Japan's Nuclear Disarmament Policy and the U.S. Security Umbrella

Japan’s Nuclear Disarmament Policy and the U.S. Security Umbrella

ANTHONY DIFILIPPO

JAPAN’S NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT POLICY AND THE U.S. SECURITY UMBRELLA

© Anthony DiFilippo, 2006. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. First published in 2006 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™ 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–7417–4 ISBN-10: 1–4039–7417–9 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data DiFilippo, Anthony, 1950– Japan’s nuclear disarmament Policy and the U.S. security umbrella / Anthony DiFilippo. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–7417–9 1. National security––Japan. 2. Japan––Military policy. 3. United States––Military policy. 4. Nuclear weapons––United States. 5. Nuclear nonproliferation. 6. Nuclear disarmament––Japan. I. Title. UA845.D57 2006 355⬘.033052––dc22

2006045183

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: October 2006 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

For the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and many other Japanese citizens, who understand that the nuclear umbrella is an anachronism

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Contents

Acknowledgments

vi

1

Introduction: Detoured on the Path to Nuclear Disarmament

1

2

The Watershed

13

3

Technology, Choice, and Nuclear Weapons

43

4

The Politics of Japanese Nuclear Disarmament: Where Government Policies and Civil Society Converge and Diverge

67

5

Japanese Security Policy and the New Agenda Coalition

93

6

The International Dimensions of Japan’s Anti-Nuclear Weapons Policies: Issues in Disarmament and Nonproliferation

111

7

Tokyo and the Axis of Evil

135

8

Security and Identity

183

Notes

205

Selected Bibliography

259

Index

271

Acknowledgments

A number of people assisted me during the time I was working on this book. Together, they helped to make this work what it is. Since I conducted many interviews in different places throughout Japan, I want to thank those that I can at this time: Dr. Terumi Tanaka, Secretary General and Mr. Michimasa Hirata, both of Hidankyo; Dr. Haruhiro Fuki, former president of the Hiroshima Peace Institute; Dr. Hiro Umebayashi, Executive Director of the Peace Depot; Mr. Hiroshi Taka, Secretary General of Gensuikyo; Mr. Ikagawa Takashi, Secretariat Vice-Chief and Mr. Hidemichi Kano, both of Gensuikin; Mr. Michiro Abe, Executive Director and Mr. Toshitaka Hayashi, both of Rengo, the Japanese Trade Union Confederation; Mr. K. Moriwaki of the Japan Association for a Nonnuclear Government; Director Hideto Ogushi and Ms. Yayoi Minokawa, both of the Peace Promotion Office, Nagasaki City Hall; Mr. Baku Nishio, Codirector and Mr. Philip White, International Liaison Officer, both of the Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center in Tokyo. Special thanks to Dr. Teiichiro Tonoue of the Tokyo Physicians for Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. Besides his hospitality, Tei went out of his way on more than one occasion to help me with my research in Japan, not to mention assuring me that the magnitude 6 earthquake we experienced in July 2005 on a patio outside of the multi-floor Palace Hotel in Tachikawa was really nothing to worry about. I am grateful to several officials in the Japanese government, particularly in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who permitted me to interview them or shared information with me via email. Thanks to Professor Kazumi Mizumoto of the Hiroshima Peace Institute who also responded by email to my many questions and to Mr. Masato Honda, Executive Director of the Hiroshima Peace Cultural Foundation, who took time from his busy schedule to meet me. Lincoln University provided several grants that defrayed some of the costs of my research in Japan; for this, I am grateful. Moreover, these funds were helpful in affording me the opportunity to write the initial draft of the first chapter of this book in the library of the International Conference Center in Hiroshima, which is located in the Hiroshima Peace Park adjacent to the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum. Once again, I want to thank the members of my family—especially my wife Patty—for their cooperation during the time that I spent working on this book.

Chapter 1 Introduction: Detoured on the Path to Nuclear Disarmament

When the American B-29 bomber the Enola Gay dropped “Little Boy,” the four-ton uranium atomic bomb that literally destroyed Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 and left 40 percent of the city’s approximate 350,000 population dead or missing, a new, technologically driven problem unambiguously emerged, one that eventually came to threaten the survival of man and the planet. Three days later, when the city of Nagasaki experienced the massive death and devastation from the four and half ton plutonium atomic bomb “Fat Man,” this problem, though not yet fully revealed to the world, again proved its seriousness.1 The subsequent nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other countries, and their continued existence have kept human beings in a perilous position: with the weapons in a state of nonuse resting very precariously on the enduring hope that they will never be employed by any government, or now, terrorist organization. In the mid-1990s, at about the same time that Tokyo began to make it known that Japan would visibly assume an active role in nuclear disarmament, a controversy arose in the United States about what to do with the display of the Enola Gay at the Smithsonian Institute in Washington. On one side were those who felt strongly that the display of the Enola Gay should be a comprehensive political and historical testimony of the atomic bombing fifty years after it occurred in Hiroshima. On the other side were those who felt equally strong that such a public revelation would be unpatriotic. Inextricable from this position was that a comprehensive display would undermine the U.S. decision to use the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, which had long been based on the contention that it saved the lives of many

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American soldiers. In the end, the display of the Enola Gay was a victory for those who wanted to demonstrate the event from an American perspective. Both President Clinton and Vice President Gore indicated through a White House spokesperson that the Smithsonian would best serve the interests of the United States by reflecting the views of veterans’ organizations and others who opposed the comprehensive display. Rejected because of political pressures, the comprehensive display, which among others received the support of many academic historians, would have included giving full attention to the human devastation at the first “ground zero.”2 Tokyo chose to keep out of the U.S. controversy, despite the lasting memory of Hiroshima in Japan. Whether or not this was a wise decision is debatable, since there is a strong sentiment in Hiroshima that the message of the hibakusha (the survivors of the atomic bombings) should be spread around the world. In any case, what has become evident since Tokyo made known that it was going to take responsibility for drawing global attention to nuclear disarmament is that it has been unwilling to challenge and confront Washington on this issue. The end of the Cold War notwithstanding, Japanese nuclear disarmament policy has remained strongly influenced by two major factors: Tokyo’s determination to keep Japan’s position under American nuclear umbrella and U.S. security objectives. While in some respect these two factors overlap, for Tokyo wants Japan to receive the deterrent benefits of the U.S. nuclear shield and Washington would not particularly welcome the existence of Japanese nuclear weapons, there is also some degree of independence. Washington’s security objectives are global and, as of now, Tokyo’s are not. Despite Tokyo’s perennial efforts to make Japan a “normal country,” the pursuit of big-power normalcy is in no small part prompted by Washington’s perennial interest in maintaining a strong bilateral security system that, when the need arises, can be quickly converted to Japanese participation in a multilateral initiative. Unlike Tokyo, Washington’s global security objectives include a dependence on the continued existence of nuclear weapons, not just for deterrence, as was their primary purpose during the Cold War, but for possible use against so-called rogue states, nonstate terrorists, and conceivably traditional rivals, who are now generally cast as friends, such as Russia and China. For Tokyo, there is a very serious problem resulting from keeping Japan protected by the U.S. nuclear shield. Emanating from Japan’s enduring pacifism and strong cultural opposition to the existence of nuclear weapons is a commitment to an anti-nuclear weapons policy that Tokyo has worked to promote internationally for more than a decade. This means that Tokyo has two simultaneous and antithetical objectives: the first is to keep Japan protected by the U.S. nuclear shield and the second is to oppose the existence of

Detoured on the Path to Nuclear Disarmament

3

nuclear weapons. Argued by some to be contradictory, a charge that Tokyo denies by saying that both objectives can be realized as the nuclear powers move toward disarmament, Tokyo attempts to maintain the first and promote the second, but only to the extent that the latter does not jeopardize the former. This has pitted Tokyo against Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons organizations and alienated it from the states that constitute the New Agenda Coalition, the seven countries which, in declaring that the nuclear powers have failed to meet their disarmament responsibilities as indicated by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), have worked diligently since 1998 to abolish nuclear weapons (see chapters 4 and 5). Pulled along by the political current created by Washington in the wake of the 9/11 catastrophe in the United States, Tokyo has generally been an ardent supporter of and participant in the Bush administration’s counterproliferation campaign. Based on a preemptive military strike doctrine, this counterproliferation campaign is largely unilateral and openly hubristic in design and relies on the threat or use of punishment to exact compliance. Tokyo’s allegiance to Washington’s counterproliferation campaign is evident, for example, not just in its policy reactions to North Korea, with which it has had poor relations for decades, but also with Iran, a country with which it has long maintained a good relationship. Significantly, Japan was one of the eleven initial participants, and the only representative from Asia, involved in the Bush administration’s Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) that formulated the Statement of Interdiction Principles to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction at its third meeting held in Paris in early September 2003.3 While efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are laudable, Japan’s participation in the PSI represents another security linkage with Washington and ultimately further distracts it from focusing on the inherent connectedness between nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. In brief, Tokyo has relegated nuclear disarmament to a much longer-term objective than it had prior to 9/11, when even then it had declared that a gradual and realistic approach was the best way to proceed toward the goal of abolishing nuclear weapons. When Prime Minister Koizumi annually visited Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9 to commemorate the 1945 bombings of these two cities during their annual peace services he declared the central government’s commitment to nuclear disarmament.4 But his public expression of Tokyo’s commitment to nuclear disarmament was largely ceremonial. While it is true that ideally Tokyo wants to abolish all nuclear weapons, it has not been willing to push very hard for this, since it knows that this is not what Washington wants. Since U.S. policy makers have not identified nuclear disarmament as a priority objective, Tokyo’s stated policy of taking gradual steps along the “path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons”5 must

4

Japan’s Nuclear Disarmament Policy

be tentative and conditional—if Washington does not approve then the Japanese government does not pursue the matter, at least not in earnest. Although—because of the atomic bomb tragedies that occurred in Hiroshima and Nagasaki—Tokyo repeatedly identifies Japan as having the leading role in the abolition of nuclear weapons, the adoption and maintenance of a gradualist approach directly contravenes Article VI of the NPT. This article specifically calls for “an early date” for the abolition of nuclear weapons.6 As will be shown in chapter 2, Tokyo has been a leading advocate of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but it dampened its enthusiasm for this accord when it became clear that the Bush administration had an incontrovertible aversion to it. While the Japanese government received some accolades for its role in organizing and completing the Tokyo Forum,7 an international project on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, the work had its shortcomings. One of the most notable of these was that since the final report did not recommend a date for the abolition of nuclear weapons, it left disarmament to the nuclear powers, putting in their hands the speed and course that the process should take in the twenty-first century. In contrast, avid supporters of nuclear disarmament in Japan want to see Tokyo identify a specific time for the elimination of all nuclear weapons. Recognizing this intended omission on Tokyo’s part, Hiroshima Mayor Tadatoshi Akiba took the initiative in his address at the 59th ceremony of the atomic bombing of the city by declaring that all nuclear weapons need to be eliminated by the year 2020.8 Considering the continuing and very strong anti-nuclear weapons sentiment held by the majority of Japanese people, which survey data shows extends to almost four-fifths of the population,9 Tokyo maintains a somewhat patronizing position on the abolition of nuclear weapons. Because of its strong propensity to be compliant with Washington’s objectives, Tokyo’s disarmament efforts have been detoured. Compounding this problem is the increasing momentum within Japan for it to become a normal country. In short, Tokyo simply does not demonstrate the commitment to nuclear disarmament that emanates from the people of Japan. International survey date often indicate that there is an unambiguous sensitivity among Japanese respondents to nuclear weapons- and disarmamentrelated issues, especially when compared to the United States. Awareness of the historical and social importance connected to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki stands at 99 percent in Japan, much higher than it is in the United States, where it is 67 percent. The Japanese perception of threats stemming from nuclear war and proliferation, 21 percent, is higher than it is for the eleven countries studied in the international survey, and noticeably higher than it is in the United States, where it stands at 6 percent. Higher also than all of the other surveyed countries, poll data shows that

Detoured on the Path to Nuclear Disarmament

5

97 percent of Japanese respondents either agree (77 percent) or somewhat agree (20 percent) that an international treaty should exist that bans all nuclear weapons. While American agreement on this issue is 76 percent, the proportion that disagrees with this, 24 percent, is noticeably higher than it is for Japan, 3 percent. Perhaps reflecting the fact that Japan was the first major nation to both sign and ratify the CTBT and that Tokyo has put relatively more effort in attempting to bring this accord to fruition than most other items on its disarmament agenda, the Japanese people strongly support a ban on nuclear testing. Compared to the United States where a reasonably high proportion of respondents, 78 percent, agree with the need—strongly or somewhat—for a ban on nuclear testing, 95 percent of the Japanese surveyed supported such a proscription. Despite the strong support for disarmament among the Japanese people, they are not much more optimistic than Americans about the prospect of eliminating nuclear weapons. Whereas 49 percent of Japanese respondents believe that nuclear weapons can be banned, 45 percent of Americans also felt this way. However, when it comes to supporting the no-first-use of nuclear weapons, 79 percent of the Americans supported this, compared to 94 percent of the Japanese respondents. Moreover, although Tokyo has refused to push hard in its disarmament agenda for negative security assurances (a legally binding pledge by the nuclear powers not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons on nonnuclear weapons states), 95 percent of the Japanese respondents agree that they should exist (70 percent strongly and 25 percent somewhat). In contrast, American respondents fared relatively poor on this issue, with 76 percent agreeing (58 percent strongly and 18 percent somewhat) with the need for negative security assurances. Only respondents in India registered lower agreement than Americans on this issue.10

Tokyo’s Nuclear Shortcomings Tokyo’s reluctance to develop and work to implement an unrestricted anti-nuclear weapons policy rooted in and corresponding with popular sentiment reflects the security dependency that it has on the United States. Tokyo’s international appeals and efforts to abolish nuclear weapons so that the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki will never be repeated have yet to escape the underlying policy issue that, despite strong opposition from the Japanese people, it fully accepts the deterrent utility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. While it easy to conclude that Tokyo knows more about the continuing need to maintain the U.S. nuclear shield than many Japanese people and either has decided not to convey this to them or has not been

6

Japan’s Nuclear Disarmament Policy

able to convince them of this requirement, there is more that should be considered here. Washington wants Japan to remain under the U.S. nuclear umbrella for at least two important reasons. First, as long as Japan remains protected by the U.S. nuclear deterrent Washington does not have to worry that Tokyo would break away from the NPT and create a Japanese nuclear state. If Tokyo were to do this, an arms race would be instantly set off in Northeast Asia, since China and North Korea would feel immediately threatened by a nuclear-armed Japan.11 Moreover, the repercussions stemming from the existence of a new regional nuclear power could reverberate to Seoul and Taipei and further destabilize the region. Washington also does not want Japan to come out from under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, even if it did not decide to develop nuclear weapons, since this would markedly reduce America’s political influence on Tokyo. Like it has not experienced for more than a half of a century, Tokyo would be in a position to develop independent Japanese security and disarmament initiatives and policies without having to consider Washington’s reactions. From the perspective of Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations, by coming out from under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, Tokyo would be in the position to claim its “moral authority” in seeking the abolition of nuclear arms.12 Tokyo’s view of nuclear disarmament could be anecdotally expressed in the following way. In a perfect world, where the threat of an attack with weapons of mass destruction from North Korea, China, and perhaps even Russia, does not exist, there would be no need to keep Japan protected by the U.S. nuclear shield. However, Tokyo believes that the world, and especially Northeast Asia, is far from perfect and that new threats are increasingly being added to the older ones. For Tokyo then, not only is it imperative to maintain the U.S.-Japan security treaty, it is also necessary to retain the protection afforded by the American nuclear shield. While Tokyo recognizes that it would be good to push harder than it has in the post–Cold War environment for the abolition of all nuclear weapons, deterrence remains paramount. Japan is currently struggling with an identity crisis with regard to its positions and policies on nuclear weapons (see chapter 8). Tokyo has, as a member of one of Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons organizations stated, “two faces.”13 One of these faces Tokyo periodically displays for the benefit of the Japanese public, usually to an international audience when it is promoting or supporting a disarmament initiative. It reveals the other face to Washington when it wants to demonstrate that Japan is a reliable ally that recognizes the importance of being protected by the U.S. nuclear shield. Stated differently, Tokyo is maintaining dual-track nuclear weapons policies that exist apart from each other, making the resolution of the conflict between the two very difficult.

Detoured on the Path to Nuclear Disarmament

7

For example, as discussed in chapter 6, during the North Korean nuclear crisis that emerged in October 2002 Tokyo did not want Washington to offer Pyongyang the assurance that the United States would not use nuclear weapons against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Had the Japanese government not initially objected to the security assurance, it could have created the impression that Tokyo understood that the threat to Japan was not too serious. This would have given Japanese disarmament organizations reason to argue more forcefully than they have already for their government to pursue a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Northeast Asia. Tokyo’s acceptance of the U.S. hard line policy toward North Korea indicated that, like Washington, the Japanese government still sees nuclear weapons as constituting an important part of the nation’s security posture. The choice by Tokyo to try and persuade Washington not to offer Pyongyang a security assurance that it would not use nuclear weapons was consistent with the retrogression that has been evident in U.S. policy. Tokyo’s decision sanctioned the infringement by Washington of two of the thirteen practical steps for nuclear disarmament established at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, “the principle of undiminished security for all” and the “principle of irreversibility.” Included in the principle of undiminished security for all is the reduced role of nuclear weapons in national security. By not wanting Washington to offer Pyongyang a security guarantee that nuclear weapons would not be used against North Korea, Tokyo was not advocating a diminished role for U.S. nuclear arms or for the nuclear shield that they provide to Japan. Tokyo’s decision to ask Washington not to offer Pyongyang a promise that it would not attack North Korea with nuclear weapons also encouraged the contravention by the United States of the principle of irreversibility, since such a guarantee had been previously established. The 1994 Agreed Framework between Washington and Pyongyang specifically states that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against North Korea.14

The Path to Become a Normal Country Besides the desire to keep Japan under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, there is another obstacle preventing Tokyo from being more committed to nuclear disarmament. Soon after the first Gulf War in 1991, Tokyo began to pursue a normal country status for Japan, which, simply expressed, is an ongoing attempt to recognize the nation’s right to have unfettered use of its military capabilities. Thus, in addition to the path to nuclear disarmament, Tokyo created another path for the nation to travel along. Because it often

8

Japan’s Nuclear Disarmament Policy

intersects with Washington’s security objectives and Tokyo’s acceptance of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, the path being traveled to make Japan a normal country typically has precedence over nuclear disarmament. Continually being constructed and redesigned by conservative and nationalist forces, the path to become a normal country could conceivably lead to the decision in the future that the development of Japanese nuclear weapons would better serve the nation’s security interests than the U.S. nuclear shield. Notably, Japanese nationalism includes an extremist strain that has demonstrated effrontery and lawlessness. A recent example of this showed up in Hiroshima on August 6, 2004, the morning of the ceremony marking the 59th anniversary of the atomic bombing of the city. Members of a nationalist extremist group allegedly fired two shots at the Hiroshima Kyoiku Kaikan, a hotel owned by the Japan Teachers Union and where Gensuikin and other anti-nuclear weapons organizations held meetings the day before.15 The Japan Teachers Union passed a resolution in 1999 stating its opposition to legislation giving official recognition to hinomaru (the Japanese flag) and kimigayo (the Japanese national anthem), both symbols of Japan’s past military and imperial aggression, without first getting the endorsement of the people of Japan; Gensuikin is one of Japan’s leading anti-nuclear weapons organizations. However, the vast majority of Japanese nationalists and conservatives prefer to influence policy making without resorting to crime. While the development of Japanese nuclear weapons is not likely in the immediate future, mainly because there would be far too many pacifist hurdles to overcome in a short time, the slow but steady growth of nationalist and conservative influence on Japanese policy making does create a formidable omen about the possible direction of Japan’s position on nuclear weapons. Thus, although currently a long shot, the development of Japanese nuclear weapons in the future could not only result from Washington, for some reason or another, denying Japan the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, but also from the growing influence of conservatives and nationalists within the country on the policy making process.

Conservative and Nationalist Influence Versus Stalwart Pacifism Because too many officials in Tokyo have accepted the reasoning that Japan needs to become a normal country, Japanese policy making has been driven to the right. This movement to the right has given some latitude to prominent Japanese statesmen to blurt out emotive comments related to the development

Detoured on the Path to Nuclear Disarmament

9

of nuclear weapons by Japan. Although occurring from time to time in the past, Japanese statesmen were generally reluctant to make such comments, since they knew that the political repercussions from their remarks could adversely affect their careers. In recent years this has changed. While these kinds of comments quickly find their way to the media, accompanied by some hedged explanation by the speaker of what he really meant, political careers spoiled on such basis are unlikely today. Not only has Tokyo decided that remaining under the U.S. nuclear umbrella is still necessary for Japan, but the trending toward the right has created some political space that tolerates public comments about the possession of nuclear weapons without fear of reprimand or punishment. There has also been a strong and continuing push from the right since 2000 to revise Article 9, Japan’s war-forsaking constitutional clause, now reaching the point where survey date indicate the support of many Japanese lawmakers.16 However, this does not mean that a generalized pacifist sentiment does not still flourish in Japan. Although Article 9 has been tagged by the right in Japan and in the United States for revision, because of popular Japanese support, its existence continues to dampen the influence of conservative and nationalist forces. In addition to the tragedies that befell Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the nation’s anti-nuclear weapons organizations help to sustain the popular support for nuclear disarmament. However, while there are many peace and anti-nuclear weapons organizations in Japan, they are not unified. As chapter 4 indicates, this fragmentation, coupled with the cooptation that has resulted from Tokyo’s more visible, though generally tepid, attempt to promote nuclear disarmament since the mid-1990s, has made these organizations less effective than they would be if they were closely tied to a unified national movement.

Tokyo’s Quagmire Although Tokyo has decided that staying under the U.S. nuclear umbrella is best for Japan, it should not be concluded that it is always in concurrence with Washington’s nuclear weapons policies. There are times—albeit not too many—that Tokyo is uncomfortable with Washington’s policies. Tokyo was disturbed when the U.S. Senate failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in October 1999. Tokyo became somewhat uneasy when it learned that the Bush administration wanted to develop a new, miniaturized nuclear weapon, yet offered little in the way of sustained criticism after learning about this. While Tokyo has stood firmly behind Washington during the

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Japan’s Nuclear Disarmament Policy

North Korea nuclear crisis that emerged in 2002, it backtracked after awhile when American policy makers continued to allege that Iran, another member of the infamously named “axis of evil,” was clandestinely attempting to develop nuclear weapons. As chapter 7 shows, after several months of supporting Washington’s counterproliferation campaign that it waged against Tehran through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2003 and 2004, Tokyo reasoned that the prospect of oil-dependent Japan17 losing the Azadegan deal with Iran was too high of a price to pay for unwavering compliance to U.S. polices. Despite Tokyo’s inking of the Azadegan oil deal with Tehran in February 2004, Washington continued to allege without evidence that the Iranians were deluding the IAEA and pursuing nuclear weapons anyway. Washington attempted to persuade the Japanese government to seek out another source of foreign oil, namely Libya. A senior member of the Bush administration suggested to the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry in the summer of 2004 that, “Certainly, one thing that Japan could consider for oil supply instead of Iran is Libya.”18 Whether or not Colin Powell was this senior official is uncertain, but a short time later the U.S. secretary of state did propose to Tokyo that it reassess the Azadegan oil deal, claiming that, “It seems clear to us that Iran is trying to develop a nuclear weapon.”19 That the IAEA had stated that there was no evidence that Tehran was trying to acquire nuclear weapons had to be something that Tokyo took into full consideration before moving ahead with the Iranian oil deal. In late August 2004, Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Yukio Takeuchi stated that Japan would stick with the Iranian oil deal. Takeuchi said that Japan must place its “national interests” before the concerns of U.S. Secretary of State Powell and indicated, contrary to Washington’s allegation, that he did not think that Iran is trying to build a nuclear weapon.20 Tokyo would feel more comfortable with American nuclear weapons policies if Washington began to look more favorably on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, which has been stalled because of a dispute between the United States and China. Tokyo is also somewhat uncomfortable with indefinitely having to support the position of the “ultimate” abolition of nuclear weapons. Caught in the middle between the unrelenting demands of Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons organizations and the pressure from the New Agenda Coalition, Tokyo maintains that it is best to move gradually along the path to disarmament. Thus, Tokyo rejects the “idealistic” and relatively expeditious approach supported by the New Agenda Coalition and Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons organizations and supports the “practical” and gradual movement toward disarmament. Although this is Tokyo’s way of supporting the abolition of nuclear weapons and not angering

Detoured on the Path to Nuclear Disarmament

11

Washington, which could conceivably eliminate Japan’s place under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, this is hardly an ideal position to be in indefinitely. By concluding that it is best for Japan to remain under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, Tokyo largely forfeits implementing and sustaining comprehensive policies that identify nuclear disarmament as an objective that can be achieved in a reasonable time. Because Tokyo has never identified a time for the realization of nuclear disarmament, this creates the potential for a very serious consequence: that nonnuclear states will not “wait out” the nuclear powers’ decisions to realize the complete abolition of nuclear weapons. Since the NPT came into force in 1970, Israel, South Africa and then India and Pakistan and have acquired nuclear weapons. Although these states have never signed the NPT, except for South Africa, which did so in 1991, a year after it ended its nuclear weapons program, the empirical evidence strongly suggests that some countries will seek nuclear arms as long as others possess them. Having been disregarded for decades, NPT’s Article VI, which obliges the nuclear powers to disarm, is considered an “ultimate”—the political euphemism for a “timeless”—objective rather than an impending reality. The longer Article VI continues in this state of political limbo, the more likely it will be that some nonnuclear nations will decide that it is in their national interests to acquire nuclear arms. This is true even for states that are signatories of the NPT. Despite having signed the NPT in 1969, Iraq was found to have been attempting to develop nuclear weapons in the early 1990s. In 2003 Libya, which became a signatory of the NPT in 1975, acknowledged that it had been attempting to develop a nuclear weapon but that it had abandoned this objective. Moreover, in January 2003 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea set a dangerous precedent; having become a signatory to the NPT in 1985, Pyongyang announced North Korea’s withdrawal from the accord in January of that year. Unlike in the early 1990s when North Korea declared its intention to withdrawal from the NPT but at the last minute decided not to complete the rescission process, by March 2003, three months after its January announcement, it was no longer bound by the accord.21 In February 2005, North Korea publicly announced that it possessed nuclear weapons, though it is yet to be confirmed. At the core of the proliferation problem is the elimination of all nuclear weapons and fissile material, processes that can be bolstered by a strict, internationalized inspections regime. Japan markedly dilutes its disarmament work by remaining under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Because Tokyo considers the U.S. nuclear deterrent essential for Japan’s security, its existing disarmament agenda has not only failed to put the world on a direct path to the abolition of nuclear weapons but its policy positions also ominously aggravate the global proliferation problem.

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Chapter 2 The Watershed

This chapter shows that the Japanese government has adopted an accommodating response to the general unwillingness of the United States to move forward with nuclear disarmament. Nearly in tandem with Washington, the Japanese government has accepted Washington’s undercutting of the nuclear nonproliferation regime’s main objective—the elimination all nuclear weapons. What is more, Tokyo showed no sustained dissatisfaction with Washington’s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and has increasingly involved Japan in the U.S.-initiated missile defense system. All of this has occurred, despite Tokyo’s repeated public proclamations affirming Japan’s strong commitment to the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Japan has been an especially enthusiastic supporter of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) from its beginning in 1996. In addition to being the first country to both sign and ratify the accord of the forty-four required to do so before it can be legally binding (the Annex 2 states),1 Japan’s Foreign Minister Masahiko Koumura chaired the initial Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty held in Vienna in October 1999. At this time, the deputy press secretary of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated the importance that Tokyo attached to the conference. He stressed that the conference had sent a strong message to the international community about the need to implement the CTBT. The deputy press secretary also emphasized Tokyo’s expectation that the nuclear weapons states that have not ratified the accord do so expeditiously

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and promised that Japan would remain active by continuing to promote the CTBT and by seeking the cooperation of other countries to bring it into force.2 The next day, on October 13, the republican-controlled U.S. Senate failed to ratify the CTBT, an action that was seen by many in the United States and throughout the world as a major setback for nuclear disarmament. This included many in Japan. On October 14 the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement that “Japan has expected U.S. leadership” in the process of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation and views the Senate’s vote as “indeed regrettable.” This statement concluded by urging the United States to soon do what is necessary to ratify the accord “lest the CTBT, created by the international community with immense wisdom and energy, should lose its credibility and significance.”3 The Obuchi government continued to advise the United States, as well as other countries, to acquiesce to the CTBT. Whether or not Japanese officials realized it, when the U.S. Senate refused to ratify the CTBT, Japan had experienced a watershed that, soon without resistance from Tokyo, would slowly deflate the enthusiasm of its nuclear disarmament policy. The Bush administration has treated the CTBT as Cold War relic, as it did the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Although technically not created during the Cold War, the CTBT has its origins in that period. In 1954, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru proposed an international prohibition on all forms of nuclear testing. However, the Cold War and verification problems caused much of the international community to view the efficaciousness of such a ban with some uncertainty. Still, the appearance of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963 prohibiting nuclear explosions in space, the atmosphere, and underwater was a notable disarmament achievement at the time. No sooner had the Cold War ended than work began to bring about a ban on all forms of nuclear testing; this work culminated with the appearance of the CTBT in 1996.4 While the Clinton and Bush administrations shared some common views on missile defense and therefore, albeit to different degrees, looked disapprovingly at the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, this was not true for CTBT. The Clinton administration supported the CTBT and was content with maintaining the efficiency of the U.S. nuclear arsenal with subcritical testing,5 authorizing many during its time in Washington (see further), much to the disappointment of advocates of nuclear disarmament. Candidate Bush first revealed his objections to the CTBT when campaigning for the presidency. During its first six months in Washington, the Bush White House began exploring ways to back out of the CTBT, believing that the accord “does not help our nonproliferation goals,” as one administration official put it. After being informed by lawyers in the State Department that the president cannot authorize the withdrawal from an

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international treaty once it has been brought before the Senate without this body’s approval, the Bush administration decided that it would simply relegate the accord to political oblivion.6 The Bush administration also attempted to delete key words relating to the CTBT in NATO communiqués.7 In August 2001, the Bush administration announced that it would no longer support most of the activities of the CTBT, especially those involving on-site inspections.8 However, consistent with its interest in counterproliferation, the administration did feel that it was important to continue to provide financial assistance to the CTBT’s International Monitoring System that deals with the detection of nuclear tests covertly conducted throughout the world.9 At the same time that the Bush administration suggested that it would tolerate a buildup by China of its nuclear arsenal if Beijing accepted missile defense (see further), it also took an early swipe at the U.S. moratorium on nuclear testing. A senior administration official remarked in early September 2001 that, “we don’t see the need for any tests, by anyone, in the near future.” But there may, at some point, be a need by both countries to make sure that their warheads are safe and reliable.”10 However, the Bush administration backpedaled on the issue of tolerating possible nuclear testing by China, stating at the time that the United States plans to maintain its moratorium on testing.11 In mid-October 2001 when Tokyo submitted its draft disarmament resolution entitled A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons to the U.N. General Assembly,12 it was well aware of Washington’s objections to the CTBT. Tokyo’s 2001 nuclear disarmament resolution was noticeably different from the one it had submitted in 2000. The 2000 disarmament resolution specified that Japan desired to see the CTBT come into force “before 2003” and that it wanted nations to sign and ratify the accord, especially those that are required to do so. Demonstrating the influence of taibei hairyo (consideration for the relationship with the United States), the Koizumi government’s 2001 draft resolution submitted to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly omitted the target date of 2003 for the CTBT to come into force.13 Tokyo reasoned that deleting the target date of 2003 to ensure the early entry into force of the CTBT, along with other concessions to Washington, most notably language pertaining to the importance of maintaining the ABM Treaty, would increase the likelihood that the United States would support Japan’s disarmament resolution, like it had done the previous year. That the United States was one of only two countries (the other was India) that voted against the Japanese disarmament resolution had to have shocked the Koizumi government. However, when remarking on the passage of Japan’s 2001 draft resolution by the United Nations in early November, the

16

Japan’s Nuclear Disarmament Policy

Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made no reference to the fact that the country’s staunch ally, the United States, voted against it.14 This issue was not totally ignored within the Diet. On November 9, 2001, a debate took place in the Japanese House of Representatives’ Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs dealing with Tokyo’s recently submitted disarmament resolution. The debate was between the Social Democratic Party’s house representative from Hiroshima, Tetsuo Kaneko, and this standing committee’s Senior Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Seiken Sugiura. The following is a translated excerpt from this debate.15 Kaneko:

Sugiura:

Kaneko:

Sugiura:

Kaneko:

In the resolution last year, you included even the goal of the year 2003 for its [CTBT] entry-into-force . . . As a MP [member of parliament] from Hiroshima, I have been irritated by the GOJ [Government of Japan] policy of ultimate goal to eliminate nuclear weapons, but welcomed your concrete positive initiatives last year. However, you dropped such a goal of 2003, and just say early entry into force. Clearly, this year’s resolution has stepped back from the last one in terms of the attitude of the GOJ. How do you think? You say this year’s resolution has stepped back. Well, you may be right in saying so, but we have maintained the fundamentals. As the U.S. voted “no,” things went in twists and turns, as you know. Japan did its best to make the U.S. vote “yes,” at worst “abstention” just as last year. [Actually, the United States voted “yes’ to Japan’s 2000 disarmament resolution]. International community, as well as Japan, made best efforts in this direction. Therefore I do hope that you understand that the languages of the resolution rest on a delicate balance. As you admit, this year’s resolution has stepped back. Then, why? You wished you would get “yes,” at least “abstention,” from the U.S. The U.S. had changed its policy on the CTBT. It had gone to the point to reject the CTBT. But you still wanted the cooperation from the U.S. Then what was the outcome? You got [a] “no” vote, didn’t you? The foreign policy of Japan is always depending on that of the U.S. But even when you drew back to meet the U.S. demand, the U.S. voted “no.” What misery Japan’s diplomacy was. Tell me what happened. Japan has a constant policy to attach great importance to early entry-into-force of the CTBT. There is no change with it. It is really regrettable that the U.S. was not in favor. But the fundamentals were that Japan maintained its position and did its best. The GOJ often says that Japan is the only nation devastated by the atomic bombs, but your arguments have no strong power of persuasion.

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On the same day that the First Committee on Disarmament and International Security adopted Japan’s 2001 draft resolution, it also voted on a CTBT draft resolution. The First Committee passed the resolution on the CTBT by a vote of 140 to 1, with no abstentions. The United States was the only country not to support the resolution. Before the First Committee, the American representative unequivocally stated that United States did not endorse the CTBT.16 This was problematic for the Koizumi government. Only a few months earlier, Prime Minister Koizumi spoke with some optimism about the upcoming second Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty during the August ceremonies commemorating the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.17 Both the U.S. rejection of Japan’s 2001 nuclear disarmament resolution and the fact that Washington had turned its back on the CTBT, therefore, put Tokyo in a very awkward position: how to remain a leading advocate of promoting the implementation of this accord while the United States rejected it. Faced with the contradiction of accepting the responsibility to coordinate international efforts to bring the CTBT into force as soon as possible, yet content with Japan’s position under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, Tokyo offered little in the way of a direct, substantive response to Washington’s decision to minimize the significance of the accord. Delayed from the end of September because of the terrorist attacks on the United States, the second Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was held in New York from November 11 to 13, 2001. The Chinese representative, Shen Guofang, pointed out in his statement that the chances for the CTBT to come into force anytime soon were not good. He emphasized that the first conference held in Vienna in 1999 had just ended when “a country explicitly refused to ratify the treaty.” Shen went on to point out that this same country indicated that its participation in the Preparatory Commission’s work for the CTBT would be selective. He stressed in his statement that China will maintain its moratorium on nuclear testing, that it continues to support the CTBT and that his government has presented the accord to the National People’s Congress. Finally, Shen stated that Beijing stands behind organizing another conference to make possible the implementation of the CTBT.18 The Russian representative to the conference, Igor Sergeev, pointed out that his country had both signed and ratified the CTBT.19 Without reservation, Sergeev stressed the significance of increasing the usefulness of the CTBT, as well as its importance within the system of international accords to prevent proliferation. He emphasized that there exists “dangerous trends toward disrupting” the CTBT, which “may result in a crisis of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and an uncontained spread of nuclear weapons.

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Japan’s Nuclear Disarmament Policy

This would take place against the backdrop of the attempts to revise the 1972 ABM Treaty while disruption of the ABM Treaty would allow proliferation of the missiles as delivery vehicles for weapons of mass destruction.” He concluded his statement by criticizing the opponents of the CTBT, who argue that actual nuclear testing is necessary to make certain that nuclear weapons are secure and dependable and that verification problems still exist.20 The issue of verification problems is a particularly important one between the United States and Russia. The CTBT does include specific protocol that permits on-site verification. The second provision in the protocol language of the treaty states that on-site inspections can be conducted “in the area where the event that triggered the on-site inspection request occurred.” Moreover, the process to acquire the permission to perform an on-site inspection is not an especially arduous one.21 But, as we have seen earlier, the Bush administration was not prepared to fund the on-site activities that are part of the CTBT. Although the Russian and Chinese representatives to the second Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty strongly alluded to Washington’s undermining of the accord, Tokyo completely avoided implying any U.S. disruption. Instead, the Japanese representative, Nobuyasu Abe, stressed that there was no chance for the imminent implementation of the CTBT and that this was partly because some countries have not ratified it; he did not explain what he believed were the other part or parts of the problem. Abe stressed that any country that did conduct nuclear tests would be in contempt of the CTBT and bring on the rebuke of the international community. In an effort to demonstrate the CTBT’s international significance to the disarmament regime, Abe indicated that the accord has successfully maintained a suspension on nuclear testing. He also stated that verification technologies are quite advanced, making it nearly impossible to conduct a nuclear test without detection, especially by a state that has not previously done so. Abe concluded his statement by pointing out what Japan had done to bring the CTBT into force, such as writing many letters to foreign government leaders urging their submission to the accord and entreating officials attending the G8 Foreign Ministers summit and the Ministerial Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum to do the same.22 The conference’s final report, issued just a few days after its last session, “stressed the importance of a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty as a major instrument in the field of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation in all its aspects.” Notwithstanding the conference’s international significance, key states were notably not participants. While 117 states took part in the conference,

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India, North Korea, and the United States did not participate.23 Explaining why the United States did not participate, a State Department spokesperson indicated that, “The purpose of the conference is to promote ratifications of the treaty, and the administration has made clear that it has no plans to ask the Senate to reconsider its 1999 vote on this issue.”24 While Tokyo had been quick to point to the national security problems posed by the North Korean missile threat, it did not publicly single out Washington’s blatantly adversative position on the CTBT. Despite the Koizumi government’s public reticence, what the conference did was to make clear to Tokyo that it could not count on Washington any time soon to help bring the CTBT into force. Washington’s aversion to the CTBT created a big problem for Tokyo. Prone to follow or accept U.S. security policies, Tokyo’s enthusiasm for the CTBT left it little room to maneuver. Unwilling to publicly criticize the Bush administration on its position relating to the CTBT, Tokyo instead directly contacted Washington in January 2002 to find if it was against the ratification of the accord.25 But this contact was more of a formal than substantive move on Tokyo’s part, since the answer was already known: the Bush administration had little intention of promoting the ratification of the CTBT. Similar to what it did with Japanese official and popular interest in the CTBT, the Bush administration ignored public sentiment in the United States, which had long supported restricting or banning nuclear testing. Survey data shows an average of 73 percent of American respondents supported restricting or banning nuclear testing in the twelve national polls performed between 1957 and June 1999, the last one conducted prior to the Senate vote in October.26 A national survey conducted a little over a week after the Senate vote showed that 59 percent of the respondents felt that CTBT should have been ratified, 29 percent did not, and the rest had no opinion. Hardly providing a public-opinion mandate that would justify the Bush administration’s previous effort to explore the possibility of backing out of the CTBT, another question in this same survey found that only 21 percent of the respondents favored withdrawing from the accord.27 Despite objections to the CTBT in Washington, Tokyo has continued to encourage governments to sign and ratify the accord, especially those whose official endorsement is necessary for it to enter into force. With Australia and the Netherlands, Japan sponsored a meeting of the Friends of the CTBT in September 2002, which was called for the purpose of “maintaining and strengthening momentum toward the entry into force of the CTBT.” Held at the headquarters of the United Nations in New York, this meting attracted foreign ministers from ten countries and, supported by their counterparts from eight additional countries that were not in attendance, including

20

Japan’s Nuclear Disarmament Policy

Russia, France, and the United Kingdom, produced the Joint Ministerial Statement calling for the early entry into force of the CTBT.28 Tokyo has also been encouraging states in bilateral discussions to endorse the CTBT. During 2002 and 2003 Japan encouraged Vietnam, Iran, China, and the United States to ratify the CTBT.29 But a fair assessment of Tokyo’s bilateral attempts to get Washington to ratify the CTBT suggests that they are devoid of any realistic expectation that the position of Washington is likely to change. Twice during 2002 and 2003 Tokyo advised Washington about its policy position on the CTBT. In August 2002 and January 2003, Minister of Foreign Affairs’ Director General for Arms Control and Scientific Affairs Yukiya Amano emphasized two things relating to the CTBT to the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton during meetings in Tokyo on the U.S.-Japan Commission on Arms Control, Disarmament, Nonproliferation, and Verification. Amano stressed to Bolton that it is Japan’s position to push for the coming into force of the CTBT as soon as possible and he strongly urged the United States to continue with its moratorium on nuclear testing.30 However, Amano expressed Tokyo’s concerns to one of the most conservative and hawkish senior officials in the Bush administration. Before assuming his position in the Bush administration, Bolton was senior vice president at the conservative American Enterprise Institute, which did not endorse the ratification of the CTBT. In August 2002, at the same time that Bolton was in Tokyo attending the meeting of the Japan-U.S. Commission of Arms Control, Disarmament, Nonproliferation, and Verification he made clear to Japanese reporters the Bush administration’s opposition to the CTBT. In his explanation Bolton stressed that the United States has the “responsibility to ensure the safety and reliability of our nuclear stockpile, the umbrella of protection, that protects all of us—protects Japan as well.”31 Thus, communicating little more than political formality with near zero probability that any substantive action would result, Amano had a pretty good idea that his comments to Bolton were very unlikely to prompt him to return to Washington and encourage the president and other senior officials in the Bush administration to support the ratification of the CTBT. The third Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT was held in early September 2003 in Vienna. All told, 107 states participated in the conference. Also in attendance were representatives from 7 specialized agencies and related intergovernmental organizations, and 19 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). As in 2001, a representative from the United States was conspicuously absent from the third conference. During the conference Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi again emphasized the importance Japan attached to the coming into force

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of the CTBT. She stressed the sophistication of the monitoring system associated with the accord and announced Japan’s recent contributions to this important nonproliferation activity.32 Tokyo had also participated in a letter campaign with Finland and Austria that encouraged “high-level” representation at the conference and requested from 191 countries that they complete their respective processes for the ratification of the CTBT. Also with Finland and Austria, Tokyo indicated that it had used diplomatic mechanisms intended to persuade Annex II countries to demonstrate their commitment to the legal implementation of the CTBT.33 But, as in other international meetings, Tokyo showed no desire at the 2003 conference to call attention to Washington’s continued rejection of the CTBT or to other ways that U.S. behavior threatened to undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime upon which it rests. Neither Washington’s manifest rejection of the CTBT nor that it has been taken as axiomatic in the international community that the United States must be involved in nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation efforts if they are going to be effective had any bearing on Kawaguchi’s comments. Foreign Minister Kawaguchi’s speech at the 2003 Vienna conference stood in stark contrast to the statements made by the representatives from Brazil, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden, five of the seven members of the New Agenda Coalition, and to that presented by the Nonaligned Movement. While these statements critically conveyed dissatisfaction that the CTBT had not come into force seven years after the U.N. General Assembly had approved it, Kawaguchi’s speech reflected the optimism of Tokyo’s position that the path to nuclear disarmament is a gradual process. Kawaguchi designed her conference speech to distance Japan from those who “are disheartened by the fact that the CTBT has still not entered into force,” a concern specifically identified in the conference’s final report.34 Instead, Kawaguchi stated that, “I am not of this view,” stressing that it is important that “we maintain our efforts to promote the Treaty’s early entry into force.”35 In contrast, Brazil’s statement noted that the real chances for the CTBT to “enter into force is still bleak.” Referring to the lack of progress made on the 13 practical steps that came out of the 2000 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, Brazil stressed its dissatisfaction that some countries had moved away from their disarmament obligations, especially those pertaining to the early implementation of the CTBT, the principle of irreversibility, and the unequivocal commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons.36 Although showing less disappointment than the Brazilian statement, the speech made by the representative from Ireland called attention to the unfulfilled commitments made at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, including the one relating to the CTBT. After

22

Japan’s Nuclear Disarmament Policy

underscoring the inextricable connection between the NPT and the CTBT, Ireland’s statement indicated that the international community still had a long way to go before achieving the goal of abolishing all nuclear weapons.37 New Zealand’s similarly pointed to the direct link between NPT and CTBT and to the fact that the early entry into force of the CTBT was one of the 13 practical steps agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. New Zealand’s statement emphasized the difficulty in believing that the CTBT still had not entered into force after so long a time and indicated that “we take no delight that we meet today, for a third time under Article XIV [of the CTBT], to accelerate the ratification process.”38 The South African representative to the conference emphasized that, because the CTBT had not yet come into force, he was concerned that the international community might not be serious about bolstering the global nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation system. He also expressed concern that the declaration of the 2003 conference “is not a more dynamic document” than those that came out of the 1999 and 2001 conferences.39 Included in Sweden’s statement were direct criticisms of several countries that it believed had been undermining the nuclear disarmament regime. Pointing to Washington, the Swedish statement stressed, “we have to express our deep concern about the on-going discussions in the United States, on creating a new generation of nuclear weapons.”40 Also in contrast to Kawaguchi’s speech at the 2003 conference, were the presentations given by the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) states and by the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), who spoke for 97 nongovernmental organizations.41 After noting the special role that the five original nuclear powers had in bringing the CTBT into force, the NAM statement critically drew attention to the 2002 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review that proposes new kinds of nuclear weapons and the possible resumption of nuclear testing. The NAM statement argued that these new kinds of nuclear weapons represent a breach of the assurances given by the original nuclear powers when the discussions had concluded on the CTBT.42 The statement given by the representative from the IPPNW underscored the grave concern that the NGOs have about the U.S. decision to begin research on miniaturized nuclear weapons. The IPPNW also noted that the United States “was the only nation to oppose the retention of the CTBT on the agenda of the U.N. General Assembly in November 2001.”43 Held in New York in late September 2005, the fourth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT was uneventful from the standpoint of international law, mainly because it occurred in the wake of the 2005 NPT Review Conference. Continuing to demonstrate its determination to not support the CTBT, the Bush administration once again did not send a representative to the conference. Like some of the other states

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that did send a representative, Japan noted the lack of progress made on substantive issues at the 2005 NPT Review Conference but nonetheless stressed the importance of bringing the CTBT into force as soon as possible. Japan’s statement at the conference emphasized the diplomatic work Tokyo had undertaken in trying to bring the CTBT into force, the importance of verification to the accord, and the Japanese commitment to strengthening the verification system. But Tokyo understood that Washington’s objections to the CTBT made the international community’s commitment to the accord expressed in the conference’s final declaration little more than wishful thinking.44

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and Missile Defense Nearing the end of a two-term administration, the Clinton White House fully understood that advancements in military technologies had reached the point where a decision soon had to be made by Washington on the fate of a national missile defense (NMD) system. So when President Clinton was confronted with the question of whether or not to authorize additional work on a NMD system, he opted to leave the decision to his successor. Further work and testing would soon mean that Washington would violate the ABM Treaty, the then nearly three-decade old accord signed by the United States and the former Soviet Union that limited both countries’ missile defense capabilities. Unlike his predecessor, George Bush was not as reserved about NMD. As a candidate for president, he forthrightly made known his support for NMD. After coming to Washington, the Bush administration made clear that it would not procrastinate in making a decision on a missile defense system.45 On at least three different occasions prior to his formal action taken on December 13, 2001 that set in motion the process permitting the United States to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty,46 President Bush publicly indicated that the accord was a relic of the Cold War. In Madrid with Spain’s President Aznar by his side, Bush declared on June 12, 2001 that both the fear associated with mutually assured destruction and the ABM treaty are relics of the past and reflected the mentality of the Cold War.47 Speaking in Denver a little over two months later, President Bush recounted that he had indicated to Mr. Putin that, since Russia was not America’s enemy, “we need to get rid of the ABM Treaty.” He went on to tell the audience that he disagreed with some members of the U.S. Senate who “are nervous about getting rid of the relics of the Cold War.”48 In Missouri a few

24

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days later, Mr. Bush similarly told the audience that he had related to Mr. Putin that the United States is not Russia’s foe and that, “We need to discard all the relics of the Cold War: a treaty, for example, that has codified hatred and distrust, called the ABM Treaty.”49 The Bush White House early on propounded a simple political theme: since the Cold War is over, the dynamics of global security have radically changed; this makes it necessary to dispose the relics from that period. Accordingly, after hearing that Moscow would be closing down its intelligence facility in Lourdes, Cuba, Bush publicly welcomed the Russian decision, celebrating it as yet “another indication that the Cold War is over” and that “both nations are taking down the relics of the Cold War.”50 However, President Bush was not concerned with removing all of the relics of the Cold War, just those that did not fit into his administration’s global security agenda. Thus, Washington began to pursue or approve the “selective destruction” of Cold War relics. For example, the Bush administration never targeted one such relic, the U.S.-Japan security alliance, which rests squarely on the bilateral security treaty signed in 1951. Notwithstanding Bush’s public comment, “It’s time to discard the treaties that codified the Cold War,”51 the Japan-U.S. security treaty became an exception. Created during the onset of the Cold War to protect Japan from the Soviet Union, the U.S.-Japan security treaty has persisted, evolving into America’s most important military alliance in East Asia. The Japan-U.S. security alliance is a relic that has been buffed and strengthened rather than buffeted and abrogated. The logic that President Bush used to rationalize the U.S. notification of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, that is, that “one of the signatories, the Soviet Union, no longer exists,” did not apply to America’s security alliance with Japan. Most of the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan military alliance actually occurred during the Clinton administration in the 1990s. During this time, the alliance evolved from a bilateral relationship that had in the past protected Japan to a security agreement that reached into East Asia and possibly beyond.52 This new alliance eventually included Japan’s participation in the U.S.-initiated missile defense project. After overcoming its initial resistance, Tokyo officially announced in August 1999 its intention to begin joint research on missile defense with the United States.53 Precipitated by Pyongyang’s unannounced launch of the Taepo Dong-1 missile that flew over Japanese territory in August 1998, the formal bilateral exchange between Washington and Tokyo on missile defense has led to noticeable changes in this work over time. Since 1999, Tokyo has steadily strengthened Japan’s connection to missile defense. After relaxing the ban on arms exports and permitting missile defense exports to the United States, Japan has moved closer with Washington to the development stage.54

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Japan’s decision to begin missile defense research with the United States enraged Pyongyang, got the immediate attention of Moscow, which became concerned about Russia’s security and its influence in Northeast Asia, and alarmed Beijing. Tokyo’s decision to participate in joint missile defense research with the United States, while primarily intended to thwart the alleged missile threat from North Korea, enormously increased Beijing’s suspicions of Japanese military objectives, which are that it believes that Japan is assisting the United States in acquiring hegemony in Northeast Asia. Sino-Japanese relations therefore suffered because of the perception that Japan was at work circumventing Chinese defense capabilities. Beijing questioned how Japan’s slumping economy permitted it to invest in high technology military projects. More generally, Beijing worried that Tokyo’s recent security initiatives would promote a revision of the Japanese warrenouncing constitution.55 Beijing’s assessment of the Sino-Japanese relationship was that Japan viewed China as a threat to its national security.56 Subsequently, Tokyo took a noteworthy step indicating this. Using its prolonged economic slump as a justification, Tokyo announced in early 2002 that it would be reducing low-interest yen loans to China. Tokyo reasoned that it would be undermining Japanese security by not cutting financial assistance to China, since Chinese military spending had been growing rapidly for more than ten years straight.57 Tokyo did not directly criticize Washington’s withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. At the end of 2001, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement that reaffirmed that the United States and Japan were continuing with joint research on missile defense technologies. This statement also indicated that because Tokyo, like Washington, is aware of the security concerns linked to the proliferation of ballistic missiles, it empathizes with the American position that is simultaneously giving thought to a missile defense system as it employs diplomacy to address missile-proliferation problems. Although avoiding direct mention of Washington’s disinterest in the ABM Treaty, Tokyo’s statement did allude to the problems associated with this issue. The statement indicated that Tokyo wishes that the issue of missile defense would be handled in a manner that enhances global security, “including in the areas of arms control and disarmament,” and supports the efforts of the United States to keep an open dialogue with its friends, as well as with Russia and China.58 From the perspectives of Moscow and Beijing, the U.S. decision on the AMB Treaty and missile defense did exactly the opposite with regard to arms control and disarmament. Moscow showed no reservation to publicize its belief that Washington’s unilateral decision to pull out of the ABM Treaty was not prudent, since it undermined international security. Like Moscow, Beijing saw the U.S. decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty

26

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as one that destabilized global security, mainly because it weakens the international system dealing with arms control. In an apparent effort to highlight the growing unilateral current in U.S. security policies, Beijing also stressed that Washington’s decision ignores the advice of much of the international community.59 Although the Bush White House initiated the U.S.’s formal withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, American antipathy of the accord began during the Clinton administration. U.S. suggestions to alter the accord were met with criticism from much of the international community. In 1999, Russia presented a draft resolution to the First Committee of the U.N.’s General Assembly on Disarmament and International Security. The resolution, as passed by the General Assembly, called on Russia and the United States to make new efforts to maintain and strengthen the ABM Treaty by completely and strictly complying with it.60 When presenting the draft resolution to the First Committee, Russia expressed the concern that by weakening the ABM Treaty, the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START) talks would be put in jeopardy. The Russian representative indicated that his country drafted the resolution because it wanted the United Nations to be aware that it was “a delusion to consider the problem of the preservation and strict compliance with the ABM Treaty as purely a bilateral affair.”61 After a heated debated between the American and Russian representatives, 80 countries voted in favor of the resolution, including Russia, China, France, India, and Pakistan, while the United States, along with Israel, Albania, and the Federated States of Micronesia did not support it. Many countries abstained from voting on the resolution, including two of the United States closest allies, Japan and the United Kingdom. Voting on the ABM Treaty in 2000 was nearly identical to the previous year.62 Not long after the Bush administration made its way to Washington its feelings toward the ABM Treaty became unequivocal: Moscow must either concede to altering the accord or the United States will withdraw from it. These feelings quickly found their way to Tokyo. Japan’s 2000 nuclear disarmament resolution to the U.N. General Assembly absorbed the language of the international community on the ABM Treaty, stressing the need to both preserve and strengthen this accord.63 But the repeated broadcasting by the Bush administration of its objections to the ABM Treaty prompted Tokyo to delete this reference to the ABM Treaty in its 2001 resolution on nuclear disarmament that it submitted to the United Nations. This omission by Tokyo in Japan’s 2001 nuclear disarmament draft resolution was particularly upsetting to Beijing. Already suspicious of Tokyo’s motives because of Japan’s strengthened alliance with the United States and because of its past military exploits in Asia, the Chinese representative’s comments before the U.N.’s First Committee emphasized that

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Tokyo had “backtracked” from the previous year in designing its 2001 resolution. The Chinese representative stressed that no mention had been made in the Japanese draft resolution about the importance of maintaining and strengthening the ABM Treaty.64 In early September 2001, the Bush administration appeared ready to trade Beijing’s acceptance of its plans to develop missile defense for an increase in China’s relatively small nuclear weapons arsenal. Faced with the inevitability of continued high levels of military spending by Beijing, the administration’s thinking, as presented by a senior White House official, was that, “We know the Chinese will enhance their nuclear capability anyway, and we are going to say to them, ‘We’re not going to tell you not to do it.’ Why panic? They are modernizing anyway.”65 Facing severe criticism from both republicans and democrats in Washington, just a few days later, the Bush administration recanted its new China policy, saying that it did not intend to win China’s support for missile defense by ignoring its buildup of nuclear weapons.66 The Chinese foreign ministry responded to these mixed messages from Washington by stating that China was never in the arms race, has always been cautious in the development of nuclear weapons, having the minimum necessary for defense, maintains a no-first-use policy, and supports their elimination.67

Retaining the Cold War Mentality When the classified Nuclear Posture Review became public in early January 2002, Washington again revealed its view of the CTBT, this time provoking some controversy. In an unclassified letter accompanying the report, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld pointed out that the Nuclear Posture Review makes the strategic readiness that existed during the Cold War a thing of the past.68 However, the review indicated that Washington’s formulation of the post–Cold War environment would not include discarding all of the nuclear readiness that existed during the Cold War. The review revealed that U.S. nuclear testing could reappear in the future—an ominous prospect that conjures up the historical fact that the United States had conducted 1,030 nuclear tests, all but 6 of which occurred during the Cold War. By indicating that the current moratorium on nuclear testing could end in the future and that the time it takes to begin nuclear testing be decreased from two years to one year or less, the review, argued some of its harshest critics, undermined the spirit of CTBT.69 These suggestions also undercut the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference that called for the early entry in force of the CTBT.70 Assistant Secretary of

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Defense J.D. Crouch indicated that the United States did not presently intend to end the moratorium on nuclear testing, which had been initiated in 1992 by President George H.W. Bush. However, Ari Fleischer, George W. Bush’s press secretary, clarified the president’s position when he stated that the possibility of nuclear testing has not been eliminated “to make sure the stockpile, particularly as it is reduced, is reliable and safe. So he has not ruled out testing in the future, but there are no plans to do so.”71 Besides clearly identifying the possibility of the resumption of nuclear testing, the Nuclear Posture Review included other plans that should have created much angst for Japanese policy makers. Tokyo had been pleased to hear that discussions between presidents Bush and Putin had produced sanguine results in that each agreed to lower substantially their countries’ nuclear arsenals. When Tokyo commented about its understanding of the U.S. missile defense plan in late November 2001 it also stressed President Bush’s pledge that he had made in a speech relating to reductions in nuclear weapons.72 But learning how Washington planned to “cut” the number of U.S. nuclear weapons had to trouble Tokyo, since this was still another setback to disarmament, even for Japan’s incremental approach to the elimination of nuclear weapons. The review revealed that Washington’s proposal to cut the number U.S. nuclear weapons from approximately 7,000 to between 1,700 and 2,200 by 2012 was illusionary. The objective was not to decrease the number of U.S. nuclear weapons but rather to reduce the number that could be used at a moment’s notice. Many of the warheads included in the proposed cut would not be destroyed but would be stored as part of a “responsive force” that could be quickly reassembled at some future date, should the need arise.73 While Tokyo remained silent on the specifics of the review, the mayor of Hiroshima did not. In a letter of protest to Bush in January 2002, Mayor Tadatoshi Akiba reprimanded the president for planning to store rather than eliminate some nuclear weapons, saying that “[s]uch a measure cannot be called nuclear disarmament.” Akiba also criticized the United States for suggesting that it may recommence nuclear testing and for proposing to reduce the time required to conduct nuclear tests. The mayor stated for the United States, which has signed the CTBT, to suggest that it wants to restart its nuclear testing program “is an outrageous act that undermines international trust.” In his letter, the mayor stressed his concerns that the resumption of nuclear testing by the United States could create serious proliferation and disarmament problems. He pointed out that the United States has repeatedly “dashed cold water on international efforts for nuclear disarmament: its unilateral abrogation of the ABM Treaty, its opposition to a resolution to totally eliminate nuclear weapons at last year’s U.N. General Assembly, its absence from the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. These acts are unacceptable.”74

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The Chinese made a point of stressing Russian objections to leaks from the review. Quoting Moscow’s official response to learning about the U.S. plan to shorten the time needed to perform nuclear testing, a Chinese news daily reported that Russia has remained steadfast in its position to bolster international nonproliferation and disarmament agreements, which are becoming more important because of the “erroneous decision by the United States to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.”75 Reacting to Washington’s proposal to store rather than destroy U.S. nuclear weapons, the spokesman for the Russian foreign ministry stated that his country believes that bilateral arms-reductions agreements between Moscow and Washington should be in the range of 1,500 to 2,200 nuclear weapons, that they should be “verifiable” and “irreversible” and that these reductions will exist “not only ‘on paper.’ ”76 Because the Bush administration indicated that it did not want to destroy all of the nuclear weapons it had planned to reduce, speculation existed in Russia that Washington did not really trust Moscow.77 Moscow became more concerned about an interrelated issue. While Moscow wanted a “judicial agreement” to destroy nuclear weapons, the U.S. position, as expressed by Pennsylvania Congressman Curt Weldon, was that “Washington wants no written agreement with Moscow on ABM and START problems.” Washington expressed the view that since Russia and the United States were no longer enemies, they should trust each other, and so the agreement did not have to be in writing. Russia preferred to have a trusting relationship built on verification.78 The Bush administration soon reversed its position, saying that a legal agreement was necessary; shortly thereafter, the United States and Russia signed the Moscow Treaty, an accord that has been widely criticized for its ineffectiveness to actually eliminate nuclear weapons and for its lack of verification mechanisms.79 While officials in Tokyo did not publicly comment on Washington’s new security policies, these initiatives did not go altogether unnoticed in Japan. In early November, the normally subdued The Japan Times editorialized that it was important for the United States to remain committed to the ABM Treaty. Pointing to the foreign ministry’s reasoning that little could be accomplished in its disarmament resolution without the support of the United States, the paper criticized Tokyo for its recent passivity in failing to promote both the CTBT and the ABM Treaty as assertively as it had done in the past.80 The paper’s editorial page subsequently directed outrage at the Bush administration for not wanting a formal written agreement on the planed reductions of nuclear weapons, for its proposal to store rather than destroy warheads, and because its desires to reduce the time needed to perform nuclear testing, since this action anticipates that testing will occur. The editorial argued that Washington’s myopic policies are disaffecting its friends, like Japan, making a mockery of international nuclear arms control

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agreements, and are demonstrating the usefulness of nuclear weapons in an international security regime.81

Subcritical Nuclear Testing Subcritical nuclear testing does not receive much attention by the media; and certainly, governments do not announce the occurrence of this experimental procedure the way they would a new domestic program or an initiative relating to tax relief. What most people do not realize is that subcritical nuclear testing has occurred many times since the first known test was conducted by the United States on July 3, 1997. The short history of subcritical nuclear testing appears as the technological unfolding of a new arms race. Like the old arms race, this new arms race relies heavily on advanced science and technology. Therefore, only those countries that have made significant strides in the science and technology field to support nuclear weapons can perform subcritical nuclear testing. Just a little over a month after the United States conducted its first subcritical nuclear test in 1997, Russia performed one on the island of Novaya Zemlya, calling it a “hydrodynamic experiment.” In mid September 1997, the United States performed a second subcritical nuclear test. In 1998, the United States performed three more subcritical nuclear tests, while Russia conducted two hydrodynamic experiments. In early December 1998, the United States and Russia each conducted a subcritical nuclear test.82 On December 13, 2001, the United States performed its fifteenth subcritical nuclear test.83 Two months later, on February 14, 2002 the United States conducted yet another subcritical nuclear test, this time joined by Great Britain. Although Washington had previously briefed London about the results of U.S. subcritical testing, the February 2002 experiment marked the first time that Great Britain participated in a subcritical nuclear experiment.84 By May 2004, the United States had conducted twenty-one subcritical nuclear tests. Russia performed at least seven subcritical nuclear tests between 1997 and 2000; in 2004, Russia performed multiple subcritical nuclear tests.85 The fact the Great Britain decided to participate in subcritical nuclear experiments suggests that China, Israel, India, and Pakistan could someday conduct them as well, once they acquire the scientific and technological competency to do so. Already New Delhi spends about 30 percent of its science budget on military research and development,86 something that suggests that India is forging a path leading to it conducting subcritical nuclear tests. When New Delhi announced that India had performed nuclear testing in

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May 1998, it officially declared that, “These tests have significantly enhanced our capability in computer simulation of new designs and taken us to the stage of subcritical experiments in the future, if considered necessary.”87 Even though India had proposed an end to nuclear testing during the early years of the Cold War, New Delhi refused to sign the CTBT in 1996 because it believed that the accord did not represent the initial, decisive step toward nuclear disarmament. New Delhi maintained that the CTBT gave the nuclear powers “nuclear hegemony” because it “is not a ‘comprehensive treaty,’ ” that is, it does not prohibit subcritical nuclear testing. For New Delhi, this meant that the CTBT was not impartial, since it simply maintained the conditions that incontrovertibly left the nuclear powers in control. New Delhi also objected to the stipulation found in Article XIV of the CTBT that permitted pressure to be placed on a state that failed to ratify the accord. Because New Delhi believed that the CTBT did not contribute to nuclear disarmament, it could not accept an international effort to pressure India to accede to the accord.88 Although bitter enemies, Pakistan gave the same reason as India for not acceding to the CTBT. In August 1996, Pakistan rebuffed a request by the United States to accept the CTBT without modifications, maintaining, like India, that the accord was not comprehensive in that it did not proscribe nuclear testing but just nuclear explosions.89 Tokyo’s position on subcritical nuclear testing is both reserved and expected. Its position, therefore, reflects the fact that Japan remains protected by the U.S. nuclear shield. In early October 1998, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Deputy Press Secretary Masaki Okada was asked about the subcritical nuclear testing performed by the United States. Okada pointed out that these experiments do not violate the CTBT, and that the United States conducts them to test the reliability and efficiency of its nuclear weapons so that it can preserve a nuclear deterrent without actual testing.90 In December 1998, when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Press Secretary Sadaaki Numata was asked a question relating to U.S. and Russian subcritical nuclear testing he replied, much like Okada did a few months earlier, that these experiments are not proscribed by the CTBT and that they are useful in testing the efficiency and reliability of nuclear weapons. However, Numata added that after contacting Moscow and Washington, both governments have assured Tokyo that these tests are not being conducted to develop new weapons.91 The comments coming from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were generally consistent with the reasoning of the Tokyo Forum, an initiative of the Japanese government, but comprised of members from several different countries. In addressing the question of whether subcritical nuclear testing circumvents the intentions of the CTBT, the forum’s final report published in 1999 notes that steps should be taken to reduce the

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concerns of those who hold them. The report further states that one sensible way to do this would be to institute “monitoring and transparency mechanisms” so that information would be readily available to determine if subcritical testing conforms to the CTBT.92 Tokyo spoke sparingly about the U.S-Great Britain subcritical nuclear testing that took place in mid February 2002. Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda stated that Tokyo would accept the subcritical testing, although it had some concerns. However, unlike the past, this time Tokyo was evidently sensitive to the potential problems caused by Great Britain joining the subcritical nuclear club. Indicating that nuclear weapons can assist in the prevention of war, Fukuda admitted that the subcritical nuclear testing could encourage other countries to follow suit.93 Still, Tokyo’s rather subdued reaction to subcritical nuclear testing reflects its position that Japan must remain under the U.S. nuclear umbrella for the foreseeable future. Referring to the joint subcritical testing conducted by Washington and London, a U.S. government spokesperson stated, “It doesn’t shake the ground. There’s nothing you can see, nothing you can feel.”94 However, the Nevada experiment did create vibrations that extended all the way to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. While Tokyo took the U.S.-British subcritical nuclear testing in stride, the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki immediately raced letters of protests off to Washington and London. Hiroshima Mayor Akiba warned President Bush and Prime Minister Blair of his belief that once again the world would have to contend with the tragedies that struck both his city and Nagasaki in August 1945. He stressed that the U.S.Britain subcritical experiment had undermined global nonproliferation and disarmament efforts and indicated that he believed the testing exercise would be used to develop new nuclear weapons.95 In letters to Bush and Blair, Nagasaki Mayor Iccho Itoh called the subcritical experiment a “reckless act” that damages the prospect of an early ratification of the CTBT. In the letter to Bush, Itoh stressed that the subcritical experiment would lead to the development of new nuclear weapons and that it could prompt other nations to perform this kind of testing, perhaps even precipitating a new arms race. In the letter to Blair, Itoh emphasized that, “Now that your country has followed the United States and Russia and become the third country conducting subcritical nuclear tests, there is a danger that other states, that is France and China, will also conduct subcritical nuclear tests and that a nuclear arms race involving suspected nuclear states will erupt.”96 In contrast, while Tokyo wants to maintain Japan’s place under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and for this reason accepts subcritical testing, Hiroshima and Nagasaki neither desire the protection of the American nuclear shield nor accept the continued performance of these experiments.97

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In his letter of protest to President Clinton after the United States conducted its first subcritical nuclear test, Nagasaki’s Mayor Itoh presciently wrote, “The continuation of these tests by the Untied States will invite other nuclear states to follow suit and thus stir up still another arms race.”98 Since Mayor Itoh penned this letter in the summer of 1997, Russia and Great Britain have been drawn into subcritical nuclear testing. Although India and Pakistan have not yet performed subcritical nuclear testing, the power and prestige obtained from possessing nuclear weapons combined with the dynamics of military science and technology could eventually push both countries to view this as in their national interests.

Nuclear Nonproliferation More than thirty years ago, NPT created an international framework designed to bring the global community to a world free of nuclear weapons. Article VI of the NPT obligates all parties to engage in genuine efforts to bring about the complete abolition of nuclear weapons. But the lack of consensus that existed at the 2005 NPT Review Conference indicated that nuclear disarmament is sill not a priority of some states. NPT was open for signature in 1968 and went into force in 1970. To date, more than 185 states have become parties to NPT, an impressive list that does not include India, Pakistan, and Israel. NPT categorically bifurcated the statuses of nations: the five declared nuclear weapons states—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and the former Soviet Union—and the rest, the nonnuclear weapons states. Originally, NPT had a limitation of twenty-five years. Thus, in 1995, since nuclear weapons were still very much in existence, the international community had to decide on the fate of NPT. The position of the nuclear weapons states in 1995 was that NPT should be indefinitely extended. While this may appear encouraging, the downside to this was that in 1995 little real progress had been made in the area of nuclear disarmament. However, the nuclear weapons states did understand that NPT had managed to sustain the bifurcation between the nations that possessed nuclear weapons and those that did not. Thus, the nuclear powers supported the indefinite extension of NPT in 1995, since this legitimated their nuclear weapons while making it a breach of international law for other states that had acceded to the accord to acquire them. That the nuclear powers have been content with maintaining the legitimacy of this bifurcation is problematic.99 For example, India had previously argued that it would not sign the NPT because it believed that the original nuclear

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powers had not shown that they wanted to disarm and therefore their efforts to get New Delhi to become a party to the accord were duplicitous.100 India’s position is consistent with the commonly perceived criticism of NPT, which is that it favors the nuclear weapons states by legitimating their possession of nuclear arsenals. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France were particularly aggressive in their efforts to win support for the indefinite extension of NPT. There were some in the international community reluctant to support the indefinite extension of the NPT. They worried that by indefinitely extending the NPT without conditions the accord would justify the existence of the nuclear powers’ arsenals, at least for the foreseeable future. Unconditional support for the indefinite extension of the NPT would simply maintain the status quo. Although the use of intimidation proved unsuccessful, the nuclear powers, to get support for their position, had to promise to improve their disarmament efforts in the future.101 Like the nuclear powers, Tokyo endorsed the indefinite extension of NPT in 1995. In the aftermath of the review conference, Tokyo emphasized that the indefinite extension of the NPT and Japanese support of it evinces the shared perspective of Japan and the global community.102 In his speech at the 1995 NPT Review Conference, Yohei Kono, who was serving simultaneously as deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, provided a more detailed explanation of Tokyo’s position. Kono stated that since the threat of nuclear war still existed, NPT needed to be extended indefinitely. He indicated that Tokyo rejected the suggestions that NPT be extended for a specific period, stressing that this may lead to its demise. Nonproliferation, said Kono, was far too important an objective to put at risk. Toward the end of his speech, Kono emphasized that because of the catastrophes experienced by Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan does not possess nuclear weapons and wants to eliminate them and that “[i]ts support for the indefinite extension of the NPT is an outgrowth of that position.”103 But what Tokyo asserted was an outgrowth of the tragedies that occurred in Hiroshima and Nagasaki was somewhat off the mark. In 1994, during their annual peace declarations commemorating the atomic bombings of their cities, the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki expressed skepticism about the indefinite extension of the NPT, since they feared that this would permit the five declared nuclear powers to keep their nuclear arsenals in perpetuity. Formed in Hiroshima in May 1993, the NPT Research Association was a group of 180 Japanese intellectuals, many from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, who opposed the indefinite extension of the NPT. The association’s work centered on a letter-writing campaign to top officials in Tokyo and to 158 leaders of nonnuclear states. In these letters, the association requested that officials not support an unconditional and indefinite extension of the

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NPT. The association stressed in its appeals to foreign leaders that while it fully supported the finalization of the CTBT, it understood that the accord could not be completed by spring 1995, that is, by the time of the NPT Review Conference. Thus, since the nuclear powers had not made a commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons by a specific date, the association did not want to trade the completion of the CTBT for an indefinite extension of the NPT. Rather, the association urged foreign leaders to support a conditional extension of the NPT. The condition that the association specified was that NPT should be extended for a limited period and that meetings be regularly held to examine the steps that had been taken to realize nuclear disarmament, especially those taken by the nuclear weapons states.104 Acknowledging its concern that some countries that had not acceded to the accord had developed nuclear weapons, Tokyo indicated at the time that NPT was not perfect. By pointing to a nation that, although a party to the NPT, refused to work with the International Atomic Energy Agency and accept its safeguards, Tokyo was also intimating its concerns about North Korea developing nuclear weapons. While Tokyo did encourage the nuclear weapons states to reduce their arsenals, its support for the indefinite extension of the NPT centered largely on the accord’s principal accomplishment: its nonexistence would mean a greater number of countries would possess nuclear weapons. To move in the direction of nuclear disarmament Tokyo therefore advocated a “realistic and incremental approach,” to the disillusionment of others who favored a direct path.105 However, the world would find out a few years later that Washington, which also publicly spoke of the benefits of a gradualist approach, was more inclined to retrogression than to incremental movement on the path to nuclear disarmament.

