Italian Unification: A Study in Ancient and Modern Historiography

BULLETIN OF THE INSTITUTE OF CLASSICAL STUDIES SUPPLEMENT 70 GENERAL EDITOR: GEOFFREY WAYWELL

ITALIAN UNIFICATION A STUDY IN ANCIENT AND MODERN HISTORIOGRAPHY

f HENRIK MOURITSEN

INSTITUTE OF CLASSICAL STUDIES SCHOOL OF ADVANCED STUDY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

1998

The cover illustration is taken from Karl Theodor von Piloty's 'Thusnelda im Triumphzug des Germanicus Munich, Bayerische Staatsgemäldesammlungen, Neue Pinakothek.

BICS SUPPLEMENT 70 ISBN 0 900587 81 4 First published in 1998 by the Institute of Classical Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of London, Senate House, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. © Henrik Mouritsen 1998 The right of Henrik Mouritsen to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Designed and computer typeset at the Institute of Classical Studies Printed by Remous Limited, Milborne Port, Sherborne, Dorset DT95EP

CONTENTS Acknowledgements

vii

Introduction

1

I The making of the 'Italian question' The ancient tradition on the Social War

5

II 1 2 3 4

The making of second century Italy Theodor Mommsen and the 'Italian question'Political integration in second century Italy The romanisation of second century Italy The Roman citizenship

EI 1 2 3

Italian 'unification' The 'Italian question' in Roman politics 125-91 BC The outbreak of the Social War Latins, Italians, and the Roman citizenship

23 39 59 87

109 129 153

IV Postscript

173

Bibliography

177

Index

199

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS During the work on this book I have received invaluable help and encouragement from many friends and colleagues, as well as practical and financial support from a number of institutions in both Denmark and England. I am very happy to thank, in particular, Tim Cornell, Michael Crawford, and John Patterson, who have offered both sound advice and frank criticism. John Carter, Peter Garnsey, Ittai Gradel, Patrick Kragelund, Inge Nielsen, Diura Thoden van Velzen, and Henrik Tvarn0, have also read and commented on the whole or parts of the book, for which I owe them many thanks. The responsibility for any remaining errors - and for the views expressed in the book - is of course my own. I am grateful also to Emma Dench who generously offered to improve my English text and provided friendly support throughout the last stages of this long and sometimes arduous process. I would especially like to thank my family and my friends for their support and interest in my work. In Denmark I am grateful to the Department of History at the University of Copenhagen, which granted me a research fellowship to initiate the project, and the Carlsberg Foundation, whose financial support allowed me to finish it. I also received practical assistance from the Department of History at the University of Odense. In Cambridge I received hospitality and support from Clare Hall, which granted me the Carlsberg-Clare Hall visiting fellowship, and from Darwin College. In London the Department of History at University College has provided a friendly environment from which I have greatly benefitted during the final revisions of the manuscript.

INTRODUCTION This study attempts to take a new look at an old question: the unification of Italy in the late Roman republic. The issue will be approached primarily as a historiographical problem, looking at the ways in which ancient and modern historians have dealt with this process of change in the Italian peninsula. Theoretically this approach is based on the presupposition that a clear-cut distinction between historiography and the writing of 'real' history is neither feasible nor desirable. A separation of historiography and 'history', relegating the former to a purely ancillary status, is epistemologically unsound: it relies on a positivist belief in 'facts', and the ability of the evidence, that is, products of the past, to suggest its own interpretations. If it is accepted that evidence only responds to the historian's questions, these themselves become valid objects of interest, inseparable from the past reality. All questions are asked from a modern viewpoint and relate - whether consciously or not - to existing scholarly traditions. Historiography may therefore offer an approach not only to our own explanatory strategies and preconceptions, but also to the past itself. Generally a complete scrutiny of the historiographical roots is not required to reassess a given problem. Since each generation writes its own history - to use a phrase that has almost become a banality - the past is often continuously updated under the influence of changing social, political, and economic conditions. The gradual evolution of historical interpretations means that in most areas the existing models, written from a perspective not radically different from the present, form the natural point of departure for further research. The 'Italian question', however, may call for a more explicitly historiographical evaluation, because in this case the revision process seems to have come to a halt in the nineteenth century. Since the first formulation of a general synthesis in mid nineteenth-century Germany this chapter of Roman history has remained remarkably resistent to change. The various trends and perspectives of modern historical scholarship have had little impact on the 'Italian question', the overall interpretational framework of which has remained largely unaltered. The endurance of this interpretation over some 150 years is striking, not least when compared with other central issues of Roman history, for example, early Rome, Roman 'party polities', the fall of the republic, and the character of the Augustan principate, all of which have undergone several transformations over the same period. When a particular version has become so well-established it carries with it an impetus and resistance to change, which can be challenged only by pointing out that it remains an inter­ pretation - favoured by ancient and modern historians, but based on a number of historical and ideological preconceptions, which may no longer be valid. The point is therefore to expand the scope of the discussion from specific elements within the existing model to the model itself, that is, its logical and narrative structure. By broadening the perspective the possibility of alternative interpretations of individual sources and events may emerge.

2

ITALIAN UNIFICATION

In the late republic, Italy was transformed politically as well as culturally. By the late third century BC Italy still presented a picture of diversity rather than uniformity. The peninsula was split into a large number of states - in alliance with Rome but maintaining full internal sovereignty. The political complexity was matched by an equally strong cultural plurality in languages and customs. Two hundred years later this situation had changed completely. Gone was the political diversity: the peninsula now constituted a single political entity with a common citizenship. Also the 'ethnic' plurality was difficult to trace; it had largely been replaced by a uniform Roman culture. Since the early nineteenth century much scholarship has been devoted to describing and explaining this process. Historians and archaeologists have scrutinised the structural features, the historical events and the underlying causes behind the transformation of Italy. Most scholars have worked within a model which sees the creation of a Roman Italy as the result of a long gradual convergence of Italians and Romans; a process which was accelerated when the Italians themselves began asking for Roman citizenship in the late second century. This request, initially refused by Rome, provoked the Social War which led to the enfranchisement of the allies, thus producing a politically unified Italy. The substance of this version can, I believe, be traced back to Mommsen's Römische Geschichte, which raises the question of whether it can still represent an adequate interpret­ ation by the end of the twentieth century. It would seem evident that irrespective of the many indisputable qualities of Mommsen's synthesis, his perspective on highly sensitive issues like national unification and sovereignty, the rights of the citizen, and cultural expansion/ imperialism, are now out of date. Viewed in this light - as a specific nineteenth-century inter­ pretation - the dated features of the 'convergence' theory become more apparent. As a political conflict between culturally distinct nations, this 'Italian issue' is nothing if not para­ doxical; a scenario of peoples subjected to foreign hegemony and exploitation spontaneously surrendering their sovereignty and culture in an attempt to join that hegemonic oppressor who was reluctant to admit them. To most modern observers the allied behaviour would seem to run directly counter to common expectations and experiences. Whenever expansionist powers in the past have claimed an almost harmonious fusion of neighbouring nations into their own, historians have rightly remained sceptical. This study attempts to apply a similar critical approach to the Roman version of the disappearance of the Italian nations. The ancient tradition of the 'Italian question', discussed in the opening chapter, operates with a series of political and military events stretching from Flaccus' citizenship bill in 125 to the Roman enfranchisement of the last remaining allies in the late 80's. The overriding theme of this process is the Roman citizenship: Italian demands for this status, Roman refusals, Italian insistence, and finally Roman concessions. Thus, the entire 'Italian question' ultimately depends on the meaning and implication of the ancient references to the citizenship issue. My point of departure here is an analysis of Appian and other sources, suggesting the existence of a different version, less favoured by imperial - and modern - historians. On this basis a working hypothesis is outlined according to which the Italians did not fight for mere citizenship. Their objectives, it is argued, may have been more ambitious; probably they sought a real power-sharing, giving them equal influence over the empire and its resources. When that was refused them, it was but a short step to turn away from Rome and try to break her supremacy by force.

INTRODUCTION

3

The four chapters that follow look at the structural background against which these political and military events took place. The struggle for citizenship has generally been seen as the consummation of a long process of integration, which evolved during the second century. This model will be discussed from a historical and historiographical viewpoint, asking what is the evidential basis for the convergence theory, and what function it performs within the broader narrative of the 'Italian issue'. Special attention is paid in these chapters to the logical relationship between the structural background drawn by modern scholarship and the events it is intended to explain. Mommsen's interpretation of Italian unification, as presented in his Römische Geschichte, has exerted a strong influence on the course taken by later research. The first of these chapters takes a closer look at this particular version, trying to locate it within the political and philosophical currents which existed in mid nineteenth-century Germany. Against the historiographical background, outlined here, three central elements of the modern 'Italian question' are then analysed: political integration, romanisation and the Roman citizenship, each representing a different, often complementary strategy to consolidate, improve and - tentatively - update Mommsen's model. The final part of the book turns to the political and military events, which make up the 'hard' historical core of the 'Italian question'; they will be reconsidered in the light of the historiographical analysis given in the previous chapters. It may be useful, however, at the outset to outline briefly the main elements of this process, and the central problems concerning its present reconstruction. According to the ancient sources the 'Italian question' first surfaced in 125, when Fulvius Flaccus supposedly suggested an enfranchisement of the Italians but withdrew in the face of strong opposition. A few years later C. Gracchus made an attempt at passing a modified version of this bill - with a similarly negative result. It took another generation before the issue re-emerged in Roman politics: in 91 Livius Drusus revived the bill, again without success, thus triggering the Italian revolt which turned into the Social War. While the war was raging in the peninsula, the Lex Julia was passed in 90, granting citizenship to the Latins and some of the Italians. During the subsequent struggle in Rome between Marius and Sulla, the franchise was extended to all the former Italian allies. At the same time full voting rights were granted to the new citizens, who were to be inscribed in all the Roman tribes. The final result was a politically unified Italy with a single Roman citizenship. This version of the 'Italian question' implies a strict linearity throughout the process. It relies on the assumption that from the first emergence of the question in 125 to the final settlement in the 80's we are dealing with a single consistent citizenship issue. The proposal made first by Flaccus and later revived by Drusus is perceived as identical with the Italian objectives in 91, which again coincided with the final settlement terms after the war. Thus, the solution first suggested in 125 was precisely the one which was implemented in 87 - after much pointless bloodshed. This linearity is historiographically problematic. History being a discipline of hindsight, it is advisable that neat correspondances of this type be treated with some suspicion. The point is that we know very little about both Roman citizenship bills prior to the war and the desires of the Italians. Our only certain information concerns the final outcome, that is, the politically unified Roman Italy which emerged after the war. The state of the evidence therefore itself imposes a certain finality on the whole process, which has - quite logically - been construed

4

ITALIAN UNIFICATION

as a build-up to the (known) end result. The pre-war citizenship issue is thus inferred from the status the Italians eventually received after the war - when the situation had changed drama­ tically. To draw direct inferences from the final stage of a conflict to its earlier phases is clearly a hazardous exercise - in this case further hampered by the extent - and date - of the literary evidence. For the linearity is based largely on the testimony of a single ancient source, Appian, who wrote more than two hundred years after the events. Several aspects of his account seem peculiar, and, as will be argued in the first chapter, it also contains literary features, that may explain the particular structure of his 'Italian question'. Historically, the consistency of the citizenship issue - despite profoundly changing condi­ tions and circumstances - raises several questions. There are obvious risks involved in assuming that the demands of sovereign allies speaking from a fairly strong military position in 91 were identical not only to the concessions Rome had already tentatively considered, but also to the position Rome eventually decided to grant her defeated foes. Moreover, the supposed consistency of the 'Italian issue' is challenged by the Social War itself. Most scholars now agree that, with the foundation of the new state 'Italia', the aims of the insurgents had moved far beyond mere enfranchisement. In other words, at the most crucial moment of the conflict the claimed linearity was decisively broken - an awkward point carefully avoided in Appian's version. Obviously, there are serious difficulties in rewriting a story-line against the sources, or in this case, source. Any alternative version will inevitably have to remain conjectural, based on fragments, inferences and circumstantial arguments. But the primary ambition is not so much to establish a new account of 'what really happened', which is obviously beyond our reach. The aim is to put the present version into perspective, pointing out that it is essentially a modern story told on the basis of a barely known ancient story. As part of this project the possibility of establishing an alternative course of events is explored in the last chapters of this study. For the sake of clarity, and readability, many discussions have been reduced to a minimum; often only the overall structure of previous arguments is outlined. Obviously the bibliography does not aim at completeness either - itself an impossible and futile ambition when dealing with a subject so vast and so extensively debated.

I THE MAKING OF THE 'ITALIAN QUESTION' 1 THE ANCIENT TRADITION ON THE SOCIAL WAR The 'Italian question' is centred around the Social War: without this major event there would hardly have been any issue to debate. The Italian allies revolted against Rome, were defeated and eventually absorbed into the Roman state. But what were they fighting for? The ancient sources are sparse and generally not very detailed. Still, it may be argued that the tradition of the war as a fight for citizenship was not the only one in antiquity. It may have coexisted with a view of the war as a struggle against Roman domination. The ancient evidence appears to fall into two parts: Appian, our only source of any substance, and the remaining evidence, which consists of short excerpts and fragments, scattered references, and brief summaries.1 Beginning with the latter group of sources, an attempt will be made to demonstrate the existence of these two versions of the Social War and trace their origins. Because of the sparse nature of the evidence any conclusion will necessarily have to remain conjectural, but a case can be made that the citizenship version may have been a later interpretation, superimposed on an alternative tradition which saw the war as an attempt to overthrow Roman domination. Our earliest historiographical source offering a view on Italian motives is Photius' excerpts of Diodorus' bibliotheké, written in the second half of the first century BC. This is widely believed to have been based on Posidonius' Roman history, which was probably written around 70-65.2 The exact relationship between Diodorus and his sources is disputed: his own contribution may have been somewhat larger, especially in the proems, than has previously been assumed.3 Nevertheless there seems to be little doubt that generally he relied heavily on a single source - in this part likely to have been Posidonius. Though Posidonius was contem­ porary with the events, his history hardly qualifies as an eyewitness account. He was a Greek writer living outside Italy (during the war he stayed in Rhodes), and despite personal contacts with exiled Roman nobles (for example Rutilius and Cotta) his work must to a large extent have been based on other Roman accounts.4 1 A full survey of the extant sources is given in I. Haug, 'Der römische Bundesgenossenkrieg 91-88 v.Chr. bei Titus Livius' WJA 2 (1947) 100-39, 201-58; here only those offering a view on the causes and character of the war will be considered. 2

E.g. E. Schwarz, 'Diodorus' RE 5 (1903) 663-704, esp. 663, 669, 690f, F. Cassola, 'Diodoro e la storia romana', ANRWU 30,1 (1982) 724-73, esp. 763-73, with literature, J. Malitz, Die Historien des Poseidonios (Munich 1983) 34-42.

3

Thus Cassola (1982) 726, K. S. Sacks, Diodorus Siculus and the First Century (Princeton 1990), but see also C. W. Fornara's review of the latter, CP 87 (1992) 383-8.

4

Cassola (1982) 766-78, K. Reinhardt, Tosidonios' RE 22,\ (1953) 558-826; for his life see esp. 563-67, Malitz (1983).

6

ITALIAN UNIFICATION

Diodorus makes numerous references to the objectives of the Italians. The war, we are told in 37,2,2, flared up when Drusus' promise of the 'much coveted Roman citizenship' was not fulfilled. This explanation also underlies the so-called 'Oath of Philippus', 37,11, probably a piece of political fabrication against Drusus, which was alleged to be an oath of loyalty sworn by prospective beneficiaries of his enfranchisement bill. Likewise in the description of the Marsic march on Rome, 37,13, where Poppaedius intended to 'surround the senate with armed men and demand citizenship'. In the story of the fraternisation between Romans and Marsians, Diodorus, 37,15, relates how Marius and Poppaedius: '... discussed at length the question of peace and the longed-for citizenship'. Finally in 37,18 a Cretan turned an offer of citizenship down with the words: 'Grant your reward of citizenship to the men who are now quarrelling over that very thing, and who are purchasing with blood this empty word for which men fight'. In other passages, however, Diodorus follows a quite different line of argument. The situation is thus summarised as: '... the nations of Italy revolted against Rome's domination (hegemonia) ...',37,1,6. And the outcome of the war, extending the citizenship to the Italians, is not seen as a Roman compromise, on the contrary: '... Rome's power (kratos) was firmly established' in the Social War, 37,2,3. Later the Italian motives are described even more unequivocally: 'The Italians, who so many times before had fought with distinction on behalf of Rome's hegemonia, were now risking life and limb to secure their own, ...', 37,22. More­ over, in 37,14 Diodorus notes that the Italian leaders shared their booty with the soldiers in order to encourage them to '... undertake the struggle for freedom (eleutheria) with a willing heart'. Other parts of his story also seem to support this interpretation of the war. The anec­ dote about the Latin comedian, set during the riots at Asculum, reveals strong anti-Roman sentiments among the Italians, 37,12. And Diodorus' detailed description of the new Italian state, 37,2,4-7, does, despite his attempt to dismiss it as a copy of Rome, demonstrate the de­ finitive character of the Italian secession. Their determination to fight Rome to the bitter end also appears from the embassy to Mithridates, on which Diodorus is our only source, 37,2,11. This confusion of two different versions is also apparent in Strabo's short summary of the war, 5,4,2, which may have been influenced by Posidonius.5 According to Strabo the Italians fought until: '... they achieved the partnership (koinonia) for which they went to war'. But they also broke away (apestesan), setting up a 'common city for all the Italians, instead of Rome'. These two trends are even juxtaposed in one and the same sentence, when Strabo defines their objectives as both eleutheria and politeia. The lengthy Livian account has been preserved only in short second-hand summaries, often of poor quality, which rarely comment on the causes of the war. Generally, however, the franchise issue features prominently in the descriptions of Drusus' tribunate. In this context Florus tells that: 'ius civitatis ... socii ... postularent', adding that: 'eadem fax, quae ilium (Drusum) cremavit, socios in arma et expugnationem urbis accendit', 2,6,3f. But elsewhere in the Livian tradition traces of another version seem to surface. Eutropius, 5,3, states that the Italian peoples: 'libertatem sibi aequam asserere coeperunt', and also Orosius, 5,18,2, makes reference, albeit rather confused, to libertas as an Italian objective.

5

Cf. e.g. Haug (1947) 219.

THE MAKING OF THE 'ITALIAN QUESTION' - THE ANCIENT TRADITION

7

In Plutarch's anecdote about Poppaedius visiting Drusus in 91, an attempt to force the young Cato to support the Italian cause is mentioned, Cato 2,1-4. The background is outlined as: *... the Italian allies of the Romans were making efforts to obtain Roman citizenship', and Poppaedius is alleged to have made this request: '... help us in our struggle for citizenship'. This ambition is, however, contradicted by Plutarch's own characterisation of the Social War in the biography of Marius, 32,3: '... the most warlike and most numerous of the Italian peoples combined against Rome, and came within a little of destroying her supremacy (Hege­ mon ia)1.6 The above examples demonstrate, I believe, the existence of two different traditions already in the first century BC. Attempts have been made to explain the two versions as chronological or geographical aspects of the same course of events. However, a fight for citizenship cannot easily be reconciled with a subsequent fight to destroy Rome's power: the political and cultural background which the two versions entail would seem to be fundamentally different. It is, moreover, an entirely modern solution to the historiographical problem facing us; no ancient source describes such a development. Neither is there any evidence indicating a dis­ crepancy between the objectives of the northern rebels and the Samnites.7 They took part in the same revolt and Italia was founded as a common state for all the rebels - the new capital was even located in the northern, supposedly more Rome-friendly region.8 The Samnites did continue the warfare after the others had given in. Still, that rather suggests a difference in military strength than in political aims, the Samnites being the strongest of the insurgent peoples. Clearly, therefore, the two versions of the Social War combined in the ancient sources are not complementary but contradictory. The origins of the citizenship interpretation of the war may be traced to a number of historical factors, most of which will be dealt with in greater detail in the chapters below. It is possible that some of the events in the turbulent period 91 to 87, when the whole situation in Rome and Italy was rapidly changing, may have been confused by later writers (or perhaps even contemporary provincials), thus inspiring the image of the war as a fight for Roman citizenship. The enfranchisement bills did play an important role in Drusus' tribunate - and met a deep-felt desire for such concessions (among the Latins?). Rome was, furthermore, hard-pressed by (Latin?) demands for citizenship when she passed the Lex Julia, which paved the way for a general enfranchisement of Italy. Finally the (defeated) rebels did make explicit 6

For Posidonius as a possible source on Marius see Reinhardt (1953) 638, Cassola (1982) 768, Malitz (1983) 57f, 395 n.305.

7

Contra e.g. P. A. Brunt, The Fall of the Roman Republic (Oxford 1988) 110, F. W. Walbank, 'Nationality as a factor in Roman history', Selected Papers (Cambridge 1985) 55-76, 63, A. Heuss, Römische Geschichte, 2nd ed. (Braunschweig 1964) 162. 3

Some Italians refused to join the revolt, cf. below p. 158. But the existence of these divisions between - and even within - allied communities does not affect the point made here. Generally we have no reason to believe that such disagreements sprang from a split between 'pro' and 'anti-Roman' elements. Romanisation seems to have played no part, and no cultural or historical patterns can be gleaned from these divisions. Rather they reflected different views on the political and military situation, i.e. the prospects of the whole enterprise on which the Italians were now embarking. Clearly it would be unrealistic to expect complete unanimity on a crucial decision as was the resolve to rise against Roman hegemony.

8

ITALIAN UNIFICATION

requests for the Roman citizenship. It takes little imagination to see how these elements could have been conflated into a single 'Italian issue' focused on the citizenship.9 Contemporary political propaganda in Rome may have contributed to this development. Already in the winter 91/90 an equestrian court was set up to prosecute Drusus' supporters, who were accused of having instigated the revolt. Immediately it became vital for the pro­ secutors to demonstrate intimate connections between the late tribune and the rebels.10 This image of Drusus as the friend of the Italians (and not just the Latins, as I shall argue below) would later have furnished the link between his citizenship bill, the Lex Julia, and the subsequent enfranchisement of the Italians. Also the political strife in the 80's may have distorted the picture. Diodorus tells an anecdote about amicable negotiations on enfranchise­ ment between Marius and Poppaedius as early as 90. This may plausibly have been a senatorial attempt to intimate illicit connections between Marius and the Italian enemy, to whom he and Sulpicius tried to grant (formal) political rights in Rome in 88. The original antiMarian character of this story is suggested by the general bias of Posidonius, who was deeply critical of Marius.11 Like the campaign against Drusus, this contemporary smear may later have also become part of a citizenship interpretation of the war. After the war, the process began which gradually transformed Italy into a unitary Roman state. The first century BC probably saw the disappearance of the indigenous Italian languages, most of their cultural distinctiveness vanished as romanization progressed effectively promoted by colonisation, break up of traditional settlement patterns, loss of political autonomy and the virtual genocide of the Samnites, who had formed the backbone of Oscan-speaking Italy. The former allies also became politically integrated into Rome, but not as an independent power block within the new territorial state. Split into numerous municipalities with limited political influence they were reduced to a provincial periphery around a Roman centre. Some Italian nobles slowly made their way into the senate. Most of them, however, stayed at home as domi nobiles, occasionally turning up for the consular or praetorian elections where they might bring some influence to bear. Ideologically, however, they had an important role to play. In Cicero's political thinking the local Italian nobilities embodied ancient virtue and respectability; they came to represent the solid corner-stone on which a new consensus could be built.12 This process of integration meant that the foreign character of the Italians peoples disappeared and they became a stable part of the Roman power structure. Therefore, as the first century progressed, the notion of an Italian threat to Rome would have seemed ever more unreal.

9

Certain elements may have influenced some writers in particular. Posidonius, for instance, arrived at Rome in 87, when the franchise and tribal distribution were still being vigorously disputed. This personal experience of the last stages of the war may plausibly have left an impact on his perception of the overall role played by the citizenship issue. 10 Cf. Livy. per. 71: 'Propter quae Livius Drusus invisus etiam senatui factus velut socialis belli auctor ...', Pliny, HN25,21,52: 'Drusum ... Optimates vero bellum Marsicum inputavere ...'.

"Cf. Cassola (1982) 766-8. 12

See e.g. E. Lepore, 4Da Cicerone a Ovidio. Un aspetto di storia sociale e culturale', PP 13 (1958) 80130.

THE MAKING OF THE 'ITALIAN QUESTION' - THE ANCIENT TRADITION

9

The character of the Roman citizenship also changed during the first century BC. Gradually it became separated from Roman territory and nationality (a process reinforced not least by the extensions after the Social War) and turned into a superior legal status, which could be held by foreigners irrespective of domicile - and in addition to their local citizenship. The Roman citizenship, in other words, became the highest level on a new status ladder, which now included the whole empire. The process gained impetus in the second half of the century, when double citizenship slowly became an accepted norm.13 At this time a grant of Roman citizenship could therefore with some justification be described as a maxumum beneficium (cf. Ps.-Sallust, epist. ad Caes. 6,4). Earlier the citizenship may have been a high priority for provincial nobles who aspired to a career in Rome, the Gaditane L. Cornelius Balbus being the obvious example. Most provincials, however, may still have been less enthusiastic.14 The position of Diodorus (and his likely source Posidonius) is illuminating on this issue. It is hardly mere coincidence that the earliest source is also the only one to describe explicitly the citizenship as 'much coveted' and 'longed-for', 37,2,2; 37,15: later historians all seem to take the attraction of the citizenship for granted. Apparently Posidonius, writing in the 60's for a non-Roman readership, had felt obliged to explain the alleged cause of the war. Also Diodorus' anecdote 37,18 about the Cretan who declined an offer of citizenship may have reflected a provincial (Posidonian?) wonder at an Italian fight for enfranchisement. The implication is that at this moment the citizenship was not yet considered a universal privilege; by the end of the century, however, this situation had changed completely. The transformation of republican Italy meant that the world known to later historians of the Social War bore little resemblance to the period they were describing. The cultural and political diversity of pre-war Italy had gone, leaving few traces. An Italian attempt to over­ throw Roman domination thus appeared an increasingly fantastic scenario. Roman citizenship, on the other hand, had become an attractive option to any ambitious foreigner. Therefore, the changes in the first century BC rendered an Italian quest for citizenship an ever more plausible explanation of the war - and the politically most acceptable.15 Viewed against this historical background it is hardly surprising to find the war portrayed as a fight for enfranchisement: indeed the very survival of the anti-Roman version is remark­ able. Its appearance in a number of sources, Diodorus, Strabo, Livy, Plutarch, demonstrates the strength of the alternative tradition. Naturally it features most prominently in the early sources, which were more inclined than later writers to accept its plausibility: Diodorus/Posidonius, as we saw, may have been less convinced by the idea of a bloody struggle over the citizenship. Moreover, the war seems to have lived on in popular memory as a genuine trial of strength between Romans and Italians. In Augustan times Ovid could still praise his native region in these terms: 'Paelignae dicar gloria gentis ego, quam sua libertas ad honesta coeg13

For this development see below p. 87-91.

14

Cf. M. H. Crawford, 'Greek Intellectuals and the Roman Aristocracy', in Imperialism in the Ancient World, ed. P. Garnsey and C. R. Whittaker (Cambridge 1978) 193-207, 195. 15 Asconius 22C demonstrates howfirmlyestablished this tradition was already in thefirsthalf of the first century AD. Apparently using Cicero's De or. 3,8, Asconius, almost as a conditioned reflex, in­ serted a reference to the citizenship issue for which there was no basis in his source - inadvertently con­ tradicting other statements about the quaestiones Variae made elsewhere in his commentary. Cf. p. 134.

10

ITALIAN UNIFICATION

erat arma, cum timuit socias anxia Roma manus', Am. 3,15,8-10. Born at Sulmo in 43 BC, Ovid is likely to express a local tradition of the Social War as a glorious moment when the Italians had stood up to Rome and fought for their freedom. The persistence of this tradition is also implied by Pompeius Trogus, 38,4,13: '... Italiam ... non iam libertatem, sed consortium imperii civitatisque poscentem', which refers directly to the other view, thus suggesting a split in the ancient tradition. If no one had thought the war to have been anti-Roman, such assertions would have been superfluous. The dominant tradition here relates to and coexists with a version which is most likely to go back to con­ temporary views of the Social War. In Velleius 2,27,2 the following statement is attributed to the Samnite leader Pontius Telesinus before the battle of Porta Collina, when Sulla defeated his Roman opponents and their Italian allies: '... dictitansque adesse Romanis ultimum diem vociferabatur eruendam delendamque urbem, adiciens numquam defuturos raptores Italicae libertatis lupos, nisi silva, in quam refugere solerent, esset excisa'. This story appears to be the only part of the antiRoman tradition that we might plausibly suspect to be a later fabrication. It may have originated in the Sullan propaganda against the Marians, which had tried to portray the civil war as a crusade against Rome's oldest and most obstinate enemy, the Samnites.16 There is no need, however, to posit a general rewriting of the Social War. The story works on the premise that the Samnites were widely believed to have fought against Roman domination.17 What Sulla may have done, was simply to project the anti-Roman element of the Social War up to the Civil War in order to discredit his opponents, who had been joined by the former enemies of Rome. One single pre-Appianic source completely ignores the alternative tradition. Describing Drusus' tribunate and the Social War, Velleius, 2,15-17, omits any reference to the antiRoman version, though later he quotes the Telesinus speech, which undermines his own concept. Velleius' account is, however, also in another respect unique, moulded as it is around the story of his Hirpinian ancestor Minatius Magius, who had actively supported Rome during the war. Viewed in this light, the absence of the freedom aspect is scarcely surprising. If the Italians had fought for independence, Magius would not have been a hero but a traitor to the Italian cause. To avoid this embarrassing implication the anti-Roman character of the revolt had to be suppressed. That on the other hand raised the question why a man so deeply romanised as Magius apparently was had not joined the fight for Roman citizenship. Velleius solved this problem ingeniously by turning the conflict into a civil war; the Italians, he claimed, were in fact Romans, defined as: 'homines eiusdem et gentis et sanguinis', 2,15,2.18 In this context Magius became a true hero, who had refused to turn against his Roman brothers and was justly rewarded for his loyalty. Velleius' account of the war thus appears as a carefully designed background for his own private family history. 16

Cf. E. f. Salmon, 'Sulla Redux', Ath. 42 (1964) 60-79, E. S. Gruen, Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts, 149-78 B.C. (Cambr. Mass. 1968) 254. 17

Cf. A. N. Sherwin-White, The Roman Citizenship (Oxford 1973) 2nd ed., 149 n.3, contra Brunt (1988) HOf. 18

This is thefirsttime the war is presented as a civil war in our sources. Later this view is found in e.g. Florus, 2,6,1.

THE MAKING OF THE 'ITALIAN QUESTION' - THE ANCIENT TRADITION

11

In sum, the sparse pre-Appianic evidence seems to combine two traditions, which are not only alternatives but essentially different. And while a number of historical factors may be adduced to explain the appearance of the citizenship motif in our sources, the freedom motif finds no such explanation. Appian's account represents our only substantial narrative of the 'Italian question'. It has therefore formed the cornerstone of modern interpretations, which have been almost directly moulded around this particular version. However, when evaluating its reliability and tendency, it is important to bear in mind that Appian is not only our longest source but also one of our latest. The Roman citizenship plays a dominant role in Appian's story; in fact there is no trace whatever of the alternative tradition, which still managed to surface in the earlier sources. Con­ sidering Appian's date this feature is in itself hardly surprising. As noted above, the transform­ ation of Italy and the Roman citizenship meant a gradual undermining of this line of explanation. Moreover, a citizenship interpretation of the war would have been far more appealing to Appian personally than the anti-Roman version, which found no resonance in his own experiences. Born towards the end of the first century AD in Alexandria, Appian first made a respectable administrative career in his home town.19 Having reached high posts in Alexandria, Appian later obtained equestrian offices in Rome; in his old age he even received the honorary title of imperial procurator (in the reigns of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus). He appears to have died in the 160's, before finishing the Roman history, which was probably begun around the middle of the century. Appian's rise in the imperial administration was made possible through a personal grant of Roman citizenship, presumably made while he was still an Alexandrian official. His own career therefore represents an excellent illustration of the social and economic advantages that might be derived from Roman enfranchisement. Confronted with the Italian issue of the late republic, Appian would have been able to empathise instinctively with an allied wish for Roman citizenship. To Appian the franchise version was a perfectly plausible account, indeed the only acceptable one offered to him. His historical work was written as a tribute to the greatness of the Roman empire, presented by a grateful provincial civil servant.20 Within this conceptual framework an attempt by the Italians (by then indistinguishable from Romans) to overthrow Roman rule in the first century BC (and usurp the empire!) could have no natural place. Appian's text, however, is not simply a more elaborate version of earlier interpretations which had already suggested a connection between the war and Drusus' citizenship bill. In Appian we find an Italian question which is different in both structure and detail. Important discrepancies can be pointed out between Appian's version and the other sources. The beginning of the process is put as far back as 125, when Flaccus' enfranchisement bill is presented as a direct forerunner of Drusus' in 91. This version, however, ignores important parts of the proposal, incidentally known through Valerius Maximus. Likewise Drusus' tribunate appears in a wholly different light; as we shall see, the political purpose and 19 For Appian's life see E. Schwartz, 'Appianus' RE 2,1 (1895) 216-37, 216, K. Brodersen, Appian von Alexandria. Römische Geschichte I (Stuttgart 1987) If, id. 'Appian und sein Werk', ANRW 11,34,1 (1993) 339-63, 352-4, A. M. Gowing, The Triumviral Narratives of Appian and Cassius Dio (Michigan 1992)9-18. 20

Most clearly expressed in the proemium 24, 43-47. Cf. Brodersen (1993) 355f.

12

ITALIAN UNIFICATION

chronology of Drusus' programme, described by Appian, have no parallel in the other sources. Also some of the chapters on the Social War are at variance with our remaining evidence; the chronology of the outbreak appears to have been altered, and the circumstances and chronology of the grant of citizenship by the Lex Julia are also open to doubt. Therefore, on several key points Appian's story receives little corroboration from other ancient sources. This situation asks for an explanation. Most scholars have tried to solve the problem by tracing the historiographical origins of the Appianic version.21 With its focus on possible sources previous research has thus been under the spell of the German tradition of Quellen­ forschung?2 This approach now raises a number of methodological and practical questions. The tradition of Quellenforschung and its attempts to trace and distinguish the (lost) sources of ancient accounts originated in a positivist belief in the historian's ability to separate fact and fiction.23 This approach, however, often failed to take into account the literary aspect of ancient historiography. The modern distinction between fiction and historiography, however tenuous it may be, was not considered a crucial one in antiquity. The strict rules imposed to maintain this division were therefore of little relevance to the Roman historian. With regret it has gradually been recognised that he did not share modern ideals of 'objectivity', transparency in argument, loyalty to sources, and accountability through proper references to sources and secondary literature. Still, it has rarely been fully recognised how differently he actually perceived his function of 'historian'.24 Basically the relationship between the historical text and the past 'reality' was not perceived in terms of direct referentiality; to the ancient historian this link seems to have been more 'poetic' in nature. It follows that the perception of the historian's task was quite different from the one which has prevailed in the western world since the mid nineteenth century. The idea of the historian as a 'judge' exercising justice at history's high court by separating true from false would not have been familiar to Roman practitioners of the craft. The line between past and present was not always drawn very sharply: the past was very much alive in the present and thus open to constant

21

For a survey see Schwartz (1895), Brodersen (1987) 5f, id. (1993) 256-9, W. Will, Appian von Alexandria. Römische Geschichte II (Stuttgart 1989) 2-4, D. Magnino, 'Le guerre civili di Appiano', ANRW 11,34,1 (1993) 533-54, 547-9. The most important contributions are E. Gabba, Appiano e la storia delle guerre civili (Florence 1956), P. J. Cuff, 'Prolegomena to a critical edition of Appian, B.C. F, Historia 16 (1967) 177-88, I. Hahn, 'Appian und seine Quellen', in Romanitas-Christianitas. Festschrift J. Straub (Berlin-New York 1982) 251-76. 22

Thus explicitly Cuff (1967) 177: '... Quellenforschung ... is the basis ... on which a solution to the historical problems of the period 133-70 B.C. must rest'.

23 F. G. Maier, 'Der Historiker und die Texte', HZ 238 (1984) 83-94, 88, has given this incisive definition of the positivist view of historical texts: 'Der historische Positivismus geht von der Annahme aus, dass sich in den Texten des Historikers Inhalt (gleich Information über vergangene Wirklichkeit), eingebrachte Vorverständnisse und literarische Form problemlos trennen lassen. Durch innere und äussere Quellenkritik sind darum aus Texten Tatsachen zu erschliessen, die durch Interpretation des Historikers Zusammenhang und Erklärung erhalten'. 24

Cf. T. P. Wiseman, Clio's Cosmetics (Leicester 1979), 3-53, A. J. Woodman, Rhetoric in Classical Historiography (London 1988).

THE MAKING UFTHE 'ITALIAN QUESTION' - THE ANCIENT TRADITION

13

25

chance and rewriting. It performed a practical function in the present, adaptable to the literary, ideological, and political needs of the moment. Essentially therefore the writing of history was a literary genre, closely related to rhetoric and philosophy, and subjected to artistic as well as didactic/propagandist objectives. As Woodman has argued, an element of invention must be accepted as an integral part of ancient historiography.26 The basic character of ancient historical writing thus poses yet another objection to the approach of the Quellen­ forschung: later inaccuracies, misunderstandings, and even distortions, may be manageable within this universe but hardly a literary rewriting of the past. The traditional search for sources also seems difficult to reconcile with our (few) indications of the working methods employed by the ancient historians. Though the details are shrouded in great uncertainty, a three-phased procedure appears to have been common. First suitable material was excerpted from other sources and roughly arranged according to topic, then a plain, unadorned account was written, and finally a stylistically more elaborated version was composed.27 The collection of material from a variety of sources, first formed into a continuous narrative at a later stage, means that the search for the source becomes a some­ what futile exercise. The historian may have drawn more heavily on some sources than others - presumably the first to be excerpted would have been more fully represented. But the final product could never be reduced to its individual components. They had become part of a new text, which remained the sole responsibility of the later writer/excerptor.28 Viewed against this background any attempt to trace the origins of the Appianic version back to individual (lost) sources faces great methodological difficulties. Furthermore, the most widespread identification - now most forcefully defended by Gabba - of Asinius Pollio as Appian's source on this period has the distinct character of a rescue operation: an attempt to save some of our few remnants of republican history.29 According to this theory, Pollio, himself of Italian origins, was partial to the Italian cause, to which he is supposed to have devoted considerable attention. The unique Appianic version of the 'Italian question' would therefore have derived from a highly qualified early source, which reflected an Italian view­ point on the conflict. The implications are paradoxical; despite the numerous shortcomings otherwise recognised in Appian's work, his credibility is restored in the paragraphs 7-239, which happen to be the only coherent narrative we have for the period 133 to 88. In other 25

See Woodman (1988), T. P. Wiseman, 'Lying Historians: Seven Types of Mendacity', in Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World, ed. id. and C. Gill (Exeter 1993) 122-46.

26

Woodman (1988) passim, esp. 87-94, cf. M. I. Finley, Ancient History: Evidence and Models (London 1985) 9, who noted that 'the ability of thè ancients to invent and their capacity to believe are persistently underestimated'.

27

For the working methods of ancient scholars and historians see e.g. J. E. Skydsgaard, Varro. The Scholar, ARID Suppl. 4 (Rome 1968) 101-16. 28 29

Cf. F. Millar, A Study of Cassius Dio (Oxford 1964) 28.

Gabba (1956) 13-89, J. Kühne, 'Appians historiographische Leistung', Wiss. Zeitschr. Univ. Rostock 18 (1969) 345-77, 345, G Zecchini, 'Asinio Pollione: Dall'attività politica alla riflessione storiografica', ANRW 11,30,2 (1982) 1265-96, 1282f; contra Schwartz (1895), E. Badian, review of Gabba (1956) CR 8 (1958) 160-2, M. Gelzer, review of Gabba (1956) Gnomon 30 (1958) 217, Cuff (1967) 185-8, S. Mazzarino, Il pensiero storico classico (Roma-Bari 1983) II 398ff, 533f, W. Steidle, 'Beobachtungen zu Appians "'Eii
14

ITALIAN UNIFICATION

words, the supposedly most brilliant part of his whole œuvre coincides with the 'dark age' in our history of the late republic.30 While the suspicion of ulterior motives is hard to escape, the theory is in itself evidentially weak. A single reference is made to Pollio in the second book, 346, but since Pollio's work seems to have dealt primarily with the war between Caesar and Pompey, it can hardly have been the source for the chapters relevant to our problem. 31 The suggestion that Pollio may have written a lengthy preface which covered the whole period from 133 is untenable. Appian's section on this period includes descriptions which clearly derive from more detailed accounts. Ultimately therefore Gabba's identification of Pollio rests on the assumption of a particular Italian viewpoint in this part of Appian's history. But, as already shown by Cuff, the Appianic emphasis on the 'Italian question' does not represent an allied perspective: the standpoint remains consistently Roman. 32 A sympathetic attitude to­ ward the Italian 'cause' may be detected, but again this was a recurrent feature throughout the imperial tradition. The identification of Pollio as the source thus has little explanatory value. The search for Appian's sources has, I believe, been fruitless: it is a positivist dream of uncovering hidden facts and meanings. As such it has often underestimated the complexity of historical texts and their creation. More fruitfully Appian's version might be approached as an autonomous text rather than simply the top layer of a long - but irretrievably lost ancient tradition. Too often Appian's potential sources have worked as a red herring, diverting attention from the fact that, no matter which sources Appian drew on, our text is the result of one man's determined efforts to compose a version in accordance with his own personal literary and historiographical ideals. 33 Generally these may not have been particularly original, although in this case I believe his chosen concept forced him to be bolder than he usually was. While accepting the independent character of Appian's work, Hahn has suggested that Appian generally followed a single main source for major parts of his work. 34 Though other versions were also consulted and used, a single main source determined the overall structure of entire chapters and books. Despite doubts as to the strength of Hahn's criteria - the incidence of speeches and the use of chronology - this may hold true for some books. But it can hardly have applied to the part concerning the 'Italian question'. This is exceptional in his preserved œuvre. As a general introduction to the books on the civil wars, it broadly outlines some of the most important events in the generation leading up to the war between Marius and Sulla, which remained the central topic of his first book. This introduction is 30

One is reminded of T. S. Jerome's observation that: 'the very paucity of material regarding Roman conditions seems often to produce a distinct unwillingness to discard any part of the evidence save where it is manifestly absurd or incredible', Aspects of the Study of Roman History (London-New York 1923)426.

31

Cuff (1967) 186, J. Bleicken, 'Tiberius Gracchus und die italischen Bundesgenossen', in Memoria rerum veterum. Festschrift für C.J. Classen (Stuttgart 1990) 101-31, 109.

32

Cuff (1967) 188.

33

In recent years scholars have upgraded Appian's own contribution, e.g. Steidle (1983) 403, Brodersen (1987) 6f, B. Goldmann, Einheitlichkeit und Eigenständigkeit der Historia Romana des Appian, Beitr. z. Altertumswiss. 6 (Hildesheim 1988), Will (1989) 8f, Gowing (1992) 39-50, M. Hose, Erneuerung der Vergangenheit. Die Historiker im Imperium Romanum von Florus bis Cassius Dio (StuttgartLeipzig 1994) 301. 34

Hahn (1982) 275f.

THE MAKING UF THE 'ITALIAN QUESTION' - THE ANCIENT TRADITION

15

clearly a selection of material exceipted from longer sources and adapted to the special needs of the Appianic approach, which concentrated on wars instead of domestic policy. In this hishly personal scheme, the period between 133 and 88, though crucial to the history of the Roman republic, was relevant only as a prelude to the Civil Wars. Considering its well-defined function in the narrative structure, it seems natural (or indeed necessary) to take a more comprehensive view of this part of his work - and in particular the Italians' appearance in it. Not only does Appian trace the citizenship issue all the way back to 125; in the previous chapters on Ti. Gracchus' land reform the Italians are also assigned a singularly prominent role. An analysis of this feature may be a key to a better understanding of Appian's 'Italian question' as a whole. The role of the Italians in the Gracchan programme in 133 has caused much dispute among historians, not least because of the divergent versions found in Appian and Plutarch.35 According to the former they were the primary beneficiaries of the re-distribution of public land, while the latter fails to mention them at all. Appian starts with a short presentation of the agrarian issue. After the conquest of Italy, he relates, Rome had turned parts of the foreign territories into Roman public land. But in order to have strong allies in the future, the Italians were allowed to cultivate the land on payment of duties to the Roman state. Gradually, however, the holdings of the rich grew at the expense of the poor, who were often away on military service. The expansion of large slave-run estates meant a decline in the numbers of Italians, thus undermining the military resources at Rome's disposal. This was the problem Ti. Gracchus addressed, when he proposed that the old regulations of the Lex Licinia Sextia be reinforced and new allotments given to the landless. He even gave a speech peri tou lialikou genous, in which he lamented '... that a people so valiant in war, and related in blood to the Romans, were declining little by little into pauperism and paucity of numbers ...',35. In this part of the account Appian therefore leaves no doubt that the law was an attempt to increase Italian rather than Roman manpower. Plutarch, on the other hand, mentions only Roman citizens as prospective beneficiaries of Gracchus' bill. Here the absence of the Italians may, however, be explained by the literary structure and objectives of the text; to Plutarch's biographical project the involvement of the Italians, however historically important, would have been of marginal interest. Most modern debate has focused on the historical issue raised by the apparent discrepancy between the two main sources - who were the beneficiaries of Gracchus' bill? Considerable doubt has rightly been expressed as to the reliability of the Appianic version. Certainly, his brief history of the Roman ager publicus appears to be mistaken on crucial points. The Romans had obviously not allowed defeated Italians to cultivate confiscated land in order to 35

D. Kontchalovsky, 'Recherches sur l'histoire du mouvement agraire des Gracques', Revue Historique 153 (1926) 161-86, J. Göhler, Rom und Italien (Breslau 1939) 76-83, E. Badian, Foreign Clientelae (264-70 B.C.) (Oxford 1958) 169-73, Cuff (1967), D. B. Nagle, The Failure of the Roman Political Process in 133 B.C.', Ath. 48 (1970) 372-94, Y. Shochat, 'The Lex Agraria of 133 B.C. and the Italian Allies', Ath. 48 (1970) 25-45, A. H. Bernstein, Tiberius Gracchus. Tradition and Apostasy (Ithaca 1978) 137-54, D. Stockton, The Gracchi (Oxford 1979) 42-60, J. S. Richardson, 'The Ownership of Roman Land: Tiberius Gracchus and the Italians', JRS 70 (1980) 1-11, F. Wulff-Alonso, 'Apiano: la colonización romana y los planes de Tiberio Graco', Latomus 45 (1986) 485-504, 731-50, D.-A. Kukofka, 'Waren die Bundesgenossen an den Landverteilungen des Tiberius Gracchus beteiligt?', Tyche 5 (1990) 45-61, Bleicken (1990).

16

ITALIAN UNIFICATION

keep them strong and populous. Moreover, the regulations imposed by the Lex de modo agrorum, possibly around 180, were not an attempt to restore the class of small landholders; rather it would have been an attempt to secure equal opportunities for the elite in exploiting the areas recently annexed in Southern Italy. Finally there is no reason why the socio­ economic developments described by Appian (and Plutarch!) should have affected only farmers holding small public allotments (Appian here seems to confuse the problem with the proposed solution) and within this category only the Italian holders. Clearly this was a Roman problem too, and Gracchus' initiative must therefore also have been a response to a decline in the Roman assidui, as maintained by Plutarch. While accepting this point the modern debate has evolved on the question of whether the Italians were admitted to the Gracchan land distributions or not. This in itself seems an important modification of Appian's opening chapters, where the Italians are presented as the sole beneficiaries. The historical question cannot be answered with any degree of certainty. The epigraphic evidence of the Lex Agraria is inconclusive, while Cicero refers only to Roman citizens as beneficiaries of the programme.36 Attempts have been made to save Appian's credibility by envisaging two phases in Gracchus' reform programme: an initial proposal including the Italians, and a final version from which they were excluded after popular pressure.37 But since Appian does not indicate any shift in policy, this is pure speculation. From a historical point of view Appian's account is clearly the weaker one, although that in itself may not rule out some Italian participation in the scheme.38 In line with traditional Roman practice in colon­ isation, some Italians might have been admitted. Nevertheless, it seems evident that they would have been secondary beneficiaries of a plan which was designed above all to benefit the Roman plebs. This result leads us directly to the core of the problem: how can the Appianic version of Ti. Gracchus' bill be explained, if his policy had contained no - or a much less prominent Italian element? Suggestions have been made that it might be due to Appian misunderstanding his sources, or that it might derive from later propaganda, trying to impose a stronger Italian aspect on Ti. Gracchus' policy. Appian may, it has been proposed, simply have confused references to Romans living outside Rome for Italians.39 This solution, wiping out the Italian 36

For the epigraphical evidence see e.g. Kukofka (1990) 5If, Bleicken (1990) 122f. In Cic. Leg. agr. 2,10 and 2,81 the beneficiaries are explicitly given as the Roman plebs. In other sources the Italians only appear as the injured party, Sail. lug. 42,1, Cic. Rep. 1,31, 3,41. 37 Bernstein (1978) 145-59, Stockton (1979) 46. According to Shochat (1970) 42f, the programme was not changed until after Tiberius' death. 38

Against Italian participation e.g. Badian (1958) 173, id. 'Tiberius Gracchus and the Beginning of the Roman Revolution', ANRW 1,1 (1972) 668-731, 681, Nagle (1970), J. Molthagen, 'Die Durchführung der gracchischen Agrarreform', Historia 22 (1973) 423-58, 430, Kukofka (1990). 39

Konchalowsky (1926), 171 ff, M. Gelzer, review of F. Taeger, Tiberius Gracchus (Stuttgart 1928) Gnomon 5 (1929) 296-303, 298f, reprinted in Kleine Schriften (Wiesbaden 1963) II 73-80, 75f, Badian (1972) 717 n.146, 718 n.149. Another variant of this theory has been presented by Wulff-Alonso (1986), who suggests that Appian's use of haliotai derives from a misunderstanding of Roman colonisation and the extension of her territory. Along the same lines Bleicken (1990), who, relying on H. Galsterer, Herrschaft und Verwaltung im republikanischen Italien (Munich 1976) 37-41, thinks Appian represents (and misunderstands) an original usage of 'Italia', which changed shortly after the Gracchan period.

THE MAKING OF THE 'ITALIAN QUESTION' - THE ANCIENT TRADITION

17

element with a stroke of the pen, is not entirely convincing. Appian, it is often demonstrated, was fully aware of the difference between Romans and Italians; a general confusion of terms is therefore unlikely.40 Badian has suggested that C. Gracchus, editing the speeches of his late brother, may have introduced the Italian element for political reasons.41 The theory is attractive and will be returned to later; however, as a final explanation of the Appianic version it remains unsatisfactory. To suggest Italian sympathies would be one thing, changing the entire character of the reform quite a different matter. Claiming that the Italians had been the sole beneficiaries, when - as seems most likely - they had barely been included at all, would serve no political purpose - and convince few contemporary observers.42 Too often, I believe, Appian has been approached as a quarry of more or less reliable data, rather than as a self-contained historical essay with strong literary features. The point is that, despite its factual weaknesses, there is an overall consistency in Appian's description of the background, purpose, and content of Ti. Gracchus' programme. However faulty and distorted it may be, the sketch of the history of public land is in perfect harmony with the ensuing paragraphs on Gracchus' policy. This agreement is too striking to be accidental; most likely it was the result of an adaptation to a general scheme - which may have been of Appian's own conception. Thus, underneath the Italian version there are still traces of an alternative Roman one, shining through the upper layer of rewriting. Gracchus, for instance, asks his Roman audience whether it 'was not just to let the commons divide the common property; whether a citizen was not worthy of more con­ sideration ... than a slave', 44, the implication being that the recipients were Roman citizens and not Italians, who could claim no share in the 'common property' of the Roman people. Later, Gracchus' warning to Octavius 'not to frustrate the wishes so earnestly entertained by the people, whose desires he ought rather to share in his character of tribune', 53, also suggests that the Roman voters were indeed among the beneficiaries of his bill. Addressing these very same Roman voters, Gracchus excited 'the poor, as well as others who were moved by reason rather than the desire for gain', 47, again implying that the poor voters were to gain from the distribution. The Italian element in Ti. Gracchus' policy thus seems to have been superimposed on a traditional version very similar to Plutarch's. It does in fact appear to be merely a thin, occasio­ nally even transparent, veneer applied to a storyline that works perfectly without any Italian involvement. The substance of the agrarian crisis and Gracchus' response to it are in no way bound to the allies; this factor can easily be removed without affecting the main argument. The impression of the Italian element as a later addition is supported by its abrupt abandon­ ment in the middle of the tribunate.43 By the end of ch. 57 Appian definitively leaves the idea, so forcefully asserted in the previous paragraphs, that Gracchus had fought for the revival of the Italian peasantry. In the remaining part of the introduction, no mention is made of the 40

Cf. Göhler (1939) 76-83, Gabba (1956) 43 n.l, Badian (1958) 172 n.8, Cuff (1967) 181, Shochat (1970) 40f, Bernstein (1978) 138f, Stockton (1979) 45f, Richardson (1980) 2, Wulff-Alonso (1986) 487, Kukofka( 1990) 56f. 41

Badian (1958) 172f.

42

Cf. Stockton (1979) 46.

43

Cf. Konchalowsky (1926) 166, Kukofka (1990) 56.

18

ITALIAN UNIFICATION

Italian problem, which had allegedly caused the wholescale disruption of Roman politics. Instead we find in the last chapters on Ti. Gracchus a simple conflict between apparently Roman 'rich' and 'poor', who are engaged in fighting at the assembly. Likewise, in his description of the dismantling of the Gracchan laws, Appian only mentions the consequences for the Roman poor, who were to be compensated by a distribution of money. On this occasion the population argument, originally used on the Italians, is even applied to the Roman plebs, which is now presented as the group in danger of decline. When the Italians later re-cmerge in ch.78 it is in an entirely new role. No longer faithful allies evicted from their modest lots, the Italians now appear as possessores unwilling to cede their unlawful holdings to the Roman poor. For lending his support to the allies, Scipio Aemilianus was blamed by the Roman plebs for taking the side of the Italians against them­ selves; protests which also demonstrate the Roman nationality of the recipients. The dispute over the public land, Appian claims, then led to the suggestion that Roman citizenship might be given to the Italians in return for their surrender of Roman ager publiais. Flaccus adopted the idea but failed to implement it. The abortive bill marks the temporary disappearance of the Italians from Appian's introduction. Until Drusus' tribunate in 91, they are mentioned only three times - despite the apparent pro-Italian bias of C. Gracchus' policy. These cases are, moreover, rather confused and misleading. Describing C. Gracchus' reform of the repetundae court, Appian claims that the knights received 'the power of sitting in judgement on all Romans and Italians', ch.94: a rather puzzling statement. Furthermore, the allies, mentioned in ch. 99 as recipients of suffragium, may in fact have been Roman cives sine suffragio. In the turbulent year 100 BC a single reference to Italians occurs, 132. From the context, however, it seems clear that these supporters of Saturninus and Marius were in fact Roman agrestes.44 The Italians only return to the Appianic narrative in 91 - and now they occupy the centre stage of Roman politics. This curious treatment of the Italians in the introduction obviously does not derive from any source particularly interested in the Italian problem. Nor can it be dismissed simply as a result of Appian's inability to reproduce the qualities of his source. Behind the seemingly erratic references to the Italians, a carefully designed scheme can be traced. Appian is not offering a historical interpretation in the modern sense of the word - rather he seems to be constructing links between different parts of his story. The shift between Italians as beneficiaries of the land-distribution to Italians as landholders, fiercely opposing the reform, is neither casual nor inadvertent. It takes place in three stages. The pan-Italian purpose of the bill, so prominent in the previous paragraphs, disappears in ch.57; in the description of the later part of Ti. Gracchus' tribunate, 58-70, rich and poor Romans are instead contrasted; finally in ch.78, the opposition of Italian landholders is intro­ duced. This pattern is clearly not accidental. In ch.57 Appian formally finishes the pan-Italian storyline by declaring that 'Gracchus had sown in Italy so many seeds of future strife', thus heralding its later reappearance in a different form. The interval of chs.58-70 was therefore 44

Cf. e.g. Gabba (1956) 75, Brunt (1988) 131, Bleicken (1990) 115, contra E. Badian, 'Roman Politics and the Italians (133-91 B.C.)', DdA 4-5 (1970-71) 373-409, 403, H. Schneider, 'Die politische Rolle der Plebs romana während der Tribunate des L. Appuleius Saturninus', Ane. Soc. 13-14 (1982-83) 193-221, 193-204, J. L. Beness, 'The Urban Unpopularity of Lucius Appuleius Saturninus', Antichthon 25 (1991) 33-62, 45 n.57.

THE MAKING OF THE 'ITALIAN QUESTION' -THE ANCIENT TRADITION

19

a deliberate effect - necessary to the implementation of the shift. Without the temporary disappearance of the Italians, the two versions would have been juxtaposed; now the reader is first being prepared for a new type of conflict, then an intermediate all-Roman version is discreetly introduced, before the Italian landholders are presented. In this way, Appian manages to move from a scenario of poor Italians opposed by Roman landholders to one of poor Romans opposed by Italian landholders, while avoiding a direct clash between the two. The dispute over the public land merges directly into the citizenship issue; Flaccus made an unsuccessful attempt to solve the problem by proposing to enfranchise the allies. As soon as this new development has been established, the Italians are virtually eliminated from Appian's account; in the following generation we are reminded of their existence only in a few confused references. The eclipse of the Italians has puzzled historians but is really quite logical;45 in the economy of Appian's text there was no need for the Italians in this period. Across the span of time from 125 to their reappearance in 91 a thematic link had been forged. Flaccus' proposal had been portrayed as a general enfranchisement law, which could be invoked as the direct forerunner of Drusus' bill; in the introduction to Drusus' tribunate great emphasis is placed on exactly this link. Therefore, within this literary perception of the text, the Italians had simply become redundant after 125; at that moment the enfranchisement issue had already been developed to the final form, in which it was to return in 91. A certain pattern thus seems to emerge in Appian's use of the Italians in the years 133 to 91. The Italian issue undergoes a series of transformations and between the different versions there is little if any overlap. The last example of this technique is the transition from the citizenship issue to the dispute over tribal registration after the war. In chs. 211-15, the Lex Julia is presented as the Roman response to an Etruscan-Umbrian revolt and the crucial move, which gave her the upper hand in the war. Oddly enough, however, Appian is far more concerned about the registration of the new citizens in tribes, immediately warning that it 'became the source of a new conflict'. Only once is enfranchisement mentioned again - and then only briefly. Thus, in ch.231, Appian makes a few concluding remarks on the outcome of the war, but again putting overall emphasis on the tribal issue. This structure, in itself curious considering the importance earlier attributed to enfranchisement, means that for example the negotiations at Nola in 87 BC - and thus the enfranchisement of the Samnites - do not feature at all. Appian, in other words, lost interest in enfranchisement as soon as the tribal registration issue, linking the Social War to the first Civil War between Marius and Sulla, had been (prematurely) introduced. This final linkage is, however, slightly different from the two previous ones. Despite its claimed historical importance, Appian makes no attempt to portray the dispute over tribal registration as the central issue in the strife between Marius and Sulla; it remained subordinate to the question of the Asian command. It thus deviates from the links he had established earlier, all of which had put the Italians at the very heart of events. They were not merely included in Ti. Gracchus' programme; they were his primary concern. And later in 125, Flaccus', probably more limited, measure was portrayed as a general citizenship bill en­ visaging the enfranchisement of all Italy. Likewise in 91, Italian enfranchisement was presented as the main purpose and raison d'être of Drusus' programme: the aim in which all Gabba (1956) 57f, Badian, CR 8 (1958) 161, Cuff (1967) 183f.

20

ITALIAN UNIFICATION

his other measures were instrumental. This disparity may suggest a difference in origins. The links listed above are all contradicted by other sources, whereas the tribal issue is fully in line with the remaining tradition. The dispute over registration in tribes was undeniably a con­ sequence of Italian enfranchisement. In this case Appian could therefore adopt an obvious, pre-existing, connection without making any further alterations. From this discussion it would appear that any search for historical consistency in Appian's use of the Italian element is doomed to fail; indeed that approach may have stood in the way of a proper appreciation of the strong textual coherence which characterises his account. The Italians may be seen as a literary leitmotif running through the whole of the introduction. When required by the narrative they feature very prominently; otherwise they are quite absent. By means of a succession of different Italian issues a string of associations is established between the beginning of civil strife in Rome and the first of the civil wars. The Italians, however, were probably not simply a cohesive factor used to bind together disparate elements of the story. It may have been the Italian issue itself which posed the problem calling for such measures. This, I believe, will be the conclusion if we take into account the general structure of the work, of which these chapters form part. Appian's work was a history of Rome's wars arranged according to geographical principles.46 These formal criteria were strictly adhered to; the Second Punic War, for instance, was divided into three different books, covering the Spanish, Italian, and African campaigns respectively. Likewise domestic matters were included only insofar as they related to the wars that remained Appian's primary interest. In its non-martial character the introduction to the Civil Wars is therefore exceptional, included because of the particular ideological significance of these books. The republican wars were crucial for two reasons; they led to the conquest of Egypt, in Appian's eyes the culmination of the Roman career of conquest (cf. 3,308f),47 but they also constitute an evocative contrast to the peace and prosperity of the imperial era, which was the object of Appian's unending praise.48 The Civil Wars thus had a well-defined function as the bleak background against which the principate was to be seen. To demonstrate this point vivid descriptions of bloodshed and atrocities are constantly given. The beginning of civil strife was generally traced back to Ti. Gracchus' tribunate, while the first civil war between Marius and Sulla broke out in 88: historiographically the period from 133 to 88 therefore became a prelude to the Civil Wars. In these introductory chapters Appian does not make any attempt to trace the roots of the civil wars or explain why it came to fratricidal war in Rome; he simply presents a series of events linked only by their display of political violence. In accordance with his general interest in republican history the focus is placed solely on the outer manifestations of crisis. The implicit argument is that the civil dis­ order possessed its own inner impetus and almost as a natural process escalated into riots and 46

The originality of this concept is stressed by Schwartz (1895) 234, A. Momigliano, 'Storiografia greca', Riv. Stör. It. 87 (1975) 17-46, reprinted in Sesto contributo alla storia degli studi classici e del mondo antico (Rome 1980) 33-67, 52, Brodersen (1993) 358. 47

T. J. Luce, 'Appian's Egyptian History', CP 59 (1964) 259-62, P. J. Cuff, 'Appian's Romaica: A Note', Ath. 61 (1983) 148-64, K. Brodersen, 'Die Buchtitelverzeichnisse, das Lexikon "rcepi ouv-ràÇecûç" und der Aufbau von Appians Werk', Wiener Studien 103 (1990) 49-55.

48

E.g. proem 24, 4,53-64, cf. Gabba (1956) 3-9, 211, Kühne (1969) 352, Will (1989) 9, Brodersen (1993) 355f.

THE MAKING OF THE 'ITALIAN QUESTION' - THE ANCIENT TRADITION

21

finali v war. The introduction was thus constructed as a thematic story of increasing violence which reached its logical culmination in the open warfare between Marius and Sulla (cf. 1,6). Within this structural framework, the Social War would have represented a problem. Essentially this was a foreign affair, a military response to an attack from neighbouring states; but for formal reasons, geographical and chronological, Appian had to include it in his domestic introduction to the Civil Wars. It took place within the area covered by the Civil Wars -- a region considered a natural national and political entity in Appian's day. For that reason alone the exclusion of the Social War would breach the basic structural principle underlying his work. The war also fell within the timespan covered by the introductory chapters, and there were obvious links between the war and some of the events included here, for example Drusus' and Sulpicius' tribunates. Appian's customary separation of domestic and foreign policy was therefore not feasible in this case. The introduction, however, could not accommodate the practical need to include the Social War. Instead of giving a plain chronological account of events, it was a thematic story with a plot, which served a distinct literary and ideological purpose. In this context the Social War could not be treated as the foreign affair it really was; it had to be integrated into the Roman story-line. The means used by Appian to create this impression were modest and simple. On crucial points emphasis was shifted, the chronology slightly altered, and new motives ascribed. A few random references to the Italians were scattered over the text, whereas inconvenient features, in particular the rebel state 'Italia', were suppressed. Obviously no overall consistency could emerge from such methods: as a historical interpretation Appian's text is a failure. Still, this is hardly the right criterion on which to judge it. As a literary solution to the problem it is effective and almost elegant in its simplicity. Only once does Appian seem to venture on a more substantial rewriting. Apparently without much historical basis, Ti. Gracchus' programme is presented as a scheme to relieve the Italian peasantry. A brief outline of the agrarian background is even adapted to this motive. Such an apparent display of ingenuity seems curious, not least when considering the quality of the later books of the Emphylia. This point may, as suggested by Badian, have been inspired by propaganda issued by C. Gracchus.49 Several factors might corroborate this theory. First, C. Gracchus appears to have had genuine understanding and sympathy for the Italian and Latin causes. Second, he may therefore have wished to improve his brother's Italian image - his law had caused much resentment among them - and, third, he prepared the publication of his late brother's speeches. C. Gracchus, in other words, had both motive and opportunity to insert references to kinship between Rome and her allies in Tiberius' speeches, perhaps implying intentions to include Italians among the beneficiaries. It is therefore not wholly unlikely that Appian may have found some inspiration also for this element of his story. Any hints in that direction were exactly what Appian would have needed in order to introduce the Italians right from the beginning of his story; as it happened, the new version even allowed him to mention them in the opening sentence. From the initial conception of these chapters the Italian problem must have been foremost in Appian's mind. The geographical concept of his work and the specific chronology and function of these books demanded that the Social War be integrated into the Roman prelude Badian (1958) 172f; (1972) 679f.

