Jerusalem and Athens: The Congruity of Talmudic and Classical Philosophy (Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism, V. 52)

JERUSALEM AND ATHENS TIe Congruity

of Talmudic and Classical Philosophy BY

JACOB NEUSNER

EJ. BRILL LEIDEN . NEW YORK · KOLN 1997

SUPPLEMENTS TO THE

JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF JUDAISM Formerly Studia Post-Bibhca Editor

JOHN ]. COLLINS The Divinity School, University of Chicago

Associate Editor

FLORENTINO GARCiA MARTINEZ Qumran Institute, University of Groni~gen

Advisory Board J. DUHAIME - A. HILHORST -

M.A. KNmB

M. MACH - J.T.A.G.M. VAN RUITEN - J. SIEVERS

G. STEMBERGER -

J.

TROMP - A.S. VAN DER WOUDE

VOLUME 52

The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources.

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnahm.e

Uournal for the study of judaism. I Supplem.ent] Journal for the study of judaism. Supplement. - Leiden ; New York ; Kaln : Brill Friiher Schriftenreihe Bis Vol. 48 (1995) u.d.T.: Studia post-biblica

Vol. 52. Neusner, Jacob: Jerusalem and Athens. - 1997 Neusner, Jacob: Jerusalem and Athens: the congruity of Talmudic and Classical philosophy / by Jacob Neusner - Leiden ; New York; Kaln : Brill, 1997 (Supplelnents to the Journal for the study of judaism; Vol. 52) ISBN 90-04-10698-7

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data is also available

ISSN 1384-1261 ISBN 90 04 10698 7 © Copynght 1997 by E.]. Bn'll, Leiden, The Netherlands

All nghts reseroed. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,. mechanical, photocopying, recording or othenvise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by E.]. Brill provided that the appropn"ate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910 Danvers AlA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. PRIXTED IX THE XETHERLASDS

In Memory of Brigitte Freudenberg

CONTENTS Preface ................... ,'............. .... ......................... ............ ................

IX

I. The Science and Philosophy of the Workaday World ... ~

1

II. Philosophical Modes of Analytical Argument ................... i. The Public Side of Thought ...................................... ii. Written Marks of Thought Recorded for Oral Recapitulation .......................................................... ~.... 111. The Rules of Engagement .......................................... IV. The Public Argument in the Mishnah ..... ........ ......... v. The Public ArgUment in the Tosefta ........................ vi. Will Plato and Aristotle Have Approved? ... ..... .........

19 20

III. The Dialectical Argument and the Bavli .................. ........ 1. Philosophical Dialectics ................................................ 11. Why Dialectics Was the Chosen Medium of , Thought and Expression for the Mishnah's Heirs and Continuators ................................................... ...... ill. The Gemara's Dialectics ................................. ...... ...... IV. An Example of a Dialectical Argument ..... ...... ......... v. An Example of an Argument of an Other-than-Dialectical Character ................................ VI. The Importance of the Dialectical Argument in the Gemara ......................................................................... VII. The Law behind the Laws ......................................... VI11. The Unity of the Law ....... ...................... ................... IX. The Triumph of the Gemara's Dialectics: Turning a List into a Series ......................................................... x. Dialectics and the Intellectual Dynamics of the Gemara ......................................................................... IV. How the Talmud Works

35 44 49 53 58 63 63

74 83 88 95 110 113 118 122 139 142

Bibliography ....................................... ....... .................................... 156 General Index ............................................................................. 163 Index to Biblical and Talmudic References ............................. 165

PREFACE The Talmud is one of the .great, classical writings of human civilization-enduring, influential, nourishing. It claims its place among the ,most successful pieces of writing in the history of humanity, along with the Bible, Plato's Republic, Aristotle's Politics, the Qur)an, and a very few other writings. What those books have in common is the power to demand attention and compel response for many centuries after their original presentation. The Qur)an, for example, is received by Muslims as God's word, as is the Bible by Christians and the Torah-comprised of the Hebrew Scriptures or Old Testament and the oral traditions ultimately preserved in the Talmud-by the faithful of Judaism. For generations beyond memory, the Talmud exer'cised the power to "impart its ideals of virtue, moral and intellectual, and so shaped generations of Israel into a single intellectual model, one of enormous human refinement. Here is what, for the Torah, it means to be a human being, in God's likeness, after God's model. Among those great and enduring classics of humanity, the Talmud, like the great Hindu classic, the Mahabharata, is distinctive because it is not really a book but a living tradition, a focus for ongoing participation in age succeeding age. The anthropologist of Hindu religion, William Sax, states, "The Mahabharata . . . was not a book at all, but rather an oral epic. . . a tradition more than a book ... not only a book but also a political model, a bedtime story, a tradition of dance, a dramatic spectacle, and much much more." The same is true of the Talmud. It is not so much a book as an intellectual enterprise for eternity. If we state the formal features, however, we shall not see a document in flux. The Talmud is made up of a philosophical law code, the Mishnah, and an equally philosophical analysis and commentary upon the Mishnah. The former is constructed as an essay in natural history, using the methods of hierarchical classification formulated by Classical philosophy in the analysis of the data of everyday life. The commentary, called the Gemara, is constructed in accord with the rules of argument and demonstration called dialectical. Important traits, form and substance alike, of Classical dialectics of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, are replicated in the Gemara's argument. That

x

PREFACE

commentary extends to the laws and the principles of the laws contained in the Mishnah. It is intellectually ambitious but economical and not prolix: a few questions recur throughout. That briefly describes the document. But that defini~on misses the key to the document and what makes it open-ended, a writing to which every generation makes· its ~ontri­ bution. The Talmud is open-ended and invites the disciple to join in its discussion. The main trait of the Talmud is its argumentative character, its dialectical argument, question-answer, back and forth. Once we have not only a proposition but the reason for it, then we may evaluate the reason, criticize it, or produce a contrary proposition based on a better reason and argument. And since the Talmud shows its hand at every point, its framers indicate that they want us to join in. And we do, and that is why so many generations of learning Jews have found in Talmud-study the substance of a worthwhile life: Talmud study, shaping the perspective of the learning Jew, his or her way of seeing ma~y things in one rational, .reasonable manner. When the Talmud's Gemara (also known simply as "the Talmud") analyzes the Mishnah, ·it is through a dialectical inquiry made up of questions and answers, yielding propositions and counter-arguments. A closer look still shows that what the Talmud gives us is not a finished statement but notes toward the main points of an argument. These notes permit us to reconstruct the issues and the questions, the facts and the use made of those facts, with the result that when we grasp the document, we also enter into its discipline and join in its argum~nt. Few documents invite readers to join the writers, and none with the success of this one. Now to the point of this book, which may be simply stated. The Talmud-the Mishnah, a philosophical law code, and the Gemara, a commentary upon the Mishnah-works by translating the principal mode of Western intellectual inquiry into the analysis of the rules of rationality governing concrete, this-worldly realities. That is philosophy, including science. Science, in particular natural history, supplies the method of making connections and drawing conclusions to the Mishnah, the law-code that forms the foundation-document of the Talmud. Philosophy, specifically, dialectical analysis, defines the logic of the Gemara and guides the writers of the Gemara's compositions and the compilers of its composites in their analysis and amplification of some of the topical presentations, or tractates, of the Mishnah. I have already spelled out the bases for my characteriza-

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Xl

tion of the Mishnah as a work of philosophy in the form of a law code, and in this volume deal principally with the Gemara. 1 Since the Mishnah, ca. 200 C.E., and the Gemara, produced over the next several centuries and closed in ca. 600 C.-E., flourished in the age of Middle Platonism (whether pagan or Christian), an age charact~rized by broad, eclectic interest in working out the philosophies of Aristotle (for method) and- Plato (for doctrine), we here see the Talmud as a free-standing chapter in the philosophicai tale of its own times. The foundation-document of Judaism, the single writing most particular to that religion, turns out to have formed an adaptation, for the purposes of the Torah, of the great tradition of philosophy, including science, of the late antique age in which Western civilization took shape. What we see in this book is how the sages of the Mishnah and the Gemara, in the Talmud, conducted the normative analysis of the data of the social order in the way in which science inquired into the data of the realm of nature, and philosophy into the definition of virtue, broadly construed. Called "our sages of blessed memory,"2 they produced a document that would be studied from its closure to our own day. Intense learning in that document was intended not only so that its students would acquire info~mation but especially so that, through the act of analytical study and debate, they themselves would be changed. The reformation of intellect and attitude, character, and conscience, as much as in viewpoint, was-and remainsthe goal. Here, then, is the glory of the Torah, which the world calls by the secular name, 'judaism:" the kind of human being the Torah meant to nurture, the kind of social order the Torah meant to found. For when we know how the Talmud works, we see two things. I refer to my Judaism as Philosophy. The Method and Message qf the Mishnah. Columbia, 1991: University of South Carolina Press. In two other works, The Economics qf the Mishnah Chicago, 1989: The University of Chicago Press, and Rabbinic Political Theory: Religion and Politics in the Mishnah. Chicago, 1991: The University of Chicago Press, I bring the Mishnah into alignment with philosophical economics and political theory, and I conduct a systematic probe of the Mishnah's modes of formulating perennial questions of philosophy in legal form in 77ze Philosophical Mishnah. Atlanta, 1989: Scholars Press for Brown Judaic Studies. Volume 1. The Initial Probe. Volume II. The Tractates' Agenda. From Abodah Zarah to Moed Qgtan. Volume III. The Tractates' Agenda. From Na;:,ir to Zebahim V olume IV. The Repertoire. 2 Also known as "rabbis," a title of honor and status; but that title was not limited to the circles of the Judaism that used it, though that Judaism is called "Rabbinic," and in these pages we shall use the normative and accepted title. 1

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First, we follow the formation of philosophy and science as these find their data not in biology or physics but in the facts of everyday life, and their problematics not in' abstract analysis of how language works in expressing abstraction but in workaday affairs and ordinary relationships. Second, we identify the way in which the founders of a social order through a piece of writing composed their most profound structures on the foundations of intellect, with the, support of rationality. No greater tribute has ever been paid to humanity's capacity for reasoned conduct of personality and society alike than the document the workings of which I propose to layout in these pages. At stake is an account of the assumptions that were held concerning the cogencyofdifferent types of argument, and the context in which those arguments were deemed compelling. Readers may reasonably present the standard question of material history: how did philosophy, including natural history, find its way into. the; circles of our sages of blessed memory,' whether in the second century C.E. for the Mishnah, or the fourth and fifth centuries C.E. for the Gemara? I do not propose to demonstrate direct connection between Classical philosophy, whether encountered in persons or mastered in books, and our sages of blessed memory. Even though the philosophers of the Second Sophistic, of the same time, went about preaching on street-corners, we cannot show, and therefore do not know, that the Mishnah's authorities stood around and listened to the preaching-and then made it their own. And, it goes without saying, none conjures the fantasy-and anachronism-of the Mishnah's authorship's tramping down a Galilean hill from their yeshiva to the philosophical academy in a nearby Greek-speaking down, Caesarea or Sepphoris, for example, there studying elementary Aristotle and listening to the earliest discourses of neo-Platonism, then climbing back up the hill and writing it all up in their crabbed back-country idiom made up of the cases and examples of the Mishnah. 3 Nor do I imagine that it was through a close study of Aristotle's Topics that our sages of blessed memory formulated the Gemara's mode of dialectical argument. None can seriously admit a claim of diachronic let alone synchronic intersection. The Mishnah links itself with no prior writing but Scripture, and cites Scripture only episodi3

We shall return to this question in Chapters One and Two.

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XU1

cally and not systematically. Hence we exclude diachronic connection ("tradition"). And it is an absolute fact and commonplace of scholar- . ship that the sages at hand never cite a line of a philosophical text of their own day or of any other time, hence we exclude synchronic relationship. In these pages, therefore, I point to congruity, not to connection and certainly pot to continuity. By congruity, I mean that I claim to demonstrate similarity (in places, even identity), but I hardly posit a material, tangible process of diffusion, influence or borrowing. That suffices to serve my purpose, which is to show that, as antiquity defined philosophy, our sages of blessed memory in the Mishnah and the Gemara, through their greatest achievement, the Talmud itself, viewed the everyday as the occasion for scientific and philosophical reflection and analysis. And with the Talmud as the curriculum for its schools and design for its culture, holy Israel did the same-but on its own terms, and in its own terms. I underscore that I lay no claim here to expert knowledge of Graeco-Roman philosophy, sources or scholarly traditions. Quite the opposite, I rely on standard accounts of the subject. I identify with the natural history of Aristotle the Mishnah's modes of making connections between and among data. I regard as comparable to the dialectics of Plato's Socrates and Aristotle the Gemara's media of analytical argument, appeal to accepted accounts of Classical philosophy in the English language. These represent modest, but I believe plausible, points of comparison (and contrast). Specialists in Classical Philosophy with a knowledge of Talmud will certainly carry matters much further than I am able to do. For example, the pointby-point comparison of Aristotle's theory of causation in detail with the Mishnah's cases, the detailed comparison of the rules of dialectics in the Talmud and those in Plato's Socrates' dialogues-these critical tasks can go forward only when scholars better qualified than I am undertake the work. What I wish to contribute is the initial recognition that the Mishnah and Gemara must be brought into relationship with the philosophical heritage of the West. In doing so for economics, politics, philosophy, and dialectics, I mean to show how our sages of blessed memory framed in their law code and commentary a school for the education of holy Israel in the right ways of thought and analysis and argument. The works that I cite form my authorities for Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and Middle Platonism. I possess no first-hand knowledge of the texts that Classical philosophy presents or of the scholarly traditions

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XlV

and issues inherent in them; I utilize only the results of what experts identify for me as authoritative and reliable. My hope is that in these pages historians of Classical philosophy and science will learn about their subject nothing new-therefore something certainly wrong. If they· gain perspective by learning about other ways, besides the standard philosophical ones, in which the same, philosophical modes of thought served, I shall be glad. From them, in this context, "original" becomes an epithet. What I wish to show is the Talmud emerging out of a process of the intellectual adaptation and accommodation, and what I propose to contribute is perspective upon the document that, thus far, has appeared unique, without precedent or parallel, in the enduring classics of religious and legal writings, the Talmud itself-both the Mishnah and the Gemara. A word on the work that is to be done to develop the hypothesis set forth in this book suffices. I follow the example of G. E. R. lloyd,: who in the· following way explains his program in the classic Polarity

and Analogy . Two Types qf Argumentation in Early, Greek Thought: In dealing with the types of argument and explanation in early Greek thought two main methods seem· to be possible, which might be called ... the analytic and the synthetic. The first would attempt a full description of the relevant texts, reaching general conclusions only at the end of an exhaustive survey of the evidence; this has the advantage of completeness. The second method would offer preliminary generalisations as working hypotheses. . . which may and indeed probably will require modification in the light of the particular evidence: this has the advantage of clarity. As my main purpose is to reveal and examine the principal, but not necessarily the only, types of argumentation in early Greek thought, I have preferred the second method. 4 1-

I have made the same decision and here offer a general theory of matters. In later work within that theory I shall account for the character of the principal documents. Then the proportions of each canonical document that are devoted to. these modes of thought, analysis, and expression, as against the proportions guided by quite other protocols of mind, will emerge, and a more dense and encompassing account of the intellectual quality of the whole ought to emerge In due course. 5 Polar£ty and Analogy. Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek 1hought, pp. 6-7. The preliminary survey in Talmudic Dialectics: Types and Forms. Atlanta, 1995: Scholars Press for South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism. I. Introduction. Tractate Berakhot and the Divisions of Appointed Times and Women. and II. The Divisions if 4

5

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xv

That to do my work I had to turn to experts in cognate fields makes me all the more grateful to those wh~ shared their learning with me. I began thinking about the problem of this book in the 1980's and made preliminary sketches of its argument in the earliest 1990's. I discussed the basic premise-ideas matter, good arguments compel, sound reasoning persuades, and, therefore, philosophy in its classical formulation feaches us how· to n~ad· and reco~~truct these writings too-with University colleagues in philosophy and religious studies from New Zealand to Finland, from England to Germany (in two universities), and at many places in the USA. Among them the most helpful philosophers were Professor Martha Nussbaum, University of Chicago, and Professor Anita Silvers, San Francisco State University. They pointed me to the books I should read. Since, as I said, I am a consumer, not a producer, of learning in the history of philosophy, without their intervention I could not have accomplished my goaL No work of mine can omit reference to the exceptionally favorable· circumstances in which I conduct my research. I wrote this book at the University of South Florida, which has· afforded me an ideal situation in which to conduct a scholarly life. I express my thanks for not only the advantage of a Distinguished Research Professorship, which must be the best job in the world for a scholar, but also of a substantial research expense fund, ample research time, and some .stimulating and cordial colleagues. In the prior chapters of my career, I never knew a university that prized professors' scholarship and publication and treated with respect those professors who actively and methodically pursue research. The University of South Florida, and all ten universities that comprise the Florida State University System as a whole, exemplify the high standards of professionalism that prevail in publicly-sponsored higher education in the USA and provide the model that privately-sponsored universities would. do well to emulate. Here there are rules, achievement counts, and presidents, provosts, and deans honor and respect the University's principal mission: scholarship, scholarship alone-both in the classroom and in publication. Here at last I find integrity, governing· in the lives of people true to their vocation and their mission. My thanks go also to the President of Bard College, Leon Botstein, 1

Damages and Holy Things. and Tractate Niddah will suffice for the moment. But what is required is a complete survey of the canonical documents.

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XVI

and Dean of the Faculty, Stuart Levine, as well as to my colleague, the chairman of the Department of Religion and co-worker in many projects, Bruce D. Chilton. Their encouragement and practical support of my research work mean a great deal to me. ,Many of the ideas in this book began in conversations with Professor Chilton or in the courses that we taught together. The angelic librarians of the University of South Borida campus at St. Petersburg library could not find enough ways to help me in my search for the literature of classical philosophy. They were prepared to ransack the entire Borida State University system holdings in search of what I needed-and to go in quest to the north, east, and west if need be. I am grateful to them whenever I walk through the doors of the USF-SP library, that is to say, nearly every day. This book is dedicated to the memory of a dear friend, who, from when we met in Frankfurt in 1991 to the present, has illuminated life for my wife and myself, and whom we cherish. A Ger~an of the great tradition of culture and learning that National Socialism tried to, but did not wholly, exterminate, she stands for all that is good and hopeful in the reborn Germany of the post-war age. Jacob. Neusner

I

Distinguished Research Professor of Religious Studies University of South Florida,Tampa and Professor of Religion, Bard College Annandale-on-Hudson, New York

CHAPTER ONE

THE SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE WORKADAY WORLD Through the study of the details of the workaday world holy Israel is instructed in the principles of philosophy (including science) of Western rationality. This is a book about how in concrete detail great principles of Western philosophical thought were brought to concrete realization, through applied reason and practical logic. A single document, the Talmud of Babylonia-that is to say, the Mishnah, ca. 200 C.E., as read by the Gemara compiled in Babylonia, reaching closure by ca. 600 C.E., served as the medium: of instruction, teaching by example alone, the craft of clear thinking, compelling , argument, correct rhetoric. That craft originated in Athens with Plato's Socrates and Aristotle, and predominated in the intellectual life of Western civilization thereafter. When we correlate the modes of thought and analysis of the Talmud with the ones of classical philosophy that pertain, we see how the Talmud works, by which, as is clear, I mean, how its framers made connections and drew conclusions, for the Mishnah and Gemara respectively. In this book-so I claim-for the first time we find ourselves able to situate within the framework of the intellectual tradition of the West the rationality of the Talmud, Mishnah and Gemara together, seen whole. That perspective takes the measure of the Talmud not merely in episodic details of its doctrines or laws viewed out of context,l but in its fundamental intellectual traits of thought and analysis. The Talmud makes connections in the manner of Western science as defined by Aristotle in his work of natural history, and it draws conclusions in the manner of Western philosophy as defined by Plato's

1 See for instances of episodic and unsystematic research into bits and pieces, lacking a picture of the whole, Saul Lieberman, Greek in Jewish Palestine and Hellenism in Jewish Palestine (N.Y., 1946ff.: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America). Lieberman did some first-rate exegetical work, within the textual and philological framework, but had no capacity to deal with ideas, historical or philosophical, or other large-scale intellectual problems. He never perceived the context for his data and in the end could not even write an introduction to the Tosefta, on which he spent most of his life.

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CHAPTER ONE

Socrates and by Aristotle in their logic, specifically, their dialectical analysis and argument. Natural history, specifically, governs the composition of the Mishnah, and dialectics, the Gemara. That, sum and substance, forms my account of how the Talmud works. In the Epilogue I speculate briefly on why the Talmud succeeded so remark-:ably well in accomplishing its goals, the definition of Israel's social order. Here, then, I tell the story of how a particular piece of writing makes connections and draws conclusions~ Modes of thought and analysis, media of the formulation of the same, and methods of explanation-these form the problems dealt with here. The weight and consequence of the matter scarcely require articulation. How one thing is deemed to connect to another but not to a third, and what conclusions we are to draw from the juxtapositions, connections, and intersections of things-these form the structure and system of thought that for a given society explain sense and also define nonsense.' What I want {o kI}.ow is what arguments shaped the data people 'selected and the conclusions that they drew therefrom" and how a set of assumptions concerning rationality and self-evidence dictated the character of the Judaism that came to written expression in the Talmud of Babylonia. 2 So here I portray the mo~es of public thought 3 that turned out to govern the affairs of an entire social order, the one that is portrayed by, and ultimately realized through, that Talmud, which is seen in its selected context, one of the most influential pieces of writing and public thought in the history of mankind. From its closure to our own day, the Talmud of Babylonia has formed the paramount authoritative writing of Judaism. It has served as the governing medium by which the revelation of Sinai, the Torah, . I paraphrase G. E. R. Uoyd, Polarity and Analogy, p. 2. The stress on "public" throughout my account means to underscore that we deal with thought processes characteristic of the social order and set forth, ultimately written down in influential testimonies of general intelligibility. How individuals reasoned, how even the great philosophers thought outside of the public square-these lie beyond the scope of our evidence. But if we claim to know how a given social order made connections and drew conclusions, then it is only through the public and authoritative writings that we find out. Not only so, but the character of the Mishnah and Talmud as political documents given effect through coercive means-whether intellectual, in reason and argument, or social, in ostracism, deprivation of property and standing, and the like-requires that same stress. In Chapter Two I focus upon the public side of thought, with attention to the media of intellectual publicity. 2 3

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oral and written, reaches age succeeding age. By reason of its unique character, the Talmud turned out not only to provide legal ruling and supporting opinion, but a model of how rulings and opinions were to reached-and, more important still, a paradigm for the education of successive generations in the method of right thought. When faithful Israelites undertook to ."study Torah," they ,opened the Talmud, and, when they did,' they learned inductively how to turn themselves into scientists and philosophers, that is t6' say, natural historians working with the data of the everyday and disciples capable of joining in a dialectical analysis through argument. 4 I so allege, because what I show here is that just as the basic structural document of the Talmud, the Mishnah, makes connections in the manner of Classical natural history, the exegesis and amplification of that document, the Gemara, conducts its analysis through the dialectical method of Classical philosophy. The former is now an established fact, and the latter forms the' focus of this study. The Talmud.and its Judaism (or, Judaic religious system) then emerge from this account as distinctive but native chapters in the intellectual history of Western civilization, as much in their point of origin, in late antiquity, as was later the case in medieval times among Judaic philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition. 5 In particular, the Talmud's modes of organizing data into intelligible patterns ("rules") have been shown to follow the rules of natural history common to Western science from Aristotle onward, and its media for the conduct of analytical argument and construction of compelling arguments and reliable judgments prove congruent to those of Western philosophy. I refer, specifically, both to those of Socrates 1

4 I use the past tense, but it should be understood that in most of contemporary Judaism-all of the various Orthodox Judaisms, both segregationist and integrationist, as well as Conservative Judaism-Talmud-study is the starting point of theological and legal literacy, and stress is laid upon modes of thought and analysis, not only or mainly on conclusions reached in one passage of another. True, some Judaic systems of the social order, e.g., Reform and Reconstructionist, do not assign priority to the classical literature in general, or to Talmud-study in particular. But outside of the USA, and for vast sectors of Judaism here as well, the Talmud occupies precisely the formative position that it has enjoyed for the whole of its history. So the past tense here is not to exclude the present. 5 The philosophical and legal movement in Islam in due course must also come under consideration for its interrelationship with Judaism not only in philosophy but, more to the point, in this same context of the history of ideas set forth within the most distinctive of Judaic writings, the halakhic ones. But that work is not part of the present project, let alone this writer's program of research.

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CHAPTER ONE

as Plato presents him and of Aristotle in his lectures on how to frame arguments, his Topics. So the Talmud imposes rationality upon, or explains, ~verse and discrete data by modes of Western science, specifu::ally natural history set forth by Aristotle, and transforms those organizations of data into encompassing, well-tested generalizations capable of encompassing fresh data, doing so in the way in which that principal labor is carried out by Western philosophy, tests of generalizations conducted in accord with the method of analytical argument (not merely static demonstration) laid out by Plato's Socrates and utilized, also, by Aristotle. 6 That the whole forms an exercise the analysis of the everyday through applied logic and practical reason is clear from the topics that are treated by the Talmud. Classical science dealt with the natural world, biology and zoology and physics, for example; dialectics investigated the definition of abstract categories of virtue. Not so in the Talmud. While possibilities for abstract inquiry presented themselves, e.g., in topical tractates concerning ~atters of no. immediate practical fact, the .Talmud in the main bypasses those tractates in favor of those deemed practical. That is to say, while the Mishnah's law covers a wide variety of practical and theoretical subjects, the Gemara deals, in the main, 7 with those tractates of the Mishnah that concern everyday life (specifically, the divisions of the Mishnah presenting laws on the festivals and holy days, laws of home and family, and the corpus of civil law, court procedure, and governance). Hence the title and program of this book: to show how the Talmud-Mishnah and Gemara together--works by bringing to bear upon the workaday 6 I shall argue presently that the rhetoric, not merely the logic, accords with the dialectics of Plato (and in its orality, also of Aristotle as a matter of fact). So the points of correspondence in part prove formal, not only methodological. 7 The Talmud of Babylonia also devotes commentaries to tractates of the Mishnah in the Division of Holy Things, most of which concern the conduct of the Temple offerings and the design and maintenance of the holy place in Jerusalem. Coming nearly six centuries after the Jerusalem Temple's destruction in 70, the Talmud cannot be represented as addressing in that division practical, everyday concerns, except for the tractate that concerns correct slaughter of animals for domestic, not only hieratic, consumption. In light of the effort to rebuild the Temple in the reign of Emperor Julian in 360, however, some may plausibly suppose that the hope and expectation of an early reconstruction of the holy place and resumption of the offerings account for the choice. Omitted entirely are the divisions on agricultural taboos, which pertain only to the Land of Israel and not to Babylonia, and purities, which concern mostly the intangible sources of cultic contamination, their effects and removal, matters that would take on practical consequence only after the Temple was . functioning.