Disarmament and Retrogression The 1995 NPT Review Conference produced three decisions: the strengthening of the accord’s review process, goals for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, and the extension of the NPT. The second decision, relating to goals for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, emphasized that for the objectives of Article VI of NPT to be completely met, the U.N.’s Conference on Disarmament would have to finalize negotiations for the CTBT by 1996 and that until the accord enters into force the nuclear powers should “exercise utmost restraint.” Recalling the 1995 U.N. Security Council Resolution 984, which provides assurances to the nonnuclear weapons states against the threat or actual use of nuclear weapons, this decision also stressed that more should be done, perhaps in the “form of an internationally

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legally binding instrument” to protect these nations.106 Unanimously adopted in 1995, this Security Council resolution notes that the nuclear powers have individually pledged not to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapons states. This resolution further stipulates that in the event that a nonnuclear weapons state is a victim of either a nuclear attack or the threat of such action any nation may immediately call this to the attention of the Security Council. Moreover, the permanent members of the council (i.e., the nuclear powers) have the responsibility to call the problem to the immediate attention of the Security Council so that it can act and assist the victim.107 The 2000 Review Conference noticeably attempted to strengthen the NPT regime. The final report of the conference commended those states whose actions supported the entry into force of the CTBT. The report called on all nations to take necessary steps to implement the CTBT, but especially those states that must ratify the accord “to continue their efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the Treaty.” The final document of the NPT Review Conference listed thirteen “practical steps” necessary to permit the implementation of Article VI. Besides emphasizing the immediate need to bring the CTBT into force, another practical step declared a moratorium on all nuclear test explosions. Still another step stressed the importance of the “principle of irreversibility” pertaining to nuclear disarmament and arms control. Included in step nine is the call for a “diminishing role of nuclear weapons in security policies” so that there will be less of a chance that these weapons will be used in war. A different section of the final document discussed the need to provide assurances to nonnuclear weapons states that have acceded to NPT. The document recalled the 1995 U.N. Security Council Resolution 984, and charged the Preparatory Committee to the 2005 NPT Review Conference with presenting proposals for a legally binding agreement that would give assurances to the nonnuclear weapons nations against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear weapons states.108 The 2005 NPT Review Conference produced no such agreement, nor for that matter any substantive movement toward nuclear disarmament. Washington has recently indicated its willingness to flail the international norms associated with nuclear disarmament. The preambles of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater (the Limited Test Ban Treaty) and the NPT instruct parties to seek the end to all nuclear weapons explosions and urges determination “to continue negotiations to this end.” These same words also appear in the 1990 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests (the Threshold Test Ban Treaty). The failure of the United States to send a representative to the 2001, 2003, and 2005 Conferences on Facilitating the

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Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, all of which reiterated the need to retain a moratorium on nuclear test explosions, is a retrogressive step that assails international disarmament norms. The Japanese government has given only passing attention to the U.S. failure to participate in the Conferences on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and has only been mildly critical, and then only in a domestic policy statement, of Washington’s attitude toward the accord.109 Tokyo has moved Japan into a position where the acceptance of the U.S. nuclear umbrella comes at almost any political cost. A big part of this cost is that Tokyo suppresses the expectations of most Japanese people who endorse nuclear disarmament and the early entry into force of the CTBT. Tokyo wasted little time in stopping all new grant and new loan aid to India and Pakistan because of their nuclear testing in 1998.110 Two weeks after Tokyo ended new foreign assistance to India and Pakistan for their nuclear testing a Yomiuri Shimbun survey showed that 59 percent of the respondents believed that the sanctions should have been more severe and 31 percent felt that they were fine; only 3 percent thought the penalty was too stringent.111 On the one hand, Tokyo’s response to nuclear testing by India and Pakistan showed its commitment to rectify deviations from the nuclear disarmament regime and even its willingness to demonstrate leadership.112 But on the other hand, Tokyo’s sanctions supported a nonproliferation regime that accepted the possession of nuclear weapons by the five declared nuclear powers. In its statements announcing the sanctions being placed on India and Pakistan, Tokyo exhorted them to become parties to both the CTBT and the NPT. Thus, Tokyo was putting into practice its advocacy of the CTBT, while pressing Islamabad and New Delhi to accede to NPT, which they could only do as nonnuclear weapons states. Even though Tokyo had demanded that New Delhi and Islamabad become parties to NPT and CTBT, which they have never done, the Japanese government lifted sanctions on India and Pakistan in late October 2001.113 At the time Washington was seeking international support for the U.S. war on terrorism and Pakistan, in particular, was deemed crucial to the success of American operations in Afghanistan.114 It did not matter to Tokyo that the majority of Japanese had indicated that they believed the sanctions placed on India and Pakistan for nuclear testing by their government should have been harsher than those actually imposed. What did matter is that Washington had signaled that the sanctions should be rescinded, and this is what Tokyo decided to do. Evidenced by its initial reaction to the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, Tokyo similarly accepted Washington’s determination to move retrogressively with respect to the NPT regime. As additional information from the

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classified Nuclear Posture Review found its way to the international community, Tokyo’s failure to respond critically confirmed that its commitment to maintaining the U.S. nuclear umbrella overshadowed its enthusiasm for disarmament. The review revealed that Washington had authorized a study to look at the development of a new type of nuclear weapon that could pierce deep into the earth’s surface.115 At the outset of his statement before the U.S. Senate’s Armed Services Committee, Undersecretary for National Security and head of the Energy Department’s National Nuclear Security Administration John Gordon indicated that the review “reaffirms that nuclear weapons, for the foreseeable future, will remain a key element of U.S. national security strategy.” He stated that while current plans do not call for an increase in the number of nuclear weapons, the objective is to be prepared to develop “new warheads in sufficient quantities” as the need arises. Gordon’s Senate testimony revealed that the Nuclear Posture Review supports the creation of “small advanced warhead concepts teams” that together will decide on the possible “requirements for new or modified warheads,” which in some instances would go beyond the “paper” phase and “include a combination of component and subassembly tests and simulations.”116 Although troubled by this, Tokyo came to accept the fact that Washington no longer supported the provision in the 2000 NPT Review Conference’s final report that stipulated the decreasing importance of nuclear weapons in state security policies. More troubling for Tokyo, but again something it had to accept, was that the Gordon statement indicated that the National Nuclear Security Administration would be allocating $15 million in fiscal year 2003 “to enhance test readiness by reducing the lead-time to prepare for and conduct an underground nuclear test.” Still another shoe was dropped that belonged to the Nuclear Posture Review, and it too created a problem for Tokyo. New information became public in March 2002 that the review contained contingency plans for the United States to use nuclear weapons on seven countries—Russia, China, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Syria.117 Since only two of the seven countries were known to be nuclear powers and all were then parties to the NPT, these contingency plans, which were tantamount to individual threats, caused Washington to run up against Security Council Resolution 984. This resolution gave the nonnuclear weapons states of North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Syria the right to seek assistance from the Security Council. Although Tokyo was not at all troubled by the identification of North Korea as one of the possible nuclear targets, it still had to digest the fact that Washington had taken another major swipe at the NPT regime. Having incorporated the “principle of irreversibility” found in the final report of the 2000 NPT Review Conference into Japan’s U.N. disarmament resolutions, Tokyo now had to face a hard reality. Not only was the Bush administration

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not prepared to diminish the significance of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy, it was also willing to threaten countries with these weapons. Although Tokyo again did not respond to the leaks revealing Washington’s position on the possible use of nuclear weapons, at least two major Japanese newspapers editorialized that the United States needed to exercise restraint. One of these, the Mainichi Shimbun, called Washington’s new plan based on the use of nuclear weapons “the height of selfishness,” arguing that, because China and North Korea are close by, it created an especially difficult predicament for Japan. The other, The Japan Times, expressed worriment that America’s new policy would destroy important parts of the nuclear arms control regime and that it “seems to endorse a pre-emptive strike” against the nonnuclear weapons countries named in the review, which the paper stated “would be indefensible.”118

Ignoring the Problem Like most nations, Japan entered the post–Cold War period with optimism, hopeful that nuclear Armageddon was a problem of the past. What made Japan’s optimism different from that of most other nations was that it had experienced the horrors associated with atomic weapons. Along with Article 9, the war-renouncing constitutional clause, this experience moved the Japanese government to publicize internationally the necessity of ridding the world of nuclear weapons. However, because it positioned itself as the leading champion of the CTBT, Tokyo suffered a major setback when the United States did not ratify the accord. This setback marked the beginning of Japanese disarmament plans and aspirations moving without much direction until retrogression eventually took hold. As Washington stepped steadily away from nuclear disarmament, Tokyo did not endorse this movement but it also did not speak out against it. As a result, Tokyo has found itself in a very peculiar situation: that of attempting to promote nuclear disarmament but not wanting to criticize Washington’s policies that are impeding—what even under the best of circumstances is—an arduous process. The 1999 Senate vote on the CTBT should have immediately suggested at least two possibilities to Tokyo. First, the Senate did not want to ratify the accord because there was a feeling among the majority of its members that the United States may need to conduct nuclear tests sometime in the future for two reasons: to maintain the safety and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons and because verification still posed a problem. It is fair to say that the majority of conservatives in Washington did not support the ratification of the

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CTBT, and this was certainly true in the republican-controlled Senate. The day after the vote on the CTBT, the then Senate majority leader Trent Lott emphasized that by ratifying the accord the United States would not be in the position “to test the safety and reliability of our weapons.”119 Conservatives also had the problem of not trusting other countries, since conceivably some nations may attempt to conduct clandestine nuclear tests. In his 1999 public comments relating to verifying the CTBT Senator Lott asked, “Do we really think that North Korea, Iraq, Iran, or even China or Russia, can be trusted to do that [verify], not to mention, Pakistan and India?” Less than two years later, in response to a letter from Japanese Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka requesting that Washington ratify the CTBT, Secretary of State Colin Powell told her in August 2001 that the Bush administration had no plans to seek final approval of the accord in the U.S. Senate.120 The second possibility that should have become apparent to Tokyo was that the republican-controlled Senate simply did not endorse the CTBT because they knew that the liberals and the Clinton administration wanted to see it ratified. There is no question that President Clinton supported the CTBT and was disillusioned when the Senate did not ratify it.121 To urge the ratification of the CTBT, the Clinton administration submitted six safeguards to the U.S. Senate. Designed to maintain the American nuclear deterrent by ensuring the technological viability of the weapons’ stockpile, these safeguards also sought to maintain intelligence on other nations’ nuclear programs, while keeping open the possibility of U.S. nuclear tests in the future. Safeguard C proposed maintaining the nuclear testing infrastructure and Safeguard F specified the procedural formula to be followed should officials deem it necessary to withdraw from the CTBT to secure the U.S. nuclear deterrent.122 For Clinton critics, these safeguards did not matter; conservative opposition was simply too strong. However, there was a third possibility that eventually should have become evident to Tokyo. The Defense Department made clear in the Quadrennial Defense Review published in May 1997 that, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States was the world’s only superpower and as such it required a “sufficient force structure” to maintain international leadership.123 Tokyo already had a glimpse of this in the spring of 1996 when the Clinton and the Hashimoto administrations took the initial step in forging a closer bilateral security relationship that within a few years led to increased regional responsibilities for Japan. This strengthened bilateral military arrangement added to America’s force structure in East Asia, a region that Washington sees as critical to U.S. interests.124 An even more important part of this force structure, which benefited the United States and its “allies and friends” such as Japan, as the Quadrennial Review emphasized, was the American nuclear arsenal.

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The safeguards on nuclear testing that the Clinton administration submitted to the Senate demonstrated that there was a political need to satisfy the opponents of the CTBT, as well as one to ensure the continuation of the international leadership position of the United States. By completely relinquishing the option of future nuclear testing, the Clinton administration would have placed in jeopardy the U.S. long-term objective of international leadership. Supporting the CTBT but reserving the right to bring back nuclear testing if the situation arose in the future allowed the Clinton administration to straddle the nuclear testing issue in a politically strategic way. But Tokyo did not pay attention to the Clinton safeguards, only to the formal U.S. commitment to ratify the CTBT. Tokyo’s failure to focus on Washington’s perceived international role and specifically on the requirement to maintain a nuclear arsenal caused it to either miss or ignore the possibility of future nuclear testing by the United States, even if the CTBT were ratified by the Senate. Certainly, the Senate vote on the Kyl-Reid Amendment in June 1996, which took place one month before President Clinton signed the CTBT, should have alerted Tokyo to this problem. The Kyl-Reid Amendment would have permitted the president to authorize nuclear testing, even if the United States had signed the CTBT, unless a joint resolution of Congress prohibited this. Even though the Senate killed this amendment by a vote of 53 to 45, when it voted on the ratification of the CTBT in October 1999, still in the upper house of Congress were 37 senators who had previously supported the Kyl-Reid Amendment, 34 of whom were republicans. In the Senate also in October 1999 were 44 senators, 39 of whom were republicans, who in August 1995 did not support an amendment to the fiscal year 1996 Defense Authorization Act that sought to end funding for low-yield, hydronuclear tests. Finally, in October 1999 there were 40 senators in the Senate, all republicans, who in September 1998 had voted against providing funding for the CTBT’s Preparatory Commission.125 Had Tokyo done its homework, it would have had a good idea that the U.S. Senate in October 1999 was not inclined to forgo the option of future nuclear testing and support the ratification of the CTBT. Wanting above all else to retain the deterrent benefits that it believes the U.S. nuclear shield provides to Japan, Tokyo from this point onward accepted U.S. initiatives that have made nuclear disarmament increasingly more difficult to achieve. As we will see in Chapter 8, further helping to neutralize the Japanese nuclear disarmament agenda has been Tokyo’s push to get Japan to become a “normal country,” a quest that began by at least the mid-1990s.

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Chapter 3 Technology, Choice, and Nuclear Weapons

For many years, Japan’s technological capabilities have provided it with a relatively unique status among industrial nations. This chapter selectively examines the role that technology has played in Japan’s actual and potential security posture. In doing this, it looks at some past and current uses and considerations of technology, including how it relates to nuclear weapons, missile defense, and Japan’s place under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The chapter concludes by suggesting three important ways that Japan can advance the use of technology to promote nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament.

Nuclear Arms and Japanese Security It is no secret that Japan is one of the most advanced technological societies in the world. It is also no secret that because of its technological competency, Japan could easily develop nuclear weapons today. However, Japan has not tried to clandestinely develop nuclear weapons. Japan’s large stockpile of plutonium, though not specifically weapons grade, could be developed and, with its scientific and technological expertise, nuclear weapons could be produced very quickly.1 What is more, Japan’s space program affords it the means to convert civilian technologies into effective delivery systems for nuclear weapons.2 Heavily dependent on foreign energy sources, Japan began generating commercial nuclear power in 1966. As of August 2004, Japan had fifty-four

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operational nuclear facilities, which generate over a third of the country’s electric power.3 Japan’s use and storage of plutonium, which today amounts to more than forty-three tons,4 worries many Japanese citizens, who fear a nuclear accident worse than the several that Japan has had already.5 Controversial in Japan are the plans to use MOX (mixed oxide) fuel as an energy source for nuclear power plants. Japan’s intention to use MOX, produced by mixing plutonium with uranium, had been delayed because of scandals and because of objections from citizens, who are worried about the safety features of this type of fuel.6 But the recent commissioning of the Rokkasho-Mura facility will soon produce MOX fuel for Japan, which has decided to rely on light-water (rather than fast-breeder) reactors to help meet domestic energy needs in the immediate future.7 Moreover, some argue that because the Rokkasho-Mura facility will substantially increase the amount of Japanese MOX plutonium, Japan will possess the largest stockpile of “weapons-usable” plutonium in the world.8 Although this could easily change, Japan is unlikely to decide to produce nuclear weapons in the immediate future for several reasons. Japan retains the Three Nonnuclear Principles (hikaku san gensoku) as a core part of government policy. While not established law, for more than three decades these principles, which are not to produce, possess, or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons into the country, have been used repeatedly to help underscore the continued existence of Japan’s nuclear allergy.9 Other constraints on Japan developing nuclear weapons are the December 1955 Atomic Energy Basic Law, which restricts the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes; Article 9, the country’s war-renouncing constitutional clause; and the existence of a very strong anti-nuclear weapons sentiment rooted in the devastation caused by the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Moreover, some officials in Tokyo believe that if Japan were to develop nuclear weapons, Northeast Asia would immediately become destabilized. China and North Korea would see this as a catastrophic threat to regional security, while Russia and South Korea would have only slightly less of a reaction. All of this is not to say that nationalist forces in Japan have not harbored the aspiration of the acquisition of nuclear weapons or that Washington, in complicity with Tokyo, has not violated the third of the three nonnuclear principles. Regarding the latter issue, there is now compelling evidence that with near certainty indicates that even subsequent to the introduction of the Three Nonnuclear Principles in December 1967, which were later adopted by a Diet resolution in November 1971, U.S. nuclear weapons continued to pass through Japan’s waters, entered its ports, and were stored on its territory. Okinawa remained important to U.S. nuclear strategic interests until at least 1972 when Washington returned the island to Japan.10

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Secret agreements between Washington and Tokyo have supposedly given U.S. administrations from the 1950 through the 1990s permission to introduce nuclear weapons into Japanese ports and airfields.11 The Daily Yomiuri reported in May 1997 the existence of a previously classified U.S. document from 1969 that showed that Tokyo allowed U.S. warships carrying nuclear weapons to enter Japanese waters. Authorized by Henry Kissinger during the Nixon administration, the report, produced mainly by the State and Defense Departments, indicates that, “Japan now acquiesces in transit by naval vessels armed with nuclear warheads. This right would extend automatically to Okinawa.”12 Prior to his becoming prime minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone, serving in 1970 as Director General of the Defense Agency, told U.S. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird that the United States could bring nuclear weapons into Japan in emergency situations, adding that remaining under the U.S. nuclear umbrella meant that Japan would not have to develop nuclear weapons.13 It recent years it has been reported that when Washington and Tokyo revised the bilateral security treaty in 1960 the accord contained a secret agreement that permitted the entrance of U.S. nuclear weapons into Japanese ports without first notifying the central government.14 However, in April 2000, former prime minister Yoshiro Mori denied during a Diet session that there had been any secret agreement between Tokyo and Washington that permitted nuclear weapons to enter Japan without informing Tokyo.15 The existence of a secret agreement that denied Tokyo the right of notification about the entrance of U.S. nuclear weapons into Japanese ports would appear to ignore the gist of the 1960 bilateral security treaty. The 1960 bilateral security treaty stipulates that, “The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.”16 Today, Tokyo has not objected to Washington’s policy of neither confirming nor denying whether U.S. ships entering Japanese ports are carrying nuclear weapons.

Contemplating Nuclear Weapons From time to time, conservative Japanese public figures have considered or raised the possibility of Japan acquiring nuclear weapons. Not long after Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato announced the Three Nonnuclear Principles as national policy in 1967, he told U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk that they were useless.17 Aware of the strong public opposition to the

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existence of nuclear weapons in Japan, Sato authorized secret work beginning in 1967 to study the possibility of his country developing them.18 In 1969, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Foreign Relations Policy Planning Committee produced a secret report entitled Our Nation’s Foreign Policy Principles. This report, which did not become public until 1994, stated that, “The policy for the time being is not to have nuclear weapons, but economic and technical potential to make nuclear weapons will always be maintained and care will be taken not to accept any restriction on this.”19 This report also stressed that, although Japan’s civilian nuclear program could produce the plutonium necessary to manufacture nuclear weapons, the development of nuclear arms was not in the nation’s interest.20 While serving as Sato’s director general of the Defense Agency Yasuhiro Nakasone claimed to have overseen a study on the feasibility of Japan developing nuclear weapons in 1970. This study indicated that Japan could build nuclear weapons in five years and that they would cost ¥200 billion; however, because Japan did not have the testing capabilities, it would not be worth pursuing their development.21 A more sophisticated study on the possibility of Japan developing nuclear weapons was conducted in 1981. Said to be the result of an unofficial project, a report completed in July 1981 by the National Defense College (now the National Institute for Defense Studies), the research branch of the Defense Agency, specifically addressed the technological feasibility of Japan developing nuclear weapons. Undertaken during the tenure of Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki, the report indicated that while Japan could build rudimentary atomic weapons it would need considerable support from the United States to develop more technologically advanced nuclear weapons. In addition to having to rely on allies to conduct nuclear tests and finding a steady supply of uranium, the report noted that it would need U.S. assistance in extracting plutonium suitable for nuclear weapons. The report concluded that, “It is impossible to build a technological architecture that would contribute to Japan’s defense strategy.”22 The most recent internal study conducted by the Japanese Defense Agency in 1995 (but not made public until 2003) on the feasibility of Japan developing nuclear weapons argued that there were three major reasons why Tokyo should not seek a nuclear arsenal, even if North Korea were to have one. First, this would critically damage the NPT, something that Tokyo did not want to do. Second, this would undercut Japanese dependability on the U.S. nuclear shield, while weakening the U.S.-Japan security alliance. Third, this would send a strong signal to other East Asian countries that Japan had embarked on a security path independent of the United States.23

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Recent Suggestions In the post–Cold War period, publicly broaching the issue of the Japanese acquisition of nuclear weapons has been controversial in Japan, given Tokyo’s heightened international campaign to abolish them and the continuing popular sentiment opposed to their existence. Despite the controversy, this issue has surfaced several times since the late 1990s and, because of Japan’s exceptionally strong technological infrastructure, including its stockpile of plutonium, is considerably more serious than it was in the past. In addition to troubling many Japanese citizens, comments made by public figures suggesting the possibility of Japan acquiring nuclear weapons have alarmed officials in Seoul, Pyongyang, and Beijing. Significantly, the reactions of the Japanese government to these comments have been discernibly different in recent years from similar remarks made in the past. Since the end of the Cold War expectedly created the opportunity for Tokyo to begin a process that would genuinely attempt to reduce and then eliminate nuclear weapons, at first blush it appears unusual, indeed contradictory, that Japan has confronted a string of domestic challenges to its policy on nuclear weapons. Encouraged by the expeditiousness with which Japan could develop and deliver nuclear weapons, these recent challenges have shifted to the first two of the Three Nonnuclear Principles, which deny Japan the right to possess or produce nuclear weapons. Most of these domestic challenges have come after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001. Since then, Washington has declared the legitimacy of preemptive strikes and taken steps that demonstrate its renewed reliance on nuclear weapons. Japanese nationalists and their sympathizers, who have long contemplated the idea of Japan acquiring nuclear weapons, have exploited the heightened fears and uncertainties that have emerged in the post-9/11 environment. In the aftermath of the attacks on the United States in September 2001, the international community expressed the urgency to eliminate nuclear weapons so that terrorists would be unable to acquire these weapons and use them on civilian populations. Precipitated also by these attacks, the international community felt compelled to stress that nuclear weapons need to have a diminished role in the security policies of countries.24 However, Washington set a different tone when it announced its Nuclear Posture Review in January 2002. By the time the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference met in New York in April 2002, the international community had become cognizant of the reality that the preferred course of nuclear disarmament was not being followed to deter terrorism. The report

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of the first session of the preparatory committee reemphasized the thinking of the 2001 U.N. General Assembly’s First Committee on Disarmament and International Security that underscored that there was an urgency to abolish nuclear weapons and establish a viable nonproliferation regime to avert the use of nuclear technologies and resources by terrorists and criminals. In addition to stressing the importance of multilateralism to nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, the April 2002 report made evident that serious problems had surfaced in recent months. The report expressed disappointment that the United States had formally announced its intention to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty and develop missile defense systems. It referred to problems in the implementation of the 13 “practical steps” on disarmament and nonproliferation that came out of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. It emphasized the necessity for two nuclear weapons states, the United States and China, to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The preparatory committee’s report noted not only the insecurity attached to existing nuclear arsenals but also indicated, without referring to the term “irreversibility” stressed in the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the concern that new formulas for the use of nuclear weapons were being seriously considered, as is the possibility of the “development of new generations of nuclear weapons.”25 The renewed interest in Washington to broaden the U.S. nuclear weapons policy quickly got the attention of conservative public officials in Japan who have long considered this option for their country. Some of these figures have been willing to speak publicly about the possibility of Japan acquiring nuclear weapons. What is interesting about the recent remarks made by Japanese public figures relating to Japan and the possession of nuclear weapons is that there were three instances between January (when Washington announced the Nuclear Posture Review) and May 2002. Two of these instances involved top officials within the government of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Unlike in the past where at the very least apology was the norm, Koizumi quickly dismissed the comments made by his subordinates concerning Japan possibly becoming a nuclear weapons state as if they were nothing more than political gibberish. The third instance involved the well-known politician, Ichiro Ozawa, who in the 1990s proclaimed that Japan needed to become a “normal country” capable of participating without restriction in the security operations of the Untied Nations. Junichiro Koizumi won the prime minister’s office in late April 2001 and lost no time demonstrating his iconoclastic propensity. Equally important, Koizumi instantly revealed his sensitivity to the nationalist position that Japan should have a stronger defense, which includes taking the bold step to revise Article 9. Koizumi, who also became the newly elected president of the Liberal Democratic Party, appointed Taku Yamasaki to the position of

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secretary general, the number two spot in the party. Within days, Yamasaki’s plan for constitutional revision was made public. His plan called for permitting Japan’s Self Defense Forces to participate in collective security activities and for eliminating from Article 9 the words that prohibit Japan from maintaining armed forces, as well as those that reject the right of the belligerency of the state. Since Koizumi had also made clear that he viewed the U.S-Japan security alliance as central to Japan’s foreign policy, his support for constitutional change created great concern in the New Komeito Party, the principal coalitional party in his government that for some time made known its support for the pacifism symbolized in Article 9. Demonstrating his political acumen, Koizumi was able to put at ease the concerns of coalition members in his government.26 Notably, there was never any doubt that the new Bush administration also favored revisions to Article 9, as well as a strong security alliance with Japan.27 Prompted by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage’s instruction to “show the flag” in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the United States, the Koizumi government formulated and sent to the Diet anti- terrorist legislation,28 which became law with uncharacteristic speed during the fall of 2001. Raising concerns in Beijing, Pyongyang and even in Seoul was that this legislation permitted Japanese forces to be involved in overseas operations—albeit only by providing nonmilitary supplies from sea to U.S. troops in Afghanistan—for the first time since World War II. To assist the United States in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan, Tokyo had to loosen its interpretation of Article 9, contrary to the objective of the revisionist-seeking nationalists, who view the constitution as “ugly” and who have little regard for its war-renouncing clause.29 But most importantly, Koizumi’s enthusiasm for a stronger defense in conjunction with Washington’s push to reestablish the significance of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategic policy after the September 2001 terrorist attacks, arguably prompted some conservative public figures in Japan to rethink the possibility of Japanese nuclear weapons. Not only have Japanese political figures long deliberated the possibility of Japan possessing nuclear weapons, they have even tried to find constitutional legitimacy for them. Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi had as early as 1957 stated that, “It is not unconstitutional for Japan to possess nuclear weapons, simply because they are called nuclear weapons, provided they are within the definition of self-defence.” In March 1979, Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira stated that, “Possessing nuclear weapons is constitutional, but it goes without saying that Japan will not obtain nuclear weapons.” The next year, the Japanese Defense Agency emphasized that it “presented various examples of nuclear weapons which it would be constitutionally permissible to obtain. These included Nike-Hercules air defence missiles,

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and 155 mm and 203 mm howitzers.” In March 1984, Prime Minister Nakasone told the Diet that the “possession of nuclear weapons does not contravene the Japanese constitution.”30 The attempt by some government officials whether in the past or more recently, as for example Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe did in 2002, to interpret the constitution as permitting Japan to possess nuclear weapons because they are defensive in nature not only directly ignores domestic public opinion, but it is also wildly out of line with Article 9. That Article 9 makes the possession of nuclear weapons by Japan constitutionally anathema is unequivocally conveyed in the words that the “Japanese people forever renounce war and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.” There can be no greater threat involved in an international dispute between nations than when one, both, or all of the countries possess nuclear weapons. Were Japan to possess nuclear weapons this would forthrightly violate the Japanese constitution, since the threat would move from being vicarious—that is, the threat stemming from the U.S. nuclear deterrent that protects Japan—to direct. Clearly, Japan would have to abandon the Three Nonnuclear Principles if it possessed nuclear weapons. But a significant issue has consistently been overlooked by those who have talked about the constitutionality of Japan possessing nuclear weapons for defensive purposes. The possession of nuclear weapons by Japan would be monumentally different from Tokyo’s interpretation of the Japanese constitution that eventually served to justify the nation’s military apparatus, including the Self Defense Forces. Although Article 9 expressly prohibits Japan from maintaining “land, sea, and air forces, as well as war potential,” the official interpretation of the Japanese constitution subsequently came to accept all of this as an inherent right that could be legally exercised to defend the nation from external aggression. However, the constitutionality of Japan’s conventional military system is not at issue here. What is important is that there is a significant difference between maintaining a conventional military system to defend the Japanese homeland and the possession of nuclear weapons to accomplish this same purpose. If Japan were attacked, it could use its land and air forces to protect the homeland and its air and sea forces to defend its waters, and even neighboring areas from an aggressor. But it could not do this with nuclear weapons. Even assuming that Tokyo adopted a no-first-use-of-nuclear-weapons policy, because of the damage and destruction to Japanese people and property, it could not detonate a nuclear warhead anywhere in geographical proximity to Japan. If Tokyo launched a retaliatory nuclear attack on another country, it would certainly be settling an international dispute by using force, an act that would be in direct opposition to the nation’s war-renouncing constitutional clause, as well as evincing

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total disregard for the Japanese conviction to “no more Hiroshimas.” Presumably, therefore the possession of nuclear weapons by Japan would be to have only the threat of an independent (from the United States) nuclear arsenal, something that would directly violate Article 9.31 Some past and recent comments by Japanese political figures attempting to justify the possibility of Japan acquiring nuclear weapons have noted that the constitution does not specifically prohibit them. But one would hardly expect that the Japanese constitution would do this, especially since it only came into existence in 1947, before the most proliferative years in the arms race and the Soviet Union’s first nuclear test in 1949. Attempting to offset the impact of comments coming from within his government about the constitutional permissibility of Japan possessing nuclear weapons, Prime Minister Koizumi unequivocally stated that the Three Nonnuclear Principles would remain as national policy.32 However, other unnamed aids close to the prime minister indicated that the comments were largely consistent with the government’s position.33 Recent talk about Japan possibly possessing nuclear weapons immediately raised the suspicion barometer in three countries in Northeast Asia. Mainly because of Japan’s past military aggression in China and the Korean Peninsula, officials in Beijing, Seoul, and Pyongyang have remained very wary of its current plutonium program. These officials are fully aware that Japan’s plutonium supply when combined with its competencies in nuclear technology and rocket propulsion makes the conversion to a nuclear weapons state a task of little difficulty today. Adding to their concerns is that Washington has accepted the Japanese plutonium program, ignoring the possibility of it quickly being converted into a nuclear weapons project and the fact that this continuing suspicion contributes to regional instability.34 Responding to Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda’s recent comments about the possibility of Japanese nuclear arms, a senior South Korean official stated that “we cannot help but express grave concerns in case his remarks reflect Japan’s intention to develop such weapons of mass destruction.” Another South Korean official remarked that, “Japan has been attempting to foment an atmosphere favorable to the development of nuclear weapons by gradually countering possible criticism.”35 A spokesperson for the Chinese foreign ministry noted that not only do the Japanese people resent Fukuda’s remarks but that they “also arouse great concern among its [Japan’s] neighbors in Asia and among the peace-loving people in the world.”36 Referring to the recent series of comments made about nuclear weapons by Japanese public officials, Pyongyang responded that such remarks “fully reflect the position and policy of the government to go ahead with moves for nuclear weaponization” and that “Japanese reactionaries

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have become more undisguised in step with the U.S. escalated moves to update nukes.”37 It has been argued that Japan’s plutonium-based nuclear infrastructure creates suspicions abroad about the possibility of it developing nuclear weapons, while at the same time making it difficult for Tokyo to assume the leading role in promoting nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament objectives.38 While retaining a plutonium-based infrastructure does give reason for some countries to worry about Japan’s nuclear future, currently the fundamental reason that Tokyo has not been able to establish genuine credibility in promoting nonproliferation and disarmament is its security alliance with the United States. This alliance keeps Japan under the kakunokasa (nuclear umbrella) of the United States, while causing it to be extremely sensitive to Washington’s security strategy. Thus, when the Bush administration decided to advance the position of nuclear weapons in the security strategy of the Untied States, some Japanese conservatives concluded that the effects of 9/11 had also changed the political climate at home enough to allow them to speak their minds about the possibility of Japan acquiring nuclear arms. Because of enduring public opposition to nuclear weapons, as most serious observers are aware, Tokyo is not any time soon likely to announce plans for Japan to convert its nuclear power industry to develop a nuclear weapons arsenal. However, an important caveat must be presented: that nationalist and conservative forces in Japan have successfully prevented the Three Nonnuclear Principles from becoming law does suggest that they have remained strong enough over the years to maintain a political ace in the hole that can be played at an opportune time in the future. The combination of Japan’s technological competency and its plutonium-based nuclear infrastructure make it easier than decades ago for Tokyo to undertake the conversion from energy production to nuclear weapons development.

Deciding on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Although later than some other countries, such as the United States, Japan did not ratify the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) until 1976, six years after it signed the accord in 1970. As we have seen earlier, during at least part of this time, a few Japanese leaders ignored compliance with the third of the Three Nonnuclear Principles, and there was some consideration given to the possibility of Japan developing nuclear weapons. Still, Japan

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acceded to the NPT as a nonnuclear weapons state and has remained steadfast in its commitment not to develop nuclear weapons. While there have been intermittent claims that it took Japan six years to ratify the NPT because Tokyo did not want to forego the option of developing nuclear weapons, such assertions are not especially compelling. Attributing the delay in the Japanese ratification of the NPT solely to the contention that some officials in Tokyo wanted Japan to develop nuclear weapons ignores the complexity of this matter. The secret work in the late 1960s authorized by Prime Minister Sato gave three reasons why developing nuclear weapons would not serve Japan’s national interests. Developing nuclear weapons would (then) be too costly for Japan, it would create regional instability, and the Japanese public would vehemently oppose it.39 While all three of these impediments were significant, for most in Tokyo the last two were especially problematic. Tokyo was not about to set off a political firestorm in Northeast Asia by declaring its intention to develop nuclear weapons. Tokyo also understood that it would have to encounter very strong opposition from the Japanese people, who felt then— as they do today—that as the only nation to have experienced the horrors of nuclear war, their country must play an important part in the abolition of nuclear weapons. Moreover, Tokyo was mindful of two other related problems connected to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan. First, this would be widely viewed by the Japanese public as a direct attack on Article 9 that helped sustain the nation’s antimilitary sentiment. Second, officials in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party knew that they would not only have to confront the robust Japanese anti-nuclear weapons movement, which propelled public opposition to the existence of nuclear weapons, but also some members of their party who supported the abolition of nuclear weapons. Notable too is that NPT legislation in 1975 had been delayed in the House of Representatives’ Committee on Foreign Affairs by the opposition Socialist Party, which in the past had endorsed the position of “unarmed neutrality” for Japan, because as Takako Doi, one its leading members indicated, the party was “not ready” to ratify the accord.40 To maintain that the Socialist Party had deferred the passage of legislation pertaining to the NPT because it was considering the question of Japan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is far from a convincing argument. Despite the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ 1969 secret report that maintained, “Citizens will be educated that general policy regarding nuclear weapons is based on an assessment of international, political and economic merits and demerits,”41 Japanese officials who wanted to consider the prospect of Japan acquiring nuclear weapons were then shrewd enough to understand that public backlash would be politically devastating. These officials did not have to think back too many years to recall the massive

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nationwide demonstrations that took place when the Sea Dragon, the first U.S. nuclear submarine to enter Japan in November 1964, caused over 40,000 Japanese people to protest its arrival. Although Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons movement had splintered by the mid-1960s (see chapter 4), it was far from dead during the time when Tokyo signed the NPT in 1970 and ratified it in 1976. Indeed, despite some conflict within the Japanese anti-nuclear weapons movement, it remained dogged in its efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons. Moreover, in both 1970 and 1971 there were more published books and written accounts dealing with the atomic bombing of Hiroshima produced there than in other years since data on this issue was first collected in 1946. While the data is not complete for Nagasaki, writers there did produce a very large number of books and written accounts of the atomic bombing of the city in 1970.42 Although the anti-nuclear weapons movement had begun to subside somewhat in many countries beginning in 1964,43 the stark reality that Japan had been the only nation in the world to have experienced the death and devastation of atomic weapons kept it relatively vigorous there. Evincing the diminution of conflict that had been occurring within the Japanese anti-nuclear weapons movement is that in 1977 Hiroshima was able to host a global conference focused on the complete abolition of nuclear weapons that greeted individuals from any ideological or political perspective. The next year, world peace conferences like this were held in Nagasaki, Hiroshima, and Tokyo.44 Japan was supposedly offered membership in the U.N.’s Eighteen Nation Disarmament Commission located in Geneva as an inducement to sign the NPT.45 When Japan signed the NPT in February 1970, it emphasized several important points in a written declaration that accompanied its signature. Tokyo stated that the accord was discriminatory in that only the nuclear powers (United States, Great Britain, Soviet Union, France, and China) would be permitted to have nuclear weapons. Because Tokyo anticipated the implementation of NPT’s Article VI, which stipulates the good-faith intentions of parties to end the arms race and achieve nuclear disarmament, it stated that this discrimination would then no longer exist. Tokyo believed that the nuclear powers had “special responsibilities” to achieve nuclear disarmament; however, at the same time, it was apprehensive about their commitment to this objective. Tokyo specifically indicated that two nuclear powers, France and China, had not yet demonstrated any intention to comply with the accord (China and France did not ratify the NPT until 1992). Tokyo nonetheless insisted that the nuclear powers “should take concrete nuclear disarmament measures” to reach general and complete disarmament. Because only a few countries possessed nuclear weapons, Tokyo cautioned them from using or threatening to use their weapons on nonnuclear weapons states. Also very important to Tokyo in 1970 when it signed

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the NPT was its concerns about the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. Tokyo pointed out that NPT does not prevent the nonnuclear weapons states from being involved in the research, development, and implementation of nuclear power for peaceful purposes; nor does the accord restrict international cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy or subject nonnuclear weapons states to discrimination because of their involvement in any of these activities. Tokyo specifically indicated that Japan’s safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as required by Article III of the NPT, must not be detrimental to its interests relative to the agreements made by this organization with other nations. Tokyo emphasized that it “intends to give full consideration to this matter before taking steps to ratify the Treaty.”46 Tokyo did just that. Concerned about what NPT could do to impede the development of civilian nuclear power, the Japanese Diet approved NPT subsequent to Tokyo receiving a guarantee that Japan’s spent nuclear fuel could be reprocessed for peaceful purposes.47 The written declaration that accompanied Tokyo’s ratification of the NPT in June 1976 reiterated the points made when Japan signed the accord six years earlier. But Tokyo did make a special effort when depositing the ratification of NPT to address the fact that Japan, as the only country to have experienced nuclear warfare, “has consistently followed a fundamental policy of forsaking nuclear armament and has steadfastly pursued the foreign policy of a nation committed to peace under its peace constitution.” Tokyo acknowledged that by ratifying NPT it would be helping to stabilize Asia and at this time made a commitment to increase its efforts to end the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Additionally, when ratifying NPT, Tokyo felt compelled to emphasize the significance of key points found in Articles IV and V relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Tokyo stressed the importance of international cooperation for the peaceful utilization of nuclear power and that the NPT should not in any way impede the nonnuclear weapons states from developing nuclear power for peaceful purposes.48 For decades, Japan has rejected attempts to acquire the “status” of becoming a nuclear weapons state, even though it has evolved into a science and technology superpower.49 At least for the time being, Japan remains committed to NPT and its nuclear energy program operates within the parameters of the accord. For now, Japan’s interest in plutonium reprocessing remains focused on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its civilian nuclear power program is fully transparent.50 But all of this could change, since Tokyo has both the technological and economic resources to develop nuclear weapons, a reality that is exacerbated by the growing political conservativism evident in Japanese security affairs.

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Decisions on Missile Defense But while Japan’s choice to stick with the NPT and not develop nuclear weapons has remained resolute so far, this is not necessarily the case with its military capability, its peace constitution notwithstanding. Even though its defense spending to gross domestic product ratio has hovered just slightly under 1 percent for years, Japan’s military expenditures are among the highest in the world.51 This has caused some concern in Northeast Asia. For example, both Beijing and Pyongyang have loudly complained that Japan is expanding its military capabilities and that it is relying on sophisticated military systems to do so.52 Japan’s senshu boei (nonaggressive or exclusively oriented defense policy) and its very strong technological capabilities, when combined with the strengthening of its military alliance with the United States, which began in 1996, have given government officials in Tokyo the political means to reorient the nation’s security initiatives. When North Korea lobbed a projectile over Japanese territory in August 1998, Tokyo soon decided to join with the United States in doing missile defense research.53 Tokyo’s interest in theater missile defense (TMD) research became problematic shortly after George Bush became president of the United States in 2001. Although Tokyo continued to support this research, the Bush administration conjoined the U.S. national missile defense (NMD) and TMD into a single program. For Tokyo, this immediately brought to the fore a major constitutional issue. Many argued that the future development and deployment of a missile defense system, one that has a Japanese technological footprint on it, would forthrightly violate Article 9. Since the official interpretation of Article 9 prohibits Japan from becoming involved in collective security, its participation in research work for a defense system that extends beyond the nation’s territorial boundaries would amount to a breach of the constitution. Tokyo therefore confronted a big policy dilemma. On the one hand, most officials in Tokyo supported a regional missile defense system. Because no decision had then been made by Tokyo on development and deployment,54 it could justify a regional TMD system as simply a “research” project to protect Japan. On the other hand, if Tokyo openly supported the Bush administration’s missile defense plan that it intended to develop and deploy and which had been publicized from the start as a system to protect the United States and its allies, then Tokyo would violate the collective security interpretation associated with the Japanese constitution. Moreover, such support would unnecessarily anger Beijing, create suspicions in Moscow, and worsen relations with Pyongyang. Thus, the nub of the dilemma for Tokyo had been to try to sustain the impression that a TMD system was separate

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from the Bush administration’s missile defense plan. Although the Clinton administration billed NMD and TMD research as separate systems for public consumption purposes, technically they have always been thoroughly interdependent. Tokyo attempted to resolve the dilemma it faced by fudging on the question of whether or not it supported the Bush administration’s inclusive missile defense initiative.55 When an official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was asked in May 2001 if Japan endorsed the Bush administration’s missile defense plans, the response was “That is up to you to decide.”56 About six months later, at the end of November 2001, the government of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi provided an official statement on the U.S. missile defense plan. What Tokyo did was to couch its official response as best it could within the context of nuclear disarmament. It applauded the Bush administration’s call for reductions of nuclear weapons.57 But Tokyo did not mention in its statement what it then strongly suspected was imminent for the Bush administration—that Washington would be announcing the withdrawal of the United States from the 1972 ABM Treaty so that it could proceed without restraint on missile defense research. What Tokyo did stress in its November 2001 statement on missile defense was that it understood the U.S. objective, which is to counter the current proliferation of ballistic missiles. Having by then abandoned its public support for maintaining the ABM Treaty that it had demonstrated in its 2000 U.N. disarmament resolution, Tokyo emphasized in its statement that the proliferation of ballistic missiles poses a threat to security, including Japan’s, and that Washington has continued to take diplomatic steps to deal with this problem. In what could be interpreted as an effort to maintain the semblance of a distinction between the Bush plan and Japanese security requirements—something that by late November 2001 was no longer discernible in Washington—Tokyo also indicated in its statement that Japan would continue to be involved in the cooperative research work on missile defense with the United States. In retrospect, Tokyo’s initial decision to begin cooperative research on missile defense with the United States that it made during the Clinton administration indicated that it had changed its thinking about the comprehensiveness of the American nuclear deterrence policy that Japan had supported for decades; in other words, the U.S. nuclear umbrella was not enough for Japan. Aware that Washington had become increasingly disinterested in the ABM Treaty since the Clinton years while becoming progressively more attached to missile defense, Tokyo was willing to concede by the end of 2001 that continuing research in this area remained important to Japanese security. Mindful of its constitutional dilemma, yet cognizant of the U.S. aversion to the ABM Treaty, Tokyo’s November 2001

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statement on missile defense indicated that it shared Washington’s views about the imminent threat from rogue states and terrorists. Tokyo has had to face some difficult policy situations, in addition to the extant constitutional interpretation that prohibits collective defense.58 One of the most complex policy issues that Tokyo continues to confront is that the future reliance on a cooperative defense shield calls into question the utility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella for Japan. If, as claimed, a defensive shield were viable and effective, there would be no need for Japan to remain under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Tokyo could pull Japan out from under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and completely conform to the nation’s defense-oriented policy. Because Tokyo does not have any plan to remove Japan from the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, this suggests that, despite the prohibitive costs and optimistic claims, a defensive shield does not portend to offer a reasonably high amount of security. Thus, Tokyo must contend with the difficult-to-reconcile policy issues of continuing to rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent while remaining tied to a costly and imperfect cooperative missile defense system. Equally problematic for Tokyo is that these two issues provide political fodder for an arms race and raise questions about the Japanese commitment to nuclear disarmament. In the post–Cold War environment, devoting resources to new nuclear weapons systems and working to develop and deploy defense technologies that erode international accords, such as the ABM Treaty, amounts to the purposeful movement away from the traditional deterrence policy based on the NPT regime.59 Crafted by Washington and supported by Tokyo is a reconstructed security paradigm that seeks to retain the threat component of the deterrence policy while attempting to minimize the circumstances associated with missile attacks. By creating the rationale for a new arms race, and in the worse case scenario the unraveling of the NPT regime, such behavior is precarious. Early on, officials in Tokyo had been divided on missile defense, even before the Bush administration’s initiative to fuse NMD and TMD. The dominant group has always felt that Japan’s participation in missile defense is the right thing to do, arguing that it strengthens the nation’s bilateral security alliance with the United States while extending deterrence capability.60 Exacerbated because of the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, others in Tokyo worried that development and deployment of missile defense would create serious problems with China, North Korea, and Russia that will irreparably damage nuclear disarmament.61 Apart from the prospect of missile defense precipitating a new arms race,62 and that the technologies on which such a system depends are far from flawless,63 zealous supporters of missile defense in Japan have connected it directly to international peace and security. They have alleged that because

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of the security benefits that it will yield, missile defense could prevent nuclear wars. Likening the existence and development of nuclear weapons to a Pandora’s Box, these staunch supporters of missile defense have averred that deploying such a system is the best way to close it. They have further reasoned that diplomatic negotiations leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is an impractical ideal; however, by relying on advanced technology, missile defense is the sensible way to end the threat of nuclear war.64 In December 2001, the Pentagon announced that it was extending the completion date on missile defense research with Japan. At the time, Japan had spent roughly $55 million on the joint research project, well below the U.S. contribution. Facing technological difficulties that led to deferring American missile testing, the Pentagon had to revise its initial plan for the completion of the joint research project. Both Washington and Tokyo had anticipated that joint research on missile defense would be finished by 2003 or 2004, but the Pentagon’s announcement added at least another four years to the project; so, at the earliest, the work would be done in 2007. At the time, this delay also pushed back Tokyo’s decision on whether Japan will develop and deploy a theater anti-missile system to at least 2008.65 More importantly, Tokyo had made a long-term commitment to missile defense research. Washington expected to gain access to critical Japanese technologies in the joint research project in industrial areas, such as cryogenics, sensors, miniaturization, and propulsion.66 Although the total research and development cost for the missile defense system proposed by Washington could reach $30 billion,67 a Japanese government projection puts Tokyo’s multiyear funding commitment for research on a ballistic missile defense system at between $200 and $300 million. During the summer of 2002, Washington and Tokyo began exploring the possibilities of sea-based technologies for missile defense.68 Even though not officially articulated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Agency, Tokyo decided to remain actively involved in missile defense research while it continued to call for nuclear disarmament. The existence of this linkage has provided Tokyo with a way to try to justify missile defense: it is defensive in nature and so is consistent with senshu boei, and it does not represent a threat to other nations in Northeast Asia. But this is flawed reasoning. China, North Korea, and Russia are unlikely to let the deployment of a U.S.-Japan missile defense system in East Asia go unchallenged. The prospect of a U.S.-Japan missile defense shield that could, at least in theory, neutralize China’s and Russia’s nuclear deterrent is unacceptable to Beijing and Moscow. Protection against the activities of rogue states or terrorists is not a sufficiently compelling argument in China or Russia. Tokyo has yet to offer a convincing argument as to how a deployed missile defense system would not jeopardize Chinese and Russian

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national interests. How would Chinese concerns about Taiwan fit into the equation for Beijing? While Russia does not appear to have hegemonic interests in Northeast Asia, the deployment of a regional missile defense system would substantially reduce Russian diplomatic influence in the area. Why Pyongyang would maintain a moratorium on the testing of missiles is a serious problem that Tokyo has also not yet addressed. Confronting a deployed U.S.-Japan anti-missile system, Pyongyang could eventually conclude that taking offensive steps to counter missile defense technologies best serves North Korea’s security interests. Tokyo raised some concern among those interested in Japan’s military objectives in December 2003 when it announced its decision to purchase missile defense equipment from the United States and that it would be requesting funds for this purpose until 2007. At the time, Tokyo stated that, “BMD [ballistic missile defense] is suitable for our exclusively defensive national defense policy,” and Japan has “decided to introduce the multilayered defense system based on the Aegis BMD system and Patriot PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability-3).” Later to surface as a point of contention between Washington and Tokyo, the Japanese government also stressed at this time that this defensive system “will not be used for the purpose of defending third countries.”69 Although different from the cooperative U.S.-Japan work on missile defense research, Tokyo’s announcement plainly indicated its intention to deploy the equipment purchased from Washington for a domestic BMD system.70 Less than a year later, Tokyo raised even more concern. In early October 2004, a defense panel report initiated by the Koizumi government recommended to the prime minister the further easing of restrictions on arms exports to the United States. Although Tokyo approved the Three Principles on Arms Exports in 1967 and strengthened them in 1976, the United States eventually became an exception to this policy that bans exports of Japanese military products. Because Tokyo felt strongly about preserving the U.S.-Japan security alliance, it exempted military technology transfers to the United States in 1983.71 Upon receiving the report by the defense panel in October 2004, Koizumi promised to consider its recommendations later in the year when his government updated the National Defense Program Outline.72 However, because the prime minister also faced considerable pressure from Washington, he did not wait that long to act. Just a week after the appearance of the defense panel’s report, the Japanese government announced that it would be developing parts for the U.S.-Japan missile defense system. Since Japanese exports of BMD parts to the United States would eventually need to occur, this announcement helped to set the stage for another change in the Three Principles on Arms Exports.73

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Tokyo’s determination to move BMD forward soon became more evident. In December 2004, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda officially announced that, “If Japan decides that it will engage in joint development and production of ballistic missile defense systems with the United States, the Three Principles [on Arms Exports] will not be applied.” Hosoda indicated that these BMD “systems and related activities” would strengthen the U.S.-Japan military relationship and add to the security of Japan. Moving beyond the just released 2005 National Defense Program Guidelines, Hosoda’s announcement also indicated that when Japan and the United Sates are jointly developing and manufacturing other military equipment, besides that earmarked for missile defense, the government would decide about exporting “on the basis of individual examination of each case.”74 Then, on February 19, 2005 at the two-plus-two Security Consultative Committee meeting in Washington, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, Minister of Foreign Affairs Nobutaka Machimura, and Minister of State for Defense and Director General of the Defense Agency Yoshinori Ohno underscored the importance of the cooperative missile defense project. The Committee’s joint statement emphasized that, because of “Japan’s decision to introduce missile defense systems and its recent announcement on its Three Principles on Arms Exports, the Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to close cooperation on policy and operational matters and to advancing U.S.-Japan cooperative research in BMD systems, with a view to possible cooperative development.”75 But even as forward progress on BMD was plainly evident, lurking in the background was the constraint stemming from the Japanese constitution. In January 2005, Tokyo reaffirmed its decision to allow its BMD system to only defend Japan, and therefore not attempt to intercept missiles targeting the United States. Because Tokyo’s interpretation of Article 9 prohibits Japanese involvement in collective security, its reaffirmation of the decision not to permit Japan’s BMD system to attempt to intercept missiles aimed at the United States was bound to rub Washington the wrong way.76 Following up on the joint statement issued by the Security Consultative Committee, Ohno announced in June 2005 that Japan would move the sea-based BMD system being developed with the United States to the developmental stage in fiscal year 2006.77 But Washington could not ignore the constitutional decision that Japan had previously made. At about the same time that Ohno made the announcement about the cooperative sea-based BMD system, it became public that Washington did not want to provide Japan with the advanced equipment that would give Japanese Aegis destroyers missile-launch data from U.S. satellites. In addition to Washington’s

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displeasure with the decision by Tokyo to not intercept missiles aimed at the United States, there were suspicions that the United States did not want to share this early-warning technology with Japan.78 If nothing else, this decision by Tokyo gives constitutional revisionists both in Japan and in the United States more reason to want to change Article 9.

The Controversial Use of Technology Because of the American exemption to the Three Principles on Arms Exports, Japanese technology transfers to the United States over the years, such as those related to missile guidance, have been used to help maintain Washington’s nuclear deterrent system. Japanese technology transfers therefore have helped to keep Japan secured under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. But it is not just Japanese exports—some of which are dual-use technologies— that are important to sustain the sophistication of U.S. military systems. Uncovered in 2001, an advanced Japanese product manufactured in the United States has also been used to bolster the American nuclear weapons program. Hoya Corporation USA, an American subsidiary of a major Japanese optical glass manufacturer with its headquarters in Tokyo, has been providing laser glass slabs for the National Ignition Facility (NIF).79 As an important part of the work being performed at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in Livermore, California, the NIF project is an attempt to engineer a fusion explosion within the confines of a laboratory. The laser glass slabs provided by the Hoya subsidiary in Fremont, California are vital to helping meet this objective. Because Hoya and its competitor, the German-owned Schott Company located in Pennsylvania, are the only two firms in the world that manufacture the sophisticated glass required by the NIF, they will be supplying all of the laser glass slabs, about 50 percent coming from each firm. When completed, the NIF will need more than 3,000 pieces of laser glass.80 Notwithstanding Diet discussions on the Hoya issue, Tokyo has not attempted to deal effectively with the matter, much to the disappointment of Japanese anti-nuclear organizations. Japanese civil society organizations are concerned that the NIF work will lead to the violation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and see Hoya as contributing to this. The mayors of both Hiroshima and Nagasaki have sent letters objecting to Hoya’s part in sustaining the nuclear weapons capabilities of the United States. Led by Gensuikin, a leading Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organization, Hoya faced strong domestic opposition in Japan. When it was learned in February 2001 that Hoya had been supplying the laser glass slabs

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used in the NIF project, the company decided to stop delivery. However, this was only temporary, since Hoya recommenced delivery at the end of March 2001, contending that its highly sophisticated laser glass slabs are not being used to develop new nuclear weapons. Actually, Hoya did more than deny the charges of opposition groups in Japan that its product is contributing to new weapons development. A spokesperson for Hoya claimed in March 2001 that, “the research programs are to contribute to the elimination of nuclear weapons.”81 But Hoya’s attempt to avoid controversy in Japan did not square with what LLNL had been saying. Prior to the public outcry about Hoya’s involvement in the NIF project, LLNL commended the company by declaring that it had achieved a “major technological milestone in optical glass melting.” Later, LLNL pointed out that if it did not have “this technology, it would be extremely difficult to build a huge solid-state laser such as NIF.” LLNL also stressed the importance of the NIF to the Department of Energy’s Stockpile Stewardship Program by indicating that “NIF will use the world’s largest laser to heat fusion fuel to thermo-nuclear ignition” and that its “experiments will help scientists sustain confidence in the nuclear weapons stockpile without actual testing.”82 Nor were Hoya’s comments consistent with at least two other accounts of this issue. Comments made by a U.S. scientist who had worked at LLNL were much different from the image that Hoya was attempting to convey about its laser glass slabs. At a news conference in Japan, the scientist pointed out that misinformation had been put out about Hoya’s laser glass slabs. The scientist resigned from his position when he found out that his work at NIF had the potential to enhance the capability of nuclear weapons.83 In early September 2001, even before the Hoya case began drawing attention, the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Commission in Arcata, California sent a letter to Hoya’s headquarters in Tokyo. The commission’s letter stated that LLNL had been providing inaccurate information to the public about the NIF project. The letter pointed out that the LLNL had been claiming that the NIF had two major purposes: to study the potential of fusion-energy technology and to maintain the “safety and reliability” of existing U.S. nuclear weapons. The latter purpose relates to the often-mentioned concern about monitoring America’s aging nuclear arsenal.84 However, in its letter to Hoya, the commission stressed that the development of the NIF’s massive laser will eventually allow for “new advances in strategic and tactical nuclear weapons technology,” an objective that stands in marked contrast to those interested in the proliferation of peace. Since Hoya’s product is so critical to the NIF, the commission requested that the company take the bold step of ending all deliveries of its laser glass slabs.85

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But Hoya continued to be an important contributor to the NIF project. With an expected completion date of 2008, the NIF will be the largest laser in the world.86 Because of the specialized product that Hoya has provided to the NIF, it is hard to think how the project can be completed on schedule without the company’s input.

Unused Technological Initiatives Tokyo has not given too much attention to technology-driven initiatives that would help permanently marry nations to the NPT regime. Although Tokyo has devoted resources to monitoring and verification efforts that support the CTBT, it has yet to develop an extensive plan that will directly link nonproliferation technologies to nuclear disarmament. An examination of three critical omissions of technology-based programs that would strengthen the NPT regime follows. Promoting nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament requires a consistent series of concrete actions, for example, avid support for nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZ) that clearly demonstrate a state’s commitment to this objective.87 But Tokyo has had only moderate interest in the creation of NWFZs and has rejected this issue altogether when it comes to Northeast Asia. Despite Japan’s propensity to excel in developing advanced technology, its nascent satellite program remains far behind that of the United States, making Tokyo very dependent on Washington.88 If made an integral part of a nuclear disarmament policy, work by Japan to develop satellite technologies to monitor NWFZs, including one in Northeast Asia, would be a confidence-building initiative demonstrating Tokyo’s support for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Another way that Japan can bolster the nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regime is to come up with innovative ways to strengthen the IAEA’s safeguards and verification system. As of December 2004, 40 nonnuclear weapons states that have acceded to the NPT still did not have their comprehensive safeguards agreements in force. Moreover, many states have still have not adopted an additional protocol to their safeguards agreement, which will strengthen the IAEA’s inspections and verification capabilities. Tokyo could begin to consider ways to link Japan’s ODA (Official Development Assistance) to a country’s acceptance of and compliance with its safeguards agreement and to its adoption of and conformity with an additional protocol. Tokyo could also provide the means and encouragement for more Japanese and others from the East Asian and Pacific region to be recruited by the IAEA safeguards program. Compared to North

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America and Western Europe, individuals from the Far East and the Pacific region occupy proportionately less of the IAEA’s inspectorate positions. Even less represented are individuals from Africa, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, and South America. Resources from Japan to improve the recruitment prospects of individuals from these underrepresented areas would help the IAEA achieve its goal of greater international diversity of its inspectorate personnel.89 Tokyo could also increase its voluntary contributions to the IAEA so that more resources will be available to the agency’s safeguards and verification program. Still another way that Japan can rely on technology to promote and stabilize the NPT regime is by providing assistance to IAEA-approved states that want to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes. Having forgotten about Japan’s concerns with regard to its right afforded by the NPT to be able to develop and possess nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes when it acceded to the accord in the 1970s, Tokyo has not been as empathetic as it could be today to countries desiring nuclear power for civilian use. Noticeably constrained today by Washington’s decision to strengthen its counterproliferation campaign, Tokyo has not tried as hard as it could to use Japan’s influence and resources to seek a balance between the rights of states to acquire nuclear power for peaceful purposes and the promotion of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. The Technical Cooperation Fund is the IAEA’s main source of revenues that supports the transfer of nuclear and related technologies to countries.90 By increasing its contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund, which supports the use of nuclear technology for a wide range of peaceful purposes, Japan would be demonstrating that it is fully emphatic to the development needs of countries. Each of these initiatives would put Tokyo on a much straighter path to the abolition of nuclear weapons than the meandering one it has been on for the last several years. But while these initiatives are important, the direct policy path to nuclear disarmament requires that Tokyo seriously rethink— rather than reaffirm—its security alliance with Washington and Japan’s place under the U.S. nuclear shield.

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Chapter 4 The Politics of Japanese Nuclear Disarmament: Where Government Policies and Civil Society Converge and Diverge

This chapter’s principal objective is to analyze the common and contrasting approaches to nuclear disarmament that have existed between the government of Japan and the nation’s disarmament organizations during recent years. However, there is some attention given to the origins and development of the Japanese anti-nuclear weapons movement. Relying on interviews with key members of Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons organizations, literature from some of these groups, as well as personal communication and interviews with Japanese officials and published material from the government, this chapter demonstrates that despite the common objective of abolishing nuclear arms, there is no unanimity about how Japan should proceed on the path to nuclear disarmament.

The Problem Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons movement has been a prominent part of Japanese culture since 1955. Although today the movement does not generate the same high-level of national enthusiasm that it did during the early Cold War years, several Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations exist, some of which have emerged in recent years. Different from the past when

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ideological disagreements within the Japanese anti-nuclear weapons movement eventually caused it to fracture, disarmament organizations today face the onerous task of overcoming some ideological disparities and an active agenda by the Japanese government. Thus, not only do these organizations often have differences amongst themselves, but they must also now contend with government initiatives that deflect popular attention from their common desire to expedite the disarmament process. Tokyo’s activities in the area of nuclear disarmament approach the objective of abolishing nuclear weapons in a way that is fundamentally different from that advocated by Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations. Tokyo unequivocally wants to move on what it considers a gradual path toward nuclear disarmament. While supporting a more direct approach to disarmament, Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations are deeply suspicious of the central government’s policies, seeing them as bending to the interests of the United States. Seeing more and more pressure being placed on Tokyo by Washington, a member of one of Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons organizations stressed that the “Japanese government is against the urgent abolition at the United Nations [and focuses] only on [their] ultimate abolition; this step-by step approach angers civil society.”1 Caught in the middle is the Japanese public, which as it has for many years, continues to show very strong support for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Because Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations are often at variance with Tokyo’s disarmament policies, they are not on the best of terms with the central government. Members of these organizations frequently distrust Tokyo’s intentions and question its motives. Tokyo is usually on the defensive when engaged in dialogue with these organizations, since Japanese civil society sees the government as not doing enough to help realize nuclear disarmament.

Differences between Government and Civil Society That Japan suffered the horrors of two atomic bombings in 1945 helps to explain the fact that the vast majority of the Japanese people continue to oppose the existence of nuclear weapons. Survey data indicates that 82 percent of the Japanese respondents think that atomic weapons should never have been developed,2 while another poll shows that 78 percent favor the complete abolition of nuclear weapons, with no exceptions.3 Representatives from two major anti-nuclear weapons organizations have also indicated that somewhere between 75 and 80 percent of the local municipalities in Japan

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have adopted nonnuclear disarmament declarations and resolutely support the nation’s Three Nonnuclear Principles,4 not to possess, manufacture, or introduce nuclear weapons into the country. The catastrophes resulting from the atomic bombings also help explain why the Japanese government has supported the idea of abolishing nuclear weapons and why, since the end of the Cold War, it has been working to design a nuclear disarmament regime.5 From the standpoint of members of Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons movement, however, Tokyo has been unwilling to risk damaging its relationship with Washington, which for the past several years has not demonstrated a strong commitment to nuclear disarmament. The end of the Cold War brought renewed hope to anti-nuclear weapons organizations in Japan. The aspirations of these organizations grew at the end of the Cold War for a very simple reason: with superpower reconciliation, it appeared as if the abolition of nuclear weapons was a realizable goal. Tokyo also took advantage of this new global climate by making it clear that it anticipated discernible progress toward nuclear disarmament. However, Tokyo has never specified the intended pace of this progress nor has it ever identified a timetable for nuclear disarmament.6 There are three major reasons why Tokyo is reluctant to move in tandem with civil society organizations in Japan toward nuclear disarmament. First, because Tokyo maintains that the Asia Pacific region, and Northeast Asia in particular, continues to be unsafe, it insists that there is a continuing need for Japan to remain under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs official recently stated that, because there is instability in Northeast Asia, Japan needs the protection afforded by the U.S. nuclear umbrella.7 Second, the recent strengthening of the U.S.-Japan security alliance in which Japan remains a junior partner, has put Tokyo in a position where it must fully consider Washington’s interests and objectives before it proceeds with security issues, especially those that are directly germane to nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.8 Third, conservative forces in Japan want greater access to security options for future consideration. The current initiative seeking to change Japan’s pacifist constitution is one prominent example of this, as is the continuing refusal by Tokyo to transform the Three Nonnuclear Principles from national policy into national law.

The Origins of Japan’s Anti-Nuclear Weapons Movement The U.S. occupation forces immediately developed a censorship policy that effectively muted public criticisms of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima

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and Nagasaki. This censorship policy, which was not publicly discussed by occupation officials, prohibited Japanese newspapers from publishing stories that dealt with the problems and devastation associated with the bombings; it extended to literature and the arts, school textbooks, and even to scientific and medical research. Because of this censorship policy, the Japanese people remained ill informed about the deleterious consequences of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during most of the occupation period that ended in 1952. Blaming both the governments of the United States and Japan, the latter for its reckless militarism, the Japanese people eventually found an outlet for the repressed frustration and anger stemming from the atomic bombings. A U.S. nuclear test (BRAVO) on the Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands in March 1954 exposed 290 people to the effects of the blast, some of whom died as a result. Among those exposed was a Japanese fisherman on board the Fukuryu Maru No. 5 (Lucky Dragon No. 5) who later died from radiation illness. Although also sickened by nuclear fallout, or as the Japanese called it, the shi no hai (ashes of death), twenty-two of his shipmates did survive.9 The first organized step to politicize this pent-up anger and frustration that pervaded Japanese society appeared in Tokyo’s Suginami district. Although the status of women in Japan during the early postwar years left much to be desired, this did not deter a number of them in the Suginami district from participating in the grass-roots activities that quickly led to the formation of Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons movement. A housewives’ reading group organized by peace activist Kaoru Yasui, an erstwhile nationalist who lost his professorship because of his political views, was responsible for carrying the Suginami Appeal throughout Japan. Demonstrating their strong opposition to the existence of hydrogen bombs, these Tokyo housewives would carry the Suginami Appeal, which fundamentally was a signature campaign demanding the elimination of these weapons, with them in their shopping baskets. Begun in May 1954, the Suginami Appeal rapidly evolved into a national initiative. In less than two months, the Suginami Appeal had acquired nearly 300,000 signatures. By August, it had evolved into a national campaign, having amassed 14,000,000 signatures. By the time the first World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs was held on August 6, 1955, the national campaign had obtained 32,000,000 signatures, a number exceeding half of all registered Japanese voters.10 The signature campaign truly mirrored Japanese society. It received support from diverse people and groups, including conservative ones, which ordinarily would not be in agreement with each other. The national signature campaign connected a substantial part of the Japanese public to the heretofore muted appeal of the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, who for years had been pleading for the abolition of nuclear weapons.11

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The formation of Gensuikyo (Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs), Japan’s first significant anti-nuclear weapons organization that served as the catalyst for the national movement, was in September 1955, a month after the first World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs. Although the mainstay of Gensuikyo was Japan’s strong socialist party, the communist party and the labor groups, Sohyo (General Council of Trade Unions of Japan) and Domei (the Japanese Confederation of Labor), the organization was initially not identifiably to the left on the political spectrum. At the time, the Japanese public was absolutely opposed to the existence of nuclear weapons and not especially concerned with the politics of political parties. A short time later, however, Gensuikyo’s strong opposition to Tokyo’s concurrence with Washington to renew the U.S.-Japan security treaty between 1959 and 1960 and Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi’s consideration to the revision of the nation’s peace constitution put the organization in a visibly confrontational position vis-à-vis the Japanese government. Resulting from both the broad ideological composition of Gensuikyo during its formative years and the conflicts that were brewing within Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons movement was the splintering of Gensuikyo in the early 1960s, which by then was controlled by the communists. Although having supported Gensuikyo’s past efforts, members of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party and the Democratic Socialist Party (which had broken away from the Socialist Party in 1959 and which had maintained a position on the U.S.-Japan security treaty that corresponded with that of the Liberal Democratic Party) left Gensuikyo. In November 1961, they established Kakkin Kaigi (actually, Kakuheiki Kinshi Heiwa Kensetsu Kokumin Kaigi or the National Council for Peace and against Nuclear Weapons), which was popularly known as the Second Gensuikyo (Daini Gensuikyo). By 1963, serious problems existed within Gensuikyo between the socialist and communist factions. The fall out within Gensuikyo centered largely on the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, signed by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain in early August 1963. The socialists opposed nuclear testing by any country, while the communists were willing to accept Soviet testing. With Sohyo, the Socialist Party left Gensuikyo in 1963. In 1965, with the support of the Socialist Party and Sohyo, Gensuikin (Congress against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs) was established.12 Having been politicized by the formation of Gensuikyo and understanding the significance of national organizations to address their concerns the Japanese people had discovered that public expression was necessary to perpetuate their anti-nuclear weapons sentiment. Thus, because the movement covered the entire political spectrum in Japan, it pushed to the fore

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the widespread appeals of the Japanese people to abolish nuclear weapons— appeals that in the past had come mainly from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In this respect, the first World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs gave Japan’s hibakusha (the survivors of the atomic bombings), which had formed groups beginning in 1954 in Hiroshima, Nagasaki, as well as elsewhere in Japan,13 the “courage to stand up” so that people in their country and all over the world could hear their voices. The formation of Nihon Hidankyo (Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations) occurred the day after the second World Conference in Nagasaki began on August 9, 1956. Hidankyo announced at its founding that because of the first World Conference in 1955: “We are feeling a sensation or ‘resurrection’ at this occasion.”14 From the time of the atomic bombings, the hibakusha had felt a sense of deep betrayal, since they received no assistance from the U.S. occupation forces or from the Japanese government, which had forfeited the right to seek compensation from Washington when it signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. Because the many social, psychological, and medical problems of the hibakusha had been ignored for years by both the U.S. and Japanese governments, the “rise of the anti-nuclear movement” gave them “hope to live, for the first time since the bombing [sic], which led to the organizing of Nihon Hidankyo.”15 In addition to Hidankyo’s continuous appeal for the complete abolition of nuclear weapons, which it views as “weapons of madness” that “turned Hiroshima and Nagasaki into dead cities” and that are “so evil that humanity must never accept them,” the confederation has fought hard since its inception for compensation for the hibakusha.16 Although the splintering of Gensuikyo altered the dynamics of Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons movement, it did not immediately weaken its overall momentum. However, in time the lack of unity in the Japanese anti-nuclear weapons movement eventually took its toll. While Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons organizations were working toward the same objective, the noncohesiveness of the movement lessened its mass appeal and therefore mitigated its political effectiveness. By the mid-1970s, the calls for the unification of Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons movement that had been previously heard became more intense. But by then the ideological divisiveness that stemmed from Cold War politics had ossified to the point where unification between Gensuikyo and Gensuikin, Japan’s most prominent anti-nuclear weapons organizations, had become too big of an obstacle to overcome.17 For Gensuikyo and Gensuikin, these ideological differences created divergent perceptions or interpretations of reality, a problem not uncommon to nuclear disarmament movements.18 Still, the Japanese anti-nuclear weapons movement did not go away. This was because the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the

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existence of the hibakusha continued to nurture public opposition to the existence of nuclear weapons. Moreover, both Gensuikyo and Gensuikin continued to push hard for the abolition of nuclear weapons, work that culminated annually in their separate World Conferences. Hidankyo’s activities also persisted and it achieved limited success in gaining assistance for the hibakusha. In addition to the 1957 A-Bomb Victims Medical Care Law that resulted because of pressure from the hibakusha, Hidankyo’s activities were instrumental in bringing about the Law on Special Measures for Sufferers in 1967.19 Because of its efforts to bring about the elimination of nuclear weapons, Hidankyo has been nominated four times for the Nobel Peace Prize—in 1985, 1995, 2001, and 2005.20

Civil Society and Japan’s Anti-Nuclear Weapons Movement in More Recent Times Still fractured, the anti-nuclear weapons movement nonetheless today remains an important part of Japanese culture. Decades after being established, Gensuikyo and Gensuikin continue to be committed to their original objective of mobilizing the Japanese people for the purpose of eliminating nuclear weapons. Its aging membership notwithstanding, Hidankyo maintains its commitment to the complete abolition of nuclear weapons and its determination to acquire adequate government assistance for the hibakusha. Regarding the latter objective, Hidankyo experienced some success in 1994 with the passage of the limited Hibakusha Aid Law.21 But Hidankyo has much left to do in this area. Of the 285,000 people who have been identified as having been exposed to atomic radiation, only 0.7 percent of them have been officially certified to receive monthly medical payments of about $1,150.22 Although many civil society organizations have contributed to the Japanese effort to abolish nuclear weapons, four major ones that have emerged since the end of the Cold War are especially notable. They are the Tokyo Physicians for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (TPENW),23 the Peace Depot,24 the Japanese Association of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms (JALANA)25 and the Hiroshima Peace Institute.26 Demonstrating the continuing popular opposition in Japan to the existence of nuclear weapons is the fact that the disarmament movement continues to attract the attention of a large number people. For example, Gensuikyo’s 2002 World Conference meeting in Hiroshima attracted

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approximately 7,000 people, while Gensuikin’s drew about 3,500.27 Beyond the survey data showing the overwhelming support of the Japanese people for the elimination of nuclear weapons, there is other compelling evidence indicating their strong anti-nuclear sentiment. Begun in February 1985, the Appeal from Hiroshima and Nagasaki for a Total Ban and Elimination of Nuclear Weapons succeeded in acquiring the signatures of more than 62 million people in Japan by January 2001.28 The Appeal from Hiroshima and Nagasaki coincided with the resurgence of both the world and the Japanese anti-nuclear weapons movement during the 1980s. Signed by nearly half of the Japanese population, the Appeal from Hiroshima and Nagasaki had broad popular support from peace and anti-nuclear weapons groups in Japan and throughout the world. Shinfujin (New Japan Women’s Association) was itself responsible for collecting 10 million signatures in Japan.29 Established in 1982, the World Conference of Mayors for Peace through Inter-city Solidarity held its first gathering in August 1985, several months after the launching of the Appeal from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Promoted by Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Mayors for Peace began a worldwide initiative encouraging the adoption of its Program to Promote the Solidarity of Cities Towards the Total Abolition of Nuclear Weapons. By December 2005, 1,253 cities in 114 nations and regions had become members of the Mayors for Peace, including many in nuclear weapons states. The Mayors Conference became formally recognized as an U.N. nongovernmental organization (NGO) in March 1990.30 The day after the opening of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan addressed the Mayors for Peace Conference, stating how pleased he was that the Mayors for Peace were at the United Nations promoting “your vision of a global ban on nuclear weapons by 2020.”31 Formed in 1984, the National Council of Japan Nuclear Free Local Authorities has been working to get municipalities to sign nuclear-free declarations. From 300 when it began, the number of local municipalities in Japan that support the elimination of nuclear weapons and the Three Nonnuclear Principles now exceeds 2,500. Some of these local governments have even passed city resolutions that visibly demonstrate their advocacy of these issues. Held in Nagasaki in July 2004, the 19th countrywide convention of the National Council of Japan Nuclear Free Local Authorities passed a resolution that demanded that the Japanese government “lead the anti-nuclear movement in the international community.”32 In 1975, Kobe adopted a resolution declaring its port a nuclear-free area. Despite the vexation the resolution has caused Tokyo, which continues to accept Washington’s neither-confirm-nor-deny policy, Kobe still maintains its resolve not to allow the entry of nuclear-armed warships into its port.