22

ITALIAN UNIFICATION

to the Civil Wars. On his ability to emphasise this point depended the coherence of the whole introduction. Appian, in sum, was faced with a formal problem and the solution he gave it was a formal one. 50 The Italians were turned into a literary motif, associating the war in the past with the tribunate of Ti. Gracchus and in the future with the civil war between Marius and Sulla. In this way the Social War was fitted organically into the overall plot structure of the introduction: it became the crucial stepping stone between political violence and open war. Though not itself a proper civil war, it marked the point when civil strife in Rome first led to war in the heartland of the empire; now the logical next step could only be a real civil war. Appian, in other words, managed to eliminate this problem so effectively that in the end it came to support his general story. Summing up this survey of the ancient tradition of the Social War, it now appears that the seeds of two different traditions were already sown in the years 91-87. One of them was strengthened by the historical developments which followed in the first century BC, while the other, increasingly alienated from the political and cultural reality of Roman Italy, did not survive into the next century. By focusing on certain features of the dispute - and ignoring others - it was possible to construe the war as a conflict solely concerned with the Roman citizenship; as romanisation progressed this became the only plausible version. The antiRoman tradition, on the other hand, was doomed to vanish by the very outcome of the Social War. Äs so often a lost cause found no voice in history. By chance, the only substantial account of the Social War which has survived to this day is the chapters from Appian, themselves no more than a part of the introduction to a high imperial history of the civil wars. The treatment accorded to the Social War was determined by particular formal principles adopted in this work. The result was a much broader 'Italian question', which was portrayed as a major issue in Roman politics since 133. The fight for citizenship thus appeared as the natural culmination of a long Italian struggle for equality within the Roman state. The chance survival of Appian, in other words, furnished the citizen­ ship interpretation with a suggestive political backdrop, otherwise absent from the ancient tradition. The implication is that the origins of the single linear 'Italian question', focused on the Roman citizenship, is traceable back to a single source, Appian, who may have had particular reasons for making this point. Other sources clearly assume a link between Drusus' tribunate and the outbreak of the war, but they generally remain ambiguous about the Italian objectives in the revolt. Altogether the state of the evidence throws considerable doubt on the role of the citizenship issue as the overriding theme of the 'Italian question'.

50

Millar's observation (1964) 28 that: 'It was indeed the attempt at originality of form, as opposed to that of content, which was characteristic of ancient historians' is a very precise description of Appian's 'Italian question', since its uniqueness is not one of historical interpretation but of literary composition.

II THE MAKING OF SECOND CENTURY ITALY 1 THEODOR MOMMSEN AND THE 'ITALIAN QUESTION' By the second century AD the imperial tradition of the Social War had reached its final and most radical stage, and, incidentally, the only one to survive intact up to the present day. Around the middle of the nineteenth century a further phase of Traditionsbildung began, which was to transform the Appianic version into a modern, scholarly account of RomanItalian relations in the late republic. The formation of this tradition in nineteenth-century Germany, its historical and ideological background, and its impact on later historiography, are the subjects discussed in the following pages. Special attention will be devoted to the role played by Theodor Mommsen's Römische Geschichte, a seminal work whose influence is still, I argue, apparent in modern treatments of the 'Italian question'. Although the Social War had featured in earlier histories, and also been subjected to more detailed scrutiny by, for instance, Mérimée in 1841, these works were more descriptive than analytical in their aim.1 Basically they were all paraphrases of Appian, repeating the motives given here (that is, the demand for citizenship) rather than explaining its background and implications. In this perspective a distinct change took place around the middle of the nineteenth century, when German historians began to look at the Social War from a new angle - influenced by the ideal of the liberal nation-state. The earliest example of this approach is found in A. Kiene's monograph on the War and its background, which offered the first 'modern' critical discussion of the source material.2 Though, as I shall argue later, the concept of nation underlies the entire work, it surfaces only occasionally and then rather sketchily. The full potential and implications of the national approach were not realised till 1854-56, when the first three volumes of Mommsen's Römische Geschichte were published.3 Developed into a consistent historiographical model, this formed the basis of a whole new vision of republican Rome and her relationship with the Italians. As the first modern interpretation of the 'Italian question' in a broad historical context, the importance of Mommsen's work can hardly be overestimated: a closer look at the structure and background of this model will therefore be attempted here. Despite the shortcomings pointed out above, the Appianic version remained the evidential basis for Mommsen's reconstruction of the Social War. In this he may simply have followed an established tradition - Kiene too had adhered to Appian. But it might be wondered whether 1 P. Mérimée, Essai sur la Guerre Sociale (Paris 1841). Earlier treatments included Keferstein, De bello Marsico (1812), Weiland, De bello Marsico (1834). 2

A. Kiene, Der römische Bundesgenossenkrieg (Leipzig 1844).

3

The early editions were extensively revised. All references are here to the Munich 1976 edition, which gives the traditional pagination from the 6th edition (1874). 23

24

ITALIAN UNIFICATION

Mommsen was actually in a position to question the citizenship explanation found in Appian. His history was, as has often been demonstrated, deeply rooted in contemporary German society and politics.4 And Mommsen's personal commitment to the two major issues of his time, the national and liberal causes, is likely also to have influenced his perception of Italian enfranchisement. Rooted in late eighteenth-century romantic notions of the nation, the idea of German unification had gained impetus during the Napoleonic occupation, which had demonstrated the political impotence of the atomised German state-structure. It was not, however, until the 1840's that the pan-German movement emerged as an actual political force - provoked by the dispute over the two duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. Historically under the rule of the Danish king, the future of these provinces, which had a mixed Danish and German population, had become a vexed issue as Danish national liberals argued for the full incorporation of Schleswig into Denmark, while their German counterparts in the two duchies demanded independence from Denmark. Born in Schleswig in 1817, Mommsen had a natural stake in the German national cause: when it came to war in 1848 he joined the Pan-German separatist movement, actively supporting their cause as a political journalist at a newspaper in Kiel.5 Mommsen's writings from this period leave no doubt as to the depth and earnestness of his engagement.6 Later the quest for national unity represented the driving force behind his political involvement, which brought him into the German parliament in the 1860's. Throughout Mommsen's life German unification remained the cause closest to his heart. The national cause was intimately linked to the fight for political rights, the primary ambition of the liberal Bildungsbürgertum, of which Mommsen was a prominent member.7 Both issues questioned the present political structure, which relied on the legitimacy of princes and nobility to hold power and privileges. Throughout his life Mommsen remained a fierce critic of inherited privileges, castigating the conservative Prussian Junkertum in speech and writing. His ideal was ein bürgerliches Rechtsstaat with equal rights and political influence for all worthy citizens. The idea of political participation was so deeply ingrained in Mommsen's personality, that in his famous Testamentklausul he could declare - resignedly

A. Heuss, Theodor Mommsen und das 19. Jahrhundert (Kiel 1956), A. Wucher, Theodor Mommsen. Geschichtsschreibung und Politik (Göttingen 1956), K. Christ, Von Gibbon zu Rostovtzeff (Darmstadt 1972) 84-118, id. Theodor Mommsen und die 'Römische Geschichte', in Th. Mommsen, Römische Geschichte (München 1976) VIII7-66, reprinted in Römische Geschichte und Wissenschaftsgeschichte III (Darmstadt 1983) 26-73, J. Kuczynski, Theodor Mommsen - Porträt eines Gesellschaftswissenschaftlers (Berlin 1978), Chr. Meier, 'Das Begreifen des Notwendigen. Zu Theodor Mommsens Römischer Geschichte', in Formen der Geschichtsschreibung, ed. R. Koselleck, H. Lutz, J. Rüsen (Munich 1982)201-44. For Mommsen's biography, see L. Wickert, Theodor Mommsen. Eine Biographie, I-IV (Frankfurt a. M. 1959-80). See C. Gehrcke, Theodor Mommsen als schleswig-holsteinischer Publizist (Breslau 1927). Cf. G. G. Iggers, The German Conception of History (Middletown 1968) 119, who summarised the objectives of the liberal historians as: 4a constitutional Rechtsstaat which would guarantee basic individual rights, effectively further the movement toward national unification, and generally follow progressive economic and social policies'.

THE MAKING OF SECOND CENTURY ITALY - THEODOR MOMMSEN

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- that: "... in meinem innersten Wesen ... bin ich stets ein animal politicum gewesen und wünschte ein Bürger zu sein. Das ist nicht möglich in unserer Nation ...'.x Mommsen, in sum, was a historian who combined a brilliant academic career with a strong political involvement, focused on the twin causes of Freiheit und Einheit. Seen in this light his unquestioning acceptance of the Appianic account, ignoring all inconsistencies and dis­ agreements with other sources, is less surprising; central elements of this version could be translated directly into nineteenth-century terms of 'freedom and unity'. The (allied) struggle to join a (Roman) unitary state, with equal citizen rights, as implied by Appian, formed a perfect parallel to Mommsen's own political struggle for the very same goal. In this per­ spective the supposed Italian demand for citizenship represented an entirely plausible pattern of behaviour, which Mommsen would have felt little inclination to question. As men of their time, and bound to its ideals and values, Mommsen - and his contemporaries - had in practice no other option than to make the ancient tradition their own. However, the image of smaller communities struggling to become part of a single central­ ised state now implied that national unity had already been developed. With the nation state established as the ideal political structure and natural objective of any people, the Italian demand for citizenship made sense only against a background of profound cultural assimilation of Italians and Romans. Without a common national identity Roman enfran­ chisement could not possibly have been an allied request; in that case it would have run directly counter to their national interests. Roman-Italian unity therefore became the logical implication of the acceptance of Appian's version of the 'Italian question'. Such a line of reasoning was first encountered in Kiene's explanation of the war, which contains the following passage: Was also den Bundesgenossen das römische Bürgerrecht wünchenswerth machte, war die grössere Annäherung an die herrschende Stadt in Verfassung, Recht, Sitten, Bildung, kurz in der gesammten Denk- und Anschauungsweise. Nachdem also das Bewusstsein selbstständiger Staaten gebrochen und mehr und mehr aus den Gemüthern verschwunden war, mussten die durch Jahrhunderte fortgesezten gemeinsamen Kriegszüge und der unmerklich um sich greifende Einfluss des herrschenden Volkes eine solche Verschmel­ zung mehr und mehr erzeugen; die Bundesgenossen mussten sich auf der einen Seite gewöhnen, in Roms Interesse das ihrige zu sehen, aber auch immer nachdrücklicher eine Gleichstellung mit der herrschenden Stadt fordern.9 As previous independence became a distant memory, the Italians, Kiene argues, gradually took over Roman law, customs and their way of thinking - a process promoted by their continuous common warfare. From this assumption of Roman lifestyle and outlook a wish for equality within the Roman state would be the natural consequence. Placed in such a cultural context the Italian demand for Roman citizenship no longer collided with the national idea: it had now become an expression of a new Roman identity. Though it remained sketchy,

Here quoted after Wucher (1956) 219. Cf. L. Gall, 'Ich wünschte ein Bürger zu sein'. Zum Selbstverständnis des deutschen Bürgertums im 19. Jahrhundert', HZ245 (1987) 601-23. 9

Kiene (1844) 120.

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ITALIAN UNIFICATION

Kiene's interpretation thus marked the introduction of a new explanatory strategy, which was to be fully developed in Mommsen's Römische Geschichte.10 Mommsen's response to the problem, described above, was very similar to Kiene's. But the formal differences between their works, monograph and narrative respectively, meant that an extra diachronic dimension was added to the background briefly outlined by Kiene. Nowhere does Mommsen 'explain' the Social War; his interpretation is woven into the broad narrative in which the event has been placed. Around the 'core', already found in Kiene, Mommsen composed the first large scale history of Italy in accordance with the new scholarly principles and with the national approach. ' l A key to Mommsen's understanding of republican Italy is already given in the introduction, where he declares that: Es ist die Geschichte Italiens, die hier erzählt werden soll, nicht die Geschichte der Stadt Rom. Wenn auch nach formalem Staatsrecht die Stadtgemeinde von Rom es war, die die Herrschaft erst über Italien, dann über die Welt gewann, so lässt sich doch dies im höheren geschichtlichen Sinne keineswegs behaupten und erscheint das, was man die Bezwingung Italiens durch die Römer zu nennen gewohnt ist, vielmehr als die Einigung zu einem Staate des gesamten Stammes der Italiker, von dem die Römer wohl der gewaltigste, aber doch nur ein Zweig sind. (1,6) The Roman conquest, in other words, was merely Italy's 'Vereinigung unter der Führung des latinischen Stammes' and the later Roman expansion thus marked the creation of an 'italischen Weltherrschaft' (1,6) rather than a Roman one. This programmatic statement might seem peculiar considering the long and bloody wars which preceded the 'unification'; but, as I shall argue below, it is fully explicable within the ideology of the work - and strictly adhered to throughout the account. In any case, when Rome finally managed to impose the new system of alliances on the defeated Italians, Mommsen insists on treating this as a political unification. Not simply sub­ jected to Roman hegemony, Mommsen claims that: 'Zum erstenmal war Italien unter der Herrschaft der römischen Gemeinde zu einem Staat vereinigt' (1,418).12 Italy had thus become a single state - though rights and influence had been unevenly distributed, with the leadership remaining firmly in the hands of Rome.13 The political unity, Mommsen claims, was accompanied by cultural unification: 'Das neue Italien war also eine politische Einheit geworden; es war aber auch im Zuge, eine nationale 10

The novelty of this approach is illustrated by a comparison with the study by Mérimée (1841), which appeared just a few years earlier. Here wefindno trace of Italian assimilation or common cause with Rome. Mérimée saw it as a simple question of exploitation and domination, presenting the relationship between Rome and her allies as one of master and vassals, 2. Later he even compares the position of Italians and Greeks to that of non-European peoples in contemporary colonies, 1 If. II

For Mommsen's national interpretation of republican Italy see Heuss (1956) 85, Meier (1982) 225f.

12

Cf. 1,412: 4... die politische Ordnung ..., nach der das also geeinigte Italien von Rom aus regiert ward

13 Cf. 1,418f: 'Im einzelnen war das Verhältnis, in welchem die Italiker zu der führenden Gemeinde standen, ein höchst ungleiches,...'.

THE MAKING OF SECOND CENTURY ITALY - THEODOR MOMMSEN

27

werden.' (1,429). Through the Roman supremacy Latin language and customs had acquired stronii attraction: '... mit dem latinischen Volke gewannen auch dessen Sprache und Sitte . itaiicn zunächst das Prinzipat und fingen bereits an, die übrigen italischen Nationalitäten untergraben.' (1,452). As the Latin nationality 'die übrigen italischen immer mehr verdunkelt' (1,451), the Italians independently began emulating Roman models, increasingly approaching the culture of the leading member of the Roman-Italian state. Consequently, Mommsen states: '... die reiche Fülle der nationalen Bildungen Italiens allmählich unterging, um ein einziges Volk zu bereichern.' (1,451). By this process the Italian nationalities merged into Rome, developing a common Roman-Italian identity. With an end brought to the old conflicts: '... so brach doch auf die Länge das gesunde Nationalgefühl notwendig sich Bahn' (1,428). No precise date is given for this second unification of Italy, which followed the political unity. But Mommsen seems to place it as far back as the third century: apparently the process was well advanced before the Mediterranean expansion of the 'Italian nation' began in the late third century. After the Second Punic War the Roman senate, previously the embodiment of Roman virtue, declined into a 'durch Erbfolge sich ergänzenden und kollegialisch missregierenden Herrenstand' (1,793), and this change in leadership had adverse consequences for the Latins and Italians.14 The Roman citizenry became more and more exclusive, jealously guarding its position and privileges. The traditionally favoured Latins were reduced to the status of Italian allies, and the gap between Roman citizens and their allies deepened: '... so trat die Bürger­ schaft ihrerseits der italischen Eidgenossenschaft gegenüber und schloss diese mehr und mehr von dem Mitgenuss der Herrschaft aus, während sie an den gemeinen Lasten doppelten und dreifachen Anteil überkam' (1,802). The result was 'eine tiefe Verstimmung' spreading among the Italian allies. As time passed and the empire grew, the position of the allies deteriorated even further: 'Ihre eigene Stellung indessen hatte sich wohl verändert, aber eher verschlechtert als verbessert' (11,218). Though materially they received their fair share of the conquests, their political impotence became ever more apparent: '...die politische Zurücksetzung ward immer herber, immer schroffer' (ibid.). In the second part of the century the desire for equality, 'Gleichstellung', could no longer be restrained - although the confrontation was initially '... zurückgehalten durch das Gefühl der nationalen Einheit ...' (11,221). It was not till after Flaccus' bill had foundered in 125 (and the revolt of Fregellae had been brutally suppressed), that the Italian movement attained its more radical character. In 91 they had invested their hopes in Livius Drusus, this time also threatening to put force behind their demand; therefore when the otherwise split Roman citizenry now united in 'einem gerechten und jetzt auch mit ansehnlicher Macht unterstützten Begehren der Untertanen mit starrer Borniertheit in den Weg zu treten' (11,228) the Social War could no longer be avoided. After the outbreak of the war and the foundation of 'Italia', Mommsen recognises that the Italian aims had shifted from seeking 'Gleichberechtigung' to actually destroying Rome's supremacy in order to take over her position (11,230). Generally, however, he does not seem to pay much attention to this aspect; the ensuing enfranchisement of the Italians is clearly 14 'Am bestimmtesten tritt der veränderte Geist der Regierung hervor in der Behandlung der italischen und ausseritalischen Untertanen der römischen Gemeinde' (1,798).

28

ITALIAN UNIFICATION

perceived as the natural (or even ideal) outcome of the conflict. Later, Mommsen's praise of Sulla's recognition of the Italian enfranchisement is remarkable: '... indem er [Sulla] sich und seine Partei zwang, die Gleichberechtigung aller Italiker vor dem Gesetz anzuerkennen, der wahre und letzte Urheber der vollen staatlichen Einheit Italiens geworden - ein Gewinn, der mit endloser Not und Strömen von Blut dennoch nicht zu teuer erkauft war' (11,373). This highly personal model raises numerous questions, concerning its intrinsic logic and the relationship between the individual components and the actual evidence. To a modern reader some of the most striking features are the early dating of the supposed national unity and the perception of the Italian alliances as a proper state structure. A key to an under­ standing of these as well as other peculiarities of Mommsen's model, may be furnished by his interpretation of the situation in 91; presumably the pivotal point around which the entire scheme was constructed. The combination of national unity and political inequality, that seemed to underlie the Italian demand for citizenship, appears to have been the fixed element, which determined the position of the other factors. Mommsen's repeated claim that Romans and Italians had already developed a common national identity in the third century is puzzling today. No epigraphical, archaeological, or literary evidence would indicate any profound fusion of cultures at this early juncture; even among scholars, who believe in the development of such unity before the Social War, no one has ventured a date prior to the Second Punic War. But even Mommsen himself does not seem to make any serious attempt to substantiate the claim; no real evidence is adduced. The underlying rationale of this idea was, I think, the need to separate chronologically the national unification from the growing political alienation of the Italians in the second century. The image of self-romanising Italians would be very difficult to reconcile to the testimonies of Roman exploitation and oppression, which played a crucial role in provoking the Social War. Consequently, the unity, which was also apparent in 91, would already have been created before the new antagonism began. To survive this conflict the national unity would, moreover, have gained a remarkable strength early on; otherwise it would not have been able to put such restraint on Italian disaffection and directed it towards Roman citizenship instead of secession and independence. The cultural unification therefore had to be a process that was already complete by the third century. That in turn presupposed that a strong political framework had already been established. Without such a supra-national structure the emergence at this particular moment of a common Roman-Italian identity would be much harder, indeed impossible, to explain. Such consider­ ations may plausibly have underlain the other peculiarity in Mommsen's thesis: his insistence on seeing third century Italy as a single state under Roman rule. By consistently presenting the allies as Roman subjects, Untertanen, Mommsen deliberately ignored the special character of the treaty system; for while surrendering their foreign policy, the Italians had maintained full internal sovereignty within recognised borders. This extensive autonomy is simply dis­ missed as Kommunalfreiheit. Understandably Mommsen's vision of a complete political unification in the early third century has found few followers and makes sense, I believe, only when perceived as a necessary condition for the romanisation so crucial to his model. Mommsen's reconstruction of an Italian unification is in itself a consistent and logical explanation of the perceived situation in 91, but as such its justification goes beyond the actual evidence, with which it often collides.

THE MAKING OF SECOND CENTURY ITALY - THEODOR MOMMSEN

29

After the outbreak of the war Mommsen was forced to admit that Italian ambitions had chansed from Roman citizenship to independence from Rome. Thereby he created the in­ superable paradox, inherent in most later interpretations, that (deeply romanised) Italians would first have demanded full integration into the Roman state and then made a determined attempt to crush this very same state. Historiographically this situation is not difficult to explain. For reasons already discussed, Mommsen generally accepted the citizenship-version found in Appian. But as a critical historian of the German school Mommsen could not ignore the alternative sources either (Diodorus, coins, etc.). Throwing light on the new Italian state (ignored by Appian), these highlighted the anti-Roman character of the rising. By applying these elements to the Appianic story-line Mommsen managed to combine all the evidence in a sin a le picture; the result was an 'Italian question' based on two heterogeneous (indeed in­ compatible) versions of the war. While taking into account the alternative version of the war, Mommsen avoided drawing any conclusions from this evidence; the general perception of the war as the final step towards unification remains unaltered. As we saw, the subsequent enfranchisement was described as 'der vollen staatlichen Einheit Italiens ... ein Gewinn, der mit endloser Not und Strömen von Blut dennoch nicht zu teuer erkauft war' (11,373). The implication is that the incorporation of defeated Italians into the Roman state, which they had just recently done their utmost to destroy, is still perceived as the happy creation of full political unity. This seemingly para­ doxical use of the concept of unification recalls Mommsen's opening definition of the conquest of Italy as a Vereinigung rather than a Bezwingung. These statements, apparently so incomprehensible in their immediate historical context, should direct our attention to some of the philosophical notions underlying Mommsen's work. Mommsen's Römische Geschichte is a primary example of German idealist historicism, which had identified the nation as 'the unit in which time marches forward'. 15 Perceived as organic entities with individual lives and destinies, nations ascended to a higher almost meta­ physical sphere, and World-history was identified with the stories of the nations, their birth, maturity and demise. First formulated by Herder and the early romantics, this philosophy soon became deeply integrated into popular ideology and historical thinking. In the philosophical system developed by Hegel the notions of the romantics received new meaning and purpose; most crucially they were now linked to the political concept of state­ hood. In Hegelian thought history represented the cosmic spirit's progress towards selfrealisation.16 Through a dialectic process, the world spirit, History's ruling principle, moved towards full awareness of its own potentials. In its course towards the ultimate goal, defined

15 J. Appleby, L. Hunt, M. Jacob, Telling the Truth about History (New York-London 1994) 65. Still fundamental on German historicism is F. Meinecke, Die Entstehung des Historismus, I-II (Munich/ Berlin 1936). Important also O. G. Oexle, 'Die Geschichtswissenschaft im Zeichen des Historismus', HZ 238 (1984) 17-55, who distinguishes between 'Historismus als geistig-kultureller Bewegung' and 'der idealistischen Begründung der Geschichtswissenschaft', represented by Humboldt, Ranke (and Mommsen), 40. Between those two forms of historicism Oexle denies the existence of any 'notwendige und exklusive Beziehung', 39. 16 C. Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society (Cambridge 1979) esp. 84ff, 0. Krogseth, Den tyske historismen (Oslo 1984) 344-57, S. Houlgate, Freedom, Truth and History. An Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy (London 1991) esp. 28-40.

ITALIAN UNIFICATION

30

as freedom, the world spirit acted through various agents. Most importantly a nation could at a certain moment in time act in accordance with History's great scheme. The fulfilment of the spirit required that a community of reason be realised. As Charles Taylor has put it: 'Spirit is trying to come to an understanding, a knowledge of self. But in order to do this it must bring into existence a reality, a spiritual community which must also be a real community (the 'geistige Welt' must be embodied in a 'Staat') which is adequate to its concept'.17 The formation of states was thus perceived to be an essential part of History's progress. Indeed 'all important historical developments take place in such (i.e. rational) communities. Those men who live outside a state, in patriarchal tribal societies for instance, are totally on the margins of history, either before it really starts or at its fringes'.18 The nineteenth-century ideal of the nation, which realised itself in the unitary state, was thus elevated to a universal historical telos. Mommsen cannot be classified as a Hegelian historian in the strict sense of the term; speculative metaphysics and a priori rules were generally alien to his practical approach to history. Nevertheless, numerous features of his work seem to reveal a certain, probably indirect, influence from Hegelian thought, which by the mid-nineteenth century represented the dominant mode of thinking in German academia.19 Most unequivocally Hegelian appears his view of history as a meaningful process, subjected to the laws of necessity. Mommsen frequently made reference to 'die notwendigen Gesetze der Entwicklung', 'der Druck der Unabwendbarkeit', or 'die unwandelbaren Gesetze des Notwendigen', which determined the overall course of history.20 Though he may have rejected more specific a priori schemes, his belief in historical progress seems unshakeable. The focal point of Mommsen's historical thinking remained the nation, which he perceived not in abstract terms but as a manifest reality. In the words of A. Heuss: 'Die Nation und der Nationalstaat sind für Mommsen keine geschichtlichen Bildungen und damit in den Fluss der Zeit hineingestellt, sondern naturgesetzliche Daten, mit denen er nicht nur normativ als zeitlosen Massstäben rechnet, sondern die er auch ohne Bedenken in der Geschichte als Realitäten ansetzt'. Mommsen, in other words, considered nations to be the essential elements of history; their struggles to realise themselves in the national state represented to him the most forceful vindication of historical progress. This ideology is apparent in Mommsen's reconstruction of republican Italy. Essentially this was seen as a national project; the example of Latium, Mommsen declares, was: '... für alle Zeiten der Prototyp der nationalen Entwicklung' (I,176).21 They alone among the ancient 17

Taylor (1979) 95.

18

Taylor, ibid. 96.

19

For Hegelian influence on Mommsen see Heuss (1956) 75, 85, 132-35, Wucher (1956) 75f, 91.

20

Reden und Aufsätze (Berlin 1912) 199, RG 11,3, Gesammelte Schriften (Berlin 1905-13) V 384f.

21

Cf. 1,40: 'Das mannigfache Spiel, wie die ältesten politischen Atome, die Gaue, sich in Latium gesucht und geflohen haben mögen, ist ohne berichtfähige Zeugen vorübergegangen, und es muss genügen, das Eine und Bleibende darin festzuhalten, dass sie in einem gemeinschaftlichen Mittelpunkt zwar nicht ihre Einheitlichkeit aufgaben, aber doch das Gefühl der nationalen Zusammengehörigkeit

THE MAKING OF SECOND CENTURY ITALY - THEODOR MOMMSEN

31

^oples had achieved 'bei einer auf Selbstregiment ruhenden Verfassung die nationale Finheit" (L29). The national state of the Latins gave them a natural superiority over the other Italian nations - and a strong expansive power. Though the confrontation with the Samnites had been crucial, the outcome seems to have been decided beforehand;22 for 'nur im Einheits­ staat ist die Kraft so konzentriert, die Leidenschaft so mächtig, dass die Erweiterung des Gebiets planmässig verfolgt wird' (1,114). While acknowledging the heroic resistance of the Samnites, Mommsen implies that they were up against forces of history they could not possibly overcome. As the proto-typical unitary state, Rome had a historical mission to bring tosether all the Italian peoples in a common state. From a philosophical perspective Rome's function is evident: in uniting the Italians she was a tool in the hands of History.23 According to the idea of nations realising their Volksgeist in the national state, the creation of an Italian (that is, Roman) state was obviously part of history's progress. From that point of view the Roman conquest of Italy was fully justifiable; the asent of history enjoyed the absolute right to overcome any opposition that might be raised against him. In doing so Rome simply performed the task that had been assigned to her. But just as it was Rome's destiny to unite and rule, so the Italians were doomed to give in to her leadership - militarily as well as culturally. The romanisation of Italy is thus portrayed as a natural development, inevitably following political unification. Defined merely as 'sekundären Nationalitäten' (I,454)24 it was their lot to merge with Rome and join in her world historical mission. Therefore, despite little Roman incitement, the spread of Latin language and customs could not be halted, promoted as it was by the very nature of things ('die Natur der Verhältnisse', 1,452). So strong were the forces behind romanisation that Mommsen, speaking of the provinces, could even liken them to a natural law: 'Kraft des Gesetzes, dass das zum Staat entwickelte Volk die politisch unmündigen, das zivilisierte die geistig unmündigen Nachbarn in sich auflöst - kraft dieses Gesetzes, das so allgemeingültig und so sehr Naturgesetz ist wie das Gesetz der Schwere, ...' (111,220). In this context, Mommsen's definition of the Roman conquest as a Vereinigung is no longer so absurd as might first appear. At the time, of course, it had seemed a straightforward conquest of neighbouring states, fiercely resisting Roman subjugation. But within a larger perspective, Mommsen could have little doubt that this had been a true unification. The crucial point was that Rome actually succeeded in unifying Italy both culturally and politi­ cally; by the turn of the eras Romans and Italians had merged completely. This harmonious outcome in itself proved that the conquest had in fact been a unification. If, on the other hand, this had not been the case, it would have been evident that, first, Rome had not been acting in accordance with History, and, second, that her aim had not been national unification. The hegten und steigerten und damit den Fortschritt vorbereiteten von dem kantonalen Partikularismus, mit dem jede Volksgeschichte anhebt und anheben muss, zu der nationalen Einigung, mit der jede Volksgeschichte endigt oder doch endigen sollte.' 22

Cf. Meier (1982) 226.

23

Mommsen places Rome as early as the fifth century among '... diejenigen Nationen, welche die Gunst der Götter und die eigene Tüchtigkeit jede in ihrer Landschaft an die Spitze gerufen hatten ...', 1,382. 24

Cf. 11,406.

32

ITALIAN UNIFICATION

nature of historical progress, perceived as a movement towards the unitary state, in itself vindicated the Roman conquest as a mission of unification. As the first people to have reached national unity it was Rome's responsibility to realise the potentials of the whole of the Italian nation, which had supposedly fallen from an original prehistoric unity.25 In pursuing this end, Rome had been entirely justified in her use of force against intransigent Italians. The implication of this deterministic approach is that history becomes its own explanation and justification; the true character of an event or process is revealed only retrospectively in the light of its final outcome and ultimate consequence. As parts of the progressive course of history, the individual events were endowed with meaning; that in turn could be grasped by looking at the way in which they contributed to the perceived ends of history. What we find exemplified in Mommsen's 'Italian question' is teleology elevated to hermeneutic method. As we saw, the philosophical framework within which Mommsen worked furnished a perfect explanation of the vanishing of the Italian peoples - a feature otherwise difficult to reconcile with the idea of the nations as non-historical agents. Their actual disappearance was tangible proof that they had been secondary nations, destined to give in. Still, that was only one side of the explanation. For by insisting on treating second century Rome as an Italian nation, Mommsen suggests that they had not really vanished at all: by merging into Rome they had merely ascended to a higher level of nationality. It was only their previous, imperfect form of nationhood that had disappeared with the Roman conquest. Contemporary political theorists held similar views. The concept that lesser nations were unable to form nation states of their own appears to have been widespread in the nineteenth century. According to the 'threshold-principle' it was not considered feasible (or profitable) for smaller nations to form independent states. In the words of E. J. Hobsbawm: '... it seemed clear that small, and especially small and backward, nationalities had everything to gain by merging into greater nations, and making their contributions to humanity through these'.26 In this ideological context the disappearance of Italian independence (and eventually also culture) represented a natural and altogether sensible process.27 Summarising the reflections made above, it seems of great importance that the first modern evaluation of the Italian issue coincided with the blooming of national liberalism in nineteenth-century Germany. In this political climate Appian's expanded version of the citizenship interpretation of the Social War could immediately be appreciated as a parallel to the liberal quest for equality and influence. Appian and Mommsen did, I believe, to a large 25

Cf. 1,43.

26

Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge 1990) 34, which gives an evocative example of this view from Mill's Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government: 'Nobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial for a Breton or a Basque of French Navarre to be... a member of the French nation­ ality, admitted on equal terms to all the privileges of French citizenship ... than to sulk on his own rocks, the half-savage relic of past times, revolving in his own little mental orbit, without participation or interest in the general movement of the world. The same remark applies to the Welshman or the Scottish highlander as members of the British nation' - or, we might add, to the Italian as member of the Roman nation. 27

Politically Mommsen made a sharp distinction between states and provinces; cf. Heuss (1956) 147: '... wenn Mommsen aus dem Staat Kommunen und Provinzen als Grössen sui generis herausschneidet. Sie sind dem einheitlichen politischen Wollen des Staates als die Körper der individuellen Bedürfnisse entgegengesetzt und dürfen sich nicht anmassen, selbst Staat zu sein.'

THE MAKING OF SECOND CENTURY ITALY - THEODOR MOMMSEN

33

rnt share the same perspective on the Italian issue: both viewed the question at long mporal distance under the influence of vital contemporary issues. The alleged quest for Roman citizenship appeared as plausible to a provincial of the high empire as it did to a ineteenth-century liberal academic. However different, their personal experiences converged actly o n tn is point of civic status and privilege. Likewise, the temporal distance from which they both saw the dispute meant that the greatness and world historical importance of the Roman empire had become an obvious truth, which formed the natural point of departure for both interpretations. Their common task was to explain this fact - not question its self-evident character. Because Appian's 'Italian question' had covered only the period 133-87, his frame of reference, that is, the completed romanisation of Italy and the appeal of citizenship in the second century AD, could remain an implicit set of premises. But that presented modern historians with a serious challenge. For by accepting Appian's version of the 'Italian question', they were left with the task of reconciling his premises with the remaining body of ancient sources. New standards of scholarship forced them to take-into account all the relevant sources, including the traces of an alternative tradition of the war and the abundance of evidence relating to the Roman conquest, domination and exploitation of Italy. The first problem was solved by simply conflating the two traditions, while maintaining an overall Appianic perspective. The second one demanded that Appian's version be meaningfully fitted into a broader republican context; this had wide implications for the interpretation of Italy in the third and second centuries BC. The alleged demand for citizenship obviously presupposed that a common identity, now interpreted as national unity, had been created between Romans and Italians. In the early third century, however, the latter had formed independent nations, culturally distinct from Rome and stubbornly resisting her domination. Those were the two 'hard facts' which a model of republican Italy had to combine. A course of events must be envisaged, leading from bloody confrontation to national unity. Around this basic story-line Mommsen composed the first narrative, which put the Social War at the end of a long process of Italian unification. Within this scheme a two-phased plot was carefully constructed. The creation of political and cultural unity was already envisaged in the third century; a common nationality thus formed the back­ ground for the growing oppression in the second century, which led to the demand for citizenship and eventually the completion of full national unity. As the first scholars to attempt to solve the problem raised by the Appianic version, Mommsen and Kiene set an important precedent for later historians. An essential contribution was, I think, their perception of Italian unity, implied by Appian, as nationhood - with all its modern ideological implications. National unity, itself a heated political issue at the time, was considered a non-historical concept and a fundamental force behind the progress of History. A process, which had led to this goal, thus acquired a deeper metaphysical meaning: its very success endowed it with a strong element of inevitability. In accordance with this teleological approach the 'link' between the Samnite Wars and the Social War could be interpreted as a logical and necessary movement from division to unity. Through a dialectical process perhaps of Hegelian origins - political and cultural unity was supposed to have been achieved in the wake of the Roman conquest. Later this was followed by full civic equality, enforced by a renewed, but now internalised, conflict between Romans and Italians.

34

ITALIAN UNIFICATION

Though parts of this model, so overtly reflecting contemporary German politics and ideology, have been abandoned by later scholarship, the overall structure remains. As well as many of its central elements, this is still apparent in modern reconstructions of 'Roman Italy' which all describe patterns of romanisation and integration similar to those envisaged by Mommsen. Moreover, the changes made to the model have often been detrimental to its internal logic and coherence. In recognition of the poor evidential support for a cultural fusion in the third century, this phase has been postponed until the second century. Likewise, the view that the Italian treaties provided a proper state structure has found few followers: instead, an increasing administra­ tive integration has been detected in the second century.28 The final outcome thus remains the same: a Roman-Italian unity, explaining the Italian demand for citizenship instead of independence. The new chronology, however, implies a coincidence between the accultura­ tion and the growing antagonism, which provoked the citizenship issue. This paradox had been avoided by Mommsen by locating the national unification before the Roman-Italian conflict of the second century. This logic was lost with the modern attempts to accommodate Mommsen's model to the ancient evidence. To overcome the problems raised by the modern chronology, other scholars have denied the very existence of a second century conflict, likely as it was to have halted the progress of romanisation.29 But that means that the unequivocal signs of Roman exploitation and encroachment are ignored. Moreover, without this antagonism the atrocities of the Social War also become difficult to explain. Therefore, pursuing this reconciliatory line of argument to its logical end, some historians have also expressed doubt as to the anti-Roman character of the Social War - a feature even Mommsen, the founder of the 'national' interpretation, had felt obliged to accept. Another approach has tended to downgrade the unitary aspect by emphasising the practical benefits to be derived from Roman enfranchisement. Interpreted simply as a higher legal status, the Roman citizenship is seen as the natural focus for any social and economic ambitions entertained by the Italians - irrespective of their national sentiments. Though this explanation might seem to distance itself from the Mommsenian model, it does in fact rely on exactly the same premises of Roman-Italian unity. The argument is based on a comparison of the rights and opportunities enjoyed by individual Romans, Latins, and Italians. But the inequality thus demonstrated does not in itself explain a demand for Roman citizenship; the supposition is that the Italians saw themselves as part of a common state structure under Roman rule. Otherwise the inequality would have been one between hegemonic and dominated states, which by its very nature must seek entirely different solutions. The in­ dividualising approach remains part of a unitary perspective of Italy, where Italians constitute an underprivileged class rather than independent states. Clearly therefore we are dealing with a variant of the national model; its origins can in fact be traced all the way back to Kiene's pioneering work. Here the one-nation view of Italy was combined with a meticulous analysis 28 29

See the detailed discussion in the next chapter.

Most often encountered in German historiography, e.g. Göhler (1939), Heuss (1964) 66, 137-39, 163-68, J. Bleicken, Die Verfassung der römischen Republik (Paderborn 1975) 206ff, Galsterer (1976), though Brunt (1988), represents another example.

THE MAKING OF SECOND CENTURY ITALY - THEODOR MOMMSEN

35

, -m-aualities of status which formed the background for (and implicit explanation of) the of the w<-H citizenship issue. TI e implication is that no real alternative to Mommsen's model has yet been established, -t.- its a*e and now obvious anachronisms. Later interpretations have all remained within despite

ll3

c

Mommsenian framework - though its weaknesses have not gone unnoticed. Various r »aies have been attempted in order to reconcile the model to our evidence, some by ditVins the m o s t P a t e n t ly nineteenth-century features, others by trying to improve the con• tency of the national model. They all highlight the remarkable strength of this version. In 1er to understand this feature better we may look at some of the formal aspects of the work. The lansuage and literary style of Mommsen's Römische Geschichte certainly rank among the most powerful ever brought into play in classical historiography. It is questionable, however, whether this actually improved its chances of a lasting impact on modern scholars­ hip Today, the vivid literary style and unashamedly anachronistic terminology are effective reminders of the nineteenth-century Germany which remained the constant frame of reference for his work. But Mommsen's 'Italian question' may also be approached as a historical narrative, and to this end the model of Hayden White may be useful. In his main work 'Metahistory' White explored the literary structure of major historical works from the nineteenth century. 30 His point of departure was a distinction between the 'story' and the 'chronicle'. Whereas the latter is simply a list of 'events' with no inauguration or culmination, the former has 'a discernible form ... which marks off the events contained in them from the other events that might appear in a comprehensive chronicle of the years covered in their unfoldings' (6). A story intends to 'disclose the formal coherence of a whole set of events considered as a comprehensible process with a discernible beginning, middle, and end.' (7). The events, however, do not by themselves form stories: they have to be invented by the historian. And just as there are no given stories, so the position of the individual event is not predetermined either. 'The same event can serve as a different kind of element of many different historical stories, depending on the role it is assigned in a specific motific characterization of the set to which it belongs. The death of a king may be a beginning, an ending, or simply a transitional event in three different stories.'(ibid.) Such different stories, White suggests, can be constructed according to only a limited number of archetypal modes of emplotment, again defined as 'the way by which a sequence of events fashioned into a story is gradually revealed to be a story of a particular kind.'(ibid.). Following Northrop Frye, White identifies four basic modes of emplotment, derived from the fictional forms of romance, tragedy, comedy, and satire. These various modes of emplotment determine the overall character of the story. Thus while the romantic mode 'is a drama of the triumph of good over evil, ... of the ultimate transcendence of man over the world in which he was imprisoned by the Fall', the theme of the ironic mode of satire is precisely the opposite 'a drama of diremption', where 'man is ultimately a captive of the world rather than its master', for in the end 'human consciousness and will are always inadequate to the task of

"° H. White, Metahistory. The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore 1973), cf. id., The Historical text as literary artifact', in The Writing of History. Literary Form and Historical Understanding, ed. R. H. Canary and H. Kozicki (Wisconsin 1978) 41-62.

36

ITALIAN UNIFICATION

overcoming definitively the dark force of death, which is man's unremitting enemy' (9). The ironic mode, White notes, is the typical one used in the twentieth century. The tragic and comic modes, on the other hand, both contain an element of hope. Tn comedy, hope is held out for the temporary triumph of man over his world by the prospect of occasional reconciliations of the forces at play in the social and natural worlds. Such reconciliations are symbolized in the festive occasions which the Comic writer traditionally uses to terminate his dramatic accounts of change and transformation.'(ibid.) Likewise the tragic mode is not entirely pessimistic: 'the fall of the protagonist and the shaking of the world he inhabits which occur at the end of the Tragic play are not regarded as totally threatening to those who survive the agonic test. There has been a gain in consciousness for the spectators of the contest.' Which of these modes is employed in individual cases is entirely up to the historian, for as White reminds us, 'Considered as potential elements of a story, historical events are valueneutral', the implication being that 'the same set of events can serve as components of a story that is tragic or comic, as the case may by, depending on the historian's choice of the plotstructure ...'.31 Most often this choice will reflect the historian's general outlook and percep­ tion of history. As an idealist historicist, Mommsen, like Ranke, generally constructed his stories in the comic mode; this was the natural mode for expressing their common belief in historical progress.32 Moreover, the 'Italian question' evidently had to be set in this optimistic mode; as a creation of unity the enfranchisement of the Italians obviously represented the happy conclusion of a long and arduous process. This tale was composed as a powerful vision of reconciliation following conflict and discord: unity and justice overcoming petty-minded opposition. Once identified as the solution to a problem, the Social War and the ensuing enfranchisement automatically came to occupy the final position in the narrative. As we saw, its place in a story-line is not an inherent quality of the event, but is established during the creative process by which the historian constitutes his 'facts'. The basic structure of Mommsen's Italian 'story' must therefore be recognised as a part of his interpretation - and perhaps the one leaving the greatest impact on later scholarship. For while many of the most obvious nineteenth-century features of his model have been modified or discarded, the narrative framework, reflecting the very same idealistic world-view, has remained untouched. Invariably the Social War has been perceived as the final consummation of a long process and the beginning of a new chapter in Italian history. But with the recognition of plots as historiographical inventions the structure of the 'Italian question' reveals itself as a legacy from the nineteenth century. The full implication of this idea emerges when the character and extent of our source material for second century Italy are taken into account. No source, contemporary or later, mentions any general development in the relations between Rome and the allies. Only a few isolated events and anecdotes are recorded in our meagre source material, leaving long periods completely blank. Inevitably any attempt to write a 'history' of second century Italy will remain conjectural. Left with virtually no literary evidence suggesting historical changes, 31

White (1978) 47.

32

White (1973) 15, 163-90.

THE MAKINU OF SECOND CENTURY ITALY - THEODOR MOMMSEN

37

it must be recognised that an independent 'history' of second century Italy cannot be written; the direction of such a story can only be derived from later, better documented, events. 33 The character of the modern accounts of this period will therefore have to be redefined; basically they are explanatory hypotheses inseparable from the Social War. Instead of presenting us with a historical background for this event, they are themselves derivations of a specific inter­ pretation of that issue. Little attention, however, has been paid to the logical structure underlying our picture of the second century. The war is consistently presented as growing out of (and explained by) processes in the previous century, the result being a confusion of premises and conclusion and a certain circularity of argument. The origins of this situation are traceable back to Mommsen's account, where the Social War and the enfranchisement finished the story by solving its conflict. Though this version has since been stripped of its overtly Hegelian features, the narrative position of the event has been universally maintained; this in itself implies a finality, which allows the preceding parts of the story to be conjectured. With the final outcome considered an established fact inferences to the foregoing story-line can be drawn according to the internal logic of the narrative. The implication is that the teleological element accorded to the Social War, originally inspired by German idealistic thinking, has survived in the narrative function. The formal structure of Mommsen's work may have been important in securing the remarkable durability of his version. In practical terms it has meant that the plausibility of his interpretation of the war has been judged against a historical background, which was construc­ ted to accommodate exactly this version of the event. Through its complete fusion of form and content, Mommsen's story of Italian unification thus became its own confirmation. His ideological interpretation of Appian was mediated by a narrative form, which was itself an ideological statement. Reluctant to recognise the historicity of this plot structure, later historians have also been unable to free themselves from the interpretational straitjacket in which Mommsen put the 'Italian question'. In this chapter an attempt has been made to explore the historiographical roots of the present view of second century Italy. By focusing on a few basic features of the tradition, a somewhat simplified picture of the contributions of modern scholarship has been unavoidable. In the following chapters the shaping of three central themes, political integration, romanisation, and the Roman citizenship, is examined more closely in the light of the historio­ graphical origins suggested here.

33

In the context of Roman religion J. North has given this salutary warning against building a straight­ forward narrative on the basis of occasional recorded facts: Tt is only if the recorded facts could be fitted into a known scheme of development that they could be raised to the significance of a historical process', 'Religion in republican Rome', CAH 7, 2nd edn (1991) 577.

II THE MAKING OF SECOND CENTURY ITALY 2 POLITICAL INTEGRATION IN SECOND CENTURY ITALY Second century Italy has generally been portrayed as a period characterised by increasing political integration. Rome, it is assumed, gradually extended her influence over the allies and besan acting as a proper Italian government.1 This vision of Italians and Romans moving towards still greater political unity is, I believe, inseparable from the Mommsenian model of republican Italy outlined above, and from its later modifications. Mommsen's claim for an Italian-Roman state established in the third century has not been widely accepted. Beloch, for instance, in his influential study of republican Italy, described its political structure as an Italian confederacy under Roman hegemony.2 But even this, modified, version seems to overestimate the unitary aspect. There is little basis for perceiving Italy as a confederation: after the Roman conquest it was organised as a system of bilateral alliances between Rome and the Italian states and tribes. There were no formal connections between the Italian allies, who were linked indirectly through their individual ties to Rome.3 The details of these treaties, though the subject of much learned scholarship, remain nebu­ lous: little, if any, reliable evidence exists to illuminate the question.4 Their basic structure, however, seems to have been established with some certainty. Effectively they deprived the allies of an independent foreign policy: they were obliged to follow Rome in all external affairs. The primary implication was that the Italians had to furnish soldiers for Rome's military engagements at home and abroad. This obligation formed the very definition of the Italian allies: thus in the Lex Agraria they are described as: '... socium nominisve Latini, quibus ex 1

Thus e.g. A. H. McDonald, 'Rome and the Italian Confederation (200-186 BC)\ JRS 34 (1944) 11-33, Badian (1958) 141-53, E. T. Salmon, Samnium and the Samnites (Cambridge 1967) 311-13, id. The Making of Roman Italy (London 1982) 93, Sherwin-White (1973) 127-29, V. Ilari, Gli italici nelle strutture militari romane (Milan 1974) 15-18 nn. 31-32, E. Gabba, 'Aspetti dell'assimilazione delle populazioni italiche nel II secolo', in Lingua e cultura degli oschi (Pisa 1985) 35-45, id. 'Rome and Italy in the Second Century BC, CAH 8, 2nd ed (1989) 197-243, 225-33, A. Keaveney, Rome and the Unification of Italy (Beckenham 1987) 29ff, U. Laffi, 'Il sistema di alleanze italico', Storia di Roma 2,1 (Torino 1990) 285-304, J. Edmondson, 'Instrumenta imperii'. Law and Imperialism in Republican Rome', in Law, Politics and Society in the Ancient Mediterranean World (Sheffield 1993) 156-91. A modified version of this interpretation is found in W. V. Harris, Rome in Etruria and Umbria (Oxford 1971) 105-13, while Galsterer (1976) 169-71, rejects it altogether. K. J. Beloch, Der italische Bund unter Roms Hegemonie (Rome 1880), esp. 194-224. 3

Cf. e.g. Badian (1958) 143, Salmon (1967) 304, Galsterer (1976) 101-04.

E.g. W. Dahlheim, Struktur und Entwicklung des römischen Völkerrechts im dritten und zweiten Ja hundert v.Chr. (Munich 1968) 117-25, Sherwin-White (1973) 119-33, Galsterer (1976) 101-04, Th. Hantos, Das römische Bundesgenossensystem in Italien (Munich 1983) 150-81, D. W. Baronowski, 'Sub umbra foederis aequi', Phoenix 44 (1990) 345-69. 39

40

ITALIAN UNIFICATION

formula togatorum in terra Italia imperare soient'.5 The nature of the formula togatorum and the way it worked are matters of dispute. However, the Roman demands were hardly based on fixed numbers laid down in the original treaties; more likely they would have been based on census figures regularly updated and dispatched to Rome by the allies.6 The levy itself was conducted locally by the Italian authorities.7 Therefore the Italian system of alliances did not resemble anything like a state-structure. Nor did it provide a framework for direct Roman intervention in the internal affairs of the Italians: so long as they fulfilled their military obliga­ tions to Rome, we have no reason to believe that Rome could claim such a right. Mommsen's Roman-Italian state had, however, served a well-defined historiographical purpose. As the political background for the cultural integration of the Italians it formed an essential part of the national process which paved the way for the demand for citizenship in the late second century. The abandonment of Mommsen's third-century Roman-Italian state by later historians - otherwise following the same basic story-line - therefore leaves a void in the explanatory model. In later historiography this has been filled by a supposed political integration in the second century BC. After the Second Punic War, a gradual extension of Roman rule over the peninsula has been envisaged. Emerging as a leading power in the Mediterranean, Rome now overshadowed her Italian allies to such an extent that her influence could no longer be confined by the old treaties. Rome's presence became still more apparent in the allied states; she started acting as a central government - and was accepted as such by the Italians. The argument therefore implies that while the formal structure of Italy remained unaffected until 90 BC, the Italians had in reality surrendered much of their internal sovereignty to Rome. The theory, in other words, manages to modify Mommsen's claim of a third-century Italian-Roman state without upsetting the entire model; the formal political unity is substituted by a gradually developed unofficial one, which performs exactly the same function in the pre-war scenario as the necessary precondition for cultural integration and a demand for Roman citizenship. In many accounts of the second century the growing political unity is presented as part of a general trend towards unification, visible in all aspects of society. This is, for instance, the 5

Lex agr. line 21 and 50.

6

Cf. P. A. Brunt, Italian Manpower 225 BC -AD 14 (Oxford 1971) 545-48, Ilari (1974), Hantos (1983) 164-66, D. W. Baronowski, The formula togatorum\ Historia 33 (1984) 248-52, G. Clemente, 'Dal territorio della città all'egemonia in Italia', Storia di Roma 2,1 (Torino 1990) 19-38, 32.

7

According to Livy, 41,5,4, a tumultus Gallicus meant that the dilectus was conducted not only in Rome but in the whole of Italy. This has been taken as proof that Rome in emergency situations assumed authority to levy troops among the allies. Considering the practical difficulties Rome would have faced with such a procedure, this interpretation seems less plausible. The aim was a swift and comprehensive levy of Italians for the defence of the peninsula; to that end the interference of Roman magistrates with no local knowledge or experience could hardly have been profitable. The Italians had the experience - and in these situations also the motivation - to conduct an effective levy themselves. Most likely the Livian passage is a - rather confused - reference to the internal Roman distinction between urbs and ager Romanus, which will be dealt with in greater detail below. None of the evidence, adduced by Ilari (1976) 133 n.52, in support of Roman intervention seems conclusive. Polybius' mention of Etruscans and Umbrians (2,24) does not necessarily imply that Rome had conducted the levy; likewise Livy 25,15. The cohorts drafted 'ex agro Piceno et Gallico', Livy 23,14, were presumably Romans.

THE MAKING OF SECOND CENTURY ITALY - POLITICAL INTEGRATION

41

• the new edition of the Cambridge Ancient History, where it is merely a complement - cultural integration of the Italians. In other accounts, however, the political element to precedence over cultural romanisation. This approach has been encountered most U , ently in Anglo-Saxon scholarship and was most fully developed by Sherwin-White, who hed primary importance to this factor.9 In his 'The Roman Citizenship' Sherwin-White Vlared that it 'formed the foundation for the future incorporation of the Italian states in the man citizenship, for which the performance of military service alone would have been an • adequate basis. The localization of the states was so complete, the penetration of Roman nthority so thorough, and the performance of military munera so customary, that the Italian • Hies were not only justified in their demands, but fitted, from a Roman point of view, to eceive the citizenship'.10 Later Sherwin-White made a passing reference to romanisation (133); still the political emphasis remains evident. This partly reflects his overall legalistic and institutional approach; however, to understand fully this line of argument we have to widen our perspective and also look at his interpretation of the Social War. Sherwin-White was the first historian to realise the full implications of the alternative tradition of the Social War. But while drawing an evocative picture of the war as a profoundly anti-Roman attempt to overthrow Rome's hegemony, he may also have felt that this version did not fit easily into an image of deeply romanised Italians. This element was therefore downgraded in favour of a political-administrative integration, which would have habituated the Italians to direct Roman rule without eliminating their ability eventually to turn against Rome. This model, in sum, was a response to the paradox left by Mommsen. By explaining the Italian demand for citizenship in political terms (already subjected to Roman rule, they had little autonomy left to lose), their subsequent revolt could be properly described without clashing with their cultural background; or in other words by separating the citizenship issue from romanisation the anti-Roman version of the war could be more satisfactorily accommodated in a reconstruction of the second century. However ingenious this solution may be, it does not square the circle. For every problem solved, another one seems to appear. For as soon as the idea of practically complete political integration is accepted, it becomes hard to explain why a cultural unity should not have developed. Thus, in Mommsen's model political unification had served exactly this purpose, forming the basis for the cultural integration of the Italian states, which he supposed had followed shortly afterwards. Therefore, Sherwin-White's attempt to create a second century Italy consistent with his view of the Social War remains a compromise. It partly maintains, partly ignores, Mommsen's vision of Italian unity, thereby reflecting the basic inconsistency in that interpretation of the Social War. Apart from this - basic - weakness, Sherwin-White's account of the supposed political integration was in itself both lucid and suggestive. He envisaged a process promoted by two interrelated forces: Rome felt a natural inclination to assume the government of Italy, and to this expansionist trend corresponded a 'centripetal' tendency among the Italians, who 'turn L

' Gabba (1989) 207-12, 225-32. ' Sherwin-White (1973) 104f, 127-29. 10

Sherwin-White (1973) 129.

42

ITALIAN UNIFICATION

to Rome for advice and offer no resistance to her usurpations'." By this dual process SherwinWhite managed to combine the two main trends in modern discussions of Italian unification the idealising and the 'realistic' approach, in a single picture.12 The idea of Italian allies (that is, the local elites) voluntarily surrendering their sovereignty to Rome is firmly rooted in the vision of a harmonious fusion of the Italians into Rome, which was conceived by nineteenth-century historians. The very notion of 'centripetal' forces, drawing the allies towards the leadership of Rome, appears suspiciously close to the Mommsenian idea of Rome's historical mission to unite the peoples of Italy - an impression further borne out by the inevitable character often ascribed to the process.13 The argument seems to attribute to the allies an attitude closely akin to that of political theorists of the nineteenth century; as we saw earlier, it was widely believed that small states served their interests best by giving up their independence to join one of the major powers. However, in a post-imperialist world with different notions of historical progress, such scenarios of selfeffacing allies would appear to have lost much of their power to convince. Though the influence from Mommsen is obvious, important changes have also been made. The enforced political unification which had been envisaged in the third century, has been replaced by a later, more spontaneous, process. But by this postponement the integration comes to coincide with the growing oppression and exploitation, which in Mommsen's model had been construed as the background of the Social War. To avoid this clash between integra­ tion and alienation, a more idealised version of Roman-Italian relations in the second century has been a necessary complement to this model. Rome has been portrayed as the almost bene­ volent patroness of the Italian allies, protecting them against both external and internal threats.14 But that approach will inevitably have to ignore the harsh realities of Roman ex­ ploitation and impose remarkably altruistic motives on Roman actions, which happened to be in full accordance with her own self-interest.15 The well-known, indeed notorious, examples of direct repression by Roman magistrates are significant testimonies to the psychological climate in second century Italy.16 Still, the economic and not least the military exploitation of the Italians was organised on a much more massive scale. During the Roman expansion in the second century the allies appear to have

"Sherwin-White (1973) 128. 12

This compromise is also apparent in e.g. Gabba (1985) 42, speaking of a '... processo di assimilazione a Roma delle classi alte italiche, spontaneo ma sollecitato dalle occasioni e dalle esigenze ...'. 13

E.g. Sherwin-White (1973) 105, 127, Gabba (1985) 44.

14

Thus e.g. Göhler (1939), Badian (1958) 141-53.

15

Interesting, if only as the most extreme example of this tendency, is V. Giuffrè, 'Esigenze militari Romane ed Italici', Labeo 21 (1975) 215-38, who thinks that the formula togatorum admitted the Italians to participate in Roman campaigns, rather than imposed military obligations. 16

These examples include physical violence (Gellius 10,3,3-5), looting of temples (Livy 31,12,1-5; 42,3), extortion (Livy 40,44,12), imposition of military tasks for which there may have been no basis in the treaties (Livy 26,14,9; 30,45,4; 32,2,4; 32,26; 45,42,4-5; 45,43,9f). For a full survey see A. J. Toynbee, Hannibal's Legacy (London 1965) II 608-45.

THE MAKING OF SECOND CENTURY ITALY - POLITICAL INTEGRATION

43

•hnred between half and two-thirds of the Roman army.17 The soldiers may have received (jontiipuicu • s hare of the booty. But their Stipendium was paid for by the allies themselves, and the \elites " . xvrre to their Roman peers, who could derive far were at a distinct disadvantage compared r v -iter prestige, power, and economic gains from their overseas campaigns. The notion of Rome as a protector of the Italians is, of course, an unacceptable idealisation. Defending Italy against foreign invasion was hardly contrary to her own interests. And it , jjj n ot be overlooked that the army fending off these intruders was primarily made up of Italian allies - who were thus protecting themselves. In support of the idea of allied submissiveness historians have adduced Italian requests for Roman arbitration and their apparent acquiescence when confronted with Roman interference. The latter evidence depends entirely on the interpretation of these alleged instances of Roman interference - which will be discussed below. As for the Roman arbitrations these are extremely rare; in Italy proper only a single case is known. 19 We should also bear in mind that in the case of disputes between Italian states there was no other option than turning to Rome, the only ally the Italians had left.20 Thus, Roman arbitrations may be seen simply as a reflection of the legal structure which Rome had imposed upon the peninsula; they cannot therefore be construed as signs of particular allied submissiveness. That attitude would also be difficult to reconcile with their actual numbers and military strength in relation to Rome. Taken individually the allied states may have appeared small and insianificant compared to Rome. But that perspective would seem to obscure the real powerstructure of republican Italy. For while the allies may originally have been a culturally and politically heterogenous group with few if any common interests, the Roman conquest radically changed this situation. Bringing an end to the perennial wars and rivalries among the Italian tribes and states, Rome paved the way for more peaceful and harmonious relations; and by turning them all into Roman allies she also gave them a common cause, which had hitherto been lacking. Although some of the treaties may have been more lenient in their demands on S

17 A. Afzelius, Die römische Kriegsmacht während der Auseinandersetzung mit den hellenistischen Grossmächten (Copenhagen 1944) 62-89, Brunt (1971) 424f, 677-86. Ilari (1974) 172, has calculated that in the two periods 200-168 and 167-91 the allies made up on average 59.7% and 57.35% of the Roman forces. For the allied role in Rome's expansion see in general W. V. Harris, The Italians and the Empire', in The Imperialism of Mid-republican Rome, PMAAR 29 (1984) 89-109. 18

For the Italian Stipendium see C. Nicolet, 'Le Stipendium des alliés italiens avant la guerre sociale', PAS/? 46 (1978) 1-11. 19 A dispute between Nola and Neapolis is mentioned by Cic. De off. 1,33 and Val. Max. 7,3,4. Other examples are known in Gallia Cisalpina and between non-allies: Patavium-Ateste ILLRP 476, AtesteVicetia 636, ILLRP 477, Genua-Viturii ILLRP 517, Pisa-Luni Livy 45,13,10f. On Roman arbitrations see now R. Scuderi, 'Decreti del senato per controversie di confine in età repubblicana', Ath. 79 (1991) 371-415. 20

Scuderi (1991) 373, notes that because 'qualsiasi azione ostile' was excluded by the treaties with Rome, '... la risoluzione pacifica di una contesa veniva logicamente affidata a un arbitro romano'. But the possibility should not be overlooked that Italian allies might solve their disputes internally - as happened between Nola and Abella in the late second century, cf. the cippus Abellanus, A. Franchi De Bellis, // cippo abellano (Urbino 1988). Perhaps such friendly agreements were normal among 'ethnically' related allies; the conflict between Nola and Neapolis, which demanded Roman arbitration, may have reflected the historical animosity between these two states.

44

ITALIAN UNIFICATION

Italian manpower, all the allies shared the same basic legal condition, deprived as they were of an independent foreign policy.21 In continuous overseas campaigns the allies made sacrifices to expand an empire in which they had less of a share. But these regular demonstra­ tions of Italian subordination also allowed them to measure their combined strength against that of Rome herself. And even if we exclude the Latins from the ranks of proper allies, the remaining allied troops still seem to have counted for more than 40% of the Roman army in the second century.22 This balance of power, combined with the Italian share in the creation of the Roman empire, was hardly the best background for generating allied acquiescence towards Roman usurpations of even greater powers in Italy. As a historiographical concept the 'centripetal' tendency, envisaged by Sherwin-White and others, is an unacceptable relic of nineteenth-century idealisation, which seems to ignore basic features of the Roman-Italian relationship. On the other hand, the expansionist trend, which implied an enforced extension of Roman power in the allied territories, might appear a more realistic scenario than the centripetal one discussed above. Such infringements of their treaties would not be entirely incompatible with the behaviour of certain Roman magistrates in this period. But again the basic power structure, outlined above, must be taken into account - and that does not support the natural, almost inevitable character ascribed to Roman interferences in the internal affairs of the Italians; indeed it would seem more likely if the Roman authorities had taken a rather cautious line in their official dealings with the allies. The system of alliances in Italy was effectively one of military cooperation - under Roman command. The allied obligation to furnish troops for the Roman army was the single crucial factor which dominated the Roman-Italian relationship in the second century BC. Throughout this period Rome relied heavily on regular supplies of Italian manpower to maintain and expand her empire. And as long as these demands were met, the treaties guaranteed the internal sovereignty of the Italians. The alliances, originally a means to pacify the Italians, thereby developed into a system of mutual exchange - albeit on unequal terms; in return for their active support the allies received non-intervention from Rome. Despite its inherent inequality the system appears to have worked impeccably during the second century expansion, leaving Rome in control of most of the Mediterranean world. Consequently, Rome could have little interest in upsetting this extremely profitable arrangement by breaching her own part of the agreement. For that reason also the perceived plausibility of Roman interference will have to be revised. Rome may have become a world power but the Italians were still an indispensable part of her military foundations. In a larger perspective any infringements of (already restricted) allied rights would be counterproductive and potentially damaging to an otherwise smoothly working machinery of manpower supply.23 This vital Roman interest would have weighed heavily against any potential benefits derived from direct 21

Some allies seem to have received a more favourable treaty, foedus aequum, the practical implications of which, though the subject of much scholarship, remains nebulous. Military obligations may have been affected; still Camerinum, which enjoyed afoedus aequissimum, provided Marius with no less than two cohorts, Cic. Pro Balbo 46, Val. Max. 5,2,8. 22

Ilari (1974) 174, has estimated that the Latins made up about 27%, which means that the Italian allies themselves furnished between 43.5% and 42% of the Roman army, cf. above n. 17.

23

Senatorial attempts to curb Roman infringements of allied rights are noted in Livy 31,12; 40,44,10-2; 42,3. Also the various leges de repetundis would seem to demonstrate some awareness of this problem.

THE MAKING OF SECOND CENTURY ITALY - POLITICAL INTEGRATION

45

interventions - and put considerable restraint on the Roman authorities.24 The implication is that the claimed 'inevitability' is not an inherent quality of the structures of second century Italv but one imposed by the unitary - and essentially teleological - model, which has been applied to this period. The general perception of the second century as a transitional phase leading from division to unity, has produced its own set of plausibilities; one of these has been the assumption of a natural development towards political integration. But as argued above, scenarios other than the unitary one are possible; the power structure of second century Italy in itself seems to question the 'natural' character of the integration process. And this alternative interpretation would allow a new approach to the ancient evidence to be applied. Typically historians have been looking for passages conforming with the image of growing Roman interventionism; and their search has not been entirely fruitless. A number of examples have been brought to light, the most notable being the Roman ban on the Bacchanalian cult. As the answer to an a priori historiographical need, these reconstructions of Roman interferences have, however, tended to overlook the ambiguities of the evidence, which appears to be far more complex than has hitherto been recognised. It is a well-known problem that the history of the Roman republic is, to a large extent, documented by writers who lived much later and had little chance of understanding the period they were describing. This difficulty is particularly pressing when dealing with republican Italy, since here the political and cultural structure was thoroughly broken up during the first century BC. Nearly all the examples of Roman interference derive from imperial writers, primarily Livy. With a single exception modern historians have invariably perceived any mention of 'Italia' as a reference to the entire peninsula, including both Romans, Latins, and Italians.25 But in so doing they have failed to address the complicated issue which concerns the meaning of 'Italia' in contemporary usage and the ability of later authors to appreciate and reproduce the original significance. Only two sources from the second century, Polybius and the Bacchanalian inscription, have been brought forward in this discussion. But in these cases there is a real risk of begging the question by reading the historian's own expectations into the evidence. The implicit premises have been the hypothesis of a Roman readiness to intervene in the internal affairs of the allies. If instead we suppose that the sovereignty of the Italian states was not a legal fiction and they naturally fell outside Roman authority, other interpretations become feasible. In that case 24

Cf. Harris (1971) 108:4... the constant difficulty in finding enough troops in the second century surely also meant that the Senate needed to avoid antagonizing the allies unduly; therefore it could not ignore the remaining autonomy of the allies as it was defined in the foedera*.