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world principal modes of scientific and philosophical thought8 characteristic of Western civilization. When I speak of philosophy, inclusive of natural history, I do so within a very limited framework. Classical philosophy encompasses a broad range. of modes of thought and analysis. .But only some of these proved congruent to our sages' focus, which was on the theory behind practical affairs of the holy life. That is why, here, only a single, principal mode in each instance comes under consideration. For modes of thought, I speak only of science in the form of natural history, which explains the rationality9 of nature by showing the connections between diverse data and classifying them, we turn to the methods of hierarchical classification set forth by Aristotle in his study of natural history. For modes of analysis, I take up philosophy, which draws conclusions through the testifying of hypotheses in analytical argument. We examine only the methods of dialecticalargument and analysis defined by Plato's presentation of Socrates. That is why the. names 9f Aristotle, for natural history, and Socrates- as read by Plato, and Aristotle in his Topics, for dialectics, make their appearance as we find our way toward the right reading of the Talmud's writing. Guided by the rules of rational inquiry set forth by the principals of Graeco-Roman philosophy, we shall make sense of the masses of specificities of which the Talmud is comprised. In doing so, we move from Talmudic realization in infinite detail to philosophical theory in the abstraction of the whole, from Talmudic case or problem to philosophical method. As we shall see immediately upon entering any Talmudic passage, whether legal, for the Mishnah, or analytical, for the Gemara, the Talmud focuses upon humble affairs of the here and now. Among these it makes its connections. It then derives its comprehensive truths from received formulations of practical rules, for its problematic commonly finds definition in conflicts among received formulations of petty rules about inconsequential matters, that is to say, from the issue of generalization from cases to rules, from rules to principles, from principles to fresh cases of a different kind altogether. The Gemara then proposes The terms "science" and "philosophy" serve contemporary sensibility, to be sure, since in ancient times no one made the distinction important to us now. 9 Perhaps in its own (Aristotelian) context "teleology" would have provided a better word than "rationality," but in the end we are constrained to use the language of our world, even when transmitting the intellect of another one, however influential that other is upon our own. 8

6

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generalizations, hypotheses governing many and diverse cases from the conclusions drawn in a few, uniform ones. But herein lies the Talmud's remarkable accomplishment, one of intellect: the everyday was subjected to the dictates of rationaliry: [1] hierarchical classification, as in Aristotle's natural history, making sense of diversity; [2] argument through challenge and response, as in Socrates' and Plato's and Aristotle's dialectical argument. IO In the great tradition, then, our sages of blessed memory explored, the path that leads in a straight line from what is virtuous to what is kosher. For reasons that are now obvious, the program of the book is simple. I begin in Chapter Two with an account of the basic rules of public thought set forth in Greek philosophy and show how these are recapitulated in the Rabbinic literature prior to the Talmud, specifically, the Mishnah, Tosefta, and Sifra~ 11 Chapter Three takes

10 We could well extend the matter to the counterpart analytical constructions of the Talmud of the Land of Israel, a.k.a., the Yerushalmi, since its principal arena of analysis is composed in the model of the axiom and theorem familiar from Euclid's geometry. But in my Academic Commentary to the Yerushalmi that observation struck me as so self-evident that I did not deem it worth an entire chapter of this book to . lay it out. Anyone who examines the permanent and persistent structures that define the Yerushalmi's sugya, its pattern of analytical argument; will immediately grasp that two stages characterize those structures. First comes an established fact, the axiom. Then comes a problem, a question, a conflict in equally-valid principles. Sometimes these are articulated, partially or even completely. But oftentimes what we have is a question or a series of questions, which are left without any discussion or resolution at all. A closer inspection will show that implicit at every point in the articulated instances will be a proposition, or a theorem to be proved on the foundations of the initial statement of established fact. That is what I mean by an axiomtheorem construction. The Yerushalmi depends far more heavily upon this kind of construction than the Bavli does on the dialectical argument (as I show in Talmudic Dialectics: Types and Forms) or, to put it differently, the Bavli is a far more diverse document than the Yerushalmi. But no one who has worked through both Talmuds can differ that what imparts to both of them their motion and purpose is the philosophical motif of analysis, whether in demonstrating a theorem or in following an analytical argument ~o its inexorable conclusion. 11 Clearly, a documentary history of the utilization of the types of argument in the Rabbinic canon of late antiquity comes into view. Some Midrash-compilations present exercises in classification and argument through hierarchical classification, for example, Leviticus Rabbah. That is the argument of my Judaism and Scripture: TIe Evidence of Leviticus Rabbah. Chicago, 1986: The University of Chicago Press. In the main, natural history defines the method only of the Mishnah. As to matters of form, the rhetoric of dialectics, that is, replication in writing of an oral debate, of course characterizes a variety of documents, and in Chapter Two we consider rhetorical dialectics in the context of the Mishnah, Tosefta, and Sifra. But authentic, logical dialectics I find mainly in the Bavli, and nowhere else (the exceptions that pop up rarely in the Yerushalmi validate that judgment). All of this awaits sorting out along documentary lines.

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up philosophy in the form of dialectics as the method of the Gemara. The concluding chapter asks how the Talmud works and why the Talmud succeeded {n the dominion its framers selected for them~' selves, the holy life of Israel. What is fresh here, beyond my work on the Mishnah, _concerns first, modes of though~ characteristic _of Western philosophy beginning in Greece in general (Chapter Two) and, second, the .dialectical argument, worked out by Plato's Socrates and by Aristotle (in the Topics and elsewhere) as that argument is portrayed by the Gemara, or Talmud, to the Mishnah (Chapter Three). I claim that the dialectical argument of the Gemara conforms to philosophical dialectics not only in logic, but also in rhetoric. Just as a fair part of Plato's Socratic dialogues is made up of scripts to be acted out, and most of Aristotle's writings are comprised of lecture notes, so the authors of the dialectical analytical arguments that are set forth in the Talmud of Babylonia supply only notes toward the reconstitution of an argument and a pUIposive inquiry. Out of those notes of what can be said, we are able to recapitulate the oral exchange, the public argument, that exposes right and worthwhile thought. In prior work I have claimed that the Mishnah formulates its detailed laws within a large system of hierarchical classification, corresponding in method to the natural history of Aristotle. 12 Here that now-familiar result takes on new meaning in an encompassing context. The order of topics subject to discussion is dictated by logic: asking questions (public argument, its logical and formal requirements) (Chapter Two), then drawing conclusions from one thing to cover many things (Chapter Three). No other sequence is possible. It is necessary to proceed in precisely the order of the three chapters, first, philosophy in general, second, natural history, third, dialectical analysis. In these three steps, therefore, I propose to keep my promise of showing how the intellectual disciplines of Western philosophy are set forth in the everyday terms of ordinary affairs that define the program of the Torah set forth by our sages of blessed memory, that is, the rabbis of the first six centuries of the Common Era, from the beginnings of the Mishnah to the closure of the Talmud of Babylonia. So much for how the Talmud works. What are the consequences that are to be drawn by those persuaded by my representation of matters? At stake in these pages to begin with is how we are to read 12

Judaism as Philosophy. TIe Method and Message

of the Mishnah,

cited in the preface.

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the Talmud, meaning, how we are to situate the document within its intelle~tual framework. That requires a theory on what, exactly, we conce~ve the writing in our hands to intend to accomplish. The results bear heavy consequences for how we are to encounter and make sense. of the document. By placing the Talmud into its intellectual context, I mean to explain how it is to be read, which is to say, to uncover how its modes of rationality goverris the way in which the document is written. I maintain that given its writers' and compilers'. goals, the Talmud, Mishnah and Gemara alike, had to be written in, this way, and in no other, with these traits of rhetoric, not with any others. I allege that we possess not only the best of all possible Talmuds-the comparison with the prior ·one, prepared in the Land of Israel, easily shows that face 3-but the only possible Talmud. That is why we pay attention not only to what is said but also to how it is set forth, .since I hope to propose a fresh way of seeing the docu.J?ent, the Talmud, itself. If I succeed in finding its intellectual situ~tion, I also set forth another way of reading the writing, besides the presently dornlnant. academic I4 one, the philological-exegetical one of the seminaries and academies, with its emphasis upon the reading of bits and pieces and the exegesis of episodic, occasional, or ad hoc problems of sense or law or theory.I5 (

13 See The Bavli)s Unique Voice. A Systematic Comparison if the Talmud if Babylonia and' the Talmud if the Land if Israel. 14 This book will have no hearing in the yeshiva-world, which works out of a different intellectual and scholarly canon altogether. The next footnote expands on this point. Deserving attention as well is a second hermeneutics founded in the academy. It is the academic search for the sources of a document implicit in the propositions of the document and in their formulation. Source-study, involving the identification of "the original" formulation of a saying, for example, as it is pursued within the academic framework by David Weiss Halivni, is criticized in my Sources and Traditions. 7jpes if Composition in the Talmud if Babylonia. Atlanta, 1992: Scholars Press for South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism. Still a third academic mode of study involves the examinatiQn of variant readings and the compilation of those variants in collections. Pursued in Jerusalem at the Hebrew University, that approach to Talmud-study\ has not yet produced a critical edition of the Talmud lof Babylonia or even an up-to-date compilation of manuscript variants for that Talmud, though some tractates are now in hand. Until we have an account of the whole, we cannot come to an informed opinion on whether, except on an ad hoc and occasional basis, these variants make much different in our grasp of the document. 15 I have no clear picture of how the Talmud is studied in the continuators of the classical yeshivot, whether in the USA or Britain, Western Europe or the State of Israel. Many institutions call themselves yeshivot without bearing any resemblance to any other institutions bearing that name in history or in the contemporary world either. So it is difficult to follow how things are done in that world. I have the impression, based on conversations with Yeshiva-teachers in the USA, Britain, and

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vVhat we shall see is that while the Mishnah is fully articulated but only to whom it may concern, the Gemara, is made up of notes, not fully spelled' out sentences, paragraphs, arguments, proposi~ons meant to affect the judgment of all who are concerned enough to join in, the debate. Much as, scholarship understands, we receive, Aristotle's writings in the form of extended lecture notes but not finished compositions, so' we have to 'view the Talmud's m.~in type of writing, the protracted, analytical argument, as a set of notes that permit us to join in the thought processes of the framers. We then ,reconstruct logical argument out of the notes the Talmud provides as guidance on the recovery of reasoned thought concerning right and wrong in practice. Accordingly, when we speak of how the Talmud works, the message is not only general-the intellectual context of the document, in classical philosophy-but quite particular to the very distinctive characteristics of the writing itself: why in this form rather than in some other? The form-question-answer, in scarcely-articulated wo.rding-proves to make sense in that very same context of philosophical analysis inaugurated by Socrates-Plato and Aristotle. So my claim concerning the Classical character of the Talmud concerns not only the generalities of rules of rationality but the specificities of rhetoric. Europe, that, at the lower levels, the tendency now is to study topically, that is, through examination of diverse passages relevant to a given problem or thesis. That kind of "reform," dismissing the literary discipline of the document itself in favor of an imposeq., extrinsic topical one, represents a repudiation of the Talmud's own character, transforming it from a sustained argument into a repository of (scattered) information on a subject. A second, historically-dominant trend in Talmud-study is to focus not on the Talmud at all but on the commentaries, the commentaries on those commentaries, and onward and upward, so that the intellectual program and discipline of the Talmud are obscured for a different set of reasons. The educational goals that define the purpose in Talmud-study also dictate the character of that study-for mere information, for the making of novellae, for instance-and institutions will embody the cultural aspirations of those that run them. And yet, the document itself bears its own integrity and imposes its own intellectual disciplines, and that is why I think it important to contribute to the study of the document a fresh mode of reading and a new perspective out of the stance of the academy (here, meant in a very literal sense!). I have found, over time, books do get read and make their impact. After all, what greater evidence can I adduce for that proposition than the Talmud itself? When it reached closure, it differed from all prior Judaic writing. Within a relatively brief time, it defined the center of all Judaic writing. That, I maintain, attests not to the political circumstance of the document's sponsorship but to the intellectual power of its masters' intellect. That the dominance of the Talmud was for a time explained by reference to the trade routes out of Babylonia (by scholarship mercifully left unnamed) shows the trivialization of learning by trivial minds.

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CHAPTER 01\,,,£

To take a step further I refer in particular to the rhetoric of dialectical argument, not only its inner logic. Specifically, in Chapter Two in theory and then in Chapter Three in 3:ctuality, we shall see the Gemara, in particular, not as a piece of V\Tiring but only as notes on the reconstruction of thought leading to. the recapitulation of the logic of what was originally thought, rather than what was originally said in just these words. This is a process of reconstruction requiring also fresh articulation in age succeeding age. Everyone understands that the Talmud is not a document to be read. Here we see it as a script for a conversation to be reenacted. That is why in the classical yeshivas, where the Talmud is not read but correctly studied through ritualized debate reminiscent of that of the Tibetan schools, all study takes place orally, and, ordinarily, in the context of pairs of debaters, students vvho work together to recapitulate thought by reading and explaining what is before them. Properly prepared in language' and information, Plato's Socrates and Aristotle would find themselves quite at home in the authentii,; yeshivas. Even the echoes of music in the argument~ 'the sung propositions, might reach' deep into their intellectual' consciousness. Or., to put it differently, because of their preference f9r oral representation of thought and argument, they will have shared my view that in our hands we hold the best of all possible Talmuds. To do the work properly, it must be done in this manner and in no other, in this kind of writing and not in any other mode of writing (e.g., essays, commentaries, codes, exegesis of a prior document, and on and on through the entire repertoire of types of writing among ancient Judaisms). So much for what is at stake here for the reading of the Talmud. But the issue of a context in which the Talmud is to be read does not exhaust matters. For, second, beyond the limits of the document and its formal protocol in rhetorir..~ we have still to ask a further question. It is, for the history of Judaism and the analysis of its cultural context, what is at stake in this approach to the philosophical and rhetorical character of the Talmud? It is to place that authoritative writing, and the religious system that it represents, squarely in the center of the intellectual heritage of Western civilization. The reason is simple. The upshot of this reading of mine is that the document of Judaism that is both most influential and also most particular and distinctive-I should say, unique-is shown also to bear traits of logic and intellect that make that same writing an integral, formidable part of the common heritage of Western scientific and

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philosophical endeavor. When we read and reconstruct the Talmud rightly, we therefore find ourselves at the center and soul of the intellectual tradition of the West. And to grasp the full implications for enduring culture of the Graeco-Roman philosophical heritage, we have to pay attention, also, to the distinctive (I think, unique) realization of those implications in t,he Talmud too. Accordingly, the Torah (a.k.a., 'judaism") as· the Talmud set forth the Torah as a profoundly Western statement, an express·ion .of the West as characteristic as is Christianity in its theological and philosophical form. And that is for a reason that all acknowledge: Christianity determined the intellectual foundations of Western civilization. It hardly suffices to say, as just now noted, that science (natural history) and philosophy together form the foundations of the intellectual life of the West. It is necessary, by way of explanation, to add, . and that is because the principal religion of the West, Christianity, along with its competition, Islam, and, we now shall see, in addition also to Judaism in its Talmudic statement, all made their own the Graeco-Roman heritage of mind. The proximate reason is that Christianity, which defined Western civilization, identified theology, conducted along philosophical lines, as its principal medium of expression. For everyone knows that Christian theologians and philosophers recast the Gospels into a philosophical statement of theology, calling upon the voice of Athens to deliver the word of Jerusalem. In due course Islam would do the same. What has not been recognized until now is that at the same time that Christianity would speak through theology, conducted along the lines of philosophical argument, so Judaism 16 would speak through norms of law, also set forth along the lines of philosophical argument-and, within broad limits, the same philosophical argument. 17 Christianity and that minority component of Western, Christian civilization, which is Judaism in its Rabbinic formulation, meet in philosophy, which is why, at some specific points in their intersecting

16 And Islam, with both theology and law at stake in philosophy. In that context, I need only point out how the great Judaic Aristotelian, Maimonides, produced not only an Aristotelian account of philosophical theology, but also an Aristotelian representation of the law. But the way in which these matters come to realization in Islam lies beyond my horizon. 17 That proposition forms the generative thesis of Harry Wolfson's account of Western philosophy from Philo to Spinoza, encompassing the Church Fathers and Muslim philosophy as well.

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histories, they were able to conduct civil and rational debate. I8 As much as Catholic Christianity-the Christianity of philosophy, theology, and intellect-defined the Western formulation of the Gospel, 19 so Talmudic Judaism-the Judaism of hierarchical classification and dialectical argument-defined in the Christian20 West the Judaic representation of Sinai. Jud~ic jurisprudents-who also accomplished the work of theology and philosophy, but in a distinctive and unfamiliar idiom, namely, saying abstract things in concrete ways-accomplished a counterpart feat. And in its own terms it was equally remarkable. To turn Christian faith into the language and logic of Classical philosophy and philology required solving intractable problems, bridging from heaven to earth, so to speak. The theologians solved them. For Judaism, others had already. set forth the Torah in the language of GraecoRoman civilization. But to turn the details of the Torah's laws, theology, and· exegesis into data ,. for Graeco-Roman scie~tific and philosophical inquiry and yet to preserve all the specificity of those detailsthat involved far more than a labor of mediation through translation. It was a task of not philology but philosophy. Our sages of blessed memory had to throw a bridge across the abyss between the here and now of marketplace and alley and the rationalities of a well-ordered social world of proportion and abstract theory. For our sages of blessed memory confronted a problem still more challenging than the one worked out by the Christian philosophers 18 Among the various Judaisms of ancient times, only Rabbinic Judaism, defined for the present purpose as the Judaism set forth by the Talmud of Babylonia, enjoyed enduring power in the West, and it was through that Judaism alone and upon its terms uniquely that other modes of thought and religious expression, e.g., those modes collectively characterized as "Qabbalah," would make their way. "Whether in normative theology or in definitive law or in the correct reading and interpretation of Scripture, that Judaism alone governed in Israel wherever Christianity ruled Christendom. In a schematic way I have dealt with the after-life of Rabbinic Judaism in medieval and modern times in two works that form part of a field-theory of the history of Judaism, Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: Exile and Return in the History oj Judaism. Boston, 1987: Beacon Press. Second printing: Atlanta, 1990: Scholars Press for South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism. With a new introduction; and Death and Birth if Judaism. The Impact if Christianity, Secularism, and the Holocaust on Jewish Faith, New York, 1987: Basic Books. Second printing: Atlanta, 1993: Scholars Press for South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism. 19 So too the Islam of philosophy and theology. But these matters become important in the study of Rabbinic Judaism in medieval times, in the context, Jr which Talmud-exegesis in that same context has to be addressed as well. 20 -and Muslim, with the same qualification as in the preceding note. That explains why, in the present formulation, Islam is by-passed for the moment.

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and theologians. The latter could find in philosophy the abstract, philosophical language and categories for issues of intangible faith, e.g., from ontology to Christology. But where could the sages discover appropriate scientific and philosophical categories for the ma. terial and tangible relationships of home and family, kitchen and bed room, marketplace and synagogue and study hous.e, that the Torah set forth as the loci of the authentically-sacred life? The fact is that our sages dealt not with abstract theological formulations of the faith but with concrete rules. Rather than reflecting on the spiritual and angelic and sublime, they thought about the worldly and human and ordinary and secular. And in doing so, what they accomplished was to turn everyday life and its accidents into the medium of instruction on right thinking, sound argument; and compelling, affecting rhetoric. That is why the Talmud's writers'and compilers' achievement compares in grandeur and wit to the one of the Greekand Syriac-writing theologians of Christianity of their own time and place. Their success in the Talmud -and its well-analyzed, rigorouslyconsidered law (as much as the success of Christianity. in theology) forms eloquent tribute to the power of Classical philosophy to accomplish the goals of rationality whatever the arena. The Greek philosophers aimed at finding universal truths through universally-valid methods. That they accomplished that goal is shown by Christianity's philosophical theologians. But I should maintain that still more compelling evidence of their success comes to us in the pages of the Talmud. That is because the two philosophical modes of thought and analysis that would govern, Aristotle's natural history, and Plato's Socrates' dialectics, proved sufficiently abstract and. general to serve quite nicely in the analysis of matters that fall between the acute particularity of Aristotle's zoology, on the one side, and the abstract grandeur of Plato's metaphysics, on the other. In many ways, then, the true vindication of science and philosophy in their shared claim to deal with all things in a single way comes in the middle passage taken by our sages. It emerges with the success of the Talmud in doing its work of workaday, concrete and practical character through the universals of thought that philosophy (including science) put forth. 21 21 In this context it is worth addressing the question I am asked from time to time: if you are right about the Aristotelian character of the Mishnah, then why did NIaimonides not notice it? He was (I am instructed) an Aristotelian and would loved

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CHAPTER ONE

How did this take place? Through the method of hierarchical classification, bits and pieces of data-undifferentiated, discrete facts without regard to the status or character or context of those facts-,would gain sense and meaning. That same method then could and would determine the Mishnah's presentation of the facts of the law. This would take the form of a topical schematization of laws in such a way that coherent formations of data, in the form of well-~omposed lists, would impart the order of laws to the chaos of rules. 2~ Lists by themselves order data in intelligible patterns, but on their own, do not generate laws beyond themselves. Only analysis of the conse-

to have found out precisely what I maintain. I regret that I cannot envisage an explanation of why even the greatest intellect in the history of Judaism (excluding only Moses, and he had help) did not happen to notice what he did not notice. I surely do not doubt that he was looking carefully at the document, for among his greatest gifts to posterity was the best commentary to the Mishnah written until the nineteenth century, and one of the two best of all time. But it should be said that Maimonides supposed to present philosophy outside of the framework of law, and law without sustained and specifjc engagement with philosophy. This came about because he did not realize the full extent to which the Mishnah, Maimonides' correct choice of the foundation-document of Judaism after Scripture, stood squarely within the Aristotelian philosophical tradition. Specifically, when Maimonides systematized philosophy in his originial Guide to the Perplexed and law in his imitative Mishneh Torah, he misunderstood the fact that the law, for the Judaism of the Dual Torah, constitutes the medium for theological and philosophical reflection and expression. And that is the fact, even though at numerous specific examples, he introduced into the explanation or elucidation of the law philosophical considerations. All of these preliminary impressions await sustained clarification, but they do serve to place this project into perspective. In his separation of the presentation of law from philosophy, he tore apart what in the Mishnah had been inextricably joined in a lasting union, which was (and is) the law of that Judaism and both its theology and also its philosophy. Seeing the law in Mishneh Torah as a problem merely of organization and rationalization, Maimonides did not perceive that that same law contained within itself, and fully expressed, the very same principles of theology and philosophy that in the Guide to the Perplexed are invoked to define what we should call Judaism. Maimonides therefore did not grasp that the law in the very document that, in his (correct) judgment contained its' classic formulation, that is, the Mishnah, also set forth precisely those principles of philosophy that, in Aristotle's system as Maimonides adapted it, would frame the proposed philosophy and theology ofJudaism of The Guide to the Perplexed. Then, in the Guide Maimonides (mis)represented philosophy and theology by divorcing them from their legal media of articulation, as though these could come to expression entirely outside the framework of the legal sources of Judaism. So the greatest scholar of the Mishnah of all time and the greatest Aristotelian Judaism has ever known misperceived the profound intellectual structure of the Mishnah. The reason for this error, in my view, is that Maimonides did not understand the deeply Aristotelian character of the Mishnah, which is the initial and definitive statement of the law of Judaism. 22 That is the argument of my Judaism as Philosophy. The Method and Message of the Mishnah.

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quences of list-making does; that is the point at which the labor of generalization takes over from the work of systematization, and lists are transformed into the beginnings of series. Dialectical analysis, for its part, served equally well in the quest for correct definitions (t~at is, governing principles or generalizations) of the virtuous and of the kosher.23 Talmudic analysis of Mishnaic lists aims at the labor of systematization and generalization-. ~d that analysis, when effective, takes the form of the· dialectical, or moving, argument, a matter defined in philosophical terms in due course. That argument comes at the end of a long period of prior, critical thought of a philosophical character. Specifically, as we shall see, in documents that reached closure long before the Talmud of Babylonia and that were utilized in the composition of that Talmud, arguments constructed along fairly commonplace philosophical principles· made their way. For instance, as we shall see, moving from the known to the· unknown by identifying the governing analogy-X i~ like Y, therefore follows the rule of Y, X is unlike Y in the following aspect, so does not follow the rule of Y, the analogy falling away-.represented a common· mode of analytical argument. So too, sorting out contradiction through the making of distinctions to explain difference will not have surprised participants in Rabbinic argument long before the Bavli came on the scene. But the writers of those compositions and composites in the Bavli that go beyond the received modes of thought and argument and venture into dialectics of a very particular order-these are the ones who took over and recast the entire antecedent heritage of thought and the rules governing argument. Specifically, they took the static, systematic exchange of proposition and counter-proposition, argument and refutation, and turned it into a dynamic, sometimes meandering sequence of propositions, lacking the neatness of the received, neat exchange of positions and reasons for those positions. For what marks the Bavli's mode of dialectics is the power of an argument to change course, the possibility of re-framing a position altogether in direct response to a powerful counter-argument. In Chapter Three I shall argue that dialectics was the necessary choice for our sages of blessed memory, considering the enormous heritage of contention and conflict and disharmony that the Mishnah and compilations of rules, as well as freefloating statements, of its period left them. How better receive these inconsistent norms than a mode of thought aiming at identifying inconsistency and defining with precision the encompassing categories and rules of a coherent order. 23

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CHAPTER ONE

Here we find not only the reasoned exchange of proposition, evidence, and argument, but the equally rational response to a good argument through a revision of the original, contrary position. When a player listens to what the other' says and responds not by repeating, with better arguments and more compelling evidence, his original position but by recasting his position altogether, then we have that moving argument that stands for dialectics in its purest sense. For there we address the possibility of not ,merely, refuting the position of the other, but even· changing his mind. In ot~er words, at its best,24 the Talmud replicates in writing the actualities of real, everyday arguments, not merely the acting out, in rhetorical form of questions and answers, of set-piece positions. And that observation returns us to our interest in rhetoric, not only logic. For we see that, approaching the replication of authentic, livj.ng argument, the Bavli's . writers did well to hand on not the script for set-piece recitation of still-life positions-the fully-articulated set":pie¢e positions of the one side and the other, as in a philosophical dialogue-but notes for the reconstruction of the real-life conversation between-and among!-' real' people, actually listening to one another and taking account of . what they were hearing on the spot. Once we admit to the possibility that the players may change positions, the course of argument, not only its issues, takes over. Then (as Plato thought, and in the manner of Aristotle's main writings) the right rhetoric is required. Notes for the reconstruction of an argument prove the ideal medium of preserving thought-that is, notes in writing. There is no other way. If I had to choose an analogy out of the arts, I would compare the prior modes of writing-spelling it all out-to the notes by which music is preserved for replication. I would further compare the Talmud's mode of writing-annotations that would guide the reconstruction of the action of thoughtto the symbols by which the dance is preserved for reenactment and renewal. The one is exact, the other approximate; both leave space for the performer's participation, but with an important difference. The composer writes down the notes out of what he hears in his head. In recording the ballet, the choreographer (counterpart to the

24 The authentic dialectical argument in the Bavli is by no means the principal or even the predominant mode of composition; many of the compositions and most of the composites of the Bavli undertake other tasks altogether, as I have shown in Talmudic Dialectics: Types and Forms.

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17

composer) is the one who dances the dance, and then the recorder writes down the symbols that preserve on paper what the choreographer has already done. If we can imagine an orchestra playing music and only then writing it down, or a soloist-composer performing the music as he made it up (and there have been such, though not many), we can see the difficulty facing those who "Y~uld write down, in advance, the rEuvre of thought. And that act of imagination helps us account for the character of:the Talmud's writing, a postfacto recording of the processes of thought to make possible others' progression through those same processes: not performance but intellectual recapitulation, not replication but reconstruction and renewal. The Talmud lives because it opens to us the intellectual life of those who lived it fir,st, then wrote it down for us. Accordingly, when we understand, in particular, the Talmud's dialectical argument, the rhetoric that encapsulates it, the analytical initiatives that drive it, the purposive program that sustains it, then we realize how' our sages of blessed memory would frame the intellect of Israel in accord with the intellectual model of philosophy (including science) that through theological Christianity also was to define the West. We therefore shall see in these pages how the Talmud's method of inquiry and mode of argument find intellectual counterparts in Aristotle's natural history and Plato's Socrates' dialectics. 25 Here then is how our sages of blessed memory would determine the necessary and sufficient way of making connections (natural history) and drawing conclusions (dialectics).

I see no point in trying at this stage to explain how our sages of blessed memory found in their solutions to the problems of science and philosophy-turning facts into intelligible patterns or lists, and patterns or lists into generalizations or seriescounterparts to the philosophical methods of natural history and dialectical argument that occupied the minds of their Christian counterparts in the Greek- and Syriac-speaking worlds (not to mention in Latin Christianity!). We should have first to come to a clear determination of the point at which modes of analysis of natural history and modes of argument through dialectics came to predominate. For the Mishnah and natural history, clearly, it was in the first and second centuries of the Common Era that the former took over; comparing the Mishnah to all prior writings of various Judaic systems, we discover we deal with a document unique in form and logic. Two exercises of comparison will shed some light on this problem of historical context. First, comparing the presentation of law in Qumran and in Elephantine-topical but not in media of hierarchical classification-shows the difference; and the formal and rhetorical character of the Mishnah finds no counterpart in any Judaism. As to the Talmud's mode of analytical dialectics, its only counterpart is in thle Rabbinic literature out of which the Talmud itself flows. In law I have found for antiquity no counterpart to the Talmud. But as we shall see, in philosophy, 25

18

CHAPTER ONE

such a counterpart presents itself. The real question is, why then does Rabbinic Judaism choose the method of philosophy to make its statement of law and theology?This brings us, second, to the other exercise in comparison that is required. The answer to that question will be suggested by the answer, to the counterpart: exactly why does nascent Christianity, from its first century, make the same choice? The difference is that what took place for Christianity in Alexandria (to begin with) took place for Judaism in Galilee (for natural history and the Mishnah) and in Galilee (in the Mishnah, Tosefta, and Sifra) and in Babylonia (in the Talmud) (for analytical dialectics). A comparison between the modes of argument of Aphrahat and his contemporaries in the fourth century stratum of the Bavli will prove interesting. My colleague, Professor Bruce D. Chilton, and I plan a work of comparison of logics operative in important documents of formative Christianity and Rabbinic Judaism, tentatively titled, The Intellectual Foundations if Christian and Judaic Discourse: The Philosopfry if Religious Argument (London, 1997: Routledge).