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Motivated by the Kobe resolution, in 1999, the Kochi prefecture unsuccessfully tried to adopt a resolution that would deny U.S. warships port access unless Tokyo could certify that they are not carrying nuclear weapons. Other local communities have recently resisted the free access of U.S. nuclear warships to their ports.33 Hiroshima and Nagasaki understandably remain the symbolic hubs of Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons movement. In addition to the organized activities of Gensuikyo, Gensuikin, Hidankyo, and other groups that take place in early August in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, thousands of people attend the annual peace ceremonies held in these two cities to commemorate those who have died because of the atomic bombings. Kakkin Kaigi, Gensuikin and one of its leading supporters, Rengo, the Japanese Trade Union Confederation, work cooperatively at the Hiroshima and Nagasaki peace ceremonies. Formed in the late 1980s as a result the dissolution of Sohyo, Domei and other groups, and the consolidation of the Japan’s labor movement, Rengo, which today has millions of members throughout Japan, maintains that working “toward disarmament, the total abolition of nuclear weapons” is one of its principal objectives.34 Rengo designates August 3–9 as “Rengo Nationwide Peace Week” so that it can work with the Japanese peace and nuclear disarmament movement. With the assistance of Kakkin Kaigi and Gensuikin, Rengo sponsors peace rallies in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and draws a few thousand people to each of these events.35 The cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have continued to protest any form of nuclear testing by any country. Nagasaki began sending protest letters to countries that carried out nuclear tests beginning in 1970. Since then, it has sent a protest letter to every country that has conducted a nuclear test. The city of Nagasaki has also sent letters of protest to the capitals of countries that have performed subcritical tests. All told, between 1970 and September 2002, the city of Nagasaki sent 547 protest letters to governments involved in any type of nuclear testing.36 Hiroshima’s public protests against nuclear testing began in 1968, about two years earlier than Nagasaki’s. In September 1968, Hiroshima sent its first letter of protest to French President Charles de Gaulle when his government conducted a nuclear test in the Mururoa Atoll in the South Pacific.37 Hiroshima’s keen sensitivity to the threat posed by nuclear weapons quickly surfaced in October 2002 when the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) allegedly revealed to a U.S. official visiting Pyongyang that North Korea had a uranium-enrichment program to develop nuclear arms. Even without proof that such work had been going on, the mayor of Hiroshima demanded in a letter of protest that North Korean leader Kim Jong Il immediately terminate his “nuclear weapons program, and abide in good

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faith with the NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty] and all other promises made to the international community.”38 Like Hiroshima and Nagasaki, organized involvement by Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations has been evident in the protestation against subcritical nuclear testing. For example, after the United States conducted its third subcritical nuclear test in March 1998, Hidankyo members went to the American embassy in Tokyo and read out loud a letter to President Clinton. At the gates of the U.S. embassy, members of Hidankyo called on Washington to “stop the threat of the use of nuclear weapons,” to “cancel all nuclear tests,” and to “abolish all nuclear weapons” so that there would be “no more hibakusha.”39 In a letter of protest addressed to Prime Minister Blair and President Bush relating their countries’ involvement in subcritical nuclear testing in February 2002, Gensuikyo demanded that both Great Britain and the United States “make good” on the principal accomplishment of the 2000 NPT Review Conference that governments work toward the elimination of all nuclear weapons.40 Rengo’s acting president condemned the Bush administration in his statement at a peace rally in Hiroshima on August 5, 2002, noting its failure to heed international calls for peace by continuing to conduct subcritical nuclear testing.41 Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations were quick to protest the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998. When New Delhi and Islamabad performed nuclear tests in May 1998, Hidankyo members immediately protested at both the Indian and Pakistani embassies in Tokyo on more than one occasion. In a letter of protest delivered to the Indian embassy on May 12, 1998 in Tokyo the day after New Delhi’s first round of nuclear testing, Hidankyo demanded that Prime Minister Vajpayee “change the nuclear deterrence policy without delay so that Hibakusha will not be created any more.”42 When New Delhi performed more nuclear testing on May 13, Hidanyko, joined by members of Gensuikin and Kakkin Kaigi, returned to the Indian embassy the next day to protest.43 Kakkin Kaigi, Gensuikin, and Rengo protested at the Pakistani embassy in Tokyo a few days after Islamabad conducted nuclear tests at the end of May 1998. In a protest statement to Pakistani officials the groups demanded that Islamabad end nuclear testing, terminate the development of its nuclear weapons program, and immediately sign both NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).44

Nuclear Disarmament and the Japanese Government Even though the Japanese government has long displayed a strong interest in nuclear disarmament, it had to repress this during the Cold War, since

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the politics of the period offered Tokyo two choices: remain depended on the U.S.-controlled security alliance or adopt a neutralist foreign policy. Leaving intact Japan’s peace constitution but convinced that the Soviet Union represented an enduring threat to the country, the American-leaning Liberal Democratic Party that dominated Japanese politics from 1955 until after the end of the Cold War decided to retain the bilateral security alliance with the United States. This alliance not only afforded Japan security but it also put it under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Tokyo’s acceptance of the U.S. nuclear umbrella caused ambivalence to develop within Japan. Extreme sensitivity to the horrors connected to nuclear warfare that pervaded Japanese society had been juxtaposed with the decision by Tokyo that Japan’s security depended upon remaining under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Significant opposition beginning in 1959 to Tokyo’s renewal of the security treaty with the United States45 gave way several years later to the formal introduction of the Three Nonnuclear Principles. Tokyo had begun cooperating with Washington in the 1950s by secretly permitting the entrance of U.S. nuclear weapons into Japanese territory and by sanctioning its neither-confirm-nor-deny policy.46 So widespread became the belief that U.S. nuclear weapons had entered Japanese territory that, according to a 1975 Asahi Shimbun survey, 67 percent of the public believed that Tokyo had ignored the third nonnuclear principle.47 Thus, despite Tokyo’s sensitivity to domestic appeals for nuclear disarmament, it remained of like mind with Washington during the Cold War: like Washington the Japanese government believed that there was a continuing need to maintain a nuclear deterrence posture and that, no matter what, Japan’s security required that it stay firmly nestled under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The end of the Cold War, however, created an opportunity for Tokyo that it fully understood did not exist in the past. Seeking a global role of some significance and already sensitive to the importance of nuclear disarmament, Tokyo proceeded to take advantage of the changed international environment. Openly calling for the abolition of all nuclear weapons became a reoccurring theme in Tokyo’s international policy agenda. Tokyo’s decision to embrace the abolition of nuclear weapons can be traced to a speech given in 1988 by former Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita to a U.N. General Assembly special session on disarmament. During his speech, Takeshita stressed Japan’s desire to host a U.N. conference on disarmament. The following year Japan hosted the conference, something that it has continued to do since then.48 As it has done every year since 1994, Japan introduced its twelfth consecutive draft resolution on nuclear disarmament to the United Nations’ First Committee on Disarmament and International Security in 2005.49 In 1994 and 1995, Tokyo submitted written statements to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) arguing that the use

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of nuclear weapons would be against the spirit of international law; in November 1995, Tokyo orally presented its position to the ICJ.50 In a speech given to the Diet in September 1995, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama stressed that Tokyo would continue to appeal for the abolition of all nuclear weapons and for the CTBT to come into force. Before the U.N. General Assembly in 1995, Foreign Minister Yohei Kono made a similar appeal and, as he had done in 1994 when he anticipated that the CTBT would soon come into force, requested the that ceremony for the accord take place in Japan. In his 1995 speech Kono also called “for a total ban on all nuclear testing.”51 To the disgruntlement of Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons movement, Tokyo revised its thinking on this matter two years later to exclude subcritical nuclear testing when the United States began performing this new experimental procedure. Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto emphasized in his statement to the U.N. General Assembly in September 1996 that it is “essential to further promote disarmament efforts.” Along with indicating his government’s satisfaction with the progress that the CTBT had made thus far, Hashimoto stressed Tokyo’s gradual or incremental position on nuclear disarmament.52 Just a little over two months later, Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda elaborated on Tokyo’s incremental position to the Seminar on Nuclear Disarmament after the Indefinite Extension of the NPT held in Kyoto. Ikeda’s remarks made clear that Tokyo did not subscribe to a “direct approach” to nuclear disarmament. Clarifying Tokyo’s position, Ikeda’s statement pointed out that a nuclear-weapons-free world could only be realized by gradually accruing “realistic disarmament measures, one by one,” a process which he identified as a “realistic and incremental approach.” Ikeda’s comments left little doubt that Tokyo believed that the incremental or gradual approach was superior to a direct one, since it relied on disarmament measures that “the entire international community, including the nuclear-weapons states, can agree.”53 The next summer, in July 1997, Ambassador Masahiko Koumura repeated almost verbatim Tokyo’s position to the U.N. Conference on Disarmament held in Sapporo.54 Nuclear testing by India and Pakistan in the spring of 1998 prompted the Japanese government a few months later to launch the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, a multinational project in which its twenty-three participants offered their positions in personal rather than official capacities. The Tokyo Forum showed clear evidence of the Japanese government’s influence on the project by demonstrating its propensity to not alienate the nuclear powers, a discernible predilection that did not play very well with Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons movement.55 Yet, relative to the nuclear powers, Tokyo has retained a higher level of commitment to nuclear disarmament. Consistent with this commitment,

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Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi again made clear before the U.N. General Assembly in September 1998 the Japanese government’s interest in abolishing nuclear weapons, stressing at the time that the “further advancement of nuclear disarmament by nuclear weapon states is more important than ever.”56 Reiterating the significance that Tokyo had attached to the “practical and progressive approach,” Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs Toshio Kojima stated at the U.N Conference on Disarmament Issues in August 2001 that Japan’s nonproliferation and disarmament efforts had become an “important pillar of its foreign policy.” This, said Kojima, was most especially true with regard to the abolition of nuclear weapons, given that Tokyo wants to see a “nuclear-weapon-free world as soon as possible.”57 In the early 1990s, the Japanese government restructured its relatively large Official Development Assistance (ODA) program to reflect its interests in nonproliferation and disarmament. Particularly germane to its nonproliferation and disarmament interests is the principle that stipulates that in making a decision about distributing foreign assistance to developing countries Tokyo will closely monitor the “development and production of weapons of mass destruction.”58 However, especially after the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 Tokyo’s conformance to the Bush administration’s aggressive counterproliferation campaign meant that nuclear disarmament had become even more of an idealistic objective now than before. In some ways, Tokyo’s objective of incremental movement toward nuclear disarmament was metamorphosing into a retrogressive approach. Using its ODA program, the Japanese government had penalized India and Pakistan because of their nuclear testing in 1998. But the Koizumi government restored financial assistance to India and Pakistan after the 2001 attacks because Washington was trying to win support, especially from Islamabad, for the U.S. war on terrorism. In doing this, Tokyo not only pushed out of political sight the significance of the Tokyo Forum, which had been launched precisely because of the nuclear testing by India and Pakistan, but it also deviated from the disarmament principle stipulated in Japan’s ODA charter. Thus, Tokyo began trying to get Islamabad and New Delhi’s to accede to the CTBT but without the leverage of its ODA program.59 This is manifestly different from the strategy it employed with China. Tokyo responded to Beijing’s nuclear testing in 1995 by withholding foreign assistance to China. In 1996, Beijing declared a moratorium on nuclear testing and subsequently signed the CTBT. Because of these steps taken by Beijing, Tokyo recommenced grant aid to China in March 1997.60 Tokyo’s somewhat dampened enthusiasm for nuclear disarmament was evident when Prime Minister Koizumi spoke before the U.N. General Assembly in September 2002. Koizumi stated in his speech that Japan

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would persevere with its work to eliminate nuclear weapons and, employing rhetoric commonly used in the past, that it would “redouble”61 its efforts to bring about the early entry into force of the CTBT.62 But the relative dearth of attention that Koizumi gave to nuclear nonproliferation and the abolition of nuclear weapons in his 2002 speech to the U.N. General Assembly did not engender optimism amongst proponents of disarmament in Japan. Moreover, his talk about redoubling Tokyo’s efforts to bring about the early entry into force of the CTBT had to be understood in the context of what unequivocally had become the Bush administration’s ill-feeling toward the accord. Indeed, Tokyo understood that the changed environment in Washington after September 2001, manifested in the Nuclear Posture Review, did not run parallel to its approach for a series of incremental steps leading to nuclear disarmament. By at least the time of the initial meeting of the preparatory committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference in April 2002, Tokyo became aware of the important disarmament concerns that pervaded the international community. These concerns were the decision by Washington to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the continued existence of nuclear arsenals, possible new uses for and the development of new classes of nuclear weapons in the future, and the need for the CTBT to come into force.63 At this time, Tokyo reaffirmed its advocacy for NPT, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s safeguards agreements, the completion of the CTBT process, and stressed that the U.N. Conference on Disarmament has not begun substantive work on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), an accord that would prohibit the manufacture of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. In a cursory way, Tokyo also stated that it is important for the U.N. Conference on Disarmament to give some additional consideration to negative security assurances for nonnuclear weapon states—that is, that the nuclear powers will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them. Although Tokyo did state that “there has been little tangible progress” in nuclear disarmament since the 2000 NPT Review Conference, it did not specifically identify any nuclear power that had caused the disarmament process to stall. Instead, Tokyo made a general plea to the nuclear powers to “make good on their commitment to nuclear disarmament” and for them to embrace a “diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies.”64 It would be inaccurate to say that Tokyo has not attempted to promote both the CTBT and the FMCT. As we saw in chapter 2, Tokyo has been perhaps the leading state advocate of the CTBT. In 2001, Tokyo and Canberra organized an international workshop on the FMCT; on seven different occasions during 2002, Tokyo’s representative to the U.N. Conference on Disarmament emphasized the need to establish a plan for beginning

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work on the FMCT.65 Indeed, since then Tokyo has continued to campaign for the entry into force of the CTBT and stress the importance of moving the FMCT process forward. However, Tokyo’s diminished interest in nuclear disarmament continued to become apparent as was evident from Prime Minister Koizumi’s September 2004 speech to the U.N. General Assembly. Save the passing comment that Japan was the only country to have experienced atomic warfare and that it remained a leading advocate of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, there was no mention of proposals or plans needed to strengthen the NPT regime.66

Same Objective, Different Perspectives Between Tokyo and Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons organizations, there are fundamental disagreements about how to reach the common goal of nuclear disarmament. It is true that these organizations do not themselves share a common unifying perspective on how to realize disarmament. However, members of Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons movement agree that Tokyo gives far too much lip service to nuclear disarmament while too often failing to take the substantive steps necessary to achieve it. For them, Tokyo’s efforts typically fall far short of meeting the expectations of the majority of the Japanese people, who continue to support the complete abolition of nuclear weapons. Although Tokyo “considers it meaningful to amply listen to the opinion of civil society including NGOs and to ensure collaboration with them in its endeavors to promote disarmament and nonproliferation,”67 it often does not like what it hears. Because it runs contrary to the Japanese government’s gradual approach to nuclear disarmament, Tokyo does not like to hear the mayor of Hiroshima publicly proclaim that the Mayors for Peace endorse the “total elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth by the year 2020.” Nor does Tokyo like to hear the demand that it “become the world leader for nuclear weapons abolition.”68 A member of one of Japan’s civil society organizations put it this way. Tokyo sees Japan’s civil society representatives who advocate nuclear disarmament and its anti-nuclear weapons organizations as a “thorn in the side of government,” and so “it pretty much ignores” them.69 Given Japan’s place under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, Tokyo is not especially pleased when it hears criticisms of Washington’s reliance on subcritical nuclear testing. Tokyo also does not want to hear the continued demands that the Three Nonnuclear

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Principles be changed from policy to law, that there is a need to develop a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Northeast Asia, and that Japan must come out from under the U.S. nuclear umbrella.70 The main source of Tokyo’s credibility problem with Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations lies in its repeated declarations that call for the complete abolition of nuclear arms while it continues to demonstrate the propensity to give priority to the interests of the nuclear powers, most especially the United States, on disarmament and nonproliferation issues. There are several important examples of this. Tokyo’s strong advocacy of the CTBT notwithstanding, it has accepted U.S. subcritical nuclear testing and has argued, contrary to the position of disarmament groups in Japan and throughout the world, that this activity does not violate the spirit of the accord.71 Moreover, Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations reject Tokyo’s gradual or incremental disarmament policy, because they do not believe that the nuclear powers are sincere about implementing Article VI of the NPT, the clause that requires that they act in good faith to abolish nuclear arms. Tokyo recently demonstrated its incremental position and its sensitivity to the interests of the nuclear powers in October 2004 when it abstained from supporting a U.N. draft resolution reaffirming the importance of the International Court of Justice’s 1996 unanimous conclusion that states should work in good faith to achieve nuclear disarmament. In clarifying Japan’s abstention to the U.N.’s First Committee, the Japanese representative—consistent with past explanations—indicated that while his government supported nuclear disarmament and the ICJ’s conclusion, Tokyo believed that it was too early for countries to meet their immediate obligations for the elimination of nuclear weapons since it is first necessary to take practical steps toward this objective.72 Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations also see Tokyo’s refusal to join NAC (New Agenda Coalition), an association of seven nations formed in 1998 that has been directly challenging the nuclear weapons states to move unequivocally toward nuclear disarmament, as a clear indication of its unwillingness to pressure Washington. Unlike Tokyo, the vast majority of the members of the Japanese anti-nuclear weapons movement see Japan’s position under the U.S. nuclear umbrella as contradicting Article 9, the nation’s constitutional peace clause, or at the very least violating its spirit. Thus, despite having the same goal of abolishing nuclear weapons, there is an observable rift in the relationship between Tokyo and the Japanese anti-nuclear weapons movement. While Tokyo has repeatedly acknowledged the importance of “civil society in promoting nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament”73 and policy makers affirm that these words are “absolutely genuine,”74 Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations are often skeptical of the government’s sincerity. The following are some of

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the comments from representatives of Japanese anti-nuclear weapons groups on this matter.75 ●

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“Tokyo pretends to listen; Tokyo encourages disarmament but when we speak out, our ideas are said not to be practical. Tokyo is listening but change is slow from Tokyo” (Hidankyo). “Tokyo does not mean it; Tokyo wants to placate the public” (TPENW). Representative I. “Simply rhetoric. Tokyo has inserted these words into its U.N. draft resolution “to pacify the NGOs interested in nuclear disarmament.” Representative 2. These words “can be understood as fairly genuine. Japanese government is getting more and more serious about evaluating the positive role of civil society; [however,] there is a kind of skepticism regarding the expression because of the past rather cool attitude of Japanese government toward civil society” (Hiroshima Peace Institute). Tokyo’s submission of the U.N. draft resolution is genuine but the words seeking participation from civil society are meant “to appeal to global NGOs; Tokyo hates Japanese NGOs.” Even though “there is a continuing conversation between Tokyo and Japanese NGOs, the central government’s nuclear weapons policy has not changed. Tokyo maintains an incremental or gradual approach to nuclear disarmament” (Peace Depot). “There is a difference between what they [Japanese government officials] say and what they are doing, regarding the abolition of nuclear weapons” (Gensuikyo). “They were good sentences. But Tokyo cannot go outside of its policy” (Gensuikin).

Tokyo has long maintained that its policy on nuclear disarmament and the fact that Japan remains under the U.S. nuclear umbrella does not contradict its work to promote the abolition of all nuclear weapons. Tokyo’s explanation is that, even though the Cold War is over, Japan still requires a nuclear deterrent. An official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it is presently “unthinkable” for Japan to come out from under the U.S. nuclear umbrella.76 Tokyo reasons that its military alliance with the United States and the protection afforded to Japan by the American nuclear shield provide extra and necessary measures of security beyond the Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF).77 Because Tokyo interprets the SDF and the bilateral security alliance as parts of an exclusive defense-oriented policy, its position is that remaining under the U.S. nuclear umbrella does not violate Article 9.

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Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations have a very different interpretation of this issue. The TPENW maintains that, “Tokyo’s acceptance of the U.S. nuclear umbrella definitely violates Article 9.”78 Hidankyo representatives believe that “most members do feel that Japan’s acceptance of the U.S. nuclear umbrella does violate Article 9.”79 Like the view held by the Peace Depot,80 one representative of the Hiroshima Peace Institute remarked that remaining under the U.S. nuclear umbrella “clearly violates the spirit of Article 9.”81 He added that this is also true for the preamble to the Japanese constitution, which states that the Japanese people “have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world.”82 Another representative from the Hiroshima Peace Institute argued that Japan’s place under the U.S. security umbrella might not violate the constitution, since this has helped to demilitarize Japan, which was the “original aim” of the constitution. However, he further pointed out that if we look carefully at the effects of Japan being under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, “it may not ease tension among nations surrounding Japan. If the umbrella cannot ease tension, its nature is unconstitutional.”83 A representative from the Japan Association for a Nonnuclear Government stated that Japan’s position under the U.S. nuclear umbrella “violates Article 9,” since this constitutional clause prohibits the use or threatened use of force.84 Representatives from both Gensuikin and Gensuikyo believe that Japan’s acceptance of the U.S. nuclear umbrella contravenes Article 9.85 Gensuikyo maintains that Tokyo “has abandoned the constitution.” Another major difference between Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations and the central government is whether Tokyo places a higher priority on satisfying Washington or on meeting the objective of nuclear disarmament. Japanese policy makers have indicated that, “both are important” and “not contradictory,” arguing “no,” that the central government does not chiefly want to please Washington.86 However, there is a widespread belief within Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons organizations that Tokyo’s highest priority is, by far, to satisfy Washington. One leading member of Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons movement put it this way, “Tokyo’s relationship with the U.S. is primary. While nuclear disarmament is an issue for Tokyo, it is engaged in a broad effort that must first be more or less sanctioned by Washington.” Following directly from this difference are two others that further demonstrate the divergent perspectives of nuclear disarmament between Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations and the central government. The first relates to Tokyo not formally aligning with the NAC countries. The second is the discrepancy between Tokyo and anti-nuclear weapons organizations on the important matter of how much attention the central government is paying to public opinion in the area of nuclear disarmament.

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Members of Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons organizations feel that the central government missed a great opportunity to join NAC when it extended an invitation to Tokyo during its formative period. Because NAC wanted Tokyo to accept its no-first-use-nuclear-weapons policy and its demand for the absence of a threat to use nuclear weapons, the Japanese government did not join.87 Hidankyo points out that, “since Japan’s safety is dependent on the United States, Tokyo could not throw away the ‘first-use’ policy.”88 Government officials contend that Tokyo “can go along with the NAC countries, since our goal is the same,” which is to create a “world without nuclear weapons,” adding that the central government “supports the NAC when it can support [it].” This, they contend, demonstrates that “there is not an ideological reason behind” Tokyo’s decision whether or not to support NAC, since it examines the “letter of the resolution and determines its position.”89 However, Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations are aware that Tokyo’s support of NAC’s disarmament resolution in the United Nations has been weak. They are also aware that Washington’s position has often influenced Tokyo’s decision on NAC’s disarmament resolution. One representative from a Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organization put it succinctly, stating that NAC “interferes with U.S. strategy.”90 Japanese officials believe that Tokyo’s disarmament polices address the public’s concerns. These officials, therefore, do not think that Tokyo is ignoring public opinion in the area of nuclear disarmament. One official commented that, “Japan’s public has a strong hope for a nuclear-weapon-free world. In forming policy in the area of nuclear disarmament, the government gives due consideration to such a public opinion.”91 A member of the House of Councilors in the New Komeito Party, which is part of the coalition government headed by Prime Minister Koizumi of the Liberal Democratic Party, remarked that there is “no sense of urgency among the Japanese public; Japan does not necessarily need a proactive approach” to nuclear disarmament.92 In contrast, representatives of Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations generally believe that Tokyo is not specifically addressing nuclear disarmament issues in a way that is consistent with public opinion. The TPENW representative indicated that Tokyo is not heeding opinion on nuclear disarmament because it “obeys Washington.”93 Gensuikyo’s representative pointed out that the central government is deceiving the public and that its nuclear disarmament policy is contradictory.94 Some other representatives from Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations stress that since people do not specifically vote on nuclear disarmament issues and because politicians are aware of this, officials have the leeway to design policies that just broadly reflect public interests. Hidankyo representatives

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argued that the public does not place sufficient pressure on political candidates to develop tough nuclear disarmament policies.95 The Peace Depot’s representative argued that despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of Japanese municipalities have adopted nuclear disarmament declarations, support Japan’s Three Nonnuclear Principles and sometimes hold seminars to educate the public on disarmament issues, their affect on national policy is weak.96 A representative from the Hiroshima Peace Institute maintained that, although a large proportion of the Japanese public wants Tokyo to do more in the area of nuclear disarmament, this percentage would decline if this means spoiling Japan’s relationship with the United States. To maintain the delicate balance for those in Japan who want the government to work harder on nuclear disarmament issues but do not want it to spoil the country’s relationship with the United States, Tokyo must interpret public opinion in a way that meets its objectives.97 Perhaps this is why the representative from the Japan Association for a Nonnuclear Government said that “our wish for a nonnuclear [weapons world] and peace is very strong; the Japanese government must do something.”98 Some parts of Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons movement maintain that, because economic issues are of paramount concern to the voting public, nuclear disarmament receives much less serious attention from Japanese politicians than it should. Politicians know that not doing more in the area of nuclear disarmament will not hurt them in elections. Moreover, the Japanese people do not think that nuclear weapons will go away in the immediate future; they are aware that they cannot presently change the minds of American policy makers. Since the Japanese people are mainly concerned with employment opportunities and with improving their everyday living conditions, they vote primarily on economic issues. Thus, the voting public in Japan does not press politicians, who are principally interested in winning elections, to support nuclear disarmament.99 Another major difference between the Japanese government and Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons organizations relates to the Three Nonnuclear Principles. The dominant view in Tokyo is that these principles should not become law. The general feeling held by most Japanese policy makers is that, because the Three Nonnuclear Principles are kokuze (national policy) and represent “an unequivocal commitment of Japan” there is no reason to make them law.100 An official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasized that these principles have the same authority as law, maintaining that, “sometimes it’s harder to change policy than law.”101 But representatives of Japanese anti-nuclear weapons groups have an entirely different view of the Three Nonnuclear Principles. On this issue, there is unanimity within Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations: they all strongly support making the Three Nonnuclear Principles law. Hidankyo representatives pointed

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out that Takako Doi, a leading socialist lawmaker, asked Prime Minister Koizumi in June 2002 about making the Three Nonnuclear Principles law. Koizumi’s response to her was that it is enough that these principles are national policy.102 Representatives from Gensuikyo, Gensuikin, and the Peace Depot all emphasized that Tokyo’s major concern about making the Three Nonnuclear Principles law relates directly to the third principle—the one that specifically deals with prohibiting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan.103 Because the United States retains a neitherconfirm-nor-deny policy on the issue of bringing nuclear weapons into Japanese territory, Tokyo would be pushing Washington too far if it were to make these principles law. Overall, representatives of Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations do not think that Tokyo has done a very good job in promoting nuclear disarmament. When asked to rate Tokyo’s performance on a scale consisting of excellent, very good, good, and poor, most representatives from these organizations indicated that the central government has performed poorly in the area of nuclear disarmament. Only two representatives gave Tokyo a rating of between good and poor. For the first time in 2002, the Peace Depot put together a report card that graded Tokyo’s work on a number of nuclear disarmament activities. Using a grading scale ranging from a score of “A” (excellent) to “E” (complete failure), ten Japanese experts on nuclear disarmament, including university professors, a former mayor of Hiroshima, and civil society representatives, gave Tokyo an average grade of D in 2002. Of the twenty-one grades assigned by these experts, Tokyo received one B, for work to complete the FMCT within five years, and one C, for its efforts to create a group within the U.N. Conference on Disarmament to focus on nuclear disarmament; the rest of the grades were Ds and Es. Evaluations given by these experts included D grades for Tokyo’s efforts in the following areas: promoting the early entry into force of the CTBT; advancing legally binding negative security assurances; establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones; and insufficient work putting excess fissile material under the control of an international institution. Tokyo received E grades for its work on preserving and strengthening the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; ensuring the “principle of irreversibility” that came out of the 2000 NPT Review Conference; advancing general and complete nuclear disarmament; and for promoting an “unequivocal undertaking” by the nuclear weapons states to abolish their nuclear weapons.104 The Peace Depot’s annual report card for the years 2003–2005 showed Tokyo’s average grade remained a D.105 To the question of what steps the Japanese government needs to take to better promote nuclear disarmament, Tokyo and Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons organizations do not always disagree. As noted earlier, members of

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Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons movement see Tokyo as doing a good job in promoting FMCT. Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations also support their government’s annual submission of the nuclear disarmament resolution to the Untied Nations and, like Tokyo, feel strongly about getting all countries to endorse the CTBT. However, Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations want Tokyo to demonstrate more active commitment than it has thus far to the FMCT and to the CTBT. These organizations want Tokyo to place much more pressure on the United States and other countries to ratify the CTBT so that it can come into force. They also want to see Tokyo take more initiative to advance the stalled FMCT process. Tokyo, in other words, must not just proclaim that it is a strong advocate of the NPT regime; it “should be leading the way [by providing] moral leadership.”106 Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations believe that the government’s U.N. draft resolution should not just mention the important role played by civil society groups in promoting disarmament. Tokyo must also continue to engage in open dialogue with them, and most importantly, be willing to accept their suggestions and criticisms, which it has not done. Often members of Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons organizations feel that Tokyo is not really on their side and at times is undercutting their work to stay in compliance with what Washington wants. Tokyo’s reluctance to place direct and sustained pressure on Washington to help move the nuclear disarmament process forward is evident in how it views weapons reductions between the United States and Russia. The Japanese government continues to be a strong advocate of nuclear arms reductions, suggesting that when the United States and Russia, the two countries with the largest nuclear arsenals, cut the number of weapons, it sends a strong message to other nuclear states. Tokyo has also demonstrated its willingness to assist Russia in the disposal of its nuclear weapons and materials.107 However, the Japanese government has not matched its enthusiasm to aid Russia in the disarmament process with an approach that would encourage Washington to conform to international disarmament norms. For Japanese anti-nuclear, civil society organizations, this preferential treatment that Tokyo gives to the United States is self-serving, since the central government has not shown any desire to pull Japan out from under the American nuclear umbrella. Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations generally support the formation of a nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ) in Northeast Asia and would like to see Tokyo take concrete steps to develop it. Some in Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons movement feel that if Tokyo were to get China to agree to a NWFZ in Northeast Asia, then the Japanese government would need to give serious consideration to come out from under the U.S. nuclear

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umbrella. Gensuikyo is unambiguous about its position, affirming that Tokyo does not want to give up the U.S. nuclear shield.108 Although Tokyo supports the development of a NWFZ in Central Asia, as well as one to cover the entire Southern Hemisphere, the Japanese government has not advocated one in Northeast Asia. Consistent with its gradualist approach to nuclear disarmament, Tokyo avers that a NWFZ in Northeast Asia “is premature.”109 Tokyo justifies its support for NWFZs in some areas but not in Northeast Asia by contending, “it is not clear” what the geographical boundary is and that it is “very unrealistic.” Tokyo believes that a NWFZ is not realistic because it is not evident what would happen to a country that violates the rules making up a NWFZ in Northeast Asia.110 The bottom line is that Tokyo believes that a NWFZ in Northeast Asia is not realistic, since the central government must ensure the safety of the Japanese people.111 To become an advocate of a NWFZ in Northeast Asia, Tokyo would, in all likelihood, have to endorse negative security assurances. But the promotion of negative security assurances is not a top priority of the Japanese government.112 Within Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons movement, there is the belief that an important way to develop a NWFZ in Northeast Asia would be to include the nonnuclear weapons states. For this approach to be viable, the nuclear weapons states would have to provide binding assurances to the nonnuclear weapons states that they will not threaten to use or use nuclear weapons against them. Some in Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons movement also believe that Tokyo is reluctant to propose the idea of a NWFZ in Northeast Asia to North Korea, since Pyongyang may link this to economic compensation during future discussions to normalize Japanese-DPRK relations.113 The concept of a NWFZ is not something that would be anathema to Pyongyang. Pyongyang proposed making the Korean Peninsula a NWFZ in the spring of 2002.114 But were Tokyo to advance a NWFZ proposal to Pyongyang, it would have to either get Washington’s approval or declare that Japan no longer desires to be protected by the U.S. nuclear shield. The problem is that Tokyo is unlikely to get this approval from Washington and, to the disappointment of Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons organizations, is not about to come out from under the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

Consequences of Co-Optation Tokyo’s active involvement in nuclear disarmament since the mid-1990s has complicated the task of Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons organizations. On the one hand, the members of these organizations realize that the Japanese

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government’s visible involvement in nuclear disarmament means that they have a common objective with Tokyo. On the other hand, they understand that there are significant differences between their views and Tokyo’s position, which must always take into full consideration Washington’s interests and concerns. While there is much disagreement and aversion existing between Tokyo and Japanese civil society working to promote disarmament, anti-nuclear weapons organizations understand that the central government, in petitioning for the abolition of nuclear weapons, is at least aware of their positions. But through its repeated appeals to the international community to achieve a world free of nuclear arms, Tokyo has been co-opting the activities of Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations. Thus, to varying degrees, members of Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons organizations acknowledge the significance of Tokyo’s willingness to promote global nuclear disarmament. That they often disagree with how Tokyo handles nuclear disarmament issues is not nearly as bad as Tokyo doing nothing at all. An important example of this co-optation process is the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament. At the forefront of the initiative was the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs delegated the responsibilities of the Forum to the Japan Institute for International Affairs, a private organization with which it is closely affiliated, and the then recently established Hiroshima Peace Institute. From August 1998 until July 1999, the Tokyo Forum held four meetings. Prior to each meeting of the Tokyo Forum, Japanese citizens groups met and debated with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.115 But the Tokyo Forum’s 1999 report showed considerably more of the central government’s footprint than that of the Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations. Making this matter worse is that those active in the Japanese anti-nuclear weapons movement did not necessarily share the same view of the report; some saw it as at least offering a little hope and prospect for nuclear disarmament, while others viewed it as far from the best of documents.116 But no matter what members of Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons movement thought about the Tokyo Forum’s final report, they shared one thing in common: the government of Japan had taken the initiative to organize an international nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation dialogue that involved representatives from many countries around the world. Although members of Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons movement recognized that the Forum’s final report could have been better, at the same time Tokyo’s initiative demonstrated to them that they have a common objective with the central government, whose efforts, while not always the best, also reflect their interest in disarmament. Along with some lingering ideological differences existing between civil society organizations, this co-optation process has undermined the

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effectiveness of Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons movement. Because the task of reaching the disarmament objective typically is understood as being the responsibility of government, Tokyo’s initiatives will usually get more attention and be seen as more credible than those of Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons organizations. Tokyo’s new willingness to dialogue with anti-nuclear weapons organizations creates the impression that the government is listening; however, how it acts and reacts to the criticisms and suggestions of civil society remains a continuing source of disagreement. Thus, a major challenge that Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons organizations face is how to acquire the legitimacy needed to compete equally with the central government’s visibility in promoting nuclear disarmament. A unified anti-nuclear weapons movement is an important first step to take; remaining as separate entities minimizes the effectiveness of these organizations. Another step is to develop a coherent strategy to make nuclear disarmament a voting issue for the people of Japan. Short of these steps being taken, control of the Japanese nuclear disarmament issue will remain largely in Tokyo’s hands.

Conclusions The current state of the anti-nuclear weapons movement in Japan is not without problems. Some ideological differences between the organizations that make up this movement remain, especially between Gensuikyo and Gensuikin, which continue to be supported by different political parties in Japan. But ideological differences, as important as they are, do not explain why these organizations have been unable to realize notable and sustained accomplishments that move them closer to the abolition of nuclear weapons. Today, some of Japan’s important anti-nuclear weapons organizations are products of the post–Cold War period. Often having been influenced by international disarmament associations, these new Japanese organizations—the TPENW, the Peace Depot, the Hiroshima Peace Institute and JALANA—are less susceptible to the ideological divisiveness of the past.117 An explicit policy difference between Tokyo and Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations is the government’s insistence that Japan must remain under the American nuclear umbrella. Thus, although Tokyo has been willing to promote nuclear disarmament within the international community, it has done this in a way that will not jeopardize Japan’s security relationship with Washington. In other words, maintaining Japan’s security alliance with the United States remains Tokyo’s primary interest; nuclear

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disarmament can be promoted only so long as it does not antagonize Washington. In the past, ideological differences within the Japanese anti-nuclear weapons movement combined with the threat environment associated with the Cold War deflated the effectiveness of Japan’s disarmament movement. As a result, the widespread Japanese sentiment opposing the existence of nuclear weapons was never sufficiently harnessed to the point where the disarmament movement could achieve its objective of a world without nuclear arms. Still fragmented today, the Japanese anti-nuclear weapons movement must also now confront a co-optation process through which Tokyo preempts some of the initiatives of civil society organizations. Adding to the problems currently faced by Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations is the easy accessibility of Tokyo to international fora where nuclear disarmament issues receive attention. Very much associated with the co-optation process is that Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations have not been able to develop a common strategy that will make nuclear disarmament a voting issue. In the much of the public’s eyes, since Tokyo has addressed the need for nuclear disarmament in international discussions, there is no urgency for this to be a voting issue, unlike economic and employment problems. A unified anti-nuclear weapons movement determined to inform the public about nuclear disarmament issues and stressing the importance of making government officials fully accountable would be hard for Tokyo to ignore indefinitely.

Chapter 5 Japanese Security Policy and the New Agenda Coalition

This chapter analyzes the tepid association between Japan and the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), which when formed in the late 1990s consisted of eight nations. Both Japan and NAC have been working to encourage nuclear disarmament in the international community. However, unlike Japan, NAC is an organized response to what its sees as the failure of the nuclear weapons states to move in the direction of nuclear disarmament. Japanese security policy has been intimately linked to U.S. military objectives for over fifty years. Because Japan remains protected by America’s nuclear shield, its war-renouncing constitution and policy posture that rejects the existence of nuclear weapons have created visible problems in its recent international efforts calling for complete nuclear disarmament. Although Japan and NAC have the common goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons, they pursue this objective separately and differently. This chapter demonstrates that Japan’s continuing security alliance with the United States has kept it from moving closer to the NAC, while at times causing its nuclear disarmament policy to retrogress. The horrid experiences stemming from the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have long contributed to both the government and the people of Japan desiring the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. But for Tokyo, this desire has been overshadowed by it commitment to a comprehensive security alliance with the United States that has its origins in the early postwar years. To argue that Japan should maintain the bilateral security alliance but abandon its reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, as some have done,1 does not sufficiently increase Tokyo’s credibility in seeking the elimination of all nuclear weapons. The continuation

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of the security alliance with the United States would keep in place a de facto nuclear deterrent for Japan. Arguments that maintain that Washington should support Tokyo’s efforts to promote independent nuclear disarmament initiatives while the current bilateral security arrangements remain in place either misconstrue or misrepresent U.S. interests and intentions. By exaggerating the fear factor in Northeast Asia, most notably that associated with North Korea and China,2 and by insisting on the necessity of Japan being protected by the U.S. nuclear shield, these arguments justify current Japanese policies and give political fodder to Washington’s indifferent position toward the nuclear disarmament regime. By assuming that Japan does not possess nuclear weapons simply because it remains protected by the U.S. nuclear shield, some of these arguments completely ignore the significance of the especially strong anti-nuclear sentiment that exists in Japan.3 One argument based on the preceding assumption is that if Washington does not want Tokyo to develop nuclear weapons, it must continue to provide Japan with a nuclear deterrent.4 A more extreme argument based on this assumption is that Japan should come out from under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and develop its own nuclear deterrent.5 While conservative pressure is clearly mounting in Japan, it is not a foregone conclusion that the absence of the U.S. nuclear umbrella would immediately cause the development of Japanese nuclear weapons. However reluctantly, Tokyo still holds the official position today that, because Japan is the only country to have experienced the devastation caused by atomic warfare and because Japanese anti-nuclear sentiment is very strong, it is “totally unthinkable for Japan to acquire nuclear weapons.”6 But despite Tokyo’s forthright acknowledgment that Japan will never possess or develop nuclear weapons, since it realizes that doing so would constitute a complete disregard of public sentiment and simultaneously destabilize East Asia, it has not been accommodating to NAC.

A Profile of the New Agenda Coalition NAC was created in June 1998, just a few weeks after nuclear testing by India and Pakistan in May. At its inception, NAC consisted of eight member countries: Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden, and Slovenia. Representatives from these countries decided that the nuclear weapons states had not taken the necessary steps to fulfill their obligations set out in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), specifically Article VI that requires states to move in earnest toward the elimination of

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nuclear weapons. NAC’s formation and the simultaneous appearance of its joint declaration entitled Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda made evident the growing concern of its eight members, which was that the nuclear threat was far too real to continue to disregard. Making the international security environment extremely perilous for NAC was that the five declared nuclear powers, which “have found new justifications where none exists for the indefinite extension of their nuclear weapons,” in addition to nuclear-capable Israel, had now been joined by India and Pakistan.7 Although NAC formally appeared in the spring of 1998, the work of some its members, but especially efforts in Ireland, had begun prior to this time.8 Particularly instrumental in this early work was David Andrews, Ireland’s foreign minister. Besides the work in Ireland, officials in Sweden, New Zealand, and South Africa had become concerned with the fact that the nuclear powers had ignored international demands to eliminate nuclear weapons. Together, these officials reasoned that the end of the Cold War had provided the opportunity for the nuclear weapons states—the United States, Great Britain, Russia, China, and France—to move the disarmament process forward, but that they had failed to do this. NAC’s June 1998 joint declaration made unambiguous its members’ disillusionment with the lack of progress that had occurred in the area of nuclear disarmament. It stressed a major point made in the 1996 report published by the Canberra Commission, an initiative of the Australian government whose seventeen well-known commissioners originated from twelve nations, including those of the five nuclear powers.9 Referring to the Canberra Commission’s report,10 the NAC declaration stated that it is highly implausible that the existence of a very large number of nuclear weapons can be indefinitely retained without ever being employed and that only the total elimination of these weapons ensures their nonuse. The NAC declaration essentially represented a challenge to the nuclear powers. It stated that, “We can no longer remain complacent at the reluctance of the nuclear-weapons states and the three nuclear-weapons-capable states to take that fundamental and requisite step, namely, a clear commitment to the speedy, final and total elimination of their nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability and we urge them to take that step now.”11 Pointing out that the nuclear powers had ignored international norms by not meeting their commitments to the NPT, the NAC declaration also reminded them of the unanimous 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which stated that they had an obligation to work in good faith toward nuclear disarmament. A few months later, NAC submitted a draft resolution to the U.N. General Assembly’s First Committee on Disarmament and International

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Security. The submission of the draft resolution created immediate apprehension among the nuclear powers, causing some of them to voice their disapproval to the committee. The French representative emphasized that the draft had flaws, one of which was that it was unrealistic. The British representative argued that the draft resolution failed to address his country’s concerns, stressed that Great Britain wanted to maintain its nuclear deterrent, and indicated that he would not support the resolution.12 Although not supporting the NAC resolution, the U.S. representative stressed that he believed that it was not necessary “to reiterate the commitment of the United States to nuclear disarmament.”13 Like Great Britain and France, the United States opposed the NAC resolution because it threatened the policy of nuclear deterrence.14 The representative from Brazil (one of the members of NAC) pointed out that the unsympathetic reaction to the draft resolution challenged logic and the opinion rendered by the World Court.15 Just before the voting took place in the First Committee, Slovenia announced that it no longer wanted to be a cosponsor of the draft resolution and decided to register an abstention.16 The General Assembly overwhelmingly passed the NAC resolution by a vote of 114 to 18, with 38 abstentions. Except for China, which abstained from voting, all of the nuclear powers, including Israel, India, and Pakistan voted against the resolution.17 Because of strong pressure from Washington, Slovenia decided to pull out of NAC.18 This left NAC with seven members, the same number that it has today.

Tokyo’s Early Reaction to NAC Despite its public appeals for the abolition of nuclear weapons, Tokyo declined an invitation for Japan to become a member of NAC. Tokyo also abstained from voting on NAC’s 1998 U.N. resolution. Because Washington opposed the NAC resolution, Tokyo reasoned at the time that it would be unwise to support it. But Tokyo could not forthrightly oppose the NAC resolution either, even though it has typically followed Washington in matters dealing with international security. Two important things then made it very difficult for Tokyo to oppose the initial NAC resolution: Article 9, the constitutional clause that forever renounces war, and very strong public support in Japan for the elimination of all nuclear weapons. On October 23, 1998, Tokyo presented the draft resolution Nuclear Disarmament with a View to the Ultimate Elimination of Nuclear Weapons to the U.N. General Assembly, making this the fifth consecutive time it had submitted such a document to this body. Four days later, Tokyo announced

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that the draft resolution it had submitted was a “road map of efforts to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons—it lays out a set of actions which the international community should follow toward the objective of the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.”19 Just a few months before, in early July, Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi publicly commended Great Britain for its decision to decrease the number of nuclear weapons on its Trident submarines, concluding his remarks with the expectation that other nuclear powers would follow in making similar judgments.20 Shortly after becoming prime minister at the end of July, Obuchi made a statement to the U.N. General Assembly in September 1998. The first topic Prime Minister Obuchi addressed was arms control and nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. Maintaining that the “further advancement of nuclear disarmament by nuclear weapons states is more important than ever,” Obuchi used much of the early part of his address as a primer for the draft resolution that Japan would submit to the General Assembly in October.21 While the NAC and the Japanese resolutions were similar, there were some discernible differences.22 What was similar about the Japanese and the NAC resolutions was that they both attempted to sensitize the international community to the continuing problems posed by the existence of nuclear weapons. Both resolutions fully supported the abolition of all nuclear weapons, both advocated the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and both wanted to see the START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) process move forward and completed. One major difference between the two resolutions was that the NAC document stressed the need for urgency in the abolition of nuclear weapons; for Tokyo, this was an ultimate objective. Another big difference was that the NAC resolution, like its 1998 joint declaration, emphasized the 1996 unanimous opinion made in The Hague by the International Court of Justice. Not suggested in Tokyo’s resolution, but key to NAC’s, was that it called on the nuclear weapons states “to demonstrate an unequivocal commitment” to the expeditious elimination of nuclear weapons. When introducing Tokyo’s 1998 draft resolution to the General Assembly, Japanese representative Akira Hayashi stressed that it was an opportune time to proceed with nuclear disarmament. He also pointed out that Tokyo was cognizant of the different positions on nuclear disarmament and that the resolution presented by Japan was intended to resolve the differences.23 What some in Japan were calling for was a tough disarmament plan worked out by the Japanese government. Although Tokyo had talked at length about Japan’s Three Nonnuclear Principles and had stressed the importance of relying on diplomacy to resolve international problems, it had not formulated a nuclear disarmament plan that could be put into practice with the assurance that the United States and Russia will actually reduce

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their arsenals.24 Tokyo’s 1998 resolution was more of an appeasement to the nuclear powers, especially the United States, than an attempt to resolve the differences between the nuclear powers and the many supporters of the NAC resolution. Although India, Pakistan, and Israel abstained from voting on Japan’s 1998 disarmament resolution, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China supported it, as did all of the members of NAC. The assertion by Tokyo that its intention was to mediate problems between factions that hold divergent views on nuclear disarmament was not without bias. Tokyo did not want to alienate the nuclear powers, especially the United States. Not only did Tokyo understand that by pushing Washington too hard on nuclear disarmament it could jeopardize Japan’s place under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, but there was also the fact that since the 1991 Gulf War, Tokyo had been seeking to expand Japanese credibility in the area of international security. Therefore, pushing the nuclear powers too hard would undermine the type of “normal state” credibility that Japan had been pursuing in recent years. Asked why he did not support the 1998 NAC resolution, Japan’s Hayashi responded that it “went just a little too far and contained some elements that are a little bit premature.”25

The Aftermath Because the people of Japan have retained a strong anti-nuclear weapons sentiment, Tokyo had to explain to the Japanese public why it did not support NAC. Tokyo’s explanation came as a shock to many Japanese. An official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealed that Tokyo opposed some of the language employed by NAC, specifically the acceptance by the nuclear powers of legal commitments to not be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten to use them on nonnuclear states.26 Tokyo’s position was that such legal commitments would put the nation’s security at risk, since a North Korean attack on Japan employing either chemical or biological weapons would prevent the United States from using a nuclear strike.27 Although this may be the reason Tokyo used to not join NAC, it does not explain why it did not support its 1998 U.N. resolution. Language dealing with legally binding restrictions on the no-first use of nuclear weapons and prohibitions on using or threatening to use nuclear weapons on nonnuclear states does appear in NAC’s June 1998 declaration. While NAC’s draft resolution presented to the U.N. General Assembly in October 1998 did call for legal restrictions to protect nonnuclear states from the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons, it did not use this kind of language with

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regard to the no-first use of nuclear weapons. Rather, the draft resolution uses language that “urges” the nuclear powers to study “interim measures,” which would include their not being the first to employ nuclear weapons.28 The revised resolution passed by the U.N General Assembly in early December completely omitted language relating to the no-first use of nuclear weapons, though it did seek to protect nonnuclear states from the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear powers.29 In October 1999, New Zealand presented NAC’s second draft resolution to the U.N. General Assembly’s First Committee on Disarmament and International Security. Noteworthy is that the representative from New Zealand stated that the existence of nuclear weapons had been “re-rationalized” in that now they were being justified for use against countries that employ biological or chemical warfare.30 The First Committee passed the 1999 NAC resolution. Except for China, which again abstained, all of the nuclear weapons states, including India, Pakistan, and Israel opposed the resolution. As it had done in 1998, Japan abstained from voting on NAC’s 1999 resolution.31 Echoing a theme that had emerged the previous year, the U.S. representative stated during committee discussions on the 1999 NAC resolution that there was no need for a new nuclear disarmament agenda, since a multilateral strategy was already in place. He indicated that, although an incremental approach may be frustrating, the United States could not support an expeditious process to eliminate nuclear weapons. At the same time, the Japanese representative pointed out that his country, like NAC, desired the complete abolition of nuclear weapons. But while the Japanese government wanted to abolish all nuclear weapons, Tokyo believed that the way to do this was gradually, through an incremental process that was both substantive and realistic. He argued that taking a confrontational approach was not a wise choice and that, even though NAC incorporated some positive changes in its new resolution, its incredulity with respect to the intentions of the nuclear weapons states was still discernible.32 Although taking a nonconfrontational approach, Japan’s 1999 disarmament resolution was unable to garner the same enthusiasm from the major nuclear weapons states that it had in the previous year. In 1999, France, China, and Russia abstained from voting on Japan’s resolution. Explaining his reasons for abstention, the Chinese representative stressed that while China supports nuclear disarmament, Tokyo’s resolution did not specifically place most of the responsibility for disarmament on the United States and Russia, the two nations with the largest nuclear arsenals. He further stressed that the resolution did not contain a no-first use stipulation,33 and reflecting the position held by some in the international community who feared a new arms race, indicated that it did not attempt to prevent the undermining of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty or restrict missile

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defense development. Similarly, the Russian representative stated that his country could not support Japan’s 1999 disarmament resolution, since it did not specifically stress the need to preserve the ABM Treaty.34 In August 1998, the Japanese government initiated work on the Tokyo Forum, a cooperative international effort intended to increase global awareness on important issues pertaining to nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. The forum’s final report was rich in analysis and contained a number of important points, such as encouraging the United States and Russia to develop a closer working relationship to help decrease their nuclear weapons, and a call for systematic reductions of nuclear weapons. Partly because of public pressure in Japan, the report also gave approbation to NAC, stating that the “Tokyo Forum notes with appreciation [its] recent efforts.” But the report did attract some criticism. Apart from the outrage that the report caused in Pyongyang,35 it also troubled China and India. Because of his disagreement with the final report, the Indian representative refused to take part in the last meeting of the Tokyo Forum.36 Although China was represented throughout the forum, it opposed a number of major points that appeared in the final report, one of which related to missile defense.37 Indeed, another reason China abstained from voting on Japan’s 1999 disarmament resolution was because Beijing could not fully endorse the report of the Tokyo Forum. Even before the appearance of the Tokyo Forum’s final report, the Japanese government had to reconcile with the public its acceptance of subcritical nuclear testing, only performed then by the United States and Russia, as well as the lack of specificity in its plan for nuclear disarmament. At a conference held in Hiroshima at the end of 1998, an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to a question on Tokyo’s tolerance of subcritical nuclear testing by stating that the purpose of this procedure is to determine the efficiency and reliability of these weapons, and that it is not prohibited by the CTBT. Hibakusha (surviving victims of the atomic bombs) questioned the ministry official about the use of the word “ultimate” in Tokyo’s U.N. resolution on the elimination of nuclear weapons, arguing that it could easily be interpreted as “eternal.” He answered by stating that, like the citizens of Japan, Tokyo wants to see the immediate abolition of all nuclear weapons and is currently doing its utmost in the area of disarmament; however, this is something that the nuclear powers are unwilling to agree to now.38

Into the Twenty-First Century Although Tokyo did not support the 1999 resolution introduced by NAC to the General Assembly, it did vote in favor of its 2000 nuclear disarmament

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resolution. But the United States also supported NAC’s 2000 resolution, as did the United Kingdom and China, while France and Russia moved from casting no votes in 1999 to abstentions. NAC’s 2000 resolution received noticeably more support than it had in the previous two years: 146 states voting yes, 3 voting no (India, Israel, and Pakistan), and 8 abstentions. As it had done before, France argued that the NAC resolution still contained problems. Russia maintained that the NAC resolution sent the wrong message, since it suggested that only sections of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, rather than all of it, are significant.39 Japan’s 2000 U.N. resolution, now bearing the title A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, also received very strong support from the international community (144 yes votes), as it had in the past. India was the only country to vote against Japan’s 2000 resolution; there were, however, twelve abstentions. Notable among the abstentions were Russia and China. The Russian representative to the U.N.’s First Committee was unhappy with the way Japan selectively presented the results of the 2000 NPT Review Conference’s final statement in the resolution. Providing the reasons for China’s abstention, its representative once more referred to the Tokyo Forum, which Beijing did not completely support, and again stressed that Japan’s resolution did not place most of the responsibility for disarmament on the shoulders of the countries with the largest number of nuclear weapons. He also indicated that the resolution did not endorse an end to the deterrence paradigm and disagreed with the designation of prior to 2005 for concluding discussions on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, stating that this was not consistent with the NPT text.40 For the most part, however, 2000 was a year when the international community demonstrated increased interest in nuclear disarmament, as evidenced especially by the increased support for the NAC resolution in the fall of that year. Why then did Tokyo still refuse to join NAC? The short answer to this question is that, because of NAC’s initiatives, the 2000 NPT Review Conference had placed an unprecedented amount of pressure on the major nuclear powers to show support for nuclear disarmament. In an attempt to help relieve this pressure, Tokyo wanted to serve as a liaison between NAC and the nuclear powers. Thus, had Tokyo joined NAC, it would have lost some credibility, especially in Washington’s eyes, and put even more pressure on the United States to take substantive steps on the path to nuclear disarmament. Held in New York City during the spring, the 2000 NPT Review Conference achieved some important results, largely because of NAC. In anticipation of its involvement in the upcoming conference, NAC presented its disarmament resolution in May 1999, along with a letter, to the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference.41 On the first day

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of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, NAC submitted a document identifying the major issues that it believed needed attention to facilitate discernible progress toward the realization of Article VI in the NPT. Evoking the International Court of Justice’s 1996 unanimous advisory opinion, NAC’s document stressed its concern about the inertia in disarmament discussions, and called for an “unequivocal undertaking” on the part of the five major nuclear powers to abolish their nuclear weapons by way of “an accelerated process of negotiations.”42 These demands were problematic for the nuclear powers; because they disturbed Washington, they created a serious problem for Tokyo. Actually, Tokyo was aware that it would have a very difficult part to play at the review conference even before it began. Meeting with members of Japanese civil society shortly before the review conference, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ disarmament official made evident Tokyo’s position. To the disappointment of the citizens, the official indicated that at the upcoming review conference, “All Japan can call for is a limited disarmament that will not damage the U.S. nuclear deterrence policy necessary to protect Japan. I would like you to understand the difficulty of striking a balance between the nation’s security policy and the idealism of nuclear disarmament.” Indicating that Japan needs to take a gradual approach to the elimination of nuclear weapons, the official stated that, “We need the ‘nuclear umbrella’ for a while as it is still rainy in this unpredictable situation. We are just waiting for fine weather which permits us to throw away the umbrella.”43 During the three-week-long review conference Tokyo’s contradictory position became clear: that it called for nuclear disarmament but that it wanted to remain protected by America’s nuclear shield and maintain the fifty-year old security alliance with the United States. Facing increasing pressure as the conference wore on, the nuclear powers wanted the final document to state the “ultimate goal” of eliminating their nuclear weapons. Rejecting the ambiguity associated with the use of the word “ultimate,” NAC instead insisted on an “unequivocal undertaking” by the nuclear powers to abolish their weapons. At the review conference Tokyo, therefore, tried to deal with both the concerns of NAC and those of the United States and the other nuclear powers. Indicating Tokyo’s taibei hairyo (consideration for relations with the United States) position, Japan’s chief disarmament diplomat, Seiichiro Noboru, stressed that, “We should consider the reality of the Japan-U.S. alliance when studying drastic proposals or comments.” That an observable rift had developed between the nuclear powers and NAC during the conference was evident; but it was also apparent that Tokyo’s attempt at playing the role of a mediator would fall short when Noboru emphasized that, “It is no use to appeal only to the idealism” of eliminating nuclear weapons. “Japan should take a gradual and realistic approach.”44

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In the end, even though the 2000 NPT Review Conference did not succeed in producing a timetable for nuclear disarmament, which most especially the United States and Russia did not want, it was able to push the nuclear powers to express their obligation to nuclear disarmament.45 The final document of the NPT 2000 Review Conference did not include wording calling for the expeditious abolition of nuclear weapons. However, because of NAC’s insistence, the final document did include a passage stating that the nuclear powers make an “unequivocal undertaking” to the complete abolition of their weapons. It also included a number of other “practical steps”—words that appear in NAC’s 1998 U.N resolution—to nuclear disarmament, such as the “principle of irreversibility,” the early completion of the START process and, especially pleasing to Tokyo, a continuation of the moratorium on nuclear testing and the early implementation of the CTBT.46 Thus, despite some lingering skepticism about the genuineness of the commitment made by the nuclear powers to disarmament, the results of the 2000 NPT Review Conference were reasonably positive.47 The major nuclear powers had acknowledged the significance of the 1996 opinion of the World Court and had made an official commitment to nuclear disarmament. Gratifying to NAC was that Tokyo incorporated some key elements of the NPT Review Conference’s final document into its 2000 resolution that it presented to the U.N. General Assembly in the fall of that year. For example, it addressed the issue of the “unequivocal undertaking,” as well as the “principle of irreversibility.” Equally gratifying to NAC was that Tokyo convincingly demonstrated its very strong advocacy of the CTBT in its 2000 resolution. Tokyo’s 2000 U.N. resolution spoke of maintaining the ban on nuclear testing until the accord entered into force. Moreover, for the first time, Tokyo’s 2000 disarmament resolution specified the goal of implementing the CTBT prior to 2003. As they had done in the past, NAC members supported Tokyo’s 2000 U.N. resolution.

A Wedge in the Tokyo-NAC Relationship Although Tokyo was generally pleased with the results of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, Washington was largely reticent. The Clinton administration had nothing significant to say about the outcomes of the review conference. Moreover, leading presidential candidates Gore and Bush spent their time discussing other things.48 While campaigning for the presidency, candidate Bush indicated his aversion to the CTBT. As shown in chapter 2, President Bush and his administration continued to demonstrate their

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aversion to the CTBT after coming into power, as well as their dislike of the ABM Treaty, which after the U.S. withdrawal from the accord, gave the green light to missile defense. For disarmament advocates, the ABM Treaty is indispensable to the process of eliminating nuclear weapons. For example, the Canberra Commission’s report emphasizes that to abolish nuclear weapons it is essential to maintain and completely protect the ABM Treaty.49 That Washington failed to demonstrate enthusiasm for the outcomes of the 2000 NPT Review Conference was one thing. That it was manifestly undermining the “principle of irreversibility” in the eyes of many was quite another matter. In 2000, during the First Committee’s discussions on a draft resolution pertaining to the preservation of the ABM Treaty, the U.S. representative stressed that the resolution, which Washington opposed, was an attempt to get the General Assembly involved in a treaty between the United States and Russia, when instead the differences should be settled through bilateral discussions.50 Although Japan abstained from voting on this resolution, Tokyo’s 2000 disarmament resolution included language calling for “preserving and strengthening the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.” Again bearing the title A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Tokyo submitted its 2001 draft resolution to the United Nations in mid-October and the General Assembly’s First Committee approved it within three weeks.51 As explained in chapter 2, Tokyo’s 2001 resolution left out language used in the 2000 document relating both to the need to preserve and strengthen the ABM Treaty and that which called for the CTBT to come into force prior to 2003.52 Having argued in the past for an incremental and gradual path to nuclear disarmament, Tokyo could offer little in the way of a reasonable explanation to justify its retrogression. Tokyo’s willingness to disregard its gradual approach to the elimination of nuclear weapons to please Washington notwithstanding, the United States voted against Japan’s 2001 disarmament resolution. The U.S. representative indicated that he could not support the Japanese resolution, since the language used in the document on the CTBT did not meet with Washington’s approval.53 Because this was the first time that the United States had voted against a Japanese disarmament resolution since the initial one was submitted in 1994,54 this was a major setback for Tokyo, albeit one that was not completely unexpected. Demonstrating its commitment to keeping Japan linked to U.S. security interests and objectives, which in recent years have often run contrary to those of the Japanese public,55 the Koizumi government had nothing substantive to say about Washington’s failure to endorse its 2001 disarmament resolution. Even before the voting took place in the U.N.’s First Committee, NAC reacted to its failure to endorse Japan’s 2001 disarmament resolution.

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Speaking for NAC, the South African representative pointed to a serious shortcoming in Tokyo’s 2001 draft resolution, serious because it specifically pertained to the “unequivocal undertaking” accepted by the participants at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. In its 2000 resolution, Tokyo welcomed the fact that the review conference’s final document had embraced the issue that the nuclear powers had acknowledged the “unequivocal undertaking” to eliminate their nuclear weapons. What disturbed NAC was that Tokyo’s 2001 resolution called for an “unequivocal undertaking,” when in fact one had already be “given.” This, argued the South African representative, “misappropriated” the time sequence of the “unequivocal undertaking.” Had Tokyo dealt with this critical issue the same way that it had in 2000, the South African representative stressed, NAC could have supported the Japanese resolution. Since Tokyo did not do this, all seven NAC members abstained from voting on Japan’s 2001 draft resolution.56 Both Tokyo and NAC continued to maintain their policy differences. In 2003, Japan abstained from voting on two draft resolutions that NAC bought before the U.N.’s First Committee, as it had done in 2002.57 In addition to its traditional “new agenda” resolution, NAC once again sponsored a draft resolution that sought to reduce and eradicate nonstrategic nuclear weapons in ways that would be transparent and verifiable. Specifically, NAC aimed this resolution at the portable, nonstrategic nuclear weapons possessed by the United States and Russia, which both argued that the NAC resolution did not acknowledge the progress that had been made to reduce nuclear weapons. Tokyo’s abstention on this resolution suggested its desire to not support a disarmament initiative that Washington would view as confrontational. For its part, NAC remained convinced that Tokyo’s 2003 disarmament resolution was not leading the world on the correct path to abolish nuclear weapons. Arguing that Tokyo’s 2003 draft still did not properly characterize the unequivocal commitment that the nuclear weapons states had made to disarmament at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the members of NAC again decided to abstain from voting on Japan’s resolution.58 Tokyo and NAC also had fundamentally different reactions to the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty between the United States and Russia. Known colloquially as the Moscow Treaty, Tokyo viewed the accord as a negotiated step in the direction of nuclear disarmament.59 Because the Japanese government perceives the Moscow Treaty to be incremental and nonconfrontational, it is consistent with Tokyo’s nuclear disarmament paradigm. Commenting both at the time of the signing of the treaty in May 2002 and when it went into force in June 2003, Tokyo indicated that it anticipated the accord “will promote international movement toward arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation.”60 In contrast, NAC reacted to the Moscow Treaty by indicating that, although it is important in helping

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to define a new relationship between Moscow and Washington, the accord left unanswered two important questions. First, NAC maintained that because the United States and Russia would each retain thousands of nuclear weapons, it questioned whether the environment created by the Cold War had really ended. Second, NAC questioned whether the Moscow Treaty had added momentum to nuclear disarmament, stressing that the accord is not verifiable and does not deal with nuclear weapons that are not in operation. Showing its dissatisfaction with the Moscow Treaty in April 2003, NAC contended that, “Reductions in the numbers of deployed strategic nuclear warheads are not a substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons.”61 Nearly a year and a half later before the U.N. General Assembly’s First Committee the representative from Sweden, speaking for NAC, reemphasized that the Moscow Treaty is not verifiable and added that the accord is not transparent and does not require that Russia and the United States destroy their nuclear weapons. The Moscow Treaty, argued the Swedish representative, “is by no account far-reaching enough.”62 But Tokyo, remaining optimistic about the Moscow Treaty, continued to maintain that the accord “should serve as a step for further nuclear disarmament.”63 Still other serious differences between Tokyo and NAC showed up in their reactions to the U.S. plans to study the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons or to possibly use nuclear arms in a preemptive strike on a nation without them. Tokyo’s determination to retain the U.S. nuclear deterrent left it uneasy about parts of these plans; however, its apprehension certainly was not sufficient to engender any serious criticism of Washington. Aware that showing strong public disapproval of Washington’s plans could jeopardize Japan’s place under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, Tokyo decided to live with its apprehension rather than oppugn American policy. However, Tokyo’s uneasiness did not extend to everything that Washington suggested, since in Japan proposals had been made that the Japanese government should also consider the use of a preemptive (though nonnuclear) attack if the situation called for it. In contrast, NAC had vocalized its strong opposition to any plans to study the development of new nuclear weapons and to nuclear arms being used in a preemptive strike, or in any way. NAC argued that, “it is critical that any such plans be laid aside immediately.”64 In 2004, NAC broadened its major reason for not supporting Tokyo’s U.N disarmament resolution. Speaking for NAC, the Swedish representative indicated that it was important for states to meet all of the obligations they made at both the 1995 and the 2000 NPT Review Conferences. Mainly because Japan’s 2004 draft resolution did not meet these expectations for NAC, its members again choose to register abstentions.65

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Recognizing that the international environment looked “rather bleak” for nuclear disarmament and understanding the importance of increasing the support for its resolution prior to the 2005 NPT Review Conference, NAC drafted its traditional document on the abolition of nuclear weapons to attract as many nations as possible in 2004. Having this as its objective, NAC significantly trimmed down its 2004 draft resolution.66 Bearing the subtitle “accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments,”67 NAC’s noticeably shortened draft resolution attracted 14 more favorable votes than it did in 2003. Although they had abstained in 2003, Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, Lithuania, and Luxembourg, despite strong pressure from Washington, supported the NAC resolution in 2004. South Korea, which had also abstained in 2003, supported NAC’s 2004 resolution. Perhaps the biggest surprise was Tokyo, which voted in favor of NAC’s 2004 resolution. Tokyo’s decision to support the NAC resolution was not because it found no fault with it. Indeed, the Japanese delegate pointed out that even though there was improvement in the NAC resolution from the previous year, he did not concur with all of it.68 Tokyo’s decision to endorse NAC’s 2004 resolution was sudden and, as the Japanese representative indicated, intended to create a “favorable atmosphere for nuclear disarmament.”69 But Tokyo’s claim that it wanted to help create a propitious environment for nuclear disarmament was not entirely accurate. For example, Tokyo continued to abstain from a disarmament resolution supported by most of the members of the Nonaligned Movement. Explaining Japan’s abstention, the Japanese delegate maintained that Tokyo preferred a course that takes realistic and progressive steps toward the abolition of nuclear weapons and that involves the cooperation of the nuclear powers.70 Tokyo could have easily abstained from NAC’s 2004 resolution, especially since, given its predilection for an incremental approach, the draft called on states to “accelerate the implementation of the practical steps” to nuclear disarmament that came out of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. However, abstaining from voting on the NAC resolution at this time would have been a difficult sell at home. Tokyo could have used little else to rationalize an abstention and since Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations have never accepted their government’s reasons for not supporting NAC in the past, they would have been especially vocal in light of the upcoming 2005 NPT Review Conference. Overlapping with this pressure at home was that had Tokyo abstained from voting on NAC’s 2004 it would have risked marginalizing its role at the 2005 NPT Review Conference. At the time of the vote on the NAC resolution, late October 2004, Tokyo had already indicated its determination “to actively contribute to the 2005 Review Process.”71 Had Tokyo not supported NAC’s 2004 resolution it

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would have had little chance of becoming meaningfully involved in nuclear disarmament initiatives at the 2005 NPT Review Conference and certainly placed in jeopardy its intentions of having a leading role there. NAC’s 2004 resolution was not only succinct but it focused directly on issues that made it difficult for states sensitive to nuclear disarmament, such as Japan, to ignore. NAC’s resolution called on states to meet all of their NPT commitments, to bring the CTBT into force at an early date, and not to develop new kinds of nuclear weapons. It also emphasized the need for the Conference on Disarmament to resume work to bring about an internationally verifiable accord prohibiting the production of fissile material, that is, the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), and called on the nuclear weapons states to subject fissile material no longer needed for military objectives to verification. Matching Tokyo’s strong endorsement of the FMCT was Washington’s unmitigated opposition, claiming as it has for the CTBT, that the accord is not verifiable.72 Noting the failure of both the 2005 NPT Review Conference and the 2005 World Summit Outcome to make any headway, Tokyo stressed in October that it is important that governments work to advance nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. To demonstrate this Tokyo again supported NAC’s 2005 resolution calling for the acceleration of nations’ commitments to nuclear disarmament, despite its acknowledgment that “Japan does not necessarily agree to all the points contained in the resolution.” At the same time, Tokyo also welcomed NAC’s support of Japan’s 2005 resolution, something NAC had not done since 2000. NAC indicated that the sixtieth anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had created a need to bring more unity to the efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons, especially since the 2005 NPT Review Conference and the World Summit Outcome did not advance the disarmament agenda. Similar to what Tokyo had done, NAC stressed that it would support Japan’s 2005 resolution, even though the document did not strongly underscore the importance of the practical steps to disarmament and the nuclear powers’ commitment to the “unequivocal undertaking” that came out of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.73

Conclusions Because NAC believes that the nuclear weapons states have not been living up to their responsibilities mandated by the NPT, it has decided to pressure them to commit to a nuclear disarmament process. This pressure achieved some amount of success at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, since the

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nuclear weapons states eventually came to accept NAC’s imperative of the need to move with commitment toward nuclear disarmament. However, at the 2005 NPT Review Conference, NAC was unable to maintain the momentum toward disarmament it had previously created. While Japanese interest in nuclear disarmament dates to many decades, Tokyo has, especially since the mid-1990s, been working to promote an international process leading to the abolition of all nuclear weapons. But Tokyo has not satisfied the expectations of organized civil society in Japan. Nor has it been able to fulfill the desire of most of the Japanese public that wants to see the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Looking separately at NAC’s and Tokyo’s nuclear disarmament statements and objectives has often led observers to the conclusion that they are naturally compatible. Because NAC and Tokyo are working to abolish nuclear weapons, they are sensitive to the issue that the disarmament objectives of the NPT remain unfulfilled; moreover, they both endorse the early implementation of the CTBT. But even though Tokyo supports much of NAC’s agenda, it has been uncomfortable with NAC’s posture that challenges the nuclear powers to eliminate their nuclear weapons in an expeditious manner. Explaining Tokyo’s reluctance to fully endorse and join NAC is the Japanese involvement in a security alliance with the United States for more than a half-century and the protection afforded to Japan by the American nuclear shield. Since the late 1990s, Washington and Tokyo have strengthened this security alliance, and have reaffirmed the provision that Japan remains under the U.S. nuclear umbrella.74 Despite professed interest in abolishing nuclear weapons, disarmament has been steadily taking the back seat to Tokyo’s ambition to become a “normal country,” poised to help Washington “win the peace” rather than leading the way to promote it. Tokyo insists that Japan still needs to rely on the nuclear deterrence provided by the United States. Tokyo maintains that it can promote the abolition of nuclear weapons while Japan remains under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Different from NAC, Tokyo has continued to promulgate the importance of following an incremental and conciliatory course toward nuclear disarmament. However, this approach has recently suffered serious setbacks as Washington has moved away from the ABM Treaty, abandoned the CTBT, and has no interest in the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

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Chapter 6 The International Dimensions of Japan’s Anti-Nuclear Weapons Policies: Issues in Disarmament and Nonproliferation

Tokyo’s intention to pursue the abolition of nuclear weapons at the end of the Cold War notwithstanding, it has fallen far short of the expectations of Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations and other disarmament advocates. Tokyo’s decision in the second half of the 1990s to deepen its security alliance with the United States quickly became a major impediment standing in its path to abolish nuclear weapons. Although Tokyo has understood that nuclear nonproliferation is integral to disarmament, its attention has discernibly shifted away from the latter and toward the former. This change in Tokyo’s nonproliferation and disarmament policy corresponds to the heightened emphasis that Washington has recently placed on nuclear counterproliferation. For example, the Koizumi government was quick to respond to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) that the Bush administration announced in May 2003. Not only was Japan one of the countries initially involved in formulating the structure of the PSI, a counterproliferation program designed to intercept the transport of weapons of mass destruction, but it also hosted the first Asian exercises in October 2004.1 Stemming directly from the pressures associated with the bilateral security alliance is that Tokyo must be convinced that Washington views Japan’s nuclear disarmament initiatives as reasonable before it is willing to move too far forward with the work to accomplish them. Because of Washington’s increasing attention to nuclear nonproliferation and Japan’s firm commitment

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to the bilateral security alliance and to retaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent, Tokyo’s decision to get on the counterproliferation bandwagon underscores the malleability of its international disarmament efforts.2

Tokyo’s Restrained Internationalism and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty While there have been serious disagreements between the Japanese government’s endorsement of a gradual path to nuclear disarmament and the more direct course preferred by Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons organizations, both sides strongly believe that it is imperative to bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force as quickly as possible. For both sides, the CTBT is important for the establishment of a credible and viable nuclear disarmament regime. For Tokyo, which for many years been a strong advocate of an all-inclusive international prohibition of nuclear testing,3 the de jure status of the CTBT would symbolize the gradual movement of the world community along the path to nuclear disarmament. Tokyo reasons that without the legal right to conduct nuclear tests officials in nuclear weapons states will be more inclined than they have been in the past to think seriously about disarmament. Although Tokyo has no illusions that nuclear disarmament is imminent, it nonetheless believes that it is important to encourage the nuclear powers, and the other countries whose ratification of the CTBT is necessary to bring the accord into force, to take the requisite actions. Anticipating its responsibilities as chair of the first Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT held in early October 1999, Tokyo issued a public announcement the day before the opening of the Vienna meetings. In this announcement, Tokyo suggested that it was troubled by the fact that the accord had not yet come into effect three years after it had been introduced in September 1996. Stressing the importance of the CTBT for the establishment of a disarmament regime, Tokyo made it clear that Foreign Minister Masahiko Koumura, who would be representing Japan at the conference, had over the course of the previous year communicated with some foreign ministers urging the ratification of the accord. Tokyo’s announcement also pointed out that, because the United States, Russia, and China had not ratified the CTBT, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi had sent personal letters to officials in these countries requesting that they do so.4 At the Vienna conference, Foreign Minister Koumura delivered a forceful statement. Lamenting that although the Cold War had been over for a

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decade and nuclear disarmament was still not in sight, Koumura’s statement called on all states, and especially the nuclear powers, that still needed to ratify the CTBT to do this “as expeditiously as possible.” These ratifications, argued Koumura, needed to be completed before April 2000 when the review conference for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) would take place. Aware of the criticism that verification restraints were not sufficient to discourage states from cheating, Koumura stressed that Japan had begun to implement measures that would assure compliance with the CTBT. Because Tokyo firmly believed that the entry into force of the CTBT would amount to “a giant and epoch-making step forward” for nuclear disarmament, Koumura told the conference that Japan had initiated specialized programs that would train technical personnel and had started building and improving ten facilities, all of which would be useful in verifying states’ compliance with the CTBT.5 On the last day of the conference, Tokyo issued another statement. Although it realized that much work still had to be done, Tokyo was guardedly optimistic in this statement about the prospects for the early entry into force of the CTBT. Tokyo’s statement conveyed its satisfaction that the conference’s final declaration had been unanimously approved and stressed that it would continue to use diplomatic efforts, including Japan’s Official Development Assistance to less developed countries, to bring the CTBT into effect.6 But Tokyo’s guarded optimism was short-lived, given the U.S. Senate’s failure to ratify the CTBT. Newly appointed Foreign Minister Yohei Kono wasted little time in dispatching a letter, delivered personally by State Foreign Secretary Ichita Yamamoto, to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in Washington. Kono’s letter to Albright urged the Clinton administration to continue to push for the ratification of the CTBT. In a subsequent letter to Kono dated October 18, 1999, Albright thanked the foreign minister for Japan’s leadership in promoting the CTBT and assured him that the Clinton administration would once again seek Senate ratification of the accord and that the United States would not perform any nuclear test explosions.7 At this time, Tokyo saw an important sign that the Clinton administration had not abandoned the CTBT. In October 1999, a U.N. document detailing discussions taking place within the General Assembly’s First Committee on Disarmament and International Security corroborated that the Clinton administration still supported the CTBT. The Clinton administration’s U.N. representative told the First Committee that the (republicancontrolled) Senate’s recent action “should not mislead you,” since his government’s commitment to arms control and nonproliferation was “unwavering” and that the United States “will complete the task of bringing the [Comprehensive Test Ban] Treaty into force.”8 A few weeks later, the United

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States, along with the other nuclear powers, with the exception of India (which abstained), voted in favor of a First Committee resolution on the CTBT.9 Because the Clinton administration had demonstrated its endorsement of the CTBT, this was a disarmament issue that the Japanese government could unconditionally support without having to worry about political repercussions from Washington. Relative to Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations, Tokyo could more easily make known to the international community Japan’s interest in the implementation of a broad nuclear test ban treaty. But the enthusiasm of Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations to bring the CTBT into force was visibly enduring. Gensuikin’s (Japan Congress Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs) sponsorship of the Kyoto International Conference in early August 1997 featured statements by two Americans—former U.S. Senator Alan Cranston and Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers. Both of these statements unequivocally supported the CTBT and reflect Gensuikin’s expectations that the accord needed to come into effect.10 A 1998 statement by Gensuikyo (Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs) emphasized its concerns about the failure to make any progress since the 1995 NPT Review Conference in eliminating nuclear weapons and stressed that the CTBT has not been brought into force.11 Nihon Hidankyo (Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations), which actively represents the hibakusha (the victims of atomic warfare), made clear its continuing support for the CTBT through its repeated protest of French, Chinese, Indian, and Pakistani nuclear testing in the 1990s. Despite the general agreement about the need for the CTBT to come into force, Tokyo and Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons organizations have not seen eye to eye on everything relating to the accord. As discussed in chapter 4, Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons organizations and Tokyo have parted ways when it comes to subcritical nuclear testing. Tokyo has accepted subcritical nuclear testing, officially holding the position that the U.S. use of this experimental process helps ensure Japan’s safety under the American nuclear umbrella. While Tokyo concedes that subcritical nuclear testing is not “a good thing,” the government publicly maintains that it does not technically violate the CTBT.12 Conversely, Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations see subcritical nuclear testing as violating the “spirit of CTBT,” arguing that it permits a nuclear power, such as the United States, to “further build up its nuclear arsenals.”13 This disagreement over subcritical nuclear testing became less important once it was clear to Japan’s antinuclear weapons organizations that Tokyo had backtracked on the position it had taken on the CTBT because of the Bush administration’s aversion to the accord.