25

Galsterer (1976) 37-41, has suggested that in the second century 'Italia', though geographically covering the entire peninsula, as a legal term applied only to ager Romanus. The theory manages to combine contradictory statements in a single coherent picture; however, it also presupposes a common terminological accuracy and consciousness in all our sources, including Polybius, Livy and Macrobius. Despite their widely different backgrounds and aims these writers are supposed to have carefully reproduced an original distinction between a juridical and a geographical 'Italia', which had long become obsolete and had no bearings on their stories. Such terminological consistency throughout the ancient tradition seems less than plausible. From a more traditional point of view the theory has been countered by, e.g. U. Laffi, 'Roma e l'Italia prima della guerra sociale: una nuova indagine', Ath. 58 (1980) 174-86, 177, and L. De Libero, 'Italia', Klio 76 (1994) 303-25.

46

ITALIAN UNIFICATION

contemporary sources could safely use the name 'Italia' to describe the rural areas covered by Roman legislation. Although it was also a common geographical designation for the entire peninsula,26 it would be evident from the context that it referred only to the ager Romamts, as opposed to the city of Rome. The ambiguity only arises when the idea of a 'natural' extension of Roman power in allied territory is accepted. The famous passage of Polybius, 6,13,4-6, has been accorded great importance as the only contemporary description of Roman powers in Italy. Polybius tells that: 'Similarly crimes committed in Italy which require a public investigation, such as treason, conspiracy, poi­ soning, and assassination, are under the jurisdiction of the senate. Also if any private person or community in Italy is in need of arbitration or indeed claims damages or requires succour or protection, the senate attends to all such matters. It also occupies itself with the dispatch of all embassies sent to countries outside of Italy ...'. Polybius' words have generally been taken as confirmation of Rome's right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Italians - and the frequency of such interventions.27 That interpretation, however, can hardly be sustained. It was, as already pointed out by Badian, inherently implausible that the treaties should have given Rome any right to act as an Italian police authority - as implied by this interpretation of Polybius' words.28 Presumably they laid down the conditions and obligations of the allies, leaving Rome to take appropriate action if they failed to obey to them. It seems highly unlikely that Rome should have claimed general jurisdiction in all cases 'which require public investigation'. Unless it affected allied treaty obligations (as their plottings did in 91 BC), Italian crime was an issue in which Rome could have little, if any, official interest. It should be noted, moreover, that Polybius is not giving a description of Roman powers in Italy; his point is to explain the internal Roman division of powers between the senate, the consuls, and the people.29 The first chapters of the sixth book describe the political institutions in Rome. Starting with the consuls, Polybius in 6,12,1 relates how their authority was confined to the city of Rome. Later, in 6,13, he goes on to discuss the role of the senate, whose powers lay outside the capital; it controlled the extra-urban territories and the relations with other states. 6,13,4-6 is therefore not an attempt to define Rome's position in Italy but the senate's sphere of authority. To make this point exact geographical terminology was less important: what was crucial was the distinction between the city and the extra-urban areas, which determined the administrative division of competences in Rome. To describe the senate's jurisdiction 'Italy' was a convenient term - and far more elegant than 'the Roman territories outside Rome'; such explicitness would also have been unnecessary since the context made

26

On the changing meaning of 'Italia' see F. Klingner, 'Italien. Name, Begriff und Idee im Altertum', Römische Geisteswelt, 3rd ed. (Munich 1956) 13-35, esp. 13-20, P. Catalano, Appunti sopra il più antico concetto giuridico di Italia', Atti' Acc. Torino 96 (1961-62) 198-228, E. Lepore, 'LTTAAIA nella formazione della communità romano-italica', Klearchos 5 (1963) 89-113, G. Radke, 'Italia. Beobach­ tungen zu der Geschichte eines Landesnamens', Romanitas 8 (1967) 35-51. 27

E.g. McDonald (1944) 14f, F.W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius (Oxford 1957) I 679-81. 28 29

Badian (1958) 142, 145.

Cf. C. Nicolet, 'Polybe et les institutions romaines', Entretiens sur Vantiquité classique 20 (1974) 209-58.

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it clear that only the Roman parts were meant. Polybius' second mention of 'Italia' could refer to both ager Romamis and ager peregrinus. But as noted above this ambiguity had no bearing on his argument, which distinguished between urbs and extra-urbs. For Polybius 'Italia' simply appears to have been a convenient term which on Roman matters could refer to ager Romamis alone and otherwise was a geographical concept covering the entire peninsula. Later, in 6,17,2, the expression 'the whole of Italy' is used in a context where the contemporarv reader could have little doubt that only ager Romanics was implied.30 The statement of Polybius can now be summarised as follows: the consuls ruled in the city of Rome, while geographically external matters fell under the authority of the senate. Therefore, 6,13,4-6 does not list the powers of Rome, but the senate's sphere of competence. Polybius' perspective was an urban one, entirely concerned with the internal division of powers between Roman institutions. The criterion applied was geographical; it did not distinguish between ager Romanus/peregrinus but between urbs/Italia. Polybius is, in other words, not discussing the modern 'Italian question' and cannot be used to illuminate it. Viewed against this background it is not inconceivable that Livy and other imperial writers may have found ager Romanus described as 'Italia' in pre-Social War sources. And although it was really a misunderstanding of the source, such a designation would have seemed quite natural within their own frame of reference more than a century later. Furthermore, the question of whether specific decrees had also applied to the allies or not, was of scant interest to imperial writers and their readers. At the turn of the eras, Italy had become the homo­ geneous, romanised, heartland of the empire; the problem had by then lost any relevance and was probably of little concern to contemporary observers. For that reason, it would probably be a mistake to expect any terminological accuracy in their treatment of this non-issue - and in Livy's work a certain inconsistency in the references to republican institutions is a recurrent feature. Presumably the term 'Italia' could be used indiscriminately; Livy may also have been inspired to do so by the Augustan tota Italia propaganda, which emphasised the Italian element of the Roman past. Therefore as a source on this issue he is best served by not being taken too literally: in every instance the context should be carefully considered. In Livy 40,19,5 we are told that the senate prescribed: '... ut per totam Italiani triduum supplicatio et feriae essent', but it is uncertain whether Rome could claim such authority in Italy.31 The maintenance of the pax deorum was one of the primary functions of the ancient state; Roman usurpation of such powers would seriously undermine the allied communities. Prior to the senatorial decree prodigia had been reported from Rome and Lanuvium, foreshadowing the plague raging '... in agris forisque et conciliabulis et in urbe ...' 40,19,3. Facing this threat the senate decided a one-day supplicatio 'circa omnia pulvinaria Romae' and the aforementioned 'per totam Italiam' lasting three days. Therefore, if there was any correlation between the areas hit by the plague, described as Rome and ager Romanus, and the measures taken by the senate, 'totam Italiam' would have been a reference to ager

30 Polybius here states that the Roman censors oversaw construction works all over Italy. Obviously, their sphere of jurisdiction did not extend beyond ager Romanus. Cf. Walbank (1957) 692f, who sees it as a reference to building contracts in citizen colonies and municipia. 31

E.g. McDonald (1944) 13, Harris (1971) 110, Sherwin-White (1973) 105, 128, Keaveney (1987) 29, Uffi (1990) 293.

48

ITALIAN UNIFICATION

Romanus alone. Nothing in the context suggests that the allies were included either; the subsequent mention of the plague's Latin victims merely serves as a further illustration of the gravity of the situation. A possible parallel may be found in 40,37,3, where a '... supplicationem in biduum valetudinis causa in urbe et per omnia fora conciliabulaque ...' is prescribed. Such a formulation cannot have been Livy's own - in his day 'Italy' was the natural term but must have been borrowed directly from his source. Livy may have found a similar expression in his source on 40,19,5, but in order to avoid repeating the same circumstantial formulation it was replaced by a for him equivalent term, that is, 'Italy'. Macrobius, Sat. 3,17,6, gives this description of the Lex Didia sumptuaria (143 BC): 'Fanniam legem post annos decern et octo lex Didia consecuta est. Eius ferundae duplex fuit causa, prima et potissima ut universa Italia, non sola urbs, lege sumptuaria teneretur, Italicis existimantibus Fanniam legem non in se sed in solos urbanos cives esse conscriptam'. The text, in itself very late, is based on another imperial source, and the confusion as to the structure of republican Italy is apparent. The Lex Didia, we are told, was a supplement to the Lex Fannia, whose validity outside Rome was established after some doubt among the Italians. But unless Roman laws generally applied to the allies (which we have no reason to believe) this discussion of the geographical extension of the Lex Fannia becomes meaning­ less. Moreover, the distinction between Italici and cives urbani was nonsensical in a republican context: it probably reflects the later situation in imperial Italy when Roman citizenship had become universal and Italici the usual term for the extra-urban citizens. It therefore seems clear that the Lex Didia merely confirmed that the Lex Fannia was as valid on ager Romanus as it was in Rome.32 In these cases, which supposedly demonstrate official Roman interference, we find rather an internal Roman distinction between Rome and areas outside the city: Polybius identified two administrative jurisdictions, the urban and the extra-urban; in the religious sphere, supplicationes of different lengths were declared for Rome and the countryside; and separate urban and extra-urban legislation was not inconceivable either, as indicated by the dispute as to whether the Lex Fannia had applied only to urban citizens. Another example, demon­ strating the feasibility of such distinctions, is found in Livy's account (29,37,3-4) of the salttax from 204 BC. Apparently the censor Livius Salinator had imposed different rates in Rome and 'in foris et conciliabulis', causing protests from the areas worst affected. A further illustration is furnished by the investigations, carried out into alleged veneficia in the years 180-84 (Livy, 39,41,5; 40,37,4; 40,43,2f; 40,44,6). The crimes were investigated in two separate districts, urbs anafora et conciliabula, with the dividing line drawn at the tenth mile­ stone from Rome. This administrative distinction between the city of Rome and the ager Romanus was a logical consequence of the structure of the Roman state. Though officially still a city 32

Cf. W. V. Harris, 'Was Roman Law imposed on the Italian Allies?', Historia 21 (1972) 639-45, 644, G. Clemente, 'Le leggi sul lusso e la società romana tra III e II secolo a.C.\ in Modelli etici, diritto e trasformazioni sociale, ed. A. Giardina and A. Schiavone (Rome-Bari 1981) 1-14, 6,8, E. Baltrusch, Regimen Morum (Munich 1989) 85-6, Bleicken (1990) 115. Contra Ilari (1974) 16 n.31, Keaveney (1987) 29, Gabba (1989) 227, Laffi (1990) 292. Also the Lex Furia de sponsu has been brought forward, but nothing in the description of Gaius, Inst. 3, 12If, suggests that other than Roman citizens were affected by the law, cf. Harris (1972) 642f.

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surrounded by its territory, Rome had in effect become a territorial state; the countryside, which had long surpassed the limits of a 'city-state', comprised communities of substantial size, administered as self-contained municipalities. This situation meant that the Roman state naturally fell into two parts, which would often have faced problems of an entirely different kind. The expansion in Italy had severed the intimate links between city and territory, which had originally existed; it had become both feasible and convenient for the Roman authorities to treat them separately. Such a distinction could hardly be a surprise to imperial writers, but instinctively they would have perceived Rome's counterpart as the entire peninsula, which had by then become an integral part of the Roman state. The consequence is a fundamental uncertainty inherent in all our evidence pertaining to the question of Roman interference in allied affairs. Only once do we hear of Roman legislation affecting the Italians, and in this case Livy's wording is unambiguous. In 193 the Lex Sempronia was passed to close a legal loophole, which had appeared when Italian middlemen were used to evade Roman regulations on money-lending (Livy 35,7,1-5). But as shown by Harris, the Lex Sempronia did not extend Roman law to the allies, it merely prescribed that transactions between Roman citizens and Italians in the future should be conducted according to Roman rules.33 This brief survey has revealed no securely documented examples of official Roman intervention on Italian ager peregrinus. Rome's right to act as Italian legislator and lawenforcer (and interest in so doing) thereby becomes purely hypothetical.34 The terminological uncertainty is quite basic. In certain contexts contemporary observers could use tota Italia for only the Roman parts, whereas later writers would have felt no need for terminological accuracy whatsoever. The administrative distinction between the city and the countryside, which was drawn internally in Rome, was, I believe, crucial in a historiographical perspective: most of the responsibility for the later confusion can be laid at its door. In the light of this conclusion the ancient evidence on the Bacchanalian affair attracts renewed interest, and in the following pages the two written sources, Livy's substantial account in the 39th book, and the epigraphically preserved SC de Bacchanalibus (CIL 1(2) 581) will first be discussed separately, then the archaeological evidence will be considered.35 Five passages in Livy's account of the Roman persecution of the Bacchus cult in 186 may illuminate Roman-Italian relations in the second century BC. 33

Harris (1972), followed by e.g. Galstercr (1976) 13If, E. S. Gruen, Studies in Greek Culture and Roman Policy (Leiden 1990) 45 n.47. 34

Cf. Cic. Pro Balbo 21: Tulit apud maiores nostras legem C. Furius de testamentis, tulit Q. Voconius de mulierum hereditatibus, innumerabiles aliae leges de civili iure sunt latae; quas Latini voluerunt, adsciverunt'. Two points should be noted here;firstlythat adoption of Roman laws was voluntary, secondly that only Latins accepted this offer. The epigraphical evidence adduced by Edmondson (1993), is not impressive, as it also includes fragments of Roman legal texts found outside allied territory. Most of those found within their borders were, moreover, part of judiciary laws, which may have dealt with non-Romans seeking redress from Roman authorities. There seems to be little basis, therefore, for Edmondson's claim of an 'increasing imposition of Roman regulations and law', 173. 35 A survey of modern research is given by J.-M. Pailler, Bacchanalia. La répression de 186 av. J.-C. à Rome et en Italie, BEFAR 270 (Rome 1988) 61-122. A recent reinterpretation is given in Gruen (1990)34-78.

50

ITALIAN UNIFICATION 39,14,7f: 'Sacerdotes eorum sacrorum, seu viri seu feminae essent, non Romae modo sed per omnia fora et conciliabula conquiri, ut in consulum potestate essent; edici praeterea et in urbe et per totam Italiam edicta mitti, ne quis qui Bacchis initiatus esset coisse aut convenisse sacrorum causa velit, neu quid talis rei divinae fecisse'.

Livy here refers to the senatorial decree, which prescribed that priests of the cult be searched for 'not only in Rome but in the entire ager Romanics' and that an edict be issued 'in the city and in the whole of Italy', prohibiting any kind of cult meetings. The attention, or rather the lack of attention, devoted to the Italian element is remarkable; it is stated as a plain matter of fact, suggesting that Livy's source did not find this step in any way extraordinary. It is mentioned only as part of the dual concept of Roma/Italia - though the logical distinction would have been between ager Romanus and ager peregrinus. In the same paragraph we find the more comprehensible distinction between Rome and fora et conciliabula. The proximity of the two terms may plausibly explain the use of Italia as a simple stylistic variation, tota being the rhetorical parallel to the - equally superfluous omnia in the previous sentence. It has, however, been claimed that Livy's formulation very precisely reflected an original delimitation of the jurisdiction of Roman and Italian magistrates, the latter effecting the ban locally in the allied states.36 But this interpretation finds no support in the SC de Bacchanalibus, which is generally identified as the document sent to allies on this occasion. Among its numerous clauses it does not include any order for the arrest of cult leaders. And since no such request was made, there is no basis for the conjecture that Rome left this apparently highly important task to the Italians. The two decrees make better sense when seen as parallel initiatives; the first starting the immediate 'police' actions against the cult, the second providing the legal framework for a lasting solution to the problem. 39,15,6: 'Bacchanalia tota iam pridem Italia et nunc per urbem etiam multis locis esse, non fama solum accepisse vos sed crepitibus etiam ululatibusque nocturnis, qui personant tota urbe, certum habeo, ceterum quae ea res sit ignorare'. In a fictional speech the consul here addresses the senate, relating that although it is wellknown that Bacchanalia had long existed in Italy and recently also reached the city of Rome, little else is known of the cult. The reference to 'Italia' is another indication that the origins of the cult lay outside Rome. Whether Livy is thinking of the geographical Italy, or merely the Roman parts of it, cannot be determined - and is of little relevance since its place of origin may not necessarily have been affected by the Roman ban. 39,17,2: 'Si quis eorum, qui turn extra terrain Italiam essent nominaretur, ei laxiorem daturos diem, si venire ad causam dicendam vellet'. Livy tells how people who had been denounced while staying outside terra Italia, received a longer respite for returning to defend themselves in court. This provision had nothing to do with the sphere of application of the ban. As clearly indicated by the addition of terra, this is 36

M. Geizer, 'Die Unterdrückung der Bacchanalien bei Livius', Hermes 71 (1936) 275-87, 282f, McDonald (1944) 15n.31.

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aeographical description of the area from which the accused could quickly get back to Rome. We are therefore dealing with a purely practical distinction between overseas and nonoverseas areas which had quite different transport times.37 a

39,17,4: 'Contione dimissa magnus terror urbe tota fuit, nee moenibus se tantum urbis aut fìnibus Romanis continuit, sed passim per totam Italiam, litteris hospitum de senatus consulto et contione et edicto consulum acceptis, trepidari coeptum est'. The passage describes the shock following the contio in which the Bacchanalian threat had first been revealed to the public. The terror had not been confined to the city or the ager Romanus but spread to the whole of Italy, as letters from Roman guest friends arrived with the news of the senate's decree, the contio and the consular edict. Livy here makes the first unambiguous reference to the Italian allies, defined as the part of 'tota Italia' which lay outside 'fines Romani'. As opposed to the distinction Roma/Italia this definition was in perfect agreement with the political structure of second century Italy. According to Livy, the allies first heard about the decree and the consular edict through their private correspondance with Roman friends; the logical implication is that they were not themselves covered by the Roman ban. Clearly Livy and his source must have believed the allies to have been unaffected by these measures. His description of the shock wave spreading from Rome to ager Romanus and, indirectly, also to the allies makes little sense if they had from the outset been included and immediately notified by the Roman authorities. Apparently the reference to the sensation also caused outside 'fines Romani' served to emphasise the exceptional character of the scandal. To make that point, however, the foreign reactions would have to come from outsiders, who were not directly involved in the affair. 39,18,7-8: 'Datum deinde consulibus negotium est ut omnia Bacchanalia Romae primum, deinde per totam Italiam diruerunt, extra quam si qua ibi vetusta ara aut Signum consecratum esset. In reliquum deinde senatus consulto cautum est ne qua Bacchanalia Romae neu in Italia esset'. In Livy's summary of the senatus consultum, 'Italia' features twice, in both cases in the, by now, familiar combination of Roma/Italia.^ Judging from the Livian paraphrase, the inclusion of the Italians appears to have been a mere formality; no departure from common legislative practice is indicated. Furthermore, due authorisation to perform the cult of Bacchus, we are told, could only be obtained from the praetor urbanus in Rome. The decree would therefore not only have violated allied sovereignty but also have undermined their local magistrates. This important aspect, however, is completely ignored in Livy's account of the decree.

" Cf. Livy 43,14,7-10 (169 BC): 'edixerunt de militibus P. Aelio [C. Popilio] consulibus postve eos consules in Macedoniam scriptis, ut, qui eorum in Italia essent, intra dies triginta, censi prius sese, in provinciam redirent' ... 'hoc edicto litterisque censorum per fora et conciliabula dimissis tanta multitudo iuniorum Romam convenit ut gravis urbi turba insolita esset.' 38

Cf. Tertull. Ad nat. 1,10,16: 'non urbe solummodo verum tota Italia', and Apolog. 6,7: 'non modo urbe sed universa Italia'. Like Livy, these passages also reflect a late perspective on the question of Italian involvement. On the sources of Tertullian see E. Meyer, 'Die römische Annalistik im Lichte der Urkunden', ANRW 1,2 (1972) 970-96, 981 n.62.

52

ITALIAN UNIFICATION

In the light of this discussion of the Livian evidence, the conclusion that Rome here undertook a blatant invasion of allied autonomy would no longer seem a cogent one. The hypothesis rests entirely on the appearance of the terms Italia/tota Italia, the latter presumably being a rhetorical emphasis of the former. In all three cases where it is being linked to Roman legislation, it forms part of the dual concept Roma/Italia, which is in the same context given as Roma/omnia fora et conçiliabula. Nothing in Livy's account suggests that the senate over­ stepped its competence by including non-Roman areas in its legislation. The omission of this aspect cannot easily be explained away as a result of textual economy and literary simplifica­ tion. It could actually have strengthened Livy's story-line if the senate had found the case so alarming that it had felt obliged to intervene directly in Italian affairs in order to eradicate the evil. Livy nevertheless chose to present the allies as neutral observers of the Roman scandal, deeply shocked but without any direct stake in the affair, of which they had only heard through their Roman hospites. Therefore, considered in its entirety and proper historical context, Livy's account does not indicate that the Italians were affected by the Roman ban: it rather suggests that the exact opposite may have been the case. The other main source on the Bacchanalian affair, the epigraphical decree, has also been adduced in support of the theory. Here too, however, the context and character of the source might question this interpretation. The inscription was found in the Calabrian locality of Tiriolo, presumably identical with the ager Teuranus mentioned in the text. The name would suggest that it was a Roman prefecture established after the Second Punic War, when extensive annexations were made in Southern Italy and in Bruttium in particular.39 Excavations have revealed the existence of a small pre-urban settlement in the third and second century.40 That would seem to fit the picture of a prefecture administered by Roman officials, as would the use of Latin in the inscription, which suggests that it was issued to Roman citizens recently settled in the area.41 Otherwise a completed latinisation would have to be envisaged among the indigenous rural population of Bruttium already in the early second century - a highly implausible scenario. The inscribed text is divided into three parts: introduction, paraphrase of the senate's decree, and a direct message to the local authorities. The relationship between the central section and the postscript, and between the inscription and Livy's account have been widely debated,42 but these issues are not crucial to the question investigated here. Interest here con­ centrates on two passages, line 2-3 defining the Bacchanals affected as those 'quei foideratei esent' and the ban in line 7-8: 'Bacas vir nequis adiese velet ceivis Romanus neve nominus Latini neve socium quisquam ...'. First, however, a look at the overall composition of the text. The summary of the senatus consultum expresses the following prohibitive clauses, concerning Bacchanalia in general (line 3), participation in Bacchanalia (7), priests, magistri 39

U. Kahrstedt, 'Ager Publicus und Selbstverwaltung in Lucanien und Bruttium', Historia 8 (1959) 174-206, 176, Pailler (1988) 285-98.

40

Kahrstedt (1959) 191, Pailler (1988) 291-4.

41

Toynbee (1965) II 120 n.6, Pailler (1988) 288.

42

The most important contributions have been those of E. Fraenkel, 'Senatus consultum de Bacchanalibus', Hermes 67 (1932) 369-96, and Gelzer (1936). For a survey of the debate see Pailler (1988) 78-82.

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and common fiscus (10), common oath (13), locations for Bacchus worship (15), number of participants in Bacchanalia (19). No less than four times the Roman praetor urbamis is mentioned as the single authority from which dispensation could be obtained, and then only with senatorial consent.43 In the postscript the local authorities were told to publicise the decree within three market days (22) and have the text inscribed on a bronze tablet (25). Finally it is declared that infringements would be punished as capital offences. In both tone and content, the inscription appears to have been an ordinary command from the central powers in Rome to the extra-urban territories. There are also traces of the same distinction between urbs and ager Romanus, which was discussed above. As already noted by Fraenkel, 'neve extrad urbem' in line 16 must originally have been part of the formulation 'neve in urbid/Romai neve extrad urbem';44 later only the relevant part was included by the authorities in the ager Teuranus. The perspective of the decree thus seems to remain firmly within the familiar Roman pattern. No departure from common practice is suggested by either the message or the language of the document. Therefore, if the decree had in fact applied to the allies as well, two equally improbable situations would have to be envisaged. The Italians might already have been fully integrated into Roman administration and legislation and effectively become a part of ager Romanus. No evidence would seem to support this claim; and by rejecting this idea the decree becomes a deliberate attempt to humiliate the Italian allies. Without offering any explanation or excuse, the senate violated Italian sovereignty and interfered in their religious affairs, criminal law, jurisdiction, and magisterial powers; the allies are treated like any other Roman prefecture or municipium. Such disregard for juridical formality would appear to have been not only unnecessary and ill-advised but also inconsistent with other examples of official Roman attitudes. Much later, in Gracchan and Marian times, charges of even minor violations of Italian foedera were taken very seriously and used as potent political weapons.4,5 In the light of this the document appears uncharacteristically insensitive to Italian feelings; as an attempt to gain Italian support in per­ secuting the Bacchanalian cult, the senate's decree would have been a remarkably clumsy, perhaps even counter-productive measure. The best way of making sense of the decree would therefore be to interpret it as a traditional dispatch to local Roman authorities. Foideratei in the second line is an ambiguous term, which has been interpreted both as allies and as sworn members of the cult, closely related in meaning to coniurati. The first view is difficult to reconcile with the general content and provenance of the inscription. The term is part of the opening definition of the subject of the decree, described as 'Bacanalibus quei foideratei esent'. This definition, however, is at variance with the subsequent ban against the participation of Romans, Latins, and Italian allies in Bacchanalia, neither Romans nor Latins being foederati themselves.46 Therefore either the Roman legislators would have made an inexplicable blunder in formulating the decree, or the foederati definition appeared only in the version which was sent to the allies. The latter solution does not conform with the status 43

Line 4-6, 8-9, 16-8,21-2.

44

Fraenkel (1932) 380.

45

Thus e.g. Cic. De rep. 3,41, and Pro Balbo 46.

Dahlheim (1968) 118 n. 19, suggested that Latini coloniarii may have been foederati, but contra e.g. K. J. Beloch, Römische Geschichte (Berlin 1926) 195, Sherwin-White (1973) 97, Ilari (1974) 3Off.

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ITALIAN UNIFICATION

of the ager Teuranus, apparently a Roman prefecture, or with the Latin language used in the inscription.47 Faced with these factual weaknesses in the traditional interpretation of foederati, many historians have accepted Mommsen's idea that foederati may have been a definition of the organised cult, as opposed to the individual worship which was not affected by the ban.48 By this solution an agreement is achieved between the introductory description of the subject and the ensuing clauses, which reveal a strong fear of organised cults based on a mutual oath. Thus, in line 13, it is explicitly forbidden 'inter sed coniourase neve comvovise neve conspondise', and also in Livy the charge of conspiracy is repeatedly referred to.49 Moreover, there is a correspondance between the central clause 'Neiquis eorum [foideratei] Bacanal habuise velet' (line 3) and Livy's initial reference to the decree: '... edicta mitti, ne quis qui Bacchis initiatus esset coisse aut convenisse sacrorum causa velit...' (39,14,8). This almost verbatim agreement would suggest a direct link between the two sources, supporting an identification offoederati with the Livian 'qui Bacchis initiatus esset'. The main objection to this interpretation, that no direct parallel to this usage is extant, is hardly cogent.50 The source is very early and deals with an otherwise unique situation; the sparse ancient evidence therefore offers little, if any, comparative material. Nevertheless, examples can be found of foedus used in the negative sense of a private agreement for illicit purposes.51 The linguistic argument against Mommsen's reading therefore fails to neutralise his alternative explanation, in every respect superior to the 'ally' interpretation. In line 7-8 cives Romani, nomen Latinum and socii are banned from taking part in Bacchanalia without permission from the praetor and the senate. This passage in particular has inspired far-reaching theories as to the scope of the decree. Considering the otherwise uncontroversial character of the decree and the repeated reference to the praetor urbanus (not inter peregrinos), it might be asked whether this is really the only possible interpretation. The two clauses 3-6 and 7-9 are very close in form and content. The first is a general ban against having a Bacchanal, giving detailed information about how dispensation could be obtained; the latter mentions three groups whose participation is explicitly forbidden. It would seem natural to perceive the former as the primary message and the latter as a supplementary elaboration on this - rather than a radical expansion of its consequences. Following this line of argument, we might seek a more limited interpretation of the lines 7-9. Did the ban really 47

The attempt by Pailler (1988) 290f, to solve these problems fails to convince.

48

Th. Mommsen, Römisches Staatsrecht, 3rd ed. (Leipzig 1887) I 249 n.3, id. Römische Strafrecht (Leipzig 1899) 875, followed by H. Rudolph, Stadt und Staat im römischen Italien (Leipzig 1935) 162 n.l, L. Fronza, 'De Bacanalibus', Ann.Triest. 17 (1946/7) 205-28, 214-7, Meyer (1972) 981, SherwinWhite (1973) 128 n.4, Galsterer (1976) 169, M. Humbert, 'Domination et administration de l'Italie romaine à l'époque républicaine (à propos d'un ouvrage récent)', Revue Hist. Droit Fr. et Étr. 58 (1980) 609-27, 625 n.33, F. Constabile, Istituzioni e forme costituzionali nelle città del Bruzio in età romana (Naples 1984) 93. Laffi (1990) 289 n.18 also accepts this possibility. 49

The cult is defined as a coniuratio in 39,8,1; 8,3; 14,4; 15,10; 16,3; 17,6; 18,3. Coniuro is found in 39,13,13; 14,8; 16,3; 16,5; 17,5, and in 39,15,13; 18,3, the aspect of initiation is stressed. In 39,13,13 Livy uses sociari, a term close to foedero. 50 51

Thus Pailler (1988) 290, cf. Gelzer (1936) 278 n.4.

E.g. Cic. Cat. 1,33: 'latrones Italiae scelerum foedere inter se ac nefaria societate coniunctos', cf. TLL s.v. B 2.

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55

. I'fect all the Latins and allies? Or did it merely cover those who had taken up residence on From a legal point of view, that interpretation could be explained as an er Romanusl attempt at completeness, supplementing the general ban in line 3-6. If, as I have argued above, the application of Roman laws was naturally confined to Roman territories, such a formulation would have been fairly unproblematic; any potential misunderstandings caused by this clause would have been eliminated by the purely Roman context of the decree. According to Livy, the cult had a strong Italian element. Originally it had been introduced by Italian immigrants, and many of its leaders were of Italian descent. Livy is equivocal as to the exaci origins of the cult; both Etruria and Campania are mentioned, but the repeated references to the Italian aspect probably reflect similar views held by contemporary observers.52 It can hardly be dismissed as a Livian fancy; he was more likely to have identified Greeks and Orientals as the corrupters of Roman virtue. More specifically, the Italian element is suggested by the names of the cult leaders and by the criminal investigations, carried out by the consuls in Southern Italy after the ban.53 As a result of immigration and annexations a considerable number of Latins and Italians now lived on Roman territory. After the Second Punic War, there are signs of a substantial emigration from Latin and allied states to Rome and Roman areas. The war also changed the political map of Southern Italy, where large tracts were incorporated as ager publiais populi Romani. Most of the local populations became dediticii, although some may have maintained their federal status after the annexation. 54 This situation meant that an adequate definition of the Bacchanalian ban would have to take into account the presence of foreigners on Roman land. This was particularly pressing as these foreigners were considered the main instigators of the illicit cult. Quite logically, therefore, the decree mentioned not only Romans but also Latins and allies, the two main types of non-Roman citizens who had taken up residence in Rome. Juridically, all foreigners staying on ager Romanus would as a matter of course have been covered by the general ban against Bacchanals expressed in line 2-3. The mention of Latins and Italians should therefore merely be seen as an explanation of this statement, parallel to the clauses dealing with secret cults, public and private, (urban and) extra-urban. Though legally superfluous they served to elucidate the ban on points where there might be uncertainty as to its application. According to this interpretation the SC de Bacchanalibus no longer con­ stitutes proof of Roman law and jurisdiction being extended to the allies. Apart from its uncontroversial character, most plausibly explained as an internal Roman document, it also con­ tains positive clues that the allies were not affected by the decree. The document distinguishes between extra-urban and (implicitly) urban areas, reminiscent of the familiar division of urbs and fora et conciliabida - and this bipartition of the area of jurisdiction leaves no room for the Italian allies. The reference to the praetor urbanus as the sole magistrate authorised to

52

In 39,8,3 Livy claims the cult to have been introduced from Etruria by a Greek, but elsewhere the leaders are given as Campanians.

53 Livy mentions an Annia Paculla and her sons Minius and Herennius Cerrinius, 39,13,9; 17,6; 19,2. Persecutions in Apulia are noted in 39,23,3-4; 39,29,8-9; 40,19,9-11. 54

Cf. Kahrstedt (1959) 187, 206.

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ITALIAN UNIFICATION

grant exemptions from the ban is also striking. Unlike his opposite, the praetor inter peregrinos, the praetor urbanus dealt exclusively with internal Roman disputes, not involving allies. The archaeological evidence pertinent to the Bacchanalian question amounts to only two monuments from Pompeii and Bolsena. In the locality of Sant'Abbondio, about 1 km southeast of Pompeii, the remains have been uncovered of what appears to have been a sanctuary of Dionysios.55 The small building was a tetrastyle temple with a deep pronaos closed to the outside by partially built up intercolumniations. This feature has been linked to mystery-cults, in which the participants did not have access to the ceremonies taking place in the cella. The identification of the deity is secured by the gable relief, in which Dionysos and a female figure, Ariadne or Aphrodite, are shown reclining on either side of a thyrsos and surrounded by erotes and panthers. Both the sculpture and the architecture appear to be midHellenistic in style, a date confirmed epigraphically by two Oscan inscriptions found on the ramp leading to the temple and on an altar placed in front of this. The latter features a Pompeian magistrate, Maras Atinius, who is datable from an inscription found in the Stabian Baths to the second half of the third century BC. The two inscriptions pertaining to the sanctuary indicate that the cult was officially sanctioned by the Pompeian authorities. In the very last period of the town's existence, two triclinia were built in front of the temple; likewise, sacrifices had recently been performed in 79 AD, suggesting that the cult was fully active at this time. Moreover, since the building itself seems to have been main­ tained continuously, the cult would appear to have been upheld without major interruptions from its initiation in the third century BC to the town's destruction in 79 AD. Since the Pompeian monument would not seem to support the theory of Roman persecu-tions of Bacchants outside ager Romanus, the idea has been proposed that the Sant'Abbondio sanctuary was the seat of an old and venerable Dionysios cult, more moderate than the Roman version and for that reason not affected by the ban in 186.56 However, none of the preserved parts of the monument, neither its shape nor the ornaments, by themselves suggest such an interpretation - which is entirely based on its survival intact throughout the second century. In effect, the possibility of adducing archaeological evidence against the theory has thereby been excluded. Following this line of argument, any Italian sanctuary unaffected by the ban may in the future be explained away as one of those excepted from the general prohibition. Against this it must be argued that the burden of proof for such ad hoc solutions will have to lie with the advocates of Roman interventions in allied affairs. The Pompeian sanctuary therefore remains a strong argument against the theory of persecutions outside Roman territory. On the other hand, in Bolsena, the ancient Volsinii Novi, a Bacchus sanctuary has been discovered, which appears to have been demolished sometime during the 180's BC.57 The partly subterranean complex, recently excavated by French archaeologists, consisted of several rooms and corridors built around a spring. The water may have been important in the 55

O. Elia, G. Pugliese Carratelli, 'Il santuario dionisiaco di S. Abbondio a Pompei', in Orfismo in Magna Grecia, Atti del quattordicesimo convegno di studi sulla Magna Grecia (Naples 1975) 139-53, iidem, 'Il santuario dionisiaco di Pompei', PP 34 (1979) 442-81. 56

Pugliese Carratelli, in Elia & id. (1975) 146-53, on the basis of SC de Bacchanalibus line 28-30 and Livy 39,18,7-8. 57

F.-H. Massa-Pairault, J.-M. Pailler, La maison aux salles souterraines, Bolsena 5,1 (Rome 1979).

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mvsterv cult, which can be identified by the throne found in the quadrangular room covered by a dome. On the seat were placed Dionysiac cult objects and on either side it was flanked by panthers. The whole complex was destroyed in the 180's, apparently deliberately since a nrivate house was soon afterwards erected on top of the remains of the sanctuary. It is most likely therefore that the destruction was a consequence of the senatorial ban against Bacchanalia in 186. It does not follow, however, that the senate's decree was also executed outside ager Roman us. Pailler has rightly expressed doubt about the allied status of Volsinii after the slave revolt in 264.™ According to Roman sources, the local elite had asked Rome for military assistance against an uprising of serfs.59 However, when the riot had been suppressed, Rome abandoned the previous hill-top site of the town and moved the entire population to a new site on the plain, less suited to effective defence. This radical step is difficult to reconcile with the official Roman version of Roman help to a faithful ally: it looks suspiciously like an act of retaliation, designed to prevent similar troubles in the future. Later the same punishment was meted out to Falerii after it had revolted against Rome in 241.60 As part of this reorganisation the territory of Volsinii may also have been annexed by Rome. Later, in the 180's, Pailler has shown interesting urbanistic changes in Volsinii; apparently the city-walls were constructed in this period, coinciding with the first introduction of the Roman foot as the standard building measure. The faint outline of a Roman colonisation of Volsinii shortly after 186 therefore seems to emerge. In the same period Rome founded colonies in Saturnia (183), Graviscae (181) and Luna (177), all of which were established on land confiscated long before the Roman settlement.61 Though it will have to remain conjectural, the idea of a Roman annexation and later colonisation of Volsinii does seem to carry sufficient historical and archaeological support to leave the status of this community in 186 an open question. The monument from Bolsena therefore does not constitute unequivocal proof of an extension of Roman rule to the allied states in Italy. Since the archaeological evidence is at best inconclusive, the theory of Roman inter­ vention, most blatantly seen in 186, rests entirely on written sources - or more precisely on an interpretation of written sources. Any interpretation is a dynamic interaction between text and reader, and in this case, I believe the preconceptions of the latter may have stood in the way of a proper historical evaluation of the sources. The model, first created by Mommsen, established a general framework, which implied a certain set of plausibilities for Italian and Roman behaviour in this period; a combination of expansionism and submissiveness was considered a likely basis for the integration, later revealed in the demand for Roman citizenship. But this logic, we should bear in mind, is not a quality inherent in the object, that is, in the past 'reality', it is imposed by the chosen plotstructure. The gradual political integration was part of the revised version of Mommsen's J.-M. Pailler, 'Enceinte, métrologie et politique. Volsinii, colonie Romaine au début du Ile siècle av. J.-C.?\ MEFRA 99 (1987) 529-34. 59

Zonar. 8, 7.

^Zonar. 8, 18. Cf. Livy, 40,29,1, on the foundation of Graviscae '... in agrum Etruscum, de Tarquiniensibus quondam captum'.

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ITALIAN UNIFICATION

unitary model, and served as a substitute for the third century Italian-Roman state that he had originally envisaged. Within this particular vision of Roman Italy, growing political integra­ tion was a natural - indeed vital - development. However, this historiographical necessity has often been confused with a historical inevitability - which, again, takes us directly back to Mommsenian teleology. In practical terms, these premises have produced a conflict between the expectations of modern historians and the ancient evidence at their disposal. The fact that our sparse and heterogeneous source material is not in the least concerned about the Italian issue has been overlooked. Neither Polybius nor Livy was interested in the questions of political integration and the position of the allies posed by modern historians. Usually such indirect information is considered highly reliable, owing to the lack of any overt bias. In this case, however, it all comes down to terminology (that is, the interpretation of Ttalia'), and that will always depend on the immediate intentions of the texts. Our sources all have aims and preoccupations within which the use of exact geographical terminology was of minor importance. To Livy's moralising tale such juridical niceties were quite irrelevant, having no bearing whatsoever on his story-line. Likewise, Polybius' focus was firmly on the political structure of Rome - not Italy. And the SC de Bacchanalibus was not conceived of as a statement for posterity about the legal structure of Italy; its aim was to give exhaustive definitions eliminating possible loopholes and misunderstandings in contemporary Rome. Too often, however, these sources have been isolated from their function and historical context, including the background of the authors and their audiences. When these are taken into account, the purely terminological argument collapses and other interpretations become possible, indeed persuasive. In conclusion, the 'political integration of Italy' seems to have been created to meet a specific historiographical need. The evidence, adduced in support of the theory, is very limited, and, when analysed more closely, reveals itself as far less unequivocal than has previously been assumed. These evidential shortcomings have gone largely unnoticed, I believe, owing to the general perception of the 'convergence' model as a given historical condition rather than a heuristic device. The unitary model provided the logical framework for the interpretation of the sources as indicators of political integration, in itself an essential part of the very same model. Roman-Italian relations in the second century have, in other words, been trapped in a hermeneutic circle, where the general has lent meaning to the specific, which in turn confirmed the general view. At the root of this confusion lies a pre­ conceived set of plausibilities, which have not been recognised as a historiographical construct to be confronted with, and judged against, other hypothetical scenarios. One such alternative was briefly outlined above, suggesting that deep structural forces in second century Italy may have counteracted any tendencies towards political integration. The balance of manpower and Rome's reliance on regular supplies of allied troops may plausibly have restrained Roman expansionism in Italy: the Italian interest in maintaining their sovereignty would seem to be self-evident.

II THE MAKING OF SECOND CENTURY ITALY 3 THE ROMANISATION OF SECOND CENTURY ITALY The cultural romanisation of Italy is not a matter of dispute. Even a brief look at imperial Italy leaves no doubt as to the extent to which hitherto culturally distinct nations, like the Samnites and the Etruscans, had become assimilated into the culture of Rome. But while the final out­ come is a given fact, the question that remains is how and when this radical transformation took place. The beginning of the process has generally been placed in the second century BC, when Rome appeared as the dominant power in the Mediterranean. A rich literature, primarily archaeological and linguistic, has sought to trace Roman influences on her Italian allies during this period. It is not the aim in this chapter to give any exhaustive survey of the results achieved, but, instead, to make an attempt to look at the historiographical origins of the idea of a second century romanisation and at the way it has been (ideo)logically constructed. Romanisation constituted a vital element in the 'unitary' model of republican Italy, which was conceived in mid-nineteenth century Germany. First introduced by Kiene, who referred to '... die grössere Annäherung an die herrschende Stadt in Verfassung, Recht, Sitten, Bildung, kurz in der gesammten Denk- und Anschauungsweise',1 it was fully developed in Mommsen's broad narrative. Here, a full assimilation of Romans and Italians as early as the third century BC was posited - despite the apparent lack of evidence suggesting a complete integration at such an early date. The rationale for this claim appears to have been furnished by the narrative logic of the story, which relied heavily on the factor of romanisation. National unity was perceived as a natural complement to the Appianic version of the 'Italian question', which formed the basis of Mommsen's interpretation. Moreover, the desire for Roman citizenship not only demanded a common Roman-Italian nationality, it was itself tangible proof that this had really been achieved. The idea of Italian romanisation was thus both derived from and used to explain the Social War. Therefore, as a historical fact implied by the political events, the existence of cultural romanisation was not itself dependent on evidential demonstration; the sources merely served as illustrations of this phenomenon. The main problem outstanding was how to date this unity - and here the theory of a mounting antagonism between Rome and her allies in the second century suggested that it predated the Hannibalic War. Historiographically the concept of Italian romanisation can thus be traced back to an idealistic model of Italian unification, created in the nineteenth century around a nucleus provided by Appian. As the Appianic version still forms the core of modern reconstructions of the 'Italian question', romanisation has - quite logically - remained an essential component of the general argument, explaining as it does the Italian willingness to abandon their tradi­ tional autonomy in favour of Roman citizenship. Placed against a background of profound 'Kiene (1844) 120. 59

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ITALIAN UNIFICATION

acculturation the choice of complete integration instead of restored independence appears a far more comprehensible stance. But although the historiographical function of Italian romanisation is unchanged since Mommsen's Römische Geschichte, the rules of the game have been altered. The sweeping assertions and arbitrary datings which Mommsen could get away with in his broad literary synthesis, no longer pass as acceptable scholarship; a more reasoned argumentation is required - as well as the introduction of ancient evidence, not least archaeological. The task of later historians has therefore been to flesh out the grand but still somewhat sketchy scheme conceived by Mommsen. In the following pages, the various explanatory strategies and attempts to demonstrate Italian romanisation will be discussed. It may seem paradoxical to start with the explanations - formally, these are expected to follow the demonstration of the phenomenon, but the two operations cannot be thus separated. The choice and use of examples to demonstrate romanisation are determined by the same set of concepts and assumed plausibilities which underlie the suggested explanations. And since the latter give a far more direct insight into the values and expectations of the historian, they form the natural point of departure for a historiographical evaluation of Italian romanisation. There has been broad agreement on the fact that Rome did not pursue any deliberate policy of romanisation in republican Italy. The supposed spread of Roman language and customs among the Italians cannot therefore have been the result of concerted Roman efforts in that direction; it would have been a spontaneous process for which a specific explanation is required. Despite the amount of scholarship devoted to this issue, there has been little real discussion as to what led to this assimilation; the explanations offered still remain somewhat rudimentary and will often have to be deduced from descriptions of 'what happened'. The origins of Italian self-romanisation have been traced back to Rome's putative role as political as well as cultural leader, that is, a consequence of cultural attraction combined with political dominance. First, an attempt is made to separate the cultural argument from the political in order to evaluate individually their explanatory potential. Roman cultural supremacy and leadership in second century Italy has generally been taken for granted by historians - despite the greater caution shown by many archaeologists familiar with the evidence. Any notion of an inherent Roman superiority over other Italian cultures is patently absurd: one merely has to think of the rich cultural traditions of, for example, the Etruscans, the Campanians or the peoples of Apulia to realise its futility. Quite logically, therefore, the claim of cultural attraction has been linked to the issue of hellenisation. For, by the third and second centuries BC hellenistic civilisation, in many respects far more sophist­ icated than other Mediterranean cultures, had become the accepted cultural ideal, widely imitated by local elites. As Paul Veyne put it, hellenisation 'was not Greek civilization or foreign civilization, but civilization pure and simple'; T o Hellenize ... was to choose ... to put oneself with the avantgarde.'2 Rome has been seen as the primary force in the hellenisation of Italy, mediating Greek influence to the rest of the peninsula. As Salmon declared, Rome had become 'the cultural leader as well as the political mistress', largely accounting for 'the speed with which the 2

P. Veyne, 'The Hellenization of Rome and the Question of Acculturation', Diogenes 106 (1979) 1-27, 8,13.

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Hellenistic civilization penetrated Italy'.3 It was Rome's hegemony, Salmon continued, which ensured the rapid transmission of hellenistic culture into other parts of Italy. This hellenising r0le would also have facilitated the spread of Roman culture. Thus Salmon maintained that: 'Italic Hellenism ... made them receptive to the growing influences radiating from Rome'.4 Rome's longstanding and ever closer contact with the Greek world is not a matter of dispute. But that does not imply that her role as mediator of hellenistic culture to the allies is thereby confirmed; other Italian towns and regions may have been even more profoundly hellenised than Rome herself. There are, however, great difficulties in demonstrating and comparing levels of hcllenisation. The state of the evidence presents obvious problems, since in many fields only the Roman side is documented. Early Latin literature illustrates this situation. The third and second centuries saw the birth and blooming of a Latin literature deeply influenced by hellenistic models. A remarkably large proportion of these early writers appear to have been of Italian stock,5 which has been taken as indicative of Rome's intellectual super­ iority as well as the literary supremacy of the Latin language over (primitive) Osco-Umbrian languages.6 This conclusion goes too far; surely the existence of an Oscan literature cannot entirely be ruled out.7 In fact the origins of these writers might in itself suggest a high literary culture in their home towns, where they had received the education and hellenistic influence they later brought to bear in Rome.8 Bilingualism would of course have been widespread at least in certain quarters. Because of her size and wealth, Rome offered better opportunities for profitable noble patronage; her attraction to some talented Italians is therefore not hard to explain. But it cannot be inferred from these examples that all Italian writers migrated to Rome; others may have stayed at home and contributed to a vernacular literature, which was lost in the first century BC along with the demise of the non-Roman languages. Another difficulty is linked to measuring the relative degree of hellenisation. Archaeo­ logical evidence has frequently been used by historians to demonstrate Rome's supremacy in this field. However, the approach has rarely looked beneath the surface of hellenisation or considered the wider significance of the individual examples. Thus from the third century on numerous new temples were erected in Rome and old ones restored in the hellenistic style;

3

Salmon (1982) 100.

4

Salmon (1982) 159.

5

Thus Plautus, Ennius, Pacuvius, Accius, Naevius, Lucilius.

5

E.g.Göhler(1939)30.

7

Only the Atellan farces are documented - because of Rome's adoption of this genre, which was itself deeply influenced by Greek plays, cf. P. Frassinetti, Fabula Atellana (Genoa 1953), A. La Penna, 'Aspetti e conflitti della cultura latina dai Gracchi a Siila', DdA 4-5 (1970-71) 193-211, 208.

8

High literary culture outside Rome is convincingly shown by T. P. Wiseman, 'Domi nobiles and the Roman cultural élite', in Les 'Bourgeoisies' municipales italiennes aux He et 1er siècles av. J.-C. éd. M. Cébeillac-Gervasoni (Paris-Naples) 299-307, who - in the first century - contrasts the 'newlyhellenized Rome' with 'the already-hellenized senators and équités from the towns of Italy', 306. E. Rawson, Theatrical Life in Republican Rome and Italy', PBSR 53 (1985) 97-113, reprinted Roman Culture and Society (Oxford 1991) 468-87, also suggested great Italian independence in the theatrical sphere. A useful survey - from a Roman view-point - in ead., Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic (London 1985) 19-37.

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Greek art flowed into the city and was emulated in the production of local artists. 9 But the introduction of Greek art and architectural fashions does not in itself presuppose any deeper hellenisation, nor did it necessarily leave any real impact on lifestyle and attitudes; it may reflect little more than a superficial hellenisation of artistic taste. Moreover, many art works were obviously brought as spolia from military campaigns, and the temples vowed by victorious generals clearly served as symbolic demonstrations of the Roman conquest of the East. The ostentatious display of Greek art treasures and architectural monuments in the imperial capital may therefore say more about Roman power and wealth than about the degree to which she had embraced hellenistic culture. Other types of archaeological evidence may, however, be more reliable as indicators of hellenisation. Certain building types would seem to reflect a greater familiarity with and acceptance of hellenistic lifestyle than architectural ornaments and objets d'art. A com­ parison of this type of evidence from Rome and Campania, including Pompeii, the best known allied town, might be illuminating. 10 It has often been noted that the large theatre in Pompeii preceded the first Roman stone theatre by more than a hundred years, and the Pompeian example is far from unique; several other Campanian theatres can be dated to the second century BC. 11 While temporary wooden structures were allowed in Rome, stone buildings were long avoided for political or, more likely, ideological reasons. 12 Outside Rome, stone theatres were erected in Latium, but 9

See e.g. P. Gros, 'Les premières générations d'architectes hellénistiques à Rome', in Mélanges Heurgon (Rome 1976) 387-409, id. Architecture et société à Rome et en Italie centro-méridionale aux deux derniers siècles de la République, Coll. Latomus 156 (Brussels 1978) 34-41, F. Coarelli, 'Classe dirigente romana e arti figurative', DdA 4-5 (1970-71) 241-65, id. 'Architettura e arti figurative in Roma: 150-50 a.C, in Hellenismus in Mittelitalien, ed. P. Zanker (Göttingen 1976) 21-32, E. S. Gruen, Culture and National Identity in Republican Rome (Ithaca 1992) 84-182. 10 For Pompeii, P. Zanker's synthesis is now fundamental, Pompeji. Stadtbilder als Spiegel von Gesellschaft und Herrschaftsform, Trierer Winckelmannsprogramm 9 (1987) 5-17. On Campania, see W. Johannowsky, 'La Campania', DdA 4-5 (1970-71) 460-71, id. 'La situazione in Campania', in Hellenismus in Mittelitalien, ed. P. Zanker (Göttingen 1976) 267-88. 11 Thus in Teanum Sidicinum, Cales, Sarno, Nuceria and Capua (only epigraphically attested, ILLRP 719), see catalogue by K. Mitens, Teatri greci e teatri ispirati all'architettura greca in Sicilia e nell'Italia meridionale c.350-50 a.C, ARID suppl 13 (Rome 1988) 154-74. 12

The censors of 154 ordered the demolition of a stone theatre under erection in Rome, Val. Max. 11,4,2, Livy per. 48, Veil. 1,15,3, Oros. 4,12,4, and a similar incident took place in 106, App. 1,125, cf. J. A. North, 'Deconstructing Stone Theaters', in Apodosis. Essays presented to Dr. W. W. Cruickshank to mark his eightieth birthday (London 1992) 75-83. The reasons may well have been moral more than political. Thus the gathering of large crowds was tolerated on many other occasions, e.g. in the circuses and at the gladiatorial games. Cf. E. Rawson, 'Roman tradition and the Greek world', CAH 8, 2nd ed. (1989) 422-76,470, M. G. Morgan, 'Polybius, Antiochus and the "Day of Eleusis'", Historia 39 (1990) 35-76, 72-74. Contra Gros (1978) 20f. Recently Gruen (1992) 209, has dismissed the moral motive, given by Appian, instead arguing that the dismantling of the theatre was primarily a reassertion of the senatorial elite's authority in cultural matters. That, however, can hardly be the whole story. For although the Roman public 'had been witnessing fabulae palliatae for three-quarters of a century and would continue to do so long after the 150s', the building of a permanent stone theatre would radically change the position and impact of this institution in Roman culture and society. To ignore these obvious implications and to claim that the censorial intervention had little to do with the theatrical institution itself seems a somewhat strained position.

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•hereas the Campanian ones were entirely Greek in form and structure, the later ones j i o n g e d to a specific Roman type clearly distinct from the Greek model.13 And since form •ind function cannot be separated, it has been convincingly argued that in Campania not only the architectural framework but also the theatrical performances may have adhered more closely to the Greek traditions.14 The aversion felt by the Roman public to Greek body culture - and in particular its link with Greek sexual attitudes15 - is well-documented, and the palaestra was therefore not represented among the hellenistic monuments in Rome.16 Pompeii, on the other hand, may have had no less than two gymnasia by the end of the second century BC, the so-called Samnite palaestra and the large portico behind the theatre.17 Both were connected with the trianCTular forum, where the running course appears to have been incorporated into a new monumental hellenistic design for the square. An Oscan inscription suggests the Samnite palaestra was the seat of the vereia, perhaps a local youth organisation parallel to the Greek ephebeia.™ In the second century the old Stabian baths in Pompeii were also transformed: the bath block was turned into a sequence of functionally related rooms and a Greek palaestra was added to the complex.19 Public baths did exist in Rome at this time but only in an older purely utilitarian version. The imperial Roman bath culture would thus appear to have been of Campanian rather than urban origins, combining as it did bathing with Greek-inspired leisure activities. The public buildings in second century Pompeii generally convey the impression of strong hellenistic influence. The Forum area may not yet have been fully monumentalised by the end of the century, although the construction of the Jupiter temple at the northern end, the basilica and the southern portico suggest that this process was already well on its way - the delay may therefore simply have been a question of time and resources. Still, it may also have reflected 13 The earliest known Roman theatre appears to be from Gabii, dated to the second century BC by M. Almagro-Gorbea (ed.), El santuario de Juno en Gabii (Rome 1982) 61, 61 Off. For Roman and Italian theatres see e.g. E. Frézouls, 'Aspects de l'histoire architecturale du théâtre romain', ANRW 11,12,1 (1982) 343-441, 343-85 with literature, L. Polacco, 'Rapporti tra i teatri greco-italici e i teatri sicelioti', in Ercolano 1738-88 (Rome 1993) 147-53. 14 H. Lauter, 'Die hellenistischen Theater der Samniter und Latiner in ihrer Beziehung zur Theater­ architektur der Griechen', in Hellenismus in Mittelitalien, ed. P. Zanker (Göttingen 1976) 413-22. 15 See e.g. R. MacMullen, 'Roman attitudes to Greek love', Historia3\ (1982) 484-502, reprinted in Changes in the Roman Empire (Princeton 1990) 177-89, cf. id. 'Hellenizing the Romans (second century BC)', Historia 40 (1991) 419-38, 434. Uì

J. Delorme, Gymnasion (Paris 1960) 223.

17

For the former see Delorme (1960) 227-30; for the latter, often interpreted as a theatre porticus, Zanker (1987) 12. ' E. Vetter, Handbuch der italischen Dialekte (Heidelberg 1953) 11, shown in A. Morandi, Epigrafia italica (Rome 1982) 123-4. The interpretation has generated considerable debate. See e.g. M. Cristofani, 'Società e istituzioni nell'Italia preromana', PCIA 1 (1978) 53-112, 89; more sceptical, E. Campanile, in id. and C. Letta, Studi sulle magistrature indigene e municipali in area italica (Pisa 1979) 32. H. Eschebach, Die Stabianerthermen in Pompeji (Berlin 1979), I. Nielsen, 'Considerazioni sulle Prime fasi dell'evoluzione dell'edificio termale romano', ARID 14 (1985) 81-112.

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local priorities. For, as Zanker noted, the area around the theatre seems to represent a far more advanced stage of hellenisation than the Forum.20 Apart from the theatre and the two palaestrae, it also featured a hellenistic square, which set the archaic Greek temple in a new scenic frame, and the temples for the two eastern deities of Aesculapius(?) and Isis respec­ tively.21 Viewed in its entirety, this district therefore suggests a whole-hearted embracing of essential elements of hellenistic public culture; an impression further borne out by the apparent precedence, at least temporarily, of 'leisure' facilities, including baths, over the political centre of the town. A similar picture emerges when we look at the domestic architecture in second century Pompeii, a period characterised by great activity and innovation.22 Most important in this context was the addition of the peristyle garden to the traditional Italic house. The Pompeian peristyle, though no direct import from the East, was composed of hellenistic building elements and reflected hellenistic lifestyle and mentality.23 For, whereas the traditional atrium house had been austere and formal rather than comfortable, the introduction of the peristyle clearly marked a new emphasis on pleasure and privacy. Among the patrician houses built in this period, several were of palatial proportions and decorated with imported mosaics, sculptures and fine plasterworks, bearing unequivocal witness to their owners' taste for hellenistic luxury and lifestyle.24 This openness, which stands in striking contrast to the often expressed Roman anxiety about the corrupting influence from the East, was hardly peculiar to Pompeii; in late republican Rome, Capua, the main urban centre of Campania, remained a symbol of domestic luxuria and a sophisticated lifestyle. In Rome such mores were found reprehensible, and here the traditional atrium house appears to have been universal right into the first century BC.

20

Zanker (1987) 16.

21

The epigraphically documented temple of Zeus Meilichios has now been identified with an extraurban sanctuary, S. De Caro, 'Novità isiache della Campania', PP 49 (1994) 7-11, who suggests the deity worshipped near the theatre may have been Aesculapius. For this temple and its hellenistic models see W. Schiering, 'Hoftempel in Pompeji', MDAI(A) 99 (1984) 305-17, D. Russo, // tempio di Giove Meilichio a Pompei (Naples 1991).

22 Gros (1978) 26, A. Hoffmann, 'L'architettura', in Pompei 79, ed. F. Zevi (Naples 1984) 105-18, Zanker(1987)5-9. 23

Cf. Gros (1978) 27, W. Jashemski, 'Giardini e vigneti in città', in Pompei 79, ed. F. Zevi (Naples 1984) 119-24, 119.1. Nielsen has recently suggested that the inspiration for the peristyles in Campania and later in Rome may have come from the hellenistic palaces, Hellenistic Palaces. Tradition and Renewal (Aarhus 1994) 164-80. 24

The Pompeian mansions, some comparable in size to the palaces of hellenistic rulers, underline the fact that despite their political 'insignificance' the Italian nobles might live in greater splendour than their Roman 'masters'. Not only the elite, building grand houses like the Casa del Fauno, Casa di Pansa and Casa del Labirinto, adopted the new lifestyle; also smaller houses were early transformed, cf. H. Eschebach, 'Die Entdeckung eines Hauses unter den Stabianer Thermen', Cr.Pomp. 1 (1975) 82-117, id. 'Die Casa di Ganimede in Pompeji VII 13,4', RM 89 (1982) 229-436, 263-68. For the mosaics see M. De Vos, 'Pavimenti e mosaici', in Pompei 79, ed. F. Zevi (Naples 1984) 161-76, and the sculpture O. Elia, 'La scultura pompeiana in tufo', Cr.Pomp. 1 (1975) 118-43, and H. Döhl and P. Zanker, 'La scultura', in Pompei 79, ed. F. Zevi (Naples 1984) 177-210.

THE MAKING OF SECOND CENTURY ITALY - ROMANISATION

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What seems to emerge from this comparison is a difference in the character of the hcllenisation of the Pompeian and the Roman elites, the latter appearing far more hesitant in accentine Greek culture than their Pompeian counterpart.25 A further illustration of this disparity is furnished by the Dionysiac imagery found in patrician houses in Pompeii,26 together with the suburban sanctuary previously mentioned, they suggest a religious outlook which remained open to Greek influences unaffected by grave Roman reservations. Thus it has been summarised that: 'La Pompei preromana del II secolo a.C, per quanto attiene alla sistemazione degli spazi urbani, all'architettura pubblica e privata, e al costume di vita delle classi superiori, offriva l'aspetto di una città ellenistica'.27 The question is therefore whether the Pompeian material can really be accommodated into a model of Italian hellenism being mediated through Rome. The seemingly more advanced level of hellenisation which we find here casts doubt on Rome's leading role in this process; other channels of hellenisation might therefore be considered - and they are not difficult to trace. The geographical proximity of Campania to the Greek communities in Southern Italy itself suggests greater familiarity with Greek culture - the location of Neapolis in the midst of the region would obviously have made an impact; and there may also have been close links with the deeply hellenised Apulia. Moreover, in the second century Oscan Campania is most likely to have maintained its own direct contacts with the hellenistic East. On Delos, after 167 the main commercial port in the Aegean, numerous Italic names are epigraphically attested.28 Although some of them may have been Roman citizens from the northern parts of Campania,29 the absence of traders from, for example, Pompeii would be difficult to explain. As the port for Southern Campania, including Nola and Nuceria, Pompeii had natural interests overseas. The boom in public and domestic building activity in the later part of the century would suggest a considerable influx of wealth - most plausibly explained as a consequence of the exploitation of the eastern provinces. Several archaeologists have remarked on the cultural dynamics of Campania which appears to have been something of a melting pot mixing influences from Italy, Rome, Magna Grecia, and the hellenistic East, and combining them into new original structures (for example the atrium-peristyle house and the bath-cum-palaestra).30 These apparently Campanian inventions often proved highly successful, spreading to the rest of Italy or even the provinces. The example of Campania therefore affects the theory of undisputed Roman leadership in this 25

F. Yegiil, Baths and Bathing in Classical Antiquity (New York 1992) 55, made the observation that in Campania: 'the diffusion and assimilation of Greek customs were smoother and more effective than elsewhere in Italy'. 26

Zanker (1987) 7,14.

27

Döhl& Zanker (1984) 189.

28

A. J. N. Wilson, Emigration from Italy in the Republican Age of Rome (Manchester 1966) 85ff, F. Cassola, 'Romani e Italici in Oriente', DdA 4-5 (1970-71) 305-22, J. Hatzfeld, Les Trafiquants Italiens dans l'Orient Hellénique (Paris 1919). 29 30

Cf. H. Solin, 'Appunti sull'onomastica romano a Delo', OIRF2 (1982) 101-17.

Most forcefully argued by J. B. Ward-Perkins, 'Taste, Tradition and Technology. Some aspects of the architecture of late Republican and early Imperial Italy', in Studies in Classical Art and Ar­ chaeology. A Tribute to P. H. von Blanckenhagen (New York 1979) 197-204.

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ITALIAN UNIFICATION

sphere: outside Rome - and the ager Romanus - other regions were active and apparently independent transformers of Greek culture. And they may plausibly have played a part also in the incipient hellenisation of the interior mountainous regions. In Samnium, a prime example of a tribal non-urbanised area perceived until recently as the primitive backwater of Italy, the most conspicuous hellenistic influence is displayed in a number of monumental sanctuaries built in the second century BC.31 The grandest of these was erected at Pietrabbondante, where in the late second century a monumental theatre-temple com-plex was added to an existing sanctuary, dating back to the third century. On a sloping hillside, overlooking the entire valley, a large semi-peripteral temple was built, raised axially above a partially built up theatre. In the quality of its details and overall design this truly hellenistic complex is outstanding - and numerous features indicate that the inspiration and craftmanship may have come from Campania. The Greek horse-shoe shape of the cavea, otherwise found only in Campania and Southern Italy, is highly suggestive, and the earliest Italian example of the theatre-temple is documented in the allied town of Teanum Sidicinum in northern Campania.32 Several of the architectural and sculptural details also have striking parallels in Campanian monuments. Other elements may have had Roman origins: still they are not central to the general design and merely reflect the complexity of cultural influences in second century Italy. Salmon's attempt to save Rome's leading role, claiming that '... in style, lay-out and decoration [the Samnite temples] owed much to Rome' is therefore a considerable exaggeration.33 Campanian influence on the hellenisation of Samnium is manifest in the archaeological remains;34 considering Campania's strong historical and 'ethnic' links to 'Sabellian' Italy the existence of such cultural connections is hardly surprising.35 The archaeological evidence may therefore suggest a far more complex situation than Salmon and others have allowed for. The hellenisation of Rome seems in several respects to have been less advanced than that in Campania, for example. This may partly be explained in historical and geographical terms by the traditionally greater Campanian familiarity with

31

Sanctuaries have been found at Pietrabbondante, Schiavi d'Abruzzo, Quadri, Vastogirardi, S. Giovanni in Galdo, Campochiaro: M. J. Strazzulla, Il santuario sannitico di Pietrabbondante, 2nd ed. (Campobasso 1972), A. Prosdocimi, 'Sui grecismi nell'osco', in Scritti in onore di G. Bonfante (Brescia 1976) 835ff, A. La Regina, TI Sannio', in Hellenismus in Mittelitalien, ed. P. Zanker (Göttingen 1976) 219-43, J.-P. Morel, 'Le sanctuaire de Vastogirardi (Molise) et les influences hellénis­ tiques en Italie centrale', ibid. 255-62, Sannio. Pentri e Frentani dal VI al I sec. a.C. (Rome 1980). Traces of hellenisation are also apparent in the domestic architecture from Saepinum, G. Ambrossetti, 'Testimonianze preaugustee da Sepino-Altilia',i4rc/z. Class. 10(1958) 14-20. 32

W. Johannowsky, 'Nuovirinvenimentia Nuceria Alfaterna', in La regione sotterrata dal Vesuvio (Naples 1982) 835-62, 844, points at direct structural parellels between Pietrabbondante and Teanum.

