. In 1968 Muhammadiyah ruled against the use of contraceptives for fertility prevention, but allowed its use in emergency circumstances. In 1969 Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) ruled family planning permissible for birth spacing but not prevention, and prohibited abortion and sterilisation. The National Family Planning Coordinating Board (BKKBN), which replaced the initial family planning program in 1970, chose to engage rather than ignore its religious opponents, granting these, and other, groups’ ownership and responsibility for BKKBN programs and activities, Further, the BKKBN initially conceded to the exclusion of controversial methods and services such as sterilisation and abortion in order to establish a working relationship with its religious opponents. Barnwal, Hull, Ludjito and Shiffman   www.un.org, www.unfpa.org and www.prb.org reports and indicators attest to this. See for example, UN World Population Policies 2005 Report at http: //www.un.org/esa/ population/publications/WPP2005/WPP2005%20web/Countries/WPP2005%20Frame. htm.

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have all credited this decision as crucial to the success of the Indonesian program. In engaging these groups, the BKKBN was able to secure religious sanction and support for its activities. In 1971, Muhammadiyah ruled contraception permissible for birth spacing. In 1972, the NU’s women’s wing created a population project and trained family planning volunteers in conjunction with the BKKBN. This pattern of engagement, according to Shiffman, has endured and intensified over time. For example, the BKKBN has convened meetings and provincial conferences to bring together national ulema to discuss family planning and population matters: Through this approach Indonesia has emerged as an international exemplar of family planning promotion in the Muslim world, by shifting religious opposition to non-interference and support (Barnwal 2004, Hull NPD, Ludjito 1997, Shiffman 2004, UNPF 2005). A multiplicity, rather than singularity, of Islamic opinion and interpretation exists on most issues, including contraception, family planning, fertility and population. Although embedded in the same textual and religio-cultural origins, they are simultaneously tempered by the social, political, and economic environment in which the interpreters operate – such as the socio-economic divide between the rich Gulf States and their poorer East African co-religionists – and in the context of political support for or protest against processes of modernisation – as was the case in Pakistan, Tunisia and Indonesia. With this said, it is reasonable to suggest that the roles played by Muslim states and societies in international efforts to secure a sustainable global future, will also be varied. The positions, perspectives and participation of these states are dependent on numerous factors, including; the interpretations of localised religious leaders, political parties, and scholars, operating nationally, sub-nationally and locally at the social and political levels; their understanding of the wider situation in which the question is posed; their relationship with the framers of debate; and their method of interpretation, whether it be orthodox or reformist. Whether Islamic states and societies can be effective partners in global sustainability efforts centred on population issues could hinge on the socio-political context in which religious and juristic approaches to the question of family planning are addressed. Contemporary Opposition: Women, Family, Marriage and Procreation as Political Symbols Islamists have emerged as strong oppositional voices to family planning and population control in the Muslim world. Many have joined orthodox anti-family planning and population control arguments with broader anti-Western, -Zionist and -modernist rhetoric, infusing these with Islamic history, language and symbolism, to produce an essentially political discourse. This is not a new process in either Muslim politics or family planning debate. Family planning opponents have long argued that it is a conspiracy to decimate the Muslim world; that it will cause promiscuity, moral decline and secularisation, in short, Westernisation; and, in

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addition, that the myth of the ‘population problem’ does not apply to the resource abundant Islamic world which enjoys the fruits of God’s providence (Omran 1992). This is illustrated in Abu Zahra’s 1962 argument that “the call for birth control is ‘foreign’ in its origin and ‘foreign’ in its consequences” (Omran 1992: 205). The implicit equation of ‘foreign’ with ‘un-Islamic,’ and the notion that this must necessarily be adversarial, is embedded in the aya “you should not follow in the footsteps of Satan; surely he is your enemy manifest; he only enjoins you (to pursue) evil and acts of indecency” (2: 109 cited in Maududi 1967: 76). Sheikh Sahnoun of Morocco posed a similar argument at the 1971 Rabat Conference where he argued that sterilisation would weaken “the strength of the Islamic nation through the reduction of its numbers” and through which he criticised both the conference and pro-family planning fatwas from the colonialist era, such as that issued by the Grand Mufti of Egypt in 1936, as being under foreign influence: In doing so he cast doubt on the Islamic credentials of pro-family planning rulings (Omran 1992: 209). The conspiratorial nature of such arguments is both rejected and countered by family planning proponents on the grounds that Muslim governments control and pioneer family planning programs, such as Sheikh Madkour’s 1965 paper which argued that “our leaders in the Arab and Muslim world are calling for it for the welfare of their people and they are not part of a foreign plot” (cited in Omran 1992: 206). Rooted in historic and contemporary Muslim experiences, these arguments have been adopted by contemporary family planning opponents and through this have entered national and international discourses. A mistrust of Western ideas and intentions pervades the thinking of many Islamist groups; a product of colonial domination coupled with early Judeo-Christian-Muslim history. This experience has convinced some Muslims – not just Islamists – that family planning and population control are euphemisms for their decimation and/or extermination, and are designed to reduce the size of the Muslim population, to control it, and undermine its cohesion through moral decline, promiscuity and secularisation (Hassan 1996: 63). More recently, Islamists’ reactions have been imbibed with self-perceived negative effects of globalisation and modernisation – societal division, social and economic dislocation, and crisis in the Muslim world – and these have entered international and national population debates. These voices have become more prominent in the post Cold War era. Firstly, in response to the Western post-Cold War agenda, particularly the neo-liberal New World Order project which sought to export and impose democracy and capitalism in the interests of global peace, stability and co-operation. This agenda has given credence to the Islamist of a moral, cultural, political and existential threaten to Islam posed by an increasingly interventionist and intrusionist West. Secondly, Islamist opposition groups have thrived in an environment where the disabling effect of lost Superpower sponsorship has weakened governmental control over them, particularly in the Middle East. What has emerged are alternative and critical Muslim voices in international debate, pitted against each other in outright rejection of Western norms, values

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and regimes versus a pragmatic approach to merging Western ideas with Islamic values (Ehteshami 1996, pp. 180–97). This was clearly demonstrated at the Cairo Conference where Muslim delegates found themselves opposing each other, as well as the Westcentric agenda. Non-state Muslims actors, adopting a hardline anti-Western stance were adversaries of the majority of Muslim states who took a more pragmatic stance based on national need. Non-state actors, such as Al-Azhar University, condemned the conference as “… a Zionist and imperialist plot to destroy Islam” (cited in MacFarquhar 1994: 54). Egyptian cleric Sheikh Mitwalli Shaarawi added to the anti-Western conspiracies arguing that Islam’s enemies at Cairo were “working to destroy our main resource, which is our human strength” (cited in Economist 27 August 1994: 34). Other Egyptian ulema embedded their objections in anti-Zionist/ Colonialist rhetoric, and accused Cairo of being a “Zionist and imperialist assault against Islam.” To this Egyptian intellectual Mustafa Mahmoud added the threat to identity, accusing the WPPA of being a “well-designed explosive device to blow apart (Muslim) religious identity” (Time 5 September 1994). The Saudi Arabian Council of Ulama likewise condemned the conference as a “ferocious assault on Islamic society”, forbidding Muslim attendance, which the Sudan, Lebanon and Iraq conceded to (Time 12 September 1994). State actors were more reserved in their objections, expressing the Muslim middle ground. The Yemeni delegation, couching its objections in Islamic discourse, requested that its reservations be put on the conference record, expressing: reservations on every term and all terminology that is in contradiction with Islamic Sharia ... we wanted to delete the words ‘sexual activity’. And, if we cannot delete them, then we wish to express our reservations … concerning ‘unsafe abortion’, we find that the definition is unclear and is not in accordance with our religious beliefs. In Islamic Sharia there are certain clear-cut provisions on abortion and when it should be undertaken. We object to the expression ‘unsafe abortion (UNFPA 2 1994 [online]).

At the other end of the spectrum were those Muslim states who, through their willingness to reformulate abortion references, enabled universal, though reserved, endorsement of the final document (Bowen 1997: 177), demonstrating the possibility of reconciling Western and Islamic agendas. Muslim delegates asked that abortion be distinguished from acceptable, legitimate family planning methods, and this was what transpired. In the draft document, abortion references were made primarily in Chapter 7, Reproductive Rights and Family Planning, reaffirming the “consensus of the 1984 International Conference on Population, governments should ‘take appropriate steps to help women avoid abortion, which in no case should be promoted as a method of family planning …” (UNFPA Draft 1994: 36). This paragraph was included in final document, but it, along with the majority of abortion references, were shifted from Chapter 7 to Chapter 8 on Health, Morbidity and Mortality, more specifically into section three Women’s Health and Safe Motherhood, where it was stated in paragraph 8.25 that:

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In no case should abortion be promoted as a method of family planning. All Governments and relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations are urged to strengthen their commitment to women’s health, to deal with the health impact of unsafe abortion as a major public health concern and to reduce the recourse to abortion through expanded and improved familyplanning services. Prevention of unwanted pregnancies must always be given the highest priority and every attempt should be made to eliminate the need for abortion. Women who have unwanted pregnancies should have ready access to reliable information and compassionate counselling. Any measures or changes related to abortion within the health system can only be determined at the national or local level according to the national legislative process. In circumstances where abortion is not against the law, such abortion should be safe. In all cases, women should have access to quality services for the management of complications arising from abortion. Post-abortion counselling, education and family-planning services should be offered promptly, which will also help to avoid repeat abortions” (UNFPA 2 1994 [online]),

Abortion was made morally palatable by shifting it from a reproductive right, which religious delegates interpreted as implying acceptability of use, to a safeguard of maternal health, and as a last resort method. Most Muslim states expressed reservations over the perceived un-Islamic content of some chapters of the WPPA, particularly those regarding abortion. Yet they agreed to endorse other key conclusions such as stabilising global population growth, the need for female empowerment as a means to this end, and the utility of abortion in health care. In doing so they demonstrated their willingness to be partners in global sustainability. The Libyan delegation, for example, chose to endorse the final document whilst expressing its “reservation on the words ‘unwanted pregnancies’ in paragraph 8.25, because our written Constitution does not allow the State to undertake abortions unless the mother’s health is in danger” (UNFPA 1994 [online]), demonstrating the willingness of some Islamic countries to countenance abortion for health reasons. The debate on abortion at Cairo demonstrated the diversity and flexibility of Islamic opinion on questions relating to population and family planning, and that global consensus could be brokered between Western and Muslim that satisfied the religious concerns of the later. Furthermore, the Cairo debate highlighted tensions existent within the Muslim world: In particular, the tension between those who reconcile Islamic and Western ideas in the pursuit of a pragmatic but uniquely Islamic political model and identity, and those who reject all things Western as outside of their identity and agenda. To some Islamists the Cairo agenda represented a threat to Muslim existence and identity because its ethos undermined the moral institutions and integrity considered foundational to Islam and the Islamic world. This went to the heart of the overarching Islamist agenda: Political and societal reconstruction through the reclamation of orthodox symbols and boundaries of identity relating to gender, sex

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and sexuality and the family – the cornerstones to Islamic society. Western liberal notions of family planning and reproductive health, bound by the Cairo agenda, posed a very real threat to this (Bowen 1997: 180; Ghazi 1993: 53; Omran 1992: 203), by posing concepts of these that are alternative, even antithetical, to Islamist ideas. For example, Western and Islamist notions of family and marriage are very different. Marriage are family are considered “the basic social unit of Islamic society and marriage is the fundamental Islamic institution. Marriage and family formation are grave responsibilities and are subject to specific regulations” (Omran 1992: 13). For Orthodox interpreters, such as Nasr, the family symbol is distinctly patriarchal and reinforces patriarchal social structures and gender roles which inform the societal ideal. He has stated that, “the Muslim family is the miniature of the whole of Muslim society and its firm basis. In it the father functions as the Imam in accordance with the patriarchal nature of Islam” (Nasr 1994: 110). Marriage has two functions: to bind men and women in love and compassion, and to allow sex for the ultimate goal of procreation. Islam regards sex as a right to be enjoyed by all Muslims, and advises married couples to avoid abstinence, and the right of both partners to fulfilment and enjoyment is explicated in the Sunna. Despite this seemingly liberal approach to sex, Islam prescribes that it is a marital act only; it should not be practiced pre or extra martially (Omran 1992: 15; Sachedina p. 108). This is demonstrated in the Prophetic Hadith “O young men! Those of you who can support a wife and household should marry. For marriage keeps you from looking with lust at women and preserves you from promiscuity. But those who cannot, should take to fasting which is a means of tempering sexual desires” (cited in Omran 1992: 18). The trinity of marriage, family and society is central to Islamist rejections of family planning, because they are foundational to “social cohesion, stability and order” (Bowen 1997: 161; Haddad 1998: 15) and central to the delineation of boundaries: the good versus bad Muslim family is foundational to good versus bad Muslim societies (Eickleman and Piscatori 1996: 81). Thus the corruption of the family, or deviations from the desired form, ultimately corrupts, misshapes and endangers the Muslim community. This logic, but not necessarily conspiratorial critique, was expressed at Cairo by the Syrian delegation which argued that it would “deal with and address the concepts contained in the Programme of Action in full accordance with the ethical, cultural and religious concepts and convictions of our society in order to serve the unit of the family, which is the nucleus of society, and in order to enhance prosperity in our societies” (UNFPA 2 1994 [online]). The general feeling was that Western liberal norms promote and enable sexual promiscuity, illegitimacy and the destruction of the family unit (Ghazi 1993: 53; Omran 1992: 203). Many Muslims reacted against Cairo’s implicit condoning of pre- and extra marital sex, homosexuality, and non-traditional unions and families by reformulating population and family planning objectives through the reproductive rights framework, which is antithetical to orthodox Islamic values

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(Economist 1994: 34; Bowen 1997: 177). The Libyan delegation, for example, expressed its reservation: on all terms in the document that are in contravention of Islamic Sharia, such as we see in paragraph 4.17 and in chapter II of the document, in relation to inheritance and extramarital sexual activities, and the references to sexual behaviour, as in paragraph 8.31 … despite the discussion that took place in the Main Committee regarding the basic rights of couples and individuals. We express a reservation regarding the word ‘individuals (UNFPA 2 1994 [online]).

Other Islamic actors, such as Al-Azhar University, suggested a more sinister Western-UN agenda which sanctioned norms antithetical to Islam “in such a manner as to demolish the values upheld by all the revealed religions, to encourage deviation and the spread of infectious sexually transmitted diseases” (Economist, 27 August 1994: 34). Muslim women were caught in the symbolic and ideational competition played out between Islamists and Western liberals at Cairo. The liberal paradigm advanced by the Cairo agenda enshrined a woman’s right to empowerment and, more importantly, to independence and independent control of her own sexuality and reproductivity through family planning: The WPPA states that “women’s ability to control their own fertility, [is a] cornerstone of population and development-related programmes” (UNFPA 2 1994 [online], Mitsuka 1993: 25). This is consistent with individualistic Western norms but is inconsistent with other cultural mores, such as Islamic ones. Some Muslim commentators criticised this individualist approach, perceiving it as antithetical to the consensual Islamic norm, particularly the idea of mutual consent on family planning. The Afghanistan delegation, for example, expressed “its reservation about the word ‘individual’ in chapter VII and also about those parts that are not in conformity with Islamic Sharia” (UNFPA 2 1994 [online]). Fundamental to these arguments are Islamic conceptions of female status and roles – which differed to those advanced by Western delegates – and historical Muslim precedents of female contraceptive and reproductive control. The status of Muslim women is representative of the tensions between the Islamic texts and interpretative practices, which are heightened by embedded historical, cultural and political circumstances. Whilst all three monotheistic faiths demonstrate prejudice against women – as God’s secondary creation and the agents of man’s fall – the Islamic texts, albeit theoretically, liberated and empowered Muslim women. The Quran grants women, albeit semantically, equal status to men, evident in egalitarian references to creation, through the interchangeable use of masculine and feminine terms, and in declaring all believers equal before God (Hassan 1996, pp. 64–6; Obermeyer 1994: 60). This is demonstrated in the aya “and the believers, men and women alike, are protectors, one of another, they enjoin the right and forbid the wrong, they observe regular prayers, pay the poor-due, and obey Allah and his Messenger. On them Allah will have mercy” (9: 71 cited in Omran 1992: 44).

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However, the equality Islam intended for women has been tempered by the same forces that have shifted and shaped interpretations on family planning (Bowen 1997; Mitsuka, 1993). Many pre-Islamic cultures, for example, featured strong kinship ties and adhered to clearly defined gender roles. Islam intended to release women from these bonds by granting them independence and freedom of choice, but retained the pre-Islamic right for senior male relatives to exercise control over them (Bowen 1997: 163, Hassan 1996, pp 61, 71, Obermeyer 1994: 71), evident in the aya “men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has given one or more (strength) than the other, and because they support them from their means” (4: 34 cited in Omran 1992: 51). This ongoing battle for control over women’s bodies and fertility has an historic precedent. Bowen has argued that despite early contraceptive knowledge, Muslim doctors were reluctant to allow women to use it for fear that they would misuse their new found freedom and control to engage in pre- or extra marital sex, safe in the knowledge that they could avoid incriminating pregnancies (Bowen 1997: 174–75). Some Muslims object to contraception and family planning because they interpret them as the means to allow women independent control over their own fertility and sexuality. This is further interpreted as permitting and enabling pre and extra marital sex, granting women independence from their male controllers, and releasing them from their traditional roles as wives and mothers: If realised this, it is argued, could undermine the gender balance and familial structure that is critical to the stability of Muslim societies. Such is the centrality of specific feminine symbols to Muslim identity that many Islamists fear that in acquiring these rights, Muslim women will become Westernised, modernised and impure, and will subsequently Westernise, modernise and pollute the Islamic world. For example, Nasr argued that “what many modernised Muslim women are doing in rebelling against the traditional Muslim family structure is to rebel against fourteen centuries of Islam” (Nasr 1994: 111, see also Eickleman and Piscatori 1996: 97; Hassan 1996: 62). Women are denied empowerment because the preservation of their virtue and morality against corrupting Western forces serves to protect the wider community and society, and this serves as a justification against family planning. Islamist voices are most likely to stand in the way of Muslim participation in global sustainability. Whilst they remain peripheral actors in international population and sustainability debates, Islamist objectors are important because in some Muslim states and societies, they have the power to marginalise and silence liberal Islamic voices that advocate co-operation in global sustainability efforts (Bowen 1997: 179). In some cases, Islamist groups pit themselves against the state – in what Eickleman and Piscatori have described as the competitive and contestational process of Muslim politics – fighting for the right to interpret and control symbols, identities and ideational boundaries. In this respect, Islamists could potentially disrupt local and national programs and policies, and thus the global sustainability efforts, of their host states. Islamist voices are also significant because, over time, their influence has increased locally, provincially and nationally,

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and at the societal and political levels; Here they have utilised the spaces they have gained in the political sphere to exert influence over personal and political decision making (Bowen 1997: 180). Their actions could negate governmental population objectives with international consequences. Islamists could shift states away from their commitment to global population objectives, or prevent the societal fruition of these objectives by encouraging high fertility as a religious and political duty, as was once the case in Iran, Tunisia and Indonesia. Furthermore, because these groups can operate trans-nationally, using interstate communication networks, they are able to transfer their ideas and arguments to a globally disparate audience, and in doing so they could undermine sustainability efforts at home and throughout the Muslim world. Many groups are reviving population conspiracies as part of a wider expression of political and moral protest against perceived Western encroachment into the Muslim world. Islam and the Muslim world, these groups claim, are under threat: Islam’s religious purity is threatened by Western liberal mores and the Muslim world is physically threatened by the decimating intentions of the Western population control agenda. The Londonbased Islamist group Hizbut Tehrir has cited Nixon’s NSSM 200 as evidence of a Western conspiracy to “control the birth rate in several Muslim countries … using the United Nations, World Bank, and World Health Organisation” as part of an “American conspiracy to prevent Muslims from becoming a global power by slashing Muslim birth rates” and that by doing so the “US would have even greater access to the immense wealth in the Islamic lands” thus prescribing Muslims to procreate for the “re-establishment of the Khalifah so as to end the American plan to destroy the rising influence of Muslims” (Nation 13/06/02). Likewise, statements by the group Mission Islam, at its website www. missionislam.com, illustrate the co-option of family planning in the contest for symbols and identity, and the demarcation of boundaries and identities vis-à-vis the West, by criticising the global population agenda and those Muslims who enable it. On the global population agenda, or, as they have labelled it, the Centrepiece of Imperialist Aggression against the Muslim World, Mission Islam reported on a 1991 American/Nigerian conspiracy to: [P]lant fake Islamic teaching manuals in religious institutions in northern Nigeria … which presented an ideology in stark contrast to traditional Islamic views of contraception, abortion, and sterilization – were written by a self-proclaimed ‘Islamic theologian’ who received funds from UNFPA … Worse yet, the author of the ‘Islamic’ booklets had participated in the preparation of a long-term ‘threat assessment’ for the U.S. Department of Defence which recommended that population control be placed by western policy planners at the top of the International security agenda (http: //www.missionislam.com/conissues/ popcontrol.htm).

The theologian and work in question was Abdel Rahim Omran and Family Planning in the Legacy of Islam. Mission Islam accused of Omran of being:

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In doing so, they attempted to discredit the Islamic credentials of Omran, his work and ideas by their association with, and contribution to, non-Muslim conspiracies against Islam and the Islamic world. However, post-Cairo developments have demonstrated the stated, if not actual, willingness of Muslim governments to partake in global sustainability efforts, through the pursuit of international population and female empowerment norms, and in eschewing conservative Islamist models. For example, the Rabat Declaration on Population and Development 2003, emerging from the Fourth Arab Parliamentarians Meeting on Population and Development, reaffirmed the population, sustainable development and empowerment objectives enshrined in the WPPA, +5 and +10 Declarations, and the MDGs. Through this declaration, Arab Muslim states “affirm[ed] their full commitment to undertake the tasks and functions required of them to translate population and development goals in their respective countries into actions and to facilitate this mission in the Arab World, particularly in the areas of reproductive and sexual health and women and youthrelated issue” (Rabat Declaration 2003). On population, the parliamentarians recognised: that the average population growth rate in the Arab world is still high, … that there is a considerable variation in this rate among the Arab countries, resulting from a widening gap between fertility and general and/or mortality rates, which led to an increase in the numbers and ratios of the youth and aged people. This has resulted in high dependency ratios, which have been associated with diminishing employment opportunities for young people and, subsequently, with expanding poverty, malnutrition and inequitable distribution of resources … therefore expressed their support for policies and programmes that help create a balance between all these aspects through improved distribution of resources, the articulation of more equitable social policies, and the enactment of legislation that promotes human rights principles in all aspects of life (Rabat Declaration 2003).

Furthermore, through the many paragraphs relating to female empowerment and equality, the Parliamentarians acknowledged the vital role played by women in development and population goals, advancing an Islamised concept of female status that was productive – counter to the reproductive one upheld by orthodox

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Islamists – stating that “women, who manage natural resources, engage in economic activities and participate in national development, play a most crucial role in society, equitable to that of men. The Arab Parliamentarians, therefore, reconfirm Ibn Kholdoun’s statement that ‘Women account for half the society, and thus unemploying women wastes half the national potential’” (Rabat Declaration 2003). Likewise, the 2005 Islamabad Declaration emerging from the International Ulema Conference on Population and Development, which brought together ulema from twenty one countries, reaffirmed the indivisibility of population, sustainable development, and female empowerment, and, in reaffirming preceding international conventions and declarations, reconciled them with Islam. The Islamabad Declaration Islamised population by reconciling global and national population objectives with religious directives, stating that “we believe that Islam is a religion for all times, i.e. past present and future, and cognisant that Population problems are related to the present as well as the future this Conference stresses the relevance of Islamic guidance to population issues that these aim towards the betterment of human life, social uplift and the elimination of poverty in Muslim countries and communities” (Islamabad Declaration 2005). Moreover, included in the numerous paragraphs relating to female empowerment and its link to national and international population and development goals, the Ulema advocated the advancement of moderate conceptions of female status, in opposition to and refutation of, orthodox ones, stating that “we reaffirm that the development of a society depends on the improved conditions of women. In this context, we are resolved to … project[ing] enlightened moderate policies to educate Muslim population in general and women in particular about their rights and responsibilities towards families in accordance with Islamic injunctions” (Islamabad Declaration 2005). Conclusion In some Muslim countries high fertility patterns and objections to family planning persist, contrary to global norms and understandings. Because of this external, read Western, assumptions that Islam is pro-natalist also persist. This assumption is evidently false. The reality is that there is no singular Islamic opinion on or experience of population growth and family planning. Islamic jurisprudence offers justification for a multitude of opinions on population growth, control and family planning which are both complimentary and contrary to global norms: The majority of historical rulings conditionally approve the use of contraceptives and family planning. Many contemporary scholars interpret this conditional approval as evidence of the permissibility of population programs. Further, a number of Muslim countries, including highly orthodox Iran, have high profile population control programs that have succeeded in lowering fertility levels, in some cases to replacement level.

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What can be said with certainty is that the Islamic religion is not an obstruction to pro-population control debates, programs and objectives, nor is its teachings antithetical to global norms on sustainability. Rather, the likely obstacles to Muslim states’ participation in global sustainability efforts are those political and religious figures that have co-opted religion to justify their pro-natalist/anti-control positions. This in itself is often part of a wider political agenda that has very little to do with population and sustainable development, rather it is part of a broader anti-Western agenda into which family planning and population control have been co-opted as potent symbols. The crux of the Islamist argument is this: objection to the perceived imposition of an alien moral agenda, or the undertaking of an insidious genocidal plot, by the Western world against the Islamic. Since 2000, the global sustainability project has taken on a new dimension, one of ensuring global security. The population-sustainability-security paradigm’s Western origins could make it a target of conservative Islamic objectors. That this paradigm focuses particularly on the developing and Muslim states, and advocates the control of populations for national and international, read Western, security interests, lends credence to Islamist objections. Can Muslim states and societies be participants in and partners to this project? Certainly there is nothing inherent in Islam that says that they can’t. Many Muslim states, by adopting global population norms and objectives, have demonstrated their receptivity to international paradigms. On this basis the precedent for receptivity to the securitised global sustainability norm is set. However, that there are groups within these states and societies who object to family planning and population control, using Muslim language and symbols to justify this, also suggests that Islam may be co-opted to obstruct the full participation of Muslim states. The possibility of Muslim states’ partnership in global security-sustainability efforts is examined through the case studies of Iran and Pakistan.

Chapter 4

Islam, Politics and Population: The Iranian Debate from 1953–1989 Iran, a major West Asian/Middle Eastern, state underwent two major socio-political shifts in the twentieth century. First, through the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1909, and second through the Islamic Revolution of 1977–1979, emerging as an Islamic Republic and the world’s only Shia theocracy (Kamali 1997: 173). These events significantly shaped religio-political relations and the status of ulema which, in turn, has influenced Iranian debates on population and development over the last century. This religio-political environment highly influenced the Iranian population and development debate from 1953 to 1989: Official and public discourses have been scrutinised to gain insight into Iranian ideas on population and development during this time. From this emerges a picture of the processes of conceptualisation and reconceptualisation, of influential figures and events and their legacy. Through this, we gain insight into the interplay between international and national discourses and events and the effect this has had on Iranian thinking. A national population debate, with the emphasis on control, was first initiated under the Shah in the 1960s as part of the ‘White Revolution’ modernisation and development policy. Controversy surrounding the Revolution tainted these reforms in the eyes of some Iranians. Modernisation led to the establishment of a national family planning program in 1967 under the First Five Year Plan of Development. Socio-economic anti-natalism was the underlying rationale of the program under the Shah. Even the Islamic government, despite its initial pro-natalist stance following the 1979 revolution, eventually conceded to pragmatism over ideology: Following the 1986 census, and on ministerial and bureaucratic advice, it reinstated the population control policy for religious and political reasons. From 1986, Iranian debate became increasingly consistent with international discourses and imbibed with international objectives. Iran was moving into partnership in the global sustainability project. Iran, Monarchy and Clergy The political, social and cultural influence of Shia Islam in Iran is longstanding: its formation and reformation by social, political and religious change agents has been an historical constant. Shia Islam, its symbols, traditions and meanings, were adopted by the Safavids in 1501, partly to distinguish their religio-cultural identity and political sovereignty as distinct and independent from their Sunni

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Arab and Turkish neighbours and adversaries. The adoption of Shia Islam, and its merging with Persian custom and tradition, informs the contemporary Iranian religio-social-political context, in particular the belief in and occultation of the twelfth Imam, Mahdi. This in turn, informs the distinction between just and unjust leadership based on religious credentials. It also introduces the idea that until the Mahdi’s return leadership will be divided between the state and clergy: political power resides with the state whilst the clergy holds social power, particularly the power to mobilise society against the state (Kamali 1997: 175). Traditionally, Iran’s clergy were located in autonomous, non-government seminaries in primarily Shia pilgrimage centres such as Qom and Mashhad, where they remained largely isolated from global social, political and scientific developments, generally untouched by the processes of modernity (Mehryar 2004: 120). Likewise, the society they influenced was predominantly agrarian, conservative, traditional, illiterate and impoverished. Until the twentieth century, clergy-monarchical relations were fairly harmonious, each respecting the other’s sphere of influence. Toward the end of the Qajar Dynasty (1794–1921) the social, religious and political landscapes began to merge and then significantly shift. The Constitutional Revolution established the pre-conditions for Reza Khan’s coup and politicised the Ulema as opposition and an alternative centre of political power. The latter fractured Iranian society by politically alienating the clergy and their traditional allies, the bazaari, who would later form links with other alienated groups, leading to the 1979 revolution. The period of social and political disintegration that followed, characterised by parliamentary fragmentation, weakened government and foreign intrusion, led to the 1921 coup and the establishment of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1925 by Reza Khan. Both he and his son, Mohammad Reza, opted for modernisation with an emphasis on autocratic rule (Esposito and Voll 1996, pp. 53–5; Kamali 1997, pp. 175–9). Despite a commitment to modernisation, population was not an official concern under Reza Khan. The Ministry of the Interior conducted a general, but unreliable census in 1939–1940, estimating a total national population of approximately 15.5 million people; no other data, such as fertility, mortality or growth rates was recorded and subsequent readers deemed it “for most comparative purposes … virtually worthless” (Firoozi 1977: 74). The Shah’s position was not unusual at a time when global concern was only just emerging, and population was not yet recognised as important to modernisation and development. The significance of this period laid in the shift in religio-political relations and the declining status of the clergy vis-à-vis the monarchy, which was foundational to later religious agitation and the eventual revolution, and had a significant effect on later population debates and programs. Until the 1960s, the clerical-monarchical relationship was ambiguous but not necessarily antagonistic, and indeed there were   Beginning with the 1892 ‘tobacco concessions’ and ending with and consolidated by the proclamation of the Constituent National Assembly in 1906.   Who was imposed as Reza Khan’s successor by western powers in 1941.

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periods of engagement and cooperation between the two. Reza Kahn embarked on a unique path of modernisation that, rather than secularising Iran, made expedient use of Islamic symbolism, and enabled limited and controlled clerical participation in politics. Initially this kept the clergy on side; however, other and later policies adopted by the Shah alienated the clergy and weakened its position. Major factors in this process were the reversion to pre-Islamic, Persian symbolism, primarily renaming the dynasty as Pahlavi and establishing Zoroastrianism as the joint state religion alongside Islam. Equally significant was the secularisation and Westernisation of the Iranian legal, judicial and education systems which robbed the clergy of their traditional power base and control over religiously defined cultural capital. Moreover, Reza Khan’s socio-economic modernisation strategy stratified Iranian society along class lines. Coupled with increasingly autocratic and repressive rule, contrary to the 1906 Constitution, this social stratification was fundamental to revolutionary agitation in Iran (Esposito and Voll 1996: 54; Kamali 1997, pp. 173–9). Reza Khan laid the religious and political foundations for religious and social protest that grew into a revolution. The deposition of Reza Khan, and subsequent installation of Mohammad Reza by Iran’s Allied occupiers in 1941, led to a period of externally enforced democracy during which oppositional groups emerged and consolidated popular support. This included two that would play an instrumental role in the eventual revolution: an Islamic group headed by Ayatollah Kashani, and the secular, nationalist left-wing National Front under Mohammad Mossadeq. The two collaborated in opposition to the privatisation of Iranian oil, calling for industry nationalisation in the pursuit of Iran’s economic and national independence. Mossadeq subsequently served as Iran’s first democratically elected Prime Minister from 1951 until his deposition by Western powers in 1953 through which Mohammad Reza was restored to power. From this point the Shah became increasingly authoritarian, repressive and dependent on external assistance, and aggressively pursued his modernisation and secularisation strategy – the ‘White Revolution’ of political, economic and social reforms. Within this context he unwittingly created the social situation that would be his eventual undoing. Secularisation and privatisation displaced the power of the Ulema and bazaari; an educated middle and working class grew, demanding greater rights and freedoms; and land reforms led to mass rural to urban migration thereby creating a social underclass of disaffected and dispossessed urban poor with their own sets of demands, and adherence to traditionalist norms: the mostazafan. During this period two events led to the clergy becoming politicised: The death of Iran’s leading Ayatollah, Borujerdi, and the imposition of a Western secular modernisation strategy. In 1920, Borujerdi had issued a Fatwa expressly forbidding clerical participation in politics. Some of Iran’s politicised Ulema interpreted his death, and perceived invalidity of his fatwa, as a sign for their foray into national politics. In 1962–63, Ayatollah Khomeini, a fundamentalist cleric from Qom, emerged as a vocal anti-monarchist. Khomeini had become politicised during the 1930s, partly because of the influences of teacher and mentor Ayatollah Shahabadi, who was explicitly anti-Shah and proposed the salvation of

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the Muslim community as restorative to Iranian power and status. Khomeini had become embittered by the political alienation of the clergy, which had led to their declining socio-political status, and by Iran’s societal moral degeneration through which, he argued, the populace had grown increasingly “selfish, sluggish and feeble and therefore unable to resist the dictatorship of the Shah” (cited in Moin 1994: 78). After the Second World War, Khomeini engaged with national political and religious debates; he was vociferous at a time when most clergy had opted for pragmatic silence. Khomeini, convinced by the Mahdi tradition, believed that governmental legitimacy rested on the rule of God. In his opinion, this could only be fulfilled by the ‘Perfect Man’, “…the holder of the chain of existence, with which the cycle is completed … He is God’s great sign, created in God’s image” (Ayatollah Khomeini cited in Moin 1994: 73): a man endowed as God’s earthly vice-regent by the chain of existence connecting him to the Prophet, Imam Ali, and the successor Imams. The Perfect Man was the valiyat-e-faqih, or jurisconsult, who would restore Islam and institute an Islamic government, thereby undoing the excesses of Western capitalist modernisation and restoring Iran to its former status, power and glory. (Enayat1982: 23; Moin 1994, pp. 69–74). Khomeini was highly and publicly critical of the Shah and the threat he posed to Iran’s national independence, its Islamic identity and the influence of the clergy. He believed that through Western alliances, external forces, particularly the US and Israel were able to control the Iran’s political and economic spheres, whilst secular modernisation threatened the country’s Islamic social foundations, and in turn clerical influence. He stated in a 1962 public lecture: Don’t listen to what others tell you. Think a little; ponder where all this is leading you. Learn at least something from your father’s fate. Don’t continue in this way. Listen to what I have to say; listen to what the ulama have to say; listen to what the religious scholars have to say – it is they who seek the welfare of this country and the nation (Khomeini in Kauthar 1995, pp. 124–5).

Khomeini’s public critiques of the Shah, coupled with a populist quasi-socialist agenda directed primarily toward the mostazafan, generated an urban support base for political protest. Following Khomeini’s deportation and eventual exile in 1963, Iran’s Ayatollahs withdrew from politics; however, Khomeini’s cause was adopted and furthered by an alliance of leftist and Islamic youth factions, which persisted until the Shah’s increasing repression of the left in the early 1970s. In this context of relative freedom, with the attentions of SAVAK and other forces of state oppression diverted elsewhere, religio-political groups were able to establish and consolidate their urban support base. Three groups emerged over time: fundamentalists such as Khomeini and Taleghani; moderates such as Shariatmadari; and traditionalists such as Khorasani and Najafi. The moderatesecular link was established in 1951 through collaboration between Taleghani and Mossadeq. What emerged in the mid-1970s was an expedient union of disparate secular and religious political movements united with the express objective of

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the Shah’s removal. Furthermore, the fundamentalist ulemas’ association with liberal groups anointed them with sufficient democratic credentials to make them palatable to Western governments. James Carter, following his election as US President in 1976, demanded liberalisation in Iran, leading to improved political freedom under which the anti-Shah movement flourished and consolidated. The Shah was ousted by the revolutionary coalition in 1979, paving the way for the eventual establishment of the Islamic revolution (Esposito and Voll 1996; Enayat 1983; Kamali 1987; Mehryar 2004). Islam, Population and Family Planning Under Mohammad Reza Shah, 1953–1979 Following his re-installation to power in 1953, Mohammad Reza intensified national modernisation efforts. In 1963 he introduced a swathe of controversial reforms under the national modernisation strategy labelled ‘the White Revolution.’ Controversial components included the rural Land Reform, female enfranchisement, the Capitulation, Provincial and District Councils Bills, all of which would be part of the Shah’s eventual undoing. Religio-political relations at this time were relatively harmonious largely because the Shah’s intolerance for and repression of opposition groups was directed elsewhere, particularly towards communists. Moreover, Borujerdi’s aforementioned fatwa kept the ulema largely out of national politics, confining the fundamentalist fringe to a protest role. Khomeini, who at the time was establishing his religio-political credentials, protested against female enfranchisement, arguing that it was a ploy to appease the populace and to distract them from the destruction Iran’s clergy and therefore Islam. In 1962, he publicly stated that: We saw that the target of this illiterate and dishonourable government from the very onset of its involvement was Islam. In the press they wrote in bold print that ladies have been given the right to participate in elections. In fact this was part of an evil plan to distract the public’s attention away from the main issue; that being the elimination of Islam and the Quran (Kauthar vol. 1, 1995: 96).