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U.S. conservatives relied on several reasons to articulate their opposition to the CTBT when the Senate failed to ratify it in 1999. At the core of conservative opposition to the CTBT was the belief that the United States had to demonstrate its global leadership, and to do this it needed to maintain a nuclear deterrent. The only way that the reliability of parts, equipment, and weapons can be assured is through nuclear testing. Second, new designs in nuclear weapons require testing to establish confidence in the new arsenal, which is necessary because of different threats to the United States. Third, a nuclear deterrent requires a sufficient supply of skilled scientists and engineers, who can only be properly trained by having experience with nuclear testing. The conservative position also rejected the argument that the CTBT would be an important nonproliferation instrument that prevented countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. The political right maintained that, since the NPT made it illegal for the nonnuclear weapons states to obtain nuclear weapons, this objective had already been formulated into international law. Rather than serve as a nonproliferation tool, the conservative position averred that the CTBT would probably contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. On this point, the right argued for the necessity of nuclear testing so that countries that depend on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, such as Japan, will not lose faith in the American deterrent. Without testing, should any of these countries conclude that the U.S. deterrent was not reliable, they might then develop nuclear weapons. Thus, whether Tokyo was aware of it or not, there was considerably more to the conservative opposition to the ratification of the CTBT in the United States than the right’s vociferous claim that verification was difficult and perhaps impossible for low-level explosions.14 This opposition quickly surfaced when the Bush administration came to power. Since 2001, the Bush administration has repeatedly voted against the draft resolution in the U.N. General Assembly on the CTBT. Moreover, it has consistently been the only opponent to the CTBT draft resolution,15 with one of its officials even stating shortly before the beginning of the 2005 NPT Review Conference that the “CTBT is a dead letter.”16 The U.S. rejection to the CTBT has locked Tokyo into a position of policy ambivalence: while it wants to see the accord come into force as soon as possible, it fully understands that this is not going to happen anytime some. Tokyo is fully cognizant of the fact that the United States, its closest ally with which it maintains a highly valued security alliance that ensures Japan a place under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, is not about to ratify the CTBT. Thus, Tokyo faces a situation in which its hands are tied in a rather unique manner. Diplomatically, it can talk up the value of bringing the CTBT into force, but it certainly is not about to directly criticize Washington before international bodies for its refusal to ratify the accord.

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Tokyo’s Credibility in Question While Tokyo has little chance of winning over Washington conservatives on the CTBT through bilateral dialogue alone, critically questioning Washington’s authorization of subcritical nuclear testing from the outset in 1997 and publicly broaching the need to keep Japan under the U.S. nuclear umbrella would have produced two important results. First, doing these things would have given Tokyo’s appeals for nuclear disarmament international credibility, which for some they do not have. Second, by demonstrating its objections to subcritical nuclear experimentation and by initiating a domestic discussion of the nation’s reliance on the U.S. nuclear deterrent, Tokyo would have put itself in the position to win some support from ardent nuclear abolitionists in Japan. Tokyo argues that Japan must still rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent and this is consistent with the nation’s exclusively defense-oriented policy.17 However, enthusiastic nuclear abolitionists in Japan want their government to adopt a different policy. The view exists in Nagasaki that the bilateral security relationship should be separate from Japan being under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Moreover, proponents of this position maintain that by making Japan’s Three Nonnuclear Principles (not to possess, manufacture, or introduce nuclear weapons into the country) law, and by establishing a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Northeast Asia, Japan can move out from under the U.S. nuclear umbrella.18 A major concern of the Japanese anti-nuclear weapons movement is that, because Tokyo continues to maintain that Japan needs the U.S. nuclear umbrella as it calls for disarmament and the end of nuclear testing, these international appeals may be ignored in those places where they should be heard.19 For example, representatives from Nagasaki stress that both India and Pakistan could not accept Japanese criticism of the nuclear testing performed by their countries in 1998 because of Japan’s place under the U.S. nuclear umbrella.20

Nuclear Disarmament: Occurring by Fits and Starts The end of the Cold War did not put a stop to nuclear testing. Although the Soviet Union conducted the last of the 715 nuclear tests that it performed over the years in October 1990 and the British government conducted its 45th and final test in November 1991, the United States procrastinated for

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awhile. In September 1992, the United States performed the last of its 1,030 tests. But China continued to conduct nuclear tests, performing 9 between 1992 and 1996. Moreover, France, after having stopped nuclear testing between 1992 and 1994, conducted 5 tests in 1995 and another one in 1996. The nuclear testing by China and France cast a pall over the expectations of people throughout the world who thought that nuclear disarmament could become a reality in a post–Cold War environment. The government of Japan also held these expectations and pointed out after Chinese testing that the 1995 NPT Review Conference stressed that the nuclear powers would exercise maximum restraint with regard to nuclear experimentation. Seeing itself in the forefront of nuclear disarmament, the Japanese government registered its opposition to French and Chinese nuclear testing in a series of public statements directed at Beijing and Paris.21 Out of what many saw as the retrograde steps taken by Beijing and Paris in the area of nuclear disarmament, came a major government-supported policy initiative, the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.22 In 1995 when France performed several nuclear tests, the Australian government, then led by Prime Minister Paul Keating, vehemently protested against what it saw as the deplorable behavior of the French government. In October 1995, the Keating government announced the creation of the Canberra Commission, which would study the global problems related to the existence of nuclear weapons and recommend ways to achieve a nuclear-free world.23 The Canberra Commission was an extremely important undertaking, since it was the first time that a government-initiated body had been delegated the responsibility of studying the politically thorny question of nuclear disarmament. Although the Canberra Commission created some encouragement that the abolition of nuclear weapons was an achievable objective, nuclear testing by India and Pakistan in 1998 was a major blow to the global disarmament regime. The “atoms for peace” assistance from the United States and Canada that helped India conduct a non-weapons nuclear test in 1974 provided the technical foundation for New Delhi’s nuclear testing in 1998.24 Prodded by India’s nuclear testing, Islamabad very quickly decided that it was in Pakistan’s national interest to follow suit. Cognizant that the nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation were in peril, the government of Japan launched the Tokyo Forum in August 1998.25 But while the Tokyo Forum raised some important disarmament and nonproliferation questions, it was short on answers to the creation of a nuclear-weapons-free world. Moreover, the Tokyo Forum’s final report engendered strong criticism from parts of Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons organizations, largely because it tended not to directly challenge the then-recognized nuclear powers. In New Delhi, displeasure with the Tokyo Forum was also evident. New Delhi viewed the

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forum’s report as too long on nonproliferation and too short on disarmament issues.26 The problems that had beset nuclear disarmament during the latter half of the 1990s were responsible for the emergence of the New Agenda Coalition that had become frustrated with the failure of the nuclear powers to live up to their commitment to abolish nuclear weapons.

The World Court Decision: How Japan Accepted U.S. Suzerainty When the Cold War ended, nuclear abolitionists in Japan understood that Tokyo’s strong commitment to Washington’s security policies and to the U.S.-Japan military alliance meant that they would have to work to build strong relations with international civil society to promote disarmament. Even though the government of Japan was beginning to promote nuclear disarmament during the mid-1990s, it never lost sight of what Washington would accept. Before the 1998–1999 Tokyo Forum and even before the Canberra Commission, Tokyo had to face the hard reality that Washington had long ago bifurcated nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. Washington wanted a strong nuclear counterproliferation regime and certainly did not intend to fulfill its disarmament commitment under Article VI of the NPT, at least not anytime in the foreseeable future. Washington, therefore, did not want a concrete nuclear disarmament regime guided by multilateral standards that would judiciously but appropriately weave nuclear disarmament with nonproliferation. While it is fair to say that the other nuclear powers were not rushing to establish a nuclear disarmament regime in the early post–Cold War years, Tokyo trained its attention to what the United States wanted and not to that of the other nuclear weapons states. In the late 1980s, a few officials in New Zealand with ties to civil society became concerned about the continuing threats posed by nuclear weapons. In 1988, New Zealand asked the U.N. General Assembly to consider the question of the legality of nuclear weapons under international law. Meanwhile, three international civil society organizations: the International Peace Bureau, the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, and the International Association of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms, were becoming increasingly interested in the question of the legality of nuclear weapons. In 1992, these civil society organizations independently instituted the World Court Project, an initiative to get the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to study the question of the legality of nuclear weapons. With assistance from the Nonaligned States, the World Court Project was successful in getting the World Health Organization and the

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U.N. General Assembly to pass resolutions in 1993 and 1994, requesting that the ICJ issue an advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons. An important part of the World Court Project was the Declaration of Public Conscience, a collection of signatures from citizens around the world who had committed themselves to the idea that the use of nuclear weapons violated international law. All told, 3.8 million people from around the world affixed their signatures to the declaration, with more than three million of these coming from Japan. One organization, the Japanese Consumers’ Cooperative Union, collected more than two million signatures.27 On November 17, 1994, the U.S. representative to the United Nations made clear to the First Committee why he would vote against the General Assembly’s resolution dealing with the question of the legality of nuclear weapons, the resolution that became the basis of ICJ advisory opinion less than two years later, in 1996. In his statement, the U.S. representative indicated that, “it would be inappropriate to ask the Court for an advisory opinion on such an abstract, hypothetical and essentially political matter.” He argued that the best way to move toward disarmament was through negotiations that result in tangible treaties. He concluded his presentation by urging countries “to abstain or vote ‘No’ on this draft resolution.” The final vote on the draft resolution, at the very least, strongly suggested that a political chasm existed between the nuclear powers and counties not closely aligned with them. Except for China, all of the other declared nuclear powers, plus Israel, voted against the resolution. Beijing did not vote on the draft resolution, stressing that it fully endorsed nuclear disarmament and that it would continue to abide by its commitments to a no-first-use nuclear weapons policy and to not threaten to use or use nuclear weapons on nonnuclear nations. Still several years before their nuclear testing bout in 1998, India and Pakistan supported the resolution. So did all of what was to be labeled by President Bush in January 2002 as the countries that constitute the “axis of evil”—Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. All told, 77 states supported the resolution, 33 opposed it, and 21 abstained. Japan was one of the 21 states that abstained in the vote on the 1994 U.N. General Assembly’s resolution that eventually brought the question of the legality of nuclear weapons under international law before the ICJ. Actually, Japan was one of a number of countries that attempted to prevent a vote on the resolution—Request for an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons—that Indonesia introduced to the First Committee on behalf of the Nonaligned States on November 9, 1994. A little over a week after the appearance of the Indonesia resolution, the Moroccan representative introduced a no-action motion, arguing like the United States, that the question of the legality of nuclear weapons was both abstract and theoretical.

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Although defeated, the no-action motion did get Tokyo’s support and, except for China, that of all of the declared nuclear states at the time, plus Israel. To assume that Tokyo’s security alliance with Washington had nothing to do with its support for the no-action motion and its subsequent abstention on the vote of the legality of nuclear weapons would be to deny the reality of power politics. Tokyo’s Ambassador Tanaka explained Japan’s abstention. Stressing that although Japan genuinely desires to abolish all nuclear weapons and never wants to see them used again, there was a serious problem with the draft resolution. Relying on a hedged argument, Ambassador Tanaka maintained, “in the present international situation, pursuing the question of the legality of the use of nuclear weapons may simply result in confrontations between countries.”28 Voting against the resolution on the legality of nuclear weapons would have put Tokyo in an extremely awkward position for two major reasons. First, the vote in the General Assembly occurred within days of Tokyo’s submission of its initial post–Cold War draft resolution on nuclear disarmament to the First Committee.29 Claiming to be a strong advocate of nuclear disarmament and at the same time voting against a resolution questioning the legality of nuclear weapons would have quickly deflated Tokyo’s credibility within the international community. While certainly important, Tokyo’s 1994 resolution was not construed as especially threatening to the nuclear powers. Tokyo’s disarmament resolution passed through the First Committee by a vote of 140 to 0, with 8 abstentions, which included the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Israel. Second, voting against the resolution on the legality of nuclear weapons would have instantly worsened Tokyo’s relationship with Japanese antinuclear weapons organizations, which had become emboldened by the idea that the end of the Cold War offered a unique opportunity for disarmament.30 Before the ICJ began examining the legality of nuclear weapons in 1995, newer parts of Japan’s disarmament movement had already become affiliated with international organizations. The Tokyo Physicians for Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (TPENW) had become affiliated with the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, which won the 1985 Nobel Peace Prize, and the Japan Alliance of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms (JALANA) with the International Alliance of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms. Both of these international disarmament organizations played an instrumental role in bringing the question of the legality of nuclear weapons before the world community. Moreover, the Japanese peace and disarmament movement naturally gravitated toward Abolition 2000, an international disarmament organization formed in April 1995 at the time of the NPT Review Conference. Abolition 2000 had as its original

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goal the establishment of a nuclear weapons convention by the year 2000. More than 60 peace organizations from Japan are on the Abolition 2000 membership list, including TPENW, Gensuikyo, Gensuikin, the Japanese Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Hidankyo, and the Pacific Campaign for Disarmament and Security, which is affiliated with the Peace Depot. Tokyo’s abstention on the vote of the legality of nuclear weapons was only the beginning of the story, since its 1995 statement before the ICJ is not what it originally planned to present to the court. Before strong public pressure persuaded Tokyo to change its position to specify that using nuclear weapons would be contrary to international law, the government of Japan was going to tell the ICJ that, “the use of nuclear weapons is not necessarily a violation of international law.” Moreover, Tokyo was hesitant at first about letting the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki testify before the ICJ, but eventually yielded because of strong public pressure in Japan.31 While an improvement over the original draft, Tokyo’s 1995 statement before the ICJ was considered ambiguous by Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons movement and therefore inconsistent with its position.32 However, there was no ambiguity whatsoever in Hidankyo’s position, which it articulated in Nagasaki during the atomic bomb commemorative ceremony in August 1993. Reflecting the interests of the hibakusha, Hidankyo’s statement endorsed the persistent efforts of civil society to get the ICJ to address the issue of the legality of nuclear weapons and maintained that these weapons are incompatible with human existence and they therefore “should be totally eliminated urgently,”33 a position fully supported by Gensuikyo and Gensuikin. Although Tokyo’s ICJ statement acknowledged the destructive power of nuclear weapons, stressed that their use is contrary to the principles of international law, and noticeably contrasted with the one presented by the United States, it did not forthrightly state that the use of nuclear weapons would violate international law. Moreover, Tokyo’s ICJ statement did not reject the threat to use nuclear weapons.34 In contrast, the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki made poignant, yet still highly insightful statements before the ICJ in November 1995. Rejecting the deterrence argument, Hiroshima Mayor Takashi Hiraoka stated before the ICJ that the existence of nuclear weapons does not maintain peace in the world. Hiraoka also argued, “It is clear that the use of nuclear weapons, that cause indiscriminate mass murder that leaves survivors to suffer for decades, is a violation of international law. In addition, the development, possession and testing of nuclear weapons, which gives a great threat to nonnuclear weapon countries, is also a violation of international law.” After providing a detailed description of the devastation caused by the atomic bombing of Nagasaki, Mayor Iccho Itoh’s asked the ICJ during his

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statement to “decide impartially about the inhumanity of nuclear weapons and their illegality in view of international law.”35 Rendered in July 1996, the ICJ advisory opinion was a major victory for advocates of global nuclear disarmament. The ICJ did not attempt to answer the question posed by the World Health Organization, which focused on the health and environmental issues pertaining to the use of nuclear weapons and their violation of international law. However, the ICJ opinion did address the query presented by the U.N. General Assembly in that it stipulated that the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law.36 Moreover, the ICJ opinion—a unanimous one among the fourteen judges—specified that the nuclear states have an obligation under international law to work in good faith to eliminate their nuclear weapons. Because Tokyo’s presentation to the ICJ on the question of the legality of nuclear weapons had been much weaker than those presented by the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the position advocated by Japan’s antinuclear weapons organizations, it was not surprising to see consistency in its voting on this issue in the United Nations. In December 1996 and November 1997, the U.N. General Assembly’s First Committee on Disarmament and International Security voted on the ICJ advisory opinion. The First Committee’s intention in both years was to strengthen the ICJ’s unanimous advisory opinion that international law obligates states to pursue nuclear disarmament in good faith. Like it did in 1994, Tokyo abstained from voting on the entire draft resolution in both 1996 and 1997. Tokyo’s 1997 attempt to explain why it did not vote in favor of the resolution is noteworthy. Fully aware that the United States and the other declared nuclear powers, except for China, which supported the draft in 1996 and 1997, opposed the resolution, Tokyo maintained that while it agreed with the ICJ’s opinion that the nuclear weapons states had an obligation to achieve disarmament, the best way to do this was through a gradual process. Relying on a phrase it employed when it made its statement to the ICJ in 1995 that “the use of nuclear weapons was contrary to the spirit of humanity,” Tokyo’s abstention from the 1997 vote was an exercise in political obfuscation.37 Difficult to do under any circumstances, Tokyo wanted to show support for the ICJ’s advisory opinion but at the same time did not want to put the pressure of a multilateral disarmament process on Washington’s shoulders, knowing that the United States insisted on bilateral dialogue. In 2003 and 2004, Tokyo continued to abstain on the ICJ resolution during sessions of the U.N. General Assembly.38 In 2004, the Japanese representative maintained before the First Committee that it was still too early to expect states to conform completely to the ICJ draft resolution and that nuclear disarmament should proceed in an incremental fashion. Abstaining again on the First Committee’s vote on the ICJ resolution in 2005, Tokyo stressed that

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before calling for concluding negotiations for nuclear disarmament consistent progress must first be evident.39

Separating Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation During the Cold War, the arms race caused Washington to view disarmament as an elusive goal; it largely considered arms control, rather than arms reduction leading to disarmament, as the most practical approach to deal with the surfeit of nuclear weapons.40 Supporting this U.S. concern for arms control was a strong and enduring interest in nuclear nonproliferation, that together with the relatively neglected disarmament objective are the two core parts of the international NPT regime. When the Cold War ended, the global dimension of the belief that nuclear weapons could be abolished appeared in international civil society organizations, in the Nonaligned Movement, in the outcome of the 1995 NPT Review Conference that indefinitely extended the NPT regime, in the 1996 CTBT, and in the formation of the New Agenda Coalition. Certainly, members of Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons movement subscribed to this position. Even Tokyo, which still demonstrated its ongoing desire to maintain Japan’s place under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, became somewhat hopeful about the prospect of abolishing nuclear weapons in the post–Cold War world. The disarmament obligation of the five declared nuclear weapons states, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia, has its historical roots in the NPT that came into force in 1970. A declaratory comment in the preambulary section of the treaty specifies that parties agree to take concrete steps moving toward nuclear disarmament. When the ICJ unanimously advised in 1996 that states have an obligation to work in good faith to achieve nuclear disarmament, it was referring specifically to Article VI in the NPT. Tokyo, as a proponent of disarmament, has not been remiss in stressing that the nuclear powers have an obligation under international law to work toward the objective of a nuclear-free world. In her statement to the second session of the preparatory committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference Japanese Ambassador Kuniko Inoguchi stated that the NPT’s Article VI commits the nuclear powers to work to eliminate all of their nuclear weapons, and that this obligation had been reaffirmed in the reports of the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences.41 However, Washington’s optimism about nuclear disarmament since the end of the Cold War has been very subdued, at best. Washington’s interest

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has largely remained centered on nuclear nonproliferation—not on nuclear disarmament. For Washington, nuclear disarmament, as it was during the Cold War, has remained an elusive goal. Although Washington has not worked enthusiastically to promote the abolition of nuclear weapons, the other nuclear powers have not been generally receptive of a disarmament regime either. Nuclear testing by France and China in the 1990s and the unwillingness of the United Kingdom and Russia to promote disarmament have led some skeptics to maintain that the nuclear weapons states retain a strong and unmitigated predilection for nonproliferation. This predilection for nonproliferation, say the skeptics, helps the nuclear states to maintain their power base indefinitely, since they do not want to relinquish their weapons. Even though the Clinton White House was more sensitive to disarmamentrelated issues than the administration of George W. Bush, its primary focus, which was generally consistent with past U.S. policy, remained on nonproliferation. A review of the State Department’s summary of the U.S. commitment to the NPT regime during the Clinton administration shows a definite preference for nonproliferation over nuclear disarmament.42 Although the U.S. representative to the United Nations told the First Committee after the Senate failed to ratify the CTBT that the United States was still committed to an arms control regime, he painted a noticeably different picture when it came to nuclear disarmament. Claiming U.S. advocacy of a “discrete” step-by-step, that is, a gradual or incremental, approach to nuclear disarmament and rejecting the direct course proposed by the New Agenda countries, the American representative to the United Nations stated, “The way forward was not through a ‘new agenda,’ but a renewed agenda.”43 When the Bush administration came to power in 2001, nuclear disarmament became a much more distant goal, especially after the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001. Several important indicators made clear that the Bush administration did not look favorably on the prospect on nuclear disarmament. ● ● ●

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an aversion to international treaties; an unequivocal rejection of the CTBT; the suggestion the nuclear testing may have to be resumed in the future; government “leaks” that the United States had developed plans for the use of nuclear weapons on several countries, some of them nonnuclear parties to the NPT; the desire to research and develop low-yield nuclear weapons.44

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In brief, not only have nuclear weapons remained integral to U.S. security but also, by disregarding the “principle of irreversibility,” the Bush administration identified new potentials for their use. Constrained by its commitment to the U.S.-Japan security alliance, Tokyo has largely accommodated Washington’s concern for nonproliferation at the expense of nuclear disarmament. When Tokyo speaks to an attentive international audience about the need to rid the world of nuclear weapons, it has been very careful not to direct public criticism at the United States. The final report of the Tokyo Forum represents just one of many examples of the Japanese government failing to take to task the United States and the other nuclear powers. Another is Tokyo’s 2003 prepared statement to the second session of the preparatory committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference. In this statement Tokyo does not mention the Bush administration’s lack of enthusiasm for the CTBT. In fact, although it devotes six paragraphs to the CTBT, Tokyo’s statement does not even mention the United States. When Tokyo presents the issue of disarmament to an international audience, it tends to speak in general terms, such as the nuclear weapons states must demonstrate “tangible progress towards nuclear disarmament.” When mentioning the United States, it typically does this in a positive manner, such as exaggerating the effects of arms control agreements that it has made with Russia45—while ignoring the serious problems that endure because of still-massive nuclear arsenals.46 Even when reporting to an international audience on what Japan has done to help implement NPT’s Article VI, Tokyo avoids specifically mentioning the United States’ and the other nuclear powers’ demonstrable failure to make satisfactory progress toward nuclear disarmament.47 As indicated earlier, what Tokyo does say, but in general terms, is that “the NPT obligates nuclear-weapon States to pursue nuclear disarmament.”48 Consistent with Washington’s 1999 position that the best way to move the disarmament process forward is by adopting a “renewed” plan, Tokyo renamed its U.N. resolution in 2005, titling it Renewed Determination Towards the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.49 Tokyo’s reluctance to be directly critical of Washington’s policies when it addresses international audiences means that it must deal with the antinuclear weapons advocates and organizations in Japan. Leaders of Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons movement criticized Tokyo’s failure to address the Bush administration’s refusal to accept the importance of the CTBT to nuclear disarmament and its decision not to seek ratification.50 These leaders wanted Tokyo to adopt a nuclear weapons policy that directly challenged the United States to conform to the norms that had been established at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

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Aware of the doggedness of Japan’s abolitionists from past encounters, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempted to mitigate the concerns of the leaders of the country’s anti-nuclear weapons organizations by including in its 2003 publication, Japan’s Disarmament Policy, comments directly critical of the United States position on the CTBT. This document notes that, “the passive and negative attitude of the Bush administration toward the CTBT has become evident.” It further points out that Secretary of State Colin Powell made clear in a letter to former Minister of Foreign Affairs Makiko Tanaka that the United States has no plan or desire to pursue the ratification of the CTBT and concluded that the Bush administration has demonstrated “direct opposition rather than just a passive attitude” toward the CTBT.51 Tokyo repeated these criticisms of the United States in its 2004 disarmament publication.52 Still, leaders of Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons movement charge that Tokyo’s nuclear disarmament policy is mainly a campaign for nonproliferation— something that they know establishes another important, and perhaps inextricable, link between Japanese and U.S foreign policies. Helping to corroborate the charge of the leaders of Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons movement that Tokyo has compromised its nuclear disarmament policy, an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that “maybe yes” the Japanese government has turned its attention to nonproliferation issues.53 Another ministry official pointed out that it is quite natural for Japan to focus on nonproliferation, adding that the Bush administration has provided some new ideas in this area,54 such as the Proliferation Security Initiative. A member of the House of Councilors from the New Komeito Party, a coalition partner of Prime Minister Koizumi’s Liberal Democratic Party, emphasized that since the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, Tokyo has been more concerned with nonproliferation than with nuclear disarmament.55 Perhaps aware of the criticism that it had mainly turned its attention to nonproliferation issues, Tokyo stressed when it published its 2003 disarmament policy that, “it is not acceptable” that the nuclear weapons powers “only emphasize the nuclear nonproliferation aspect of the NPT regime and disregard their obligations for nuclear disarmament.”56 However, after receiving Washington’s signal that put into perspective the “new threats” posed by terrorists and “states of proliferation concern,” Tokyo came to accept the increased importance of nonproliferation by the time it published its 2004 disarmament document. The 2004 publication is titled Japan’s Disarmament and Nonproliferation Policy.57 It is important to understand that the publication of Japan’s 2003 disarmament policy and its 2004 disarmament and nonproliferation policy, though important since they stress the need to build a disarmament regime,

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do not get the same exposure or attention as the documents that Tokyo directly presents to foreign diplomats and to the international community. These publications are more likely to be examined thoroughly by domestic proponents of disarmament and by scholars studying this subject than by U.S. policy makers or foreign diplomats. Indeed, the 2004 publication includes a note at the bottom of the cover page stating that the document is “mainly to promote better understanding of ordinary citizens on Japan’s disarmament and nonproliferation policy.” Because these publications are not intended nor directly delivered to a professional international audience, they do not represent a significant challenge to U.S policy and are very unlikely to trouble officials in Washington or command their serious attention.

Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty Tokyo supports the entry into force of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT),58 since an international ban on the production of fissile material— plutonium and highly enriched uranium—would reduce the likelihood of countries acquiring or developing new nuclear weapons. Tokyo believes that the conclusion of the FMCT can take place within 5 years from the beginning of negotiations. Initially, expectations were that multilateral discussions on the FMCT would begin subsequent to the conclusion of the CTBT in 1996. More recently, negotiations on the FMCT have been complicated by a disagreement between two of the nuclear weapons states, the United States and China. Proposed by President Clinton in 1993 at the United Nations, serious negotiations on the FMCT were stalled initially because of political inertia. Since 2000, the United States’ interest in developing a missile defense system and China’s opposition to it have short-circuited discussions on the FMCT within the U.N. Conference on Disarmament (CD). Beijing wants negotiations on the FMCT to occur simultaneously with discussions on the Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). The Bush administration, however, has resisted negotiations on PAROS.59 U.S. support for the FMCT during the Clinton administration was unequivocal. In 1999, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Holum read President Clinton’s message to the CD in Geneva: “Let us devote our mutual and full support to advancing substantially the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty negotiation this year and to completing it at the earliest possible date.”60 Although the Bush administration initially suggested its support for the FMCT, unlike the Clinton White House, it argued that the accord is entirely separate from the CTBT.61 Tokyo’s desire to see movement on the FMCT caused it to pull

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more optimism than actually existed from the Bush administration’s initial suggestion of support for the accord.62 In October 2004, U.S. Ambassador Jackie Sanders used diplomatic doublespeak to tell the U.N. First Committee that while Washington “supports the negotiation in the CD of a ban—in the form of a legally binding FMCT—” after careful review, “the United States believes that an [sic] FMCT cannot be verified effectively.” Because of problems with the accord, Ambassador Sanders concluded by saying the “we must rethink how to approach an [sic] FMCT in the CD.”63 Thus, like the CTBT, the Bush administration adopted the position that the FMCT lacks tough verification standards. Leaders of Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons movement want Tokyo to develop a neutral position on the FMCT and PAROS and not be influenced either by the U.S. determination to proceed with missile defense or China’s insistence to begin discussions on a new treaty that focuses on the weaponization of space. They want Tokyo to work harder than it has thus far to promote the FMCT outside of the CD. So that nuclear disarmament will not be undercut for the sake of nonproliferation, they want Tokyo to push for discussions on the FMCT that also include the manufacture of fissile material “produced in the past,”64 given that the United States and Russia, which have sufficiently large stockpiles of fissile material, could continue to produce nuclear weapons. However, Tokyo has continued to concentrate its efforts on the FMCT within the CD, hoping that there will be a breakthrough in the enduring U.S.-China stalemate.65 By seeing the CD as the only major place for progress to be made on the FMCT, something that Washington can tolerate, Tokyo has given critics reason to suspect that if the government of Japan truly wanted to do more it would broaden its campaign to attract interest in the accord’s importance for nuclear disarmament. As Tokyo becomes increasingly focused on nonproliferation, the failure to expand its work on the FMCT raises another concern about its commitment to ending the existence of nuclear weapons.

More on Nonproliferation Tokyo has recently been emphasizing the importance of states signing and ratifying an Additional Protocol. Once in place, an Additional Protocol enhances the inspections regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) beyond states’ NPT safeguard agreements by, most notably, permitting the agency to conduct very short-notice inspections. Japan finalized an Additional Protocol with the IAEA in December 1999. While there is nothing wrong with encouraging the acceptance of an Additional Protocol, Tokyo’s motive becomes suspect when it does this to

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strengthen a counterproliferation campaign led by Washington. Tokyo rushed into the recent nuclear fray between the United States and Iran by calling on the latter to immediately and unconditionally sign an Additional Protocol and by cosponsoring an IAEA resolution that demanded Tehran completely demonstrate by the end of October 2003 that it did not have a secret nuclear weapons program. Repeated allegations by the Bush administration in 2003 charging that Iran had been clandestinely developing nuclear weapons prompted Tokyo’s involvement in the dispute and ultimately caused some hostility toward Japan to emerge in Tehran for awhile (see chapter 7).66 Tokyo has also worried about the putative instability of the so-called rogue states; foremost among these for Japanese policy makers is North Korea. Tokyo’s recent concerns about rogue states have focused on the serious problems related to the proliferation of arms and weapons materials to other countries and to terrorist organizations. Related to this is Tokyo’s interest in export control regimes, which have been designed to inhibit the spread of arms and weapons material to states and to terrorist organizations. While these and other nonproliferation issues are certainly important, Tokyo’s increased interest in counterproliferation has meant that it has not been working diligently to link them to a comprehensive nuclear disarmament agenda.

Security Assurances That Tokyo has not been enthusiastic about bolstering security assurances is a good indication that it is not totally committed to nuclear disarmament. Tokyo’s lack of enthusiasm for security assurances, which protect the nonnuclear states that have acceded to the NPT from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against them by the nuclear powers, is the result of two things. First, Tokyo wants to maintain a nuclear deterrent for Japan but currently does not want to possess nuclear weapons. Thus, Tokyo wants Japan to remain under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, which the Bush administration has reaffirmed,67 despite the realist-like speculation that the alliance will atrophy as the Japanese assume increasingly more responsibility for the defense of their nation.68 Second, evidenced by the continuation and strengthening of the U.S.-Japan military alliance,69 and the Japanese active support of the U.S. led war on terrorism, Tokyo has constantly demonstrated that it has remained cognizant of what Washington wants or does not want when it comes to security issues. Facing significant public opposition at home to Japanese troops being sent to Iraq, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi told a unit of the Self Defense Forces heading there in February 2004,

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“The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and international cooperation are vital to Japan’s peace and prosperity.”70 There are two types of security assurances—positive and negative. Consistent with the tenor of the U.N. charter, positive security assurances mean that the nuclear powers will assist nonnuclear states that have experienced a nuclear attack or have been threatened with the use of nuclear weapons. Negative security assurances denote that the declared nuclear weapon states have made a commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapons states. Although positive security assurances imply that the nuclear powers will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons on nonnuclear states, there is not a specific and direct commitment made to forswear the use or the threat to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear nations. The nonnuclear weapons states that have acceded to the NPT have some recourse in international law from Security Council Resolution 984 unanimously passed on April 11, 1995. This resolution states that the five original nuclear powers will not use or, by implication (because of positive security assurances), threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapons nations that have become parties to NPT. Security Council Resolution 984 reflects the pledges that had previously been made by the original nuclear weapons states. Apart from China, which provides an unqualified commitment not to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states that have renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the security assurances of the four other nuclear weapons powers specify similar exceptions when nuclear weapons could be used against nonnuclear weapons nations.71 The 1995 NPT Review Conference reaffirmed Security Council Resolution 984, the positive and negatives assurances made by the nuclear powers, and lastly specified that movement should be made in the direction of establishing “an internationally legally binding instrument.”72 Because uniformity in the provision of negative security assurances from the nuclear powers is still not part of the nonproliferation and disarmament regime, a legally biding international agreement is sought, especially by the nonnuclear weapons states.73 Noting that the abolition of all nuclear weapons is the only real way to eliminate the threat to use or actual use of these weapons, the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference states plainly that “legally binding” security assurances provided by the five declared nuclear powers to the NPT’s nonnuclear-committed nations will buttress the nuclear nonproliferation regime.74 However, today there is a serious problem. A growing number of nonnuclear weapons nations have come to believe that, because of inaction on Article VI, the NPT has allowed the five declared nuclear states to keep their weapons indefinitely, permitting them to rely on their arsenals in ways

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that best serve their national interests. Binding negative security assurances embedded in international law can provide a legal pledge by the nuclear powers that they cannot use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the nonnuclear states. Otherwise, some nonnuclear nations are likely to conclude that a course similar to the one followed by India, Pakistan, and Israel— three nuclear weapons states that have not acceded to the NPT and which do not meet the criteria to be designated as such by the accord75—is best for them. Thus, strengthened negative security assurances would serve to dissuade the nonnuclear weapons states from withdrawing from the NPT, as North Korea did in January 2003 or as Iran briefly suggested it might do in September 2003 because of its perception of Washington’s confrontational policies. Strengthened negative security assurances would also discourage the nonnuclear weapons states from cheating, as Libya had done up until 2004, as Iraq did during the early 1990s or as North Korea has been accused of doing for a number of years. In today’s precarious global environment, where there exists the constant threat that international terrorist organizations will acquire nuclear weapons or the capability to produce them, legally bending negative security assurances to the nonnuclear weapons states make good sense. Legally binding negative security assurances would bolster not just nonproliferation but nuclear disarmament as well. Besides serving as institutionalized restraints on the nuclear powers by placing a rigid and visible layer of international norms around their capability to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons on the nonnuclear nations that have acceded to the NPT, legally binding negative security assurances would reduce global security concerns and function as confidence-building mechanisms. A less hostile and less threatening international environment would mean that the nuclear weapons powers would have good reason to begin meaningful discussions on how to implement NPT’s Article VI. One of the most noticeable shortcomings in Tokyo’s nuclear disarmament agenda is its equivocation on the question of strengthening negative security assurances to the nonnuclear weapons states. Although Tokyo indicates that it understands the importance of providing negative security assurances to nonnuclear weapons states, this is not a top priority of the Japanese government. Similar to its past position, Tokyo’s statement to the second session of the 2005 NPT preparatory committee indicates only that it supports the efforts of the ad hoc committee (previously created in March 1998) within the U.N.’s CD.76 In the final analysis, however, Tokyo does “not have a definite position” with regard to the endorsement of legal negative security assurances. Tokyo believes that a “legally binding agreement is not our approach, since the U.S. and the other nuclear powers, except for China, do not accept this legally binding treaty.”77

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Tokyo’s reluctance rests on the fact that Japan’s military alliance with the United States prevents it from giving an endorsement to negative security assurances. Some of the exceptions that the United Sates has maintained with regard to negative security assurances provided to nonnuclear states apply directly to Japan.78 One of these exceptions is if a nonnuclear weapons state associated or in alliance with a nuclear power attacks a U.S. ally. Another is an attack on American troops by a nonnuclear weapons state associated or in alliance with a nuclear weapons power. A third exception, added by President Clinton in 1995, specifies the condition of a nonnuclear weapons state attacking a country with which the United States has a security commitment. These three exceptions apply to Japan, because American troops are there, because Washington maintains a formal military commitment to protect it (the bilateral security alliance), and because it is an ally of the United States. Thus, Tokyo understands that standing firmly behind legally binding negative security assurances would not only aggravate Washington but this would put at risk Japan’s place under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. As explained in chapter 5, Japan did not join the New Agenda Coalition in 1998 because Tokyo would not accept its advocacy of a no-first-use nuclear weapons policy and legally binding negative security assurances. Tokyo understood that not only would Washington not look favorably on these disarmament initiatives, thereby risking Japan’s place under the American nuclear umbrella, but it also reasoned that the U.S. nuclear shield would become ineffective in deterring a nonnuclear attack by North Korea. During the nuclear crisis with North Korea that emerged in 2002, Tokyo specifically requested that Washington not provide to Pyongyang a security agreement that removes the U.S. threat of nuclear weapons.79 Tokyo’s reluctance to endorse legally binding negative security assurances continues to stand in marked contrast to the position of the countries that make up the New Agenda Coalition. During the second session of the preparatory committee for the 2005 Review Conference, the New Agenda countries presented both a working paper on security assurances and a protocol agreement to the NPT on this issue. The protocol agreement, although in draft form, is a comprehensive document that details both negative and positive security assurances that need to be issued in a legally binding form to nations that have decided to become parties to NPT as nonnuclear weapons states.80 That these states have opted not to develop or pursue the acquisition of nuclear weapons, argues the New Agenda countries, means that they should be afforded legally binding guarantees not granted by the NPT. Tokyo’s position also stands in marked contrast to the paper submitted to the preparatory committee’s second session for the 2005 Review Conference

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by Malaysia for the Nonaligned Nations, which argued that “a legally binding instrument on security assurances to nonnuclear weapon states should be pursued as a matter of priority.”81 Moreover, Iran, one of the countries labeled by President Bush as a member of the “axis of evil” in January 2002 and repeatedly claimed by his administration to be attempting to violate its nonnuclear status within the NPT, submitted a statement to the 2005 preparatory committee’s second session on the issue of security assurances. The Iranian statement called for the finalization of legally binding negative security assurances that are both comprehensive and unqualified in form.82 At the 2005 NPT Review Conference, Tokyo submitted a working paper that gave very little attention to negative security assurances and demonstrated no urgency that they become legally binding.83

Waging a Nuclear Nonproliferation Campaign In conjunction with its enduring dependence on the U.S.-Japan security alliance, Tokyo’s rejection of the “direct approach” and support for the “realistic and incremental approach” to nuclear disarmament has left it susceptible to the highly preferential treatment that Washington has given to arms control and nonproliferation in the post–Cold War environment. Although Washington has repeatedly expressed its commitment to the NPT regime, considerably more effort has been put into arms control and nonproliferation than into disarmament. A State Department publication issued during the Clinton administration emphasizes the strong U.S. commitment to NPT, to the strengthening of the accord, “and to the broader international nonproliferation and arms control regime.” For the Clinton administration, nuclear disarmament was an “eventual goal,” that is, for sometime in the twenty-first century.84 After the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, there was little ambiguity: Washington’s turned its attention almost exclusively to nuclear nonproliferation, or as it is often called, counterproliferation. The earlier penchant of the Bush administration to minimize or disregard the importance of international agreements evolved into a policy where the United States would ignore the global community’s mandate, as stipulated in the practical steps for implementing Article VI detailed in the 2000 NPT Review Conference’s final report. That the Bush administration had little interest in promoting or safeguarding the “principle of irreversibility,” which is indispensable to an unequivocal commitment to abolish nuclear

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weapons and an effective nuclear disarmament regime, became a casualty of its continuing “war on terror.” When John Wolf, Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation and the U.S. representative to the second session of the preparatory committee meeting for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, presented his statement to this body his discussion focused almost entirely on nonproliferation and noncompliance issues. Apart from a few general comments on the Moscow Treaty, a nuclear weapons accord between the United States and Russia that many critics consider as exceptionally lame, his statement reflected the point that “proliferation is on the front page of newspapers all over the world and worry over its threat is on the minds of all of our citizens.” Wolf referred to the past Iraqi threat, but also detailed the noncompliance problems associated with the other two countries that constitute the “axis of evil,” Iran and North Korea.85

Conclusion The central problem for Tokyo is that it is caught between Washington’s global objectives and its claimed interest in designing and implementing an effective anti-nuclear weapons policy. Tokyo’s continued commitment to the security alliance with Washington has restrained its enthusiasm for the complete abolition of nuclear weapons and keeps it locked into a gradual approach to disarmament.86 Because of this commitment, the Japanese government has lacked the diplomatic enthusiasm and credibility it needs to promote nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament as a unified policy that seeks the abolition of nuclear weapons within a reasonable timeframe. While Tokyo continues to express support for both the CTBT and the FMCT, there are shortcomings in too many areas associated with its approach to nuclear disarmament. These shortcomings have caused Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons organizations to be generally dissatisfied with the government’s disarmament efforts. Nestled comfortably under the U.S nuclear umbrella, too often Tokyo is not seen as a legitimate international broker for nuclear disarmament. Firm commitment to Washington’s counterproliferation campaign, active military support for the U.S.-led war on terrorism, and recent discussions on the revision of Japan’s peace constitution have not served to shore up Tokyo’s image as a government embracing an impartial and unified nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament policy.

Chapter 7 Tokyo and the Axis of Evil

Similar to what it had done with regard to Iraq prior to disposing of the regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Washington drew world attention to its position that North Korea and Iran, the other two “axis of evil” countries, threatened international security because of their nuclear weapons programs. After the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, Washington became aware that to shape an international counterproliferation policy it was not sufficient to draw public attention to an issue. It needed the support of foreign governments. Determined to become a “normal country,” the Japanese government has almost consistently backed Washington’s policies toward the axis of evil counties, serving as an important anti-proliferationist from the beginning of the war on terrorism.

From Iraq Onward It mattered little to the Bush administration that Iraqi weapons of mass destruction could not be found. Nor did it matter that the claims President Bush made during his 2003 state of the union address—“The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa” and “Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production”—proved to be entirely baseless.1 In addition to President Bush, key members of his administration had unabashedly justified the invasion of Iraq by claiming that Saddam Hussein was an imminent threat who possessed WMD (weapons of mass destruction) and had committed his regime to developing nuclear weapons, something that

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was unambiguously antithetical to Tokyo’s push for nuclear disarmament. In March 2002, Vice President Richard Cheney stated that Saddam Hussein “is actively pursuing nuclear weapons at this time, and we think that’s cause for concern for us and or everyone in the region.” Even the Bush administration’s moderate voice, Secretary of State Colin Powell, proclaimed at the United Nations in February 2003 that, “We have no indication that Saddam Hussein has ever abandoned his nuclear weapons program. On the contrary, we have more than a decade of proof that he remains determined to acquire nuclear weapons.” Questioned in November 2003 about Cheney’s and Powell’s comments, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohamed ElBaradei indicated, that “these statements were not supported by the facts as we have seen them, and I don’t think we have today any evidence to support the statement that Iraq was trying to develop its—or reconstitute its [—] nuclear weapons.”2 Like the Bush administration, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi was reluctant to face the reality that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq did not have WMD and an active nuclear weapons program. Consistent with the repeated statement that Japan is America’s closest ally in Asia, Koizumi continued to contend that WMD could be found in Iraq. Indeed, in February 2004, even after David Kay—the former head of Washington’s Iraq Survey Group looking for WMD there—told the U.S. Senate’s Armed Services Committee in January that his group’s work uncovered no evidence that Saddam Hussein had WMD, Koizumi still maintained that, “We cannot at present say firmly that Iraq does not have WMD. The rationale for supporting the war has not been lost.”3 With a policy of a preemptive strike in place and with President Bush having formally declared, “mission accomplished” in Iraq, his administration continued to present the case to the international community that there is a need to strengthen counterproliferation measures. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation Andrew Semmel stated at the second session of the preparatory committee for the 2005 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in Geneva that although the Iraqi threat had been eliminated, “other dangers gather.” Elaborating on the nonproliferation and noncompliance themes discussed by Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation John Wolf, Semmel emphasized the serious threats posed by North Korea and Iran, maintaining that both countries had been surreptitiously maintaining programs to develop nuclear weapons. Semmel argued that very serious problems today relate to the failure of some states to comply with Article II of the accord, which makes nonnuclear weapons states legally bound to their commitment not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. Seeing nuclear disarmament through the prism of the world’s only superpower and the major nuclear weapons nation, Semmel stressed

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that, “more states with nuclear weapons means a more dangerous world. It also means that the overall goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons would become even more difficult to achieve.”4 With Saddam Hussein and his Baathist government gone, the Bush administration lost little time zeroing in on Iran. In the heightened frenzy that characterized Washington after September 11, the Bush administration vociferously argued after the defeat of Saddam Hussein that Tehran’s violation of its NPT commitments so that Iran could develop nuclear weapons represented a serious security and proliferation problem. The Bush administration has repeatedly tried to bring the Iranian nuclear problem to the U.N. Security Council so that Tehran can be sanctioned. Moreover, Washington intimated that Iran could become a military target of the U.S. global war on terrorism. For Washington, Iran represents all things bad in the Middle East. Iran is strongly anti-American and anti-Israeli; it a terrorist nation, remaining one of the countries identified by Washington as a state sponsor of terrorism; it violates human rights, and it is determined to obtain WMD, including nuclear arms.5 The Bush administration’s public problems with North Korea formally began in the fall of 2002. Several days after a U.S. delegation returned from trip to the North Korean capital of Pyongyang, the Bush administration revealed that the communist Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) had been maintaining a clandestine uranium-enrichment program to produce nuclear weapons. From the beginning of the U.S.-DPRK crisis, Washington made clear that all options remained on the table, including a military one. Tokyo’s response to the Bush administration’s identification of Iraq, North Korea, and Iran as constituting the core of the axis of evil was fully consistent with its efforts to acquire for Japan the status of a “normal country.” For Japan this meant a stronger military posture than it had previously, identifiable contributions to international security and, most especially, a tacit commitment from Tokyo to, when possible, help Washington meet its objectives. At the very least, Tokyo would apply as much political pressure as it could to help Washington achieve its international objectives. Having already provided noncombat assistance to the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11, the Koizumi government showed no reluctance to support the American-led invasion of Iraq. Although the invasion of Iraq had not been sanctioned by the United Nations, a key pillar of Japan’s security posture for many years, Koizumi was quick to endorse Washington’s march into Baghdad. During a televised speech to the nation in March 2003, Prime Minister Koizumi declared his endorsement of the Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq. Always cognizant of Japan’s security relationship with Washington, Koizumi stressed, “We will dedicate our efforts

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to obtaining public understanding of the importance of our alliance with the United States and the importance of international cooperation.”6 Ignoring considerable public opposition,7 the Koizumi government was able to get authorization for sending Japan’s Self Defense Forces (SDF) to Iraq. In February 2004 Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage stated that, “I believe that Prime Minister Koizumi has set a new benchmark, not just in the dispatch of Japanese Self Defense Forces to Iraq, but also in redefining Japan’s role in the world, as well as finding a way forward for this country.”8 Although assigned a humanitarian and reconstruction mission, the SDF deployment to Iraq was nonetheless the first time the Japanese military had been in a war zone since World War II. Determined to demonstrate support for the U.S. global war on terrorism, the Koizumi government later approved an extension of the SDF deployment in Iraq past the initial midDecember 2004 deadline,9 even though survey data had shown that nearly two-thirds of the respondents did not favor this.10 Consistent with Washington policies, Tokyo demonstrated its preference for taking a hard line approach toward North Korea, different from that advocated by Beijing, Seoul, and Moscow. Although Tokyo readily accepted the inherent “evil” in the policies of Hussein’s Iraq and Kim’s North Korea, it had to follow a different track with Iran, since Japanese-Iranian relations had been good for a number of years. Still, for several months Tokyo supported Washington’s IAEA-centered counterproliferation strategy on Iran but later recognized that Japan’s energy needs were more important.

The Iranian Nuclear Threat The Iranian problem between the administration of George W. Bush and Tehran initially centered on the matter that in 1991 Iran had not reported to the IAEA information pertaining to a small portion of uranium in its possession. The Bush administration left no room for confusion: this, and then other undisclosed actions, meant that Tehran intended to develop nuclear weapons. President Bush maintained that the United States and other countries “will not tolerate the construction of a nuclear weapon”11 by Iran and later stated that the international community will condemn the Iranians “if they continue with their nuclear weapons program.”12

Accusations and Denials Despite the continued claims by Washington that Iran was working to develop nuclear weapons, for example, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

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maintained in June 2003 that, “The assessment is that they [the Iranians] do have a very active program and are likely to have nuclear weapons in a relatively short period of time,”13 Tehran repeatedly denied U.S. allegations. Tehran argued in its June 2003 statement to the IAEA that the organization’s 2002 Safeguards Implementation Report showed that a number of other countries do not have pristine reporting records and that this “clearly shows that hardly any member state can claim to be impeccable.”14 Although the Bush administration turned a deaf ear to the Iranian government’s retort to the U.S. charge that Tehran has been cheating on its NPT commitment, a Malaysian ambassador, voicing the sentiments of the nonaligned countries, stated that, “There are many other counties that have failed to report, not just Iran.”15 At the top of the list of countries today where there is no official documentation of activities related to nuclear weapons is Israel, which is one of the few nations in the world that has never acceded to the NPT. In its June statement to the IAEA Tehran stressed that it was not attempting to obtain or develop nuclear arms. It argued that for Iran nuclear weapons “have no place in its defence doctrine,” since it considers their acquisition, development, and use to be “inhuman, immoral, illegal and against its very basic principles.” Shortly after this in Tehran, President Mohammad Khatami reiterated that Iran has no desire to develop nuclear weapons.16 Later, Khatami stressed that U.S. accusations that Iran is clandestinely working to acquire nuclear arms are wrong, since it “cannot use such weapons based on our Islamic and moral teachings.” Khatami also pointed out that Iran would not be abandoning its nuclear technologies, which are for civilian purposes and which the NPT gives it a legitimate right to possess.17 In his report released to the public in mid June 2003, IAEA Director General ElBaradei indicated that Iran’s failure to be transparent about its nuclear activities is a cause for concern but that it is cooperating with the IAEA to correct the problems. His report emphasized that while the amount of uranium that Tehran failed to reveal as it is obligated to do in its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA is small (0.13 effective kilograms), it could be used for research and development work. However, the director general’s report also stated that Tehran’s undeclared uranium would necessitate additional processing before it could satisfy the fissile requirements of an explosive device. The chairman’s report urged Iran to sign an Additional Protocol to the NPT.18 By signing and then ratifying an Additional Protocol, Iran would be authorizing an intensive and intrusive IAEA inspections regime, which would be very helpful in assuaging the concerns of the international community. Khatami suggested that his country might sign the Additional Protocol “if the world recognizes” Iran’s right to possess nuclear technologies for civilian use.19

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At the time, Iran was hardly alone in not having approved an Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. In June 2003, only 78 states had signed an Additional Protocol and less than half of these—just 35—had actually ratified them.20 That in 2003 there were 188 state parties to the NPT means that a substantial number of nations had not signed an Additional Protocol and that many more had not ratified them. What is more, 46 countries that are parties to the NPT had not yet established the mandatory Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA.21 Cognizant of all of this, Iran’s Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi pointed out that Tehran expects that when it signs a protocol agreement other states should also be taking the appropriate steps.22

Tokyo’s Involvement Washington’s nuclear problem with Iran soon became a serious matter for Tokyo. Another problem for Tokyo, however, was that unlike the United States, Japan had maintained an amicable relationship with Iran for many years, the two nations having established diplomatic ties in 1926. In early June 2003, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage visited Japan and warned officials in Tokyo of the impending seriousness of the Iranian nuclear problem. At the time of Armitage’s visit, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi indicated that it was necessary to wait for a report from the IAEA before concluding that Iran has been maintaining a nuclear weapons program. A few days later Tokyo, responding to a summary statement by the IAEA, urged Iran “to take the international community’s concern seriously.”23 Just weeks before this Tokyo gingerly mentioned in its statement to the second session of the preparatory committee for the 2005 Review Conference in Geneva that its was important that Iran acquiesce to a high level of transparency, since it is a country that maintains uranium-enrichment facilities that could be redirected to the production of nuclear weapons. At the same time, Tokyo called on Iran to accede to an Additional Protocol to increase the transparency of its nuclear activities with the IAEA.24 The Bush administration remained dogged in its unilateral effort to isolate Iran, pressing the Koizumi government to demonstrate its disapproval of Tehran’s alleged nuclear infractions. Making public its opposition to Japan’s investment in an Iranian oil project,25 U.S. State Department representative Richard Boucher pointed out in a written statement in Washington that American law permits the government to sanction foreign firms that do business with Iran’s energy infrastructure.26 Indeed, in early July 2003 Washington did impose economic sanctions on five Chinese

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companies and one North Korean firm that it said had been helping Tehran develop nuclear weapons.27 Worth about $2 billion, Tokyo had worked on the Azadegan deal with Tehran since July 2001 and wanted very much to finalize it to increase Japan’s petroleum supply that had been curtailed by the loss of rights to an oil field in Saudi Arabia. Giving no heed to Tokyo’s desire to make the deal, the Bush administration told the Koizumi government not to finalize the oil agreement with Iran, since this would give the “wrong message” to Tehran. Besides its friendly relations with Tehran and the fact that oil-poor Japan could certainly benefit from the deal, Tokyo’s problem was that the Japanese consortium involved companies in the private sector. Although the Koizumi government realized it would be very difficult to tell the private sector what to do in the Iranian negotiations, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda stated that the business deal was unlikely to go forward until the nuclear matter had been resolved between Washington and Tehran.28 The Iranian nuclear issue created a serious dilemma for Tokyo. On the one hand, it wanted to secure the oil that the Azadegan deal would eventually yield to Japan. On the other hand, Tokyo realized that doing what Washington wanted mattered a lot. The Bush administration remained relentless: it did not want Tokyo to permit the Japanese consortium to move forward with the Iranian oil deal. There is, however, an equally serious matter that went unnoticed. Tokyo’s subdued frustration with Washington strongly suggested that it would have let the Iranian oil deal go through had not the Bush administration demanded that it do otherwise. There are only two plausible and interrelated explanations of why Tokyo would have been unlikely to interfere with the Iranian oil deal were it not for the insistence of the Bush administration. First, Tokyo did not feel threatened by Iran. Unlike with Pyongyang, Tokyo’s friendly relationship with Tehran did not cause it to worry about any security threat to Japan. If Tokyo suspected that the allegations of the Bush administration eventually would be proven true, the Japanese government would have entered into an oil deal with Tehran while it was pursuing nuclear weapons. This would have not only demonstrated the selectivity of Tokyo’s disarmament efforts, as they have sometimes been in the past,29 but Japan would be giving its imprimatur to a country in the process of illicitly attempting to develop nuclear weapons, something not very likely. The second explanation is that Tokyo did not privately subscribe to the argument of the Bush administration that Tehran had been violating the NPT so that it could develop nuclear weapons. That Washington had missed the mark completely in finding WMD in Iraq meant that Tokyo could have reasonably suspected the quality of U.S. intelligence, its interpretation by Bush administration officials, or both. Had Tokyo really

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believed that Iran was clandestinely maintaining a nuclear weapons program it would not have been urging Tehran during bilateral discussions to show cooperation and transparency in dealing with the IAEA; rather, it would have demanded that it adhere to its NPT commitments and cease its efforts to develop nuclear weapons. In any case, Washington’ counterproliferation concerns quickly became Tokyo’s. After national security advisor Condoleezza Rice and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage sent for Japanese Ambassador Ryozo Kato in Washington to tell him of their objections to the oil deal,30 Tokyo was left with few viable options if it wanted to stay in the good graces of the Bush administration. Attempting to circumvent Washington’s demand, Tokyo maintained that it viewed the Iranian oil deal as a separate issue from the Bush administration’s allegations that Tehran was working to develop nuclear weapons. Tokyo asked Washington to grant Japanese companies the same exemptions from the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act—the law that prohibits non-U.S. firms from doing business with either country—it gives to European corporations. Feeling pressure from Washington, Japan did not sign the oil deal as it wanted to do at this time; instead, Tokyo announced that it would send a high-level official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Iran to encourage Tehran to sign the IAEA’s Additional Protocol.31

Growing Suspicion of Tehran Things looked bad for Tehran when the IAEA completed a report in late August 2003 indicating that, while it welcomed Iran’s increased cooperation, remnants of highly enriched uranium had been found at the Natanz facility and then later at the Kalaye Electric Company. Tehran stated that it was not manufacturing material for nuclear weapons and that the highly enriched uranium came from centrifuge equipment that it had imported from another country. At the same time, Tehran decided to step up its cooperation with the IAEA. On August 24, 2003 Tehran notified the agency in a letter that Iran is “prepared to begin negotiation with the [IAEA] on the Additional Protocol.”32 Shortly after Tehran notified the IAEA of its intentions pertaining to the Additional Protocol, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi met with his Japanese counterpart Kawaguchi in Tokyo. Kharrazi told Kawaguchi that Tehran had no desire to produce nuclear weapons and that his government had just recently decided to begin talks with the IAEA on signing an Additional Protocol.33 Although western critics and the media generally played down the implications associated with the Iranian declaration about the Additional Protocol, Tehran’s announcement did suggest that it had not been concealing a program

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to develop nuclear weapons. The very stringent—including very shortnotice—inspections that are part of the Additional Protocol, which go beyond the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, would make it very difficult for Tehran to conceal or maintain a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Moreover, that no WMD had been found in Iraq meant that the U.S. and British governments already had to contend with a serious credibility problem. Thus, Washington’s credibility problem instantly worsened when Tehran announced its intention to start discussions on the Additional Protocol: two of the three countries said by the Bush administration to belong to the “axis of evil” possibly would not have the weapons, or the programs intended to produce them, that they were alleged to have been concealing from the international community. But Tehran’s announcement that it would begin discussions to sign the Additional Protocol occurred at an inopportune moment. While Kharrazi was telling Kawaguchi of Iran’s intention to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol, six-way talks (the United States, North and South Korea, Russia, Japan, and China) were taking place in Beijing to deal with the North Korean nuclear crisis. What therefore became international news was the heated dispute between the U.S. and the North Korean delegations in Beijing, particularly the bluster by Pyongyang that it was prepared to declare that the DPRK has nuclear weapons and that it might soon conduct a nuclear test to prove this. No sooner had the Beijing talks ended that attention turned to the nuclear issue in Iran. Since the matter had not been resolved, the IAEA’s September 2003 report to its Board of Governors understandably demonstrated the agency’s continuing concerns with the Iranian nuclear issue; but, at the same time, it by no means was alarmist in tone. Relative to the June report, the one issued by the IAEA in September made clear that while work still needed to be done, much had been accomplished during the threemonth period. Besides urging Tehran to accede to an Additional Protocol, the June report concluded that Iran had not thoroughly met its obligations as specified by its Safeguards Agreement; however, this document did indicate that the Iranian government had started to take corrective steps.34 By contrast, the IAEA’s September report to its Board of Governors stressed that Tehran had demonstrated an increased willingness to cooperate with the agency but that some problems still existed and that outstanding concerns needed to be resolved between Iran and the agency. Significantly, the September report saw Tehran’s willingness to begin discussions on an Additional Protocol as a “positive step” made by Iran to resolve the issue.35 Like it had with Iraq and North Korea, the Bush administration demonstrated that it was going to continue pursuing the Iranian nuclear issue in a visibly aggressive manner. But unlike with Iraq where U.S. unilateralism

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prevailed, the Bush administration reasoned that the best way to deal with Iran was by exercising international pressure on Tehran. Thus, the Bush administration decided that it was going to do its best to bring the international community to bear on Iran, even if this was perceived as hubristic and hegemonic and deepening the already strong anti-American sentiment that pervaded the Middle East. Attempting to ratchet up the Iranian nuclear issue in early August 2003, the White House press secretary stated that intrusive inspections of “Iran and its nuclear weapons program” are necessary, and that this problem “remains a serious concern.”36 In late August IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei stated that, “the United States government demands that other nations not possess nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, it is arming itself.”37 Ignoring this admonishment, the Bush administration presented a scathing statement on the Iranian nuclear issue to the IAEA Board of Governors a few days later in Vienna. Presented by Ambassador Kenneth Brill, the U.S. statement focused on the unresolved issues and argued that Tehran’s cooperation was disingenuous and, without explanation, maintained that most of Iran’s so-called increased cooperation with the IAEA “came only in the last two weeks” prior to the director general’s report.38 During five days of private talks in Vienna, Washington worked diligently trying to get the international community to take a tough stand against Iran, arguing that Tehran had been surreptitiously maintaining a program to develop nuclear weapons. Washington insisted that the international community impose an October 31 deadline on Iran, giving Tehran time only until this date to answer all of the IAEA’s outstanding questions. The Bush administration went so far as to send U.S. officials abroad to lobby their counterparts in some countries to adopt a tough approach toward Iran.39 Having only months before failed to win international support for the invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration was pleased when France, Germany, Great Britain, and Russia concurred that the international community had to toughen its position on the Iranian nuclear issue. But despite appearances, there was a political gulf between the United States on the one side and Great Britain, France, Germany, and Russia, on the other. A joint letter sent in August 2003 by Great Britain, France, and Germany to Tehran urged it to accept enhanced U.N. inspections and end its uranium-enrichment program. In exchange, these three European countries suggested that they would possibly share civilian nuclear technology with Iran. Despite the resolute efforts by the Bush administration to prevent the letter from being sent to Tehran, it went anyway.40 Although not associated with this letter, Russia, which worked hard to assuage the tough language preferred by Washington in the IAEA’s September resolution, wanted to make certain that Iran was not attempting to develop nuclear

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weapons. Beyond the immediate benefits to international peace and security, Moscow had another motive—it wanted to ensure that the approximately $1 billion that Russia had invested in Iran to help build the nuclear power facility at Bushehr would not be jeopardized by U.N. sanctions if Tehran had been attempting to develop nuclear weapons. Just a few days after the issuance of the IAEA resolution in September, Moscow announced that there was no evidence that Tehran was technologically capable of developing nuclear weapons.41 The upshot of U.S. pressure was that an IAEA resolution officially imposed a deadline on Iran. Although the Bush administration did not sponsor the September resolution, it certainly was its catalyst. Sponsored by Australia, Canada, and Japan, the resolution was not as tough as Washington would have liked; nonetheless, it served its purpose. The resolution called for Iran to increase its cooperation with the IAEA, for complete transparency of its nuclear operations, for full compliance with its Safeguards Agreement, and for the suspension of its uranium-enrichment and nuclear-reprocessing activities. The resolution decided that Tehran urgently needed to “remedy all failures” that the IAEA has detected “by taking all necessary actions by the end of October 2003,” and requested that Iran, without conditions, quickly sign, ratify, and institute an Additional Protocol.42 Protesting the resolution, the Iranian representative Ambassador Ali Salehi left the IAEA proceedings just prior to its adoption. Commenting on the resolution, an agency spokesperson indicated that, “The resolution was adopted without a vote, a procedure very unusual in the IAEA” and that the Iranian official left in “protest against the resolution and against the procedure.”43 However, before leaving in protest Salehi presented his statement to the IAEA. Salehi insisted that through the use “political bullying” Washington was determined to put the Iranian nuclear issue on a fast track to the U.N. Security Council so that sanctions would be imposed on Iran. Alluding to an argument that the Bush administration had used to help justify its invasion of Iraq, Salehi stressed that Washington is promoting the notion that Iran is an “imminent and clear danger” and privately telling governments around the world that it will become a nuclear problem and threat to international security in six months. Salehi called attention to what he said was public knowledge that at least some in the Bush administration want to invade another country so that the United States can readjust the entire Middle East. He suggested that the sponsors of the resolution had helped Washington by undermining the direction of the IAEA cooperative process and by creating the pretense of multilateralism when American unilateralism had actually been at work. Salehi’s statement challenged the Japanese, Australian, and Canadian representatives, who made only minor changes to the original draft resolution, despite amendments recommended by the

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Nonaligned Movement (NAM). Salehi’s challenge to delegates from Japan, Australia, and Canada was for them to step forward and address the issue of whether Tehran’s full compliance with the IAEA will ensure Iran of its NPT right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Salehi’s statement contended that for the last two decades the Untied States had been interfering with Iran’s right to develop nuclear energy for civilian use and that this has been the reason why it has sometimes proceeded judiciously when working with the IAEA. Not wanting to leave unstated his view of the Israeli nuclear arsenal, Salehi emphasized that Israel has developed nuclear weapons and has been “pampered instead of being chastised.”44 The statement by the NAM to the IAEA’s Board of Governors questioned the utility of having the end-of-October deadline, arguing that the resolution suggested that Iran’s compliance after that date no longer appeared to be needed. Most importantly, the NAM statement emphasized that the resolution went beyond the requirements of the NPT and the Additional Protocol. To underscore its point, NAM requested that there be a legal explanation given for the use of the words “unrestricted access” within the resolution, since this phrase does not appear in the Additional Protocol.45 Tehran continued to insist that its nuclear activities were for peaceful purposes and that the NPT and therefore international law afforded Iran the right to develop and possess nuclear power for civilian use, a position supported by Article IV of the NPT.46 After the September IAEA resolution, Iranian President Khatami again stressed that his country “basically condemns weapons of mass destruction.” Citing Washington as the reason for Iran’s problems with the IAEA and aware of the precedent set by Pyongyang in January 2003, Tehran threatened to withdraw from the NPT and to cease cooperating with the agency. Pointing an accusatory finger at the Bush administration’s hegemonic posturing, Tehran’s representative to the United Nations stated that, “There are people in Washington who do not want to clarify matters—who, in fact, would encourage, invite and welcome negative news from Iran.”47 Because Iran had been included in the Bush administration’s invective of the “axis of evil,” it suspected that part of Washington’s Iranian plan was invasion, regime change, and occupation. The Iranian representative to the IAEA argued that the resolution violated international standards and that some of its stipulations were even beyond what the Additional Protocol required.48 The official debate in Tehran about whether Iran should remain committed to the NPT and move ahead with the negotiations on the Additional Protocol was brief. Three days after the adoption of the IAEA resolution, the leader of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization announced his country would not withdraw from the NPT and that it would continue negotiations

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on an Additional Protocol. Iranian Foreign Minister Kharrazi emphasized that his country did not have a problem with the Additional Protocol but rather with the U.S. position that this would not be sufficient. Kharrazi raised the question of why Tehran should sign the Additional Protocol if Washington remains steadfast in wanting more from Iran than its acceptance of the protocol.49 But Iran’s official decision to stick with the NPT and discuss the Additional Protocol contrasted noticeably with some influential Iranians, including some clerics, who prolonged the discussion about the intention of the IAEA resolution. They remained highly suspicious of U.S. objectives and for this reason kept alive the prospect that Tehran could withdraw from the NPT and not cooperate with the IAEA.50 This prolonged discussion centered on the reoccurring issue of Washington identifying Iran as a threat to peace in the Middle East and determined to acquire nuclear weapons, when it is actually Israel that possesses nuclear weapons, has not signed the NPT or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and therefore has given no consideration to an Additional Protocol. Tehran’s official written response made to the 47th General Conference of the IAEA made clear that it held the United States responsible for the September 2003 resolution. In its statement to the IAEA, Tehran stressed that Washington had employed an especially large amount of pressure on foreign governments to go along with the resolution and that it had interfered with the positions and amendments of NAM members, as well as with those of some of the sponsors. Tehran charged that, although the IAEA resolution appeared to be multilateral in design, it was nothing less than a unilateral action by Washington. Tehran brought attention to the fact that, while the IAEA had acknowledged Iran’s increased cooperation with the agency, Washington had turned this completely around, ultimately causing a disruption in the process. Tehran’s statement emphasized that if the IAEA’s process had not been interfered with, it would have produced complete transparency. Stressing the counterproductive ramifications of the resolution, Tehran drew attention to Washington’s recent retrograde policies that increase the possibility of the United States using nuclear weapons, something clearly contrary to the mandate of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Tehran also pointed disparagingly to the Bush administration’s new policy of preemptive strike, arguing that by using Washington’s reasoning the recent hostile actions by the United States “or its client Zionist regime,” would legitimate preemptive military action by Iran, which it dismissed as being contrary to maintaining international peace and security. Tehran emphasized that the only obstacle standing in the way of the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East is Israel.51

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Tokyo’s Problems The newest twist in the Bush Administration’s counterproliferation campaign against Iran did not take long to create a problem for Tokyo. In late August 2003, a Japan-Iran expert meeting took place in Tokyo to discuss the benefits of Tehran acceding to an Additional Protocol. The Japanese participants encouraged their Iranian counterparts to quickly sign and ratify an Additional Protocol and to cooperate completely with the IAEA. Underscoring Iran’s legal right to develop nuclear energy for civilian use, the Iranian participants at the meeting stated that Tehran had been giving serious thought to the Additional Protocol and wanted to become familiar with Japan’s experiences with acceding to it, a request that Tokyo met.52 The day after this meeting, Iranian Foreign Minister Kharrazi visited Japan and informed officials there that Tehran had decided to begin discussions with the IAEA on an Additional Protocol. Kharrazi also gave Prime Minister Koizumi a letter from Iranian President Khatami. This letter stated that Iran does not have a nuclear weapons program. Japanese government officials encouraged Kharrazi to cooperate with the IAEA and immediately agree to, and completely institute an Additional Protocol. Tokyo assured Foreign Minister Kharrazi that Japan would continue to value its good bilateral relationship with Tehran. Kharrazi stressed that Japan can be sure that its presence in the Middle East is welcome and expressed pleasure that bilateral discussions relating to the Azadegan oil deal were continuing to take place.53 But Tehran did not appreciate the fact that Japan became one of the three sponsors of the IAEA resolution on Iran. An editorial in one of Iran’s leading Persian-language daily newspapers, Kayhan, called for the expulsions of Japanese, Australian, and Canadian diplomats from Iran. The editorial stressed that these foreign diplomats should only be permitted to come back to Iran after they render a full apology to Tehran and the Iranian people.54 Very harsh words also came from the government of Iran. What had been a good Japanese-Iranian relationship had suddenly been strained by Tokyo’s sponsorship of the IAEA resolution that Washington actively promoted. The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced just a few days after the IAEA issued its resolution that, “These three countries [Canada, Australia, and Japan] made a very big mistake and Iran will naturally use its diplomatic clout to respond to the unfriendly move.”55 Tokyo was not apologetic and continued to demonstrate its nonproliferation predilection, now unambiguously putting this above its previously solid relationship with Tehran. Not long after the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced its displeasure with the three-nation sponsors, Tokyo stated that the Japanese government “welcomes the adoption of the

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resolution” that the IAEA had just issued on Iran’s nuclear program. Openly suggesting doubt about the veracity of the August letter that President Khatami had written to Prime Minister Koizumi, which stated that Iran does not have a nuclear weapons program, Tokyo announced that because Japan is very concerned about the Iranian nuclear issue, it was one of the sponsors of the resolution. In this announcement, Tokyo also strongly encouraged Tehran to take care of all outstanding problems by no later than the end of October.56 At the 47th General Conference of the IAEA Tokyo’s statement echoed the sentiments of Washington. Rather than highlighting the report by the director general to the Board of Governors that acknowledged Iran’s enhanced cooperation or that Tehran had reaffirmed its commitment to work with the IAEA on an Additional Protocol, Tokyo’s conference statement first underscored the grave concern and skepticism associated with the Iranian nuclear issue. Tokyo’s statement maintained that the Iranian nuclear issue “has become increasingly serious” and, echoing the theme evident in Washington’s intensified counterproliferation campaign, that both Japan and the international community are “deeply concerned about” it.57 Only after taking a firm counterproliferation stand, which corresponded with Washington’s thinking that the IAEA resolution on Iran demonstrated that the “international community will not tolerate erosions of the nonproliferation regime,”58 did Tokyo urge Tehran to offer its total cooperation to the agency by being completely transparent and by acceding to an Additional Protocol. In contrast, IAEA chief ElBaradei’s conference statement emphasized the need for Iran to expedite its cooperation with the IAEA, be completely transparent, and to resolve outstanding issues, especially those that pertain to the enrichment of uranium.59 Unlike Tokyo, the director general’s statement did not mention the growing seriousness of the Iranian nuclear issue that had become profoundly troubling to global society, nor did it admonish Tehran, as the Japanese representative to the conference did, “to take the international community’s concerns seriously.” The director general later made clear that the end-of-October deadline was not nearly as important as Iran’s continued cooperation with the IAEA and its willingness to be fully transparent about its nuclear program. Regarding this matter, ElBaradei stated that, “I am not going to scuttle the process because of a particular date nor am I going to jump to conclusions.”60 Tokyo was confronted with a political dilemma when Tehran announced at the end of September 2003 that it would sign an Additional Protocol with one condition. Tehran wanted the assurance that by signing an Additional Protocol Iran could proceed with its work to manufacture enriched uranium for peaceful purposes to meet the country’s future energy

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requirements.61 Since Japan’s civilian nuclear programs are extensive, it was difficult for Tokyo not to empathize with Tehran’s desire to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Because Tokyo had repeatedly urged Tehran to accede to an Additional Protocol, Iranian compliance with the IAEA was impossible for Japan to dismiss out of hand. But Tokyo also had to confront the reality that Washington was not about to let Tehran so easily off the counterproliferation hook. What is more, Tokyo knew that the Bush administration was even less likely to concede to Foreign Minister Kharrazi’s insistence that Washington demonstrate that it is “sincere in its call for a dialogue” with Tehran. The argument that Tokyo would begin to develop a Middle East security policy,62 especially one pertaining to Iran, that is independent of the United States appeared to be cogent at a time when Japan was resisting Washington’s insistence that it pull out of the Azadegan oil deal. But this argument could not hold the test of time. Washington’s long counterproliferation arm eventually reached Tokyo and nudged the Koizumi government to move largely in lockstep with the Bush administration. Tokyo’s support of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq provided the first indication of the correspondence between U.S. and Japanese security policies on the Middle East. Later, when Prime Minister Koizumi visited Bush at his Texas ranch in May 2003, the president announced that, “Japan and the United States have a global alliance.”63 Although the importance of the Iranian oil deal initially made Tokyo hesitant about the possibility of spoiling its good bilateral relationship with Tehran, its new global alliance with Washington was enough to win the Koizumi government over, at least for awhile, to the American counterproliferation campaign. During Foreign Minister Kawaguchi’s visit to Iran in May 2002, there was no mention to officials there about the need for Tehran to consider acceding to an Additional Protocol. Kawaguchi had amicable exchanges with several Iranian officials including Foreign Minister Kharrazi and President Khatami. With Kharrazi, she emphasized that international stability depended on regard for international treaties, such as the CTBT, which Iran has signed but not ratified. Kawaguchi told Kharrazi that regional stability would increase if Tehran improved its relations with Washington. During Kawaguchi’s meeting with Khatami, the president told her that Iran would not yield to threats from the United States and expressed his wish that Washington would not develop an imperious policy toward Iran.64 Only after Washington began ringing alarm bells about the serious threat that Iran’s clandestine nuclear weapons program was presenting to international society did Tokyo eventually adopt a strong counterproliferation stand against Tehran.