"Salmon (1982) 117. 34

Cf. J.-P. Morel, 'La romanisation du Samnium et de la Lucanie aux IVe et Ille siècles av. J.-C. d'après l'artisanat et le commerce', in Comunità indigene e problemi della romanizzazione nell'Italia centro-meridionale (IV- III sec. av.C.) (Brussels-Rome 1991) 125-44. 35

As noted by M. H. Crawford, there are also indications that Samnium had its own independent links with the east, 'Le monete romane nelle regioni d'Italia', in Les 'Bourgeoisies' municipales italiennes aux Ile et 1er siècles av. J.-C, éd. M. Cébeillac-Gervasoni (Paris-Naples 1983) 47-50, cf. Sannio (1980) 342f. Links to Apulia have also been noted, ibid. 51.

THE MAKiNG OF SECOND CENTURY ITALY - ROMANISATION

67

m e k culture. But the cautious stance taken by Rome probably also reflects her different ilitical position. In the first half of the second century, Rome had seen a radical change in 1 *r world position. Within a few decades, major hellenistic powers had bowed to her arms, I *avin2 her as the sole power dominant in the Mediterranean. But by defeating the eastern vers s 0 decisively, Rome had not only experienced the sophistication and attraction of Greek culture but also the political and military impotence of this civilisation. The double îsDCCt of hellenism put Rome in a dilemma which may have left her with severe misgivings about the moral impact of hellenisation as a possible threat to the foundations of her newly won empire36 The Italians, on the other hand, were in an entirely different position; deprived as they were of any responsibility for the upkeep of the empire, they could freely embrace Greek culture and lifestyle without moral preoccupations. And in doing so they were not dependent on Roman leadership but could draw on their own traditional links with the Greek world. The paradoxical result was that Rome, despite - or rather because of- her political supremacy stayed cautiously in the slow lane of hellenisation, while some of her allies overtook her in the fast track. In sum, the cultural explanation of self-romanisation does not withstand a closer scrutiny. The theory of Roman leadership ignores impressive archaeological evidence from the allied states and seems to have been derived ultimately from her role as conqueror and ruler of the hellenistic world. The argument, incidentally overlooking the inherent dilemma of Rome's position, reflects a general confusion of political and cultural attraction. Thus, the cultural argument has invariably been combined with an external political explanation of the romanisation of second century Italy. The external argument has been gradually developed towards its present form, where it con­ sists of at least three different strands, introduced in successive chronological phases. The earliest version of the political explanation, formulated by Mommsen, was - hardly sur­ prisingly - cast in the national mould, but can still - in various disguises - be traced in recent accounts. It envisaged a growing sense of national unity between Romans and Italians.37 Under Roman leadership the hitherto split and politically atomised Italian peninsula had been united and given a common cause. As Klingner later put it: 'Wenn es darum eine gemeinsame Sache der Italiker gab, so hiess sie Rom'.38 During long campaigns overseas, in Gaul and in Italy, Romans and Italians had fought side by side, forming what Gohler saw as a

36

Cf. MacMullen (1991). The Roman empire may have seemed more precarious to contemporary observers in the second century than it does from a modem perspective of hindsight. The elite's worries about the corrupting influence from the east may therefore have been more than bigoted moralising; they may have seen it as a real threat to the safety of Rome and her empire. Thus the repeated legislation against luxuria, D. Daube, Roman Law. Linguistic, Social and Philosophical Aspects (Edinburgh 1969 117-28, M. Bonamente, 'Leggi suntuarie e loro motivazioni', in Tra Grecia e Roma (Roma 1980) 67ff, Clemente (1981), Baltrusch (1989) 40ff. Similar motives may have underlain the suppression of the Bacchanalia in 186 and the expulsion of Greek philosophers in 161 and 154(?), cf. Gruen (1990) 173-79. The Gracchan programme to revive the peasant class in 133 probably also reflected deep-seated anxieties about the safety of Rome and her empire, recently reinforced by the slave wars in Sicily. 37

In this century most powerfully formulated by Gohler (1939) 31-38. Klingner (1956) 23, cf. Keaveney (1987) 28: 'Pan-Italism was ... Rome's creation'.

68

ITALIAN UNIFICATION

Kampfgemeinschaft?9 The solidarity developed in the battlefields strengthened Italian identification with the interests of Rome. 40 And, with the growth of the empire, Italy's special position became more and more apparent; in an imperial context the purely geographical concept of Italy received new political meaning, set off from the provinces and closely associated with Rome. Within this interpretation the Roman-Italian relationship has often been perceived as an almost affectionate one. 41 Rome was seen as the protector against foreign invaders and the great neighbour who had brought peace to the peninsula and given the Italians access to booty and provincial markets. 42 Italian acquiescence in the second century is thus described in terms of loyalty, as is their support for Rome during the Second Punic War. Occasionally this loyalty has even been endowed with moral qualities by introducing the concept of clientelism with all its implications of pietas towards the patron. Common nationality was thus generated by a combination of Italian admiration, gratitude, and morally charged feelings of loyalty.43 There are obvious objections to be made to this idealised picture of a harmonious fusion of Romans and Italians. Some have already been touched upon: it ignores the fundamental conflict of interest between Rome and her Italian allies, focused on the exploitation of Italian manpower and the inequality of imperial power and profits enjoyed by Rome and the allies. Viewed within this broader perspective the occasional convergence of interests, for example when they were fending off foreign invaders, would appear to be merely temporary distractions from the daily reality of Roman domination. Naturally, the outlook of the allies did change as a consequence of their (enforced) relation­ ship with Rome: after the revolt in 91 they did not return to the old pre-Roman structures but

39

Göhler (1939) 31. With characteristic bombast Göhler later describes Romans and Italians as 'Schicksalsgefährten', 35.

40

Cf. Badian (1958) 144: 'It was ... inevitable that a sense of unity should grow up among all the states so often fighting side by side', Brunt (1988) 117: 'Military camaraderie probably played a large part in promoting a national sentiment', Keaveney (1987) 28: 'The mingling of men in a common service cannot but have fostered the growth of a common Italian identity and will have served to implant in the leaders of the diverse nations of Italy a sense of community.' 41

Göhler (1939) 31, insisted that without taking into account 'das Gefühlsmässige' and 'die geheimen Kräfte, die zwischen Rom und dem nichtrömischen Italien wirkten' second century Italy could not be properly understood.

42

Göhler (1939) 30, 'Rom ... schützt seine einseitig an ihn gebundenen Kampfgenossen gegen alle Gefahren, die von aussen drohen ...', Badian (1958) 31, and 145: "Their submission by now was voluntary, based ... on the habit of obedience and the desire for protection', Salmon (1982) 72: 'Rome ... provided protection. At times it must have been very comforting for Italians to know that in times of trouble Rome's power was there to support them.', and ibid. 'Above all, Rome put an end to fighting between Italian states with incalculable benefit to all'.

43

Cf. Göhler (1939) 23: '... Rome "erobert" nicht, sondern die Stämme Italiens fügen sich von selbst der Überlegenheit des römischen Wesens', Heuss (1964) 66: 'Mit der Zeit schwand bei den Italikem die Erinnerung an die Tage der Unterwerfung, und an ihre Stelle trat ein Gefühl der Zusammengehörigkeit mit Rom.', Badian (1958) 151: '(Rome) bases her hegemony on moral grounds', P. A. Brunt: '... in Italy too Rome had ultimately won the consent of her subjects', Roman Imperial Themes (Oxford 1990) 274, Salmon (1982) 158: '(Rome) assumed the moral, juridical and admini­ strative leadership of Italy'.

THE MAfviNG OF SECOND CENTURY ITALY - ROMANISATION

69

founded a unitary state with central institutions. In a sense, therefore, it is true that Rome united the Italians; but it was a unity that grew in opposition to Rome, not around her. For the mposition of the alliances not only brought an end to internal strife among the allies, it also v e t n e m a common cause - and opponent. The geographical concept of Italy may originally r v e been introduced by the Romans, probably to unite the Italians against Carthage on the eve of the First Punic War.44 But later, Rome's own creation was turned against her, as demonstrated graphically in the insurgent coinage during the Social War, where 'Italia' and the bull, linked by a spurious etymology, became potent symbols of anti-Roman unity. As noted above, the idea of Rome as the protector of Italy is an undue idealisation. She did of course defend the peninsula (with very substantial Italian 'help') and intervene when internal stability was at risk. But as a hegemonic power Rome naturally performed the double function of exploiting/controlling her sphere of domination whilst at the same time preserving it against external and internal threats. In this perspective the concept of Italian loyalty to Rome also appears misplaced. A description of allied acquiescence or support in terms of moral obligation overlooks the fact that most of them had been forced into the alliance with Rome. The remarkable durability of the alliances therefore says more about the effective organisation of the Roman hegemony than about the attitude of the Italians. Similarly, the pattern of allied support and defection during the Hannibalic War was hardly a division of devoted followers and hostile opponents. Most communities would have been split on the issue, the choice being one between an unknown master and an all too familiar one; their final stance would probably have been based on an estimate of who was the most likely victor.45 In essence, this line of argument clearly goes back to the historicism of the nineteenth century, which saw Rome as unifier and protector of the Italian peoples - a mission which automatically invested her rule with moral qualities. And within this positive vision of Italian unification, the spontaneous development of national unity was a natural expectation. Obviously such idealism now belongs to a dated - and widely abandoned - paradigm. But the historiographical roots of this model are important to bear in mind. For not only does it still underlie many modern accounts; it has also come to pervade the vocabulary used to analyse the question, for example through the introduction of the term 'loyalty'. In the twentieth century, however, the emphasis has gradually been shifted from nationality to hegemony. This developed version of the argument has focused on Rome's undisputed political superiority and super-power status in the Mediterranean world. Thus Gohler argued that: 'Es lag an der Oberhoheit Roms in allen militärischen und aussenpolitischen Fragen des Italischen Bundes, dass sich eine gewaltige Überlegenheit Roms auch in den geistigen Belangen ergeben musste'. 46 And after her victory in the Second Punic War, Salmon claimed that: '... Rome, whether consciously seeking to do so or not, could now hardly help impressing Italy with her

Acknowledged by Salmon (1982) 81: 'The attitude of Rome's allies was based on self-interest, not pan-Italian patriotism' - as opposed to H. H. Scullard's claim that: 4... the unexpected loyalty of her Italian allies ... morally justified her conquest of the peninsula ...', A History of the Roman World 753-146 BC, 4th ed. (London 1980) 239. 46

Gohler (1939) 29.

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ITALIAN UNIFICATION

character, her speech and her customs', thus explaining the spontaneous self-romanisation.47 The Italians, in other words, emulated Rome because they were overawed by her grandeur, authority, and power. Again, this perspective ignores the background of Rome's position, which was to a large extent based on Italian manpower - a fact most likely to have dampened their admiration. It also fails to take into account the internal military balance within the peninsula, which was less unequivocally in Rome's favour than her world position might suggest. In effect, the argument puts them in the category of provincials who were, as I shall argue below, in an entirely different position from that of the Italian allies. More seriously, however, the argument relies on what is basically a false nomological assumption; for the cultural attraction of power, which it presupposes, is not a common historical experience. The political power of a large, hegemonic state is not in itself a valid explanation of why smaller neighbours should spontaneously assume its language and culture; the opposite reaction has more often been the case. Small nations often react quite differently when put under such political pressure. A sort of centre-periphery relationship has also been envisaged, a natural system with Rome in the centre surrounded by and reflected in small allied states.48 The image is deceptive as it fails to explain why the Italians saw themselves as a cultural periphery to Rome. One might wonder whether these preconceptions are linked to the national background of the modern scholars concerned with the issue, most of these having come from large nations, whose survival and cultural identity have rarely, if ever, been seriously questioned. This large-nation perspective may also have been strengthened by the colonial experience when western powers saw their customs emulated on the foreign con­ tinents where they had established their rule. Thus, we generally find an instinctive identifi­ cation with Rome - Italy's history has never been written from below49 - and a conspicuous

47

Salmon (1982) 93, cf. Keaveney (1987) 31: 'One readily concedes that the Italians could be overawed by the majesty of Rome'.

48

Cf. G. Devoto, 'La Romanisation de l'Italie médiane', CUM 3 (1956) 443-62, 454: 'Nous avons sous les yeux l'image d'une organisation stellaire de l'Italie antique, dans laquelle la lumière part de Rome et où celle-ci reçoit sa propre lumière par réfraction'. More recently the centre-periphery model has been invoked by e.g. M. Torelli, 'Edilizia pubblica in Italia centrale tra guerra sociale ed età augustea: ideologia e classi', in Les 'Bourgeoisies' municipales italiennes aux Ile et 1er siècles av. J.-C, éd. M. Cébeillac-Gervasoni (Paris-Naples 1982) 241-50, 243. 49

The modem account which comes closest to an allied viewpoint is Salmon's Samnium and the Satnnites, which M. W. Frederiksen in his review, JRS 58 (1968) 224-29, 224, characterised as 'partisan'. The author's apparent sympathy for the Samnites did not, however, lead to any new under­ standings of the historical events and processes. And rather paradoxically Salmon's later synthesis, The Making of Roman Italy, now stands out as one of the most romano-centric among recent accounts. Also historiographically interesting is G. De Sanctis' posthumously published La guerra sociale (Florence 1976). His viewpoint was that of the Italian Risorgimento, and the ideal a combination of political unity and cultural diversity, esp. 40-42, cf. L. Polverini's introduction, XXXVI n.16. De Sanctis fully shared the federal aims of the allies, who sought to 'creare un'Italia degli Italiani', 41, rather than a romanised Italy. But this identification with the allied cause left the substance of the received romano-centric version largely untouched. D. B. Nagle's 'An Allied View of the Social War', AJA 11 (1973) 367-78, promises more than it delivers. Nagle merely points to the land issue as a possible factor behind the still accepted - allied demand for Roman citizenship, thus following J. Carcopino, 'Les lois agraires des Gracques et la guerre sociale', BAB 22 (1929) 2-23.

THE MAKING OF SECOND CENTURY ITALY - ROMANISATION ,'llinaness

t0 accept

her position as that of a benign patron and peace-maker. M) The benefits

f her rule are elevated, and possible Italian reservations dismissed as 'particularism' which ^fleets their 'parochial outlook'. 51 Occasionally, the rhetoric has turned almost imperialist, lefendins - even praising - Rome's success in stamping out the Italian states'and cultures. 52 More recently, another layer has been added to the hegemonic argument, giving it a more realistic turn. In this updated version, the code word is political expediency, now seen as the -rucial factor which induced in the Italians the wish to adopt Roman culture. The strategy reflects an increased awareness of the hierarchical structure of allied society which has led to the identification of romanisation as primarily an elite phenomenon. The local elites, it has been argued, held on to power by virtue of Roman protection and connections to Roman nobles. Their adoption of Roman language, customs and institutions has therefore been seen as a political demonstration of loyalty to Rome - on which their position depended. 53 The problem of this model is quite a basic one: we have no examples of Rome actually intervening on behalf of allied nobles in the second century, where the central phase of romanisation has been located. After the early third century, only a single case is known; in 264, a revolt was suppressed in Volsinii, but even here the class aspect remains dubious. 54 The whole idea of local elites relying on Roman support is therefore not merely hypothetical, the

50

A similar situation has been noted by M. Millett for the study of provincial romanisation, 'Romaniza­ tion: historical issues and archaeological interpretation', in The Early Roman Empire in the West, ed. id. and T. Blagg (Oxford 1990) 35-41, 36f. See also Roman Imperialism. Post-colonial perspectives. ed. J. Webster and N. Cooper, Leicester Archaeology Monographs 3 (1996), and Dialogues in Roman Imperialism. Power, discourse, and discrepant experience in the Roman Empire, ed. D. J. Mattingly, JRASuppi 23(1997). 51

Brunt (1988) 117, Salmon (1982) 157, who also talks of their 'parochial pride', 158, and Oscan as 'acountry-dwellers' patois', which was 'in continuous retreat before an international tongue of stability, substance and authority', 122 and 155. 52

Badian (1958) 32 spoke of 'Italy secure under the Roman peace', Salmon (1982) 160 talked about 'the remarkable feat of the Romans in inducing all Italy ... to share their loyalty to their City'. To this end 'The Romans had to overcome large and formidable obstacles', 1, but using their 'virtuosity' they conquered the resistance and planted 'their Latin imprint indelibly upon the Saturnian land', 2. Likewise Brunt (1988) 114 described the creation of a common nation as 'a remarkable achievement'. A similar perspective is found in Scullard (1980) 149-51. 53

Galsterer(1976) 138-51, A. Pontrandolfo Greco, I Lucani (Milan 1982) 140. 164f, Gabba (1989) 228, G. Volpe, La Daunia nell'età della romanizzazione (Bari 1990) 44, M. R. Torelli, T rapporti fra Italici e Romani', in Italici in Magna Grecia. Lingua, insediamenti e strutture (Venosa 1990) 93-103, 93, M. Torelli, 'Aspetti materiali e ideologici della romanizzazione della Daunia', DdA 10 (1992) 4764. Reservations as to the evidential foundations of this explanation have been expressed by Morel (1991) 134-44. This example is repeatedly brought forward to prove the theory; one case has, in other words, come to constitute typicality. Earlier Roman interventions are known in Arretium, 302, and Lucania, 296, Livy 10,3-5, 10,18,8. Later, in 241, Rome crushed a revolt in Falerii, but the sources give no indication that Rome intervened on behalf of the local elite: Val. Max, 6,5,1; Eutr. 2,28; Oros. 4,11; Zonar. 8,18; Polyb. 1,65,2. Also the idea of the Roman allegiances of the local elites, as opposed to the lower classes, is largely unsubstantiated. Basically it goes back to Livy 24,2,8, which is, as both Badian (1958) 147f, and Brunt (1990) 280f, noted, an ideological statement frequently at variance with his own account of the Hannibalic War.

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very absence of any such manifestations of Roman power makes it unlikely that Italian elites could have seen her as a permanent guarantor of their privileges - to be continuously wooed and courted by signs of self-acculturation. The assumption that local aristocracies depended on external support is both unproven and implausible; the basis of their position should rather be sought within their local social and economic framework. In autonomous communities, elite dominance would, as in Rome, have been embedded in internal power structures based on social and economic control. They may not have been static, but we have no evidence suggesting that changes were influenced by Rome - how would that have been done without direct intervention?55 The existence of particularly romanophile parties, favoured by Rome, is therefore also open to doubt. A more moderate version of the 'realistic' argument has linked romanisation to allied aspirations for the practical benefits Rome could award. Thus Gabba stated that local elites 'pursued a spontaneous policy of cultural and political assimilation and integration' in order to 'share in some of the rewards' of the empire.56 But it is not clear what kind of benefits were handed out by Rome according to the level of romanisation. Commercially, the exploitation of the empire seems very much to have been a free-for-all enterprise, and, especially in the East, knowledge of Greek was probably more profitable than Latin. Pompeii, for instance, a most likely participant in the eastern trade, does not strike us as particularly romanised. Political favours thus remain hypothetical, and we have no real evidence suggesting that Rome treated 'self-romanised' communities more favourably than other allies. Personal 'advance­ ments' through grants of citizenship were extremely rare in this period and cannot for that reason have been a carrot of any significance. This conclusion also affects the clientela theory, which has supplemented several of the arguments listed above. According to this hypothesis the system of alliances in Italy worked as a client-patron relationship between Roman nobles and the local Italian elites; allied compliance has thus been explained by a combination of self-interest and moral obligation. The concept of patronage, however, was originally derived from the social sphere and its application to the domain of international relations is not unproblematic - particularly in the case of the Italian allies.57 For not only does it imply that the Italians had definitively accepted 55

Contra e.g. Torelli (1992) 53, who spoke of a '... radicale selezione delle classi dominanti indigene'.

56

Gabba (1989) 209. Cf. Campanile, 'L'assimilazione culturale del mondo italico', Storia di Roma 2,1 (Torino 1990) 305-12, 306: '... l'integrazione degli Italici nell'economia e nella milizia romana creava in essi - o, almeno, nei loro ceti pili elevati - un interesse obiettivo a una romanizzazione integrale'.

57

The clientela model was first applied to allied Italy by Badian (1958), and has since been widely accepted as an important factor in the upkeep of internal stability during the second century, cf. e.g. Galsterer (1976) 138-42. Evidentially, however, the theory is weak. Neither the existence of widespread patronage nor the political significance of such a network can be demonstrated. Virtually all the republican evidence for 'international' clientela pertains to the provinces. Characteristically, J. Rich, 'Patronage and interstate relations in the Roman Republic', in Patronage in the Ancient World, ed. A. Wallace-Hadrill (London 1989) 117-35, concentrates entirely on the East, ignoring Badian's application of inter-state patronage to Italy. Moreover, there is no real need for this element to account for allied acquiescence in the second century. This can be satisfactorily explained by a single crucial factor: Roman military might, which made any attempt at civil or armed resistance an extremely risky venture. Moreover, Rome's general policy of non-intervention may have ensured that allied grievances did not reach a level of desperation that made the military solution a viable option - i.e. until 91.

THE MAKING OF SECOND CENTURY ITALY - ROMANISATION

73

• licrior position as clients;08 an overall framework for the exchange of beneficia and officia uld also have been developed. But as argued above, there are few signs of political integra• n in second century Italy - let alone of any central Roman government regularly intervening • local affairs. And, without a constant Roman presence in allied communities, the clientela ■ t»roretaticn collapses.59 The Italians would obviously have tried to cultivate contacts with R iman nobles. But these links, which would have been both prestigious and occasionally also c-ful are probably better understood in terms of hospitium, formalised friendship between -overeiizn elites. Clearly the two parties were not equally powerful, but their inequality was c between states and not, as implied by the clientela model, between different social strata vithin a single social and political structure. Since the model itself works on the assumption that a Roman Italy had already been created, it contributes little to an understanding of the allied compliance, that would have paved the way for such a unity.60 The various strategies used to explain romanisation all seem to rely on a certain a priori set of plausibilities, which tend to ignore the specific cultural, political and military situation in second century Italy. A peculiar submissive attitude has been attributed to the allies - despite a structural background difficult to reconcile with such self-effacement. The expectation of Italian humility in the face of the world ruler is, I think, a relic of nineteenth-century perceptions of Rome's rise to world power as a meaningful process endowed with its own lo^ic and impetus. This historiographical tradition invested the early Roman republic with special moral qualities, which explained her seemingly miraculous rise from small Latin citystate to world ruler. The seeds of Rome's future grandeur were thus traced back to the earliest beginnings and her triumphant course through History perceived as a linear movement towards the fulfilment of her mission. Such blatant teleology has, of course, been abandoned by later scholarship, which has made great efforts to demystify the history of republican Rome. Among the most important contributions to this process were Afzelius' analyses of the Roman conquest of Italy and the hcllenistic East.61 Taking exception to the traditional idealistic approach, it managed to explain the expansion purely in terms of superior manpower resources and a clever alliance policy. With the realisation that Roman expansion did not represent a force of nature but should be seen in its proper historical context, there is now much greater awareness of the risks of projecting Rome's later position back to the republic.

58 Badian recognised this implication and stated that about the middle of the second century: 'Roman hegemony is now complete and unchallenged, and client relationships have hardened into a recognized part of the administrative system' (1958) 13.

Thus when Salmon (1982) 157 declares that: 'the upper-classes ... strove for social acceptance as well as for political favour from their Roman counterparts' and therefore adopted Latin, he does not go into any detail as to what they could actually achieve by such assimilation. Along the same lines also the criticism by J. Bleicken, review of Badian (1958), Gnomon 36 (1964) 176-87,182, 'Mir scheint, dass mit der Einführung der "foreign clientela" als ein arcanum römischer Politik die politische Entwicklung der mittelmeerischen Staatenwelt in 3. und 2. Jh. nicht erklärt ist, sondern vielmehr durch sie das schliessliche Ergebnis, die faktische Abhängigkeit aller Staaten von Rom, auf den Anfang der Entwicklung übertragen und also vorweggenommen ist.' 61

A. Afzelius, Die römische Eroberung Italiens (340-264 v.Chr.) (Copenhagen 1942) and id. (1944).

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The modernisation of the study of the Roman republic has, however, come to a halt in second century Italy, where the Italians are still expected to have bowed to the inevitable and meekly assumed the culture of a hegemonic neighbour. Their submissiveness has been seen as a logical stance in the sense that it conformed with an underlying, no longer reversible trend toward universal Roman supremacy. This idealistic perspective has probably survived for this particular period, because of the unitary model of late republican Italy, in which second century romanisation remains a vital component. But this tendency may also have been reinforced by the concept of romanisation which itself induces a similar set of expectations. Originally, the concept of romanisation was not invented to describe a situation found in second century Italy, but inspired by developments observed in the provinces.62 The adoption of Roman customs, language and lifestyle by provincial elites was one of the most striking features of the Roman expansion in the West. And this more or less spontaneous acculturation not only left a deep and lasting impact on the cultural map of Europe, it also provided the implicit frame of reference for the construction of romanisation in second century Italy. Conceived of in a provincial context, the concept of romanisation is not a neutral one but carries with it a whole set of expectations and plausibilities. Later experiences established assimilation as a common - indeed natural - response to Roman hegemony. This logic, however, was an imperial one which cannot be directly applied to allied Italy, where the situation was entirely different. The foundation of provinces in the West, often following immediately after crushing defeats suffered by the local peoples, meant a major disruption of existing structures: new admini­ strative organisations were imposed, promoting urbanisation in tribal areas; Latin became the new administrative language; a permanent Roman authority, backed by the threat of over­ whelming military power, was established in the province.63 This situation does not offer many points of resemblance with that of second century Italy. Unlike the provincials, the allies had not been reorganised or incorporated after their subjugation (that would not have been practically feasible) but had maintained internal sovereignty and - perhaps even more important - full military strength. Eventually, Roman power came to rely partly on their support, a fact which must have given them a different perspective on her empire. Through their common status the allies were also brought closer together by Rome - but not absorbed by her. Consequently a formidable rival to Roman supremacy still existed at the beginning of the first century BC - as demonstrated by the course of the Social War. The political and administrative structures were therefore quite different from the provinces, as was the military background. For these reasons, the imperial logic is misplaced in the context of allied Italy. The very existence of the provincial experience, summarised in the concept of 'roman­ isation', has meant that students of republican Italy have in a way been dealing with a known process: the phenomenon under investigation has been pre-defined by later developments in the provinces. This relationship between concept and evidence has been blurred by attempts 62 63

P. Desideri, 'La romanizzazione dell'Impero', Storia di Roma 2,2 (Torino 1991) 577-626, 585.

For a survey of provincial romanisation see e.g. J. Bleicken, Verfassungs- und Sozialgeschichte des römischen Kaiserreiches (Paderborn 1978) II 34-47, P. Garnsey and R. Salier, The Roman Empire (London 1987) 186-95, S. Gozzoli, 'Fondamenti ideali e pratica politica del processo di romanizzazione nelle province', Ath. 65 (1987) 81-108, R. MacMullen, 'Notes on Romanization', BASP (1984) 161-77, reprinted in id. (1990) 56-66.

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to portray second century Italy as the first example of a 'provincial' self-romanisation.64 In effect this reverses the logic of the argument, projecting a later experience back to the republic. The 'precedent' of later provincial acculturation has not only influenced the ideological construction of a second century Italian 'romanisation'; it has also affected the way this has been demonstrated in the sources. This is particularly striking in references to urbanisation as a sign of romanisation. It has often been asserted that the inspiration for '... the gradual but steady growth of rural settlements into centres of greater consequence and of more monumen­ tal aspect'... 'clearly came from Rome'.63 On closer inspection, however, this claim appears both conceptually dubious and evidentially weak. For whereas urbanisation was undoubtedly a crucial element of the romanisation of the western provinces, a similar link cannot be ascertained for republican Italy. A high level of urbanisation had already been reached in many parts of the peninsula before the Roman conquest. An urban culture was therefore not a particularly Roman characteristic but one shared equally by, for example, Etruscans, Campanians, and Greeks. The growth of urban settlements, visible in some regions in the second century, may therefore not have drawn on Roman models - nor, for that matter, entailed any greater familiarity with, or acceptance of, Roman language and customs. The application of the provincial connection between urbanisation and romanisation is therefore deceptive, appealing as it does to a latent romano-centrism, which tends to ignore the complexity of republican Italy. Ultimately, the increased urbanisation may, of course, have been caused by Rome and her empire - and the new influx of wealth it implied. But a clear distinction must be drawn between changes brought about by Roman expansion and romanisa­ tion proper, which actually altered the identity and allegiances of the local elites; and in Italy urban growth was not in itself a sign of Italians having assumed Roman ways and views.66 The monumentalisation of allied towns has often been traced back to patterns developed in Rome.67 The wider implications should not be exaggerated, and the theory itself may not enjoy unequivocal archaeological support. At this time, the visual impact of Rome herself was

64

Thus Brunt (1990) 274: '... the Romanization of the provinces had its counterpart and model in that of Italy', Walbank (1985) 69: "This assimilation of Italy is in fact the pattern for what later happens all over the empire. Usually the granting of civitas and Latin rights is the recognition of Romanization already achieved', and Gozzoli (1987), 87, noting in connection with provincial romanisation that: 'II fenomeno [of latinisation] è già evidente nel corso del II sec. a.C....'. 65

Salmon (1982) 100 and 159, cf. E. Gabba: 'Il fenomeno dell'urbanizzazione in Italia è dovuto, nel secolo III e poi nel II e più ancora nel I, all'iniziativa politica romana ...', 'La città italica', in Modelli di città, ed. P. Rossi (Torino 1987) 109-26, 117, M. Torelli, 'Gesellschaft und Wirtschaftsformen der augusteischen Zeit: Der Consensus Italiae', in Augustus und die verlorene Republik (Mainz 1988) 23-48, 30. 66

There has been a tendency to see every change in Italy, social as well as economic, as reflections of 'romanisation', thereby depriving the term of any real meaning, e.g. Torelli (1988), where factors as diverse as the import of slaves, the introduction of new building techniques and the spread of luxury are all brought under this heading. 67

E.g. Torelli (1983) 243, id. and P. Gros, Storia dell'urbanistica. Il mondo romano (Rome-Bari 1988) 158.

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ITALIAN UNIFICATION

hardly breathtaking and her attraction as an urban model dubious.68 Still, a number of public building types have been adduced suggesting direct Roman influence, for example Capitoline temples, basilicas, comitia, and macella. The situation may, however, have been more com­ plex than this simple causality allows. Circular comitia have for example been found outside Rome only in Latin colonies - which were planned and populated by Rome herself. The same applies to temples for the Capitoline triad, which were not built in allied Italy until after the Social War.69 The earliest known basilicas were clearly Roman, Basilica Portia (184), Fulvia et Aemilia (179) and Sempronia (170); only later did basilicas begin to appear in Latin colonies and allied towns of Southern Italy. The latter, however, seem to belong to a different type, that may have been developed independently of the Roman basilicas.70 The Roman origins of the macellum remain - despite recent attempts to establish it - altogether dubious.71 The Roman case is based entirely on literary sources, and there is evidence to suggest that the tholos type, later spreading over Italy, was hellenistic in origin.72 The traditional view of the monumentalisation of Italy therefore needs to be modified, and a clearer distinction drawn between Latin and allied communities, the former adhering much more closely to Roman patterns than the latter. For whereas the exportation of Roman structures to areas directly or indirectly under her control is a well-attested fact, the demonstration of allied emulation of distinctly Roman models has proved considerably more difficult. But while the significance of urbanisation and monumentalisation remains dubious, the administration of the allied communities has been stressed as an area showing clear Roman influence. The evidence here consists of Italian inscriptions attesting magistracies with Roman titles and of the Oscan law from Bantia, supposedly representing a fully romanised allied constitution prior to the Social War. A considerable number of the magistracies in Italian communities appear to have carried Roman titles in the second century.73 They include the aedileship (for example in Pompeii, 68

Despite Torelli's claim (1983) 243, that in the second century: 'il volto di Roma cambia assumendo l'aspetto della città ellenistica', the occasional erection of new Greek inspired buildings had not yet transformed the overall appearance of Rome into that of a hellenistic city. As P. Zanker noted: 'Der bauliche Zustand Roms entsprach ganz und gar nicht der Hauptstadt eines Weltreiches. Schon am Hofe Philipps V. von Makedonien (um 182 v.Chr.) hatte man sich über das ärmliche und altmodische Aussehen Roms lustig gemacht (Livius 40,5,7). Auch 150 Jahre später konnte sich das Stadtbild noch in keiner Weise mit den Griechenstädte des Osten messen'. Thus, whereas the towns of Latium and Campania had competed in urban embellishment, 'hatte sich die Situation Roms eher verschlechtert', Augustus und die Macht der Bilder (Munich 1987) 29. 69

1. M. Barton, 'Capitoline Temples in Italy and the Provinces', ANRW 11,12,1 (1982) 259-333, 259-65.

70

J. B. Ward-Perkins, 'Constantine and the origins of the Christian Basilica', PBSR 9 (1954) 68-90, 73f, id. (1979), followed by J.-M. David, le tribunal dans la basilique: évolution fonctionelle et symbolique de la république à l'empire', in Architecture et société, Coll. École Fr. Rome 66 (Rome 1983) 225. 71

C. De Ruyt, Macellum. Marché alimentaire des romains (Louvain 1983) 236-39.

72

Cf. M. Pagano, 'Note sui macella del mondo romano', RAAN 59 (1984) 111-21.

73

G. Camporeale, 'La terminologia magistratuale nelle lingue osco-umbre', Atti Acc. Toscana (1956) 33ff, Salmon (1967) 87f, Harris (1971) 187-92, M. Cristofani (1978) 88-102, Campanile (1979) 15-28, A. Prosdocimi, 'Questura italica e questura romana', Am Ist. Veneto 142 (1984) 169-90, Brunt (1988) 118f.

THE MAKING OF SECOND CENTURY ITALY - ROMANISATION

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Aufidena. the Vestine area), the quaestorship (Pompeii, Abella, Supinum, Nola(?), Potentia, Rossano di Vaglio) and the censorship (Pietrabbondante, Histonium, Antinum) in addition to the tribunate, which may have existed in pre-Roman Bantia. The adoption of elements from the Roman administration has been described as a result of 'admiration for Rome',74 but before accepting this interpretation, the historical background for the phenomenon should be considered. The traditional Italic administration was simple and focused on military leader­ ship- Originally a single, annually elected, meddix (the question of collegiality is disputed) exerted absolute power at home and in the field. The Roman conquest obviously changed this situation, but perhaps more important for administration was the increase in wealth and urbanisation. A more specialised structure of local officials was needed as building activity increased, urban facilities were developed, and public finances became more complicated. A reorganisation of Italian institutions became urgent; occasionally the old meddix system was developed, but most often the Italians looked to Rome for inspiration.75 Considering her size and highly refined administrative structure this dependency is in itself hardly surprising. But it rarely took the form of direct loans. Generally the Roman models were adapted to local needs and traditions; Roman titles might even be applied to magistracies which were quite different in function and lacked the collegiality. As Salmon notes: 'The Sabellians adopted Roman names for some of their native institutions simply because Roman nomenclature was better adapted to specialization of function than Oscan'.76 The Italians were clearly not copying prestigious Roman models for the sake of emulation but improvising new solutions for specific purposes. No uniformity sprang from this process of specialisation which resulted in a highly diverse pattern of institutions. The disappearance of the meddix, or at least loss of importance, has been claimed.77 Though there are instances where other magistracies have become eponymous, the meddix seems generally to have remained the supreme office, supplemented by lower magistracies rather than supplanted by them. The relative frequency of the aedileship and the quaestorship may be due to the composition of the epigraphical evidence, primarily consisting of dedications of which these magistrates were in charge. The redundancy of the meddix should not be exaggerated either; though the foreign policy aspect had disappeared, he might still lead the local contingents in the field, and at home the judiciary function remained vital. The wider implication of the administrative changes in Italy should not be overestimated. They were not spontaneous attempts to adapt to a Roman pattern - a willing abandonment of local traditions and individuality. Rather than slavish imitations of Rome, we generally find a piecemeal development of existing systems in response to new situations and needs. There­ fore, these changes in themselves can hardly be construed as Italian emulation of a prestigious and superior civilisation, which they admired: they may have reflected only a superficial romanisation of the allies.

74

Brunt (1988) 118.

' Thus from Nola a meddix decentarius is attested, apparently an equivalent to the quaestors in Abella and Pompeii, cf. Salmon (1967) 87, Prosdocimi (1984) 180f. 76

Salmon (1967) 88.

77

Campanile (1979) 25-27, Brunt (1988) 118.

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ITALIAN UNIFICATION

The above conclusion might appear to be challenged by the Tabula Bantina, often invoked as an example of a complete Roman constitution adopted by an allied community.78 The Roman origins of the Bantian law are not the issue: the prescribed cursus honorum included the quaestorship, the aedileship, the praetorship, the censorship and the tribunate; and several clauses, given in barely oscanised Latin, are clearly derived from Roman statutes. The un­ certainty is linked to the date of the document - and thereby the civic status it refers to. Traditionally it has been placed in the late second century: because the reverse of the bronze tablet featured a Latin law usually dated to around 100 BC, the Oscan text was automatically assumed to predate the Latin one. In 1969, however, a new fragment was published which proved that the Latin law was inscribed first, opening up renewed debate on the date of the Oscan text.79 Two main schools have since formed, arguing for a date in the 90's and a Sullan or post-Sullan date, respectively.80 The latter has relied on features which seem to link the law to the new constitutional principles first introduced in Rome by Sulla. Thus a fixed cursus honorum was prescribed, and the tribunus plebis was set off from the rest of the magistracies, no previous holder of these being allowed to stand for the tribunate. Also, the provision that a tribune(?) could prohibit an assembly only with senatorial consent has been seen as a strengthening of the senate's position which reflects the constitutional changes under Sulla. Against dating the law after the Social War, it has been argued that the Bantian constitution was obviously not a standard duoviral administration of the type common in municipia established after the Italian enfranchisement and later also attested in Bantia. Secondly, the traces of Sullan influence have been downgraded and departures from Roman practice pointed out.81 Evidence suggesting the existence of the tribunate in pre-Roman Bantia has also been adduced in support of the early date.82 Still, the fixed cursus honorum and the restrictions on tribunician(?) intercessio remain curious in a pre-Roman context. And no advocate of a later date has suggested that the Lex Bantina was imposed directly from Rome; the composition is clearly too confused and peculiar to be a Roman directive. Moreover, the idea that this structure is best explained as a local pre-Roman concoction seems to rest partly on the assumption of a standardisation of local administrations following immediately after the Social War - a theory not beyond dispute. Numerous cases can only be accommodated with

78

E.g. M.R. Torelli (1990).

79

M. Torelli, 'Il nuovo frammento della tabula bantina', Arch. Class. 21 (1969) 1-17. The text is now published in Roman Statutes, ed. M. H. Crawford, BICS Supplement 64 (1996) 271-92.

80

The early date has been favoured by C. Nicolet, in Les 'Bourgeoisies' municipales italiennes aux Ile et 1er siècles av. J.-C, ed. M. Cébeillac-Gervasoni (Paris-Naples 1983) 400, M. Torelli, 'Una nuova epigrafe di Bantia e la chronologia dello statuto municipale bantino', Ath. 61 (1983) 252-7, Brunt (1988) 139-43, D. Cloud, 'Municipal capital jurisdiction over Roman citizens: a chimaera?', LCM 18,3 (1993) 39-43, the later by H. Galsterer, 'Die lex Osca Tabulae Bantinae - eine Bestandsaufnahme', Chiron 1 (1971) 191-214, Cristofani (1978) 96, Letta (1979) 64f, L. Del Tutto Palma, La tavola bantina (Padova 1983) 20ff. 81

The argument has focused on the provisions on the census and on capital punishment, cf. n.80. Torelli (1983).

THE MAKING OF SECOND CENTURY ITALY - ROMANISATION

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a *at difficulty into a model of fully regulated municipal leges issued in Rome." The possible ^ istence of the tribunate in pre-Roman Bantia does not preclude a Sullan date either; it may l MVe been an earlier borrowing from nearby Venusia, where the office is attested.84 Thus, both cases can be argued with some conviction, and any dating of the Tabula Banana rill probably have to remain provisional. But whatever date is preferred, and on balance the earlier may seem to carry the greater weight, the Bantian constitution inevitably stands out as exceptional case, unusual as it is both within a pre- and a post-war context. Therefore, even ■fa date prior to the Social War is accepted, it should not be allowed unduly to distort our picture of allied Italy. Certainly the evidence discussed above does not suggest that the tablet reflected typical allied behaviour. No parallels exist for such a full-scale adoption of a Roman constitution: generally the Italians showed considerable independence and originality in their use of Roman models. The Bantian case would therefore need a specific explanation - most plausibly derived from the close proximity of neighbouring Venusia, likely to have exerted a strong influence on the small town situated right on its borders. While the administrative evidence for romanisation thus appears to be, at best, equivocal, the importance of the linguistic argument is correspondingly enhanced. Language is generally perceived as a crucial element in the construction of national identity. But whether it played the same role in ancient Italy as it does in modern ideology is a big question. In any case, it still represents one of the areas in which the cultural change claimed for second century Italy would be expected to have manifested itself. The spread of Latin among the allies can be assessed directly from epigraphical evidence or inferred from circumstantial arguments. The latter approach allows us to make some tentative estimates as to the possible knowledge of Latin in Italian communities. Thus, con­ sidering the political and military structures, it seems likely that the Italian elites would have been able to understand and communicate in Latin. As officers in the allied contingents, they would have been under direct Roman command, mediating Roman directives to their cohorts. But since the allies fought in independent units under local officers, the military experience may have had less of an impact on the ranks in terms of latinisation. In commercial circles, whether active in Italy or abroad, some knowledge of Latin (along with Greek) would have been most useful, perhaps even necessary. Some allied areas were bounded by Roman territory (in some cases even surrounded by it) or intersected by Roman roads; here the frequent contact with Latin speakers would probably have enhanced Italian familiarity with their language. Moreover, there are a few more detailed indications of allied command of Latin in the second century. We are told that the Romans conducted their negotiations ex­ clusively in Latin;85 rhetores from allied communities, Asculum and the Marsic area, are

83

Letta (1979) 33-88, H. Galsterer, 'La loi municipale des Romains: chimère ou réalité?', Revue Hist. Droit Fr. et Étr. 65 (1987) 181-203. Contra Laffi, 'Sull'organizzazione amministrativa dell'Italia dopo la guerra sociale', Akten 6. Kongresses gr. und lat. Epigr. (Munich 1972) 37-53. 84

CIL IX 438. Val.Max. 2,2,2.

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ITALIAN UNIFICATION

documented in Rome;86 and at the outbreak of the Social War the Asculans, joined by Romans from the neighbouring areas, were gathered in the theatre to watch a play performed by Latin actors - evidently in Latin.87 Likewise, stories were later circulated of fraternisation between Marius' troops and the Marsi during the war - allegations which would have been absurd if no communication had been possible. Thus, we have every reason to believe that Latin would have been widely understood and perhaps even spoken in some quarters; still, the implications should not be exaggerated. The Italians simply responded to a practical need which had been created by Rome's political and military position and by the spread of her population. Familiarity with Latin does therefore not in itself imply any change of language - or any particular admiration for the Latin language and its speakers.88 Knowledge of a foreign language ought not to be confused with spontaneous assumption of that tongue; and the former, we should bear in mind, does not necessarily lead to the latter.89 The inscriptional evidence might seem to reflect more directly the linguistic practice in the allied communities; although the common notion of local elites demonstrating loyalty to Rome through overt display of romanisation would imply that the use of Latin in pre-Roman inscriptions might be less reliable as a source on the latinisation of the allied communities. In that case the impression of an advanced latinisation might simply be a display put on in order to please Rome. Another practical complication is the lack of comprehensive studies of the use of Latin in pre-Roman Italy. But by piecing together the existing regional studies some general observations can be made, however preliminary and lacunose. The picture emerging is one of considerable variety between different areas and, occasion­ ally, even within the same region.90 In Apulia few traces of latinisation have been found prior to the Social War.91 Likewise in Samnium where Latin influence is virtually absent from the second century sources. Perhaps more surprisingly a similar situation is found in Pompeii, otherwise yielding an impressive corpus of pre-Roman inscriptions. With a single exception 86 Cic. Brutus 169. Cf. G. V. Sumner, The orators in Cicero's Brutus (Toronto 1973) nos. 115 and 119, J.-M. David, 'Les orateurs des municipes à Rome: intégration, réticences et snobismes', in Les 'Bourgeoisies' municipales italiennes aux Ile et 1er siècles av. J.-C, éd. M. Cébeillac-Gervasoni (ParisNaples) 309-23. 87

Rawson(1991)469f.

88

Salmon's claim that to learn Latin, '... an elegant language suitable for cultivated drawing rooms ...', had become '... for Italians the fashionable ... thing to do' (1982) 121, is not supported by any evidence. Likewise Keaveney's remark (1987) 23, that it: '... might be regarded as a mark of sophistication in certain quarters to be able to converse in the language of the leading power of the day', seems to overlook the fact that the prestigious language of culture evidently was Greek rather than Latin. 89

The difference between understanding a foreign language and using it among themselves should be emphasised. Thus, it is worth noting that the Latin play in Asculum was performed, not by local Asculan actors, but by a visiting troupe, Diod. 37,12. 90 91

Cf. e.g. Salmon (1982) 125.

C. Santoro, 'La latinizzazione della regio II: il problema linguistico', in La Puglia in età repubblicana (Lecce 1988), 127-66. Noting that in the second century the process was slow and partial, Santoro concluded that it was not till after the Social War that: '...il processo di latinizzazione comincia ad essere più veloce e capillare', 148.

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. pompeian inscriptions predating the Social War were written exclusively in Oscan.92 Also • Teanum. located near Campania and the Latin colony Cales, Oscan was in use right up to Social War.93 In the Marsic area, however, a more developed latinisation seems apparent. F- rlv on the central Italian peoples had adopted the Latin alphabet, but in the second century I - Latin language itself appears with some frequency.94 In Umbria, too, a number of Latin • xriptions have been found, although the majority were still written in Umbrian.95 Neigh­ bouring Etiuria, one of the best studied areas, shows a highly diverse picture with the -outhernmost parts yielding the first traces of latinisation, while the central and northern states seem fairly untouched by Latin influence.96 No generalised latinisation can therefore be demonstrated in allied Italy. Latin may have been widely understood and used in some circles for practical purposes of communication with Romans and Latins. But only in some areas, geographically close to Rome, are there any si»ms of Latin actually having been used internally within the allied communities.97 And even here nothing like a complete latinisation seems yet to have occurred. Even from this cursory survey it would appear that the idea of a general and profound romanisation prior to the Social War has little evidential basis. Certainly, Roman influence ean be traced in many areas of Italian life and culture; but that was only to be expected con­ sidering Rome's political position and the size and dispersion of her population, which constantly brought many allies into contact with Romans. Such a meeting of different cultures naturally leaves an impact - and probably on both sides. For we have little reason to believe that Roman colonists and settlers always remained unaffected by the culture which surrounded them; most likely the Latin colonists in, for example, Aesernia would have come to know some Oscan. The cultural exchange was obviously asymetrical - Rome's political supremacy assured that. But again, nothing suggests that any profound change of culture had taken place before the Social War. Evidently no parameters exist to measure levels of cultural change. But a comparison with the situation a hundred years later cannot but put the idea of a second century 'romanisation' into perspective. When looking at Augustan Italy one is immediately struck by the remarkable homogeneity achieved in most areas: language, urbanisation and monumentalisation, institutions, cults, artistic production, burial practice, epigraphic habits, etc. The obvious romanisation encountered in this period contrasts sharply with the barely traceable Roman influence prior to the Social War. More than anything else the painstaking w

De Vos (1984) 165, argues that the HAVE inscription on the threshold of Casa del Fauno is con­ temporary with the second century mosaics in the house.

n

Cf. Morel (1991) 136.

g4

E. Peruzzi, 'Testi latini arcaici dei Marsi', Maia 14 (1962) 117-40, C. Letta, / Marsi e il Fucino nell'Antichità (Milan 1972), id. 'Dialetti italici minori: Marso', SE 44 (1976) 275-81, id. and S. D'Amato, Epigrafia della regione dei Marsi (Milan 1976). 95

Harris (1971) 169-87.

%

Harris, ibid., J. Kaimio, 'The ousting of Etruscan by Latin in Etruria', AIRF 5 (1975) 89-245, E. Benelli, Le iscrizioni bilingui etrusco-latine (Florence 1994). The geographical patterns suggest that the spread of Latin was not so much the result of political/economic expediency or any particular sense of national unity as it was a consequence of growing familiarity with the language through frequent contact with Latin speakers.

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search for traces of Roman influence, conducted by generations of scholars, has underlined how far from real romanisation Italy still was by the end of the second century BC. This conclusion has serious consequences for the unitary model of late republican Italy in which romanisation was a primary factor explaining the Italian demand for Roman citizenship. The cultural phenomenon was linked here to collective behaviour, interpreted as a result of assimilation. But it now seems that this common reaction came from Italian peoples very dif­ ferently affected by Roman influence. Thus, the Marsi were more latinised than the Samnites, and the Campanians far more urbanised than either of them, but apparently less latinised than the former. Therefore, in terms of romanisation the rebels were a highly heterogeneous group. And there appears to be no direct correspondence between the stance taken by individual nations and their perceived level of 'romanisation'; a point epitomised in the Asculan massacre which erupted while Romans and Asculans were watching a Latin actor perform in the theatre. Likewise, the Etruscans and the Umbrians, the latter probably more latinised than the former, made common cause during the war, showing the same initial reluctance to join the revolt.98 Since the research has shown little more than a thin and often rather patchy spread of romanisation in allied Italy, it must be recognised that Mommsen's claim of a common Roman-Italian nationality remains unproven. The task of establishing an evidential foundation for Mommsen's assertion has therefore not been fulfilled by modern research - which most historians have readily conceded. Salmon, for example, admitted that: '... throughout the second century the peoples and tribes of Italy remained conscious of their distinctiveness from the Romans, just as much at the end of the century as at its beginning'.99 But since roman­ isation remains a crucial part of the Mommsenian model, still adhered to, attempts have been made to overcome the apparent lack of evidential support. Some historians, accepting the anti-Roman character of the Social War, have presented a picture where romanisation had just about reached a level which made Roman citizenship an acceptable option but was still too weak to prevent them from breaking away when that was refused them.100 This interpretation obviously falls between two stools, projecting the inconsistency of the political story-line on to the cultural background. The point is that this explanation of the allied demand for citizenship relies on an advanced stage of romanisation; either the allies had come to think of themselves as Romans, thus preferring total integration to their ancestral independence, or they had not. Any compromise between the two positions remains logically untenable, since anything less than full identification with Rome cannot explain the allied wish for citizenship. Such complete identification, however, would be 98

The problem of a sporadic romanisation leading to a universal demand for citizenship has been addressed by Keaveney (1987) 33f. Thus while recognising that: 4... romanisation could not have been a factor everywhere in Italy in forming the desire for the citizenship', he suggests that 'Once the notion was born [in romanised.areas] its attraction became obvious ...', for 4A bright idea will always win adherents'. The shortcomings of this solution hardly need be pointed out.

99

Salmon (1982) 125, cf. id. (1967) 316 and Keaveney (1987) 27, '... Romanization ... had simply not yet reached the point where it could supplant native cultures'. In contrast, Devoto (1956) 457, claimed that romanisation had already been completed before the Social War. But for his argumentation see below n. 115. 100

Thus most clearly Keaveney (1987) 21-75, 197-206, but the idea can also be traced in Galsterer's reconstruction (1976).

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extremely difficult to reconcile with the idea of a bloody struggle to defeat Rome and usurp her empire, which is also part of the picture. In short, therefore, this compromise is doomed, tryins as it does to combine two basically different lines of explanation in a single model. More often a slightly different, more subtle approach to the problem has been followed. A quotation from Gabba may illustrate this strategy: 'Tutti questi fattori ... spingevano, anche se in modo indiretto e spontaneo, ad un sempre maggior allineamento degli stati italici con quello romano durante il II sec. a.C.; ne venivano, lentamente ma inesorabilmente, annullate le principali caratteristiche di autonomia e di independenza che ogni stato alleato possedeva', and it was this 'spontanea politica di integrazione culturale' which eventually led to 'la richiesta di participazione all'eserzione del potere'.101 Particularly interesting is the careful avoidance in this passage of any reference to completed romanisation - elsewhere Gabba acknowledges that no Italian-Roman unity existed prior to the war.l02 Instead emphasis is put on the fact that romanisation moved forward 'lentamente ma inesorabilmente' towards 'un sempre maggior allineamento'. A similar stress on the progress of romanisation is found in, for example, Salmon, who declared that although: '... nothing like a universal language shift had as yet occurred', '... the transition to Latin was in full, if uneven, swing throughout all Italy in the second century'.103 Thus, romanisation and latinisation have more often been described as 'making headway' than as completed or advanced.104 The shift of emphasis from the state of romanisation to the movement of cultural change reflects the notion of romanisation as a given process endowed with its own inescapable logic. Once initiated it was only a question of time before romanisation would reach completion. As Salmon put it: 'By c. 100 the trend towards romanization everywhere in Italy was undoubtedly evident and probably irreversible: by then the whole country was manifestly destined to adopt Roman ways sooner or later. The Social War ensured that it happened sooner'.105 The concept of the 'inevitabilità di una completa assimilazione' recalls Mommsen's comparison of the power of romanisation with 'der Gesetz der Schwere'.106 Similar natural forces were invoked by Heuss, who declared that: 'Die Italiker waren unter dem Zwang einer unvermeidlichen Entwicklung auf dem Wege, Angehörige des römischen Volkes zu werden'; in sum: 'Der Prozess war natürlich und notwendig'.107 This line of reasoning has occasionally been given a psychological twist by the intro­ duction of a peculiar submissive mentality of the Italians, which reflected an inherent lack of 101

Gabba (1985) 41. E. Gabba, 'Il problema dell'"unità" dell'Italia romana', in La cultura italica (Pisa 1978) 11-27.

101

Salmon (1982) 124.

104

E.g. Göhler (1939) 38, Salmon (1967) 316, E. Gabba, interventions in Les 'Bourgeoisies' Municipales italiennes aux He et 1er siècles av. 7.-C.,ed. M. Cébeillac-Gervasoni (Paris-Naples 1983) 401,404, Keaveney (1987) 27,199. Salmon (1982) 159, cf. 88 where he speaks of '... districts where it [i.e. latinisation] would otherwise nave penetrated much more slowly' and of factors 4... that delayed assimilation of the Etruscans', 124. 106

a

Gabba (1985) 44, Mommsen 111,220.

Heuss (1964) 138. Cf. Campanile (1990) 312: \.. il processo di latinizzazione è ormai irreversibile: istituzione del latino all'osco, nell'uso pubblico e privato, ne sarà solo l'inevitabile corollario'.

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vitality in their nations and cultures.108 Linguistically, for example, the ultimate demise of Oscan has been ascribed to a certain 'atteggiamento di recettività e di passività assunto dall'Osco': to the Italians 'i vantaggi pratici dell'assimilazione apparivano superiori alla con­ servazione di una propria identità culturale'.109 Likewise Salmon's claim that '... it was the failure of the Italians to feel strongly attached to their native dialects that accounts for their disappearance'.110 In other words, to get a share in the benefits they willingly abandoned their language and traditions. The stress on the allied attitude - rather than the tangible traces of romanisation - has important consequences. It means that although the process may not have been completed yet, its inception can be taken as proof that the Italians had mentally accepted Roman culture and shown their readiness to go the whole way towards full assimilation. In this way the Italians can be expected to act like fully romanised subjects, although this does not surface in the source material. The limited Roman influence which can be demonstrated is then sufficient to explain the wish for citizenship. For by showing that the process, later to unfold in the first century, had actually begun before the Social War, it becomes clear that it was the Italians themselves who had started the process and thus declared their acceptance of Roman rule. Along the same lines, Walbank argued that the Social War had been an attempt to '... force the Romans to bring the Italian nation to birth', despite the fact that '... full assimilation was hardly completed in some areas before the end of the Republic'.111 The implication is that the Italian sense of national unity preceded romanisation, from which the concept has effectively been separated.112 In other words, the problem of demonstrating cultural change has been eliminated by substituting for traceable romanisation a receptive state of mind, attributed to the allies. Unfortunately, however, this solution relies on scattered signs of Roman influence being interpreted as the first step of a pre-defined process of 'romanisation' upon which the allies had consciously (and willingly) embarked. But 'romanisation' is not a natural phenomenon - still less a natural law as Mommsen would have it - but a term to be applied to certain patterns of behaviour observed under a specific set of circumstances. The notion of a 108

Göhler (1939) 31, for example described the Italians as 'geistig unterlegener', and according to Galsterer (1976) 151, they had gradually lost '...der Wille, die Autonomie aufrechtzuerhalten'. The inherent weakness of Oscan culture is also stressed in E. Campanile, 'Note sulle divinità degli Italici meridionali e centrali', SCO 41 (1991) 279-97, esp. 296. 109

E. Campanile, 'La latinizzazione dell'osco', in Scritti in onore di G. Bonfante (Brescia 1976) 107-20, 110, id. 'La diaspora italica: implicazioni storico-culturali di fatti linguistici', in La cultura italica (Pisa 1978) 103-19, 117. The idea of a feeble Oscan language, deprived of all vitality, has been countered by Del Tutto Palma (1983) 24ff, who argues that neither the alphabet nor the latinisms of the Lex Banana are 'esiti di una latinizzazione del'osco' but linked exclusively to the text itself, its character, function and context. 110

Salmon (1982) 156.

111

Walbank (1985) 63f.

112 A similar paradox is found in e.g. M. Pallottino, 'L'Italia prima della romanizzazione: proposta di una sintesi storica', PCI A 7 (1978) 373-90, 390, where he refers to '... tendenze di reciproca assimilazione' and 'progressiva e rapida unificazione romana, anche se autonomie istituzionali, religiose, culturali, linguistiche perdureranno nelle diverse regioni d'Italia ... sino all'unificazione giuridica [in 90 BC]'.

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particular 'submissive' Italian attitude, making up for the scanty evidence for romanisation, is therefore firmly rooted in nineteenth-century idealism and reflects the acute need for this explanatory factor in the received model of Italian unification. For as Salmon put it so bluntly: 'The demand of the insurgents for Roman citizenship proclaimed their willingness for assimilation'. 113 Having failed in the attempt to demonstrate actual romanisation, modern historiography has thus reverted to Mommsen's position and simply assumes that the allies had somehow come to identify themselves with Rome by the end of the second century. Salmon's statement, quoted above, exposes with admirable clarity the logical structure of this argument: the Italian proto-romanisation (in the absence of real romanisation) was deduced from the political events, that is, the supposed Italian fight for the Roman citizenship. At the same time, however, this event has itself been explained, and thereby confirmed, by references to previous cultural changes taking place in Italy. As Gabba put it: 'la richiesta aeneralizzata della cittadinanza romana ... non è altro che l'esito finale del lungo avvicina­ mento, durante un secolo, degli Alleati Italici a Roma'. 114 These two quotations illustrate the historiographical ambiguity of this phenomenon, which has become both cause and effect of the same historical event; though logically a derivation of the Social War, it is presented as the structural background out of which it naturally grew. 115 To summarise, the idea of a second century romanisation of allied Italy has, I believe, been conceived primarily as a response to a historical problem, created by the later Roman tradition of the Social War. And in particular by the Appianic version, where the war was presented as the result of a prolonged struggle for Roman citizenship. To Appian and other imperial writers there was nothing remarkable in the fact that the disaffection of dominated peoples ex­ pressed itself in a wish to become fully absorbed into the hegemonic power - insofar as this power was Rome. For their perspective was inevitably an imperial one, in which the Italians were inseparable from Romans, the Roman citizenship a coveted privilege, and the idea of any serious challenge to Roman supremacy from within the empire virtually unthinkable. Modern historians have viewed the question from basically the same imperial perspective as the ancient sources. The spontaneous acculturation of the allies, which seemed the logical implication of the wish for citizenship, offers no surprise to historians familiar with the Western provinces. Thus, the self-romanisation now envisaged in allied Italy was explained in provincial terms of admiration, self-interest and elite ambitions - combined with a specifically Italian element of common cause and national unity. The imperial perspective, however, misses the uniqueness of the situation in second century Italy, which defies provincial categorisation. The combination of internal sovereignty and military strength finds no parallel in the provinces. Consequently, the imperial logic used to explain the acculturation is anachronistic - and basically teleological. As demonstrated by the military events in 91-89, the unchallengeable Roman supremacy, to which the assimilation

1,3

Salmon (1982) 159.

114

Gabba (1985) 45.

115

Two statements by Devoto (1956) 457, also illustrate this point. On the one hand 'La guerre sociale ... prouve que la romanisation est un fait accompli', but on the other hand, if the war had been a fight against Rome, 4... le développement du processus de romanisation, tel qu'il est décrit dans les pages précédentes, serait démenti' - the circularity is evident.

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was supposed to have been a response, was not established until after the Social War - the very event claimed to have sprung from this process. It was the Social War itself which changed the situation, opening up a rapid 'provincial' process of romanisation in Italy. After the Roman victory her position was undisputed; the Samnites had been crushed and any Italian nationalism that may have been mobilised during the war definitively broken. New incentives to assimilation appeared: personal advancement to the senatorial order became a possibility, and Italian nobles and communities now had a real interest in gaining Roman patronage. Cultural change was effectively promoted by the mixing of populations through colonisation and veteran settlement, and by the disruptions of the civil wars, in which Romans and Italians as a rule no longer fought in separate units. Finally, new administrative structures were gradually imposed, often leading to new settle­ ment structures and increased urbanisation.116 The legal system was also changed and Latin introduced as a common administrative language. The structural upheavals after the Social War thus seem able to explain fully the homo­ geneous and romanised Italy we later find in Augustan times. There is, in other words, no need to posit a proto-romanisation in the second century. This factor was introduced in an attempt to neutralise the basic problem of the unitary model, that is, the apparent oddity of the Italian reaction to Roman domination. Within a wider historical perspective the struggle by autonomous, culturally distinct nations to become fully absorbed into a larger hegemonic neighbour is nothing but exceptional. This fundamental weakness of the model has been countered by the creation of an alternative logic in which the Italian demand for citizenship became the natural response to their plight. In the cultural sphere several lines of argument have been pursued to produce this new set of expectations. First, idealism: the presentation of Italian unification as an irreversible historical trend, recognised by the allies, duly giving into History. Second, nomology: the equation of political power and cultural attraction. Third, realism: the exclusion of any real alternative to Roman domination, in which case the allies had to make the best of the situation; thus relying on the same assumed inevitability as the idealistic argument, which it merely supplements. Fourth, analogy: the (implicit) use of the provincial experience to present the perceived allied behaviour as a common response to Roman domination, fully consistent with later observations. All these strategies, however, remain part and parcel of the same narrative structure, from which they ultimately derive their authority. The story of Italian unification, ending with full enfranchisement in response to an Italian demand, constitutes the logical framework for these explanations. Therefore, when that model is questioned, the various plausibilities invoked to explain the Italian self-romanisation lose their cogency. The implication is that the object under investigation is itself transformed; for it is only within a story of Italian unification that traces of Roman influence become signs of 'romanisation'. Without this frame of under­ standing they are simply 'traces of Roman influence' - rather than expressions of an under­ lying historical trend or presages of greater changes to come. And in that perspective they are clearly too few and far between to explain an allied wish for Roman citizenship. 116 E. Gabba, 'Urbanizzazione erinnovamentiurbanistici nell'Italia centro-meridionale del I sec. a.C, SCO 21 (1972) 73-112, M. H. Crawford, 'Italy and Rome from Sulla to Augustus', CAH X, 2nd ed. (1996) 414-33. Cf. Torelli (1983) 249, noting that: 'La vera trasformazione si colloca nel I sec. a.C...'-

II THE MAKING OF SECOND CENTURY ITALY 4 THE ROMAN CITIZENSHIP The ancient tradition presents the issue of Roman citizenship as the central feature of the •Italian question'. Logically, therefore, much modern scholarship has been devoted to investigating the personal rights it entailed, and the political, social, and economic advantages it miCTht bring a recipient. Most of the discussion has revolved around the question of which benefit was the primary incentive behind the Italian quest for enfranchisement. Thus, various attractions have been brought forward: for example, hope of participating in land schemes, need for personal legal protection, wish for political influence, power, magistracies and the wealth that they might carry with them; or a combination of political and economic motives, which saw political influence as a means of promoting commercial interests overseas. This research into the specific advantages entailed by Roman citizenship has tended to shift the emphasis away from national unification. The result has been a version of the 'Italian question' more in line with modern sensibilities and expectations. By focusing on the tangible benefits to be derived from enfranchisement an image has been evoked of oppressed and underprivileged groups demanding equality and a fairer share of power and benefits. But can Roman citizenship be reduced to a set of individual, more or less profitable, rights? Two aspects of citizenship will be discussed. First the idea of Roman citizenship as a universally recognised privilege in the second century BC is considered; second, the theory of a second century grant of ius civitatis per magistratum adipiscendae to the Latin Name, is evaluated. Roman citizenship had traditionally been incompatible with any other, automatically excluding the possibility of holding double citizenship. In this Roman law differed sharply from Greek, which readily accepted the possibility of a person claiming citizen rights in several city-states. Particularly in hellenistic times isopoliteia became a more widespread practice in the Greek world. The Roman stance was based on the belief that no one could be the subject of different judicial systems and legislations: as Cicero put it in Balb. 31, 'ne quis nostrum plus quam unius civitatis esse possit (dissimilitudo enim civitatum varietatem iuris habeat necesse est)'. Therefore, in the words of Sherwin-White, 'a man can only be a political member of the community in which he resides, and when he leaves it he ceases to belong'. 1 The implication was that the Latin League had to be organised along lines quite different from those found in Greece. Instead of isopoliteia a series of rights were exchanged, allowing for trade, marriage and freedom of movement between the Latin states. The latter was secured by the institution of exilium and postliminium, which enabled Latins to visit other states within the League without forfeiting their citizenship, and by the ius migrationis, which allowed

'Sherwin-White (1973) 293. 87

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them to settle permanently in another town and there receive the local citizenship.2 These rights were of vital importance, as long as the citizenship remained inextricably linked to the territory and was automatically lost when the borders of its jurisdiction were crossed. Later, however, in the first century AD, the concept of double citizenship appears to have been an important and fully integrated part of the legal structure of the empire. At this time it was possible for a Roman citizen to hold full local citizenship in a provincial town. The traditional republican view of the incompatibility of the Roman citizenship had thus been modified: the chronology of this process is all-important.3 The fullest discussion of this question is found in Cicero's speech for L. Cornelius Ealbus, a prominent provincial from Gades, who had received Roman citizenship from Pompey. The grant was now called into dispute by the prosecutor's claim that Gades had not given the consent which was essential to its legality. This objection was, rightly it seems, rejected by Cicero, who argued that anybody could freely accept any citizenship that might be offered to them by another state.4 In this context he draws attention to the Romans who had gone into exile and received foreign citizen rights, thereby surrendering their Roman citizenship. These examples, Cicero states, sprang from the absolute incompatibility of the Roman citizenship, which meant that: 'Duarum civitatum civis noster esse iure civili nemo potest; non esse huius civitatis, qui se alii civitati dicarit, potest', 28. Later, in 30, Cicero explicitly contrasts the Roman practice with the Greek, which allowed multiple citizenships. His statement therefore leaves no doubt as to the impossibility of double citizenship around the middle of the first century BC. That conclusion, moreover, was not directly linked to the particular argument Cicero was pursuing; rather it appears as a matter-of-fact reference to an apparently wellknown legal principle. The same point was also made in the speech for Caecina, 100, despite the legal issue here being a different one. In the speech for Balbus, Cicero also refers to postliminium and exilium which, as we saw, reflected the intimate connection between citizenship and territoriiim (28,30). Clearly this link had been weakened at that juncture - a change of domicilium no longer meant loss of citizen­ ship. Nevertheless, the very mention of postliminium and exilium demonstrates a familiarity with these institutions, which had only recently lost their juridical importance.5 The weakening of the link between civitas and domicilium may therefore have been of fairly recent date. These general statements about the character of the Roman citizenship can be compared with specific examples of grants to foreigners. In the Lex repetundarum, probably identical with the Lex Acilia of 123-122, non-Romans who had successfully prosecuted Roman magistrates for extortion were given the choice between, either, Roman citizenship and 2

Sherwin-White (1973) 32-37.