CHAPTER TWO

PHILOSOPHICAL ,MODES OF ANALYTICAL ARGUMENT One day there was a dispute in the school house [on the following matter]: 'As to a sword,. knife, dagger, spear, hand-saw, and scythe-at what point in making them do they become susceptible to become unclean? It is when the process of manufacturing them has been completed [at which point they are deemed useful and therefore susceptible]. And when is the process of manufacturing them completed? R. Yohanan said, "When one has tempered them in the crucible." R. Simeon b. Laqish said, "When one has furbished them in water." [R. Yohanan] said to him, "Never con a con-man" [lit.: a robber is an expert at robbery]. He said to him, "So what good .did you ever do Jor me? JiVhen I was a robber, people called me, (my lord' [lit.: rabbiJ, and now people call me (my lord.'" He said to him, "I'll tell you what good I've done Jor you, I brought you under the wings if the Presence if God. " R. Yohanan was offended, and R. Simeon b. Laqish fell ill. His [Yohanan'sJ sister [Simeon b. Laqish's wife] came to him weeping, saying to him, "[Heal my husban~] do it Jor my children's sake!" He said to her, "'Leave your fatherless children. I will preserve them alive' (Jer. 49: 11 )." "Then do it on account of my widowhood!" He said to her, "'and let your widows trust in me' (Jer. 49: 11 )." R. Simeon b. Laqish died, and R. Yohanan was much distressed tifterward. Rabbis said, "Who will go and restore his spirits? Let R. Eleazar b. Pedat go, because his traditions are well-honed." He went and took a seat bifOre him. At every statement that R. Yohanan made, he comments, "There is a Tannaite teaching that sustains your view." He said to him, "Are you like the son if Laqisha? When I would state something, the son if Laqisha would raise questions against my position on twenty four grounds, and I would find twentyfOur solutions, and it naturally Jollowed that the tradition was broadened, but you say to me merelY, (17zere is a Tannaite teaching that sustains your view.' Don't I know that what I say is sound?" So he went on tearing his clothes and weeping, "Where are you, the son if Laqisha, where are you, the son if Laqisha,)) and he cried until his mind turned .from him. Rabbis asked mercy for him, and he died. Bavli Baba Mesia 84a

20

CHAPTER TWO

I.

THE PUBLIC SIDE OF THOUGHT

The Gemara to the Mishnah, in the Talmud of Babylonia, provides us with notes that permit us to reconstruct large-scale analytical arguments. That fact underscores the public character of thought that the document means to precipitate. F or these notes require us to follow certain rules of thought and analysis i.nvolving a shared rationality. And, in fact, the rules are those of the Graeco-Roman philosophical tradition of dialectical analysis associated with the names of Aristotle and Socrates as portrayed by Plato in particular. The work of reconstruction can take place only in public, that is, within an intellectual ("textual") community. Guided by those rules of analysis alld argument, we may take the brief notes provided by the Talmud ~nd re'alize in full,the large-scale intellectual inquiry preserved for us in concise a manner by the framers and authors of the Talmud. Just as Plato's Socrates deemed writing books, inferior to presenting o~a.l arguments, so our sages of blessed memory denigrated writing in fay-or of memory, meaning, the recapitulation in speech of what is remembered. 1 That is why I undertake here to present an account of the reading and reconstruction of the Talmud. What turns thought from opinion into philosophy is what transforms philosophy from reflection or meditation into a public event. That is the intent not only to exchange information or set forth a viewpoint to whom it may concern, but to change the mind of the listening, the responsive other. What marks writing as philosophical is the claim that what is said confronts and withstands contrary

so

I

,

I For the Mishnah memorization involved not the gist but the exact wording, which accounts for the mnemonic characteristics of Mishnah-writing, its poetic quality. For the Gemara, oral recapitulation required not the wording but the gist; no hint of an expectation that the precise formUlations of argument would be repeatedly acted out is contained in the wording, which is too elliptical and abbreviated to make sense when merely repeated. Every translator has to supply the missing words, to convey the un articulated thoughts of the text, and every commentator imparts to the text his own construction of its sense and meaning. That makes commentary and translation an active player in the intellectual process of representation. For the Mishnah, by contrast, commentaries provide the sense of fixed wording, and translations of a quite literal character (so far as American English and German are concerned, at any rate) convey the sense of the Hebrew original. I have the impression that a contemporary Israeli can read the Mishnah without the mediation of inserted language, requiring only data to make sense of the text, but no one can translate the exact wording of the Talmud and without extensive amplification (in notes) or interpolation produce sense of any kind. See my Translating the Classics if Judaism. In Yheory and in Practice.

PHILOSOPHICAL MODES OF ANALYTICAL ARGUl\tIENT

21

opinion, enjoys the validation of argument and evidence, and enters into the competition of truth. The other-~eader or listener-is in~ vited to participate, indeed treated as judge of the process. And the thinker becomes a philosopher in the setting of Classical philosophy when he acknowledges _that his concept competes with some other. That takes place. when he assumes the burden not only of-announcing his view but examining evidence acknowledged by all sides and conducting an argument of advocacy and analysis in accord with modes of argument shared by both (or all) parties. And, in the nature of things, the claim to present the best explanation, the most adequate theory, carries with it the requirement that the claim register in public, in open debate and universally-accessible argument. To think is to act in intellectual community, and much philosophical writing-Classical and Talmudic alike-takes the form of an argument-a dispute, a debate, a dialogue. It is important at this point to specify what we should not regard as philosophical discourse but discourse of another sort altogether, that is, not a dispute, debate, or dialogue. The indicative mark of philosophical. dialogue emerges in the character of the exchange. What would constitute a contra-indication? A mere conversation hardly suffices to mark discourse as public in the sense used here, nor is a dialogue merely an exchange between persons who formally are not presented as equal parties to the conversation-master and disciple, for instance. When Jesus converses with his disciples, the form of a dialogue does not obscure the absence of authentic exchange of equally-plausible positions and the reasons thereof. Nor is he represented as conducting a dialogue with the Pharisees, only a tirade against them. When Tarfon plays straight man to Aqiba's lecturing, announcing, " ... who parts from you parts from life itself," that does not constitute a dialogue. Tarfon is a straight-man. A fictitious debating partner, e.g., Justin's "Trypho," or Aphrahat's "Sage of Israel" does not qualify as a player in a philosophical dialogue. Indeed, these artificial creations, using philosophical form to convey polemical substance, typify theological apologetics, but not philosophical dispute, debate, or dialogue. In them the dispute is scarcely plausible, and the debate is too one-sided to qualifY as a philosophical exchange worthy of the name. To produce dialogue we must identify authentic competition between well-crafted ideas, reasonably set forth on both sides, with ample evidence and fully-exposed arguments given to each participant.

22

CHAPTER TWO

In both the Talmud and Classical philosophy, we shall now see, thought takes place in public, subject to on-going competition among equal partners to debate. Philosophical dialogue entails the contention of engaged minds, debating as equals in standing and judgment quite contrary' positions on the same question. And that, dialogue marks as singular both Classical philosophy set forth by Plato and Aristotle and also Talmudic law and dialectics. In formal terms. the debate in the primitive form of the disp~te, 'or in the complex fqrms of exchanges of reasoning, evidence, and argument, marks a paramount convention in the sages' writing; in substantive terms disagreement conducted in civil terms, through reasoned disputes on common issues, defines the dynamics of their thought. That public thought therefore is always active, demonstrative, expressive. It never suffices, within the analytical components of their canon, in particular the Talmud, merely to set forth a pr()position. Absent argument, no one leaves the field sati~fied, let alone persuaded. In rhetorical tGrms too, the pres,entation of thought for both Classical philosophy and the Talmud takes place in public and in the context of contention. The rh~toric of dispute and debate matches the logic of philosophical contention concerning what is the better explanation or the more compelling and useful definition. That characteristic of thought bears deep implications also for the form of argument, which is our starting point in considering the scientific and philosophical character of the Talmud, the manifest conviction, shared with Classical philosophy but not with earlier Judaic writings, that opinion is subject to test of evidence, argument, constructive demonstration, that argument is the medium of examination, and that implicitly-public dispute and debate define the discipline of intellect. Modes of public argument characterize the context, not only the conduct, of intellectual exchange. Merely announcing conflicting opinions or reporting myths or stories bearing contradictory implications will not suffice to establish such an exchange. For the substance of debate and dispute corresponds to the form: just as ideas are exchanged and compared, so the exchange takes place face to face and not only in autonomous writing. Questionanswer, not only set-piece, side-by-side expositions of two contrary propositions, 2 best embodies the transaction. Accordingly, choices in favor of public thought govern not only the manner of argument but 2

As in the two Creation-stories of Genesis 1-2!

PHILOSOPHICAL MODES OF ANALYTICAL ARGUMENT

23

also the intellectual media, e.g., not static, free-standing disquisitions (whether or not using questions and answers) but vivid, staccato interchange of contradictory phrases or clauses. Thought that tak~s place in dynamic arguments characterizes Classical philosophy and predominates in the Talmud. To assess any claim -to explain and interpret Talmudic logic and rhetoric (modes of argumen,t, media of presentation of ·argu:p1ent), we have to begin with prior jsraelite writing. For an allegation such as mine, that a context other than the Israelite one is to be invoked in the inquiry into modes of thought and argument of the Talmud, must address the obvious challenge: is this not "traditional," meaning, derived from Israelite precedent? In the present setting, what is implicit in the allegation of a traditional origin for the documents under ·study is that we are able to read and interpret the Mishnah and Gemara in precisely the same ways that ·we should read and in~erpret any prior Israelite writing, e.g., whether in Scripture, or in the Dead Sea Library, or in the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Hebrew Scriptures, or in the writings of Josephus or Philo or any other Judaic source. Before we look for context and explanation beyond the limits of Israel's on-going herit?-ge, 3 weare required by prevailing premise to look for origins within and not beyond Israel's own boundaries. 4 That is why we have at the outset to ask a simple question. It is 3 Speaking of "heritage" within the premise that a single, unitary, harmonious, and continuous "tradition" is to be posited and invoked, a premise that I do not myself hold. 4 That is, diffusionists, who concern themselves with explanation by appeal to a particular time and place of origin (not, e.g., timeless logic) ordinarily assume that a "tradition" handed on over time is the first explanation for traits of culture or intellect (expressed in writing or in doctrine) characteristic of a given Israelite writing. Issues of "influence" and "borrowing" then may be considered. For my part, I hold no brief for questions of origin, neither "tradition" nor "influence" and "borrowing," since comparison and contrast, such as I conduct in these pages, hardly must be limited to what is continuous (traditional) or contiguous and contemporaneous (those that may borrow or influence). And mine is an exercise in seeking the context for the reading and interpretation of a rather odd piece of writing by identifYing an intellectual, not a sociological-historical and material, context. G. E. R. lloyd, Polarity and Analogy. Two Types oj Argumentation in Early Greek 77zought compares Near Eastern and Egyptian science without invoking the notion that there were direct connections between Greek and other intellectual communities or that the latter "originated" in the former. But those who raise issues of tradition, influence, and borrowing and deem matters of cultural comparison best explained thereby will quite reasonably wonder about matters of origin, influence, borrowing, not to mention "heritage" or "tradition." Hence the issue pursued in the present setting.

24

CHAPTER TWO

whether or not the Talmud's premises as to the context in which inquiry takes place and the rules of argument that govern prove congruent to those coming down from ancient Israelite times and attested in received writings. Only then do we consider whether those premises as to the modes of argument-context and conduct alikeprove congruent to the ones characteristic of Classical philosophy. Indeed, asking about prior representation of thought even prior to the Israelites allows broader perspective on; the entire matter' at hand. And that brings us to the remarkable discovery of Classical philbs~ ophy, the critical importance of debate. So' native to the Mishnah, so essential in Classical science and philosophy, debate marks the Mishnah as unique in the Israelite context, but natural in the Classical philosophical one,-and the Greek philosophers as singular in the context of world civilization. G. E. R. lloyd describes this matter in language that serves equally well for the various Judaic systems: J

,

'

The Egyptians. ~ . had various beliefs about the way the sky is held up. One idea was that it is supported on posts, another that it is held up by a god, a third that it rests on walls, a fourth that it is a cow or a goddess ... But a story-teller recounting anyone such myth need pay no attention to other beliefs about the sky, £\nd he would hardly have been troubled by an y inconsistency between them. Nor, one may assume, did he feel that his own account was in competition with any other in the sense that it might be more or less correct or have better or worse grounds for its support than some other belief. 5

If we examine the two creation-myths of Genesis, or the two stories of the Flood, we see how readily conflicting stories might be joined together, and how little credence was placed on the possibility that one theory of matters, embodied in one version, might be correct, the other wrong. In search of dispute and debate, articulated and pursued, we simply look in vain through the entire heritage of Israelite Scriptures (with a stated exception given presently) and through all extra-scriptural writings of various Judaic systems. Greek philosophy and Talmudic jurisprudence in due course, by contrast, articulately faced the possibility that differing opinion competed and that the thinker must advocate the claim that his theory was right, the other's wrong. Conflicting principles both cannot be right, and merely announcing an opinion without considering alter5

Lloyd, Ope cit., pp. 11-12.

PHILOSOPHICAL MODES OF ANALYTICAL ARGUMENT

25

natives and proposing to falsify them does not suffice for intellectual endeavor. And with the recognition of that possibility of not only opinion but argument, Greek philosophy engaged in debate:; When we turn to the early Greek philosophers, there is a fundamental difference. Many of them tackle the same problems and investigate the same natural phenomena [as Egyptian,a~d other science], but it is tacitly assumed that the various theories and explanations t~ey propose are directly competing with, one another. The urge is towards finding the best explanation, the mo~t adequate theory, and they are then forced t6 consider the grounds for their ideas, the evidence and arguments in their favor, as well as the weak points in their opponents' theories. 6

And what was true of science pertained to civilization in all aspects: In their very different spheres of activity, the philosopher, Thales and the law-giver Solon may be said to have had at least two things in common.' First, both disclaimed any supernatural authonty for their own ideas, and, secondly, both accepted the principles of free debate and of public access to the information on which a person or an idea should be judged. The essence of the Milesians' contribution was to introduce a new critical spirit into man's attitude to the world of nature, but this should be seen as a counterpart to, and offshoot of, the contemporary development of the practice of free debate and open discussion in the context of politics and law throughout the Greek world. 7

We are on strong grounds indeed in insisting that the presuppositions of the circumstance of discourse and the conduct of exchange of thought demand attention before the details of the rules of engagement come under discussion. The phenomenon of debate brings us to the rules of engagement that dictate where and how philosophy takes place . For Classical philosophy learning takes place (at least in imagination) in person, in public and through universally accessible debate. The same evidence and arguments must appeal to all parties, and the same principles of rational inquiry govern everyone. That is why the ideal circumstances for philosophizing present themselves in collective argument, conducted (at least in theory and intent) orally, through exchange; or in public exposition, in lecture-form, of well-considered knowledge. Plato's dialogues, Aristode's lectures, define the norm, even though other contexts of philosophical speech are attested. The public circumstance-

6

7

lloyd, op. cit., p. 12. lloyd, op. cit., p. 15.

26

CHAPTER TWO

dialogue through debate or lecture-defines the rhetorical premise and even dictates the form, whether dialogue, for Plato's Socrates, or lecture notes, for Aristotle. Arguments conducted for all concerned parties, aimed at showing for a wide audience the reasons for sound. convictions, form the wherewithal of rigorous and als? effective thought. These convictions form the basis Qf Western intellectual life at its origins, with Plato and Aristotle, and, as we shall see, they are shared by the framers of the Mishnah and, in a different manner, the Gemara as well. Now to advert to the view that the Mishnah and Gemara continue tradition and do not innovate. That claim conflicts with the condition of the entire received heritage ("tradition"). Ancient Israelite Scriptures yield few comparable kinds of writing, that is to say, written down notes for a public exposition, on the one side, or a script for the reenactment of an exchange of views, on the other. True, one may well claim that parts of Job are meant for public ' performance, but in the\main, the' Wisdom literature, even parts of it devoted to propositions of general intelligibilitY and moral virtue such as Ecclesiastes and Proverbs, in no way approach the conception of a public engagement in the form of a dialogue rich in argument and other exchange. The counseling father and the counseled son do not present themselves as exceptions to the rule. Whether written to be read in private or publicly sung and declaimed, these writings do not exhibit in common with those of Plato and Aristotle a single salient trait. That is to say, we look in vain in the writings of other Judaic systems, such as those collected in the Old Testament Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha, in the library found at Qumran, in the papyri discovered at Elephantine, for instance, for anything comparable to notes for a public argument. 8 ,

For a comparison with the Zoroastrian Rivayat-writing of the period just beyond the closure of the Talmud, see my Judaism and Zoroastrianism at the Dusk qf Late Antiquity. How Two Ancient Faiths Wrote Down 77zeir Great Traditions. Atlanta, 1993: Scholars Press for South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism. There .the oral setting is presupposed, but the exchange is one involving only information, not dispute. My result may be simply stated. Some authors find it sufficient to give [1] a rule alone, some want [2] a myth to accompany the rule, but one authorship-the Talmud's alone-insists that [3J the rule be subordinated to a process of critical analytical reason. Specifically: [1 J in the first category fall Aturfarnbag's Rivayat, on the one side, and the Mishnah, on the other. In the second we find [2J the other rivayat, the one that accompanies the Datestan i Denig,-not to mention on the Israelite side all of the Pentateuchal law codes. In the third is only [3J the Bavli, which so reformulates discourse as to redefine what can be meant by "tradition." 8

PHILOSOPHICAL MODES OF ANALYTICAL ARGUMENT

·27

And the Talmud's innovation in form corresponds to its intellectual novelty. In no prior writing is a debate conducted, or the premise of a debate allowed to govern; opinions conflict throughout, bVt never compete in articulate fashion as they do in the dialogic writing of the Mishnah and analytical dialectics of the Gemara. For the received Israelite writing in Hebrew and Aramaic prior. to the Mishnah contains no counterpart to a document made up of disputes, with conflicting opinions given in accord with named authorities on a common agendum of difference. The dispute-form, indicative ,of the Mishnah and amplified in the Gemara, finds no counterpart in a single earlier writing in Israel. In all of Hebrew Scriptures, for example, with their rich record of conflicting viewpoint we have nothing like a public dispute, a debate comprising balanced, reasonable arguments (prophets, for instance, do not debate with kings or priests, and only Moses debates with God, and then not on equal terms). Not only· so, but while more than a single opinion may register in a given context,

Of the documents I survey in the cited work, two suffice with [1] the statement of rules alone, Aturfarnbag's Rivayat, which sets forth rules in the form of questions and answers, and the Mishnah, which uses simple declarative sentences, statements of fact, with the same effect. A third document, the Yerushalmi, wants a rule with secondary clarification, and forms a secondary development within this same cat. egory. Further, the Pursishniha-called by its editors "a Zoroastrian catechism"-· exhibits the same general characteristics: convey information through unadorned statements of fact in the form of questions and answers. Its governing form does not greatly vary from Aturfarnbag's (Translations are by A. V. Williams, 'The Pahlavi .8ivayat Accompanying the Dadestan i Denig Copenhagen, 1990: The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters through Munksgaard): j

Question: Do any of them who stand by the religion of Ohrmazd and Zartuxsht become worth of Hell or not? Answer: No. Because everyone who stands by the religion of Ohrmazd and everyone who has worshipped Zartuxsht are all worth of Paradise .... The laconic style runs on in this way for fifty-eight such exchanges. It requires very little writing skill to produce out of that form of statement of facts, e.g., "None of them who stand by the religion of Ohrmazd and Zartusht become worthy of Hell, because everyone who stands by ... are all worthy of Paradise." How far does that formulation stand from the following: A. All Israelites have a share in the world to come, B. as it is said, "Your people also shall be all righteous, they shall inherit the land forever; the branch of my planting, the work of my hands, that I may be glorified" (Is. 60:21). C. And these are the ones who have no portion in the world to come: D. (1) He who says, the resurrection of the dead is a teaching which does not derive from the Torah, (2) and the Torah does not come from Heaven; and (3) an Epicurean.

28

CHAPTER TWO

one opInIon is never juxtaposed with some other and set out with arguments in behalf of the superiority of one position over another" or one explanation ~ over another, for the 'purposes of a reasoned exchange of opinion and argument. That is to say, Elijah and the priests of Baal do not enjoy equal time to explain why fire consumed Elijah's but not the priests' offerings. The singularity of the dispute-form proves still more striking when we examine the genre of Israelite literature to which the Mishnah MISHNAH-TRACTATE SANHEDRIN

10: 1

In the presentations of theological norms in the two documents I see no consequential difference in form-use of laconic declarations of facts-other than the cited proof text. Both suffice with simple declarative sentences. Neither demands a myth in situ-in the very context of its presentation, I rpean-to validate the information. The principal point is what accompanies these declarations: validation or not. When, by contrast, we find persistent reference to Zoroaster's asking Ohrmazd questions, even though the questions form simple, laconic statements, and the answers likewise, we are in a different frame of reference altogether. The point of differentiation is, clear when we come to the second type of presentation. The joining of rule to myth characterizes [2J the Pahlavi Rivayat Accompanying the Dadestan i Denig, , invoking an implicit myth at most of its statements of rules by having Ohrmazd 'answer Zoroaster's questions. This occurs early on, setting the stage for the governing (but not sole) form of the document:

THE

OMNISCIENCE OF OHRMAZD

This chapter: Zoroaster asked Ohrmazd: "Are you wise and omniscient?" And Ohrmazd said: "I am wise and omniscient" And Zoroaster said: "Of what nature is your wisdom?" Ohrmazd said: "My wisdom is such that if they take all the milk of every Oiving) thing into one cup, *then I know how to tell one by one separately *from whose breast (the milk comes); and if they let all the water which is in the world (flow) into one place, I know how to tell one by one separateOy) from which spring (the water comes); and if they compress (together) finely all the plants which are in all the world, I know how to put them back one by one into their own place". But the same form persists when mere factual information, rules of conduct, for example, is set forth, as in the following:

BODILY EFFECTS OF SINS AND GOOD DEEDS

And this also he asked of Ohrmazd: "If a man commits a sin (through) all (his) bodily members, then to which of his members does the evil first come?" Ohrmazd said: "Because in the human body the organ of the tongue (is) the most valuable, then it first comes to the tongue .... " Not all of the pericopes are prefaced by the attributions to God and Zoroaster, but enough of them are to impart to the entire document the character of a writing

PHILOSOPHICAL MODES OF ANALYTICAL ARGUMENT

29

most obviously may be alleged to correspond, law codes. 9 The manner in which laws are set forth in Exodus (JE), the Holines.s Code (P), Deuteronomy, let alone the llbrary at Qumran and in the Elephantine papyri, for example, in no way proves congruent with the manner in which the Mishn~h sets forth laws. To take two striking differences already adumbrated, the -former attribute nothing to named authorities, the latter names authorities in nearly every crimp~sition; further, the former never contain articulated debates on laws but only apodictic laws; the latter is made up of explicit disputes of rulings on a shared agendum of issues. A third difference, from Scripture's codes in particular, is to be noted: the absence of a myth of authority, corresponding to "The Lord spoke to Moses saYing, speak to the children of Israel and say to them." To take an obvious point of comparison, set side by side, the Mishnah's presentation of Sabbath law and that in the Dead Sea library bear few points of formal comparability at all. True, the Mi~hnah's law refers constantly to the substance of Scripture, even though citations of scriptural proof-texts prove rare and at best episodic. That makes all the more remarkable the persistence of disputes as the norm, unattributed, normative law as the mere background for the setting of vivid discourse. It is equally true that'the Mishnah's law intersects with the law portrayed in prior collections, which is hardly surprising given the reference-point of all collections in Scripture. That again underscores the significant point: while in some details, the snippets of laws preserved at Qumran intersect in contents with bits of the laws of the Mishnah and related writings, in form we find only differences. 1O As we shall note in a moment, while the Mishnah frames much of its materials in the form of public exchanges, the other Judaisms' law codes give no hint as to their framers' expectations on how their writings were to be received and on the authority of the communication of God to the prophet, one that provides a verbatim record of revelation, and that bears the implicit myth that the information conveyed is revealed. The third mode of writing down a great tradition belongs only to the Bavli: rules accompanied by analytical reasoning and sustained, dialectical argument. 9 I do not concur in that allegation as to the "genre" of the Mishnah, but once more introduce it for the sake of argument. In fact a single document cannot define, or constitute, a genre at all. And the Mishnah's singularity is its indicative trait in Israelite context. 10 On the relationship of Qumran and Rabbinic Sabbath law, see Lawrence H. Schiffman, The H alakhah at Q!fmran (Leiden, 1975). Schiffman does not undertake form -analytical comparisons.

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CHAPTER TWO

read. The Mishnah is a document to be memorized and perforrneda kind of mimetic version of the law-and the formal traits that so indicate in the case of th'e Mishnah simply do not characterize those other law codes at all. 11 It is the striking fact, therefore, that the first piece of writing in the history of Judaic religious systems to set forth a program of debate is the Mishnah. 12 And the only subsequent documents that carried forward the disputes and debates of the Mishnah are the two Talmuds' Gemaras. Elsewhere, differing opinions prove abundant. But occasions in which differing opinions are set forth in the form, and for the purpose, of debate prove few indeed. 13 The Mishnah, start to finish, forms a vast arena for debate. And, as lloyd points out, beyond the recognition that "natural phenomena are not the products of random or arbitrary influences but regular! and governed by determinable sequences of cause and effect,"14 it is'-'debate that forms the ~stinguishing mar~ of Greek science and philosophy, and it is with the Mishnah that debate entered the public discourse of the Judaism put forth by our sages of blessed memory. In the Mishn,ah's representation of matters, the sages always' "knew and criticized one another's ideas," just as did the early Greek philosophers. And, in the context of prior Israelite writing, they find no antecedents or models or precedents for their insistence upon debate, (implicit) face-to-face exchange of contradictory views, with provision for sorting out difference through reasoned exchange. 15 I I If we further consider the literary ambition exhibited in the massive size of the Mishnah as compared with the paltry volume of laws preserved among other Judaisms, that point is reenforced. 12 We make provision for a possible exception in the case of Job, but supernatural debate and debate between men surely are to be classified differently. 13 The dispute in the l\1idrash-compilations must be addressed in its own terms. But when it comes to debates and extended dialogues, the Gemaras of the two Talmuds stand by themselves even when compared with the later Midrash-compilations, beyond Sifra. 14 Uoyd, Early Greek Science, p. 8. 15 That is not to argue for one minute that our sages studied philosophy before, during, or after their yeshiva-years (so to speak). Questions of origins, theories of influence and borrowing-these presuppose traits of culture and its formation and diffusion that require attention in their own terms. Why anyone should find surprising in the age of Neo-Platonism that our sages should produce a work such as the Mishnah congruent in method and in intent to neo-Platonic writing (as I show in Judaism as Philosophy) seems to me also to require an explanation. There I argue that comparison and contrast by definition acknowledge no boundaries of culture or historical context. By rights and by simple logic we can compare and contrast anything that falls into the same classification with anything else in that same classification. Since people in widely separated places may and often do come to the same con-

PHILOSOPHICAL MODES OF ANALYTICAL ARGUMENT

31

If we cannot find an Israelite "tradition" realized, also, in the Mishnah, then when we come to the Talmud's Gemara, We find ourselves still further away from the received and typical rhetoric of Israelite writing. It is there, and only there, that we find the sustained, dialectical argument that transforms law into jurisprudence and the arena for philosophical spe·culation· and argumen_t~ 16 Except for the Gemara of the Talmud of the Land of Israel,17 no . other writing out of the Judaisms of antiquity, whether of the Rabbinic or any other Judaism, is comprised of fully-exposed disputes and debates and protracted analytical arguments as is the Bavli. It follows that had the authors of compositions of dialectical analysis for use in the Bavli wished to find models for their work in the prior literature of Israel-whether of their own Judaism or of some other-they would have looked in vain for guidance. The very conception of the writtendown argument, or rather, the provision of notes for the reconstitution of an oral argument, in the Israelite setting is unique to the Mishnah's two Gemaras, the Yerushalmi and the Bavli. But-to return to our argument-~n the Classical philosophical setting that conception of the requirement of responsible thought will have proved routine. For writing in the form of notes for a lecture, a script for a public debate, notes for the oral reiteration of reasonable, conflicting positions, and similar public exercises in particular, cannot have surprised Classical philosophers. 18 That judgment rests clusions about the same things, we commit no act of violence against common sense by invoking in this context the names of Aristotle as to method and Plato and Middle Platonism and particularly the Neo-Platonism that came to full expression only later on in the writings of Plotinus as to proposition. What we seek, as a matter of fact, is nothing more than the classification, as philosophy, of the Mishnah's method and message. I maintain that that message and method exhibit congruence with philosophies of the same kind, that is, philosophies that, whole or in part, ask the same types of questions and pursue the same means for answering them. We pursue these matters in Chapter Two. 16 What I said about the points of commonality and difference with the Zoroastrian Rivayat-writing of a somewhat later period pertains here as well. 17 There, as I have already noted, the dispute gives way to considerable analytical arguments. These are different from the kind we find in the Bavli, as I said, since they prefer the form of the axiom-theorem, rather than the open-ended dialectics of the Bavli. But in the Yerushalmi we do find disputes and debates as we do in the Bavli. 18 I make no reference to Hellenistic ones, but only to the principals who define my models here. Philonic scholarship is well able to make its own judgments on these matters. I cannot point to any books or articles that compare Philo's modes of argument with the Talmud's. Harry A. Wolfson, Philo (Cambridge, 1954: Harvard University Press) does not pursue this question.