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European Intercession, Persistent Problems, and Tokyo’s Changing Position Following the letter sent by France, Germany, and Great Britain to Tehran in August 2003, the foreign ministers of these countries traveled to Iran in October 2003. Resulting from the ministers’ trip was a declaration by Tehran that it did not intend to develop nuclear weapons and an affirmation of its commitment to cooperate fully with the IAEA, including its willingness to accept the Additional Protocol and to comply with its rules even before ratification takes place. Although the ministers acknowledged Iran’s right afforded to it by the NPT to develop nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes, Tehran also agreed to cease its uranium-enrichment activities.65 In December 2003, Tehran signed an Additional Protocol to its NPT Safeguards Agreement at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna.66 Director General ElBaradei’s November 2003 report to the IAEA’s Board of Governors made two major points. First, the report stressed that for some time Iran had not fully complied with its NPT Safeguards Agreement, specifically its possession of nuclear material, its reprocessing activities, and by not acknowledging the facilities where work had taken place. Second, the director general indicated that “there is no evidence” that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities” identified and discussed in his report “were related to a nuclear weapons programme.”67 That the November 2003 report was not a straightforward indictment of Iran’s nuclear activities or one that provided at least some technological link to a clandestine nuclear weapons program is not exactly what Washington wanted from the IAEA’s director general. Creating even more ire in Washington was that the IAEA’s November resolution sponsored by Japan, Great Britain, France, and Germany that appeared shortly after the director general’s report was markedly less damaging than the Bush administration had hoped for. The Bush administration continued to want the IAEA to refer the matter to the U.N. Security Council so that Iran could be sanctioned. The compromise resolution reprimanded Tehran for its failure to comply with its Safeguards Agreement; however, the resolution also acknowledged the Iranian government’s statement of cooperation and transparency with the IAEA and its decision to cease uranium reprocessing.68 Just prior to the resolution, Foreign Minister Kharrazi was in Tokyo seeking Japan’s support to help reconcile the nuclear issue. Prime Minister Koizumi responded to Kharrazi’s request by stating that, “Japan and the United States are closely cooperating, and that is why friendly relations between Japan and Iran is [sic] important.”69 What Koizumi did not reveal to Kharrazi was the type of close cooperation that was taking place between

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Washington and Tokyo. Despite the efforts of Secretary of State Powell to get the thirty-five IAEA Board members to refer the Iranian nuclear issue to the Security Council, he was only able to convince Australia, Canada, and Japan that this was the best course to take with Tehran.70 Tokyo understood that it was treading in dangerous political waters. Rejecting Washington’s efforts to get the Iranian matter referred to the Security Council would not be good for the U.S.-Japan security alliance that the Koizumi government had come to place an especially high premium on. But Tokyo also wanted very much to move forward with the Azadegan oil deal. On the same day that the IAEA issued its November resolution, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs produced a statement that attempted to clarify Tokyo’s position. Referring to the concerns in the international community about the Iranian nuclear issue and to the fact that Tehran had not declared everything it should have to the IAEA, the foreign ministry’s statement also tried to demonstrate that Tokyo did not intend to adopt a vituperative, hard line position. Thus, the foreign ministry’s statement concluded by stressing that, “Japan welcomes Iran’s positive and cooperative attitude toward IAEA’s activities and strongly hopes that Iran will remove international concern and establish real confidence with the international community by cooperating fully with the IAEA.”71 In January 2004, Tokyo and Tehran consulted on disarmament and nonproliferation issues. Part of the discussion centered on Tehran’s progress in meeting the IAEA requirements and ratifying the Additional Protocol. Tokyo characterized Tehran’s “detailed explanation as indicating positive steps.”72 Then, in February Tokyo and Tehran concluded the Azadegan oil deal. Both governments had the expectation that the new business venture would further strengthen bilateral relations. However, Tokyo felt compelled to point out in its formal statement announcing the deal that it appreciated Tehran’s cooperation with the IAEA and hoped that the government of Iran would conform with its NPT responsibilities and with the agency’s resolutions so that there would be no damage to Japanese-Iranian relations.73 The imminent signing of the Azadegan oil deal in February prompted U.S. State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher to say, “Our policy has been, with respect to Iran, to oppose petroleum investment there. We remain deeply concerned about deals such as this and disappointed that things might go forward.” Drawing attention away from Boucher’s comments and cognizant that the signing of the oil deal was not the quintessence of Washington’s influence on Japan, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton stressed in Tokyo immediately after the finalization of the contract, “I am not troubled at all. I’m very confident that the view of Japan and the United States on the Iranian nuclear weapons program is essentially the same.”74

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But this was hardly the case. Although Tokyo had worked closely with Washington on its unrelenting counterproliferation campaign against Iran, Japanese officials were now ready to reveal their skepticism of U.S. accusations, mainly because the Azadegan oil deal meant a lot to Tokyo and to a lesser extent because the Bush administration had never proffered any proof that Tehran was attempting to develop nuclear weapons. While the Bush administration’s allegations that Tehran was in breach of its NPT Safeguards Agreement so that it can develop nuclear weapons regularly got the attention of the U.S. media and became the mindset of mainstream academic thinkers,75 Tokyo had its doubts. Tokyo’s dependency on foreign oil forced it to reconsider Washington’s recurring claims. Significantly, in August 2004, several months subsequent to the formal singing of the Japan-Iran oil contract, Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Yukio Takeuchi, indicated that he did not believe that Tehran was attempting to develop nuclear weapons.76

New Discoveries and Tokyo’s Reaction All of this, however, did not mean that Tehran had revealed everything to the IAEA. Suspicions about Tehran’s nuclear objectives resurfaced in February 2004 when the IAEA learned that Iran possessed advanced P-2 centrifuge designs. The P-2 designs would permit more efficiency than the P-1 centrifuge technology that Tehran had reported to the IAEA the previous year and that it had already used, along with a laser-enrichment process, to produce small quantities of low-enriched uranium. While Tehran possessed the P-2 designs, it did not actually manufacture the complete advanced centrifuges, only components, and these by a small private group. Members of the Bush administration, nonetheless, took advantage of Tehran’s failure to be completely forthcoming with the IAEA. Deputy Secretary of State Armitage stressed that, “There is no doubt in our mind that Iran continues to pursue a nuclear weapons program.” Undersecretary of State Bolton maintained that, “This is another act of Iranian deception. It does not lead to any feeling of security that Iran is carrying through on its commitment to suspend enrichment activity.”77 In his statement to the IAEA in Vienna, Ambassador Brill indicated that Tehran is repeating what it had done in the past, by adhering to “a policy of denial, deception and delay.”78 Tehran argued that the Safeguards Agreement did not make it mandatory to report to the IAEA data on P-2 “drawings” and the existence of a few rotor tubes that had been produced in Iran, “since neither construction of a nuclear facility nor nuclear material was involved.”79 However, IAEA’s

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Director General ElBaradei felt differently about the P-2 centrifuge designs, stressing that Tehran’s “possession of the P-2 centrifuge design drawings and associated research, manufacturing and mechanical testing activities is a mater of serious concern” and “a setback to Iran’s stated policy of transparency.” Despite his dissatisfaction with Tehran’s lack of complete transparency, ElBaradei stated in his report that “Iran has been actively cooperating with the Agency.”80 With the Azadegan deal now signed, Tokyo found itself in an undesirable position. Enthusiastic about the newly signed oil contract and unconvinced that Tehran was attempting to develop nuclear weapons but, at the same time, unwilling to jeopardize Japan’s close political relationship with Washington, Tokyo tried to find the middle ground. Tokyo showed its support for the IAEA’s March 2004 resolution, although unlike in the past it no longer was one of its sponsors. The IAEA’s March resolution, sponsored by the United States, Germany, France, and Great Britain, was a compromise reflecting the hard line position of the United States and the relatively conciliatory one supported by the Europeans. Thus, the resolution indicated appreciation for Iran signing the Additional Protocol but also deplored it for not providing a complete account of its centrifuge and related activities.81 Coinciding with the issuance of the resolution, Tokyo released a statement stressing its hope that Tehran recognizes the importance of complying with the resolution and with the agency.82 Immediately after this, when the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Hassan Rowhani, visited Japan, Tokyo stressed that it very much wanted Tehran “to continue its positive moves” and conform with the IAEA requirements so that it can build international confidence and settle the nuclear issue.83 For his part, Rowhani again emphasized the Iranian position that the NPT gives states the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful applications and that this is precisely what Iran is doing.”84 Although still proffering no evidence that Tehran was working to develop nuclear weapons, Washington was resolute in its efforts to have Iran seen by the international community as having breached its NPT commitment. By June 2004, the P-2 centrifuge problem had not been resolved by the IAEA, creating some cause for concern for Director General ElBaradei. The director general also remained concerned about the lack of complete information on the origins of equipment thought to have been imported by Iran that had been contaminated with traces of low- and high-enriched uranium. Still, ElBaradei indicated that the IAEA was continuing to make progress on the Iranian nuclear issue.85 Although the IAEA’s June resolution that had the support of the main European countries deplored Iran for not being fully cooperative with the IAEA, Washington again preferred the adoption of a tougher position. Washington wanted the resolution to

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stipulate a deadline for Tehran’s full compliance with the IAEA; short of this, the Iranian nuclear issue would be sent to the U.N. Security Council where sanctions could be leveled against Iran.86 Tokyo again sought the middle ground. Its statement pertaining to the IAEA’s June 2004 resolution on Iran was nearly identical to the one it made in March.87 Thus, Tokyo wanted the Iranian nuclear issue expeditiously resolved and urged Tehran to comply fully with the requirements of the IAEA’s resolutions. However, some retrogression occurred during the summer of 2004. Disturbed by the failure of Great Britain, France, and Germany to end the nuclear issue, Tehran decided to demonstrate its displeasure. Almost immediately following the IAEA’s June resolution sponsored by Great Britain, France, and Germany that deplored Iran’s failure to be completely cooperative with the agency, Tehran announced its intention to resume work on centrifuges, which could allow for the enrichment of uranium.88 When work actually began in July, Iranian Foreign Minister Kharrazi stressed that, although his government’s decision stemmed from the failure of the three European countries to do what they had promised, Tehran was not going to enrich uranium from the centrifuges.89 Tokyo’s response to Tehran’s decision to restart work on centrifuges was anything but strong. Tokyo issued a brief announcement stating its regret that Tehran had made this decision and urged Iran’s compliance with IAEA resolutions, including the suspension of all centrifuge and related work.90 Except for the Bush administration’s insistence that Tehran was working clandestinely to develop nuclear weapons, the Iranian issue improved by September 2004. Director General ElBaradei reported guarded satisfaction on the progress made in resolving the Iranian nuclear issue. Using a noticeably cautious tone, he noted that the contaminated equipment “may not have resulted from enrichment of uranium by Iran.” He also emphasized that, while more investigation still had to take place, the IAEA had “a better understanding” of all of Iran’s centrifuge work. Urging Tehran to end all enrichment and reprocessing work, ElBaradei stressed that the IAEA “continues to make steady progress in understanding” Iran’s nuclear program.91 However, the Bush administration had a very different take on the matter. Prior to the adoption of the IAEA’s September resolution, it produced a draft document maintaining that Tehran had violated its commitment to the NPT. Stipulating an October 31, 2004 deadline for Tehran to stop all nuclear work, Washington’s draft resolution required Iranian compliance by that date; if not, the matter would be sent to the Security Council. But the Bush administration’s determination to castigate Iran failed, since its draft resolution could not get the support of Great Britain, Germany, France, China, Russia, Canada, and Australia.92 As a result, the IAEA’s September 2004

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resolution, again sponsored by Great Britain, France, and Germany, was relatively mild in tone, and mainly called on Tehran to stop all enrichment work and not to proceed with the building of a heavy-water research reactor.93 Having decided to keep out of the Iranian nuclear issue as best it could, Tokyo issued a statement on the IAEA’s September resolution that was consistent with the ones that it had made in the recent past.94 By November 2004, the Iranian nuclear issue was going in different directions. France, Germany, Great Britain, and the European Union reached a formal agreement with Tehran in mid-November in Paris. The gist of the Paris Agreement allowed Iran to voluntarily suspend its uranium enrichment and reprocessing work, in exchange for rewards provided by the Europeans to Iran.95 In addition to providing technological assistance to Iran, the agreement called for the Europeans to support Tehran’s entry into the World Trade Organization, something strongly opposed by the Bush administration. No sooner had the Paris Agreement become public, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, an Iranian opposition organization, announced that they had new evidence that Tehran has been maintaining a covert program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons at a military facility. The National Council of Resistance of Iran is a political affiliate of the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization, which several European governments and the United States consider a terrorist organization.96 Tehran responded by calling the organization a “discredited terrorist” entity, that, as in the past, is trying to ingratiate Western governments, adding that, “Iran is not involved in any secret nuclear activity and the IAEA is clear about it.”97 Meanwhile, Secretary of State Powell revealed, what had previously been classified information, that Iran has been trying to adapt its missile technology to transport a nuclear weapon.98 Tehran called Powell’s accusations “baseless,” maintaining that American politicians “have repeatedly been disgraced and discredited before the world public opinion due to spreading and inculcating incorrect information.99 IAEA’s ElBaradei did not appear impressed with the evidence made public by the National Council of Resistance of Iran, commenting that, “We follow every credible source of information. There’s a big difference between doing robust verification and harassing a country.”100 In his November 2004 report, the director general emphasized that, “All the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and therefore such material is not diverted to prohibited activities,” noting also that the IAEA is not yet prepared to state definitely that Tehran is not engaged in any undeclared nuclear work.101 Though not appreciated by Washington, the IAEA’s November 2004 resolution reflected the noticeably improved cooperative relationship that Tehran had developed with the IAEA since October 2003 and its willingness to work with Europe.102 ElBaradei alluded to

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Tehran’s improved cooperative relationship with the IAEA in January 2005. During an interview in Switzerland, the director general indicated that if the Iranians “are still cheating, we haven’t seen any evidence of that.” Asked during the interview how long it would take Tehran to build a nuclear weapon, ElBaradei stated that if the Iranians restart the enrichment process they could build a nuclear weapon in a few years. But the director general also stated that, “We haven’t seen signs” that Tehran has “been doing weaponization.”103 Not long after this, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Tehran’s recent activities give reason for Russia to believe that Iran “does not intend to produce nuclear weapons.”104 For its part, Tokyo was content to remain on the sidelines. It had nothing new to say that was different from what it had announced subsequent to the past few IAEA resolutions.105 Tokyo simply wanted the Iranian nuclear issue to end so that it could continue its good relationship with Tehran without pressure from Washington. Taking no counterproliferation initiative for several months to address the incessant allegations against Iran by the Bush administration created the strong impression that Japanese officials remained unconvinced that Tehran was concealing its efforts to develop nuclear weapons. In any case, that the Japanese government had begun traveling a different course than that followed by Washington became evident when Prime Minister Koizumi stated in Tokyo that Japan’s Iranian policies are not the same as those of the United States. Koizumi indicted that while there are remaining international concerns about Tehran’s nuclear activities, this is not a reason for Japan to maintain a hostile relationship with Iran.106 In February 2005, Tokyo indicated that it supported the negotiations between Tehran and Europe. While in Tokyo, Foreign Minister Kharrazi emphasized that Iran wants to do what Japan is doing: not build nuclear weapons, but produce nuclear fuels scrutinized by the IAEA.107 Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura further indicated that Tehran was complying with the IAEA resolutions.108 Still unresolved, the Iranian nuclear issue continues to be chiefly characterized by the Bush administration’s insistence that Tehran has plans to develop nuclear weapons. Tehran, for its part, maintains that, despite Washington’s enduring campaign to pressure the global community to take punitive action against Iran, the nation “considers nuclear weapons and capability to produce or acquire them as detrimental to its security.”109 It is not reasonable to presume that Tokyo would risk further deterioration in the credibility of Japan’s initiatives in the area of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation by ignoring Iran’s—blatant, in the eyes of the Bush administration—efforts to develop nuclear weapons. Whether Tokyo went along with the Bush administration’s charges against Tehran when the

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issue first surfaced because it believed that eventually Washington would be able to provide evidence to support its charges is unclear. What is clear is that for Tokyo the signing of the Azadegan oil contract put Japan’s national interests ahead of the allegations of the Bush administration.

The North Korean Crisis While the Bush administration continued to insist for months that the nuclear issue that emerged in the fall of 2002 between Washington and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was not a crisis, problems with North Korea became increasingly more serious. Certainly, Pyongyang interpreted the nuclear issue as a crisis from the beginning.110 Involved first with Iraq and subsequently with the Iranian nuclear issue, the Bush administration largely left unattended for many months the very serious problems associated with North Korea.

The Early Stage According to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly, DPRK officials told him while he was visiting Pyongyang in early October 2002 that North Korea had been maintaining a clandestine uranium-enrichment program to develop nuclear weapons. The North Korean foreign ministry, however, not only gave a different account of what took place in Pyongyang but also stressed that, “We flatly denied at the early stage of the talks the U.S. accusations of our plan to produce nuclear weapons using enriched uranium,” adding that the DPRK has “never admitted a nuclear weapons development itself.”111 A program to enrich uranium would allow Pyongyang to develop even more nuclear weapons—more because officials in the Bush administration officials have maintained that the DPRK already possesses them. Although the U.S. intelligence community has said for years that North Korea might have extracted enough plutonium to develop a small number of nuclear arms, Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld metamorphosed this conjecture into definitive statements, declaring publicly in late 2002 that they thought the DPRK possessed a few nuclear weapons.112 When these statements were made the DPRK was a signatory to the NPT as a nonnuclear weapons state. Thus, according to international law, as a party to the NPT it would not be permissible for the DPRK to possess nuclear weapons.

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Washington attempted to balance the high-level rhetoric of the DPRK as a rogue state against its insistence that the North Korean nuclear issue could be resolved diplomatically, although it refused to rule out the use of military force. Exerting no substantive effort for months to resolve the nuclear issue with the DPRK bilaterally, the Bush administration essentially gave Pyongyang a reason to exacerbate it—and this is exactly what it did. Pyongyang reasoned that since the Bush administration refused to deal bilaterally with the DPRK and was in no hurry to resolve the nuclear dispute, this was enough of a justification for taking a series of provocative steps. In December 2002, the DPRK threw out IAEA inspectors. Shortly after this, the DPRK restarted its dormant nuclear facility at Yongbyon, which would eventually permit it to reprocess plutonium. On January 10, 2003, Pyongyang officially announced that it was withdrawing from the NPT, which legally meant that the DPRK would no longer be bound by the accord as a nonnuclear weapons state three months later, in April 2003. Although it took these steps, Pyongyang maintained in late January during high-level North-South discussions in Seoul, that despite its withdrawal from the NPT, “we have no intention of producing nuclear weapons at this stage.”113 Tokyo immediately commented on Pyongyang’s announcement that it was withdrawing from the NPT, stressing that it was very troubled by this decision and urged the DPRK to demonstrate its full commitment to the status of a nonnuclear weapons state. Suggesting a desire to settle the North Korean nuclear issue diplomatically, Tokyo’s statement emphasized that it would work closely with Washington, Seoul, other concerned governments, and the IAEA to do this.114 While Tokyo claimed to favor diplomacy to resolve the DPRK nuclear issue, it remained a staunch supporter of the U.S. hard line approach and itself threatened Japanese economic sanctions against North Korea. Pyongyang eventually began extracting reprocessing fuel from the spent fuel rods at its facility in Yongbyon. In June 2003, Pyongyang clarified its position: “The DPRK will put further spurs to increasing its nuclear deterrent force for self-defence as a just self-defence measure to cope with the U.S. strategy to isolate and stifle the DPRK the danger of which is increasing with each passing day.”115 By July 2003, Pyongyang claimed to have reprocessed plutonium that would enable it to develop nuclear weapons. Still, none of this reached the level of a crisis for the Bush administration. If the DPRK did not have nuclear weapons in October 2002, Pyongyang had put the country on the course to develop them in the not too distant future. But while the Bush administration continually tried to downplay the nuclear crisis, it could not lose sight of the size of the DPRK’s known

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military strengths. The DPRK has a military force that exceeds one million, and its proven missile delivery capability could wreak havoc on the proximate civilian populations in South Korea and Japan, as well as on the more than 72,000 U.S. troops stationed in these countries.116 That the DPRK nuclear issue officially did not reach the level of a crisis in the Bush administration does not mean that it did not want to promote one in Japan. Before going public about North Korea in October, Washington told Tokyo in August 2002 that the DPRK’s uranium-enrichment program would permit it to manufacture a nuclear weapon by 2004.117 In June 2003, Tokyo announced that Washington had informed the Koizumi government that the DPRK might have several miniaturized nuclear weapons that could be affixed to missiles that could strike Japan.118 Since the DPRK had never tested a nuclear warhead and because comments by U.S. officials that North Korea possesses them had been based on conjecture rather than facts, Tokyo remained concerned but uncertain about whether or not Pyongyang had nuclear weapons capabilities. One thing that Washington did accomplish in notifying Tokyo about the DPRK’s possible possession of miniaturized nuclear weapons is that it allowed support to grow in Japan for developing a missile defense system with the United States. Creating a crisis in Japan about the threat coming from North Korean missiles gave undecided officials in Tokyo much more of a reason to support moving missile defense research with the United States to the developmental stage. What Pyongyang mainly wanted from Washington was a nonaggression agreement, a formal promise from the United States that it would not attack the DPRK. For the most part, the Bush administration’s position was to refuse to make such a formal commitment until Pyongyang verifiably ended its nuclear program. The Bush administration also insisted that the resolution of the dispute could only occur through multilateral discussions, which, in addition to the United States and the DPRK, would include China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia. Although North Korea would not have been averse to accepting economic assistance from Japan and South Korea, Pyongyang stressed that it wanted to resolve the issue via bilateral dialogue with Washington, claiming that the nuclear dispute was between the United States and the DPRK and not the other countries. In April 2003, discussions took place in Beijing between U.S. and DPRK officials, with China serving as the host for the talks. Pyongyang’s alleged omission during a private conversation in Beijing between U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kelly and the DPRK representative Ri Gun that North Korea possessed nuclear weapons was consistent with earlier claims by senior members of the Bush administration. Very soon after U.S., North Korean, and Chinese officials met in Beijing, Pyongyang stated that, “the DPRK’s

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media have not confirmed the information” relating to the reported admission to Kelly that North Korea possessed nuclear weapons.119 Pyongyang’s alleged disclosure in Beijing that it had nuclear weapons should not have been shocking to Washington, since by then the claim was not new and had followed directly from the public comments made by senior Bush administration officials that North Korea already had them. In early March 2003, well before the Beijing revelation in late April, Pyongyang stated explicitly what some U.S. officials had been publicly claiming for some time. Pyongyang gave ten reasons why the United States could not attack the DPRK, as it did Iraq; included in reason number one was Pyongyang’s statement that, “The U.S. speculates that North Korea has already one or two nuclear weapons.”120 Thus, Pyongyang managed to acquire a nuclear deterrent from public statements made by Bush administration officials, even though they did not have supporting evidence that the DPRK possessed nuclear weapons.

Tokyo’s Position For two important reasons, the North Korean crisis for Tokyo was very different from the Iraqi and Iranian issues. First, the strengthened security guidelines between Japan and the United States that were finalized in the late 1990s meant that Tokyo had regional security responsibilities in East Asia. If the United States deemed it necessary to take military action against the DPRK to end the nuclear dispute, it would be very difficult for Japan not to become actively involved in the fighting. The fear of Japan being pulled into a U.S. war121 reached 80 percent, according to a cabinet office survey conducted in January 2003, up sharply from 65.4 percent who felt this way in an earlier poll performed in 2000. Although the increased fear among the Japanese people reflected the international conditions relating to Iraq and to the DPRK, nearly 75 percent of the respondents believed that the most serious security threat to Japan comes from North Korea.122 Second, unlike Iraq, which was a world away, and unlike Iran, which maintained good relations with Japan, the historically inimical relationship between Tokyo and Pyongyang made the Koizumi government very aware that in any military conflict Japanese targets would be a priority for the DPRK—nuclear weapons or not. Before the Bush administration’s October 2002 announcement that the DPRK was secretly maintaining a uranium-enrichment program, and just a few weeks prior to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s first historic trip to Pyongyang in September of that year, Washington passed this information

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along to Tokyo. The purpose of Koizumi’s visit to the North Korean capital was to improve Japanese-DPRK relations. Koizumi’s one-day trip to North Korea produced two major results. The first was the Pyongyang Declaration. Prime Minister Koizumi and Chairman Kim signed the Pyongyang Declaration during their one-day summit in the North Korean capital. Because of the goodwill expressed in the Pyongyang Declaration, the Koizumi-Kim summit also led subsequently to normalization talks between Japanese and DPRK officials. However, the problems that resulted from Washington’s public announcement that North Korea had been concealing a uranium-enrichment program left Tokyo with the only option it had to accept: stand resolutely behind what the United States feels is right for security in East Asia.123 Although normalization talks did take place in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in late October between Japan and North Korea, Tokyo’s concerns about the DPRK’s alleged uranium-enrichment program and the failure to resolve the abduction issue, caused the discussions to fizzle, as they had done many times in the past. The abduction of Japanese citizens during the 1970s and 1980s by the DPRK had been consistently denied by Pyongyang but during the September 2002 summit Kim Jong Il acknowledged to Koizumi North Korea’s culpability in the kidnappings. Although the abduction issue has remained the paramount concern of the Japanese people, for Washington it has been the DPRK nuclear imbroglio—something Tokyo has had to keep in mind.

The Bush Administration’s Perspective and Pyongyang’s Reaction The Bush administration made it clear from the beginning in January 2001 that it did not support the more conciliatory approach toward North Korea practiced by the Clinton White House. It did not like the 1994 Agreed Framework, the formal bilateral agreement between the United States and the DPRK that ended the nuclear dispute in the previous decade; it did not trust North Korea; and it certainly did not hold North Korean leader Kim in high regard. Peppered with ideological assumptions and ad hominem symbolism, the Bush administration’s policy toward the DPRK quickly became simple and straightforward: significant distrust of Pyongyang coupled with a hard line—and what some have called a hubristic—approach. But Pyongyang also exacerbated the crisis. Along with its vitriolic rhetoric, Pyongyang took a number of steps, as we have seen earlier, such as withdrawing from the NPT, specifically intended to provoke Washington. From the outset, Pyongyang has remained consistent about a few things. Pyongyang has stressed that the hard line attitude of Washington remains a

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major obstacle in the way of resolving the crisis, as is the failure of the Bush administration to commit formally to a nonaggression agreement. During Kelly’s October 2002 meeting in Pyongyang, the DPRK contends that he maintained “a high handed and arrogant attitude.” Pyongyang claims that Kelly stressed that not only would the DPRK’s relationship with the United States remain strained if it did not comply with Washington, but that its relations with Japan and South Korea would also not improve.124 While it is said that Washington brought to Pyongyang indisputable proof that it had been maintaining a uranium-enrichment program,125 North Korea contends that, “Producing no evidence, he [Kelly] asserted that the DPRK has been actively engaged in the enriched uranium program in pursuit of possessing nuclear weapons in violation of the DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework.”126 Besides the DPRK violating the Agreed Framework, Washington argued that its admission of a uranium-enrichment program was a breach of several other of its international commitments: the NPT, the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and its IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Should Pyongyang have such a program it would be abusing the spirit of the NPT and the Agreed Framework, while being in violation of its IAEA Safeguards Agreement and the Joint Declaration on the Denulcearization of the Korean Peninsula.127 Pyongyang charged Washington with violating its international commitments as well. Especially during the early months of the crisis, Pyongyang stressed that Washington had directly violated the Agreed Framework when President Bush, in his January 2002 state of the union address, included the DPRK in the “axis of evil” and subsequently revealed its plans to launch a preemptive nuclear attack against North Korea.128 Occurring well before the October 2002 nuclear issue emerged, the threat to strike the DPRK with nuclear weapons, directly violated the Agreed Framework, which states: “The U.S. will provide formal assurances to the DPRK against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.”129 Moreover, Pyongyang argued that the threat to attack the DPRK with nuclear weapons undermined its status as a nonnuclear state and violated the spirit of NPT.130 Pyongyang also referred to a special session of the U.N. General Assembly in 1978 when, during the Carter administration, the United States pledged not to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states that are parties to the NPT.131 As Washington and Pyongyang repeatedly argued that the other caused the demise of the Agreed Framework, the bilateral agreement that froze the DPRK’s nuclear program, the crisis remained unresolved, leaving Japan, South Korea, and China concerned about the prospect of regional instability. Pyongyang refused to yield to Washington’s demand that talks could proceed only after the DPRK proved that it had disarmed itself. Pyongyang

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became even more resolute on this matter after the United States invaded Iraq, arguing that Baghdad’s insistence that it did not possess WMD, and no evidence proving otherwise from international inspectors, failed to stop the U.S. invasion. Washington refused to yield to Pyongyang’s demand to discuss their dispute bilaterally, maintaining that the DPRK nuclear issue was a multilateral problem. Cognizant of what could occur if the crisis remained unresolved, the April 2003 discussions Beijing hosted between Washington and Pyongyang allowed both sides to feel that the concession came from the other. Washington suggested that because the talks involved Beijing, they were multilateral. Because Pyongyang did not want South Korea and especially Japan involved in the discussions, it believed that by having Beijing, its most important ally, serve as the host of the talks the DPRK had won a symbolic victory. The April talks, however, went nowhere.

Tokyo’s Allegiance Tokyo’s nearly complete support of Washington helped to make the JapanDPRK Pyongyang Declaration lose most of its purpose as the crisis wore on. The Pyongyang Declaration spoke of mitigating the “history” problem between Japan and the DPRK, of cooperation to improve the security environment in Northeast Asia, of the absence of threats to each other’s security, and of cooperation in settling nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula.132 Pyongyang became convinced during the nuclear crisis that Tokyo had resorted to its past behavior of simply “toeing the U.S. line,” asserting that it was very quick to support America’s invasion of Iraq in 2003 and, by depending on its strengthened security alliance with Washington, wants to exercise hegemonic control over Asia.133 In contrast, Seoul continued to question Washington’s hard line approach toward the DPRK,134 and in late June 2003 indicated that, contrary to U.S. intelligence reports that speak of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, South Korea has “no compelling evidence to prove these claims.”135 The Bush administration became exasperated not with just South Korea, but also with Russia and China.136 Tokyo’s support of the U.S. position left it unable to deal seriously with public sentiment in Japan toward North Korea. Even though two-thirds of the Japanese people, according to a government survey, wanted to normalize relations with North Korea,137 Tokyo continued to feel compelled to support Washington’s tough approach toward the DPRK. This support not only did not bode well for normalizing Japan-North Korean relations but it also helped to explain why Tokyo’s interest in the DPRK nuclear crisis sometimes appeared as more important than the abduction issue, the major concern of the Japanese people.

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Tokyo let Washington shape each step of the policy approach toward the DPRK. Tokyo took Washington’s suggestion to bring up the nuclear issue during the October 2002 normalization discussions, something that Pyongyang immediately rejected because it insisted that the crisis needed to be resolved between the United States and the DPRK. Despite the importance of KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) in sustaining the Agreed Framework, Tokyo eventually conceded, along with Seoul, to Washington’s demand to end heavy oil shipments to the DPRK beginning in December 2002.138 At the same time, Tokyo announced that it supported Washington’s hard line approach toward North Korea. At the two-plus-two ministerial meetings held in Washington in December, Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi declared that, with respect to the DPRK nuclear issue, between the U.S. and Japanese governments “there is no difference, no fundamental difference of position—absolutely none in that respect.”139 Consistent with Washington’s hard line approach, Tokyo announced in January 2003, that it had been giving some thought to hitting the DPRK with economic sanctions, if North Korea took steps to worsen the crisis. At about the same time, Pyongyang announced that it might resume missile testing.140 This was another possible blow to the Pyongyang Declaration, since in this document the DPRK formally expressed to Tokyo its commitment to extend the moratorium on missile testing beyond 2003. Demonstrating its overriding interest in nonproliferation relative to disarmament and fully consistent with Washington’s global objective, Tokyo issued a strong statement on January 10, 2003, the day the DPRK announced its intent to withdraw from the NPT, emphatically advising Pyongyang “to immediately retract its decision and take prompt action to dismantle its nuclear development programs.”141 In May 2003, when Prime Minister Koizumi visited Bush at his ranch in Crawford, Texas the president stated that while Washington and Tokyo want to resolve the nuclear issue with the DPRK diplomatically, “we agree that further escalation of the situation by North Korea will require tougher measures from the international community.” Prime Minister Koizumi’s comments further reinforced the U.S. position on the DPRK, pointing out that although Washington maintains the view that “all options will remain available,” President Bush remains certain that the problems can be resolved peacefully.142 Tokyo’s inability to improve Japan’s relations with North Korea, gave Beijing, which already had an advantage because of its good relationship with Pyongyang, the unique opportunity to favorably position China in the DPRK nuclear crisis as the stabilizing diplomatic force in East Asia.143 That Beijing had made a demonstrable effort to position itself as a diplomatic liaison in the North Korean nuclear crisis was well understood in Seoul.144

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At times at odds with Washington, Seoul, like Beijing, remained determined to peacefully resolve the problem without antagonizing or further alienating Pyongyang. In April 2003, Washington began trying to convince the U.N. Security Council that a reprimand of the DPRK was in the best interest of international stability. Concerned about how a reprimand would affect future talks to end the crisis, Beijing and Moscow stood in opposition to a U.N. condemnation of the DPRK.145 Pyongyang maintained that any such action by the Security Council would be nearly tantamount to an act of war. While Seoul often expressed its disagreement with the Bush administration’s rigid and hard line approach toward North Korea, Tokyo remained Washington’s loyal ally, saying nothing about the U.S. effort to get the Security Council to reprimand the DPRK.

Six-Party Talks: Round One Pyongyang’s concession in August 2003 served to create some degree of optimism when it agreed to multilateral talks in Beijing. The multilateral talks held in Beijing during August did not end abruptly, as did the April meetings. Other than this and the fact the participants agreed to hold discussions in the near future, the August meetings resolved nothing. Washington and Pyongyang, the principal disputants, could find no common ground. Prior to the talks, Bush administration hard liners remained adamant. Beijing’s request that participants approach the meetings willing to make concessions had no effect on the hard liners within the Bush administration; for them, North Korea was to get no concessions of any sort until it first agreed to dismantle its nuclear program. Just weeks before the meetings in Beijing, John Bolton, the ultraconservative U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, delivered an acrimonious speech on North Korea while visiting Asia, calling DPRK leader Kim Jong Il, among other things, a “tyrannical rogue.” Suggesting that the hard liners had won out over the less influential and far less numerous moderate voices within the Bush administration, and that during the multilateral discussions Washington would remain obdurate to Pyongyang’s repeated request that North Korea receive a written nonaggression commitment from the United States, was the hasty resignation of Charles “Jack” Pritchard. Shortly before the multilateral discussions were to begin, Pritchard, an advocate of a conciliatory approach toward Pyongyang within the Bush administration and its special envoy for negotiations with North Korea, resigned his position, leaving little doubt that the U.S. delegation to the Beijing talks would remain inflexible.146

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While Tokyo demonstrated concern for the nuclear issue, it also wanted to focus on the unresolved matter of the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea during the 1970s and 1980s. However, apart from Tokyo, none of the other parties believed that the multilateral meetings were the proper place to discuss the abduction issue. Although U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kelly made passing mention to the abduction issue in his opening remarks on the first day of the three-day meetings, Tokyo was largely left on its own to resolve what the other parties saw as a bilateral problem. Tokyo did manage to engage North Korea in a bilateral discussion on the abduction issue; however, these talks got nowhere, as both sides accused the other of not fulfilling their commitments.147 During his speech on the first day of the six-party talks, DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Kim Yong Il stressed that, “It is not our goal to have nuclear weapons.” Kim reiterated a common theme that for months had come out of Pyongyang, which was that it wanted to see a noticeable change in Washington’s hostile policy toward the DPRK. Kim proposed a “package solution” that required “simultaneous actions.” Of foremost concern to Pyongyang was a nonaggression treaty between the DPRK and the United States. Kim emphasized that the treaty that Pyongyang sought was not a demand for a security assurance from Washington but rather a legal document that obligated both the United States and the DPRK to make a binding commitment to nonaggression. As Kim noted, Pyongyang also sought diplomatic relations with Washington, American support for economic cooperation between Japan and South Korea, resumption of KEDO’s suspended heavy oil shipments, and compensation for the electric power lost because of the delay in the construction of the light-water reactors stipulated in the Agreed Framework between the DPRK and the United States. In return, Kim said that the DPRK would not produce nuclear weapons, but would permit inspections, dismantle its nuclear facilities, freeze missile testing and end the exporting of missiles. Kim insisted that prior to the suspension of the Agreed Framework Pyongyang had completely met its commitment to the accord. He stressed that when U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kelly visited Pyongyang in October 2002, without evidence, he abrasively accused the DPRK of violating the Agreed Framework by clandestinely maintaining a program to produce highly enriched uranium. To this accusation, Kim stated that DPRK clearly pointed out that “we have no secret nuclear program.” It was in this hostile environment, Kim said, that the DPRK proclaimed “we are entitled to have weapons more powerful than those based on enriched uranium,” words that many times found their way to the ears of millions throughout the world. Kim indicated during his speech in Beijing that after Kelly left Pyongyang in October 2002, Washington deluded the public, by declaring that the DPRK admitted to having a uranium-enrichment program.148

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During a bilateral discussion at the August 2003 meetings in Beijing, the U.S. delegation rejected the DPRK’s proposal for simultaneous actions. Before the Bush administration could begin to consider Pyongyang’s concerns and address a broader range of bilateral issues, the U.S. delegation made clear that the DPRK would have to accept the U.S. demand for complete, irreversible and verifiable disarmament. Washington’s first disarmament proposal was unacceptable to Pyongyang,149 especially since it observed the U.S. invasion of Iraq after its declaration that it had no WMD. By at least the second day of the meetings, the DPRK delegation concluded that Washington had retained its hostile policy toward North Korea. During what appears to have been another heated dispute between the American and the DPRK delegation, North Korea told U.S. officials that it will demonstrate to the world that it has nuclear weapons by performing a nuclear test and that it has the means to deliver nuclear weapons. Although few specific details about the Beijing meetings found their way to the outside world, these comments were quickly dispatched to Washington and just as quickly to the international media. The Bush administration’s stressed that its objective was to dismantle the DPRK nuclear program, completely, verifiably, and irreversibly.150 Regarding Pyongyang’s alleged threat to conduct a nuclear test, Beijing reported that this was “according to a U.S. official.”151 Apart from retaining its strong interests in resolving the abduction issue, Tokyo’s position on the DPRK nuclear crisis during the first round of the six-party talks was virtually indistinguishable from that taken by Washington. Like Washington, Tokyo demanded that nothing could happen until Pyongyang took the initial step of dismantling its nuclear program, a position that was fully consistent with Bush’s argument that the Untied States would not succumb to North Korean “blackmail.” Tokyo insisted that North Korea “must immediately dismantle all of [its] nuclear weapons development programs in a complete, irreversible, and verifiable manner.” Lead by Ambassador Mitoji Yabunaka, the Japanese delegation asserted that there are no nations, including the United States, that maintain hostility toward North Korea. Regarding the normalization of relations between Japan and North Korea, Tokyo stated during the talks that for this to occur, there must first be a resolution of the nuclear, abduction and missile issues.152 Aware of Pyongyang’s missile capabilities, the announcement that Pyongyang may test a nuclear weapon had an immediate effect in Tokyo. The Japanese Defense Agency, then headed by Shigeru Ishiba, a leading advocate of missile defense, hastily announced that it would request $1.21 billion dollars in 2004 and a similar amount for the next several years to purchase U.S.-developed missile defense equipment.153 Shortly after the

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Defense Agency announcement, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe demonstrated his penchant for conservative-inspired controversy. During a lecture delivered the day after the talks in Beijing ended, Abe stated that the United States should not sign a nonaggression agreement with North Korea. Abe reasoned that such an agreement would effectively forfeit the U.S.-Japan security treaty, since the DPRK would be able to launch an attack on Japan without any worry of a military retaliation from Washington.154 After the conclusion of the multilateral meetings, Washington announced that it had altered its negotiating posture during the talks held in Beijing and that it had demonstrated some flexibility in its position toward Pyongyang, specifically in regard to a nonaggression agreement and economic incentives to the DPRK.155 However, the Bush administration’s claims that it had become more flexible during the multilateral talks had apparently been missed by Beijing. Chinese officials stated that the United States was the “main obstacle” standing in the way of the peaceful resolution of the DPRK nuclear crisis. Beijing had identified Washington’s “negative policy” toward Pyongyang as something that needed to be changed during future multilateral talks.156 Most importantly, Pyongyang did not discern flexibility in the U.S. negotiating posture during the August meetings. Pyongyang stressed that the Bush administration continued to demand that the DPRK relinquish its nuclear program before any resolution could be reached. With the American invasion of Iraq still fresh in its memory and aware of U.S. plans to build smaller nuclear weapons “obviously aimed at making a preemptive nuclear attack upon the DPRK,”157 Pyongyang insisted that such a unilateral move on its part would be foolish. Pyongyang emphasized “that what is clear is that the U.S. sought to lead the talks to the point of rupture by raising unilateral demands unacceptable to the DPRK and shift the responsibility for it to the DPRK.”158 Pyongyang later announced that Washington’s resolve to retain a hard line position eliminated the need for future discussions. Although Pyongyang quickly retracted its threat not to participate in future multilateral talks, Beijing came out ahead. Beijing’s criticism of the Bush administration’s intractable position pressured Washington to convey an upbeat impression about future multilateral discussions to South Korean Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Yoon Young-kwan during his visit to United States in early September 2003. After returning to South Korea, Yoon stated that, “In my meeting with President Bush, it was mentioned that the U.S. is positively considering ways to dispel North Korean security worries, and they will likely prepare something. I think that the U.S. will likely go to the next round of talks with their own proposal.”159

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Shortly after the talks, Pyongyang not only made clear its displeasure with the Bush administration, but with Japan as well. Pyongyang publicized its worries associated with Prime Minister Koizumi’s recent efforts to change Article 9, the war-renouncing clause, in the Japanese constitution.160 Pyongyang also expressed its displeasure with Koizumi’s trip to Europe, claiming that, while there, he was attempting to persuade leaders in some countries to support Japan’s position that North Korea posed a serious threat to international peace and security.161 Although the August multilateral meetings in Beijing did little to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis, China did surface as a clear winner. Highly skeptical of the strengthened U.S.-Japan security alliance that had recently given Washington the hegemonic edge in Northeast Asia, Beijing’s diplomatic feats, in which it now twice brought Washington and Pyongyang together to talk about their differences, demonstrated its continued evolution as both a regional and a global power. While security analysts continued to search for substantive indicators of the Chinese meaning of “multipolarity,”162 Beijing’s enduring diplomatic efforts during the North Korean nuclear crisis cast an auspicious light on China, raising its stature in East Asia and throughout the global community. Prior to the August meetings, Chinese officials traveled to Washington and Moscow to discuss the North Korean nuclear crisis. Beijing convinced Pyongyang to accept the multilateral talks that it had for months viewed as inimical to its interests. It was Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo’s visit to Pyongyang in midJuly 2003 that ultimately convinced Kim to accede to multilateral talks. In early August, Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi went to North Korea to clarify the details of the upcoming six-party meetings to officials in Pyongyang.163 Moreover, with Moscow, China had successfully blocked U.S. efforts to get the U.N. Security Council to take punitive actions against North Korea.

No End in Sight By October 2003, the DPRK nuclear crisis had begun to look even worse than it had before. About two weeks after the August meetings in Beijing, Washington announced that there was evidence that the DPRK had stopped its plutonium reprocessing activities at the Yongbyon facility that it had restarted a few months earlier.164 Responding to what it termed “a rumor afloat in the international community” that the DPRK had stopped its activities at Yongbyon, Pyongyang announced in October that this was false. Pyongyang stressed that it had previously declared that the resumption of work at Yongbyon facility was “for a peaceful purpose” but that it

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been forced to increase its activities because of Washington’s hostile policy toward North Korea. Intending to worsen the crisis, Pyongyang indicated at this time that it had processed the DPRK’s 8,000 spent fuel rods at the Yongbyon facility and that it had “made the switchover in the use of plutonium churned out by reprocessing spent fuel rods in the direction of increasing its nuclear deterrent force.”165 Pyongyang’s unambiguous announcement that it was increasing its nuclear deterrent force became a rationalization for Tokyo’s past behavior and helped finalize a major decision. Just before the first round of the multilateral meetings in Beijing, Prime Minister Koizumi carried Tokyo’s commitment that “We cannot permit North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons”166 to Europe. Koizumi traveled to Germany, Poland, and the Czech Republic in August 2003 attempting to get these states to recognize the seriousness of the North Korean nuclear situation and to understand that the abduction issue remained unresolved. Indeed, in Poland, Koizumi stressed that the North Korean nuclear issue is a serious threat to Japan and to the international community as well.167 Thus, Pyongyang’s October announcement not only served to justify Tokyo’s support of the hard line approach maintained by Washington, it also underscored the presumed correctness of Japanese efforts to get the international community to recognize North Korea as a rogue state. Moreover, finalizing a policy issue that had months earlier emerged in Japan, Tokyo announced in December 2003—largely for protection against DPRK missiles—that it would soon begin purchasing and introducing missile defense equipment from the United States.168 Washington also benefited politically from Pyongyang’s October announcement that it was increasing its nuclear deterrent force. Beginning in June 2003, notwithstanding repeated statements by senior members of the Bush administration that it had no plans to attack North Korea, Washington started sending technologically advanced military weapons and equipment to South Korea that had been tested in Afghanistan and Iraq.169 Thus, Pyongyang’s October announcement afforded to Washington the opportunity to reaffirm its hard line approach—a combination of tough diplomacy backed by heightened military preparation in South Korea. Pyongyang responded antagonistically to Washington’s deployment of high technology weapons and equipment to South Korea. Pyongyang announced that, “the DPRK will further increase its physical deterrent force to cope with the increasing U.S. threat.”170 Whether or not this physical deterrent force included, or was, what Pyongyang had earlier termed its nuclear deterrent force, is not clear. What is clear is that in December 2003 there was still some doubt in the international community that the DPRK had nuclear weapons. In New York at the United Nations, Chinese Prime

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Minister Wen Jiabao stated that “at present” the DPRK does not hold the “objective to possess nuclear weapons,” but rather “their ultimate objective is to have a nuclear-weapons-free Korean Peninsula.”171 Pyongyang remained determined to keep the political fires well stoked, wanting to convince the Bush administration that it was readying its nuclear deterrent force as a response to what it perceived as a hostile U.S. policy. In January 2004, a five-person American team visited North Korea. Given the opportunity to observe the Yongbyon facilities, a U.S. nuclear expert formerly in charge of the Los Alamos nuclear laboratory stated before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he was uncertain that Pyongyang had successfully reprocessed the 8,000 spent fuel rods into plutonium or that it was capable of developing a nuclear weapons device.172 During the early months of 2004, Washington focused on a new issue in an attempt to bolster its position that North Korea was concealing a uranium-enrichment program to develop nuclear weapons. Never having been able to prove the existence of the DPRK’s uranium-enrichment program nor identify its location, Washington made the connection between Pakistan and North Korea. Washington said that Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan and his associates in the past had provided North Korea with technology and equipment for its uranium-enrichment program to develop nuclear weapons. Reminiscent of the major problem associated with pre-invasion Iraq was that U.S. intelligence about the Pakistani-DPRK connection was not conclusive.173 Pyongyang rejected Washington’s assertion. The North Korean government claimed this was “groundless propaganda” intended to try to convince the world community and “sour the interior of the DPRK . . . in a bid to disarm it just as the U.S. did in Iraq and justify its brigandish demand that Pyongyang scrap its nuclear program first at the upcoming six-way talks.”174

Six-Party Talks: Round Two Held again in Beijing, the second round of six-party talks that took place in late February 2004 were not successful. As it had done in the past, Pyongyang continued to deny that it had a clandestine uranium-enrichment program. On the last day of the four-day talks, President Bush directed the U.S. delegation in Beijing to stress that his patience with North Korea was running thin, thereby making a military option a possibility.175 For Tokyo, the February talks did not settle the abduction issue. The DPRK, which had expressed its opposition to Japan’s participation in the talks,176 again stressed that the abduction issue had been settled when Koizumi visited North Korea in September 2002 and endorsed the Pyongyang Declaration. In its

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evaluation of the second round of the six-party talks, Tokyo made certain to stress that the United States, Japan, and South Korea fully endorsed the policy of “complete, verifiable and irreversible disarmament,” but that Pyongyang wanted to keep its peaceful nuclear program.177 In any case, Pyongyang was not about to do much of anything until—at minimum—it received a security agreement from Washington. Pyongyang maintained that because of Washington’s insistence that the DPRK completely, verifiably, and irreversibly dismantle all of its nuclear programs, “we cannot but demand the United States guarantee it a complete, verifiable, and irreversible security.”178 Pyongyang again stressed that a “simultaneous package solution” was the key to the peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue.179 Meanwhile, the Japanese public had grown increasingly concerned about Japan’s problems with North Korea, most especially with the abduction issue. Ninety percent of the respondents involved in a government survey expressed deep concern about the unresolved abduction issue. Moreover, two-thirds of the respondents said that they were cautiously monitoring the DPRK nuclear issue, and over sixty percent worried about North Korea’s missile capabilities. Another survey showed that more than two-fifths of the Japanese public wanted economic sanctions immediately imposed on North Korea because of the abduction issue and other problems, while an equal proportion advised patience.180 Interestingly, more than a year after the nuclear issue emerged in October 2002, the abduction issue remained, by far, the paramount concern of the Japanese public. Tokyo found itself in an unenviable position. On the one hand, while the Japanese public’s worries about the North Korean nuclear and missile issues did grow with time, the overwhelming majority was concerned with the abduction issue. On the other hand, Washington had little genuine interest in the abduction issue, little more than extending Tokyo the courtesy of saying it was concerned about it. Tokyo, therefore, had to try to balance the public’s concerns with Washington’s uncompromising demand that the DPRK had to completely, verifiably, and irreversibly end all of its nuclear programs. What neither Washington nor Tokyo ever tried to explain is why the Japanese public remained noticeably less concerned about the nuclear and missile issues than the United States, especially since Japan, America’s principal regional ally in Northeast Asia, would be an easy target in the event that North Korea took aggressive action.

Six-Party Talks: Round Three Held in Beijing in late June 2004, the third round of the six-party talks ended much the same as the second—no breakthroughs, big or small,

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occurred during the meetings. Pyongyang argued that the U.S. “landmark proposal” at the talks demanded that the DPRK disarm before it received what it termed “reward for freeze.” Pyongyang’s proposal at the third round of the six-party talks relied again on the notion of simultaneous action: the DPRK would freeze all work in “facilities related to nuclear weapons and products,” provided that Washington ended sanctions and recommenced deliveries of heavy oil that had been ended by KEDO.181 Still giving highest priority to a security guarantee, Pyongyang rejected Washington’s proposal, since it would disarm the DPRK without simultaneous action from the United States. Developed in consultation with Tokyo and Seoul, Washington’s proposal sought DPRK disarmament first, calling for an approximate three-month “preparatory period,” which would demonstrate Pyongyang’s commitment to a process of accountability. At some unspecified point during the preparatory period in which Pyongyang would have demonstrated to the United States that it had accounted for all of its nuclear activities, including the acknowledgement of the alleged uranium-enrichment program, the other members of the talks would take “corresponding steps.” However, these steps, according to the U.S. proposal, would only be “provisional or temporary.” Only after Washington was certain that the DPRK had disarmed and had demonstrated full accountability, would Pyongyang begin to receive the rewards it sought, including a security assurance.182 After the six-party talks, Pyongyang argued that it had only been Washington that had not “positively supported and sympathized” with the reward for freeze proposed by the DPRK.183 This, however, was not true of Japan, which in its subsequent evaluation of the talks made clear that it had not strayed from the U.S. position. Identical to Washington, Tokyo stressed that the freezing of all of North Korea’s nuclear activities had to be done first, and in a verifiable manner. Tokyo indicated that before the DPRK could receive energy assistance from Japan via the six-party structure, Pyongyang would have to acknowledge all nuclear programs. Tokyo emphasized its desire to provide economic assistance to the DPRK but only after Japan and North Korea had normalized relations and had settled the nuclear, missile, and abduction issues.184

Normalized Relations Going Nowhere That Koizumi had traveled to Pyongyang for a second time and met with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il about a month before the beginning of the third round of the six-party talks did nothing to make the June multilateral meetings in Beijing a success. Nor did Koizumi’s visit bring Japan

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and North Korea closer to establishing normalized relations, certainly the best way to resolve bilateral problems.185 During his May 2004 visit to North Korea, Koizumi reaffirmed the significance of the Pyongyang Declaration, the bilateral accomplishment of his first trip to the DPRK in September 2002. Koizumi also indicated during a press conference immediately after he returned that he strongly believed that his “visit to North Korea this time will serve as a turning point for realizing the normalization of relations between Japan and North Korea.” After his comments, the prime minister took five questions from the press. Reflecting a pervading concern in Japan with the abduction issue, the first two questions addressed this subject. Only one question, the third, pertained to the DPRK nuclear issue. The fourth question concerned the normalization of relations between Japan and North Korea. The fifth question again addressed the abduction issue, specifically relating to Hitomi Soga and her husband Charles Robert Jenkins, a deserter from the U.S. Army who defected to North Korea in the 1960s.186 To some extent, the Bush administration has held Tokyo and the Japanese people’s interest in normalizing bilateral relations with North Korea hostage to U.S. security objectives. As indicated earlier, when the Bush administration informed Prime Minister Koizumi before his September 2002 trip to North Korea that Pyongyang had been clandestinely maintaining a uranium-enrichment program187 this move literally tainted normalization efforts before they got started.188 Nearly two years later, when Kelly presented the Bush administration’s account of the third round of the six-party talks to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July 2004 he pointed out that this multilateral forum gives the DPRK the chance to improve its relations with the United States and Japan, if Pyongyang makes the right choice. Washington considered the right choice to be the satisfactory resolution of the nuclear issue along the lines that Kelly had proposed to North Korea. Kelly also stressed during the Senate hearings that other good things would begin to happen to the DPRK, such as normal international trade and viable relations with international financial institutions.189

Six-Party Talks: Rounds Four and Five The participants of the six-party talks agreed to meet again by no later than the end of September 2004. But because Washington and Pyongyang remained far apart on how to resolve the DPRK nuclear issue, September passed without the talks taking place. Washington continued to insist on the DPRK’s disarmament—a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all of North Korea’s nuclear programs. Pyongyang, on the other

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hand, insisted on two things: a reward for a freeze and that Washington drop its hostile policies toward the DPRK. Further complicating the standoff between Washington and Pyongyang was the announcement in late August 2004 by Seoul to the IAEA that it had secretly enriched a small amount of uranium in 2000. Suspicion immediately surfaced that South Korea intended to weaponize the uranium. Seoul promptly stressed that since it did not authorize the work, it was unaware that uranium enrichment had taken place in South Korea and that it did not have any plans to build nuclear weapons.190 This, however, did not satisfy Pyongyang, which linked the matter to the six-party talks and claimed that it is impossible to believe that Washington was unaware of the uranium-enrichment work, since South Korea’s intelligence serves U.S. interests. Charging Washington with maintaining “double standards,” Pyongyang argued that the key question is whether the United States will simply ignore the South Korean nuclear project as it did in the past with Israel.191 With the fourth round of the six-party talks stalled Washington and Pyongyang continued to show that relations were anything but good. In early 2005, the Bush administration claimed that it had solid scientific evidence that North Korea had sold processed uranium to Libya at the time when Qaddafi was clandestinely seeking to develop nuclear weapons. This gave the hawks inside the Bush administration more reason to justify their claims about Pyongyang’s unpredictability and to insist, as Vice President Dick Cheney did, that “time is not on our side.”192 Soon after the story became public, information surfaced that indicated that the uranium could have come from Pakistan, which meant that the scientific testing implicating North Korea was inconclusive.193 But this story was considerably more intriguing than it originally appeared to be. Having become increasingly concerned that Beijing and Seoul were growing dissatisfied with the six-party talks, the Bush administration dispatched two senior-level members of the National Security Council (NSC) to Northeast Asia in late January 2005. The NSC staff members visited Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo, telling officials in each of these capitals that North Korea had sold uranium hexafluoride to Libya. According to the briefing provided by the Bush administration and delivered to these Asian capitals by the NSC staff members, Pyongyang was a proven purveyor of a material that can be further processed and enriched for use in nuclear weapons. What the Bush administration had done, however, was analogous to what it had done to Iraq—it incorrectly used intelligence to win support for its policy. U.S. intelligence reports provided absolutely no evidence to support the accusation of the Bush administration that North Korea, which has natural uranium, had sold nuclear material to

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Libya. What North Korea had done was sold some uranium material—and perhaps not even uranium hexafluoride, since there is no evidence that the DPRK can convert uranium ore to uranium hexafluoride—to Pakistan. Without Pyongyang’s knowledge, Pakistan, at some unknown time, sold the uranium hexafluoride to Libya.194 Angered by Condoleezza Rice’s remarks made in January 2005 during her Senate confirmation hearings for the position of secretary of state that identified North Korea as one of the six countries that the Bush administration considers “outposts of tyranny,” Pyongyang announced in February that it had produced nuclear weapons for self-defense. At the same time, Pyongyang indicated that, “Japan is now persistently pursuing its hostile policy toward the DPRK, toeing the U.S. line.”195 Shortly after the NSC briefings given to Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo, Pyongyang announced both that it was suspending its involvement in the six-party talks and that it had produced nuclear weapons. Pyongyang’s announcement that it had produced nuclear weapons quickly found its way to the international media. Reports indicated that North Korea for the first time stated that it had “manufactured nukes,” while also announcing its intention to discontinue its involvement in the six-party talks.196 Responding to the North Korean announcement, Prime Minister Koizumi advised Pyongyang that, “It’s better to retract it as soon as possible,”197 a comment that clearly suggested some incredulity relating to the DPRK’s possession of nuclear weapons. Seoul’s response to Pyongyang’s announcement reflected both skepticism and cautious diplomacy. South Korean Unification Minister and head of the National Security Council Chung Dong-young indicated that, “It’s too early to say that North Korea has nuclear bombs. The North’s claims have neither been proven nor can be confirmed.”198 Chung emphasized that Seoul sees North Korea’s comment “as a claim to own nuclear weapons, not an official statement of being a nuclear weapons state.”199 But the public comments made by two senior-level U.S. officials are the most interesting of all, since they disregarded previous statements made by Rumsfeld and Powell, as well as the official line of the Bush administration, which is that Pyongyang possesses a small number of nuclear weapons. Reacting to Pyongyang’s February 2005 statement that it had produced nuclear weapons, White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan indicated that, “North Korea has frequently used that rhetoric in the past.” During his Senate confirmation hearing for the position of Deputy Secretary of State, Robert Zoellick stressed that, “I would be careful about reading too much into the North Koreans’ most recent statement.” Zoellick went on to indicate that there are a number of reasons that might have caused Pyongyang to say that it has made nuclear weapons.200

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It is important to understand that since the nuclear crisis began Pyongyang has gone from denying that it intended to build nuclear weapons to saying that it possesses them. As the crisis continued, Pyongyang decided to change its political strategy pertaining to comments about the possession of nuclear weapons. But this changed political strategy does not in anyway confirm that Pyongyang has nuclear weapons—either built before the crisis began in 2002 or sometime thereafter. The big irony, of course, would be if Pyongyang did not possess nuclear weapons prior to the onset of the crisis in October 2002 but later decided to build them because of the perceived hostility it viewed coming from the Bush administration. It is also important to understand that during 2004 Pyongyang had more than once spoken of the DPRK’s need to retain a nuclear deterrent force and even explicitly stated that it possesses nuclear weapons before the comment that it made in February 2005. Commenting on the third round of the six-party talks soon after they ended in June 2004, a spokesperson for the DPRK foreign ministry stated that Pyongyang would “refrain from producing more nukes, transferring and testing them and the freeze would be the first start that would lead to the ultimate dismantlement of the nuclear weapons program.”201 When the two-plus-two ministerial meeting took place in February 2005, it was clear once again that Washington and Tokyo viewed the North Korean nuclear issue through the same policy lens. Indeed, the joint statement from the meeting, whose key participants were Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Minister of Foreign Affairs Nobutaka Machimura and Minister of State for Defense and Director General of the Defense Agency Yoshinori Ohno, identified Washington and Tokyo’s commitment to nonproliferation and their concerns about North Korea.202 For its part, Pyongyang viewed the statement resulting from the two-plus-two consultative meeting as a “joint strategic target” by Washington and Tokyo to further establish security control over the entire Asia-Pacific region.203 Going one step further and seizing the opportunity afforded by the presence of the four senior officials at the two-plus-two consultative meeting held in Washington, the ministers also issued a joint statement on North Korea. The U.S-Japan Joint Statement on North Korea indicated Washington and Tokyo’s concerns about Pyongyang’s decision to suspend its participation in the six-party talks and its announcement that it had produced nuclear weapons. In the joint statement Washington and Tokyo reconfirmed “their fundamental policy toward North Korea” and stressed that Pyongyang’s nuclear program, which is a threat to the stability of Northeast Asia, including Japan, creates a major problem for the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In addition to emphasizing the need to reach closure on the abduction issue, Tokyo and Washington indicated in the joint statement that Pyongyang should recommit to the six-party talks and that it should completely

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dismantle all nuclear programs, including its uranium-enrichment project. While maintaining their commitment to resolve the DPRK nuclear issue through a diplomatic process, the joint statement concludes by stressing that the four ministers “reaffirmed the continuing strength and vitality of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements, and expressed confidence in their capacity to deter and address challenges to regional peace and security.”204 Prodded by Beijing, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il indicated to a Chinese delegation visiting Pyongyang in late February 2005 that the DPRK remained committed to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and to the peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue. Kim also indicated that the DPRK still supported the six-party talks and would participate in them at anytime, so long as conditions develop to a mature level.205 It took until late July 2005 for the fourth round of the six-party talks to begin. After thirteen days, the meetings recessed, recommencing for seven more days in mid-September. With the six parties in agreement, this time talks ended with a joint statement. The joint statement affirmed the parties’ commitment to the peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. It assured the DPRK that the United States does not have nuclear weapons in South Korea and that Washington does not plan to attack the DPRK. It indicated Pyongyang’s position that the DPRK has the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It maintained that the United States and North Korea respect the other’s sovereignty. Among other things, the joint statement also projected movement toward the normalization of relations between the United States and North Korea and between the latter and Japan. However, the joint statement subsequently produced nothing substantive. As Kenichiro Sasae, Japan’s representative at the fourth round of the six-party talks indicated in his closing statement, “agreeing to a common document does not mean that the solution to our problems has been found.”206 Producing no tangible results, the first session of the fifth round of the six-party talks was short-lived, lasting only three days in November 2005. Indeed, since the appearance of the joint document in September 2005, not only have solutions not been found but also distrust and animus have been evident between Washington and Pyongyang and between Japan and the DPRK. KEDO has been scrapped, economic sanctions have been imposed on DPRK companies, and Pyongyang has forewarned that, given the hostile environment, it sees no reason to return to the six-party talks.207

Tokyo’s Connection Despite Tokyo’s constant reminder to the international community that Japan is the only country that has experienced the devastation of nuclear

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weapons, ostensibly making complete nuclear disarmament very high on the nation’s policy agenda, its heightened counterproliferation posturing has been evident with the countries that have constituted the Bush administration’s “axis of evil.” Tokyo’s determination to push Japan toward becoming a normal country, the premium that it places on the security alliance with the United States and the desire to remain under the American nuclear umbrella created the political momentum for it to support the Bush administration’s actions against the “axis of evil” countries. Associated with these factors is that Tokyo has accepted Washington’s position that counterproliferation— and not nuclear disarmament—is the primary security objective to pursue in the post-9/11 world. The Koizumi government recognized that Japan could take a major step forward in becoming internationally recognized as a normal country if Japanese SDF could have some visible—even if a noncombat—role in Iraq. While the U.S.-led and Japanese supported counterproliferation initiative in Iraq took the form of armed invasion, Washington’s dealings with Iran and North Korea have been manifestly less belligerent, but no more informed. Washington has never provided any evidence to support its allegation that Pyongyang possesses a clandestine uranium-enrichment program to develop nuclear arms, the event that triggered the multiyear crisis during which the DPRK eventually claimed that it did build nuclear weapons. Nor has Washington provided any evidence that substantiates the oft-heard claim by members of the Bush administration that Tehran is concealing an active nuclear weapons program. Tokyo’s involvement in the Iranian nuclear issue differed noticeably from its participation in the North Korean nuclear crisis. Although Japan had maintained good bilateral relations with Iran for some time, once Washington began to insist that Tehran was concealing its efforts to build nuclear weapons from the international community, Tokyo quickly hopped onto the counterproliferation bandwagon. For a number of months, Tokyo remained committed to the Bush administration’s Iranian counterproliferation efforts. But Tokyo jumped off of Washington’s counterproliferation bandwagon dealing with Iran just as quickly as it leaped onto it. Tokyo came to realize that national security for oil-dependent Japan had to include more than just a strong allegiance to the Japanese military alliance with the United States. Indeed, Tokyo understood that it could only postpone the Azadegan oil deal for so long. If Tokyo wanted oil for Japan, it had to ink the Azadegan deal with Tehran. Once it did, Tokyo removed Japan from active involvement in Washington’s counterproliferation campaign against Iran. Although continuing to urge Tehran to cooperate with the IAEA and abide by the agency’s resolutions, Tokyo not only pulled Japan out of Washington’s political fracas with Iran but also eventually suggested that its position differed from that of the Bush administration.

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Especially poor bilateral relations between Japan and the DPRK have kept Tokyo’s political teeth affixed to the North Korean nuclear issue. Partly because of the Japanese annexation of the Korean Peninsula from 1910 until 1945, deep animosity developed between Japan and the DPRK. That Japan and North Korea were on different sides during the Cold War certainly did not help bilateral relations. The DPRK’s abduction of Japanese citizens in the past, as well as its unlawful entrance into Japanese territorial waters and unannounced missile testing, has only served to worsen already bad bilateral relations. The United States’ continuation of its Cold War security policies in Northeast Asia, especially with regard to North Korea, has meant that its military alliance with Japan remains regionally significant for both Tokyo and Washington. Tokyo has never wanted the United States to promise Pyongyang that it will not use nuclear weapons against North Korea. Just two weeks before the August 2003 six-party talks in Beijing, the Japanese foreign ministry officially requested that U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kelly not make a commitment to Pyongyang to not use nuclear weapons against North Korea. Tokyo believed that such a commitment, similar to the one Washington made in the Agreed Framework with Pyongyang that obligated the United States not to threaten to use or use nuclear weapons against North Korea, would not be in the best security interests of Japan.208 Unlike the other participants involved in the six-party talks, Japan has supported the United States’ policies toward North Korea almost completely, a very serious problem since Pyongyang has long maintained that Washington’s hostile and hard line approach is the major obstacle standing in the way of resolving the crisis. The fact that the abduction issue has not been settled has only deepened the animus between Japan and North Korea. That Northeast Asia is the principal regional focus of the U.S.-Japan security alliance and because Pyongyang sees the DPRK as the major justification for the continuation and strengthening of this arrangement between two major military-capable states, an atmosphere of distrust exists that is not conducive to the resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis.

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Chapter 8 Security and Identity

Although Japan’s national identity is a social and political composite that has both old and relatively new roots, its security identity has remained problematic for many years. Currently, Japan’s security identity reflects a struggle between two divergent issues. The first centers on Japanese culture, which continues to exude and demonstrate pacifist values. The second relates to the effort to keep Japan moving on the path to become a “normal country.” Along with having accepted the security objectives and policies of the United States, which includes the presumed protection that they offer to Japan, the effort to become a normal country means a readiness to deploy Japanese military forces beyond the nation’s borders. Thus, a very important part of the dilemma that Japan faces is its position with regard to nuclear weapons, given both the strong opposition to them existing throughout the country and its acceptance of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. While publicly advocating the complete abolition of nuclear weapons, Tokyo finds it acceptable that the use of American nuclear weapons for Japanese national security is a distinct possibility as Japan pursues the status of a normal country. Meanwhile, some key Japanese politicians and prominent figures have recently attempted to legitimate the conditions under which Japan might possess a nuclear arsenal.

Basic Components of Security Identity Several factors have come together to mold Japan’s security identity during the past half century.1 The postwar emergence and endurance of pacifism notwithstanding, Japan’s militarist past has also remained an intrinsic part

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of the nation’s security identity. Indeed, nationalists and their sympathizers recently have become determined to see a bigger and more visible Japanese military. The Japanese national anthem, kimigayo, which literally means “the emperor’s reign,” is a political remnant of the Meiji period during which Japan focused on the development of its military to counter the perceived threat from the West. Following the end of the Meiji period in 1912, Japan’s military, encouraged by nationalists, grew more sophisticated with time. During World War II, the emperor’s power became absolute, something that nationalists exploited to their advantage by pushing Japanese militarism to its apex. Similarly, hinomaru, the flag that came into prominence during the Meiji period, became a recognized symbol of Japan’s military prowess.2 The Meiji period produced the country’s first constitution. Japan’s defeat in World War II and subsequent Occupation by the United States that lasted nearly seven years led to a new war-renouncing constitution in 1946 and to continuing questions about the nation’s identity.3 Indicating the strong association of kimigayo and hinomaru to Japanese past imperialism and militarism is that for several years during the U.S. Occupation of Japan, the American command prohibited the use of both. While the postwar constitution eliminated the absolute political powers of the emperor, it still left him as a symbol of national unity and identity.4 Bolstering the retention of this imperial symbolism has been that kimigayo states: “May the reign of the Emperor continue for a thousand, nay, eight thousand generations and for the eternity that it takes for small pebbles to grow into a great rock and become covered with moss.” Moreover, for some Japanese and for most of their Asian neighbors hinomaru today continues to bring to mind thoughts of Japan’s imperialistic and militaristic past.5 Although the Japanese government officially approved kimigayo and hinomaru in August 1999, they are nonetheless still somewhat controversial in Japan today. While Article 9 of the postwar constitution technically prohibits Japan from using military force to resolve international conflicts, Japanese conservatives and some American statesmen have long felt that changing this war-renouncing clause would be in the best interest of the country. Since the strength of the Japanese economy became apparent, pressure for constitutional change from the United States has rested on some variation of the argument that Japan has taken a free security ride for too long, making it necessary to bring the country’s military policies in line with its economic power. The Japanese argument, on the other hand, has been based on the fundamental point that for years Japan has had a parochial interpretation of Article 9; policy makers have acknowledged the government’s right to rely on collective defense but have proscribed Japan’s involvement.6

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Since 2000, Japan has been actively engaged in a national debate on constitutional change, with much attention aimed squarely at Article 9, the nation’s pacifist constitutional clause. The national debate to promote the revision of Article 9 intensified after Junichiro Koizumi became prime minister in late April 2001, though he and his Liberal Democratic Party have worked to minimize public backlash as much as possible.7 Still, early on in his tenure as prime minister, Koizumi promulgated his dissatisfaction with the restrictions imposed on Japan’s military activities by stating that Article 9, “should be revised in the future.”8 Notably, the continuing effort to revise Article 9 runs against the grain of Japanese public opinion, as indicated in two recent surveys. An Asahi Shimbun survey conducted in late April 2005 showed that a majority of respondents, 51 percent, did not want to see revisions to Article 9, while 36 percent supported changes. A Kyodo News survey, also conducted in late April 2005, showed that a plurality, 41.3 percent, opposed revisions to Article 9, while 31.3 percent favored changes.9 The thrust of Tokyo’s current efforts to ameliorate Japan’s military capabilities, including its active participation in the U.S. global war on terrorism, is a direct consequence of the international reaction that it confronted during and after the 1991 Gulf War. Then, Tokyo argued that the Japan’s constitution prohibited its participation in collective, international security activities; it attempted to quell global criticism by demonstrating that as a “civilian power” a hefty financial contribution was all that it could do. The United States’ reaction, however, involved more than just criticism of Japan. In a 1991 cable sent to the State Department, U.S. Ambassador to Japan Michael Armacost stressed that, “In pursuing our interests here, we have the opportunity to take advantage of Japan’s defensiveness and fear of isolation in the wake of the Gulf crisis to gain greater GOJ [government of Japan] cooperation. In sum, we have a real opportunity to influence the direction of Japanese foreign policy.”10 The combination of international criticism, pressure from Washington, which wanted Tokyo more than anytime before to remove the military constraints imposed by Article 9, and conservative forces at home locked Japan into an enduring campaign to become a normal country.11

Opposition to Nuclear Weapons The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki became the catalyst for the Japanese revulsion of atomic arms. Later, Japan’s disarmament movement emerged as the crystallization of the country’s opposition to the existence of nuclear weapons.12 Although Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations

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remain a conspicuously active part of Japan’s political culture today, their contribution to the country’s identity has typically been avoided by academic analyses.13 Japan’s peace constitution gave the Japanese people some solace in believing that war would never again afflict them; pacifist values soon became an important part of the nation’s identity.14 However, like Washington, Japanese nationalists and conservatives came to regret the military restrictions imposed on Japan by Article 9. Reflecting strong public sentiment, the self-imposed ban on nuclear weapons possession, development, and introduction into Japan manifested in the Three Nonnuclear Principles (hikaku san-gensoku) left a bad taste in the mouths of at least some of the more conservative Japanese nationalists. Although recent poll data indicates that the Japanese people still overwhelmingly reject the possession of nuclear weapons by Japan, with 86 percent opposing this idea,15 it is important to understand that the Three Nonnuclear Principles are policy and not law. When Tokyo began the post–Cold War campaign intended to get Japan on course to become a normal country, the paradox of opposing the existence of nuclear weapons and wanting the security afforded by them leaped to the surface. Haunted by the memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the widespread Japanese loathing of the continued existence of nuclear weapons has prompted Tokyo to become a leading advocate for global disarmament in the post–Cold War world. At the same time, however, Tokyo has demonstrated that it has grown very comfortable with the U.S.-Japanese military alliance and Japan’s place under the American nuclear umbrella. The latter, rationalized by the Japanese government’s insistence that China and North Korea are major security threats to Japan,16 dissuades Tokyo from countenancing a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Northeast Asia, from enthusiastically supporting negative security assurances to nonnuclear nations, and from promoting the universal acceptance by the nuclear powers of a no-first-use-of nuclear weapons policy.