3

For a survey of the extensive debate on double citizenship see H. F. Jolowicz and B. Nicholas, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law, 3rd ed. (Cambridge 1972) 71-74, and E. Ferenczy, 'Rechtshistorische Bemerkungen zur Ausdehnung des römischen Bürgerrechts und zum ius Italicum unter dem Prinzipat', ANRW 11,14 (1982) 1017-58, 1046-53. 4 5

Cf. P. Brunt, 'The Legal Issue in Cicero, Pro Balbo', CQ 32 (1982) 136-47.

As late as the second half of the second century BC several cases are known, in which the question of postliminium was of great significance, cf. A. Watson, The Law of Persons in the Later Roman Republic (Oxford 1967) 237-55, Sherwin-White (1973) 292f.

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vacatio, exemption from military service, or, ius provocationis, vacatio and immunity from local duties, lines 76-79. The existence of the alternative offer in itself suggests that double citizenship was not yet possible at this time; if the winner of the trial had been free to receive the Roman citizenship without losing his local citizenship, the alternative offer makes little sense.6 In that case there would be no disadvantages involved in accepting all the iura of the Roman citizen - instead of merely the ius provocationis. The two options only appear as meaningful alternatives if they represented a choice between Roman and local citizenship. Moreover, the absence of any mention of local obligations in connection with the grant of Roman citizenship also indicates that these (and thereby also the local citizenship) were auto­ matically discontinued, when Roman citizenship was accepted.7 But while the Roman citizenship apparently implied the loss of local citizen rights it could only be of very limited use outside ager Romanus. Presumably, therefore, the grant would generally have been linked to 'solum vertere' (cf. Balb. 28) and accompanied by a transfer to Roman territory, as happened in the cases mentioned by Cicero {Balb. 53-5). In effect, the first offer would have been an invitation to move to ager Romanus with full citizen rights and vacatio, while the second meant that the beneficiary stayed at home with a number of local privileges. By these measures Rome gave those of the exploited foreign nobles who were interested in an economic and/or political career in Rome, a chance of doing so, while protecting the rest from possible retribution from Roman magistrates8 and lightening their local obligations, economic as well as military. Incidentally, the latter measures seem to represent the only unequivocal example of Roman interference in the internal affairs of the allies. The consequences of the two offers were thus quite different; plausibly they were directed at different groups. Perhaps it was not entirely fortuitous that Cicero, Balb. 53, only mentions Latins as recipients of Roman citizenship after repetundae trails.9

6

Cf. D.W. Bradeen, 'Roman Citizenship per magistratum', CJ 54 (1958-9) 221-28.

7

Cf. Sherwin-White (1973) 301.

8

The offer of ius provocationis can hardly, as Sherwin-White and others have done, be taken as indicative that this was the Roman citizenrightmost coveted by outsiders. Considering the character ofa repetundae case, directly challenging vital interests of Roman nobles, it seems likely that the grant of ius provocationis was a measure specifically directed against possible acts of retaliation. SherwinWhite (1973) 135-37, Keaveney (1987) 30. 9

Cicero's choice of examples has been linked to the Lex Servilia, which is supposed to have limited the access to Roman citizenship to Latin winners of repetundae trials, cf. E. Badian, 'Lex Servilia', CR 4 (1954) lOlf, H. B. Mattingly, 'The Extortion Law of the Tabula Bembina', JRS 60 (1970) 154-68, 165-68. The theory has since been convincingly refuted by Sherwin-White, 'The date of the Lex Repetundarum and its consequences', JRS 62 (1972) 83-99, 96f, cf. e.g. Galsterer (1976) 94f, and now also H. B. Mattingly, 'Acerbissima lex Servilia\ Hermes 111 (1983) 300-10, 302. Cicero had a clear interest in referring to recipients who, like Balbus himself, originally came from allied communities, cf. 52: 'Multi in civitatem recepti ex liberis foederatisque populis sunt'. The cases from allied Tibur, apparently well-known in Rome, were therefore obvious examples. Cicero's focusing on Latini throughout the passage 53-54 is curious, however, considering that Balbus was not a Latin. Possibly only Latins had accepted the offer of citizenship, while others had preferred the alternative privileges. For a different solution see B. Levick, 'Acerbissima Lex Servilia', CR 17 (1967) 256-58, 258, M. T. Griffin, 'The "Leges Iudiciariae" of the Pre-Sullan Era', CQ 23 (1973) 108-26, 124.

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The automatic enfranchisement of provincial soldiers later became an important institution in the Roman empire. But prior to the Social War only one grant of this type is known.10 During the battle of Vercellae, 101 BC, Marius offered the citizenship to two cohorts from Camerinum." Later he was severely rebuked for this act of generosity; not only was his authority to make such grants called in doubt, but Camerinum's status as one of Rome's most favoured allies was also invoked. As Cicero tells: 'idem cohortes duas universas Camertium civitate donavit, cum Camertium foedus omnium foederum sanctissimum atque aequissimum sciret esse', Balb. 46. An echo of this criticism is also found in Valerius Maximus, who hardly correctly - claims that the grant violated the foedus with Camerinum.12 Cicero's emphasis on the fact that the grant was made despite Camerinum's favoured position implies that it was detrimental to the Umbrian ally. The whole affair therefore makes sense only within a context of automatic loss of local rights when accepting Roman citizenship. Juridically cut off from their local community, the beneficiaries were left with a Roman citizenship they could make little use of outside the Roman state. On the face of it, Marius' reward might therefore seem a somewhat mixed blessing. It may, however, be explained by the special relationship Marius maintained with his troops; more than any other general in this period he appears to have taken responsibility for his men. Already in 103 Marius had - in collaboration with Saturninus - founded his first veteran colonies, and three years later a new colonial bill, the Lex Appuleia, was passed, also authorising Marius to enfranchise three(?) settlers for each of the new colonies - of the citizen type.13 When considered in the context of veteran provisions, the enfranchisement of the Camertes takes on a new meaning. Marius' grant on the battle field of Vercellae may plausibly have been inspired by the colonial rewards he had introduced a few years earlier. Already in the following year the settlement policy was resumed and new colonies founded: for these the newly enfranchised Camertes - and a few other non-citizens - would be eligible. Therefore, in these early grants made virtutis causa, the real reward may not have been the Roman 10

According to Livy 23,20,2, the senate in 216 BC offered Roman citizenship to the Praenestine soldiers who had defended Casilinum. The offer was declined, and the Praenestines received double Stipendium and vacatio forfiveyears. Livy's summary account must, however, be either incomplete or incorrect. At this time acceptance of Roman citizenship evidently meant the loss of local citizen rights - itself the only reasonable explanation of the Praenestine refusal. Logically, therefore, the offer would have implied moving to Rome. But as shown by Sherwin-White (1973) 32ff, the ins migrationis must have been an original part of the Latinrights,and thus enjoyed also by allied Latin states like Praeneste. At any time, therefore, the Praenestine soldiers could have transferred to Rome and received Roman citizenship. The offer made in 216 is consequently absurd, unless it contained further privileges not mentioned by Livy. One such privilege might be full vacatio - a favour Rome may have been reluctant to bestow on allies, cf. below p. 104. 11 P. J. Cuff, Two CohortsfromCamerinum', in The Ancient Historian and his Materials. Essays in honour of CE. Stevens on his seventieth birthday (Farnborough 1975) 75-91. 12 5,2,8: 'duas enim Camertium cohortes mira virtute vim Cimbrorum sustinentis in ipsa acie adversus condicionem foederis civitate donavit'. 13 Much ink has been spilled over Saturninus' colonies. However, the theory of a renewed Latin colonisation, argued by e.g. H. Last, 'The enfranchisement of Italy', CAH 9 (1932) 158-84, 169, relies entirely on the dating of the Latin ius civitatis per magistratum adipiscendae to the second century BC. For this see below pp. 99-108.

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• -nship itself; this was probably little more than the admission ticket to land-distribution programmes which were to follow. \ number of individual grants made after the Social War may shed further light on the . -lopment 0 f t n e concept of double citizenship. In the aforementioned case of L. Cornelius ifons we are told that, after receiving the Roman citizenship in 73, he exchanged hospitiwn .. I citizens from his home town of Gades (Balb. 42). The two parties, in other words, now h»loniTed to different states - thus confirming the incompatibility of the Roman citizenship. Around 41 BC, Octavian had enfranchised a Seleucus from Rhosus. One of the clauses of the r Momentary edict allowed Seleucus to hold local honours, from which he would otherwise have been barred (FIRA 55).14 This provision recurs in the edict by which Octavian granted citizenship to some Egyptian veterans (FIRA 56). Here the local liturgies are listed from which they were now exempted. In these grants the conditions appear to have been adjusted to the fact that the recipients continued to live outside Roman territory, avoiding the automatic separation from the local community which would otherwise have followed. Octavian's edicts therefore represent a weakening of the principle of incompatibility, now under increased pressure from the political realities of the empire, which demanded an extension of the privileges of Roman citizenship to the provincial elites. The first signs of a change in practice and attitude appear around the middle of the first century BC. In Cicero's time, Roman nobles started accepting citizenship in Athens - unaware of the implications for their Roman citizenship. The growing uncertainty is illustrated by Atticus' reaction when he was offered Athenian citizenship; initially inclined to accept the honour, Atticus only turned it down when Roman jurists had made it clear to him that it would mean the loss of his Roman citizenship.15 Rome's rise to territorial state and imperial power - with close contacts with the Greek world - had already transformed the structural background to incompatiblity and was also in the process of changing the outlook of her leading citizens. But this development was slow since traditional legal conservatism had to be overcome. The double citizenship does not appear to have been formally adopted at any stage: it was probably gradually introduced through compensatory clauses which in effect allowed enfranchised provincials to maintain the status and influence they had previously enjoyed in their local communities. In conclusion, the evidence suggests that in the second century Roman citizenship had not yet developed into a higher legal status attractive to outsiders in general. Apparently it was still specifically Roman and linked to Roman soil and Roman law. A few grants were made prior to the Social War, but presumably the citizenship itself was not the main attraction: rather it was a means to obtain other benefits, offered in addition, or to be gained when the new citizen moved to Rome. In what follows we will take a brief look at the economic, personal/juridical, and political benefits which have been adduced to explain an allied request for Roman citizenship. Ignoring for the moment the economic gains to be made from office-holding, interest con­ centrates on the importance of the ius commercii, which allowed non-citizens to conduct organised trade with Romans. It did not affect informal everyday exchange of goods, but was 14

R. K. Sherk, Rome and the Greek East to the death of Augustus (Cambridge 1984) 106-09, line 30-2, cf. Sherwin-White (1973) 296-99. 15

Corn. Nepos, Atticus 25,3,1.

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a condition for mancipatio and thereby for a legally binding transfer of res mancipi. Thus, a contract was protected by Roman law only when both parties enjoyed ius commercii. It could therefore have been attractive to Italians who were seeking a share in the imperial wealth controlled by Rome. It has, however, been suggested that ius commercii may already have been granted to most of the allies before the Social War.16 Thus Livy, 35,7,5, mentions the use of allied middlemen to evade Roman laws on usury, a practice which may have demanded ius commercii. In his account of the Social War, Diodorus, 37,15,2, also notes intermarriage between the insurgents and Romans. The ius conubii, thus implied, was so closely linked to ius commercii that an isolated grant would seem unlikely. But at least as important as these testimonies may be the provisions on privatisation of public land laid down in the Lex agraria. The privatisation probably affected only the land redistributed by the triumviral commission: this was first turned into ager privatus vectigalisque, and, after the abolition of the duty, private property. The law explicitly deals with situations in which Roman land, given in exchange for land surrendered to a colony, became the private property of Latins and Italian allies; and Roman land being res mancipi, the implication is that they already had the ius commercii}1 There is, in other words, some evidence to suggest that the ius commercii may not have been one of the iura the allies would obtain through the Roman franchise. There are other indications that the commercial gains to be derived from Roman citizen­ ship may have been limited. The evidence for overseas trade in the second half of the second century does not convey the impression that any legal obstacles impeded Italian participation in the lucrative eastern trade in the second century. On Delos a considerable number of traders carried Italian names, and literary evidence also suggests a strong Italian engagement in the commercial exploitation of the provinces.18 To this activity abroad corresponded a remarkable influx of wealth and hellenistic influence in the allied states. In Pompeii, for instance, a huge increase in private and public affluence is apparent in the second half of the century, when a frantic building activity transformed its appearance into that of a hellenistic city. Most likely this boom, also traceable in other allied states, was - to a certain extent - linked to the expansion in eastern trade. Therefore whether the Italians had received ius commercii or not, archaeological, epigraphical, and literary sources suggest that they were already deeply involved in the exploitation of the provinces. It is therefore questionable whether Roman citizenship would have brought the allies substantial new advantages in this particular field.19 16 Salmon (1967) 315, 318, Sherwin-White (1973) 125 (with some reservations), Galsterer (1976) 103, Stockton (1979) 113, Keaveney (1987) 3, 22. Contra Richardson (1980) 7. 17

Lex agraria 1. 2If, for acquisition of Roman land see Richardson (1980) 6f.

18

Wilson (1966), Brunt (1971) 209-14.

19

The fairly equal footing on which Romans and allies seem to have exploited the empire commercially, has - rather paradoxically - been invoked as a crucial factor in the development of an Italian wish for Roman citizenship, E. Gabba, Republican Rome. The army and the allies (Oxford 1976) 70-96. Having tasted equality abroad, the argument goes, the allies soon began to ask for similar rights at home. The logic is hardly cogent, since the directly opposite situation, i.e. Roman discrimination against the allies, would be able to perform exactly the same function in the argument. Therefore, rather than adding further weight to the citizenship version of the Italian question, this explanation is itself part of that story - and works only on its premises.

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Commercial interests have nevertheless been invoked as a possible motive behind an allied wish for citizenship. But the argument, as formulated by Gabba, is not really an economic one 2l) F° r t n e objective envisaged was not equal access to the markets, but a more expansive nolicy which would open up greater exploitation of the provinces. Basically, therefore, it was about influencing foreign policy, not rights of trade. The Roman citizenship might, however, bring other economic benefits. The collection of taxes in the provinces was a highly lucrative business, entirely in the hands of Roman publicani. Roman citizenship would give prominent Italian traders access to this market. But in a competition with Roman publicani already holding the concessions, Italian newcomers had no guarantee of winning a share in these profits.21 The distribution of allotments to the landless poor would be opened up for Italian partic­ ipation. Earlier, the Latins and - to a limited extent - the allies had had access to Latin colonies, and the former also to the citizen colonies.22 But after 177 Latin colonies were no longer founded, and at some juncture the Latin right to join citizen colonies also appears to have been abolished. Thus, according to Cicero, Balb. 48, T. Matrinius, a Latin from Spoletium, was enfranchised by Marius as part of his veteran settlement scheme. If the Latins still enjoyed free access to citizen colonies, the grant would have been superfluous; apparently Rome had curbed thisrightin response to domestic pressure. Consequently Roman citizenship would have meant a potential but in no way certain economic salvation for impoverished Italians and Latins, hitherto excluded from Roman settlement programmes. In 167, after the conquest of Macedonia, Rome suspended the tributum, which was, with the single exception of the period 43-36, never thereafter collected.23 Among the allies, how­ ever, tributum was still needed to finance their - very substantial - contributions to the Roman army. The tributum, covering not only cost of equipment but also Stipendium for the troops, would have weighed heavily on the propertied classes, who were at a distinct disadvantage compared to their Roman peers. This burden would be removed with the Roman citizenship. Among the personal rights the ius provocations ad populum has attracted much attention and even been singled out as a major incentive behind the allied demand.24 Following Cicero, Mommsen saw the right to appeal to the people against magisterial coercion as an essential part of the Roman citizenship. Since then it has become clear that the ius provocationis was

20

Gabba (1976) 70-130, followed by E. T. Salmon, 'The Cause of the Social War', Phoenix 16 (1962) 107-19, but critical e.g. J. P. V. D. Balsdon, Gnomon 26 (1954) 343f and A. N. Sherwin-White, JRS 45 (1955) 168-70, in their reviews of E. Gabba, Le origini della guerra sociale e la vita politica romana dopo l'89 a.C. (Pavia 1954), reprinted in id. (1976) 70-130. 21 On the basis of the list in C. Nicolet, L'ordre équestre à l'époque républicaine (312-43 av. J.-C), BEFAR 270 (Paris 1966) 344-46, Brunt (1988) 127 n.l 14, noted that among the known publicani only two former Italian allies are documented. 22

For Latins in coloniae civium Romanorum Livy 34,42,5-6, cf. Sherwin-White (1973) 100.

23

Plut. Aem. Pauli. 38. C. Nicolet, Tributum (Bonn 1976), id. 'Armée et fiscalité: pour un bilan de la conquête romaine', in Armées etfiscalitédans le monde antique (Paris 1977) 435-52.

24

Sherwin-White (1973) 135-37, Keaveney (1987) 30.

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not a general right of appeal, but far more limited in its scope and implications.25 Still, it did provide some protection against magisterial imperlimi and arbitrary punishments. Considering the outrages committed by Roman magistrates in the second century, there can be little doubt that the ius provocationis would improve the security of both their lives and their property. More dubious are the inferences, drawn from the offers of the ius provocationis in 125 (and possibly in 122), that this element represented the primary allied objective. That offer, it should be borne in mind, was a compromise between Italian demands and Roman reluctance. Therefore, what some Romans might have beeen willing to concede in order to calm Italian disaffection cannot automatically be identified with the innermost wishes of the allies. Roman citizenship naturally implied a freedom of movement that would enable the Italians to settle permanently in Rome or the old ager Romanus. As noted above, the ius migrationis had been one of the original Latin rights, which had allowed them to move to Rome and there acquire the local citizenship. Later this right appears to have been at first restricted and then at some juncture entirely abolished. Consequently, an enfranchisement would legalise migra­ tion to Rome and the affluent regions along the Tyrrhenian coast. Finally Roman citizenship would give equal rights to vote and hold office in Rome. That would allow well-connected Italian nobles to gain a share in the prestige and huge economic benefits which followed from Roman magistratures, military commands and provincial promagistratures. To summarise, a number of advantages might have followed from acquisition of Roman citizenship. They were hardly as large or universal as has often been assumed. Still, they could bring about a substantial improvement in the conditions of allied communities. Their legal position would be raised, the tax burden eased for the elite, some of whom might also get the chance of state contracts and political careers, and for the lower classes emigration became an option and access was opened to grain and land distribution schemes. These benefits make it obvious why some Italians might accept an offer of Roman citizen­ ship - and move to Rome or ager Romanus in order to exploit them. It remains questionable, however, whether that also automatically explains the collective wish for Roman citizenship attributed to the Italians. The focus on the citizenship itself and the advantages it might bring has, I believe, distorted our perception of the 'Italian question', shifting as it does attention from the core of the problem to its practical implications. For it hardly need be pointed out that the attraction of enfranchisement was not rooted in any inherent quality of the Roman citizenship: its privileged position reflected Rome's historically conditioned hegemony over the peninsula. Thus, all the benefits listed above were derived from the superiority of the Roman state in relation to the allied communities. The disparity between the opportunités of the Roman citizen and those of an Italian ally in similar social circumstances was an aspect of her political domination of their states. That point, however, is obscured when emphasis is placed on the Roman citizenship itself, rather than the underlying power structure. The result has been an individualisation of the 'Italian question'. For, by comparing the individual ally to the

Cf. W. Kunkel, Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung des römischen Kriminalverfahrens in vorsullanischer Zeit, Abh. Bay. Akad. Phil. Hist. 54 (1962).

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ndividual Roman, the problem has been turned into a question of personal opportunities: an individual solution is implicitly suggested to the general problem of Roman domination. This approach was first applied in Kiene's Der römische Bundesgenossenkrieg, where the Social War was set against a background of personal inequality between Romans, Latins, and Italians. Kiene's detailed analysis of individual rights and privileges in second century Italy reflected the legalistic perspective of German historiography. More importantly, however, it was an organic part of the unitary model of republican Italy, which formed the historical framework - and justification - for this focus on the Roman citizenship. As we saw, Rome and Italy were here perceived as a single nation, united culturally as well as politically. The allied cultures had given into that of Rome and their traditionally indepen­ dent states been reduced to the level of mere municipalities. The members of the RomanItalian nation were, however, still divided by differences in status. And by systematising these juridical variations a layered structure was produced, in which Roman citizens optimo iure held the highest position, followed by citizens sine suffragio, and members of the Nomen Latinum. At the bottom of the ladder were located the Italian allies. Second century Italy was, in other words, interpreted as a class system with carefully graduated personal rights. In Mommsen's words, Italy had developed into 'eine politische Kastenwesen', where Romans held privileges at the expense of 'die zurückgesetzte Klasse' of Italians.26 No longer citizens in states of their own, the Italians were turned into members of an under­ privileged class, thereby eliminating the difference between individual aspirations and col­ lective solutions. The distinction between the two was wiped out; for by internalising the Roman-Italian conflict the Italians have been reduced to individuals who happened to find themselves in the same legal position. Once placed in this hierarchical structure, their interests have auto-matically been defined in terms of upward mobility within the system. The juridical fiction of the status ladder thus provides its own rationale for the supposed Italian demand for citizenship. This logic, however, only works within a one-nation model; without these premises, the benefits of Roman citizenship have little explanatory value in a wider historical context. For if the allied nations were still culturally distinct and enjoyed full internal sovereignty, they must be seen as bearers of collective interests instead of individual ambitions. In that case it becomes an international conflict focused on Rome's hegemonic control over the Italian states. The crucial question is therefore whether the mere acquisition of Roman citizenship would secure these collective interests and break the monopoly of power held by the Roman nobility. The political implications of enfranchisement become of paramount importance. Despite the fact that Rome had long been a territorial state, her political structure remained that of a city-state. Magisterial elections were held and legislation carried exclusively in the comitia in Rome. An obvious implication was that the political equality bestowed on new Italian citizens was formal rather than real; the sheer physical distance meant that in practice citizens living outside Rome could not exercise remotely the same influence as urban voters. 26 1,424,798, 802. Cf. Abriss des römischen Staatsrechts (Leipzig 1893), 52-53: 'Wenn der Latiner von jeher betrachtet ist als dem von Rom geführten Gemeinwesen ebenso, wenn auch mit geringerem Recht angehörig wie der römischen Bürger, so treten nun die Bürger der gleichfalls ewig verbündeten nichtlatinischen Staaten Italiens gewissermassen als dritte Klasse hinzu und werden Glieder des römischen Reiches'.

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The centralised structure automatically reduced the extra-urban citizens to the fringes of Roman politics.27 A number of passages in Cicero might, however, suggest a relatively large attendance by municipales, who appear to have exerted some influence in the comitia. But it is not certain how representative these instances are and the implications ought not to be exaggerated. Thus, some of them are patently tendentious, such as his numerous references to 'cuncta Italia' supporting his consular candidature (for example In Pis. 3) and later recalling him from the exile (Sest. 125). Likewise the overwhelming electoral backing Cicero claimed his client Plancius had received from his native Atina (Plane. 20) may be taken with more than a pinch of salt. In any case, this example does not indicate any regular participation by extra-urban crowds; people were clearly mobilised ad hoc to support a local noble.28 In 70 BC Cicero describes the visitors who filled the Forum as 'haec frequentia totius Italiae ... quae convenu uno tempore undique comitiorum, ludorum censendique causa' (Verr. 1,54). The size of these crowds cannot be determined; still, considering the spatial constraints of the Forum, even a few thousand visitors could easily cause serious overcrowding. Moreover, that year the turnout may have been exceptionally large, the census being the first effective one conducted after the mass enfranchisements in the 80's.29 A more reliable indication of municipal partici­ pation in Roman politics might be found in the Commentariolum petitionis, where Q. Cicero devotes considerable attention to the extra-urban voters, 30-32. The significance of maintaining local contacts throughout the peninsula is emphasised here - a curious piece of advice if the municipal vote could have no impact on the outcome. This text, however, does not necessarily represent typical patterns of electoral campaigning. It may relate more specifically to Cicero's consular campaign in 64, when he seems to have put particular effort into courting the Italian constituency.30 The structure of the two assemblies offered widely different opportunities for extra-urban citizens. The timocratic character of the comitia centuriata allowed relatively few municipal nobles to exert some influence on the election of praetors and consuls.31 It was primarily as voters in this assembly that they were relevant to Roman politicians - as in the case of 27

A good discussion of the role played by extra-urban citizens in Roman politics is found in J. Bleicken, Lex Publica. Gesetz und Recht in der römischen Republik (Berlin-New York 1975) 254-68. See also L. R. Taylor, Party Politics in the Age of Caesar (Berkeley 1949) 57-62, C. Nicolet, The World of the Citizen in Republican Rome (London 1980) 292-97, E. Gabba, 'Le città italiche del I sec. a.C. e la politica', Riv. Stor. hai 98 (1986) 653-63, T. P. Wiseman, New Men in the Roman Senate 139 BC-AD 14 (Oxford 1971) 136-42, the latter perhaps overestimating both the influence and the independence of the Italian voters. 28 The extent of the support Cicero may have received from Volaterrae and Atella (Fam. 13,4,1 ; 13,7,4) cannot be determined. 29

Cf. T. P. Wiseman, 'The Census in the First Century BC, JRS 59 (1969) 59-75, esp. 67-69. Whether people came to Rome for the actual registration is a big question. The census appears to have been conducted locally already in 70. Still, Cicero explicitly says that Italians came to Rome 'censendi causa'. One solution might be that they were local magistrates who arrived with their entourages to submit their census lists and attend the games and elections. 30

Cf. e.g. Comm. pet. 31, noting lack of interest in the Italians shown by Cicero's competitors.

31

But also here the urban elite exerted a relatively larger influence, cf. Bleicken (1975) 167.

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Cicero's recall from exile.32 But the influence of municipal elites on legislation passed in the tribally organised assemblies remained limited. Firstly, their votes carried much less weight in these assemblies, especially when compared to urban residents inscribed in the rural tribes. And secondly the legislative process demanded a constant presence in Rome, which was in the nature of things quite beyond their means.33 Thus, we only know of two sets of legislation carried through the backing of extra-urban citizens: the programmes of Ti. Gracchus and Saturninus, the fate of the former clearly illustrating the uncertainty involved in relying on this kind of support.34 In sum, therefore, we have no evidence for large-scale participation in Roman politics by non-urban voters, whose influence on Roman legislation seems to have been minimal. The domi nobiles may occasionally have gone to Rome to attend ludi, transact business and vote in the elections. The bulk of the population probably only attended comitia when obliged to show their respect for a local grandee - cf. the case of Plancius (Cic. Plane. 20). More substantial attendance might occur, but remained exceptional. In general, the means of transport and communication in ancient Italy would have prevented extra-urban citizens from becoming a political force of any significance. And even the upper-classes may have been more fully represented only from the regions closest to Rome.35 The 'Italian' influence in the comitia centuriata ought therefore not to be mistaken for a real position of power in relation to the Roman nobility. Cicero's remark about the power of the municipal elites in Pro Sulla 24 does not describe their actual role in Roman politics, but a hypothetical situation in which they jointly mobilised all their electoral strength. In practice they remained far too disorganised and divided for their potential to be realised. Thus, from Cicero's speeches and letters it appears that the initiative for their participation invariably came from Roman politicians seeking support from every single tribe.36 The limited influence of extra-urban citizens, built into the political structure, evidently reduced their chances of magisterial careers. A few Italians are known to have reached high offices in the late republic, but they are neither numerically nor geographically representative of the enlarged citizenry living outside Rome. The Paelignians, as we know, could not boast of their first senator until the Augustan age (ILS 932), and even from the prosperous and highly urbanised region of Southern Campania less than a handful of republican senators are

32

Cic. Sest. 125, Post reditum in senatu 24, 31, In Pis. 80, De domo 73-5.

33

Cf. BleickenC 1975) 257-60.

34

App. BCI,41f,58f, 132.

35 The electoral importance of Cisalpine Gaul assumed by e.g. Taylor (1949) 58, and C. Meier, Res publica amissa (Wiesbaden 1966) 193, is dubious. Cicero's canvassing there is likely to have been atypical, and the influence of the region, noted in An. 1,2, was potential rather than actual. The campaigning in Cisalpine Gaul by Caesar and Antony was probably a question of mobilising veterans dispatched to Rome to vote for their generals, Cic. Phil. 2,76, Hirtius BG 8,50. 6 Cicero even complains about the lack of interest in urban politics shown by the local Italian elites, A«. 8,7,5; 8,13,2; 8,16,1.

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securely attested.37 More importantly, however, their access to office and prestige depended on complete integration into the power networks of the capital. Without an urban base, i.e. patronage upwards as well as downwards, political aspirations were doomed to fail. The lower magistracies, which gave access to the senate, were appointed by the comitia tributa and thus largely in the hands of the urban electorate. And even in the centuriate assembly, unanimous municipal backing may not have been able to ensure the election of a consul - apart from the fact that such coordinated efforts in practice would have been impossible to organise. From this perspective the example of Marius, often adduced as an incentive for the Italian struggle for citizenship, is less persuasive.38 As a politician he did not act as a representative of his native Arpinum, but was fully integrated into urban structures. His unique career he did not owe to the influence of the Volscians but to his own extraordinary qualifications - and the support of powerful Roman nobles. Far from revealing any potential for regional represent­ ation in the Roman system, his example - and later that of Cicero - merely reflect a measure of social mobility which allowed exceptionally gifted (or otherwise useful) municipales to climb the social ladder. The case of Marius could therefore hardly have deluded anybody into believing that Roman citizenship could bring the Italians a political influence which even remotely corresponded to their numbers and share in the empire. It demonstrated that only by fully assimilating themselves, moving to Rome and seeking noble patronage might allied leaders enter the senatorial order. And at that stage they had effectively ceased to be Italians, and instead become parvi senatores living in Rome. Those who were even less fortunate ended up as domi nobiles, members of politically marginalised, 'provincialised' elites, with limited local powers. In 91, the chances of entering the senate would, moreover, have seemed even more remote than the actual course of the first century might suggest. For without the Sullan doubling of the senate (unforeseeable in 91 ) and the decimation of the Roman nobility through proscriptions and civil wars, the 'Italian' representation would have been weaker still. Therefore, to an Italian ally, conscious and proud of his national origins, it would have been self-evident that Roman citizenship alone would not break the political supremacy which formed the foundation of Rome's hegemony. The wish for 'consortium imperii', which Pompeius Trogus, 38,4,13, ascribed to the insurgents, could not be fulfilled by simple enfranchisement. For that to happen a radical reorganisation of the Roman state was required - and the introduction of a decentralising federal element to the political system. And there are indications that this is not just a modern rationalisation; our evidence for the constitutional views of the allies in 91 suggests that they themselves were fully conscious of this situation. As will be argued below, both the demands, which Livy, 8,4-5, anachronistically attributed to the Latins in 340, and the political structure actually realised in the new state 'Italia', bear witness to the federal objectives of the Italians. Such ambitions in themselves undermine the notion that they might at any stage have asked for nothing more than the Roman citizenship.

37 From this area Wiseman (1971) 189, lists only eight potential senators,fiveof whom are extremely dubious (271, 272, 401, 409, 505). The region which included cities like Nola, Nuceria, Pompeii and Herculaneum, is therefore securely represented only by three senators (275, 503, 504) - all from the Augustan age.

E.g. Brunt (1988) 129.

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They demonstrate an awareness that enfranchisement without major changes to the political system would merely cement the supremacy of the Roman nobility; allied power and sovereignty would be surrendered in exchange for a hypothetical and altogether unlikely influence in Rome. Mere enfranchisement would mean the end of the Italians as distinct nations with a political existence of their own. The idea of this being an allied request therefore presupposes that they had already disappeared as such. Again therefore, we must conclude that the narrow focus on the Roman citizenship, far from being a realistic alternative to the national model, works on exactly the same historicist premises, reducing the Italians to members of an underprivileged class within a Roman nation-state. Only by discarding the Italian states and nationalities can Roman citizenship be construed as a sensible answer to allied grievances. Thus reduced - to romanised individuals - they become able to pursue individual solutions to what would otherwise have been a collective problem. Therefore, if the Appianic version of the 'Italian question' is to be accepted, there is no way of getting round the one-nation model of second century Italy, invented as it was for that very same purpose. The ius civitatis per magistratum adipiscendae. It has been widely assumed that by the time of the Social War the Latins had already received the right to obtain Roman citizenship through the holding of local magistracies.39 According to the prevailing view this had been granted in 124 after the revolt of Fregellae, when Rome finally realised that something must be done to calm Latin disaffection. Later this privilege became the most significant element of the ius Latii and an effective promoter of romanisation in the provinces. However, its existence in second century Italy remains a hypothesis, introduced, I believe, in order to explain the Latin stance during the Social War. The idea of an enfranchised Latin elite fits perfectly into the explanatory model which has been analysed in the previous chapters. For on the one hand, the allied revolt is here seen as a fight for the Roman citizenship; on the other hand, the Latin wish for and interest in the Roman citizenship are well-documented, not least by the revolt of Fregellae in 125. These two factors are difficult to reconcile with the stance taken by the Latins during the war, when they refused to join the insurgents and defended themselves against Italian attacks. A limited en­ franchisement, only affecting the upper decision-making classes, would provide an ideal solution to this problem, explaining as it does how the Latins could act so directly contrary to their own, often expressed interests and oppose natural allies, who were supposedly fighting for the very same goal as themselves. The explanatory value of this theory within the received model of Italian unification may plausibly account for the almost universal acceptance with which it has been met - despite the 39

The theory, traceable back to Mommsen (1887) III 639f, id. (1905-13) I 62, was further developed by G. Tibiletti, 'La politica delle colonie e città latine nella guerra sociale', RIL 86 (1953) 45-63. Later also e.g. G. Luraschi, Foedus ius Latii civitas (Padua 1979) 301-29, D. J. Piper, The ius adipiscendae civitatis Romanae per magistratum and its Effect on Roman-Latin Relations', Latomus 47 (1988) 59-68. It has been rejected by A. Rosenberg, 'Die Entstehung des sogenannten Foedus Cassianum und des latinischen Rechts', Hermes 55 (1920) 337-63, 347f, Bradeen (1958-59), Mattingly (1970) 163-68, Galsterer (1976) 93-100. Sceptical also F. Wulff-Alonso, Romanos e Itâlicos en la Baja Repûblica, Coll Latomus 214 (Brussels 1991) 233ff.

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paucity of evidence hitherto adduced. For it seems improbable that any of the two sources Asconius' casual remark on the content of the his Latii and the ambiguous clause in the Lex repetundarum, would otherwise have been accorded such weight and significance. The obvious advantages of this solution may not only have overshadowed the shortcomings of the 'positive' evidence; it has also meant that immense legal and practical problems involved in implementing this right prior to the Social War have gone largely unnoticed. On a basic juridical level the early date collides with the - widely recognised - exclusivity of the Roman citizenship, which Cicero, 68 years after the putative grant, could still describe as a fixed and indispensable principle of Roman law. Thus, an automatic grant of Roman citizenship to ex-magistrates would within a few generations have deprived the Latin com­ munities of their entire elite, who would have become citizens of a foreign state.40 There would be no political and military leadership, and most of the property would also have come into the hands of foreigners. This situation being patently absurd, the implication is that a grant of civitas per honorem could not possibly have severed local links to their individual communities; the beneficiaries must have been allowed to maintain their previous citizenship. Most supporters of the theory have recognised this need, envisaging some special arrange­ ments which exempted the Latins from the rule of incompatibility.41 No one has, however, made any serious attempt to define how this arrangement would have worked in practice; a project destined to run into great difficulties. Enfranchisement was essentially about entering the Roman census register. When inscribed in tribus and classis the citizen received political rights and became liable to taxation - and conscription. The Latin magistrates and their descendants would therefore automatically have served in the Roman legions; the result could have been a serious loss of manpower for their home communities which would have difficulty mustering the equestrian units demanded by Rome. The body of officers would also be reduced, leaving the Latin contingents without proper leadership. Obviously Rome had no interest in such a development taking place. But assuming - for the sake of argument - that the Latin ex-magistrates, despite their enfran­ chisement, did not serve in the legions, that would leave their citizenship as an empty shell with no real substance. For since Roman office-holding was inextricably linked to military service and command in the legions, the new citizens would in practice have been barred from pursuing political careers in Rome. Effective double citizenship was not feasible in practical terms. The military obligations imposed on the Latins meant that no one could enjoy full citizenship in both states; either they served in the legions or in the Latin contingents. No compromise seems viable in this basic 40

Bradeen (1959) 224, also noted that since the magistrates would receive the Roman citizenship already after their first office, the principle of incompatibility would mean that higher magistracies could no longer be filled.

41

Mommsen (1887) III 641f, with characteristicrigourmaintained the incompatibility of the Roman citizenship - at least until the Social War. The citizenship of Latin ex-magistrates was, in his view, only realised when they transferred to Rome or officially surrendered their local citizenship. In effect, therefore, the Latin elites were not enfranchised in 91. Tibiletti (1953) 46f, 50f, while subscribing to Mommsen's view, also accepted the continued eligibility of 'Latin' Romans for local magistratures, which in effect amounts to double citizenship. A similar compromise in Sherwin-White (1973) 11 If» and Brunt (1988) 97, 124.

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,0I1flict of interests, which remained unsolved until the abandonment of the formula togatoritm after the Social War. In this respect, Rome's relationship with the Latin communities ;n second century Italy was fundamentally different from the later situation in the provinces where double citizenship is a well-documented practice. The early date of the ius civitatis per maçistratiun adipiscendae does not take into account this disparity between provincial holders of ins Latii and the Latin Name in republican Italy. The enfranchisement of the Latin upper-classes also raises another structural problem. For if the grant was to make any sense, the properties of the new citizens would have to be registered in the Roman census; otherwise the elites would not gain access to the equestrian order, political influence and careers, or shares in state contracts. However, their local status also relied on census registration. Effective double citizenship therefore implied that the same estate would have figured in two different registers and been liable to the taxation of two sovereign states.42 This situation seems obviously untenable, juridically as well as financially. It is, moreover, questionable whether Latin land could actually be inscribed in the Roman census, traditionally the registration of land within the borders of the ager Romanus.47, The issue does not receive explicit treatment in the sources, but in the speech for Flaccus, Cicero discusses a case which may cast light on the legal implications of registering foreign property in the census. After his pro-praetorship in Asia in 62 Flaccus was accused of extortion. At the repetundae court the Roman Decianus complained about a verdict Flaccus had delivered in a property dispute Decianus had been involved in in the free state of Apollonis. Cicero meets the accusation by pointing out that Decianus had acquired the property fraudulently (70ff) and that also Pergamon had refused to recognise the purchase (74f). In support of his claim on the property Decianus appears to have referred to its registration in the Roman census; in 79-80 Cicero discusses the lawfulness and implications of this step. Cicero first declares that he will ignore the fact that the property was illegally acquired and therefore not Decianus' at all. He then goes on to ask whether the estate (if acquired legally) would have met the conditions for inscription in the Roman census: 'illud quaero, sintne ista praedia censui censendo, habeant ius civile, sint necne sint mancipi, subsignari apud aerarium aut apud censorem possint. In qua tribu denique ista praedia censuisti?', 80. The questions are clearly rhetorical and implicitly answered in the negative; it would serve no purpose to stress the legitimacy of the registration.44 The subsequent remark: '... gloriosus fuisti, voluisti magnum agri modum censeri', also demonstrates his non-approval of Decianus' declaration of the property. It must therefore have been evident that landed possessions in Apollonis did not qualify for registration in the Roman census, since they were not covered by the ius civile, acquired by mancipatio or usable as security for a lease or contract. In order to bring home this point Cicero finally asks ironically in which tribus Decianus had his property entered on the census. The implication is that land registered in the 42

The Roman tribute had been suspended in 167 but nothing prevented its reintroduction if needed. That happened, as we know, in 43. In 59 Cicero had presented it as a perfectly realistic possibility, Flac. 80. 43 44

Cf. J. Suolatili, The Roman Censors (Helsinki 1963) 39f.

Cf. T. B. L. Webster, M. Tulli Ciceronis Pro Fiacco Oratio (Oxford 1931) 98, A. Watson, The Law °f Property in the Later Roman Republic (Oxford 1968) 18.

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census normally was part of one of the Roman tribus, and that the census basically was a registration of properties within the Roman state.45 Moreover, if a given property could be registered in a foreign owner's local census, parts of one state's territorium would be included in the tax base of another. Frequently people would find themselves in the absurd situation mentioned by Cicero, where Decianus' land was simultaneously subjected to the tax authority of both Apollonis and Rome.46 According to the principle of real property following 'la legge territoriale', the Roman census could only deal with Roman property.47 Therefore, what appear in Cicero as the formal juridical conditions for census registration, may simply be a listing of the characteristic features of the possession of Roman land - as also indicated by the tribus question.48 The restriction of the census to Roman property would have serious consequences for the social and political opportunities of new citizens. For only by converting their Latin estate into Roman property could they reach a position similar to the one they had previously enjoyed. But that solution could in the nature of things only apply to a tiny minority - there would also have to be buyers for the land. And if they converted their property they would automatically lose their status in the local Latin community. We are thus faced with yet another obstacle to the realisation of double citizenship for Latin ex-magistrates. The existence of the census as the basis for political influence and social standing as well as conscription and taxation must have precluded a combination of Roman and Latin citizenships, since the two registrations would have imposed mutually exclusive sets of obligations. In the light of the practical difficulties pointed out above, the contemporary evidence adduced in support of a second century ius civitatis per magistratura adipiscendae attracts renewed interest. In the Lex repetundarum, foreign winners of extortion cases are given a choice between two sets of awards. Either they could receive the Roman citizenship and vacatio or maintain their local citizenship with the additional privileges of provocano, immunitas, and vacatio. The last option was, however, not open to those who had locally held the dictatorship, aedileship, or praetorship; in line 78 this group is explicitly barred from the alternative privileges. The magistracies mentioned have, primarily because of the occurence of the dictatorship, been identified as belonging to the Nomen Latinum, and interpreted in the light of Asconius' remark on the ius Latii. In this way the exclusion clause of the Lex

45

Cf. V. Arangio-Ruiz, 'Sul problema della doppia cittadinanza nella repubblica e nell'impero romano', in Studi F. Carnelutti (Padua 1950) IV 55-77, 70.

46

80: 'Collimisisti, si tempus aliquod gravius accidisset, ut ex isdem praediis et Apollonide et Romae imperatum esset tributum'.

47 48

Arangio-Ruiz (1950) 67.

P. 0rsted, Roman Imperiai Economy and Romanization (Copenhagen 1985) 157ff, suggested that only Decianus' unlawful acquisition of the property prevented its census registration. That inter­ pretation, however, seems to place greater weight on the Schol. Bob. than on the speech itself. The scholiast writes p. 52 that: 'De iure loquitur praediorum, in quae per vim et iniuriam videbatur invasisse Decianus. Praedia autem, quae iure legitimo non habentur, neque aput aerarium subsignari neque aput censorem possunt'. But by adducing the unlawfulness of the possession to explain Cicero's discussion of the census registration, the scholiast distorts Cicero's argument, which is based on the explicit premises that the estate is perceived asrightfullypurchased.

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yepetiindarum has come to indicate that Latin officials already had the Roman citizenship by virtue of the ius civitatis per magistratiim adipiscendae. The logic of the argument is peculiar: the exclusion of certain individuals from offer B is construed as indicative that they already had the supposedly more generous offer A. It has, moreover, been pointed out that if Latin magistrates had automatically received the Roman citizenship, the rewards to successful foreign prosecutors were irrelevant to his group. They would have been covered by the later paragraph, line 83, which dealt separately with the rewards offered to Roman citizens. Therefore the ius civitatis per magistratiim adipiscendae does not provide a satisfactory explanation for the exclusion of some local magistrates from some privileges. The identification of the Latin magistracies, a cornerstone of the theory, also raises certain questions. For although dictator may be a genuine Latin title, the absence of several other Latin offices, the duovirate, quaestorship, tribunate and censorship, casts doubt on Mommsen's interpretation. Either these did not give access to the Roman citizenship, or they were the only ones to enjoy the alternative praemia offered by the Lex repetundarum. Both solutions are untenable, implying as they do an inexplicable distinction between what appear to be arbitrarily selected offices. This throws doubt on the identification of the three magistracies as a reference to specially privileged officials of the Latin Name. To counter this problem Sherwin-White made the attractive suggestion that the offices, rather than specific Latin posts, were an attempt at describing Latin-Italian magistracies in general.49 For the three offices mentioned cover the standard types of administration, led by one, two, and three officials, respectively. Instead of listing all the various Etruscan, Oscan, Umbrian, Greek, and Latin titles among the allies and the Nomen Latinum, the authors of the law may simply have preferred a summary, containing only the Latin version of the three main types of Italian administrations. The implication is that the clause did not refer exclusively to the Latins but to every Italian ally who had held local office. That, of course, strikes the final blow at the civitas per honorem explanation, which cannot possibly be applied to the entire peninsula. We are therefore forced to seek another interpretation of this passage. One solution might be that Rome simply did not want members of the allied and Latin elites to have the alternative offer.50 Prima facie the clause would seem to exclude rather than favour this group. That in turn shifts attention from the status of the presumed recipients to the three privileges included in the alternative awards.51 49

Sherwin-White (1972) 94-6, followed by e.g. Galsterer (1976) 94f.

50

That conclusion has recently been reached also by Gabba (1989) 24If, and A. Lintott, Juridical Reform and Land Reform in the Roman Republic (Cambridge 1992) 159f. In 1981, M. H. Crawford already doubted the assumed link between the Lex repetundarum and the ius civitatis per magistratum adipiscendae, 'Italy and Rome', JRS 71 (1981) 153-60, 154. J. L. Strachan-Davidson, Problems of the Roman Criminal Law (Oxford 1912) 151, A. Rosenberg (1920) 347, Bradeen (1958-59), Mattingly (1970) 166f, Crawford (1996) 111, have taken the exclusion clause as indicative that Latin magistrates had provocano and the other privileges but not Roman citizenship. This solution, though perfectly logical, does raise a number of questions. Thus, we may wonder whether Rome could intervene in this way in the internal affairs of the Latins and en bloc bestow privileges of this kind on the entire local elite. A grant of vacatio, though linked to their military obligations to Rome, seriously undermined local control over the levy. Likewise, immunitas from local

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ITALIAN UNIFICATION

The offer of ius provocations was hardly controversial. In itself it would do little to change the position of the recipients. Moreover, if Flaccus could propose a general grant in 125, an exclusion of local elites in 123-2 makes even less sense. On the other hand, immunitas from munera publica might have represented a serious violation of allied sovereignty - and financial prosperity. Ex-magistrates would naturally have been the main contributors to the local coffers, funding not only public services but also the allied military contingents.52 The most serious matter, however, may have been the vacatio militiae, which would affect thè very essence of Rome's relationship with her allies - defined, as we know, as those 'quibus ex formula togatorum milites in terra Italia imperare soient'.13 As political and military leaders the local elites performed a vital function in this system. And although the practical con­ sequences of a few individual grants of vacatio might be negligible, they would breach the fundamental principles on which Rome's hegemony in Italy was based. Admittedly, the local councillors could get the privilege by opting for the citizenship reward. But that would also change their local status and position. For even if they might have maintained some of their previous influence, they would no longer belong to the official elite, from which they became juridically - and presumably also physically - separated. A grant of vacatio as a supplement to Roman citizenship might therefore have been less controversial than an isolated grant of the same privilege to an Italian noble. The provisions of the Lex repetundarum may thus be explained without recourse to the institution of civitas per magistratum; on closer inspection it would appear that the intro­ duction of this right creates more problems than it solves. In addition, two passages in Cicero attract attention in this context: the discussion of citizenship grants in the Pro Balbo, and his references to Volaterrae's constitutional status. In his speech for Balbus Cicero gives a detailed survey of Roman grants of citizenship prior to the Social War. Two Tiburtines are mentioned as having received citizenship through an extortion case, which presumably took place shortly before the war. L. Cossinius and T. Coponius are described as 'pater huius equitis Romani optimi atque ornatissimi viri' and 'civis item summa virtute et dignitate (nepotis T. et C. Coponius nostis)', respectively, 53. The implication is that they belonged to the Tiburtine elite, whose local magistracies were otherwise supposed to have given direct access to the Roman citizenship. The two plaintiffs would therefore have brought the case before they had reached magisterial age - a somewhat strained solution,54 which also collides with the subsequent emphasis on the fact that access to citizenship was upheld under the Lex Servilia and went unchallenged by the Lex Licinia Mucia. Not even these severe laws, Cicero stresses, contested the grants made to Latin promunera was in principle a matter in which Rome could have little interest or say. The practical implica­ tions of granting these privileges to the office-holding class would also have been quite dramatic. The elite would no longer lead their local contingents in thefield,and perhaps more seriously an exemption from munera publica is likely to have had adverse consequences for the public finances of the Latin towns. The question also remains as to why the Roman legislators, when drafting the law, chose to explicitly exclude a group, which happened to already have the privileges in question. 52

Crawford (1996) 111, in line with his interpretation of the exclusion clause takes a minimalist view of the munera publica, seen merely as corvée labour, rather than elite liturgies.

53

Lex agraria 1.21,50.

54

Contra Brunt, (1988) 134.

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secutors. That point, however, becomes faintly absurd if at the same time an alternative, and far easier, way of obtaining the Roman citizenship existed for the Latin elite. This passage highlights one of the major questions raised by the early date of the ius civitatis per magistratum adipiscendae - one rarely adressed, let alone solved: Why does Cicero avoid any mention of this right in his speech for Balbus?55 The absence of even the slishtest reference to this institution is peculiar - not least when considering the legal argument of the trial. Central to the case appears to have been the prosecutor's claim that Balbus' native town of Gades should have been a fundus and thus formally recognised the law which authorised Sulla to make the grant. Cicero refutes this claim by reference to a number of enfranchisements which, despite having received no such formal acceptance, had not been challenged on those grounds. Cicero's argumentation is highly detailed; apart from collective errants to Italian peoples no less than fourteen individual enfranchisements are mentioned. These had either been made virtutis causa or as rewards to repetundae winners; even the exceptional case of the Ceres priestesses 'imported' from Magna Grecia is included in the survey. Considering the thoroughness with which Cicero otherwise tries to demonstrate the extent and diversity of earlier grants, the complete absence of Latin ex-magistrates is striking. Their numbers and importance would have been many times as large as those listed with painstaking, often repeated detail. They would, moreover, have been a much more familiar, indeed contemporary, point of reference for the Ciceronian audience - little conversant with the intricacies of vintane grants of citizenship in second century Italy. One passage in Cicero throws the absence of the ius civitatis per magistratum adipiscendae in relief. In a discussion of grants, which neither breached treaties nor demanded local consent, Cicero mentions successful Latin plaintiffs who had claimed citizenship 'e lege Servilia', asking (Balb. 54): 'Num fundos igitur factos populos Latinos arbitramur aut Serviliae legi aut ceteris, quibus Latinis hominibus erat propositum aliqua ex re praemium civitatis?'. All the laws which had granted citizenship to Latins 'aliqua ex re', are thus summarized as 'aut Serviliae legi aut ceteris'. The implication is that the epoch-making introduction of civitas per magistratum, admitting thousands of Latin nobles to the Roman citizenry, is included in 'ceteri' and subordinated to a repetundae law, which could hardly have enfranchised more than a few dozen.56 The apparent absurdity of this passage underlines the fundamental problem of reconciling our fullest source, Cicero's Pro Balbo, with the early dating of civitas per honorem\ a theory further weakened by his account of Volaterrae's status in the speech for Caecina. After the civil war Sulla had deprived Volaterrae of its recently acquired Roman citizen­ ship, deciding instead that: '... eodem iure esse quo fuerint Ariminenses, quos quis ignorât duodecim coloniarum fuisse et a civibus Romanis hereditates capere potuisse', 102. Volaterrae had thus received the same set of rights which Ariminum and eleven other Latin colonies had once enjoyed, including the right to inherit from Roman citizens - a point vital

55

H. B. Mattingly, 'A new look at the lex repetundarum Bembina', Philologus 131 (1987) 71-81, 72, indirectly acknowledged the problem, admitting that: Tt is only strange that such a rate of absorption of new citizens before the Social War has left hardly any trace in our sources'. 50

'For the Lex Servilia see Badian (1954) lOlf, Levick (1967), Mattingly (1970) 163-66, Sherwin-White (1972) 96f, Griffin (1973) 123-26.

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to Caecina's case. From Cicero's speech it is evident that the elite of Volaterrae did not have access to the Roman citizenship through local magistracies. Thus, as a member of the elite Caecina could easily have obtained local office, and Cicero's lengthy discussion of Volaterrae's disenfranchisement, 95-102, would be meaningless if the local nobles had in fact maintained their right to aquire the Roman citizenship. The ius civitatis per magistratum adipiscendae can therefore not have been included in the ius Ariminense, which is known only through this single reference. Cicero's words do not allow us to conclude that this was an inferior form of Latin rights, and the political situation obtaining in 268 offers no explanation as to why a lesser status should have been introduced for the new colony at Ariminum.57 Consequently, Ariminum - and hence also Volaterrae - is most likely to have received the ius civitatis per magistratum adipiscendae, if such a grant had been made in the second century. For this theory to be upheld, the ius Ariminense would have to be an inferior Latin status, excluded from the privilege of civitas per honorem when this was granted in 124 BC. That solution is problematic. Not only would this graduation of Latin colonies in the third century have - rather implausibly - been maintained right up to 124; the existence of twelve colonies without enfranchised elites also undermines the traditional view of the Social War, since no split between colonies with and without this privilege can be traced up to or during the war. Therefore, whatever view is taken of the ius Ariminense, the absence of the ius civitatis per magistratum adipiscendae in Volaterrae affects the common explanation of the Latin stance in the Social War.58 The theory now rests on a single statement by Asconius, whose discussion of Placentia's status contains this description of Cn. Pompeius Strabo's grant of ius Latii to the Transpadani in 89 BC: Tompeius ... ius dedit Latii, ut possent habere ius quod ceterae Latinae coloniae, id est ut petendo magistratus civitatem Romanam adipiscerentur', Asc. 3C. However, the claim that in 89 the ius Latii already included the ius civitatis per magistratum adipiscendae, would seem highly unlikely in the light of the arguments presented above. Two explanations of the Asconius passage are possible. A reference to the first introduction of this right may have been perceived as a mere extension of a pre-existing status. A factual mistake of this kind in Asconius may now seem less surprising than it did just a few decades ago. For the traditional image of this writer as a diligent researcher, who worked along almost modern scholarly principles, has now been shown to be a myth, inspired by his practice of reference which may give a superficial impression of academic scrupulousness.59 In reality he often seems to have quoted from memory, and his commentary contains a number of mistakes and simplifications. Thus, for instance, the whole discussion about Placentia's status is based on a misunderstanding of the fate of Latin colonies after the Social War. Neither his familiarity with republican history nor his research methods seem to have differed substantially from that 57

Cf. F. De Martino, Storia della costituzione romana (Naples 1972-75) II 99-102. Sherwin-White's view (1973) 102, that Cicero's mention does not indicate either a higher or a lower Latin status, is here criticised 102 n.74.

58

H. Wolff, *Caesars Neugründung von Comum und das sogenannte ius Latii maius', Chiron 9 (1979) 169-87, esp. 181 n.31, suggested that when Sulla granted the ius Ariminense to Volaterrae he left out the ius civitatis per magistratum adipiscendae. That solution, however, is directly contradicted by Cicero's explicit statement that Volaterrae had received 'idem ius' as Ariminum. 59

B. A. Marshall, A Historical Commentary on Asconius (Columbia 1985) esp. 62-77.

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of other imperial writers. And in the nature of the case he cannot have adhered to an ideal of scholarship, which was first conceived in the nineteenth century. He belonged to an age with entirely different notions of the means and ends of historical writing.60 Focusing on a few seemingly 'modern' features in his commentary, later historians seem to have accepted him as one of their own and thereby ascribed to him a set of scholarly standards, which he could not possibly have had. There was, moreover, a distinct element of continuity in Strabo's grant of ius Latii which may have added to the confusion as to the previous nature of this status. Alternatively, the passage may be read simply as a parenthetical note, briefly explaining the content of the ius Laîii and based on Asconius' own personal experience of this status, in that case it may represent a retrojection of the imperial ius Latii, whose main feature was precisely the ius civitatis per magistratum adipiscendae. Anachronisms of this type are common in ancient historiography, which generally had little understanding of institutions as a result of long developmental processes.61 Moreover, the name of the ius Latii itself suggested origins back in a distant, almost mythical past. To describe earlier stages of this institution on the basis of contemporary experience may therefore have come quite naturally to Asconius. On this line of reasoning it could be argued that the ius civitatis per honorem adipiscendae may not have been one of those granted to the Transpadani in 89. One case might suggest an even later date for the introduction of this right. In 51 BC the consul Marcellus publicly birched a colonist from Comum in order to demonstrate that he was not a Roman citizen.62 In 59, Caesar had sent new colonists to Comum and on that occasion also enfranchised five hundred Greeks by officially inscribing them in the colony; the Latin colony had in other words been given citizen status. Caesar's opponents challenged the validity of this grant, and Marcellus' act was a way of showing that the colonist were not protected by the Roman citizen's right of provocano. The episode is mentioned by Plutarch and Appian, but Cicero's letter to Atticus, 5,11,2, remains our only contemporary source. Cicero appears to respond to comments made earlier by Atticus, noting that: 'Marcellus foede de Comensi. Etsi ille magistratum non gesserit, erat tarnen Transpadanus. Ita mihi videtur non minus stomachi nostro quam Caesari fecisse. Sed hoc ipse viderit.' Cicero's mention of a possible magistracy suggests some uncertainty in Rome as to whether the victim had been a decurion or not. This discussion is also reflected in Plutarch's pro-Caesarian account (Caes. 29), in which the victim - perhaps to underline the seriousness of Marcellus' misdeed - is described as a decurion. In Appian, 2,98, however, he

60

Cf. Woodman (1988) 70-116.

61

R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford 1946) 42-45, described the Greco-Roman perception of history as 'substantialism'. This distinguishes between 'act and agent, regarded as a special case of substance and accident'. History is then perceived as acts which take place in time; but 'The agent from which they flow, being a substance, is eternal and unchanging and consequently stands outside history', 43. Agent' is here taken in its widest sense and comprises not only individuals but also nations, states and institutions. A prime example is Livy's account of early Rome, where all institutions are presented in their 'final' form,firstreached centuries later. The sources on this episode are collected in E. G. Hardy, 'Caesar's Colony at Novum Comum in 59 BC, Some Problems in Roman History (Oxford 1924) 126-49, 126-28, also discussing its historical background. Later literature in Wolff (1979) n.l, and Luraschi (1979) 457ff.

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ITALIAN UNIFICATION

is perceived as a Latin, who had gained Roman citizenship by virtue of the ius civitatis per magistratum adipiscendae. But in that version the whole point of the story is lost. If Latin officials automatically received the Roman citizenship, the victim's possible magistracy becomes all important. For in that case he would, irrespectively of Comum's over­ all status, have been a legitimate Roman citizen - and Marcellus have committed a criminal offence. Politically the provocation would have completely failed its purpose, leaving him not only as a brute but a foolish one, too. Appian - and his modern followers - thus assume that Marcellus could have ignored the existence of a long established and widespread Latin right and thoughtlessly have attacked the first Novocomensis who came along, without checking whether he had been a magistrate and thus a rightful Roman citizen. Our evidence suggests that this was a deliberate political act, intended to challenge Comum's citizen status. The idea that he might incidentally have assaulted the 'wrong' man is therefore unconvincing. Contemporary discussion in Rome probably dealt with the social rather than juridical status of the victim. Cicero's moral judgement of the act, which he found reprehensible, preceded his comment on the victim's personal status; there is no suggestion that both the character of the act and its juridical and political consequences rested on this question. The moral implica­ tions of an assault to a great extent depended on the victim's position in society, membership of the ordo decurionum clearly representing an aggravating circumstance. Therefore, while apparently accepting Marcellus' claim about Comum's status, Cicero simply seems to say that even if this factor was absent, the victim as a Transpadane - that is, Latin - still belonged to a group which had traditionally enjoyed some protection and privilege from Rome.63 The 'Comum affair' may thus suggest an even later introduction of ins civitas per magistra­ tum adipiscendae: only with some difficulty can Marcellus' act and Cicero's discussion of it be fitted logically into the Appianic version, which may be a later, imperial rationalisation of the 'Comum affair'. The possibility therefore exists that the ius civitatis per magistratum adipiscendae may not have been introduced until the second half of the first century BC, when the first evidence for provincial grants of this right appears.64 This dating will of course have to remain hypothe­ tical; what seems clear from this discussion is that the introduction of this privelege is most unlikely to have preceded the Social War.

63 A. Keaveney, 'Civis Romanus sum', Critica Storica 21 (1984) 345-72, 368-70, has argued that Transpadani i.e. Latini: 'effectively enjoyed freedom from verberatio\ 64

Among the earliest testimonies is Strabo's mention of Nemausus' ius Latii, 4,1,12. This grant, probably made by the end of the first century BC, included the ius civitatis per magistratum adipiscendae.