However, even after Borujerdi’s death, Khomeini remained a solitary religious protestor. Most ulema opted out of politics, thus preventing significant religiopolitical engagement. On population during this period, Iranian authorities adopted a pro-natalist stance, counter to the growing global anti-natalist norm. The first national census, conducted by the Central Statistics Bureau in 1956, was designed to determine national demographic, social and economic characteristics. It recorded a total population of 18.95 million people, but, more importantly for the Shah’s development plans, demonstrated that Iran was predominantly rural and largely illiterate (Bank Markazi Iran 1977: 64; Firoozi 1977: 74; Paydafar 1967: 9). Although the government did not

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actively promote or run family planning programs, services and supplies were made available through private clinics and volunteer networks supported by international organisations such as the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF); in 1961 the government permitted the importation of modern contraceptives (Friesen and Moore 1977: 117). The official position was one of strategic pro-natalism due to Iran’s perceived encirclement by pro-Soviet and Arab nationalist states, and the desire to grow Iran into a regional power vis-à-vis the rapidly growing populations, and therefore power, of its neighbours. Iran refused to sign international agreements, such as the 1964 WPA, to control population growth, and domestic academic and intellectuals are said to have been unconvinced by global population-development arguments given Iran’s vast oil wealth (Mehryar et al. 2000: 3). Others argue that the absence of policy and programs reflected a lack of knowledge rather than official pronatalist desires (Edwards 1992: 116; Hoodfar and Assadpour 2000: 19). Whatever the explanation, the Iranian population grew significantly by the time of the 1966 Census; the national population was 25.79 million, the growth rate 2.71 per cent, and the national Total Fertility Rate (TFR) 7.7 (Aghajanian 1995: 1, Ministry of Health and Medical Education [MoHME] 1994: 6). Iran’s pro-natalist stance contradicted the emerging global anti-natalist economic-development discourse of that time. Launched in the mid- to late 1960s, Iran’s embryonic White Revolution and subsequent family planning programs were driven largely by external donors and the pursuit of petro-dollars, thus their operational rationale and philosophy largely reflected the dominant global population-development paradigm. During the late 1960s, governmental attitudes toward fertility and population shifted from pro to anti-natalist in line with changed international opinion. Whilst Iran may have initially perceived the geo-strategic benefits of a large population, it faced pressures from its Western allies and sponsors to rapidly modernise to fulfil external geostrategic aims in the region. This included pressure to control population growth. Experts from the US-based Population Council, as well as American experts and the UNFPA, assisted Iran in establishing its family planning program in 1967, administered by The Council of Family Planning (CFP) within the Ministry of Health (MoH), with the expressed aim of promoting “the physical, mental, social and economic welfare of families and in consequence that of society” (Fourth Five Year Plan cited in Friesen and Moore 1977: 117). The government accepted the utility of fertility control to socio-economic development by balancing human, natural and social resources. For example the government was concerned that the growth and structure of the population was such that the working cohort was increasingly overburdened by the young, as expressed by the Iranian representative to the 1967 International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP) International Conferences. He stated: The population of Iran is increasing with as high a rate as about 3 per cent a year. This alarming rate of growth is upsetting the population structure, particularly insofar as the working aged population is concerned … the consequence of rapid

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increase in population is burdening the active population of Iran with a very high dependency ration (cited in Desai 1978: 31).

Family planning was intended to control and reduce fertility and bring the population growth rate (PGR) down to 1 per cent by the late 1980s. At this time Iranian officials, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, inducted global population and development norms into national thinking. Iran adopted the supply side approach favoured and advocated by global population experts, who were also the sponsors of its program. This approach assumed a natural wish to control fertility that remains unfulfilled without adequate contraceptive supplies; in Iran these were made widely available, free of charge, to enable fertility control. In addition, the government launched a national awareness campaign to promote and motivate contraceptive use and to educate people about Iran’s wider population concerns and goals, specifically those connected to socio-economic development (Aghajanian 1995, pp. 2–3; Edwards 1992: 116; Hoodfar and Assadpour 2000, pp. 19–20; Hoodfar 1994, pp. 11–12; 1995, pp. 106–107; Roudi 1997: 2). Moreover, in 1967, Mohammad Reza signed the 1967 UN Declaration on Population under which signatories agreed that “the population problem must be recognised as a principal element in long range national planning if governments are to achieve their economic goals and fulfil the aspirations of their people” (UN 1967: 3), thus signifying Iran’s national commitment to global population objectives. Further, the Iranian program promulgated an emphasis on individual socio-economic wellbeing as the objective of family planning. This was conistent with global ones codified in the 1967 declaration which stated “the objective of family planning is the enrichment of human life, not its restriction; that family planing, by assuring greater opportunity to each person frees man to attain his individual dignity and reach his full potential” (UN 1967: 3). Iranian officials adopted international population discourse which came to conceptualise population as a socio-economic development issue, positing population control, through fertility limitation, as the key to national development. They sought to establish population and fertility control as national norms through education and awareness programs. Family planning and population efforts intensified and flourished during the 1970s due to increased political support, which would later prove detrimental to the program. The government adopted a more aggressive population reduction policy in the 1970s, evident in high profile appointments and increased budgetary allocation. Mehryar et al. have argued that the appointment of Dr Sardari as Deputy Health Minister, who had close ties to the Prime Minister and government elite, enabled the institution to introduce of a number of innovative, but later controversial, schemes such as the White Revolutionary ‘corps’. This scheme redirected men and women with secondary and higher education away from military service and into jobs that assisted and furthered rural socio-economic development as teachers, health workers and development agents (Mehryar et al. 2000: 4). Further, under Sardari, the family planning became the dominant MoH program; evidence of the program’s growing political importance. The family

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planning budget continually and significantly increased throughout the 1970s; government spending alone stood at $US 31 million in 1977, just prior to postrevolutionary suspension, in addition to the finance from foreign donors. In order to further the program’s political support and connections, administrators aligned with the Shah’s sister, Princess Ashraf, and the Iranian Women’s Organisation (IWO) she headed, leading to its involvement in social legislation which had already proven controversial. The IWO was instrumental in legislating for the improved legal and socioeconomic status of women under the 1975 amendments to the Iranian Family Protection Law. First ratified in 1968, the law raised the marriageable age to 18, encouraged women to enter the workforce, and restricted arbitrary and unjustified divorce. This legislation complemented the family planning program through the institution of reforms conducive to lower fertility. It also reflected the responsive of Iranian authorities, whether voluntary or involuntary, to international population-human/female rights discourses being advanced at that time. Furthermore, modernisation enabled shifts in female status and fertility, through industrialisation, education, urbanisation and economic growth, which created the necessary “socio-structural precursors of fertility decline: high rates of infant and child survival, declines in the economic contribution of children to the family and increased costs for their upbringing” (Aghajanian and Mehryar 1999, pp. 5–6; Edwards 1992: 116; Hoodfar 1994, pp. 11–12; 1995: 107; Hoodfar and Assadpour 2000: 19–20; Mehryar et al. 2003, pp. 3–5). The 1976 census suggested marginal success in fertility control, signalling that Iran was moving toward the middle phase of demographic transition and that fertility behaviour and norms had changed in some sectors of society. The PGR declined from 3.1 per cent to 2.7 per cent, directly attributed the declining birth rate, while the TFR declined from 7.7 to 6.3 (Aghajanian 1995: 1; Aghajanian and Mehryar 1999: 5; Edwards 1992: 116; Hoodfar 1994: 12; 1995: 106). During this phase religio-social and religio-political factors emerged that served to undermine the program’s potential, and establish the ulema as potential obstacles to national development goals. The government did not engage the ulema, rather it alienated them and ignored their objections, and the effect at the societal level was popular confusion as to the religious permissibility of contraceptive use: This resulted in non-use within those sections of society where religious influence was strong. This should not have been the case, as many of Iran’s leading Ayatollahs has ruled in favour of family planning. Ayatollahs Mahallati, Shariatmadari (an ally of Khomeini), Milani and Khansari, for example, issued fatwas in favour of family   I add this qualifier because, as discussed earlier in the chapter, Iran was, at this time, under great pressure from its Western sponsors to adopt modernisation measures. As I can only speculate on the thinking and intentions of Iranian officials, I acknowledge that these decisions may have been prompted by an acceptance of international norms, or simply because they were enforced by international donors.  As opposed to other factors such as migration and death rates.

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planning in response to questions from the public on personal use. In 1964 Mahallati of Shiraz issued a fatwa in response to questions from a local gynaecologist, Dr Sarram, seeking clarification on the permissibility of contraceptive use, stating that “various methods of pregnancy control are not prohibited by religious laws as long as their effect is temporary and does not make women sterile” (cited in Mehryar 2000: 20; Omran 1992). Likewise Shariatmadari’s 1969 fatwa distiguished the conditions under which contraceptive use was permitted, stating that: in cases where for medical reasons, lack of means of support for a large family, or any other religiously justified reason birth control becomes necessary – and both wife and husband agree to it – then contraception using drugs and medical treatment is permissible provided that the following three conditions are satisfied … does not cause physical or psychological damage or lead to impotence … have any harmful effect on the health of the couple … does not involve abortion … birth control is religiously permissible as long as the state conditions make it necessary (cited in Mehryar 2000, pp. 20–21).

Although family planning officials understood religious support as vital to the program, and they themselves embedded Islamic teaching on al-azl in their campaigns, they did not seek fatwas or religious sanction. Drs Marandi and Mehryar cite the failure to secure religious sanction as being partly responsible for the program’s failure at the societal level, particularly in rural areas where fertility decision making amongst the largely illiterate populace was bound by tradition, particularly religio-cultural, and persistent high rates of infant and child mortality. Had the government secured fatwas or sought clerical support, and opted for a low profile program in keeping with cultural sensibilities, it is suggested that they could have overcome religio-cultural objections and societal resistance (Mehryar et al. 2003). The government’s decision to rely on foreign expertise, opinion and assistance in family planning programs and debate not only alienated the clergy, it also heightened clerical suspicion of the program and its intentions at a time when this group was growing increasingly politicised and anti-establishment: The family planning program became a potent symbol in anti-monarchical rhetoric. Khomeini, whose power and prestige had grown since the 1940s, openly criticised the Shah’s modernisation scheme for enabling foreign intrusion into and control of Iran, and for undermining Islam. Khomeini was particularly critical and suspicious of the White Revolution’s Western connections, its adherence to the Western capitalist modernisation model, and because the reforms initiated under it were mandated by a limited referendum, and because they enabled the: Iranian economy, agriculture and culture [to be] subject[ed] to direct incursions by America and the West, and in a short time Iran was transformed into a   Interviewed in Tehran, 1st July 2002.

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Islam and the Securitisation of Population Policies military base for preserving American interests … Economic, military and political agreements for the protection of the illegitimate interests of America were ratified one after the other … (Khomeini in Kauthar 1995: xxxi).

The Shah did little to counter this, rather he seemingly confirmed Khomeini’s belief, and through some public statements, added population control objectives to Khomeini’s anti-monarchical arsenal. In a number of statements, the Shah implicitly acknowledged a connection between population control and the depletion of national oil reserves, and suggested that the population control objective was intended to preserve Iran’s oil asset. For example, in 1978 he stated that by the time Iran’s population reached 65 million in 1998, “it [would] also [be] the time when Iran’s oil would have run dry” (cited in Kauthar vol 1, 1995: 519). From this and other statements, Khomeini interpreted family planning and population control objectives as being the means to protecting Western, rather than Iranian interests, arguing: He [Shah] spoke of what we will have achieved in a few years’ time, and amongst other remarks he stated that in the near future Iran’s population will have reached sixty five million and its oil will have run out. Who on earth is exhausting our oil supply? He repeatedly says that there is no oil. But there is oil and it is you who is sucking our oil supply dry. You are pumping oil down the throats of America and other countries. It is not that there is no oil. We have many oil reserves, but you are using them up such that in a few years time they will run dry and the people will be left in despair (Khomeini in Kauthar 1995: vol 1, 519).

The Shah’s White Revolution rhetoric served to alienate and attach all forms of opposition, including political and clerical. In a 1962 statement he clearly identified the clergy and communists as the main obstacles to national development, charging that “there is no doubt that the ‘black reaction’ and the subversive red forces will not desist in their attempt to check Iran’s reforms” (cited in Kauthar 1995: 124). In return, anti-monarchical forces denounced all components of the modernisation policy, including population and family planning objectives, as imperialistic. The Shah’s government is said to have “show[n] much more interest in building tactical political alliances with the then prevalent sources of political power than stabilising strategic links with religious leaders … that might have provided them with long term public credibility and support” (Mehryar et al. 2003: 3), and in doing so served to substantiate clerical fears that the modernisation policy was intended to politically alienate them. Post-Revolution 1979–1986 Immediately following the revolution, political consolidation was the primary concern of the government which for the ulema meant the eventual establishment

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of an Islamic Republic. In this environment matters concerning population and family planning were not a priority and thus omitted from public discourse. The primary concerns of the political elite were the consolidation of power, national ideology and identity, internal political turmoil and international pressures. Although the 1979 Referendum established popular support for an Islamic republic, the immediate government under Khomeini’s appointed Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan was not Islamic and adopted a relatively liberal stance in order to establish and consolidate its domestic and international legitimacy. However, over the course of 1979 the revolutionary coalition fractured over the actual role of religion in politics, particularly leadership, reflected in the Constitutional Debates of 1979. The 1979 Constitution sets a high criterium for leadership, the office of the faqih, in keeping with Khomeini’s personal interpretation of Shia tradition, jurisprudence and occultation, could only be occupied by a marja, or Grand Ayatollah, which granted the faqih extensive religio-political power. Whilst Khomeini’s religiously and politically controversial valiyat-e-faqih model prevailed, supported by the clerical majority within the Assembly of Experts responsible for framing the constitution, a number of high profile religio-political figures, such as Bazargan, Bani-Sadr, Shariatmadari and Taleqani, were reluctant to support what they considered a potentially authoritarian and dictatorial system. The institutionalisation of the valiyat, rule by the jurisconsult, consolidated the ulema as supreme power holders by placing them above the scrutiny of public elections, and by granting them control over the electoral process through approval for political and presidential candidates. Further, article 96 of the Constitution granted the Council of Guardians veto power over parliamentary legislation, as demonstrated by their screening function in the organogram overleaf. Khomeini, with clercial support, instituted a process of political deconstruction, dismantling everything monarchical through socio-economic Islamisation, economic nationalisation, and ideological foreign policy realignment. This fomented the shift from populist revolution and popular government to the consolidation of a militant clerical regime (Esposito and Voll 2003, pp. 62–5;, Kamali, 1997; Wright 1997). This in itself would taint any policy and program established in the early years, including population and family planning. In this political climate there was no public debate on population and family planning. This omission resulted in confusion at the societal level, and a schism between societal and expert opinion on the one hand, and official governmental opinion on the other: the latter being founded on a milieu of factors, including political, religious, economic and demographic ones. Politically, the connection of the family planning program to pre-revolution imperialist and monarchical policies united all opposition groups – atheist, devout and non-secular –in their denunciation of it and all policies linked to the Shah and his allies. Economically and demographically, a number of technocrats returning from exile were said  An authority with a large following who renders independent judgment about religious issues (Milani, 1992: 173).

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Figure 4.1

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Basic organogram of the Islamic Republic of Iran Government

Source: http: //www.iranchamber.com/government/articles/structure_of_power.php, accessed July 2006

to be unconvinced of the socio-economic development rationale of the family planning program, convinced that Iran’s oil wealth would enable it to sustain a larger population. These experts opposed a state sanctioned family planning policy but not personal contraceptive use; instead they advocated further socio-economic development to foment fertility change. The situation at the societal level was thus one of religious confusion, whereby the government’s silence, particularly by the ulema, on family planning and its failure to clarify a position fuelled speculation as to the religious (im)permissibility of family planning in a “culture of hyperreligiosity” (Mehryar et al. pp. 6–9). The reality was that the government, particularly top level managers and mid-level technical administrators, supported the continuation of the national family planning program in light of the socio-economic development benefits, and it is further evident that they were increasingly concerned by the ‘population problem’. There were, for example, at least six pro-family planning fatwas issued by Khomeini and other high ranking Ayatollahs between 1979 and 1981. In 1979 Dr Kazem Sami, the Minister of Health under the immediate post-revolution Prime Minister, Bazargan, approached Khomeini for clarification on birth control and family planning in a report highlighting the necessity of these programs due to growing population pressures. Khomeini’s written response on the report’s margins, taken as a fatwa by the MoH, stated that “If the use of these methods does not expose women to any health problem (or harm) and it is also approved by her husband [their use] to solve the problems [mentioned in the report] is religiously permissible” (cited in Mehryar et al. 2003, pp. 9–10, insertions in the original).

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In 1980 the Deputy Health Minister, Dr Motamadi, sought further clarification from Khomeini, who responded that “prevention of pregnancy is not forbidden. As long as it is done with consent of the couple, does not expose them to any harm, or require action inconsistent with religion, it is permissible” (cited in Mehryar 2003: 9) and having secured this, issued a circular to the MoH that stated “The subject has been shared with the Maraje’e Taghlid and the results are … none of the methods, devices and drugs currently supplied … are prohibited and they should be made freely available” (cited in Mehryar et al. 2003: 10). Moreover, an unpublished 1981 government report by the ‘Office of the Deputy Prime Minister in Charge of Revolutionary Projects’ identified rapid population growth as one of a number of major problems facing the new regime (cited in Mehryar et al. 2003: 12). It cannot be said that a population debate existed as such due to the apparent lack of societal and non-governmental awareness of or engagement with officials on population issues. However, it is evident that the Iranian bureaucracy was convinced that population growth was detrimental to national socio-economic development and that fertility control was the best solution, in keeping with international discourse, and that family planning use was religiously sanctioned by the country’s leading ulema. From 1981 until the 1986 census, Iranian discourse shifted to pro-natalism, rapidly departing from international trends. This was due primarily to two factors: Islamisation and the Iran-Iraq war. From 1981, militants and conservatives were able to consolidate their political position and pursue their Islamist agenda because a number of modernists, including Prime Minister Bazargan and Bani-Sadr, quit, were exiled, or executed, and clerical opponents of the valiyat model were arrested, thus marginalising or removing all sources of opposition. Islamisation at the national level consolidated Iran’s religio-political identity and state apparatus The Iran-Iraq war created the psycho-social enabling context in which elite and societal opinion on population and family planning converged, causative to a national fertility increase. During this war the government invoked a number of strategic arguments as justification for high fertility and elevated population growth to a security issue; this was contrary to emerging global norms which posited population growth a threat rather than means to security. Family planning and population control were caught in the process of Islamisation and consolidation, utilised by Khomeini’s regime as potent symbols to establish its anti-imperialist, anti-Western, Islamic credentials. Commenting on this period the Management and Planning Organisation (MPO), formerly the Budget and Planning Organisation, stated that “early marriage and reproduction were promoted as basic Islamic values and the government was urged to adopt economic policies to facilitate and encourage early and universal marriage” (PO 2001: 5). Government policies served to embed pro-natalist thinking on population matters at the societal level, with the fundamental aim of rapid and dramatic population increase. For example, the repealing of the 1967/1975 Family Protection Law reinstated social and legal conditions conducive to high fertility, encouraging   The MPO has official ministerial status.

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women to fulfil their religious obligations by returning to the domestic sphere and reprising their roles as wives, mothers, reproducers and, ultimately, guardians of Muslim morality. The marriageable age was lowered to nine to promote early marriage and encourage early and prolonged fertility exposure. Polygynous marriages were reinstated to encourage further population growth. In addition, the government established the Marriage Foundation to provide newlyweds with furniture and other household basics to circumvent financial obstacles to marriage. Additional legislation coerced and restricted couples’ fertility decisions. The war time rationing system, for example, provided a tangible incentive to high fertility because “newborn babies were entitled to an equal share of the generously subsidised basic food item and consumer goods available through the rationing system” (MPO 2001: 6). In addition contraceptives became virtually unavailable through the public health system, being offered only through health facilities that did not specialise in family planning. Moreover, the cost of contraceptives rose significantly and prohibitively, from 100 to 1000 rials, thus leaving most Iranians reliant on largely ineffective traditional methods (Aghajanian and Mehryar 1999: 7; Esposito and Voll 1996, pp. 67–8; Hoodfar and Assadpour 2000: 22; Hoodfar 1994: 12; 1995: 108; Mehryar et al. 2003: 16). Through contraceptive deprivation and economic persuasion, the regime effectively controlled reproductive choices and instilled pro-natalism at the societal level. Moreover, the psychological impact of the Iran-Iraq war, oft cited as a factor driving high fertility, enabled the government to construct a tangible strategic and security argument regarding population; securitising rhetoric was embedded in elite discourse through references to population control as a threat to Muslim values and furthermore, to Iran and the Muslim world by allowing both to be dominated by the West. Regime rhetoric posited increased fertility as the measure which would overcome the physical and spiritual invasion from Iraq and its Western backers. The MPO reflected that “with Iraqi aggression and the start of the eight year war in September 1981 high fertility and population growth acquired real military and political significance” (MPO 2001: 6; Anon, The Economist 5 August 1995: 41; Hoodfar 1994: 12; 1995: 108; Paydafar and Moini 1995: 73; Roudi 1995: 2). With Iran sustaining heavy casualties, the government argued that a larger population would ensure the security of the state and nation, giving it a strategic size advantage over Iraq and greater manpower resources to replace casualties. Khomeini’s ‘20 million man army’ was an “honorific title … coined to refer to the huge number of young, middle aged and old men (and women) who had voluntarily taken up arms to defend their country against Iraqi aggression” (Mehryar et al. 2003: 16) – and furthered the argument that Iran was justly defending itself against the uninvited aggression of an imposed war. Procreation  According to Marandi, Azali, and Mehryar, contraceptive methods were available through private clinics at a cost.   Iranians outnumbered Iraqis 3:1. Iran’s population in 1985 was 48,916,000, Iraq’s 15,317,000 (unhabitat.org).

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was incorporated into this logic, a civilians’ war time duty was to breed an army of martyrs which would protect Iranian society from outside invaders (Aghajanian and Mehryar 1999: 7; Aghajanian 1995: 3; Hoodfar 1994: 12; 1995: 108; Mehryar et al. 2003: 16; Paydafar and Moini 1995: 73; Roudi 1995: 2). Elite population discourse at this time was consistently pro-natalist, embedded with strategic and security rhetoric and logic which posited family planning as an existential threat to the Iranian state, nation, and society, its Islamic values and identity. These strategic arguments had a societal appeal couched, as they were, in an ‘us versus them’ logic that reinforced a sense of Iranian unity and identity. Demographic data stands as testament to the social resonance of this logic in the absence of other discursive evidence. The 1986 census recorded a 3.8 per cent increase in population, 15 million people – the largest numerical increase since 1900 – and the TFR increased to 7. The process of Islamisation extended to national policy, including on population and development: the decision to disband population activities was justified by theological reasoning and religious rhetoric. The Islamisation process politicised the ulema and enabled them and other religious agents to establish their place in Iranian debate. Most ulema10 openly supported the government’s position, using their Friday sermons to communicate this to the public, doing so through the language of Muslim brotherhood and unity, and anti-Western sentiment (Hoodfar and Assadpour 2000: 20). Iranian officials, particularly the elite, welcomed the census figures and Islamised their statements of satisfaction. Prime Minister Moosavi, for example, hailed population growth as a “God sent gift” (cited in Mehryar 2000: 36) and Parliamentary Speaker, and later President, Rafsanjani stated that Iran “could and should aim at a population size of 200,000,000” (Mehryar 2000: 36). Furthermore, the Iranian government reported its satisfaction with the census results to the UN, stating that it would not implement a population control policy (Roudi 1991: 3; Edwards 1992: 116–17), and in doing so demonstrated its opposition to international population norms. However, it would be false to suggest that all parties to the population debate were pro-natalist because within the bureaucracy, particularly the MoH and the MPO, the administrative organs responsible for family planning and national development, population growth remained a concern, and family planning the desired policy solution. Family planning services continued to be supplied through both public and private health clinics, evidenced in official publications such as the Statistical Yearbook of Iran, which listed family planning as a service provided by the Office for Family Health and Family Planning from 1981–1988. MoH data demonstrates that the number of contraceptive users grew from 5.23 million in 1978 to 6.7 million in 1986 despite official suspension of services, suggesting that certain segments of society were still receptive to family planning and fertility control. Moreover clerical support for and advocacy of family planning, particularly from those with medical training (despite being marginalised by pro10 That is, those outside of the political leadership.

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natalist officials), was still present and demonstrated that religious opposition in the debate was not universal, as some studies have assumed (Dr Mehryar,11 and Mehryar 2000, pp. 27–9). From Pro- to Anti-Natalism: The Shift in Official Conceptualisation, 1986 to 1989 1986 was a critical year in Iranian demography and national population debate. The 1986 census revealed the occurrence of a growth spike between 1976 and 1986, when Iran’s population underwent its most rapid period of growth, growing from 33.71 million, to 49.5 million people, a growth rate of 3.91 per cent per annum12 (MoHME 1994: 6). This catalysed the reversal of official opinion, shifting it from strategic pro-natalism to anti-natalism founded on an understanding of population growth as the root cause of present and future social, political, economic, environmental and developmental problems. The shift in official population thinking started at the bureaucratic level, primarily within the MPO and MoH where junior ministers and senior technocrats grew increasingly concerned with the 1986 census results. Their persistent and persuasive engagement with the Iranian elite was critical in shifting official thinking from pro to anti-natalist, ideological to pragmatic. Bureaucratic discourse took on an increasingly alarmist tone to demonstrate population growth’s threat potential. The adoption of this language by the Iranian elite demonstrated the reversal of former strategic pro-natalism in favour of securitised anti-natalism. The enabled the immediate and future enactment of a number of controversial policies, re-instated international opinion into official discourse, and embedded population growth in domestic security discourse. At the time of the 1986 census, the MPO was also in the process of preparing the First Five Year Plan13 of Development (FYPD) for the revolutionary government, and thus was gathering a variety of socio-economic development data. At that time, Iran’s national infrastructure was depleted and was in dire need of reconstruction, and the country was in a post-war economic decline which was worsened by declining world oil prices: This situation, coupled with the alarming census figures, led MPO officials to conclude that population growth was unsustainable and would undermine reconstruction and development, thus posing a national threat (Butta 1993: 3; Mehryar 2000: 37; Wright 1996: 163). The MPO was “well aware of the vulnerable state of the economy and its inability to bear the burden of a rapidly rising and young population” (Mehryar 2000: 37). 11  Interviewed at the Institute for Research on Planning and Development, Tehran, 30th June 2002. 12 Of this, 3.2 per cent of growth occurred naturally, and 0.7 per cent resulting from Afghan refugees crossing the border. 13 Original in Persian only therefore inaccessible.

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The MPO’s concerns translated to Ministers and technocrats in charge of other service sectors such as agriculture, health and education taking “every opportunity to call attention to the inevitably grave consequences of unchecked population growth and to emphasise the need for a population and birth control policy” (Mehryar 2000: 37), highlighting the inherent dangers in relation to unemployment, education, housing, and food shortages (Azali,14 Marandi, Mehryar), advocating a quality over quantity approach to population. Dr Marandi, a former national Health Minister, has stated that bureaucratic and Ministerial reports to government were couched in socio-economic terms, arguing that “schools were being stretched to run five or six shifts each and, as a result, everyone could see that school facilities were not sufficient. The economy too was in poor shape” (cited in Dungas 2000: 9): The direness of the national situation was stressed to senior and elite figures, including the then Health Minister and Prime Minister Moosavi. However, bureaucratic and Ministerial concerns did not translate to the elite level for political and religious reasons. Dr Mehryar highlights that on a joint MoH/BPO proposal for a formal birth control policy, “almost half the cabinet voted against it and the proposal was approved by a majority of one. Many of the ministers opposing the proposal were more concerned about the negative public reactions …” (Mehryar 2000: 38). Official and societal thinking had been conditioned to accept population control and family planning as un-Islamic. Friday prayer leaders continued to encourage population growth as a war-time duty, and the state-controlled media was broadcasting pro-natalist messages. Dr Marandi, recalling his personal experiences and involvement in mobilising official opinion, has stated: As the then Deputy Minister of Public Health, I had a responsibility to think about the potential problems this would cause. I began communications with the minister and the prime minister about my concerns. People understood population control and family planning to be against Islam, and for this reason there was no political action. When I became the Health Minister, I urged the Prime Minister to revive the family planning program. There was no progress at the political level. Friday prayer leaders were using the sermons to encourage population growth to counter the loss of men through the war with Iraq. The media was also broadcasting pro-natalist messages.

Overcoming religious and societal objections was crucial to the implementation of the population policy, and this was achieved by the bureaucratic adoption of securitised rhetoric. The MPO, MoH and like-minded officials devised a strategy to engage the public and clerical opponents in a debate on the merits of population control and family planning. They recognised that in order to convince one sector they would also have to convince the other – such was the nature of the societalclerical interrelationship. This was demonstrated in statements by anonymous 14  Personally interviewed at the Family Planning Association of Iran offices, Tehran 19 June 2002.

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officials, who have said that the objective of the societal campaign was to “make the population issue the talk of the town everywhere, in private and in public. Otherwise, without considerable public pressure, it would be impossible to bring the clergy into the population discussion” (cited in Hoodfar and Assadpour 2000: 23). The clerical campaign recognised the social capital of the ulema stating that “you see, clearly they [the clergy] have a way with people. We can discuss the matter in scientifically, but they can relate this to every aspect of people’s lives, moral and material. This is an art that we, the so called experts, do not usually possess” (cited in Hoodfar and Assadpour 2000: 24). The public engagement strategy in 1987 and 1988 involved the media to publicise “articles about the dangers over overpopulation for developing countries … followed by specific discussions of issues surrounding population in Iran” (Hoodfar and Assadpour 2000: 23)15 and invited the public to participate in the debate. These articles demonstrated that population growth threatened governmental legitimacy by making it socio-economically impossible for it to deliver its revolutionary promise of a true Islamic society which guaranteed all Muslims, particularly the mostazafan, basic welfare provisions and equality of opportunity. Economic growth, population decline, or ideally both, were the only solutions. The government could not increase economic growth because its oil dependent economy relied on international markets. Furthermore, assistance from many Western countries would be contingent on abandoning the Islamic theocracy. The government could only control population growth (Hoodfar 1994: 12; 1995: 108–109; Paydafar and Moini 1995: 73; Roudi 1997: 1). Added to this debate were other objections, and opinions, namely public objections which recalled earlier anti-imperialist revolutionary rhetoric, and calls for development rather than population control. In February 1988 Prime Minister Moosavi reinstated population to the national agenda, sending a secret memorandum to all government departments and ministries that directed them to incorporate population factors into their planning. According to, Dr Marandi: The decision was not publicised for fear of stirring negative religious reactions. It was intended that the policy would be secretive but this would be counterproductive. I approached the President, the speaker and the head of the judiciary about this. The head of the judiciary was against family planning. The then speaker, Rafsanjani, would not help. President Khomeini was not in favour, but took a pragmatic approach to family planning (interview 2002).

However, this shifted once Khomeini’s support for a national population debate was secured.

15  Access to these articles is not possible due to language barriers and lack of archival records. For this reason, secondary reports on the media debate are referred to here.

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Dr Marandi received a letter from Khomeini in 1988 in response to his prior requests for support and religious clarification on population and family planning in which the “Imam said he saw population as an important issue that should be discussed in the universities, in a public ad in the media, in order to reach a decision on what actions Iran should take” (cited in Dungas 2000: 9). Marandi also secured fatwas from Khomeini on behalf of the MoH clarifying the religious permissibility of family planning. The following communication exemplifies such fatwas: Question: I am a 39-year-old woman … [with] four children [suffering] ill [health] and back pain … I cannot work and must rest … [my physician advised by to go under an operation to prevent pregnancy. For a woman under such conditions as mine and with my husband’s permission is TUBALIGATION allowed or not? Fatwa: IN THE NAME OF GOD if sterilisation causes permanent infertility, it is not allowed, however for a woman with your condition, it is allowed (courtesy of the MoHME).

Khomeini’s letter and fatwas were important because they enabled a national, public debate to take place with religio-political sanction, thus freeing participants from previously held religious reservations. This move enabled the MPO to organise a committee of technocrats and experts in preparation for a national population conference, endorsed by Prime Minister Moosavi who stated that “the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is reconsidering this issue of population growth” (cited in Mehryar 2000: 38) in the context of wider socio-economic development and a national threat (Hoodfar and Assadpour 2000: 22; Azali, Marandi). The resultant Seminar on Population and Development, at Mashad in September 1988, was a technical meeting attended by Moosavi, experts and Ministers from the renamed Ministry of Health and Medical Education (MoHME) and Ministry of Planning and Budget (MPB), other service Ministries and demographers who, after analysing the socio-economic implications of unchecked population growth, declared that “the rate of population in Iran was too high and that, if left unchecked, it would have seriously negative effects on the national economy and welfare of the people” (Mehryar 2000: 39). Furthermore, Moosavi and others publicised the population findings and the intention to establish a family planning program, and declared population and birth control “a destiny factor for Iran”. The bureaucracy’s clerical engagement strategies had to undo years of suspicion caused by political alienation and the excesses of modernisation in the name of development, which left many ulema wary of Western socio-economic development paradigms. Dr Marandi has argued that “the letter from Khomeini changed the atmosphere. Earlier misunderstandings on family planning and Islam were cleared by the Imam” (cited in Dungas 2000: 9). Khomeini’s pragmatism helped to shift clerical opinion in favour of population control for national progress, by demonstrating the compatibility of population control with religious teachings, and having come from

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Iran’s highest religious authority, these fatwas established a conception of population that was beyond theological reproach (Ayatollah Mohaghegs-Damad16). In December 1988, Iran’s High Judicial Council affirmed that “Islam does not pose any barriers to family planning” (cited in Aghajanian 1994: 68), thus granting religious sanction to the proposed population policy. Further, Khomeini’s decision drew some ulema into the public discussion and engaged them in civic advocacy, open debate, and national education campaigns (Azali, Dr Shariari,17 Dr Mosleh-Uddin18). In order to maintain ulema engagement, subsequent population conferences, such as Islamic Perspectives in Medicine, at Mashad in February 1989, and Islam and Population Policy at Isfahan in April 1989, brought together a number of prominent Ayatollahs, such as Harissi, Shirazi, Marefat and Taskhiri, to comment on the proposed policy and ensure that it was consistent with Islamic jurisprudence. In doing so, Iran’s ulema were granted a degree of ownership over the issue, the policy and the direction of national debate. During this period elite discourse was also becoming securitised. Observers have noted that by 1988, the question of over-population and its danger, on the national and international scale, had found its way into the political speeches of various leaders (Hoodfar 1988: 12). In 1989, Moosavi added to the securitised rhetoric, stating in April 1989 that population growth was “alarming for the future” declaring that “none of the government programs [for development and social welfare] work without a serious family planning program” (cited in Aghajanian 1994: 68), and demonstrated that the rationale for reinstating the population control policy was the perception of an impending socio-economic crisis that was fast reaching a point of no return (Aghajanian 1995, pp. 3–4, Hoodfar 1994: 12, 1995: 108–109). This logic also existed within the Ministry of Education where “… advocates of fertility control frequently pointed out that intense competition for limited resources [would] thwart the efforts to build a just Islamic society and will tear the nation apart” (Hoodfar and Assadpour 2000: 29). In addition, Khomeini’s fatwas were, according to Dr Mehryar (interview 2002), intended to ensure familial survival and by extension, the existence of the society, state and Islam. The security logic resonated at the clerical level, as recalled, for example, by former Health Minister Dr Sayyari: From the religious point of view, some of the clergyman concluded that the survival of Islamic rule was a priority for the country. And for the Islamic Government to continue, the happiness and satisfaction of the people [was] a priority. Therefore they concluded that, since they could not quickly increase production or immediately meet all the needs, the solution was to tackle population growth (cited in Dungas 2000: 10) 16  Personally interviewed at his home in Tehran, 4 July, 2002. 17  Personally interviewed at the Ministry of Health and Medical Education, Tehran, 22 June, 2006. 18  Personally interviewed at the UNFPA Iran Office, Tehran, 14 July 2002.

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This is not to say that the government was able to convince all ulema, within and without of the government, of the saliency of the population control argument. A number of prominent ulema were unconvinced of the urgency of the population problem or of the proposed policy’s consistency with Islam. This opposition caused the government to turn to the newly established Expediency Council to Safeguard the Interests of the System to make a final ruling on the legitimacy of the proposed policy, in an attempt to overcome any final religious objections. The persistence of clerical opposition despite the Council’s approval forced the expeditious withdrawal of the Family Planning Bill in 1989 to prevent further clerical and political opposition. Instead, the government made provisions for family planning within the First Five Year Plan of Development (FYPD), which was ratified by parliament in 1989. Conclusion In the early twentieth century Iran began what would become an ongoing process of political reformation and transformation. Early modernisation efforts, beginning in 1906 and intensifying under the Pahlavi dynasty, reshaped the social and political landscape, creating new classes of urban poor, educated working and middle classes, and a wealthy industrial elite. At the same time, modernisation efforts alienated the ulema, whose relationship with the monarch until that time was relatively harmonious, by stripping them of their traditional power structures and base. The ulema’s reaction, although initially quiet, had grown by the 1960s into an organised protest movement under radicals such as Khomeini, reviving the nationalist movement’s critique of Western dependence and interference, and oil privatisation, joined with an Islamic discourse of religion, identity and morality under threat. Population was of little or no concern until the 1950s when, following his restoration to power, Mohammad Reza established a strategically pro-natalist discourse, encouraging population growth as part of the national security strategy, and in contradiction to the emerging global anti-natalist norm. Under the rubric of the White Revolution, fomented by external geo-strategic demands for intense modernisation, the population debate shifted to socio-economic anti-natalism, and a number of social and legal measures conducive to fertility reduction were instituted, with the first official family planning program established in 1967, all with the express objective of population control, consistent with global discourse of that time. Population and Islamic discourses merged during this period as part of wider religious objections to the White Revolution. Immediately following the Islamic Revolution, and in a climate of religiopolitical uncertainty and instability, population growth was not an immediate government priority nor the subject of public discourse, eclipsed as it was by more pressing issues such as constitutional reform, political consolidation and legitimation, and international backlash. However, the family planning program

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remained, albeit unassumingly and shrouded in confusion as to its religious permissibility. Services continued, but with limited supplies. Following the consolidation of the Islamic Republic under clerical leadership, the population control objective established under the Shah was overturned and family planning formally suspended, in an effort to distinguish the identity of the new regime as diametrically opposite to the Pahlavi dynasty. Social policies and family legislation were enacted that aided and encouraged high fertility. During the Iran-Iraq war, population discourse took on a psychological and geo-strategic form; a nationalist discourse justified and encouraged high fertility which was incentified through the war time ration scheme. The Islamic government, having disengaged itself from global politics, likewise disconnected from developments in international population discourse, particularly the agenda of anti-natalism in the pursuit of socio-economic development. However, the results of 1986 census demonstrated that population growth would prove problematic to the success of the Islamic government’s proposed First FYPD. Bureaucrats within the MPO and MoHME were the first to cognate the magnitude of the situation, realising that the only real option open to the government, given its international political and economic isolation, was population control. Bureaucrats and Ministers thus began mobilising elite and then clerical and popular opinion for population control, via a number of strategies the most effective of which proved to be the generation of a public discourse through the media. Targeting first the clerical elite and securing their sanction, bureaucrats then engaged the public and clerical masses to convince them of the necessity of population control. Once a national consensus was established, the debate shifted from dogmatic to pragmatic. The socio-economic development anti-natalist arguments of the MoHME and MPO, which were consistent with established global discourse, served as the rationale for the proposed family planning program. Although consistent with global discourse, Iranian discourse was unique in that it joined Islamic language and symbolism to the rationale for population control. Moreover, despite its isolation from the international stage, Iranian discourse took the form of the newly emerging global populationsecurity-sustainability paradigm. Two key events changed the course of Iran’s population debate, the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in June 1989 and the question of his succession, which led to Constitutional reform and subsequent reshaping of the Iranian political system. Post-Khomeini, Iranian politics were de-Islamicised through the politicisation of the office of faqih, the abolition of the Prime Ministerial office, and the strengthened position of the President. Furthermore, the appointment of key pragmatists to these positions, in Khamanei and Rafsanjani, reshaped Iran’s religio-political landscape which directly influenced the national population debate. The debate from 1989 to the present is the subject of the following chapter.