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on the fact that while undertaking formal writing, writing to be read and not necessarily reconstructed and declaimed, both Plato and Aristotle set forth in much of the writing that we have from them notes on what is to be said, an intellectual mnemonics, a corpus of scripts guiding reenactment of public dialogue, recapitulation of public learning. They deemed oral recapitulation of argument to form the preferred (though not sole) medium for philosophy. For it is broadly recognized that the writings of Aristotle comprise well-spelled out lecture notes, not written-out treatises; from those notes one may reconstruct the thought-proposition, argument, evidence, analysisthat Aristotle wished to convey. The Talmud's premises as to the rules of engagement in public argument prove congruent to the ones characteristic of Classical philosophy.19 Let us turn from generalities to the specifics of the public side of learning as conducted by our models of philosophy, Plato and Aristotle. For both, philosophy was to be conducted in public, through argument conducted analytically. As to Plato, he held the view that the supreme method is question-and-answer: Plato . . . thinks of dialectic as a method of discovery at least as much as a method of teaching. . . question-and-answer is essential to philosophic discovery20 . . . dialectic is the supreme method of discovery as well as of teaching, and dialectic has its being only in question-and-answer 21

19 Only extreme historicism requires us to speculate on where and how our sages of blessed memory discovered the possibilities for the preservation and reconstitution of thought that Classical philosophy realized. It suffices to recall that Christianity from Ncrth Mrica and Egypt eastward to Babylonia, from the Land of Israel northward to Syria and Asia Minor, found philosophical media of thought and presentation to form entirely appropriate and desirable ways for the statement of the faith. They were not the same media, to be sure. For example, Aphrahat's civil and eloquent briefs for Christian belief, composed in compelling argument, based on evidence shared by all parties to the dispute, find no counterpart in the Rabbinic literature. But why should we find surprising that, in a world in which learning shaded over into critical, analytical quest for reasoned argument through philosophy, our sages of blessed memory should have shaped for their own purposes a set of deeply philosophical media for defining the context and the conduct of the arguments they proposed to :r;nount. What marks their originality is the distinctive ways in which they made use of elements of a common heritage. For, after all, Christianity in Syriac, Greek, and Latin produced philosophical writings, but no Mishnah (for the expression through norms of law of deep philosophical judgments) and no Gemara (for the systematic testing of encompassing generalization, the resolution of issues of conflicting opinion or tradition, and the generation of new knowledge). 20 Richard Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic, p. 80. 21 Ibid., p. 81.

PHILOSOPHICAL MODES OF ANALYTICAL ARGUMENT

33

What formally defines dialectic to begin with is the pattern of question and answer, 'challenge and response. But that was not for merely rhetorical effect. It was for substantive intellectual considerations. It was the way to accomplish one's intellectual purpose, fully to expose the strengths of one's own announced position and the weaknesses of the contrary view. Later on, in the proper context, we shall identifY the substantive intellectual consequences of the Talmud's conduct of argument through the dialogue of. question and answer. But it is clear that, for Plato, question and answer formed not a mere rhetorical conceit, a way of holding the attention of the audience through dramatic exchange, but a manner of conducting thought. So states Robinson on the interplay of public argument and public intellection: Plato's view that question-and-answer is essential to good method was due in general to the fondness of the ancient Athenians for discussion. They regarded thinking as a social affair and interpreted thought in terms of speech. Although Plato recognized that a man may make discoveries in his study, he held that he does so by a process essentially the same as that of discussion. 22

The form, as much as the substance, governs the progress of thought. The _following passage could serve as well to describe the kind of writing through which Talmudic dialectics comes to formal expression. Just as the Gemara's argument is brief, elliptical, interrupted, and disruptive, so dialectics in Classical philosophy thrived on discontinuity, interruption, objection, response-conversation: ... the dialectician's words are always arranged in the discontinuous form of conversation, as opposed to the continuous oral harangue and the written discourse... dialectical method means conversational method ... dialectic was a social activity. It could not be furthered by the individual alone.

My earlier remarks on the importance of audience and communityhearing in a broad presence-underscore the deliberate choice represented in dispute, debate, dialogue, in all, dialectic: The notion of communal inquiry ... is frequent in the dialogues. The partners in this enterprise were not identical in function. The one led and the other followed (for essentially dialectic was a conversation between precisely two persons at a time; any third was, for the time, merely a listener). The leader questions and the follower answered; for

22

Ibid., pp. 82-3.

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CHAPTER TWO

the conversation was always predominantly question-and-answer. The question was usually a request for judgment on a given proposition, requiring the answer yes or no. 23

It suffices at this point to note: so it is with the Talmud, which is made talmudic by recurrent exercises in dialectical analysis. That affect upon the art of writing, therefore reading, should not be missed. Plato's scripts, Aristotle's highly articulated lecture-notesthese form choices, not mere accidents.24 While among many, both philosophers produced writing for other than oral replication, an important component of the oeuvre of each took the form of written. down dialogue. Specifically, the reason for providing notes, not fully articulated, written down thought, derives not from the technical limitations of the world before printing, when all writing required endless copying. For the academy, the reason derived from the conviction that writing is inferior to conversation. In the Phaedrus, Plato argues, "The written word cannot teach or give any great certainty and clarity."25 This is for seyeral reasons: [The written word] makes men forgetful, by inviting _them to trust the ink instead of their memories; whereas true knowledge involves memory graven in the soul. Secondly, it cannot answer questions: "if you ask a question, wishing to understand one of the statements, it only says some one and the same thing all the time." It therefore can neither explain anything you do not follow nor remove any objection you may have. Thirdly, the written word cannot chose whom to address, but inevitably speaks to anyone who reads it ... True teaching occurs only "when a man takes a fitting soul and, using the dialectical art, sows and grows therein with knowledge words that can defend themselves and their grower, that are not fruitless but bear seed, from which others growing in other characters may continue this immortally, making their possessor happy as it is possible for man to be."26

Our sages of blessed memory took the same view, though for different, theological reasons. Expressed in a quite different idiom. the same powerful preference for oral media appears in the following: 23

Ibid., p. 77.

24 That is so, even though what has survived is a matter of accident-Aristotle's notes, but not his fully-written out treatises, and an equally-fortuitous selection of Plato's writings. I obviously make no claim that what has survived fully embodies the Classical philosophers' intention, only that it typifies the media of thought and expression characteristic of their heritage, and that those media resorted to oralitydialogue, debate, lecture-for their principal form. 25 Richard Robinson, Plato)s Earlier Dialectic, p. 79. 26 Ibid., p. 80.

PHILOSOPHICAL MODES OF ANALYTICAL ARGUMENT

35

1.10 A. R. Judah bar Nahmani, the interpreter of R. Simeon h. Laqish, expounded, "One version of Scripture says, 'Write these words' Ex. 34:27), and another verse of Scripture says, 'For in accord with these words' (Ex. 34:27). [Since the word 'in accord' can be translat~d, 'by the onil version ... ,'] it means to tell you, matters that are to be memorized you have not got the right to state in writing,' and those that are to be in writing you have not got the right to state from memory." B. And a Tannaite.. authori!J if the household if R. Ishmael [states}, "Scripture says, 'Write these words for yourself,' meaning, these are the words that you may write, but you may not write down laws." C. Said R. Yohanan, "The Holy One, blessed be He, made a covenant with Israel only on account of words that are memorized: 'For by memorizing these words, I have made a covenant with you and with Israel' (Ex. 34:27)." Bavli Gittin 60b

For our sages, the medium of oral formulation and oral transmission, through memory, takes priority in the preservation of tradition. But the reasons given in the Phaedrus do not intersect with the theological convictions implicit in the Talmudic passage. What is important for our argument is only the shared point of insistence on the priority of a medium of formulation and transmission that is, by its nature, public.

II.

WRITTEN

RECORDED FOR

MARKs ORAL

OF THOUGHT RECAPITULATION

At several points we have already noted the character of dialogue, dispute, and debate as the written-down form of an oral document. From these general considerations, we move to the specifics of the technology of the written dialogue, script, or mnemonic record. To read any piece of writing that comes to us from remote places and distant times, we have first of all to ask ourselves how has this writing reached us. And, stipulating in advance a long process of copying, leading upward to printing, we particularly want to know the state of the writing at the point of origin. Specifically, we need. to inquire whether the writing bears the marks of having been formulated originally for publication, or whether it took shape in some other way than the way that for us is routine, that is, through a deliberate act of authorship. For example, Moses,

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CHAPTER 1WO

Socrates and Jesus produced no written records, so that what we have in our hands concerning their lives and teachings derives from others. Much that comes to us in Aristotle's name, moreover, in fact originated in notes on lectures or for lectures that he gave. Some maintain that Plato's dialogues were intended as scripts for public performances. One of our tasks in finding out how the document works is to ask how it worked to begin with. We want to know how people want it to accomplish their goals. So these considerations will recur throughout. To begin with, some ancient writings exhibit marks of careful composition, and others do not. Some bear the marks of a single writer and attest to his idiosyncrasy, as in the ·case of Paul's letters. Others, whether written by an individual or by a committee, conform to the rules of consensus-writing, e.g., are anonymous and laconic, avoiding marks of distinctive modes of personal expression. The Mishnah is a good example of that kind of public writing. Some adhere to a protocol of dignity and clarity and elegance of argument and expression, like the writings of Aphrahat. Others prove catch-as-catch-can, like major composites of the Talmud of Babylonia, which meander hither and yon, bear in their midst sizable interpolations, carry in their wake huge appendices of information lacking all clear argument. These complex composites conform to rules of structure and composition different from those that govern other documents in the very same canon, e.g., the Mishnah, Sifra, Leviticus Rabbah, and so forth. In more general terms: some prove hig~y formalized, others not at all systematic in their formal traits. Some documents-the psalms from the Essene library at Qumran, for another--can be read (and translated into an Indo-European language) more or less word for word, as they were written, being immediately accessible to US. 27 Others clearly presuppose not a reader but a teacher and student, vast bodies of information and techniques of interpretation being required to make sense of any given passage. Whether or not the Mishnah presupposes access through a masterdisciple encounter, the Talmud certainly does. Documents that someone or circle has composed to be read prove immediately accessible without mediation; we may pick up and read the Gospels, for example. Documents for which some other plan was originally in mind, 27 Stipulating, for the moment, that diverse readings, deriving from centuries of copying, will have to be taken into account.

PHILOSOPHICAL MODES OF ANALYTICAL ARGUMENT

37

by contrast, make their statement, in an a~cane and gnomic manner, and it becomes the task of the contemporary reader to learn the rules of reading such a writing. The traits of the writing· therefore point toward the situation in which the writing originated: the rules of writing, the presuppositions and premises and governing protocols thereof But for late antiquity one circumstance prevailed. Writing in antiquity in general reached its audience aurally, as much as, or perhaps more than, visually: heard, not only, or mainly, read (and, more commonly, declaimed or sung).28 That is true both for the philosophical and the Rabbinic documents, though in what measure and circumstance we cannot say. But it means that as the preferred medium of exchange, writing for the purposes defined by philosophers and Judaic sages alike aimed at a public hearing, at an aural reception, as much as, or in preference to, a silent, individual, and visual one. Take for example the foundation-document, after Scripture, of Judaism, which is the Mishnah, a writing rich in mnemonic formulations. 29 Our sages of blessed memory vastly preferred oral to written tradition, formulating the Mishnah to facilitate memorization, assuming that a fair part of the tradition was going to be memorized. That preference did not merely accommodate the limited technology of the day-the requirement that everything published be copied over and over again. It formed a strong preference, a matter of (for our sages) theology, replicating in the here and now the way in which God handed on to our rabbi, Moses, the oral part of the Torah at Sinai. Here is how the publication of the Mishnah is portrayed: 1.43 A. Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authority: B. What is the order of Mishnah teaching? Moses learned it from the mouth of the All-PowerfuL Aaron came in, and Moses repeated his chapter to him and Aaron went forth and sat at the left hand of Moses. His sons came in and Moses repeated their chapter to them, and his sons went forth. Eleazar sat at the right of Moses, and Itamar at the left of Aaron. C. R. Judah says, "At all times Aaron was at the right hand of Moses." 28 It is on that basis that I identify music as the generative metaphor for theology in Rabbinic Judaism, as in Judaism)s 'lheological Voice: 'lhe Melody if the Talmud. Chicago, 1995: The University of Chicago Press. 29 See my Oral Tradition in Judaism: 'lhe Case if the Mishnah. N.Y., 1987: Garland Publishing Co. Albert Bates Lord Monograph Series of the journal, Oral Tradition.

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D. Then the elders entered, and Moses repeated for them their Mishnah chapter. The elders went out. Then the whole people came in, and Moses repeated for them their Mishnah chapter. So it came about that Aaron repeated the lesson four times, his sons three times, the elders two times, and all the people once. E. Then Moses went out, and Aaron repeated his chapter for them. Aaron went out. His sons repeated their chapter. His sons went out. The elders repeated their chapter. So it turned out that everybody repeated the same chapter four times. F. On this basis said R. Eliezer, "A person is liable to repeat the lesson for his disciple four times. And it is an argument a fortiori: If Aaron, who studied from Moses himself, and Moses from the Almighty-so in the case of.a common person who is studying with a common person, all the more so!" G. R. Aqiba says, "How on the basis of Scripture do we know that a person is obligated to repeat a lesson for his disciple until he learns it [however many times that takes]? As it is said, 'And you teach it to the children of Israel' (Deut. 31: 19). And how do we know that that is until it will be well ordered in their mouth? 'Put it in their mouths' (Deut. 31: 19). And how on the basis of Scripture do we know that he is liable to explain the various aspects of the matter? 'Now these are the ordinances which you shall put before them' (Ex. 31: 1)." Bavli Erubin 54B

The premise of this picture emerges clearly: the document is orally formulated and orally transmitted, without resort to the medium of writing at all. And that means, so far as the presentation of the Mishnah is concerned, our sages assumed a public process of declamation, in fact, in song, not a private one of reading, whether the individual sang or did not sing. That is what I mean by "the public side of thought," the insistence that thought gains currency when it is shared in community. To think means, to say what one thinks. The upshot is, the writing in our hands rests upon two premises: [1] writing will be heard and discussed in audience, by an audience, responded to and not merely absorbed by a reader; and, it follows [2] all thought set forth for preservation is public, up for palpable response in discussion. Now for Graeco-Roman philosophy, too, a prejudice in favor of thought set forth for audience, not for private reflection in the solitude of mind, comes to expression as well. It is not merely that audiences in the exact sense, hearers, formed the anticipated recipient of writings such as tragedies, comedies, panegyric, funeral, and

PHILOSOPHICAL MODES OF ANALYTICAL ARGUMENT

39

forensic orations, as Gilbert Ryle points out. 30 It is that the principal philosophers, too, deemed books to serve principally as elaborate mnemonic devices, or as aides-memoires.The situation of writing is not reading but declamation and, it must follow, also debate. Writing was not left ~n the page to be read in silence, reflected upon in the privacy of one's inner ear and intellect. It was to be read as a script, a guide to thinking, a goad to right reason. To read was to hear, and to hear was to respond, and, that meant, in the nature of things, to respond in public to a public discourse. We need not follow every detail of Ryle's general thesis on the form and reception of Plato's writing to consider his main point, which is, as indicated, writing was for audience. He goes beyond the point important for the argument of this book, when, for example, he argues, "Plato, like the dramatists, orators, and composers of mimes, wrote for audiences."31 He points to the dramatic character of the dialogues, which "act extremely well." So "it is natural to suppose that their author designed them to have the theatrical excellences which they do in fact possess." Aristotle, for his part, contrasts "exoteric" and other discourses, and Ryle maintains that means, spoken discourses: "Dialogues are exoteric since they are recited to the general public."32 Some lectures were to be given to the general public, some to the academy alone. So, in general, Ryle proposes, dialogues were recited to audiences. And where a dialogue encompasses three voices, the conversation is reenacted, with vocal parts of the speakers rendered appropriately. In due course, we shall note, the Talmud is not only best studied orally, but cannot be studied except in dialogue, two voices interchanging. 33 When writing down thought that will find realization in oral presentation and aural reception, writers are constrained to put down on paper the script of what is to be recited, and that means, writing is in the form of notes for the reconstitution of discourse, the reconstruction of thought. Naturally, as soon as we take up the hypothesis of writing as an act of public discourse for audience, we have to ask about the assembly 30

Gilbert Ryle, PlatoJs Progress (Cambridge, 1966: Cambridge University Press),

p.20. 31 Ibid., p. 23. 32 Ibid., p. 24. 33 Indeed, in my class room, for reading the text, I assign speaking parts to different voices, corresponding to the intertwined voices of the text, recapitulating the auraloral argument through students' own amplifications of their respective voices' intent, just as, it is clear, the original writers' clear program and procedure required.

40

CHAPTER TWO

of the hearers, the occasion for the hearing, since, by definition, people do not gather together to hear in the random manner in which an individual reader picks up a book at will. The social side of learning in the Talmud will not detain us when we come to the Bavli, for the issues connected with the occasion for public learning do not affect our theory of the way the Talmud works-once we stipulate that the learning is a public act of oral-aural communication, preserved in notes that for us constitute the document. But we do well to follow Ryle's answer to the same question: how and when did writing come to audience? Ryle proposes that particular occasions marked the presentation of the dialogues: "The Games, which provided three- or four-day audiences for the dramatists, provided three- or four-day audiences for the dialogue audiences toO."34 Not only so, but some of Plato's dialogues narrate conversations Socrates reports he had with others. The audience then hears the sole voice of Socrates (Plato) replicating the prior conversation. Where, by contrast, Socrates is not a party to the play, this permits Plato to record what Socrates for one reason or another could not have said. But if the Games defined the occasion for dialogues, that does not mean the audiences proved numerous. 35 N either the techniques nor the topics can have gained a large audience; people who had not participated in disputations cannot have looked forward to witnessing them. Still, the Games can have set the stage for rigorous thought and careful expression, in Ryle's language: First-rate works are not evoked by claque. They presuppose the existence of keen, practised, and unindulgent critics. Their authors must match themselves and be matched by others against authors who are at least nearly as good. They must learn their art by considering the relative excellences and defects of their own and their rivals' compositions . .. It was the Games that provided the judges, the rivals, the yavvns and plaudits, the boos and the prizes for tragedies, comedies, mimes, rhapsodes' recitals and panegyric orations. It is inference that the Games provided them also for dialogues. 36

Ryle's observation that for effective thought to take place, conflict must provoke it, will take on weight when we consider the Talmud's persistent juxtaposition of opposed views.

34

35 36

Ibid., p. 33. Ibid., p. 41. Ibid., pp. 43-4.

PHILOSOPHICAL MODES OF ANALYTICAL ARGUMENT

41

Indeed, the entire character of the dialectical argument presupposes opposed forces, equal in wit and weight, capable of matching one another and evoking from one another thought of a pure and refined character. Some may find attractive in the context of Ryle's theory the hypothesis that the dialectic argu~ent of the Talmud served for the annual convention, or kallah, of disciples of sages, when many thousands assembled for learning. But the picture we have of the kallah-gathering commonly presents the great sage as lecturing, through the medium of a loud-speaker (a borrowed voice), and not debating. I think the dialectical exchanges take for granted the setting of the master-disciple circle, in which debate is carried on everyday. The affect upon .the character of the writing-and, it goes without saying, of the thinking-will be the same. If, then, the dialogues are meant to be just that-presentations of real exchanges of views by real players-then what purpose did books serve? They served as a large-scale mnemonic. Plato assigns to Socrates the following concession to book-writing: He who has knowledge of the just, the good and the beautiful will, for amusement, write to treasure up reminders for himself, when he comes to the forgetfulness of old age, and for others who follow the same path. 37

In broader terms, the dispute, debate, and dialectical argument follow the lines of logical exposition: this position invokes such-and-so arguments and evidence, counter-arguments and conflicting evidence. Once we have the basic position and accompanying axioms, a limited repertoire of possibilities logically present themselves. To present an exposition of the whole, then, we require not a fully-spelled-out script-say this, then say that-but merely notes, brief allusions, and reference-points to what logically will require recapitulation as a counter-position and a contrary argument. "He said to him ... he said to him ... ," followed by the briefest sort of formulations-these constitute the raw materials for the reenactment of thought. From Plato's perspective, in any event, books therefore have their value, but first-class minds do not write books; they compose public statements, to be recited and replicated for the hearing of audiences. We need not follow all speculations on the character of such audiences-at the Games, meetings of clubs of young men, private circles

37

Ibid., p. 45, cited from Plato's Phaedrus 275-6, 277D-278E.

42

CHAPTER TWO

that would "entertain and edify their middle-aged and elderly members with book-readings," and the like. 38 It suffices to recognize that books were meant to be recited in public, and the book-writer bore responsibility to issue a text, not orally to deliver the words of a dialogue but to make possible such recurrent delivery. 39 , Now, when we turn to the Rabbinic literature, we find an explicit and ubiquitous allegation that what is now written down is meant to be, and originally was, recited. From the earliest document, the Mishnah, to the latest, the Talmud, the literature persistently announces its character as a script for oral discourse. That announcement takes the form of the recurrent attributive, "said," or "says,"40 On the surface, the choice of "say" for the attributive appears as a happenstance, a matter of pure form. But the organization of discourse presupposes exchanges of contradictory opinions. The dispute-form, which pre- . dominates in the Mishnah, invariably sets two opinions against a common question. In the present context, it suffices to consider a single instance of the dispute, the elements of which it is composed, the interior logic upon ~hich it rests, the premises upon the immediate recognition of issues and arguments that are presupposed. Here is a case, chosen more or less at random. The tone is laconic, the form spare. We have two elements: [1J the statement of the topic and [2J the opposed opinions of the players. These opinions are exactly balanced in word-choice and even syllable-count. The composition lends itself to easy memorization, once we have in hand the topic or problem; there are two possible positions, framed in cliche-language. Where there will be variation, it will occur not at the conflicting 38 39

Ibid., p. 52. Ibid., p. 52.

40 The choice of the word and the tense as well as the placement of words, e.g., subject then verb, or verb, then subject, bears heuristic meaning. X says announces an opinion, said X ordinarily inaugurates a response to an opinion or the beginning of an argument, itself encapsulated with, "he said to him ... he said to him ... ," as stage directions. It took me a while to realize that, in translating, I should preserve the exact word-order of the attributive. When that is preserved and rendered into exact English, the various functions, within an argument, signaled by the order of subject and verb, R. X says) ... said R. X (it is very rare in any document to find the set, R. X says . .. says R. X . .. ) emerging clearly. One concrete example: R. X says . .. , sets forth the proposition; said R. X immediately following then announces that what we are now to hear is the elaboration or argument in behalf of said proposition. In the context of a dispute-X says ... , Y says ... , the attributive, said to him R. X . ...) said to him R. serves the purpose of labeling what is coming as the debate attached to the dispute. This is routine for the Mishnah and the Tosefta. In our discussion of the rules of engagement, we shall see examples of these rules.

r ... ,

PHILOSOPHICAL MODES OF ANALYTICAL ARGUMENT

43

opinions but at the statement of what is subject to conflict. That is where all development will take place. The passage concerns the rule governing the formation of a fictive gate-way at the head of an alley-entry, such that the entire alleyentry is treated as a single domain for purposes of carrying objects on the Sabbath. Since what renders the open-ended entry into a closed gate is the provision of the marks of a gate, e.g., a sidepost, a cross-beam, one party demands both components of a gateway; the other is satisfied with a single signal, a fictive symbol. A. The validation of an alley entry [for carrying of objects on the Sabbath] B. the House of Shammai say, "[It must have] a sidepost and a cross beam. " C. And the House of Hillel say, "A sidepost or a crossbeam." D. R. Eliezer says, "Two sideposts."

Now we come to the possibility of development and secondary expansion. But it is wholly within the statement of what is at issue, not in the opinions on the issue. So the form of the dispute promises a debate that does not take place, an exchange of opinion that proves a mere formality. While the Mishnah and related writings contain not only disputes but debates, as we shall see, the Rabbinic canon would present an authentic dialectical argument only in its final, and climactic statement, the Gemara that, added to the Mishnah, would form the Talmud itsel£ To see what in the Mishnah serves as an extension of a dispute into a debate, we continue our analysis of the same passage. The passage proceeds to a restatement of what is at issue, that is, a revision of A. But the recapitulation then goes back over the originally-assigned opinions, in exactly the original words. The issue is now complicated; Ishmael wishes to take account of the character of the alleyway. If it is very broad, then we have a dispute; but if it is narrow, all parties will concur on a minimal requirement. I indent the recapitulated language and so highlight the secondary dispute, E vs. J: E. In the name of R. Ishmael said a certain disciple before R. Aqiba, "The House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not dispute concerning an alley entry which is less than four cubits wide, that it [is validated] either by a sidepost or by a crossbeam. F. "Concerning what did they dispute? G. "Concerning one which is broader than four cubits, up to ten cubits. H. "For: The House of Shammai say, 'A sidepost and a crossbeam.'

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1. "And the House of Hillel say, 'A sidepost or a crossbeam.'" ]. Said R. Aqiba, "Concerning both this case and that case did they dispute." Mishnah-tractate Erubin 1:2

In fact, the composite presents us with three positions, A, E, and j, all having to do with the subject of dispute of the fixed dialogue, B-C, H-I. Aqiba's opinion replicates the opening one. The details should not obscure our purpose. The important point, from our perspective, is simple: the issue of how one validates an alley-entry, what is required to do so, is formulated as a public exchange of contrary views, even though, as we see, the public side of the exchange-the Houses' conflicting, but fixed opinions-·-in fact does not bear the burden of the issue at all. Here, then, is dialogue imposed upon what is in fact a dispute about a principle of law. The form of the dialogue-a script for a simple colloquy-moreover by its gnomic, elliptical character invites us to penetrate into the grounds of the dispute, to supply a script for what is not said but is deemed implicit, namely, the issues under dispute. The script then governs not only what is to be said, but what is to be thought. And, as I said, that entire process is meant to take place in public. So much for the public context in which thought takes place.

III. THE

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

So much for the form of thought re-presented in the form of a dispute. Now we proceed to the explicit point of contact between the logic of Classical philosophy and the logic of Rabbinic analytical argument. What about the substance of thought? VVe begin with a consideration of modes of thought characteristic of not the Mishnah and Gemara alone but a variety of canonical documents of Rabbinic judaism, from the Mishnah through the Bavli. At this point we shall see how the generative modes of thought, the rules of analysis and argument, correspond to profoundly-rooted convictions of Classical philosophy about how learning and the analysis of learning take place. Then we turn to the two components of the Talmud and focus upon modes of thought and expression distinctive to the principal documents, the Mishnah and the Gemara, respectively. That is the appropriate approach to the description of the workings of the Talmud, because a single intellectual protocol, encompassing a single, prevail-

PHILOSOPHICAL MODES OF ANALYTICAL ARGUMENT

45

ing logic, pervades the entire canon, start to finish, even while quite particular modes and media of thought and methods of explanation characterize specific documents as welL The governing rule of logic governing Classical philosophy and Rabbinic thought throughout is simple: "Something that is true of a particular case is true also of a similar case. "41 Once we explore the implications of that logic, we can account for the bulk of the disputes that predominate in the Mishnah, and, more important, the debates that clarify and purify the disputes throughout the normative writing. For faced with a situation the governing rule of which is unknown, we turn immediately to the appropriate likeness, and the dispute will take shape when two parties announce conflicting opinion on the governing simile. The debate that follows will allow each party to differentiate the other's simile from the case. The working of the logic for normative law is clear. If we wish to discover the rule that governs a particular case, we shall have to find out that to which that case is similar (or even identical). When we know to what the unknown is to be compared, we also know the· rule that governs the unknown. That simple rule of logic dictates the conduct of the dispute in the Rabbinic canon and determines the course of debate and the suitability and relevance of evidence adduced by all parties to a debate. And that generative logic spins out the entire fabric of discourse. F or the engagement in analysis and argument will take the form of an examination of the facts of the case: is B really similar to A? Is it similar in the way that matters in context, or merely in general? If it is similar, is the similarity best explained through the consequence that is proposed, or is some other explanation going to make better sense of the similarity? And, finally, if it is alleged to be similar but shown to be different, then what conclusions are we to draw from the difference? These, briefly stated, form the rules of engagement for Rabbinic argument, and all of them will have formed commonplaces for Classical science and philosophy, which long before the Rabbinic canon reached precisely the conclusions concerning polarity and analogy that animated, also, our sages of blessed memory. No better characterization of the basic premise of all rational thought in the Rabbinic

G. E. R. Uoyd, Polari!} and Analogy. Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought, p. 384. 41

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canon can be offered than the one that G. E. R. Lloyd provides for early Greek speculative thought in the following language: A large number of the theories and explanations which were put forward in early Greek speculative thought may be said to belong to one or other of two simple logical types: the characteristics of the first type is that objects are classified or explained by being related to one or other of a pair of opposite principles, that of the second type that a thing is explained by being likened or assimilated to something else. 42

lloyd elaborates in this language: Both in pre-Platonic texts and in the dialogues of Plato himself we find many arguments in which pairs of opposites of quite different sorts ... appear to be treated as mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternatives in whatever sense or in whatever relation they are used. And quite often too, it seems to have been assumed that when two cases are known to be similar in certain respects, it necessarily follows that what holds true for one holds true also for the other. 43

We may restate the same premise of thought and argument in simple language: what is like another thing follows the rule that governs that other thing, and what is not like another thing follows the rule opposite the one that governs that other thing. Hence, critical to all analysis will be the investigation of the properties that indicate one thing is like another or different from another. 44 Comparison validated by similarity or analogy then led to the classification of data within a single species, and difference or contrast led to the differentiation of those data into genera. In the Mishnah's framework, as we shall see later on, everything depended upon what belonged to the same list, or classification, of like-things. Both in the Mishnah and in its immediately-consequent documents, the Tosefta and Sifra, an argument then would follow along the lines of identi42

lloyd, Polarity and Analogy, pp. 7-8.