The Quest to Become a Normal Country Japan’s continuing effort to acquire a national security identity during the postwar period has been a troubling experience.17 Having lived for decades with its peace constitution and at the same time with the bilateral security alliance, Japan drew different conclusions from its postwar experiences. As an economic power constitutionally prohibited from exercising military muscle to resolve international disputes, some Japanese policy makers reasoned that national identity could be best demonstrated by fully embracing

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a peace-state (heiwa kokka) status that underscored Japan’s civilian accomplishments. But Japan’s historical and cultural association with militarism provided residual sustenance to conservative and nationalist forces that existed throughout the Cold War. Once the Cold War ended, these forces, which had always felt disdain toward the peace constitution and now wanting to put into practice Washington’s recommendation for an expanded Japanese military role, began to exploit the nation’s civilian-power response to the 1991 Gulf War by eventually urging Tokyo to make Japan a normal country (futsuu kokka). Perhaps best associated with the push to get Japan to become a normal country is Japanese statesman Ichiro Ozawa. During the first part of the 1990s, Ozawa argued that the Japanese constitution, and specifically Article 9, does not prohibit Japan’s involvement in international security operations as long as this occurs under the auspices of the United Nations. He stressed that while Tokyo speaks of relying on the United Nations and the Japan-U.S. security alliance for its protection, the latter is what the country has actually depended upon for decades. Reviving a concept featured more prominently in Japan during the early postwar years, Ozawa’s argued that the activation of “U.N.-Centrism” (kokuren chushinshugi) would permit Japanese participation in international security and help move the country in the direction of normalcy. Acknowledging the continued importance of the Japan-U.S. security alliance in the post–Cold War period, Ozawa reasoned that it was likely that America, which during the administration of George H.W. Bush had promulgated the “new world order” in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, would also become increasingly dependent on the international security measures of the United Nations. For Ozawa, this would give legitimacy to Tokyo closely cooperating with Washington’s efforts to maintain global peace. By relying on an activated U.N. system and cooperating with the United States, Japan could legitimately participate in international security initiatives—beyond the 1991 Peacekeeping Operations Law—and avoid the criticism that it really depended on the bilateral military alliance with Washington. However, the argument for the necessity of Japan becoming a normal country originally rested on the assumption that United States would accept the U.N. security system, not act unilaterally, and not in any way undermine this international body; if it did otherwise, Tokyo would need to revise the nation’s security policy.18 The U.S. war on global terrorism confirmed the suspicions of those who had previously been arguing that Washington, since the time of the Clinton administration, had been rebuffing the United Nations. Despite constitutional impediments, the Koizumi government’s unrestrained determination to have Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF) assist the United States in the

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global war on terrorism in Afghanistan and in Iraq further indicated Tokyo’s desire to acquire a normal country status for Japan. When the Bush administration authorized the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 without a specific U.N resolution to do so, the Koizumi government expressed its understanding and within months successfully maneuvered to get authorization to send Japanese forces there. Prime Minister Koizumi himself stated on the eve of the offensive on Iraq that it is “unavoidable” and that “I believe that [the invasion] can go ahead, considering past U.N. resolutions.”19 Tokyo’s support of the invasion of Iraq without international sanction shows that it has moved decisively away from Japan’s historical commitment to the legitimacy of the U.N. security system and that it viewed this as acceptable behavior for a state aspiring to be recognized as a normal country. Thus, Japan’s quest to become a normal country has fallen sharply off the course that had been designed in the early 1990s. Then, the U.N. system was the nucleus around which plans to become a normal country were being crafted by conservative thinkers who believed that, as a wealthy industrial country, Japan had to move beyond economics and enter the real world of post–Cold War international security. In the mid-1990s, Tokyo promoted Japan’s bid to become a permanent member of the Security Council largely on the notion that as an economic superpower and a major financial contributor to the United Nations, it could help steer the world toward nuclear disarmament because of its commitment to pacifism and the abolition of nuclear weapons.20 More recently, however, this has changed. In June 2004, an advisory panel recommended to Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi that the number of permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council should be increased and that, at minimum, a country that does not possess nuclear arms should occupy one of them, the suggestion being that it should be Japan.21 Although this is what the Japanese press reported, it is not what Koizumi told the U.N. General Assembly three months later. In September 2004, Koizumi stressed before the U.N. General Assembly that, “We believe the role that Japan has played provides a solid basis for its assumption of permanent membership on the Security Council.” Koizumi sought to demonstrate to the General Assembly that Japan’s recent role has been largely tied to it becoming a normal country, stating at the outset of his speech that it is a “responsible” member of the United Nations and that, “Our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan offer excellent examples.”22 His speech of nearly 1,600 words devotes less than 30 to nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.23 Koizumi never mentioned during his U.N address that the acquisition of a permanent position for Japan on the Security Council is important because it does not possess nuclear weapons.

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Although the urgency for Japan to become a normal country began with the call for it to be able to participate in U.N.-sanctioned security operations, it has evolved into a recognized need to assist the United States in fighting the global war on terrorism, even without the approval of the United Nations. Still, Tokyo knows that there is the potential for political backlash from too quickly undoing the pacifism that has been deeply embedded in the Japanese psyche. The plummeting of the Koizumi government’s approval rating in 2004 partly resulted from the prime minister’s promise at the G-8 meeting in June to permit the participation of Japanese SDF in a new multilateral force in Iraq without debate in Japan.24 Viewing the prime minister’s unilateral decision as arrogant, the Japanese public sent a strong cautionary signal to policy makers in Tokyo that it was not prepared to jettison the cultural pacifism of postwar Japan, especially not without debate. Thus, when Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage told Hidenao Nakagawa, head of the Liberal Democratic Party’s Diet Affairs Committee, during his July 2004 trip to Washington that for Japan to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council it must first revise Article 9, policy makers in Tokyo immediately conveyed their displeasure with his remarks. Even hawkish defense chief Shigeru Ishiba stressed that constitutional change was not something that Japan was obligated to do to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. Because of the Japanese reaction, Armitage later stressed that the decision of whether or not to change the war-renouncing constitutional clause was up to the people of Japan and that, contrary to the earlier interpretation of his comments, Article 9 was not an obstruction to the U.S.-Japan alliance.25 Just a short time later during an August 2004 interview in Washington, Secretary of State Colin Powell came very close to echoing Armitage’s initial remarks, including that the United States supported the Japanese effort to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. Powell stated that “if Japan is going to play a full role on the world stage and become a full, active participating member of the Security Council and have the kinds of obligations that it would pick up as a member of the Security Council, then Article 9 would have to be examined in that light.” Powell went on to stress, like Armitage eventually did, that the decision relating to whether or not to revise Article 9 rests entirely with the people of Japan, adding that, “the United States would never presume to offer an opinion.”26 However, Washington has long disliked Article 9, leading some in the past, including Armitage, to offer opinion on the revision or reinterpretation of this constitutional clause.27 Indeed, right after Armitage’s recent remarks, but before Powell’s, U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton stressed that while constitutional change is a choice that should be made by

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the Japanese people, “a decision by Japan to modify the Constitution would be welcomed and accepted by the United States.”28 Despite the efforts of Japanese officials to create the public impression that Japan found Armitage and Powell’s comments to be out of line and overbearing, they said only what many in Tokyo actually want to do anyway, revise Article 9. Japan will continue to pursue, and presumably with Washington’s tepid support, a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. Moreover, the sought-after revision of Article 9 by Koizumi and the Liberal Democratic Party, which caused some in the crowd of 45,000 attending Hiroshima’s fifty-ninth ceremony of the atomic bombing of the city in 2004 to boo the prime minister,29 is an issue that will be pursued to its conclusion. The nationalist call for Japan to become a normal country has seeped into mainstream policy thinking in Japan. Although the quest to become a normal country has not exactly followed the preferred path of the nationalists, who originally sought to reduce Japan’s dependence on the United States, their presence and unrelenting determination has succeeded in pushing Japanese politics to the right.30 As a result, the drive to become a normal country, which largely entails helping Washington “win the peace,” has promoted and supported the revisionist desire to change Article 9 and given momentum to those determined to strengthen the security alliance. While conservative thinking in Washington has remained unconvinced that Japan is approaching a normal country status,31 Beijing and Pyongyang have felt differently. The enactment of the three emergency laws by the government of Japan in June 200332—legislation that in case of an actual or perceived attack on the country has increased its military capabilities and further coordinates Tokyo and Washington’s previously strengthened alliance interests in East Asian security affairs33—has led Beijing to reason the worse. Consistent with the belief of Chinese foreign policy analysts that Japanese politics has recently been moving to the right34 is Beijing’s contention that, “Japan is not far away from its objective set 10 years ago for becoming a ‘normal country.’ ”35 From Beijing’s perspective, Japan moved further down the road to become a normal country in the second half of 2003 when Tokyo decided to import from the United States equipment for a Japanese missile defense system,36 primarily to protect the country against the perceived threat from North Korea.37 For Pyongyang, at least in a rhetorical sense, the three emergency laws represented another major step forward by Japan in its attempt to become a military power determined once again to engage in foreign aggression. Thus, from Pyongyang’s perspective, this legislation was expectedly normal for Japanese militarists. Pyongyang argued that the three emergency laws, which it saw fashioned specifically to deal with the contrived threat from the Democratic People’s

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Republic of Korea (DPRK), rendered Article 9 useless. Pyongyang charged that, “Japan, having a legal system for military expansion and overseas aggression, will launch this aggression anytime, fluttering blood-stained ‘hinomaru’ and singing ‘kimigayo’ as in the past.”38

Normal Country and Japanese Nuclear Weapons? Japan’s movement toward the right as it has been working to become a normal country has been visible in its stepped-up military initiatives,39 strengthened security relationship with the United States, including work on and procurement of missile defense, and active military involvement in the global war on terrorism.40 Unlike in the past when, from time to time, Japanese politicians would comment on the prospect of Japan possessing nuclear weapons, the recent spate of remarks on this issue deserves special attention because they come at a time when Japan is attempting to become a normal country. These blatant public challenges to the long-held nuclear taboo, which directly contravene official policy on the Three Nonnuclear Principles,41 suggest that some in Japan believe that the push to become a normal country should include the possession of nuclear weapons. Although already underway for a few years, Japan’s movement toward becoming a normal country had not yet prepared the Japanese public to digest the comments made in the fall of 1999 by Shingo Nishimura, then parliamentary vice minister of the Defense Agency. After Nishimura brought up the possibility of Japan possessing nuclear weapons during an interview, public outrage forced him to submit his resignation to Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi. Less than three years later, the Japanese public was again subjected to similar comments about the possession of nuclear weapons by Japan; however, this time no political blood had to be let. A sequence of public comments made by three prominent Japanese statesmen in the spring of 2002 signified that Japan had moved far enough along the path to become a normal country for them to question the nation’s nuclear taboo—and without fear of political recoil. Referring to China’s increasing military budget in an April 2002 speech given in Fukuoka, former member of the Liberal Democratic Party and then leader of the opposition Liberal Party Ichiro Ozawa declared: “It would be so easy for us to produce nuclear weapons—we have plutonium at nuclear power plants in Japan, enough to make several thousand such warheads. If that should happen, we wouldn’t lose in terms of military strength. What would [Beijing] do then?”42 Soon after Ozawa made these remarks, he received

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a congratulatory call from the governor of Tokyo and well-known nationalist Shintaro Ishihara.43 Apart from gaining media attention because of his lack of equivocation, Ozawa’s comments are interesting, since they depart significantly from the formulation that he presented when he initially made the case that Japan needed to become a normal country. Then, Ozawa stressed that, because the Cold War was over, Japan had an obligation to move the world in the direction of nuclear disarmament, emphasizing that its political opposition to the existence of nuclear weapons is more likely to be successful in the post–Cold War environment than it was in the past. He argued that it was important for the United States and the former Soviet countries to reduce their nuclear arsenals, adding that Japan would be willing to assist in their destruction. Significantly, Ozawa also argued that existing nuclear weapons be placed under the control and management of the United Nations. This, argued Ozawa, would extend a nuclear umbrella to all countries that are members of the United Nations and reduce the possibility that some countries might furtively develop nuclear weapons. Ozawa stressed that the current system—the nuclear nonproliferation regime, which permits five nations to possess nuclear weapons, while prohibitting others from doing so—is “patently unjust” and essentially encourages rather than dissuades countries from trying to acquire nuclear weapons.44 In contrast to his earlier views, Ozawa’s April 2002 comments dismiss his previously proposed U.N.-management-and-control idea and threaten that Japan, should it decide to do so, could easily have a substantial nuclear arsenal, since it already has the plutonium stockpile. Ozawa’s 2002 comments thus strongly suggest that the normal country paradigm for Japan can include the development of nuclear weapons. Because they were directed at China, Beijing condemned Ozawa’s comments, calling them “irresponsible,” a reversion to the antiquated thinking of the Cold War, and contrary to the desires of both the Chinese and the Japanese people.45 However, citing examples from the past, Beijing also made clear that this was not the first time that a Japanese statesman had made comments about the possibility of Japan possessing nuclear weapons. This led Beijing to speculate that Ozawa’s comments may not have just been an off-color, impromptu expression of political effrontery; rather, given Japan’s technological accomplishments and the volume of its stored plutonium, Tokyo’s future objectives could include the development of nuclear weapons.46 Similarly, Pyongyang compared Ozawa’s comments to words spoken in the past by a senior Japanese statesman who proclaimed that if Japan wanted to, it could build a nuclear weapon in 183 days. Like Beijing also, Pyongyang stressed that since Japan has a significant amount of plutonium, Tokyo could indeed have ambitions to possess nuclear weapons.47

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On the heels of Ozawa’s comments about nuclear weapons came the remarks of two senior-level members of the Koizumi government. In mid-May 2002 Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe told a group of students assembled for a lecture at Waseda University in Tokyo that the possession of small, tactical nuclear weapons for defensive purposes would not be a violation of the Japanese constitution. Abe defended his comments by arguing that they reflected “the government view” and that they were consistent with the “explanations given by Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi in 1959 and 1960.” Worthy of mention is that Kishi, who was Abe’s grandfather, spent three years in jail after the Pacific War as a Class A war criminal. Asked why he made the comments about the constitutional permissibility of Japan possessing nuclear weapons, Abe maintained that he “simply answered a question at the lecture with sincerity.” Attempting later to demonstrate the hypothetical nature of his remarks, Abe stressed that as a matter of policy, “Japan stands by the Three Nonnuclear Principles and possession of nuclear weapons is impossible.”48 Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda also wanted to express his sincerity when, in the wake of Abe’s comments, he remarked that “that the [nonnuclear] principles are just like the [war-renouncing] constitution. But in the face of calls to amend the Constitution, amendment of the principles is also likely.”49 While Fukuda quickly emphasized that the nonnuclear principles would not be forsaken, his remarks caused serious concern among Japan’s neighbors in East Asia, including South Korea, where some officials feared that the Koizumi government might have desires to develop nuclear weapons.50 This was the same response that critics in Japan had about Fukuda’s remarks,51 as well as those made by Abe.52 While Prime Minister Koizumi attempted to ignore the comments of his senior aide by stating that his words were no more than a “slip of the tongue” and “nothing serious,”53 another argument was that both Fukuda’s and Abe’s comments had been misinterpreted and were merely speculative.54 However, the critical position maintained that the comments made by Fukuda and Abe had structural implications, since the intention was to convey the message that public sentiment about Japan possessing nuclear weapons perhaps needs to change.55 As seen in chapter 3 in 1969 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs felt that Japanese citizens had to be aware that Japan’s policy on nuclear weapons would depend on an evaluation of political and economic international conditions. That the Three Nonnuclear Principles have remained policy rather than law to offer Japan the option of possessing nuclear weapons, a position that is evident in Tokyo today,56 means that, if conditions warrant change, Japanese nuclear arms could become reality. More recently, former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, still recognized as a prominent statesman, remarked in January 2004 at the Foreign

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Correspondents Club in Tokyo that it would be constitutionally possible for Japan to possess nuclear weapons if they are for the defense of the country. According to Nakasone, “It all depends on how you interpret the Constitution, but I think having small nuclear arms solely for defense purposes is not banned under the Constitution.”57 Expectedly, Nakasone’s remarks did not sit well with officials in Beijing or Pyongyang. Beijing stressed that the former prime minister’s comments demonstrate that a “considerable political force” in Japan supports the possession of a nuclear arsenal.58 Pyongyang averred that Nakasone’s remarks were not just a reflection of his personal beliefs, but rather unequivocally shows “Japan’s stand and ambition to emerge [as] a new nuclear force in the 21st century.”59 Key to understanding all of these recent comments about Tokyo possibly possessing nuclear weapons is that they have been made in an environment where there has been a resurgence of Japanese nationalism and the perception in Northeast Asia of Japan working to become a normal country.60 Introducing the political seeds for changing the public mindset about nuclear weapons can easily be construed as a normal thing to do for a major industrial nation striving to become a normal country. Nations that possess nuclear weapons legitimate them by stressing their defensive-deterrent utility. Moreover, it has not been an anomaly for a so-called normal country to threaten to use nuclear weapons, or at least to keep this as an option, against a perceived enemy. Testifying to the importance governments place on having the immediacy of a nuclear threat at their disposal is that China is the only declared nuclear power that has a policy stating that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons and, more generally, negative security assurances have not been codified into international law. No one would quarrel with Ozawa’s statement that Japan could produce many nuclear weapons. The open question is whether revisionist and nationalist forces are strong enough to sustain a discussion that international or regional conditions require Japan to develop a small, “defenseonly” nuclear arsenal as the nation pursues a normal country status. Advancing the argument that possessing such a nuclear arsenal is necessary for a normal country that wants to discourage or eliminate potential threats from Beijing and Pyongyang is well within the political purview of some revisionists and nationalists who would like to amend the war-renouncing constitution and abandon Japan’s Three Nonnuclear Principles. Indeed, some revisionists and nationalists worry that if Washington decides to push Japan out from under the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, Tokyo will have no choice but to develop nuclear weapons. Similarly, an end to the bilateral security alliance for whatever reason would leave Japan unprotected by the U.S. nuclear shield, giving momentum to

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those who support the acquisition of a Japanese nuclear deterrent. Moreover, the Bush administration’s failure to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis, resulting in Pyongyang actually possessing and maintaining a nuclear arsenal, would open up for Japanese nationalists and their sympathizers a political avenue that has not been available to them. North Korean nuclear weapons coupled with the means to hit Japan would strengthen what are now somewhat subdued nationalist calls for a Japanese nuclear arsenal, especially in an environment where there is uncertainty about the dependency of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.61

Identity, Nuclear Disarmament, and the U.S. Nuclear Umbrella But for now and the foreseeable future, Japan will be protected by the U.S. nuclear shield—and Tokyo knows that this is a safe bet.62 This helps explain why Tokyo has compromised its professed objective to abolish all nuclear weapons. By declaring the need to abolish all nuclear weapons, but on the terms of the nuclear powers, Tokyo is sending the message that nuclear disarmament is an objective that is out of its hands. This has caused Tokyo to reject the need for the immediacy of nuclear disarmament and settle for an approach that is sensitive to and depends on the objectives of the declared nuclear powers, especially those of Washington. This poorly developed, “contingency approach” to policy formulation has led Tokyo to distance Japan from the countries that make up the New Agenda Coalition, an alliance of seven states that have been aggressively promoting nuclear disarmament. It has caused Tokyo, following closely in the footsteps made by Washington in the last few years, to shift its focus conspicuously toward counterproliferation—the major nuclear arms control theme of the United States in the post-9/11 period63—and away from nuclear disarmament. This contingency approach caused Tokyo to make a major policy concession on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to Washington (see chapter 2). Although Tokyo has occasionally criticized the Bush administration’s opposition to the CTBT at home, its efforts have amounted to no more than admonition that lacks both the intensity and the resolve necessary to move Washington to accept the accord.64 This contingency approach explains why Tokyo, despite often calling attention to the fact that Japan’s unfortunate experience with atomic warfare makes it well suited to promote nuclear disarmament in the international community, has a strained relationship with Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations. That Tokyo has not attempted to stop the Hoya Corporation, a U.S.-based

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subsidiary of a Japanese company, from providing laser glass slabs to the U.S. National Ignition Facility (NIF) located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is yet another example of this contingency approach (see chapter 3). Because Washington wants to keep Japan under the U.S. nuclear umbrella as much as most in Tokyo currently want Japan to remain there, the Japanese government has not responded to the possible threat that Hoya’s deliveries to the NIF, which is working to produce a fusion explosion, present to the CTBT. The upshot of this contingency approach for Tokyo is “selective disarmament.” Based on the security interests and objectives of the United States and Japan, Tokyo selects which problems to address and which to turn its back on. This selectivity problem diminishes the international and domestic credibility of Tokyo’s disarmament efforts and exposes it to the criticism that Japan’s understanding of peace and security is fundamentally based on the maintenance of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Tokyo’s response to recent missile testing by Islamabad and New Delhi illustrates this selectivity problem. Tokyo reprimanded India and Pakistan, the two newest confirmed members of the nuclear club, for conducting ballistic missiles tests in the spring and summer of 2004. Understanding that ballistic missile testing brings New Delhi and Islamabad closer to the nuclear precipice, Tokyo made clear to both governments that their actions endangered regional peace and were therefore unacceptable, since they ran counter to “the continued efforts by the international community to promote the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”65 But Tokyo uttered not a word when, at about the same time, the United States conducted its twenty-first subcritical nuclear experiment in late May 2004 at its Nevada test site.66 While technically not a violation of the CTBT, critics charge that subcritical testing, which ensures the safety and reliability of existing nuclear arms and may be used in the future to design new weapons, undermines the spirit of the accord. Tokyo’s silence on this recent instance of U.S. subcritical testing contrasts sharply with the protests lodged by the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In a letter of protest to President Bush, Hiroshima Mayor Tadatoshi Akiba stressed what he called Washington’s obvious “self-serving double standard” of demanding that North Korea abandon the nuclear weapons program that the United States claims Pyongyang has while continuing to conduct subcritical testing. He also expressed his concern that U.S. policies are “destroying the NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty] regime” and prompting “a new round of nuclear proliferation.”67 Nagasaki Mayor Iccho Itoh argued in a letter of protest to President Bush that U.S. subcritical nuclear testing is “directly contrary to the ‘unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons.’ ”68

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Tokyo’s simultaneous efforts of being ostensibly sensitive to the pervasive Japanese anti-nuclear weapons sentiment, while keeping both ears alert to what Washington wants and expects has triggered an identity problem for Japan with respect to nuclear weapons. An integral part of this identity problem is Tokyo’s push to make Japan a normal state that, for now, relies on the U.S. nuclear umbrella—something that could change in the future, should Japanese policy makers insist that “defensive” nuclear weapons are necessary. This identity problem and the concomitant push to make Japan a normal country have largely alienated the country’s disarmament organizations, sustained serious suspicions in Beijing, Pyongyang, and even in Seoul, and deflated Japan’s credibility among some states in the international community. In 1998, New Delhi brought Tokyo back to reality after the Japanese government initially responded sternly to the series of nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan69 when it stressed that Japan, since it remains secure under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, has little justification for such political theatrics.70 Japan’s identity problem is far too critical to be resolved by annually submitting a nuclear disarmament resolution to the United Nations. Its identity problem is that it cannot satisfactorily answer the question of why Tokyo considers itself an international advocate of nuclear disarmament but opposes the creation of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Northeast Asia.71 Advocating the global abolition of nuclear weapons while finding serious fault with a legally recognized regional prohibition to their presence sends the troubling signal that the behavior Tokyo exhibits to the international community is quite different from the persona that it has adopted for Northeast Asia. While Tokyo struggles with Japan’s identity problem, the dominant political personality believes that there is a continuing utility for the existence of nuclear weapons. Because Japan does not now possess nuclear weapons, Tokyo must therefore safeguard the nation’s place under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. An illustration of a Japanese official trying to circumvent a problem that could potentially jeopardize Japan’s place under the U.S. nuclear umbrella came to the fore in the spring of 2002. In an interview not long after her appointment as Japan’s top disarmament official to the U.N. Conference on Disarmament, Kuniko Inoguchi made an admonitory statement about Washington’s response to terrorism in the post-9/11 world. She stressed that Washington’s reliance on military superiority to combat terrorism will lead to additional weapons in the international market and this will give terrorists the occasion to acquire them. Rather than this kind of response from the United States, Inoguchi argued, it “should be the ‘flag-carrier’ for disarmament and arms control.” But aware that there would be no rush by Washington to bear the disarmament flag, and fully demonstrating Tokyo’s

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acceptance of the incremental approach to the elimination of nuclear arms, Ambassador Inoguchi also pointed out that she did not believe that “total abolition will be accomplished” by 2020,72 a goal set by some Japanese disarmament advocates.73 Had the ambassador accepted the 2020 deadline for the abolition of nuclear weapons and identified concrete steps replete with details for the United States to take on the role as the flag bearer for disarmament, she would have precipitated angst in Tokyo, which does not want to put Japan’s position under the U.S. nuclear umbrella at risk. Since Japan’s devastating defeat in the Pacific War, its national security identity has been strongly influenced by Washington.74 Together, the penchant to be influenced by Washington, which has encouraged increased Japanese involvement in security affairs, the resurgence of nationalism and Tokyo’s post–Cold War interest in getting the country to move toward the status of big-power normalcy have created a political environment that prominently includes, albeit currently restrained, the proposal and toleration of suggestions to develop nuclear weapons. Although Washington has not encouraged Japan to develop nuclear weapons, even hawkish U.S. policy makers understand that, in the event that Tokyo decides to do this, perhaps in responding to apprehension over the perception of Pyongyang’s objectives, an East Asian arms race would quickly ensue.75 For now, Tokyo is perfectly content with keeping Japan protected by the U.S. nuclear shield, something that Washington also views as desirable. This arrangement allows Washington to remain the dominant partner in the bilateral security alliance with Tokyo and keeps Japanese policy makers especially sensitive to the nuclear weapons objectives of the United States.

Normal State Status or Retaining the “Abnormalities” of Pacifism Japan’s movement in the direction of becoming a normal state appears to confirm the central tenet of the realist school of thought that nations work to acquire big power status by eventually building up their military capabilities. Having one of the largest military budgets in the world with an array of advanced equipment, even if it is “exclusively” for defense, as Tokyo maintains, suggests that Japan is well on its way to acquire the status of a normal country. Tokyo has used the new global war on terrorism and the increased anarchy introduced into international society to justify the continued enlargement of Japan’s military responsibilities and capabilities. Japan is now one of the biggest purchasers of arms from the United States,76 including advanced missile defense equipment.77

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The problem with the application of the realist model to Japan is that since Japanese pacifism is still very strong today, it remains a major hurdle that conservative and nationalist-leaning policy makers must overcome to acquire the full status of a normal country, one with nuclear weapons. This pacifist sentiment is evident in Japan’s defense policy, which indicates that, “not becoming a military power” is not a national objective. This, however, is quickly qualified by the comment that, “There is no clear definition of a ‘military power.’ ”78 Although Japan’s possession of nuclear weapons for defensive purposes is a position that recently has been repeatedly heard, justifying this under the current defense policy would be difficult. Current policy holds that not becoming a military power “means that Japan will not possess military capability strong enough to pose a military threat to other countries, beyond the minimum necessary level of the defense capability for self-defense.” Add to this Japan’s pervasive anti-nuclear weapons sentiment and those in Tokyo supporting the development of a Japanese nuclear arsenal face a major task. Thus, any current argument that attempts to reduce Japan’s nuclear allergy to it simply receiving a “free ride,” that is, refusing to acquire nuclear weapons only because it remains under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, does not understand the linkage between existing policies and the enduring strength and pervasiveness of the Japanese anti-nuclear weapons sentiment.79 Japan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons any time in the near future would require Tokyo to dispose of existing policies and turn its back completely on the popular sentiment that continues to demonstrate an abhorrence of these weapons. Because persistence has been the hallmark of the advocates of Japan becoming a normal country, those supporting the nuclear arming of the nation could find a loophole by arguing that the possession of nuclear weapons is not beyond the minimum necessary to protect the country, given the potential threats—that is, North Korea and China—they claim currently exist. However, in addition to the Three Nonnuclear Principles, the 1956 Atomic Energy Basic Law, and the fact that Japan decades ago signed and ratified the NPT as a nonnuclear weapons state, current Japanese defense policy places another restriction on the possession of nuclear weapons. It states that, “it is unconstitutional to possess what is referred to as offensive weapons that, from their performance, are to be used exclusively for total destruction of other countries, since it immediately exceeds the limit of the minimum necessary level of self-defense.” Convincing the hibakusha (the atomic bomb survivors), the vast majority of the residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and many other Japanese citizens that atomic warfare is not synonymous with total destruction is not an easy sell, even with the contention that the possession of nuclear weapons would be for deterrent, defensive purposes.

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Nonetheless, without the war-renouncing restraint provided by Article 9, nationalists and their sympathizers who want Tokyo to broach the debate of Japan possessing nuclear weapons would no longer have to deal with a nuclear taboo often associated with the pacifist constitution. With less risk of reprimand from the public and the media, they would be afforded the unprecedented opportunity to make the case time and time again that Japan needs nuclear weapons to serve as a “defensive” deterrent for regional uncertainties and perhaps for the anarchy that is attendant to the ongoing global war on terrorism. The revision of Article 9 as Japan continues to pursue the status of a normal country places the “next order of business” on the doorstep of nationalists and others who believe that it is right for Japan to possess nuclear weapons. As already noted, the policy of the Three Nonnuclear Principles could be abandoned. Article 2 of the Atomic Energy Basic Law of 1956 states only that, “The research, development and utilization of atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes,” not specifically that it will not be used to build weapons.80 Withdrawing from the NPT only requires that Japan wait three months before it is no longer bound by the accord. In some ways, Japan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons to maintain the peace would be analogous with several justifications that have been used in the recent past to rationalize Japanese military activities. Defenders of Article 9 in Japan have more to worry about than being pulled into a U.S. war (makikomare ron) that has nothing directly to do with the defense of the nation. For conservative policymakers, the revision of Article 9 would make Japanese pacifism a product of history and create a political environment, even more auspicious than what now exists, for Japan to move up the ladder to become a normal country, perhaps in the future even developing nuclear weapons. Although Japan’s possession of nuclear weapons is far from certain and not about to happen anytime soon, the revision of Article 9 would be a major political victory for the Japanese right and would send a strong signal to Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons organizations that future efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament will meet more resistance than those of the past. One of the biggest challenges Japanese pacifism confronts today is that, for years, advocates of Japan becoming a normal country have cast the debate as a moral issue. They have consistently suggested that it is wrong for Japan, as a major economic power, to sit on the sidelines while other countries do the security dirty work. They suggest that Japan has a moral obligation to participate in international security conflicts, since global security is a collective effort that requires the triumph of good over evil. The problem is not Japan’s participation in international security initiatives but that U.S. military objectives and interests have decidedly colored and influenced Tokyo’s conception of what is morally correct.

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Because of Japan’s military alliance with the United States, Tokyo typically has seen international security issues largely through the lens used by Washington. This remained true in the aftermath of the Cold War and even as Tokyo began its visibly important initiative to promote nuclear disarmament in the mid-1990s. Japan’s security alliance with the United States and its refuge under the American nuclear umbrella has meant that Tokyo has never satisfactorily been able to explain the dualism of its policy—public opposition to the existence of nuclear weapons but willful acceptance of a foreign nuclear shield.81 Although Japan suffered the horrific experiences of atomic warfare, giving it, as some say, a moral obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament, Tokyo has not rejected the utility of nuclear weapons.

Disparate Selves Tokyo’s interest in having Japan assume an important role in the international community after the 1991 Gulf War soon became the catalyst for pursuing the status of a normal state. The fusion of the two meant that Japan’s security identity would be subject to change. The ensuing struggles between cultural pacifism, emergent nationalism, and ongoing pressure from Washington that Japan needs to expand its military responsibilities have prompted the Japanese identity to develop disparate selves. One of these selves sees Japan’s identity as being comprised of an antimilitary sentiment that emerged after the Pacific War and that strongly opposes the existence of nuclear weapons. The other self sees Japan’s identity as inadequate, since it is a big power that retains an abnormal security posture in international society. Tokyo’s way of handling this identity dilemma has been to portray in public both selves, sometimes as if one does not know of the existence of the other. One side of Tokyo projects its enduring worries about Chinese military power,82 the fear of a nuclear-armed North Korea83 and the strong belief that nuclear weapons—now belonging to the United States—provide an important deterrent benefit to Japan. These issues create a unique amalgamation that advocates of Japan becoming a normal state use to their advantage, especially in an environment where Article 9 has become the target of revisionists. The possession of nuclear weapons by Japan is something that only a few U.S. analysts have given passing consideration to.84 Even though Washington does not want to see Japan develop nuclear weapons, its reaction to this would be more of how this affects U.S. security policies in Northeast Asia than about proliferation concerns and damage to the NPT regime. Already having the technological capability and the plutonium, and

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with the political dynamics of a normal state continuing to evolve, there is the possibility, albeit slim at the present time, that Tokyo could begin pushing for the inclusion of the possession of nuclear weapons into Japan’s security identity. It is important to keep in mind that in the past, security initiatives that the Japanese public has not clearly endorsed have become reality in Japan.85 The other side of Tokyo understands that a culture of pacifism sustains the Japanese people’s abhorrence of nuclear weapons. While it is clear that Tokyo has not enthusiastically sought to rectify the retrogression that has recently afflicted the NPT regime, specifically the undermining of the “principle of irreversibility,” Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons organizations have been pressing the government hard to move the global disarmament process forward. The efforts of these organizations help maintain the widespread public detestation of nuclear weapons. What is more, extending beyond Hiroshima and Nagasaki is the Japanese public’s rejection of the premise promoted by Tokyo that Japan’s national security depends upon it retaining its place under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. A survey conducted in 2001 by the Nihon Seron Chosakai (Japan Public Opinion Research Group) indicated that 55 percent of the Japanese respondents did not believe that Japan needed to be protected by the U.S. nuclear shield.86 A poll conducted by Asahi Shimbun and South Korea’s Dong-A Ilbo in the summer of 2005 showed that a plurality of Japanese respondents, 48 percent, believed that Japan did not need to depend on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, while 39 percent believed that it did.87 The widespread belief that Japan does not need the U.S. nuclear umbrella is therefore directly at odds with the Cold War policy still maintained by the Japanese government. This stark contrast between what Tokyo accepts and what many Japanese people believe is necessary for the security of the nation points to the perennial tension in Japan’s dissociative identity with regard to nuclear weapons. Tokyo would be inclined to work harder than it does presently for the abolition of nuclear weapons if the United States genuinely pursued this as an achievable objective and actively sought the involvement of the other nuclear powers—that is, if Washington assumed the role of a “flag-carrier.” While there would be resistance from ultranationalists in Japan who support the development of a Japanese nuclear arsenal, without the worry of Washington’s reaction, Tokyo would be free of the exogenous U.S. influence on its disarmament initiatives. However, since this is not the case, Tokyo’s must play down the enduring anti-nuclear weapons sentiment that exists in Japan. It therefore must be satisfied with limited disarmament efforts and intermittent declarations to the international community to bring about the elimination of nuclear weapons. In doing this, Tokyo must continue to sidestep the question of

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why and how Japanese national security and the promotion of peace depend primarily upon the existence of nuclear weapons—even if for now they belong to the United States.

Summary and Conclusion The central argument of this book is that, despite Japan’s public-policy efforts to design and implement an approach that will lead to nuclear disarmament, Tokyo has concluded that U.S. nuclear weapons continue to serve Japanese national security interests. Tokyo reasons that designing a path to eliminate nuclear weapons does not mean that they have to be eliminated quickly; this, it maintains, would not be practical. Tokyo supports a gradual, step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament, which becomes its way of circumventing criticism that it holds two incompatible interests—the abolition of nuclear weapons and the continuing need for a nuclear deterrent. However, Tokyo’s gradual or incremental approach is tantamount to embracing an ever-compromising posture that increases the possibility that nuclear weapons will be used again. For Tokyo, nuclear disarmament will not occur until the nuclear powers decide that the time is right; to think otherwise is not practical. Endorsing a policy approach to nuclear disarmament that the nuclear weapons states see as unreasonable means that they would also view it as confrontational, something Tokyo cannot support. All of this does not mean that, because of Japan’s enduring anti-nuclear weapons sentiment, Tokyo simply proclaims the country’s interests in nuclear disarmament but does nothing substantive to promote the NPT regime. Tokyo does have a genuine interest in strengthening the NPT regime, particularly in seeing the CTBT come into force, and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons. However, Tokyo’s continuing desire to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent for Japan has remained a higher priority than nuclear disarmament. This has caused Tokyo to carefully monitor Washington’s objectives, yield to its policies, and to not draw critical attention in international assemblies to the United States’ disinterest in nuclear disarmament. That Tokyo has developed an interest in making Japan a “normal country” further mitigates its enthusiasm for nuclear disarmament. In regard to this, Tokyo has accepted Washington’s strong unilateral counterproliferation policy, only moving away from this in the case of Iran because of a huge oil deal with Teheran. Accompanying Tokyo’s determination to get Japan to become a normal country is the risk that one day in the future nationalist

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and conservative forces will proclaim that the country is cured of its “nuclear allergy” and launch an assertive push to develop a defensive nuclear weapons arsenal. Tokyo’s desire to maintain Japan’s place under the U.S. nuclear umbrella has put it on a different path to nuclear disarmament than Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations. Suffering from fragmentation, these organizations have not been able to bring the Japanese citizenry to the complete realization that Japan’s disarmament efforts are often enfeebled by U.S. policy, by Tokyo’s insistence that the American nuclear deterrent is necessary for national security, and by its interest in making Japan a normal country. Tokyo is currently at a political crossroad, one that is important for forming Japan’s security identity with respect to nuclear weapons. Maintaining its existing nuclear disarmament policy is not likely to result in the elimination of nuclear weapons any time soon. Alternatively, Tokyo can give more attention to fortifying the NPT regime. By strengthening Japan’s nuclear disarmament policy and by exercising considerably more autonomy in its decision making, Tokyo would be taking important steps in this direction.

Notes Chapter 1 Introduction: Detoured on the Path to Nuclear Disarmament Notes to Pages 1–4 1. Atomic Bombs and Poems of Sankichi Toge (Shimonoseki City, Japan: Secretariat of the Shimonoseki A-Bomb Exhibition, 2002). 2. Robert Jay Lifton and Greg Mitchell, Hiroshima in America: A Half Century of Denial (New York: Avon Books, 1996), pp. 276–297; Philip Nobile, ed., Judgment at the Smithsonian: The Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (New York: Marlowe & Company, 1995). 3. U.S. Department of State, The Proliferation Security Initiative, Washington DC, July 28, 2004; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Speech by H.E. Mr. Masatoshi Abe, Senior Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan on the Occasion of the Asian Senior-Level Talks on Nonproliferation, Tokyo, November 13, 2003. 4. Since he became prime minister in April 2001, Junichiro Koizumi has attended every atomic bombing ceremony in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On August 6 and 9, 2005, the prime minister stated, “Japan will lead the international community to promote international efforts for nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation and devote itself to abolish nuclear weapons.” See Address by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at the Hiroshima Memorial Service for the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony, Hiroshima, August 6, 2005; Address by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at the Nagasaki Memorial Service for the Nagasaki Peace Ceremony, Nagasaki, August 9, 2005. 5. Between 2000–2004, this was the title of Tokyo’s nuclear disarmament resolution submitted to the United Nations’ General Assembly. 6. Article VI of the NPT is as follows: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” 7. The Report of the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, Facing Nuclear Dangers: An Action Plan for the 21st Century, Tokyo, December 1999. 8. Tadatoshi Akiba, Mayor of Hiroshima, Peace Declaration, Hiroshima, August 6, 2004.

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Notes to Pages 4–13

9. See Anthony DiFilippo, The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military Arrangement: Competing Security Transitions in a Changing International Environment (Armonk, NY; M.E. Sharpe, 2002), p. 124. 10. Survey data are from Global Poll Shows World Perceived as More Dangerous Place, Centre for Public Opinion and Democracy, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, May 16, 2002. Survey conducted by the Centre for Public Opinion and Democracy, with support from the Simon Centre and the Asahi Shimbun. 11. For a discussion of the highly dubious contention that “Arms races are not always bad,” see Charles Glaser, “When are Arms Races Dangerous? Rational Versus Suboptimal Arming,” International Security, vol. 28, no. 4, Spring 2004, pp. 44–84, especially p. 81. 12. Akira Kurosaki, “Domestic Politics and Nuclear Disarmament Diplomacy: Limits of the Japanese Antinuclear Movement,” paper presented at the International Studies Association, Portland, Oregon, February 27, 2003, accessible at www. bsos.umd.edu/pgsd/publications_main.htm. 13. Author interview with a representative of the Japan Association for an AntiNuclear Government, Hiroshima, July 31, 2004. 14. Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Geneva, October 21, 1994. The Agreed Framework states: “The U.S. will provide formal assurances to the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.” 15. “Shots Fired at Hiroshima Hotel Hosting Guests for A-Bomb Ceremony,” Mainichi Daily News, August 6, 2004; “Shots Fired at Hotel,” The Japan Times Online, August 7, 2004. 16. Survey conducted by Kyodo News and reported in “85% of Lawmakers Support Revising the Constitution,” The Japan Times Online, September 5, 2004. 17. Foreign sources account for 90 percent of Japan’s oil supply. See Charles Morrison (ed.), Asia Pacific Security Outlook 2004 (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2004), p. 112; also see “Iran Supplies 17% of Japan’s Crude Demand,” Tehran Times, September 1, 2004. 18. “Japan Nudged to Consider Libya Oil Deal,” The Japan Times Online, August 6, 2004. 19. Quoted in “Powell Links Japan UNSC Seat to Article 9,” Daily Yomiuri Online, August 14, 2004; see also “Article 9 a UNSC-Bid Hurdle: Powell,” The Japan Times Online, August 14, 2004. 20. “Japan’s Deputy FM Rejects US Demand to Scrap Oil Deal With Iran,” Islamic Republic News Agency, August 24, 2004. 21. Anthony DiFilippo, “Security Trials, Nuclear Tribulations, and Rapprochement in Japan-North Korean Relations” The Journal of Pacific Asia, vol. 11, 2004, pp. 7–31.

Chapter 2

The Watershed

1. For CTBT to come into force, 44 (the Annex 2) countries—such as, the United States, Russia, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, China, Pakistan,

Notes to Pages 13–16

2.

3.

4. 5.

6. 7.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

14.

15.

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India, Israel, Iran, and North and South Korea—must sign and ratify the accord. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Conference by the Press Secretary, October 12, 1999, accessed at www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/1999/10/1012.html on January 18, 2002. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by Foreign Minister Yohei Kono on the Refusal by the U.S. Senate to Ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), October 14, 1999, accessed on January 18, 2002 at www.mofa.go.jp/ announce/announce/1999/10/1014–2.html; “Japan Worried by Treaty’s Defeat,” The Washington Post, October 16, 1999. Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, accessed at www.ctbto.org on January 18, 2002. According to the U.S. Department of Energy, in subcritical nuclear testing “chemical high explosives are detonated next to samples of weapons-grade plutonium [plutonium-239] to obtain new insights about plutonium and its alloys in the ensuing microseconds.” It also maintains that during a subcritical test “no critical mass is formed, so no self-sustaining nuclear fission chain reaction occurs as it does in a nuclear detonation. The experiments are permitted within the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty signed by President Clinton in 1998.” U.S. Department of Energy, “Underground Explosions are Music to their Ears,” U.S. Department of Energy’s website at www.llnl.gov/str.Conrad.html, accessed on December 18, 2002. “White House Wants to Bury Pact Banning Tests of Nuclear Arms,” The New York Times, July 7, 2001. Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Danger, “Test Ban Treaty: Still in America’s Interests but the Bush Administration is Befuddled on Whether to End Nuclear Blast,” Coalition Issue Brief, vol. 5, no. 13, June 8, 2001. Rebecca Johnson, “Boycotts and Blandishments: Making the CTBT Visible,” Diplomacy Today, no. 61, October–November 2001. Philipp Bleek, “White House to Partially Fund Test Ban Implementing Body,” Arms Control Today, September 2001. Quoted in “U.S. Will Drop Objections to China’s Effort on Missile Buildup,” The New York Times, September 2, 2001. “U.S. Restates its Stand on Missiles in China.” The New York Times, September 2, 2001. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Submission of a Draft Resolution on Nuclear Disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly, Tokyo, October 19, 2001. See A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, 56th General Assembly of the United Nations, Plenary Session, New York, November 29, 2001; “U.N. Adopts Stand on Nukes,” Asahi Shimbun, November 7, 2001. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the Adoption of the Draft Resolution on Nuclear Disarmament Submitted by Japan to the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, Tokyo, November 6, 2001. Translated by Hiro Umebayashi, Diet Debate on UN Resolution (November 2001), accessed on January 14, 2002 from the Peace Depot (Yokohama, Japan) website at http://peacedpot.org/e-news/nd/diet.html.

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Notes to Pages 17–20

16. Disarmament Aimed at Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Called for in Draft Resolution Approved by First Committee: Other Texts Approved Address Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, UN Conference on Nuclear Dangers, Small Arms, Africa Centre, 56th General Assembly of the United Nations, First Committee, New York, November 5, 2001. 17. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Address by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at the Hiroshima Memorial Service for the Hiroshima Peace Memorial, Hiroshima, August 6, 2001; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Address by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at the Nagasaki Memorial Service for the 56th Nagasaki Peace Ceremony, Nagasaki, August 9, 2001. 18. Statement by H. E. Am. Shen Guofang, Head of the Chinese Delegation at the 2nd Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, United Nations, New York, November 12, 2001. 19. Russia ratified the CTBT in June 2000. 20. Russia Statement by H.E. Igor D. Sergeev, Assistant to the President of the Russian Federation on Strategic Stability: The Second Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, United Nations, New York, November 11, 2001. 21. See U.S. Department of State, The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, accessed at www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/ctb.htm on February 14, 2002; Independent Commission on the Verifiability of the CTBT, Final Report, November 7, 2000, accessed on the worldwide web at www.ctbtcommission.org/ FinalReport.pdf. 22. Japan Statement by H.E. Mr. Nobuyasu Abe, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, United Nations, New York, November 12, 2001. 23. Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Report of the Conference, United Nations, New York, November 15, 2001. 24. Quoted in “U.S. Boycotts U.N. Conference on Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,” People’s Daily, November 12, 2001. 25. “Japan Asks the U.S. to Clarify Stance on CTBT,” Kyodo News, January 14, 2002. 26. Survey data from several polling organizations accessed from the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Site on January 23, 2002 at www.clw.org/coalition/ctsuppor.htm#polls. 27. CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll conducted between October 21 and 24, 1999. Poll data accessed from the website of the Council for a Livable World on January 22, 2002 at www.clw.org/control/cnnctbtpoll.html. 28. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Joint Ministerial Statement on the CTBT, Tokyo, September 14, 2002; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CTBT: Launch of Joint Ministerial Statement (Overview and Evaluation), Tokyo, September 2002. 29. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Recent Efforts to Promote the Early Entry into Force of the CTBT, August 2003, Tokyo. 30. Ibid. 31. Department of State, United States Embassy, Transcript: Undersecretary Bolton Fields Queries on Iraq, N. Korea, Tokyo, August 26, 2002.

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32. Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs Yoriko Kawaguchi at the 3rd Conference on Facilitating the Early Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Vienna, September 3, 2003. 33. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Initiatives for Facilitating the CTBT’s EIF (Entry into Force), Tokyo, September 2003. 34. Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban Treaty, Report of the Conference, Vienna, September 3–5, 2003. 35. Yoriko Kawaguchi, Foreign Minister of Japan, Speech to be Delivered at the 3rd Conference on Facilitating the Early Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Vienna, September 3, 2003. 36. Enio Cordeiro, Deputy Permanent Representative to the Conference, Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Statement by the Brazilian Delegation, Vienna, September 3, 2003. 37. Thomas Kitt, Minister of State, Visit by Minister of State Kitt to Vienna 31 August to 4 September 2003 CTBTO Article XIV Conference, National Statement, Vienna, September 3, 2003. 38. Barbara Bridge, Permanent Representative to the Conference, Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 3–5 September 2003, Vienna, September 4, 2003. 39. Alfred Tokollo Moleah, Permanent Representative to the Conference, Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 3–5 September, Statement by South Africa, Vienna, September 5, 2003. 40. Statement by State Secretary Hans Dahlgren, Sweden, at the CTBT Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Vienna, September 3, 2003. 41. Press Release, Conference Closes with Adoption of Final Declaration Calling for Universal Ratification of the CTBT, Vienna, September 5, 2003. 42. Statement by H.E. Dato’ Hussein Haniff Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the CTBTO on Behalf of the Nonaligned Movement States Signatories and Ratifiers to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, Vienna, September 3, 2003. 43. Dr. Klaus Renoldner, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Statement of the Nongovernmental Organizations to the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 3–5 September 2003, Vienna, September 5, 2003. 44. Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Draft Report of the Conference, New York, September 21–23, 2005; Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Draft Final Declaration and Measures to Promote the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, New York, September 21–23, 2005; Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations, Statement by H.E. Mr. Tatsuo Arima, the Special Envoy of the Government of Japan at the Fourth Conference of Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, New York, September 22, 2005. 45. In the aftermath of the September 2001 attacks on the United States, the Bush administration averred, contrary to many lawmakers in Washington who

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46.

47.

48.

49.

50.

51. 52.

53.

54.

55. 56. 57.

Notes to Pages 23–25 supported beefing up the nation’s counterterrorism capabilities, that missile defense would be necessary for protection against future terrorist assaults. However, a report issued by the Central Intelligence Agency in December 2001 indicated that an attack on U.S. territory employing weapons of mass destruction is more likely to occur by a state or nonstate group using ships, trucks, and airplanes rather than by missiles. See National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015: Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate (McLean, VA: Central Intelligence Agency, December 2001). Office of the Press Secretary, President Discusses National Missile Defense, The White House Rose Garden, Washington, DC, December 13, 2001, accessed on January 14, 2001 at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12. Office of the Press Secretary, Joint Press Conference with President George W. Bush and President Jose Maria Aznar, Moncloa Palace, Madrid, Spain, June 12, 2001, accessed at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010612-6.html on January 14, 2002. Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks at Fundraising Dinner for Senator Wayne Allard and Governor Bill Owens, Adams Mark Hotel, Denver, Colorado, August 14, 2001, accessed at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/ 20010814-6.html on January 14, 2002. Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President on the Budget, Harry S. Truman High School, Independence, Missouri, August 21, 2001, accessed on January 14, 2002 at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/20010821. html. Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President, President Welcomes Russian Decision, Washington, DC, October 17, 2001, accessed on January 14, 2002 at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011017-10.html. Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks at Fundraising Dinner for Senator Wayne Allard and Governor Bill Owens, Dever, Colorado, August 14, 2001. Anthony DiFilippo, The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military Arrangement: Competing Security Transitions in a Changing International Environment (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002). Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Exchange of Notes Concerning a Program for Cooperative Research on Ballistic Missile Technologies Based on the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America, Tokyo, August 16, 1999. “Japan to Develop Rocket for Joint Defense System,” The Japan Times Online, August 25, 2005; “Cost of Joint Japan-U.S. Interceptor System Triples,” Daily Yomiuri Online, September 25, 2005. Zan Jifang, “Japan Overseas Military Actions Arouse Concern,” Beijing Review, no. 47, 2001. Wang Fan, “Sino-Japanese Relations: Year of Events,” Beijing Review, no. 52, 2001. “Tokyo Set to Cut the Umbilical Chord: Yen Loans to China Face 25% Trim,” The Japan Times Online, January 18, 2002.

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58. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Position on the Missile Defense Plan, Tokyo, November 29, 2001. 59. “US Urged to Reconsider Opinions of Others on ABM: FM Spokeswoman,” People’s Daily, December 14, 2001; “US Withdrawal from ABM, An Unwise Move: Commentary,” People’s Daily, December 21, 2001. 60. Preservation of and Compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, 54th General Assembly of the United Nations, Plenary, New York, December 1, 1999. 61. Rebecca Johnson, “U.N. First Committee Seeks a New Agenda on Disarmament and Backs the ABM Treaty,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 41, 1999. 62. General Assembly Adopts 49 Disarmament, International Security Texts on Recommendation of its First Committee, 55th General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, November 20, 2000. 63. Japan’s 2000 U.N. nuclear disarmament resolution is entitled A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, 55th General Assembly of the United Nations, Plenary Session, New York, November 20, 2000. 64. “Practical Steps” on the Path to Nuclear-Weapon Elimination Stressed in Draft Text Approved by First Committee, 56th General Assembly of the United Nations, First Committee, New York, November 5, 2001. 65. Quoted in “U.S. Will Drop Objections to China’s Missile Buildup,” The New York Times, September 2, 2001. 66. See “U.S. Restates its Stand on Missiles in China,” The New York Times, September 5, 2001. 67. “China Cautions U.S. on MDS [Missile Defense System],” People’s Daily, September 8, 2001. 68. Donald Rumsfeld, “Unclassified Letter to Congress” (accompanying the Nuclear Posture Review), January 10, 2002. 69. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts], 8 January 2002, Nuclear Posture Review Report, submitted to Congress on December 31, 2001; “U.S. to Seek Options on New Nuclear Tests: White House Worries About Arsenals Reliability,” The Washington Post, January 8, 2002; “Pentagon Study Urges Arms Shift, From Nuclear to High-Tech,” The New York Times, January 9, 2002. 70. United Nations, Department of Disarmament Affairs, 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, New York, 2000. 71. “U.S. Aims for 3,800 Nuclear Warheads,” The Washington Post, January 10, 2002. 72. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Position on the Missile Defense Plan, Tokyo, November 29, 2001. 73. “U.S. Aims for 3,800 Nuclear Warheads.” 74. Tadatoshi Akiba, Mayor of Hiroshima, Letter of Protest, January 18, 2002. Letter accessed on the city of Hiroshima homepage on February 15, 2002 at www.city.hiroshima.jp.

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Notes to Pages 29–31

75. Quoted in “Russia Stresses Nuclear Arms Reductions Must Be ‘Irreversible.’ ” China Daily, January 10, 2002. 76. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Alexander Yakovenko, the Official Spokesman of Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Answers a Question from Russian Media Concerning Reports on US Strategic Plans in Nuclear Field, Moscow, January 9, 2002. 77. “New Initiatives of US Administration are Dangerous and Senseless,” Pravda, January 11, 2002. 78. “Moscow-Washington: No Consensus Reached,” Pravda, January 17, 2002. 79. “U.S. Now Seeking Binding Deal with Russia on Nuclear Arms,” The Washington Post, February 6, 2002; “Powell Says U.S. Plans to Work out Binding Arms Pact,” The New York Times, February 6, 2002. On May 24, 2002 Moscow and Washington signed the “Moscow Treaty,” officially titled thus to describe the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions. See U.S. Department of State, www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/18016.htm. 80. “Bad Omen for Nuclear Disarmament,” The Japan Times Online, November 1, 2001. 81. “Mr. Bush’s Nuclear Sleight of Hand,” The Japan Times Online, January 17, 2002. 82. “Russia Performs Subcritical Nuclear Test, Drafts START II Law,” Bellona, December 10, 1998, accessed on the Bellona website on February 15, 2002 at www.bellona.no/imaker?id⫽1&sub⫽1. 83. The Department of Energy announced the eighth Oboe subcritical test on December 13, 2001. See “Subcritical Experiment Conducted Successfully,” News Releases, accessed on February 14, 2002 at www.nv.doe.gov. Prior to this, the United States conducted seven other subcritical experiments. 84. See Department of Energy, “Scientists to Conduct Vito Subcritical Experiment,” News Releases, February 12, 2002, accessed on February 15, 2002 at www.nv.doe.gov; “U.S., Britain Conduct Nevada Nuclear Experiment,” The New York Times, February 14, 2002. 85. For information on U.S. and Russian subcritical nuclear testing from 1997 to 2000 see Jonathan Medalia, “Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,” Congressional Brief, National Council for Science and the Environment, Washington, DC, January 11, 2001. For information on Russian subcritical nuclear testing also see “Seven Subcritical Tests in the Artic,” Bellona, February 8, 2000, accessed at www.bellona.no/imaker?id ⫽ 1&sub ⫽ 1on February 14, 2002. Information on subcritical nuclear testing performed by the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia can be found on the Hiroshima City website (Protests against Nuclear Tests) at www.city.hiroshima.jp/e/index-E.html. 86. Eric Arnett, “Big Science, Small Results,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 54, no. 4, July/August 1998. 87. Quoted in David Albright, “The Shots Heard ‘Round the World,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 54, no. 4, July/August 1998. 88. See Statement on the CTBT by Minister of External Affairs of India, Mr. I. K. Gujral, August 22, 1996, accessed January 9, 2006 at http://disarm.igc.org/paperctbt. html; Statement by I. K. Gujral, Minister of External Affairs, in the Indian

Notes to Pages 31–35

89.

90. 91. 92.

93. 94. 95.

96.

97. 98.

99.

100. 101. 102.

103. 104.

105.

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Parliament on 11 September, 1996, accessed at www.indianembassy.org/policy/ CTBT/gujral_ctbt_september_11_96.htm on February 13, 2002. General Assembly of the United Nations, United States Calls on Disarmament Conference to Accept Draft Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty without Changes, Press Release, New York, August 1, 1996. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Conference by the Press Secretary, 2 October 1998, Tokyo. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Conference by the Press Secretary, 11 December, 1998, Tokyo. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Facing Nuclear Dangers: An Action Plan for the 21st Century, Japan Institute of International Affairs and Hiroshima Peace Institute, Tokyo, July 25, 1999, p. 4. “U.S., Britain Conduct Nevada Nuclear Experiment,” “U.S., Britain Conduct Nevada Nuclear Experiment,” China Daily, February 15, 2002. Quoted in “Britain Joins U.S. in Nuke Experiment,” The New York Times, February 15, 2002. Akiba, Letter of Protest; Tadatoshi Akiba, Mayor of Hiroshima, Letter of Protest, February 15, 2002. Letters accessed at http://pcf.city.hiroshima.jp on February 15, 2002. Iccho Itoh, Mayor of Nagasaki, Letter of Protest, Washington, DC, February 15, 2002; Iccho Itoh, Mayor of Nagasaki, Letter of Protest, February 15, 2002. Letters accessed on February 15, 2002 at www1.city.nagasaki.nagasaki.jp. “Hiroshima and Nagasaki Seek Security without U.S. Nuclear Umbrella,” Asahi Shimbun, August 16, 1998. Iccho Itoh, Mayor of Nagasaki, Letter of Protest, Mr. William J. Clinton, Washington, DC, July 3, 1997. Letter accessed at www.us1.nagasakinoc-or.jp/~nacity/na-bomb/na-peacee.html on September 4, 1997. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 190–191; Richard Butler, Fatal Choice: Nuclear Weapons and the Illusion of Missile Defense (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001), p. 27. Kenneth Totty, “Nuclear Proliferation on the Indian Subcontinent,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 24, Spring 2000, p. 67. Butler, Fatal Choice, pp. 45–63. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Yohei Kono on the Decision for the Indefinite Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Tokyo, May 12, 1995. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister’s Major Speeches and Articles: The NPT Review and Extension Conference, New York, April 18, 1995. See Editor, “The NPT Research Association’s Appeal to Heads of Government,” and Naomi Shohno, President, The NPT Research Association of Japan et al., “A Japanese Appeal on the Extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” in Plutonium, no. 7, Autumn 1994, accessed at www.cnfc. or.jp/p17/focus.e.html on March 12, 2002. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister’s Major Speeches and Articles: The NPT Review and Extension Conference; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement

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106.

107.

108.

109.

110.

111.

112.

113.

114.

115.

116.

117.

Notes to Pages 35–38 by Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda at the Seminar on Nuclear Disarmament after the Indefinite Extension of the NPT, Kyoto, December 2, 1996. U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs, Decisions and Resolutions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, Washington, DC, accessed on March 18, 2002, at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/ stories/confact.htm. Security Council of the United Nations, Security Council Resolution 984 (1995) on Security Assurances against the Use of Nuclear Weapons to Non-Nuclear Weapon States that are Parties to the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, April 11, 1995. United Nations, Department of Disarmament Affairs, 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document. See Directorate General, Arms Control and Scientific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Disarmament Policy (Tokyo: Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Nonproliferation, Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 2003), pp. 45–47. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Conference by the Press Secretary, Comment by Chief Cabinet Secretary Kanezo Muraoka on the Nuclear Tests Conducted by the Republic of India, Tokyo, May 15, 1998; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Comments by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on Measures in Response to Nuclear Testing Conducted by Pakistan, Tokyo, May 29, 1998. Interviews conducted on June 13 and 14, 1998 by Yomiuri Shimbun. Data acquired from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. Satu Limaye, “Tokyo’s Dynamic Diplomacy: Japan and the Subcontinent’s Nuclear Tests,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, vol. 22, no. 2, 2000, pp. 322–339. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Announcement by Chief Cabinet Secretary on Discontinuation of Measures in Response to Nuclear Testing Conducted by India and Pakistan, Tokyo, October 26, 2001; “India, Pakistan Sanctions to Go,” Asahi Shimbun, October 24, 2001. Anthony DiFilippo, “Japan’s Anti-Nuclear Weapons Policy Misses its Target, Even in the War on Terrorism,” Medicine, Conflict and Survival, vol. 19, no. 3, July/September 2003, pp. 235–247. “Nuclear Plans Go Beyond Cuts,” The Washington Post, February 19, 2002; “U.S. Nuclear Plan Sees New Weapons and New Targets,” The New York Times, March 10, 2002. Statement of John Gordon, Undersecretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, Before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC, February 14, 2002. “U.S. Works Up Plan for Using Nuclear Arms,” The Los Angeles Times, March 9, 2002; “Secret Plan Outlines the Unthinkable,” The Los Angeles Times, March 10, 2002.

Notes to Pages 39–44

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118. “U.S. Must Not Lower Nuclear Threshold,” Mainichi Daily News, March 22, 2002; “America’s Dangerous Nuclear Posture,” The Japan Times Online, March 22, 2002. 119. Remarks by Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) Following the President’s Press Conference on Senate Rejection of the CTBT, October 14, 1999, accessed on February 4, 2002 on the website of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers at www.clw.org/coalition/lott101499.htm. 120. Directorate General, Arms Control and Scientific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Disarmament Policy, p. 46. 121. Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, Remarks by President Clinton at Press Conference on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Washington, DC, October 14, 1999, accessed on the website of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers on February 4, 2002 at www.clw.org/coalition/clinton101499.htm. 122. Statement of Senator Joseph Biden, “Stop Playing with our National Security: Ratify the Test-Ban Treaty,” Congressional Record, September 24, 1999; Richard Garwin and Georges Charpak, Megawatts and Megatons: A Turning Point in the Nuclear Age? (New York, Knopf, 2001), p. 308. 123. Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, May 1997). 124. DiFilippo, The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military Arrangement. 125. Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, Votes of Senators on Nuclear Testing and The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 106th Congress, October 15, 1999, accessed at www.clw.org.coalition/bckgrvts.htm on April 6, 2002.

Chapter 3

Technology, Choice, and Nuclear Weapons

1. Marvin Miller, “Japan, Nuclear Weapons, and Reactor-Grade Plutonium,” Security Studies Program and Department of Nuclear Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, paper presented to a seminar at the Nuclear Control Institute, March 27, 2002. 2. Jeremy Hall, “Will Japan Go Nuclear?” New Zealand International Review, vol. 22, no. 6, November/December 1997, pp. 12–15. 3. World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in Japan, London, August 2004, accessed at www.world-nuclear.ors. 4. “Plutonium from Spent Fuel at 43 Tons,” The Japan Times Online, September 7, 2005. 5. “Japanese Nuclear Games,” Economist, vol. 353, no. 8140, October 9, 1999, pp. 101–102; “A Pox on MOX,” Economist, vol. 359, no. 8224, pp. 38–39. 6. Sueo Machi, Japan’s Nuclear Energy Policy and International Cooperation, Atomic Energy Commission of Japan, March 19, 2004; “Japanese Citizens

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7. 8.

9. 10.

11.

12. 13.

14. 15. 16.

17. 18.

19.

Notes to Pages 44–46 Reject Plutonium MOX Use—Major Setback for Nuclear Program, British Nuclear Fuels and COGEMA,” May 27, 2001, accessed at http://archive. greenpeace.org/pressreleases/nucreleases/2001may27.htm. “Nuclear Policy to Focus on Upgraded Light-Water Reactors,” Asahi Shimbun, June 11, 2005. Frank Barnabie and Shaun Burnie, “Thinking the Unthinkable: Japanese Nuclear Power and Proliferation in East Asia,” Japan Focus, September 8, 2005, accessed at http://japanfocus.org. Tsuneo Akaha, “Japan’s Three Nonnuclear Principles: A Coming Demise?” Peace & Change, vol. 11, no. 1, Spring 1985, pp. 75–89. Hans Kristensen, Japan Under the US Nuclear Umbrella (Berkeley, CA: The Nautilus Institute, July 21, 1999), accessed at www/nautilus.org/papers/ security/index.html#nanp on May 21, 2001; Robert Norris, William Arkin, and William Burr, “How Much Did Japan Know?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2000, vol. 56, no. 1, pp. 11–15. Japan-U.S. Secret Agreements on Nuclear Weapons and their Meaning, speech given by Shoji Niihara, Japanese Communist Party, International Commission Chairman, at the International Meeting of the 2000 World Conference Against A & H Bombs, Hiroshima Japan August 2, 2000; “Japanese Government Lied on Nuclear Weapons,” The Guardian, August 23, 2000; “Nuclear Pact Ensured Smooth Okinawa Reversion,” The Japan Times, May 15, 2002. “U.S. Report: Japan Allowed N-Arms in Territorial Waters,” Daily Yomiuri Online, May 15, 1997. “Nakasone Ok’d Nukes for Japan,” Asahi Shimbun, December 2000. The existence of this nuclear shield permitted Nakasone to write many years later in 1998 that, “After being appointed director general of the Defense Agency in 1970, I repeatedly and explicitly declared that Japan would not acquire nuclear weapons.” See Yasuhiro Nakasone, “Japan’s Firm Nonnuclear Resolve,” Japan Echo, October 1998, vol. 25, no. 5. See “Japan Ok’d No-Notice Entry of US Nukes,” Mainichi Daily News, April 14, 2000; “Secret Nuke Pact,” Mainichi Daily News, August 31, 2000. “Mori Dismisses Charges of Nuclear Arms in Japan,” The Japan Times Online, April 19, 2000. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Washington, DC, January 19, 1960. Historical documents have revealed that in 1960 Washington and Tokyo had secretly agreed that the United States would not have to provide prior consultation to the Japanese government if a security problem emerged on the Korean Peninsula. See “Japan-U.S. Security Pact Had Secret Deal,” Mainichi Daily News, June 6, 1999. “Peace Prize Winner Sato Called Nonnuclear Policy ‘Nonsense,’ ” The Japan Times Online, June 11, 2000. Morton Halperin, The Nuclear Dimension of the U.S.-Japan Alliance (Berkeley, CA: The Nautilus Institute, n.d.), accessed at www.nautilus.org/papers/security/ index.html#nap on August 15, 2001. Translated by the Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center, Tokyo, Japan, from the August 1, 1994 edition of the Mainichi Shimbun.

Notes to Pages 46–52

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20. Selig Harrison, “Japan and Nuclear Weapons,” in Japan’s Nuclear Future: The Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996), p. 8. 21. “Japan Considered Developing Nukes: Nakasone,” The Japan Times Online, June 19, 2004. 22. See “Nuclear Arsenal Deemed Infeasible in ’81,” The Japan Times Online, October 3, 2004. 23. “ ’95 Study: Japan and Nukes don’t Mix,” Asahi Shimbun, February 20, 2003. 24. General Assembly of the United Nations, Terrorist Use of Nuclear Weapons, Biological Weapons Convention Review Among Issues Addressed by 14 Texts Introduced in First Committee, Press Release, New York, October 30, 2001. 25. Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Report of the Preparatory Committee on its First Session, New York, United Nations, April 8–19, 2002. 26. “Foreign Affairs, Security Not Koizumi’s Strengths,” Asahi Shimbun, April 25, 2001; “Japan’s Premier-To-Be Seeks Right to Openly Field Army,” The New York Times, April 25, 2001; “Koizumi Woos Peace Faction after Backing Rearmament,” The New York Times, April 26, 2001; “Yamasaki Eyes Draft to Revise Article 9,” The Japan Times Online, April 30, 2001. 27. See “As Japan Tries to Cut Expenditures, Defense Pact with U.S. is Tempting Target,” Stars & Stripes, June 20, 2001; U.S. Department of State, Embassy of the United States, Japan, Armitage Praises Japan’s Increasing Role in Global Security, Tokyo, February 3, 2004. 28. “All or Nothing, Says U.S.,” Asahi Shimbun, October 8, 2001. 29. See, for example, “Ishihara Takes ‘Ugly, Illegitimate’ Constitution to Task,” Mainichi Daily News, December 2, 2000. 30. All quotations in this paragraph are from Greenpeace, “Japan and Nuclear Weapons: Threat or Intent?” accessed most recently at www.greenpeace.org/ raw/content/france/press/reports/japanesenuclearpolicy.pdf on October 13, 2005. 31. Anthony DiFilippo, “Nuclear Weapons Unconstitutional for Japan,” The Korea Times, November 28, 2002. 32. See, “Nonnuclear Principles to Stay: Fukuda,” The Japan Times Online, June 11, 2002; “Nonnuclear Policy to Stay As Is: Koizumi,” The Japan Times Online, June 13, 2002. 33. “Nuclear Remarks May Spark Diet Disorder,” Daily Yomiuri Online, June 3, 2002. 34. Jinzaburo Takagi, “Japan’s Plutonium Program: A Critical Review,” in Japan’s Nuclear Future: The Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security, ed. Selig Harrison (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996), pp. 77–78. 35. Quoted in “Japanese Leader’s Remarks on Nuke Possession Draws Criticism,” The Korea Times, June 2, 2002. 36. See “Japan under Fire over Nuke Remark,” China Daily, June 4, 2002. 37. See “KCNA Assails Japan’s Move for Nuclear Weaponization,” Korean Central News Agency, June 24, 2002; “KCNA on Japan’s Undisguised Nuclear

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38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

43.

44. 45. 46.

47. 48.

49. 50.

51. 52.

53.

54.

Notes to Pages 52–56 Ambition,” Korean Central News Agency, June 4, 2002; “Japan’s Moves for Nuclear Armament Blasted,” Korean Central News Agency, June 23, 2002. Eiichi Katahara, “Japan’s Plutonium Policy: Consequences for Nonproliferation,” The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 5, no. 1, Fall 1997, pp. 53–61. Harrison, “Japan and Nuclear Weapons,” p. 8. Council for Nuclear Fuel Cycle, How Japan Should Tackle the NPT, Tokyo, September 28, 1993. Translated by the Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center, Tokyo, Japan, from the August 1, 1994 edition of the Mainichi Shimbun. The Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings, translated by Eisei Ishikawa and David Swain (New York: Basic Books, 1981), pp. 581–583, 586. Lawrence Wittner, The Struggle Against the Bomb: Resisting the Bomb—A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954–1970, vol. 2 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), pp. 442–462. The Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damaged Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, p. 583. Council for Nuclear Fuel Cycle, How Japan Should Tackle the NPT, Tokyo, September 28, 1993. Declaration made by the government of Japan when it signed the NPT, February 1970. Accessed at www.un.org/Depts/dda/dda.htm in the documents of the United Nations, Department for Disarmament Affairs, May 20, 2002. See Asia Society at www.asiasociety.org/publications/south_asia_after.html, accessed May 6, 2002. Declaration made by the government of Japan when it ratified the NPT, June 1976. Accessed at www.un.org/Depts/dda/dda.htm in the documents of the United Nations, Department for Disarmament Affairs, May 20, 2002. Anthony DiFilippo, Cracks in the Alliance: Science, Technology, and the Evolution of U.S.-Japan Relations (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 1997). Tetsuya Endo (Commissioner of Japan’s Atomic Energy Commission), “Answering the Nuclear-Armaments Arguments—Correcting a Great Misunderstanding,” Plutonium, no. 31, Autumn 2000. See Japan Information Network at http://web-japan.org/stat/stats/04DPL22. html, accessed on October 4, 2005. Wang Baofu, “Japanese Military Expansion Underway,” Beijing Review, May 23, 2002; “High Vigilance Against Japan Called for,” Korean Central News Agency, January 5, 2001; “KCNA on Japan’s ‘Strategic Review’ of East Asia,” Korean Central News Agency, March 8, 2001. Anthony DiFilippo, The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military Arrangement: Competing Security Transitions in a Changing International Environment (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002). Michael Swaine with Loren Runyon, “Ballistic Missiles and Missile Defense in Asia,” The National Bureau of Asian Research (Seattle, WA), vol. 13, no. 3, June 2002, p. 59.