Ill ITALIAN 'UNIFICATION' 1 THE 'ITALIAN QUESTION' IN ROMAN POLITICS 125 - 91 BC The above re-examination of the Roman citizenship and its possible extension in the late second century has wide implications for our picture of the 'Italian question' as an issue in Roman politics before the Social War. It affects the basis on which the three citizenship bills recorded in this period have been constructed. The bills have traditionally been seen as direct forerunners for the Lex Julia which led to a complete enfranchisement of the Italian peninsula after the Social War. In this interpretation the citizenship issue was first raised by Fulvius Flaccus in 125. When his attempt failed C. Gracchus revived the plan a few years later in a modified version which limited the citizenship offer to the Latin Name. Again nothing came of it, and the issue lay dead until Livius Drusus, the tribune of 91, proposed a general enfran­ chisement of the Italians as part of a broad reform programme. His failure to carry the bill triggered the Italian revolt, which eventually forced Rome to grant citizenship to her allies. This version of the 'Italian question' implies a direct linearity from the first appearance of the citizenship issue in 125 to its final settlement in the 80's: the enfranchisement of the Italians after the war becomes the belated implementation of a bill, which had first been proposed a generation earlier. This linear continuity relies on the assumption of the universal attraction of the Roman citizenship throughout this period. Thus, it follows logically from this premise that an open offer of citizenship to the allies would automatically lead to a general enfranchisement of the entire peninsula. The superior status identified with Roman citizen­ ship naturally implied a unanimous acceptance by those included in the offer, which was itself likely to have been the response to a widespread demand. However, as argued above, this image of the Roman citizenship may be a backwards projection from the imperial age when it had become an indisputable privilege throughout the Roman world. The status of Roman citizenship in second century Italy is a far more complex issue which cannot be directly inferred from later developments. Although it may have been attractive to individual Italians who wished to improve their prospects in Rome, a simple extension of the coveted Roman citizenship was not an effective solution to the inequality experienced by the Italian allies. As suggested above, the Roman citizenship in second century Italy may be seen as a historiographical construct derived from the Appianic version of the 'Italian question'. It follows that the three citizenship bills recorded here will also have to be reconsidered; their character and import may be a function of this model and shaped to fit later, potentially unrelated events. The benefit of hindsight, enjoyed by modern - as well as ancient - historians, may turn out to be a mixed blessing when it comes to interpreting the role of the citizenship issue in Roman politics. The simple fact that Italy did become a single political unit after the Social War has inevitably influenced our perception of the probabilities obtaining in Roman politics prior to 109

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the war. In other words, the eventual 'unification' has affected the range of plausible behaviour that may be expected from Roman politicians in this period. In retrospect, general enfranchisement bills have appeared as provident attempts to defuse a looming crisis which was later identified as a real threat to the Roman state. However, this impression of political realism and continuity, provided by subsequent developments, is both superficial and deceptive, ignoring as it does the fundamentally different situations prevailing before and after the war. There is a world of difference between the incorporation of a defeated enemy and the admission of allied states with powerful elites and undented military strength. The allied defeat meant a complete upheaval of Roman-Italian relations; the idea of a linear 'Italian question', unaffected by this change, therefore has a distinct element of teleological projection. The question is whether Roman politicians could seriously have contemplated a general enfranchisement of the Italian allies before the Social War. The revolutionary character of a proposal of this kind has often been overlooked. Perhaps because the incorporation after the war may seem to have proceeded relatively smoothly, Italian enfranchisement has - in hindsight - appeared as an ambitious but far from unrealistic project, which would pose few threats to the Roman state. However, the allies' eventual en­ franchisement not only followed military defeat but was also accompanied by profound internal reorganisation, colonisation, and in some cases even genocide. A peace time incorporation was an entirely different matter, and the actual course of events taken after the war is therefore irrelevant to a discussion of Flaccus' and Drusus' enfranchisement bills. Viewed in their proper pre-war context the prospect of complete Italian enfranchisement, ascribed to these proposals, would have appeared infinitely more hazardous and unpredictable. The incorporation of the allies would, by any standards, have seemed a tremendous enterprise with far-reaching and dangerous consequences. The territory and population of the Roman state would be more than doubled.1 Entire foreign states would be absorbed and given equal legal, political, and economic status. Rome had in the past managed large expansions of its citizen body, but never on a scale remotely comparable to that which would follow from a general enfranchisement of the allies. Earlier grants of citizenship had followed directly after military subjugation, often accompanied by colonisation and internal reorganisation. Political rights had only gradually been extended to the new territories - or in some cases probably not at all.2 The process of integration had, in short, never been allowed to threaten the stability of Rome - or challenge the supremacy of the urban nobility. In the late second century the allies were independent nations with distinct cultural and political identities and considerable economic and military power. The foreign character of allied peoples like the Etruscans, the Greeks, and the Samnites was evident to contemporary 1 2

For the demographic structure of republican Italy see Afzelius (1942), Brunt (1971).

On the gradual extension of political rights see in general M. Humbert, Municipium et civitas sine suffragio. Coll. École fr. Rome 36 (1978). However, it seems quite possible that the category of cives sine suffragio existedrightup until the Social War. The assumption of its disappearance in thefirsthalf of the second century BC is based largely on the absence of later references to this group. However, considering the nature and extent of our evidence from this period, such arguments e silentio carry little conviction, cf. Sherwin-White (1973) 210-12, Stockton (1979) 1 lOf, contra Humbert (1978) 346-54. As I shall argue elsewhere, there are indications that cives s.s. may have featured in C. Gracchus' citizenship bill, which probably also involved a grant of suffragium to this group.

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hservers, while their military strength was a fact all too apparent from their contributions to the Roman army. A complete - peaceful - incorporation of these peoples would present Rome with quite unprecedented problems. politically, the number of potential voters would probably be doubled. Although their •nfluencc would be limited by the centralised structure of the Roman state, considerable instability might follow from their enfranchisement. The local upper-classes could be expected to attend the centuriate assembly in substantial numbers, adding greater uncertainty to consular and praetorian elections. Tensions between the traditional Roman elite and the Italian upper-classes could also be foreseen, as the latter demanded adequate political representation in the senate and at top magisterial level. These requests could be accom­ modated only at the expense of the Roman nobility, which would have to sacrifice its virtual monopoly on the highest offices or accept radical changes to the political system.3 In practical terms, the integration of the former allies would represent a major challenge to the Roman administration. Roman law would have to be extended to new territories with different legal customs and traditions - and indeed languages. The most important admin­ istrative tasks, the census and the dilectus, would become the responsibility of Roman officials. Also the judicial system would come under great strain as criminal cases were brought in from the entire peninsula. In the military sphere, the former allied contingents would have to be integrated into the Roman legions. Fiscally, an enfranchisement of the allies would have serious repercussions and threaten to undermine Rome's public finances. Roman citizens had been effectively exempt from tributimi since 167, and an extension of this privilege to the Italians would impose a heavy burden on the Roman treasury. A lifting of the allied tributum, which had hitherto financed the Italian half of the Roman army, would lead to an enormous increase in public spending. At one stroke military expenditure would be doubled without any corresponding rise in the tax-revenue. The social implications of enfranchisement can only be conjectured, but some aspects are likely to have caused considerable concern in Rome. Most obviously it would open up the way for unrestricted immigration to the capital, a controversial issue in Rome at this time. Thus, in 126 the tribune Junius Pennus had carried a bill, expelling thousands of immigrants from Rome.4 And in 122 Fannius had opposed C. Gracchus' citizenship bill by playing on fears in the Roman public of being crowded out of their own city by Latins and Italians.5 Immigration was probably regarded with great suspicion at all levels of urban society; the plebs may have seen it as a threat to their relatively privileged position, and the political elite as a potentially unstable element on the margins of their control. For the consulship as the preserve of the nobility, see E. Badian, 'The Consuls, 179-49-BC, Chiron 20(1990)371-413. 4

Cic. De off. 3,47. Cf. R. W. Husband, 'On the expulsion of foreigners from Rome', CF 11 (1916) 315-33, 319f, Göhler (1939) 133-35, Badian (1970-71) 388, Galsterer (1976) 178ff. The discussion in Rome over this measure is reflected in C. Gracchus' speech, ORF 179, 21-22; also Lucilius 1088M, from Book XXX, written between 129 and 123, probably refers to this event, expressing sympathy for the expelled, cf. C. Cichorius, Untersuchungen zu Lucilius (Berlin 1908) 21 If.

" ORF 144,3, 'Si Latinis civitatem dederitis, credo, existimatis vos ita, ut nunc constitisse in contione nabituros locum aut ludis et festis diebus interfuturos? Nonne illos omnia occupaturos putatis?'.

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A peace-time enfranchisement of the allies would have been a truly revolutionary project with grave and ominous consequences for the Roman state. It therefore remains dubious whether any Roman politician could have seriously considered such a radical change to Rome's foreign and domestic policy. The two occasions, on which this is supposed to have happened, invite closer scrutiny, and it is paramount that they be viewed in their immediate context of Roman politics - and not as predecessors of the Lex Julia. The background, purpose and implication of Flaccus' bill is virtually unknown.6 Only a single source provides a - sketchy - setting for the proposal. According to Appian, 86-90, the consul of 125 suggested this transformation of the Roman state in an attempt to revive the Gracchan land-distribution scheme, with which he was closely associated. This programme had been in limbo since 129, when Italian protests had provided the senate with an excuse to intervene and deprive the commission of its judicial powers. As a result any land dispute was now able to halt the distribution process. In this situation, Appian relates, it was suggested to Flaccus that an enfranchisement of the Italians might break the deadlock, the greater benefit of citizenship making them more willing to cede their holdings of Roman public land. The idea was received enthusiastically by the Italians, but internal opposition in Rome eventually forced Flaccus to withdraw the bill. This version is politically problematic. There seems to be no reasonable balance between the alleged purpose of the bill, that is, to release tracts of public land currently held by Italian possessores, and its implications for the Roman state. It thus remains an insuperable paradox that Flaccus' citizenship bill would have been infinitely more far-reaching in its implications than the reform promoted by this measure. Instead of merely redistributing a part of Rome's public land, it would lead to a total upheaval of the traditional alliance-system on which Roman domination in Italy had been based for centuries. Moreover, Appian's account fails to explain how a general enfranchisement of Italy could be a politically feasible solution to the problems faced by the Gracchan commission. Because of its revolutionary character, the bill would have had no realistic chance of getting through the comitia. The senate's opposition to the bill would seem evident, and the popular appeal of such radical measures may also have been limited.7 Therefore, as an attempt to restart the land distribution process the bill would probably have been of scant value. Even if - against all probability - Flaccus had succeeded in passing the bill, it remains uncertain whether it would have served its purpose of releasing more public land for redis­ tribution. The general attraction of Roman citizenship may, as argued in the previous chapter, have been overestimated for this period; and the chances of individual Italians making direct material - or political - gains to compensate for the losses of public land were quite hypothetical. Political representation in Rome was not guaranteed by enfranchisement; and the most obvious economic benefit, the abolition of the tributum, was a general improvement 6

The literature includes: Last (1932) 45-47, Gohler (1939) 136f, Gruen (1968) 72f, Badian (1970-71) 391-93, A.R. Hands, 'Land and Citizenship, 125-122 BC\ Mnemosyne 29 (1976) 176-80, U. Hall, 'Notes on M. Fulvius Flaccus', Ath. 55 (1977) 280-88, W. L. Reiter, 'M. Fulvius Flaccus and the Gracchan Coalition', Ath. 56 (1978) 125-44, Galsterer (1976) 177-79, Stockton (1979) 94-96, Keaveney (1987) 47-75.

7

C. Meier, 'Populares', #£suppl. 10 (1965) 549-615, 556 and 593, noted the unique position of the citizenship-bills as the only 'popular' proposals unpopular among the urban plebs.

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that would make little difference for those Italian land-holders who had to surrender tracts of Roman ager publicus, which might have been in their families' possession for generations and perhaps provided a substantial part of their livelihood. The suspicion that Appian may have exaggerated the enthusiasm shown by the Italians, is reinforced by our only other source on the bill, Valerius Maximus 9,5,1, who describes it as 'perniciosissimas rei publicae leges ... de ci vitate [Italiae] danda et de provocatone ad populum eorum, qui civitatem mutare noluissent'.8 The existence of an alternative offer makes little sense if citizenship was considered a universal privilege in second century Italy. It therefore represents a significant modification of Appian's claim that Flaccus' bill envisaged a complete enfranchisement of the peninsula - in response to a general Italian demand. Confronted by this problem some scholars have suggested that the grant was limited to the Italian posses-sores who ceded Roman public land.9 But apart from the practical problems entailed by this solution, it also founders on the evidence of Valerius Maximus.10 For if some Italians were expected to decline the offer, as the alternative option would imply, those most likely to do so would clearly have been the land-holders who had to make great sacrifices in return for the citizenship. In sum, we may doubt whether a general enfranchisement of the Italians could have been considered a viable means of bringing the Gracchan land scheme back on track. As presented by Appian, Flaccus' bill seems politically unrealistic and out of proportion with the stated aims. We may wonder too whether this far-reaching proposal would in fact be an effective way of overcoming the opposition of individual Italian land-holders. While raising a number of historical questions, Appian's version of Flaccus' bill makes perfect sense from a historiographical viewpoint. The proposal holds a key position in his introduction to the civil wars, linking as it does the land issue to the citizenship question. As suggested in the opening chapter, the Italian element may be seen as a literary leitmotif, running through the whole of Appian's introduction. As such it would serve to integrate the Social War into Roman domestic politics by presenting it as a conflict which grew directly out of previous 'popular' riots and naturally developed into civil war. The function of Flaccus' proposal within the Appianic narrative may explain the particular version found here; his concept relied on the enfranchisement being, firstly, a general one comprising the entire peninsula, secondly, eagerly sought by all the Italian allies, and, thirdly, directly linked to the land issue raised by Ti. Gracchus.

The circumstantial wording suggests that it is derived from a rather detailed account. The anti-popular bias of the anecdote and hostility to the citizenship bill make Livy the most likely source. On Valerius Maximus and Livy see G. Maslakov, 'Valerius Maximus and Roman historiography. A study of the exempla tradition', ANRW 11,32,2 (1984) 437-96. 9

Badian (1970-71) 391-93, Hands (1976). Also P. Conole, 'Allied disaffection and the revolt of Fregellae', Antichthon 15 (1981) 129-40, 132, rejects the idea of an en bloc enfranchisement of the allies. Unless all beneficiaries were expected to move to Rome, the enfranchisement of individual Italian land-holders would have presupposed acceptance of double citizenship - of which we have no indication in the second century BC. Moreover, the reaction of Fregellae to the failure of Flaccus' bill suggests that this was more than an individual grant but could apply to entire communities.

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Appian put great emphasis on Flaccus' bill being the direct forerunner for the Italian enfranchisement, which Drusus proposed a generation later (152-5).11 But unlike Flaccus' bin Drusus' tribunate appears with some frequency in republican and imperial sources; and the combined evidence of Cicero, Diodorus, Ps.-Sallust, and the Livian tradition casts consi­ derable doubt on the traditional interpretation of Drusus' citizenship bill, for which Appiana account provides the framework.12 According to Appian, 155-64, Livius Drusus, a supporter of the Italian cause, put together a grand legislative scheme intended to facilitate the passine of a general enfranchisement law. The plan included a number of separate bills. The senate was to be accommodated by a transfer of the courts from equestrian to senatorial control. The knights in turn were compensated for the loss of judicial powers by an expansion of the senate, to which 300 new members drawn from the equestrian order were to be admitted. The people would be gratified by an extensive land-distribution scheme benefitting the landless proletariat. Although this measure would inevitably affect the Italian holders of Roman public land, the allies remained the primary beneficiaries, whose elevation to full Roman citizenship would crown his achievement. The plan thus represented a genuine compromise between all interests involved - with a view to bringing an end to the iniquitous treatment to the Italian allies.

11 The literature on Drusus' tribunate is extensive; general studies include: E. Teil, M. Livius Drusus in der Überlieferung (diss. Marburg 1884), W. Strehl, M. Livius Drusus, Volkstribun im Jahre 91 v.C (diss. Marburg 1887), J. Asbach, Das Volkstribunat des jüngeren M. Livius Drusus (diss. Bonn 1888), E. Drzezga, Die römische Bundesgenossenpolitik von den Gracchen bis zum Ausgang des Bundesgenossenkrieges (diss. Breslau 1907), C. Lanzani, 'Ricerche sul tribunato di M. Livio Druso il Giovane', Riv. FU. 40 (1912) 272-92, P. A. Seymour, 'The policy of Livius Drusus the Younger', Eng. Hist. Rev. 29 (1914) 417-25, M. T. Polidori, 'Il tribunato di M. Livio Druso', Historia 1 (1927) 14045, F. Münzer, 'M. Livius Drusus', RE 13 (1926) 859-81, J. Carcopino (1929) 348-61, Last (1932) 177-84, R. Thomsen, 'Das Jahr 91 v.Chr. und seine Voraussetzungen', C&M 5 (1942) 13-47, A. Bernardi, 'La guerra sociale e le lotte dei partiti in Roma', NRS 28-9 (1944-45) 60-99, esp. 81-98, Haug (1947) 100-39, Gabba (1956) 13-25, Badian (1958) 215-19, J. Van Ooteghem, Lucius Marcius Philippuset sa famille (Brussels 1961) 120-33, J. Martin, Die Populären in der Geschichte der späten Republik (diss. Freiburg 1965) 193-99, Meier (1966) 211-5, Gruen (1968) 206-14, De Martino (1973) III 40-47, B. P. Seleckij, 'Der Gesetzentwurf Drusus' des Jüngeren zur Gewährung der Bürgerrechte für die Italiker im Lichte der Schriften Ciceros (Q. fr. 1,1; Att. 11,16)', Klio 58 (1976) 425-37, G. De Sanctis (1976) 3-33, L. Perelli, // movimento popolare nell'ultimo secolo della repubblica (Torino 1982) 140-44, U. Hackl, 'Die Bedeutung der populären Methode von den Gracchen bis Sulla im Spiegel der Gesetzgebung des jüngeren Livius Drusus, Volkstribun 91 v.Chr.', Gymnasium 94 (1987) 109-27, esp. 118-24, Keaveney (1987) 76-98, M. Sordi, 'La legislazione di Druso e l'opposizione degli Etruschi', Aevum 62 (1988) 61-68, L. A. Burckhardt, Politische Strategien der Optimaten in der späten römische Republik Historia Einzelschrifien 57 (1988) 256-67, E. Gabba, 'Rome and Italy: The Social War', CAM 9 (1994) 2nd ed. 104-28, 110-13. 12

For the ancient sources on Drusus see Haug (1947).

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Ti '- version of Drusus' tribunate is unique and uncorroborated.13 Other sources suggest that 14 In the 0 f the judiciary, rather than Italian enfranchisement, was the main objective. text of contemporary politics this presents an entirely plausible scenario. The knights' trol over the repetundae court had been a serious thorn in the side of the senate. The 'res hlica biceps' established by C. Gracchus was first challenged in 106, when the senate \ rtially) regained the extortion court {Lex Servilia), only to see it transferred back to the ahts two (or five) years later.15 The senators' precarious situation had recently been *ohli*hted by the - seemingly unjust - conviction and exiling of Drusus' uncle Rutilius, and "rhaps even more effectively by the attempt to prosecute Drusus' adviser, the princeps senatus M. Aemilius Scaurus, the previous year.16 With Appian as the notable exception, the surviving ancient sources consistently present Drusus as a senatorial partisan, who fought for the cause of the Optimates. Cicero portrays him as the champion of the senate, for example Mil. 16: '... senatus propugnator atque illis quidam temporibus paene patronus ...', and Cluent. 153: 'cum ille nihil aliud ageret cum ilia cuncta, auae tum erat, nobilitate, nisi...'. Likewise, Cicero asserts that his tribunate was 'pro senatus auctoritate susceptus', De or. 1,24, and refers to Drusus' close association with leading senators. Licinius Crassus and Aemilius Scaurus are mentioned in De domo 50 as Drusus' 'consiliarii' in designing the legislative programme. Crassus later defended him in the senate against attacks from the consul Philippus who: 'vehementius inveheretur in causam princi­ pimi', De or. 1,24 (cf. 3,2f).17 Drusus' strong senatorial allegiances are also recorded in the Pseudo-Sallustian Epistula ad Caesarem, Diodorus and the Livian tradition.18 From this evidence it seems clear that his programme was developed in close collaboration with some " It has nevertheless been preferred by Gabba (1956) 20-25, Badian (1958) 216-19, Meier (1966) 211-15, De Martino (1972-75) III 46, Perelli (1982) 141f, but is rejected by Münzer (1926) 860, Thomsen (1942) 15, Hackl (1988) ibid. 14

Livy, per. 70, Veil. 2,13,2, Ascon. 21C. Also Cic. De off. 2,75: '... tantum bellum propter iudiciorum metum excitatum ...', though generally taken as a reference to the Lex Licinia Muda, more likely refers to Drusus' policy in 91, thus suggesting that Cicero considered the transfer of the courts to be the main incentive behind the reform programme, which provoked the Social War. 15 Cf. J. P. V. D. Balsdon, 'The history of the extortion court at Rome, 123-70 BC\ PBSR 14 (1938) 98-114, Brunt (1988) 204f. For the disputed date of Glaucia's law see also Gruen (1968) 166f, and J.-L. Ferrary, 'Recherches sur la législation de Saturninus et de Glaucia', MEFR91 (1979) 85-134. 16

R. Kallet-Marx, 'The trial of Rutilius Rufus', Phoenix 44 (1990) 122-39, has recently tried to downgrade the importance of the Rutilius case claimed by the ancient sources. Rutilius may have been amore marginal political figure than often assumed. Still, the psychological impact of his conviction cannot be wholly explained away. For the prosecution of Aemilius Scaurus, Ascon. 21C, see KalletMarx, 126, 138f. Drusus' intimacy with Scaurus is also implied in Cic. De or. 1,25, 1,97. Ps.-Sallust, 6,3: M. Druso semper consilium fuit in tribunatu summa ope niti pro nobilitate; neque ullam rem in principio agere intendit, nisi illei auctores fuerant. Diodorus, 37,10,1, Livy, per 70: ... sustinente causam eius (senatus) M. Livio Druso ..., per. 71: maioribus viribus senatus causam susceptam tueretur ..., Ascon. 69C: Qui cum senatus partes tuendas suscepisset et leges pro optimatibus tulisset..., Schol. Bob. Milo. 16 ... cum partes senatus in tribunatu suo contra plebem suscepisset,..., Ve »- 2,13,2: Qui cum senatui priscum restituere cuperet decus et iudicia ab equitibus ad eum transferre ordinem....

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of the senate's most prominent leaders, who were intent on restoring its authority. The other measures appear to have been subordinate to the primary objective of judicial reform - rather than attempts to reach a general consensus. Thus, the alleged 'compromise' between the senate and the knights is particularly unconvincing. Appian, for example, ignores the obvious fact that Drusus' bribery law was an act of vengeance and targeted directly at the equestrian judges.19 And the expansion of the senate - if that was really what Drusus proposed20 - can hardly, as Appian insists, have been a concession to the knights.21 The admission of more members, drawn from the equestrian order, would have been a simple necessity if all the courts were to be filled entirely with senatorial judges.22 Appian's account of Drusus' citizenship bill may be explained within the overall structure of his introduction, where the year of 91 is a focal point bringing together all the different thematic strands of his story. As the domestic prelude to the Social War, Drusus' tribunate marks the transition from urban riots to the Social and civil wars.23 It follows naturally from this narrative function that emphasis is placed on the citizenship issue - the one element in Drusus' legislation which linked the two 'popular' reformers, Flaccus and C. Gracchus, to the Social War, Sulpicius and the first civil war between Marius and Sulla. Once identified as the historically most important part of the programme, Italian enfranchisement logically becomes the main objective to which the other elements would be instrumental. Moreover, in line with the positive role accorded to Drusus as propugnator sociorum, he is presented as a man of the best intentions, who tried to reach a balanced compromise between the senate, the équités and the plebs - for the benefit of the Italians. Both the unique features of Appian's version, that is, the Italian aims and compromise character of Drusus' programme, may thus be explained by literary considerations peculiar to Appian's narrative concept. Thus explained, the evidence of the only dissenting voice among the ancient sources is less cogent, which leaves us with the conclusion that Drusus' programme was senatorial in its background and purpose. It seems clear, moreover, that it long enjoyed wide and influential support in the senate. Right up until his death in September, Crassus staunchly defended him 19

App. 158, Cic. Rob. Post. 16, Cluent. 153.

20

The diverging accounts of Drusus' jucidial reform found in Appian and Livy have generated some debate, Appian's version, supported by De vir. ill. 66,4, usually being preferred. Münzer (1926) 867-69, E. Gabba, 'Osservazioni sulla di M. Livio Druso (91 A.C.)', PP 11 (1956) 363-72, Nicolet (1966) I 559-70, Gruen (1968) 208, E. J. Weinrib, 'The judiciary law of M. Livius Drusus (tr. pi. 91 BC)\ Historia 19 (1970) 414-43, A. Fuks & J. Geiger, 'The "lex iudiciaria" of M. Livius Drusus', in Studi in onore di E. Volterra (Milan 1971) II 421-27, A. R. Hands, 'Livius Drusus and the courts', Phoenix 26 (1972) 268-74, M. Griffin (1973) 116-20, Brunt (1988) 194-239, esp. 206-10. 21

Cf. Gruen (1968) 208, Brunt (1988) 144-93, esp. 155. The knights could hardly have perceived an... expansion as a favour to their order. As Brunt observed, the knights admitted to the senate would cease to be members of the equestrian order and soon gain new political allegiances.

22

Since the Gracchan reform of 122 the number of quaestiones had been increased, raising the number of judges beyond the size of the then existing senate. Hardy, 'Three questions as to Livius Drusus', CR 27 (1913) 263, Gruen, ibid., Weinrib (1970), Brunt (1988) 207, 227-36. Thus, when the expansion was finally implemented by Sulla it was a direct consequence of the senate's taking control over the tribunals. Cf. Münzer (1926) 860, Thomsen (1942) 15.

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and his policies - against the attacks from the consul, who despaired over the senate's tinued s u p p 0 rt for his opponent.24 Drusus' senatorial backing is crucial and raises doubts bout the traditional interpretation of the citizenship bill. For it seems inherently implausible hat the senate could have abandoned all caution and endorsed a complete incorporation of the Italian allies - with all the risks and uncertainties it involved.25 If we accept that the nlirpose of the programme was to regain control over the courts, the franchise bill becomes an ancillary measure which would nevertheless have transformed not only Italy but also Rome herself. Moreover, none of the sources, when referring to senatorial opposition to the plan, seems to suggest any misgivings about the wider consequences of Italian enfranchisement. The criticism raised against the bill appears to have concentrated on the personal prestige and influence that would fall to Drusus if the enfranchisement was passed in his name.26 At no point is there any mention of the political, administrative or financial implications for the Roman state. As we saw, Roman leaders are supposed to have planned an incorporation of the Italian allies in 125 and again in 91. However, viewed in the context of contemporary politics both bills become highly unlikely forerunners for the Lex Julia. The 'Italian' version of Flaccus' bill is thus based entirely on the evidence of Appian, who fails to explain the political logic behind the proposal. Moreover, the underlying premises for his interpretation are questioned by the alternative offer of ius provocations, which throws doubt on the universal attraction of Roman citizenship. Drusus' 'Italian' bill, on the other hand, seems inherently implausible, precisely because of the wide support his programme enjoyed among the traditionally con­ servative senatorial aristocracy. Ultimately, the traditional interpretation of these two pro­ posals founders on the twin grounds that simple incorporation of the Italians both went too far and not far enough; it would seriously upset internal stability in Rome without addressing the basic problem of inequality between Rome and the allied elites. At this point in our investigation we have two options: either we accept our fundamental ignorance of the citizenship issue prior to the Social War, irretrievably lost as it seems in an impenetrable fog of subsequent rationalisation and teleological rewriting; or we may try, however tentatively, to break the tyranny of the received model and propose an alternative interpretation of the citizenship bills. The latter option is obviously open to the criticism of attempting to write history without - or even against - the sources. However, the fact that the sources operate within a specific frame of interpretation does not necessarily preclude a modern re-evaluation from a different viewpoint. But in the nature of things the answer to our questions will have to be indirect, drawn as they are from sources with an agenda different from Cic. De or. 3,2: '... ea oratione quae ferebatur habita esse in condone a Philippo, quem dixisse constabat videndum sibi aliud esse consilium, ilio senatu se rem publicam gerere non posse ...'. To avoid this problem it has been suggested that Crassus did not endorse the citizenship bill, perhaps first put forward towards the end of the tribunate, Gruen (1968) 21 If, R. A. Bauman, Lawyers in Roman Republican Politics (Munich 1983) 370. That theory, however, founders on the combined evidence of Cicero and the Livian tradition, which indicates an early introduction of the franchise question and unflagging support from Crassus, until his death in September. Thus Ps-Sall. ep. ad Caes. 6,5: Ttaque metu ne per tantam gratiam solus rerum poteretur;' ... Veil. 2.13,3: ... '[senatus] huius summae gloriae invideret'... The so-called 'Oath of Philippus', probably fabricated by the consul, plays on similar anxieties within the nobility, cf. p. 6.

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our own. Therefore, in the remaining part of this study an attempt will be made to outline a new 'Italian question', the hypothetical nature of which must obviously be stressed from the outset The critique of the traditional interpretation formulated above implied, firstly, that the measure which Flaccus and Drusus had in mind was both more limited and less controversial than a full enfranchisement of the allies, and, secondly, that it responded to an actual demand expressed by the prospective beneficiaries. We may therefore look for a smaller group 0f recipients, one which could be easily integrated into Rome and had a clear interest in the Roman citizenship. This line of inquiry logically leads us to the Nomen Latinum, which was not only a much more limited category but also one with close historical and cultural links to Rome. With a few exceptions, all the communities in this group were Latin colonies founded by Rome. The large majority of the colonists had been Romans and Latins, and even if some Italians were admitted and local populations gradually absorbed, the Latin colonies seem to have remained Roman in language, culture and customs. That was in fact an essential part of their geopolitical function, acting as they did as propugnacula imperii in conquered Italian territories. Their constitutions were devised by Rome and the institutions closely modelled on her own, right down to their physical framework. Unlike many Italian peoples, they showed no apparent foreignness and for that reason alone their incorporation would have been less controversial. Because of their smaller numbers it was also a much more manageable reform. Moreover, since their independent statehood was a historically determined fiction, the Latin demand for equality could be accommodated by simple enfranchisement, which would restore them to their natural status as Roman municipalities.27 Despite the extreme paucity of sources there are indications that prior to the Social War the question of enfranchisement was indeed focused on the Latin Name. Thus, when Flaccus had to withdraw his citizenship bill, it was the Latin colony of Fregellae which revolted against Rome.28 The details are not clear, but the consul Opimius immediately laid siege and con­ quered the town, which was then razed to the ground and its entire population transferred to a new settlement, Fabrateria Nova. The connection between the revolt of Fregellae and Flaccus' failure to carry the citizenship bill seems evident and was indeed made in contemporary Rome.29 The localised character of the uprising has led some scholars to see it as an isolated incident provoked by local factors, that is, the Oscan immigration attested earlier in the second century.30 However, the idea of a single colony standing up to Rome in 27

These colonies had originally been founded as independent states, the existence of large communities of Roman citizens separated from the Roman heartland being incompatible with Rome's structure - and self-perception - as a city-state. In the early part of the second century this principle was broken and large coloniae civium Romanorum established far from the main Roman territory. The raison d'être for their special - more disadvantaged - status had in other words disappeared. For Roman colonisation see e.g. E. T. Salmon, 'Roman expansion and Roman colonization in Italy', Phoenix 8 (1954) 63-75, and most recently F. Coarelli, 'Colonizzazione e municipalizzazione: tempi e modi', DdA 10 (1992) 21-30. 28

Rhet. Her. 4; 13, 22, 37, Cic. Defin.5,62, Phil 3,17, De inv. 1,8,11, Ascon. 17C, Livy per. 60, Val. Max. 2,8,4, Veli. 2,6,3, Strabo 5,237.

29

Thus, after the revolt allegations were made against Flaccus' associate C. Gracchus for having secretly instigated it, Plut. C. Gracchus 3,1, ORF 182, 29, De vir. ill. 65. 30

Carcopino (1929) 12, Salmon (1962) 11 Of (1967) 326, Gabba (1976) 217 n.l 1.

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■ned conflict is plainly absurd. Fregellae would clearly have expected wide support from \ .her (Latin) communities equally upset by the Roman refusal to accept their enfranchisement; therwise her revolt becomes an improbable act of suicidal desperation.31 Most likely it was 10 f a general Latin revolt which had broken out prematurely in Fregellae before a pact had h , ell sealed and hostages exchanged. The resolute Roman response then effectively prevented it from spreading any further. The psychological impact of the Fregellan revolt can hardly be overestimated. Three acnerations of Italian peace had been broken by one of Rome's own colonies, located just mOkm from her walls. Thus, despite the abject failure of the revolt, the very re-emergence of military opposition within the Italian peninsula must in itself have been an effective eyeopener, dispelling any remaining doubt as to the urgency of the Latin question. It is therefore entirely logical that a citizenship bill directed specifically towards the Latins should be included in the legislative programme put forward by C. Gracchus three years later.32 Gracchus' bill has appeared as a much modified, and historically less important initiative, but it may in fact have been very similar to Flaccus'.33 With Appian providing our only narrative of the citizenship issue before the Social War, the secondary role ascribed to Gracchus' bill is entirely logical. It followed directly from Appian's general concept and use of the Italian motif that emphasis would be placed on the first and the last proposal - and little attention paid to the intermediary bill of Gracchus which added nothing new to his Italian story-line. However, in its effect - and intention - the open offer considered by Flaccus may have differed little from Gracchus' Latin bill. Assuming that simple enfranchisement, that is, incorporation, was not a realistic, or indeed desirable, option for the Italian elites, Gracchus' modification may have excluded only those Italians who for personal reasons might have wished to become Roman citizens. Although relatively small in numbers, these grants would have been controversial in Rome, linked as they were to the sensitive issue of foreign immigration. For that reason - and bearing in mind the failure of Flaccus - it was probably thought wisest to exclude the Italians from the scheme, since their few but potentially troublesome grants might become an unwelcome distraction from the main issue of Latin enfranchisement.

31

Cf. Conole (1981) 135, and Keaveney (1987) 65-68. Despite recent excavations which have revealed important economic changes in the second century, there still appears to be little evidence to support the idea of Fregellae as a particularly oscanised town in 125.

32 Appian 99, ORF 144,3, Plut. C. Gracchus, 8,3, Velleius, 2,6,2, briefly notes that Gracchus: 'dabat civitatem omnibus Italicis, extendebat earn paene usque Alpis', but this idea of a general enfranchise­ ment of Italy is unsupported and rightly dismissed as a piece of rhetorical simplification, cf. Badian (1958)299.

The literature on this bill includes: P. Fraccaro, 'Ricerche su Caio Gracco', Ath. 3 (1925) 76-97, 156180, reprinted in Opuscula II (Pavia 1957) 19-51, esp. 22, 37ff, Last (1932) 45-54, Gòhler (1939) 16366, Badian (1958) 185-86, G. Wolf, Historische Untersuchungen zu den Gesetzen des C. Gracchus (diss. Munich 1972) 87-142, De Martino (1972-75) II 528-31, K. Meister, 'Die Bundesgenossen­ gesetzgebung des Gaius Gracchus', Chiron 6 (1976) 113-25, with previous literature, Stockton (1979) 138f, 156-59, Perelli (1982) 109-13, Keaveney (1987) 60-70.

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Flaccus' and C. Gracchus' proposals may therefore have been successive attempts to canalmost identical citizenship bills,34 which casts further doubt on the causal relationship bet ween the land question and the emergence of the citizenship issue claimed by Appian. Th political and economic logic of this theory is, as already noted, itself very fragile and collapse when the alternative offer, recorded by Valerius Maximus, is taken into account. Moreover when C. Gracchus renewed the citizenship bill three years later - in close association with Flaccus - enfranchisement seems to have been unconnected with the question of Roman public land in Italy. The political function and character of the 'popular' citizenship bills would, in other words, have changed radically within a few years. More likely, the direct link between land and citizenship was Appian's own contribution and part of his particular con­ ception of the 'Italian question'.35 The motives of Flaccus and Gracchus for embracing the citizenship issue can only be conjec­ tured. On the one hand, the bill responded to a real, ever more pressing problem, highlighted by the Fregellan revolt. On the other hand, Latin enfranchisement would also improve the Ion» term political fortunes of those politicians who succeeded in passing the bill. As the personal benefactors of a large section of the citizenry their prestige would soar, adding further strength to their electoral basis in the comitia. Still, there need be no inherent contradiction between recognising a problem and trying to solve it to one's own advantage. C. Gracchus generally seems to have shown considerable understanding for the plight of the Latins and allies, even when no direct political gains could be made from improving their lot.36 After Gracchus' attempt the issue was not touched again for another generation. Clearly, this cannot be taken to indicate that the problem had disappeared. The brutal repression of the Fregellan revolt had probably suppressed Latin disaffection, while the spectacular failure of the Gracchan group had turned an expansion of the citizen body into a dead political issue in Rome. Therefore, when the influential group of senators around Drusus again raised the issue of enfranchisement, we may also expect the resurgence of the Latin question. And there are signs that the Latins played a prominent role in the dispute over his citizenship bill. According to the Livian tradition, prospective beneficiaries of Drusus' citizenship bill turned up in large numbers to support the passing of his other laws. Apparently, they took part in the voting and even physically attacked the consul who opposed Drusus' legislation.37 And later, when Drusus proved unable to fulfil his part of the deal, they complained vociferously, demanding 'pretium rogationis' for their assistance (Florus 2,5,9). These people have tradi34

The similarities between the two bills may have extended beyond the citizenship offer. As will be argued in greater detail elsewhere, C. Gracchus may plausibly have renewed also Flaccus' grant of ius provocationis to the Italians. Traditionally the allies are supposed to have been offered Latinrights,but that is a - dubious - conjecture based on a grant of voting rights, recorded in Appian. This offer was probably directed towards the remaining cives sine suffragio. A grant of ius provocationis would, on the other hand, be fully in line with Gracchus' general concern for the safety of Latins and Italians, cf. ORF 190, 47-48. 35

From a traditional viewpoint this link has been doubted by Last (1932) 45, Hall (1977) 282f, Perelli (1982) 96f.

36 37

Cf. ORF 190, 47-48.

Livy, per. 71: 'iisque [the allies and Italian peoples] adiuvantibus per vim legibus agrariis frumentariisque latis iudiciariam quoque pertulit...'.

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• .illy been seen as Italians but that seems inconceivable. The use of foreigners to carry a H in the Roman assembly would have been quite unheard of.38 Overtly unlawful methods tthis sort would have been unacceptable to the senate, and to Crassus, Drusus' mentor, it uld have been particularly embarrassing; just a few years earlier, he had been responsible ^g notorious Lex Licinia Muda, which prosecuted foreigners who falsely claimed Roman -tizenship-39 It is also significant that, when the senate later chose to abolish Drusus' legisf ion, the enrolment of illegal voters - otherwise a perfect excuse, does not appear among the sons educed in support of the annulment.40 More likely these non-citizen voters would l ave been Latins who had a historical right to vote in one Roman tribe chosen by lot. Later the same year, when the citizenship bill had run into difficulties, news of a conspiracy to assassinate the consuls surfaced in Rome.41 The attempt was to be carried out at the Latin festival on the Mons Albanus, which was usually held in the spring or early summer. It goes without saying that only Latins would be present on that occasion.42 Since the story came out in public - Drusus denounced the plan and warned the consuls - it may be given greater credence than most of the rumours reported from this turbulent year. We thus have an indication of the level of desperation felt by the Latins over the citizenship issue, which was already about to erupt into open violence against Roman officials at a relatively early stage in the tribunate.43 Thus, beneath the Appianic story-line of the 'Italian question' the continuous prominence of the Latin element in the citizenship issue can be traced from the Fregellan revolt and Gracchus' bill, to Drusus' use of Latin voters and their planned attempt to force a grant of citizenship. At the same time it seems inherently implausible that the senate could have sup­ ported a complete incorporation of the allies. Drusus' bill may therefore have gone no further w

The only comparable instance is from 122, when Fannius expelled people without thérightto vote from Rome (App. 100). But we have no indication that they were foreigners summoned by C. Gracchus to take part in the actual voting. Heavy-handed methods were used in 91, and it could be argued that Drusus' foreign supporters had merely put pressure on the Roman voters. But even on this interpret­ ation they would still have been present in the comitia during the vote, which was itself clearly illegal. 19 For the Lex Licinia Muda see Badian (1970-71) 406f, and id. 'Marius' villas: the testimony of the slave and the knave', JRS 63 (1973) 121-32, 127f, Bauman (1983) 366-70. 40

No less than four different reasons for the annulment of Drusus' laws are recorded in the sources; 1) that they were passed contra auspicia (Cic. De leg. 2,31, Asc. 69C), 2) per vim (Livy per. 71, Florus 2,5,9), 3) without the trinundinum required by the Lex Caecilia Didia (Cic. De domo 41), 4) per satiiram, that is, by combining disparate measures, a practice banned by the Lex Caecilia-Didia (Cic. De domo 50). Cf. Diodorus 37,10,3; A. W. Lintott, Violence in Republican Rome (Oxford 1968) 136f, 140ff, K. Heikkilä, 'Lex non iure rogata: the Senate and the Annulment of Laws in the Late Republic', AIRF 13 (1993) 117-42, esp. 136f, F. X. Ryan, 'The Reliability of Asconius. In Comelianam 69C\ Studi hai. Fil. Class. 87 (1994) 103-09. 41

Dio, 28,96,4, Florus, 2,6,8 (interpreting it as thefirstskirmishes of the Social War), De vir. ill, 66,12.

This conspiracy by the leaders of the Latin communities also undermines the theory of a grant of civitas per magistratum in 124. If the Latin elites had already received the Roman citizenship an attempt of this type would have been inconceivable. To fit the Latin conspiracy into a traditional chronology of the Italian revolt a postponement or repetion of the feriae Latinae in 91 have - needlessly - been suggested by e.g. E. Marcks, Die Überlieferung des Bundesgenossenkrieg 91-89 v.Chr. (Marburg 1884) 26f, and Last (1932) 181.

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than those of his 'popular' predecessors. In fact some sources explicitly describe the bill as a grant of citizenship to the Latins. The De vir. ill. presents his programme as Tribunus plebis Latinis civitatem, plebi agros, equitibus curiam, senatui iudicia permisit' (66,4), and later mentions that Drusus 'Latinorum postulata differed (66,11).44 Orosius also indicates the Latins as the beneficiaries of the citizenship offer (5,18,2).45 That solution would improve the political logic of the senatorial plan, Latin enfranchisement being a more limited, but urgently needed reform. The initiative may have been prompted by Latin agitation in the - largely undocumented - decade which preceded Drusus' tribunate. While the problem addressed in 91 may have been the same as the one previously tackled in 125 and 122, the political situation was now entirely different. Drusus' tribunate is in many respects an intriguing episode in republican politics. On one level it might appear as the filial revival of a paternal strategy: in 122 Livius Drusus senior had to great effect employed 'popular' methods for optimate ends against C. Gracchus, and in 91 the paternal example is evident, not least in Drusus' renewal of the land scheme first proposed by his father (App. 156). But, however tempting, it would probably be a mistake to focus too narrowly on Drusus' person in the early stage of the tribunate. He may simply have been thefigureheadof a project planned by a group of influential senators intent on consolidating their own and the senate's position.46 The noble background of the citizenship proposal meant that the chances of succeeding were now infinitely better than they had ever been before. It seemed as if the paralysis in which Roman politics had found itself over the citizenship issue had finally ended. It was crucial that the personal advantages which individual politicians or factions might gain from a large extension of the Roman citizenship be neutralised. Benefactions on this scale had to be made collectively to avoid ambitious individuals breaking ranks and exploiting the grants to their own personal advancement. In 91 a winning formula had been found based on broad senatorial backing for a junior politician of impeccable optimate pedigree. The prospects for Latin enfranchisement were therefore promising, and it is not least against this background that their reaction to his failure should be seen. This discussion of the three bills leaves us with the conclusion that probably none of them had envisaged an enfranchisement of the entire peninsula. More likely the real issue debated on these occasions had been the enfranchisement of the Latins. Historiographically the Italian version of Flaccus' bill may be explained by the particular structure and perspective of Appian's introduction. In Drusus' case, however, a much broader ancient tradition consis­ tently posits a connection between his citizenship bill, the Social War, and the Lex Julia. Three main factors may be adduced to explain this linkage. 44

On this basis Sherwin-White (1973) 136f, suggested that Drusus offered citizenship only to the Latins. Contra Brunt (1988) lOlf.

45

According to Livy per. 71 Drusus induced a hope of citizenship in 'socios et italicos populos'. The wording is curious and may be compared with the almost identical one found in Florus, 2,5,6, '(Drusus) socios ad plebem spe civitatis erexit'. The socii, mentioned here, later helped pass his legislation in the assembly and are therefore most likely to have been Latins. 46

Thus explicitly Ascon. 21C: 'M. quoque Drusum tribunum plebis cohortatus sit ut iudicia commutaret'. Also Gruen (1968) 206f, and Kallet-Marx (1990) 138, consider Drusus to have been an agent for leading senators.

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F'rstly, the sheer temporal proximity between Drusus' bill and the Lex Julia - combined .. t h e rapidly changing situation in post-war Italy - made a connection almost inevitable. ri - senatorial citizenship proposal was separated from the Lex Julia by only one and a half which in the distant perspective of our sources made them appear as parts of the same ntinuous process of Italian enfranchisement. And the distinction between Latins and . ij ans? still vital in 91, was soon obliterated by the political and cultural integration which t 1 lowed in the wake of the Social War. To later observers with no personal experience of re-war Italy, the important difference between a Latin and an Italian enfranchisement bill vould either have been incomprehensible or an irrelevant detail which could easily be •anored. Moreover, if Drusus' offer had been open also to individual Italians, the connection with the Lex Julia would have seemed obvious to later historians, who knew the Roman citizenship only as a privileged and widely coveted status. Secondly, Drusus' opponents among the senators and the équités soon aquired an obvious interest in forging a connection between his tribunate and the Italian revolt. The outbreak was immediately exploited to discredit his original backers. The Varian court was set up to pro­ secute the associates of Drusus for allegedly instigating the uprising. Thus, already in contem­ porary Rome, Drusus' links with the Italians had become a matter of great political significance, shrouded in rumours and propaganda. As Livy, per. 71 noted: Tnvisus etiam senatui factus velut socialis belli auctor', and likewise Pliny, HN 25,21,52: '[Drusus] cui ... Optimates vero Bellum Marsicum inputavere'. A third factor, that may have added to the confusion about the character and implication of the senate's citizenship bill, is the possible changes to Drusus' policy towards the end of his tribunate. While the earlier stages, up to the time of Crassus' death, emerge with some clarity from the evidence of Cicero, Ps-Sallust, and Diodorus as a programme focused on court reform, devised and supported by leading senators, and enjoying considerable backing in the curia, the last phase is more nebulous in comparison. Cicero mentions that his tribunate 'infringi iam debilitarique', De or. 1,24, and the first cracks in his political basis may have appeared early on. Some senators may have had second thoughts about the implications of the judicial reform. Doubts about Drusus' methods and personal commitment to the programme may also have grown, reinforcing their natural opposition to the enfranchisement plan, which soon proved unrealisable. However, despite these setbacks it is evident from Cicero that Drusus still enjoyed wide support among the senators in mid-September, when Crassus repudiated the consul and put all his authority behind Drusus' programme. But Crassus' death a few days later delivered a serious blow to Drusus' position and seems to mark the beginning of the final, increasingly desperate, phase of his tribunate. Many details remain uncertain about these last months between Crassus' death and Drusus' own assassination later in the autumn. But it seems clear that dramatic changes in the political landscape took place in this period. Drusus became completely alienated from the senate, which - under a legal pretence

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- declared his entire legislation null and void; even the transfer of the courts was abolished.47 The senate openly denounced its former champion, and his senatorial opponents dismissed him as a popularis, who had turned his back on the optimate cause.48 The hostility went so deep that after his death the senate even refused to investigate his murder. Soon afterwards Drusus found a place among the popular martyrs, who had fallen victim to senatorial violence. Thus, in the Rhetorica ad Herennium, 4,31, Drusus is listed alongside the Gracchi, Saturninus, and Sulpicius, and in 4,46 he is called a 'Gracchus'.49 Drusus' growing desperation and alienation from the senate is attested in several sources, for example Asconius 69C: '... postea eo licentiae est progressus ut nullum in his morem servaret', and SchoL Bob. Milo 16: 'cum... postea volens gratificari sociis et Latinis civitatem Romanum promisisset, ad extremum eiusdem pollicitationis implendae desperatione praeventus ...'. Some also suggest that his policy changed with his increasing political isolation. Thus, Ps-Sallust Ep. ad Caes. 6,3, tells that 'neque ullam rem in principio agere intendit, nisi illi [nobiles] auctores fuerant', and the policy changes, implied here, are specified by Velleius who relates that Drusus at this moment put the franchise question at the top of his agenda: 'Turn conversus Drusi animus, quando bene incepta male cedebant, ad dandam civitatem Italiae', 2,14,1.50 Various interpretations of this passage are possible. He may have extended an original Latin offer to those Italian allies who had a personal interest in Roman citizenship. Alternatively, he might have adopted far more radical policies and suggested a fundamental reorganisation of Rome's relationship with the allies, that is, offered them a real partnership. The latter solution seems to be implied in the stories about his contacts with the Marsic leader Poppaedius, who became one of the allied commanders in the

47

See above n. 40 . The dramatic character of the shift is indicated by Cicero's remark to Philippus' son in De prov. con. 9,21, noting that his father had once been reconciled to his sworn enemies: '... tuus pater, Philippe, nonne uno tempore cum suis mimicissimi s in gratiam rediit? quibus eum omnibus eadem res publica reconciliavit, quae alienarat'. Cicero suggests that an entirely new political situation had arisen, bringing the consul and his former opponents together.

48

That seems to be the implication of a passage from a speech held by C. Papirius Carbo Arvinas quoted, with inserted comments, in Cic. Orator 213: 40 Marce Druse, patrem apello. Tu dicere solebas sacram esse rem publicam, quicumque earn violavissent, ab omnibus esse ei poenas persolutas. Patris dictum sapiens temeritas fili comprobavit'. 49

The reading of 4,46 is uncertain. According to a different manuscript tradition Drusus is here described as 'Gracchum nitorem obsoletum', a faded reflection of the Gracchi, Cf. J. von UngernSternberg, 'Die populären Beispiele in der Schrift des Auetors ad Herennium', Chiron 3 (1973) 143-62, 152-57. A negative image of Drusus as a popularis appears in Seneca, De brev. vitae 6,1, Cons, ad Marc. 16,4, Lucan 6,795. 50

The apparent contradiction between the early date, indicated by other sources, and Velleius' claim have led scholars to doubt the reliability of the latter version. Thus Münzer (1927) 876, Haug.(1947) 120-25, Keaveney (1987) 97 n.70. Contra Thomsen (1942) 33f, Gruen (1968) 211, Hackl (1988) 121, and apparently Bauman (1983) 370f. There seem to be no inherent grounds for rejecting Velleius' testimony - the 'reversal of fortune' topos does not necessarily entail any change of policy - and the views taken by modem scholars seem largely dependent on the feasibility of fitting such a development into their overall reconstruction of the tribunate.

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Social War, and about the Marsic march on Rome.51 However, a late conversion to the Italian cause seems rather unlikely considering Drusus' earlier land bill, which had threatened vital allied interests. Already at the time of its passing we hear of Italian protests; Appian tells us that Etruscans and Umbrians turned up in Rome to complain about the bill, which was about to be voted on.52 And Italian disaffection over this issue can only have intensified as the commission was set up and began its work.53 The lack of respect earlier shown towards the interests of the allies gives a hollow ring to the stories of his intimacy with Italian leaders. However, assuming for a moment that he did comply with Italian wishes, and proposed a full scale reorganisation, it would have been a truly subversive plan - with no real prospect of implementation. To summarise, it seems politically impossible that Drusus' initial plan could have aimed at full Italian incorporation; more likely it would have been an enfranchisement of the Latins. What happened in his last months in office must remain a matter of speculation, but whatever ideas he may have toyed with in this brief period, they would obviously have appeared quite

51

The connection between Drusus and Poppaedius, Plut. Cato 2,1-4, Val. Max. 3,1,2, should probably be seen in the light of the Varian trials. After the outbreak of the revolt any links to leading allied generals would have been highly compromising. Their intimacy is therefore likely to have been greatly exaggerated. As reported by Diodorus 37,13, the Marsic march on Rome is clearly too fantastic to be accepted at face value. In 91 all sorts of rumours were circulating in Rome, and what - if any - basis there may have been for this story we have no way of telling. For a more literal reading of Diodorus see A. Bancalari Molina, 'Gli interventi degli italici nella lotta politica romana durante il tribunato di Livio Druso (91 A.C.)', SCO 37 (1987) 408-37, 408-22, with previous literature. "The passage has generated some discussion, since Appian, 163, links the Italian protest with Drusus' death in the autumn, when the land bill had long been passed. Gabba (1976) 72-74, followed by G. Asdrubali Pentiti, 'Etruschi e Umbri nella Guerra Sociale', Ann. Fac. Lett. Univ. Perugia 19 (198182) 263-68, 264, has suggested that the law opposed by the allies was in fact the franchise bill. Their appearance in Rome, however, follows immediately after the description of the anger caused by the land distribution. Gabba's theory, therefore - as Harris (1971) 214, put it - 'goes too far in assuming that Appian could write nonsense'. Badian (1958) 218f, followed by Brunt (1988) 106f, thought that the dokimasia awaited by the Italians, must have been the senate's investigation into the juridical validity of Drusus' legislation. But like Gabba's this interpretation perceives Appian's text not as a literary composition in its own right but as a - fairly erratic - patchwork of fragments put together almost at random. Appian's story of Drusus' tribunate may be seen as a carefully composed moral tale of the tragic hero, who tried to reconcile all parties but failed miserably because of the petty-mindedness which surrounded him, and in the end fell victim to the violence of those whom he had tried most to benefit. Appian has constructed a tripartite story: an idealistic and promising start, growing opposition from all sides and a tragic end. Drusus being the benefactor of the Italians and champion of their cause, any allied resistance to his programme would appear as the ultimate folly and the culmination of his troubles. Its natural place in the account was therefore after the Roman opposition of the knights and the senate and before Drusus finally succumbed to the forces against him. If already reported at the beginning of the tribunate, the Italian complaints would have diminished the dramatic 'rise and fall' effect Appian was aiming at. Moreover, the reform programme is consistently described as proposals first voted on shortly before Drusus' death. The omission of both the passing and the nullification of the laws cannot therefore be explained away simply as a blunder; rather it was another - deliberate attempt at dramatic intensification and textual economy. The land-distribution process had probably been initiated before Drusus' fall. An elogium (CIL 1(2), 1 P-199) mentions Drusus as 'Xvir a. d. a. lege sua', indicating that a commission had already been set U P, and De vir. ill. 66,10, also notes: 'Nam plebs acceptis agris gaudebat, expulsi dolebant...'.

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unrealistic to contemporary observers, knowing that he had lost - or was about to lose - all his support in the senate. Drusus' relationship with the Italians is now beyond our grasp; the outbreak of the war immediately turned it into a contentious political issue in Rome, while the eventual outcome of the war influenced all later interpretations of his tribunate. The citizenship issue prior to the Social War seems to have been conceived as a direct extension of the well-established end result. The plausibility of two failed Roman attempts to incorporate the Italians has been derived from their assumed place in a process leading inexorably to complete political unification of the Italian peninsula. The linear model however, founders on the grounds that the process reached its logical conclusion only after a bloody and truly disastrous war, which fundamentally changed the relationship between Rome and the Italians. The subsequent enfranchisement therefore happened in a political and military context which was entirely different from the one which obtained during the earlier stages of the 'citizenship process'. The apparent realism lent to these bills by their later historical 'vindication' is in other words misleading. The opening Roman chapter in the story of Italian unification is historiographically the product of a single ancient writer, Appian, whose treatment of the 'Italian question' generally seems to follow rules of textual rather than historical logic. Whenever his version can be com­ pared with other evidence, fundamental discrepancies appear. Attempts to merge these different traditions into a single account have frequently led to curious paradoxes, which tend to undermine the received story-line. Thus, taking account of the alternative offer, reported by Valerius Maximus, historians have modified the implications of Flaccus' bill, while main­ taining its historical position and significance.54 The Appianic structure has thereby been preserved, but its individual components altered under the influence of another tradition. Likewise, Appian's model of Drusus' tribunate has often been combined with alternative evidence. In consequence, hybrid versions have been produced which try to accommodate two different perspectives on the bills; on the one hand, they may be seen as chapters in an Italian story-line, mainly provided by Appian, and on the other hand as episodes in the long running chronicle of Roman domestic politics. The result of combining these two perspectives has been a clash between the narrative logic of the former and the structural realism and con­ straints imposed by the latter. In the above pages an attempt has been made to disentangle these two lines of reasoning and show their practical incompatibility. The citizenship issue before the Social War is virtually unknown. All our evidence has been filtered through the later experience of Italian unification, which colours every reference to this question. However, by ignoring the purpose and historical significance, later ascribed to the bills, the pre-war issue may be brought down to three core events. First, Flaccus' abortive citizenship bill, which included an alternative offer to those who were not interested in Roman citizen rights; second, the revolt of the Latin colony Fregellae; and third, C. Gracchus' attempt to enfranchise the Latins. If the causal link between these chronologically close events is accepted, it would appear that in this period the 'Italian question' was in fact a 'Latin question'. Furthermore, without the direct precedent of Flaccus' bill the Italian interpretation of Drusus' bill is less plausible. Political considerations would suggest that the senate could 54

Thus, e.g. Gabba (1976) 70f, Badian (1970-71) 385-409, who suggest that rather than reflecting a general Italian demand for Roman citizenship, Flaccus' offer helped create this ambition among the allies, who were fully prepared for enfranchisement in 91.

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no further than the enfranchisement of the Latins. And as we saw, there are indications that " n t n j s occasion also the Latins dominated the citizenship issue. After this discussion of the political background for the Social War, the central event of the •Italian question' may now be approached without some of the premises which have previously determined its interpretation. Most importantly, it now seems that no serious Roman attempt to enfranchise the Italian allies had been made before the war; no universal desire for Roman citizenship can therefore a priori be assumed.

Ill ITALIAN 'UNIFICATION' 2 THE OUTBREAK OF THE SOCIAL WAR In the autumn of 91 : riots broke out in the Italian town of Asculum. Apparently, the locals massacred most of the Romans who happened to be in the city. That was to be the start of the Social War, which raged for the next three years and led to the incorporation of all Italy into the Roman state. In order to understand the character of the Social War it is, I believe, important to separate the outbreak from the outcome; there need not be any direct connection between the two. Therefore, while deliberately ignoring the later enfranchisement, this chapter will concentrate solely on the outbreak of the war. Both ancient and modern historiographical traditions have maintained a close link between the war and the abortive citizenship-bill, which foundered definitively when Drusus was killed. Three aspects will be looked at in order to evaluate this theory: the character and chronology of the Asculan riots and the political reactions in Rome and among the Italian allies respectively. Finally an alternative interpretation of the revolt is presented, suggesting two factors which may have triggered the violence. The massacre in Asculum was generally believed to have been an immediate reaction to the death of Drusus. Thus, for example, Velleius, 2,15,1: 'Mors Drusi iam pridem tumescens bellum excitavit', and Florus, 2,6,4: 'postquam ille domestico scelere oppressus est, eadem fax, quae ilium [Drusum] cremavit, socios in arma et expugnationem urbis accendit'. This tradition could probably not have developed if the two events had been chronologically separated; the overall chronology of the autumn of 91 also suggests a contemporaneity. On the 13th of September, the only certain date in Drusus' tribunate, Crassus defended him against the consul's attack. At that moment a dramatic series of events also commenced. A week afterwards Crassus died; the senate later abolished Drusus' legislation and shortly afterwards he was himself assassinated. Then the scene shifted to Italy. Open confrontation broke out in Asculum, and a last attempt to reach a peaceful settlement was made; the Italians sent a delegation to Rome but the senate refused to negotiate. The Social War became a reality, and in the first year the military operations seem already to have taken place on a considerable scale. Apparently several towns were besieged and large areas ravaged before the operations were suspended for the winter. This chronology hardly leaves room for an interlude between Drusus' demise and the uprising at Asculum. Both events probably took place around the middle of October; a compromise allowing both for the political develop­ ments prior to Drusus' death and for the diplomatic and military actions taken after his assassination. The coincidence between Drusus' death and the revolt in Asculum has been an important argument for a causal link between the two events. On further reflection, however, this chronology would rather seem to weaken the theory.

129

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A conspiracy to rebel against Rome was an extremely hazardous venture. The example of Fregellae had demonstrated the immense risks involved; the alternative to success might be the physical and political annihilation of the entire community. With Fregellae acting as a dire warning it was obvious that such a project had to be very carefully planned. Reliable alliances had to be formed in advance - and confirmed by exchange of hostages. Long negotiations would have preceded the revolt - as implied by the ancient sources. According to Velleius the war was already 'tumescens' when Drusus died, and Appian writes that when the Italians decided to revolt: 'they sent envoys secretly to each other, formed a league, and exchanged hostages as a pledge of good faith. The Romans were in ignorance of these facts for a long time ...', 170. The Livian periocha, 71, records that: 'Cum deinde promissa sociis civitas praestari non posset, irati Italici defectionem agitare coeperunt. Eorum coetus coniurationesque et orationes in consiliis principum referuntur'. This passage, however, is apparently a reference to the Latin conspiracy earlier that year; this incident was directly linked with the senatorial citizenship-bill, and the mention in both Florus, De vir. ill. and Dio might indicate its prominence in Livy's account. When Rome heard about the plottings, praetors were sent to investigate the rumours. Three of these are incidentally known to us; a Domitius features in Diodorus' story of the Marsic march on Rome, according to an anecdote in Livy, per. 72, Ser. Galba was saved by a woman in Grumentum, and Servilius fell victim of the massacre in Asculum. These incidents are important clues to the chronology of the Italian conspiracy. After a tip from a Roman agent Servilius came to Asculum exactly as the revolt broke out (for a connection see below). Likewise Galba seems to have been trapped in Grumentum, when the Lucanians joined the war shortly afterwards. The story of the Marsi is significant, since it was originally part of a continuous narrative. The Marsi had allegedly been summoned by the 'tribunes', evidently a reference to Drusus, at a time when rumours of an Italian plot reached Rome. In Diodorus' account, the sending of envoys would have been placed before Drusus' tribunate came to an end. These examples therefore suggest that the investigation was initiated while Drusus was still alive and continued after his demise. We have other indications that Rome took strong measures against the conspiracy at quite an early stage. When the Samnite leader Papius Mutilus in 90 captured Nola, 2000 Roman soldiers were taken prisoner (App. 185). The soldiers accepted an offer to join the Italian army; the officers, among them the praetor L. Postumius, refused it and were executed. The appearance of such a number of Roman troops in Nola is curious. The fall of Nola was one of the first events of 90 recorded by the Livian epitomator; the siege may have begun in the previous year. The question is how the Romans got into the town. They may have been sent either to protect the Nolans against the insurgents or to prevent them from joining the revolt. Nothing suggests that Nola was particularly pro-Roman.1 Papius was able to take the town by treachery, and at the end of the war it was a Samnite stronghold. Admittedly, some of the towns in Southern Campania first joined the revolt after some persuasion, but in general this

1

Diodorus, 37,2,4, explicitly mentions Nola as one of the most prominent insurgents, and after the war it suffered the same retribution as the obstinate Pompeii in receiving a Sullan colony.

ITALIAN 'UNIFICATION' - THE OUTBREAK OF THE SOCIAL WAR , r e a was favourable to the allied cause.2 For that reason the latter explanation seems referable. But why, in that case, did the Nolans open their gates to the Romans? The answer • ant be that when the Romans arrived, the war had not yet begun. In that situation the \joians would have to let them in; otherwise the conspiracy would have been prematurely evealed and Nola perhaps left in the lurch as Fregellae had been in 125. The Nolan affair vould therefore indicate that Rome had been mobilising troops towards the end of Drusus' tribunate, dispatching them to vulnerable and strategically important positions. Aesernia, one of the first Italian targets, may have been among the towns thus reinforced; here two Romans, L Scipio and L. Aciiius, were in command, managing a narrow escape.3 It might be conjec­ tured that these 'commanders' had not arrived without soldiers either.4 The following chronology emerges from these considerations. Already during Drusus' tribunate the first rumours of an Italian conspiracy had surfaced in Rome. After deliberations on the issue, the senate sent praetors around to investigate the rumours throughout the peninsula. Troops may also have been levied in order to accompany the praetors to the places most liable to revolt. Therefore, when the news finally reached Rome, it was because the plot was so advanced that it could no longer be kept a secret. The Italians were already exchanging hostages - the final sealing of protracted and difficult negotiations. Appian, 170, is therefore undoubtedly right in saying that the conspiracy had been going on for a long time before the senate heard of it. The implication is that the planning of the Social War almost certainly predated the death ofCrassus, which marked the beginning of the final, desperate phase of Drusus' tribunate. It was suggested above that Drusus' first bill had dealt only with Latin enfranchisement, which makes his political failure an unlikely cause of the Italian revolt. During his last weeks in office he may have made more radical proposals. But not only did they never have any chance of being passed - at that stage he had lost all his support; it would also seem that the conspiracy had been conceived long before Crassus' death. The coincidence between Drusus' death and the Asculan riots would thus seem to separate the war from the franchise question rather than connect it. His death is unlikely to have provoked such an embittered reaction as the massacre in Asculum. A causal relation between them is claimed by Velleius and Florus, but Appian, 173f, furnishes our only description of the event. Appian's chronology of the outbreak of the Social War (165-74) has long been recognised as mistaken; the sequence of events has been altered and new connections forged. A deliberately distorted version may, however, be revealing as to the dominant historical tradition to which it relates. After Drusus' death, Appian asserts, the knights used the opportunity to strike a blow at their opponents. A quaestio was set up by the tribune Varius Hybrida to prosecute those who Thus, Nuceria, the dominant town in the region, seems to have joined the revolt without hesitation, cf. Cic. Sulla, 58, who relates that while 'finitimi ac vicini' seceded, his friend P. Sittius remained personally loyal to Rome. Contra D. H. Berry, Cicero Pro P. Sulla Orano (Cambridge 1996) 249. 3

Appian 182.

Cf. Orosius 5,18,16: 'Sulla ... Aesemiam missus, ubi artissima obsidione Romani cives et milites premebantur'.