Chapter 5

Islam, Population, Sustainability and Security: The Iranian Debate from 1989–2006 Khomeini’s death in June 1989 marked the end of an era in Iranian politics, an era which will leave an indelible mark. The shift toward pragmatism and populism initiated in Khomeini’s final years transcended his passing, and was consolidated under subsequent leaders. This shift had a significant impact on Iran’s populationdevelopment debate and program. From 1989 to the present, Iranian debate became increasingly pro-family planning and pro-population control. Further, international population discourses were increasingly adopted and replicated, in particular the socio-economic, sustainable development, and global sustainabilitysecurity paradigms. Iranian officials, elites, ministers and bureaucrats grew increasingly aware and convinced of the linkages between population growth, sustainable development and security, making the same causal connections as their international counterparts. This is clearly evident in official reports, government releases, news articles and other data. Moreover this data makes it abundantly clear that a number of important change agents, including the clergy, and also the public, were actively engaged in, and supportive of, governmental discourse, enabling the establishment of a national population – sustainability-security consensus. Khomeini’s failure to appoint a successor opened Iranian politics to a pragmatistpurist schism which only his charismatic leadership was said to have controlled. Changed domestic political and economic circumstances, declining oil revenues coupled with the pressures of post-war reconstruction and population growth meant that the government had to rethink its economic nationalisation strategy and isolationist foreign policy. Pragmatists favoured re-engagement and moderation in foreign policy, and post-war socio-economic reconstruction based on reformation of the nationalised state economy; purists opposed this in favour of the status quo. The appointment of Khamanei as faqih resolved the matter in favour of the pragmatists (Esposito and Voll 1996, pp. 68–71; Milani 1992, pp. 184–85). Furthermore, changes to faqih succession reduced clerical power, shifting it to the President. Under the Supreme Leadership of Ayatollah Khamanei and modernist, pragmatic Presidents in Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Ayatollah Khatami, Iranian officials engaged with the international community and permitted a degree of societal freedom. Because of this, the pragmatic approach to population policy established by Moosavi and Khomeini was furthered and consolidated, and norms consistent with, but not necessarily a product of, international ones were increasingly adopted.

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These took hold at the societal level through ongoing engagement between elites, ulema, experts, the media and the public, which resulted in the merging of a number of issues and agendas to the population debate, and united opinions at all levels. The October 2006 anti-family pronouncements of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad suggested that in some sectors, elite level opinions on foreign and population policy were shifting back to the ideological pattern of the immediate post-Revolution period. However, that these statements failed to generate a significant political or social debate, or foment policy change, suggests that elite level opinion on population has not changed, that these statements were probably just another example of Ahmadinejad’s vitriol, and that Iran remains committed to national and global sustainability objectives. Pragmatism Consolidated – Politics, Religion and Population under Rafsanjani and Khamanei 1989–1997 The 1989 Constitutional Reforms, intended to resolve the problem of succession by reforming the role and qualification of the valiyat-e-faqih, resulted in the sideways shift of political power to the office of the President, in turn enabling the pragmatic re-orientation of domestic and foreign policy. The faqih model had established Khomeini as the heart, soul and final voice in Iranian politics; “his fatwa was the law, his was the final word” (Milani 1992: 179–80). The 1979 Constitution had endowed this office with autonomy and sweeping political powers, as discussed in the previous chapter. In the late 1980s the question of succession appeared settled, that the role of faqih would pass to Khomeini’s student Ayatollah Montazeri: however, Khomeini removed Montazeri from office following a political scandal involving close relatives whom he publicly defended. In 1989, with the question of appointing a suitably qualified successor proving problematic, Khomeini formed the Assembly of Reconsideration of the Constitution to revise and reassess the role of faqih, particularly the question of qualification, stating that “we cannot leave our Islamic government without a leader. We must choose an individual who can defend our Islamic prestige [interests] in the world of politics and deception … It is sufficient to have just a mojtahed, who is selected by the Assembly of Experts …” (cited in Milani 1992: 181, insertions in the original). Article 109 of the revised Constitution indicated the creep toward pragmatism and the secularisation of Iranian politics. Reinventing the faqih as a jurisprudential expert with political experience in preference to a marja with no political experience, secularised and politicised the role of faqih as Iran’s political leader, granting marjas responsibility for individual religious matters at the societal level (Milani 1992, pp. 178–81). The revised Constitution of 1989 strengthened the role of the President by abolishing the prime ministerial office and transferring its powers to the presidency. This, coupled with the election of another key pragmatist, the Parliamentary Speaker Rafsanjani, furthered the secularisation of the Iranian administration.

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This consolidated the pragmatist hold on government and caused the shift from religion and ideology to Iranianism and pragmatism as Iran’s institutional and administrative rationale. Ehteshami has described the process as de-Islamisation, where “politics … acquired an ‘Islamic’ odour … but Islam [did] not actually affect the administration of the state” (Ehteshami 1996, pp. 145–47). This Islamic odour came in the form of religious language and symbolism as justification for a shift from the revolutionary path, through the merging of religious and secular discourses. For example, in a Friday sermon, Rafsanjani stated “the Prophet was very insistent to ensure that the feelings should not gain strength among the people to imagine that an Islamic society should be a poor society … when one puts on one’s work overall and enters a factory … one should feel that one is engaged in the act of worship as in the mosque” (cited in Esposito and Voll 1996: 69). Rafsanjani rationalised and analogised reconstruction as religious duty. Likewise, Khamanei argued that the shift furthered rather than refuted the revolutionary path. He claimed that these changes would contribute to the strengthening of the revolution if the government acted to solve “the people’s problems, to increase production, to activate mines and industries and to expand agriculture”. Importantly, he stressed the need to improve the quality of life as a worthy goal. He said: “We want this world and the next world both, ideals and welfare together – this is attainable” (cited in Esposito and Voll 1996: 69). Under the pragmatists, what had been deconstructed under Khomeini was reconstructed. The Khamanei/Rafsanjani period was one of reconstruction, through the privatisation and deregulation of the national economy, and to borrow from Shireen Hunter, ‘creeping realism’ in foreign policy shifting from ideological to nonideological regional and international re-engagement. For example, Rafsanjani’s reformation of domestic and international economic policy in the early 1990s saw clerical bureaucrats and their allies replaced by technocrats, and economic reengagement with global institutions such as the World Bank (Wright 1996, pp. 166– 67). In doing so, Rafsanjani opened a space in Iranian politics and political debate to domestic and international experts which later enabled the infusion of new and different perspectives on a number of issues, including population. Further, the domestic political climate shifted to a consensual form in which public debate, a degree of press freedom, intra-regime bargaining and the development of inter-actor consensus became the norm (Esposito and Voll 1996: 75–6; Wright 1996: 167). Political opposition took the form of ‘loyal’ opposition that sought not to overthrow the Islamic system, but to protest against government excess and ineffectiveness. This opened a space to public voices in Iranian politics. This was clearly evident in the development of the national population policy which demonstrated official: resilience and adaptability in the face of a rather harsh socio-economic reality … [and] keen awareness that creating an informed public and building a broad consensus is one of the most important elements of success in any development

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Islam and the Securitisation of Population Policies plan, particularly as it touches on the most intimate and day-to-day aspects of people’s lives (Esposito and Voll 1996, pp. 71–2).

The government utilised and consolidated the nationwide public debate generated by the MPB and MoHME under its predecessors, through which the necessity of family planning and population control had been highly publicised and granted elite level religio-political sanction, commitment and support to successfully build public consensus on its program (Aghajanian and Mehryar 1999: 7–11; Hoodfar 1994: 11; Dr Azali; Dr Mehryar; Dr Shakeri; Dr Mosleh-Uddin). Family Planning Reinstated: 1989 The Iranian family planning program was reinstated under the First FYPD (1998– 1993) in 1989, with the express aim of reducing national fertility and population. The structure and mandate for the program demonstrated the government’s prioritisation, perceived urgency and mobilisation regarding, and in response to, national population problems. The government merged socio-economic, religious and crisis discourses to its population discourse, projecting the image that the program was developed to politically manage socio-economic obstacles to achieve a just Islamic society. Advocates of “…fertility control frequently pointed out that intense competition for resources [would] thwart the efforts to build a just Islamic society and [would] tear the country apart” (Hoodfar and Assadpour 2000, pp. 24–8). Modest targets based on the 1986 census figures were set to be achieved by 2006: this was TFR reduction from 6.4 to 4.0 and PGR reduction from 3.9 per cent to 3.2 per cent (UNFPA IRI 1993: 20; Mehryar, 2000: 4). The significance of these targets, as evidence of the success of the program and national consensus on population objectives, will become apparent throughout the chapter. The MoHME was responsible for the promotion and administration of the program. It was granted almost unlimited resources to provide free family planning services to married couples, which included education and supplies, to encourage birth spacing and a limited reproductive life span (between 18–35 years), the three child family norm, and free and wide contraceptive availability (Aghajanian 2000: 42, Aghajanian and Mehryar 1999: 98; Mehryar 2004; Roudi 1997: 4). Moreover, a 1990 Cabinet Decree mobilised the political administration and inducted international norms into the Iranian program. The decree joined female empowerment, primary health, and social security measures, the mainstay of international debate since Bucharest, to reshape societal fertility behaviour to enhance the family planning program. Furthermore, in reflection of governmental   Interviewed by the author in Tehran; 19 June 2002.   Interviewed by the author in Tehran; 30 June 2002.   Interviewed by the author in Tehran; 22 June 2002.   Interviewed by the author in Tehran; 14 July 2002.

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commitment to the program, its success and societal acceptance, the Decree mobilised other ministries, instructing them to work in concert with the MoHME in population planning and service provision. This was made possible by establishing the inter-departmental Family Limitation Commission/Birth Limitation Council with powers to monitor, coordinate and review proposals for population growth. The document clearly identified these powers as the ability to: Monitor, supervise and coordinate all government policies and activities bearing on population control, to report on steps taken by member organisations, to make recommendations on the formation of a High Council on Family Planning and its functions and membership, and to review proposals made for changing laws and regulations that may encourage or inhibit population growth (cited in Aghajanian 2000: 43).

The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting Organisation (IRIB) was made responsible for the promotion of population objectives and service information, and for mobilising and maintaining societal support by acting as a conduit for elite-societal engagement (Aghajanian 1994: 66; 2000: 42, Hoodfar and Assadpour 2000, pp. 28–9). Furthermore, the government has utilised the media in an ongoing education campaign focusing on the national dangers of overpopulation, and the familial benefits of small families, but in keeping with religio-cultural mores, has abstained from contraceptive advertising. On this, MoHME and other health officials have stated that the information and education program had, and has, a wide public audience. The government uses TV and print media “… to promote the message of health and family planning … focusing on contraception, small families, disease and prevention” (Dr Shariari, interview 2002) but this does “not include the promotion or advertisement of contraception. The media ensures that all Iranians are exposed to the problems associated with population growth” (Dr Sidghazar, interview 2002). The Iranian model for the program was subsequently described by former Deputy Minister of Health Ali Sayyari as the four pillars approach: The health network was in place to provide family planning services, the Ministry of Education helped raise literacy rates and provide training, the mass media improved the public’s access to information and the fourth factor in this was international support for family planning and population (cited in Dungas 2000: 10).

Sayyari’s statement is testament to the merging of national need and international norms in Iran. Within the space of two years, the Islamic government had shifted from pro to anti-natalist and reinstated and rebuilt a program it had debased and dismantled a decade earlier. It perceived population control to be an urgent national priority, existentially crucial to nation, society and the regime, to be confronted through socio-political mobilisation. Further, the changed political atmosphere

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opened spaces to public and international voices in the national debate, enabling the contribution of a milieu of perspectives in the pursuit of a national consensus. Population: Prioritisation and Mobilisation Subsequent changes to the inaugural population administration demonstrated ongoing and increasing political commitment to and prioritisation of population during the Khamanei-Rafsanjani period. It was evident in the growing population bureaucracy, continual budgetary increases, and the passing of religio-culturally controversial legislation in the pursuit of national objectives, which were subsequently endorsed by the elite, ulema, experts and the public, in turn enabling the development of a national population-sustainability-security consensus. In 1991 the Department of Population and Family Planning was established within the MoHME (Aghajanian and Mehryar 1999(2): 98; PAI 1992: 12). The department delivered family planning services through the national primary health care network centres: Hospitals, district clinics and, most importantly, the village health houses operated by female volunteers – behvarz – trained in basic primary health care, and educated to provide family planning information and services. The extensive volunteer network dedicated to providing population and family planning information and services demonstrates government commitment to societal mobilisation in the pursuit of national population goals. Organisations such as the Mobilisation of the Sisters, Women Health Volunteers and the Literacy Movement Organisation are examples of the numerous groups providing literacy and education, family planning, population and basic health care information at the societal level. An example of the role played by these groups was given by female volunteers interviewed in 2002 at Qom University medical centre who stated that they encouraged the use of family planning and adherence to the small family norm by demonstrating to clients the familial and individual health and economic benefits in concert with teaching the detrimental societal and national impact of population growth through unemployment, youth agitation, and environmental degradation. In addition, they have embedded religious discourse into their teachings citing the example of the Imam Ali, the pivotal figure in Shiism, who is said to have stated that a small family is the key to happiness. Further, these women demonstrated the infusion of international development and security discourse into Iranian debate and its acceptance at the societal level, stating that they believed and taught that population and development are of great importance and that the high PGR equates to a bomb (group interview, 2002). The political prioritisation of population and mobilisation of national resources in pursuit of these objectives during the Khamanei-Rafsanjani period was further demonstrated by continual budgetary increases in concert with decreased defence spending. Since its resumption in 1990, the family planning budget has continued to increase annually, as demonstrated in Table 5.1. Further health and education spending, which incorporate family planning and population spending,

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Table 5.1

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Percentage increase in family planning spending per year

1991/92 13 billion Rials

1993 29%

1994 No data*

1995 19%

1996 24%

*Aghajanian and Mehryara argued that due to changed national accounting practices, it is difficult to calculate the percentage increase from 1993–1994.

Table 5.2

Education Health Defence

Percentage of government budget allocation, by spending type, according to year, Iran 1976 8.5 3.0 28.0

1981 16.0 6.0 10.5

1986 13.0 7.5 13.0

1990 22.0 9.0 10.5

1995 13.0 7.0 5.0

(SCI cited in Hoodfar and Assadpour 2000, UNDP HDR 2005).

increased proportionally and then stabilised, whilst defence spending decreased, as demonstrated in Table 5.2. Government commitment, prioritisation and mobilisation were further demonstrated by the fact that the Iranian program was, and remains, almost entirely self-funded. Granted in 1993 the Iranian government accepted a World Bank loan of US $140 million dollar loan to fund PHC and RH/FP services and facilities (Matin, UNFPA Program Review and Strategy Development Report 1994, Iran News 14 July 1998; Tehran Times 14 July 1998), but its willingness to overcome reservations about external ‘interference’ further demonstrated its willingness to change its rules of engagement in the pursuit of national priority. Because of the program’s relative independence, its direction and rationale were entirely driven by the Iranian government in the pursuit of its own objectives; its terms were not dictated by international donors pursuing their own political agendas through Iranian fertility control, as was the case with the Shah’s program. Moreover, granting a comparatively substantial budget for a new and, at that time, untested program in difficult economic circumstances further demonstrated governmental commitment to and prioritisation of population control. The ratification of religiously, culturally and politically controversial legislation further demonstrated official commitment to and prioritisation of population and family planning. Moreover, support for the legislation from amongst the ulema, experts and the public demonstrated the willingness of Iranian society to accept the imposition of controversial and restrictive measures in pursuit of national population objectives. The Family Limitation Law, enacted by the Majlis in 1993, institutionalised the government’s preferred three child norm by denying social   The UNFPA and World Bank are the most significant contributors (PAI 1992: 11).

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services to fourth and subsequent children, as stated in Article 1 “All privileges envisaged in the law according to the number of children are no more valid regarding the fourth child and more, born one year after enactment of this law. The children born prior to this date would be enjoying the privileges as envisaged by the law”. Article 2A further discouraged large families by restricting maternity leave entitlements, thus limiting the options of working mothers, stating that “Maternity leave for female workers (article 75 of the labour law, and approved by the Council to Identify the Expediencies of the System on Nov. 19th, 1990) for the fourth child and more born one year after the approval of this law, will be decided separately and will be paid by the insured according to the tariffs set by social securities organization” (Government of Iran 1994, p. 20). Subsequent articles of the law enforced ministerial cooperation and mobilisation in pursuit of national population objectives, as follows: A. The Ministry of Education is assigned with the task of effectively incorporating the educational materials regarding population and mother and child health care in the curriculum texts. B. The Ministry of Culture and Higher Education and the Ministry of Health and Medical Education are entrusted with the task [of including] the subject of population and family planning in all educational curricul[a]. C. The Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance is called to prepare grounds for active and effective participation of journalists, film makers and other artists related in a way to the Ministry in order to increase the general awareness of people regarding the population and family planning programs. Article 3. The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) is entrusted with the task of producing and broadcasting of direct and indirect programs to increase the general awareness about mother and child health care and population.

The legislation was controversial with regards to its restrictions on individual human and reproductive rights and contradiction of religio-cultural norms. The policy did not enforce a three child norm – couples could still choose larger families, but were financially obligated to the upbringing of the fourth and any subsequent child. Given the economic climate in Iran at that time, particularly rising cost of living, the restriction of state services effectively limited fertility choices for the majority of Iranians. The economic cost of childbearing was consistently cited in groups and individual interviews as informing couples’ two child preference (group interviews, 2002). Furthermore, the legislation contradicted prevalent notions of family planning in Islamic jurisprudence. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, Islamic scholars, including family planning proponents and Shia’s, reject the theistic validity of national family planning and population policies, specifying coercive policies as particularly objectionable for a number of reasons including refutation of God’s providence and design (Bowen 1997: 163; Dardir and Ahmed 1981: 3; Academy of Islamic Research in Omran 1992: 215; Omran, 1992: 203). Iran’s Family Limitation Law financially rewards, or coerces depending on one’s interpretation, low fertility. Moreover, the Family Limitation Law could be interpreted as an infringement of the

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universal human right to free and informed reproductive choice codified under the 1968 Universal Declaration on Human Rights to which Iran is a signatory (McIntosh and Finkle 1995: 253). However, unlike China’s One Child Policy, which is widely criticised for, amongst other things, its draconian approach to enforcing the one child norm which has fomented infanticide, Iran’s policy does not punish couples for having more than three children: couples can still choose to have more children. It is, perhaps, this difference which has quelled international condemnation of the Family Limitation Law. Despite the possible diminution of individual rights this legislation was, and remains, widely accepted. Iranian experts viewed the legislation favourably in light of its national, societal, familial and individual benefits, and did not question the law’s restrictive or persuasive nature or its abrogation of individual rights (2002 interviews: Afzali, Marandi, Mehryar, Shariari). For example, Dr Marandi expressed his support for the Law, stating that “despite the success of the family planning, and the family limitation law, the problem of population momentum remains” (interview 2002). He has further argued that the Family Limitation Law and population policy are religiously compatible – demonstrative of the ambiguity on population planning under Islam – and that they had the support of the national clergy, stating that: Iran’s position [was] based on the judgements made by Khomeini. If population control had been against Islam, then he would not have discussed or approved it. Other leaders project[ed] their view, based on Islam, through Friday prayers. The pro-natalist message in Islam is historic, and does not fit the current situation. When Islam is threatened by population growth, then population control must be used in its defence. There is a duty to protect the Islamic community from any threat therefore everything that can be done to protect it must be done. The flexibility of Islam allows for population control in this context (Marandi interview 2002).

Dr Marandi suggested that the unique circumstances, particularly the threats to Islam, nation, community and individual, posed by population growth, justified   This includes at the international level. The Family Limitation Law is widely known internationally, and, rather than being criticised, is often referred to matter of factually in glowing international reports on Iranian family planning (see for example, Brown, L (2006) at www.earth-policy.org/Books/PB2/PB2ch7_ss3.htm, Larsen, J (2003) at www.theglobalist. com/StoryID.aspx?StoryId=2269, and www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=19627). Whilst on the surface the policy may seem at odds with the norms enshrined in the Cairo Plan of Action, particularly the stance taken against coercive state policies, the Iranian Law is not coercive per se. It does not force couples to choose small families rather it gives them the option in the knowledge that the state is not obliged to financially support them. The family planning and population debate in Iran is such that couples are enabled to make free and informed choices about their own fertility.

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the circumvention of established religious norms in pursuit of the greater good, invoking other Islamic injunctions such as the security and stability of the Umma as priority. The rapid and continual decline of the national TFR, illustrated in Table 5.3 below, is demonstrative of the societal embrace of the Family Limitation Law and the three child family norm. Domestic Consistency with Global Norms During the Khamanei-Rafsanjani period, the Iranian population debate and program were internationalised in the sense that Iran participated in international population conferences, inducted international population norms and paradigms, and received international recognition for its efforts: This marked a departure from the isolationist and obscurantist approach Khomeini adopted in pursuit of national foreign policy priorities and objectives. During this period, Iran received international praise for its program: For example, in 1993, Population Action praised the Iranian program, stating that it “offered proof that family planning can be provided – and will be used – in very diverse social, economic and cultural settings” (cited in Grier 1993). This aspect of the program has been consistently highlighted and praised by a number of international population organisations, such as PAI and the UNFPA who uphold Iran as a model for successful family planning in developing and Islamic countries. Furthermore, the Iranian government were quick to, and successful in, inducting the emerging reproductive health-female empowerment-sustainable development paradigm into the national program, through its domestic collaboration with the UNFPA and through its involvement in the 1992 ESCAP Fourth Asia Pacific Population Conference, Population and Sustainable Development: Goals and Strategies into the Twenty-first Century which was the regional preparatory conference for the 1994 ICPD. On national population goals, the conference document, the Bali Declaration, stated that: Within the overall objectives of sustainable development, the goals of population policy should be to achieve a population that allows a better quality of life without jeopardizing the environment and the resource base of future generations. Population policy goals should also take cognizance of basic human rights as well as responsibilities of individuals, couples and families (UNESCAP 1992).

Furthermore, the Bali Declaration formally identified factors which, caused by and in concert with, population growth are detrimental to national and international stability, such as rapid urbanisation, environmental degradation, unemployment and aging. On the environment for example, the Declaration stated that In many countries and areas, high rates of population growth and concentration have caused environmental problems, such as land degradation, deforestation,

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air and water pollution, threats to biological diversity from habitat destruction and rising sea level due to the greenhouse effect. In some countries, calamities and associated loss of life have followed the extension of human settlements into marginal and vulnerable areas, especially along rivers, coasts and foothills.

The Bali Declaration reaffirmed population and fertility stabilisation and control as the preferred solution to national and international population problems, stating that “To help reduce high rates of population growth, countries and areas should adopt strategies to attain replacement level fertility, equivalent to around 2.2 children per woman, by the year 2010 or sooner”. Iranian support for the Bali Declaration demonstrated official acceptance of international population norms, including those relating to the population-security interrelationship. Moreover, these norms were inducted into the Iranian program in 1993/94, following Iran-UNFPA consultations to develop a national population strategy, which identified “several overriding population and related issues, chiefly rapid urbanisation, uneven population distribution, unemployment and environmental degradation” (UNFPA 1993: 17). The report identified a number of detrimental environmental situations caused by population growth: land degradation, desertification, pollution, energy consumption, and environmental health problems, which were consistent with international population-security discourse. This signalled the induction of these into Iranian debate, a process simplified and enabled by the practice of inter-ministerial population cooperation and coordination established under the Family Limitation Law. Furthermore, the public communication process established under the Law enabled the public dissemination of the interrelationship between population and other issues, via the conduits of the media and the education and health sectors. The securitised notion of population was also gaining clerical support, as demonstrated by Iran’s report to the 1994 ICPD and articles published by high ranking ulema. For example, Iran was represented at Cairo by Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Sheykhi, an expert and author on population and fertility. At Cairo, the Iranian delegation under Sheykhi argued that: [T]he disproportionate growth of population has created a closed circle of under-development leading again to increase of population. It would undo the economic, social and cultural achievements of the countries, undermine the socio-political stability of the society and thus enhance the social harms. Not accompanied by production increase, population growth would lead to hunger and poverty in case the production is increased; the living environment of human being, the earth on which we are living, the air we breathe and the water which is vital to our existence would be destroyed or polluted.

Sheykhi added to this assessment and to Iran’s securitised population-development discourse. In a 1995 article he stated:

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The Second FYPD (1995–1999), the final for the Khamanei-Rafsanjani period, reaffirmed population growth as a national priority and furthered the process of national resource mobilisation in pursuit of population objectives. For example, the Social Affairs sector, which incorporated the Ministry of Education and the MoHME, and thus the Population Department, was allocated 46 per cent, of the national budget for that period, and rose from Rials 0.5 billion in 1989, to Rials 50 billion in 1998 (Matin, UNFP/IRI 1994, Iran News 14 July 1998; Tehran Times 14 July 1998; www.mporg.ir/english/bar2.htm). The Second FYDP also specified the allocation of “the necessary resources, in terms of funds, training, manpower and equipment, for the implementation of an appropriate and effective population policy, taking account of the determining effect of population growth on the country’s overall development” (www.mporg.ir/english/bar2.htm). Further still, the aims of the plan intended to continue the process of social mobilisation by “increasing public awareness on issues relating to population through … female education and awareness … on the advantages of birth control … raising the level of public awareness on the disadvantages and difficulties stemming from uncontrolled population growth through mass media … education on population issues [at the] secondary and tertiary level …” (www.mporg.ir/english/bar2.htm). Moreover, demographic data for this period demonstrated elite-public consensus on national population objectives, as evidenced by significantly lower fertility levels indicative of changed fertility norms and behaviour. The significant decline in the national TFR and PGR surpassed government predictions and expectations, with targets being achieved and surpassed earlier than planned. Winning the Battle but Not the War: Continued Mobilisation under Khamanei and Khatami 1997–2005 Hojjatoleslam Syyed Mohammed Khatami assumed the Presidency in August 1997 following his June election. His election is said to have been a sign of revolutionary fatigue and the societal desire for social, political and economic reformation, and the creation of a friendlier Iran. Amuzegar has argued that the electoral attraction

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Table 5.3 TFR Target Actual PGR Target Actual

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Population growth rate and total fertility rate for Iran by year 1986

1989

1991

1994

1997

5.6

5.2

5

3.5

2.6

2.46%

1.8%

1.41%

2001 3.5

2.2 3.4%*

*Natural population increase, not including refugee influx which took the rate to 4 per cent. See Hoodfar and Assadpour, 2000: 32. Sources: MoHME 1994, MoHME 1996 and Statistical Centre for Iran cited in Hoodfar and Assadpour 2000, MPO/SCI, 2001, pp. 8–10, UNFPA State of the World Population 2001, UNFPA IRI Annual Report 2000.

of Khatami’s reform agenda was the promise to enforce the rule of law, promote and encourage domestic civil society, a foreign policy of détente, and economic reform and revival (Amuzegar 2000: 93). Khatami enabled a comparative degree of societal and political freedom which produced a “self restrained counter revolution” as questions about the relevance and practicality of the persistent fundamentalist, orthodox line were raised within and without the clergy. In addition, a comparatively relaxed attitude to the media produced a quasi liberation which enabled freer public discourse. Together with equally relaxed attitudes to social and cultural mores, this opened the space to public debate and critique on a number of issues. Khatami relaxed Iran’s approach to foreign policy and relations, which furthered Rafsanjani’s pragmatic policy of rejecting Khomeini’s ‘neither East nor West’ isolationism. Khatami’s philosophy of Dialogue Among Civilisations guided an Iranian foreign policy of ‘dignity, rationalism and the national interest,’ and was endorsed by the UN, to which it dedicated the year 2001. On the economic front, Khatami attempted to balance the reform process of the Rafsanjani period, characterised by privatisation and liberalisation, with the pursuit of social justice to achieve economic growth but not at the expense of human dignity, by improving social welfare provisions (Amuzegar 2000, Salehi-Isfahani 1999). Khatami inherited from Rafsanjani, amongst other things, a highly successful population control program to which the government, ulema, experts and populace were highly committed and mobilised behind. By that time, Iran’s policy and discourse was reflective of the socio-economic, development, reproductive health, and female empowerment paradigms prevalent in international debate. Inter actoragent-audience engagement had enabled the construction of a near universally accepted conception of population growth as socio-economically detrimental, and of an anti-natalist national population norm, embedded in which was a nascent securitising discourse that had started under Khomeini. Moreover, the population

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problems faced by Khatami were very different from those Moosavi and then Rafsanjani encountered: high rates of fertility and population growth which they successfully managed to lower and stabilise. The now young adults and adolescents of the Khomeini baby boom caused population momentum and a large and disproportionate youth cohort – adding to the population growth problem. The size and momentum of this cohort meant that even though Iran had reached replacement level fertility, the desired goal of zero population growth would be delayed due to this cohort reaching its reproductive life span. Iran had won the fertility battle but not the population war. The combined problems of ongoing population growth, population momentum and a large youth cohort required additional policy and program initiatives. Khatami approached this by capitalising on societal momentum and heightening national awareness of and mobilisation behind a situation that he, under expert advice, designated as a national threat. This enabled the broadening of debate by experts, the ulema, bureaucrats, and ministers who, taking factors such as youth, the environment and unemployment that had been joined to the socio-economic development paradigm by the IRI and UNFPA in 1993, began constructing a securitised understanding of the population growth situation. Moreover, through the conduits of the national media, religious sermons, and the health and education sectors, the government, experts and ulema continually and consistently engaged with the public in the process of consensus building on the national population objective and perspective. Population and family planning education were inbuilt into the national curriculum at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels, in compulsory pre-marital counselling, into health services, and through public advertisement in the media, on billboards, and the packaging of consumer goods. This section of the chapter focuses on this process: the enlarged population concept, the debates within the debate, the designation of population growth as threat, consistency of Iranian debate with international discourse, and inter actoragent-audience engagement in the construction of a shared sense of threat and security. The realisation of Iran’s paradoxical situation unveiled immediately for the President elect, as attested to by media reports. On the one hand, Iran was receiving international praise for its family planning successes while consensus in domestic debate was being consolidated. Iran’s commitment to and success in fulfilling its population objectives and in implementing the 1994 ICPD was praised by the UNFPA in 1997, through its representative in Iran, Dr Xu, who declared that “Iran has achieved the indicators of the ICPD goals … I am pleased to announce that Iran has been globally recognised as a model for the implementation of family planning or reproductive health programs in an Islamic context” (Iran Daily 3 July 1997). Religious leaders, ministers and bureaucrats convened at the Tehran World Population Day Conference in 1997, consolidated their consensus on population, demonstrated through statements such as that from leading cleric, Ayatollah Mohammad Ali Taskhiri who confirmed the religious compatibility of the national population control policy, stating that “there was no individual or social barrier to

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formulating laws to control the population. The wali faqih and religious authorities could, in the interests of the country, declare a violation of these laws ‘haram’ (religiously unlawful)” (Iran News 13 July 1997, italics and insert added). On the other hand, despite Iran’s successes, MoHME experts such as Dr Marandi identified that “a … new wave of population growth” would emerge as Iran’s then 32 million strong youth cohort entered its reproductive age, calling for “sound planning and the requisite measures” to maintain the low growth rates already achieved (Iran News 13 July 1997). The realisation at elite, expert and clerical levels that the population growth crisis had not been entirely averted led to an intensified education and awareness campaign meant to maintain societal awareness and attention. The issues of population momentum, the youth, unemployment, and environmental degradation, were joined with existing socio-economic arguments to demonstrate the immediate and urgent problems threatening Iranian families, the nation, and its Islamic identity; existing domestic debate merged with ideas of security reflective of international population-security discourse. For example, a 1998 statement by a former Minister of Health illustrated the tenor of official securitised discourse under Khatami, which recognised population as a national and international threat, stating that “the world [was] threatened by the problem of population explosion which cause[d] illiteracy, poverty, environment pollution and immigration to big cities” (Tehran Times 18 July 1998). Population Momentum Past high fertility and population growth caused the large and disproportionate growth of Iran’s youth cohort, which in turn caused ongoing population growth and contributed to a new set of socio-economic problems in Iran. Population momentum is “the tendency for population growth to continue beyond the time that replacement level fertility has been achieved because of the relatively high concentration of people in the childbearing years” (PRB 1998: 61). In 1990 the 15–24 age group was 18.5 per cent of the total population; by 2005 it had risen to 25.4 per cent (PRB 2005, p. 130). This was the situation referred to in Dr Marandi’s above cited 1997 statement. Since Marandi’s initial identification of it, a number of national and international, secular and non-secular agents have engaged on this subject, constructing and designating it as a national threat and publicly projecting this via the media. For example in 1999, following Marandi’s lead, the UNFPA, the primary international voice engaged in Iranian debate, warned that with 62 per cent of the population aged under 25 years Iran “was facing a renewed threat as a generation of post-revolution baby boomers is reaching reproductive age” (Iran News and Iran Daily 10 July 1999). Ministerial voices added to the debate and threat designation, joining the situation with already established socio-economic arguments and warnings to the   15–44 years of age.

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public about the familial and national dangers in fertility complacency, as expressed by then Deputy Health Minister Dr Sayyari who stated that “despite the drop [in the PGR], the country is still seriously faced with the danger of a rise in population due to the young age of its population” (Tehran Times 21 July 1999). This was reiterated at the World Population Day Conference in Tehran, 2001, by the then Minister of the MoHME who stated that “considering the large number of children born between 1976 and 1989, we are faced today with a young age structure and if the youth are not active participants in population policies and planning, we may once again witness a rise in the population growth rate” (UNFPAIRI 2001: 3). In 2002, the UNFPA again issued warnings regarding population momentum, this time positing it as a threat to national population achievements, stating that “the ever growing birth rate prompted by the young population of Iran will threaten the current fertility rate which is now showing a decreasing mode” (Tehran Times 11 July 2002). Here it was evident that, following the initial identification of a new population growth problem by a government minister, other ministers and external experts adopt the shifted conception of population and, through their reading and understanding of it possible national impact, designated it as a national threat. Interviews conducted with government officials and family planning and health experts and advisors in 2002 demonstrated almost universal actor-agent consensus on the effects of population momentum, with the exception of one voice of alternative reasoning. Drs Azali, Bashi, and Sidghazar, all argued that because the disproportionately large 15–25 cohort, then estimated at 33 per cent of the total population, had, or was, entering its reproductive life span under societal pressure and expectation to marry and procreate, even if it adhered to replacement level fertility, it would cause ongoing momentum and growth which would cause the Iranian population to grow to 130 million by 2025. In his opening address at the 2002 World Population Day conference in Tehran, Dr Hosseini, then Chancellor of the Iran University of Medical Sciences, warned of the of the potential human development crisis and threat in Iran stating that “even if couples have only two children, the population will grow from 65 to 90 million in 20 years. This will bring many problems to Iran”. However, Dr Zanjani, Professor of Demography at Tehran University and a senior official in the Ministry of Housing, while not denying the presence of population momentum, questioned, but did not criticise, the official discourse employing threat and fear. He argued that instead the persistent decline in fertility would avert any long term impact on growth rates, and predicted a small but temporary growth pattern that would decline and stabilise as the current cohort aged. Zanjani expressed his interpretation thus: I do not believe that population momentum will affect Iran in the future. High fertility in the past means more people who will reproduce. However, we face a future of decreasing fertility; therefore population momentum is not an issue. There might be a minimal increase in the PGR as this group reproduces, but this will decline again once this group ages (interview 2002).

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Youth Cohort, Youth Crisis The youth vote, a group said to have been “hungry for a loosening of cultural and social restrictions and in need of higher education and jobs” (Baktiari and Vaziri 2002: 17), was crucial to Khatami’s election. He dedicated himself to youth affairs and welfare, which he embedded in and joined with national socio-economic development objectives, and thus to and with national population concerns. For example, at the 53rd Session of the UNGA on 21 September 1998, Khatami stated that: At the threshold of the new millennium, the United Nations should have faith in the new generation, to whom the next century belongs.  It should thus be prepared to accept and embrace the requirements of believing in the youth.  Let us bring ourselves to accept that we are not custodians of the youth and that the young do have the right to enjoy the social process of growth and development; a right they should exercise consciously and wilfully.

Khatami, guided by the framework and philosophy of sustainable development, advocated investment in Iran’s youth: this was noted by Presidential advisor and Head of Iran’s National Youth Organisation, Dr Rahim Ebadi, who stated that according to the sustainable “paradigm of development, the president Khatami addressed his famous doctrine on youth affairs in 1998. This doctrine define[d] young people as a national opportunity not a national threat or problem” (Ebadi 2004 [online]). Khatami’s belief was juxtaposed against a growing international and national discourse that designated a large youth cohort as, under certain conditions, a potential national and international threat. The Iranian media, by picking up and reporting on this current, introduced into public debate a conceptualisation of the causal relationship between population growth, momentum and a large youth cohort consistent with international discourse, linking it to a number of socioeconomically and politically destabilising outcomes. For example, on the causal relationship between population growth, youth and unemployment, Iran News reported that: The population of our youths and its increase is one of the major factors causing unemployment … Unemployment itself causes further difficulties which create a vicious circle causing yet other difficulties … Unemployment can be the cause of social, economic, and psychological turbulence. It has been the cause of a lower marriage age among the youth and also a cause of divorce … The cause of half the crimes in the society is unemployment (Iran News 4 January 1998).

  16–30 age group according to Baktiari and Vaziri 2002.  Cited in place of unavailable original document.

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Table 5.4 1990 23.8

Unemployment rate of 15–24 year olds (%) 1992 21.3

1994 21.2

1996 19.2

1998 28.8

2000 30.9

2002 28.2

Source: Macroeconomic Bureau MPO (2003), cited in Iran MDG Report 2004.