43

Ibid., p. 8.

44 Just as later on, people came to differentiate between similarity and identity or (in lloyd's words) "between those modes of opposites that form mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternatives and those that do not," so in the later documents, after the Mishnah, the rule that like follows like and unlike unlike was richly modified and clarified. lloyd points out, "We must consider the steps which led to the formulation of the principle of contradiction and the law of excluded middle, to the analysis of analogical argument, and to the recognition and definition of various degrees of similarity and difference" (p. 8). Certainly, even within the limits of this presentation, Sifra will emerge as a rich improvement upon the fundamental principles of analogy and contrast that governed in the Mishnah. But to accomplish the goal of this book we need not follow that line of research.

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47

£)ring the governing analogy. If X is like Y, then it follows the rule of Y. The contrary position will be required to differentiate X from Y in some detail heretofore not considered. Or, along the saine front, the indicative trait of Y, that which imparts to Y the qualities that are regarded as differentiating, is thus and so, but that indicative trait does not characterize X at all. These two arguments serve the same purpose, that is, to effect a contrast between two things that appear sufficiently similar to begin with to sustain comparison. The act of comparison must strike us as a given of thought, so Bruno Snell: Our habit of referring to the objects in the world around us by means of concrete nouns is itself based on an act of comparison, on the drawing of a parallel. By attaching the name "horse" to various animals at different times, I equate them in spite of their many distinguishing marks ... The process may be reversed; by itemizing the specific differentiae it is possible to arrive back at genus and species. Since Plato this has been the regular procedure in logical arguments; a definition includes both the common class and the specific differentiae which distinguish the object from other members of the class. 45

What distinguishes Rabbinic from philosophical thought is not the method of comparison, nor the premise that like follows like, and unlike follows the opposite rule. It is only the arena for the work of comparison and contrast. In this context it suffices to observe that,. while science and philosophy dealt with the natural world and abstractions of social relationships, our sages of blessed memory covered that middle ground of the concrete that also involved the social order. What pennitted philosophical thinking in Hebrew as much as in Greek was the possibility (in the case of Greek) of forming an abstraction out of a noun by the addition of "the," as in "good," "the good," and the usage, in the case of Hebrew, of nouns and adjectives in abstract ways, as in the following: 46 A. He said to them, "Go and see what is the straight path to which someone should stick." B. R. Eliezer says, "A generous spirit." C. R. Joshua says, "A good friend." Snell, p. 191. It is to be regretted that Snell insisted on the unique properties of Greek in enabling philosophy and science to take place, when Mishnaic Hebrew (and not that form of Hebrew alone) allows for many of the same functions. Had he known Mishnaic Hebrew, he may well have broadened his frame of reference. 45

46

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D. E. F. G. H. 1.

J. K. ·L. M.

N. O.

R. Yose says, "A good neighbor." R. Simeon says, "Foresight." R. Eleazar says, "Good will." He said to them, "I prefer the oplllon of R. Eleazar b. Arakh, because in what he says is included everything you say." He said to them, "Go out and see what is the bad road, which someone should avoid." R. Eliezer says, "Envy." R. Joshua says, "A bad friend.'" R. Y ose says, "A bad neighbor." R. Simeon says, "Defaulting on a loan." (All the same is a loan owed to a human being and a loan owed to the Omnipresent, blessed be he, as it is said, The wicked borrows and does not pay back, but the righteous person deals graciously and hands over [what he owes] R. Eleazar says, "Bad will." He said to them, "I prefer the opinion of R. Eleazar b. Arakh, because in what he says is included everything you say." Mishnah-tractate Abot 2:8-9

Had the colloquy proceeded to an examination (elenchus) of the definition of "envy," had Y ohanan asked, "What, exactly do you mean by bad will?" and proceeded to a systematic test of the cogency of the answer(s), then we should have found ourselves deep in a conversation with a philosopher in the tradition of Socrates. But, it is clear, that trait of language Snell deems determinative plays no role in my argument about the philosophical character of the Rabbinic argument. Rather, it is the identity of logic concerning comparison and contrast, commonality and difference, stated at the outset. In the Rabbinic documents in general, we may characterize the paramount modes of thought and, consequently, also the lines of argument, in a simple way, as follows: 1. Through similarity we make connections. 2. Through the examination of difference, we then draw conclusions. In challenging the allegation of similarity (all the more so, identity), and in differentiating what appear to be alike, we conduct the substance of argument. Modes of thought and analysis, media of the formulation of the same, and methods of explanation-these focus upon the work of analogy, comparison and contrast. Similar traits connect one thing to another but not to a third, differences distinguish one from another; like follows like, unlike follows the opposite rule.

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49

Rationality and self-evidence emerge from the modes of thought that center upon polarity and analogy, as defined by Uoyd, in Rabbinic, as much as in scientific and philosophic, thought. They differ mainly on the object of thought, the source of the problematic of inquiry, but when we come to modes of analysis, argument, and demonstration, lloyd's "polarity and analogy," or, as here, analogy and contrast prevail throughout. What marks the Rabbinic logic as distinctive are the items listed as opposites: unclean, clean, guilty or innocent, for instance, predominate, in place of the opposites that would occupy other lists, e.g., peel/pith or co-wife/first wife, to take two at random-not to mention yin/yang. 47 But why travel so far afield, when we can examine the power of analogical and contrastive logic in the formative documents of the Rabbinic canon, the Mishnah, Tosefta, and Sifra?

IV.

THE PuBLIC ARGUMENT IN THE MISHNAH

Taking account of the shift in subject-matter, we now turn to the Mishnah to examine how analogy and contrast serve as the medium for settling moot points. To understand what follows, we must realize that, for our sages of blessed memory, Scripture supplied governing facts, so that when we identify the verse of Scripture that pertains, we also know the fact that must emerge. But that is the point at which analogy and contrast come into play, for the relevance of one verse of Scripture over another depends upon the appropriate comparison. In the following case, the governing analogy is the same, but the trait of the governing analogy that applies to the problem at hand is subject to dispute. The facts of the case present no complexities. We deal with the sacrificial cult in the Temple in Jerusalem, in which sacrificial meat and other materials were placed on altar fires and burned up. What happens, however, when something is put on the altar that for one reason or another does not constitute a valid offering? Scripture is clear on that point: whatever touches the altar is sanctified by it, therefore may not be removed from it, no matter what it is that has touched the altar: "Whatever touches the altar shall become consecrated" (Ex. 29:37). The Mishnah's rule begins with the question: but

47

lloyd, p. 33.

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what if what touches the altar is not suitable for consecration to begin with? Does the altar affect what is unsuitable ex opere operata, or does the rule of Scripture pertain only to what can have been legitimately placed upon the altar to begin with? The operative analogy derives from an offering that is wholly consumed on the altar fire, which is the burnt offering. In the dispute, the first of the two authorities invokes that analogy and maintains that, just as that offering, once placed on the altar, is not removed for any reason, so anything else that has been set on the altar must be left there. The operative trait of the burnt offering is that it is thrown into the fire, so whatever can. be affected by the fire-whatever is appropriate for the altar fire-is left on the altar, but other things are removed. The second opinion addresses the same analogy, the burnt offering, but finds the operative trait the matter of being put on the altar to begin with. Whatever can be put on the altar is left there. Then what is at stake in the debate is whether the operative trait of the burnt offering is the altar fire ("burnt") or being put on the altar to begin with ("offering"). Joshua, in ~hat follows, focuses upon the fire, Gamaliel on the altar, and the dispute then works itself out in terms of the governing analogy and the reading of the verse of Scripture that provides the analogy: A. The altar sanctifies that which is appropriate to it. [If something is placed on the altar that is suitable for the altar, it is not to be removed.] B. R. Joshua says, "Whatever is appropriate to [not the altar but] the altar fires, if it has gone up [onto the fires], should not go down, since it is said, 'This is the burnt offering-that which goes up on the hearth on the altar' (Lev. 6:9): just as the burnt offering, which is appropriate to the altar fires, if it has gone up, should not go down, so whatever is appropriate to the altar fires, if it has gone up, should not go down." C. Rabban Gamaliel says, "Whatever is appropriate to the altar, if it has gone up, should not go down, as it is said, 'This is the burnt offering on the hearth on the altar' (Lev. 6:2): just as the burnt offering, which is appropriate to the altar, if it has gone up, should not go down, so whatever is appropriate to the altar, if it has gone up, should not go down." D. The difference between the opinion of Rabban Gamaliel and the opinion of R. Joshua is only the blood and the drink offerings. E. For Rabban Gamaliel says, "They should not [having. been placed on the altar] go down." . F. And R. Joshua says, "They should go down." Bavli Zebahim 9: 1

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51

The exchange of disputed opinion in principle, B-C, is followed up with the exchange of opinion' on a concrete case, E-F. Implicit is the point of the dispute, which is the salient trait of the governing analogy. Then the logic of argument, shared by both parties, conforms to that analysis through comparison and contrast (analogy and polarity, for Uoyd) that philosophy valued. A still better articulation of the problem of analogical reasoning presents itself when the acknowledged facts are placed on display, followed by the dispute and the debate. In our second case drawn from the Mishnah, the facts are set forth as an axiom, then the dispute replaces what we should have expected in the form of a theorem (prove this, prove that, out of the axiom). At stake, as is common in the Mishnah, is how we classify a mixture of substances, each belonging to its own taxon. In the case at hand, we deal with blood of sacrificial animals. Depending upon the character of the offering-the animal and the purpose its sacrifice is meant to serve-the blood may require four acts of tossing upon the corner of the altar or only one; and it may require tossing to a point on the upper side of the altar wall or to one on the lower side of the wall, differentiated by a red line around the center of the altar wall. The issue, which is to be predicted on the basis of the facts at hand, is how we are to toss a bowl of blood that is to be tossed in a single act of tossing that has been confused with a bowl of blood that is to be tossed in four such acts: A. [Blood] which is to be tossed in a single act of tossing which was mixed up with [blood] which is to be tossed in a single act of tossing-B. let them be tossed in a single act of tossing [below the red line]. C. [Blood] which is to be tossed in four acts of tossing [which was mixed up with] blood which is to be tossed in four acts of tossing-D. let them be tossed in four acts of tossing [below the red line]. E. [Blood] which is to be tossed in four acts of tossing [which was mixed up] with blood which is to be tossed in one act of tossing-F. R. Eliezer says, "Let them be tossed in four acts of tossing." G. R. Joshua says, "Let them be tossed in a single act of tossing." H. Said to him R. Eliezer, "And 10, he transgresses the rule against diminishing [the required acts of tossing, so Dt. 4:2]." I. Said to him R. Joshua, "And 10, he transgresses the rule against adding [to the required acts of tossing-Dt. 4:2]." J. Said to him R. Eliezer, "The prohibition against adding is stated only in connection with the act in itself. K. Said to him R. Joshua, "The prohibition against diminishing is stated only in connection with the act in itself."

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L. And further did R. Joshua say, "When you placed [the blood four times], you transgressed the prohibition against adding, and you did the deed with your own hand, and when you did not sprinkle [four times], you transgressed against the prohibition against diminishing, but [at least] you did not do the deed with your own hand." Mishnah Zebahim 8:10-11

The issue is joined at E, with the dispute exposed at F-G. Then at H we invoke the governing verse of Scripture, counterpart to the governing analogy: "You shall not add anything to what I command you or take anything away from it" (Dt. 4:2). If blood that is to be tossed four times is tossed only once, that represents an act of diminution, and if blood that is to be tossed one time is tossed four times, it is an act of addition. Then the analogy itself is subjected to analysis, J-L. Here is where the dispute and its evidence gives way to argument. Eliezer rejects Joshua's reading of the relevant verse, since, he maintains, the prohibition against adding to what the Torah requires concerns the act in itself, which is done as it should be donefour .times-and not the blood that is to be tossed only once. Joshua employs the same reasoning with the opposite result, K: one should not diminish the action, but as to the blood, that is another matter. So each party reasons in precisely the terms and manner of the other. At the end, Joshua introduces the point of differentiation: whether the deed that, of necessity, violates the principle of not diminishing or augmenting is done by the priest or not. If one does the deed four times, he himself is responsible by reason if an affirmative action. If one does not sprinkle four times blood that is to be sprinkled four times, that is an act of omission, not of commission. And, implicitly, that is to be preferred. What we shall now see is that the principle at issue transcends not only the case but also the governing analogy. The issue-which is more to be deplored, the sin of omission or the sin of commissionis set forth in other terms entirely, and in these other settings, the analogy important in the case in Mishnah-tractate Zebahim plays no role at all: A. [As to] a jug [of wine in the status of heave offering] which broke in the upper vat, and the lower [vat] is unclean" B. R. Eliezer and R. Joshua agree that if he can save from it a fourth in a state of cleanness, he should save [it]. C. But if not: D. R. Eliezer says, ."Let it go down [into the lower vat] and be made unclean."

PHILOSOPHICAL MODES OF ANALYTICAL ARGUMENT

53

E. "But let him not make it unclean with his hand [through his own actions] ." F. And so [in the case of] a jug of oil [in the status of heave offering] which was spilledG. R. Eliezer and R. Joshua agree that if he can save from it a fourth in a state of cleanness, he should save [it]. H. But if not: 1. R. Eliezer says, "Let it run down and be soaked up [in the ground]. J. "But let him not soak it up with his hands." ... K. [If] one was walking from place to place, and loaves [of bread] in the status of heave offering were in his handL. [if] a gentile said to him, "Give me one of them and I shall make it unclean, and if not, 10, I shall make all of them unclean"M. R. Eliezer says, "Let him make all of them unclean, but let [the Israelite] not give him [the gentile] one of them that he make it unclean." N. R. Joshua says, "Let him place one of them before him, on a rock." O. And so [in the case of] women to whom gentiles said, "Give [us] one of you that we may make her unclean, but if not, 10, we will make all of you unclean"P. let them make all of them unclean, but they should not hand over a single Israelite. Mishnah Terumot 8:9-12

Clearly, Joshua's principle is made to prevail; the final case is explicit on that score. The main point we derive from the several cases is that the modes of argument prove contingent, the principle at issue, invariable. Diverse cases may contribute to the exposition of the principle that is subject to dispute, and each of them will be worked out through arguments that are particular to the case.

V.

THE PUBLIC ARGUMENT IN THE TOSEFTA

The T osefta presents us with a striking case in which the governing analogy is introduced in an explicit manner. Here, I am inclined to think, a more philosophical mode of argument comes to full articulation. What we see is how argument by analogy and contrast works. The case concerns the disposition of what is subject to doubt-along with mixtures, a favorite theme of the framers of the Mishnah. In the following case, what we do not know is the status of objects immersed in an immersion-pool that, at a given point in time, is found to be lacking in the requisite volume of water and so unable

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to effect the purification of what is immersed. Specifically, how do we dispose of those objects immersed in the time from the last point at which it was known that the pool had a valid volume of water? A. An immersion-pool which was measured and found lacking-all the acts requiring cleanness which were carried out depending upon it B. whether this immersion-pool is in the private domain, or whether this immersion-pool is in the public domain-[Supply:] objects that have been immersed are unclean.] C. R. Simeon says, "In the private domain, it is unclean. In the public domain, it is clean."

Thus far we have the statement of the case. Now comes the dispute and debate: D. Said R. Simeon, "There was the case of the water-reservoir of Disqus in Yabneh was measured and found lacking. E. "And R. Tarfon did declare clean, and R. Aqiba unclean. F. "Said R. Tarfon, 'Since this immersion-pool is in the assumption of being clean, it remains perpetually in this presumption of cleanness until it will be known for sure that it is made unclean.' G. "Said R. Aqiba, 'Since this immersion-pool is in the assumption of being unclean, it perpetually remains in the presumption of uncleanness until it will be known for sure that it is clean.'

The principle is, do we focus upon the prevailing assumption as to the status of the pool, and confirm that status, or do we declare the governing analogy to be the status of the unclean object that was immersed in the pool, and confirm that status? The former status is confirmed as valid, since we have assumed the pool was valid until we discovered that it was lacking in the requisite volume of valid water; the latter status is confirmed as unclean, since we assume objects that have been declared unclean remain so until they are validly purified. Now at stake is, which is the governing analogy? H. "Said R. Tarfon, 'To what is the matter to be likened? To one who was standing and offering [a sacrifice] at the altar, and it became known that he is a son of a divorcee or the son of a woman who has undergone the rite of removing the shoe. 1. "'for his service is valid.' J. "Said R. Aqiba, 'To what is the matter to be likened? K. '''To one who was standing and offering [a sacrifice] at the altar, and it became known that he is disqualified by reason of a blemishL. "'for his service is invalid.'"

PHILOSOPHICAL MODES OF ANALYTICAL ARGUMENT

55

Thus far we have the conflict between relevant analogies. Now how is the argument articulated? It is through the challenge of each party to the pertinence of the analogy introduced by the other: M. "Said R. Tarfon to him, 'You draw an analogy to one who is blemished. I draw an analogy to the son of a divorcee or to the son of a woman who has undergone the rite of removing the shoe [and is invalid for marriage into the priesthood]. N. "'Let us now see to what the matter is appropriately likened. O. '''If it is analogous to a blemished priest, let us learn the law from the case of the blemished priest. If it is analogous to the son of a divorcee or to the son of a woman who has undergone the rite of removing the shoe, let us learn the law from the case of the son of the divorcee or the son of a woman who has undergone the rite of removing the shoe.'

In fact, as we shall now see, Tarfon's statement of the issue of which analogy governs proves to set matters up to allow Aqiba to setde the question. He does so by differentiating the analogical cases, showing where the true point of similarity-now, he insists, not mere similarity but identity!-is to be located: P. "R. Aqiba says, 'The unfitness affecting an immersion-pool affects the immersion-pool itself, and the unfit aspect of the blemished priest affects the blemished priest himself. Q "'But let not the case of the son of a divorcee or the son of a woman who has undergone the rite of removing the shoe prove the matter, for his matter of unfitness depends upon others. R. '''A ritual pool's unfitness [depends] on one only, and the unfitness af a blemished priest [depends] on an individual only, but let not the son of a divorcee or the son of a woman who has undergone the rite of removing the shoe will prove the matter, for the unfitness of this one depends upon ancestry.' S. "They took a vote concerning the case and declared it unclean." T. "Said R. Tarfon to R. Aqiba, 'He who departs from you is like . h es. '" one W h 0 pens Tosefta Miqvaot 1: 16-19

Aqiba finds no difficulty in acknowledging the similarity, but he criticizes the use of the analogy by differentiating, in the manner of Socrates, between similarity and identity. He is able to differentiate ("divide") the. analogy into its operative components, and, in doing so, he shows that the analogy as he proposes to apply it sustains his position. A second, famous dispute and debate concerns the ~se of an appropriate

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analogy to provide a law that people do not know. It concerns whether or not the restrictions of the Sabbath apply to the offering of a Passover-sacrifice. On the Sabbath people may not perform acts of labor, such as food-preparation, as would be required to present the Passover-offering. But in the Temple people are permitted to perform all acts of labor involved in preparing food for the altar of the Most High. The operative logic in the dispute appears in the unfolding of the dialogue: A. One time the fourteenth of Nisan coincided with the Sabbath. B. They asked Hillel the Elder, "As to the Passover-sacrifice, does it override [the prohibitions of] the Sabbath?" C. He said to them, "Now do we have' only a single Passover-sacrifice in the course of the year which overrides [the prohibitions] of the Sabbath? We have many more than three hundred Passover-sacrifices in the year, and they all override [the prohibitions of] the Sabbath." D. All the people in the courtyard ganged up on him.

Hillel's answer is disingenuous, since it rests on the double-meaning of "Passover." There are many offerings through the year of the beast that serves on Passover as the offering for Passover in particu1ar. Reference is made to the daily whole offering, which, like the Passover offering, is a lamb. Now, every day, including ordinary Sabbaths in the course of the year, such an offering is presented. But that hardly meets the issue head on, since the people have asked about the Passover offering, the lamb offered on that occasion in particular, and that is something else again. Now comes the argument from analogy: E. He said to them, "The daily whole-offering is a public offering, and the Passover-sacrifice is a public offering. Just as the daily wholeoffering is a public offering and overrides [the prohibitions of] the Sabbath, so the Passover-sacrifice is a public offering [and] overrides [the prohibition of] the Sabbath."

The salient trait of the Passover lamb is that it is a public offering, and the salient trait of the daily whole offering, also· a lamb, is that it is a public offering. Hence the same rule applies to both; since the latter is offered on Sabbaths, so the former may be sacrificed on the· Sabbath as well. Hillel proceeds to three further arguments. The first derives the analogy from the use of the same language in the pertinent verses of

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57

Scripture. The appearance of the same formula is taken to mean that the same rule governs in both situations to which the respective verses refer: F. "Another matter: In connection with the daily whole-offering, Its season is stated (Nurri. 28:2), and in connection with the Passover, Its season is stated (Num. 9:2). Just as the daily whole-offering, in connection with which Its season is stated, overrides [the prohibitions of the Sabbath, so the Passover-sacrifice is a public offering [and] overrides [the prohibitions of] the Sabbath.

The second argument derives from an argument a fortiori-certainly not a mark of philosophical thinking in particular, since Scripture itself knows precisely the same argument (Num. 12: 14). If people should omit the daily whole offering, they are not subject to extirpation; if they fail to offer the Passover offering, they are. If the former overrides the prohibitions of 'the Sabbath, though not making the offering carries a lesser penalty, the latter, omission of which bears a much heavier penalty, all the more so should override the prohibitions of the Sabbath: G. "And further there is an argument a fortiori: Now if the daily whole offering, on account of which people are not liable to extirpation, overrides [the prohibitions of] the Sabbath, the Passover-sacrifice, on account of which people are liable to extirpation-is it not logical that it should override [the prohibitions of] the Sabbath?

The form of the third argument will not have impressed the Classical philosophers, since all it does is appeal to received opinion. In the context of a debate such as this, appeal to tradition surely will not have carried much weight. But a second look shows that tradition is needed because of a serious flaw in one of the earlier arguments, specifically, the philosophical one from analogy: H. "And- furthermore: I have received a tradition from my masters that the Passover-sacrifice overrides [the prohibitions of the Sabbath]-and not [solely] the first Passover but the second Passoversacrifice, and not [solely] the Passover-sacrifice of the community but the Passover-sacrifice of an individual."

The argument by analogy rests on the comparison of the two Passovers, the lamb for the daily whole offering, the lamb for the Passover offering. But that analogy falls away when we realize that the lamb for the Passover offering is presented by families, not out of

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communal funds and in behalf of the entire community ("public offering"). So the argument has violated the very principle of analogy upon which it rested, the two elements of the comparison not being truly similar (let alone identical!). And the rest follows. . I. They said to him, "What will happen with the people, who did not bring knives and Passover-lambs to the sanctuary?" ]. He said to them, "Do not worry about them. The holy spirit rests upon them. If they are not prophets, they are disciples of prophets." K. What did the Israelites do in that hour? L. He whose animal for the Passover-sacrifice was a lamb had hid it [the knife] in its wool. . M. He whose animal for the Passover-sacrifice was a goat had tied it between its horns. N. So they had [in any event] brought both their knives and their Passover-sacrifices to the sanctuary. O. And they sacrificed their Passover-sacrifices. P. On that very day they appointed Hillel to be patriarch, and he taught them laws of Passover. T osefta Pesahim 4: 13-14

When we consider the Mishnah and the T osefta in detail, we see a mixture of modes of thought, not only the one upon which I have laid greatest emphasis. Any account of philosophical modes of analytical argument in the Rabbinic literature must point both to the power of the argument from analogy and contrast, and also to the presence of other-than-philosophical media of thought and exchange. That is why we speak of philosophy in everyday life, not of everyday life. Our sages utilize modes of thought characteristic of philosophy, including science, to analyze problems of everyday life; they do not claim to derive philosophy from the workaday world. In ancient times no one did.

VI.

WILL PLATO AND ARISTOTLE HAVE APPROVED?

Hearing the language, "Let us now see the governing analogy," will have pleased the Classical philosophers. True, sages' debates on differentiating the like into unlike categories will not have challenged the intellect of the philosophers, for whom the question was one of practical, not theoretical interest. But with the details properly explained, they will have fully appreciated the modes of analytical argument before them and have found no reason to dismiss them as other

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than philosophical. Certainly the basic thrust of the public arguments we have examined-to assess the allegation of analogy or identity between two different things-will have won applause from Plato, as Lloyd states: The idea that the central task of dialectic is to distinguish the essential similarities and again the essential differences between things is a point to which Plato returns again and again. Plato's main interest . . . is in the material problem of which Forms "agree with" or "share in" which others, rather than in the formal question of the relationships of similarity and difference themselves, and although in various passages he does draw attention to such points as the difference between "similarity" and "identity" and to the distinction between the denial of a term and the assertion of its contrary, it is not until Aristotle that we find a full exposition of the relationships of opposition and similarity.48

The basic mode of analytical argument we have examined conforms to Lloyd's account, in its principal interest. The really interesting question that remains is one of how philosophy will have valued the logic before us. So far as Plato distinguished arguments from proofs, deeming analogy an ultimately unreliable guide, he will have deemed our sages' efforts amateurish. Aristotle too will have found fault. In the end he will have wondered at the thin layer of argument accompanying disputes, at the easy, not terribly laborious proofs for one proposition over another than analogy afforded. Perspective on the cases we have examined comes to us from Lloyd's account of the practice of the explicit analogical argument over time. He states: First Plato distinguished merely probable arguments from proofs and drew attention to the unreliability of likeness as a whole in the context of dialectic (while continuing... to use analogical arguments extensively....). Aristotle then classified analogical argument (the paradigm) as a rhetorical, that is, persuasive, mode of argument and analyzed it from the point of view of the syllogism, where he divided this argument into first and inductive and then a deductive step and suggested that the weakness of analogy lies in the fact that the induction is incomplete. The importance of this becomes clear when we reflect that earlier writers had often tended to assume the validity of their analogical arguments without question and sometimes explicitly claimed that a conclusion which had been recommended by an analogy had been demonstrated ... After Aristotle's analysis of the paradigm there

48

Uoyd, pp. 433-434.

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was ... little excuse for later writers to claim that the conclusion of an argument that proceeded direct from a particular case to a particular case had been demonstrated. . .. 49

The second of the two considerations introduced by lloyd, the explicit analogical argument that moved from case to case, encompasses the examples given here, and many others like them, in the Mishnah . and the T osefta. It must follow that, so far as our sages pursued their inquiries through the media of philosophical thought, they took a place well back from the front lines of criticism and reflection. True, philosophy found its place in their reformation of the everyday life of those for whom they set norms. But so far as the sages turned to analogy and contrast to do their work, measured against the state of the art centuries earlier, theirs proved a not very advanced exercise of intellect at all. In the next chapter, we shall see that that initial impression will require considerable revision and will justify the claim contained in the title of this book, that our sages found occasions of scientific and philosophical enterprise in the setting of workaday matters. It remains to ask, what accounts for the difference between the abstraction of Aristotle's presentation and the severely concrete presentation of our sages' views? If I had to point to a single point of differentiation, it emerges in Aristotle's discovery of the power of abstract symbolization, e.g., the use of mathematical symbols for logical problems, e.g., for the syllogism: A=B B=C therefore: A

=C

To say the same thing, our sages will have had to present a series of three concrete cases to produce the same result. More to the point, in their work of hierarchical classification, they wished to differentiate, as in the logic we have examined, showing the difference between similarity and identity (as Plato's Socrates would have wanted). To do this, they would place on display case after case in which X is similar to Y but not to be identified with V-but at no point, in no passage, in the thousands of chapters of the Mishnah, Tosefta, and Sifra (to take the case before us), do we have the simple syllogi~m expressed in abstract symbols. Aristode invented a medium for 49

lloyd, pp. 418-419.