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had openly or secretly aided the Italians to acquire citizenship. Many of Drusus' allies u * prosecuted on these charges; when the Italians heard about the murder of Drusus and quaestiones Variae, they realised that the only way for them to achieve the Roman franch" was open revolt. While a plot was formed and hostages exchanged, Rome long remain ignorant about the threat. Finally an inquiry was instituted, praetors were dispatched and " Asculum one of these provoked the bloody riots. The important features of the Appianic version are his claims that, firstly, the quaestio) Variae predated the Social War, and, secondly, that the Italian conspiracy was first conceit \ after Drusus' death and the Varian trials. As demonstrated later, we have ample evidence tfi the quaestiones Variae were in fact set up to prosecute alleged instigators of the Italian revolt - not supporters of Drusus' citizenship-bill. The trials were an attempt to exploit the Italian revolt politically. Appian, therefore, inverts both the sequence of the events and the causal relationship between them. Consequently, the overall chronology is also impossible. If the Italians had not started plotting till after the quaestiones Variae, the war could not possibly have begun in 91. 5 By this rearrangement of the events Appian was able to simplify the narrative structure Placing the Varian court immediately after Drusus' death, Appian could round off the political events in Rome before shifting to the Italian scene.6 A more traditional version would have implied a break in the military narrative, inserting a parenthesis of internal struggles in Rome. To avoid this interruption, Appian chose a thematic structure, which separated domestic events from those of the Social War. This structure could, however, easily have been recon­ ciled with the traditional chronology, for example by saying 'while this was happening in Rome, the Italians ... etc.': some ulterior motives may therefore be suspected. It was vital to Appian's general scheme to establish a connection between the franchise bill and the Social War. This interpretation was already common, but Appian nevertheless found that some changes were needed. Usually, it was the riots in Asculum, a supposed reaction to the murder of Drusus, which constituted the link. Appian, however, was aware that the planning had begun long before Asculum. To overcome this weakness, he put the Italian plot off till after the definitive failure of the franchise bill, that is, Drusus' death and the quaestiones Variae. That eliminated any doubt that the conspiracy might not have been born out of allied frustration over Roman unwillingness to grant the citizenship. Appian may, in other words, have noticed the problem of chronology, pointed out above, and solved it by a slight re-arrangement of the events. The link between franchise bill and Italian conspiracy firmly established, Appian then offers an alternative explanation for the outbreak of the war. One of the Roman agents observed an Italian being sent as hostage to Asculum and informed the praetor Servilius, who hastened there together with his legate Fonteius. When he arrived at Asculum, Servilius berated the inhabitants with threats and accusations. Supposing that the plot had been discovered, the Asculans then killed Servilius, Fonteius, and all the Romans gathered in the town for a 5

Cf. E. Badian, 'Quaestiones Variae', Historia 18 (1969)447-91,459, Keaveney, (1987) 167f. The fact that Varius took up office in December 91 in itself implies that the law could not have been passed this year. 6

Cf. Haug, (1947) 226.

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• .ai The implication is that the riots are explained entirely by locally pertinent circum,, s that is, the arrival of the praetor. They were not a response to news from Rome; the 5 '., i anS reacted to the apparent disclosure of their conspiracy. That also explains the isolated nrter of the Asculan outburst of violence, which would be less comprehensible if • aered by a political event in Rome. In this situation the Asculans could either give in or "c that the alliances would hold; the praetor's threats left them no choice. Once their antiman feelings had been released, a virtual massacre was to follow. This version thus manages to draw a coherent picture of the riots while ignoring the widely •■umed causality between Drusus' death and the outbreak of the war. While subscribing to he traditional interpretation of the war, Appian also sensed a weakness in the opening chronoI ay of the war and modified the received course of events. This rearrangement led him to nclude a different version of the Asculan affair. Inadvertently he thereby gave a glimpse of another tradition, eventually undermining his own thesis. Appian's alterations have often been regarded merely as thoughtless blunders, but that approach does not entirely do him justice. In this case, his account is an elaborate and fully consistent piece of fiction. All details have been carefully fitted into the scheme: the charges of the quaestiones Variae have, for example, been adjusted to their new position before the war.7 Without alternative evidence we would have had no choice but to accept his version at face value. In Rome, the outbreak of the war had dramatic political consequences. The knights (and Drusus' senatorial opponents) now gained the upper hand and launched a counter offensive against their enemies. The tribune Varius Hybrida carried a bill to investigate Roman complicity in the Italian revolt. 8 A quaestio was set up, fully controlled by the knights, and members of the group which had originally supported Drusus' programme were prosecuted. Considerable scholarly attention has been devoted to the judicial aspects of the Varian court. More important in this context, however, are the actual charges raised against the senators; what kind of offence did Varius manage to convince the electorate had been committed by leading Romans? According to Cicero they were accused of treason; in his speech for Scaurus he notes that Scaurus: '... lege Varia ... proditionis est in crimen vocatus' (Asc. 22C). Likewise, in De or. 3,8, the charges are described as 'sceleris nefarii'. Asconius, in a passage likely to render parts of the original wording, 9 states that Varius: '... legem tulit ut quaereretur de iis quorum ope consiliove socii contra populum Romanum arma sumpsissent' (22C). That the charge was in fact one of aiding the rebels is further corroborated by the argument, probably in a contio,10 between Scaurus and Varius. Scaurus had denied: 'socios in arma ... convocasse', and asked ÌLb

Cf. R. A. Bauman, The Crimen Maiestatis in the Roman Republic and Augustan Principate (Johannesburg 1967)60. *SeeE. S. Gruen, 'The Lex Varia', JRS 55 (1965) 59-73, id. (1968) 215-20, Bauman (1967), R. Seager, 'Lex Varia de Maiestate', Historia 16 (1967) 37-43, Badian (1969). ' Cf. Badian (1969) 449. 10

Gruen (1965) 62f, Badian (1969) 467. Contra Bauman (1967) 60.

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the audience: 'testis nemo est; utri vos, Quirites, convenit credere?'. He was, in other words accused of having instigated the revolt, secretly assisting 'ope consiliove'.11 Therefore we have ample evidence that the Varian courts did not prosecute political act but conspiratorial collaboration with the rebels. Asconius, however, gives this description of the quaestiones Variae, 22C: 'Non multo ante, Italico bello exorto, cum ob sociis negatam civitatem nobilitas in invidia esset, Q. Varius tr. pl. legem tulit ut quaereretur de iis quorum ope consiliove socii contra populum Romanum arma sumpsissent'. The suggested ünu between the trials and the citizenship issue is curious and would seem to run directly counter to the other information given by Asconius; the charges cannot have been both of secret plotting with the Italians and of taking a well-known political stance against them. Besides the accused were all supposed to have favoured the Italian 'cause'. Asconius' text is therefore an obvious mistake, perhaps inspired by Cicero's De. or. 3,8, where the miseries are listed which death saved Crassus from witnessing: 'Non vidit flagrantem bello Italiani, non ardentem invidia senatum, non sceleris nefarii principes civitatis reos, ...'. Cicero here describes the equestrian hatred for the senate, which led to the prosecution of 'principes civitatis'. But Asconius probably linked 'ardentem invidia senatum' to the preceding passage, explaining the connection by inserting a reference to the failed citizenship-bill. However mistaken, this passage therefore illustrates the tendency of the later tradition to introduce the franchise-question in contexts where it was ignored by earlier sources.12 Another source on the Roman reaction to the outbreak of the war has often been over­ looked. In Rhetorica ad Herenniwn, 4,13, a lengthy example of the middle style is given, which is closely related to the Varian trials. 'Men of the jury, you see against whom we are waging war - against allies who have been wont to fight in our defence, and together with us to preserve our empire by their valour and zeal. Not only must they have known themselves, their resources, and their manpower, but their nearness to us and their alliance with us in all affairs enabled them no less to learn and appraise the power of the Roman people in every sphere. When they had resolved to fight against us, on what, I ask you, did they rely in presuming to under­ take the war, since they understood that much the greater part of our allies remained faithful to duty, and since they saw that they had at hand no great supply of soldiers, no competent commanders, and no public money - in short, none of the things needful for carrying on the war? Even if they were waging war with neighbours on a question of 11 Cf. Asc. 73C: '... cum multi Varia lege inique damnarentur, quasi id bellum illis auctoribus conflatum esset...'. 12 Val. Max. 8,6,4, writes of the Varian law: '... quae iubebat quaeri quorum dolo malo socii ad arma ire coacti essent, magna cum clade rei publicae; sociale enim prius, deinde civile bellum excitavit'. This description is not only confused but also self-contradictory. The Varian trials cannot both investigate the causes of the war and actually provoke it. Keaveney (1987) 168, makes a vain attempt to reconcile these two positions, invoking Varius' later conviction at his own court. We have, however, no reason to believe that this charge had any more substance than the previous accusations against leading senators; the Varian trials were some of the most openly political prosecutions seen in the late republic, cf. Gruen (1965) 60, Badian (1969) 451. When Varius' star was waning in 89 (and the knights lost their control over the court), his enemies could getridof him only by accusing him according to his own law; no other court was functioning during the war. Therefore, his conviction for treason does not imply that his law had had any influence on the actions of the Italians.

ITALIAN 'UNIFICATION' - THE OUTBREAK OF THE SOCIAL WAR boundaries, even if in their opinion one battle would decide the contest, they would yet come to the task in every way better prepared and equipped than they are now. It is still less credible that with such meagre forces they would attempt to usurp that sovereignty over the whole world which all the civilized peoples, kings and barbarous nations have accepted, in part compelled by force, in part of their own will, when conquered either by arms of Rome or by her generosity. Someone will ask: 'What of the Fregellans? Did they not make the attempt on their own initiative?' Yes, but these allies would be less ready to make the attempt precisely because they saw how the Fregellans fared. For inexperienced peoples, unable to find in history a precedent for every circumstance, are through imprudence easily led into error; whilst those who know what has befallen others can easily from the fortunes of these others draw profit for their own policies. Have they, then, in taking up arms, been impelled by no motive? Have they relied on no hope? Who will believe that any one has been so mad as to dare, with no forces to depend on, to challenge the sovereignty of the Roman people? There must, therefore, have been some other factor, and what else can this be but what I say?'13 The origins of the examples in Rhet. ad Her. have been disputed. Against the author's claim to have produced them himself (4,1), there can be little doubt that many of the illustrations have been taken from authentic speeches, declamations, or collections of exempla.14 This is evidently true in this case; the example is clearly a fragment of a larger composition. The whole point of the speech is missing from the excerpt given in Rhet. ad Her. The argument seems to be that the Italians could not by themselves have conceived the idea of rebellion; somebody must have inspired them to do it, as implied by the question 'nulla igitur re inducti?'. But it is not clear from this example who was actually accused of this crime: that had already been explained in the previous part of the speech, referred to in the final question: 'Quid aliud nisi id quod dico potest esse?'. Presenting this isolated fragment, the author of the Rhetorica obviously believed the readers to be familiar with the Varian trials. Only in a later excerpt, 4,16, probably taken from the same speech, is the point made more explicitly: '...si quidem sua sponte facerent et non haberent hinc adiutores multos, malos homines et audaces'. The central argument used to underpin the charge stated that the rebellious allies obviously did not have the military resources to challenge the ruler of an empire. One would have expected them to have taken a lesson from the fate that befell Fregellae after a similar attempt, but they did not, and a vain hope of success must therefore have been induced in them, by Roman traitors. Such a line of argument seems to have been possible only for a short period at the beginning of the revolt. In 90 Rome was hard-pressed by the insurgents; after numerous defeats, the Romans assumed the sagum and mobilised all manpower resources, including freedmen (the first time since the Second Punic War) and quite inexperienced young recruits. Although the anonymous orator is clearly exaggerating the inferiority of the rebels, the point would make no sense against the bleak background of 90. Only in 89 did Rome really gain the upper hand, but that coincided with the suspension of the Varian trials. After the war such a point was even less feasible. The war turned out to have been one of the bloodiest Rome ever

' Here quoted after the Loeb edition, apart from a minor change in the last line. 4

See Ungern-Sternberg (1973) 149ff, with literature.

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fought, and an attempt to ridicule the Italian threat would have been rather unfortunate, if not absurd. Moreover, the revolt is compared to the isolated incident at Fregellae, and there is an overall emphasis on the incentives behind the Italian uprising, suggesting that the revolt had only begun quite recently. Likewise the orator claims, perhaps exaggerating, that the majority of allies were still loyal to Rome: '... multo maximam partem sociorum in officio manere ...'. That too would fit a date in the winter 91/90, when the revolt had not yet spread to the whole of Oscan-speaking Italy. According to Asconius the Varian court had already been established when: 'crebraeque defectiones Italicorum nuntiarentur', 73-4C. It is precisely the possibility of locating the fragment within a specific historical context, obtaining for only a short period during the winter 91/90, which suggests that we may be dealing with an authentic speech, probably held shortly after the Asculan massacre. In that case, it would represent our only contemporary source on the Roman reaction to the outbreak of the Social War.15 As part of the Varian propaganda against Drusus' circle, the speech was highly tendentious. But it also addressed the public, trying to convince it of the complicity of leading senators. In doing so, it cannot have run directly counter to common perception of the war; indeed the Varian trials were (successful) attempts to exploit popular sentiments engendered by the out­ break of the revolt. It was argued that without Roman help and encouragement the allies would never have embarked on such a hazardous venture. To make this point, the orator takes the trouble to demonstrate the futility of the Italian revolt, suggesting outside influence. His circumstantial argument implies that Roman involvement was a matter of speculation, unproven and unseen; as already noted, the charge against Drusus' friends was exactly one of secret instigation to rebellion. Consequently, they were not prosecuted for any political activity, that is, their supposed support for Drusus' citizenship bill. In their reactions to the war, the Romans seem to have ignored the franchise question altogether. Neither the charges raised nor the arguments employed suggest that the Italian franchise had been a burning issue in the focus of public attention throughout the year. If the failure of Drusus' citizenship bill had been the obvious cause of the revolt, there would have been no need to explain it as a result of secret instigation. After the revolt an endorsement of a pro-Italian policy, which had led to such a disaster, would have been highly subversive and the natural target for Drusus' opponents; instead Varius relied on unsubstantiated accusations of clandestine contacts with the insurgents. The fact that Varius nonetheless managed to win the electorate over is revealing as to the degree of confusion in the Roman public. In the fragment discussed above, the whole argument is built on the audience's reaction of sheer disbelief. Bewildered over the unexpected threat, which seemed to be against the very nature of things, the public was susceptible to all kinds of rumours and allegations, even of treason among prominent senators. Such stab-in-the-back theories are plausible only when no other explanation is at hand; 15

Alternatively, we would have to envisage an orator, not long after the end of the war, producing a declamation, which argued the case for prosecuting Drusus' senatorial allies after the outbreak of the revolt. In doing so he consistently treated the war as a localised uprising of little consequence, and, as we shall see, managed to ignore the citizenship issue altogether - despite its highly topical character in post-war politics. This scenario carries little conviction. However, even if accepted, we would still be dealing with a fragment which appears to be part of a meticulous reconstruction of Roman discourse in the winter 91/90.

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. nparently the Romans did not see any direct connection between the franchise question and the outbreak of the war. This causality, claimed by later tradition, is difficult to reconcile with the belief in secret conspiracies held by contemporary observers. While the causes of the war were a matter of speculation in Rome, there seems to have been little doubt about Italian intentions. 16 It is explicitly stated that they sought to defeat Rome, break her dominance, and usurp the empire: 'nedum illi imperium orbis terrae ... ad se transferre tantulis viribus conaretur', and later: 'Quis hoc credet, tantam amentiam quemquam tenuisse ut imperium populi Romani temptare auderet nullis copiis fretus?'. The orator's point is to show the weakness of the insurgents, highlighted by the superior power they had risen against. Therefore, the overt bias lies in the belittlement of the allied forces, not in the motives ascribed to the rebels. Apparently there was little doubt in Rome that the Italians wanted to take over Rome's position: yet another indication of the minimal attention paid to the franchise issue. Varius was obviously a tool in the hands of stronger interests, and his bill probably a con­ tinuation of an ongoing campaign. News of Latin and later also Italian plottings had reached Rome already before Drusus' assassination. Instantly they had been turned against him, even when he publicly denounced them. Apparently, rumours were spread, envisaging whole armies of Italians summoned by Drusus to coerce the senate. After Drusus' death and the out­ break of the revolt, his opponents proceeded with this strategy and accused his circle of secret instigation. In doing so they had an obvious interest in forging close relations between the insurgents and the late tribune. On account of this overt distortion, little credence may be given to the anecdotes showing his intimacy with the Italians; they may plausibly derive from the trials, whose outcome depended precisely on the prosecutor's ability to show this connection. The Varian trials represented, I believe, a crucial phase in the formation of the historical tradition of Drusus' tribunate. By portraying him as the culprit responsible for the revolt, his enemies saw a chance to strike a blow against their opponents. 17 The contacts which he - like any other Roman politician - had cultivated with Italian leaders became a burning issue in Roman politics. Apparently Varius managed to convince the public of their intimate and illicit character: in 90 all Drusus' friends and mentors were on the defensive. Considering the success of this propaganda a lasting impact would undoubtedly have remained after the trials had ended. But as the political structure of Italy changed after the war, so did the character of the Varian charges. With the eventual unification of Italy the alleged contacts with the allies lost much of their subversive taint. Therefore, what had originally been a political smear, later contributed to a positive picture of Drusus as the friend and benefactor of the Italians. After the revolt in Asculum, the Italians made a last attempt to open negotiations with Rome. Apparently the prospect of a full scale war was so frightening that no chance of a peaceful solution was to be left untried. Appian, 176, our only source on this interlude, tells us that the Italians sent ambassadors to Rome to present their complaints. The senate, however, refused to negotiate unless the Italians repented of the riots; the Italians had no other option than to proceed with the preparations for war. According to Appian, the Italians 16

Cf. Sherwin-White (1973) 146.

17

Cf. Pliny, HN 25,21,52, and Livy, per. 71.

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demanded Roman citizenship for their help in building the empire, a motive fully in line w" h Appian's general perception of the Italian question. But as argued above, it seems that tl Romans shortly afterwards saw the revolt as an attempt to break their dominance and talover the empire. The Italians, in other words, are held to have made a complete U-turn in the' attitude to Rome. That scenario seems less plausible, and there are indications that the Italia ultimatum may in fact have been far more radical than Appian suggests. Livy's eighth book may seem an unlikely source on the Social War, but the inherent anachronisms of his early books have long been recognised; in this case the prelude to the Latin War may (rather paradoxically) illuminate a later (but largely unknown) event, which influenced Livy's version. In 340 the Latin allies were preparing for revolt against Rome, and their views are presented in two speeches (8,4-5), containing the following argument: No longer would the Latins '... sub umbra foederis aequi servitutem pati', 8,4,2, since they provided half of the army, 'ubi pars virium, ibi et imperii pars esto', 8,4,4. Therefore, one of the consuls and half the senators should be chosen from among the Latins. Then the two nations would merge and form one people in a single (Roman) state. The senate flatly refused to concede these favours, thus provoking the war. There are obvious similarities between the Latin and the Social Wars. In both cases subordinate allies revolted against Rome, were reduced and incorporated into the Roman state. The negotiations on the eve of the war also have a striking resemblance to the Italian opening, mentioned by Appian. Moreover, the general line of argument appears to be rather anachronistic; the inspiration from the events in 91 would therefore seem evident.18 It would, however, underestimate Livy's creativity to read his account as a direct projection of the later events.19 What we are dealing with is not a mechanical duplication of 91 but an ingenious combination of various elements, some of which may be later conjectures or propaganda. At least two different trends can be traced, the unitary and the confrontational. The national unity of Latins and Romans is underlined by references to, for example, kinship,20 and so is the Latin willingness to become Romans: '... et Romani omnes vocemur', 8,5,6. This conciliatory line is perfectly understandable within Livy's primary frame of reference, that is, the Augustan tota Italia ideology and the cultural assimilation of Italy in the late first century BC. But we also find an undisguised anger and contempt for Roman hegemony, which is far more difficult to fit into a Livian conception of Roman Italy. The Latins, we are told, felt exploited and demanded equality with the Romans - a situation closely similar to that of the Italians in 91.21 The Latins did not, however, make the familiar request for Roman citizenship, expected in this context; they went much further and demanded real power-sharing. The constitutional changes they envisaged broke completely with Roman traditions - and are therefore unlikely to be Livy's own invention. Magistracies and senatorial seats should be set aside for the 18

Cf. T. Cornell, 'The conquest of Italy', CAH7 (1989) 351-419, 361.

19

G. Dipersia, 'Le polemiche sulla guerra sociale nell'ambasceria latina di Livio VIII,4-6\ in Storiografia e propaganda. Contributi dell'Istituto di storia antica 3 (Milan 1975) 111-20, seems (somewhat naively) to perceive Livy's account as a straightforward description of the events in 91. 20 21

Thus 8,4,3 and 8,5,4, both referring to consanguinitas.

The quest for freedom is found e.g. 8,4,3, iibertatis desiderium', and 8,5,4, 'adserere Latium in libertatem'.

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MIS corresponding to their contributions to the common army. This model was a far cry - n mere enfranchisement; it was a federal state with collective and proportionate sentation 0 f m e individual peoples within the confederation. The centralised structure t'tlie Roman state, the main obstacle to real equality, would crumble, as would the supremacy 0f

the urban elite. These demands, ascribed to the Latins in 340, may plausibly reflect aspects of the Italian Iiimatuni in 9 1 . Here, the Italians had spoken from a position of power, providing as they lid almost half of the Roman army, and federal ambitions were therefore not unrealistic. The oraanisation of the new Italian state, founded after the Roman refusal, might suggest that this vas exactly what they had in mind when they rose against Roman hegemony. After the revolt the Italians created a state of their own, called 'Italia'. 22 As its capital was chosen the Paelignian town of Corfinium, centrally situated in the middle of the insurgent area.23 Though mentioned by Diodorus, Strabo, and Velleius, only the former reveals any details about the political institutions of Italia. According to Diodorus, 37,2,4-8, a senate of five hundred members was set up; here the most capable men were to be selected.24 The actual warfare against Rome was entrusted to two consuls, one for each of the two war zones into which Italy was divided, and twelve praetors assisting the consuls. All the magistrates were elected for one year. Diodorus notes that 'Italia' 'for the most part copied the time-honoured Roman pattern' (37,2,8), thereby contributing to modern notions of the Italians as politically immature. Judging by Diodorus' own description of their institutions, this is not true. 25 There is no certain evidence of any popular assembly; 26 instead we find an apparently sovereign senate, described as koinen, that is, with delegates, synedroi, from all the insurgent states. This

22

The fundamental discussion of 'Italia' is Sherwin-White (1973) 147. See also H. D. Meyer, 'Die Organisation der Italiker im Bundesgenossenkrieg', Historia 7 (1958) 74-79, Salmon (1967) 348-51, De Martino (1972-75) III 50-52, De Sanctis (1976) 39-44, Keaveney (1987) 121-25, G. Firpo, 'Considerazioni sull'organizzazione degli Italici durante la guerra sociale', in Federazioni e federalismo nell'Europa antica (Milan 1994) 457-78. 23 Strabo, 5,4,2: 'a city common to all the Italiots in place of Rome', Veli. 2,16,4: 'caput imperii sui Corfinium', Florus, 2,6,7: '... et victrix Asiae et Europae a Corfinio Roma adpeteretur'. 24

Cf. Sherwin-White (1973) 147.

25

Adhering to Diodorus' claim, Mommsen, 11,230, founded the modern view that: '... ihre Verfassung nichts war als ein reiner Abklatsch der römischen ...', later followed by Meyer (1958) and Gabba (1990) 704, but convincingly refuted by Salmon (1967) 349f, Sherwin-White (1973) ibid., De Martino (1972-75) ibid. 26

Diodorus mentions the planning of a large forum in Corfinium; obviously this is no proof of a popular assembly, as claimed by Meyer (1958) 77f, cf. Sherwin-White (1973) 147, and Keaveney (1987) 122. Moreover, as pointed out by Sherwin-White, ibid, Strabo, 5,4,2, does not say that an assembly was held, but simply that troops were mustered in Corfinium, contra Meyer, ibid. The idea of a full muster of the troops electing the commanding magistrates, suggested by Meyer, seems highly unlikely. It implies that the soldiers from all rebel states were brought together in the Paelignian mountains for a political meeting, while the confrontation with Rome was already raging over the peninsula. Presumably the mustering, which took place in Corfinium, was far more limited than Strabo suggests. The Italian commanders may plausibly have been proposed by the individual peoples and formally appointed by the senate.

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federal structure represented a clear alternative to the Roman system. By abandoning the impossible concept of popular assemblies in territorial states, the Italians demonstrated political ideals that went far beyond the mere acquisition of Roman citizenship. While realising the need for a supranational structure both during and after the war, they also seem to have been reluctant to form a unitary state.27 Although it remains conjectural, we have no indication of any surrender of internal autonomy; none of the local elites would have had any interest in limiting their own powers at home. The solution was a confederation with a representative senate and magistrates, acting on its behalf. In designing this new constitution the Italian leaders may have drawn on traditional patterns of tribal cooperation.28 In the preceding pages an attempt has been made to assess the outbreak of the Social War from a contemporary point of view. Motives ascribed to the Italians by later authors have deliberately been ignored; instead emphasis has been put on the chronology and character of the outbreak and on the Roman and Italian reactions to the events. Little evidence has been found to support the traditional link between the war and the franchise question. The Italian conspiracy had begun long before the war broke out in Asculum; rumours of their plotting had already surfaced in Rome before Drusus' death. It would therefore also have preceded his last increasingly desperate phase after Crassus' death, in which new proposals may have been made. Likewise, the riots of Asculum do not seem to have been provoked by the news of Drusus' assassination. Roman envoys arrived at the town, threatening the locals who feared that the plan had been disclosed; letting go of all caution, the Asculans then - incidentally triggered the starting signal for the Social War. In Rome, Drusus' enemies tried to exploit the general state of shock following the revolt. The Italian threat was unexpected, and Varius used the opportunity to offer the public a scape­ goat. The charges were weak, bordering on the fantastic, but the conspiracy theory caught on because no other explanation seemed evident. The Romans, in other words, did not draw any direct connection between the revolt and the failure of Drusus' franchise bill. After the Asculan riots, the Italians presented their conditions to Rome; the senate refused to negotiate, whereupon the alliés founded a state of their own, even issuing an independent Italian coinage. This move, which went much further than a simple military measure, is revealing as to the definitive character of the Italian secession. Even more so is the federal structure of the new state. It demonstrates the existence of well thought-out political ideals, which differed greatly from that of the centralised Roman state. Conscious of such alternative options, the Italians are unlikely to have been satisfied - at any stage - with the Roman 27

It is interesting that throughout the war the various peoples maintained their own separate armies, underlining the confederal (rather than federal) character of the Italian state. 28

G. Tibiletti, 'Considerazioni sulle popolazioni dell'Italia preromana', PCIA 7 (1978) 17-49, has drawn an evocative picture of Italie cooperation centred on transhumance, which depended on political collaboration between neighbouring states. On pre-Roman transhumance see J. E. Skydsgaard, Trans­ humance in Ancient Italy', ARID 1 (1974) 7-36, M. Pasquinucci in E. Gabba and M. Pasquinucci, Strutture agrarie e allevamento transumante nell'Italia romana (III - I sec. a.C) (Pisa 1979) 90f, E. Gabba, 'La pastorizia nell'età tardo-imperiale in Italia', in Pastoral economies in classical antiquity, Proc. Cam. Phil. Soc. suppl. 14 (1988), 134-42, 137f. In the same volume, however, P. Garnsey has suggested that the political conditions for long distance transhumance werefirstcreated in the second century BC, 'Mountain economies in Southern Europe', 196-212, 199f. See also the discussion in E. Dench, From Barbarians to New Men (Oxford 1995) 111-25.

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franchise, which would deprive them of their local sovereignty without offering a proper share the empire. What they demanded in the autumn of 91 was probably more than just admission to the Roman citizenship; a fundamental reorganisation of Roman-Italian relations may have been at issue. Small wonder, therefore, that the Romans right from the beginning saw the Italian revolt as a frontal attack on their position in Italy and the empire. From the outset, the rebellion was characterised by strong anti-Roman sentiments. The massacre at Asculum is intelligible only as a manifestation of deeply-rooted hatred against everything Roman. Not only were the representatives of the Roman state killed, but also ordinary Romans who happened to be in the town. Hardly surprisingly, the Italian coinage, issued by the new state, also featured anti-Roman motifs, like the famous fight between the Italian bull and the Roman wolf.29 However hyperbolic war-time propaganda may be, it would have to reflect the overall intentions of those at war. The fighting scene is indiscriminately anti-Roman, and difficult to reconcile with a wish for Roman citizenship, that is, to become part of Rome. If the war had simply been a reaction to the senate's refusal to grant the franchise, the more natural target would have been the Roman elite - not Rome herself.30 A demand for Roman citizenship (rather than a federal Italy) presupposes an identification with Rome, which is given the lie by the Italian hostility apparent throughout the revolt. The circumstances of the outbreak, in sum, all conform with the theory of the war as a straightforward rebellion against foreign domination. The Roman-Italian relationship must be recognised as one of hegemony and exploitation. As the Roman empire grew (thanks to allied manpower) new aspects were added to the Italian alliance system, but its essential character of subordination remained. An Italian attempt to overthrow Rome's position should therefore cause little surprise - historically that would certainly seem the most typical reaction. But what provoked an Italian reaction at this particular moment? Rome had after all exerted its domination for more than two hundred years. The immediate trigger was clearly the Asculan riots, but at that point the conspiracy was already far advanced. The question is therefore what happened in the transitional phase when general disaffection with Roman hege­ mony grew into active resistance and plotting. Traditionally the conspiracy has been linked with Drusus' franchise bill, but that explanation, as we saw, is more likely to be a later attribution. A reconstruction of the intermediate causes is doomed to be conjectural, the whole issue being deeply shrouded in a fog of contemporary ignorance and later distortions. All our 0f

29

See E. A. Sydenham, The Coinage of the Roman Republic (London 1952) 89-95, E. Bernareggi, 'Problemi della monetazione dei confederati italici durante la guerra sociale', Riv. It. Num. 68 (19B6) 61-90, J.-M. Eychenne, 'Considérations numismatiques sur la guerre sociale', Pallas 36 (1990) 71-87, A. Campana, La monetazione degli insorti Italici durante la guerra sociale (91-87 a. C) (1987). Various theories about the Italian coinage have been propounded, most of which appear rather speculative and unsubstantiated. The old idea of a separate Latin and Oscan coinage issued by Marsi and Samnites respectively can now be dismissed, cf. Bernareggi (1966) 78f and Eychenne (1990) 84 n.6. Also the widespread notion of the overtly anti-Roman motifs as belonging to a later radicalised (and predominantly Samnite) phase of the war seems unfounded. The most common motifs are Italia, the oath of the insurgents, the fighting scene between the wolf and the bull, Victory and the divinities Hercules, Castor and Pollux, and Bacchus, none of which reveals any allegiance to Rome. Eychenne (1990) 77, has noted the absence of any claim on the Roman citizenship m the Italian coinage, concluding that: 'Au contraire, à travers la série monétaire, les buts des Italiens pendant la guerre sociale sont d'abattre Rome et d'affirmer une autorité italienne sur ses ruines'.

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sources are Roman - an Italian version was probably never written - and exclusively Con cerned about the political drama in Rome. And from that point of view the Italians firçt entered the stage with the Asculan massacre. During the year 91 very little may have been known in Rome about the aims of the Italians - and after the outbreak these became a domestic issue exploited in political trials. Later still, in the imperial age (from which most of our sources derive), another layer was added to the ancient tradition; now the Social War was seen entirely in the light of Italy's subsequent political and cultural unification. Against this historiographical background it is clear that Italian aims cannot be read directly out of the extant sources; in practice we are here writing history without sources. Therefore, neither of the two factors which I believe may have inspired the Italian plot in 91 feature prominently in our sources - indeed one of them does not appear at all. Their importance has to be inferred from an overall view of the economic, military, and political situation in the early first century BC. The first factor highlighted their subordinate and vulnerable position; the second held out hopes that this time a revolt might have a chance of success. Only one issue is known to have caused major Italian discontent in the generation leading up to the Social War - the question of Roman public land. In 91, the agrarian law of Livius Drusus was opposed by Etruscans and Umbrians. Turning up in Rome, they followed the example from 129 when Italians had - successfully, it seems - complained against the Gracchan land distribution. According to Drusus' law, new colonies were to be founded in Italy, thus reviving his father's extensive colonial programme from 122. The commission's sphere of competence was defined as 'agri dandi assignandi', which suggests that viritanc assignations were also provided for. The question to be considered here is how seriously this apparently quite ambitious scheme would affect the Italian allies. Our knowledge of allied holdings of Roman public land in Italy is extremely poor.11 Archaeology gives little information on the question, and the literary evidence is hardly more illuminating.32 Allied occupation of land annexed by Rome is briefly mentioned by our sources in connection with the Gracchan reforms. But while these passages will be 31 For a discussion see Toynbee (1966) II 546-54, who focuses, I think, too narrowly on the parts of ager publicus populi Romani annexed after the Second Punic War. 32

We have to distinguish between sources relating to the distribution of land and those merely indicating the existence of Roman public land. The former are, in the nature of things, more reliable than the latter. They include inscribed border stones {cippi) set up by the Gracchan commission, references to Gracchan assignations and colonial deductions in the Liber coloniarum and traces of centuriation. For these sources, see below. The existence of Roman land is far more difficult to demonstrate. The municipal organisation after the Social War may indicate the previous status of the community, i.e. whether it had at some time been annexed by Rome. That criterion, however, only applies to the inclusion of entire communities, not partial confiscations of their territory. The imperials estates in the early principate might on principle give a clue as to the location of public Roman land in the Republic. Butfirstlyour knowledge of their extent and exact location is sparse, and secondly they may have come into the possession of the emperor through other channels. Also the prodigia, reported by republican writers, have been invoked as signs of the Roman status of the land in question, Mommsen (1905-13) VII 168-74. The criterion seems, however, to be too uncertain to be of any practical use, cf. E. Rawson, 'Prodigy lists and the use of the Annales Maximi', CQ 21 (1971) 158-69, reprinted in ead. (1991) 1-15, B. McBain, Prodigy and expiation: a study in religion and politics m Republican Rome (Bruxelles 1982) 24-30. The sources, therefore, do not allow us to point out Italian holdings of Roman public land, unless they were affected by the commission and ceased to be Italian.

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sidered later, for the moment, it is arguable that the clearest indication of the importance • u^p holdinss is in fact provided by the course of political events between 133 and 91. X er publiais populi Romani became an issue in Roman politics in 133 with Ti. Gracchus' T arian law. Reinforcing earlier regulations, a commission was set up to seize land held in " of the amount allowed and divide it into smaller allotments. The commission's work V ntinued after Ti. Gracchus' death, but in 129 Italian complaints brought it to a standstill. lTUin2 that their private properties were being unlawfully seized, the Italians offered the -nate an opportunity to intervene and deprive the commission of its judicial powers. Vooarently this move effectively halted further redistribution; all the cippi put up by the mmission s e e m t 0 p re d a te the Scipionic intervention.33 Flaccus may have made a failed attempt to revive the process, and in 123 C. Gracchus -arried a new and expanded version of his brother's reform bill. In addition to vintane assign­ ations it also included colonial deductions both in Italy and abroad. Apparently without Italian complaints, C. Gracchus managed to regain the commission's Imperium, a surprising feat con­ sidering their previous success in preventing this. According to the Lex agraria from 111, C Gracchus explicitly exempted certain areas from his land-distribution law. The passage has been seen as tralatician, repeating a clause of the first Sempronian law, and the areas iden­ tified as the ager Campanus, which Cicero {leg. agr. 2,81) asserted not even the Gracchi had dared to touch.34 But Cicero's statement cannot necessarily be taken at face value35 and may be questioned by signs of Gracchan activity around Capua.36 It has been suggested that since the ager Campanus included several different types of public land, some may have been exempted while others were not.37 Such a partial exemption, however, only accentuates the problems of juridical and political logic. Large parts of the ager Campanus had fairly recently been reorganised, and here the holdings would presumably not have exceeded the limits

" Cf. Molthagen (1973), E. Hermon, 'Le programme agraire de Caius Gracchus', Ath. 70 (1982) 258-72,260f. Contra M. Pani, 'Potere di iudicatio e lavori della commissione agraria graccana dal 129 al 121 A.C.', Ann. Fac. Lett. Bari 19-20 (1976-77) 131-46, R. A. Bauman, 'The Gracchan Agrarian Commission: four questions', Historia 28 (1979) 385-408, esp. 403-08, who believe that the senate's intervention stopped the commission's work only temporarily. u

Thus K. Johannsen, Die lex agraria des Jahres 111 v.Chr. (diss. Munich 1971), 187-200.

For Cicero's reliability see e.g. F. De Martino, 'Gromatici e questioni Graccane', in Sodalitas. Scritti in onore di Antonio Guarino (Naples 1988) VII 3125-50, esp. 3135f. A Gracchan cippus has been found at Sant'Angelo in Formis, ILLKP 467, datable to 132/1. Traces of extensive centuriation, which may be linked to this document, have also been found in the ager Campanus, G. Chouquer, M. Clavel-Lévêque, F. Favory, J.-P. Vallat, Structures agraires en Italie c entro-méridionale. Cadastres et paysage ruraux, Coll. École fr. Rome 100 (Rome 1987) 202-6. Cf. Misurare la terra (Modena 1984) 222ff, 23lf (M. Pagani). According to Plutarch, C. Gracchus planned a colony in Capua, C. Gr. 8,3, cf. De Martino (1988) 3133f. Crawford (1996) 157, has suggested that foe commission's activities only touched upon the most marginal parts of the ager Campanus and that no actual redistribution may have taken place here. 7E

-g. Johannsen (1971) ibid.

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reinforced by the Sempronian law.38 Consequently no special clause would have been needed to safeguard these areas against the Gracchan commission - no matter how politicallv sensitive they may have been regarded. On the other hand, those parts which remained un­ regulated were apparently affected by the commission's work already in 132/1. A general exemption of the entire ager Campanus therefore makes little sense; some parts may have enjoyed no protection, while others automatically fell outside the commission's mandate. Several types of land were probably already excluded by the agrarian law of Ti. Gracchus But there is a strong possibility that more areas were included in the law of C. Gracchus, to which the preserved text repeatedly refers.39 In the previous decade the main obstacle to the land reform had been the complaints made by the Italian allies. Quite plausibly, therefore, it has been sugggested that the exemption concerned their holdings of Roman public land.40 That might explain how C. Gracchus, apparently meeting little opposition, managed to reopen the reform process. Inevitably the land at its disposal would be reduced by this measure, but the alternative could have been a total abandonment of the reform programme. Such a gesture would also have been consistent with the general awareness shown by C. Gracchus as to the potential risks posed by Italian disaffection. After C. Gracchus' death, Appian describes three successive laws, which brought the reform process to an end (1,121-5). First the lots became alienable, then they were privatised in return for a vectigal, and finally this compensation for the poor was also abolished. The relationship between these laws and the epigraphically recorded law from 111 has been intensely discussed, without any consensus being reached.41 Most likely, however, we are dealing with the second Appianic law, to be identified with the Lex Thoria mentioned by Cicero. The text gives the terms on which public land was privatised. Not included in this process were the areas which C. Gracchus had formally exempted from his agrarian scheme. These may, as argued above, have been the ager publicus which had remained in allied hands. 38

Since then some holders might, of course, have taken over neighbouring lots, cf. the scenario suggested by Appian. But why should Gracchus have protected such irregularities simply because they happened in Campania?

39

lexagr., lines 1,3,4,6,7,13,22-23.

40

F. T. Hinrichs, 'Die lex agraria des Jahres 111 v. Chr.', ZSSR 83 (1966) 252-307, 254-8. Following . a similar line of argument D. Flach, Römische Agrargeschichte (Munich 1990) 52, 57, A. W. Lintott, •Political history, 146-95 BC CAH 9 (1994) 40-103, 64, tentatively Gabba (1994) 111-14. Fora different view see Flach, 'Die Ackergesetzgebung im Zeitalter der römischen Revolution', //Z 217 (1973) 265-95, 271-74, suggesting that the exemption may have applied to allied occupations made before the upper limits, reinforced by the commission, had been introduced between 180 and 167. 41

Hinrichs (1966), Johannsen (1971) with previous literature, Flach (1973) 275-81 and (1990) 54-58. K. Meister, 'Die Aufhebung der gracchischen Agrarreform', Historia 23 (1974) 86ff, C. A. M. Triebel, Ackergesetze und politische Reformen (diss. Bonn 1980) 204-09, 312f, R. Develin, 'The Dismantling of the Gracchan Agrarian Programme', Antichthon 13 (1979) 48-55. There are two indications to go by: Appian's mention of 15 years from the beginning to the end of the Gracchan reforms and line 19-21 of the epigraphic law. Depending on whether Tiberius' or Caius' tribunate is taken as our starting point, the law of 111 can be identified as either the second or the last of the Appianic laws. The fragmentary lines 19-21, dealing with the vectigal, can be restored as both imposing and abolishing the rent. J. Granet, 'La loi agraire de 111 et l'élevage', Pallas 35 (1989) 141-54, has - less plausibly - suggested that the law was in fact not one of those mentioned by Appian.

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Rut even if this theory is not accepted without reservations (admittedly, the arguments are . c u m s t a n t i a l ) , few Italian holdings would probably have benefited from the privatisation. The law clearly seems to deal primarily with Roman citizens. Only twice do they appear in the remaining fragments. In line 20-3, public land which Latins and Italian allies had received • exchange for land surrendered to a colony or town is privatised. Later, in line 29, the law confirms the statutory rights (the nature of which is not known) of Latins and foreigners. Most ■if the remaining clauses appear to deal exclusively with Roman citizens 42 The implications for the Italian allies of this law are therefore likely to have been limited.43 As noted earlier, the Italian allies in 129 claimed that the commission, when redistributing oublie land, also encroached upon their private properties. The complaint proved effective. The senate intervened, and the commission was deprived of its imperium. The three-year interval between the setting up of the commission and the emergence of Italian opposition seems crucial; the Italians would have had no reason to hesitate - presumably it was well known that the senate was waiting for a pretext to block the process. The delay would therefore suggest that it was in 129 that the commission first displayed a more serious interest in allied holdings of public land. The distribution of Gracchan cippi (all predating 129) would support such an inference; none of them have appeared in areas where we might expect to find old allied holdings. 44 The senatorial intervention, stripping the commission of its judicial powers, seems to have blocked any further progress for the reform process. By implication only a few Italian holdings would have been affected by the Gracchan activity. After 129, most of the Roman public land available for redistribution was probably in Italian hands. 45 Apparently the commission had begun its work in Roman areas and turned to Italian holdings at a later stage. There are, moreover, indications that the Roman holdings may have been almost exhausted during the initial phase of the commission's work. According to Appian, 18, the legal disputes over public and private land were peculiar to allied holdings. But after the intervention in 129, all activity, not only in Italian but also in Roman areas, appears to have come to a standstill. Later, C. Gracchus may have exempted the Italians altogether in order to restart the reform. But even so, the extent of his assignations in Italy may have been limited; only two colonies are securely documented, and even they may have been atypical. 46 More significant was the founding of the first overseas colony, Junonia in Africa. Highly controversial in Rome, this step is a clear indication of the shortage of land available in Italy. The elder Livius Drusus, on the other hand, proposed in 122 an extensive colonial programme to be realised within the peninsula and on Sicily; the implication is that large tracts of public land still remained undistributed. The crucial difference between the two schemes may have been a Gracchan exemption of Italian holdings, which limited its scope considerably. In the end, however,

42

Cf. Crawford (1996) 55.

43

Cf. Hinrichs (1966) 259, Johannsen (1971) 207f, Triebel (1980) 205, Flach (1990) 57f.

44

For a full list see E. Gabba, TI tentativo dei Gracchi', Storia di Roma 2,1 (Torino 1990) 671 -89, 677 -13. Their location is shown in Misurare la terra (1984) 162.

n

45

Cf. Triebel (1980) 206. Tarentum Neptunia and Scolacium Minervium, Veli. 1,15,4.

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ITALIAN UNIFICATION

such differences turned out to be immaterial. Drusus' programme was (for reasons not reported) never implemented; it is perhaps not too fanciful to assume that the trouble involved in a seizure of Italian holdings may have contributed. That might also explain whv Saturninus' colonial scheme followed the example of C. Gracchus, preferring the controversies of overseas settlements to the protestations of Italian allies.47 This course of events suggests the existence of substantial holdings of Roman ager publicum in allied hands - holdings that became increasingly important as Roman holdings were re­ distributed. Eventually, however, they remained largely untouched by the various Roman land schemes, which turned to the provinces instead. Most likely, a reluctance to challenge the Italians would have been a consequence of the effectiveness of their complaints in 129, which in turn may have reflected the sensitive and 'foreign' character of Roman-Italian relations The Italian holdings may have had a history quite different from that of the Roman holding redistributed by the Gracchan commission. The latter may only relatively recently have become Roman public land. After the Second Punic War, the quantity of ager publicus populi Romani grew substantially.48 In Southern Italy, the allies who had supported Hannibal suffered severe retaliation; some communities were annexed altogether, in other cases lame parts of their territories were expropriated and turned into Roman public land. Large Roman holdings were established on the former allied territories, and in order to regulate the new areas, limitations may have been imposed on the amount occupied, probably around 180.49 Though quite generous (500 - possibly 1000 - iugera per holder) they had not been respected - in itself illustrating the scale involved, and were first reinforced by the Gracchan reformers. These regions would have been the obvious target for the commission, and there are some indications that they were particularly affected by its work. Three source-types may help to locate these tracts of Roman public land. The most unam­ biguous is the inscribed border stones, which represent the commission's own epigraphical signature on its work.50 Further archaeological evidence is provided by the traces of centuria­ tion still extant in the modern landscape. As signs of limitation and land-distribution these traces are unequivocal; their dating, however, is largely speculative. Some characteristics of Gracchan centuriation have been demonstrated, but they do not allow a dating on these criteria alone.51 The Liber coloniarum frequently refers to Gracchan assignations and deductions, but the quality of this information has long been disputed. Attempts have been made to upgrade its

47

Cf. e.g. Flach (1973) 281.

48

See Brunt (1971) 278-84.

49

Thus most recently B. Forsén, Lex Licinia Sextia de modo agrorum -fiction or reality (Helsinki 1991), with previous literature, and D. Flach, Die Gesetze der frühen römischen Republik (Darmstadt 1994) 285-94. Contra, D. W. Rathbone, review of Flach (1990) in Göttihgische Gelehrte Anzeigen, 245 (1993) 26-38, T. J. Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome (London 1995) 328-30, 333-40.

50 51

See above n.44.

On Gracchan centuriation see F. T. Hinrichs, Die Geschichte der gromatischen Institutionen (Wiesbaden 1974) 58-60, Chouquer et al. (1987) 245-47, to be used with caution cf. J. Patterson's review, JRS 81 (1991)215.

ITALIAN 'UNIFICATION' - THE OUTBREAK OF THE SOCIAL WAR , lue and clearly this source cannot be flatly discarded, as it was by Mommsen.52 However, . j^-ae parts of it remain dubious, an uncorroborated statement cannot be accepted at face ; lue. Therefore, apart from the cippi, most of the evidence remains inconclusive. The material •. moreover, by no means comprehensive; the cippi have been found purely by chance, and the -stipes of centuriation, ephemeral as they are, have been thoroughly investigated only in -rtain areas.53 In the liber coloniarum, assignations otherwise attested have sometimes been iiiiitted. Still, from these scattered pieces of information an overall picture does emerge, which may with all due reservations, give us a vague idea as to the geographical location of the Gracchan settlements. The main areas affected by the redistribution appear to have been those confiscated by Rome after the Second Punic War. The Gracchan settlements may have been concentrated in the regions of Apulia (Arpi), Calabria (Tarentum, Lupiae), Lucania (Grumentum, Consilinum, Volcei, Tegianum, Atina), Bruttium (Consentia, Clampetia), Campania (Capua, Abellinum), Southern Samnium (Calatia, Compsa, Aeclanum, Telesia), that is, the areas most affected by the con­ fiscations after the Second Punic War. Outside these regions assignations are found in Latium (Allifae, Verulae), Southern Etruria (Ferentum?, Tarquinia?) and the Ager Gallicus, and in the territories of the Latin colonies Cales and Suessa Aurunca. No redistribution of Roman public land confiscated from the Italian allies before the Hannibalic War is securely documented.54 By concentrating on the more recent annexations much land could be made available for redistribution by a few transactions. The status of the land was probably clear from the outset and itmay have been (roughly) surveyed just two generations earlier. Relatively uncomplicated there, the redistribution process may well have been so far advanced in the Roman areas that by 129 the commission had no other choice but to turn to Italian holdings of Roman public land. The location of these holdings is virtually unknown; untouched as they were by the commis­ sion, no traces of redistribution have been left. Our only source is Appian, whose 'history' of the

52

De Martino (1984) 3126-32. For the value of the liber coloniarum see the survey in L. Keppie, Colonisation and veteran settlement in Italy 47 - 14 BC (Rome 1983) 8-12.

53 For central Italy see Chouquer et al. (1987), Northern Apulia: G.D.B. Jones, 'Il Tavoliere romano. L'agricoltura romana attraverso l'aerofotografia e lo scavo', Arch. Class. 32 (1980) 85-100, Samnium: R. Compatangelo, 'Catasti e strutture agrarie regionali del Sannio', in La romanisation du Samnium aux Ile et 1er siècles av.J.-C. (Naples 1991) 139-47, Salento; ead., Un cadastre de pierre: le Salento romain (Paris 1989), cf. J. Patterson's review, JRS 83 (1993) 191f.

Traces of centuriation have been found in the territories of the Paelignian towns of Corfinium and Sulmo, Chouquer et al. (1987) 134f. Their structure resembles that of the Gracchan settlements, and according to the lib. col. Gracchan assignations were carried out around Corfinium. That date, found •n the most corrupt part of the lib. col., cf. Hinrichs (1974) 59, is however, ruled out by the sheer extent of the centuriation. Covering the entire valley, including the urban areas, it implies that both towns and territories were in fact Roman before the Social War. That situation is quite incompatible with their abundantly documented status of allied states. On the other hand, a Sullan distribution of their land would be perfectly understandable not least in the light of Corfinium's role during the war. The assigna­ tions in Arretium, recorded by the lib. co/.(215,4), may, as suggested by Hinrichs, ibid., have dealt with viasii vicani settled along the Roman road passing by the town, although that remains hypothetical.

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ITALIAN UNIFICATION

Roman public land is a web of misconceptions.55 When describing Scipio's intervention, Anni 18, gives, however, a sketch of the current situation in 129 which invites a great deal mo -. confidence. The fundamental difficulty facing the commission (and the one causing th* allegations of violation of allied treaties) was the distinction between public and private land S much time had passed since the first occupation had taken place that hardly any documentary evidence had survived, while the physical borders had gradually been wiped out. Apparently th situation was far more complicated here than it had been when the commission dealt with th holdings annexed more recently (in Southern Italy?). Presumably the allies in question coul | therefore not simply have been the Italians still living in these recently con-fiscated areas ■*■"' Moreover, the confusion as to the status of the allied land suggests that no records existed and that consequently no vectigal had been levied by the Roman authorities. This rent seems otherwise to have been levied regularly in the second century, and as noted by Nicolet, it appears unlikely that once imposed it would have been 'forgotten'.57 The implication is that the Romans had never made any attempt to profit economically from the old holdings in allied hands; they may therefore have had a different character from the Roman holdings, mainly located in the former allied territories of Southern Italy. Whereas these were probably to a large extent created after the Hannibalic War, the Italian holdings would have been much older; the confiscations must, as explicitly stated by Appian, have taken place right after the Roman conquest in the early third century. Presumably, the original purpose was to reserve land for future Roman colonisation and viritane assignations. In the meantime, the allies were allowed to use it as before. The Romans, however, never reclaimed it.58 Two interrelated processes may have been responsible for this. Firstly, expansion in the Mediterranean meant a growing Roman dependency on regular supplies of Italian soldiers. The empire had been established with large contingents of allied troops - and they would still be needed if Rome was to maintain its position. The extensive use of Italian manpower implied that other types of exploitation had to yield to this primary interest in the Italians, whose acquiescence is likely to have become a matter of concern in Rome. Further colonisation in Italy would have undermined not only the allies' ability to mobilise a sufficient number of troops, but also their 55

As pointed out by K. Bringmann, 'Das "Licinisch-Sextische" Ackergesetz und die gracchisene Agrar­ reform', in Symposium für A. Heuss, FAS 12 (Kalimünz 1986) 51-66, and Flach (1990) 32f, the lex de modo agrorum, perhaps carried between 180 and 167, was not, as claimed by Appian. 32-34, an attemptto strengthen the class of small farmers. The purpose was to secure equal access for all Roman nobles to the new public land. Also the imposition of a vectigal, which Appian links with thefirstoccupation (in the early third century), seems spurious. The motives ascribed to the Romans, handing over their public land to the allies, are obvious anachronisms; in the early third century maintaining the military strength of the Italians was hardly one of Rome's primary concerns. 56

Their holdings are unlikely to have exceeded the generous limits of the Gracchan law;., the ^. confiscation of their land was after all meant as a retribution, and the lex de modo agrorum clearly demonstrates the interests of leading Romans in the newly annexed areas. 57 58

Nicolet (1976) 8If.

Though the existence of such 'hidden' tracts of Roman public land cannot, for obvious reasons, be proven, there are indications that the political map of republican Italy may have been more complex than often assumed. Thus, the colonies in Southern Etruria, Saturnia, Graviscae and Heba, would have been founded on land which had been confiscated long before Rome decided to exploit the terntont in 183, 181 and 157.

ITALIAN 'UNIFICATION' - THE OUTBREAK OF THE SOCIAL WAR

149

•ii-naness to do so. Such considerations may also have contributed to the other important \ dopment, the colonisation of Cisalpine Gaul. Instead of seizing allied holdings of public land, me chose to subdue the northern tribes and settle her colonists in that region. The resources / j n combination with the recent Southern Italian annexations), were so abundant that the man requirements could easily be met throughout the first half of the second century. 59 In the » *ond half, however, the growing impoverishment of the small landowners led to new demands • rdistributions, which could no longer be accommodated by northern expansion; the sensitive issue of the Italian holdings had to be faced again. Ti Gracchus first addressed the problem but failed, because the holdings had now reached an ac that made a distinction between public and private land practically impossible - and olitically untenable. These areas had probably never been properly surveyed - only rough estimates of their location and the extent of the areas may have been recorded. Unlike the Roman holdings in Southern Italy, the holders will often have owned private land adjoining the public domains, gradually blurring the borderlines. The difficulties involved in measuring and redistri­ buting these tracts of public land were immense, and as soon as the commission turned to the Italian holdings political obstacles emerged. The Italians claimed violation of the treaties, which cuiaranteed the integrity of their territories, thereby bringing the whole process to a halt. After an abortive attempt to revive it, Flaccus turned once again to Cisalpine Gaul - the standard solution to such problems in the past. Taking a lesson from his example, C. Gracchus probably also added an exemption of the allied territories and introduced the strategy for the future, overseas colonisation in the provinces. The elder Drusus may have been more bold, but his Italian programme came to nothing. Later, Saturninus followed in C. Gracchus' footsteps, keeping Italian land out of his colonial scheme. \vi

Viewed in this perspective Drusus' agrarian law of 91 assumes a new character. Not simply another 'popular' device in the Gracchan tradition, it would have been far more controversial in its implications than has often been assumed. Defining the target area as Italy, where mostly allied holdings were left for distribution, Drusus ignored the political lesson of the previous generation. The law is therefore likely to have represented a serious threat to the social and economic wellbeing of the allies - perhaps the greatest since the extensive colonisation in the third century and the annexations in the early second century. Certainly, both Ti. Gracchus and the elder Drusus had made similar proposals. But their plans had either failed or (perhaps) been cancelled. This lime, however, the programme seemed to have a good chance of being implemented. Drusus' scheme would seize land which had been cultivated by the allies for centuries and become inseparable from their private properties. Moreover, if the scheme was in fact a revival of the extensive paternal plan, expanded with viritane distributions, it is uncertain whether the generous

!ne scale involved is illustrated by the fact that Rome in 181 could settle 47,000 Ligurians on confiscated areas in southern Samnium, cf. J. Patterson, Sanniti, Liguri e Romani (Benevento 1988).

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ITALIAN UNIFICATION

Gracchan limits could be maintained.60 It is, therefore, ironic that the younger Drusus should h known to posterity as the 'friend of the allies'. Not all allies may have been equally severely affected by Drusus' agrarian law. But for tho who were, it was a serious blow; their whole economic (and social) standing might have been stake.61 Their predicament effectively highlighted the precarious situation of the allies in generalit is therefore not unlikely that Drusus' lex agraria may have been that straw which broke th camel's back and turned general discontent into active subversion. The second factor likely to have incited the Italian rebellion of 91 can only be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Drusus' agrarian law had put the subordinate position of the allies in sharp focus; but in 91 other quite exceptional events had radically improved the prospects of a successful rising against Rome. Throughout the year, the Latins (perhaps also affected by the land bill62) had demonstrated an unprecedented intransigence and disaffection towards Rome. Set on finally obtaining Roman citizenship, they had started conspiring and had even planned an attempt on the consuls who obstructed their cause. In the next chapter, it will be argued that the Latins constituted an important category within the military structure of republican Italy. If, as seemed likely, the Latins were about to desert Rome in 91, the balance of power between Rome and the Italians would shift dramatically in favour of the latter. The political struggle over the franchise question, the Roman refusal and the indignant Latin reaction would have signalled to the allies that Rome's military position might be seriously weakened. Thus, the Latins may, I believe, have played a pivotal role in the Social War,firstby (indirectly) encouraging the outbreak of the revolt and later in determining its military course andfinaloutcome. The chronology of the Italian conspiracy can now be reconstructed as follows. The anger of the allies wasfirstaroused when Drusus' agrarian law was proposed and passed against their protests - and Italian desperation can only have increased as the new agrarian commission began seizing their land. At the same time Drusus proved unable to fulfil his promise of Roman citizenship to 60

Flach (1990) 66f, believes that the Italian holders had become 'rechtmässigen Besitzern' by C. Gracchus' agrarian law, which exempted them from redistribution. Therefore, invoking Appian's account of Italians cultivating Roman land 'some by force and others clandestinely', 162, Flach suggests that Drusus could only seize land illegally held by the Italians. This inference, however, is not cogent. A general exemption does not in itself imply a legal recognition. Furthermore, it appears from Appian's text that all allied holdings were threatened by Drusus' law (in some cases even their private land). As noted above, the fundamental problem was to determine the exact location and extent of the public land. The holdings in question would therefore have been the same disputed tracts, which had led to the halt in 129. The definition 'vi et clam', underlying Appian's definition, probably reflects the partial Roman point of view, expressed by Drusus and his supporters, keen to assure the Roman public that the Italians had no rightful claim on the land. 61

E. Gabba, 'Considerazioni sulla decadenza della piccola proprietà contadina nell'Italia centromeridionale del II sec. A.C.', Ktema 2 (1977) 269-84, and (1979) 15-73, has advanced the attractive theory that the Roman confiscations primarily affected the large tracts of common land, arable as well as pasture, which formed an essential part of the economic structure of the allied states. In that case the redistribution of Roman public land would affect not merely individual farmers, but entire communities. 62

The Gracchan cippus found at Celenza Valfortore may have pertained to the territory of Luceria, cf. M. Pani, 'Su un nuovo cippo graccano dauno', RIL 111 (1977) 389-400. However, A. Russi & A. Valvo, 'Note storiche sul nuovo termine graccano di Celenza Valfortore', Mise, greca romana 5 (1977) 225-49, have suggested that the area in question was part of the ager Taurasinus.

ITALIAN 'UNIFICATION' - THE OUTBREAK OF THE SOCIAL WAR * Latins. Already in spring/early summer their discontent had reached a level where violence , ueCome a viable option. A plot to assassinate the consuls at the Latin festival was disclosed j became widely known in Rome - and presumably in Italy too. This apparent split between the main groups on the Roman side, the cives optimo iure and the Latini, would have appeared a aod-sent opportunity to the grumbling allies. A revolt now became a far more realistic r -nture, and it was probably at this moment that the idea of open resistance first firmed up in the linds of tlie Italians. After protracted negotiations (the failure of Fregellae being a dire warning) . oreat coalition was formed; in the autumn it was about to be sealed by the exchange of hostages when the incident at Asculum, somewhat prematurely, triggered the revolt.

Ill ITALIAN 'UNIFICATION' 3 LATINS, ITALIANS, AND THE ROMAN CITIZENSHIP In 90. the Lex Julia offered the Roman citizenship to the peoples of Italy. The historical signi­ ficance of this law is beyond doubt: in Pro Balbo, 21, Cicero implies that it was the most important of the enfranchisement laws which brought about the first political unification of Italy. This step has been seen as the ultimate confirmation of the traditional view of the war as a struggle for Roman citizenship. If there had been no demand for citizenship, it could rightly be argued, why should Rome have made this concession? Certainly a desire for Roman citizenship seems evident: the question is who entertained this ambition. It is not a certain fact that it was the Italian peoples who had risen against Rome; indeed, no direct connection between the Lex Julia and the motives of the insurgents can be shown. The law does not seem to have had any impact on the Italian revolt. It did not lead to any immediate enfranchisement or bring an end to the warfare. None of the original insurgents laid down their arms; they were all subdued in the war which continued apparently unaffected by the citizenship law. Two explanations may be offered to this problem, depending on how the terms given by the law are interpreted. According to Appian, 212, the offer of citizenship was given to loyal allies, whereas Velleius, 2,16,4, defines the recipients as those who had either not taken up arms or laid them down 'maturius'. This expression has been interpreted both as 'before a fixed date given in the law' and 'well before the law had been passed'.1 The implication of the first interpretation is that the rebels actually refused the offer of Roman citizenship, thus striking the final blow to the idea of the war as a struggle for enfranchise­ ment. The latter interpretation is, however, hardly less damaging to this theory than the former. An offer to the loyal allies would make little political and military sense. Hard-pressed by the Italian revolt, Rome finally accepted the idea of an extension of the Roman citizenship; still she chose to limit the offer to the loyal allies, excluding exactly those who had gone to such extremes to get it. The concession would therefore not have removed the serious military threat which had forced Rome to make this move in the first place. According to Appian, the law was passed to prevent the Etruscans and Umbrians from joining the revolt. But if Rome had accepted the idea of admitting more or less rebellious allies to the Roman citizenship in exchange for peace, the question is why Rome compromised only with potential opponents and not with the rebels themselves. The logical answer would be that the insurgents were not fighting for Roman citizenship but had made far more extensive demands which Rome could not possibly meet. Appian's account might therefore suggest a curious difference in the attitudes of the Oscan-speaking insurgents and the Etruscans and Umbrians. In that case, 1 The former is suggested by Sherwin-White (1972) 148, De Martino (1972-75) III 53, the latter by Salmon (1967) 361, Gabba, 'Mario e Siila', ANRWl,\ (1972) 764-805, 792, G. Luraschi, 4Sulle "leges de civitate" (Iulia, Calpurnia, Plautia Papiria)', SDHI44 (1978) 321-70, 324f, Brunt (1988) 108.

153

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ITALIAN UNIFICATION

however, we would have to explain why the latter were on the brink of joining an anti-Roma revolt whose intentions they did not share. Viewed in this perspective, the role of the Etruscans and Umbrians attracts considerable interest. According to Appian 211-3, they heard about the victories of the rebels and were incited to revolt themselves. Fearing a new front to the north, the Roman senate enrolled freedmen and decided that loyal allies should be admitted to the Roman citizenship, 'which was the one thing they all desired most. They sent this decree around among the Etruscans who gladly accepted the citizenship. By this favour the senate made the faithful more faithful confirmed the wavering, and mollified their enemies by hope of similar treatment'. But the joy of the new citizens was tempered, when it later emerged that they would not be inscribed in the 35 old tribes but in a smaller number of new tribes. Before the news of the enfran­ chisement of the Etruscans and Umbrians had reached the Ionian coast, an allied army of 15,000 men had already been sent to their assistance, App. 216. They were defeated by the consul Cn. Pompeius and the survivors had to make their way back through difficult terrain in a severe winter, where half of them perished. This version is opposed by the Livian tradition. Per. 74 states that 'A. Plotius legatus Umbros, L. Porcius praetor Etruscos, cum uterqus populus defecisset, proelio vicerunt', and in almost identical words Orosius 5,18,17 tells us that 'Porcius Cato praetor Etruscos, Plotius legatus Umbros plurimo sanguine inpenso et difficillimo labore vicerunt'.2 Although Orosius may exaggerate the bloodshed (as he often does), we have no reason to doubt the core of information given in these passages. The implication is that not only did Etruscans and Umbrians revolt, but they also refused to lay down their arms and were defeated in battle. This situation is also implied by Appian's own account of the measures taken by the senate; freedmen were called up and a franchise law was passed. The question is why it was necessary to call up freedmen, if the other measure would automatically eliminate the northern threat, which had created the need for more troops. By the enlistment of freedmen it is implicitly recognised that the revolt was a reality and expected to continue despite the franchise law. The revolt cannot therefore, as claimed by Appian, have been aimed at the acquisition of Roman citizenship. In that case there would have been no need for a military confrontation (or reinforcement); when offered citizenship, the Etruscans and Umbrians would simply have accepted and joined the Romans. We are therefore confronted with two different versions, between which no easy com­ promise seems possible. Appian claims that citizenship was offered in order to avoid a revolt in Etruria and Umbria. The Livian tradition, on the other hand, relates that these peoples rebelled and were subdued. Faced with such contradictory evidence we have to choose, and Appian's version is obviously the weaker one, based as it is on a suppression of information given by the annalists as plain matters of fact. This version is, moreover, indirectly supported by Sisenna. Three fragments, P94, P95, and PI 19, all refer to dealings with individual communities in Umbria, Iguvium, Perusia, and Tuder. PI 19 says that 'tarnen Tudertibus senati consulto et populi iussu dat civitatem', which may suggest that this was not a straightforward enfranchisement according to the general offer of the Lex Julia. This process may therefore have had a different, more complicated character than Appian implies. 2

Also Florus 2,6,5-6, mentions both Umbrians and Etruscans among the rebels of the Social War.