Furthermore, the Iran News added to the debate, reporting on the global youth population situation it stated that “more than 95 per cent of [these] youth live in less-developed nations where many governments are already struggling to meet the needs for social and infrastructure services, education, jobs, family planning information, and reproductive and other health services” (Iran News 4 August 1999). Khatami embraced this conception of the Iranian youth problem, embedding it in national population discourse and sustainable development goals and later joining it to security; this discourse then enters the public sphere via the media, ulema, and the health and education sectors. As the debate passes through this filter, so to speak, it is joined with macro, micro and religious perspectives, arriving at conceptions of the national problem and objectives that were, and remain, easily and readily understood at the societal level. Youth dissatisfaction causally links population growth and insecurity; in this instance population poses an indirect threat, but a threat nonetheless. On World Population Day 2000, Khatami emphasised population momentum and youthfulness as particularly problematic, urging low fertility formation for this cohort (UNFPAIRI 2000, pp. 55–6). In January 2001, Khatami highlighted the fine line between population threat and gift by identifying how Iran’s youth could become a national threat, stating that “… a young population in the country is a suitable opportunity for progress; however, … if the youth do not find their place in society, then they could be a threatening factor to the future of the country” (Tehran Times 10 January 2001). Moreover, later that year, Khatami gave the situation a name that explicitly conveyed his perception of the situation. He designated the youth cohort as a national threat, set the parameters of the problem and solution, which became embedded in national population discourse: Khatami declared a youth crisis. Youth unemployment steadily increased from 1990 to 2000, then began to decline, as demonstrated in Table 5.4. This would suggest the realisation of official predictions that population momentum would increase unemployment. The Government in conjunction with the UNFPA invited all stakeholders in national population and development questions to partake in the 2001 World Population Day conference in light of “the national exigency of a population growth rate estimated to increase during the decade” (UNFPAIRI 2001: 1). Here, Khatami stated that: In 2001 we enter into the decade of a young population crisis (thus) all programs and policy makers must aim at attaining a desirable rate of population growth. Popular awareness must be increased on the value and significance of the

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small dimensions of families. The youth must be given an understanding of demographics and its social implications. The Government is bound to provide all required means to promote the youth’s information on demographic issues, reproductive health and family planning (UNFPAIRI 2001: 1).

In 2002, Khatami and then Minister of the MoHME, Dr Pezeshkian, widened official conceptions of population interrelationships, through issue linkages consistent with those found in international discourse, and also identified a number of at-risk referent objects. At the World Population Day Conference in Tehran, President Khatami stated: There are many dimensions to the current population crisis. Iran’s population is too young, but, at the same time, it is aging. We can’t sustain the youth cohort, and we face the challenges of an aging population. Reproductive health and family planning are a responsibility, and they are the keys to sustainability.10

Dr Pezeshkian’s statement elaborated on the situation alluded to by Khomeini, using stronger and more alarming language, stating that: Rapid population growth is an obstacle to achieving the development goals of the revolution, and leads to behavioural problems. High population growth has serious effects and causes problems in areas such as employment, education, food, economic growth, and the capacity of infrastructure. For individual families, large numbers undermines their ability to sustain a good quality of life (Dr Pezeshkian).

While Khatami’s statement implied it, Pezeshkian’s explicated Iranian families, the state and its Islamic identity as being threatened by population growth. Khatami’s references to the state’s inability to socio-economically sustain its growing youth and aging cohorts implied threats to individual and familial wellbeing. Pezeshkian elaborated on this, identifying shortages in a number of areas as detrimental to quality of life. Moreover, in identifying population growth as obstructive to the fulfilment of Iran’s revolutionary socio-economic objectives, the basis of its identity and legitimacy, he highlights threats to the state’s Islamic identity and credentials. These statements demonstrated the consistency of elite thinking with international population – sustainable development – security discourse. The linkage of these issues, in various forms, has contributed to the attainment of consensus in actor-agent-audience debate. The perception that Iran’s youth, facing the prospect of poverty and lacking educational, employment and other opportunities, was emerging as a future threat to social and political instability 10  Verbatim from live Persian to English translation recorded by this author. Khatami’s address was delivered by a representative.

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and referents resonated at the expert, clerical and societal levels. A number of experts interviewed in 2002 confirmed and supported Khatami’s proposition of a youth crisis and the beyond family planning approach advocated by the government, elaborating on the potential scenarios through which this threat could manifest, through interconnected macro- and micro-level outcomes. In doing so they demonstrated their cognisance of and consistency with the international population-security paradigm. Drs Mehryar and Azali, for example, identified the two biggest problems as arising from the lack of education and employment opportunities. Mehryar stated that: Iran has a large youth base, most of whom are either students or unemployed. This group, because of its size and lack of opportunity, is the most volatile group. Iran is at a politically critical point. There are un-met expectations amongst the youth. How should the government control their behaviour? The impact and situation are potentially violent (interview 2002).

Azali stated that: This young generation needs employment, education, housing, and the opportunity to marry and establish a family. The country therefore has a problem: how to provide these things with limited resources. A lack of employment and other opportunities creates a sense of hopelessness which in turn leads to problems such as drug addiction and violence. This also burdens individual families, particularly parents (interview 2002).

Experts interviewed in 2002 agreed that youth unemployment was likely to lead to societal and political instability, caused by the growing impatience and frustrations of a well educated youth cohort unable to find ongoing or meaningful employment, and that unmet youth expectations had already caused an increase in instances of anti-establishment protest and socially destabilising behaviour such as drug use and violence. In addition, problems in the education sector resulting from population growth were predicted to cause detrimental individual, societal and national outcomes. Due to the already large youth cohort, Iran suffered a shortage of student places resulting in stop-gap solutions such as teaching in shifts and a disparity between tertiary place supply and demand. Iranian experts considered this to be detrimental to the attainment of quality education and future national development. The macro level outcome would be a loss of national economic independence. An unskilled and incompetent workforce would make Iran reliant on external labour and skilled economies and thus vulnerable to external economic interference. Furthermore, the micro level impacts of diminished education quality would be felt immediately at the individual level, but would have macro level repercussions. Poorly educated youths would not be able to establish themselves independently of their parents; this would cause disenchantment, frustration, social dislocation

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and disruption. Destructive youth behaviour would also threaten familial stability, thus undermining the very fabric of societal and national stability. Azali and Mehryar, for example, argued that unemployment, under and menial employment were detrimental to personal status and psychological wellbeing because they frustrated personal career and social expectations, such as familial independence and marriage, causing shifts in personal social status in a society that adheres to norms of marriage and family formation. Azali stated the situation thus: “Parents are under stress and family integrity is under threat. Family is central to the culture thus if the family is undermined so too is the culture.” Iran’s youth situation was considered to be causing familial repercussions detrimental to societal stability and identity. Family integrity was threatened by the parental burden caused by dependent youth. In Iran, where familial stability is central to societal stability and national religious identity, a threat to familial integrity is essentially a threat to society, culture, religion and identity. Iranian ulema and scholars have endorsed this conception and reconciled the logic with Islamic principles. For example, Professors Laboff, Borvi, and Moslemi, female theologians at Qom11 endorsed the necessity of family planning under then socio-economic circumstances, for familial well being and stability. Professor Laboff stated that: The family remains the centre of an Islamic society, and we must ensure that the family, and therefore society, are good. There are tradeoffs: a large population can lead to a spread of the culture/beliefs, but a smaller population means better welfare for the people. The problem is finding the right balance for the present conditions. The family is the foundation of the Muslim society. Without family stability, society cannot be stable. Therefore, there should be a focus on creating stable families to ensure a stable society. The two are inextricably linked.

Ayatollah Mohaghegs-Damad offered a different perspective on the socioreligious threat. He argued that population growth threatened individual, societal, and national fulfilment of the principle of izzah, living life with respect, honour and esteem. Historical circumstances required pro-natalism to fulfil izzah, but changed contemporary circumstances meant that pro-natalism now threatened this. Population growth had caused the diminution of izzah in a number of Muslim states and societies, including Iran, through the deprecating effects of poverty, which had deprived them of esteem and honour at the international level where power and respect have socio-economic foundations. Furthermore, he affirmed population control as restorative to izzah, and therefore as the means to religious stability and security. Iranian experts also agreed that population growth undermined national identity by threatening the fulfilment of the revolution’s socio-economic objectives, and 11  Group interview conducted at Qom Medical Centre, 20 July 2002.

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by making it vulnerable to external interference. There was universal support for the government’s zero population growth objectives as the only means to avert a national socio-economic crisis. According to Dr Matin: The government must ensure its policy is implemented correctly. It is aware that the population growth rate must reach 0 and this should be the main goal of the program. Future problems include the need to import food to cope with demand, which will create an economic burden. The government needs to be more active. There are many problems associated with population growth – unemployment, poor nutrition, housing shortages and agricultural decline.

All agreed that one of the most pressing problems was the food situation which, if not resolved, could cause individual suffering, societal and political instability, and make Iran vulnerable to external interference and intrusion, as had been the case pre-revolution. Experts argued that the prospect of food shortages and malnutrition would force the government to begin food imports, which would drain the national economy and, due to price imbalances, create socio-economic class stratification which could cause violence and revolution. In addition, experts identified a potential human security crisis: a malnourished populace would be more vulnerable to disease which would overburden and possibly collapse the national health system, thus causing a vicious cycle of the spread and under-treatment of disease. Moreover, and as national history would suggest, these conditions could overburden the national bureaucracy causing its collapse and political stability (2002 interviews with Drs Delavar,12 Azali, Marandi, Matin, Mehryar, MoslehUddin, Sidghazar).13 This assessment was also clerically endorsed. For example, Ayatollah Mohaghegs-Damad stated the current future necessity of population control for socio-economic development, joining his endorsement with the Islamic principle of serving the greater good. He stated: The government believes that many of the country’s problems, such as unemployment, food shortages, and education burden, are a result of population growth. Youth employment is low; the government cannot meet the demand for jobs. Therefore, they have promoted family planning to reduce the population to a level that can be supported by the [religious] system (Mohaghegs-Damad interview 2002).

Furthermore, through interaction with his clerical colleagues he had concluded that this was the majority religious opinion in Iran. Professors Laboff, Borvi, and Moslemi, likewise identified and endorsed the socio-economic threat conception of 12  Verbatim translation of a statement at the World Population Day Conference, Tehran, 11 July 2002. 13  Interviewed at Shahid Jafari Health Care Centre, Tehran, 24 June 2002.

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population growth, arguing that it was the important factor in policy and planning decisions. Moreover, they had reconciled population control with Islam, stating that the practice of ijtihad provided for reinterpretation under changed circumstances, and that one day population control may no longer be necessary, but at the present, it was permissible because it served the greater good and protected familial and therefore societal stability. Moreover, Khatami’s crisis message had taken hold at the societal level, communicated through the media, ulema, the health and education sectors, and enabled by the simplification of the message in personalised, micro-level terms. A number of experts interviewed stated societal consensus had resulted from the communicative approach of the health and education sectors which was to analogise the national situation to the personal and daily experiences of the populace. Furthermore, the government communication strategy was to highlight fertility as personally beneficial and a civic responsibility, through religioculturally resonant themes such as quality over quantity to instil the international two-child small family norm, and to illustrate the macro and micro level costs and benefits with each. Official discourse used quality over quantity to ultimately encourage fertility limitation. This, according to national experts, engaged the public in national discourse and mobilised them behind population objectives. Some added that it was necessary to employ the language of threat and crisis to continue societal mobilisation and overcome creeping complacency due to the success in achieving national fertility goals. Moreover, their engagement with the public led these experts to conclude that Khatami’s crisis message has widespread societal endorsement (Drs Azali, Marandi, Mehryar, Matin,14 Mosleh-Uddin, Shariari, Sidghazar, interviews 2002). Interviews conducted with staff, volunteers and clients at health centres in and around Tehran – Azahra,15 South Tehran,16 Fazel,17 Islamshah,18 – and Qom,19 demonstrated societal endorsement of official population concepts, norms and objectives. There was a near universal preference for two-child families, and a minor preference for one-child families. Clients cited socio-economic reasons for this preference, believing they could provide a better quality of life to two children, and that this is preferable to having a large family. Clients at the Fazel clinic cited the small family norm as their socio-economic civic duty in assisting national development goals. For example, a lower middle class couple in their 14  Personally interviewed at the MoHME, Tehran, 22 June 2002. 15 A small village situated north-west of Tehran. 16 Suburban area in southern Tehran. Clients are poor and have low educational attainment. 17  Situated in mid-Tehran. Clients are upper working and middle class, and educated to at least 15 years. 18 A semi-rural village south of Tehran. Islamshah is home to unemployed rural migrants and Afghan refugees. 19 Two hours south of Tehran. Qom is the centre of religious education in Iran.

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early twenties, who both worked, stated that the national family planning program was beneficial and had succeeded in slowing the population growth rate, that it was their social responsibility to adhere to the two child norm, and that this message had come from the media and the clinic, which had also made them aware of the socio-economic impact of a large and growing population. Female family planning volunteers at Qom stated that their role was to communicate population and family planning issues which are taught as parts of the same whole and as indivisible from youth, unemployment, social welfare and education, and joined with Prophetic teachings on the importance of marriage and planning the family. They added that their role is supported and complimented by local ulema, who endorse the population and family planning messages while promoting these in Mosques and madrassas. Unemployment The link between population growth and insecurity is often indirect, manifesting by causation or exacerbation of certain socio-economic conditions, such as unemployment. That population growth and unemployment are detrimental in tandem was officially identified during the Rafsanjani-Khamanei period, as previously shown. During the Khatami period, the debate on these issues widened and then securitised by a number of government officials, academics and experts, who internationally consistent discourse then entered the public domain via the media and other outlets. Although Iran experienced a steady decline in unemployment since 1996, as demonstrated in Table 5.4, the ongoing growth of the population, coupled with low economic growth, meant that the possibility of rising unemployment remained a governmental concern. In 2002, officials predicted an increase to 24 per cent by 2006 when 5.5 million high school graduates entered the job market and that trend would likely continue given the size of the youth cohort (Iran News 8 July 2002). It is evident that unemployment, as caused by population growth, has been securitised in Iran. The social and political outcomes of unemployment were acknowledged by the former head of the Chamber of Commerce, Industries, and Mines (CCIM) Ali Naqi Khamoushi, who likened “an unemployed individual to a potential rioter who can be abused as a tool by counter-revolutionaries” (Iran News 17 August 1999). A 1999 Iran News editorial, reporting the opinions of a number of officials and experts, demonstrated Iranian cognisance of this casual chain and added to the public discourse on population, unemployment and insecurity. Professor Mohammad Qasemi highlighted population growth as causal to national unemployment, stating that: Generating [the required] number of jobs requires contribution by all socioeconomic sectors. This includes population, economic and political relations, technology and consumption patterns … Figures indicated that about 8.3 million

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people joined the active population between 1986 and 1996, whereas a meagre 6.6 million jobs were generated in this decade (Iran News 27 September 1999).

Population growth in this instance is cast as an indirect cause of social and political instability; it causes unemployment which in turn can cause volatile individual and group behaviours. On this, social commentator and academic Ali Moini, stated “…yesterday’s innocent individual will turn to one who is unruffled about committing sins, robbery, or social nuisance … addiction, murder, violence and psychological disorders increase with unemployment” (Iran News 27 September 1999). Sociologist Mehrdad Mirshojaci added that: … neglecting the issue of employment, not only threatens the society but it is also a root cause of disorder. An increasing number of unemployed among a 60-million strong population can have cancerous effects. If one goes through the news in the past few years, one can easily see the correlation between the rates of crime and unemployment (Iran News 27 September 1999).

Official discourse took a different approach to population growth as socioeconomically and politically destabilising, demonstrating the correlations between population growth and unemployment, and the positing of the former to what emerged as a crisis in the latter. For example, former Intelligence Minister, Hojjatoleslam Younessi identified population growth as causal to unemployment, stating that “one of the major causes for unemployment in Iran today is the irrationally high population growth rate during the first decade after the victory of the Islamic Revolution” (Tehran Times 16 April 2001). At the provincial level, the crisis logic was adopted, as demonstrated, for example by Mojtaba Zali, an official from Boroujerd, who stated that “…unemployment has intensified because of increased population over the last two decades,” adding that the situation “… has turned into a crisis in Boroujerd …” and urged “… officials to adopt radical measures to solve the rampant unemployment dilemma” (Iran News 8 July 2002, pp: 2, 15). Further, experts interviewed agreed on the detrimental macro and micro level of effects of population growth and unemployment combined, particularly with relation to family stability and formation. They argued that the presence of population momentum would worsen the unemployment crisis, because in 2002 job demand was in excess of supply and creation. Many identified interconnected micro and macro level outcomes. Unemployment, they said, caused increasing individual, familial, and societal vulnerability through negative behaviours such as crime, drug use and divorce. Dr Shakeri20 argued that not only were these types of destructive behaviours on the rise, they were also intensifying. Recalling her 1998 research, she stated that “the rate of crime and violence [was] on the increase and this [was] seen as a symptom of unemployment. Also [crimes] have become more weaponised and violent.” (Interview 2002). 20  Interviewed in Tehran, 15 June 2002.

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Table 5.5

Unemployment rate as percentage of productive population

1986 1996 2002 14.3% 9.1% 8% Sources: www.ciafactbook.gov, Iran Daily, 27 September 1999.

2004 11.4%

Environmental Impact – Urbanisation, Pollution, Degradation The population-environment-security paradigm was also present in Iranian discourse, evident in the identification of population as causal to the degradation of the natural and urban environments, which in turn caused societal and political instability. Environmental protection had been initially recognised under Article 50 of the 1979 Constitution which stated: It is a duty of every individual in the Islamic Republic, to protect the environment so that present and future generations would be able to realise their potential growth. Therefore, any economic or other activities which cause pollution or deterioration are prohibited (cited in Zekavat 1997: 53).

Iran’s endorsement of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and subsequent international documents on population, sustainable development and the environment is further testament to official commitment to environmental norms. More recently, Iranian population environment discourse has been joined with security. In 1997, Iranian academic Seid Zekavat of the University of Shiraz concluded that in order to protect the nations natural environment it had to “stabilise its population growth at a zero rate” (Zekavat 1997: 49). Urbanisation, caused by past population growth, was identified as a source of future unrest, upheaval and insecurity due to lack of social infrastructure and other opportunities. For example in 1999, then Deputy Governor for Planning, Ali Asghar Zebardast, predicting Tehran’s growth to 13 million people, argued that “… if no action was taken to prevent excessive immigration to the city, the area wouldn’t be able to account for the needs of all citizens” (Iran News 12 December 1999). In 2002 the Mayor of Tehran cast the situation in crisis terms, predicting unmet societal need due to the imbalance between population and resources, stating that: Under ideal conditions, the capacity of Tehran’s management and service infrastructure to provide housing can meet the needs of three million residents. In a controllable situation, it can provide for five million citizens, while in the brink of a crisis, the figure is eight million. Currently, the resources of the city is strained with a population of 12 million and if a proper [political] management [of infrastructure] is not effected, even the most costly and efficient service facilities would fail to provide the minimum civic amenities for Tehrani residents” (Tehran Times 15 May 2002).

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Furthermore, urban and rural population growth was identified as causal to the degradation of Iran’s natural environment and this was also joined to population and security under the current Environment Minister Dr Massoumeh Ebtekhar. At the First UNFPA Workshop on Reproductive Health and Family Planning at Isfahan in 2000, Ebtekhar, opened the workshop and declared its main purpose as addressing the “…implications of accelerated population growth on environmental and natural resources” (Tehran Times 16 May 2000). This generated a public discourse, via the media, through which population growth was identified as causal to the degradation of the natural and urban environments, through reports stating: … larger and overcrowded cities in Iran such as Tehran … and] rural areas have become increasingly victims of desertification due to uncontrolled development and pollution … Rivers, lakes, the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf are also suffering from increasing industrial pollution which can be traced back to the population boom … . (Iran News 11 December 2000).

In 2002, Ebtekhar securitised the population-environment relationship, stating at the World Population Day Conference in Tehran, that “the burden of population growth is a threat to the environment,” identifying the “environmental problem [as] a threatening crisis …” through which “the world and humanity are threatened.”21 With regards to Iran, she stated that population growth had caused pollution and environmental degradation, problems which will worsen and become more threatening as the population continues to grow. Experts interviewed, endorsed and expanded Ebtekhar’s assessment and threat designation. For example, Dr Shakeri found that rapid urbanisation had caused detrimental macro- and micro-level outcomes. Tehran’s urban fringe continued to grow through inward and outward migration of the urban and rural poor in search of employment and lower cost of living, and that this was causative to behaviours detrimental to familial and societal stability. She stated that census results for Islamshah had recorded high population growth and unemployment rates, and that this corresponded to an increase in violent and destructive behaviour, particularly in migrants isolated from familial and community support networks. Unemployment was causing family breakdowns and therefore eroding the usual social control mechanisms that curtailed antisocial behaviour, creating an environment of lawlessness and suspicion at the community level. In addition, rapid urbanisation was adding to Tehran’s environmental problems, particularly pollution and congestion caused by increased and prolonged commuter traffic as people moved further from their places of work in search of affordable housing.

21 Recorded verbatim from live translation at the World Population Day Conference, Tehran, 11 July 2002.

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Clerical Opposition: Minority Opinion Clerical advocacy and endorsement of national population control and family planning objectives are often cited as a factor critical to the Iranian program’s success. The ulema were inducted into and given ownership of various aspects of the policy and program. They have acted as conduits for elite-public engagement and contributed to the construction of a public consensus by endorsing and promoting governmental aims through fatwas, sermons and education programs. Interviews with staff and clients at family planning centres attest to clerical endorsement of and assistance in localised programs. However, whilst clerical support and endorsement was, and remains, overwhelming, it was not entirely universal. Whilst this was not considered troubling at the political level, it was considered as potentially problematic at the societal level, particularly in rural areas where religious and conservative norms persist. Iranian experts accounted for persistent religious opposition in political, socio-economic, ethnic and communal terms. They argued that the majority of clerical opponents operated outside of the formal power structures, and their objections were expressions of personal political protest, or of the interpretative differences between Shia and Sunni Islam. For example, Dr Sidghazar argued that some clients cited the objection and rejection of socio-economic arguments by their local cleric as a reason not to use family planning. However, Sidghazar, and other experts dismissed this type of objection as politically insignificant because it emanated from lower ranking ulema that did not possess the social capital to obstruct the majority opinion. Moreover, the growing education and sophistication of the populace undermines the saliency of these ulema and their arguments at the societal level (2002 interviews: Bashi, Azali, Marandi, Mehryar, MohaghegsDamad, Shakeri). Evident also was an implicit pro-Shia/Iranian, anti-Sunni/Afghan bias, partly substantiated by fertility indicators, which suggested objections were informed by communal and ethnic differences and the perceived inherent pro-natalism of Sunni Muslims. Provincial fertility indicators demonstrated that Sunni fertility was higher than Shia, albeit marginally, with a 2001 TFR of 3.9 compared to 2.3 (see for example, UNFPA IRI 2001). Observers also reported the reluctance amongst Sunnis, primarily Afghan refugees, to adopt the small family norm. Islamshah health clinic staff observed religiously motivated reluctance amongst their Afghan clients, saying that this extended to their reluctance to seek general health services, not just family planning ones. That they had not witnessed this in their Iranian clients leads one to assume that this was an expression of ethnic and communal norms particular to Afghans and Sunnis. Experts argued that the ShiaSunni difference was a consequence of interpretational and structural differences, particularly the use of ijtihad and the lack of religious hierarchy which tended to produce orthodox, multiple, and conflictual interpretations on population and family planning in Iran’s Sunni communities (Marandi, Mohaghegs-Damad, Shakeri).

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However, it was apparent that Sunni perception and opinion was shifting, particularly in clerical perspectives, partly induced by improved religio-political relationships at the provincial level. This has led to greater cooperation on population matters, evident in forums such as the 2001 ‘Population Matters from the Point of View of Religion’ conference involving the UNFPA, MoHME and Sunni ulema. The conference report confirmed the shift in Sunni leadership perspectives toward national population norms (UNFPA IRI 2001, pp. 22–5). For example, the report stated that Mr Hosseini, representing the leader of Sunni Affairs, had argued for a quality Umma over a large one. A number of high profile Sunni ulema also endorsed family planning as permissible and desirable under the given socio-economic climate, and for the preservation of quality over quantity. Molavi Abdul Hamid stated that “it is better for a woman to be sterile than to give birth to thieves and criminals” (UNFPA IRI 2001: 24). Likewise, Molavi Teres stressed the religious preference for quality over quantity, stating that “Longing for too many children is bad, like longing for too many belongings. Children will then be of high quantity but low quality” (UNFPA IRI 2001: 24). The gathering is cited as having joined this logic with security, having concluded that “a small group of powerful quality people could easily overcome enemies of large quantities” (UNFPA IRI 2001: 25). Shift in Emphasis under Khatami: 2002–2004 By 2002, Iran had clearly achieved, and surpassed, the population and fertility goals set under the First FYPD, as demonstrated in Table 5.5, demonstrating the successful mobilisation of all societal sectors in the pursuit of national objectives. A slight shift in official emphasis occurred post 2002. Whilst the control of population growth and maintenance of fertility rates remained, that little more can be done to lower the growth rate for the present, other than continually mobilise Iranian youth behind the one/two child family norm, has fomented a shift in emphasis in population debates. Iran’s Fourth FYPD (2005–2009) and 2004 MDG Report to the UN demonstrated the induction of the sustainable development and human security-social justice paradigms that now inform global population thinking. The FYPD, unlike its predecessors, does not explicitly mention population or family planning control. Rather, the emphasis is on addressing those problems that past population growth has caused, particularly unemployment, pressure on social services and environmental degradation. The Fourth FYPD priorities are: enabling the knowledge based growth of the national economy in interaction with the global economy; environmental protection; enhancement of health, human security and social justice; safeguarding Islamic-Iranian identity and culture; strengthening national security; good governance and modernisation of the state (MPO, 2004). This suggests a shift to solving the development problems caused by population

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Table 5.6 TFR Predicted Actual PGR Predicted Actual

Islam and the Securitisation of Population Policies

Predicted and actual PGR and TFR for Iran by year 1986

1996

2005

6.4

2.96

1.8

3.2%

1.47%

1.1%

2011 3

2.3%

Sources: IRI MPO/SCI, 2001: 7, www.cia.gov – 2005.

growth rather than controlling growth to solve development, since fertility has been controlled and population growth would not stabilise for some time. Population and family planning were explicitly identified in reports on country level cooperation with specialised international agencies, such as the UN. In particular, Iran’s 2004 report to the UN on the implementation of the MDGs suggested that population control and family planning now fell under the rubric of social justice and human security by enabling national realisation of the MDGs, which the government claims are foundational to the FYPD, particularly the eradication of poverty, child and maternal mortality, and the provision of reproductive health, particularly to adolescents. For example, on poverty, the Iranian report stated that “Combating poverty has been one of the most important objectives in the FYDPs in I.R. Iran over the past decades. A review of the most recent FYDPs offers an insight into programmes undertaken to reduce poverty from the national perspective” (IRI 2004: 13). It then identifies population growth and demographic change as one of the major challenges to the eradication of poverty, stating that “Poverty reduction requires maintaining the relatively low levels of fertility and population growth despite the large cohort of young people entering reproductive age. Slow population growth opens a “demographic window” of opportunity for economic growth and poverty reduction, as the ratio of dependants to working age population” (IRI 2004: 14), adding that “[r]eviewing the correlation between the population and poverty in the country” is a national development priority. The Present: Ahmadinejad Going Back to the Revolution? Following the Iranian debate from a distance is not an easy task due to sporadic and unreliable external access to the national media. Whilst the global media continuously reports on Iran it is usually in connection to major political developments. Since his election in 2005, Iran’s first post-revolution civilian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has seized international headlines due mainly to his inflammatory, belligerent anti-Western/Israeli rhetoric, and the justification

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of Iran’s right to pursue civilian nuclear technology. His aggressive foreign policy stance, in stark contrast to Khomeini’s engagement approach, has won him regional support, but generated the ire of Western states, particularly the US, Britain and their allies. Iran’s intensified nuclear attainment program under Ahmadinejad has led to accusations that it intends to develop a weapons capability, despite continual protestations to the contrary by Iranian officials. Ahmadinejad justifiably maintains Iran’s right under international law to acquire and pursue a civilian nuclear program, refusing to bow to international pressure to abort in the face of sanctions and possibly military strikes. The belligerent reaction of the US and its allies has, unsurprisingly, led to increased Western suspicion in Iran, and heightened antiWestern rhetoric from Ahmadinejad. It was in this context that the Western media picked up Ahmadinejad’s refutation of the national population program and its objectives and norms, embedded as it was in anti-Western references. On Sunday 22 October 2006, Ahmadinejad told Iranian ministers and officials: I disagree with those who say two children are enough. Our nation is capacious. It can sustain many more children and allow them to grow here. Iran can sustain as many as 120 million people. Western countries have problems, and since they have a negative population growth, they are worried and scared that if our population grows we may dominate them (Harrison 2006, www.bbc.co.uk).

Furthermore, he argued for the abolition of the national family planning program, and proposed economic incentives to encourage women to stay at home or take only part time employment, with the government ensuring part time wages are matched to the full time equivalent. The anti-Western references caught the eye of the international media, which highlighted and implicitly laughed at the strategic aspect of the statement. For example, Scotland’s national newspaper, The Scotsman, stated that “Iran’s hardline president has unveiled a novel way to intimidate the West – by urging his people to go forth and multiply” (The Scotsman 23 October 2006). Just how successful Ahmadinejad is likely to be remains unknown; reactions from inside Iran are hard to acquire. Certainly his anti-Western sentiment may have populist appeal, and the promise of financial incentives may be appealing to Iran’s poor. However, domestic critics point to the economic impossibility of implementing this plan. The Scotsman quoted the reformist newspaper Etemade-Melli as stating that “He stresses the necessity of population growth and the triumph of Iran over western governments, ignoring the fact that what leads to such triumph is not population size but knowledge, technology, wealth, welfare and security” (The Scotsman 23 October 2006). Not only is his strategic logic outdated and flawed, his assumption that Iranian’s desire high fertility defies the logic of Iran’s rapid fertility transition. The data tells us that Iranian couple’s desire one and two child families for a number of reasons, including health, happiness and the economic cost of raising a large family. Unless Ahmadinejad proposes abolishing the Family Limitation Law as well, the offer of wage matching is unlikely to

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cover all the costs associated with childrearing. Further still, history tells us that despite the withdrawal of family planning services following the revolution, contraceptives were still available and used by Iranian couples. Experts, reflecting on Ahmadinejad’s statement, have concluded that even if he had been successful in cutting state-funding, which he hasn’t, he would not have succeeded in fomenting a shift to pro-natalism given the availability of contraceptives through other avenues, coupled with a well embedded societal norm for small families. Furthermore, his assumption was that Iranian women would want to stay at home in defiance of the stated desires of women for independence. Iranian women are highly educated and ambitious; they are not likely to stay at home under a Presidential directive. If Ahmadinejad wants to solve the national unemployment crisis, he should continue the slow and steady path of economic reform, and perhaps be more humble in his diplomatic approach so as not to put off foreign investors. Falsifying unemployment figures by keeping women out of the workforce might look good on paper, but it will not solve the problem. The other problem he faced was in convincing the ruling clergy to overturn the program and national legislation. Granted, he may have the support of a handful of ulema, but are they the same ones who occupy seats in government and other positions in power and who have publicly endorsed the program? A number of high profile and powerful Ayatollahs, including Khomeini and Khamanei personally endorsed the program through their fatwas. A reversal of the program would be a refutation of their judgement, and possibly construed as disrespectful to the memory of Khomeini and the revolution. Ahmadinejad, if successful, would have turned Iran away from the international regimes and norms it has so diligently and successfully adopted and implemented, and would undo twenty years of public debate and consensus building on population. It would seem that Ahmadinejad’s statements were simply a storm in a teacup. What the available, unfortunately limited, information suggests is that outside of this one off statement, very little has changed. Iranian fertility remains low, at slightly below replacement level, and international forecasts are that the PGR will continue to decline. In December 2006, only two months after Ahmadinejad’s announcement, the UNDP reported that the Majlis had unanimously reaffirmed Iran’s commitment to fulfilling the MDGs. Indeed, on the occasion of World Population Day 2008, the Minister of Health and Medical Education, Dr Bagheri Lankarani, reaffirmed national commitment to the population program approved by Ayatollah Khomeini (www.unfpa-iran.org.view_news.asp?id=133). Likewise, the public discourse remains in favour of population stabilisation for sustainable development, with newspapers such as Iran Daily reporting favourably on official pronouncements from the World Population Day conference, in particular those made by the UNFPA’s IRI representative, Dr Mohamed Abdel-Ahad who noted Iran’s “... strong headway in the fields of population and reproductive health” and acknowledged praise of and reward by the UNFPA to Iran for its successes (Iran Daily, 23 July 2008, www. iran-daily.com/1387/3180/html/society.htm). For all intents and purposes, remains committed to national and global sustainability goals.

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Conclusion Post Khomeini, his failure to appoint a successor to the faqih heightened the purist/ pragmatist schism within the government. The 1989 Constitutional reforms relaxed faqih qualifications which, coupled with the economic necessity of pragmatism over ideology, resolved the situation in favour of the moderates Khamanei and Rafsanjani. Under their leadership, Iran embarked on a program of political, economic and social reconstruction, resulting in international re-engagement, economic reform and relative social liberalisation. In this environment, the national population program was implemented in pursuit of socio-economic development objectives, consistent with international discourse. Joined to the program was a strategy of societal engagement and public discourse which generated national consensus on official population conceptions and objectives. The tactic of personalising the national situation, reframing macro concerns in micro perspectives, cultivated a broad-based societal awareness and understanding of population growth’s impact at all levels. Fertility data, demonstrating rapid declines in fertility, to replacement level, and growth rates points to successful mobilisation and prioritisation. Under Rafsanjani and Khamanei, the nascent securitising discourse introduced by and joined with Islam by Khomeini and Moosavi, was consolidated and furthered. Consistent public references to the overarching population growth threat, within which multi-sectoral threats and referents were designated and a sense of urgency was conveyed, kept the public informed on and mobilised behind official conceptions and objectives. Through an ongoing process of ministerial and program reorganisation and status elevation, coupled with a seemingly limitless fiscal budget and publicly-stated Presidential support, the Iranian government demonstrated its commitment to and prioritisation of population growth. Furthermore, the adoption and replication of international discourses and regimes signified Iran’s commitment to global population norms and objectives. Khatami furthered the securitising discourse, capitalising on the social engagement and mobilisation established by Rafsanjani, and joining to established debate, new conceptions of threat, such as the youth crisis he gave name to. Whether this will continue is unknown. Ahmadinejad’s recent statements suggest the possibility of a shift in official thinking back to the anti-natalism of the early post-Revolution days. That this appears to be the opinion of the fringe is heartening; however, the antinatalist conception that now serves as the national norm was the fringe conception but twenty years ago. Will Ahmadinejad succeed in reversing the national norm? Unlikely, but then stranger things have happened. Khamanei, Rafsanjani and Khatami, and the Iranian bureaucracy proved that it is possible to mobilise on family planning and achieve replacement level fertility in an Islamic society. Moreover, the Iranian debate demonstrates that Islam need not necessarily prevent the internalisation of global population norms and objectives, and this includes those couched in security references. Islam has not prevented the emergence of a securitised population norm in Iran comparable to that found in global discourse.