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61

the expression of pure abstraction, and our sages had no comparable means of speaking about many things in the same symbols. And yet, one may rightly observe, that explanation of the difference turns out merely to repeat the difference and so beg the question: Classical philosophy found a rhetoric of abstract expression, even in the pure abstraction of symbols, and our sages possessed no such rhetoric. That is not because they had no abstract language, and given their power of saying through concrete cases a variety of abstract principles, it also is not because they could not invent language they needed. 50 In their oeuvre I detect no intellectual limitations of a cultural character. In fact, Scripture supplied them with a rich language of abstraction, e.g., through words that covered a variety of cases, such as justice, mercy, sin, salvation, redemption, repentance, let alone murder, adultery, theft, and the like. The cited passage of tractate Abot underlines that same fact. Our sages could speak, not merely provide instances, of envy. But, our sages may well have explained, what the written Torah has set forth, the oral Torah, given permanent formulation by us, now articulates and instantiates. If they took as their task the amplification of the written Torah and its laws and commandments, then definition through abstract generalization is precisely what they did not require, Scripture having supplied a sufficiency thereof. To give a single, but quite sufficient, instance: having received "thou shalt not steal," they took as their task not the restatement of theft into abstract language expressing property rights (for instance). Rather, they undertook the clarification of context in situations of conflict between two legitimate claimants, as in the immortal language: Two [in court] lay hold of a cloak-. this one says, "I found it!" And that one says, "I found it!" This one says, "It's all mine!" And that one says, "It's all mine!" This one takes an oath that he has no less a share of it than half, and that one takes an oath that he has· no less a share of it than half. And they divide it up. Mishnah-tractate Baba Mesia 2: 1

50

The vast technical vocabulary that accompanies the Gemara's dialectics and

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I think our sages will have found Socrates' and Plato's inquiries into the definition of justice-well, more than anything else, not so much insufficient as simply beside the point. That is why, in the end, our sages produced their thought in the form of not philosophy (let alone in abstract logical symbols) but jurisprudence: that is how they chose to define justice.

contains its signals proves the contrary! They invented the rhetoric they required, as the formal originality of the Mishnah shows too.

CHAPTER THREE

THE DIALECTICAL ARGUMENT AND THE BAVLI Dialectic tests, where philosophy seeks, knowledge Aristotle l

1.

PHILOSOPHICAL DIALECTICS

Both Classical philosophy and Talmudic analysis of daily affairs greatly valued argument, the one as a test of knowledge, the other as a sure guide to deep inquiry into truth. And argument demanded not merely set-piece presentation of propositions, pro and con, but challenge and response, analytical reasoning on the spot. Well-reasoned demonstration did not suffice, only rigorous dispute between responsive, reasonable players. And, as we shall see, all parties deemed contention in quest of truth to form the path to a well-considered position. Let us begin with an account of dialectics as defined by Aristotle and by Classical philosophy more generally, then turn to cases that set forth the Talmud's version of the same mode of argument. As we shall see, the classification of a certain type of Talmudic argument as dialectical in the conventional sense will prove entirely appropriate. Robin Smith provides the following: Generally speaking, the practice of arguing with others on the basis of their own opinions and securing premises by asking questions may be described as "dialectical argument.... " I would propose ... as a definition of dialectical argument in its most general sense, argument directed at another person which proceeds by asking questions. 2

Certain very specific types of Talmudic arguments readily conform to that definition, though, not all Talmudic arguments qualifY as dialectical ones, as the examples in Chapter Two have already shown us. Now Smith elaborates on this matter in the following language:

I Cited by C. D. C. Reeve, Practices qf Reason. Aristotle)s Nicomachean Ethics, p. 34. The commas are supplied by me; Reeve gives the sentence without them. 2 Robin Smith, "Logic," in Barnes, Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, p. 60.

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The word "dialectical" comes from a verb, dialegesthai, which means, "argue." Arguments are verbal disputes in which each party attacks and defends positions, arguments can be won and lost. Here we already have an important distinction from demonstrations, in which attack and defense play no part. Dialectical argument differs from demonstrative reasoning in that it is intrinsically a kind of exchange between participants acting in some way as opponents.. .. Socrates took his philosophical mission in life to be a kind of testing or examining of the beliefs of others through questioning...... The majority of [Plato's] written works take the form of dialogues in which Socrates questions various interlocutors. These depictions of dialectical exchanges are more than a device of presentation for Plato; he gives the name "dialectic" to the method of philosophy itself.... [Dialectical argument] differs from demonstration, which must deduce from first principles and not from what people think ... 3

Finally, let us ask what a dialectical method should allow us to accomplish. In Smith's terms, it is . . . to make us able to deduce the conclusion we want from premises conceded by the opponent we are faced with. That can be accomplished if we can find premises that have two properties: [1] the desired conclusion follows from them, and [2J the answerer will concede them ... 4

Now let us broaden our brief examination of the matter to include a variety of definitions that work together, all being necessary, none sufficient, to the task. Dialectical argument-the movement of thought through contentious challenge and passionate response, initiative and counter-ploycharacterizes the Gemara of the Talmud of Babylonia in particular, and finds a limited place, also, in only two other Rabbinic documents. 5 "Dialectical" means, moving, and for the Gemara a dialecSmith, pp. 58-60. Smith, pp. 60-61. I do not think we can persuasively compare and contrast the forms of argument set forth in the Topics, where Aristode sets forth rules "for discovering premises from which to deduce a given conclusion. They rest on a classification of conclusions according to form; each gives premise-forms from which a given form of conclusion, can be deduced. . . Overall, the dialectical method of the Topics requires the joint application of the 'locations' and the inventories of opinions. To find my argument, I first look up a location appropriate to my desired concLusion and use it to discover premises that would be useful; then I consult the relevant inventory of opinions to see if those premises are found there. If they are, I have my argument; all that remains is to cast it into the form of questions and present them to my opponent. ... " 5 The outstanding case is Sifra, which sets forth a vast repertoire of dialectical 3

4

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65

tical argument is a systematic exposition, through give and take, moving from point to point; the argument is the thing, since the dialectical argument strays from its original, precipitating point and therefore does not ordinarily undertake the demonstration, but rather the exploration, of a fixed proposition. Argument moves along, developing an idea through questions and answers, sometimes implicit, but more commonly explicit. That mode of analysis through media of question-answer and contentious argument imparts to the Gemara its distinctive, and I should claim, unique characteristics of thought. 6 Called in the language of the Talmud shaqla vetarya, give and take, dialectics requires definition in neutral terms. What, exactly, do I mean by a "moving argument"? It is one that transcends the juxtaposition of propositions, arguments, and evidence. This it does by treating propositions, arguments, and evidence to a process of interchange and challenge, composing out of the pronouncement of differences of opinion an ongoing, unfolding argument, one in which one point is countered by another, so that, what then follows is not a recapitulation of what has been said, but an interchange of reason and argument. Then because the players listen thoughtfully to one another and respond to the point, the "moving argument" may, and should, change course. This is always in response to the arguments that ,are set forth, the obstacles placed in the original path of thought. The purpose of the dialectical argument is not to advocate but to explore, not to demonstrate truth but to discover truth out of a process of contention and confrontation. The successful argument formed dialectically will deal with all possibilities and reach not a climax but a laconic conclusion: all things

arguments, as adumbrated in the preceding chapter. Besides Sifra and the Yerushalmi, however, I do not know any other Rabbinic compilation that sustainedly utilizes the dialectical argument-or does so at all. The Tosefta contains nothing of consequence, though its replication of the argument concerning similarity and identity, examined in Chapter Two certainly is indicative. The dialectical argument does not appear in any Midrash-compilation (besides Sifra), e.g., Genesis Rabbah, Leviticus Rabbah, Pesiqta deRab Kahana, Mekhilta, or the late Midrash-compilations; or in The Fathers, or in The Fathers According to Rabbi Nathan. 6 For an equivalent exercise of hermeneutics of a contentious order, we look in vain among the other law codes and commentaries of antiquity, which tend to a certain blandness. For the Zoroastrian counterpart, see my Judaism and ,?proastr£anism at the Dusk qf Late Antiquity. How Two Ancient Faiths Wrote Down Their Great Traditions. In medieval times the situation would change and systematic argument would enter in, as shown by James Brundage, Canon Law; see especially his chapter on Gratian.

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having been said, we end up here, rather than somewhere else. The Rabbinic dialectical argument-the protracted, sometimes meandering, always moving flow of contentious thought-raises a question and answers' it, then raises a question about the answer, and, having raised another question, it then gives an answer to that question and continues in the same fashion until a variety of issues has been sorted out. So it moves hither and yon; it is always one and coherent, but it is never the same, and it flows across the surface of the document at hand. The dialectical character derives not from the mere rhetorical device of. question and answer, but from the pursuit of an argument, in a single line, but in many and diverse directions: not the form but the substantive continuity defines the criterion. And the power of the dialectical argument flows from that continuity. We find the source of continuity in the author's capacity to show connections through the momentum of rigorous analysis, on the one side, and free-ranging curiosity, on the other. Those second and third and fourth turnings therefore differentiate a dialectical from a stalic argument, much as the bubbles tell the difference between still and sparkling wine. The always-sparkling dialectical argument is one principal means by which the Talmud or some other Rabbinic writing accomplishes its goal of showing the connections between this and that, ultimately demonstrating the unity of many "thises and thats." These efforts at describing the argument serve precisely as well as program notes to a piece of music: they tell us what we are going to hear; they cannot play the music. What "moves" therefore is the flow of argument and thought, and that is-by definition-from problem to problem. The movement is generated specifically by the raising of contrary questions and theses. What characterizes the dialectical argument in Rabbinic literature is its meandering, its moving hither and yon. It is not a direct or straightline movement, e.g., the dialectical argument with which we are familiar in the modern West, thesis, antithesis, synthesis. It also does not correspond to any propositional or syllogistic argument, even though such arguments may take place in three or more steps, inclusive of counter-arguments. For Classical philosophy dialectics is a philosophical mode of analysi~ through the rhetoric of question-answer, within the framework of intellectual dialogue, brought to fruition by Plato's Socrates and Aristotle. The Oxford English Dictionary provides a first-rate account of the definition of the word "dialectics:"

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67

. .. the investigation of truth by discussion. .. logical argument or disputation. . . Originally the art of reasoning or disputation by question and answer ... scientifically developed by Plato, by whom the term dialektike was used in two senses: the art of definition of discrimination of ideas, the science which views the interrelationship of ideas by a single principle 7

For the purpose of description, the dynamic character of dialectics requires emphasis as well: a dialectical argument is an exchange of conflicting opinion that moves from point to point, not remaining bound to the initial proposition but pursuing the consequences of practical reason and applied logic wherever they direct the flow of argument. In the Classical philosophical context, the simplest definition of dialectics once more stresses its formal, not its logical traits, in the following language: dialectic is the practice of sorting things into their kinds by taking counsel with each other. The theory which Xenophon here imputes to Socrates would be roughly along these lines: to dialegesthai is to engage in the sort of conversation that is courteous, serious and concerned with the truth. When men are thus seriously conversing, each trying to learn from the other, they are sorting things for themselves, and roughly the only way in which a man can sort things for himself is to expose his ideas in this way to another's criticism. 8

That definition certainly leaves ample space for Talmudic dialectics, for the Gemara lays out its arguments through brief statements, clearly representing distinct voices: a conversation. And the Gemara's arguments are nothing if not courteous, serious, and concerned with truthand mutual criticism. But more is required to define matters than this formal account. Aristotle defines the matter, in Ackrill's presentation, in these terms: In the Topics, Aristotle systematizes "dialectic," the practice of arguing according to certain rules, for or against any given proposition ... Aristotle distinguishes four main types of question, and correspondingly of proposition: Is A the definition of B, or the genus of B, or a necessary 7 The Compact Edition if the OifOrd English Dictionary (Oxford, 1971: Oxford University Press), p. 310. The use of the term in modern philosophy need not detain us, though Hegel's utilization of dialectics as a description of "the process of thought by which ... contradictions are seen to merge themselves in a higher truth that comprehends them" provides fruitful perspective on the outcome of Talmudic dialectics. 8 I. M. Crombie, An Examination if Plato's Doctrines. II. Plato on Knowledge and Realiry, p.563.

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property of B, or an accident (a contingent, non-necessary feature) ofB? Different kinds of argument and counter-argument are appropriate for the various types. of question, and he works them out with many examples . . . More interesting to us than the detail is the whole idea of argument that relies on probability, analogy, and other such devices, common in ordinary discussion and persuasion, though not parts of a strict formal logic. . . . The second general feature of dialectic ... is the requirement in it that argument should be based upon and appeal to endoxa, opinions that are held . . . either by most people or by notable people worth attending to. A disputant in the game of dialectic will be a failure if, to keep his end up, he has to rely on the assertion of what goes against common sense and has no backing from any reputable authority. Aristotle makes a third large claim for dialectic: "For dialectic, by examining and testing, affords a way of reaching the starting points of all branches of inquiry." The procedure of working from endoxa, through discussion of conflicting views and of problems . . . toward something clear and certain, is a procedure that Aristotle often recommends and regularly adopts. 9

And to the task of defining dialectics, R yle contributes, further: The T opics [of Aristotle] is a training manual for a special pattern of disputation, governed by strict rules, which takes the following shape. Two persons agree to have a battle. One is to be questioner, the other answerer. The questioner can ... only ask questions; and the answerer can ... only answer "yes" or "no." So the questioner's questions have to be properly constructed for "yes" or "no" answers. This automatically rules out a lot of types of questions, like factual questions, arithmetical questions and technical questions ... it leaves only conceptual questions, whatever these may be. The answer~r begins by undertaking to uphold a certain "thesis." The questioner has to try to extract from the answerer by a series of questions an answer or conjunction of answers inconsistent with the original thesis . . . The questioner has won the duel of he succeeds in getting the answerer to contradict his original thesis, or else in forcing him to resign, or in reducing him to silence, to an infinite regress, to mere abusiveness, to pointless yammering or to outrageous paradox. The answerer has won if he succeeds in keeping his wicket up until the close of play.... The duel is fought out before an audience; and apparently it is sometimes for the audience to judge whether the questioner or the answerer has won. 10

9 Ackrill, Aristotle the Philosopher, pp. 110-111. This and the following definition of the matter seNe to encompass the traits of the dialectical argument in the Talmud, as. we shall see when we examine specific cases. But the correspondences strike me as general; one did not have to study Aristotle's Topics to create the remarkable dialectical compositions that grace the Gemara, though as we shall see, precisely the same premises as to discourse and rules of engagement apply. 10 Gilbert Ryle, PlatoJs Progress, pp. 102ff. Quotation: pp. 104-5.

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The Socratic Method culminates, when successful, in the answerer being caught in an argumentative impasse. But the philosopher's operations culminate, when successful, in his finding the way out of an impasse. II Aristotle makes it a defining property of a dialectical argument that the thesis which the answerer undertakes to uphold is an "endoxon" . and not a paradox. It should be a truism or something attested by the experts or something obvious to the man in the street.I2

As we shall see, Talmudic dialectics conforms, since the starting point is an announced thesis that enjoys appropriate sponsorship and authority. A named authority of considerable standing will be assigned authorship of the thesis. Then contrary opinion will be set forth, and the argument begins. Sometimes matters come to a resolution, others, the formulation of the argument concludes with a tacit recognition that one position or another has survived and is to be treated as normative. Dialectics never serves as an end, only as a means. Clearly, we shall have to undertake a systematic analysis of the Gemara's type of dialectical argument, before we can accomplish a balanced comparison and contrast with philosophical dialectics as herein described. But even now, the proposition emerges that, in order to accomplish their tasks of presenting a perfect law for the Torah, our sages required a mode of analytical argument that would enable them· to deal with contention and conflict. And dialectics in the Classical philosophical definition constituted that instrument of rationality. For reasons now fully set forth, our sages propose to take seriously all received opinion. It was their task to do precisely that. The mass of normative rules labeled TNY defined the work at hand: test this against that, the reason for this against the reason for that. That conviction conforms to the view of Aristotle, who holds that what is generally believed is likely to have some truth in it, and that the views of the wise are also not likely to be entirely wrong. . . So a close survey of "opinions" will both throw up problems and provide much material for solving them. The solution will preserve whatever was true in the various conflicting views, while filtering away what was unclear, exaggerated or erroneous . .. Sometimes a distinction will be drawn, or an ambiguity l?rought to light, with the consequence that we can accept both of two apparently opposed views, provided that they are suitably interpreted. 13 II

12 13

Ryle, p. 108. Ryle, p. 143. Ackrill, p. 112.

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Defining dialectics in the framework of Classical philosophy leaves us on familiar ground in the Mishnah, Sifra, and Gemara. For so far as the Mishnah and Sifra propose to define, e.g., what is similar and what is identical,14 theirs is a labor that Classical philosophy will have recognized. For in the setting of philosophy it is through dialectics that the work of clarification goes forward, for that is how we find out what is like, or unlike, that to which it is compared. Ryle is explicit on this point: ... Plato and Aristotle agree that the dialectician's concern is with what is "common" to, that is, shared by and neutral between the various special branches of knowledge. He is concerned with those concepts which are ubiquitous or trans-departmental; or with those truths which are in some way presupposed by all alike of the proprietary truths of the special sciences. The concepts of existence, non-existence, identity, difference, similarity, dissimilarity, unity and plurality are such "common" or ubiquitous concepts .... So Plato and Aristode both credit dialectic with the task of discovering some very important transdepartmental principles which hinge on the ubiquitous, non-specialist or "common" concepts .... 15

This work goes forward through formulating lists of things that belong together "ladders of kinds"16 and that presupposes a labor of distinction-making, comparison producing contrast, or, in the classical language, "division." It is that observation that leads Ryle to the point cited just now, concerning "a chain of summa." "Division" refers to "separating what you are defining from everything else."l7 Here is what is required: "A man who cannot give a determinate account of the Idea of the Good, separating it from everything else, and battling through all the scrutinies of it, being eager to scrutinize it by reference not to opinion but to its real being, and who cannot in all these scrutinies come through with his account unscathed, will you say that a man like that knows neither the Good nor any other good thing ... ?" 18 A still clearer formulation of the work of "setting out in a systematic form the definitions which were the answers to Socrates' questions," is as follows: "This form came later to -be called 'definitio per genus et differentiam;' in

14 15 16

17 18

T4erein lies Sifra's critique of the Mishnah's taxonomic method. Ope cit., pp. 133-4. Ryle, p. 136. R. M. Hare, "Plato," in Hare, Barnes, and Chadwick, Founders oj Thought, p. 50. Republic, 534 b, c, Hare, p. 50.

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order to say what something is, one has first to give its genus, assigning it to the class of things into which one has collected everything that resembles it generically, and then divide up the genus into species, saying what differentiates each, including the thing in question."19 But for the Gemara of the Talmud of Babylonia, dialectics finds its definition not in the task alone, but in the way in which the task is carried out, and that is through the question-answer of dialogue. True, rhetoric of that sort defines only the form. But, for reasons now spelled out, the form takes its part in the definition of substantive logic. Socratic method is not merely asking leading questions. 20 The value of questions is different. It is to include as active players the proponents "of two or more positions. Socrates' interlocutors are invited to join him in the pursuit of wisdom, rather than to be passively "instructed" in whatever Socrates has already learned himself. 21 Nor can we say that a single type of argument exhausts Socrates' definition of dialectics: . . . Socrates uses arguments of nearly every form. First, he constructs a great number of inductive arguments; some of these are inductive arguments from analogy, which we shall call inductive analogues; others are inductive arguments to a generalization, which we shall call inductive generalizations. He also constructs a great number of deductive arguments ... most of Socrates' most significant and most controversial arguments are reductio ad absurdum arguments. 22

This he calls dialectical method, in the language of Richard Robinson: The particular method which Plato discusses and recommends is called by him "the dialectical method" or "the power of conversing" or "the art concerning discussions" or "the procedure of discussion."23

Robinson further states: The fact is that the word "dialectic" had a strong tendency in Plato to mean "the ideal method, whatever that may be." ... The meaning of the word "dialectic" undergoes a substantial alteration in the course of the dialogues. Thus in the Phaedo, the "resort to discussion" which is equivalent to dialectic is identified with the hypothetical method. In the Republic on the other hand dialectic is supposed to consist solely

19

20 21 22 23

Hare, p. 50. Brickhouse and Smith, Plato's Socrates, p. 3. Brickhouse and Smith, p. 4. Gerasimos Xenophon Santas, Socrates. Philosophy in Plato's Early Dialogues, p. 137. Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic, p. 69.

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of whatever that "upward path" is which is there offered as superseding the hypothetical method of mathematics. In the Philebus, again, dialectic is represented as consisting solely of synthesis and division .... Although dialectics can be used to advantage in many and various spheres, its subject-matter is in one sense always the same ... It is always the search for "what each thing is." That is to say, it seeks the "essence" of each thing, the formal and abiding element in the thing. It regards "what neither comes into being ·nor passes away but is always identically the same." Thus it presupposes that things have unchanging essences; and if anyone denies this, he absolutely destroys the power of dialectic. 24 ... the dialectical conversation had two other aims, each of which might conflict with the answerer's saying what he really thought. In the first place, consistency was required. The answerer's opinions must agree with each other . . . The other aim which might conflict with the answerer's saying what he really thought was that there should be complete agreement between the speakers ... There can be no "agreeing to differ." The leader's questions are usually invitations to assent to a certain proposition, and if the answerer declines to assent, the leader cannot overlook the fact. He must reinstate agreement either by abandoning the proposition or by going back and obtaining the answerer's assent by showing that the proposition follows from others to which he assents. 25

Robinson here makes the definition of dialectic difficult, SInce by "ideal method," many things may be meant. Much that defines dialectics in the Classical philosophical setting proves so particular to that setting as to permit litde movement beyond. But when used by Aristotle, dialectics is a means for dealing with contraries, that is, with points of conflict. That is why the sole valid form is the question-answer exchange, and why dialogue proves essential. Dialectical reasoning works with opinions "that are generally accepted, though not recognized definitely by the reasoner as truth on the strength of their own proper evidence:"26 Though the dialectic itself does not yield knowledge in the full sense of the term, it is of the utmost importance for the acquisition of knowledge and for meeting other people on their own ground. . . dialectic may be said to contain the path to the first principles of all the sciences. Hence arises its indispensable function in relation to the ultimate bases of the principles used in the several sciences. For it is

24

25 26

Robinson, pp. 70-7l. Robinson, p. 78. Ibid., p. 304.

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impossible to discuss them at all from the principles proper to the particular science in hand, seeing that the principles are the a prioris of everything else; it is through the opinions generally held on the particular points that these have to be discussed, and this task belongs, properly, or most appropriately, to dialectic: for "dialectic is a proof of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries."27

Dialectical procedure yields not knowledge but the quest for knowledge. Aristotle's interest is in "thinking processes" that make possible various types of dialectic. When Aristotle pursues the dialectical approach to knowledge, like sages in the Mishnah, he deals with the physical world. Again Owens: That universe is a plurality. It consists of substance and accidents. Sensible substance itself is found to be a plurality. Change is seen as a process from one contrary to another .... contraries do not constitute the substance of anything, they are accidents and so should require a substrate. 28

Here we see the work of comparison and contrast, but of course the subject-matter is hardly congruent with that taken up by the Mishnah's authorship. Yet do we distinguish, in the Mishnah, accidents from essential qualities? And do we recognize the plurality of data and the parlous character of our taxonomic labor with it? I can open any page of the Mishnah for examples of precisely those distinctions and recognitions. What is at stake in dialectic is stated by Allan as follows: Dialectic will find some common foundation for those unproved assumptions upon which all scientific reasoning is based, and, in general, will make our fragmentary experience part of one coherent system, not by assembling the fragments and piecing them together, but by an intuitive grasp of a central necessary truth . . . from which all partial truth can be deduced without risk of error. 29

In the Mishnah and Gemara we find ourselves at home with a philosophy that aims at imparting coherence to knowledge and experience. Let us now turn to see precisely how the Gemara in particular accomplishes that aim of finding the norm through systematic contention. For, as with Classical philosophy, the authors of the Gemara's dialectical composites took as their premise that out of rigorous and unyielding conflict concerning truth, truth emerges. 27

28 29

Owens, p. 305, citing Aristotle, as indicated in his notes. Ibid. Allan, op. cit., p. 145.

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II. WHY

DIALECTICS WAS THE CHOSEN MEDIUM OF THOUGHT AND

EXPRESSION FOR THE MISHNAH'S HEIRS AND CONTINUATORS

Here we come to the critical question, how can we account for the Talmud's resort to dialectical argument, which had no precedent whatsoever in prior Israelite writing of any kind? Much of the Talmud accomplishes its goals without resort to contentious argument, let alone to the asking and answering of questions, so the work of Mishnah-commentary can have been accomplished without dialectics. But the Talmud's single indi~ative trait, even though not a paramount or ubiquitous one, is its dialectics, and we have every reason to want to know why.30 Because they inherited a corpus of conflict, a heritage of contending statements of norms and laws, the heirs of the Mishnah, proposing to continue the work of the Mishnah, found in dialectics the appropriate medium of expression and thought for accomplishing their task of confronting contention and resolving disharmony. If the Torah \ of the Lord was to be perfected, as the Psalmist held, then it was through dialectics that our sages would both demonstrate the perfection of the Mishnah, the transcription of the oral Torah of Sinai, and also remove the imperfections of the law that the Torah handed on to Israel. To understand what identified dialectical inquiry as the medium of choice for accomplishing the goals of the framers of the Gemara's composites and authors of its compositions, we have to review the Gemara's own tasks. Organized around the Mishnah in the form of a commentary to that document, the Gemara that together with the Mishnah comprises the Tahnud of Babylonia, a.k.a., the Bavli, accords privileged standing to the Mishnah. The form of the Gemara, its principles of organization and its systematic program, all accord priority to the Mishnah. But that is misleading. For, bearing secondary developments and also sizable topical appendices, as well as freestanding composites of Scripture-commentary, the Gemara of the. Bavli vastly exceeds the requirements of a Mishnah commentary. Not only so, but when we understand the actual task of the compilers of the

30 For the definition of dialectics in the Talmudic context, with the important distinction between authentic dialectics and the merely-formal framing of matters in question-and-answer style, see my Talmudic Dialectics: Types and Forms.

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Gemara and authors of its compositions-not only the formal requirements they adopted for themselves-we shall see why dialectics solved a considerable intellectual problem that they addressed. The Gemara created in Babylonia joins together a variety of composites of cogent compositions. 31 By no means do all of these composites take the task of Mishnah-commentary and propose only to explain or amplify the law of the Mishnah, or its language, or its Scriptural bases. 32 These composites divide into various types, each with its own rhetorical protocol and exegetical or expository and argumentative task. All but one type bear in common the purpose of compiling bodies of information, e.g., exegesis of verses of Scripture, lower-critical comments upon the sense and meaning of passages of the Mishnah, and the like. All express viewpoints, some contain disputes. The one type of composition (sometimes built into a composite) that conducts a sustained argument concerning an important thesis, sets forth a highly argumentative kind of writing. That writing takes the form of question-answer, aiming at dialogue, which is called the dialectical argument. Not by any measure the paramount type of composite in the Gemara,33 the dialectical argument imparts flavor to the whole Gemara by imposing tension and supplying movement, focus and purpose. By its movement, from question to answer, point to point, problem

31 For the definition of "composition" and "composite" and the critical part in my analysis of the document that those literary categories play, see my The Rules if Composition if the Talmud if Babylonia. The Cogency if the Bavli's Composite. Atlanta, 1991: Scholars Press for South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism. 32 It would carry us far afield to take up the various elements of Mishnahcommentary that the Gemara joins together. The three main programs are those listed in the text. My account of the matter is in The Bavli's Primary Discourse. Mishnah Commentary, its Rhelon'cal Paradigms and their Theological Implications in the Talmud of Babylonia Tractate Moed Qatan, Atlanta, 1992: Scholars Press for South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism. On the Gemara's persistent interest in identifying the Scriptural bases for the Mishnah's laws, see The Torah in the Talmud. A Taxonomy if the Uses if Scripture in the Talmuds. Tractate Qjddushin in the Talmud if Babylonia and the Talmud if the Land if Israel. 1. Bavli Qjddushin Chapter One. II. Yerushalmi Qjddushin Chapter One. And a Comparison if the Uses if Scripture by the Two Talmuds. Atlanta, 1993: Scholars Press for South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism. 33 See my Talmudic Dialectics: 1jpes and Forms, which graphically shows how small a proportion of the tractates of the Bavli is devoted to dialectical arguments, carefully defined. As I shall explain, question-answer-form by itself does not signifY dialectics; that is a mere rhetorical device. Where the questions and answers govern the direction of argument, shifting its course and imposing an intellectual program of challenge and response, there we have a dialectical argument, as I shall explain in detail.