Notes to Pages 57–59

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55. Kori Urayama, “Missile Defense: Japan’s Wait-and-See Approach,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 57, no. 6, November/December 2001, pp. 33–35. 56. Quoted in “Japan Stops Short of Supporting Missile Plan,” The New York Times, May 8, 2001. 57. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Position on the Missile Defense Plan, Tokyo, November 29, 2001. 58. Soeya Yoshihide, “Mutually Assured Discussion,” Look Japan, vol. 47, no. 546, September 2001, p. 23. 59. For a general discussion of the weakening of the systems of deterrence and abstinence (of nuclear weapons) but that draws a far too sanguine conclusion see William Walker, “Nuclear Order and Disorder,” International Affairs, vol. 76, no. 4, October 2000: 703–724. 60. Actually, the deployment of a missile defense system can only extend Japan’s deterrence capability if other countries accept it as insurmountable or impenetrable. If not, then these countries are likely to use it as a justification to build up their military capabilities. 61. Stanley Foundation and the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Ballistic Missile Defense and Northeast Asian Security: Views from Washington, Beijing, and Tokyo, April 2001. 62. A number of writers have forcefully argued this point. For a recent example of this argument, see Richard Butler, Fatal Choice: Nuclear Weapons and the Illusion of Missile Defense (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001). 63. Richard Garwin and Georges Charpak, Megawatts and Megatons: A Turning Point in the Nuclear Age? (New York: Knopf, 2001), pp. 357–359. 64. Masaji Takayama, “Prospects for Missile Defense (MD)—Aiming to Establish a New Order,” in DRC Annual Report, 2001 (Tokyo: Defense Research Center, September 2001), accessed at www.drc-jpn.org/index-e.htm on May 6, 2002. Notice that the introduction of comprehensive missile defense systems represents the beginning phase of a security circularity that intensifies the prospects of nuclear proliferation. Defensive systems lead to the need for targeted nations to increase their offensive capabilities, which then encourages more and improved missile defense systems, which in turn provides the justification for the development of additional offensive systems and the like. Such a precarious sequence is fraught with proliferation problems. 65. “Japan and U.S. Seen as Extending TMD Study to ’07,” The Japan Times Online, December 20, 2001. 66. Anthony Cataldo, “Critical Technologies at the Core of U.S.-Japan Collaboration on Missile Defense—Pact Sets Sights on ‘Hit to Kill,’ ” Electronic Engineering Times, September 20, 1999. 67. Michael Swaine, Rachel Swanger, and Takashi Kawahami, Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2001), p. 67; Paul Mann, “Economic Woes Shadow Japan’s Missile Defense,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, vol. 156, no. 10, March 11, 2002, pp. 55–57. 68. “U.S., Japan Review Options for Future Sea-based Missile Defense Work,” Defense Daily International, vol. 2, no. 36, July 12, 2002.

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Notes to Pages 60–63

69. Statements and Announcements by Chief Cabinet Secretary, Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Tokyo, December 19, 2003. 70. Anthony DiFilippo, “Security Trials, Nuclear Tribulations, and Rapprochement in Japan-North Korean Relations,” The Journal of Pacific Asia, vol. 11, 2004, p. 22. 71. DiFilippo, Cracks in the Alliance, pp. 169–171; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Policies on the Control of Arms Exports, accessed at www.mofa.go.jp/ policy/un/disarmament /policy/index.html on July 17, 2002. 72. “Defense Panel Seeks Enhanced Ties with U.S., Flexible Force,” Kyodo News, October 4, 2004. 73. “Missile Shield Research to Enter Development Stage,” The Japan Times Online, October 11, 2004. 74. Statements and Announcements by Chief Cabinet Secretary, Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary (Hiroyuki Hosoda), Tokyo, December 10, 2004. 75. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Joint Statement: U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, Washington, DC, February 19, 2005. 76. “Constitutional Constraint: Missile Defense to Guard Japan Only, not Other Countries,” The Japan Times Online, January 10, 2005. 77. “Missile Defense to Enter Next Stage in FY 2006,” The Japan Times Online, June 6, 2005. 78. “Collective-Defense Ban Seen Keeping Japan Out of Missile First-Alert Loop,” The Japan Times Online, June 10, 2005. 79. By January 2001, Hoya had supplied over 600 laser glass slabs for the NIF. See “Hoya Corporation Produces More Than 600 Laser Glass Slabs for LLNL’s National Ignition Facility,” Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory: News Release, U.S. Department of Energy/University of California, January 24, 2001. 80. Ibid.; Katie Walter, “Big Glass for a Big Laser,” Science & Technology Review, Livermore, CA, September 2001, pp. 6–7; Masa Takubo, “Japanese and German Glass Companies Involved in U.S. Nuclear Weapons Development,” International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation, Information Bulletin, no. 19, March 2002. 81. Masa Takubo, “Japanese Optical Glass Giant Involved in U.S. Nuclear Weapons Development,” Gensuikin (Japan Congress Against A- and H- Bombs), Tokyo, accessed at www. Gensuikin.org/english/main.html on July 18, 2002; “Hoya to Ship Glass to U.S. Nuclear Lab,” The Japan Times Online, March 28, 2001; Peace Depot, Evaluating Implementation of the NPT 13⫹2 Steps: Japan’s Report Card on Nuclear Disarmament 2002, Yokohama, Japan, March 27, 2002. 82. “Hoya Corporation Produces More Than 600 Laser Glass Slabs for LLNL’s National Ignition Facility”; Walter, “Big Glass for a Big Laser,” pp. 6–7. 83. “Glass-Maker Hoya Aiding Nuclear Arms Facility, U.S. Scientist Says,” The Japan Times Online, June 5, 2001. 84. Fumikazu Asa, “Invisible Testing,” in The Road to the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 1999), pp. 45–49. 85. Letter of City of Arcata’s Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Commission to Hoya Corporation, Tokyo, Japan, September 5, 2001.

Notes to Pages 64–70

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86. “World’s Largest Laser Switches on to Research,” Optics.Org., April 2005, accessed at http://optics.org on October 8, 2005. 87. See Paul Doty and Steven Flank, “Arms Control for New Nuclear Nations,” pp. 53–76; Joseph Nye, “Diplomatic Measures,” pp. 77–96, both in New Nuclear Nations: Consequences for U.S. Policy, ed. Robert Blackwell and Albert Carnesale (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993). 88. “Satellite Spies: Black Hole: Despite the Launching of Astronomically Priced Domestic Spy Satellites, Japan Remains Dependent on U.S. Intelligence,” Asahi Shimbun, October 7, 2004. 89. See the IAEA’s Department of Safeguards website at www.iaea.org/OurWork/ SV/Safeguars/index.html. 90. See the IAEA’s Technical Departments website at www-tc.iaea.org/tcweb/ abouttc/iaeadepts/default.asp.

Chapter 4 The Politics of Japanese Nuclear Disarmament: Where Government Policies and Civil Society Converge and Diverge 1. Author interview with a representative of the Japan Association for a Nonnuclear Government, Hiroshima, July 31, 2004. 2. “Gallop Poll on the Ownership of Nuclear Weapons and the Threat of Nuclear War,” Gallup News Service, June 6, 1999. 3. Survey conducted by the Asahi Shimbun between October 4 and 5, 1998. Data obtained from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. 4. Author interviews conducted with representatives from two of Japan’s prominent anti-nuclear weapons organizations, July 31, 2002 and August 8, 2002. 5. Anthony DiFilippo, “Can Japan Craft an International Nuclear Disarmament Policy,” Asian Survey, vol. 40, no. 4, July/August 2000, pp. 571–598. 6. See, for example, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Report of the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, Facing Nuclear Dangers: An Action Plan for the 21st Century, Tokyo, July 25, 1999. 7. Author interview with an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 27, 2005. 8. Anthony DiFilippo, The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Security Arrangement: Competing Security Transitions in a Changing International Environment (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002). 9. Philip Nobile, ed. Judgment at the Smithsonian: The Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (New York: Marlowe & Company, 1995), p. 122; The Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical, and

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11.

12.

13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

18.

Notes to Pages 70–72 Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings, translated by Eisei Ishikawa and David Swain (New York: Basic Books, 1981), pp. 4, 575; Lawrence Wittner, The Struggle Against the Bomb, One World or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement Through 1953, vol. 1 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 45–48. George Totten and Tamio Kawakami, “Gensuikyo and the Peace Movement in Japan,” Asian Survey, vol. 4, May 1964, pp. 833–841; The Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, pp. 576–577. Gensuikin (The Japan Congress Against A- and H-Bombs), “What is Gensuikin?” accessed from the Gensuikin website at www.gensuikin.org/ english/wharis.html on November 11, 2002. Lawrence Wittner, The Struggle Against the Bomb: Resisting the Bomb—A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954–1970, vol. 2 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), pp. 9, 321–324; The Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, pp. 580–581; Totten and Kawakami, “Gensuikyo and the Peace Movement in Japan,” p. 836; Gensuikin, “What is Gensuikin?”; Naoki Kamimura, “Japanese Civil Society, Local Government, and U.S.-Japan Security Relations in the 1990s: A Preliminary Survey,” The Japan Center for Area Studies, National Museum of Ethnology, JCAS Occasional Paper, no. 11, JCAS-Rutgers Series iii, 2001, pp. 8–9; The Web Kanzaki, “Political Parties in Japan,” accessed on November 11, 2002 at www.kanzaki.com/jinfo/PoliticalParties.html. An important aside to the falling-out between Gensuikyo and Gensuikin relates to the underlying cause of the disagreement that led to the fragmentation of Japan’s anti-nuclear weapons movement. Gensuikyo insists that the decisive factor was the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty. It maintains that disagreements relating to the treaty were so intense that reconciliation was not possible. Gensuikin, on the other hand, contends that the movement fragmented because, unlike the communists, the socialists would not accept Soviet nuclear testing. Author interview with Gensuikyo representative August 11, 2002, Tokyo Japan; author interview with Gensuikin representatives, August 12, 2002, Tokyo, Japan. Hidankyo, Chronology of Hidankyo’s International Activities, n.d. Hidankyo, Message to the World: Proclamation at the Establishment Meeting of Hidankyo, August 10, 1956. Nihon Hidankyo (Policy Statement, n.d.). Hidankyo, No More Hibakusha: Atomic Bomb Victims Demand, n.d. The Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, pp. 582–583; Tsuneo Akaha, “Japan’s Three Nonnuclear Principles: A Coming Demise?” Peace & Change, vol. 11, no. 1, Spring 1985, p. 84. For an analysis of ideological differences that led to problems in the U.S. nuclear disarmament movement see Robert Benford, “Frame Disputes within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement,” Social Forces, vol. 71, no. 3, March 1993, pp. 677–701.

Notes to Pages 73–75

223

19. Hidankyo, “Introduction” (Policy Statement), n.d.; City of Hiroshima, The First Special Exhibition of Fiscal Year 2001, Turn of the Century Commemoration Project, Let’s Talk at the Special Exhibit, July 19–December 16, 2001, accessed at www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp on November 13, 2002. 20. The International Peace Bureau was responsible for the first three nominations. See Nihon Hidankyo (Policy Statement), n.d.; the American Friends Service Committee nominated Hidankyo in 2005. 21. “Hibakusha Want Aid for Illness,” Asahi Shimbun, July 8, 2002. 22. “Hiroshima Mayor Calls on the U.S. to ‘Sever the Chain of Hatred,’ ” The Japan Times, August 7, 2002. 23. TPENW was established in 1988. The official name of the Tokyo Physicians for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons is the Tokyo Physicians, Dentists and those Working in the Medical Field for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons and the Prevention of Nuclear War. Correspondence with TPENW representative, September 12, 2002. 24. The Peace Depot was officially established in 1997. 25. Associated with the International Association of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms, JALANA was formed in 1994. 26. Under the auspices of the Hiroshima City University, the Hiroshima Peace Institute was created in April 1998. 27. “Gensuikyo and Gensuikin Hold Conferences in Hiroshima,” Chugoku Shimbun Peace News, August 5, 2002. 28. See Appeal from Hiroshima and Nagasaki for a Total Ban and Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on Gensuikyo’s website at www.twics.com/~antiatom/html, accessed November 15, 2002. 29. Shinfujin, Shinfujin Members Achieved 10 Million Signatures in Support of Appeal from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, accessed at www. Shinfujin.gr.jp/ index_e.html on November 16, 2002. 30. See Mayors for Peace at www.mayorsforpeace.org/english/index.html. 31. United Nations, Nuclear Weapon Ban Only Guarantee They Will Never Again be Used, Says Secretary-General in Remarks to Mayors for Peace, Press Release, New York, May 3, 2005. 32. Kamimura, “Japanese Civil Society,” p. 9; Gensuikyo, “On Achieving 60 Million Signatures in Support of the ‘Appeal from Hiroshima and Nagasaki for a Total Ban and Elimination of Nuclear Weapons’ in Japan,” Tokyo, October 4, 2000; City of Hiroshima, Resolution to Support the Emergency Campaign to Ban Nuclear Weapons at the National Convention of Japan Nuclear Free Local Authorities, accessed on October 25, 2004 at www. pcf.city.hiroshima.jp/ mayors/English/topic/list/EC06.html. 33. DiFilippo, The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military Arrangement, pp. 176–177. 34. See Rengo’s website at www.jtuc-rengo.org/htmls1/intro.html. 35. Rengo, “Strengthen Peace Movements at Workplaces and by Region: 2001, Rengo Peace Rally at Hiroshima/Nagasaki,” Weekly Rengo, Tokyo, August 24, 2001; Rengo, “Oppose the Disintegration of History, Teach New Generations of A-Bomb Horrors/Respect for Life: Peace Actions in Hiroshima/Nagasaki Conducted,” Weekly Rengo, Tokyo, August 30, 2002.

224

Notes to Pages 75–78

36. City of Nagasaki at www.1.city.nagasaki.nagasaki.jp/abm-e/index.html, accessed on November 19, 2002. 37. City of Hiroshima at www.city.hiroshima.jp/index-E.html, accessed on November 19, 2002. 38. City of Hiroshima, “Letter of Protest” addressed to the Honorable Kim Jong Il, Chairman of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, October 22, 2002. 39. Hidankyo, “Protest against US Subcritical Test” (monthly paper), Tokyo, April 1998. 40. Gensuikyo, “Nevada Subcritical Test” (Letter to U.S. President Bush and British Prime Minister Blair), February 14, 2002. 41. Rengo, “Oppose the Disintegration of History.” 42. Hidankyo, “Protest the Underground Nuclear Tests India and Pakistan Conducted” (monthly paper), Tokyo, June 1998; Hidankyo, “Letter to Prime Minister of India, Tokyo, May 12, 1998. 43. “Japanese Groups Protest India’s Nuclear Tests,” Chugoku Shimbun, May 14, 1998. 44. Rengo, “4 Organizations Protested against Pakistan in Executing Nuclear Test,” Weekly Rengo, no. 347, Tokyo, June 5, 1998. 45. George Packard, Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966). 46. Robert Norris, William Arkin, and William Burr, “How Much Did Japan Know?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 56, no. 1, January/February 2000, pp. 11–13, 78–79; Hans Kristensen, “Japan under the US Nuclear Umbrella” (Berkeley, CA: The Nautilus Institute, July 21, 1999). 47. Akaha, “Japan’s Three Nonnuclear Principles.” 48. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, In Quest of a New Role: United Nations and Japan (pamphlet), Tokyo, 2000. 49. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Internet Press Chat: Conference by the Press Secretary 13, October 2005, Submission of Japan’s Resolution on Nuclear Disarmament to the U.N. General Assembly, Tokyo. 50. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook 1996 (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996). 51. Emphasis added. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation: Japan’s Stance on Nuclear Nonproliferation and the Promotion of Nuclear Disarmament (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995). 52. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto at the 51st Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, September 24, 1996. 53. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda at the Seminar on Nuclear Disarmament after the Indefinite Extension of the NPT, Kyoto, Japan, December 2, 1996. 54. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Masahiko Koumura to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues in Sapporo, Sapporo, Japan, July 22, 1997. 55. See, The Report of the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, Facing Nuclear Dangers; DiFilippo, “Can Japan Craft an International Nuclear Disarmament Policy?” pp. 571–598.

Notes to Pages 79–81

225

56. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by H.E. Mr. Keizo Obuchi Prime Minister of Japan at the Fifty-Third Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, September 21, 1998. 57. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Address by Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs Toshio Kojima at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues in Ishikawa-Kanazawa, Kanazawa, Japan, August 28, 2001. 58. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s ODA 1992 (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 1993), p. 45; Anthony DiFilippo, Cracks in the Alliance: Science, Technology, and the Evolution of U.S.-Japan Relations (Aldershot, England, 1997), p. 208; William Long, “Nonproliferation as a Goal of Japanese Foreign Assistance,” Asian Survey, vol. 39, no. 2, March/April 1999, pp. 328–347. 59. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Approaches to Nonproliferation, Tokyo, September 2002. 60. Ministry of Affairs, Japan’s Official Development Assistance, Summary 1998 (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1998). 61. For years, Tokyo has called on nations to “redouble their efforts” in the area of nuclear disarmament. 62. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by H.E. Mr. Junichiro Koizumi Prime Minister of Japan at the Fifty-Seventh Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, September 13, 2002. 63. See Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Report of the Preparatory Committee on its First Session, New York, April 19, 2002. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs reproduced part of this document in The First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Chairman’s Summary), New York, April 2002. 64. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by Ambassador Yukiya Amano, Representative of Japan, at the First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, April 8, 2002; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Working paper submitted by Japan), New York, April 12, 2002. 65. Japanese official participating in the Delegation of Japan to the U.N. Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, Switzerland, personal communication, December 17, 2002. 66. Address by H.E. Mr. Junichiro Koizumi Prime Minister of Japan at the Fifty-Ninth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, September 21, 2004. 67. Director General, Arms Control and Scientific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Disarmament and Nonproliferation Policy, Tokyo, April 2004, p. 230. 68. Tadatoshi Akiba, Mayor of Hiroshima, Peace Declaration, Hiroshima, August 6, 2004. 69. Author interview with representatives from Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center, Tokyo, July 21, 2005.

226

Notes to Pages 82–84

70. Iccho Itoh, Mayor of Nagasaki, Nagasaki Peace Declaration, Nagasaki, August 9, 2004. 71. DiFilippo, The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military Arrangement, p. 78. 72. See United Nations Fifty-Ninth General Assembly, First Committee, Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Aim of Draft Text Approved by First Committee, Press Release, New York, October 28, 2004; United Nations, Fifty-Seventh General Assembly, First Committee, Urgent Ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Called for in One of Nine Texts Approved by the First Committee, Press Release, New York, October 21, 2002. 73. See, for example, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Tokyo, October 2002; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Working paper submitted by Japan). 74. Personal correspondence with a member of the Delegation of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, December 17, 2002. 75. Quotations are from author interviews in Tokyo, Hiroshima, and Yokohama and from correspondence with representatives of Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations, July 31 to October 25, 2002. 76. Author interview with an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, July 27, 2005. 77. DiFilippo, “Can Japan Craft an International Nuclear Disarmament Policy?” p. 571. 78. Author interview with representative from the Tokyo Physicians for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (TPENW), Tokyo, July 31, 2002. 79. Author interview with representatives from Hidankyo, Tokyo, August 1, 2002. 80. Author interview with representative from the Peace Depot, Yokohama, August 8, 2002. 81. Author interview with representative from the Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima, August 5, 2002. 82. Quoted from The Constitution of Japan (preamble). 83. Personal correspondence with representative of the Hiroshima Peace Institute, October 25, 2002. 84. Author interview with a representative from the Japan Association for a Nonnuclear Government, Hiroshima, July 31, 2004. The Japan Association for a Nonnuclear Government is one of the many “other” civil society organizations working to abolish nuclear weapons. Formed in 1986, it believes that the Japanese government is chiefly responsible for leading nations to abolish their nuclear weapons. The Japan Association for a Nonnuclear Government calls attention to the point that “successive Japanese governments have not only abandoned this responsibility but have positively cooperated in the U.S. nuclear strategy based on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.” Statement of the Japan Association for a Nonnuclear Government, Tokyo, n.d. 85. Author interview with Gensuikin representatives, Tokyo, August 12, 2002; author interview with Gensuikyo representative, Tokyo, August 11, 2002. 86. Personal correspondence with arms control and disarmament official in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 29, 2002; personal

Notes to Pages 84–88

87.

88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104.

105.

106.

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correspondence with a member of the Delegation of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, December 17, 2002 (hereafter, correspondence with Japanese government official[s]). Peace Depot, December 1998. Hiromichi Umebayashi, Peace Depot (Newsletter), “NAC (The New Agenda Coalition) and Japan,” Yokohama, Japan, December 25, 1998. Author interview with Hidankyo representatives, Tokyo, August 1, 2002. Correspondence with Japanese government officials, September 29, 2002 and December 17, 2002. Author interview with a representative from the Japan Association for a Nonnuclear Government, Hiroshima, July 31, 2004. Correspondence with Japanese government nuclear disarmament official, December 17, 2002. Author interview with member of the House of Councilors, New Komeito Party, Tokyo, July 26, 2005. Author interview with representative from the TPENW, Tokyo, July 31, 2002. Author interview with Gensuikyo, Tokyo, August 11, 2002. Author interview with Hidankyo representatives, Tokyo, August 1, 2002. Author interview with representative from the Peace Depot, Yokohama, August 8, 2002. Author interview with representative from the Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima, August 5, 2002. Author interview with a representative from the Japan Association for a Nonnuclear Government, Hiroshima, July 31, 2004. Author interviews with representatives from Hidankyo, the Hiroshima Peace Institute and the Peace Depot, in the summer of 2002. Correspondence with Japanese government officials, September 29, 2002 and December 17, 2002. Author interview with an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, July 27, 2005. Author interview with representatives from Hidankyo, Tokyo, August 1, 2002. Interviews with representatives from Gensuikyo, Gensuikin, and the Peace Depot. Peace Depot, Japan’s Report Card on Nuclear Disarmament 2002, Yokohama, Japan, March 27, 2002; Peace Depot, We Graded the Japanese Government’s Efforts towards Nuclear Weapons Abolition in a Report Card, Yokohama, Japan, n.d.; Peace Depot, Japan’s Report Card on Nuclear Disarmament 2002, Annex: Explanation of the Reason of Evaluation, Yokohama, Japan, March 27, 2002. Japan’s annual report card on nuclear disarmament for the years 2002–2005 can be found on the website of the Peace Depot at www.peacedepot.org. Details on grading for these years appear in the Evaluating Implementation of the NPT (13⫹2) Steps: Japan’s Report Card on Nuclear Disarmament, Yokohama, Japan. Author interview with a representative from the Japan Association for a Nonnuclear Government, Hiroshima, July 31, 2004.

228

Notes to Pages 88–94

107. See Anthony DiFilippo, “Japan and a New International Security Paradigm,” IC2 Institute, Japan Industry and Management of Technology Program, Working Paper, University of Texas at Austin, March 11, 1999; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan-Russian Federation Joint Efforts for Disarmament and Environment Protection, Tokyo, May 29, 1999. 108. Interviews with TPENW, Gensuikyo, and Hidankyo representatives in Tokyo in the summer of 2002. 109. Peace Depot, Japan’s Report Card on Nuclear Disarmament 2002, Annex: Explanation of the Reason of Evaluation, Yokohama, Japan, March 27, 2002, pp. 42–43. 110. Correspondence with Japanese government nuclear disarmament official, December 17, 2002. 111. Author interview with an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, July 27, 2005. 112. Ibid. 113. Interview with Peace Depot representative, Yokohama, August 8, 2002. 114. “Prevention of Nuclear War Called for,” Korean Central News Agency, May 24, 2002. 115. Peace Depot Newsletter, no. 5 (Yokohama), December 15, 1999. 116. See articles in the Peace Depot Newsletter, no. 5 (Yokohama), December 15, 1999. 117. Naoki Kamimura, “Civil Society and Nuclear Disarmament: A Comparison of U.S. and Japanese Experiences during the 1980s and 1990s,” Japan Center for Area Studies (JCAS), JCAS Symposium Series 18, National Museum of Ethnology, Osaka, Japan, 2002, pp. 275–308.

Chapter 5 Japanese Security Policy and the New Agenda Coalition 1. For example, see Kumao Kaneko, “Japan Needs No Umbrella,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 52, no. 1, March/April 1996, pp. 46–51. 2. Yoneyuki Sugita, “A Never-Ending Story: Inflating the Threat from North Korea,” The Journal of Pacific Asia, vol. 11, pp. 55–77; “Japan Plans to Call China, North Korea Key Threats,” The Japan Times Online, November 27, 2004; Pei Yuanying, “Who is the Threat?” vol. 47, no. 1, October 14, 2004, Beijing Review, p. 13. 3. Michael Green and Katsuhisa Furukawa, “New Ambitions, Old Obstacles: Japan and its Search for an Arms Control Strategy,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2000; Robyn Lim, “Japan’s Best Bet Remains the American Nuclear Umbrella,” International Herald Tribune, October 29, 1999; Yasuhiro Nakasone, “Japan’s Firm Nonnuclear Resolve,” Japan Echo, vol. 25, no. 5, October 1998; Yasuhiro Nakasone, “Japan’s Nuclear Role,” New Perspectives Quarterly, vol. 9, no. 3, Summer 1992, pp. 26–27; Matake Kamiya, “Japan,

Notes to Pages 94–97

4. 5. 6.

7.

8. 9.

10. 11.

12.

13. 14.

15. 16.

17.

18. 19.

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Nuclear Weapons, and the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” paper presented at the Conference on U.S.-Japan Relations,” Washington, DC, May 2, 1996. Morihiro Hosokawa, “Are U.S. Troops Needed in Japan? Reforming the Alliance,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 77, no. 4, July/August 1998, pp. 4–5. Clifton Sherrill, “The Need for a Japanese Nuclear Deterrent,” Comparative Strategy,” vol. 20, 2001, pp. 259–270. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Q&A on Japan-U.S. Political Cooperation, Tokyo, April 1996, accessed at www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/index.html on January 6, 2002; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Role in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, Tokyo, 2004, p. 6. Statement by Mr. David Andrews TD, Ireland’s Foreign Minister, on the Release of Towards A Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda, Dublin, Ireland, June 9, 1998; “New Agenda Coalition—Background Information,” accessed from the Acronym Institute’s website on October 19, 2001 at www.acronym.org.uk/nac.htm. Karen Birchard, Lancet, vol. 351, no. 9119, June 20, 1998, p. 1870. See Asahi Shimbun, The Road to the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 1999), pp. 141–145; Richard Garwin and Georges Charpak, Megawatts and Megatons: A Turning Point in the Nuclear Age? (New York: Knopf, 2001), p. 371. The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Canberra, Australia, August 14, 1996. New Agenda Coalition, Statement by Eight Nations Calling for Moves Toward a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World, June 9, 1998, accessed at www.clw.org/archive/ coalition/eigh0609.htm. General Assembly of the United Nations, Draft Resolution Aiming for “Nuclear-Weapon-Free World” Introduced in Disarmament Committee, Press Release, New York, October 27, 1998. General Assembly of the United Nations, Ten Disarmament Draft Resolutions Introduced in the First Committee, Press Release, New York, October 29, 1998. Robert Green, “A Fast Track to Zero Nuclear Weapons: The Middle Powers Initiative and the New Agenda Coalition,” Medicine, Conflict and Survival, vol. 16, no. 1, January/March 2000, pp. 24–36. General Assembly of the United Nations, Draft Resolution Aiming for “NuclearWeapon-Free World” Introduced in Disarmament Committee. International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation, “Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World: The Need for a New Agenda,” INESAP Information Bulletin, no. 16, November 1998. General Assembly of the United Nations, General Assembly Deplores South Asia Nuclear Tests, as it Acts on Recommendations of First Committee, Press Release, New York, December 4, 1998. Rebecca Johnson, “The NPT Review: Disaster Averted,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 56, no. 4, July/August 2000, pp. 52–57. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Submission by Japan of Two Draft Resolutions Regarding Arms Control and Disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly,” Press Conference by the Press Secretary, Tokyo, October 27, 1998.

230

Notes to Pages 97–100

20. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Announcement by Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi on the U.K.’s Cut in Nuclear Warheads, Tokyo, July 9, 1998. 21. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by H.E. Mr. Keizo Obuchi Prime Minister of Japan at the Fifty-Third Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, September 21, 1998. 22. See “Nuclear Disarmament with a View to the Ultimate Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,” December 4, 1998, in Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly, New York, General Assembly of the United Nations, 53rd Session, January 12, 1999; “Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda,” December 4, 1998, in Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly, New York, General Assembly of the United Nations, 53rd Session, January 12, 1999. 23. General Assembly of the United Nations, Ten Disarmament Draft Resolutions Introduced in the First Committee. 24. Imai Ryukichi, “Renewed Effort to Limit Nuclear Weapons,” Japan Quarterly, vol. 45, no. 4, October/December 1998, p. 23. 25. Quoted in “Japan Hit over Weak Antinuclear Stance,” The Japan Times Online, November 12, 1999. 26. American diplomat George Kennan first proposed a policy on the no-first use of atomic weapons for the United States in January 1950. See Patrick Glynn, Closing Pandora’s Box: Arms Races, Arms Control and the History of the Cold War (New York: Basic Books, 1992), pp. 130–131. 27. Hiromichi Umebayashi, “NAC and Japan,” Peace Depot Newsletter, no. 3, Yokohama, December 25, 1998; “Nuclear Arms Dilemma Snags Japan,” Asahi Evening News, April 14, 2000. 28. Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Site, accessed on October 19, 2001 at www.clw.org/coalition/newagre2.htm. 29. “Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda,” December 4, 1998, in Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly, New York, General Assembly of the United Nations, 53rd Session, January 12, 1999. 30. General Assembly of the United Nations, First Committee Draft Text, Introduced by New Zealand, Calls for a “New Agenda” in Nuclear Disarmament, Press Release, New York, October 26, 1999. 31. General Assembly of the United Nations, Draft Text Calling for Disarmament Aimed at Eliminating Nuclear Weapons Approved in Disarmament Committee by Vote of 128-0-12, Press Release, New York, November 9, 1999. 32. Ibid. 33. Beijing notes, “As early as the 1960s, China unilaterally undertook not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.” Foreign Ministry, People’s Republic of China, Foreign Policy, accessed at www.fmprc.gov.cn/e/c/ec.htm on February 13, 1999. 34. General Assembly of the United Nations, Draft Text Calling for Disarmament. 35. See “Japan Accused of Frantic Anti-DPRK Campaign,” Korean Central News Agency, August 30, 1999. 36. Professor Kazumi Mizumoto of the Hiroshima Peace Institute informed of this matter.

Notes to Pages 100–104

231

37. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Facing Nuclear Dangers: An Action Plan for the 21st Century: The Report of the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, Tokyo, July 25, 1999. 38. “NAC and Japan,” Peace Depot Newsletter. 39. General Assembly of the United Nations, First Committee Approves Texts Calling for a Strengthened ABM Treaty, “New Agenda” to Achieve Nuclear-Weapon-Free World, Press Release, New York, November 1, 2000. 40. General Assembly of the United Nations, Draft Resolution on “Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons” Approved by the First Committee, as it Concludes Current Session, Press Release, New York, November 1, 2000. 41. Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Letter Dated 12 May 1999 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations and Head of Delegation to the Preparatory Committee Addressed to the Chairman of ME [sic] Preparatory Committee, and Annex, New York, May 10–21, 1999, accessed at http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/prepcom99/99NAC_Statement.htm at on October 17, 2001. 42. 2000 NPT Review Conference, Documents or Working Papers, New Agenda Coalition (NAC) Working Paper: The NPT 2000 Review Conference, New York, April 24, 2000, accessed at http://www.opanal.org/NPT-TNP/Documents/ NAC.htm on October 24, 2001. 43. “Nuclear Arms Dilemma Snags Japan.” 44. “Japan Caught in the Middle of Dispute over NPT [:] Confrontations Intensify at Conference for Nuclear Disarmament,” Asahi Shimbun, May 10, 2000. 45. “Nuke Powers Agree to Disarm,” Asahi Evening News, May 20, 2000. 46. Department of Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, April 24 –19 May 2000, Final Document of the Conference, New York. 47. “Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World,” UN Chronicle, vol. 37, no. 4, December 2000–February 2001, pp. 32–33. 48. Tad Daley, “The New Agenda Coalition for Nuclear Abolition,” Humanist, vol. 61, no. 2, March/April 2001, p. 11. 49. See The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. 50. General Assembly of the United Nations, First Committee Approves Texts Calling for Strengthened ABM Treaty, “New Agenda” to Achieve Nuclear-Weapon-Free World, Press Release, New York, November 1, 2000. 51. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Submission of a Draft Resolution on Nuclear Disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly, Tokyo, October 18, 2001; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the Adoption of the Draft Resolution on Nuclear Disarmament Submitted by Japan to the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, Tokyo, November 6, 2001. 52. Cf. “A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,” November 20, 2000, in Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly, New York, General Assembly of the United Nations, 55th Session, January 12, 2001 and “A Path

232

53.

54. 55.

56. 57.

58.

59.

60.

61.

62.

Notes to Pages 104–106 to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,” November 29, 2001, in Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly, New York, General Assembly of the United Nations, 56th Session, January 10, 2002. General Assembly of the United Nations, “Practical Steps” on the Path to Nuclear-Weapon Elimination Stressed in Draft Text Approved by First Committee, Press Release, New York, November 5, 2001. “U.N. Adopts Stand on Nukes,” Asahi Shimbun, November 7, 2001. Anthony DiFilippo, “How Tokyo’s Security Policies Discount Japanese Public Opinion: Toward an Alternative Security Agenda,” Pacifica Review: Peace, Security and Global Change, vol. 14, no. 1, February 2002, pp. 23–48. General Assembly of the United Nations, “Practical Steps” on the Path to Nuclear-Weapon Elimination Stressed in Draft Text Approved by First Committee. United Nations, Fifty-Ninth General Assembly, First Committee, Dangers Posed by Proliferation of “Nonstrategic” Nuclear Weapons, Addressed in Disarmament Committee Draft Resolution, Press Release, New York, October 20, 2003; United Nations, Fifty-Ninth General Assembly, First Committee, Risk of Proliferation, Unauthorized Use of “Nonstrategic” Nuclear Weapons, Addressed in One of Five Texts Approved by Disarmament Committee, Press Release, New York, November 4, 2003. United Nations, Fifty-Ninth General Assembly, First Committee, Text Outlining “Path” to Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Approved in Disarmament Committee, Press Release, New York, October 30, 2003. United Nations, Fifty-Seventh General Assembly, Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly 57/78, A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, New York, January 8, 2003; United Nations, Fifty-Eight General Assembly, Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly 58/59, A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, New York, December 19, 2003. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions and the Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship between the U.S. and Russia, Tokyo, May 24, 2002; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the Entry into Effect of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (Moscow Treaty), Tokyo, June 1, 2003. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Disarmament Division, New Agenda Statement for the 2003 NPT PrepCom made by the Honourable Marian Hobbs, Minister of Disarmament of New Zealand on Behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, South Africa, Sweden and New Zealand, Geneva, April 28, 2003. Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations, General Statement by H.E. Mr. Anders Liden, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations General Assembly. On Behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden as Members of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), New York, October 4, 2004.

Notes to Pages 106–108

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63. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (59th General Assembly U.N., 2004), Tokyo, October 2004. 64. Permanent Mission of Mexico to the United Nations, Plans to Develop New Nuclear Weapons Contradict the NPT: The New Agenda Coalition Continues to Press for Nuclear Disarmament, Press Release, New York, April 26, 2004; Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations, General Statement by H.E. Mr. Anders Liden, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations General Assembly. On Behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden as Members of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), New York, October 4, 2004; Foreign Ministers Celso Amorim of Brazil, Ahmed Ali Aboul Gheit of Egypt, Brian Cowen of Ireland, Luis Ernesto Derbez Bautista of Mexico, Phil Goff of New Zealand, Nkosazana Dlimini-Zuma of South Africa, and Laila Freivalds of Sweden (members of the New Agenda Coalition), “Nonproliferation and Disarmament to go Hand in Hand,” International Herald Tribune, September 22, 2004. 65. United Nations, Fifty-Ninth General Assembly, First Committee, Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Aim of Draft Text Approved by First Committee, Press Release, New York, October 28, 2004. 66. Untied Nations, Fifty-Ninth General Assembly, First Committee, Security for Nonnuclear-Weapon States, Accelerating Nuclear Disarmament, Press Release, New York, October 19, 2004; Rebecca Johnson, “United Nations First Committee and the Conference on Disarmament, U.N. First Committee Votes on October 28, 2004,” accessed on the website of the Acronym Institute at www.acronym.org.uk/un/20041028.htm. 67. United Nations, Fifty-Ninth General Assembly, First Committee, Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: A New Agenda, Accelerating the Implementation of Nuclear Disarmament Commitments, Press Release, New York, October 13, 2004. 68. United Nations, Fifty-Ninth General Assembly, First Committee, Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Aim of Draft Text Approved by First Committee, Press Release, New York, October 28, 2004. 69. Quoted in Douglas Roche, “A New Bridge to Nuclear Disarmament,” October 29, 2004, accessed on the website of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation at www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2004/10/30_roche_new-bridgedisarmament.htm. 70. United Nations, Fifty-Ninth General Assembly, First Committee, Verification, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Southern Hemisphere Among Issues, As First Committee Approves Nine Draft Texts, Press Release, New York, November 1, 2004. 71. Directorate General, Arms Control and Scientific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Disarmament and Nonproliferation Policy, Tokyo, April 2004, p. 86. 72. In 2004, the United States was the only country to vote against a resolution before the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly intended to encourage the Conference on Disarmament to design a plan that would immediately permit the start of negotiations on FMCT. Only two countries registered abstentions, the United Kingdom and Israel. See United Nations, Fifty-Ninth

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Notes to Pages 108–113

General Assembly, First Committee, Text Urging Negotiations on Fissile Material Treaty Approved by Disarmament Committee, Press Release, New York, November 4, 2004. 73. See Explanation of Vote by Japan on L4, “Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: Accelerating the Implementation of Nuclear Disarmament Commitments,” accessed on November 6, 2005 at www.reachingcriticalwill.org; United Nations, Sixtieth General Assembly, First Committee, Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Tracing Small Arms Among Issues Addressed as Disarmament Committee Adopts 10 Draft Texts, Press Release, New York, October 26, 2005. 74. Anthony DiFilippo, “Why Japan should Redirect its Security Policy,” Japan Quarterly, vol. 45, no. 2, April/June 1998, pp. 24–31.

Chapter 6 The International Dimensions of Japan’s Anti-Nuclear Weapons Policies: Issues in Disarmament and Nonproliferation 1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan to Host the Proliferation Security Initiative Maritime Interdiction Exercise, Tokyo, August 2004; “Tokyo to Host 2 Anti-WMD Drills,” Asahi Shimbun, October 11, 2004. 2. For a recent expression of the Bush administration’s commitment to counterproliferation see, Office of the Press Secretary, President Announces New Measures to Counter Threat of WMD, Fort Lesley J. McNair, National Defense University, Washington, DC, February 11, 2004. 3. National Institute for Research Advancement, Japan’s Proactive Peace and Security Strategies, Research Report 20000005, Tokyo, March 2001, p. 19. 4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister Masahiko Koumura to Attend the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Tokyo, October 5, 1999. 5. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by H.E. Koumura, The Representative of Japan, at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty, Vienna, 1999. 6. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by Foreign Minister Yohei Kono on the Issuing of Final Declaration at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), Tokyo, October 8, 1999. 7. “Fight for Test Ban Treaty Not Over, Albright Says,” The Japan Times Online, October 22, 1999. 8. United Nations General Assembly, First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, Despite Test-Ban Rejection, Commitment to Arms Control “Unwavering,” United States Tells First Committee, as General Debate Concludes, Press Release, New York, October 20, 1999.

Notes to Pages 114–117

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9. United Nations General Assembly, First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, General Assembly Would Convene 2001 Conference on Illicit Arms Trade Under Terms of Draft Text Approved in Disarmament Committee, Press Release, New York, November 8, 1999. 10. Alan Cranston, “The Cold War is Over: Civil Leaders’ Statement,” Kyoto, August 1–2 1997; Daryl Kimball, “The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Efforts to End Nuclear Weapons Modernization,” Kyoto, August 1, 1997. Both statements accessed on Gensuikin’s website at www.gensuikin.org/english on May 1, 2003. 11. Gensuikyo, Statement to the 2nd Preparatory Committee for the NPT Review Conference, Demand for Straightforward Negotiations on a Treaty Totally Banning and Eliminating Nuclear Weapons as an Urgent Priority, Tokyo, April 1998, accessed on May 1, 2003 on Gensuikyo’s website at www.10plala.or.jp/ antiatom/html/e.htm. 12. Author interview with official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 30, 2003. 13. See, for example, Hidankyo, “Letter to the Heads of States and Governments,” Tokyo, November 20, 1999. 14. Kathleen Bailey, “Testing Nukes Makes Good Sense,” The Washington Times, November 16, 1997; Bailey, Comprehensive Test Ban: The Worse Arms Control Treaty Ever (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, September 1999). 15. See United Nations, Fifty-Eighth General Assembly, First Committee, Proliferation of “Non-Strategic” Nuclear Weapons, New Agenda for Disarmament, Press Release, New York, December 8, 2003; United Nations, Fifty-Ninth General Assembly, First Committee, Verification, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Southern Hemisphere Among Issues, as First Committee Approves Nine Draft Texts, Press Release, New York, November 1, 2004; United Nations, Sixtieth General Assembly, First Committee, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, Bolstering Global Nonproliferation Regime, Amongst Issues Addressed, as First Committee Approves 21 Draft Texts, Press Release, New York, October 24, 2005. 16. Quoted in “U.S. to Reject CTBT Early Implementation at NPT Review Session,” Oregon Peace Works, accessed at www.oregonpeaceworks.org/site/index.php? option⫽content&task⫽view&id⫽1736&Itemid⫽86 on November 22, 2005. 17. Anthony DiFilippo, “Can Japan Craft an International Nuclear Disarmament Policy?” Asian Survey, vol. 40, no. 4, July/August 2000, pp. 571–589. 18. Author interview with city officials from Nagasaki, August 9, 2003. 19. City of Nagasaki, For a Future without Nuclear Weapons, Explanatory Guide for a Better Understanding of the 2001 Nagasaki Peace Declaration, accessed on Nagasaki’s website on April 11, 2003 at www.1.city.nagasaki.nagasaki.jp/ abm/abm_e/heiwasengen/kaisetsu/kaisetsu_main.html. 20. Author interview with city officials from Nagasaki, August 9, 2003. 21. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations of the Foreign Ministry on China’s Nuclear Testing, Tokyo, May 15, 1995; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Comment by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on China’s Nuclear Testing, Tokyo, August 17, 1995; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Comment by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on China’s Nuclear

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22.

23.

24. 25.

26. 27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33. 34.

Notes to Pages 117–121 Testing, Tokyo, June 8, 1996; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Conference by Press Secretary, Planned Resumption of Nuclear Testing by the French Republic and Japan’s Policy Toward Nuclear Testing, Tokyo, July 18, 1995; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Comment by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on the Nuclear Testing by France, Tokyo, October 28, 1995; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Comment by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on the Nuclear Testing by France, Tokyo, November 22, 1995. The Canberra Commission issued a public report entitled The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on August 14, 1996; it presented the report to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament on January 30, 1997. Eliminating Nuclear Weapons: A Survival Guide for the Twenty First Century, a lecture given by Paul Keating, former prime minister of Australia, November 25, 1998. Martin Schram, Avoiding Armageddon: Our Future. Our Choice (New York: Basic Books, 2003), pp. 48–50. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Facing Nuclear Dangers: An Action Plan for the 21st Century, The Report of the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, Tokyo, July 25, 1999. Brahma Chellaney, “An Obstacle-Ridden Path to Nuclear Disarmament,” International Herald Tribune, August 21, 1999. World Court Project UK, Nuclear Weapons on Trial, accessed on the World Court Project’s website at wcp.gn.apc.org/infl.htm on April 7, 2003; Hideaki Ishibashi, “The World Court Project,” in The Road to the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 1999), pp. 151–155; Hiromichi Umebayashi, “The Role of NGOs in Japan and the World,” in Nuclear Disarmament in the Twenty-First Century, (Hiroshima: Hiroshima Peace Institute, 2004), pp. 338–353. United Nations General Assembly, General Assembly Resolution 49/75 K and Documents Relating to the Proceedings Leading to the Adoption Thereof, New York, November 18, 1994. Japan introduced the draft resolution Nuclear Disarmament with a View to the Ultimate Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on November 7, 1994; a revised version appeared on November 16, 1994. Naoki Kamimura, “Civil Society and Nuclear Disarmament: A Comparison of U.S. and Japanese Experiences during the 1980s and 1990s,” Japan Center for Area Studies (JCAS), National Museum of Ethnology, Osaka, 2002. Kate Dewes and Robert Green, “The World Court Project: History and Consequences,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, vol. 7, no. 1, Fall 1999, pp. 61–83. City of Hiroshima, The ICJ Proceedings, accessed on the website of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum on November 17, 2005 at www.pcf. city.hiroshima.jp/peacesite/English/Stage3/3-9/3-9-5-1E.html. Hidankyo, Appeal from Nuclear Weapons Victims to the Peoples of the World, Nagasaki, August 9, 1993. See Anthony DiFilippo, The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military Arrangement: Competing Security Transitions in a Changing International Environment (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), pp. 52–53.

Notes to Pages 122–135

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35. Verbatim Excerpts of Oral Statements to the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, October 30—November 15, 1995, accessed at http://disarm.igc.org/oldwebpages/icjquote.html#Japan. 36. IALANA (International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms), World Court Project: Background of the World Court Project, accessed on the IALANA website at www.ialana.org/site/affairs/wcp_index.html on May 14, 2003. 37. United Nations General Assembly, First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, General Assembly Stresses Importance of World Court Nuclear Weapon Opinion, as it Adopts 48 Disarmament-Related Texts, New York, December 10, 1996; United Nations General Assembly, First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, Multilateral Negotiations for NuclearWeapon Elimination Called for in First Committee Draft Resolution, New York, November 10, 1997. 38. United Nations, Fifty-Eighth General Assembly, First Committee, Proliferation of “Non-Strategic” Nuclear Weapons, New Agenda for Disarmament, Press Release, New York, December 8, 2003; United Nations, Fifty-Ninth General Assembly, First Committee, Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Aim of Draft Text Approved by First Committee, Press Release, New York, October 28, 2004. 39. United Nations, Sixtieth General Assembly, First Committee, Nuclear-WeaponFree Zones, Bolstering Global Nonproliferation Regime, Amongst Issues Addressed, as First Committee Approves 21 Draft Texts. 40. Anthony DiFilippo, “Arms Control Versus Disarmament,” Briefing Paper, National Commission for Economic Conversion and Disarmament, Washington, DC, May 1991; David Alexander and Anthony DiFilippo, “Beyond INF: Toward Progressive Arms Reduction,” Defense Analysis, vol. 4, no. 4, December 1988, pp. 398–400. 41. Statement by H.E. Dr. Kuniko Inoguchi, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament, The Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Geneva, April 29, 2003. 42. See U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Nonproliferation, U.S. Commitment to NPT Article VI, The Record from May 1995 to April 2000, Washington, DC, April 1, 2000; U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Nonproliferation, The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons: A Global Success, Washington, DC, May 2000; U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Nonproliferation, Article IV of the NPT: U.S. Support for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation, Washington, DC, January 20, 2001. 43. United Nations General Assembly, First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, Despite Test-Ban Rejection, Commitment to Arms Control “Unwavering,” United States Tells First Committee, as General Debate Concludes, New York, October 20, 1999. 44. “Senate Votes to Lift Ban on Producing Nuclear Arms,” The New York Times, May 20, 2003; “GOP Blocks Democrats’ Effort to Halt Nuclear Arms Studies,” The Washington Post, May 21, 2003. 45. The most recent nuclear weapons accord between Russia and the United States, the Moscow Treaty, does not mandate the elimination of nuclear weapons nor

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46.

47.

48.

49.

50. 51.

52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58.

59. 60.

61.

62.

Notes to Pages 125–128 require on-site inspection to verify that reductions have been made by Russia or the United States. See “Senate Approves U.S.-Russian Treaty to Cut Nuclear Arms,” The New York Times, March 6, 2003. Working Paper submitted by Japan, Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Second Session, Geneva, April 28–May 9, 2003. Report submitted by Japan, Implementation of Article VI of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament,” Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Second Session, Geneva, April 28–May 9, 2003. Statement by H.E. Dr. Kuniko Inoguchi, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament, The Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Geneva, April 29, 2003. United Nations, General Assembly, Sixtieth Session, First Committee, Renewed Determination Towards the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, New York, October 24, 2005. See Evaluating Implementation of the NPT 13⫹2 Steps: Japan’s Report Card on Nuclear Disarmament 2002, Peace Depot, Yokohama, March 27, 2002, pp. 1–5. Directorate General, Arms Control and Scientific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Disarmament Policy (Tokyo: The Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Nonproliferation, Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 2003), pp. 45–47. Ibid., pp.101–102. Author interview with an official from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, July 30, 2003. Ibid., July 27, 2005. Author interview with a member of New Komeito Party in the House of Councilors, Tokyo, July 26, 2005. Directorate General, Arms Control and Scientific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Disarmament Policy (March 2003), p. 25. Directorate General, Arms Control and Scientific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Disarmament and Nonproliferation Policy (April 2004), pp. 1–3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by H.E. Dr. Kuniko Inoguchi, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament, on Japanese Working Paper on Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, Geneva, August 14, 2003. Directorate General, Japan’s Disarmament Policy, 51–53. U.S. Department of State, United States Information Service, Washington File, Text: Holum Urges CD to Pursue Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, Geneva, January 21, 1999. U.S. Department of State, Press Conference on the Conference on Disarmament, John Bolton, Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security, Geneva, January 24, 2002. Directorate General, Japan’s Disarmament Policy, 51.

Notes to Pages 128–131

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63. U.S. Department of State, U.S. Government Approach to Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), Ambassador Jackie Sanders, Head of the U.S. Delegation, Remarks during a United Nations First Committee Plenary Session of Debate, New York, October 16, 2004. 64. See Evaluating Implementation of the NPT 13⫹2 Steps: Japan’s Report Card on Nuclear Disarmament 2003, Peace Depot, Yokohama, April 18, 2003, pp. 8–11. 65. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Working Paper of Japan for Submission to the 2005 NPT Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, Tokyo, 2005. 66. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors’ Adoption of the Resolution Concerning the Nuclear Issues in Iran, Tokyo, September 16, 2003; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Visit to Japan by Dr. Seyyed Kamal Kharrazi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Overview and Evaluation), Tokyo, September 2003; “Peaceful Nuclear Program Irreversible,” Iran Daily, September 15, 2003; “Call to Expel Japan, Australia, Canada Envoys,” Iran Daily, September 15, 2003. 67. See U.S. Department of State, Jacquelyn Porth, Rumsfeld: U.S. Will Continue to Provide Allies with Nuclear Umbrella, United States Embassy, Tokyo, July 25, 2002. 68. Rajan Menon, “The End of Alliances,” World Policy Journal, vol. 20. no. 2, Summer 2003, pp. 10–16. 69. See DiFilippo, The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military Arrangement; DiFilippo, “The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance: A Question of Regional Stability,” Asian Affairs, no. 21, Spring 2004, pp. 41–53. 70. “Koizumi Salutes SDF in Send-Off,” Asahi Shimbun, February 2, 2004. 71. Jean du Preez, “Security Assurances Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons: Is Progress Possible at the NPT Precom?” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, April 24, 2003; Fact Sheets, “U.S. Nuclear Policy: Negative Security Assurances,” Arms Control Association, Washington, DC, March 2002; U.S. Department of State, A Declaration by the President on Security Assurances for Nonnuclear Weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Washington, DC, April 5, 1995. 72. United Nations website (www.un.org), Decision and Resolution Adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, Decision 2: Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, accessed June 11, 2003. 73. George Bunn, “The Legal Status of U.S. Negative Security Assurances to Nonnuclear Weapon States,” The Nonproliferation Review, Spring/Summer 1997, pp. 1–17. 74. 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, New York, 2000, pp. 15–16. 75. Article IX, paragraph three, of the NPT specifies, “a nuclear-weapon state is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.”

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Notes to Pages 131–134

76. Working Paper submitted by Japan, Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Second Session, Geneva, April 28–May 9, 2003, p. 9; Working Paper submitted by Japan, Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, First Session, New York, April 12, 2002; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Facing Nuclear Dangers, where Tokyo recommends that the nuclear weapons states “explore the possibility of negotiating a legally-binding agreement.” 77. Interview with official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, July 30, 2003. 78. In 1978, the United States formally offered negative security assurances to the nonnuclear weapons states that were parties to NPT; these assurances, in slightly revised form, were again offered in 1995 and recently reaffirmed in February 2002. See Bunn, “The Legal Status of U.S. Negative Security Assurances to Nonnuclear Weapon States”; U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, Washington, DC, February 22, 2002. 79. “Govt Wants U.S. to Keep North Korea N-Deterrent,” Daily Yomiuri Online, August 23, 2003; “U.S. May Omit N-Promise for N. Korea,” Daily Yomiuri Online, November 23, 2003. 80. Working Paper: “Security Assurances,” Submitted by New Zealand on Behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, Sweden, and South Africa as Members of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Second Session, Geneva, April 28–May 9, 2003, and “Annex,” Draft Protocol Agreement on the Prohibition of the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons Against Nonnuclear-Weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 81. Working Paper submitted by Malaysia on Behalf of the Group of Nonaligned and Other State Parties to the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Second Session, Geneva, April 28–May 9, 2003. 82. Working Paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran, Negative Security Assurances, Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Second Session, Geneva, April 28–May 9, 2003. 83. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Working Paper of Japan for Submission to the 2005 NPT Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT. 84. U.S. Department of State, U.S. Commitment to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Washington, DC, May 3, 1999. 85. U.S. Department of State, John Wolf, Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation, U.S. Representative to the Second Session of the PrepCom, Preparatory Committee Meeting for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, Remarks to the Second Meeting of the Preparatory Committee, Geneva, April 28, 2003. 86. DiFilippo, “Can Japan Craft an International Nuclear Disarmament Policy?” Asian Survey, July/August 2000.

Notes to Pages 135–138

Chapter 7

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Tokyo and the Axis of Evil

1. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, State of the Union, Washington, DC, January 28, 2003. 2. Quotations from CNN Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer, Transcript of Interviews: Transcript of the Director General’s Interview on Iran, Iraq, North Korea, November 2, 2003. 3. Quoted in “Koizumi Backs off on WMD,” Asahi Shimbun, February 11, 2004. 4. U.S. Department of State, Andrew Semmel, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Alternate U.S. Representative to the Second Session of the PrepCom, Articles I and II: Nonproliferation, Remarks to the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, Geneva, May 1, 2003; U.S. Department of State, Andrew Semmel, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Alternate U.S. Representative to the Second Session of the PrepCom, Regional Nonproliferation Issues, Remarks to the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, Geneva, May 2, 2003; U.S. Department of State, U.S. Official: NPT Enforcement Measures Need to be Strengthened, Actions by Iran, North Korea Called “Provocative, Disturbing,” Washington, DC, May 5, 2003. 5. U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Iran, Washington, DC, June 2003; U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, Washington, DC, April 30, 2003. 6. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi Interview on the Issue of Iraq, Tokyo, March 18, 2003; “Koizumi Adds Japan to Pro-War Shortlist,” Asahi Shimbun, March 19, 2003. 7. In July 2003, 55 percent of the respondents to a random survey in Japan opposed sending the SDF to Iraq. See “Survey: More Oppose SDF Iraq Mission,” Asahi Shimbun, July 22, 2003. 8. Embassy of the United States, Japan, Armitage Praises Japan’s Increasing Role in Global Security, Tokyo, February 2, 2004. 9. Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, Statement by Junichiro Koizumi (Decision on the Extension of the Basic Plan Regarding Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance of the Self Defense Forces in Iraq), Tokyo, December 9, 2004. 10. A Kyodo News random survey conducted more than one month before the mid-December 2004 deadline found that 63.3 percent of the respondents did not support extending the SDF stay in Iraq. See “Don’t Extend GSDF’s [Ground Self Defense Forces] Iraq Aid Mission, Most in Poll Say,” The Japan Times Online, November 4, 2004. A survey conducted by the Nihon Keizai Shimbun after the deadline found that approximately 54 percent of the respondents opposed the extension of the SDF’s stay in Iraq. See “54% of Japanese Don’t Want SDF in Iraq 1 More Year: Nikkei Poll,” Nikkei Net Interactive, December 29, 2004. 11. Quoted in “Bush Says U.S. Will Not Tolerate Building of Nuclear Arms by Iran,” The New York Times, June 18, 2003. 12. Quoted in “Bush Steps Up Pressure on Iran over Nuclear Plans,” The Washington Post, September 26, 2003. White House Press Secretary Scott

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13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

19. 20.

21. 22. 23.

24.

25.

Notes to Pages 138–140 McClellan stated the United States first revealed and began “talking about Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.” See Press Briefing by Scott McClellan, White House, Washington, DC, September 25, 2003. Quoted in “Rumsfeld Says Iran is Developing Nuclear Arms under Guise of Civilian Program,” The New York Times, June 12, 2003. Statement by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the IAEA’s Board of Governors, Vienna, June 19, 2003. “Iran Rejects U.S. Charge of Faulty Nuclear Report,” The New York Times, June 18, 2003. “Khatami: Iran has no Intention of Manufacturing Nuclear Weapons,” Islamic Republic News Agency, July 1, 2003. “Iran Refuses to Give Up Nuclear Program, Denies Seeking Bomb,” The Japan Times, August 9, 2003. IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, June 6, 2003. “Iran Refuses to Give Up Nuclear Program, Denies Seeking Bomb.” Japan has signed and ratified its Additional Protocol with the IAEA, as has China and more recently the United Kingdom and France. Russia has signed an Additional Protocol but has not ratified it. Like the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, India, Israel, and Pakistan have not signed an Additional Protocol agreement with the IAEA. The United States signed an Additional Protocol agreement with the IAEA in June 1998; although it was sent to the Senate for ratification in May 2002, as of November 2005, it has not been ratified. See International Atomic Energy Agency, Strengthened Safeguards System: Status of Additional Protocols, November 22, 2005, accessed on the IAEA website at www.iaea.org. Even if the U.S. Senate eventually ratifies the Additional Protocol, IAEA access to American nuclear facilities is conditional, since it includes a restriction that can be implemented by Washington for national security purposes. See Carl Behrens, “Nuclear Nonproliferation Issues,” Issue Brief for Congress, Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, April 28, 2003. Mohamed ElBaradei, IAEA Director General, Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors, Vienna, June 16, 2003. “Iran Stalls over Nuclear Inspections,” BBC News World Edition, United Kingdom, June 30, 2003. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the Chairwoman’s Summing-up Statement of the IAEA Board of Governors Meeting Concerning the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Tokyo, June 19, 2003; “Japan, U.S. Share Concern Regarding Iran,” The Japan Times Online, June 10, 2003. Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Working Paper Submitted by Japan, Geneva, April 28–May 9, 2003. U.S. Department of State, Japan Investment in Iran Oil Field, Daily Press Briefing, Washington, DC, June 30, 2003.

Notes to Pages 140–146

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26. “Japan’s Investment Opposed in Iranian Oil Field,” Iran Daily, July 1, 2003. 27. “U.S. Penalizes 6 Asian Firms for Helping Iran Arm Itself,” The New York Times, July 3, 2003. 28. “U.S. Urges Japan to Quit Iran Oil Deal: U.K. Paper,” The Japan Times Online, June 29, 2003; “Japan May Not Ink Oil Deal Amid Iran Nuke Issue: Fukuda” Kyodo News, July 1, 2003; “U.S. Pressure Places Iran-Japan Oil Deal in Doubt,” The Japan Times Online, July 2, 2003. 29. Anthony DiFilippo, “Japan’s Anti-Nuclear Weapons Policy Misses its Target, Even in the War on Terrorism,” Medicine, Conflict and Survival, vol. 19, no. 3, July–September 2003, pp. 235–248. 30. “U.S. Tells Japan to Abandon Iran Oil Deal,” Mainichi Daily News, July 2, 2003. 31. “Tokyo: Oil, Nukes, Not Linked in Iran Talks,” Asahi Shimbun, July 9, 2003. 32. IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Vienna, August 26, 2003; “New Report Cites Traces of Uranium at Plant,” The New York Times, August 27, 2003. 33. “Nuclear Development: Iran Confirms Door Open on Inspections,” Asahi Shimbun, August 29, 2003. 34. IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, June 6, 2003. 35. Ibid., August 26, 2003; Mohamed ElBaradei, IAEA Director General, Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors, Vienna, September 8, 2003. 36. Press Briefing by Scott McClellan, White House, Washington, DC, September 25, 2003. 37. Quoted in “ElBaradei: U.S. Should Set Nuclear Disarm Example,” Common Dreams News Center, August 26, 2003. 38. Statement by Ambassador Kenneth Brill, United States of America, IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Vienna, September 8, 2003. 39. “Iran Given Deadline to Lay Bare Nuclear Program,” The Washington Post, September 13, 2003. 40. “UK, Germany, France Propose Nuclear Deal,” Iran Daily, September 20, 2003; “Iran Cleric Suggests Nation Quit Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,” The New York Times, September 20, 2003. 41. “Russia Against Nuclear Weapons Program,” Iran Daily, September 14, 2003; “No Proof of Iran’s Nuke Capability,” Iran Daily, September 18, 2003; “Iran Threatens to End Ties with UN Watchdog,” The New York Times, September 13, 2003. 42. IAEA Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Resolution Adopted by the Board of Governors on 12 September 2003, Vienna, September 12, 2003. 43. Quoted in “Nuclear Watchdog Imposes Oct. 31 Deadline,” Iran Daily, September 13, 2003. 44. Statement by Ambassador Ali Salehi, Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Vienna, September 12, 2003.

244

Notes to Pages 146–149

45. Statement by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Vienna, September 12, 2003. 46. Article IV of the NPT states that, “Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.” 47. “Iran Threatens to End Ties with UN Nuke Watchdog,” The New York Times, September 13, 2003; “US Blamed for Problems with IAEA,” Iran Daily, September 14, 2003; “Khatami Insists on Non-Military Nuclear Technology,” Iran Daily, September 16, 2003. 48. “Will Reconsider IAEA Collaboration,” Iran Daily, September 14, 2003. 49. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Islamic Republic of Iran, Dr. Kharrazi Holds an Interview with Washington Post, Transcript of Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi’s interview with The Washington Post, New York, September 22, 2003. 50. “MP Slams IAEA Deadline,” Iran Daily, September 17, 2003; “Additional Protocol Depends on Nat’l Expediency,” Iran Daily, September 20, 2003; “Jannati Proposes NPT Withdrawal,” Iran Daily, September 20, 2003. 51. H.E. Mr. Reza Aghazadeh, Vice President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Statement to the Forty-Seventh Regular Session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, September 2003. 52. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan-Iran Expert Meeting on the IAEA Additional Protocol, Tokyo, August 2003. 53. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Visit to Japan by Dr. Seyyed Kamal Kharrazi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Overview and Evaluation), Tokyo, September 2003. 54. “Call to Expel Japan, Australia, Canada Envoys,” Iran Daily, September 15, 2003. 55. Quoted in “Peaceful Nuclear Program Irreversible,” Iran Daily, September 15, 2003. 56. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors’ Adoption of the Resolution Concerning Nuclear Issues in Iran, Tokyo, September 16, 2003. 57. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by Mr. Hiroyuki Hosoda, Minister of State for Science and Technology Policy, Delegate of the Government of Japan at the Forty-Seventh General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Tokyo, September 2003.

Notes to Pages 149–153

245

58. Statement by Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham of the United States of America at the 47th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, September 16, 2003. 59. Mohamed ElBaradei, Statement to the Forty-Seventh Regular Session of the IAEA General Conference 2003, Vienna, September 15, 2003. 60. Quoted in “IAEA Wants Full Iranian Disclosure,” Iran Daily, October 1, 2003. 61. “Iran Ready to Sign NPT Protocol Conditionally,” Iran Daily, September 30, 2003. 62. Alan Dowty, “Japan and the Middle East: Signs of Change?” Middle East Review of International Affairs, vol. 4, no. 4, December 2000, pp. 67–76. 63. Quoted in International Debates, vol. 1, no. 6, September 2003, pp. 188, 190. 64. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Visit by Minister for Foreign Affairs Yoriko Kawaguichi to the Islamic Republic of Iran (Overview and Evaluation), Tokyo, May 9, 2002. 65. IAEA, “Statement by the Iranian Government and Visiting EU Foreign Ministers,” News Center, Vienna, October 21, 2003. 66. IAEA, “Iran Signs Additional Protocol on Nuclear Safeguards,” News Center, Vienna, December 18, 2003. 67. IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Vienna, November 10, 2003. 68. IAEA Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Resolution Adopted by the Board on 26 November 2003, Vienna, November 26, 2003. 69. Quoted in “Iran Seeks Japan’s Help in Resolving Nuclear Issue,” The Japan Times Online, November 15, 2003. 70. “U.S. Acquiesces to Allies on New Iranian Resolution,” The New York Times, November 25, 2003. 71. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the Adoption of the IAEA Board of Governors’ Resolution concerning Iran’s Nuclear Issue, Tokyo, November 26, 2003. 72. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Summary of Japan-Iran Consultation on Disarmament and Nonproliferation, Tokyo, January 27, 2004. 73. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General of Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on Conclusion of the Contract for the Development Operations for the Azadegan Field, Tokyo, February 19, 2004; “Iran, Japan Sign Contract on Azadegan Oil Field,” Islamic Republic News Agency, February 19, 2004. 74. Quotations from “Japan, Iran Sign Huge Oilfield Deal Despite US Opposition,” Mainichi Daily News, February 19, 2004; “Bolton Downplays Disagreement over Japan-Iran Oil Deal,” The Japan Times Online, February 20, 2004. 75. See, for example, Chaim Braun and Christopher Chyba, “Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nonproliferation Regime,” International Security, vol. 29, no. 2, Fall 2004, pp. 5–49.

246

Notes to Pages 153–155

76. “Japan’s Deputy FM Rejects US Demand to Scrap Oil Deal with Iran,” Islamic Republic News Agency, August 24, 2004. 77. “Undisclosed Nuclear Equipment Designs Found in Iran, Diplomats Say,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, Global Security Newswire, February 12, 2004, accessed at http://nti.org/; “Iran Admits Failure to Report Nuclear Technology,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, Global Security Newswire, February 13, 2004, accessed web at http://nti.org; IAEA Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. 78. IAEA Board of Governors, Statement of the Implementation of Safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran by Ambassador Kenneth Brill, United States f America, Vienna, March 13, 2004. 79. Comments and Explanatory Notes by the Islamic Republic of Iran on the Report of the IAEA Director General, Vienna, March 5, 2004. 80. IAEA Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran; Statement of the Director General, Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Vienna, March 8, 2004. 81. IAEA Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Resolution Adopted by the Board of 13 March 2004, Vienna, March 13, 2004. 82. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the Adoption of the IAEA Board of Governors’ Resolution concerning Iran’s Nuclear Issue, Tokyo, March 13, 2004. 83. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Visit to Japan of Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Hassan Rouhani [sic] of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Summary), Tokyo, March 2004. 84. “SNSC Sec.: Iran Ready to Negotiate Nuclear Issues with Other States,” Islamic Republic News Agency, March 16, 2004. 85. IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Statement of the Director General, Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors, Vienna, June 14, 2004; IAEA, Transcript of the Director General’s Press Statement on IAEA Inspection in Iran, Vienna, June 18, 2004. 86. IAEA Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Resolution Adopted by the Board on 18 June 2004, Vienna, June 18, 2004; “Iran Assailed for Lack of Cooperation on Nuclear Program,” The New York Times, June 18, 2004. 87. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the Adoption of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors’ Resolution concerning Iran’s Nuclear Issue, Tokyo, June 21, 2004. 88. IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Vienna, September 18, 2004, pp. 9–10. 89. “Iran Resumes Centrifuge Building,” BBC News, July 31, 2004.

Notes to Pages 155–157

247

90. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the Resumption of Uranium Enrichment-Related Activities by Iran, Tokyo, August 3, 2004. 91. IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Statement of the Director General, Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors, Vienna, September 13, 2004; IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Vienna, September 18, 2004. 92. “Allies at IAEA Meeting Reject U.S. Stand on Iran,” The New York Times, September 18, 2004. 93. IAEA Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Resolution Adopted by the Board on 18 September 2004, Vienna, September 18, 2004. 94. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the Adoption of a Resolution by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Iran’s Nuclear Issue, Tokyo, September 21, 2004. 95. “Europeans Say Iran Agrees to Freeze Uranium Enrichment,” The New York Times, November 16, 2004. 96. “Group Says Iran Has Secret Nuclear Arms Program,” The New York Times, November 17, 2004; “Iran Says It Suspends Uranium Enrichment Program,” The New York Times, November 22, 2004; U.S. Department of State, Designation of National Council of Resistance and National Council of Resistance of Iran under Executive Order 13224, Press Statement, Washington, DC, August 15, 2003. 97. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, “Dr. Asefi Rejected the Allegations made by the Outlaw MKO,” Tehran, November 18, 2004. 98. “Powell Says Iran is Pursuing Bomb, Evidence Cited of Effort to Adapt Missile” The Washington Post, November 18, 2004; “Nuclear Disclosures on Iran Unverified: U.S. Officials Checking Evidence Cited by Powell,” The Washington Post, November 19, 2004. 99. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, “Dr. Assefi [sic] Rejects Colin Powel’s [sic] Claim that Iran Intends to Develop Nuclear Weapons,” Tehran, November 19, 2004. 100. Quoted in “Iran Says It Suspends Uranium Enrichment Program,” The New York Times, November 22, 2004. 101. IAEA Board of Governors, Report by the Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Vienna, November 15, 2004. 102. IAEA Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Resolution Adopted by the Board on 29 November 2004, Vienna, November 29, 2004. 103. “Q&A: ElBaradei, Feeling the Nuclear Heat,” The Washington Post, January 30, 2005. 104. Quoted in “Putin Says He [sic] Sure Iran not Building Nuclear Arms,” The New York Times, February 18, 2005.

248

Notes to Pages 157–161

105. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the Adoption of a Resolution by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAA) Board of Governors on Iran’s Nuclear Issue, Tokyo, December 1, 2004. 106. “Tokyo Differs from Washington with Regard to Policies on Iran,” Islamic Republic News Agency, February 2, 2005. 107. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Visit to Japan by Dr. Seyyed Kamal Kharrazi Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Summary and Evaluation), Tokyo, February 16, 2005. 108. “Japanese FM Says Iran Committed to IAEA Resolutions,” Islamic Republic News Agency, February 9, 2005. 109. The Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations, An Unnecessary Crisis: Setting the Record Straight about Iran’s Nuclear Program, New York, November 2005. 110. “KCNA Accuses IAEA of Speaking for U.S.,” Korean Central News Agency. December 11, 2002; “Pyongyang Blames U.S. for Nuclear Crisis,” The People’s Korea, December 2002. 111. “J. Kelly Failed to Produce ‘Evidence’ in Pyongyang, Framed up ‘Admission’ Story,” The People’s Korea, January 19, 2003. 112. In October 2002, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld asserted during a Pentagon press briefing that he believes that the North Koreans “have a small number of nuclear weapons.” “Rumsfeld Believes North Korea has ‘Small Number of Nuclear Weapons,’ ” Department of Defense Report (United States Embassy, Tokyo, Japan), October 17, 2002; Secretary of State Powell maintained during an interview with ABC in December 2002 that, “North Korea now has, in the judgment of our intelligence experts, one or two nuclear weapons” Interview on ABC’s This Week with George Stephanopoulos, Secretary Colin Powell, Department of State, Washington, DC, December 29, 2002. 113. Quoted in “North Korea Informs South Korea That It Doesn’t Plan to Produce Nuclear Weapons,” The New York Times, January 23, 2003. 114. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by Ms. Yoriko Kawaguchi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the Declaration by North Korea to Withdraw from the NPT, Tokyo, January 10, 2003. 115. “DPRK to Put Spurs to Increasing its Nuclear Deterrent Force for Self-Defence,” Korean Central News Agency, June 18, 2003. 116. Department of Defense, Active Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Country, Department of Defense, Washington, DC, December 31, 2004. 117. “North Korea Able to Produce Nukes by 2004, Says U.S.,” The Japan Times Online, November 21, 2002. 118. “N. Korea’s Nuclear Threat Growing, Analysts Say,” Daily Yomiuri Online, June 22, 2003; “U.S. has Warned Japan over Pyongyang Warhead Threat,” The Japan Times Online, June 21, 2003. 119. “Pyongyang Allegedly Hints Nuclear Possession at ‘3-Party Talks,’ Makes ‘New Bold Proposal,’ ” The People’s Korea, April 26, 2003. 120. See “Ten Reasons Why the U.S. Cannot Attack North Korea in Comparison to Iraqi Case,” The People’s Korea, March 1, 2003.

Notes to Pages 161–165

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121. Sometimes the term “entrapment” is used inaccurately here to describe being pulled into an ally’s war. See Victor, Cha “Defensive Realism and Japan’s Approach toward Korean Unification,” NBR Analysis: Perspectives on the Future of the Korean Peninsula, pp. 18–21, vol. 14, no. 1, June 2003, National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, Washington. 122. “80% Fear Japan will be Involved in War,” The Japan Times Online, March 30, 2003. 123. Anthony DiFilippo, “The Troubled Relationship: What Normalized Relations Would do for Japan and North Korea,” in The Significance of Koizumi’s Visit to North Korea, ed. Yone Sugita, monograph series (Tokyo: Architect Press, Smallworld Libraries, 2003), published in English and Japanese. 124. “Spokesman for DPRK FM on DPRK Visit of Special Envoy of U.S. President,” Korean Central News Agency, October 7, 2002; “U.S. Hostile Policy towards DPRK under Fire,” Korean Central News Agency, October 15, 2002; “Practical Measures to Conclude Non-Aggression Treaty Called for,” Korean Central News Agency,” October 29, 2002. 125. James Laney and Jason Shaplen, “How to Deal with North Korea,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, no. 2, March/April 2003, p. 21. 126. “Conclusion of Non-Aggression Treaty between DPRK and U.S. Called for,” Korean Central News Agency, October 25, 2002. 127. See IAEA, The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency, at www.iaea.org/worldatom. The 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, prohibits the two Koreas from possessing “nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.” 128. “KCNA Refutes U.S. Claim for Scrapping DPRK’s ‘Nuclear Weapons Program,’ ” Korean Central News Agency, October 31, 2002. 129. Agreed Framework between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States of America, Geneva, October 21, 1994. 130. “KNCA Detailed Report on Circumstances of DPRK’s Withdrawal from NPT,” Korean Central News Agency, January 22, 2003. 131. “U.S. New Plan for Nuclear Attack under Fire,” Korean Central News Agency, March 14, 2002. 132. Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration, Pyongyang, September 17, 2002, accessed on Japanese ministry’s of foreign affairs website at www.mofw.go.jp. 133. “James Kelly’s Reckless Remarks Blasted,” Korean Central News Agency, March 23, 2003. 134. “Roh Skeptical on US Policy Toward North Korea,” The Korea Times, December 31, 2002. 135. Quoted in “Roh Not Sure of NK’s Nuke Possession,” The Korea Times, June 2, 2003. 136. Larry Niksch, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” Issue Brief for Congress, Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, April 28, 2003. 137. “66% of Japanese Favor Links with North Korea,” The Japan Times Online, December 22, 2002. 138. Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, KEDO Executive Board Meeting Concludes, November 14, 2002, accessed on July 25, 2003 on the

250

139.

140. 141.

142. 143.

144.

145.

146. 147.

148. 149. 150.

151. 152. 153.

154.