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Chapter 6

Islam, Politics and Population: Debate in Pakistan 1947–1988 This chapter examines Pakistani discourses on population and development from 1947–1989. Here, the influence of various change agents over national debate, and the impact of these on Pakistani norms, policies, and programs, is demonstrated. It is evident that international norms have filtered into opinions at the national and sub-national levels: these have sometimes been accepted, and at other times rejected. This trend is evident in a wide variety of data including news reports, policy documents, interviews, and demographic reports and statistics. What emerges is a sometimes uneasy process of inducting international population norm into Pakistani debate, giving rise to both positive and negative reactions from secular and non-secular agents. What is also evident is a definite chronological delineation of the Pakistani debate during this period into three phases. The first begins under Ayub Khan with the launch of the national population program in the early 1960s, and continues into the brief rule of Yahya Khan. The second under Ali Bhutto in the early 1970s, is characterised by concessions to conservatives over sensitive issues in order to legitimise and maintain political power. During the third phase, Zia ul-Haq enabled the Islamisation of domestic politics, resulting in a number of conservative social policies such as the Hudood ordinances. Approaches to population issues shifted because of this emphasis on Islamisation. Pakistan’s present and future demographic trends are products of past growth and fertility. Population growth has been a constant in Pakistan’s history, as demonstrated in Table 6.1, and it now ranks amongst the world’s 10 most populous nations (www.unfpa.org/swp/2001), due to high fertility coupled, reduced mortality rates, and improved health services (Amalric and Banuri 1995: 15, CIRDAP 1998: 33). Pakistan’s population growth rate is of concern because if past and current fertility and growth rates remain constant the population will reach 229 million by 2020 (www.esa.un.org.unpp 2004). Furthermore, Pakistan’s population structure is unsound: approximately 40 per cent of Pakistanis are under the age of 15, skewing the non-productive/productive cohort ratios and causing strains on social infrastructure. This group will cause further growth through population momentum (www.esa.un.org.unpp). Further still, Pakistan is approaching its sustainability threshold; whilst the natural resource base may currently be sufficient, land and water are nearing full utilisation and becoming unsustainable. Moreover, overpopulation is furthering environmental degradation. This situation is unlikely to be remedied without controlling population growth, which itself is unlikely (Amalric and Banuri, 1995) because of persistent high

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fertility caused by large family preference, inadequate health and family planning services, and a large gap between contraceptive knowledge (94 per cent) and use (24 per cent) (Hakim et al. 2000: 8). Pakistan’s population will continue to grow, compounding existing problems. Population and Religion: The Partition Legacy Islam and religio-ethnic separation were the raison d’être for demands by the Muslim League to create a state for Muslims in British India. The leaders of the movement, Mohammed Ali Jinnah and Muhammad Iqbal, considered the communal separation of India a necessary step, and Pakistan was envisaged as a state for Muslims. As such it was to provide them with a homeland where national identity – uniting an ethnic, class and linguistic milieu – and political legitimacy would be founded on Islam. Since then, Islam has remained a constant influence over Pakistani politics. It has been continuously and consistently co-opted and manipulated, de-politicised and politicised in the quest for national identity and unity and the pursuit of religiopolitical illegitimacy. Pakistan was designated an Islamic Republic in its first, much anticipated and debated, constitution in 1956. While the structure of the Pakistani state has been based upon Western administrative, legislative and educational traditions, the place of Islam has been increasingly debated and negotiated by the elite and the citizens alike. The religio-political parties that had existed pre-partition, but remained largely silent or critical of the partition movement during the process of state formation, emerged post partition as vociferous and demanding voices for the establishment of an Islamic state, working within and against the existing state structures for Pakistan’s religious reformation and Islamisation. Modernists have prevailed and predominated throughout Pakistan’s sixty year history however, concessions to Islam and the religious orthodox in the pursuit of legitimacy and stability have often been expedient and necessary. This has granted religio-political voices a place in national debates – a process consolidated under Zia ul-Haq – which has left an indelible mark in the form of politicised and legitimated orthodoxy and fundamentalism: Pakistan’s subsequent leaders, Benazir Bhutto (1988–1990 and 1993–96), Nawaz Sharif (1990–93 and 1997–99) and Pervez Musharraf (1999 to 2008), have had to negotiate and contend with this in pursuit of modernist social, economic and political agendas (Adams, 1983, Esposito and Voll, 1996, Taylor, 1983, Yasmeen, 1996). The rightful place of Islam in Pakistan has been constantly and consistently debated, questioned, politicised and reformulated, and has served as a politically and socially divisive issue throughout. Perhaps the earliest religio-political test for Pakistan was the 1949 Objectives Resolution by the Constituent Assembly which, in attempting to clarify and codify Islam’s official place in Pakistan, arrived at a middle point between modernist secularism and conservative religiosity by distinguishing sovereignty thus: “…sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Allah Almighty alone, and the authority which He has delegated to the State

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of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust” (cited in Adams 1983: 108). The question of sovereignty, and therefore Islam, was resolved by delineating it along earthly and heavenly lines: Allah’s sovereignty was considered universal; man’s was bound to the terrestrial plain. This was clearly declared by Pakistan’s first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in 1949, stating “[t]he people are the real recipients of power. This naturally eliminates any danger of the establishment of theocracy” (cited in Esposito and Voll 1996: 104). Furthermore, it stipulated that Western norms and institutions would be instituted in accordance with Islam, and Islamic teachings would serve as the foundation for societal and political order. It seemingly swayed Maulana Maududi who had founded the Jamaat-i-Islami in Lahore, 1941, in response and reaction to the partition movement’s emphasis on Muslim nationalism in a secular state. Maududi had envisaged an Islamic state in which “the whole system of human life in all its departments be erected upon the worship of God” (cited in Adams 1983: 105). The 1949 Objectives seemingly satisfied this requirement enough for him to cease agitations against the state. Instead Maududi and the Jamaat-i-Islami worked toward Islamisation from within, stating that “Now that this has become a regularised Islamic state, it is no longer the country of the enemy against which it is our duty to strive. Rather, it is now the country of our friends, our own country, the strengthening, construction, and progress of which are our duty” (cited in Adams 1983: 109). However, the question of religion was not adequately resolved and sectarian schisms emerged, culminating in key events such as anti-Ahmadi agitations of 1952–3, and Constitutional debates. The Ahmadi affair demonstrated, amongst other things, that Pakistani identity remained divisive, and was resolved by the isolation of groups as non Muslims. The 1956 constitution attempted to further resolve secular and religious demands, merging Westminster parliamentary democracy with divine sovereignty, the institution of Islamic law, and the establishment of religious advisory bodies, the Islamic Research Centre (IRC) and the Islamic Ideology Council (CII) (Esposito and Voll 196: 105; Taylor 1983: 181–91; Yasmeen 1996: 3–4). Population and family planning likewise featured as consistent Pakistani concerns, having been embedded in the consciousness of the elite and middle class through experiences in pre-partition India. The Indian debate was sparked by domestic neo-Malthusian leagues, established post World War One, and led to the subsequent establishment of the world’s first government sponsored family planning program in Mysore state in 1930. Nehru advocated birth control, his international experiences having exposed him to pro-population control debates, and the 1935 pre-partition Congress National Planning Committee included a subcommittee to address population policy and family planning. It found that “in the interests of social economy, family happiness and national planning, family planning and the limitation of children are essential, and the state should adopt a policy to encourage these” (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973: 8). Upper class women also joined the cause; for example, the All India Women’s Conference

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(AIWC) invited high profile international advocates such as Margaret Sanger to India to advise on family planning: This transpired into Indian collaboration with the international Family Planning Association in the early 1940s. However, questions of population and family planning carried the taint of colonialism and anti-colonialist agitation. The Indian intelligentsia was said to have resisted addressing the overpopulation problem because they feared that identifying fertility as the cause of national poverty would undermine their quasiMarxist anti-imperialist agenda. Furthermore, the colonial administration, although aware of India’s population problem, were said to have been reluctant to address it for fear of inciting anti-imperialist agitation and causing suspicion of eugenicist objectives and inciting inter-communal rivalry. Yet, it was evident as early as the 1930s that Indian economists were cognisant of the adverse interrelationship between population growth and economic development, thus putting them ahead of their international counterparts. This was demonstrated in 1931 by the Indian Census Commissioner J.H. Hutton who stated: It appears to be the general opinion of Indian economists who discuss the population problem that the only practical method of limiting the population is by the introduction of artificial methods of birth control, though it is not easy to exaggerate the difficulties … A definite movement towards artificial birth control appears to be taking place and is perhaps less hampered by misplaced prudery than in some countries which claim to be more civilized (cited in Symonds and Carder 1973: 9).

India and Pakistan were global family planning pioneers, enabling and institutionalising family planning programs for pragmatic reasons at a time when many states were still reluctant to acknowledge issues external to demography and the morally taboo. Moreover, through their adoption of the population-development paradigm emerging from economic and other expert circles, they served as test cases to the paradigm’s validity. India launched the world’s first national family planning policy in 1952, whilst the non-government sector activated programs in Pakistan around the same time. Pakistan first institutionalised population and family planning in the First Five Year Development Plan (FYPD) 1955–1960 (Leete and Alam 1999 [online]). Pakistan’s family planning program was initiated by its female elite, most notably Begum Saeeda Waheed who, concerned by the unnecessary death of her maid through a self induced abortion, and the realisation that other women were unnecessarily dying in the pursuit of fertility control, established the Family Planning Association of Pakistan (FPAP) in 1952–3 (Ayesha Khan 1996: 31), with the eventual assistance of international agencies such as the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF). The FPAP originated as a small scale NGO operating out of Karachi, Lahore and Dhaka, dedicated to educating and informing the public as to the personal, familial and national benefits of family planning and population control. It described Pakistan’s women as being socially excluded by a thick “curtain of invisibility”

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which denied them access to education, health and personal independence: the need to “revitali[se] education, provid[e] livelihood skills, and improve health care” were the FPAP’s initial objectives and rationale (www.fpap.org). Furthermore, it embraced the emerging international population-development paradigm, advanced by experts at the global level, as its additional operational rationale. The FPAP has stated that in 1953 it “stepped in to put brakes on a burgeoning population outdoing the country’s meagre resources with a commitment to responsible parenthood. Providing access to reproductive health care and training in nutrition, family planning, and sanitation were crucial to building the newly independent nation” (www.fpap.org). It used “so modest an advocacy as blaring the message on donkey-cart and so unassuming a mode of transport as a bicycle” to a national network of clinics and centres providing reproductive health and family planning services and education. The early experiences of the FPAP demonstrated that religio-cultural factors and actors would prove to be the program’s strongest opponents. The FPAP stated that initially: [T]here was resistance to family planning in some quarters. Some would even pelt stones on the cart that rang out the need for providing health services to women. A major obstacle in accepting family planning was the generally shared belief that it was either clearly prohibited or was considered immoral in religion (Islam)” (www.fpap.org).

The FPAP lobbied unsuccessfully but persistently for a national program or government assistance. Waheed used her social status and contacts to press national ministers for government involvement, and was reportedly told on one occasion by the Director General of Health that the overpopulation problem could be solved by redistributing the population to Balochistan (cited in A. Khan 1994: 3). The FPAP was first and foremost committed to female health and empowerment; national socio-economic concerns were secondary. Pakistan’s first FYPD codified socio-economic anti-natalism as the elite population norm. The government’s primary economic and social objectives were: to develop the resources of the country as rapidly as possible so as to promote the welfare of the people, provide adequate living standards, ad social services, secure social justice and equality of opportunity and aim at the widest and most equitable distribution of income and property (National Planning Board (NPB) 1956: 1).

Population size and high growth and fertility rates, shown in Table 6.1, were identified as obstacles to this objective and to national development, economic reform and modernisation plans. The FYPD demonstrated official cognisance of this, and its willingness to learn from other states’ experiences. The Plan’s goal was:

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Table 6.1

Total population, PGR, and TFR Pakistan 1950–2006 1950

Total 36.94 Population (millions) PGR% TFR 6.6

1955

1965

1998

2006

41.127 52.327 68.924 94.719 132.4

165.8

2020 medium projection 211.7

2.15 6.6

2.09 4

1.81 3

2.47 6.6

1975

2.74 6.6

1985

3.55 6.4

2.6 5

Note: 1950–1985 figures based on UN median calculations. Sources: UN World Population Prospects, 2004.

not only to increase the national income but to increase it faster than the population … We estimate … the population is growing at a rate of about 1.4 per cent per year … If this rate of increase continued the population would double in fifty years and the national production and income would have to double in fifty years merely to maintain present standard of living... Many countries face the problem of population growth, and some of them have deliberately chosen to follow policies designed to limit its rate. It will be necessary to observe how far these policies produce significant results and to consider to what extent they can be adapted for use in this country (NPB 1956: 60).

Further consistencies with external opinion were evident in the FYPD’s identification of Islam, low socio-economic status and lack of education as causal to Pakistan’s high population growth and fertility rates. The FYPD argued that these factors would need attention to address the national population problem (National Planning Board 1956, pp. 190–92). This reflected the secularist, modernist, and anti-traditionalist mindset of the administration, and its recognition that it would not be able to modernise Pakistan without first overcoming societal obstacles to modernisation. The government appeared cautious yet optimistic that family planning would be of benefit to and succeed in Pakistan. As demonstrated above, the government was reserving judgment on family planning’s efficacy, waiting for empirical data from other states. However it was evident that the government sensed the population situation as urgent and thought it best to act sooner rather than later, allocating a “lump sum payment of Rs. 5 lakh for family planning.” The plan further stated that family planning measures should be initiated now so that the evils of under-feeding and over-crowding may not undo the efforts for the provision of a better life for the nation. The country must appreciate that population growth is a rock on which all hopes of improved   Lakh = 100,000.

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conditions of living may flounder. It admits of no approach except that the rates of growth must be low (NPB 1956: 192).

Although the government had stated its commitment to anti-natalism, it did not however establish a government-run family planning program or organisation, instead leaving this to already established private sector groups. In any case, it is difficult to assess the government’s actual commitment to family planning given that only two years into the FYPD it was ousted in a coup in 1958. Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan: 1958–1971 Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan assumed power following the 1958 coup. He aimed to correct the political chaos and mismanagement prevalent in the country, and established the first of Pakistan’s many military regimes. As a western oriented modernist, Ayub Khan was committed to Pakistan’s rapid socioeconomic development. Equally convinced of the need for ‘guided’ democracy in Pakistan which was to be controlled by the military, he pursued a liberal Islamic agenda which he described as necessary to “liberate the spirit of religion from the cobwebs of superstition and stagnation which surrounded it” with the aim of “mov[ing] forward under the forces of modern science and knowledge” (cited in Esposito and Voll 1996: 106, see also, Adams 1983; Taylor 1983; Yasmeen 1996). In the process, Ayub Khan was not afraid to marginalise the sources of orthodoxy, such as the IRC and CII. During Ayub Khan’s regime (1958–69), the national population debate and program was influenced by his personal religio-political and anti-natalist convictions. The main features of this period were Pakistan’s positioning at the forefront of international debate, the entrenchment of international populationdevelopment norms at the elite level, and the reshaping of the national program to reflect its priority status and to mobilise national action. Ayub Khan took a personal interest in population control and family planning. The interest was informed by exposure to international demographic and economic discourse through groups such as the American Rockefeller Foundation and Population Council. He was also influenced by prominent American experts such as Ansley Coale and Edgar Hoover, particularly their 1958 study Population Growth and Economic Development in the Low Income Countries and their Coale-Hoover socio-economic development model. In addition and in demonstration of his convictions, Ayub personally engaged with population and family planning experts, through discussions with national technocrats and involvement in FPAP activities such as its first national seminar in 1959. On this occasion he declared “ the menace of over population and rapid rate of population increase exists in most underdeveloped countries, and a big concentrated drive is necessary to educate the people about the evils of over-population” (Ayub Khan cited in Finkle 1972: 111). The use of this language reflected his awareness of nascent global population-security discourse and also

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established his credentials as a proponent of international population norms. Demonstrating his personal commitment to the population control objective and its political prioritisation, Ayub was reported as stating in 1959 that he had impressed on the Minister of Finance “the need for allocating more and more funds for the movement of family planning” (cited in Johnson 1987: 17). The federal National Board of Family Planning (NBFP) was established, with offices in East and West Pakistan, as a policy advisory board, with services provided via the Ministry of Health, FPAP and other NGOs (A. Khan 1994: 4). Pakistan’s stated commitment to population control was clearly expressed in the Second FYPD 1960–1965. It demonstrated elite convictions that population growth was the primary obstacle to national economic development and social modernisation, and that the need existed for societal mobilisation for development and population control. As such, the Second FYPD formally politicised the Pakistani debate. This was encapsulated in the following declaration in the Second FYPD: Since population growth can threaten to wipe out the gains of development, the Plan clearly recognises the paramount need for a conscious population policy and its implementation. A population policy, however, must take into account many implications of population growth for other aspects of planning. The existing pressure of population leads to an intense struggle for the means of life at subsistence levels … Apathy is the companion of malnutrition and ignorance. Under these conditions people have meagre reserves of energy to strive for wider understanding and improvement (National Planning Board 1961).

Clearly there was a stated governmental commitment to population control. It would also appear that, perhaps albeit superficially, Ayub and his government were international population pioneers. That the direction of the FYPD and its population provisions were also informed by external expert assessment, donor and geopolitical demands, suggested that Pakistan, under Ayub, was a quasi innovator that worked in partnership with international opinion makers. Ayub willing accepted international population-development prescriptions because they assured him domestic and international political legitimacy, which rested on Pakistan fulfilling its development objectives. He could not reform the domestic economy without upsetting the interests of Pakistan’s landed elite and business owners upon whom his political career rested. International aid was crucial to Ayub’s modernisation plans, but such funding was contingent on a population control program. The operational rationale of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the biggest contributor to Pakistan, at that time was the Coale-Hoover model; population control as necessary to development, therefore all US development funding was contingent on a population control policy (A. Khan 1996, pp. 31–3). The model clearly influenced the Third FYPD; population control was considered the pre-condition for development, posited as the critical factor in, and

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obstacle to, national economic growth. The Third FYPD, 1965–1970, introduced population control to the national political agenda, stating: Unless [population growth] is checked by a fall in the fertility rate, the population growth rate could easily be pushed up beyond 3 percent per annum. If this happens the population will double itself by 1985. Such an increase would defeat any attempt to raise per capita income by a significant amount. A vigorous and broadly based program of family planning is therefore an integral part of the strategy of the Perspective Plan (Planning Commission 1965).

That population was considered the pre-condition for development, and the apparent government belief that development could not really take off until population was controlled, was reiterated by Enver Adil. He was appointed the first director of the national population program the early 1960s. In 1968, he stated: the economic implications of … rapid population growth are well known. For Pakistan, the highlights are that nearly 45 per cent of the population is under 15 years of age and hence are predominantly income consumers rather than income producers. The cost of providing even minimum education, a health and welfare service seriously affects the country’s capacity for capital formation so essential to future development. It was against the backdrop of this crisis situation that Pakistan embarked on a national family planning/population control program (Adil 1968: 659).

Pakistan’s first government family planning program operated with the express objective of population control through fertility reduction. The program, federally administered by the NBFP and operated through the Ministry of Health (Finkle 1972: 117; Khan 1996: 31), adopted the internationally favoured supply-side approach predicated on the assumption that fertility control was an unmet demand that could be fulfilled by the supply of contraceptives, services and information. This was combined with a target approach. The program functioned to ensure efficient supply and distribution, and this included increasing staff and outlet numbers. Furthermore, the supply/demand rationale extended to setting ‘insertion’ and ‘service’ targets, offering economic incentives to family planning staff and clients throughout Pakistan in the belief that this would motivate demand and use (Finkle 1972: 104; Robinson et al., 1981: 86). In addition, extensive and widespread media coverage and promotion of the family planning program was envisaged as necessary to societal mobilisation behind national population objectives (Adil 1968: 670). For the period 1965–70, the targets included twenty million couples to be supplied with contraceptives, five to six million births to be averted, 20, 000 village midwives to be trained. Further targets were set for IUD insertions and sterilisations. Program success would be measured by progress towards set targets (Robinson, Shah and Shah 1981: 86; Cernada and Rob 1992: 51). Furthermore, reflecting the priority status accorded to family planning, Ayub

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Khan allowed Adil to restructure the program which was granted administrative independence from the health ministry. This left population and family planning officials free to control their own budget and personnel policies. Family planning employees earned higher than average wages compared to their cohorts in other civil service sectors, demonstrating the priority attached to the program (Finkle 1972, pp, 111, 118). Pakistan established its credentials as an international population control advocate through its support for a number of international initiatives and declarations, and was important to the politicisation of the global agenda. Pakistan was among a small group that supported the tabling of the draft resolution arising from Sweden and Norway’s 1961 proposal that ‘[p]opulation growth and economic development’ be incorporated into the agenda for the UN General Assembly’s 16th session (Johnson 1987: 19, Lee and Walt 1995: 260). At the 1961 Conference on the World Population Crisis in New York, the Pakistani Ambassador to the UN, Said Hassan, spoke of a population explosion in Malthusian terms. He suggested that the resultant clash of reality against expectations and aspirations could heighten existing international tensions stating that “population explosions become a problem and a matter of concern when the economic and social resources of a country are unable to cope with increasing numbers” (Hasan 1964, pp. 162–3). Pakistan also joined other states demanding the UN increase its assistance in national population policy, planning, and programs. In 1966 it joined India, Sri Lanka and Sweden in proposing the General Assembly Resolution 2211(xxi). The resolution: called upon the Economic and Social Commission, the Population Commission, the Regional Economic Commissions, the United Nations Economic and Social Office in Beirut and the specialised agencies concerned to assist, when requested, in further developing and strengthening national services in the field of population bearing in mind the different character of population problems in each country and region and the needs arising there from (http: //daccessdds.un.org/doc/ RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/005/14/IMG/NR000514.pdf?OpenElement).

The following year, Ayub Khan signed the 1967 World Leaders Declaration on Population which stated that “the population problem must be recognised as a principal element in long range national planning if governments are to achieve their economic goals and fulfil the aspirations of their people”. The Declaration agreed that “the objective of family planning is the enrichment of human life, not its restriction” and that “family planing, by assuring greater opportunity to each person frees man to attain his individual dignity and reach his full potential” (UN 1967: 3). The Pakistan Government’s population objectives contradicted the ideas propagated by religious conservatives. Maududi, for instance, had already established his, and later the Jamaat-i-Islami’s, strategic pro-natalist position. First published as articles in during the 1930s in the journal Tarjumanul Quran, and then later in book form under the title Birth Control, first published in 1943,

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then revised and circulated in 1962, his ideas were seemingly in response to government activities, which the book described as “…a propaganda war being waged in favour of [birth control]”. In 1943 Maududi wrote: The danger that I had visualised about seven or eight years ago and which had prompted me to write something has not all lessened … During the war [World War Two], a mighty world power, i.e. France, has suffered colossal consequences of the ethico-social and cultural policies which had been adopted under the obnoxious influences of the unrestricted liberalism … Many statesmen and thinkers are suggesting that one of the most important factors responsible for France’s defeat was its constantly dwindling birth rate” and in doing so established himself as an opponent of family planning (Maududi 1968, pp. xii–xv).

Strategic pro-natalism remains central to the Jamaat-i-Islami’s critique of population control. In addition Maududi, along with other prominent ulema protested a 1954 FPAP seminar, condemning the associations work as un-Islamic (A. Khan 1994: 3). Furthermore, Birth Control explicitly rejected the socio-economic rationale for population control and criticised political attempts to reconcile it to Islam, stating that “since Pakistan is an Islamic state, effort is being made to somehow prove that it is completely in accord with Islam” (Maududi 1968: 3). Ayub’s personal modernist Islamic convictions led him to dismiss, misread and disregard orthodox religio-political clerical opinion on a number of issues including population and family planning. He had not sought a religious mandate for his rule and was not prepared to let his socio-economic vision of Pakistan be disrupted by the moral objections of religious agitators. He countered the criticism from the clergy with his own modernist Islamic rationale, arguing that: I cannot believe that any religion can object to population control because no good religion can object to anything aimed at the betterment of the human lot, because all religions, after all, come for the good of the human race and human beings do not come into this world for the religions (Ayub Khan, cited in Khan 1996: 31).

Moreover, the establishment of the family planning program ran concurrent to a range of social and political reforms which further marginalised Pakistan’s ulema and religio-political groups whose concerns Ayub Khan either misread or ignored. Orthodox elements directed by Maududi and the Jamaat-i-Islami protested the Muslim Family Laws Ordinances, 1961, which instituted liberal marriage laws, restricted polygamy, and strengthened a woman’s rights regarding divorce (http: //www.vakilno1.com/saarclaw/pakistan), as un-Islamic and too Western. Furthermore, Ayub’s reformations of the Pakistan constitution in 1962 diluted Islamic symbolism by removing Pakistan’s ‘Islamic’ adjective, making it simply a Republic; this was later reverted in an attempt to appease religious objections. However, with regards to family planning, the only concession to

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religious sensibilities was that contraceptives and services would only be available to married couples (Cernada and Rob 1992: 51). The program did not succeed for a variety of reasons. Firstly, Ayub Khan misunderstood societal desires and expectations, believing that Pakistanis would accept his socio-economic perspective on population and family planning, and that the individual and familial benefits of fertility limitation would outweigh and override social and religious considerations (Khan 1996: 32). Secondly, the emphasis on supply at the expense of after-care meant that the untreated side effects of the experimental, yet over-prescribed, IUD caused many clients to discontinue its use. Furthermore, the supply weighted incentive scheme, combined with job insecurity, prompted staff to falsify statistics to ensure bonus payments (Cleland and Lush 1997: 46–7; Finkle 1972). Because of this, experts preparing the Third FYPD in the late 1960s were unable to determine program outcomes. Moreover, because Ayub Khan favoured economic outcomes over populist policies, and assumed to know the wants and desires of the Pakistani people, he instituted politically unpopular measures such as family planning in the pursuit of what he perceived to be the national greater good. This overall approach to politics contributed to Khan’s political demise and tainted family planning programs that he had favoured. According to a USAID report during the last months of Ayub’s rule, family planning became the target of anti-Presidential protests from the political left, particularly the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), and religious right, the Jamaat-i-Islami, who were said to have chanted “Family planning, for those who want free sex!” (Finkle 1972: 122; Khan 1994: 12). General Yahya Khan took control from Ayub Khan in 1969. Appointed by Yahya Khan, Wajihuddin Ahmed replaced Adil as national Family Planning Commissioner. Wajihuddin acted on the 1969 National Impact Survey’s (NIS) damning indictment of Ayub’s program, which found it to have been dysfunctional, besieged by weaknesses such as poor quality of staff and poor procedural structure. As a result, Wajihuddin shifted the approach from supply-side to the Continuous Motivation Scheme (CMS) (Khan 1994: 12; Robinson et al. 1981: 87), which combined service and supplies with education and motivation, consistent with changes in wider international discourse. Midwives were teamed with male and female motivators, and visited couples to persuade them to accept and use contraceptives, with follow-up visits, and individual and group meetings planned to provide supplies and further motivation. Furthermore, it was assumed that this approach would induce demand through the familiarisation with and normalisation of contraceptives at the societal level (Robinson, Shah and Shah 1987: 87). Despite the shift in approach, the wider socio-economic rationale for population control remained. The program was designed to ensure that population growth did not exceed that of Pakistan’s Gross National Product (GNP). Furthermore, Pakistan remained an important player in international population developments. Wajihuddin permitted the Pakistan program to be used in an international experiment to determine whether family planning was causal to downward fertility trends. Because of this, Pakistan’s program continued to receive international attention

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and assistance (Khan 1996, pp. 12–13, 35; Robinson, Shah and Shah 1981: 87). Such steps suggested that during the Yahya Khan’s rule, Pakistan retained the socio-economic development rationale for population control established under Ayub and continued to court international assistance, but shifted the operational philosophy from supply to motivation. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: 1971–1977 During the 1970s priority status of population control deteriorated as new political concerns emerged. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto rose to power following the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 which resulted in the secession of East Pakistan as Bangladesh. Ali Bhutto inherited a nation traumatised by the loss of its eastern wing and the demonstrated limits of the Two-Nation Theory which had formed the basis of the country’s creation. He adopted a multi-dimensional policy designed to correct the regional geo-political imbalance vis-à-vis India while redirecting the Pakistani nation in a different direction. Apart from relying upon China for strategic support, Ali Bhutto also identified Islam and Muslim links as an important part of his strategy to deal with the post-war situation. He paid special attention to the oilrich Gulf States as a source of economic support in an era of decreasing help from western supporters. On the domestic front Ali Bhutto also recognised and acknowledged the role of Islam. Although a secular socialist, he had already demonstrated his ability to negotiate the religiously charged political environment with his own interpretation and use of Islamic language and symbols by raising the slogan of Islamic socialism in the late 1960s. Upon assuming power of what remained of Pakistan, Ali Bhutto pursued a policy of appeasement and rhetorical and populist Islamisation to consolidate his own position and reunify the fractured post-war society. Religiopolitical groups, including Maududi, objected to Ali Bhutto’s merging of socialism and Islam. Critical of Bhutto’s substitution of Islamic socialism with ideas of Islamic equality (musawat), Maududi said: They found that their socialism cannot dance naked … After realising this they started calling socialism ‘Islamic’ … If it is really based on the Quran and the Sunnah [sic] then what is the need for calling it socialism?...Now when they can see that this too does not work they have started calling it Islamic equality (musawat) and Muhammadi musawat. The object is the same – pure socialism (cited in Esposito and Voll 1996: 107–108, italics added).

Instead of ignoring these elements, Ali Bhutto competed with his religio-political rivals for control over Islamic symbols and the path of Pakistani Islamisation. Apart from forging close links with Muslim states, Ali Bhutto made symbolic concessions to orthodox Islam in the Pakistan Constitution of 1973. The oath of the President and Prime Minister came to include a declaration of belief in the

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“Unity and Oneness of Almighty Allah, the Books of Allah, the Holy Quran being the last of them, [and] the Prophethood of Muhammad (peace be upon him) as the last of Prophets and ... the Day of Judgment, and all the requirements and teachings of the Holy Quran and Sunnah [sic]” (www.pakistanconstitution-law. com/const, italics added). Specifically on the population issue, Ali Bhutto distanced himself from Ayub Khan’s preference for population control and family planning policies: The PPP government would not publicly endorse the strategy adopted by previous regimes (Esposito and Voll 1996, pp. 107–110; Khan 1994: 14, 1996: 36, Shah and Cleland 1993: 177; Sultan, Cleland and Ali 2002: 1168). However, what emerged was a curious situation in which stated commitment and prioritisation accorded to the population issue was low, but actual commitment and prioritisation was relatively high. Whilst the PPP regime may not have afforded population control and family planning the same degree of stated commitment and prioritisation as Ayub, these issues did remain on the agenda and the PPP government continued to co-operate with international agencies and engage with and in international debate. The actual level of government commitment was evidently high. The 1972 census demonstrated rapid population growth and constant high fertility, as demonstrated in Table 6.1, and this information provided the basis for the Population Planning Program for 1972–77 (Planning Commission 1972: 197; 1974: 204; 1976: 199). Immediately following his accession, Ali Bhutto established a committee to review the national population and family planning program. The findings of the committee in 1972 led to governmental commitment to program expansion for 1973–74 and 1974–1975, under the new Annual Development Plan (ADP) system, to be implemented by the Population Planning Division. Furthermore, population provisions were included in the 1973 Constitution which directed federal and provincial governments to incorporate population factors into planning and development. Further still, the program was renamed the Population Planning Program which signified “the widening of its scope and closer collaboration with development programs in such areas as education, labour, industries” (Zaidi, Alahuddin and Hardee 1974: 256). Pakistan’s ADPs consistently and continually referred to population in urgent and problematic terms. The 1972–3 Plan stated: The projection indicates a bleak future unless urgent action is taken to check the fertility rate. Such a rapid increase in population would require the provision of employment and other population related services at a level much beyond the economic potential of the country. There is, therefore, a pressing need for an effective family limitation system (Emphasis added, Planning Commission 1972: 168).  This was reported by Zaidi, Alahuddin and Hardee, demographers employed by the Pakistan government and national demographic research organisations.

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Similarly, the 1976–77 Planning Program highlighted that “[t]he rate of growth of population in Pakistan is one of the highest in the world and constitutes perhaps the most serious problem facing the country” (Planning Commission 1976: 199). Moreover, despite Pakistan’s stated distance from the US, it continued to collaborate with American agencies, such as USAID, which resumed funding to Pakistan in 1973. USAID was committed to global population control, as reflected in its operational insistence on family planning as a precondition for funding. The chief of the program at the time, Joseph Wheeler, considered that population growth should have been Pakistan’s primary concern. He reportedly stated that it had been clear to him by 1969 that population growth would be one of the main issues of the coming decade. Hence “USAID felt population was an important issue and offered to help” (cited in Khan 1994: 14). The Pak-USAID partnership shifted the existing CMS, established under Yahya Khan, combining it with the Contraceptive Inundation Scheme (CIS), the then untested assumption of USAID senior population officer Ray Ravenholt premised on the belief that increased contraceptive supply would increase public demand for, and use of, family planning. Pakistan, in accepting the CIS, sided with Ravenholt and the Western driven ‘control before development’ paradigm over the counter ‘development before reduction’ one which emerged at the 1974 WPC (Khan 1994: 14–16; 1996: 37; Robinson, Shah and Shah 1981: 87). In accepting the program, they lent credibility to Ravenholt’s contention that: Regardless of what special social measures may ultimately be needed for optimal regulation of fertility, it is clear that a main element in any population control program is the extension of family planning information and means to all elements of the population (Ravenholt 1968: 573).

The CMS/CIS was meant to lower fertility by increasing contraceptive methods and availability but its failure to do so, as demonstrated above in Table 6.1 and below in Table 6.2, was later attributed to social, cultural and structural factors. Administrators found it difficult to employ suitable motivators; most were young, unmarried and immature, thus lacking the personal knowledge or social capital requisite for the role. Also, restrictive cultural practices made it difficult to employ women, making it difficult to service female clients. Furthermore, volunteer motivators attributed their failures to the inability to reach clients due to insufficient vehicles and transportation allowances to cover costs. Supply of contraception was not a problem, but distribution was, as some outlets were said to have refused to sell, distribute, or even accept them, in turn limiting client access to supplies. Moreover, the CIS blatantly ignored social determinants of fertility; the government remained committed to a centralised system and singular approach to family planning premised on societal homogeneity, contrary to Pakistan’s socioreligio-ethnic milieu and against the advice of grass roots NGOs who advocated the suitability of a decentralised and localised program to the Pakistani context (Khan 1996: 37; Robinson, Shah and Shah 1981: 88). The political upheaval

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surrounding the 1977 elections and Ali Bhutto’s removal from power left no time for modifications or corrections to the family planning system, thus removing the opportunity for the PPP government to address its mistakes. Table 6.2

Current Ever

Contraceptive prevalence rate, current and ever use, % 15–49 years women, for Pakistan, by year

1968/9 5.5 12.1

1975 5.2 10.5

1979 3.3 4.6

1984/5 9.1 11.8

1990/1 11.9 20.7

1994/5 17.8 28.0

1996/7 23.9 35.7

Source: UN/Sathar www.un.org/esa/population/publications/prospectsdecline.

General Zia-ul-Haq: 1977–1988 General Zia-ul-Haq seized power in July 1977 following a bloodless coup. Ali Bhutto’s symbolic concessions to Islam to appease and quieten orthodox opposition initiated Islamisation in Pakistan which Zia consolidated by embedding conservative norms into national politics. In consolidating his own position, Zia allied himself with religio-political parties, including Maududi’s Jamaat-i-Islami, offering key political positions to their members. Further, he inducted their orthodox religious norms into national law, and used them to construct national unity and identity and restore lost national status and pride through Islam. Zia instituted orthodox social, political, economic and judicial reforms embodied in a number of Constitutional Amendment Orders, in the implementation of the Hudood Ordinances in 1979 and by repealing the 1961 Muslim Family Law Ordinances. Hudood merged “Pakistan Penal Code offences based on Common Law Jurisprudence and criminal procedure with Hudood Laws based on Hanafi jurisprudence” (CII 2006: 2). It stipulated severe corporal punishments, such as the controversial Zina ordinance which obfuscated rape and adultery, increased the burden of proof for rape and stipulated the death penalty for women found guilty, outlawed alcohol and gambling and made their use and practice subject to corporal punishment (CII 2006). The Constitutional Amendments strengthened the judicial position of the ulema by making the Shariat benches the key centres of legal judgment and increasing the number of Shariat judges from 5 to 8 by amending code 203C 1973 under order PO 7 1981. Amendments to article 228.2 under Provisional Order /16/1980 increased the size and scope of the CII (www. nrb.gov.pk/constitutional). Against this background, one could have expected the shelving of the population policies initiated by previous regimes. But the population debate under Zia ul-Haq was more curious than that under Ali in that Zia’s stated position was  Translates to extra-marital sex.

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one of outright denunciation belying an actual policy of increased commitment and mobilisation and a growing sense of urgency, particularly within the federal bureaucracy. Furthermore, whilst Pakistan may have taken a visible back seat in international population debate and developments, national planning policies demonstrated that it remained nonetheless committed to international population and development norms. Moreover, under Zia, a nascent population-environmentsecurity discourse emerged out of the bureaucracy. Commitment to population control and family planning was seemingly internalised against the backdrop of Zia’s external objectionableness used to establish his Islamic credentials and legitimising his political control. The discrepancy and disparity between Zia’s stated and actual commitment to population resulted in a ‘silent’ approach to population and family planning, seemingly in response to the contradictory demands of religious opponents, external donor agencies and the objectives of the Pakistan population bureaucracy. International donors and stakeholders demanded the implementation of family planning and population control programs as components of broader economic aid packages, and in the case of the US, in pursuit of geo-strategic aims. After initially suspending funding to Pakistan between 1976–78 due its pronouncement and pursuit of nuclear weapons capability, USAID resumed development funding in reward for Pakistan’s support of America’s anti-Soviet Afghan policy, explicitly stating its geo-strategic objective thus: “ The military-security-political position of Pakistan, including the burden of a massive refugee influx, accentuated the development problem to which the proposed US economic assistance package respond[ed]” (unpublished USAID report cited in Khan 1996, pp. 39–40). Because of USAID’s aforementioned population control conditions, the new aid package required Pakistan to resume family planning. Having already made concessions to his religious supporters, Zia had to balance Western anti-natalist demands against religious pro-natalist ones to secure the best outcome for Pakistani development and his own political survival. In 1980, Zia appointed Dr Attiya Inayatullah, formerly the head of the FPAP, as his Presidential Advisor on Population. He reportedly respected her as a person and technocrat, giving her carte blanche to run the program as she deemed fit. The program was to be reinstated, but silently, and perhaps Inayatullah was trusted to be discreet. Her appointment was significant because it demonstrated the discrepancy between Zia’s stated and actual approaches to a number of issues, and his negotiation between liberal and orthodox demands. He reinstated a program that he had personally suspended and appointed a woman to a high profile position contrary to his seemingly orthodox gender bias illustrated by his judicial and legislative reforms. Critics have argued in hindsight that this appointment was made expediently by Zia to appease international donor demands for evidence of his commitment to population. Whatever the reason for her appointment, it is evident that Inayatullah instituted a marked shift in official conceptualisation, evident in the 1981 amendments to the Fifth FYPD (1978–83).

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The new Plan adopted an internationalist perspective, recognising the global context and impact of national population growth, combining the newly emerging global population-development-environment discourses to national planning, and advancing a more holistic perspective on family planning. For example, the Fifth FYP emphasised the domestic causes and outcomes of population growth within a socio-economic development framework, combined with the emerging health and ‘development for decline’ paradigms. It stated: The growth in population, at the present rate will continue to considerably undermine economic progress and improvements in standards of living … [leaving] insufficient margin out of the growth of national income … socioeconomic gains that are accomplished, are largely diluted by the increase in population … The reduction of the population growth rate will, therefore, serve the twin objectives of increasing the nation’s capacity to save and invest and improving the per capita availability of goods and social services … The plan … embodies a socio-economic strategy which would induce a desire to limit family size [through education and female employment] (Planning Commission 1978, pp. 174–5).

Although the plan emphasised fertility control and reduction, its operational definition of a small family was three to five children, considerably higher than the international two child norm. The 1981 amendments to the Fifth Plan acknowledged the global causes and consequences of Pakistan’s population growth and the significance of the Bucharest Plan of Action. The FYPD amendments acknowledged growth and consumption as equally causative to global problems, as well as the need to consider the environmental impact of population and development. Moreover, it demonstrated bureaucratic cognisance of international population-security discourse, stating that: A gradual increase in the global population has put a far greater squeeze on the world’s resources … there are environmental limits to the exploitation of world resources which cannot be ignored … If the planet is to survive as a hospitable place, the requirement for the restraint in production and consumption habits in the developed countries must be paralleled by restraint in reproduction within the developing ones … [p]opulation dynamics is one of the most important elements in the [environmental] problem … [i]t was against this background that the [UNWPC] … in Bucharest, adopted the [WPPA] to which Pakistan is a signatory … [t]he principle aim of social, economic and cultural development, of which population goals and policies are integral parts, is to improve levels of living and the quality of life of the people, as the [WPPA] proclaims (Pakistan Population Division 1981, pp. 19–20).

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Under this rationale, the proposed plan sought to lower fertility and population by combining the national family planning program with a number of social, economic, political and development strategies that would induce fertility change. It sought to integrate population planning into social mobilisation and the national development effort, rather than relying on a stand-alone, clinical approach emphasising birth control only. It stated that “a program to reduce fertility must be complemented by action to improve the general standards of living, income distribution, nutrition, and the provision of health services, education and employment of women …” (Pakistan Population Division 1981: 8). Moreover, the 1981 Plan amendments demonstrated bureaucratic acknowledgement and awareness of international population-security discourse. Drawing on UNFPA documents the Plan predicted potentially destabilising outcomes for Pakistan, identifying factors and causal relationships inherent in global debate. The 1981 Plan acknowledged the findings of the UNFPA’s Basic Needs Assessment Report, 1979, which identified the twin global menaces of population growth and growing aspirations. Echoing the views held by UNFPA, the Plan made references to the ‘population bomb’ and ‘aspiration bomb’. The FYPD amendments cited the UNFPA report, stating “[e]ven if the ‘population bomb’ is defused the ‘aspiration bomb’ ticks on … The explosion of aspirations is likely to become a tremendous problem in its impact on limited resources, fragile eco-systems and the struggle against mass poverty and on the world’s political, economic and social fabric” (Planning Commission 1981: 23). Working on a projected national PGR of 2.9 per cent and an urban growth rate of 4.4 per cent (Planning Commission 1978: 175), the 1981 Plan predicted Pakistan’s potential social, economic, environmental and political deterioration and destabilisation by 2001. In this, it identified conditions and outcomes consistent with global discourse and posited population growth as causal to them. The plan predicted that a growth rate of 4.4 per cent would lead to urbanisation and the growth of overcrowded mega-cities, strained public and environmental health services, inflation and scarcity, unemployment, homelessness and the growth of slums. This could result in a “revolution of rising frustrations [which] would carry … crime and violence … alienation … the politics of extremism and polarisation. Class struggle … giving rise to fascist organisations advocating desperate remedies” (Planning and Development 1981: 22). In line with international discourse, Pakistani bureaucrats identified population growth as causal to a number of factors that could threaten national stability and security. The population component of Sixth FYP 1983–88 was scrutinised by the ‘Population Sector Working Group’ comprising Pakistani and international experts, including the main international contributor to the program, the UNFPA. Emerging from this process was a much broader conceptualisation of population through which emerging global discourses were further integrated to national population planning. This was evident in the consolidation of the populationenvironment-development paradigm as foundational to the Pakistan plan in the following statement:

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Islam and the Securitisation of Population Policies [the plan] is constructed within a framework which takes cognisance of the interrelation between population, resources, the environment and development strategies. This has produced a broadening of the concept of population well beyond the classic variables of fertility, mortality and migration (Planning Commission 1983: 361).