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to problem, case to case, the dialectical argument also gives the Gemara the quality of dynamism. The rigor required to participate in a challenging exchange defines the intellectual quality of the whole document, even though most of the sustained discussions prove merely illuminating, not contentious. For its part the dialectical argument asks for not merely information but analysis, not merely acute reading of existing language but formulation of new points of interest altogether. What makes me insist that dialectics defined the ideal method for the Mishnah-analysis undertaken by the Gemara? The character of the Mishnah defined the challenge that was met by the selection and utilization34 of the dialectical argument, which, in all writings of all Judaisms from the beginnings to the third century C.E., has no precedent. Nor does the dialectical argument appear elsewhere than in the two Talmuds. And, truth be told, dialectics predominates only in the final compilation of the Rabbinic canon, the Talmud of Babylonia. A large-scale structure of lists, the Mishnah's generalizations (e.g., the king ranks higher in the political hierarchy than the high priest) rarely come to articulation; the mass of detail invited close study and analysis. The general had to emerge out of the concrete and specific, and generalizations valid at one point had to be tested against those emergent elsewhere; implications of generalizations for encompassing principles here required comparison and contrast with those that formed the foundations of a legal unit on an unrelated topic elsewhere. All of this work of construction would tum the Mishnah's details into large-scale compositions of encompassing significance. But the Mishnah by itself did not exhaust the resources of normative rulings that formed the heritage of its time and sages. And the Gemara, for its part, though organized around the Mishnah, in fact took as its problem the law of the Mishnah, along with other law not found in the Mishnah. The privileging of the Mishnah did not extend to the laws that it set forth. If the framers of the Mishnah hoped to bring order out of chaos by giving the authoritative selection of the law-not merely a collection of their preferences and chojces among laws-they were to find only disappointment. Repu34 In this context, obviously, not the invention. But I have no idea where or how o-qr sages learned about such types of argument, though, in the age of Neo-Platonism in which they thrived, we may hardly find surprising that they formulated a dialectics of their own, corresponding in its main formal and logical traits to the dialectics of Plato and Aristotle.

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diating the privileging of the Mishnah, reducing the document to a mere framework for the organization of something greater, the writers of the Gemara's compositions and compilers of its composites redefined matters and assigned to themselves a far more important task than merely glossing a fixed code. That choice formed their response to a simple fact: the Mishnah collected only a small portion of the law that had come into being in the first and second centuries. A sizable corpus of opinion, rulings, cases and disputes, circulated from the period in which the Mishnah emerged but found (or was given) no place within the Mishnah. Some of these materials came to rest in the compilation of supplements to the Mishnah called the Tosefta. Corresponding to the Mishnah in its topical organization and program, the Tosefta exceeded the Mishnah in sheer volume by at least four times-perhaps more. Other laws were formulated along with attributions to the same authorities, called Tannaite sages, who occur in the Mishnah. These laws scarcely differentiated themselves from those in the Mishnah, except in' contents. Still more laws circulated, whether or not attributed to the names of authorities who occur. also in the Mishnah, bearing the mark TNY-yielding "it was formulated as a Tannaite rule"35-and these too enjoyed the same standing and authority as Tannaite sayings collected in the Mishnah or the Tosefta. If therefore, a coherent and uniform, principled system of norms was to reach full articulation, the laws, and not the Mishnah, would form the arena for systematic study. That is to say, if a cogent system was to emerge out of the heritage of normative rulings out of Tannaite sponsorship, the entire mass of normative rulings would require analysis; points of contradiction would have to be sorted out; harmony between and among diverse laws would have to be established. To In the Talmud of Babylonia, statements bearing the signal, TNY, in its various forms, ordinarily bear the names of authorities who occur, also, in the Mishnah; or who are credited with the compilation of Mishnah-sayings, e.g., a Tosefta, such as Hiyya or Bar Qappara. But in the Talmud of the Land of Israel, the same convention does not prevail, and TNY-sayings may routinely occur in the names of authorities who elsewhere figure only with figures much later than the time of the closure of the Mishnah. Whatever the intent of TNY in the Bavli, therefore, in the Yerushalmi the meaning of the signal cannot. be the same. It is generally supposed that TNY in the Bavli means, a teaching out of Tannaite times. But indifference to chronology, indicated by name-associations, in the Yerushalmi then bears a different meaning. There, it follows, TNY signals a status as to authority, not as to origin. And I suspect closer study of the Bavli, without the prevailing assumption as to the sense of TNY, will yield a comparable result. 35

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accomplish the task of analysis of sayings, formulation and testing of generalizations, above all, the discovery of the principles embedded in the normative rules governing discrete cases, the Gemara resorted to the dialectal argument. 36 That would make possible the transformation of the Mishnah's lists, limited by their nature to data of a single kind, into the starting-points for series capable of infinite extension across data of diverse kinds, as I shall explain in due course. , The implications of the character of the heritage of norms that our sages of blessed memory addressed with the Mishnah in hand prove self-evident. Specifically, had our sages of blessed memory received only the Mishnah, the character of that document would have imposed a labor of mere amplification of a well-crafted document and application of a uniform law. That is not only because of the exquisite quality of the craftsmanship exhibited in the Mishnah's composition, but also because of the pristine clarity of its laws themselves. Where there is a difference of opinion, it is labeled by assigning to the minority view a name, with the majority, and normative, position given anonymously. So was schism signaled clearly if tacitly. Hence applying the law would have imposed no formidable burdens. 37 And had the Babylonian sages of the third through seventh centuries received only a mass of laws, deriving from hither and yon, the primary work of selection and organization, not analysis and theoretical synthesis, would have occupied their best energies. But that is not how matters worked out. The Mishnah imposed structure and order. The boundaries of discourse therefore were laid out. But 36 As I shall argue in a later part of this chapter, the upshot was to turn a list into a series. But how this was to be done-how the Mishnah (in formal terms) was to be made to yield law beyond itself and for topics outside of the closed system of its framers-remains to be examined in due course. The greatest single dialectical argument in the Talmud, that in Bavli-tractate Zebahim Chapter Five, will be examined in detail, and there we shall see the manner in which dialectics transformed law into jurisprudence, norms into principles, and, as I said, lists into series capable of indefinite expansion. 37 Proof for this supposition lies in the character of the Mishnah-commentaries, beginning with the master, Maimonides. Commenting on the Mishnah solely in its own framework, not on the Mishnah's law in the setting of laws deriving from a variety of sources, Maimonides obviated the necessity of addressing the Talmud and its protracted debates-and that was his announced intention. So in claiming that the character of the legacy received by our sages in the Gemara-the privileged Mishnah, competing with other authoritative laws, all viewed as equal candidates for normative standing-dictated the choice of dialectics as the preferred mode of analysis by reason of its capacity to address contention, I appeal to facts created by an alternative choice of Mishnah-reception and commentary.

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the Mishnah's selectivity defined the exegetical problematics for further inquiry. Accordingly, our sages of blessed memory addressed a dual challenge, 1. both subjecting a well-crafted document to exegesis, amplification, and theoretical inquiry, 2. but also sorting out conflicting data on the same matters that said document took up. To amplify this point, which is crucial to all that follows: the intellectual tasks confronting the heirs of the Mishnah were made complicated by the conflict between the status of the Mishnah and the sizable legacy of authoritative data transmitted along with the Mishnah. The Mishnah e~oyed privileged status. All other compositions and composites received the form of commentary to the Mishnah. But the exegesis of the Mishnah did not then define the sole intellectual labor at hand. For the privileging of the Mishnah proved incomplete, with a huge corpus of other rulings on the same agenda compiled in the Tosefta, with other corp era of rulings on elements of the same agenda compiled alongside the Tosefta, and with still other free-floating sayings endowed with Tannaite status to cope with as well. Mishnah-exegesis-words, phrases, sources in Scripture-then would ordinarily enjoy pride of position, at the head of any sustained composite. But, following that work, next in line would come the challenge of conflicting opinion on the Mishnah's topics and rulings. Not only so, but the privileging of the Mishnah would remain a mere formality, without a direct confrontation with the conflicting opinions preserved along with the Mishnah. The Mishnah had to be shown perfect in form, harmonious in contents, dominant in normsetting, if that initial act of privileging were to signal long-term status as the authoritative statement. 38 The Mishnah's character as a mass of petty rulings defined a third task, one that was natural to the rigorous intellects who comprised

38 That task would always be left by the framers of a law code to the heirs, who would defend the code by encompassing within its framework precisely the norms that the codifiers deemed superfluous! In the case of the Mishnah, the Tosefta accommodated a vast corpus of supplementary or complementary materials, organized as an amplification and extended development of the Mishnah. But that then left the TNY-sayings, formed into compositions and occasionally even into composites. So the Tosefta solved no problems, and no one today suspects it was meant to.

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the cadre of our sages of blessed memory. That was to require the quest for not only harmony but also generalization, the encompassing principle, the prevailing rule emerging from concrete data. For intellectuals of sages' sort sought not only information about details, but guidance on the main lines of thought. Not only so, but, engaged as they were in the administration of the life of the Jewish communities of Babylonia, theirs proved to be a practical reason and applied logic. They had not only to rule on cases covered by the Mishnahand laws of its standing in addition-but also on cases not envisaged at all within the framework of the Mishnah. These cases of new kinds altogether, involving not only application of the law but penetration into the principles behind the law that could be made to cover new cases, demanded the formation of an analytical logic capable of generating principles to produce new laws. And that is where dialectics entered in, for both practical and theoretical reasons. Theoretical considerations come first. Crafted to begin with to produce clarity of definition, the mode of dialectical argument of Classical philosophy defined a reliable method to secure compelling definitions of important principles. To deal with conflicting opinion on definition, two or more rulings on the same problem had to be set side by side and given each its hearing. Perhaps the conflict could be resolved through making a distinction; in that case let one party challenge the other, with a harmonizing opinion then registering. Perhaps the conflict revealed principles that were at odds. These required articulation, analysis, juxtaposition and then, if possible, harmonization, if possible, reformulation at a higher level of abstraction. 39 Perhaps rulings on one topic rested on a principle that affected, also, rulings on another topic altogether. Then the principle expressed by rulings on that unrelated topic had to be made articulate and brought into relationship with the underlying principle operative elsewhere. And again, a given set of rulings served to illustrate a single point in common, and that point in common was to be formulated as a hypothesis of general intelligibility and applicability. rulings on one topic rested on a principle that affected, also, rulings on \~nother topic altogether. Then the principle expressed by rulings on that unrelated topic had to be made articulate and brought into relationship with the underlying principle operative elsewhere. 39 The mode of argument in the pattern of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis would be long in coming, and I see no precursors in the Gemara.

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And again, a given set of rulings served to illustrate a single point in common, and that point in common was to be formulated as a hypothesis of general intelligibility and applicability. How better to test a hypothesis than in a dialogue between proponents and opponents, the latter raising contrary cases, the former overcoming contradiction, the former amplifYing and extending their hypothesis, the latter proposing to limit it. The upshot is, the very character of the corpus of law received by our sages in Babylonia insured that a vast repertoire of conflict and contention would define the work of those responsible for the orderly application of the law-the Mishnah's law but not that alone-to the everyday affairs of the community of holy Israel. Given the range of data to be addressed, the mode of questionanswer, challenge out of conflicting data and response through resolution of conflict, served as the principal medium of thought. The very character of the corpus of norms generated the kind of conflict best resolved through the challenge and response embodied in question-answer rhetoric of dialectics. The specific purpose of our sages' reading of the norms-the formulation of an internally coherent, proportionate, and harmonious statement-coincided with the promise of dialectic, which is to expose conflict and find ways through reason of resolving it. But if theory made dialectics the method of choice, politics reenforced the theoretical usefulness of that method of thought and expression. Practical considerations, both intellectual and political in character, moreover underscored the usefulness of dialectics. Framed in a rhetoric aimed at effecting agreement out of conflict, preserving civility and rationality in confrontation of opinion, received tradition, or ideas, dialectics moreover took a form exceedingly suitable to the situation of the sages. All of them proud, accomplished, certain of their knowledge, and opinionated, sages required a medium of thought that would accord recognition and respect to all participants. Simply announcing opinions-solutions to problems, rulings on cases, theories for analytical consideration-accomplished little, when the participants to public discourse addressed one another as equals and laid a heavy claim upon a full hearing for their respective views. And even had our sages proved men of limited intellect, politics pointed toward dialogue and argued in favor of a rhetoric of dialectics. None possessed access to coercive force,4° other than that of 40

A single exception proves the rule. A few sages were employed by the Jewish

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intellectual power and moral authority. For, lacking an efficient administration capable of imposing order, they could hope to accomplish their goals through persuasion, not coercion. Denied the services of a police force or army, effective principally through public opinion and persuasion (relying heavily, for instance, upon ostracism as a social penalty), our sages could best impose their will by means of powerful argument. The power of rationality, moreover, proved singularly congruent to sages' circumstance, since none of them enjoyed political sponsorship sufficient to compel the rest to conform, and all of the more influential ones jealously guarded their standing and prerogatives. 41 The mode of argument made possible through dialectics-two or more positions fully exposed, with arguments pro and con, a complete repertoire of positions and possibilities, laid out in the form of an exchange between and among equals, with point-by-point AU5eindersetzungen, allowing for the full articulation of generalizations, exceptions based on cases, counter-arguments, and competing generalizations-that mode of argument alone could prove congruent to the politics of powerful intellects lacking worldly position to sustain their hypothese.s. 42 Accordingly, our sages chose wisely when they civil administration of Babylonia, a state-recognized agency called the exilarchate. The exilarchate is represented in the Rabbinic sources as an independent authority over the Jews, and not as a corporate body of sages themselves. A few sages, however, are represented as employed by (part of the "household" of) the exilarch. But stories about those fe,:", while acknowledging their political standing, never represent the exilarch's sages as employing power rather than persuasion of a reasoned sort. The pertinent stories are collected in my History if the Jews in Babylonia. (Leiden, 1965-1970: E. J. Brill) I-V. Chapter Two of each of the volumes, II-V, is devoted to the exilarchate. 41 In my Jews if Babylonia, I collect most of the stories on the ways in which the laws were enforced, on the one side, and the manners of sages in dealing with one another, on the other side. These brief remarks summarize a huge corpus of tales, all of them telling the same story of an institutionally-inchoate body of powerful . teachers-judges-administrators. Chapters Three and beyond of each of the volumes, c II-V, are devoted to stories about the sages as administrators of the law, as holy men, and in other public capacities. 42 Such a claim requires comparison between the selected mode of analytical argument as the medium of commentary and other, available media of response to received texts. We have already examined available, and well-utilized, modes in the consideration of the logic of analysis and contrast set forth in Chapter One, and my comparison of the Bavli's and Yerushalmi's readings of the Mishnah, in The Bavli's Unique Voice, provides another examination, all within the Rabbinic framework. The problem of moving beyond that boundary derives from the absence, in other legal codes in the Israelite setting, of any sort of analytical program at all. If we begin with the Scriptural codes, e.g., the Holiness Code, the codes of JE, and so Oll, and

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determined that argument in dialogic form, within dialectical logic, defined the best possible instrument with which to accomplish their task of explanation, analysis, and amplification of the law that they had received not only from the Mishnah but from other sources of the same status or origin. -

III. THE

GEMARA'S DIALECTICS

Even though it occurs in only a few documents, and even there, in only a limited proportion, the dialectical, or moving, argument is important because, in the sustained conflict provoked by the testing of proposition in contention, argument turns fact into truth. Making a point forms of data important propositions. The exchanges of propositions and arguments, objects and ripostes, hold together, however protracted. The dialectical argument opens the possibility of reaching out from one thing to something else, not because people have lost sight of their starting point or their goal in the end, but because they want to encompass, in the analytical argument as it gets underway; as broad and comprehensive a range of cases and rules as they possibly can. The movement from point to point in reference to a single point that accurately describes the dialectical argument reaches upward toward a goal of proximate abstraction, leaving behind the specificities of not only cases but laws, carrying us upward to the law that governs many cases, the pre~ses that undergird many rules, and still higher to the principles that infuse diverse premises; then the principles that generate other, unrelated premises, which, in turn, come to expression in other, still-less intersecting cases. The meandering course of argument comes to an end when we have shown how things cohere. Or, sometimes, the argument simply stops, leaving open possibilities for coming generations to take up. proceed to the representations of law in Elephantine, Qumran, and elsewhere, we find no proximate counterpart, not only in detail but in main purpose, for what our sages undertook in a variety of settings, whether in the Mishnah or the T osefta or Sifra or in the Gemaras of the Yerushalmi and the Bavli. So our allegation that we deal with the best possible analytical mode, given the task at hand, rests on comparisons' but, alas, comparisons only within the same system. Some day someone will want to compare Talmudic dialectics with the presentation of canon law in Gratian's writings and afterward-that is where the Aristotelian dialectics once more surfaces in the context of norm-setting.

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Before proceeding in our consideration of the Gemara's dialectics, we have now to specify what is to be excluded from our account. And, therefore, an important qualification is in order, and that concerns the exclusion from consideration of protracted presentations of data, in the form of questions and answers, that simply set forth a mass of well-crafted information, but no sustaining and continuous proposition. Such agglutinations of compositions and even composites prove informative; they collected information, much of it serving as on-site footnotes; but they follow no analytical problem, and they aim at little more than the provision of information. What differentiates an authentic dialectical argument, with an analytical program from a merely illuminating collection of information? Both will exhibit connections from one item to the next, but the dialectical-analytical argument will always pursue an abstract and generalizing question, and the agglutinative composite will ordinarily turn out to be a set of footnotes. Let me give one example of discourse that moves forward through rhetorical questions and answers but does not demand classification as dialectical, in that the movement proves superficial, the basic argument static and narrowly propositional. In the following case we see how a dialectical form conceals a perfectly standard exchange of information, nothing more: 1.6 A. Said R. Huna, "He who enters the synagogue and finds the community saying the Prayer, if he can begin and complete the Prayer before the leader of the community in his repetition, reaches the blessing, 'We acknowledge ... ,' should say the Prayer, and if not, he should not say the Prayer." B. And R. Joshua b. Levi said, "If he can begin and complete the Prayer before the leader of the community in his repetition reaches the Sanctification, he should say the Prayer, and if not, he should not say the Prayer." C. Concerning what principle do they dijfer? D. One master [A] takes the view that an individual may say the Sanctification-prayer [by himself]. E. The other [B] takes the view that the individual may not say the Sanctification-prayer [by himself]. F. So too [B] did R. Ada bar Ahba say, "How do we kpow on the basis of Scripture that an individual [praying by himself] does not say the Sanctification-prayer? As it is said, 'And I shall be sanctified among the children of Israel' (Lev. 22:32). Every matter involving sanctification may be conducted among no fewer than ten men."

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G. How does the besought proqf derive .from the cited verse? H. It accords with that which Rabbinai, brother of R. Hiyya bar Abba, taught on Tannaite authon'ty, "An analogy is drawn on the use of the word 'among.'" 1. "Here it is written, 'And I shall be sanctified among the children of Israel' (Lev. 22:32), and elsewhere it is written, 'Separate yourselves from among this congregation' (Num. 16:21). Just as, in the latter instance, 'among' involves ten men, so here ten are required." J. Both authorities concur, in the end, that one does not interrupt [the prayer. !f a person has begun to recite the Prayer, when the congregation comes to recite the Sanctification, the person does not interrupt his prayer to recite the Sanctification with the congregation)

What we have is little more than a first-rate exposition of the point at issue in a dispute, followed by a secondary datum, which shows how a proposition emerges from a proof-text. Merely presenting a dispute in a fair and balanced way, utilizing the form of question and answer, does not lead us into the realm controlled by authentic dialectics. We cannot confuse the deft presentation of conflicting propositions, along with required information, with the rich intellectual movement, hither and yon, that dialectics involves. This distinction, between the rhetoric of dialectics and the logic thereof, forms so central a point of differentiation in all that follows as to justify introducing a second example of what I class as other than an analytical-dialectical argument. It is a case in which the formal utilization of questions and answers masks a quite static argument, in which set-piece positions are intertwined, compared and contrasted, without a trace of movement' from one point to some other:

SERVING MISHNAH-TRACTATE ERUBIN

6:3-4

VI.2 A. Abbayye asked Rabbah, "Five tenants lived in a single courtyard, and one of them forgot and did not participate in the fusion meal-when he renounces his rights of access, does he have to renounce it in favor of each and every tenant or does he not have to do so?" B. He said to him, "He has to renounce his right in favor of each and every tenant." C. An objection was raised: One party who did not participate in the fusion meal abrogates his right in favor of one party who did participate in the fusion meal; two persons who participated

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D. E.

F.

G.

H. I.

].

K. L.

in the fusion meal assign their right to one who didn't, and two who didn't participate in the fusion meal abrogate their right to two who did participate in the fusion meal or to one who did not participate in the fusion meal. But one who participated in the fusion meal doesn't abrogate his right to one who didn't participate, and two who participated in the fusion meal do not abrogate their right in favor of two who didn't participate, and two who didn't participate in the fusion meal don't abrogate their right in favor of two who didn't participate in the fusion meal. Now the Tannaite formulation in atry event states at the outset, one party who did not participate in the fusion meal abrogates his right in favor of one party who did participate in the fusion meal. Now how are we to imagine the case? If there is no other with him, then with whom might he have joined in the fusion meal? So it must follow, there must have been another tenant alongside, and yet it is stated, one party who did participate in the fusion meal! [Slotki: How could Rabbah maintain that renunciation must be made in favor of each and every tenant individually?] And Rabbah? Here with what situation do we deal? It is a case in which there was a tenant with whom the fusion meal was made, but who died [Slotki: by the time the third party presented his share; so there were only two tenants in the courtyard, and one may renounce in favor of the other]. Well, then, what about what follows: But one who participated in the fusion meal doesn't abrogate his right to one who didn't participate? Now, if he had been there but died, w~ shouldn't it be permitted [for the survivor to renounce his share (Slotki)]? So it's obvious tkat the tenant with whom the meal was prepared was still around, and, since the final clause takes for granted that he was still around, the initial clause also deals with a case in which he was still around [and Rabbah's got a problem}! 'What makes you see things that way? The one clause deals with its case, the other deals with its situation. You may know that that is the case, for the concluding part qf the opening formulation says, two who didn't participate in the fusion meal abrogate their right to two who did participate in the fusion meal. So to two they may do so, but not to one. And Abbayye? He may say, what is the meaning qf"to two"? It is, "to one of the two." If so, w~ instead of "two" wasn't it said, "To one who joined in the fictive fusion meal or to one who did not" [Slotki: since one tenant cannot join in a fictive meal with himself, it would then be obvious that the sense was, to one of two]? Well, that's a legitimate problem. ... one party who did not participate in the fusion meal ab-

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rogates his right in favor of one party who did participate in the fusion mealM. In Abbayye)s view, this speaks of a case in which the other tenant [who joined in the fiction meal with the one mentioned] was still alive, and so we are irifOrmed that it is not necessary to renounce one's rights in favor of each and every tenant. N. In Rabbah)s view, it is a- case in which he was around but then died, and so. we are informed that no precautionary decree is enacted to deal with· the possibility that someone may yet be around [and yet the same procedure might be followed]. O. . . . two persons who participated in the fusion meal assign their right to one who didn'tP. So thal's pretty obvious. Q "What might you otherwise have imagined? That since he did not participate in the fUsion meal, an extrqjudicial penalf:Y is to be imposed on him? So we are irifOrmed that that is not the case. R. ... and two who didn't participate in the fusion meal abrogate their right to two who did participate in the fusion mealS. In Rabbah's view, the Tannaite formulation if the concluding clause was meant to clarifY the sense if the opening clause. To Abbayye, it was necessary to include the clause concerning two who didn't participate in the fUsion meal. For it might have entered your mind that we should make a precautionary decree) to cover the possibilif:Y that thf!J may come and renounce in their fovor [which is forbidden}, but so we are irifOrmed that that is not the case. T. . . . or to one who did not participate in the fusion mealU. "What do I need this item for? V. JiVhat might you otherwise have supposed? That the rule applies to a case in which some if the tenants participated in the fusion meal and some didn't, but in a case in which all of them didn )t, we impose a penalf:Y, so that the rule of the fUsion meal should not be forgotten? So we are irifOrmed that that is not so. W. But one who participated in the fusion meal doesn't abrogate his right to one who didn't participateX. From Abbayye's perspective, the Tannaite formulation if the concluding clause serves to explain the sense if the opening one. From Rabbah's perspective, since the opening clause was set forth, the closing clause was put in to match it. Y. . . . and two who participated in the fusion meal do not abrogate their right in favor of two who didn't participateZ. So for what do I need to be told this again? AA. It was necessary to cover the case in which one of them renounced his share in favor of the other [of those who didn't share in the fUsion meal}. JiVhat might you have supposed? That the latter should then have the right to use the courtyard? So we are informed that that is not the case) since at the time the former renounced his share, he had no right to use the courtyard.

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BB .... and two who didn't participate in the fusion meal don't abrogate their right in favor of two who didn't participate in the fusion meal ee. So for what do I need to be told this again? DD. It was necessary to cover even the case in which they said to him, "Acquire our share on the stipulation that you transfer them.))

Here is a superb exercise in fair and equitable presentation of two positions; but the positions stand still and the argument leads nowhere; without motion, the dialectic or movement proves merely formal but in no way substantive, the basic point at issue being made manifest but not made to move. Time and again, a closer look at what appears to be a moving argument shows us that all we have is a rhetorical device to secure the proper and orderly balance between two contradictory positions.

IV. AN

EXAMPLE OF A DIALECTICAL ARGUMENT

The passage that we consider occurs at the Babylonian Talmud Baba Mesia 5B-6A, which is to say, Talmud to Mishnah Baba Mesia. 1: 1-2. Our interest is in the twists and turns of the argument. We have now to discern what is at stake in the formation of a continuous and unfolding composition: [5bJ IV.I. A. This one takes an oath that he possesses no less a share of it than half, [and that one takes an oath that he possesses no less a share of it than half, and they divide it up]:

The rule of the Mishnah, which is cited at the head of the sustained discussion, concerns the case of two persons who find a garment. We settle their conflicting claim by requiring each to take an oath that he or she owns title to no less than half of the garment, and then we split the garment between them. Our, first question is one of text-criticism: analysis of the Mishnahparagi~ph's word choice. We say that the oath concerns the portion that the claimant alleges he possesses. But the oath really affects the portion that he does not have in hand at all:

B. Is it concerning the portion that he claims he possesses that he takes the oath, or concerning the portion that he does not claim to possess? [Daiches: "The implication is that the terms of the oath are ambiguous. By swearing that his share in it is not "less than half," the claimant might

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mean that it is not even a third or a fourth (which is "less than half"), and the negative way of putting it would justify such an interpretation. He could therefore take this oath even if. he knew that he had no share in the garment at all, while he would be swearing falsely if he really had a share in the garment that is less than half, however small that share might be]. C. Said R. Huna~ "It is that he says, 'By an oath! I possess in it a portion, and I possess in it a portion that is no more than half a share of it.'" [The claimant swears that his share is at least half (Daiches, Baba Mesia, ad loc.)]'

Having asked and answered the question, we now find ourselves in an extension of the argument; the principal trait of the dialectical argument is now before us: [1] but [2] maybe the contrary is the case, so [3] what about-that is, the setting aside of a proposition in favor of its opposite. Here we come to the definitive trait of the dialectic argument: its insistence on challenging every proposal with the claim, "maybe it's the opposite?" This pestering question forces us back upon our sense of self-evidence; it makes us consider the contrary of each position we propose to set forth. It makes thought happen. True, the Talmud's voice's "but"-the whole of the dialectic in one word!-presents a formidable nuisance. But so does all criticism, and only the mature mind will welcome criticism. Dialectics is not for children, politicians, propagandists, or egoists. Genuine curiosity about the truth shown by rigorous logic forms the counterpart to musical virtuosity. So the objection proceeds: C. 7hen let him say, "By an oath! The whole of it is mine!"

Why claim half when the alleged finder may as well demand the whole cloak? D. But are we going to give him the whole if it? [Obviously not, there is another claimant, also taking an oath.]

The question contradicts the facts of the case: two parties claim the cloak, so the outcome can never be that one will get the whole thing. E. Then let him say, "By an oath! Half of it is mine!"

Then-by the same reasoning-why claim "no less than half," rather than simply, half. F. That would damage his own claim [which was that he owned the whole of the cloak, not only half of it].

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The claimant does claim the whole cloak, so the proposed language does not serve to replicate his actual claim. That accounts for the language that is specified. G. But here too is it not the fact that~ in the oath that he is taking, he impairs' his own claim? [After ali, he here makes explicit the fact that he owns at least half of it. What happened to the other half?]