Notes to Pages 165–169 KEDO website at www.kedo.org; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on KEDO Executive Board, Tokyo, November 15, 2002. U.S. Department of State, Two Plus Two Ministerial: Joint Press Availability with U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi, and Director General Shigeru Ishiba of the Defense Agency of Japan, Washington, DC, December 16, 2002; “Japan Says Nuclear Effort in Korea Merits Hard Line,” The New York Times, December 16, 2002. “North Korea Sanctions Possible,” The Japan Times Online, January 13, 2003. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by Ms. Yoriko Kawaguchi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the Declaration by North Korea to Withdraw from the NPT, Tokyo, January 10, 2003. Quoted in “U.S. and Japan Warn North Korea on Nuclear Standoff,” The New York Times, May 24, 2003. See Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security, vol. 27, no. 4, Spring 2003, pp. 5–56, for a discussion of China’s integration into the international community. An adviser to South Korea’s President Roh stated, “In contrast to the first nuclear crisis in 1993–1994, China’s position is more active now.” See “Seoul at Odds with US over NK,” The Korea Times, July 5, 2003. “U.N. Council Stalled on N. Korea,” The Washington Post, April 10, 2003; “UNSC Draft Takes Hard Line with N. Korea,” Daily Yomiuri Online, June 21, 2003. “U.S. Set to Take a Hard Line in Talks on Korean Arms,” The New York Times, August 26, 2003. “6-nation Talks: Tokyo Stands Firm on Abduction Issue,” Asahi Shimbun, August 27, 2003; “Progress Sidelined: Talks Break Down on Abduction Issue,” Asahi Shimbun,” August 29, 2003. “Keynote Speeches Made at Six-Way Talks,” Korean Central News Agency, August 29, 2003. “DPRK Foreign Ministry on Six-Way Talks,” Korean Central News Agency, August 30, 2003. “N. Korea Threatens Nuclear Arms Test,” The Washington Post, August 29, 2003; “North Korea Says it may Test an A-Bomb,” The New York Times, August 29, 2003; “U.S. Official: North Korea Vows to Make Nuclear Test,” China Daily, August 29, 2003. “U.S. Official: North Korea Vows to Make Nuke Test,” China Daily, August 29, 2003. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Six-Party Talks on North Korean Issues (Overview and Evaluation), Tokyo, September 2003. “North Korea: Ganging Up on Pyongyang,” Far Eastern Economic Review, September 11, 2003; “Japan Seeks Shield for North Korean Missiles,” The New York Times, August 29, 2003. “U.S.-N. Korea Nonaggression Pact ‘Invites War,’ ” Mainichi Daily News, August 30, 2003.

Notes to Pages 169–172

251

155. “U.S. Said to Shift Approach in Talks with North Korea,” The New York Times, September 5, 2003; “U.S. Moderates Position on Incentives for North Korea,” The Washington Post, September 5, 2003. 156. “North Korea: Ganging up on Pyongyang”; “U.S. Stand Could Stall Korea Talks, Chinese Say,” The New York Times, September 2, 2003. 157. “U.S. Urged to Stop Threat to DPRK,” Korean Central News Agency, September 2, 2003. 158. “KCNA on Six-Way Talks and DPRK’s Principled Stand,” Korean Central News Agency, September 2, 2003. 159. Quoted in “US Considers Offering NK Security Assurances,” The Korea Times, September 8, 2003. 160. “KCNA Assails Japan for Trying to Discard ‘Peace Constitution’ ” Korean Central News Agency, September 2, 2003; “Koizumi Speaks Out on his Constitutional Pet Peeves,” Asahi Shimbun, August 28, 2003. 161. “Japan’s Sinister Moves Assailed,” Korean Central News Agency, September 2, 2003. 162. Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” 29–35. 163. Zhou Bian, “China Practices ‘Shuttle Diplomacy,’ ” Beijing Review, vol. 46, no. 34, August 21, 2003, p. 40. 164. “Shutdown of Nuclear Complex Deepens North Korean Mystery,” The New York Times, September 13, 2003. 165. “DPRK to Continue Increasing its Nuclear Deterrent Force,” Korean Central News Agency, October 2, 2003; “DPRK Claims Right to Increase Nuclear Deterrent,” Korean Central News Agency, October 3, 2003. 166. Quoted in “Japan States its Case on N. Korea Nukes,” Asahi Shimbun, August 28, 2003. 167. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Visit of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to the Federal Republic of Germany (Summit Meeting: Summary), Tokyo, August 2003; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Visit of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to the Czech Republic (Summit Meeting: Summary), Tokyo, August 2003; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Visit of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to the Republic of Poland (Summit Meeting: Summary), Tokyo, August 2003. 168. Anthony DiFilippo, “Security Trials, Nuclear Tribulations, and Rapprochement in Japan-North Korean Relations,” Journal of Pacific Asia, vol. 11, 2004, p. 22. 169. U.S. Moves High-Tech Weaponry into Korean Peninsula,” China Daily, December 22, 2003. 170. “U.S. Escalated Arms Buildup Assailed,” Korean Central News Agency, December 28, 2003. 171. Quoted in “U.S. and 2 Allies Agree on a Plan for North Korea,” The New York Times, December 8, 2003. 172. “Nuclear Expert is Unconvinced that North Korea Has the Bomb,” The New York Times, January 22, 2004; “North Korea Displays Nuclear Deterrent Force to U.S. Delegation,” The Korea Times, January 11, 2004. 173. “U.S. Sees more Arms Ties between Pakistan and Korea,” The New York Times, March 14, 2004.

252

Notes to Pages 172–176

174. “DPRK FM Spokesman Refutes U.S. Story about ‘Transfer of N-Technology’ to DPRK,” Korean Central News Agency, February 10, 2004; “KCNA Blasts U.S. Smear Campaign against DPRK,” Korean Central News Agency, February 21, 2004. 175. “Bush Signals Patience on North Korea is Waning,” The Washington Post, March 4, 2004. 176. “DPRK Insists that Japan be Excluded from Nuclear Talks,” The People’s Korea, October 11, 2003. 177. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Second Round of Six-Party Talks (Overview and Evaluation), Tokyo, March 2004. 178. “U.S. Urged to Make Switchover in its Policy toward DPRK,” Korean Central News Agency,” March 9, 2004. 179. “Rodong Sinmun on Key to Settlement of Nuclear Issue,” Korea Central News Agency, March 8, 2004. 180. “Public Interest in North Korean Problems Increasing: Survey,” The Japan Times Online, January 11, 2004; “Pollees Split Equally over North Korea Sanctions,” Mainichi Daily News, March 8, 2004. 181. “DPRK Foreign Minister Spokesman on Six-Party Talks,” Korean Central News Agency, June 28, 2004. 182. Prepared Statement of James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Dealing with North Korea’s Nuclear Programs,” Washington DC, July 15, 2004. 183. “U.S. Urged to Make Political Decision on Six-Way Talks,” Korean Central News Agency, July 6, 2004. 184. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Third Round of Six-Party Talks Concerning North Korean Nuclear Issues, Tokyo, June 2004. 185. See DiFilippo, “Security Trials, Nuclear Tribulations, and Rapprochement,” 7–31. 186. Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, Speeches and Statements by the Prime Minister, Press Conference by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi after the Japan-North Korea Meeting, Tokyo, May 22, 2004. 187. For a good analysis of the uncertainty of the existence of the DPRK’s uranium enrichment program, see Selig Harrison, “Did North Korea Cheat?” Foreign Affairs, vol. 84, no. 1, January/February 2005, pp. 99–110. 188. DiFilippo, “The Troubled Relationship: What Normalized Relations Would do for Japan and North Korea.” See also a truncated Japanese version of this article, Yoichi Hirama and Yone Sugita, eds., “Kojireta Kankei no Nichicho Kokko Seijohka,” Kitachosen o Meguru Hokutoh Ajia no Kokusai Kankei to Nihon (in Japan and Northeast Asian International Relations Involving North Korea), (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2003), pp. 66–84. 189. Prepared Statement of James A. Kelly, “Dealing with North Korea’s Nuclear Programs.” 190. IAEA Press Releases, “IAEA Inspections Team Conducting Investigation in South Korea,” September 2, 2004, accessed at www.iaea.org; “South Korea Rebuffs Weapons-Grade Uranium Claim,” The Korea Times, September 3, 2004.

Notes to Pages 176–180

253

191. “Spokesman for DPRK FM on Issue of Uranium Enrichment in South Korea,” Korean Central News Agency, September 11, 2004; “KCNA on Nuclear Scandal in S. Korea,” Korean Central News Agency, September 18, 2004. 192. “Tests Said to Tie Deal on Uranium to North Korea,” The New York Times, February 2, 2005. 193. “Nuclear Evidence Could Point to Pakistan,” The Washington Post, February 3, 2005. 194. “U.S. Misled Allies about Nuclear Export,” The Washington Post, March 20, 2005. Dafna Linzer, the author of this article, stated in an email message to the author that the Bush administration did not have any evidence that North Korea sold uranium to Libya; nor did Pyongyang know that Pakistan would resell uranium to Libya. 195. “DPRK FM on its Stand to Suspend its Participation in Six-Party Talks for Indefinite Period,” Korean Central News Agency, February 10, 2005. 196. Ibid. 197. Quoted in “N. Korea to Shun 6-Way Talks/Says Move to Counter ‘Hostile’ U.S. Policy, Claims it has Nukes,” Daily Yomiuri Online, February 11, 2005. 198. Quoted in “Too Early to Call NK a Nuclear State,” The Korea Times, February 14, 2004. 199. Quoted in “North Korea not yet a Nuclear Weapons State,” China Daily, February 14, 2005. 200. Quotations from “U.S. Official Says North Korea could be Bluffing on Nuclear Arms,” The New York Times, February 16, 2005. 201. Quoted in “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on the Six-Party Talks,” Korean Central News Agency, June 28, 2004 (emphasis added). 202. See U.S. Department of State, Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, Washington, DC, February 19, 2005; U.S. Department of State, Remarks with Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Japan’s Foreign Minister Machimura and Defense Minister Ohno, Washington, DC, February 19, 2005. 203. “Moves of U.S. and Japan to Tighten their Military Alliance under Fire,” Korean Central News Agency, March 14, 2005. 204. U.S. Department of State, U.S.-Japan Joint Statement on North Korea, Washington, DC, February 19, 2005. 205. “DPRK Still has Intention to Participate in 6-Party Talks,” The People’s Korea, February 26, 2005. 206. (Japanese) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing, September 19, 2005; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Sasae’s Remarks at the Closing Ceremony, Beijing, September 2005. 207. “Six-Party Talks Endeavor to Translate Commitment into Action,” The People’s Daily Online, November 11, 2005; “KCNA Blasts U.S. and KEDO’s Total Stoppage of LWR Construction,” Korean Central News Agency, December 6, 2005; “Pyongyang Threatens to Boycott Six-Way Talks,” Yonhap News, December 7, 2005. 208. “Govt Wants U.S. to Keep North Korea N-Deterrent,” Daily Yomiuri Online, August 23, 2003.

254

Notes to Pages 183–186

Chapter 8

Security and Identity

1. For a recent account of three major security issues facing Japan see Christopher Hughes, Japan’s Security Agenda: Military, Economic, and Environmental Dimensions (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004). 2. Miki Ishikida, Hinomaru as a National Flag and Kimigayo as a National Anthem in Japanese Schools, Center for U.S.-Japan Comparative Social Studies, 2001–2003, accessed at www.usjp.org/jpeducation/Hinomaru.htm. 3. “The Constitution and National Identity,” Mainichi Daily News, May 27, 2002. 4. Article 1 of the Japanese constitution (November 3, 1946) states: “The Emperor shall be the symbol of the state and unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power.” 5. Ishikida, Hinomaru as a National Flag. 6. Seizaburo Sato, “From National Defense to Security,” Gaiko Forum, Special Issue, 1999. 7. “Article 9, Iraq and Revision of the Japanese Constitution,” Asahi Shimbun, November 3, 2003. 8. “New Leader Koizumi Courts Controversy,” CNN.com/World, April 25, 2001. 9. See “56% Support Revisions to Constitution,” Asahi Shimbun, May 3, 2005; “Public Accepts the Realities of SDF and Pacifist Ideals,” Asahi Shimbun, May 4, 2005; “61% Support Making Change to Constitution: Poll,” The Japan Times Online, April 28, 2005. 10. Quoted in “U.S. Used Japan’s Gulf War Isolation to Push it onto World Stage,” The Japan Times Online, December 18, 2005. 11. Anthony DiFilippo, “ ‘Normal Country’ Status Costing Japan Dearly,” Asahi Shimbun, May 8, 2004. 12. The Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings (New York: Basic Books, 1981), pp. 57–593. 13. A recently compiled edited book on Japanese civil society totaling over 400 pages and with fifteen contributors fails to mention the existence of Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations. See Frank Schwartz and Susan Pharr, eds., The State of Civil Society in Japan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 14. John Nathan, Japan Unbound: A Volatile Nation’s Quest for Pride and Purpose (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2004). 15. Only 10 percent of the respondents thought that Japan should possess nuclear weapons. See “6-Nation Poll: Most Believe Nuclear Weapons Will Increase,” Asahi Shimbun, August 8, 2005. 16. Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 2005 (Summary), Tokyo, 2005. 17. Shin’ichi Kitaoka, “Japan’s Identity and What It Means,” The Japan Forum on International Relations, Tokyo, May 10, 2004; Susanne Klien, Rethinking Japan’s Identity and International Role: An Intercultural Perspective (New York: Routledge, 2002).

Notes to Pages 187–190

255

18. Ichiro Ozawa, Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1994), pp. 101–121. 19. “New U.N. Resolution Unneeded for Attack,” Asahi Shimbun, March 18, 2003. 20. See surveys conducted by the Shin Joho Center for the Prime Minister’s Office during the periods October 12–22, 1995 and October 3–13, 1996. Survey data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. 21. “Japan Prepares Push for Place on Security Council,” The Japan Times Online, June 29, 2003. 22. Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, Address by H.E. Mr. Junichiro Koizumi, Prime Minister of Japan, at the Fifty-Ninth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, September 21, 2004. 23. Anthony DiFilippo, “Positioning Japan for ‘Winning Peace,’ ” The Korea Times, December 23, 2004. 24. “From Pacifism to Populism,” The Economist, July 10–16, pp. 21–23; “What Goes Up Must Come Down: Voters Send Junichiro Koizumi a Deflating Message,” The Economist, July 17–23, 2004, pp. 27–28. 25. “Article 9 Hindering U.S. Ties, Bid for UNSC Seat: Armitage,” The Japan Times Online, July 23, 2004; “Armitage Wrong to Link UNSC Bid with Reform of Article 9, Officials Say,” The Japan Times Online, July 24, 2004; “Armitage Now Has No Problem with Article 9: Okada,” The Japan Times Online, July 31, 2004. 26. “Powell Links Japan UNSC Seat to Article 9,” Daily Yomiuri Online,” August 16, 2004. 27. Anthony DiFilippo, The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military Arrangement: Competing Security Transitions in a Changing International Environment (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), pp. 137–138. 28. “Armitage’s Remarks Puzzle Lawmakers,” Asahi Shimbun, July 26, 2004, p. 16. 29. “Hiroshima Mayor Again Lambastes U.S.,” The Japan Times, August 7, 2004, pp. 1–2; “Foes to Constitutional Change Speak Out: Koizumi Gets Cool Reception in Hiroshima,” The Japan Times Online, August 7, 2004. 30. Tokuko Shironitta and Tsuneo Watanabe, “Japan Outlook: Struggle for Change,” Japan Watch (Washington, DC: Office of the Japan Chair of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2000). 31. John Bolton, “Is Japan Now a ‘Normal’ Country?” Taipei Times, January 2, 2000. 32. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi Concerning the Enactment of the Three Laws Regarding Response to Armed Attacks, Tokyo, June 6, 2003. 33. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Legislation on the Response in the Case of an Armed Attack and Other Such Emergency and Japan’s Foreign Policy, Tokyo, June 2003. 34. Joseph Cheng, “Sino-Japanese Relations in the Twenty-First Century,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol. 33, no. 2, 2003, pp. 251–273. 35. “Is Japan Advancing Toward a ‘Normal Country,’ ” People’s Daily Online, July 3, 2003.

256

Notes to Pages 190–193

36. Lou Yuan and Wang Guifang, “Japan’s Shield, Scourge of Others?” Beijing Review, vol. 47, no. 3, January 15, 2004, pp. 44–45. 37. “Japan to Introduce Controversial U.S. Missile Defense System,” Mainichi Daily News, July 12, 2003; “Japan Adopts Missile Defense System,” Mainichi Daily News, December 19, 2003. 38. “Institution of ‘Emergency Laws’ in Japan Assailed,” Korean Central News Agency, June 14, 2003; “DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Denounces Passage of Bills in Japan,” Korean Central News Agency, May 19, 2003. 39. Bhubhindar Singh, “Japan’s Post–Cold War Security Policy: Bringing Back the Normal State,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 24, no. 1, April 2002, pp. 82–105. 40. Hideki Yamaji, “Future Japanese Security Policies: Contending Approaches,” Brookings Northeast Asia Survey, 2003–2004, pp. 31–49. 41. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, On the Three Nonnuclear Principles, Tokyo, June 19, 2002. 42. Quoted from Greenpeace, Japan and Nuclear Weapons: Threat or Intent? Accessed at www.greenpeace.org/~nuclear /bnfl/docs/japannuclearweaponsquotes. pdf; “Japan Can be a Nuclear Power: Ozawa,” The Japan Times Online, April 7, 2002. 43. “Nuclear Arms Taboo is Challenged in Japan,” The New York Times, June 9, 2002. 44. Ozawa, Blueprint for a New Japan, pp. 116–118. 45. “China Condemns Ozawa’s Remarks on Nuclear Weapons,” China Daily, April 4, 2002. 46. “Don’t Regard Politician’s Clamor as Ravings, How Far Japan is Away from Nuke,” People’s Daily Online, April 10, 2002. 47. “Japan’s Nuclear Ambition Persists: Leaders’ Remarks Deemed ‘Calculated,’ ” The People’s Korea, June 15, 2002. 48. “Interview/Shinzo Abe: Japan’s Policy Remains: No Nuclear Weapons,” Asahi Shimbun, June 12, 2002. 49. Quoted from “Nonnuclear Principles to Stay: Fukuda,” The Japan Times Online, June 11, 2002. 50. “Japanese Leader’s Remarks on Nuke Possession Draws Criticism,” The Korea Times, June 3, 2003. 51. “Top Gov’t Official Suggests a Review of Nuclear Weapons Policy,” Mainichi Daily News, June 1, 2001; “Nonnuclear Principles to be Reviewed, Anger in Hiroshima Vented in Sit-in Protests and Letters,” Chugoku Shimbun, Peace News, June 2, 2002; “Furor Erupts Over Nuke Comment,” Asahi Shimbun, June 3, 2002; “Opposition: Fukuda Must Go,” Asahi Shimbun, June 4, 2002. 52. See, “If You Want to have Nuclear Weapons, Let’s have an Open Discussion: Yoshito Sengoku,” an exchange between Abe and Yoshito Sengoku, a member of the opposition Democratic Party of Japan, during a meeting of the House of Representatives’ Emergency Situation Committee, June 10, 2002, accessed at www.dpj.or.jpe/english/news/020614/nuclear weapons.html. 53. “A Reckless Pronuclear Comment,” The Japan Times Online, June 7, 2002.

Notes to Pages 193–197

257

54. Matake Kamiya, “Nuclear Japan: Oxymoron or Coming Soon?” The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2002–2003, pp. 63–75. 55. Nobumasa Akiyama, Blabbing or Bluffing: Discourse over the Nuclear Option in Japan (Washington, DC: The Henry Stimson Center, 2003). 56. Author interview with a member of the Japanese House of Councilors, Tokyo, July 26, 2005. 57. Quoted in “Nakasone Says Koizumi is Populist but Has No Strategy,” Japan Today, January 8, 2004. 58. “Why Japanese Officials Visit China ‘to Explain Diplomacy,’ ” People’s Daily Online, January 14, 2004. 59. “KCNA Assails Japan’s Moves to Go Nuclear,” Korean Central News Agency, January 21, 2004. 60. John Miller, “The Glacier Moves: Japan’s Response to U.S. Security Policies,” Asian Affairs: An American Review, vol. 30, no. 2, Summer 2003, pp. 132–141; Eugene Matthews, “Japan’s New Nationalism,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, no. 6, November/December 2003, pp. 74–90. 61. Yutaka Kawashima, Japanese Foreign Policy at the Crossroads: Challenges and Options for the Twenty-First Century (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2003), pp. 48–49. 62. Department of State, Jacquelyn Porth, “Rumsfeld: U.S. will Continue to Provide Allies with Nuclear Umbrella,” United States Embassy, Tokyo, July 25, 2002; “U.S. Vows to Keep Japan Under ‘Nuke Umbrella,’ ” The Japan Times Online, October 31, 2003; Japan Defense Agency, Security Consultative Committee Document, U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future, Washington, DC, October 29, 2005. 63. Remarks by the President (Bush) on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation, President Announces New Measures to Counter the Threat of WMD, Fort Lesley J. McNair—National Defense University, Washington, DC, February 11, 2004. 64. For example, see “Insight: Kawaguchi Tries to Buoy Nuke Treaty,” Asahi Shimbun, September 6, 2003. 65. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Ballistic Missile Testing by Pakistan, Tokyo, June 4, 2004; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Ballistic Missile Testing by India, Tokyo, July 5, 2004. 66. National Nuclear Security Administration, “National Nuclear Security Administration Scientists to Conduct Armando Subcritical Experiment,” Nevada Site Office News, May 23, 2004. 67. Tadatoshi Akiba, Mayor of Hiroshima, Letter of Protest, Hiroshima, May 26, 2004. 68. Iccho Itoh, Mayor of Nagasaki, Protest against a Nuclear Test Conducted by the United States of America, Letter of Protest, Nagasaki, May 26, 2004. 69. Anthony DiFilippo, “Japan’s Anti-Nuclear Weapons Policy Misses its Target, Even in the War on Terrorism,” Medicine, Conflict and Survival, vol. 19, no. 3, July/September 2003, pp. 235–248.

258

Notes to Pages 197–202

70. Kumao Kaneko, “Ungrateful Japanese,” Discover India, August 1998. 71. Hiromichi Umebayashi, “A Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone,” Peace Review, vol. 11, no. 3, 1999, pp. 431–436. 72. “Interview/Kuniko Inoguchi: U.S. should be the ‘Flag-Carrier’ for Disarmament,” Asahi Shimbun, May 3, 2002. 73. Mayors for Peace at www.mayorsforpeace.org/english/campaign/2020vision.html. 74. Masaru Tamamoto, “The Uncertainty of Self,” World Policy Journal, vol. 16, no. 2, Summer 1999, pp. 119–128. 75. “Cheney Voices Arms-Race Fear,” The Japan Times Online, March 18, 2003. 76. “Japan No. 2 on Buyer List for U.S. Arms,” Daily Yomiuri Online, December 26, 2004. 77. In September 2004, the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of Japan’s plans to buy 20 PAC-3 (Patriot-Advanced-Capability-3) missiles and related equipment and services from the United States. The estimated cost of the purchases is $79 million. See Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Japan—Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC) Guided Missiles,” News Release, Washington, DC, September 7, 2004. 78. Information from the Japanese Defense Agency accessed at www.jda.go.jp/e/ index_.htm. 79. Jennifer Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policies,” International Security, vol. 29, no. 1, Summer 2004, pp. 92–121, especially pp. 117–118. 80. See the websites of the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan at http://aec.jst.go.jp/jicst/NC/eng and the Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute at www.jnc.go.jp/kaihatu/hukaku/English/atomiclaw.htm. 81. Yuri Kase, “Japan’s Nonnuclear Weapons Policy in the Changing Security Environment: Issues, Challenges and Strategies,” World Affairs, vol. 165, no. 3, Winter 2003, pp. 123–131. 82. See, for example, “China Arms Buildup Key Concern,” Asahi Shimbun, January 15, 2005. Conversely, Beijing worries about Japan’s increasing military interests. See “Who’s Threatening Whom?” Beijing Review, vol. 48, no. 2, January 13, 2005, pp. 20–21. 83. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004 Diplomatic Bluebook (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004), pp. 25–30. 84. “U.S. Experts Weigh Odds of Japan Going Nuclear,” The Japan Times Online, December 6, 2002. 85. Anthony DiFilippo, “How Tokyo’s Security Policies Discount Japanese Public Opinion: Toward an Alternative Security Agenda,” Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change, vol. 14, no. 1, February 2002, pp. 23–48. 86. Survey data from “Let’s Send a Warning from the A-Bombed City,” The Chugoku Shimbun, August 6, 2001. 87. “6-Nation Poll: Most Believe Nuclear Powers Will Increase,” Asahi Shimbun, August 5, 2005.

Selected Bibliography

Akaha, Tsuneo. “Japan’s Three Nonnuclear Principles: A Coming Demise?” Peace & Change, vol. 11, no. 1, Spring 1985: 75–89. Akiyama, Nobumasa. Blabbing or Bluffing: Discourse over the Nuclear Option in Japan. Washington, DC: The Henry Stimson Center, 2003. Albright, David. “The Shots Heard ‘Round the World,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 54, no. 4, July/August 1998. Alexander, David and Anthony DiFilippo. “Beyond INF: Toward Progressive Arms Reduction,” Defense Analysis, vol. 4, no. 4, December 1988: 398–400. Arkin, William. “How Much Did Japan Know?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 56, no. 1, January/February 2000: 11–15. Arnett, Eric. “Big Science, Small Results,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 54, no. 4, July/August 1998. Asa, Fumikazu. “Invisible Testing,” in The Road to the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons. Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 1999: 45–49. Bailey, Kathleen. Comprehensive Test Ban: The Worse Arms Control Treaty Ever. Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, September 1999. ———. “Testing Nukes Makes Good Sense,” The Washington Times, November 16, 1997. Barnabie, Frank and Shaun Burnie. “Thinking the Unthinkable: Japanese Nuclear Power and Proliferation in East Asia,” Japan Focus, September 8, 2005. Accessed at http://japanfocus.org. Benford, Robert. “Frame Disputes within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement,” Social Forces, vol. 71, no. 3, March 1993: 677–701. Bleek, Philipp. “White House to Partially Fund Test Ban Implementing Body,” Arms Control Today, September 2001. Braun, Chaim and Christopher Chyba. “Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nonproliferation Regime,” International Security, vol. 29, no. 2, Fall 2004: 5–49. Bunn, George. “The Legal Status of U.S. Negative Security Assurances to Nonnuclear Weapon States,” The Nonproliferation Review, Spring/Summer 1997: 1–17. Butler, Richard. Fatal Choice: Nuclear Weapons and the Illusion of Missile Defense. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001. Cataldo, Anthony. “Critical Technologies at the Core of U.S.-Japan Collaboration on Missile Defense—Pact Sets Sights on ‘Hit to Kill,’ ” Electronic Engineering Times, September 20, 1999.

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Cha, Victor. “Defensive Realism and Japan’s Approach toward Korean Unification,” NBR Analysis: Perspectives on the Future of the Korean Peninsula (National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, Washington), vol. 14, no. 1, June 2003: 18–21. Chellaney, Brahma. “An Obstacle-Ridden Path to Nuclear Disarmament,” International Herald Tribune, August 21, 1999. Cheng Joseph. “Sino-Japanese Relations in the Twenty-First Century,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol. 33, no. 2, 2003: 251–273. Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers. “Test Ban Treaty: Still in America’s Interests but the Bush Administration is Befuddled on Whether to End Nuclear Blast,” Coalition Issue Brief, vol. 5, no. 13, June 8, 2001. The Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings, translated by Eisei Ishikawa and David Swain. New York: Basic Books, 1981. Council for Nuclear Fuel Cycle. Plutonium “How Japan Should Tackle the NPT,” No. 3, October 1993, accessed at www.cnfc.or.jp/e/journal/index.html. Daley, Tad. “The New Agenda Coalition for Nuclear Abolition,” Humanist, vol. 61, no. 2, March/April 2001: 11. Dewes, Kate and Robert Green. “The World Court Project: History and Consequences,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, vol. 7, no. 1, Fall 1999: 61–83. DiFilippo, Anthony. “Arms Control Versus Disarmament,” Briefing Paper, National Commission for Economic Conversion and Disarmament, Washington, DC, May 1991. ———. “Can Japan Craft an International Nuclear Disarmament Policy,” Asian Survey, vol. 40, no. 4, July/August 2000: 571–598. ———. The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military Arrangement: Competing Security Transitions in a Changing International Environment. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002. ———.Cracks in the Alliance: Science, Technology, and the Evolution of U.S.-Japan Relations. Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 1997. ———. “How Tokyo’s Security Policies Discount Japanese Public Opinion: Toward An Alternative Security Agenda,” Pacifica Review: Peace, Security and Global Change, vol. 14, no. 1, February 2002: 23–48. ———. “Japan and a New International Security Paradigm,” IC2 Institute, Japan Industry and Management of Technology Program, Working Paper, University of Texas at Austin, March 11, 1999. ———. “Japan’s Anti-Nuclear Weapons Policy Misses its Target, even in the War on Terrorism,” Medicine, Conflict and Survival, vol. 19, no. 3, July/September 2003: 235–247. ———. “ ‘Normal Country’ Status Costing Japan Dearly,” Asahi Shimbun, May 8, 2004. ———. “Nuclear Weapons Unconstitutional for Japan,” The Korea Times, November 28, 2002. ———. “Positioning Japan for ‘Winning Peace,’ ” The Korea Times, December 23, 2004.

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Harrison, Selig. “Did North Korea Cheat?” Foreign Affairs, vol. 84, no. 1, January/ February 2005: 99–110. ———. “Japan and Nuclear Weapons,” in Japan’s Nuclear Future: The Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996. Hosokawa, Morihiro. “Are U.S. Troops Needed in Japan? Reforming the Alliance,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 77, no. 4, July/August 1998: 4–5. Huntington, Samuel. The Clash of Civilizations. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996. Hughes, Christopher. Japan’s Security Agenda: Military, Economic, and Environmental Dimensions. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004. Imai, Ryukichi. “Renewed Effort to Limit Nuclear Weapons,” Japan Quarterly, vol. 45, no. 4, October/December 1998: 23–28. International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation. “Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World: The Need for a New Agenda,” INESAP Information Bulletin, no. 16, November 1998. Ishibashi, Hideaki. “The World Court Project,” in The Road to the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons. Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 1999: 151–155. Ishikida, Miki. Hinomaru as a National Flag and Kimigayo as a National Anthem in Japanese Schools, Japan, Center for U.S.-Japan Comparative Social Studies, 2001–2003. Accessed at www.usjp.org/jpeducation/Hinomaru.htm. Johnson, Rebecca “Boycotts and Blandishments: Making the CTBT Visible,” Diplomacy Today, no. 61, October/November 2001. ———. “The NPT Review: Disaster Averted,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 56, no. 4, July/August 2000: 52–57. ———. “U.N. First Committee Seeks a New Agenda on Disarmament and Backs the ABM Treaty,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 41, 1999. Johnston, Alastair Iain. “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security, vol. 27, no. 4, Spring 2003: 5–56. Kamimura, Naoki. “Civil Society and Nuclear Disarmament: A Comparison of U.S. and Japanese Experiences during the 1980s and 1990s,” Japan Center for Area Studies (JCAS), JCAS Symposium Series 18, National Museum of Ethnology, Osaka, Japan, 2002. ———. “Japanese Civil Society, Local Government, and U.S.-Japan Security Relations in the 1990s: A Preliminary Survey,” Japan Center for Area Studies, National Museum of Ethnology, JCAS Occasional Paper, no. 11, JCAS-Rutgers Series iii, 2001. Kamiya, Matake. “Japan, Nuclear Weapons, and the U.S.-Japan Alliance.” Paper presented at the Conference on U.S.-Japan Relations,” Washington, DC, May 2, 1996. ———. “Nuclear Japan: Oxymoron or Coming Soon?” The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2002–2003: 63–74. Kaneko, Kumao. “Japan Needs No Umbrella,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 52, no. 1, March/April 1996: 46–51. ———. “Ungrateful Japanese,” Discover India, August 1998.

Selected Bibliography

263

Kase, Yuri. “Japan’s Nonnuclear Weapons Policy in the Changing Security Environment: Issues, Challenges and Strategies,” World Affairs, vol. 165, no. 3, Winter 2003: 123–131. Katahara, Eiichi. “Japan’s Plutonium Policy: Consequences for Nonproliferation,” The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 5, no. 1, Fall 1997: 53–61. Kawashima, Yutaka. Japanese Foreign Policy at the Crossroads: Challenges and Options for the Twenty-First Century. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2003. Kitaoka, Shin’ichi. “Japan’s Identity and What it Means,” The Japan Forum on International Relations, Tokyo, May 10, 2004. Klien, Susanne. Rethinking Japan’s Identity and International Role: An Intercultural Perspective. New York: Routledge, 2002. Kristensen, Hans. Japan under the US Nuclear Umbrella. Berkeley, CA: The Nautilus Institute, July 21, 1999. Accessed at www/nautilus.org/papers/security/ index.html#nanp. Kurosaki, Akira. “Domestic Politics and Nuclear Disarmament Diplomacy: Limits of the Japanese Antinuclear Movement.” Paper presented at the International Studies Association, Portland, Oregon, February 27, 2003. Laney, James and Jason Shaplen. “How to Deal with North Korea,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, no. 2, March/April 2003: 16–30. Lifton, Robert Jay and Gregg Mitchell. Hiroshima in America: A Half Century of Denial. New York: Avon Books, 1996. Lim, Robyn. “Japan’s Best Bet Remains the American Nuclear Umbrella,” International Herald Tribune, October 29, 1999. Limaye, Satu. “Tokyo’s Dynamic Diplomacy: Japan and the Subcontinent’s Nuclear Tests,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, vol. 22, no. 2, August 2000: 322–339. Lind, Jennifer. “Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policies,” International Security, vol. 29, no. 1, Summer 2004: 92–121. Long, William. “Nonproliferation as a Goal of Japanese Foreign Assistance,” Asian Survey, vol. 39, no. 2, March/April 1999: 328–347. Lou, Yuan and Guifang Wang. “Japan’s Shield, Scourge of Others?” Beijing Review, vol. 47, no. 3, January 15, 2004: 44–45. Mann, Paul. “Economic Woes Shadow Japan’s Missile Defense,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, vol. 156, no. 10, March 11, 2002: 55–57. Matthews, Eugene. “Japan’s New Nationalism,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, no. 6, November/December 2003: 74–90. Medalia, Jonathan. “Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,” Congressional Brief, National Council for Science and the Environment, Washington, DC, January 11, 2001. Menon, Rajan. “The End of Alliances,” World Policy Journal, vol. 20. no. 2, Summer 2003: 10–16. Miller, John. “The Glacier Moves: Japan’s Response to U.S. Security Policies,” Asian Affairs: An American Review, vol. 30, no. 2, Summer 2003: 132–141. Miller, Marvin. “Japan, Nuclear Weapons, and Reactor-Grade Plutonium,” Security Studies Program and Department of Nuclear Engineering, Massachusetts

264

Selected Bibliography

Institute of Technology. Paper presented to a seminar at the Nuclear Control Institute, March 27, 2002. Morrison, Charles (ed.). Asia Pacific Security Outlook 2004. Tokyo: Japan Center for International, 2004. Nakasone, Yasuhiro. “Japan’s Firm Nonnuclear Resolve,” Japan Echo, vol. 25, no. 5, October 1998. ———. “Japan’s Nuclear Role,” New Perspectives Quarterly, vol. 9, no. 3, Summer 1992: 26–27. Nathan, John. Japan Unbound: A Volatile Nation’s Quest for Pride and Purpose. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2004. National Institute for Research Advancement. Japan’s Proactive Peace and Security Strategies, Research Report 20000005., Tokyo, March 2001. Nobile, Philip (ed.). Judgment at the Smithsonian: The Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. New York: Marlowe & Company, 1995. Norris, Robert, William Arkin, and William Burr “How Much Did Japan Know?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 56, no. 1, January/February 2000: 11–15, 78–79. Nye, Joseph. “Diplomatic Measures,” in New Nuclear Nations: Consequences for U.S. Policy, ed. Robert Blackwell and Albert Carnesale. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993. Ozawa, Ichiro. Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation. Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1994. Packard, George. Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966. Pei, Yuanying. “Who is the Threat?” Beijing Review, vol. 47, no. 1, October 14, 2004: 13. Roche, Douglas. “A New Bridge to Nuclear Disarmament,” October 29, 2004. Accessed at www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2004/10/30_roche_new-bridgedisarmament.htm. Sato, Seizaburo. “From National Defense to Security,” Gaiko Forum, Special Issue, 1999. Schram, Martin. Avoiding Armageddon: Our Future. Our Choice. New York: Basic Books, 2003. Schwartz, Frank and Susan Pharr (eds.). The State of Civil Society in Japan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Secretariat of the Shimonoseki A-Bomb Exhibition. Atomic Bombs and Poems of Sankichi Toge. Shimonoseki City, Japan: Secretariat of Shimonoseki A-Bomb Exhibition, 2002. Sherrill, Clifton. “The Need for a Japanese Nuclear Deterrent,” Comparative Strategy, vol. 20, 2001: 259–270. Shironitta, Tokuko and Watanabe, Tsuneo. “Japan Outlook: Struggle for Change,” in Japan Watch. Washington, DC: Office of the Japan Chair of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2000. Shohno, Naomi et al., “A Japanese Appeal on the Extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,” Plutonium, no. 7, Autumn 1994.

Selected Bibliography

265

Singh. Bhubhindar. “Japan’s Post-Cold War Security Policy: Bringing Back the Normal State,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 24, no. 1, April 2002: 82–105. Soeya, Yoshihide. “Mutually Assured Discussion,” Look Japan, vol. 47, no. 546, September 2001. Stanley Foundation and the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. Ballistic Missile Defense and Northeast Asian Security: Views from Washington, Beijing, and Tokyo. Monterey, CA, April 2001. Sugita, Yoneyuki. “A Never-Ending Story: Inflating the Threat from North Korea,” The Journal of Pacific Asia, vol. 11: 55–77. Swaine Michael with Loren Runyon. “Ballistic Missiles and Missile Defense in Asia,” The National Bureau of Asian Research (Seattle, WA), vol. 13, no. 3, June 2002. Swaine, Michael, Rachel Swanger, and Takashi Kawahami. Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2001. Takagi, Jinzaburo. “Japan’s Plutonium Program: A Critical Review,” in Japan’s Nuclear Future: The Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security, ed. Selig Harrison. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996. Takayama, Masaji. “Prospects for Missile Defense (MD)—Aiming to Establish a New Order,” in DRC Annual Report, 2001. Tokyo: Defense Research Center, September 2001. Accessed at www.drc-jpn.org/index-e.htm. Takubo, Masa. “Japanese and German Glass Companies Involved in U.S. Nuclear Weapons Development,” International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation, Information Bulletin, no. 19, March 2002. Tamamoto, Masaru. “The Uncertainty of Self,” World Policy Journal, vol. 16, no. 2, Summer 1999: 119–128. Totten, George and Tamio Kawakami. “Gensuikyo and the Peace Movement in Japan,” Asian Survey, vol. 4, May 1964: 833–841. Totty, Kenneth. “Nuclear Proliferation on the Indian Subcontinent,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 24, Spring 2000: 62–67. Tyrrell, James. “World’s Largest Laser Switches on to Research,” Optics.orgs., April 2005. Accessed at http://optics.orgs. “Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World,” UN Chronicle, vol. 37, no. 4, December 2000–February 2001: 32–33. Umebayashi, Hiromichi. “A Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone,” Peace Review, vol. 11, no. 3, 1999: 431–436. ———. “The Role of NGOs in Japan and the World,” in Nuclear Disarmament in the Twenty-First Century. Hiroshima: Hiroshima Peace Institute, 2004: 338–353. Urayama, Kori. “Missile Defense: Japan’s Wait-and-See Approach,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 57, no. 6, November/December 2001: 33–35. “U.S., Japan Review Options for Future Sea-Based Missile Defense Work,” Defense Daily International, vol. 2, no. 36, July 12, 2002. Walker, William. “Nuclear Order and Disorder,” International Affairs, vol. 76, no. 4, October 2000: 703–724. Walter, Katie. “Big Glass for a Big Laser,” Science & Technology Review (Livermore, CA), September 2001: 6–7. Wang, Baofu. “Japanese Military Expansion Underway,” Beijing Review, vol. 45, no. 21, May 23, 2002.

266

Selected Bibliography

Wang, Fan. “Sino-Japanese Relations: Year of Events,” Beijing Review, vol. 44, no. 52, 2001. Wittner, Lawrence. The Struggle Against the Bomb, One World or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement Through 1953, vol. 1 and 2. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993. World Nuclear Association. Nuclear Power in Japan, WNA: London, August 2004. Yamaji, Hideki. “Future Japanese Security Policies: Contending Approaches,” Brookings Northeast Asia Survey, 2003/2004: 31–49. Zan, Jifang. “Japan Overseas Military Actions Arouse Concern,” Beijing Review, no. 47, 2001. Zhou, Bian. “China Practices ‘Shuttle Diplomacy,’ ” Beijing Review, vol. 46, no. 34, August 21, 2003: 40.

Newspapers and News Organizations ABC News Asahi Shimbun BBC News China Daily The Chugoku Shimbun CNN Common Dreams News Center Daily Yomiuri Online The Economist Far Eastern Economic Review The Guardian International Herald Tribune Iran Daily Islamic Republic News Agency The Japan Times Japan Today Korean Central News Agency The Korea Times Kyodo News The Los Angeles Times Mainichi Daily News The New York Times Nikkei Net Interactive People’s Daily Online The People’s Korea Pravda Stars & Stripes

Selected Bibliography

267

Taipei Times Tehran Times The Washington Post Weekly Rengo Yonhap News

Selected U.S. Government Documents Behrens, Carl. “Nuclear Nonproliferation Issues,” Issue Brief for Congress, Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, April 28, 2003. Department of Defense. Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts], 8 January 2002, Nuclear Posture Review Report, December 31, 2001. Department of State, Embassy of the United States, Japan, Armitage Praises Japan’s Increasing Role in Global Security, Tokyo, February 2, 2004. ———. Jacquelyn Porth, Rumsfeld: U.S. Will Continue to Provide Allies with Nuclear Umbrella, United States Embassy, Tokyo, July 25, 2002. ———. The Proliferation Security Initiative, Washington, DC, July 28, 2004. ———. Remarks with Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Japan’s Foreign Minister Machimura and Defense Minister Ohno, Washington, DC, February 19, 2005. ———. Two Plus Two Ministerial: Joint Press Availability with U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi, and Director General Shigeru Ishiba of the Defense Agency of Japan, Washington, DC, December 16, 2002. ———. United States Embassy, Transcript: Undersecretary Bolton Fields Queries on Iraq, N. Korea, Tokyo, August 26, 2002. ———. U.S.-Japan Joint Statement on North Korea, Washington, DC, February 19, 2005. “Hoya Corporation Produces More Than 600 Laser Glass Slabs for LLNL’s National Ignition Facility,” Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory: News Release, U.S. Department of Energy/University of California, January 24, 2001. National Intelligence Council. Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015: Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate. McLean, VA: Central Intelligence Agency, December 2001. National Nuclear Security Administration. “National Nuclear Security Administration Scientists to Conduct Armando Subcritical Experiment,” Nevada Site Office News, May 23, 2004. Niksch, Larry. “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” Issue Brief for Congress, Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, April 28, 2003. Prepared Statement of James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Dealing with North Korea’s Nuclear Programs,” Washington, DC, July 15, 2004.

268

Selected Bibliography

Selected Japanese Government Documents Address by H.E. Mr. Junichiro Koizumi Prime Minister of Japan at the Fifty-Ninth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, September 21, 2004. Address by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at the Hiroshima Memorial Service for the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony, Hiroshima, August 6, 2005. Address by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at the Nagasaki Memorial Service for the Nagasaki Peace Ceremony, Nagasaki, August 9, 2005. Atomic Energy Commission of Japan. http://aec.jst.go.jp/jicst/NC/eng/index.htm. Defense Agency. Defense of Japan 2005 (Summary), Tokyo, 2005. ———. Security Consultative Committee Document, U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future, Washington, DC, October 29, 2005. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Directorate General, Arms Control and Scientific Affairs. Japan’s Disarmament and Nonproliferation Policy, Tokyo, April 2004. ———. Directorate General, Arms Control and Scientific Affairs. Japan’s Disarmament Policy, Tokyo, March 2003. ———. Japan to Host the Proliferation Security Initiative Maritime Interdiction Exercise, Tokyo, August 2004. ———. Joint Statement: U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, Washington, DC, February 19, 2005. ———. A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (59th General Assembly U.N., 2004), Tokyo, October 2004. ———. The Report of the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, Facing Nuclear Dangers: An Action Plan for the 21st Century, Tokyo, July 25, 1999. ———. The Second Round of Six-Party Talks (Overview and Evaluation), Tokyo, March 2004. ———. Six-Party Talks on North Korean Issues (Overview and Evaluation), Tokyo, September 2003. ———. Speech by H.E. Mr. Masatoshi Abe, Senior Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan on the Occasion of the Asian Senior-Level Talks on Nonproliferation, Tokyo, November 13, 2003. ———. Statement by Foreign Minister Yohei Kono on the Refusal by the U.S. Senate to Ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Tokyo, October 14, 1999. ———. Statement by H.E. Mr. Keizo Obuchi, Prime Minister of Japan, at the FiftyThird Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, September 21, 1998. ———. Statement by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto at the 51st Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, September 24, 1996. ———. Third Round of Six-Party Talks Concerning North Korean Nuclear Issues, Tokyo, June 2004. ———. Working Paper of Japan for Submission to the 2005 NPT Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, Tokyo, 2005.

Selected Bibliography

269

Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet. Address by H.E. Mr. Junichiro Koizumi, Prime Minister of Japan, at the Fifty-Ninth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, September 21, 2004. ———. Statement by Junichiro Koizumi, Decision on the Extension of the Basic Plan Regarding Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance of the Self Defense Forces in Iraq, Tokyo, December 9, 2004.

Other Documents Agreed Framework between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States of America, Geneva, October 21, 1994. The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Canberra, Australia, August 14, 1996. Department of Disarmament Affairs, United Nations. 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, April 24– 19 May 2000, Final Document of the Conference, New York. “DPRK Foreign Minister Spokesman on Six-Party Talks,” Korean Central News Agency, June 28, 2004. “KCNA on Six-Way Talks and DPRK’s Principled Stand,” Korean Central News Agency, September 2, 2003. New Agenda Coalition. Statement by Eight Nations Calling for Moves Toward a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World, June 9, 1998. The Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations. An Unnecessary Crisis: Setting the Record Straight about Iran’s Nuclear Program, New York, November 2005. Security Council of the United Nations. Security Council Resolution 984 (1995) on Security Assurances against the Use of Nuclear Weapons to Non-Nuclear Weapon States that are Parties to the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, April 11, 1995. United Nations, General Assembly, Sixtieth Session, First Committee. Renewed Determination Towards the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, New York, October 24, 2005. Verbatim Excerpts of Oral Statements to the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, October 30–November 15, 1995.

Websites (sources for many speeches and documents) Bellona, www.bellona.no. Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, www.clw.org/archive/coalition.

270

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Council for Nuclear Fuel Cycle (Plutonium), www.cnfc.or.jp/index_e.html. Gensuikin, www.gensuikin.org/english. Gensuikyo, www.10.plala.or.jp/antiatom/html/e/discriptiongensuikyo.htm. Hidankyo, www.ne.jp/asahi/hidankyo.nihon/english. Hiroshima Mayors’ Peace Declarations, www.pcf.hiroshima.jp/declarations/English/ index.htm. Hiroshima Peace Institute, http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English. Hiroshima Peace Site, www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp/peacesite/index.html. International Atomic Energy Agency, www.iaea.org. Mayors for Peace, www.mayorsforpeace.org/english/index.html. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japanese), www.mofa.go.jp/index.html. Nagasaki City Peace Declaration, www1.city.nagasaki.nagasaki.jp/abm/abm_e/ heiwasengen/sengen_frame.html. No More Nagasaki’s Home Page, http://base.mng.nias.ac.jp/nomore-e.html. Peace Depot, www.peacedepot.org/e-news/frame.html. Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization, www.ctbto.org. Tokyo Physicians for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, www.ask.ne.jp/~hankaku/ english/ENGIDX.html. United Nations, www.un.org. U.S. Department of Defense, www.defenselink.mil. U.S. Department of Energy, www.engery.gov/engine/content.do. U.S. Department of State, www.state.gov. World Court Project, http:wcp.gn.apc.org. World Nuclear Association, www.world-nuclear.org. 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/nptrevhome.html#home. 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, http://www.un.org/events/npt2005.

Index

abduction issue, see Japan-North Korean relations Abe, Nobuyasu, Japanese representative to the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT 18 Abe, Shinzo, deputy chief cabinet secretary 169 comments regarding nuclear weapons 50, 193 Abolition 2000 120–1 Afghanistan 37, 49, 137, 171, 188 Agreed Framework (U.S.–North Korea, 1994) 7, 159, 163, 165, 167, 181 Akiba, Tadatoshi, mayor of Hiroshima 4, 28, 32, 196 Albania 26 Albright, Madeleine 113 Amano, Yukia, Japanese director general for Arms Control and Scientific Affairs 20 American Enterprise Institute 20 Annan, Kofi, U.N. secretary-general 74 Andrews, David, Irish foreign minister 95 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) 13–15, 18, 29, 58, 87, 99–100, 104: Tokyo’s reaction to 25, 26–7 U.S. withdrawal from 23, 25–6, 28, 48, 57–8, 80, 104, 109 anti-nuclear weapons organizations see Japanese anti-nuclear weapons organizations

A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (Japan’s U.N. Disarmament resolution 15–17, 101, 104 Appeal from Hiroshima and Nagasaki for a Total Ban and Elimination of Nuclear Weapons 74 Armacost, Michael 185 Armitage, Richard 49, 138, 140, 142, 153, 189–90 Asahi Shimbun 77, 185, 202 Atomic Energy Basic Law (Japan) 44, 199 Atomic Energy Organization (Iran) 146 atoms for peace 117 Australia 19, 117, 145–6, 148, 152, 155 Austria 21 “axis of evil,” 10, 119, 133–5, 137, 146, 163, 180 Azadegan oil deal 10, 141, 148, 150, 152–4, 158, 180 Aznar, Jose Maria, Spanish president 23 Baghdad 137, 164 Beijing 15, 17, 25–7, 47, 49, 51, 56, 59–60, 79, 100–1, 117, 127, 138, 143, 160–1, 164–74, 176–7, 179, 181, 190–2, 194, 197 Belgium 107 Bikini Atoll (Marshall Islands) 70 Blair, Tony 32, 76

272

Index

Bolton, John 20, 152–3, 166, 189 Boucher, Richard 140, 152 BRAVO (U.S. nuclear test) 70 Brazil 21, 94, 96 Brill, Kenneth 144, 153 Bush administration 3–4, 14–15, 20, 23–4, 26–7, 29, 38, 40, 49, 52, 56–8, 76, 79–80, 114–15, 124–9, 133, 135–48, 150–1, 153, 155–64, 166, 168–71, 175–8, 180, 188, 195 and the rejection of the CTBT 14–17, 19–23, 103–4, 109, 111 Bushehr nuclear facility (Iran) 145 Bush, George, H.W. 28, 187 Bush, George, W. 14, 23–4, 28, 32, 56, 76, 103, 119, 124, 133, 135–6, 138, 163, 165, 168–9, 172, 196 support for NMD 23 Canada 117, 145–6, 148, 152, 155 Canberra 80 Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons 95, 104, 117–18 Carter administration 163 Cheney, Richard 136, 176 China 6, 10, 15, 17, 20, 25–7, 30, 32–3, 38–40, 44, 48, 51, 58–9, 88, 94–6, 98–101, 119–20, 122–3, 127–8, 143, 155, 160, 163–5, 170, 186, 191–2, 199, 201 and the CTBT 79, 112 and negative security assurances 130–1, 230n and the NPT 54 and no-first-use of nuclear weapons’ policy 27, 119, 194, 230n and nuclear testing 79, 114, 117, 124 Chung, Dong-young, South Korean unification minister 177 Clinton administration 14, 23–4, 26, 40–1, 57, 103, 113–14, 124, 127, 133, 162, 187

Clinton, William 2, 23, 33, 40–1, 76, 127, 132 Coalition to Deduce Nuclear Dangers 114 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 4–5, 13–23, 27–9, 31–2, 35–7, 39–41, 48, 62, 64, 76, 78, 80, 87–8, 97, 100, 103–4, 108–9, 112–16, 123–8, 147, 150, 195–6 International Monitoring System 15, 21 Tokyo’s reaction to the Bush administration 15–19, 37 U.S. public support of 19 U.S. Senate’s failure to ratify 9, 14, 39–41, 113, 115, 124 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 13, 17–18, 20, 22, 112 U.S. nonattendance at 19–20, 22, 28, 36–7 Cranston, Alan 114 Crouch, J.D. 27–8 Czech Republic 171 Dai Bingguo, Chinese vice foreign minister 170 Daily Yomiuri 45 Defense Agency (Japanese) 46, 49, 59, 168–9 National Defense College 46 Defense Authorization Act (1996) 41 de Gaulle, Charles, French president 75 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), see also North Korea 7, 75, 158–81, 190–1 announcement of possession of nuclear weapons 11 uranium-enrichment program (alleged) 137, 158, 160–3, 167, 172, 174–5, 179–180 withdrawal from NPT 11, 159, 162, 165 Democratic Socialist Party (Japan) 71

Index Doi, Takako, Japanese stateswoman 53, 87 Domei (Japanese Confederation of Labor) 71, 75 Dong-A Ilbo 202 Egypt 94 ElBaradei, Mohamed, IAEA director general 136, 139, 144, 149, 151, 154–7 Enola Gay 1–2 Fat Man (atomic bomb) 1–2 Federated States of Micronesia 26 Finland 21 Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty 10, 80, 87–8, 101, 108–9, 127–8 Fleischer, Ari 28 France 20, 26, 32–3, 95–6, 98–9, 101, 120, 123, 144, 151, 154–6 and the NPT 34, 54 and nuclear testing 75, 114, 117, 124 Fukuda, Yasuo, Japanese chief cabinet secretary 32, 141 comments regarding nuclear weapons 51, 193 Fukuryu Maru No. 5 (Lucky Dragon No. 5) 70 Geneva 54, 140 Gensuikin (Congress against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs) 8, 62, 71–6, 83–4, 87, 91, 114, 121 Gensuikyo (Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs) 71–3, 75–6, 83–5, 87, 91, 114, 121 Germany 107, 144, 151, 154–6, 171 Gordon, John 38 Gore, Al 2, 103 Great Britain, see United Kingdom Gulf War 98, 185, 187, 201 Hashimoto, Ryutaro, Japanese prime minister (government) 40, 78

273

Hayashi, Akira, Japanese statesman 97–8 hibakusha (survivors of atomic bombings) 2, 72–3, 76, 100, 114, 121, 199 Hibakusha Aid Law (1994) 73 hinomaru (Japanese flag) 8, 184, 191 Hiraoka, Takashi, mayor of Hiroshima 121 Hiroshima 1–5, 8–9, 16–17, 32, 34, 44, 51, 54, 62, 69–70, 72–6, 93, 100, 108, 121–2, 185–6, 190, 196, 199, 202 protest letters 28, 75, 196 Hiroshima Peace Institute 73, 83–4, 86, 90–1 Holum, John 127 Hosoda, Hiroyuki, Japanese chief cabinet secretary 61 Hoya Corporation, USA 62–4, 195–6 Hussein, Saddam 135, 137–8 and nuclear weapons development 135–6 Ikeda, Yukihiko, Japanese foreign minister 78 India 11, 15, 19, 26, 30, 37, 40, 95–6, 98–101, 114, 119, 131, 196 and the CTBT 31, 79 and the NPT 33–4 and nuclear testing 76, 78–9, 94, 114, 116–17, 197 Indonesia 119 Inoguchi, Kuniko, Japanese disarmament official 123, 197–8 International Association of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms 118, 120 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 10, 35, 55, 64, 129, 136, 138–40, 142–57, 159, 176, 180 Additional Protocol 128–9, 139–40, 142–3, 146–7

274

Index

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)––continued Safeguards Agreement(s) 80, 128, 139–40, 143, 163 Safeguards Implementation Report 139 safeguards and verification system 65 International Court of Justice (ICJ) 77–8, 82, 95–7, 102–3, 118–23 and advisory opinion on nuclear weapons 122, 123 International Peace Bureau 118 International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) 22, 118, 120 Iran 3, 10, 20, 38, 40, 119, 129, 131, 133–4, 138–9, 141–57, 161, 180, 203 and the Additional Protocol 142–3, 145, 147–52, 154 and nuclear weapons 135–45, 147, 149–58, 180 and Safeguards Agreement 145, 151, 153 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act 142 Iraq 11, 38, 40, 119, 129, 131–5, 137–8, 141, 143–5, 150, 158, 161, 164, 168–9, 171–2, 176, 180, 188–9 Ireland 21–2, 94–5 Ishiba, Shigeru, Japanese director general of the Defense Agency 168, 189 Ishihara, Shintaro, Tokyo governor 192 Islamabad 76, 79, 117, 196 Israel 11, 26, 30, 33, 95–6, 98–9, 101, 119–20, 131, 139, 146–7, 176 Itoh, Iccho, mayor of Nagasaki 32–3, 121–2, 196 Japan and commercial nuclear power 43–4, 46, 55

and the CTBT 13–23, 39, 109, 115, 203: MOX (mixed oxide) 44; Rokkasho-Mura nuclear facility 44 and exclusively oriented defense policy (senshu boei) 56, 59–60, 83, 116, 198 and the FMCT 80–1, 108, 127–8, 134 and gradual or incremental approach to nuclear disarmament 3–4, 10, 21, 28, 35, 68, 78–83, 89, 99, 102, 104–5, 107, 109, 112, 122, 133–4, 198, 203 and military expenditures 56, 198 and missile defense 24–5, 56–62, 160, 168, 171, 191, 198 and NAC 96, 99, 101, 105–7, 109 as a normal country 2, 4, 7–8, 41, 48, 98, 109, 135, 137, 180, 185–92, 194, 197–204 and negative security assurances 131–3, 186 and the NPT 34–5, 52–5, 199–200 and nuclear disarmament contradiction 2, 3, 5–6, 11, 39, 77, 82–4, 102, 109, 183, 186, 197, 201, 203 and Official Development Assistance (ODA) 64, 79, 113 and plutonium stockpile 43–4, 47, 51–2, 55, 191–2, 201 and possession of nuclear weapons 8–9, 43–53, 94, 183, 191–5, 197–202, 204 and possible technological initiatives for nuclear disarmament 64–5 and preemptive strike 106 and security identity 6, 183–7, 197–8, 201–2, 204 and (1995) statement to the ICJ 121–2

Index and support of CTBT 19–21, 23, 80–2, 103, 112–13, 134 and support of nuclear nonproliferation 125–6, 128–9, 179–81, 195, 203 and the United Nations 187–9, 192 and U.N. nuclear disarmament resolution(s) 77, 83, 88, 96–101, 103–6, 108, 120, 125, 197 and vote on U.N. resolution(s) on the legality of nuclear weapons 119–22: defined 7, 183 under U.S. nuclear umbrella (kakunokasa) 2, 5–6, 8–9, 11, 17, 31–2, 37–8, 45–6, 52, 57–8, 62, 65, 69, 77, 82–4, 88–9, 91, 93–4, 98, 102, 106, 109, 111, 114–16, 123, 129, 132, 134, 180, 186, 194–9, 201–4 Japan Association for a Nonnuclear Government 84, 86, 226n Japanese anti-nuclear weapons movement 53–4, 67–75, 78, 81–2, 84, 86, 88–92, 116, 120–1, 123, 125–6, 128, 185; fragmentation of 72–3, 91–2, 204, 222n anti-nuclear weapons organizations 3, 6, 8–10, 62, 67–9, 72, 74, 84, 85–92, 102, 107, 109, 111, 114, 117, 120, 122, 125–6, 185, 195, 197, 200, 202, 204: co-optation of 89–92; differences with Tokyo 68–9, 81–91, 112, 114, 134, 202, 204 constitution 84, 134, 184–7, 193, 194: Article 9 (war-renouncing clause) 9, 39, 44, 48–51, 53, 56, 61–2, 82–4, 96, 170, 184–7, 189–91, 194, 200–1 defense policy 198–9

275

nationalism (conservatism) 8–9, 44, 47, 49, 52, 69, 184–7, 190, 194–5, 198–204 nuclear disarmament policy 2 opposition to nuclear weapons 2–5, 44, 47, 52–3, 68–9, 71, 74, 81, 92–4, 96, 98, 183, 185–6, 192, 197, 199, 201–3 pacifism 2, 8–9, 183, 186, 188–9, 199–202 Japan Institute for International Affairs 90 Japanese Association of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms (JALANA) 73, 91, 120 Japanese Consumers’ Cooperative Union 119 Japanese Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War 121 Japan-Iranian relations 138, 140–1, 145–6, 148–58, 161, 180 Japan-North Korean relations 89, 159–62, 164–5, 167–8, 172–3, 177, 181 abduction issue 162, 164, 167–8, 171–3, 174–5, 178, 181 normalization talks 162, 164–5, 168, 174–5, 179 The Japan Times 29, 39 Jenkins, Charles Robert, U.S. Army defector to North Korea 175 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula 163 Kakkin Kaigi (Second Gensuikyo, National Council for Peace and against Nuclear Weapons) 71, 75–6 Kalaye Electric Company (Iran) 142 Kaneko, Tetsu, House representative from Hiroshima 16 Kato, Ryozo, Japanese ambassador to the United States 142

276

Index

Kawaguchi, Yoriko, Japanese foreign minister 20–2, 140, 142–3, 150, 165, 187 Kay, David 136 Keating, Paul, Australian prime minister 117 KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) 165, 167, 174, 179 Kelly, James 158, 160–1, 163, 167, 175 Khan, Abdul Qadeer, Pakistani nuclear scientist 172 Kharrazi, Kamal, Iranian foreign minister 140, 142–3, 147–8, 150–1, 155, 157 Khatami, Mohammad, Iranian president 139, 146, 148–50 Kimball, Daryl 114 kimigayo (Japanese national anthem) 8, 184, 191 Kim Jong Il, North Korean leader 75, 138, 162, 166, 170, 174, 179 Kim, Yong Il, North Korean vice foreign minister 167 Kishi, Nobusuke, Japanese prime minister 49, 71, 193 Kissinger, Henry 45 Kobe 74 Koizumi government 15, 17, 19, 48–9, 57, 60, 104, 111, 137–8, 140–1, 150, 152, 160–1, 180, 187–9, 193 Koizumi, Junichiro, Japanese prime minister 3, 17, 48–9, 51, 60, 79–81, 85, 87, 126, 129, 136–8, 148–51, 157, 161, 165, 170–2, 174–5, 177, 185, 188, 190, 193 Kojima, Toshio, Japanese parliamentary secretary for foreign affairs 79 Kono, Yohei, Japanese foreign and statesman 34, 78, 113 Koumura, Masahiko, Japanese foreign minister and statesman 13, 112–13

Kuala Lumpur 162 Kyl-Reid Amendment senate rejection of 41 Kyodo News 185 Kyoto 78 Kyoto International Conference

114

Laird, Melvin 45 Liberal Democratic Party (Japan) 48, 53, 71, 77, 85, 126, 190–1 Liberal Party (Japan) 191 Libya 10, 38, 131, 176–7 Limited Test Ban Treaty, see Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater (Partial Test Ban Treaty) Linzer, Dafna 253n Little Boy (atomic bomb) 1–2 Lithuania 107 London 30 Los Alamos 172 Lott, Trent 40 Lourdes, Cuba 24 Luxembourg 107 Machimura, Nobutaka, Japanese minister of foreign affairs 61, 157, 178 Mainichi Shimbun 39 Majahedin-e Khalq Organization, see also National Council of Resistance of Iran 156 Malaysia 133, 139, 162 Mayors for Peace 74, 81 Program to Promote the Solidarity of Cities Towards the Total Abolition of Nuclear Weapons 74 McClellan, Scott 177 Mexico 94 Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Japanese) 10 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA, Japanese) 14, 16, 25, 31, 46,

Index 53, 57, 59, 69, 83, 86, 90, 98, 100, 102, 126, 142, 152, 193 missile defense system (see also national missile defense) 13–15, 25, 27–8, 48, 56–7, 59–60, 99–100, 104, 127–8, 160, 168, 190 Mori, Yoshiro, Japanese prime minister 45 Morocco 119 Moscow 24–5, 29, 31, 56, 59, 106, 138, 145, 166, 170 Moscow Treaty (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty) 29, 105, 106 Tokyo’s reaction to 105–6, 134 Murayama, Tomiichi, Japanese prime minister 78 Nagasaki 1, 3–5, 17, 32, 34, 44, 54, 62, 70, 72, 74–6, 93, 108, 116, 121–2, 185–6, 196, 199, 202 protest letters 33, 75, 196 Nakagawa, Hidenao, LDP official 189 Nakasone, Yasuhiro, Japanese prime minister and statesman 45–6, 50 comments regarding nuclear weapons 193–4 Natanz nuclear facility (Iran) 142 National Council of Japan Nuclear Free Local Authorities 74 National Council of Resistance of Iran, see also, Majahedin-e Khalq Organization 156 National Defense Program Guidelines (Japan) 61 National Defense Program Outline (Japan) 60 national missile defense (NMD) 23, 56–8 negative security assurances, see security assurances Nehru, Jawaharlal, Indian prime minister 14 The Netherlands 19, 107

277

New Agenda Coalition (NAC) 3, 10, 21, 82, 84–5, 93–109, 118, 123–4, 132, 195 joint declaration – Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda 95 and U.N. nuclear disarmament resolution(s) 96–101, 103, 105, 107–8 New Delhi 30–1, 34, 76, 79, 117, 196–7 New Komeito Party (Japan) 49, 85, 126 “new world order,” 187 New York 47, 101, 171 New Zealand 21–2, 94–5, 99, 118 Nihon Hidankyo (Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations) 72–3, 75, 83–6, 114, 121 Nihon Seron Choskai (Japan Public Opinion Research Group) 202 Nishimura, Shingo, Japanese Defense Agency official 191 Nixon administration 45 Noboru, Seiichiro, Japanese disarmament official 102 no-first-use of nuclear weapons 5, 27, 50, 85, 98–9, 119, 132, 186, 230n Nonaligned Movement (NAM) 21–2, 107, 118–19, 123, 133, 139, 146–7 North Korea 3, 6–7, 19, 38–40, 44, 46, 58–60, 89, 94, 98, 119, 129, 131–2, 134, 137–8, 143, 158–81, 186, 190, 195–6, 199, 201 and development of nuclear weapons 35, 135–6, 177–8, 180 North Korean missile threat 19, 25, 56, 160, 165, 171, 173–4 North Korean nuclear crisis 7, 75, 132, 143, 158–61, 164–5, 169–71, 173–5, 178 180–1, 195

278

Index

Norway 107 Novaya Zemlya 30 NPT Research Association 34–5 nuclear nonproliferation 33–5, 80 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 3, 6–7, 22, 34–8, 46, 52–3, 55–6, 58, 64–5, 76, 80–1, 88, 94–5, 101–2, 108–9, 115, 123–6, 129–33, 137, 139–40, 146–7, 151–5, 158–9, 163, 196, 201–4 Article IV 146, 244n Article VI 4, 11, 33, 35–6, 54, 82, 94, 102, 118, 123, 125, 130–31, 133, 205n Review Conference 7, 21–3, 27, 33–6, 38, 47–8, 74, 76, 80, 87, 101–9, 113–15, 117, 120, 123, 125, 130, 132–4, 136, 140, 147 Nuclear Posture Review (U.S.) 22, 27–9, 37–8, 47–8, 80 Tokyo and 37–9 nuclear-weapons-free zone Middle East 147 Northeast Asia 7, 64, 82, 87–9, 116, 186, 197 Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Commission (Arcata, CA) 63 nuclear weapons states (original) 95, 123 Numata, Sadaaki, Japanese press secretary, MOFA 31 Obuchi Keiko, Japanese prime minister 14, 79, 97, 112, 191 Ohira, Masayoshi, Japanese prime minister 49 Ohno, Yoshinori, Japanese director general of the Defense Agency 61, 178 Okada, Masaki (Japanese deputy press secretary, MOFA) 31 Okinawa 44–5 “outposts of tyranny” 177

Ozawa, Ichiro, Japanese statesman 187, 193 comments regarding nuclear weapons 48, 191–2, 194 Pakistan 11, 26, 30, 33, 37, 40, 95–6, 98–9, 101, 119, 131, 172, 176–7, 196 and the CTBT 31, 79 and nuclear testing 76, 78–9, 94, 114, 116–17, 197 Paris 117 Paris Agreement 156 Partial Test Ban Treaty, see Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater (Limited Test Ban Treaty) Peace Depot 73, 83–4, 86–7, 91, 121 Pacific Campaign for Disarmament and Security 121 Peacekeeping Operations Law (1991) 187 Pentagon 59 Poland 171 post-9/11 3, 47, 52, 79, 124, 126, 133, 137, 180, 195, 197 Powell, Colin 10, 40, 126, 136, 152, 156, 158, 177, 189–90 Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) 127–8 Pritchard, Charles 166 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 3, 111, 126 Putin, Valadimir, Russian president 23–4, 28, 157 Pyongyang 24–5, 47, 49, 51, 56, 59, 75, 89, 100, 132, 137, 141, 146, 158–81, 190, 192, 194–8 Pyongyang Declaration 162, 164–5, 172, 175 Qaddafi, Muammar, Libyan leader 176

Index Rengo (Japan Trade Union Confederation) 75–6 Rice, Condoleeza 61, 142, 177–8 Ri, Gun, North Korean official 160 Rowhani, Hassan, Iranian secretary of supreme national security council 154 Rumsfeld, Donald 27, 61, 138, 158, 177–8 Rusk, Dean 45 Russia 6, 18, 20, 23, 25–6, 29–30, 32, 38, 40, 44, 58–60, 88, 95, 97–101, 103–6, 112, 123–5, 128, 134, 143–5, 155, 157, 160, 164 Salehi, Ali, Iranian representative to the IAEA 145–6 Sanders, Jackie 128 San Francisco Peace Treaty 72 Sasae, Kenichiro, Japanese representative to six-party talks 179 Sato, Eisaku, Japanese prime minister 45, 53 Saudi Arabia 141 Schott Company 62 Sea Dragon (U.S. nuclear submarine) 54 Security assurances negative security assurances 5, 87, 89, 98–9, 131–3, 194: defined 80, 130 positive security assurances 130, 132: defined 130 Security Consultative Committee, twoplus-two ministerial meetings, (U.S.–Japan) 61, 165, 178 Seergev, Igor, Russian representative to the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into force of the CTBT 17 Self Defense Forces (SDF, Japanese) 49–50, 83, 129, 138, 180, 187, 189

279

Seminar on Nuclear Disarmament after the Indefinite Extension of the NPT 78 Semmel, Andrew 136 Seoul 6, 47, 49, 51, 138, 159, 164–6, 176–7, 197 Shen, Guofang, Chinese representative to the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT 17 Shinfujin (New Japan Women’s Association) 74 six-party talks 143, 166–70, 172–9, 181 Slovenia 94, 96 Smithsonian Institute 1–2 Socialist Party (Japan) 53, 71 Soga, Hitomi, Japanese abductee to North Korea 175 Sohyo (General Council of Trade Unions of Japan) 71, 75 South Africa 11, 21–2, 94–5, 105 South Korea 44, 51, 107, 143, 160, 163–4, 167, 169, 171, 173, 176, 179, 193 Soviet Union 23–4, 33, 40, 51, 54, 71, 77 and nuclear testing 116 Spain 23 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) 26, 29, 97, 103 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, see Moscow Treaty subcritical testing 14, 76, 78, 81–2, 100, 114, 116, 196, 207n Great Britain performance of 30, 32–3, 76 Russian performance of 30–3 Tokyo’s position on 31–2, 82 U.S. performance of 30–2, 196 Suginami Appeal 70 Sugiura, Seiken, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs 16

280

Index

Suzuki, Zenko, Japanese prime minister 46 Sweden 21–2, 94–5, 106 Switzerland 157 Syria 38 Taepo Dong-1 24 Taipei 6 Taiwan 60 Takeshita, Noboru, Japanese prime minister 77 Takeuchi, Yukio, Japanese vice minister for foreign affairs 10, 153 Tanaka, Makiko, Japanese minister of foreign affairs 40, 120, 126 Tehran 10, 137–57, 180, 203 theater missile defense (TMD) 56–60 Three Nonnuclear Principles (hikaku san gensoku) 44–5, 47, 50–2, 69, 74, 77, 81–2, 86–7, 97, 116, 186, 191, 193–4, 199–200 Three Principles on Arms Exports 60–2 Tokyo Forum 4, 31, 78–9, 90, 100–1, 117–18, 125 Tokyo Physicians for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (TPENW) 73, 83–5, 91, 120–1 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater (Limited/Partial Test Ban Treaty) 14, 36, 71 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests (Threshold Test Ban Treaty) 36 Turkey 107 unarmed neutrality (Japan) 53 U.N.-Centrism 187 U.N. Conference on Disarmament 35, 77–80, 87, 108, 127–8, 131, 197

U.N. Eighteen Nation Disarmament Commission 54 U.N. General Assembly 21–2, 28, 77–81, 96–100, 103–4, 115, 118–20, 122, 127, 163, 188 First Committee on Disarmament and International Security 15, 17, 26, 48, 77, 82, 95–6, 99, 101, 104–6, 113–14, 119–20, 122, 124, 128 United Kingdom 20, 26, 33, 71, 95–8, 101, 120, 123–4, 143–4, 151, 154–6 and the NPT 34, 54 and nuclear testing 116 United States counterproliferation campaign 3, 10, 15, 65, 79, 111–12, 118, 129, 133–6, 138, 142, 148–50, 153, 180, 195, 203 and exceptions to negative security assurances 132 and gradual or incremental approach to nuclear disarmament 99, 124 interest in nuclear nonproliferation 123–4, 133–4 Iraq Survey Group 136 National Security Council (NSC) 176–7 and the NPT 34, 52 and nuclear testing 116–17 and nuclear weapons in Japan 44–5 and preemptive strike 3, 47, 106, 136, 147, 163, 169 rejection of the CTBT 14–23, 37 Senate Armed Services Committee 38, 136 Senate Foreign Relations Committee 172, 175 war on terrorism 37, 49, 79, 129, 134–5, 137–8, 185, 187–9, 191, 200

Index and withdrawal from the ABM 23, 25–6, 28, 48, 57–8, 80, 104, 109 U.N. Security Council 35–6, 38, 137, 145, 151–2, 155, 166, 170, 188–90 Resolution 984, 35–6, 38, 130 U.S. Department of Defense 45 and the Quadrennial Defense Review 40 U.S. Department of Energy Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) 62–3, 196: National Ignition Facility (NIF) 62–4, 196 National Nuclear Security Administration 38 Stockpile Stewardship Program 63 U.S. Department of State 14, 45, 124, 133, 140, 152, 185 U.S.-Japan Commission on Arms Control, Disarmament, Nonproliferation, and Verification 20 U.S.-Japan security alliance (treaty) 6, 24, 45–6, 49, 52, 56, 58, 60, 69, 71, 77, 83, 91, 93–4, 102, 109, 111–12, 115, 118, 120, 125, 129, 130, 132–4, 138, 152, 164, 169–70, 179–81, 186–7, 189–90, 194, 198, 201 U.S. security objectives and nuclear weapons 2, 37–41, 47–9, 52, 125, 198 Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, Indian prime minister 76 Vienna 144, 151, 153 Vietnam 20

281

Wang, Yi Chinese vice foreign minister 170 Waseda University 193 weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 135–7, 141, 143, 146, 164, 168, 196 Weldon, Curt 29 Wen, Jiabao, Chinese prime minister 171–2 Wolf, John 134, 136 World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs 70–3 World Conference of Mayors of Peace through Inter-city Solidarity 74 World Court, see International Court of Justice World Court Project 118–19 Declaration of Public Conscience 119 World Health Organization 118, 122 World Summit Outcome 108 World Trade Organization 156 Yabunaka, Mitoji, Japanese ambassador 168 Yamamoto, Ichita, Japanese state foreign secretary 113 Yamasaki, Taku, Japanese statesman 48 Yasui, Kaoru, Japanese peace activist 70 Yomiuri Shimbun 37 Yongbyon (site of North Korean nuclear facility) 159, 170–2 plutonium reprocessing 159, 170–2 Yoon, Young-kwan, South Korean foreign affairs and trade minister 169 Zoellick, Robert

177