Based on this rationale, the Sixth FYPD proposed measures not only aimed at birth limitation, but also to shift socio-cultural fertility norms through a number of development measures. In addition, the plan integrated the education sector and media as partners in national population planning, recognising the utility of mass education and communication as necessary to societal mobilisation behind national population objectives (Planning Commission 1983, pp. 363–65). Furthermore, the plan envisioned community and grassroots engagement and involvement in local planning and programs with the aim of making the program more responsive and accepted at the societal level, as had been the advice of grass-roots NGOs in the late 1970s. Under Zia, Pakistan’s religious leaders, scholars and politicians consolidated their political legitimacy and strength. More than simply stakeholders in the debate, powerful bodies such as the CII, upon whose support Zia’s legitimacy rested and whose powers he had constitutionally increased, could directly input into national debate, policy and programs (Shah and Cleland, 1993: 199). Many were antipopulation control and family planning and attempted to shut down the national program. In 1984 the CII issued its Report on Population and Planning which it intended to be tabled in Parliament to secure legislation removing the family planning program. In the report, the CII explicitly rejected family planning and population control based on an orthodox interpretation of Hanafi jurisprudence. The CII conceded to individual use under extenuating circumstances, but rejected a policy enforcing family planning as a national norm. It stated: the Prophet (pbuh) [did] not establish justification for exterior ejection without loathing, rather it seems [he] discourage[ed] this … A policy to customize birth control methods on the national level and thus promote obscenity is disliked in Islam and is harmful for society; and prohibited. Nevertheless, at the individual level, if pregnancy or child-birth endangers a woman’s life, she is allowed according to her peculiar conditions. The above quoted Traditions allow birth control practices only in case of necessity, at the individual level, and without loathing. The decrees of scholars in which the adoption of methods for birth control and exterior ejection are allowed pertain to extraordinary individual necessity. But, at the national level, to waste hundreds of millions for customizing birth control methods and thus directly promoting obscenity cannot be justified (CII 1984: 10).

However, despite his personal religious convictions, and his reliance on influential religious groups, Zia chose to ignore this advice by the CII. Instead, he opted for

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population control to secure ongoing international aid; the CII report did not make it to the National Parliament (A. Khan 1996: 40). The Zia bureaucracy continued to evolve the national population program through the ever broadening of its conceptualisation and the continual induction of international norms and paradigms into official thinking. Whilst population may not have been a stated national priority, the attention paid to emerging international trends, program expansion, and increasing budgetary allocation between the Sixth and Seventh Plans suggested that actual commitment was high. Furthermore, it was evident by the late 1980s that issues interrelated to population, particularly those causal to national instability, were combined with official and academic discourse. For example, the Seventh Plan demonstrated a broader conceptualisation of the interrelationship between population growth and socio-economic development that integrated traditional concerns of resource allocation and savings depletion with the effects of malnourishment and poor health on labour force quality and thus capacity. Furthermore, the national Economic Surveys of 1987–88 and 1988– 89, the last of the Zia years, raised concerns about the effects of urbanisation and unemployment as caused by population growth, consistent with international discourse. The 1987–88 Survey cited population growth as the main weakness of its development program, caused by and contributing to development failure. For instance, the urban population was growing rapidly, causing rapid urbanisation and the growth of mega-cities, as demonstrated in Table 6.3. On the urban situation, the 1987–88 Survey stated: The rapid rate of urbanisation has exerted considerable pressure on urban infrastructure and has contributed to urban unemployment problems. The pressure on urban housing conditions is reflected in the growing number of persons per room (from 3.3 in 1960 to 3.5 in 1980) and average size of households (from 5.5 to 7.0) (Finance Division 1987: 79).

In addition, the report cited population growth and momentum as directly causal to Pakistan’s employment pressures, stating that “the high growth rate of the population for more than two decades has started throwing up new entrants in the labour force at a rate that cannot be absorbed at the existing pace of development in the economy” (Finance Division, 1987: xvii). Growing unemployment, as demonstrated in Table 6.3, and associated problems led to the establishment of the Manpower Commission in 1987 with the objective of establishing a long term strategy for dealing with unemployment. The 1988–89 Survey recognised unemployment as potentially destabilising, consistent with international discourse, stating that “Unemployment … is now threatening to disrupt social harmony is under focal view” (Finance Division 1988: xix). The urban population in Pakistan, although smaller than the rural, was growing more rapidly and in addition, the urban unemployed cohort was greater and growing more rapidly than the rural, thus adding to the pressures of urbanisation. Moreover, Pakistani academics joined the debate on population and its detrimental

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Table 6.3

Unemployment figures: total, rural, urban in millions

Unemployment Total Population Rural Urban

1.99 1.83 2.36

3.05 2.5 4.51

3.13 2.6 4.58

3.13 2.6 4.58

impact on and interrelationship with factors identified in international discourse; some couched their arguments in securitised terms. In 1987 Pakistan’s National Institute of Population Studies (NIPS) surveyed the continual impact of population growth on Pakistan’s natural environment. It found that “The facts … presented a sombre picture of the relationship between population growth and socio-economic development in Pakistan and the enormous pressures exerted by rapid population growth”. It further argued: [t]he social, economic and political repercussions of this situation, particularly in the years to come, can at least be called explosive … [it will] exacerbate the major problems faced by urban centres, such as housing shortages, shortage of schools, overcrowding, traffic congestion, slums, shanty towns, inadequate sanitation and conservancy services resulting in the deterioration of the quality of life (Annudin and Farooqui 1987, pp. 8, 18).

Furthermore, Zia’s approval of Dr. Nafis Sadik’s appointment to Executive Director to the UN in 1987 reportedly boosted Pakistan’s image in the global population community, and lent credence to its stated commitment to global population objectives and norms (Khan 1996: 39). A Pakistani national, Sadik joined the UNFPA in 1971, and later served as the Director-General of Pakistan’s Central Family Planning Council which oversaw the development, preparation, and evaluation of the health and family planning programs, thus making her an important contributor to Pakistani population debate and conceptualisation. Through her appointment to the UNFPA Sadik became one the UN’s highest ranking female officials, and the first woman to be appointed head of a major program (http: //www.un.org/events/women/iwd/2003/sadik.html). Conclusion Islam and population have been two of Pakistan’s constants. Islam was the primary rationale for Indian partition and the existence of Pakistan. Intended as a national social unifier, Islam has instead been expediently co-opted by various religious and political groupings to legitimate and consolidate their power at the expense of others. Islam has been foundational to communal and sectarian agitation and as such has served to divide rather than unify Pakistan. On population, Pakistan was

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Figure 6.4

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Pakistan population, total, rural, urban (in millions)

Source: Finance Division Economic Survey 1988–89.

amongst the world’s first countries to identify and adopt population as a national socio-economic objective. The legacy of elite involvement in Indian activities and international debate transcended the partition process and led to the establishment of the FPAP, which then advocated for political involvement in population and family planning. The government conceded with financial provision for family planning granted in the First FYPD (1955–60). Ayub Khan, Pakistan’s first military ruler, took a personal interest in population control as an economic development issue. Under him, Pakistan participated in international debates, advocated for UN involvement, signed key conventions, and inducted international norms into national debate and programs. Ayub granted population, the issue and its national bureaucracy, a high political profile and was demonstrably committed to population-development objectives. He chose however to ignore clerical objections and social realities, pushing on with an ambitious, but eventually unsuccessful family planning program. Ali Bhutto was cautious about stating his commitment to national population goals. PPP supporters had joined religious conservatives in denouncing Ayub Khan, using objections to family planning in their campaign. Because of his desire to distinguish himself from Ayub, Ali Bhutto publicly conceded to religious and popular opinion and chose not to advocate family planning in public. Furthermore, in the post-secession period, the attentions of Ali Bhutto and the PPP was diverted to other more pressing issues, such as dealing with consequences of the failed Two State Policy and in repairing international relations damaged by Pakistan’s actions against Bangladesh. However, the Annual Development Plans demonstrated that population remained on the national agenda, that there was a political commitment to population-development objectives, and that the Pakistani agenda remained informed by international norms and discourse.

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General Zia ul-Haq’s position was a curious one, in that his public denunciation of population control and family planning belied his actual prioritisation of and commitment to established objectives. Zia attempted to appease different factions and balance competing demands through a silent approach to population, where activities and programs progressed but were distanced from Presidential consent. Eventually pragmatism won over ideology with Zia choosing to ignore CII objections to population control and instead conceding to donor demands in the pursuit of international aid. More importantly, it was under Zia that the official conceptualisation of population began to broaden, encompassing new issues and concerns such as environmental, employment and urban impacts, and through which a nascent securitising discourse emerged.

Chapter 7

Islam, Population, Sustainability and Security: The Pakistan Debate 1988–2006 Introduction The death of Zia ul-Haq in 1988 diluted but did not end or undo Pakistan’s orthodox Islamisation. Religio-political parties and figures who had gained prominence and influence under Zia remained present and vocal in national politics. Pakistan’s subsequent leaders, Benazir Bhutto (1988–90/1993–96) Nawaz Sharif (1990– 93/1996–99) and Pervez Musharraf (1999–2008) had to negotiate the boundaries of Muslim politics. Within this context these governments attempted to address national population and sustainable development questions and establish objectives. The purpose of this chapter is to show how population was addressed and whether global norms and discourses were internalised. To answer this, the chapter examines Pakistani debates on population and development since 1988, focusing on the regimes led by Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif and Pervez Musharraf. It will demonstrate the process of inter-subjective re-conceptualisation of population in national discourse, and the internalisation of international discourses and norms, particularly those relating to the population-sustainable development-security paradigms. These leaders inherited the highest regional fertility and growth rates, as demonstrated in Table 7.1. Under the changed political climate post-Zia, population and family planning re-emerged as stated national objectives; stated governmental commitment has steadily increased, resulting in the establishment of Pakistan’s first official National Population Policy in 2002. Actual commitment is much harder to gauge: given the brevity of their periods in government, neither Benazir Bhutto nor Nawaz Sharif had time to realise their population objectives. Pakistan publicly recommitted itself to international population norms, objectives and discourse by endorsing global documents and internalising these through policy, programs and debate. Furthermore, General Musharraf combined stated commitment with societal mobilisation, actively engaging the ulema and the public in debate and devolving the program to enable localised ownership and input. As a result, elite, academic, and expert population perspectives have been re-conceptualised, producing a broader concept, joined with international sustainable development and security discourse. However, the internalisation of international counter debates by a number of Pakistani agents has proven problematic to building a national consensus on population and development.  As discussed in Chapter 2.

Table 7.1

PGR and TFR regional and most populous countries

PGR Asia China South-central Asia India Pakistan South-eastern Asia Indonesia Western Asia

1950–1955 1.91 1.87 2.03 2.00 2.24 1.92 1.69 2.64

1960–1965 2.21 2.07 2.38 2.26 2.69 2.37 2.14 2.73

1970–1975 2.28 2.21 2.35 2.24 2.58 2.44 2.41 2.75

1980–1985 1.88 1.38 2.30 2.17 3.42 2.14 2.06 3.02

1990–1995 1.55 1.10 1.94 1.86 2.68 1.72 1.54 2.26

2000 1.31 0.83 1.67 1.53 2.64 1.43 1.36 2.16

2006 1.1 0.6 1.5 1.4 2.1 1.2 1.1 1.9

TFR Asia China South-central Asia India Pakistan South-eastern Asia Indonesia Western Asia

5.91 6.22 6.08 5.97 6.50 6.03 5.49 6.38

5.62 5.72 6.01 5.81 7.00 5.90 5.42 6.18

5.09 4.86 5.72 5.43 7.00 5.31 5.10 5.57

3.70 2.55 4.92 4.47 6.50 4.18 4.06 4.96

2.85 1.92 3.79 3.56 5.51 3.05 2.90 4.05

2.52 1.82 3.17 2.93 4.76 2.54 2.42 3.63

2.38 1.72 2.97 2.65 3.87 2.37 2.25 3.17

Source: Leete and Alam, 1999, UNFPA State of the World Population 2006.

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Benazir Bhutto 1: December 1988 – August 1990 In November 1988, Benazir Bhutto led the PPP to victory in Pakistan’s first democratic election since 1977. She defeated the Islamic Democratic Alliance (IJI), an amalgamation of religious parties backed by the military and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency (Esposito and Voll 1996). Although the PPP had defeated the Islamists, the need to negotiate the boundaries of religious politics and protest did not diminish. The constitutional amendments introduced by General Zia-ul-Haq had tilted the balance of power in favour of the President. The Prime Minister was to function for the term at the pleasure of the President. Against the background of the military’s direct and indirect role in Pakistan’s politics, the constitutional amendments severely limited the ability of any elected government. Since the PPP failed to secure a parliamentary majority in the 1988 elections, the Benazir Bhutto administration remained inherently weak: It could not afford to provoke protest from its religious or military opponents upon whose disquiet its rule rested. Attempting to shield herself from religio-political protest, Benazir Bhutto avoided actions that challenged General Zia’s political legacy, especially the process of Islamisation. The Hudood Ordinance, for instance, was not repealed or modified. At the same time, Benazir Bhutto found it necessary to prove her personal religious credentials, opting for very public and expedient displays of her religiosity: an arranged marriage and pilgrimage to Mecca (Esposito and Voll 1996: 116). It was against this backdrop that Benazir Bhutto and the PPP had to balance their population-development commitments. The party’s 1988 manifesto stated the party’s commitment to tackling population as well as cognisance of the causative effects of growth to other factors, consistent with international discourse. The PPP recognised population growth as detrimental to national socio-economic development, stating: We will pursue foremost, the achievement of a high and sustained rate of overall economic growth, well in excess of the existing rate of population growth. We will pursue a development strategy which will achieve growth with better utilization of the country’s two main natural resources, manpower and land … (www. ppp.org.pk/manifesto/1988.htm).

In recognition of prevailing global norms, the PPP planned to induct family planning into the health system. Family planning was to be made an effective part of the health care program with more mobile services and rural health centers (www.ppp.org.pk/manifesto/1988.htm). The Population Welfare Program for 1989–1990 stipulated the continuance of the Seventh FYP (1988–1993) guidelines and objectives. However, the shift to increased supply and use of clinical contraceptive methods, which were considered more effective and reliable than client administered ones, suggested that the aim of the program was to improve contraceptive use to enable fertility reduction. In June 1990, the Population Division was elevated to Ministry status, thus removing

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it from the bounds of the Health Ministry. This suggested that the PPP government had assigned higher priority to population issues. Its actual commitment to the issue was also high. In partnership with the World Bank, the Pakistan government was working towards social sector integration – advanced under the global populationdevelopment paradigm – through which population growth would be tackled in conjunction with other interrelated and inter-causal factors such as education, rural development, and public and environmental health, and to increase localised program responsiveness, acceptability and accessibility by training, employing and deploying a projected 33,000 Village Based Health Workers (A. Khan 1996, pp. 41–2; Planning Commission 1989: 42, www.mpow.gov.pk). It was also evident that Pakistani academics and experts were taking note of the global securitised population discourse. For example, the 1990 Pakistan Yearbook cited the findings of a World Bank report which posited national population growth as potentially causal to social and political unrest, arguing the need for urgent attention to fertility and growth to resolve the situation. The Pakistan Yearbook stated: A World Bank study on Pakistan’s rapid population growth rate has suggested that Pakistan must take action to curb the high fertility rate failing which it would become harder to deal with in it in the future … The report observe[d] that the high fertility imposes costs on individuals, families and the society at large. It is time for Pakistan to decide today to deal with the problem as it would become harder to do so in the future (Akhtar 1990: 412–14).

It is difficult to assess whether Benazir Bhutto succeeded or failed on population during this period, given the brevity of her time in power. Her stated commitment to and prioritisation of population control and family planning was demonstrated through the national program’s status elevation, use of societal mobilisation and domestic consistency with global discourse. On 6 August 1990, President Ishaq Khan dissolved the parliament and dismissed Benazir Bhutto on charges of corruption and incompetence (Esposito and Voll 1996: 117), thus cutting short her opportunity, at that time, to implement her population objectives. Nawaz Sharif 1: November 1990 – July 1993 Nawaz Sharif, heading the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) – Jamaat-i-Islami alliance, the Islamic Democratic Alliance (IDA), was elected Prime Minister in October 1990. Sharif found himself bound by the need to appease the concerns of Western donors and Islamic orthodox allies regarding his Islamic credentials. He needed to assure the former he was moderate and the latter of his personal and political commitment to Islam. Sharif found himself negotiating the same religio-political boundaries as Benazir Bhutto. Sharif made legislative, judicial and educational overtures to orthodoxy as Benazir Bhutto but in a different form. This

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included promises of constitutional amendment to consolidate the primacy of Sharia and by financing madrassas from the zakat fund (R Khan 1993, pp. 130–37). In contrast to these overtures, Sharif very publicly proclaimed his commitment to the religiously sensitive issues of population control and family planning. Population control was a stated component of the IDA’s election platform, and Sharif publicly made a plea for population control at a National Population Conference in July 1991 – the first head of government to do so since Ayub Khan (Malik 1992: 29). Furthermore, he appointed Syeda Abida Hussain as his Population Minister and Advisor: A veteran politician and committed to the issue of population control, she made an extensive personal tour of Pakistan to promote and popularise family planning, suggesting governmental commitment to societal mobilisation (Malik 1992: 29). The program under Sharif blended old objectives with new methods. The socio-economic development rationale for control remained, with ambitious targets for PGR reduction from 2.7 per cent to 1.7 per cent per annum. Furthermore, Sharif stated the population-development interrelationship in securitised and urgent terms, arguing that “[i]f the decline in social sectors and the rise in population [were] not rapidly arrested, the very process of economic development could degenerate and lead to social instability and political turmoil” (cited in R. Khan 1993: 134). However, and in keeping with changed international discourse and national demographic data, demonstrated in Table 7.2, the program for fertility reduction shifted to addressing unmet need, which is predicated on the assumption that high fertility is caused when existing societal demand for family planning is not met by service supply (Anon 1997: 6; Cernada and Rob 1992: 51). Thus the national program was readjusted to address structural and social obstacles to family planning by increasing the number of service outlets and operatives (Hakim et al. 1998: 88). In order to mobilise society behind national objectives and instil a national low fertility/small family norm, prominent figures were enlisted to endorse family planning by promoting it as socio-culturally compatible and acceptable, and establish it as a community and family responsibility (Sathar and Casterline 1998: 25; Bhagar, 1999: 3). Moreover, as demonstrated in Table 7.3, the almost doubling of population expenditure from the Seventh to the Eighth FYPD suggested Sharif’s actual commitment to and prioritisation of population objectives. Syeda Hussain reaffirmed Pakistan’s stated commitment to global population and development objectives, regimes and norms. In a 1991 briefing to the UN, Syeda stated that “We see [population control] as part of a new pledge to the world community … Unless we contain our growth rate we will no longer be in a position to improve education, health and other … social development” (cited in Mouat 1991: 12). The Pakistan government continued to merge global discourse to national policy and planning by formally recognising population growth as causal  Translates to alms.   This target was never met, and Pakistan’s population growth rate is, to this day, higher than 2 per cent. www.unfpa.org.

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Table 7.2

15–19 24.7

Unmet need for family planning Pakistan 1990–1991, % age group 20–24 24.4

25–29 27.9

30–34 29

35–39 35.1

40–44 32.4

45–49 17.7

Source: NIPS Pakistan Demographic Health Survey, 1990/1991.

Table 7.3

1st n/a

National spending on population welfare, by FYPD, million rupees 2nd 0.01

3rd 0.14

4th 0.82

5th 0.60

6th 2.36

7th 3.50

8th 11.20

Source: /unpan1.un.org/intradoc.

to a number of other areas of development. Pakistan’s 1992 National Conservation Strategy for the protection of the natural environment identified the integration of population and environmental programs as necessary to national protection objectives (eia.doe.gob/PakistanEnvironmentalIssues). Academics and experts also continued to internalise international discourse, adding to the elite-agent consensus on population as indivisible from the environment and development. In 1991, Qutubbin Aziz, then director of the United Press of Pakistan and board member of the international group Population Communication International (PCI), a key partner in Pakistan’s national program and the process of social motivation and mobilisation, cited population growth as causal to Karachi’s rapid urbanisation and rise as a mega-city. He posited family planning as the best solution to this problem, stating: developmental planning is often upset by an unbridled increase in the city’s population. Therefore, family planning services in Karachi is all the more important, particularly for the large industrial workforce and their families. Similarly, the promotion of social awareness about the demographic and environmental problems and what individuals and communities should do is of immense importance (cited in Aziz 1991: 4).

Religio-political opposition to population control and family planning was reportedly declining at this time: Observers note the presence of mainly token objections. Many of Pakistan’s religio-political groups and figures, having acquired new found political legitimacy and status, were considered unwilling to jeopardise this by publicly criticising family planning and population control for fear of marginalising moderate sectors of the electorate who supported these objectives (Malik 1992: 29).

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Like Benazir Bhutto, the brevity of Sharif’s first government gave it little time to fully implement its population objectives. What was evident at the time was a stated commitment to population, its political prioritisation, and societal and national resource mobilisation in pursuit of stated objectives. Pakistan under Sharif continued to consolidate its international population credentials by internalising global population discourse and objectives. Benazir Bhutto 2: July 1993 – November 1996 Benazir Bhutto was re-elected Prime Minister in July 1993. Her return to power was internationally hailed as Pakistan’s return to moderate Islam which she was considered to embody. However, electoral defeat strengthened the resolve of Pakistan’s religio-political orthodoxy which regrouped post-election, igniting sectarian and ethnic division and violence, the worst of which was incited by the Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM) in Karachi, 1995. Thus Benazir Bhutto consistently found herself caught between competing international and domestic demands for modernism, orthodoxy and ethnic loyalty, having to negotiate these boundaries in the formation of her political identity and agenda. Benazir Bhutto’s public approach to population control and family planning reflected the schizophrenic political environment in which she operated, balancing moderate liberalism and economic pragmatism with conservative religio-cultural sensitivities. On paper, the PPPs 1993 election manifesto reaffirmed the 1988 platform and the party’s commitment to population control. It further demonstrated the PPP’s cognisance of international discourse and norms with a stated aim of internalising these through national policy and programs, attaching a sense of urgency to these objectives. The PPP manifesto stated: Pakistan’s population is increasing at the rate of 3% per annum. At the turn to the century the population of the country will exceed 170 million … PPP aims at bringing the annual population growth rate to below 2% in 10 years. The need to implement a program to achieve this target is urgent and cannot brook any delay (ppp.org.pk/manifesto/1993.htm/manifesto/1993.htm).

The PPP’s stated objective was the implementation of a program geared to mass political and societal mobilisation through the media, private and non-government sectors, greater funding, decentralisation, and full utilisation of existing health facilities. It appeared committed to strengthening the institutional, operational and managerial side of the program, and suggested improving program autonomy and ministerial control and thus prioritisation. Moreover, the PPP manifesto connected population growth to other issues, consistent with international discourse, positing growth as causative to a number of other development problems. For example, the manifesto identified population growth as an obstacle to sustainable development,

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reflecting international discourse emerging out of the 1992 Rio Summit, stating “[a] rising population, rampant poverty, unregulated and indiscriminate economic activity have brought severe stresses on the country’s natural resources...this is prejudicially affecting the quality of life of our present and future generations” (www.ppp.org.pk/manifesto/1993.htm). Engagement and mobilisation of the rural populace and religious and religiopolitical groupings were particularly important because these groups proved most resistant to national objectives and thus the construction of a national consensus on population. Academic conceptions fitted elite and international ones, as demonstrated by authors such as Amalric and Banuri, replicating even the most alarmist international opinions. Their study on rural attitudes towards population growth and environmental degradation demonstrated that national level perceptions of problem and priority had not transpired at the rural level. Governmental projections of the problem in macro level terms coupled with modernisation and a centralised approach to programs had alienated, marginalised and de-responsibilised the rural sector, contributing to locally perceived priorities, such as community survivability, competitive to national level ones. The rural communities they spoke to could not comprehend the need for population control or its link with environmental degradation because the picture this presented did not fit the localised reality (Amalric and Banuri 1995). Moreover, the competition for the national conscience publicly drew religious leaders and religio-political players into the debate through the national media. In 1993 Mehmood Ghazi, an academic at the International Islamic University, Islamabad, whilst conceding to individual and conditional use of family planning, rejected the religious compatibility of a national family planning policy, particularly one founded on a socio-economic rationale. He referenced what was emerging internationally as a conspiratorial and existentialist objection to population growth that was religio-politically appealing. He argued: prohibition relates mainly to efforts on a national level to indiscriminately contain the population … .Muslim scholars do not agree with the popular contention that economic maladies of developing countries are only due to population … there are strong indications that political manoeuvres are behind the campaign in the third world (Asiaweek 27 October 1993: 53).

Benazir Bhutto’s determination to negotiate religious, political and cultural boundaries in pursuit of population control was demonstrated in her participation at the 1994 ICPD, Cairo. Positioning herself between Western liberal and religious orthodox viewpoints she was able to establish herself as a broker for the conference agenda. She demonstrated her perception that global and Pakistani population and development interests were best served by a middle ground approach that accommodated the milieu of disparate cultural, religious, economic development and gender perspectives. Moreover, simply by appearing at Cairo against a context of domestic and global Islamic orthodox protest, Benazir Bhutto demonstrated her

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commitment to and prioritisation of national population-development objectives. Benazir Bhutto was set to withdraw from Cairo fearing conservative opposition. Time magazine reported that the Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, Najmuddin Sheikh, phoned Dr. Nafis Sadik with news to this effect. However on securing Sadik’s assurances that the Cairo debate would be inclusive of all viewpoints, the Pakistan government confirmed Benazir Bhutto’s attendance. Sadik reportedly considered Benazir Bhutto’s presence necessary given the number of high profile delegate withdrawals – Tansu Ciller, Khalida Zia, and President Suharto – and clerical and religio-political protest, as demonstrated in Chapter 2. The presence of a high profile female Muslim at the conference, she believed, would counter these actions and present an image of Islam as moderate on and accommodating of the global population agenda (Time 12 September 1994 [online]). Benazir Bhutto, in her conference opening address, established her position as a moderate Muslim, not an adherent of Western liberal values or religious orthodoxy. She attacked attempts from both sides to dictate the terms of the global agenda at the expense of other view points. She declared: Leaders are not elected to allow a narrow-minded minority to dictate and agenda of backwardness … We must concentrate on what unites us … Our document should seek to promote the objective of planned parenthood, of population control … [It] must not be viewed as a universal social charter seeking to impose adultery abortion, sex education and other matters on individuals, societies and religions who have their own social ethos … Regrettably, the Conference’s document contains serious flaws in striking at the heart of a great many cultural values, in the north and in the south, in the mosque and in the church (UNFPA 2 1994, [online].

Benazir Bhutto’s stated aim was finding a global consensus on population which would enable nationally and globally beneficial international guidelines on programs and co-operation to be established. She argued “[t]he world needs consensus. It does not need a clash of cultures. Where there is no consensus, there will have to be a willing and whole-hearted recognition and acceptance of diversity” (UNFPA 2 1994 [online]). To this end she and the Pakistani delegation were pro-active. They helped broker a solution over controversial references to abortion and sexual freedom and norms in the Draft Program of Action, balancing Western and secular demands for free and unquestionable access to abortion against a blanket rejection from Islamic conservatives. Benazir Bhutto’s opening address reflected on this pre-conference controversy, stating “Islam … except in exceptional circumstances, rejects abortion as a method of population control.” Pakistan agreed to abortion references in the final document if the conception shifted from reproductive rights to safe motherhood and where it was stipulated as conditional and a last resort not an alternative method of family planning (IUNFPA 2 1994, [online]). Pakistan played an important role in shaping abortion references in resultant Program of Action.

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Benazir Bhutto stated her commitment to internalising global population norms, in particular the ICPD agenda. In her address, she stated that Pakistan’s population problem would be best solved by combining family planning and fertility control with sustainable development, reproductive health and female empowerment initiatives (ICPD 2 1994 [online]). This was demonstrated for example by the new VBW scheme launched through the Ministry of Health, to complement and supplement the activities of the existing scheme in the Ministry of Population Welfare; its stated emphasis on child and maternal health in conjunction with family planning and contraceptive supply reflected the ICPD paradigm(Sultan, Cleland and Ali 2002 [online]). Benazir Bhutto’s Cairo address also demonstrated her cognisance of populationsecurity discourse, speaking of population growth as a potential threat to national and global stability and stating the need for urgent action. Her conception of the Pakistan situation suggested she appreciated a securitised conception of population, positing it as causative to a number of nationally detrimental outcomes and behaviours, declaring: “I dream of a Pakistan, of an Asia, of a world not undermined by ethnic divisions brought about by population growth, starvation, crime and anarchy” (ICPD 2 1994 [online]). On the global situation, she stated “we are a planet in crisis, a planet out of control, a planet moving towards catastrophe. The question before us is whether we have the will, the energy, the strength to do something about it” (ICPD 2 1994 [online]). A year later, Benazir Bhutto restated her securitised position at a national ICPD follow up, where she sought to mobilise Pakistani opinion leaders behind national population objectives, urging “parliamentarians and all political parties and all ulema to come forward in this great battle that asks us to save Pakistan from the population bomb which is ticking away” (cited in Asian Forum 1995: 6). Moreover, at Cairo Benazir Bhutto used Islamic language, symbols and jurisprudence to engage religious objectors at home and abroad, demonstrating population control and family planning as religiously compatible objectives. In doing so, she further demonstrated her preference for a moderate approach to religious knowledge and the willingness of Muslim states and societies to cooperate in global objectives. She stated: In Pakistan, our response will doubtless be shaped by our belief in the eternal teachings of Islam. Islam is a dynamic religion committed to human progress … Muslims, with their overriding commitment to knowledge, would have no difficulty with dissemination of information about reproductive health, so long as the modalities remain compatible with their religious and spiritual heritage (UNFPA 2 1994 [online]).

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Nawaz Sharif 2: February 1997 – October 1999 Nawaz was re-elected in 1997, this time solely as the PML-N candidate without a religious coalition. However, Nawaz continued to make expedient Islamic overtures in domestic and foreign policy. For example, following Pakistan’s successful nuclear tests in 1998, and resultant international condemnation, Nawaz played the Muslim card, labelling Pakistan’s weapon an ‘Islamic bomb.’ In doing so he attempted to garner international Islamic support for the program, stir religionationalist support, and send a clear message to India as to the program’s intent. Islam was still important to Sharif’s politics. Although the Sharif government had adopted a predominantly secular sustainable development perspective, overtures to moderate Islam were evident in Pakistan’s address to the ICPD +5. However, on population, there were no demonstrable Islamic overtures and official discourse was evidently secular. The PML-N manifesto demonstrated Sharif and the party’s stated commitment to population control and internalisation of the ICPD framework, stated: Without a healthy nation, there can be neither development nor progress … In the last ten years, due to Social Action Program, initiated by PMLN government, there has been considerable progress in improving the social indicators and controlling the population growth rate … despite frequent change of governments in the 90s. PML-N remains committed to the social sector and will pursue policy of providing quality health care to all citizens whether poor, rural, or urban (www.pmln.org.pk).

To this end, the PML-N proposed efforts to reduce the PGR to 1.5 percent and to tackle infant and maternal health issues through safe motherhood programs. Furthermore, the PML-N manifesto demonstrated its cognisance of international population-security discourse, which was subsequently internalised by the party. The PML-N acknowledged population as socially, environmentally and developmentally detrimental, and spoke of factors such as unemployment in securitised terms, stating “Growing unemployment is posing a serious challenge to the stability and peace of the society” (www.pmlm.org.pk). Population Minister Syeda Hussein added to the securitised official discourse, framing population growth as a threat to national sustainable development and thus existence, and positing it in urgent terms. In 1997 she stated: Our annual growth rate is 2.7%. This is much too high since there is no way of improving health without economic development, and we cannot have economic development if the population resource is bigger than what the natural resource base can afford. If we don’t make the demographic transition in the next decade, we will have a grim future … We have another decade at the very most (cited in JOICP News 1997: 6).

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Moreover, Sharif and Hussain continued to internalise international discourse and norms, even those relating to religion and culture established by Benazir Bhutto at the ICPD. At the ICPD +5 Forum at The Hague in 1999, they reaffirmed, via a national delegate, Pakistan’s commitment to the ICPD agenda, stating: Pakistan has tried to implement the requirements of the ICPD agenda. There is no doubt that the ICPD agenda has influenced shifts in policy, in taking us in new directions, and in broadening the Population agenda. However, we have done so maintaining the voluntary nature of our existing Population Program and within the religious and cultural values that we wish to uphold. In fact, we have adapted the principles of the ICPD within our own social, economic and cultural realities (Emphasis added, Government of Pakistan 1999 [online]).

Sharif’s global commitment was further demonstrated when the Pakistani delegate informed the +5 conference of its intent to implement an official and dedicated Population Development Policy. The policy’s intended objectives were improving quality of life nationally through the reduction of rapid population growth, which would be enabled by reproductive health and female empowerment initiatives, implemented through government – private-non-government – inter-sectoral collaboration. The proposed policy would mobilise government resources by enforcing inter-ministerial collaboration on national population objectives, as covered by their remit, through the prior established Inter-Ministerial Committee on Population and Development, 1997. This committee included the Religious Affairs ministry, signifying that Sharif considered religious engagement as necessary to population efforts. The Pakistani delegate concluded by reconfirming its government’s commitment, but stressed its financial inability, to implement the ICPD agenda. It stated “despite our financial constraints, Pakistan pledges to maintain the momentum of its progress and also to accelerate it. Both Government and civil society have a clearer grasp of the task ahead and therefore there is a stronger will to address our development issues” (Government of Pakistan 1999 [online]). Liberal and conservative media coverage of elite, expert and academic debate increased in the late 1990s. Through this, opinion makers engaged with the public on national population issues and concerns, informing them of international discourse and norms. A number of reports emerged describing Pakistan’s population growth in securitised terms, positing growth as causative to national insecurity and instability via a number of intermediary effects; this discourse was consistent with the global population-sustainability-security paradigm. In 1999, the UNFPA dubbed the growth of the developing world’s youth cohort as a youthquake; sections of the Pakistani media defined this situation where “one billion people worldwide between ages 15 and 24 are entering their peak child-bearing years … [causing] the enormous momentum of population growth through 2050” (News 11 October 1999). Relating this phenomena to Pakistan, the moderate News reported that “around 65 per cent of the country’s total population is under 25 years of age,” with an expected “doubl(ing) in the next 35 years” under conditions of “growing poverty, rising unemployment

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and increasing resources constraint the mounting pressure poses a serious challenge” the mismanagement of which “can lead to instability and undesired consequences such as anarchy” (News 11 October 1999). News journalists consistently reported Pakistan’s population situation in securitised, existential terms embedded with a sense of urgency and the need for societal engagement, debate and mobilisation. For example, under the explicit headline The Population Bomb is Ticking, News posited population growth as potentially causative to societal and national instability, stating: The population growth rate is closely associated with illiteracy, poverty, malnutrition and political and social instability. The increasing pressure in terms of employment opportunities, health facilities, transport needs and agricultural land availability is an outcome of exploding population (News 8 August 1999).

In a later report, News journalists melded physical and normative dimensions to their securitised population-sustainability discourse, positing these as existentially threatened without immediate remedial action, and taking aim at orthodox Islamists as obstacles to national resolve, arguing that: the most dangerous element, which threatens to destroy the very fabric of the society, is the ever increasing population … Everything that must be done should have been done yesterday. Tomorrow it will be more costly. Time is the most important variable in the equation of the future … The special features of this historical epoch and its societies must be analysed carefully so that Muslim scholars and leaders do not lend support to policies which, in the final analysis, turn out to be contrary to the Islamic spirit or to public interest (News 8 November 1999).

General Pervez Musharraf (1999–2008) General Pervez Musharraf came to power in a bloodless coup in 1999, serving as President until his forced resignation in 2008. Because of his anti-democratic rise, and subsequent criticism to this effect, Musharraf sought to assuage concerns by establishing himself, publicly, domestically and globally as a nationalist and moderate. Post 9/11, General Musharraf attempted to rebuild Pakistan’s international credibility by taking a tougher stance on religious extremism, cooperating in the global War on Terror. Co-operation with President Bush came replete with a substantial financial aid package and the promise to remove international sanctions. General Musharraf’s expressed intolerance for Islamic fundamentalism culminated in public statements as to his desire to remove extremists from Pakistani soil. However, Islamist parties such as the Jamaat-iIslami won seats in the national and provincial parliaments thus finding themselves at the front and centre of national politics, contrary to Musharraf’s anti Islamist

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objective. Because of this, Musharraf’s anti-Islamist objective remained stated rather than actual. This is the religio-political context in which the Musharraf period debate has taken place. It forced Musharraf to de-secularise his modernist agenda and embed it in moderate Islamic discourse. The Pre-Policy Debate: 1999–2002 On population, Musharraf reiterated the Pakistan government’s commitment to the global population agenda, evident in statements demonstrating the internalisation of international norms and discourse, and through actions and programs designed to meet the standards and objectives of global regimes. This was evident in statements by Ejaz Rahim in March 2000, as Pakistan’s delegate to the UN Commission on Population and Development. He urged renewed global efforts to fulfil reproductive health and rights, and female empowerment obligations, stating: [v]isions alone would not carry the way forward. That required an investment and implementation of programs. Efforts must be intensified to meet the targets envisaged by Cairo. Partners for human development must expand and strengthen their actions to retain the momentum of joint endeavours (UN 2000 [online]).

Musharraf demonstrated his commitment to female empowerment in line with ICPD guidelines by establishing the National Commission on Women’s Status (NCSW) in 2000. The NCSWs stated aim was the “emancipation of women, equalisation of opportunities and socio-economic conditions amongst women and men and elimination of all sorts of discriminations amongst women” (www. ncsw.gov.pk). Moreover, Musharraf’s domestically publicised World Population Day 2000 statement confirmed that the official conception of population was a securitised one built on the elite discourse of his political predecessors. He projected this into the public sphere, stating “there is no room for complacency. We must address this issue on a war footing” (Dawn 12 July 2000). From the start, the Musharraf government recognised societal mobilisation as critical to the success of national population-development goals, committing itself to societal engagement via the media and other fora (Nation 8 December 1999; News 8 August 1999, Dr Kausuri). A 2001 FPAP report confirmed this assessment, arguing that the failure of past governments to consult with all societal sectors had negatively affected fertility and population objectives but that this could be remedied by greater inter-sectoral engagement (FPAP 2001: 17). Academics and experts identified the public and religious groups as most vital to this process, arguing that prior failures to engage them had resulted in misplaced policies and mismatched objectives. For example, on the small family norm,   Personally interviewed at the Alama Iqbal Open University, Islamabad, 7 August 2002.