ITALIAN 'UNIFICATION' - LATINS, ITALIANS, & THE ROMAN CITIZENSHIP

155

further doubt is thrown on the causal link between the Lex Julia and the Etruscan and ï Tmbrian revolts by the chronology of events. The northern revolt may be dated to the end of on In both Orosius and the Livian perioecha, their suppression is mentioned as the last lititary event of the year, appearing immediately before the new consuls took over. Appian merely places it in the autumn of 90, but the allied expedition's miserable fate in the snowy moun-tains suggests a relatively late date. This story is probably Appian's own creation, based on the Marsic attempt to relieve the besieged city of Asculum in early 89.3 The replacement would nevertheless be odd if no chronological proximity existed between the two events. The story may therefore confirm the Livian date of the Eiruscan/Umbrian revolt. The Lex Julia has generally been dated to the end of 90, often October, when the consul was back in Rome to preside over the elections. That date, however, is based entirely on Appian's linking it to the Etruscan/Umbrian revolt; none of the other sources which mention the law gives any chronological hints. But considering the problems attached to the Appianic version, pointed out above, the date of the Lex Julia can no longer be regarded as certain. That in turn draws new attention to the evidence of Sisenna, PI7, the implication of which has not yet been fully recognised. The excerpt derives from the third book and runs 'Lucius Calpurnius Piso ex senati consulto duas novas tribus'. Another excerpt, PI20, refers to a Lex Calpurnia, which had provided for the enfranchisement of soldiers 'virtutis ergo'. In theory these Leges Calpumiae may be identical, although it seems unlikely. Certainly, the creation of new tribes can hardly have been a measure to accommodate individual grants of citizen­ ship. They could not possibly have been so numerous that two additional tribes were required. The creation of special tribes for individual foreigners would also have been contrary to the basic conception of tribes as geographical entities. The Lex Calpurnia therefore must be part of the legislation following a major territorial extension of the citizenship.4 In Pro Balbo 21 : 'Ipsa denique Julia, qua lege ci vitas est sociis et Latinis data ...', Cicero implies that the Lex Julia was the main law granting citizenship to Latins and allies. His words would also seem to exclude the possibility that it might have been preceded by other substantial enfranchise­ ments. Consequently the Calpurnian law on new tribus can hardly have been passed prior to the Lex Julia. This conclusion, in itself hardly controversial, is interesting in the light of the chronology of the 3rd and 4th books of Sisenna. Frassinetti's careful study has shown that the 3rd book

3 This misunderstanding has long been suspected, cf. Marcks (1884) 76, A. von Domaszewski, Bellum Marsicwn, S. B. Akad. Wiss. Wien 201 (1924) 28, Haug (1947) 229. Appian, 216, and Orosius, 5,18,17, describe two contemporary expeditions coming to the relief of northern allies, but defeated by Pompeius Strabo and ending up in snowy mountain areas. Such a coincidence seems unlikely, and also in this case the overall probability suggests that Appian is mistaken - and Orosius right. An attempt to relieve Asculum appears a far more realistic move than the venture described by Appian. Geographically, as well, the Appianic version seems implausible; a rescue action for Etruscans and Umbrians by peoples living on the 'Ionian coast' could hardly have met Pompeius, who was laying siege to Asculum. Keaveney (1987) 149 n. 43, accepting both versions, appears to place too much trust in Appian's reliability. 4

Cf. e.g. R. G. Lewis, 'Appian BC 1,49,214, Dekateuontes: Rome's new tribes 90-87 BC, Ath. 46 (1968) 273-91, 279, Keaveney (1987) 170, contra Gabba (1976) 90f, Brunt (1988) 133.

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is unlikely to have covered the autumn of 90.5 None of the datable fragments refer to events after August 90, the last one, PI2, mentioning the deposition of the sagiun after the battle of Acerrae. On the other hand, the earliest excerpts of the 4th book seem to refer to events in the late summer; P60 may be related to the battle by the Fucine Lake, App. 201 ff.6 This chronological division of the two books has previously been rejected on the grounds that it would be at variance with Appian's dating of the Lex Julia.1 Such compromises are untenableit must be recognised that the evidence of Sisenna seems to point to an earlier date, probablv to the summer of 90 - well before the Etruscan/Umbrian revolt. Therefore, not only the causal connection between the law and the northern rebellion, claimed by Appian, but also the chronological link is modified by other sources. Appian's account, in sum, hardly justifies the attribution to the Etruscans and Umbrians of attitudes essentially different from those of the other allies. A strong case can be made for them actually having joined the Italian revolt - and for them having done so after the Lex Julia had been passed. Their relatively late entry into the war (presumably in the early autumn) defies closer analysis. Several factors, contributing to the delay, may be conjectured, however. Geographical separation and the absence of traditional links may explain why they did not take part in the original conspiracy. The revolt was largely an 'Oscan' affair; the war may have appeared to them merely as an attempt to replace the Roman hegemony with a 'Sabellian' one, probably dominated by the Samnites.9 Therefore, it was only when an Italian victory emerged as a realistic possibility, that the Etruscans and Umbrians decided to take up arms against Rome. If, as argued above, the connection between the the Lex Julia and the Etruscan/Umbrian revolt is fictitious, the background and purpose of the law must be reconsidered. The Etruscan/Umbrian link was the sole factor explaining, though not fully satisfactorily, why the Romans passed the law and how it was able to strengthen Rome's military position. Having returned to our starting point, these questions will have to be posed anew. The only other major group yet to be considered is the Latins. But again, it might be asked, what were the purpose and benefits of enfranchising peoples who had remained loyal to Rome? The fidelity of the Latins has been regarded an indisputable fact; but a closer look at the evidence may suggest a more independent role in the war. The course of the Social War features a remarkable reversal of fortune. An impressive series of allied victories in the first year was followed by a continuous series of setbacks throughout the second year; within a few months Rome turned an imminent disaster into a sweeping military success. A full account of the war operations is hardly needed to

5

P. Frassineti 'Sisenna e la guerra sociale', Ath. 50 (1972) 78-113, 96-98.

6

Frassinetti (1972) 99.

G. Bambino, 'I frammenti delle "Historiae" di Lucio Cornelio Sisenna', Studi Noniani 1 (Genoa 1967) 119ff. Harris (1971) 218-29, lists a number of (mostly speculative) reasons for the late entry of the Etruscans and Umbrians. 9

Cf. Harris (1971) 220.

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demonstrate this point; even a cursory survey shows the difference between 90 and 89.10 In the former, most confrontations were won by the Italians, who could claim only one major victory the following year. Two interrelated questions are raised by this couse of events: why was Rome so hard-pressed in the first year and how did she manage to avert the defeat? The Social War was an unusual conflict; the two opposing forces had hitherto constituted a single army. Therefore in respect of experience, equipment and technical and strategic skills they would have been on an equal footing. But while the explanatory value of qualitative differences is negligible, the importance of numerical strength is correspondingly increased. In his study of the Roman expansion Afzelius demonstrated that the crucial factor in Rome's conquest of Italy 340-264 BC had been her numerical superiority over changing opponents.11 Miliary success in antiquity was probably often less dependent on factors like generalship, equipment, and 'morale', than on sheer manpower. In the Social War, where the qualitative equality of the opponents was striking, this aspect will have been of even greater significance. We have no reliable indications of the size of the armies in the Social War. According to Appian, 177, 100,000 soldiers fought on each side, while Velleius, 2,15,3, tells us that more than 300,000 were killed in the war.12 These statements, inconsistent and rhetorical as they are, cannot be accorded much credence. To make an estimate of the relative strength of the warring parties we may turn to Polybius' account of the mobilisation in 225. Facing a Gallic invasion, Rome asked the allies to report the maximum number of troops they were able to raise. Via Fabius Pictor these figures are transmitted in Polybius 2,23ff, offering a unique insight into the manpower resources of republican Italy.13 The actual numbers cannot, of course, be directly applied to the situation in 90. But they may reflect the regions' varying population density, which were dependent on geographical and climatic constants. Therefore, while taking into account demographic changes caused by later historical developments, Polybius' figures may be a valid tool to analyse the Social War. Several events and processes may have affected the relative strength of Romans, Latins, and Italian allies. Most profound was probably the impact of the Hannibalic War. The devasta­ tions were immense, not least in the South; however, the long-term effect of the Roman con­ fiscations, following the war, were probably greater than the destructions themselves.14 They may in many cases have permanently reduced the allied populations. In the following decades we find indications of a substantial emigration to Roman and Latin areas, which may have been a recurrent phenomenon throughout the century. The allies also seem to have made relatively larger contributions of manpower to the Roman expansion in the Mediterranean

10

See the accounts of the war in e.g. Salmon (1967) 340-99, or Keaveney (1987) 131-61. Afzelius (1942) 193. 12 Livy may have given the casualties as 50,000, cf. Brunt (1971) 439. 11

13

For this list, probably identical with the formula togatorum, see Afzelius (1942), Walbank (1957) 196-203, Brunt (1971) 44-60, Ilari (1974) 64-71, D. W. Baronowski, 'Roman military forces in 225 BC (Polybius 2,23-4)', Historia 42 (1993) 181-202. For the destructions of the Hannibalic War see Brunt (1971) 269-11'; for the confiscations see ibid. 278-84. See also Tim Cornell, 'Hannibal's Legacy: the effects of the Hannibalic War on Italy', in The Second Punic War: A reappraisal, ed. Tim Cornell, Boris Rankov, and Philip Sabin, BICS Supplement 67 (1996), 97-113.

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than Rome herself.15 On the other hand, Rome's income from the empire and territorial exnsion in Italy and Gallia Cisalpina in the second century would have allowed for a great growth in the Roman population. In short, the demographic changes since 225 were all ' favour of Rome and the Latins, therefore by using Polybius' figures we are unlikely to und restimate the relative strength of the Italian rebels in 90. Polybius' list gives the manpower resources for the following regions: Samnites, centnl Italian peoples, Apulians, Lucanians, Umbrians, Etruscans, Latins and Romans, the first fou of which covered the insurgent area for most of 90. Asculum, an isolated tract of allied terri­ tory in Roman Picenum, was probably included in the Abruzzi contingent rather than the Umbrian one.16 However, some communities within the predominantly rebel areas seem to have been split on the issue, remained neutral, or even supported Rome. Groups opposing the war are incidentally known in Nuceria, Aeclanum, and most notably Pinna, which seems to have become a standard example of internal strife among the insurgents.17 The Messapii are on the other hand, not known to have participated in the revolt, while Teanum Sidicinum seems to have given active support to the Roman forces.18 It is far from certain whether these divisions should be perceived as a clash between pro- and anti-Roman groups. Joining the revolt was a crucial decision that might determine the future of the entire community: a failure would be disastrous and jeopardise its very existence. Inevitably discussions and disagree­ ments would arise as to the prospects of success and the wisdom of taking up arms. Rather than disagreements over the aims of the revolt it may have been lack of confidence in a positive outcome that set some groups and communities apart from the majority of allies. On the Roman/Latin side only Venusia is known to have taken part in the revolt. The relative strength of the rebels will therefore have been even smaller than that indicated by Polybius for 225. Brunt has made some corrections in Polybius' numbers where these appear suspect, also taking into account the fact that the allies may have underestimated their military resources when reporting to Rome.19 Using these corrected figures, converted into free male adults, we find that the balance of manpower would have weighted strongly in favour of the Romans and Latins. In 225 they could muster 434,000 men compared to 320,000 for the 'rebel' regions; but, as noted above, the difference in manpower resources in the Social War would have been relatively greater than these figures suggest.20 This estimate of the resources of the warfaring parties therefore indicates a substantial Roman/Latin superiority. Nevertheless Rome was seriously pressed in the first phase of the war, suffering defeat after defeat on the battlefields.

15

Afzelius (1944) 75 n.l, Ilari (1976) 171-3.

16

Cf. Afzelius (1942) 106.

17

For Nuceria see Cicero, Pro Sulla 58cf. p. 136 n.2, Aeclanum: Velleius 2,16,2, Pinna: Rhet. ad Her. 2,45, Diodorus 37,19,4-5. 18

Cf. Appian, 199.

19

Brunt (1971) 54. See also E. Lo Cascio, 'I togati della "formula togatorum"', Ann. 1st. hai Studi Storici, 12 (1991/1994) 309-28. 20

Salmon (1967) 346, seems to think that the relative peace in the provinces was an advantage to the allies. However, the six legions, which Brunt (1971), 435, estimates were engaged overseas in 91. would undoubtedly have been accompanied by a corresponding number of Italians.

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159

u has been suggested that the Italians, having started the war, had an initial advantage, •ch Rome only gradually overcame.21 The argument is hardly a strong one. As argued Rome may already have made quite substantial preparations before the outbreak. In case the warfare soon had to stop for the winter, giving Rome plenty of time to mobilise. .' initia.l advantage which the insurgents may have enjoyed can therefore only have been . r i ^ incident at Asculum was in fact highly inconvenient from an Italian point of view, rf possible, they would probably have preferred to postpone the revolt till the following •nvT We have no external grounds to posit any temporary manpower shortage on the Roman side. Indeed, Rome seems already to have stretched its manpower resources to their limits at the beginning of the campaign of 90. Young and quite inexperienced recruits were thrown into battle early on.22 Later in 90 even freedmen were called up (for the first time since the Second Punic War), a step which clearly implies that all other resources had been ex­ hausted. Further reinforcements were brought from the provinces. Troops from Gaul, Africa, and Spain all appear on the Roman side, some of them already in the early, critical phase of the war.23 Against this background not only does Rome's plight during the first year seem curious, but the abrupt reversal of fortune which followed is also hard to explain. It has generally been seen as a consequence of the Etruscans and Umbrians joining Rome,24 but that solution is not entirely satisfying. Rome already had a major numerical advantage over the insurgents; rein­ forcements from Etruria and Umbria, not some of the most populous or martially renowned regions, can hardly have made such an impact on the course of the war. Their contributions, moreover, could neither have been voluntary nor whole-hearted; they had, after all, joined the revolt and been defeated in battle. Their loyalty may rightly have seemed questionable and there is no evidence whatsoever of Etruscans or Umbrians fighting on the side of Rome. The military role of these peoples, therefore, most probably came to an end in the winter of 90/89. To the problem of political logic, noted above - for whom was the Lex Julia passed? - we have now added one of military logic, pointing out a discrepancy between the resources available on either side and the actual course of the war. A possible answer to both questions may lie in a reconsideration of the peoples participating in the war - and in particular the position of the Latins. The unflagging loyalty of the Latins has constituted a fixed part of modern interpretations of the Social War. Without questioning its basic truth, historians have, however, wondered at this feature of the war. As we saw, suggestions have been made that a supposed ius civitatis per magistratum adipisce/idae had already given the Latin elites access to the Roman citizens­ hip before the war.25 But the existence of such a right, in itself highly dubious in this period, is clearly contradicted by the Latin conspiracy during Drusus' tribunate. Therefore, rather than 21

Salmon (1967) 346f, even claiming that the insurgents were numerically superior to the Romans.

22

Plut. Marius 33,2, Oros. 5,18.

23

App. 188f, 219f, SisennaP29, P71, P72, Plut. Sert. 4, ILLRP 146, mentioning African reinforcement at some point sent to Alba Fucens.

24

E.g. Salmon (1967) 361.

"Cf. above pp. 99-108.

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ITALIAN UNIFICATION

trying to explain their remarkable support for Rome, we might ask whether it really had th strength and unanimity which have been ascribed to it. The only source explicitly mentioning Latin support is Livy, per. 72: 'Auxilia deinde Latin' nominis et exterarum gentium missa populo Romano ...' In itself this does not allow us to sav anything about the extent of the help. The appearence of this piece of information in the summary suggests that Livy had devoted considerable space and attention to the question; that might seem odd if their support had been both prompt and unanimous. A more complex issumay therefore underlie this brief notice. Certainly some Latin colonies put up stubborn resistance to Italian attacks; both Alba Fucens and Aesernia were besieged by the rebels. But self-defence should not be confused with active support for Rome. We must also bear in mind the possibility that Roman forces may already have been dispatched to these strategically important towns, eliminating any alternative options for the local Latins. The Latin struggle for Roman enfranchisement had been long and occasionally dramaticlet us briefly recapitulate. In 125 the revolt of Fregellae had demonstrated the depth of their grievances. This rising had been brutally crushed, but soon C. Gracchus again raised their hopes. After his failure, one generation - of persistent campaigning? - passed before a new opportunity appeared. Backed by influential senators, the younger Drusus proposed an extension of the citizenship. The prospects had seemed good, probably raising Latin expecta­ tions to unprecedented heights. As opposition grew and Drusus proved unable to fulfil his promise, the Latins were infuriated to the point of defection; an attempt on their consular opponents was even planned. The conspiracy was exposed, and with the assassination of Drusus there was no longer any hope of enfranchisement. At that moment, however, the Latin threat had been overtaken by other far more ominous developments. A great coalition had been formed by the Italian allies set on breaking the Roman hegemony. In the autumn the revolt broke out, and the Latins found themselves in a new position. Viewed against this background, it is difficult to see how the Latins could have rallied to the support of Rome in 90. The course of Drusus' tribunate had shown beyond any doubt that Rome was not prepared to grant the citizenship, to which the Latins felt they were entitled. Though their resentment was deep, the Latins could not join the revolt for the simple reason that it was distinctly anti-Roman, whereas the Latins were culturally and historically closely linked to Rome. The anecdote from the riots in Asculum, told by Diodorus, 37,12, illustrates their situation. To avoid persecution by the agitated Asculans a Latin actor drew attention to the fact that he too was subjected to the Roman fasces. That is, to the local Italians he appeared as a Roman enemy, whereas legally he was in largely the same position as the Italians themselves. The Latins, in other words, had no natural part in the revolt, whose objectives they could not share. If the ambition had merely been to obtain the Roman citizen­ ship, there would have been nothing to prevent the Latins from joining the revolt on the spot. The fact that they did not is a strong indication that the Italian motives were fundamentally different from those of the Latins. In this situation, the Latins would logically have tried to stay outside the conflict. Expressing their resentment at the Roman refusal, this position would also put greater weight behind a renewed demand for citizenship. The Italian revolt opened up new possibilities for the Latins of forcing concessions from Rome - possibilities which the Latins can hardly have failed to recognise. The stakes were high: Rome might lose the war before giving in to the

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I atins' extortion. But the rebellion of Fregellae and the conspiracy in 91 had already shown how far the Latins were prepared to go in order to get the Roman citizenship. Therefore, a Latin reluctance to supply Rome with troops in 90 would merely have been the natural con­ tinuation of their previous policy.26 A limited Latin support during the first phase of the war may, hypothetical though it is, throw light on some of the problematic aspects of the course of military and political events. In 225 the Latins had made up (in Brunt's corrected figures) 134,000 compared to 300,000 Romans. In the intervening years this balance may have shifted slightly in favour of the Latins. New colonies had been founded and reinforcements sent to existing ones. Most of the c 37,000 new colonists would have been Romans, probably reducing the gap between Romans and Latins to less than two to one in 90.27 Therefore, if the Latins had withheld some of their forces, the consequences for Rome would have been serious; she may have been deprived of a third of her manpower. The struggle with the insurgents would have been far more equal, allowing the determination of the rebels to decide the outcome in the first phase of the war. But as soon as the full support of the Latins had been won by a promise of citizen­ ship, the natural Roman/Latin superiority would have been re-established. In this way the position of the Latins may explain not only the military situation in 90 but also the passing and military impact of the Lex Julia. The event most likely to have caused the Roman concession was the disastrous battle on June 11th, when the consul Rutilius Lupus was killed and his army crushed by the Marsi.28 That was the culmination of a series of allied victories, which had already pressed Roman resources to the limit. Moreover, on a closer examination of the military events, this defeat appears to have been the very turning point of the war. In the next confrontation (probably in August) Caesar defeated the Samnites; celebrating this victory, the military cloak was officially laid aside in Rome.29 During the remainder of the year Rome suffered only one major setback, the fall of Aesernia; the fortune of war had decisively turned against the insurgents.30 Still, it was only in the following year that Roman forces managed to sweep away the Italian resistance. The enrolment of freedmen in the autumn also suggests that Roman trib-ulations were not over yet. The Roman progress may have been halted by the Etruscan and Umbrian revolt. We are extremely poorly informed about this part of the war. Appian, our most detailed source, ignores it altogether, while the Livian tradition, abridged to the bare essentials, only 26

One Latin colony, Venusia, did join the revolt. The common explanation has been oscanisation of the town, Salmon (1967) 316, 343, 357, but this idea has recently been countered by F. Grelle, Carnosa Romana (Rome 1993) 63f. More likely, perhaps, Venusia's isolated position in the Social War was a parallel to the Fregellanrisingin 125. Geographically cut off, the Venusians may have lost touch with the other Latin communities and believed that they would put force behind their demand for citizenship. 27

For thesefiguressee Toynbee (1965) II 654-57, and Brunt (1971) 84f, who suggests that half of the settlers were Romans. This estimate seems too low considering the proportion of Romans to Latins. The Migration to Rome, which Brunt believes counterbalanced the new Latin foundations, would have been offset by the Italian migration to Latin states, incidentally documented at Fregellae. 28

Ovid, Fasti 6,563-6.

29

Livy, per. 73.

30

Cf. Salmon (1967) 363.

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ITALIAN UNIFICATION

mentions major battles. Modern attempts to reduce the insurrection to mere skirmishes smackof harmonisation, reconciling contradictory evidence.31 Appian cannot, as argued above be trusted on this point (either), and the Livian evidence merely indicates that their participation was relatively brief; only the decisive battles which crushed their resistance feature in the summaries. These battles would presumably have been preceded by campaigns of some scale­ like other insurgent peoples they would probably have started attacking Roman positions within the area - rather than waited for a Roman army to meet them in battle. The northern revolt may therefore have occupied considerable Roman forces in the autumn of 90 - and also caused the enrolment of freedmen for coastal defence. In line with the evidence of Sisenna the course of the war might therefore indicate that the enfranchisement of the Latins took place as early as the summer of 90. According to Appian 196, however, no successor to Rutilius was elected for the rest of the year, since the remaining consul, Julius Caesar, was unable to come to Rome and conduct the election. Instead, two legati were appointed to lead Rutilius' army. But we cannot entirely exclude the possibility that Caesar may have visited Rome at a later juncture before the regular consular elections in the autumn. Strictly speaking, Appian merely says that immediately after Rutilius' death, when new elections were required, none could be held. In that situation the new legati might have been appointed for the remainder of the year. The revolt of the Etruscans and Umbrians was presumably over by the end of 90, when they gave in after military defeats. The brevity of their involvement may have been due to their late entry into the war. Inspired by the prospects of an allied victory, the decision to join the rebellion would have been taken during the summer of 90 when a Roman defeat seemed imminent. But before the war could begin in the autumn (the practical preparations and negotiations would have taken some time) these premises had already vanished. By the grant of citizenship to the Latins, Rome had decisively improved her military position. This devel­ opment may plausibly have discouraged the late arrivals from continuing their faltering campaign after the winter break. In any case the Etruscans and Umbrians became the first defeated rebels whom the senate had to deal with in the Social War. Its handling of this situation set the pattern for the later reorganisation of the whole of Italy. At the beginning of 89 the old system of treaties had outlived its usefulness. The war had shown beyond any doubt that it could no longer guarantee Roman hegemony over the peninsula; a new arrangement had to be made. In principle, Rome had two options: she could either keep the subjugated Italians in a subordinated position as dediticii, administered and controlled by Roman officials, or incorporate them fully into the Roman state. The first solution was hardly a lasting one and would also put great strain on Rome's administrative resources. Logically, therefore, Rome chose to enfranchise the subdued insurgents. Given the Latin struggle for citizenship, only recently finished, this might seem a rather surprising con­ cession to make. It should be borne in mind, however, that Roman opposition to the Latin franchise had probably to a large extent focused on the immediate impact it would have on Roman politics. In 91, a major obstacle seems to have been the benefits which individual politicians might gain from a citizenship bill, rather than the enfranchisement itself. The Lex Julia, presumably backed by a unanimous senate, offered an ingenious solution to this 31

Thus e.g. Keaveney (1987) 142.

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163

oblem. The new citizens would not be inscribed in all the 35 tribes but only in a few, rently n e w tribes, effectively depriving them of any political influence.32 Rome, in other .'ords, resumed the policy, abandoned 200 years earlier, of incorporating conquered areas ithout granting full political rights. Then the special status had been the civitas sine suff.agio: in 90 the Lex Julia introduced a new formula for eliminating the political repér­ assions of large scale enfranchisements. Therefore, since an incorporation of the former Hies now involved fewer risks of upsetting stability in Rome, it may have been a less con­ troversial step than might be expected. To the Etruscans and Umbrians, a grant of Roman citizenship would, even in the new version, have seemed a highly generous offer. Faced with a Roman victory, they could prepare for extreme hardship and a status as dediticii, by which they, in Livy's classic description, 26,33,13: 'se dediderunt in arbitrium dicionemque populi Romani... quosque una secum ... quaeque ... dediderunt agrum urbemque divina humanaque utensiliaque sive quid aliud'. The citizenship, on the other hand, would secure equal juridical rights and, perhaps more important in this situation, safeguard them against Roman retaliations, for example, in the form of land confiscations. The Etruscans and Umbrians are therefore likely to have received the offer with enthusiasm; in fact the prospect of such a relatively favourable treatment may have contributed to break the final resistance in these areas. After this discussion of the Lex Julia, the structure of the Appianic version can now be assessed in greater detail. By presenting the law as an attempt to meet the demands of Etruscans and Umbrians, then on the brink of revolt, Appian managed to fit it into his overall conception of the war as a fight for Roman citizenship. In doing so, he appears to have amal­ gamated two chronologically separated events, ignoring military and political developments which took place between the passing of the Lex Julia and the enfranchisement of the Etruscans and Umbrians. Individually, both the events went unchanged; the law was a con­ cession to more or less loyal allies and the Etruscans and Umbrians did accept the citizenship. However, by integrating the two Appian distorted their individual character: for, while the Lex Julia may have been a concession to the Latins, the enfranchisement of Etruscans and Umbrians probably happened only after their military subjugation. Appian's rearrangement was feasible because the Latins had no place whatsoever in his account; as an intermediate category between Romans and Italians they would have been a distraction, likely to confuse the main plot of his story.33 Moreover, since the Etruscans and Umbrians, first entering the war at a later stage, did not feature among the initial rebels, their brief involvement could easily be omitted from his account. It is possible therefore that Appian may have taken advantage of the relatively short interval between the enfranchise­ ments of the (generally ignored) Latins and the Etruscans and Umbrians and replaced the former with the latter.

32

The details of these short-lived provisions remain uncertain. The meaning of Appian's dekateuontes, 214, is dubious, cf. Lewis (1968). Sisenna, 17P, mentions an early proposal to create two new tribes, while Velleius, 2,20,2, states that the new citizens were to be inscribed in eight, apparently new, tribes. In the entire first book of Appian's Civil Wars the Latins are mentioned only twice - in connection with C. Gracchus' citizenship bill, which explicitly dealt with this category.

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ITALIAN UNIFICATION

The coherent version emerging from these devices does, however, conceal serious breaches of logic. The basic problem of why Rome conceded the citizenship to the Etruscans and Umbrians and not to the rebels, supposedly fighting for this very same goal, remains unsolved Also chronologically the rearrangement raises various questions. As already noted, the late date of the Lex Julia implies a curious coincidence between the enfranchisement act and the enrolment of freedmen, two seemingly contradictory measures, both allegedly meeting the same northern threat, one by confrontation, the other by compromise. It also entails a rather unlikely date for the Etruscan/Umbrian revolt, locating it in the late autumn, when Rome was already gaining the upper hand, and right before winter would put an end to the campaign In short, this passage would seem to illustrate the structuring principle already suggested in previous discussions of the Appianic version. His method was simple and (therefore) effec­ tive. No events or episodes are entirely invented; but in order to clarify central themes of the story, events are rearranged and placed in a new context, thereby altering their character. Returning to the military course of the war we find that in 89 the situation had changed dramatically. The Latins had now closed ranks with Rome, and after the Etruscan and Umbrian revolt had been crushed, Rome could finally throw all her forces against the Italian insurgents. The effect was prompt and devastating for the Italians, who sustained a continuous series of defeats. With a single exception, the Romans returned victoriously from all major con­ frontations with the rebels. One by one the insurgent armies surrendered to the Roman generals; at the end of the year the revolt had definitively failed. Only the Samnites and Lucanians continued the warfare in 88, and by 87 Nola was the only stronghold still held by the Samnites. In this period, the Italians showed signs of desperation. Most dramatically, they made diplomatic contacts with king Mithridates of Pontos. Diodorus, 37,2,11, recounts that while offering the king an anti-Roman alliance, they encouraged him to exploit Rome's troubles in Italy.34 A full scale war in Asia might have relieved the critical situation of the rebels, but the initiative, in itself an important indication of the Italian attitude, came too late to have any impact on the war. The insurgents' cause was a lost one, and already in 89 some rebel leaders seem to have bowed before the inevitable. In Phil. 12,21, Cicero illustrates the mutual respect that might exist between opponents (but was impossible in the case of Mark Antony!) by referring to a meeting between the consul Pompeius Strabo and the Marsic general Vettius Scato, which Cicero attended in his tiro­ cinium. The talks, Cicero claims, were characterised by 'aequitas'; no fear, no suspicion and little hatred were apparent: 'Non enim ut eriperent nobis socii civitatem, sed ut in earn reciperentur petebant'. The amicability of the negotiations, a political point of Cicero's, should probably be taken with a pinch of salt. And Cicero, fifty years after the war, had an obvious political interest in portraying the Italian elite, whose descendants were now domi nobiles, as worthy members of Roman society.

34

It has been suggested that an Italian aureus, Sydenham (1952) no. 643, closely resembling a bronze coin from Amisus, may have been linked to this diplomatic opening, cf. Bernareggi (1966) 62-64, J.-M. Eychenne(1990)76f.

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A more precise dating of the meeting is not possible; neither the military events known to nor the chronology of Cicero's early years allow a date closer than 89.35 Most likely, however, it would have taken place at a fairly advanced stage, when the Marsi were recognisins the ultimate failure of their revolt. In that case, it could plausibly be construed as prel­ iminary negotiations over their future status after a surrender. Livy, per. 76: 'Marsi quoque a L.Cinna et Caecilio Pio legatis aliquot proeliis fracti petere pacem coeperunt', suggests that -uch talks were commenced only when the Marsi were already weakened militarily.36 In this situation a wish for citizenship should cause little surprise. The most attractive option for the former aiiies was now the Roman citizenship, which would ensure a relatively safe and privi­ leged position within an expanded Roman state. The Marsic demands in this interpretation become a parallel to the Samnite conditions for surrender presented at Nola in 87, which also included a grant of Roman citizenship.37 Seen against the military background of 89-87 it is obvious that no conclusions can be drawn from these demands as to the original intentions of the rebels.38 The situation had changed dramatically. In 91, the prospects of an Italian victory had seemed promising; two years later the game was up and instead of throwing off Roman domination they were now struggling to save some of their previous wealth and autonomy from the wreckage. In general, the Romans would have been sympathetic towards Italian wishes. Enfran­ chisement was a simple and effective way of incorporating the former allies, posing little risk of political or social upheavals. Rome had already offered the citizenship to the Etruscans and Umbrians, thus creating a blue-print for the post-war organisation of Italy. Even the Cispadani may have been offered the citizenship in 89, when Latin rights were also bestowed on the Transpadane tribes.39 The enfranchisement of the insurgents who surrendered in 89 and early 88 may therefore have been almost a formality, following soon after their (unconditional) capitulation. In 87, however, the Samnites at Nola made an explicit demand

35

The meeting has generally been dated in the early 89. But there is great uncertainty about Cicero's early years, on which he often himself gives contradictory information, cf. Badian (1969) 454-58. He was a tiro with Pompeius Strabo in 89 and also served under Sulla in Campania- probably in April, Cic. De div. 1,72, 2,65, Plut. Cic. 3. The conference has been linked with the allied attempt to rescue the besieged town of Asculum, e.g. Keaveney (1987) 159 n.2 with literature. But there is no indication that the army defeated by Strabo in the winter was in fact led by Vettius Scato. On the contrary, Orosius, 5,18,18, explicitly states that: 'decern et octo milia Marsorum in ea pugna cum Frauco impera­ tore suo caesa sunt'. Most likely therefore Cicero is referring to a later event. 36

Diod. 37,15, describes a similar meeting between Marius and Poppaedius, possibly in 90. Here the two leaders allegedly '... discussed at length the question of peace and the longed for citizenship'. According to Diodorus it was part of a general fraternisation between the two armies, which was characterised by greatfriendliness.The whole scenario appears highly implausible, bearing in mind for example the fact that Poppaedius tenaciously continued the struggle even after the Lex Julia had been passed and his own people forced to surrender. The story, which perhaps originated in a minor episode offraternisation,may have been a slur against Marius, made during the dispute over the tribus alloca­ tions, when Marius' and Sulpicius' position would have appeared less than patriotic. 37

Dio fr. 104,7, Gran. Licin. 20F.

38

Contra Brunt (1988) 111.

39

Cf. Sherwin-White (1973) 157-59.

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of citizenship, which the Roman senate refused. The situation was special here; the Samn't, the traditional arch-enemy of Rome, may have feared that they would be singled out f special, unfavourable treatment - with good reason, as Sulla's persecutions later proved Tu Roman response, on the other hand, was probably not a categorical refusal of thefranch;• But since the Samnites had not yet surrendered, compliance would mean yielding to pressu setting a dangerous precedent, that might give the Samnites a stronger and more independp position within the future Roman state. The demand for citizenship was, moreover, only n of several requests, which included controversial issues like citizenship for perfuo (probably Roman slaves who had deserted to the insurgents, cf. App. 190, Diodorus 57,2 9v return of booty and of Italian deserters (for punishment?). The negotiations at Nola did not therefore mark any departure from Rome's general policy concerning the Italians; the senate was merely pursuing a more cautious strategy of procrastination. When Cinna shortly after agreed to the Samnite conditions, this was done for the sole purpose of winning their military support in the civil war. Our knowledge of the legal arrangements for admitting the Italians to the Roman citizenship is extremely poor.40 But as noted earlier there can be little doubt about the importance of the Lex Julia, which probably formed the legal basis for the whole process. Although it may originally have been carried to accommodate the Latins, the Etruscans and Umbrians also seem to have been enfranchised according to this law - otherwise Appian's account makes no sense. The Lex Julia cannot therefore have laid down any narrow definition of prospective beneficiaries; these may plausibly have been described as 'all Latins and allies from whom the Romans exact soldiers "e formula togatorum'", as tentatively suggested by SherwinWhite.41 That would have covered not only the Latins but also the Hernici and the other Italian communities closely related to Rome, who had a strong interest in obtaining the citizenship. Later it could be applied to the Italian peoples, who had become dediticii. It appears from Sisenna, P. 94, 95, 119, that the senate dealt with each community individually, deliberating their case before recommending the assembly to grant the franchise. The aforementioned passage of Velleius, 'qui arma aut non ceperant aut deposuerant maturius', would therefore not have been a legal definition but simply a description of the loyal allies who actually received citizenship in 90. The Lex Julia did not a priori exclude any potential recipients in Italy; but it was first after their defeat that it became an attractive option to the insurgents. In Pro Balbo, 21, Cicero incidentally notes that the Greek cities of Neapolis and Heraclea were divided on the issue of Roman citizenship. Large groups were inclined to reject the offer, anxious of losing 'foederis sui libertatem'. Eventually, however, citizenship was accepted. This discussion (which may have occurred in other Greek towns too) has often been seen as 40

But the literature is extensive: G. Niccolini, 'Le leggi de civitate Romana durante la guerra sociale', RAAL 1 (1946) 110-24, Haug (1947) 248f, A. Biscardi, 'La questione italica e le tribù supranumerarie', PP 6 (1951) 240-56, L. R. Taylor, The Voting Districts of the Roman Republic (Rome 1960) 101-07, Lewis (1968), Sherwin-White (1972) 151-7, Gabba (1976) 89-96, W. Seston, 'La lex Julia de 90 av. J.-C. et l'intégration des Italiens dans la citoyenneté romaine', CRAI (1978) 529-42, Luraschi (1978), Keaveney (1987) 170, Brunt (1988) 132-36, K. W. Dahlheim, 'Der Staatstreich des Konsuls Sulla und die römische Italienspolitik der achtziger Jahre', in Colloquium aus Anlass des 80. Geburtstages von Alfred Heuss, ed. J. Bleichen FAS 13 (Kallmünz 1993) 97-115. 41

Sherwin-White (1973) 158.

ITALIAN 'UNIFICATION' - LATINS, ITALIANS, & THE ROMAN CITIZENSHIP -insequence of the favourable treaties which these states enjoyed with Rome. That inter­ n e n , however, seems to miss the real significance of their disagreement. The point is that - Greeks were some of the very few allies who still had a genuine choice. Having remained val to Rome, they could, unlike the surrendered Italian dediticii, maintain their former status A autonomy - and that option seemed preferable to a substantial part of them. In other M-ds, their heated discussion suggests that the Roman citizenship was not yet considered an • disputable privilege by the non-Roman peoples of Italy. The general demand by the . .uraents should therefore be seen as a direct result of their military subjugation. This point is further illustrated by the Lex Piatitici Paplrla passed in 89. The content is unknown except for a clause providing for the enfranchisement of adscripti, mentioned in Cicero's speech for Archias; the law may also have solved other practical problems, which had arisen in the wake of the Lex Julia.42 According to Cicero the law prescribed that those adscripti who had their domicillum in another Italian state than the one in which they were inscribed, could obtain the citizenship by presenting themselves for the praetor in Rome within sixty days. Three types of adscripti should be distinguished: those domiciled outside the peninsula, who were for obvious reasons not affected by the Italian enfranchisement, those living permanently in the state, where they were registered (these were automatically enfran­ chised together with their home town), and finally the intermediate category covered by the lex Plautia Papiria.43 As Italian residents formally affiliated with enfranchised communities, they had a rightful claim to citizenship, which was clearly recognised in the law. Their contact with their 'home town' was, however, too tenuous to allow them to be included in a collective enfranchisement. This group was therefore presented with an offer of citizenship as individuals. In doing so, Rome demonstrated not only subtle juridical discrimination but also an awareness that not all foreigners might be interested in the Roman citizenship. Otherwise there would have been no need to prescribe that this type of adscripti turn up in person before the praetor. Far from being an undue (and rather odd) attempt to prevent their enfran­ chisement, this provision was simply a recognition that these individuals could not be included administratively into the Roman citizen-body; they had every right to make their own choice - and apparently it might not necessarily be Roman citizenship. In sum, therefore, although the enfranchisement of Italy may legally have been a simple and uniform process, its character was probably quite different in various parts of the peninsula. The Latin enfranchisement may have been a (forced) concession of equality to a segregated part of the Roman people. This move opened the process, which took a new turn when Rome offered the citizenship to the Italian dediticii. Their acceptance should not conceal the fact that this grant bears all the signs of a traditional incorporation of defeated enemies, albeit on relatively favourable terms. As part of this fundamental reorganisation of Italy, citizenship was also offered to the (few) allied states which had remained loyal. Their internal discord is revealing as to the character of the Roman citizenship at this moment; it does not seem to have even vaguely resembled that universal privilege we later encounter in the imperial era. Its Sherwin-White (1972) 15If, offered what seems thefinalsolution to this problem, and the arguments of Luraschi (1978) 339ff, for a return to the old interpretation are unconvincing. See also Badian (1973) 121-32. FOT adscripti see E. Deniaux, 'Civitate donati: Naples, Héraclée, Come', Ktema 6 (1981) 133-41.

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attraction to the rebels was closely linked to their defeat, which left them no alternative. Wh reasons the Greeks may have had for accepting we do not know; they may have receive i special guarantees for their local autonomy.44 For the Roman elite, enfranchisement was les of a sacrifice. The political arrangements effectively precluded any threats to their positionRome merely tightened her control over the peninsula. The solution to the suffrage problem, envisaged in 90, was, however, challenged alreadv in 88 when the tribune Sulpicius proposed that the new citizens be inscribed in all 35 tribes The bill was passed, but later abolished by Sulla. The issue refused to go away, and just the following year Sulpicius' example was followed by the consul Cinna, whose settlement of the question was finally recognised by the senate and Sulla in 84 and 82.45 To ancient and modern historians, this dispute has confirmed the importance of Roman citizenship to the Italian rebels as a means of gaining political influence in Rome. This inference, logical as it may seem, is open to doubt, however, and must be considered within a wider historiographical context. This episode in Roman politics has commonly been interpreted as the last stage of the lon<» process of Italy's political unification. Thus, the inscription of the new citizens in the old tribes, which was eventually accepted in the late 80's and effected in 70, has been seen as the final implementation of the plan first proposed by Fulvius Flaccus in 125. It thus concludes the linear story-line, which was developed around the historical core of Italian enfranchise­ ment, in turn seen as the happy consummation of a prolonged struggle for this goal. Within this narrative the dispute over the inscription in tribes naturally represents the closing phase, when political equality was finally achieved. As in the earlier stages of the process, the Italians were again assisted by liberal Roman politicians, sympathetic to their cause. Sulpicius has thus received a place alongside Fulvius Flaccus, C. Gracchus, and Livius Drusus in a succession of Roman champions of the Italian allies. However, the received story of Italian unification, from which this version of the tribal dispute draws its logic, also leaves it vulnerable to any modification of that model. For if we accept, as many scholars have now done, that the Social War was fought against Rome - and not simply to achieve her citizenship, the crucial linearity is broken. And despite attempts to bracket the war as an aberration from the 'real' Italian issue, resumed after the conflict, the lost continuity cannot be restored; the tribal dispute will have to be interpreted in the light of the war, which had provoked this discussion. The tribus debate, we should bear in mind, followed more than two years of tenacious warfare, which had seen Roman citizens being massacred, her legions destroyed in the battlefields, an alternative state being founded, and an attempt to incite her worst enemy in the East. Viewed against this background the notion of an Italian 'cause' in Roman politics in the years 88-87 is implausible. In short, the antiRoman character of the conflict undermines the idea of idealistic Roman politicians struggling to secure a more favourable deal for the - barely defeated - Italians.

44 45

Cf. MommsenII,241.

Livy per. 84, notes that: 'novis civibus senatus consulto suffragium datum est', probably referring to a tribal redistribution. Sulla's recognition of this settlement is mentioned in per. 86: 'Sylla cum Italicis populis, ne timeretur ab his velut erepturus civitatem et suffragii ius nuper datum, foedus percussit'.

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169

\lore specifically the concept of an 'Italian cause' has been used to explain the course of ç jpicius' tribunate, which is assumed to have seen a dramatic shift in his political alleg. nce s. A strong ideological commitment to Italian equality has been identified as the pivotal se which provoked a break with the 'Optimates' and drew Sulpicius into the arms of vi'irius.46 However, the idea of a political U-turn during his tribunate, from staunch optimate rebellious ally of Marius, has now been questioned. Powell has convincingly argued that {uc U-turn of Sulpicius is in fact a myth, based on a misinterpretation of the sources and a schematic perception of Roman politics.47 No source mentions any shift during the tribunate. Cicero, Har. resp. 43, indicates an increasingly radicalised 'popular' strategy, but not a •han^e in methods or policy.48 Plausibly the alliance with Marius had been forged already before Sulpicius took up office. The need for a particular cause, setting Sulpicius apart from the nobility, thereby disappears. The 'Italian cause' is therefore not only implausible in 88; it is also unnecessary as a means of explaining the course of events during Sulpicius' tribunate - which brings us to the core of the tribal problem. For the point is that the inscription in the tribes was, in the nature of things, a Roman rather than an Italian issue. What was at stake here was not the 'democrat-isation' of the new Roman-Italian state, or the access to equal political influence for the new citizens. Whichever principle for the inscription was applied, Rome would remain a city-state with all political decision-making concentrated in the capital. Even a 'fair' inscription in the old tribes would therefore not secure the Italians anything like equal influence or representation in Rome -as the course of the first century BC would later demonstrate beyond any doubt.49 The real power would still lie with the old Roman nobility, whose patronage - rather than the electoral strength of individual Italian towns - was vital to the senatorial careers of municipal nobles. From an Italian viewpoint the dispute over the tribal inscription was probably an issue of marginal interest and their active involvement herein consequently rather limited, presumably organised from Rome. Thus Velleius, 2,20,3, relates that in order to carry the tribal reform Cinna 'ingentem totius Italiae frequentiam in urbem acciverat'. The rhetorical hyperbole is apparent, and the crucial word is 'acciverat', which underscores the passive role played by the former allies in the dispute over their tribal inscription. *'Badian (1958) 230ff, id. (1969) 481, T.J. Luce, 'Marius and the Mithridatic command', Historia 19 (1970) 161-94, A. Keaveney, 'Sulla, Sulpicius and Caesar Strabo', Latomus 38 (1979) 451-60, id., Sulla. The Last Republican (London 1982) 56-62, id., 'What happened in 88?', Eirene 20 (1983) 53-86, whereas A. W. Lintott, 'The Tribunate of P. Sulpicius Rums', CQ 21 (1971) 442-53, T.N. Mitchell, 'The Volte-face of P. Sulpicius Rufus in 88 BC, CP 70 (1975) 197-204, B.R. Katz, 'Caesar Strabo's struggle for the consulship - and more', RliM 120 (1977) 45-63, see the dispute over Strabo's consular candidature as the dividing issue. "'"J. G. F.Powell, 'The Tribune Sulpicius', Historia 39 (1990) 446-60, cf. Meier (1966) 216-21. Velleius, 2,18,5f, describes a shift from senatorial to 'popular' allegiances. There is no indication, however, that this change took place during Sulpicius' tribunate, which Velleius seems to contrast with his previously unblemished career. Appian, 243, while describing the potential benefits of a redistribution, notes that the new citizens outnumbered the old. This piece of information, in itself perfectly reliable, is quite irrelevant to the lr ibus question; such total figures for the entire peninsula were indifferent to urban politics, where Physical proximity remained the crucial factor.

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In Rome, however, the issue was obviously regarded as a matter of great importance. This paradox reflects the general paradox which was the Roman state itself. Owing to the anachronistic city-state structure only a tiny proportion of the citizen body ever participated in the 'democratic' process, which meant that even relatively small numbers of voters inscribed in the old tribes - could make an impact in the comitia. On the other hand, the centralisation also implied a concentration of all political initiative in Rome, effectively excluding independent action by groups outside the urban elite. The real significance of a tribal redistribution therefore lay in the opportunities it offered Roman politicians to mobilise newly enfranchised citizens, many of whom may not yet have been integrated into the social networks of Rome. The interest of Roman nobles naturally focused on politically exploitable voters. Later, the writings of Cicero suggest that the local elites, who were able to influence the election of higher magistrates, might be a target for Roman electioneering. But as important in the 80s - especially to politicians acting in opposition to the senate - were probably the voters living near or in Rome, who were able to attend the assemblies on a regular basis. At any time immigrants would have made up a substantial part of the urban population, which relied on a constant flow of immigration from the countryside or the provinces.50 In the late 90's - after a generation of restrictive Roman enfranchisement policy - the number of Latin and Italian immigrants to Rome without citizen rights would have been considerable. With the general enfranchisement of Italy, this group immediately became a factor in Roman politics - which may explain the Italian involvement in Sulpicius' campaign, claimed by the ancient sources. According to Appian, new citizens supported him ardently, even engaging in street fighting with old citizens opposing the bill, 244. Presumably, these armed gangs were not made up of Latin and Italian nobles anxious about their political future. Indeed it is not certain whether these supporters were in fact extra-urban. Appian gives little indication that they had arrived from the countryside; plausibly, many were Latin and Italian immigrants, already living in the capital. If inscribed in all the tribes, they might become a useful instrument in the hands of Roman politicians. Most of them would probably have been of low social standing and as such have had much to gain from a redistribution; their political attraction to leading nobles would be greatly enhanced, perhaps opening up opportunities for favourable patronage and donations. In that situation, they may have come to Sulpicius' support and formed the core of his armed gangs. In the streets, Appian relates, they were confronted by the old citizens, and although some Romans may have resented a tribal redistri­ bution, such armed resistance seems highly unlikely; they would probably have been the followers of Sulpicius' senatorial opponents, mobilised to counter the tribune's bands. In sum, the dispute over the inscription of the new citizens in tribes is no real indication of the - continued - importance of Roman citizenship as the driving force behind the Italian revolt. It was fundamentally a Roman issue, originating in an internal political conflict in Rome. During the war Rome had been forced to abandon her restrictive citizenship policy and enfranchise the Latins. This grant was later extended to Italian dediticii, to be fully incor­ porated into Rome. To eliminate any political repercussions of this expansion of the citizen50 For extensive Latin/Italian immigration to Rome, see N. Purcell, 'Rome and the plebs romana', CAH 9 (1994) 644-88, 650-52, and N. Morley, Metropolis and Hinterland: the city of Rome and the Italian economy (Cambridge 1996) 44-54.

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171

body, the senate had prescribed that the new citizens be distributed in but a few tribes. Such attempts, however, to seal up a political resource were doomed to fail, based as they were on the false premises of an aristocratic consensus, which had long been lost. At the first oppor­ tunity, 'popular' politicians might turn their attention to the new citizens who lived in or around Rome, trying to reap the benefits of a redistribution. This was probably what happened in 88 when Sulpicius appears to have made an ambitious attempt to round up all potential support in Rome. Thus, the freedmen, also restricted to the four urban tribes, were to be redistributed in all the tribes, including the influential rural ones.51 The following year, Cinna employed a similar strategy and carried a law which admitted the new citizens to all the tribes; presumably his motives were no more Ttalophile' than Sulpicius' had been.52 For most Italians, the tribal issue had little bearing on their future status, and the appearence of its Roman proponents in a succession of champions of the Italian 'cause' is therefore misleading. Cinna's redistribution of the new citizens in the old tribes was later recognised by Sulla and the senate. The introduction of a substantial number of new, potentially volatile, voters into the assemblies on equal terms with the old citizens may for a period have contributed to the turbulence of urban politics. But since the traditional institutions of the city-state went un­ changed, this outcome did not represent a genuine compromise, affecting Rome's hegemony over the peninsula. The new citizens were still effectively barred from exerting any real influence in the Roman state.53

Livy, per. 71: 'Cum P. Sulpicius ... perniciosas leges promulgasset, ut ... novi cives libertinique distribuerentur in tribus'. p

or a traditional view see e.g. CM. Bulst, 'Cinnanum tempus', Historia 13 (1964) 306-37.

53

Cf. De Martino (1972-75) III 57.

IV POSTSCRIPT In the previous chapters an attempt has been made to trace the historiographical roots of the modern view of the 'Italian question'. According to the theory presented here, this was created in two stages - an ancient and a modern one. The construction of the ancient tradition appears to have been influenced by a number of factors. The ground seems to have been laid by a combination of contemporary political intrigue and the new political (and ideological) role attained by the Italian elites after the Social War. During the first century BC the cultural and political map of Italy changed radically, eradicating most of the previous diversity. Therefore, when virtually the entire corpus of republican sources was lost, the result was an ancient tradition which had no experience of Italy as anything but a direct extension of Rome herself. Moreover, owing to the vagaries of textual transmission, the only full account of the 'Italian question' to be preserved was Appian's highly personal introduction to his Civil Wars. The final outcome of all these historical, literary and textual processes was the almost seamless fusion of the Latin and the Italian 'causes' - and the Roman initiatives addressing the former - into a single 'Italian question' focused on the fight for Roman citizenship. This version of the events was adopted in its entirety when the first modern scholarly account was written in mid-nineteenthcentury Germany. In this phase of the Traditions­ bildung, the core of events recorded in the ancient sources was incorporated into a broad narrative, deeply coloured by contemporary German history and philosophy. The teleologica! element inherent in the imperial perspective of the ancient sources was thus expanded into a great vision of unity restored after a spell of fraternal discord. The primary objective of this study has been to uncover some of the ideological and historiographical structures underlying this particular interpretation. An attempt has been made to disentangle the various strands and elements which make up the present version of the 'Italian question'. The events 125-87 have thus been detached from their supposed structural background, which appears to be a direct derivation of these very same events. By ignoring the 'background' it has been possible to take a fresh look at the sources on which this 'vision of unity' was originally built. A new version of the 'Italian question' has thus been produced, and viewed as a historical narrative this account differs in both character and structure from the one presented in most modern text-books. Its theme is no longer the cultural and political unification of the peninsula, but the political and cultural annihilation of the Italian nations. Consequently, the beginning and end of the process have also been redefined. The starting point is not, as previously, marked by Rome's rise to superpower status after the Second Punic War, but by the Roman conquest of the penisula. The new version therefore begins with the formation of the Italian alliances, that is, the establishment of Rome's hegemony. Its plot is straightforward and simple; a conflict between dominated peoples and a foreign oppressor. For that reason the Social War does not mark the end of the narrative either. Representing as it does the loss of allied statehood and sovereignty it was merely the 173

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beginning of the final stage in the dismantling of the Italian nations. The real ending to il » story is not marked by any single dramatic event. The Italian nationalities gradually fach away during the first century and no exact date can be fixed for their ultimate demise. By r| * turn of the eras, however, few traces of their separate nationalities can be found. The stor thus changes tone and character after the Social War; the grand epic comes to a spectacula end and is replaced by the protracted and largely uneventful process, by which the last si
ITALIAN 'UNIFICATION'- POSTSCRIPT

175

rticular approach to the 'Italian question'. By drawing attention to the historiographical ots of the 'unitary' model, the aim has been to challenge the aura of 'factuality' which has . uen tiy acted as a straitjacket for new interpretations of the question. The historical recon­ struction given here is thus an attempt to explore some of the possibilities which then appear. \s such it offers a preliminary sketch of what a contemporary version of the 'Italian question' might look like.

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INDEX Acerrae 156 Abellinum 43, 77 Acilius, L. 131 aediles 76f, Aeclanum 147, 158 Aemilius Scaurus, M. 115, 133f Aesernia81, 131, 160f Afzelius, A. 73, 157 ager publicus populi Romani 15-19, 52, 55,92, 112-14, 142-50 Ager Gallicus 40, 147 Ager Teuranus 52f AlbaFucens 159f alliances, Roman-Italian 26, 28, 39f, 43f, 46, 53f, 69, 90 Allifae 147 Antinum 77 Antonius, M. (triumvir) 97, 164 Apollonis lOlf Arpi 147 Arpinum 98 Atina 96, 147 Aufidena 77 Appian 2,4f, 11-25, 29, 32f, 37, 59, 62, 85, 99, 107-09, 112-26, 130-33, 138, 144f, 147f, 153-57, 162f, 166, 169f, 173. Appuleius Saturninus, L. (trib. 103) 18, 90, 97, 124, 146, 149 Apulia 60, 65f, 80, 147, 158 Ariminum 105f Arretium71, 147 Asconius Pedianus 9, 100, 106f, 115, 122, 124, 133f, 136 Asculum 6, 79f, 82, 129-32, 137, 140-42, 155, 159f, 165 Asinius Pollio, C. 13f

assemblies, Roman 96-98, 112, 120f, 170 Athens 91 Aurelius Cotta, C. (cos. 75) 5 Bacchanalian affair 45, 49-58, 67 Badian, E. 17, 21, 46, 68, 71-73, 125 B3x\i\?Jtabula Baritina 76-79, 84 basilica 63, 76 baths, public 63, 65 Beloch, K. J. 39 Bleicken, J. 16,73 Bradeen, D. W. 100 Brunt, P. A. 68, 71, 75, 77,116, 158, 161 Bruttium52, 147 Caecina, A. 105f Calatia 147 Cales 62, 81, 147 Camerinum 44, 90 Campania 55, 60, 62-66, 75, 82, 97, 130, 144,147, 165 Campanile, E. 72, 83f Capua/Ager Campanus 62, 64, 143f, 147 censors 77f, 103 census 40, 96, 100-02, 111 centuriation 143, 146f Cispadani 165 civitas sine suffragio 18, 95, 110, 120, 163 civitas virtutis causa 90, 105, 155 Clampetia 147 Claudius Marcellus, M. (cos. 51) 107f clientela 68, 72f coinage, Italian 29, 69, 141,164 Coilingwood, R. G. 107 colonisation, Roman 16, 81,90, 93 Comitium 76

200

ITALIAN UNIFICATION: A STUDY

Compsa 147 Comum 107f Consentia 147 Consilinum 147 Coponius, T. 104 Corfinium 139, 147 Cornelius Balbus, L. 9, 88f, 91, 104f Cornelius Cinna, L. (cos. 87) 166, 168f, 171 Cornelius Sulla, L. 3, 10, 14, 19, 27f, 78, 88,98, 105f, 116, 130f, 147, 165f, 168, 171 Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, P. (cos. 134) 18, 148 Cossinius, L. 104 Crawford, M. H. 103f, 143 Cuff, P. J. 12, 14 De Sanctis, G. 70 Del Tutto Palma, L. 84 Delos 65, 92 Devoto, G. 70, 82, 85 dictator 102f Dio 130 Diodorus 5f, 9, 29, 114f, 123, 125, 130, 139f, 160, 164 domestic architecture 64-66 domi nobiles 8, 97f double citizenship, Roman 9, 87-91, lOOf duo viri 103 Egypt 11, 20 elections, Roman 8, 95-98 équités 114-7, 123, 133 Etruscans 19, 40, 55, 59f, 75, 81f, 111, 125, 142, 147f, 153-56, 158f, 161-65 Eutropius 6 Fabius Pictor, Q. 157 Fabrateria Nova 118 Falerii57,71 Fannius, C. (cos. 122) 111, 121 Ferentum 147 Feriae Latinae 121, 150

Finley, M. I. 13 Flach, D. 149f Florus6, 10, 121f, 129-31, 139, 154 fora et conciliabula 48-52, 55 formula togatorum 40, 42, 101, 104, 157 166 Fraenkel, E. 53 Frassineti, P. 155f Fregellae 27, 99, 113, 118-21, 126, 130f, 135, 151, 160f freedmen 159, 171 Fucine Lake 156 Fulvius Flaccus, M. (cos. 125) 2f, 11, 19 27, 104, 109f, 112-14, 116-19, 122,' 126, 149, 168 Gabba, E. 13, 42, 72, 75, 83, 85, 92f, 125 Gabii 63 Gades 88, 105 Gallia Cisalpina 43, 97, 106-08, 149, 158 Galsterer, H. 45, 84 Göhler, J. 67-69, 84 Graviscae 57, 148 Gruen, E.S. 62 Grumentum 130, 147 Hahn, I. 14 Harris, W. V. 45, 49, 125 Heba 148 Hegel, G. W. F. 29-31,33,37 hellenisation 60-67 Heraclea 166 Herculaneum 98 Herder, J. G. 29 Heuss, A. 30, 32, 68, 83 Hirpini 10 Histonium 77 historicism, German 29f, 36, 69, 73, 85, 173f Hobsbawn, E. J. 32 hospitium 5 lf, 73, 91 Iggers, G.G. 24 Iguvium 154

ITALIAN 'UNIFICATION' immanitas 89, 102-04 Italia, concept 16, 40, 45-55, 58, 69 Italia, insurgent state 4, 6f, 21, 27, 68f, 98, 139f Julius Caesar, C. 97, 107f Julius Caesar, L. (cos. 90) 16If ius civitatis per magistratum adipiscen^ 8 7 , 9 0 , 9 9 - 1 0 8 , 121, 159 ius commercii 91 f ius conubii 92 ius Latii 87f, 90, 99, 102, 106-08 ius migrationis 87, 90, 94 Jerome, T. S. 14 Junius Pennus, M. (trib. 126) 111 Junonia 145 Keaveney, A. 68, 80, 82, 108, 134 Kiene, A. 23, 25f, 33-5, 59, 95 Klingner, F. 67 Lanuvium 47 Latin colonies 76, 93, 106, 118, 161 Latin War 138f Latini 3, 7f, 44, 49, 54f, 87-9, 93, 95, 99-108,118-27,138f, 150,156,158-64, 166 Latium 30, 47, 62, 147 \zvy/dilectus 40, 111 LexAciliaSSf Lex agraria 16, 39, 92, 104, 143-45 Lex Appuleia 90 Lex Caecilia Didia 121 Lex Calpurnia 155 Lex de modo agrorum 16, 146, 148 Lex Didia 48 Lex Fannia 49 Lex Furia 48 Lex Julia 3, 7, 19, 109, 112, 117, 123, 153-56, 159, 161-67 Lex Licinia Muda 104, 115, 121 LexPlautia Papiria 167 Lex repetundarum 88f, 100, 102-04 Lex Sempronia 49 LexServiliaS9y 104f, 115

201

Lex Thoria 144 Liber coloniarum 142, 146f Liber de viris illustribus 116, 122, 125, 130 Licinius Crassus, L. (cos. 95) 115f, 121, 123, 129, 131, 134 Livius Drusus, M. (trib. 122) 122, 145f, 149 Livius Drusus, M. (trib. 91) 3, 7, 1 If, 19f, 22,27, 109f, 114-18, 120-37, 140, 142, 160, 168 Livius Salinator, M. (cos. 207) 48 Livy 6, 9,45, 47-52, 58, 98,113-16, 122f, 130, 138, 149f, 154f, 159f, 162f, 165, 171 Lucania 71, 130, 147, 158,164 Luceria 150 Lucilius, C. 111 Luna 57 Lupiae 147 macellum 76 Macrobius 45, 48 Magius, Minatius 10 Magna Grecia 65, 75, 105, 111 Maier,F. G. 12 manpower, Roman/Italian 43f, 58, 70, 73, 148, 157f Marcius Philippus, L. (cos. 91) 115, 117, 123f, 129 Marius, C. 3, 6-8, 14, 18f, 44, 80, 90, 98, 116,165, 169 Marsi6,79,81f, 125, 130, 141, 161, 165 Matrinius, T. 93 Mattingly, H. B. 105 meddices 11 Meier, C. 112 Meyer, H. D. 139 Mérimée, P. 23, 26 Messapii 158 migration, Italian 55, 94, 111, 157, 161, 170 Mill, J. Stuart 32 Millar, F. 22

202

ITALIAN UNIFICATION: A STUDY

Mithridates 6, 164 Mommsen, Th. 2f, 23-37, 40-42, 54, 57-60, 82-85, 93f, 100, 139, 147, 174 narrativity 35-37, 59, 86 Neapolis 43, 65, 166 Nemausus 108 Nicolet, C. 148 Nola 19, 43, 65, 77, 98, 130, 165 North, J. 37 Nuceria 62, 65, 98, 131, 158 Octavian 91 Octavius, M. (trib. 133) 17 Oexle, O. G. 29 Opimius, L. (cos. 121) 118 Orosius6, 122, 154f, 165 Ovid 9f Paeligni 97, 147 Pailler, J.-M. 57 palaestra 63f Pallottino, M. 84 Papirius Carbo Arvinas, C. 124 Papius Mutilus, C. 130 Perusia 154 Picenum40, 158 Pietrabbondante 66, 77 Pinna 158 Placentia 106 Plancius, Cn. 96f Pliny 123 Plotius, A. 154 Plutarch 7, 9, 15-17, 107, 143 Polybius 45-48, 58, 157f Pompeii 56, 62-65, 72, 76f, 80f, 92, 98, 130 Pompeius Strabo, Cn. (cos. 89) 106, 154f, 164f Pompeius Trogus 10, 98 Pomponius Atticus, T. 91, 107 Pontius Telesinus 10 Poppaedius Silo, Q. 6-8, 124f, 165 populäres 112, 116, 124, 168 Porcius Cato, L. (cos. 89) 154

Porcius Cato, M. (pr. 54) 7 Posidonius 5-9 Postumius, L. 130 Potentia 77 Powell, J.G.F. 169 Praeneste 90 praetors 78 praetor iirbanus/inter peregrinos provocano 89, 93, 102-4, 107, 117, 120 Ps-Sallustll4f, 117, 123f publicani 93 Punic War, First 69 Punic War, Second 20, 27, 40, 52, 69, 71, 135, 142, 146-48, 157, 173 quaestors 77f, 103 Quellenforschung 12f Ranke, L. von 36 repetundae courts/trials 18, 88f, 101-05, 115 Rhetorica ad Herennium 124, 134f Risorgimento 70 Rossano di Vaglio 77 Rutilius Lupus, P. (cos. 90) 16If Rutilius Rufus, P. (cos. 105) 5, 115 Saepinum 66 Salmon, E. T. 60f, 66, 68-71, 73, 75, 77, 80, 82-85, 158, 174 Samnite Wars 31, 33 Samnites 7f, 10, 19, 31, 59, 66, 80, 82, 111, 130, 141, 147, 156, 158, 161, 164f Sarno 62 Saturnia 57, 148 Schleswig-Holstein 24 Scholia Bobiensia 102, 115, 124 Scolacium 145 Scullard, H. H. 69 Sempronius Gracchus, C. (trib. 123) 3, 17f, 21, 109, HOf, 115f, 118-22, 124, 126, 143-49, 160, 168 Sempronius Gracchus, Ti. (trib. 133) 15-22,97, 114, 124, 142f, 149

ITALIAN 'UNIFICATION'

203

Servilius, Q. (pr. 91) 130, 132 Servilius Glaucia, C. (trib. 104) 115 Sherwin-White, A. N. 4If, 44, 87, 89f, 103, 106, 122, 139, 166f Sisenna, L. Cornelius 154-56, 162f, 166 Sittius, P. 131 Spoletium 93 Strabo6, 9, 139f Suessa Aurunca 147 Sulmo 9, 147 Sulpicius, P. (trib. 88) 21, 116, 124, 165, 168-71 Sulpicius Galba, Ser. (pr. 91) 130 Supinum 77

Varius Hybrida, Q. (trib. 90)/ quaestiones VariaeSl 123, 131-37 vectigal 144, 148 Velleius Paterculus, M. 10, 115, 124, 129-31, 139, 153, 157, 163, 166, 169 Venusia79, 161 Verulae 147 Vestini 77 VettiusScato 164f Veyne, P. 60 Volaterrae 96, 105f Volcei 147 Volsci 98 Volsinii56f, 71

Taylor, C. 30 Tarquinia 147 Teanum Sidicinum 62, 66, 81, 158 Tegianum 147 teleology 30-32, 37, 45, 58, 85, 110 Telesia 147 theatres 62f, 66, 80 Tibiletti, G. 100 Tibur 89, 104 Torelli, M. 72, 76, 86 transhumance 140 Transpadani 106-08, 165 tribuni plebis 77rf, 103 tribus 8, 19f, 100-02, 155, 163, 168-71 tributum93, lOlf, 111, 113 Tuder 154 Tullius Cicero, M. 8, 16, 87-91, 93, 96-98, lOlf, 104-08, 114f, 121, 123f, 131, 133f, 143, 153, 155, 164-67, 169f Tullius Cicero, Q. 96

Walbank, F. W. 75, 84 White, H. 35f Woodman, A. J. 13

Umbrians 19, 40, 81f, 125, 142, 153-56, 158f, 161f, 165 urbanisation 75f vacatio 89f, 102-04 Valerius Flaccus, L. (pr. 63) 101 f Valerius Maximus 11, 90, 113, 120, 126, 134

Zanker, P. 63f, 65, 76