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demographer and a former government population official, Dr Jillani, argued that the government’s failure to clearly conceptualise and communicate its two child preference created societal confusion which worked counter to rising contraceptive prevalence and knowledge. In a 2001 editorial he stated “We have attained almost universal awareness of family planning as an instrument of checking population growth. But the ratio of population that is convinced of having a small family, or those practising family planning, remain very low. The crusade for small families must therefore continue” (News 30 August 2001). In stating mobilisation in crusade terms, Jillani confirmed Musharraf’s securitised conception. On the necessity of religious engagement, the elite, academics and public were essentially agreed, evident in the public debate played out in the print media. For example, a number of letters to the editor appearing in Dawn in 2000 urged the government to examine how other Muslim states had engaged their ulema. One letter stated “It would be worthwhile for our Ministry of Religious Affairs to find out how the Iranian government convinced their clerics to extend a helping hand in family planning” (Dawn 16 February 2000). Another argued: Other Muslim countries … have effective population planning programs; they see no conflict between family planning and the teachings of Islam … Unless and until the government can bring the mullahs into the fold, and make them active partners in propagating the need for sensible population programs, all efforts to slow down demographic growth will end in failure, while the population will continue to grow uncontrolled (Khan, S. 2000).

A 2001 FPAP report similarly found that failure to address orthodox objections in the past had caused Pakistan to fall behind other developing and Muslim countries, such as Iran and Indonesia, who had successfully tackled their own population problems with clerical assistance (FPAP 2001: 5–7). The conservative press weighed into the debate offering pro and anti-natalist religious perspectives. For example, in 2002 the Nation published an editorial criticising the religio-political oppositions uncritical adherence to Maududi’s Birth Control, in which he labelled the family planning proponents the “pupils of Satan,” contrary to the conditionally pro-natalist stance of Hanafi fiqh (Nation 24 May 2002). Furthermore, academic critics pointed to the manifestation of religious opposition within the government, particularly from within the Ministry of Religious Affairs and CII, as problematic to the population agenda and its societal acceptance. Moderate Muslim scholar Professor Rafi Ullah Shehab, for example, argued: Such support by government officials to the anti-population planning campaign started by the half educated ulema, has disturbed the peace of mind of many countrymen. They are at a loss to know why the government is spending billions   Personally interviewed at his home in Islamabad, 8 August 2002.

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In a 2002 editorial Professor Shehab explicitly referred to population growth in securitised terms, thus establishing the receptivity of some Islamic agents to this perspective. He argued: The population explosion has become a serious issue in today’s world. It is as serious as the threat of atomic war … In this respect it is rightly argued that while there is no chance of the explosion of an atom bomb anywhere in the world, the population bomb has already exploded in a large number of developing countries, including Pakistan (News 10 March 2002).

The media debate from 2000 until the policy launch in 2002, demonstrated consistent and continuous internalisation of international discourse by external agencies, such as the UNFPA, academics, experts and commentators, merging global findings to the Pakistan situation. Moreover they often couched their arguments in securitised terms, assigning prime causality to population growth. These shifting and expanded conceptions of population carried to the public sphere via the media. The concurrent themes running through this debate were: obstacles to sustainable development, environmental degradation, the effects of momentum and the growing youth cohort, and unemployment, caused by population growth and causal to societal and political instability. At the FPAP’s January 2000 conference, Facing Population Challenges of the New Millennium, participants concluded “all other socio-economic problems are the offshoot of the single, gravest problem of uncontrolled population growth; and tackling it is tantamount to minimising all others” and that “underemployment in rural areas, stagnating per capita income, criminalisation of society, collapse of national values and ethics were but a few ramifications of the[population] problem” (Dawn 2 January 2000). On World Population Day 2000, News argued “Crime, the collapse of social order and multiplying poverty cannot be controlled without dragging down the birth rate over a long period of time” (News 11 July 2000). On population growth as causative to poverty, societal dissatisfaction and destabilisation, the News argued “economic and social betterment will be constrained by excessive population pressure and unless effective means are found for checking population growth the ‘revolution of rising expectations’ must remain unfulfilled” (News 21 December 2001). On the youth situation, established in public discourse in 1999 as a ‘youthquake,’ the FPAP predicted in 2001 that Pakistan would be trapped in a vicious circle of momentum and rising expectations and demand on services which, if left unmet, could potentially end in violence (FPAP, 2001: 9). On momentum, News cited the then President of the Pakistan Medical Association, Dr Yasmin Rashid’s prediction of an inevitable baby boom, arguing: “ [a] little over half the country’s population of 140 million is under the age of 20 … [t]here is too much momentum and, at present, we are already too many in the country” (News 16 April 2001). Then

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UNFPA Pakistan country chief, Olivier Brasseur, further identified Pakistan’s large youth cohort as a potential source of instability. He argued that if the government failed to address its needs and expectations the “[l]ack of opportunities for employment and education may expose the country’s youth to a hard time trying to discover the very purpose of their lives. They will be unstable, vulnerable and a potential threat for civil peace and national security” (News 1 November 2001). The Nation also projected the youth question in securitised terms, reporting: “The country is facing unrest and political disturbances due to rising poverty and fast growing population. Increase in crime rate is certain when young generation will not find jobs and deny basic necessities of life” (Nation 5 November 2001). Although the population-environment interrelationship was projected in less alarming terms, the debate nonetheless suggested cognisance, internalisation, and public projection of population as causative to national environmental problems. Building on an established elite conceptualisation, the media carried the debate to the public domain; for example, a 2000 Nation editorial stated: “Population, resources and the environment are interlinked with each other through mutually dependent systems … Basically, the environmental and natural resources problems are caused by human activities often arising from the needs of growing population” (Nation 8 December 2000). The Nation furthered this discourse in a 2001 editorial on population growth’s causative effect to the degradation of the urban and natural environment, and of this as potentially life threatening. This editorial stated that population growth was causal to “unsatisfactory water, sanitation and housing facilities. Due to inadequate food supply and unhygienic conditions, people are suffering from diseases” (Nation 5 November 2001). In a 2002 editorial, Dr Jennifer Bennett of the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) expanded the public discourse on Pakistan’s population growth as causative to its environmental degradation, by demonstrating growth as causal to a number of interconnected problems. She argued that growth caused rapid urbanisation, leading to arable land reclamation, the displacement of the rural populace and forced urban migration, resulting in reclamation of land for resettlement and cultivation. Furthermore, growth increased food demand resulting in intensified farming practices, such as continuous farming and the use of chemical fertilisers, which erode soil and soil quality, undermining long term productivity (Balochistan Times 21 February 2002). Academic and religious counter-debates emerged concurrent with the above. The former, like its global counterpart, critiqued the intellectual rigour and logical foundations of the socio-economic rationale for population control. The latter questioned its religious compatibility and raised perceived suspicions of ulterior motives. For example, economist Shaved Burki critiqued the conceptualisation of a large youth cohort as problematic, arguing that with proper political management and social investment this group stood as a national economic asset, stating that this potential “productive asset … could contribute significantly to economic growth, improvement in income distribution and poverty alleviation” (Dawn 31 July 2001). Burki was further critical of the Pakistan governments uncritical adoption of what

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he considered a global agenda predicated on a flawed economic paradigm. This, he argued, had produced “a point of view which looked at a country’s population as a burden and not as an asset. They didn’t see it as a resource waiting to be developed and exploited for its own benefit and for the benefit of the whole economy” (Dawn 31 July 2001). To the contrary, Burki argued that proper investment would place Pakistan in a position to economically exploit its global demographic advantage vis-à-vis the rapidly aging West. The shrinking of the developed world’s youth cohort would mean: the demand for skilled labour will outpace their domestic supply. Once that happens enormous benefits will accrue to the developing world as they get to exploit their large and young populations to penetrate the rich and large markets of the richer parts of the globe. In sum, there are some extraordinary opportunities waiting to be exploited in the industrial world. We should take advantage of them (Dawn 31 July 2001).

The second critique emerging primarily from Pakistan’s religio-political establishment pointed to a sinister global agenda perpetrated against the developing and Islamic worlds by the non-Muslim/developed one. This discourse revived anti-imperialist and post-colonialist arguments premised on racial, religious and civilisational themes. For example, in a 2000 Frontier Post editorial, author and commentator Abid Ullah Jan suggested that Western population discourses and agendas were predicated on racist and eugenicist objectives. He argued that the emphasis on developing world populations as a global burden demonstrated “a new, sanitised way of talking about ‘the white man’s burden.’ People of European descent (or at least their governments) feel ‘burdened’ by people of the developing world, and therefore would wish the earth to carry fewer of them” (Frontier Post 9 March 2000). Moreover Jan criticised the population securityparadigm as hypocritical, questioning the emphasis of developing world growth as causal to global instability. He attempted to deconstruct the paradigm’s logic by exposing the economic demand explanation for crime and conflict as false and hypocritical given “[t]he number of serious crimes reported compared to total population in Shreveport, Louisiana, US, with 200,000 people, for instance, is immensely higher that it is in Cairo, Egypt with 20 million people” (Frontier Post 9 March 2000). The real, yet un-stated, developed world concern was, he argued, essentially a geo-strategic one, predicated on the fear of eroded Western strategic advantages, where “[i]ts (potential military manpower) explains the eagerness of densely populated western countries to encourage births at home, while demanding at the very same time to take outrageous steps to prevent fertility in the developing world to avoid a shift in the balance of power at some time in the future” (Frontier Post 9 March 2000).

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Pakistan’s First Population Policy 2002: Formalising the Musharraf Agenda General Musharraf and his (re) appointed Population Minister Attiya Inayatullah launched Pakistan’s first official Population Policy in July 2002. The policy was the government’s population conception formalised. It was predicated on the perception of population growth as detrimental to sustainable development remedied via an integrated governmental program incorporating reproductive, child and maternal health, and female empowerment. The ultimate goal was societal uplift, consistent with the global ICPD and MDG agendas. The policy not only formalised Pakistan’s commitment to the international agenda, it suggested that the Musharraf government was committed to the political prioritisation of population and development. It proclaimed the government’s intent for societal mobilisation behind national objectives and to instil population and fertility control as national norms, stating “Pakistan still has an unacceptably high rate of population growth compared to other developing countries. Therefore the Government of Pakistan is attaching the highest priority to the lowering of the population growth rate (Government of Pakistan 2 2002). The primary policy objective was to achieve “population stabilisation by the year 2020 through the expeditious completion of the demographic transition that entails declines both in fertility and mortality rates.” It envisaged a structural and administrative overhaul to improve the program’s efficiency and effectiveness as the key to fertility and momentum control. The plan included inter-sector coordination and co-operation, devolution to the provincial level and societal education and mobilisation (Government of Pakistan 2002). The Policy’s consistency with the ICPD sustainable development paradigm further demonstrated government commitment to global norms and objectives, The Pakistan government interpreted this as: each country brings into balance its resources with population through a policy, which is in accordance with its own social, cultural, religious and political realities. This Population Policy is designed to achieve social and economic revival by curbing rapid population growth and thereby reducing its adverse consequences for development (Government of Pakistan 2 2002).

Further consistencies with the ICPD agenda were evident in the strategies designed to enhance inter-ministerial, inter-sectoral and inter-agency partnerships and collaborations, in recognition of the globally endorsed ‘whole of society’ approach. Sustainable development planning and programs would be dovetailed with population programs and objectives. To this end the policy proposed expanded private and NGO service provision and administrative devolution, giving provincial and district authorities and agents greater ownership of localised program implementation and thus making the policy more sensitised to localised needs and concerns (Government of Pakistan 2 2002). The ICPD agenda was further joined through the “adopted shift from a target-oriented to people-centred

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needs and services” in recognition of the ICPD’s human centred, rather than demographic and economic, philosophy. The Policy and its predecessor, the Interim Population Sector Perspective Plan 2012 (IPSPP), demonstrated the government’s commitment to and prioritisation of population. These documents presented a securitised conception of security by conveying a perceived sense of urgency and expressing a desire for societal mobilisation Moreover, these documents demonstrated internalisation of international discourse through the inclusion of key concepts, themes and conclusions: development and poverty; youth; environment; and the small family norm as part of a beyond family planning approach. Presidential and Ministerial statements in the IPSPP formalised the securitised notion of population. Dr Inayatullah explicitly stated the situation as a national disaster, linking her explanation to international discourse by stating that “much of humanity remains caught in a vicious cycle of poverty, ill health and lack of opportunity. Pakistan is squarely in this disaster category. The coexistence of these divergent demographic and social trends makes this a crucial moment of decision about our future” (Government of Pakistan 2002, p. iii). To this, Musharraf added a sense of urgency and, in revisiting his war footing rhetoric, likened population to traditional security threats, stating “there is no room for complacency: to make up for lost time we must address the issue on a war footing” (Government of Pakistan 1 2002; cover). Furthermore, the plan explicitly stated the situation in security terms and in doing so designated Pakistan – state, nation, and society – as referents. It stated “[p]opulation concerns are central in the search for a nation’s stability, be it in the context of economic growth, individual quality of life, poverty alleviation, employment or social harmony” (Government of Pakistan 1 2002: 21). The policy recognised societal mobilisation and engagement as critical to achieving national population objectives. To this end, it proposed a multilayered communication strategy which would “convey the macro and micro effects of runaway population growth” by “engaging change agents to communicate on the impact … on the lives of the individual, family and communities.” It envisioned whole of society engagement with, involvement in and responsibility for national population objectives. It identified “public and various influential groups … public representatives … policy/decision makers … opinion leaders … men … youth and adolescents … medical professions … organised sector … intelligentsia/influential groups” as key targets for communication. The strategy took cognisance of the primary obstacles to effective communication – education and religio-cultural mores – tailoring the program to ensure coverage of “those who being illiterate lack knowledge or have inhibitions to practice family planning … to address prevalent fears about contraception and misconceptions … change beliefs and the value system … to reduce fertility to replacement levels” The proposed interpersonal communication and mass education tactics were multi-sectoral, utilising local

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health centres, Lady Health Workers (LHW) and private and government print, radio, and television media, primary, secondary and tertiary education. The program was designed to reach all Pakistanis, young and old, literate and illiterate to mobilise them behind the government’s population objective. Joined with this was a beyond family planning strategy, consistent with the ICPD agenda, that merged traditional fertility control measures with programs to change fertility norms through the propagation of the globally endorsed two child small family norm. This approach was designed to fulfil the policy’s stated goal of “reduce[d] fertility through enhanced voluntary contraceptive adoption to replacement level 2.1 births per woman by 2020.” The policy also addressed the problem of momentum, stating “[t]he adolescent population … as it enters into its reproductive years … constitutes population momentum in the future that has serious implications for provision of schooling, health services, and other basic amenities of life”, and that the dilution of impact required the two child norm to be instilled at the societal level (Government of Pakistan 2002). Furthermore, the policy revived environmental concerns, though less dramatically than they had been presented in prior academic and public discourse. It acknowledged the interrelationship between growth and degradation, positing the former as causal to the latter, stating “rapid population growth contributes to environmental degradation and depletion of natural resources” (Government of Pakistan 2002). The policy resolved to mainstream population into development plans to “promote justice and address poverty through socio-economic development in the context of migration, urbanisation, environment and sustainable growth” (Government of Pakistan 2002). The 2002 Population Policy institutionalised the government’s cognisance of international discourse and the securitised conception of population growth. The Population Policy 2002 codified an elite conception of population informed by international discourse and which demonstrated elite level securitisation. Furthermore, the emphasis on societal mobilisation and engagement suggested the government was attempting to build a national consensus on its conception and objectives. Personal interviews conducted in 2002, news articles and official reports and documents from the private and non-government sectors provide insight into the public debate and give a sense of public affirmation or rejection of the projected official conception. This is the focus of the following discussion, with reference to the concepts and conclusions identified above. Population Growth and Development: A Negative Relationship? Secular and non-secular agents in Pakistan agreed that population growth and development are interrelated; on this there is consensus. However, as to the   Groups such as Population Communication International and Key Social Marketing produce pamphlets, audio-cassettes, television programs and radio broadcasts to promote population issues and the small family norm (Hakim, Ahmed).

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nature of the relationship and causative effects there is division. Some adhere to the dominant, negative socio-economic paradigm. Others reject this in favour of the emerging global development and/or conspiratorial geo-strategic critiques. Adherents to the negative perspective were primarily academics and experts in the fields of health, demography and economics. They agreed on the detrimental macro effects of Pakistan’s population growth and the need for control. Their access to the public, primarily via the media, health outlets and educational institutions, made them important communicators of national objectives. For example, on World Population Day 2002, Dr Jillani wrote for the Jang media group – which publishes in Urdu and English – “within a national plan for development – or say, for stability – one has to place population at the centre of things … Out of all the variables involved, a consistent decline in population is the best bet to correct the balance” (News 11 July 2002), thus projecting a negative conception of the population-development relationship and the necessity of population control into the public domain. Other experts interviewed such as Sarah Javeed, and NGO field researcher, Dr Javed, ex government population advisor, Dr Naushin Mahmood of the PIDE, and Dr Tauseef Ahmed10 of the World Bank, concurred that the economic pressures of population size and growth were detrimental to national development, had caused negative social behaviours, and could potentially cause societal and political destabilisation. They identified population growth as causative to resource overburden, lower national savings due to import reliance, increased poverty due to lack of, and pressure on social welfare infrastructure such as public health, education and housing. Unmet needs and expectations, they argued, was causing exploitation, discontent and disaffection which, if left unaddressed, could cause societal and political instability. For example, Mahmood stated: We are still analysing the impact of population growth on development, so the full extent of the situation is unknown. In the context of employment, we know that unemployment is forcing urban to rural migration, and that a situation of discontent, disaffection, and exploitation is arising. Poverty is on the rise, and this has a negative impact overall. Slum development is one side affect, and this is detrimental to the environment. The weak economic base is coupled with a weak social and moral base, and this has led to an increase in crime fuelled by want (interviewed 2002).

Javeed argued that in an ideal situation “resources should be managed to match the growth rate.” However she conceded, and concurred with her counterparts, that this approach was currently infeasible in Pakistan because the state of the population  Personally interviewed at her home in Islamabad, 13 August 2002.   Personally interviewed in Islamabad, 8 August 2002.   Personally interviewed at the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad, 8 August 2002. 10  Personally interviewed at the World Bank offices, Islamabad, 8 August 2002.

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resource imbalance was such that for the present the focus must necessarily be on population control. There were two streams of counter debate in Pakistan. The first, arising primarily from secular and non-secular academics, critiqued the validity of the underlying development rationale and official overemphasis on population as cause and cure. One academic at the SDPI critiqued the intellectual validity of dominant international and national discourse in the context of what was identified as an emerging global post-development debate which identifies development as a failed panacea. Further, this counter debate criticises donor cooption of academic debate to legitimate ineffective agendas and the uncritical acceptance of donor altruism. This person’s criticism of Pakistani debate was that the apparent uncritical acceptance of growth as problematic and overemphasis on control as a solution. Their colleague, Dr Jennifer Bennett argued this point publicly, critiquing the emphasis on growth and control to the exclusion of other factors, stating: to say that population per se is the sole problem to the socio-economic and political situation the country faces today is shying away from the core issues … The real issues to grapple with are: redistribution of resources, human development, equity and equality across the board, the right to equal opportunities and informed choices … Attaining these … will take its natural course of managing the population (Dawn 12 June 2002).

Dr Rahman11 of the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) reflected Islamic viewpoints but couched them in neo-Marxist terms, pointing to exploitation and manipulation as inherent to Western and donor agendas. He critiqued Pakistan and the developed world’s uncritical political faith in donors who exploit and manipulate their financial need in pursuit of self serving initiatives. He identified the Western driven ‘one world’ development philosophy and the global ‘democratisation’ agenda as hypocritical, stating both are “contradicted by differing population standards and expectations for the developed and developing world, evident in value laden discourse, and their imposition to the exclusion of indigenous alternatives; a process donors have willingly legitimated and instituted” (interview, 2002). He further critiqued perceived external financial coercion through fertility and population control conditions in overall development aid. In Pakistan, this, in a context of governmental inconsistency, corruption and confusion had enabled “international interests to prevail, diverting funds into unsuitable control programs at the expense of genuine poverty alleviation which would have fulfilled the same population objectives.” Rahman further criticised overemphasis on population control as the development panacea, in national and international discourse, as “a political smokescreen and policy of blatant misinformation,” which shifted blame from global and domestic economic and political mismanagement and inequity, the real causes of poverty and underdevelopment, to unconstrained fertility amongst 11  Personally interviewed at the IPS, Islamabad, 19 August 2002.

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the poor. The national development solution, Rahman argued, was greater social investment in Pakistan’s potential asset, its people. Family planning, he argued should be a personal choice enabled by the government through service provision and access to information on all viewpoints – pro and anti – which would enable free, independent and informed user choice. Orthodox religious and religio-political groups, couching their arguments in secular and religious terms, have likewise criticised the socio-economic rationale for and justification of population control, and its overemphasis at the expense of other policy options. Professor Zaman12 of the CII acknowledged the socioeconomic anti-natalist argument as “the almost unanimous position of economists and it cuts across political ideology, with China being an example.” He argued that “economic and population expansion can successfully coexist when growth levels are relatively harmonious” but the challenge, and therefore solution, lies in maintaining a balance through good management practices, rather than population growth and fertility control, adding “family planning should not receive greater funding than investment in human resources such as education and health. There needs to be more equity in the distribution of government financial resources.” Hafiz Hussein Ahmad, former Secretary General of the MMA13 has linked socio-economic and Islamic discourses in his critique, arguing that the Pakistan government’s adoption of the Western economic rationale was contrary to God’s providence. He added that the historical failure of the family planning program suggested that national development objectives would be better served by redirecting money and resources into genuine poverty alleviation programs rather than into fertility control. Moreover, Zaman and Hafiz, whilst condoning the individual and conditional use of family planning, rejected compulsive and coercive fertility and family limitation policies and objectives, stating its antithesis to Islamic morals, ethics and jurisprudence. Zaman was further critical of a perceived bias in the government’s campaign. He argued that over-statement of population as problematic amounted to anti-natalist propaganda serving to restrict informed individual fertility decision making by enforcing the government’s perspective as the norm. He questioned the religio-cultural suitability of a communication strategy that was uncensored and sexually explicit rather than informative. Population Growth: A National Crisis, a National Threat? In a seemingly uncritical manner, the national media has been primarily responsible for publicising the crisis discourse in the form of articles and editorials highlighting the detrimental effects of population growth, seeking to mobilise and engage the populace with national objectives. Immediately following the 2002 policy launch the News reported growth as critical to national survival, arguing “[a]t the current 12  Personally interviewed at the CII, Islamabad in 22 August 2002. 13  Interviewed in Islamabad in August 2002.

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population growth rate, there can never be enough of anything – food, clothing, shelter, health care, education, security, justice – for the people, particularly the increasing number of the poor. That is why population control is a survival issue” (News 13 July 2002). Political and societal instability were the preferred themes of the Business Recorder which argued “with the highest population density in the region, Pakistan has remained dangerously exposed to a serious erosion of civic amenities, adding to the mounting predicament of the disillusioned people year after year” (Business Recorder 12 July 2002). Further, joined to public discourse were the heightened references of the global securitised paradigm. For example, the media reported the emotive conclusions drawn at World Population Day 2002 conferences, revisiting the bomb, explosion and threat analogies. The Business Recorder reported “any substantial reduction is unlikely to take place before the dreaded population explosion takes us, by blowing up the entire socio-economic scheme of things in, at least, developing countries like Pakistan” (Business Recorder, 12 July 2002). Reports in Dawn connected the threat analogy with nationalistic and historic symbols through implicit comparisons to the situation vis-à-vis India, stating “[t]hey [experts] said that if serious efforts were not made and the population growth was not brought under control soon, the threat posed was greater than any external threats as it would eventually cripple the economy of the country” (Dawn 12 July 2002). Academic opinions on the crisis/threat conception were largely sceptical, even critical, of governmental intent in the choice of threat and crisis rhetoric, and its utility to national population objectives. Most academics and experts interviewed argued that the population situation was indeed a crisis, and possibly a threat, but were uncertain whether this could or would translate beyond the educated elite. Drs Ahmed, Jillani, Kausuri, demographers Dr Rukhshana Masood,14 of the Alama Iqbal Open University (AIOU), Dr Zeba Sathar,15 of the Population Council, and Dr Abdul Hakim16 of NIPS, and Dr Assai17 of the WHO, argued that whilst the ‘crisis’ message had infiltrated non-governmental thinking and was worthy of public communication, it remained the province of a small elite, contradicted and undermined by poor communication, conceptualisation, administration and public political scepticism. Presidential and Ministerial18 rhetoric had been undermined by lack of commitment, evident in the failure to engage key stakeholders in population planning and programs. Ahmed and Assai pointed to administrative failures as belying governmental intent, arguing that the stated commitment to the crisis had failed to translate into necessary ministerial and non-governmental coordination and engagement. Failure to explain the threat and crisis messages beyond the Presidential and population bureaucracies was caused by failed inter14  Personally interviewed at the AIOU, Islamabad, 7 August 2002. 15  Personally interviewed at the Population Council, Islamabad, 5 August 2002. 16  Personally Interviewed at the NIPS, Islamabad, 31 July 2002. 17  Personally interviewed at the MoHME, Tehran, 21 July 2002. 18 Citing Dr Nasheem Ashraf, then Minister of State, as a proponent of this view.

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ministerial communication. Moreover, Ahmed argued that the government itself had failed to clarify this concept and possibly did not itself understand it, stating there was “no national standard regarding small, large and optimum population size, or on the meaning and implication of population pressure, which works against the development of national population norms and effective policies and programs” (interview 2002). Hakim, Sathar, and Jillani, questioned whether the message in its ‘crisis’ form would have the desired effect of societal mobilisation. They argued that although national and provincial officials and experts could comprehend it, the pre-policy discourse emphasised macro level impacts, engaging concepts alien to the wider populace. They suggested that simplifying, specifying and localising discourse and concerns would enable societal acceptance of the crisis concept. For example, Sathar stated that there was: a disparity between the public speeches and desires and needs at the district and community level. Many people view the national position with suspicion and distrust. The federal government is seen as having failed in its governing duties; the atmosphere of mismanagement that surrounds the government has created popular distrust. The perception of good versus bad governance has impact[ed] on social action. Because of this [public] perception the sense of threat that the government projects will not translate into action (interview 2002).

Moreover, many critiqued the perceived discrepancy between stated and actual prioritisation and commitment evident in the gap between statement and action. In July 2002 the News argued that continual governmental inaction belied the stated prioritisation of population, reporting: With half of Pakistan’s population under 25 years of age, the country could drown in its own staggering numbers of the procreant potential if its youth is not checked significantly. That is why population control is a survival issue. Yet, successive governments have ignored the challenge altogether or paid lip service to it without mustering the will to create and back an efficient organisational network for community awareness and facilitation (News 13 July 2002).

Ahmed, Kausuri and Dr Rahkshinda Perveen,19 of the population NGO SACHET, argued that governmental language and imagery of prioritisation was not matched with commensurate or tangible action, pointing to the paucity of bureaucratic organisation and expertise and lack of ministerial will as evidence. A similar assessment was made and publicised in 2002 by the Balochistan Times which illustrated the discrepancy between stated and fiscal prioritisation, stating “[o]ut of every 100 rupees, Pakistan spends 38 on defence, 48 on debt retirement and the rest [sic] 14 are spent on all remaining issues. The development sector gets only 19  Personally interviewed at the SACHET office, Islamabad, 7 August 2002.

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2 rupees. This ratio is negligible and is not going to solve our problems. Pakistan will fail to address its social problems if it walked at the present pace” (Balochistan Times 2002). If population is analogous to other security threats as the government claimed, then it should, they argued, receive equal funding commensurate with its priority status. Instead defence and traditional security were the actual national priorities, preferenced over social issues, evidenced by national spending. A 2002 Nation editorial connected this assessment to public discourse, acknowledging the threat perspective but questioning actual governmental commitment, stating “[t]he ticking population bomb needs to be defused through genuine commitment and dedicated effort. There has been an unfortunate tendency in Pakistan to project ‘paper plans’ as achievements of the government of the day … Seminars in five star hotels cannot substitute for solid work on the ground” (Nation 15 July 2002). Secular and non-secular academics such as Mahmood, Rahman, and Burki also rejected a threat/crisis conceptualised simply in terms of population growth and control. Mahmood, for example, argued that “There is no population crisis; there is a crisis of need.” Expert and official extremism and narrow mindedness, and socio-economic mismanagement had caused a different crisis, one where “people do not experience the benefits of wealth and development” which the government had failed to redress and by emphasising growth and control as cause and solution had attempted to absolve official responsibility, stating “Pakistan has the necessary resources, but not the management skills needed to address the problem.” Equitable resource access and management practices, she argued, would enable basic needs to be met, improve societal wellbeing and quality of life, and create the conditions for freely chosen fertility and population control. Ahmed argued that past rhetorical forms were easily discredited by employment, growth and fertility statistics demonstrating steady declines and therefore crisis aversion. The emotive political arguments of religious and conservative groups pointing to political mismanagement as the true source of the threat also undermined it. Indeed this had been the tactic of religious and conservative groups who, with the aid of the conservative media, had discredited the threat/crisis conception pointing to government failure and, tapping into global religious discourse, suggesting population control as a global, anti-Islamic conspiracy. For example, in 2002 the Nation gave voice to global Islamist arguments, citing the pro-natalist, anti-Western critique of Islamic resistance group Hizbut Tehrir. This group, citing Nixon’s NSSM 200 as evidence, alleged that the real objective of international population control was geo-strategic, stating the “control the birth rate in several Muslim countries, including Pakistan, using the United Nations, World Bank, and World Health Organisation” was part of a wider “American conspiracy to prevent Muslims from becoming a global power by slashing Muslim birth rates.” This, they argued, would also ensure unrestricted and cheap access and potential control of Mid-East to oil “by reducing the growth of Muslims, the US would have even greater access to the immense wealth in Islamic lands” (Nation 13 June 2002). Furthermore, Hizbut Tehrir’s pro-natalist prescription was itself overtly

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strategic, urging Muslims to “work for the re-establishment of the Khilafah so as to end the American plan to destroy the rising influence of Muslims” (Nation 13 June 2002), which was inferred as a directive to ignore national and international population limitation norms. Jillani, through the moderate media, explained that such arguments were gaining national and international saliency in the post-9/11 context in which “anti-terrorist activities … focused on Muslims [are considered] part of the same Muslim-elimination agenda, which includes family planning” fomenting pro-natalist discourses emphasising “The need for increasing numbers in the Third World – especially in the Muslim countries” (News 11 July 2002). International Islamist discourse, particularly the anti-Western/Israel and conspiratorial aspects, was adopted by militant elements with Pakistan’s two major religio-political parties, Muttahida Majlis e-Amal (MMA) and Jamaat e Islami (JeI), where it was merged with Maududi’s perspective. Because these parties secured seats at the last federal and provincial elections, their perspectives cannot be dismissed as fringe fanaticism. Rather they are now joined to official discourse, agendas and policy decision making, and could work counter to established national population objectives. Moreover, media coverage of these perspectives has embedded them in public discourse where they could have a divisive affect. For example Hafiz Ahmad argued that family planning was a hypocritical and geostrategic Zionist conspiracy that imposes anti-natalism on non-Jews, particularly Israel’s enemies. By contrast, he argued, Zionists incited Jewish pro-natalism to increase the community’s numerical strength and security, which he suggested was evidenced by celebrated and rewarded Jewish high fertility and because “people cannot covert [to] Judaism, you can only be Jewish by birth” (interview 2002). Furthermore, this conspiracy was directed by Israel and the West particularly at the Muslim world and represented a physical and moral crusade against Islam. It would, Ahmad argued, cause the de-Islamisation of the Muslim world through the imposition and replication of un-Islamic practices such as pre-marital sex and child bearing, and the societal normalisation of de-facto relationships. The JeI has been likewise openly and publicly critical of the national population agenda. In 2003, vice president Qazi Hussain Ahmad countered the official growth and control perspective arguing that it “was not a problem of Pakistan but of the Western countries because they were scared of an increase in the population of Muslims (Daily Times 1 October 2003). Small Family Norm The strategy for societal mobilisation, recognising past program communication failures, envisaged the personalisation of national population problems and perspectives to improve understanding and acceptance at the grass roots level. Whilst fertility reduction remained the primary objective, a human centred approach evolved which sought to shift societal high fertility norms and behaviours

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by promoting the internationally defined two child family norm as the stated governmental preference. On this, the 2002 policy stated: An Advocacy Campaign will be devised to build and sustain adoption of the small family norm. It will raise awareness about population and development issues by engaging change agents to communicate on the impact of runaway population growth on the lives of the individual, family and communities (Government of Pakistan 2002).

Academics and experts such as Hakim, Kausuri, Masood and Perveen suggested that this was a necessary remedial measure. They argued that a societally expressed desire for smaller families had not transpired because governments had failed to explicitly define small family size as two, as demonstrated in Chapter 6. Implicit references resulted in perpetuation of the four child societal small family concept. Perveen, for example, stated the “family planning messages promote a small family norm, implying two children. However, to most people, a small family is four children. The slogans imply two children, but this was not always properly explained” (interview 2002). Furthermore, they argued that top down strategies of normative imposition failed to address the causes of large family preferences. These caused included localised socio-economic dynamics, educational attainment, income, class and the urban rural divide or to popularise the individual and familial benefits, instead opting for macro perspective arguments. Kausuri, for example, argued: Urban couples tend to have smaller families, often because of their level of education. But there is a rich/poor divide in urban areas. The urban poor also see children as a source of income, because they are a source of labour. However, they are more likely to be exposed to the family planning message than their rural counter-parts, and are therefore more likely to reduce their fertility. The higher the level of income and education the higher the level of awareness of population issues and/or family planning. However, there is still a sense that a large family is normal. Because of this, it is difficult to make people aware of the associated problems. The government must take the lead in propagating the small family norm and population message (interview 2002).

They also pointed to the failure to dispel gendered dimensions of family formation, such as gender inequity, female status, and the individual social capital gained through child-bearing. Perveen pointed to the employment of inappropriate, gendered language as counterproductive to the small family objective. She stated: Another problem stems from the language used in the slogans and campaigns. They refer to children as ‘batchi,’ which means male children. The language

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Hakim pointed to purdah and maternal status as other gendered obstacles to two child families, stating “the practice of purdah prevented women from accessing services independently. Further, social pressure to conceive soon after marriage, and to have sons, undermined a woman’s place in the household” prevented female reproductive choice and control. They argued that for the two child norm to take hold, these issues had to be addressed in tandem with norm promotion. By promoting the costs and benefits of two child families the government seeks to communicate and popularise national population concerns and mobilise grass roots support for national population objectives. Addressing the question of family size with staff and clients at urban and semi-rural health centres gave insight into fertility and population conceptions at this level, and thus an understanding of the process of engagement and consensus building through inter-group dialogue. Staff – doctors, nurses and volunteers – concurred that the barriers to two child family formation lie in poor governmental communicative practices, particularly failure to define preferred family size or to address gendered obstacles. Staff stated that the two child norm was ideal and that there was growing societal receptivity to it, however the comparative experience of rural clients instilled a norm of three to four children given the until recent persistence of eight to ten child families. Client interviews suggested the increasing social saliency of the two child norm, with most expressing this as a preference and one that they instilled and encouraged in their own children, families, and communities. For example, female clients interviewed at a rural clinic near Islamabad, although each having five or more children expressed a personal preference for two children for familial socioeconomic benefit. These choices however had been overridden by the desires and demands of their husbands. They were using family planning to prevent further pregnancies. Only one client, originally from the socially and religiously conservative and orthodox North West Frontier Province (NWFP), expressed a large family preference, stating “children were a source of security in a hostile environment, a source of family strength, and could be economic providers” (group interview 2002). However understanding of macro population perspectives at the grass roots level was low. Clients gave no voluntary or prompted indication of they were aware of the macro perspectives communicated by the government, which suggested failure of governmental messages to filter to this level. Furthermore, these interviews substantiated the above argument that the societal small family norm is smaller than it once had been, but was not necessarily as small as the government’s two child objective. However, given the relative proximity of these interviews to the policy launch, recent growth and fertility statistics in Table 7.1 are clearer indicators that despite failing to reach the stated PGR target of 1.9 by 2004, society is mobilising behind national control objectives albeit seemingly slower than the government had intended.

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Religious Mobilisation: Countering Religious Opposition to Bring the Ulema In The 2002 policy recognised the importance of religion to successful societal prioritisation of, and mobilisation behind, national population perspectives and objectives. Stated strategies included policy and program development in accordance with religious realities, and to target, engage, involve and grant ownership to civil society groups, opinion makers, public representatives, and influential groups which necessarily included Islamic ones. This represented a marked departure from past practices of ignoring or appeasing religious demands. Now, rather than fight or concede to Islamic orthodoxy, the government is countering through moderate Islamic groups, agents and discourse. Indeed, orthodox and conservative religious academics and experts critiqued the perceived Islamic antithesis of the 2002 policy. Zaman, Rahman, and Shaheena Khan,20 manager of the JeI’s Women’s Aid Trust (WAT) Islamabad office argued that state policies compel and coerce couples into adopting official norms and objectives that may be contrary to their own, in this instance the two child norm, and that this is religiously impermissible. Moreover, in pursuit of its own objectives, the government was engaging in a strategy of misinformation and imposition of its will over the populace, counter to the Islamic ethos of free and informed individual choice. Zaman illustrated this with reference to a 1997 paper by scholar Khalid M Haq, which found that prophetic consent of azl was as something that could rather than should be practiced. Tactics such as public discourse and direct engagement were part of an overall strategy to counter orthodox objections through moderate discourse. For example, Professor Rafiullah Shehad publicly demonstrated family planning as consistent with the Hanafite fiqh, stating that “many prominent companions of the Holy Prophet (PBUH), such as Hazrat Ibn Abbas (RA) and Hazrat Abdullah bin Umar (RA) had done the same” (NG, 10 March 2002) and later countered ‘providential’ objections arguing that “Almighty Allah is the provider and He provides the necessities of life to every human being” (Nation, 24 May 2002). The moderate media has further promoted family planning’s Islamic credentials through articles demonstrating the conditions under which it is permitted “with a view to ward off health, social and economic hardships and to enable them to shoulder their responsibility toward their children and society.” The moderate media has publicly further illustrated Muslim precedents for policy, through arguments such as: those who oppose it arguing that a great many Muslim countries don’t have the policy of controlling birth could be reminded of several country examples. A number of Muslim countries in the North Africa … Iran, and extremely orthodox and ultra-conservative religious country, realised the need to control population and did achieve the desired results (Dawn 12 June 2002).

20  Interviewed at the WAT’s Islamabad office in August 2002.

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Moreover, Musharraf was quick to publicly establish the policy’s Islamic credentials, stating “family planning is not against the Islamic spirit as it is being practiced in many Muslim countries and many scholars supported it (News 12 July 2002). Recent tactics have included direct engagement of Pakistan’s ulema, encouraging their participation in population planning and activities and offering them ownership of national debates and agendas. For example, in May 2005 Pakistan hosted the International Ulema Conference on Population and Development in Islamabad. Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz “…urged religious scholars (ulema) to draw guidelines in the light of Islamic teachings for bringing about a positive change in people’s opinion on family planning. Ulema could play a pivotal role in guiding the Muslim Ummah [sic] on population planning.” Moreover Aziz flattered the ulema as agents for global Muslim prestige and security in the post9/11 context, stating that their participation at the Islamabad and other international conferences demonstrated their potential to work for “the glory of the Muslim world and present it as a model of enlightened moderation and peace. Their role could create unity in the ranks of over 1.3 billion Muslim Ummah and prepare them to meet the challenges endangering their existence” (Dawn 5 May 2005). The emergent Islamabad declaration demonstrated that moderate scholars and ulema were aware of, had internalised and then religiously contextualised global population and sustainable development discourses, enjoining this with securitised references stating, amongst other things: We the Ulema representing 21 Muslim countries as well as communities in Minority Muslim States … recognise that concerted and co-operative efforts should be initiated by Muslim Umma in general and in the participating countries in particular, in the field of population and development. We hereby; Reaffirm that Islam … provides the guidelines on all aspects of life including issues of population and development … Express concern on rapid population growth in the contemporary world, declining standards of maternal and child health, increasing environmental degradation, unmanaged migration and massive urbanisation, which is a threat to the process of socio-economic development and welfare of the people (MoPW 2005).

In a further move to engage Pakistan’s ulema in national programs, the Federal Minister for Population Welfare Chaudhry Shahbaz Hussain announced in July 2005 that the government would train 13,000 religious leaders to assist in family planning programs and that religious scholars and population experts had collaborated to develop the training curriculum (Dawn 8 July 2005). It was further and publicly evident that the NWFP’s provincial MMA government had shifted its position in favour of population control by lifting previous reservations over promotion activities and advertising the small family norm on private provincial radio station Buraq Radio (Daily Times 6 May 2005). Furthermore, a federal MMA Minister publicly stated that “Islam is a religion of quality, not quantity, and it lays

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emphasis on a life of better quality. As soon as we accept this reality, new avenues of social development will open” (Dawn 29 July 2005). The current Parliamentary Secretary for Population, Donya Aziz, recently employed a similar argument to counter orthodox objections to the government’s proposed educational incentive for one child families. Citing conservative religious suspicion as a continuing obstacle to population objectives, Aziz sought to dispel the conspiratorial Islamist arguments by stating: We have only a certain amount of money available for all the citizens of Pakistan, for all the development. When the population is too large all the money gets diluted … People say some bizarre things – that family planning is something the West wants to control the number of Muslims in the world. If they really wanted Muslims to be in bad shape they would let us continue to have so many children and we would never be able to develop (populationmedia.org July 2006).

However, the campaign to counter orthodoxy with moderacy was being met with orthodox challenges. In May 2005, Dr Kauser Firdos, Federal Senator and Secretary General of the JeI Women’s Wing, condemned the ulema engagement strategy as falsely disguising family planning as Islamic, adding that the government was promoting and enabling a Western agenda for moral degradation in the name of population control. She argued that family planning funds should be diverted into poverty alleviation. Furthermore, she rejected the religious validity of the Islamabad conference and attacked the attendees religious credentials, stating “no genuine religious scholar considers [family planning] permissible in Islam” adding “[t]he government is deceiving Ulema by using their name to cover its immoral and non-Islamic activities. The same million dollars could be used for improving the standard of life of common people which are being used to hold so called Ulema Conferences on Family Planning” (www.jamaat.org). Postscript: 2008 The Pakistan government continues to state its dedication to global population stabilisation objectives, and to demonstrate its consistency with international norms. In its quarterly activity report for July–September 2008, the MPW maintains that it “endeavours to bring social and attitudinal change in the behaviour of people for the adoption of the small family norm for achieving the goal of population stabilisation” (www.mopw.gov.pk/reports/QAR/QAR%20july-Sep, %202008.doc). This report detailed a comprehensive public communication strategy utilising all sources of national media. At the 2008 World Population Day Conference, held in Islamabad on 11 July, representatives of the World Population Foundation-Pakistan reported that Pakistan’s population would continue to grow due primarily to stagnating fertility declines, stalled at 4.5 births and persistent low contraceptive prevalence rates. In

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addition, these representatives stated that the growing youth, if not given access to opportunities through investment to technology, were likely to engage in risk behaviours (http: //teabreak.pk...). This sentiment was echoed by newly elected Prime Minister Yousuf Riza Gilani who stated that the government remained “...committed to containing population explosion for our development and progress” (Daily Times, 12 July 2008). Female empowerment, education and youth opportunity were cited as critical components of national population objectives. Gilani also recalled the late Benazir Bhutto’s contribution to the 1994 ICPD, and urged the continuation of her legacy. The language of population as a security concern also continues. At the above World Population Day conference, the current Minister for Population Welfare, Humayun Aziz Kurd repeated the war footing symbolism first introduced by Musharraf in the early 2000s. In addition, national newspaper editorials remain vigilant in reporting on Pakistan’s need for population control, doing so in a securitised manner. On 15 July 2008, a Dawn editorial opined that “The population bomb is ticking away and the urgency of the threat requires immediate action. The outcry is not unfounded. With Pakistan being the sixth most population country in the world, overpopulation has caused burgeoning levels of unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, health issues, crime and environmental degradation in Pakistan” (Dawn, 15 July 2008). Pakistan, it would seem, remains dedicated, even if only discursively, to global population-sustainability-security objectives. Conclusion Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif came to power at a time when orthodox Islamic influence was high and the status of the population program was low. Sensing the urgent need for population control both attempted to implement ambitions control programs, and to induct global norms into national discourse. Given the brevity of their terms in office they had insufficient time to fully implement their population objectives. However the evidence left by both suggested that, at the stated level at least, they were committed to issue and program prioritisation and social mobilisation, and that they were fully cognisant of international population norms and discourses. Furthermore, they, and Benazir Bhutto in particular, acknowledged religious influence as important and they negotiated this through moderate Islamic discourse, but did not necessarily seek to engage the national ulema. Moreover, both picked up securitising discourse that was initiated by General Zia with reference to Pakistan’s situation as well as the global paradigm. Pakistan’s population debate during the 1990s had become increasingly consistent with global discourse, particularly the socio-economic and then sustainable development paradigms, and the securitised one. Also during this period, academics, experts and other change agents became evidently more active in the Pakistan debate, bringing to it a milieu of perspectives, including emerging global development and religious counter debates.

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Since 1999, Pervez Musharraf has attempted to engage all societal sectors in the national debate and to mobilise whole of society support for national population control and related development objectives. In 2002, his government launched Pakistan’s first official population policy, demonstrating commitment to and prioritisation of this issue. National commitment to global norms and objectives, particularly those embodied in the 1994 ICPD was further demonstrated by the whole of society, beyond family planning approach instituted. As part of the societal mobilisation strategy, and informed by Musharraf’s personal intolerance of militant Islam, the government has pursued moderates as partners in population debates and programs. Furthermore, Musharraf has attempted to convince the populace and orthodox ulema of population control’s religious compatibility through moderate Islamic discourse. Under Musharraf, Pakistan’s population discourse was securitised. Population growth was increasingly, then consistently, posited as a threat to national and societal stability and survivability, and therefore security. Elite and public discourse have attached to population a sense of urgency and the necessity of societal mobilisation for security. However, it is evident that Musharraf has failed to create a national population consensus. Although there is a general consensus on the interrelationship between population and development, there are divergent perspectives as to whether this is a negative or positive relationship, and whether the government’s conception and subsequent conclusions on this are the right ones. Counter debates have emerged within non-secular and secular circles, generally critiquing the conception of population growth as detrimental to national development and control as the solution. Furthermore, the securitising discourse employed by Musharraf has its discontents. Many academics, whilst agreeing that population growth had reached a crisis point and posed a potential threaten, questioned the utility of a public discourse in this form. Others, based on their critique of the population-development paradigm, pointed to the invalidity of the argument by stating the conditions under which threat could be turned into an asset, not through population control, but with better political management. Secular agents particularly objected to the security argument, countering with their own conception of the security problematic, one of a global conspiracy against the Muslim world conducted via the international population agenda. What the Pakistani case study suggests with regard to the possibility of securitising population growth in Muslim states and societies is that orthodox and fundamentalist Islamic elements and perspectives are potential obstacles to this process. However, the presence of secular objections demonstrated that it is not Islam alone that prevents securitising discourse from taking hold, but rather that objections are informed by non-religious discourses.

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Conclusion What Iranian and Pakistani experiences tell us is that Muslim states and societies can and have engaged with global population-sustainability-security debates and developed national debates consistent with these. They can be effective partners in global population initiatives and objectives. Prior to and during the initial phases of the 1994 ICPD suggested this would not have been possible. Here, Islamic and Catholic conservatives protested against the global population-developmentsecurity paradigm that had emerged throughout the twentieth century, questioning, criticising and denouncing the global population agenda. Whilst moderates were willing to negotiate on certain passages and references, the more fundamentalist or conservative were less conciliatory. Islamic agitation, coupled with persistent high fertility and growth rates throughout the Muslim world, fostered myths and assumptions about Islam as conservative, monolithic, and pro-natalist, and as obstructive to global population objectives. The Iranian case study demonstrated that it is possible for a conservative Muslim state to engage with international discourse and induct and internalise globally established norms. In 1956, Mohammad Reza Shah shifted population growth from a non-political to political issue by making population control an objective of his modernisation strategy. The official conceptualisation of population was consistent with the dominant global paradigm of that time: population control as the means to economic development. Following the revolution this shifted to pro-natalism after a short period of uncertainty. The regime adopted a pro-natalist stance informed by factors including religion, nationalism and geostrategic concerns. High fertility was encouraged and rewarded. During this time Iran ignored international population conventions and norms, opting for growth contrary to the global control objective. Population growth was posited as a means rather than threat to security. 1986 was a critical year in Iranian debate because the census and process of five year plan development catalysed the shift from pro- to anti-natalism and the return to official engagement with global discourse and objectives. Officials, experts and bureaucrats within the MPO and MoHME were alarmed by the growth rate recorded and considered it a major obstacle to national development objectives. They lobbied the political elite to renounce its pro-natalist stance and reinstate population control for socio-economic and political reasons. Bureaucratic/ agent discourse was consistent with global ones. It argued that the situation was urgent and required immediate action before the population situation grew beyond political control. Furthermore, agents advocated the necessity of societal engagement and mobilisation. The ruling elite, although initially reluctant, took

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bureaucratic arguments on board relatively quickly. Population then became the subject of intense public debate conducted primarily through the media. The key messages were security ones: population growth could not continue and had to be addressed immediately if Iran, Islam and the Revolution were to survive. This discourse continued and expanded post-Khomeini. Elite and bureaucratic population discourse maintained the alarmist language initiated by the preceding regime. Furthermore, Iranian population debates, discourses and objectives grew increasingly consistent with global norms and conventions. Global engagement and the securitised conception of growth led to other issues being joined to official population discourse. These included environmental degradation, urbanisation and unemployment, which served to illustrate the multiple ways in which the population threat could manifest. Official discourse continued to press upon the populace that population growth threatened the state, society, revolution and Islam. It stressed the need for continued and intensive government and societal action against this threat. Khatami’s projection of a youth crisis was a clear example of this. Moreover, at the heart of this discourse was Islam. Appeals were made on behalf of Islamic referents – tangible and symbolic – and the population control solution was shown to be consistent and compatible with religious teachings. The evidence points to universal societal knowledge and acceptance of the secular and non-secular securitised population perspective. The Iranian case study demonstrated that Muslim states and societies can successfully engage with and internalise global population discourses and norms, even those that are securitised. In Iran, Islam and its clerical agents supported public discourse securitising population. Furthermore, ulema became themselves agents in the securitising process, acting as conduits for official discourse. Many communicated the securitised conception of population to the public through a number of secular and non-secular media and fora and demonstrated the consistency of this conception with Islam. In Iran, population was first identified and posited as a threat by senior and mid-ranking officials and bureaucrats. They then alerted Iranian elites/actors to the problem, projecting it through securitising discourse. Iranian agents identified a number of referents existentially threatened by population growth, including Islam and the revolution. These arguments led to the official reinstatement of population control measures which were justified to the populace through securitising arguments. The public, including the clergy, were told of referents under threat from population growth, and were asked to assist government counter measures. For the public this meant fertility regulation. For the ulema it meant unquestioning support for and promotion of government objectives. Iran reached replacement level fertility in a short space of time demonstrating near universal support for the national population-security objective. However, Ahmadinejad’s recent attacks on this long established and accepted conception suggests that this consensus may be unravelling. Whilst initial discourse seems to suggest that his statement was a one off and not widely received, it is impossible to tell at this stage what the full

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affects will be. Will Iran turn its back on national and global population control objectives? The Pakistani case study demonstrated that Muslim governments can and do engage with global discourse and norms, however they are not always able to induct and internalise these due to agent objections: this includes the objections of ulema. Pakistan was amongst the first countries to develop an awareness of population growth as problematic. It adopted the global population-development paradigm without question, making this the rationale for national population and development objectives. Initially, the Pakistan government was highly engaged with global discourse and norms. Internally, it ignored clerical and religio-political objections. This changed in the 1970s. Population was first subsumed by other political considerations and then sidelined to appease religious and conservative objections. In the early 1980s, population debates and activities were conducted quietly lest the government offend its conservative constituents. Whilst the Pakistan government did not visibly engage with global debate, the ‘silent’ program was demonstrably consistent with the global agenda of that time. Population growth was established as being interrelated with a number of issues – including the environment, urbanisation and unemployment – and was posited as potentially threatening to national development. The use of the ‘bomb’ analogy by national bureaucrats demonstrated a nascent securitising discourse. In the post-Zia period, successive governments attempted to re-establish population as a national political concern and priority. This process was made difficult by conservative religious objections. Because of this, governments adopted a moderate Islamic discourse to justify their population objectives and to counter religious criticism. Benazir Bhutto’s stance at the 1994 ICPD was a clear demonstration of government commitment to population and intolerance of religious obstruction. In signing the 1994 Plan of Action and subsequent population-development conventions, Pakistan’s governments signified their intention to induct and internalise global norms and discourses. During this period, a securitised notion of population took hold. The debate widened and the inclusion of new agents and perspectives enabled interrelated issues to be fully merged with the securitised population concept. Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif made references to a population bomb that threatened both state and society. Musharraf adopted and furthered this conception of population. His discourse attached to population a sense of urgency and he spoke of dealing with population growth on a war footing, creating a sense of heightened alert where this issue was involved. His government’s passing of Pakistan’s first population policy demonstrated its commitment to and prioritisation of it as a national concern. The policy included a strategy to engage and mobilise the populace, including the national ulema, behind the securitised national population control objective. The Pakistan example demonstrated that Islam and Islamic agents are obstacles to developing internationally consistent population-security discourse. Some ulema and religio-political parties and agents have objected to population control even where it serves to mitigate a potential national threat. Furthermore,

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some suggested that population control was the real threat because it was a ploy through which the non-Muslim world would decimate and control the Muslim one. Moreover, their objections were informed by and couched in Islam. They pointed to the inconsistency of family planning and population with religion. However, what the Pakistan example also demonstrated was that Islam is a factor but not the factor preventing a consensus on population as security. First, not all Islamic agents objected to population control. More recently, for example, provincial governments controlled by Islamists have adopted and encouraged population control. Second, Islamic agents were not the only objectors. A number of secular agents rejected the official population problematique and the necessity of population control. They argued an alternative position that posited growth as beneficial with proper political management. In Pakistan the primary obstructing factor obstructing was societal mistrust of the government. Secular and non-secular agents viewed the government’s position rather cynically. Past inaction, despite charged rhetoric, led many to consider the government’s arguments as hollow. Furthermore, many doubted that the government fully understood the situation: they agreed with the threat assessment, but were not convinced the government was fully cognisant of it. Islam and/or Islamic agents do not necessarily prevent Muslim states and societies from engaging with global population norms and discourses – including securitised ones – and developing consistent ones. The Iran and Pakistan case studies demonstrated that Islam can either enable this or that it is one of many, rather than the only obstacle. It is safe to say that, as with any other issue or objective there are no singular Islamic or Muslim experience. The Muslim world is as diverse and nuanced as its non-Muslim counterparts. This was clearly demonstrated with reference to Pakistan and Iran’s experiences with population growth and control, engagement with global debate and discourses. Taking this a step further, it demonstrates that, despite a seemingly intractable conflict between the Western and Muslim worlds, there are areas where there is great scope for cooperation and conflict. Whilst we cannot ignore the political and military events that have given rise to this thinking on both sides, we can perhaps hope that states and societies will also pursue avenues for cooperation.

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‘Iran Will Face Serious Food Shortages if Current Trend Continues’ Tehran Times, 07/01/02. ‘Annual Birth Rate Decreases’ Tehran Times, 14/01/02. ‘Speaker Asks MPs to Take a Long Stride in Solving Employment Problem’ Tehran Times, 26/01/02. ‘Unemployment is a Serious Challenge for Nation: Official’ Tehran Times, 07/02/02. ‘Ebtekar Meets with Colombia President’ Tehran Times, 16/02/02. ‘Iran, UNESCO Sign MOU on Water Management’ Tehran Times, 17/02/02. ‘More Attention Should be Paid to Recycling’ Tehran Times, 17/02/02. ‘Tehran’s Problems have National/Global Dimensions: Mayor’ Tehran Times, 15/05/02. ‘Unemployment, Divorce Main Headache for Iranian People’ Tehran Times, 02/06/02. Unemployment Thorniest Challenge Facing Iran’s Economy’ Iran News, 08/07/02, pp. 2, 15. ‘Iran’s Current Fertility Rate Threatened by Young Population’ Tehran Times, 11/07/02. ‘One Child is Enough’ 12/07/02, Tehran Times. ‘Iran’s Family Planning Program Successful’ Tehran Times, 13/07/02. ‘Iran is a UNFPA Success Story’ Iran News, 14/09/02. Interviews Pakistan Personal interviews were conducted with the following individuals: Dr Assai, World Health Organisation Pakistan. Interview conducted at the Ministry of Health and Medical Education Offices in Tehran, Iran, 21/07/02. Dr Mahbub Ahmed, former Government of Pakistan Population official and freelance adviser to the UNFPA. Interview conducted at the UNFPA Pakistan Country Office, Islamabad, 30/07/02. Mr Ahmed Jameel, In-Country Representative, Population Communication International. Interview conducted at the PCI offices, Islamabad, 31/07/02. Dr Abdul Hakim, demographer at the National Institute of Population Studies. Interview conducted at the NIPS offices, Islamabad, 01/08/02. Dr Zeba Sathar, Pakistan Country Director, Population Council/Family Planning Association of Pakistan. Interview conducted at the Population Council offices, Islamabad, 05/08/02. Dr Javed Mehmood Kausuri, Director of the Institute for Educational Technology at the Allama Iqbal Open University. Interview conducted at the AIOU, Islamabad, 07/08/02.

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Dr Rukhshana Masood, demographer and lecturer, AIOU. Interview conducted at AIOU, Islamabad, 07/08/02. Dr Rakhshinda Perveen, Executive Vice President of Society for the Advancement o Community, Health, Education and Training (SACHET). Interview conducted at the SACHET offices, Islamabad, 07/08/02. Dr M.S. Jillani, demographer and former Pakistan Government Population Official. Interview conducted at the home of Dr Jillani, Islamabad, 08/08/02. Dr Naushin Mahmood, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics. Interview conducted at PIDE, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, 08/08/02. Dr Tauseef Ahmed, adviser to the World Bank. Interview conducted at the Pakistan Country Office, Islamabad, 08/08/02. Professor Javed, former Pakistan Government adviser on population. Interview conducted at Pakistan Institute of Business Administration and Technology, Islamabad09/08/02. Hafiz Hussein Ahmad, former General Secretary of the MMA (translated by Mrs Sarfraz Iqbal). Interview conducted at a private residence in Islamabad, 13/08/02. Ms Sarah Javeed, freelance family planning and population researcher. Interview conducted at her home in Islamabad, 13/08/02. Ms Shaheen Khan, Women’s Aid Trust. Interviewed at the WAT offices, Islamabad, 19/08/02. Dr Khalid Rahman, Director of the Institute of Policy Studies. Interview conducted at the IPS, Islamabad, 19/08/02. Mr Baber Hussein Khan, Manager of the Futures Group/Key Social Marketing, Pakistan. Interview conducted at the organisations Islamabad offices, 20/08/02. Dr Mehtab Karim, Professor of Demography, Aga Khan University. Interview conducted at the AKU, Islamabad, 20/08/02. Dr Zaman, Chairman of the Centre for Islamic Ideology. Interview conducted at the CII offices, Islamabad, 22/08/02. Iran Dr Tahereh Shakeri: Demographer/sociologist, Centre for Women’s Participation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and liaison between the CWP and the UNFPA, 15/06/02. Dr Azali: Director, Family Planning Association of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 19/06/02. Dr Changerachi Bashi: Adviser to the Deputy Minister for Health and Medical Education, 22/06/02. Dr Safieh Shariari: Gynaecologist, University lecturer, assistant to Dr Bashi, MOHME IRI, 22/06/02. Dr Matin: Demographer, researcher and freelance adviser to the MOHME, 22/06/02.

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Dr Sidghazar: Director Shahid Jafari Health Care Centre, Tehran, 24/06/02 Dr Habibbi: Director Sira Health Centre, Karaj, 26/06/02. Mrs Mollah: Behvarz, Azahra Rural Health House, 26/06/02. Group interview with female clients of the Azahra Rural Health House, 26/06/02. Family planning staff, volunteers and clients at a women’s NGO in South Tehran, 29/06/02, translated by Dr Shakeri. Professor A Mehryar: Demographer and researcher, Institute for Research on Planning and Development, Tehran, 30/06/02. Dr Ali Reza Marandi: Former Minister of Health and Medical Eduction, Tehran, 01/07/2002. Staff, volunteers, and clients: Afghan health post, Islamshah, south Tehran, 02/07/02. Drs Bonbat and Hosseini, Mrs Javed: Staff of the Fazel Health Clinic in Tehran, 03/07/02. Family planning volunteers and clients of the clinic, Fazel Health Clinic, Tehran, 03/07/02. Group Interview with members of the Association of Women Managers, an Iranian women’s NGO, 03/07/02. Present and interviewed were: Dr Tahereh Shakeri; Zahra Nory, Mayor of the 7th Sector of Tehran; Ms Kefayati, Engineer and MD of an electronics company; Mrs Alipour, Governor of Shemiran and consultant to the Department of Women’s Affairs in the Ministry of the Interior; Mrs Mofid, Special Consultant to the Ministry of Education; Mrs Mofid, Consultant to the Ministry of Agriculture. Ayatollah Mohaghegs Damad: Iranian authority on Islam and Family Planning, Tehran, 04/07/02. UNFPA World Population Day Conference, Tehran, 11/07/02. Dr Mohammed Mosleh Uddin: Country Chief UNFPA Iran, Tehran, 14/07/02. Staff, volunteers and clients: Qom Medical Centre, 20/07/02. Mrs Laboff, Mrs Borvi, and Mrs Moslemi: Female Professors, Qom religious colleges, 20/07/02. Dr Zanjani: Professor of Demography, Tehran University, and senior official in the Department of Housing, 22/07/02.

Index abortion 33, 43, 44, 45–6, 80–81, 83–4, 88–9 academic literature 4 Ad Hoc Coalition for Cairo 44 Afghanistan 91 Ahl-i-Quran movement 64 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud 120, 149–51 AIDS 34–5, 43–4 Al-Azhar University 69–70, 88, 91 al-azl 55, 60–4, 68, 105, 207 Algeria 81 aspiration bomb 171 Australia 40 Ayub Khan, Muhammad 159–60, 162, 163–4 Bali Declaration 128–9 Baptists 44 Belgrade World Population Conference 1965 20–21 Bhutto, Benazir 177, 179–80, 183–6, 215 Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali 165–6 birth control 12–14, 18, 51–2 see also contraception; family planning; population control BKKBN (National Family Planning Coordinating Board (Indonesia)) 85–6 Borujerdi, Seyyed Hossein 99, 101 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros 44 Brandt Report 28–9 breastfeeding 63 Britain 13 British Malthusian League 13 Brundtland Report 2, 33–4 Bucharest World Population Conference 1974 25–8, 31 Draft Plan of Action (DPA) 25–6 Cairo International Conference on Population and Development

(ICPD) 1994 see International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) 1994 Catholic Church 18 Chad 81 chastity 11 China 127 Clinton, Bill 41–2 Colombo Declaration on Population and Development 28, 29 colonialism 27, 156 Condorcet, Nicolas, Marquise de 9–11 conflict demographic causes of 36, 49 environment 37, 39, 51 migration 40–41 population growth 35 contraception see also birth control; family planning; population control for economic reasons 70–71 Hanafi school of law 61 Hanbali school of law 62 Iran 103–5, 110, 123 Ismailism 63 Maliki school of law 61–2 Pakistan 82, 167 Shâfi‘i school of law 62–3, 69–70 Sunna 68 Twelver school of law 63 women 92 Zâhirî school of law 63–4 Zaydi school of law 63 crime 144, 194 Darfur 40 demographic transition 76 Deobandi 82 discourse 3–4 Djibouti 80

250

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Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) 23 ECOSOC see United Nations, Economic and Social Commission Eisenhower, Dwight 19 El Salvador 39 environment conflict 51 degradation 37, 39–40, 144–5, 184, 193 migration 40 population growth 32, 39–40, 129 urbanisation 145–6 Ethiopia 39 eugenics 13, 156, 194 family 90 family planning see also birth control; contraception; population control colonialism 156 India 155–6 Iran 78, 102–5, 107–9, 111–12, 113–14, 116, 122–8, 132–3, 142 Islam 55–6, 60–64, 67–74, 157 Islamists 86–7 law 84 opposition to 86–95 Pakistan 156–7, 158–9, 161–2, 166, 168–9, 179, 181–2, 184, 191–2 reproductive health 43–4 Sunni Muslims 156–47 United Nations 21 Family Planning Association of Pakistan (FPAP) 156–7 FAO (Food and Agricultural Organisation) 16 fear of want 70 fertility 75–82 diversity within Muslim populations 81 Iran 150 Pakistan 157, 181 wealth 79 women 91 fertility regulation 83–4, 214 Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) 16 food supplies 140

FPAP (Family Planning Association of Pakistan) 156–7 G77 23, 26–7 Geneva World Population Conference 1927 13 Global AIDS Strategy 35 Global Gag Rule 33, 48 global sustainability 92–3, 94–5, 96, 97, 151 Godwin, William 9–10 Hadith 58, 59, 64 Hanafi school of law 61 Hanbali school of law 62 Hassan, Shaukat 36–7 HIV/AIDS 34–5, 43–4 Hizbut Tehrir 93 Honduras 39, 45 Huxley, Aldous 16 ICPD see International Conference on Population and Development 1994 Ijma 58, 59 ijtihad 58, 59–60, 64, 82 India see also Pakistan birth control 14 family planning 155–6 individualism 83, 91 Indonesia 78, 85–6 infanticide 70 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) 1994 2–3, 42–6, 80, 84, 88–91, 184–6 +5 conference 46–7, 188 +10 conference 46, 48–9 International Health Conference 1946 16 International Obscene Material Convention 1910 12–13 International Ulama Conference on Population and Development 2005 208–9 Iran anti-natalism 102, 112–17, 123, 213–14 Bali Declaration 129 clergy 98–100, 146–7, 150 Constitution of 1979 107, 120

Index Constitutional Revolution 98 contraception 103–5, 110, 123 Council of Guardians 107 crime 144 democracy 99 Department of Population and Family Planning 124 economic growth 114 education 138–9 environmental impact 144–6 Expediency Council to Safegaurd the Interests of the System 117 Family Limitation Law 125–7, 150 family planning 78, 102–5, 107–9, 111–12, 113–14, 116, 122–8, 132–3, 142, 149 Family Protection Law 104, 110 family size 142, 150 family stability 139 faqih 107, 119–20 fertility 81, 131, 141, 150, 214 Five Year Plans of Development (FYPD) First 112, 117 Second 130 Fourth 147–8 food supplies 140 global norms 128–30 global sustainability 97, 151 government 107 insecurity 136, 142–3 Iran-Iraq war 109–10 Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting Organisation (IRIB) 123 Islamisation 109, 111 leadership 98, 107 marriage 109, 110 national identity 140 nuclear technology 149 oil reserves 106 Pahlavi dynasty 98–9 polygny 110 population 98, 101–3 population control 95, 116 population growth 3, 103, 109–11, 112–13, 131–5, 139–42, 149, 213, 214 rate (PGR) 103, 104, 122

251

population momentum 133–5 population reduction 103–4, 140–41 poverty 148 pragmatism 119–22 pro-natalism 101–2, 109–10 rationing 110 religio-political environment 97 religio-political groups 100–101 Seminar on Population and Development 1988 115 Shia Islam 97–8 small family norm 142, 146–7 socio-economic modernisation 99 sterilisation 74 sustainable development 135 Total Fertility Rate (TFR) 102, 104, 111, 122, 128, 146 unemployment 135–6, 138, 142–4 urbanisation 144–6 valiyat-e-faqih 107, 120 White Revolution 97, 99, 101, 102, 105–6 women 110, 150 youth cohort 132–3, 135–9 Iran-Iraq war 109–11 Islam conservatism 80 fallibility of the Prophet 64 family planning 55–6, 60–64, 67–74, 157, 216 fear of want 70 fertility 75–82 global sustainability 96 jurisprudential codification 59 lesser harm principle of jurisprudence 73–4 modernity 65 obligation to procreate 72 population control 141, 163 population growth 3, 56 pre-Islamic cultural influences 79 predestination 73 pro-natalism 95, 139–40 quality of life 71–2 as a religion for all time 67–9, 82, 95 as a religion of ease 69–71 as a religion of moderation 71–2 as a religion of planning 72–4, 83

252

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schools of thought 60–64 Shia 97–8 Sunni 146–7 textual ambiguity 78 textual interpretation 64–8 women 91–2 Islamabad Declaration 2005 95, 208 Islamic socialism 165 Islamist discourse 204 Islamists family planning 86–7, 90 global sustainability 92–3 marriage 90 women 92 Ismailism 63 Isnad 58 Italy 14 izzah 139–40 Jamaat-i-Islami 155, 162–3, 204 Jamiat-Ulama Islam 82 Johnson, Lyndon 24 Khatami, Mohammed 130–32, 135–7 Khomeini, Ruhollah Musavi 99–100, 105, 107, 108–9, 115–16 League of Nations 12–14 lesser harm principle of jurisprudence 73–4 Libya 89, 91 Mahdi 98 Maliki school of law 61–2 Malthus, Thomas 1, 9, 11 Marandi, Alireza 113, 114–15, 127–8 marriage 90 Maududi, Abul A’ala 68, 70, 72, 82, 155, 162–3, 165 McNamara, Robert 24 MDGs (Millennium Development Goals) see 47-48 Mexico World Population Conference 1984 30–33 migration 40–42 militarisation 39 Millennium Declaration 47

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 47–8 Mission Islam 93–4 MMA (Muttahida Majlis e-Amal) 73, 204 modernity 65 Mossadeq, Mohammad 99 Mubarak, Hosni 42 Muhammadiyah 85, 86 Musharraf, Pervez 177, 189–90, 196, 215 Muslim politics 65 Muttahida Majlis e-Amal (MMA) 73, 204 Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) 85, 86 National Family Planning Coordinating Board (Indonesia) 85–6 national identity 140, 154 National Security Study Memorandum 200 24–5, 29, 93 neo-Malthusianism 12, 22 New International Economic Order (NIEO) 27 New World Order project 87 NGOs (Non Governmental Organisations) 31, 43 Nigeria 78, 79, 93 Nixon, Richard 24–5 Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 31, 43 NSSM 200 (National Security Study Memorandum 200) 24–5, 29, 93 NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) 85, 86 nuclear technology 149 nuclear weapons 20, 187 Omran, Abdel Rahim 60–63, 67–8, 69–70, 71–3, 76–7, 82–3, 93–4 overpopulation 17, 50, 116, 123, 153, 210 Özal, Turgut 32 Pahlavi dynasty 98–9 Pakistan Annual Development Plans (ADP) 166–7 clergy 191 Constitution 1956 155 Constitution 1973 165–6 Continuous Motivation Scheme (CMS) 164, 167

Index contraception 82 Contraceptive Inundation Scheme (CIS) 167 Council of Islamic Ideology 172–3 development 197–200 Economic Surveys 173 environmental degradation 184, 193 family planning 156–7, 158–9, 166, 168–9, 179, 181–2, 184, 191–2, 207–9 Family Planning Association 156–7 family planning program 161–2, 164–5 fertility 157, 177, 181 Five Year Development Plans (FYPD) First 156, 157–8 Second 160 Third 160–61 Fifth 169–71 Sixth 171–2 Seventh 173, 179 Hudood Ordinance 168 insecurity 188–9 Interim Population Sector Perspective Plan 2012 (IPSPP) 196 international aid 160, 167, 169 International Ulama Conference on Population and Development 2005 208–9 Islam 154–5 Islamist discourse 204 Jamaat-i-Islami 155, 162–3 modernists 154 Muslim Family Laws Ordinances 1961 163, 168 National Board of Family Planning (NBFP) 160 National Commission on Women’s Status (NCSW) 190 National Family Planning Policy 82 nuclear weapons 187 Objectives Resolution 1949 154–5 partition 154 population 157 population control 160, 166, 168–9, 181–2 population discourse 191–4

253

population growth 3, 157, 161, 166–7, 171, 173–4, 177, 199–204, 209–10, 215 rate (PGR) 171, 181, 187 Population Planning Program 166 Population Policy 195–7, 207 poverty 192 religious engagement 191 religious mobilisation 207–9 rural communities 184 sectarian schisms 155 small family norm 190–91, 204–6 sovereignty 154–5 spending on population welfare 181 Total Fertility Rate (TFR) 158, 178 unemployment 173 United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 160, 167, 169 urbanisation 173–4, 182 youth cohort 193–4, 209–10 youthquake 188, 192–3 Zina Ordinance 168 Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) 187 Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) 166, 175, 179–80, 183–4 paternalistic humanitarianism 50 Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier 32 Planned Parenthood 13 Poland 16 polygamy 82–3, 110 population bomb 17, 171, 192, 210 population control 11, 95, 116 Islam 163 non-consensual 84 opposition to 86–95 Pakistan 160, 166, 168–9, 181–2 population-development paradigm 19, 21, 22–3, 50, 102, 156–7, 215 population discourse 191–2 racism 194 religion 56–7 security 24–5, 29, 32 population growth crisis 200–204 development 197–200 environment 32, 39–40, 129

254

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Iran 3, 103, 109–11, 112–13, 131–5, 139–42, 149, 213, 214 Islam 56 Pakistan 3, 157, 161, 166–7, 171, 173–4, 177, 199–204, 209–10, 215 rate (PGR) 103, 104, 122, 171, 181, 187 unemployment 142–4 population momentum 133–5 Population Reference Bureau 81 power and security 38 PRB (Population Reference Bureau) 81 predestination 73 primary sources 4 procreation obligation 72 Qiyas 58, 59 quality of life 71–2 Quran 57, 59, 64 Rabat Declaration on Population and Development 2003 94–5 Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar Hashemi 120–21 religion fertility 3 population discourse 56–7 reproductive health 43 reproductive rights 31 Rome Declaration on population 1980 28, 29 Rome World Population Conference 1954 17–18 Sanger, Margaret 13 Saudi Arabia 80, 88 securitisation 1 security population 35–9, 49–51 population discourse 24–5, 29, 32 power 38 unemployment 38–9 Shâfi‘i school of law 62–3, 69–70 Shariah 57 Sharif, Nawaz 180–83, 187–9 Sheykhi, Mohammad Taghi 129–30 Shia Islam 97–8 Shia schools of law 63–4 Shia-Sunni schism 59

slaves 61 small family norm 75, 142, 146–7, 190–91, 204–6 sovereignty 154–5 Soviet bloc 18, 19, 26–7 sterilisation 74 Stevenson, Adlai 20 Sudan 40, 78 Sunna 57–8, 59, 64, 68 Sunni Muslims, family planning 156–47 Sunni schools of law 59, 61–3 sustainable development 2, 34, 135 Syria 81, 90 Tehran World Population Day Conference 2000 132, 134, 136–7 TFR see Total Fertility Rate Third World growth 50, 194 Total Fertility Rate (TFR) 77, 81 Transjordan 16 Tunisia 78, 81, 82–3 Twelver school of law 63 U Thant 23–4 UAE 81 UDHR ( Universal Declaration on Human Rights) 22 underdevelopment 26–7 unemployment 38–9, 135–6, 138, 142–4, 173 UNESCO (United Nations, Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation) 16 United Arab Emirates 81 United Kingdom 13 United Nations Conference on the World Population Crisis 1961 162 Declaration on Population 1967 103, 162 Economic and Social Commission (ECOSOC) 15 Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) 16 family planning 21 Fund for Population Activity (UNFPA) 2, 22–3, 33, 171

Index International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) 1994 see International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) 1994 Millennium Declaration 47 Population Commission 15, 17, 19 population control 15–17 Population Division 19 religion 48 Round Table on HIV/AIDS and Population 1993 35, 43–4 World Leaders Declaration on Population 1967 103, 162 World Population Conference 1954 17–18 World Population Conference 1965 20–21 World Population Conference 1974 25–8 World Population Conference 1984 30–33 United States abortion 33 Agency for International Development (USAID) 160, 167, 169 Baptists 44 migration 40–41

255

National Security Study Memorandum 200 24–5, 29 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) 22 urbanisation 51, 144–6, 173–4, 182 valiyat-e-faqih 107, 120 wealth and fertility 79 white man’s burden 194 World Bank 24, 125, 180 World Population Conference 1927 13 World Population Conference 1954 17–18 World Population Conference 1965 20–21 World Population Conference 1974 31 Plan of Action 1994 27–8 World Population Conference 1984 30–33 World Population Plan of Action 1974 25, 27–8 Yahya Khan, Agha Muhammad 164–5 Yemen 80, 81, 88 youthquake 188, 192–3 Zahiri school of law 63–4 Zaydi school of law 63 Zia-ul-Haq, Muhammad 168–9, 172–3 Zionism 88, 204