The solution merely compounds the problem. H. [Not at all.} For he has said, "The whole of it is mine!" [And, he further proceeds,] "And as to your contrary view, by an oath, I do have a share in it, and that share is no less than halfl"

We solve the problem by positing a different solution from the one we suggested at the outset. Why not start where we have concluded? Because if we had done so, we should have ignored a variety of intervening considerations and so should have expounded less than the entire range of possibilities. The power of the dialectical argument now is clear: it forces us to address not the problem and the solution alone, but the problem and the various ways by which a solution may be reached; then, when we do come to a final solution to the question at hand, we have reviewed all of the possibilities. We have seen how everything flows together, nothing is left unattended. What we have here is not a set-piece of two positions, with an analysis of each, such as the formal dialogue, such as we saw in Chapter Two, exposes with such elegance; it is, rather, an analytical argument, explaining why this, not that, then why not that but rather this; and onward to the other thing and the thing beyond that-a linear argument in constant forward motion. When we speak of a moving argument, this is what we mean: what is not static and merely expository, but what is dynamic and always contentious. It is not an endless argument, an argument for the sake of arguing, or evidence that important to the Talmud and other writings that use the dialectics as a principal mode of dynamic argument is process but not position. To the -contrary, the passage is resolved with a decisive conclusion, not permitted to run on. But the dialectical composition proceeds-continuous and coherent from point to point, even as it zigs and zags. We proceed to the second cogent proposition in the analysis of the cited Mishnah-passage, which asks a fresh question: why an oath at all?

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2. A. [It is envisioned that each party is holding on to a corner of the cloak, so the question is raised:] Now, since this one is possessed of the cloak and standing right there, and that one is possessed of the cloak and is standing right there, why in the world do I require this oath?

Until now we have assumed as fact the premise of the Mishnah's rule, which is that an oath is there to be taken. But why assume so? Surely each party now has what he is going to get. So what defines the point and effect of the oath? B. Said R. Y ohanan, "This oath [to which our Mishnah-passage refers] happens to be an ordinance imposed only by rabbis, C. "so that people should not go around grabbing the cloaks of other people and saying, 'It's mine!'" [But, as a matter of fact, the oath that is imposed in our Mishnah-passage is not legitimate by the law of the Torah. It is an act taken by sages to maintain the social order.]

We do not administer oaths to liars; we do not impose an oath in a case in which one of the claimants would take an oath for something he knew to be untrue, since one party really does own the cloak, the other really has grabbed it. The proposition solves the problem-but hardly is going to settle the question. On the contrary, Y ohanan raises more problems than he solves. So we ask how we can agree to an oath in this case at all? D. But why then not advance the following argument: since such a one is suspect as to fraud in a properry claim) he also should be suspect as to fraud in oath-taking?

Y ohanan places himself into the position of believing in respect to the oath what we will not believe in respect to the claim on the cloak, for, after all, one of the parties before us must be lying! Why sustain such a contradiction: gullible and suspicious at one and the same time? E. In point if fact) we do not advance the argument: since such a one is suspect as to fraud in a properry claim) he also should be suspect as to fraud in oath-taking) for ifyou do not concede that fact) then how is it possible that the All-Merciful has ruled, "One who has conceded part of a claim against himself must take an oath as to the remainder of what is subject to claim"?

If someone claims that another party holds property belonging to him or her, and the one to whom the bailment has been handed

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over for safe-keeping, called the bailee, concedes part of the claim, the bailee must then take an oath in respect to the rest of the claimed property, that is, the part that the bailee maintains does not belong to the claimant at all. So the law itself-the Torah, in fact-has sustained the same contradiction. That fine solution, of course, is going to be challenged: F. JiVhy not simplY maintain, since such a one is suspect as to fraud in a properry claim, he also should be suspect as to fraud in oath-taking? G .. In that other case, [the reason for the denial if part if the claim and the admission if part is not the intent to commit fraud, but rather,] the difendant is just trying to put off the claim for a spell.

We could stop at this point without losing a single important point of interest; everything is before us. One of the striking traits of the large-scale dialectical composition is its composite-character. Starting at the beginning, without any loss of meaning or sense, we may well stop at the end of any given paragraph of thought. But the dialectics insists on moving forward, exploring, pursuing, insisting; and were we to remove a paragraph in the middle of a dialectical composite, then all that follows would become incomprehensible. That is a mark of the dialectical argument: sustained, continuous, and coherent-yet perpetually in control and capable of resolving matters at any single point. For those of us who consume, but do not produce, arguments of such dynamism and complexity, the task is to discern the continuity, that is to say, not to lose sight of where we stand in the whole movement. Now, having fully exposed the topic, its problem, and its principles, we take a tangent indicated by the character of the principle before us: when a person will or will not lie or take a false oath. We have a theory on the matter; what we now do is expound the theory, with special reference to the formulation of that theory in explicit terms by a named authority: H. This concurs with the pOSItIon of Rabbah. [For Rabbah has said, "On what account has the Torah imposed the requirement of an oath on one who confesses to only part of a claim against him? It is by reason of the presumption that a person will not insolently deny the truth about the whole of a loan in the very presence of the creditor and so entirely deny the debt. He will admit to part of the debt and deny part of it. Hence we invoke an oath in a case in which one does so, to coax out the truth of the matter."]

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1. For you may know, [in support of the foregoing], that R. ldi bar Abin said R. Hisda [said]: "He who [falsely] denies owing money on a loan nonetheless is suitable to give testimony, but he who denies that he holds a bailment for another party cannot give testimony."

The proposition is now fully exposed. A named authority is introduced, who will concur in the proposed theoretical distinction. He sets forth an extra-logical consideration, which of course the law always will welcome: the rational goal of finding the truth overrides the technicalities of the law-- governing the oath. Predictably, we cannot allow matters to stand without challenge, and the challenge comes at a fundamental level, with the predictable give-and-take to follow: ]. But what about that which R. Ammi bar. Hama repeated on Tannaite authority: "[If they are to be subjected to an oath,] four sorts of bailees have to have denied part of the bailment and conceded part of the bailment, namely, the unpaid bailee, the borrower, the paid bailee, and the one who rents." K. JiVhy not simply maintain, since such a one is suspect as to fraud in a property claim, he also should be suspect as to fraud in oath-taking? L. In that case as wel~ [the reason for the denial ofpart of the claim and the admission ofpart is not the intent to commit frau~ but rather,] the defendant is just trying to put off the claim for a spell. M. He reasons as follows: '"I'm going to find the thief and arrest him." Or: ''I'll find [the beast} in the field and return it to the owner."

Once more, "if that is the case" provokes yet another analysis; we introduce a different reading of the basic case before us, another reason that we should not impose an oath:

g that is the case,

then why should one who denies holding a bailment ever be unsuitable to give testimony? Why don't we just maintain that the defondant is just trying to put off the claim for a spell. He reasons as follows: ''I'm going to look for the thing and find it." O. When in point offoct we do rule, He who denies holding a bailment is unfit to give testimony, it is in a case in which witnesses come and give testimony against him that at that very moment, the bailment is located in the bailee's domain, and he folly is iriformed of that jact, or, alternatively, he has the object in his possession at that very moment. N.

The solution to the problem at hand also provides the starting point for yet another step in the unfolding exposition. Huna has given us a different resolution of matters. That accounts for No.3, and No.4 is also predictable:

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3. A. But as to that which R. Huna has said [when we have a bailee who offers to pay compensation for a lost bailment rather than swear it has been lost, since he wishes to appropriate the article by paying for it, (Daiches)], "They impose upon him the oath that the bailment is not in his possession at all," B. JiVhy not in that case invoke the principle) since such a one is suspect as to .fraud in a property claim, he also should be suspect as to fraud in oathtaking? C. In that case also, he may rule in his own behalf, I'll give him the money. 4. A. Said R. Aha of Dijti to Rabina, "But then the man clear!J transgresses the negative commandment: 'You shall not covet.'" B. "You shall not covet" is general!J understood by people to pertain to something for which one is not ready to pay.

Yet another authority's position now is invoked, and it draws us back to our starting point: the issue of why we think an oath is suitable in a case in which we ought to assume lying is going on; so we are returned to our starting point, but via a circuitous route: 5. A. [6A] But as to that which R. Nahman said, "They impose upon him [who denies the whole of a claim] an oath of inducement," why not in that case invoke· the principle, since such a one is suspect as to .fraud in a property claim, he also should be suspect as to fraud in oath-taking? B. And forthennore, there is that which R. Hiyya taught on Tannaite authority: "Both parties [employee, supposed to have been paid out of an account set up by the employer at a local store, and storekeeper] take an oath and collect what each claims from the employer," why not in that case invoke the principle, since such a one is suspect as to .fraud in a property claim) he also should be suspect as to .fraud in oath-taking? C. And furthenn0 re) there is that which R. Sheshet said, "We impose upon an unpaid bailee [who claims that the animal has been lost] three distinct oaths: first, an oath that I have not deliberately caused the loss, that I did not put a hand on it, and that it is not in my domain at all," why not in that case invoke the principle, since such a one is suspect as to .fraud in a property claim) he also should be suspect as to fraud in oath-taking?

We now settle the matter: D. It must follow that we do not invoke the principle at al~ since such a one is suspect as to fraud in a property claim, he also should be suspect as to .fraud in oath-taking?

What is interesting is why walk so far to end up where we started: do we invoke said principle? No, we do not. What we have accomplished on our wanderings is a survey of

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opInIon on a theme, to be sure, but opinion that intersects at our particular problem as well. The moving argument serves to carry us hither and yon; its power is to demonstrate that all considerations are raised, all challenges met, all possibilities explored. This is not merely a set-piece argument, where we have proposition, evidence, analysis, conclusion; it is a different sort of thinking altogether, purposive and coherent, but also comprehensive and compelling for its admission of possibilities and attention to alternatives. What we shall see, time and again, is that the dialectical argument is the Talmud's medium of generalization from case to principle and extension from principle to new cases.

v.

AN

EXAMPLE OF AN ARGUMENT OF AN

OTHER-TH.AN-DIALECTICAL CHARACTER

Merely-rhetorical dialectics, that is, arguments framed in terms of sequences of questions and answers, should not be confused with dialectical arguments. The reason is that such compositions and composites set forth exchanges of information and principle, but do not establish that wide-ranging analytical inquiry that encompasses within an extending frontier broad areas of law. Another rhetorical argument that serves only to set forth information in a balanced and proportionate manner takes an important role in the Talmud but in no way constitutes that logical marvel of dialectics that the Talmud occasionally creates. Readers who follow the Talmud along with my survey will note that I have not included numerous examples of exquisite exposure of balanced opposites. Two or more positions will be set forth, amplified, analyzed, without the intrusion of that logic of dialectics that requires us to move beyond the limits of the case. Here is a single example, and an especially lucid and appealing one, of how the Talmud's sense of equity and classicism comes to expression in the orderly representation of conflicting views: 1.1 A. [Mishnah-tractate Erubin 4:7A: He who was coming along the way and darkness overtook him., and who knew about a certain tree or a fence and said, "My place of residence for the Sabbath will he under it," has said nothing at all:] VVhat is the meaning of he has said nothing at all? B. Said Rab, "He has said nothing at all in any way, shape,

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or form, so that he may not even continue to the space under the tree." [Slotki: He must not move from his position until after the Sabbath, since he has acquired no place for his Sabbath rest, from which he could be entitled to walk within a permitted Sabbath limit; his right to the place on which he stood when the Sabbath came into effect has been expressly renounced by his choosing another one, and the area under the tree couldn't be acquired by him, since he had not specified which particular four cubits of that space he chose.] C. And Samuel said, "He has said nothing at all in respect to going on to his home. But he may go to the space under the tree." D. The space under the tree is treated as in the case of an ass driver and a camel driver [so the man can't move in any direction for very far]. If he wanted to measure from the north side of the tree, they tell him to begin measuring from the south side. [Slotki: In appointing the tree as his Sabbath base, he didn't specify which particular four cubits of space under the tree he wanted to acquire, so any four cubits of space within the circumference of the tree and the branches may be assumed to be the appointed spot. In measuring the distances, therefore, a course must be adopted that under all circumstances could not possibly lead to an infringement of any of the restrictions involved. If the diameter of the circumference of the tree and its branches measured twenty cubits, and the distance from the northern point to the man's house was exactly two thousand cubits, the measuring must not begin from that point, but from the southern point of the diameter, which is two thousand and twenty cubits distant from the house. And since it is forbidden to proceed beyond two thousand cubits, the man's Sabbath limit would terminate at a point twenty cubits away from his house, which, in consequence, he would not be able to enter during the Sabbath.] So, too, if he came to measure from the south side of the tree, they tell him to measure from the north side. E. [50A] Said Rabbah, "What is the operative consideration behind the ruling if Rab? Because the man didn't specijj the exact spot." F. There are those who say: Said Rabbah, "What is the operative consideration behind the ruling if Rab? Because he takes the view, in aqy case in which if a statement would not be valid if one statement followed another, then even if the statements are made simultaneously, they are also null." [Freedman, Nedarim 6gB: Whatever is not valid consecutively is not valid even simultaneously.] [Slotki: The man's appointment of the entire area under the tree, including both the northern and southern sides, is therefore null; an area of four

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B.

C.

D.

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cubits on the northern side of the tree cannot be acquired after such an area had been acquired on the southern side or vice versa.] G. 1iVhat's the difference between these two explanations? H. At issue between the two explanations would be a case in which someone sai~ ''Let me acquire an area qf four cubits out if eight." One who has said that the operative consideration is that the man didn't specijj the exact spot will hold that here he didn't specijj the spot. And one who said that the operative consideration is, in any case in which if a statement would not be valid if one statement followed another, then even if the statements are made simultaneously, they are also null, lo, such a statement is valid if an area offour cubits has been specifie~ for here the man said he wanted to acquire no more than four cubits. Reverting to the body if the foregoing: Said Rabbah, "In any case in which if a statement would not be valid if one statement followed another, then even if the statements are made simultaneously, they are also null"Objected Abbayye to Rabbah, "He who gave too Illuch tithewhile the produce is properly tithed, the tithe is ruined [since part of what is included within the tithe is in fact not tithe at all] [T. Dem. 8:13A-B]. But w~ should this be the case? 1iVhy not say, 'What cannot be done consecutively also cannot be done simultaneously'?" He said to him, "That case is exceptiona4 because, as to tithes, it is possible in the case of half-grain to do it, for if one said, 'Let half if each grain be sanctified,' it is indeed sanctified; but as to tithes of cattle, it is impossible to do it by halves, and it is also impossible to do it consecutively; and yet Rabbah has said, 'If two animals came out of the corral simultaneously as tenth, and he called them tenth, the tenth and the eleventh are treated as a group together [the tenth is actually tithe, the eleventh is a peace-offering].'" [If he had declared them so in sequence, the second would be invalid; why is the simultaneous declaration valid? (Freedman)]. The tithing if cattle is exceptional, since it is valid even when done in error, for we have learned in the Mishnah: [If] he called the ninth, tenth, and the tenth, ninth, and the eleventh, tenth, all three are sanctified [M. Bekh. 9:8D]. Lo, what about the matter of the thanksgiving-ifJering, which cannot be designated in error nor consecutively [that is, the thanksgJving-ifJering was accompanied by forty loaves that were sanctjjie~· if the animal was sacrificed to sanctify certain loaves, which weren't the intended ones, they are not sanctified; if after forty loaves are sanctifie~ another forty are declared holy, the declaration is null (Freedman)), and yet it has been stated: A thankoffering that one slaughtered in connection with eighty loaves of bread-

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F. Hezekiah said, "Forty of the loaves among the eighty have been sanctified. " G. R. Yohanan said, "Forty of the loaves among the eighty have not been sanctified." H. Hasn't it been stated in that connection: Said Zira, "All concur that if the qfficiating priest said, 'Let forty out of the eighty be sanctified,' they are sanctified. 'TIe forty shall not be sanctified unless all eighty are sanctified,' they are not sanctified. VVlzere they differ is on~ when the matter has not been made explicit. One authority takes the view that the unstated intention of the donor in presenting eighty loaves was to make sure that at least forty would be found suitable, [50B] and the other authority maintains that the intention was mere~ to provide a very large qffering [so all eighty have to be valid)"? 1.3 A. [With reference to the statement, said Rab, "He has said nothing at all in any way, shape, or form, so that he may not even continue to the space under the tree,"] said Abbayye, "That has been taught only with regard to a tree with a diameter underneath of no less than twelve cubits [Slotki: the length comprising no less than three sections of four cubits each, so it is impossible to ascertain whether it was the middle section or one of the outer ones that the man wanted to acquire as his Sabbath base]. But in the case of a tree with a diameter underneath of less than twelve cubits, at least part of the man's house is well marked out." [Slotki: If the diameter was only eleven cubits, each four cubits at either of the extremities must inevitably overlap half a cubit with the middle four cubits; if the man chose the middle section, all of his Sabbath base is obviously well defined; but even if he intended one of the outer sections to be his Sabbath base, each of them is at least partially defined in that part where it overlaps with the middle sections; his base may therefore be regarded as located in full or in part in that section.] B. Objected R. Huna b. R. Joshua, "But how do you know that he ever intended to utilize the middle four cubits? Maybe he intended to utilize either the four cubits on one side or the four on the other!" C. Rather, said R. Huna b. R. Joshua, "That has been taught only with regard to a tree with a diameter underneath of no less than eight' cubits [where we don't know what section he intended], but if it has seven cubits underneath, then in such a situation at least part of the man's house is well marked out." 1.4 A. [With regard to the statements above, said Rab, "He has said nothing at all in any way, shape, or form, so that he may not even continue to the space under the tree." And Samuel said, "He has said nothing at all in respect to going on to his home. But he may go to the space under the tree, "] it has been taught on Tannaite authority in accord with the position of Rab, and it has been taught on Tannaite authority in accord with the position of Samuel.

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B. It has been taught on Tannaite authority in accord with the position if Rab: He who was going along the way and it got dark and he knew a certain tree or fence and said, -"My place of Sabbath rest will be under it," has said nothing at alL But if he said, "My place of Sabbath rest will be in such and such a ·place," he may continue the trip till he gets to that place. Once he has gotten to that place, he may walk throughout the place and outside of it for two thousand cubits. Under what circumstances? If it is a place that is well defined, for instance, a mount ten handbreadths high and from four cubits to two bet seahs in area, or a valley ten handbreadths deep and from four cubits to two bet seahs in area; but if it was a place that was not well defined, he is not allowed to move for more than four cubits. If there were two people traveling together, and one of them knows of a well-delineated spot and the other doesn't, the latter assigns to the former his right to choose a place for Sabbath rest, and the other says, "My place of Sabbath rest will be in such and such a place." Under what circumstances? Where the man indicated the four cubits he selected by a clearly defined landscape marker. But if he did not define the four cubits by a clearly defined landscape marker, he may not move from his place. C. May we then say that this is a refutation oj the position oj Samuel? D. Samuel may say to you, "Here with what case do we deal? It would be one in which from the place where the man stood to the root oj a tree were two thousand four cubits, so that ifyou set him up on the jar side if the tree, he would be standing outside of his permitted limit; so, if he indicated that the spot was four cubits on the hither side of the tree, he may go there, but otherwise, not." E. And it has been taught on Tannaite authority in accord with the position oj Samuel: If someone erred and made fusion meals in two opposite directions in the belief that it is permitted to set out fusion meals in two opposite directions, or if he said to his servants, "Go and set out a fusion meal for me," and one of them set out a fusion meal to the north and the other to the south, he may go northward as far as the limit of the southern fusion meal, and southward up to the limit of the northern fusion meaL But if they measured each limit exactly, he may not stir from the place. F. May we then say that this is a refutation if the position oj Rab?

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G. Well, not exactlY: Rab has the standing if a Tannaite authori!J and so has every right to differ from this Tannaite formulation.

This argument stands still. It sets forth merely a static presentation of beautifully articulated and amplified exchanges of principles. The argument utilizes the rhetoric of question and answer-but does not move. In Hegelian terms, we have a thesis, an antithesis, but no synthesis, hence, no dialectics of logic, merely of rhetoric. Now to the details: the balance between B and its articulation against C, then the introduction in Rabbah's name, of the consideration underlying Rab's position, simply deepens the presentation, but does not expand it in any way. The same static trait characterizes G-H. 1:2 forms nothing more than a footnote. That is shown by 1:3, which simply reverts to our starting point; 1:4 follows suit. And the appendix at 1:4B draws us back to the contrary position of Samuel. So, as I said, what we have is balanced, orderly, fair--but in the end merely an exercise in paraphrase, recapitulation, and amplification. And these valued modes of clarification of conflicting principles stand still and find no resolution, such as dialectics effects. Within this classification of rhetorical dialectics falls the bulk of the cases that are not reproduced here and that play no role in my account of matters. The Talmud presents a vast quantity of exqUIsitely balanced expositions of various positions, that is, essentially syllogistic arguments, in which two contrary propositions are argued. These exhibit a pure classicism, according to each party to a proposition a balanced and proportionate share of the whole, with both sides given equal opportunity to answer one another. The result is the construction, in words, of a discourse that compares in balance and order and exact proportion to the Parthenon. Here is yet another instance of that perfection of presentation that may readily be confused with a dialectical argument, but that is not, in fact, dialectical at all: 1.1 A. It has been stated: B. He who enters into the rite of removing the shoe with a pregnant woman who then miscarriedC. R. Yohanan said, "She does not perform the rite of removing the shoe [with the brothers]." D. And R. Simeon b. Laqish said, "She does perform the rite of removing the shoe [with the brothers]." E. R. Y ohanan said, "She does not perform the rite of removing the shoe [with the brothers]:" the rite of removing the

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shoe performed by a pregnant woman who has miscarried is classified as a valid rite of removing the shoe, and the act of sexual relations of a pregnant woman is classified as a valid act of sexual relations. F. And R. Simeon b. Laqish said, "She does perform the rite of removing the shoe [with the brothers]:" the rite of removing the shoe performed by a pregnant woman who has miscarried is not classified as a valid rite of removing the shoe, and the act of sexual relations of a pregnant woman is not classified as a valid act of sexual relations. G. Whqt is at stake in this dispute? H. Ifyou wish~ I shall say that at issue is the interpretation if a verse of Scripture, and ifyou wish, I shall say that at issue is a matter of reasoning. I. Ifyou wish~ I shall say that at issue is the interpretation of a verse of Scripture: "R. Yohanan takes the view that the language, "And have no child" is what Scripture has said, and 10, this one has no child. And R. Simeon b. Laqish maintains that the language, "And have no child" implies, "look into the matter" [and find out whether there has been any kind of oJfspring~' here the miscarriage then qualifies}. J. And if you wish~ I shall say that at issue is a matter if reasoning. R. Yohanan takes the view that, if Elijah should come and say that the woman is going to miscarry, would she not in any event have been subject to the rite of removing the shoe or levirate marriage? [She most certainly would.] So here too, it is a fact that is subject to retrospective clarification. And R. Simeon b. Laqish maintains that we do not invoke the principle that a fact is subject to retrospective clarification [but we settle matters as they are at the moment of decision}. K. R. Yohanan objected to R. Simeon b. Laqish, " [If] the offspring is not titnely, he is prohibited frOlll ntarrying her relatives, and she is prohibited from. m.arrying his relatives, and he has invalidated her frOnt m.arrying into the priesthood. Now from my perspective~ in holding that the rite of removing the shoe performed by a pregnant woman who has miscarried is classified as a valid rite of removing the shoe, and the act of sexual relations of a pregnant woman is classified as a valid act of sexual relations, that explains why he renders her unfit. But from your perspective~ in holding that, the rite of removing the shoe performed by a pregnant woman who has miscarried is not classified as a valid rite of removing the shoe, and the act of sexual relations of a pregnant woman is not classified

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as a valid act of sexual relations, wiry in the world can he have invalidated her from. m.arrying into the priesthood?" L. He said to him) ''It is based on rabbinical authority and represents merelY a stricter ruling than the law would require)) [Slotki: one not knowing the circumstances of this particular case would . erroneously assume that any other woman who has performed the rite of removing the shoe likewise may be married to a priest]. M. There are those who represent matters as follows: R. Simeon b. Laqish objected to R. 'Yohanari, "[If] the offspring is not tim.ely, he is prohibited from. m.arrying her relatives, and she is prohibited from. m.arrying his relatives, and he has invalidated her from. marrying into the priesthood. Now from my perspective) in holding that the rite of removing the shoe performed by a pregnant woman·who has miscarried is not classified as a valid rite of removing the shoe, that explains wiry he renders her urifit-that is) as a strict interpretation of the law. But it is not taught as the Tannaite rule, she does not have to undergo the rite of removing the shoe with the brothers. But .from your perspective) the rule should be stated: she does not have to undergo the rite of removing the shoe with the brothers." N. He said to him) "True enough. But since the Tannaite formulation in the first clause is, and he has not invalidated her from. m.arrying into the priesthood, it is stated in the second clause, and he has invalidated her from. marrying into the priesthood." O. R. 'Yohanan objected to R. Simeon b. Laqish, "[If] the offspring is not tim.ely, he m.ay confirm. [the tnarriage]: now from my perspective) in holding that the rite of removing the shoe performed by a pregnant woman who has miscarried is classified as a valid rite of removing the shoe, and the act of

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sexual relations of a pregnant woman is classified as a valid act of sexual relations, that explains wig he m.ay confirm. [the m.arriage]. But from your perspective) in holding that, the rite of removing the shoe performed by a pregnant woman who has miscarried is not classified as a valid rite of removing the shoe, and the act of sexual relations of a pregnant woman is not classified as a valid act of sexual relations' why in the world [can he confirm. the II1arriage]? Rather) the rule should state, he must go and have sexual relations with her again, and only then may he confirm the marriage!" P. "But what is the meaning oj, he II1ay confirm. [the II1arriage]? It is, he must go and have sexual relations with her again, and only then may he confirm the marriage. That is, it is not sufficient [without doing so]." Q There are those who represent matters as follows: R. Simeon b. Laqish objected to R. Yohanan, "[If] the offspring is not tim.ely, he II1ay confirm. [the m.arriage]: now flom my perspective) in holding that the rite of removing the shoe performed by a pregnant woman who has miscarried is not classified as a valid rite of removing the shoe, and the act of sexual relations of a pregnant woman is not classified as a valid act of sexual relations, that explains wig he m.ay confirII1 [the II1arriage]-meaning: he must go and have sexual relations with her again, and only then may he confirm the marriage. That is, it is not sufficient [without doing so]. But flom your perspective) the mle should be, if he wants, he may divorce her, but if he wants, he may confirm the marriage with her."

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R. He said to him, "True enough. But since in the prior clause it s£rys, he rn.ust put her away, in the following clause it says, he rn.ay confirm. [the rn.arriage]." S. An objection was raised: "He who marries his deceased childless brother's widow and she turns out to be pregnant, la, her co-wife should not remarry, lest the offspring tum out to be viable. To the contrary, what it should say is this: if the offspring is viable, her co-wife is exempt [and free to marry, so none if the widows if the deceased is subject to the levirate connection is arry form]. So rather read: it is possible that the offspring will not be viable. Now, if it should enter your mind that the act of sexual relations of a pregnant woman is classified as a valid act of sexual relations, why is the rule that her co-wife should not remarry, lest the offipring tum out to be viable? Let her be freed if the levirate connection through the act if sexual relations if her fellow!" T. Said Abb£ryye, "As to the sexual relations, both parties concur that she does not exempt her co-wife. VVhat separates them is only the question if the rite if removing the shoe. R. Yohanan maintains that the rite of removing the shoe performed by a pregnant woman who has miscarried is classified as a valid rite of removing the shoe but the act of sexual relations of a pregnant woman is not classified as a valid act of sexual relations, and R. Simeon b. Laqish holds the view that the act of sexual relations of a pregnant woman is not classified as an act of sexual relations, and the rite of removing the shoe performed by a pregnant woman who has miscarried is not classified as a valid rite of removing the shoe." U. Said to him Raba, "Well, how do you want it? If the act of sexual relations of a pregnant woman is classified as an act of sexual relations, then the rite of removing the shoe

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performed by a pregnant woman should be regarded as valid, and if the act of sexual relations of a pregnant woman. is not classified as an act of sexual relations, then the rite of removing the shoe performed by -a pregnant woman should not be regarded as valid. For we have it as an established rule [36A] that anyone who is subject to marriage with the Ie vir is subject to the rite of removing the shoe, and anyone who is not subject to marriage with the levir is not subject to the rite of removing the shoe." V. Rather, said Raba, "This is the sense qf the matter. 'He who marries his deceased childless brother's widow and she turns out to be pregnant, 10, her co-wife should not remarry, lest the offspring turn out to be viable, and sexual relations with a pregnant woman are not classified as sexual relations, and the rite of removing the shoe done with a pregnant woman is not classified as a valid rite of removing the shoe, and the offspring does not exempt the co-wives from the levirate connection until it is actually born.'" W. It has been taught on Tannaite authority in accord with the position qf Raba: He who marries his deceased childless brother's widow and she turns out to be pregnant, 10, her co-wife should not remarry, lest the offspring tum out to be viable, and sexual relations with a pregnant woman or the rite of removing the shoe does not exempt the co-wives from the levirate connection, but only the offspring exempts the co-wives, and the offspring does not exempt the co-wives from the levirate connection until it is actually born. X. The operative consideration therefore in exempting the cowives .from the levirate connection is, lest the offspring turn out to be viable. But then, if the offspring is not viable, the co-wife is exempt [Slotki: on the strength of the sexual relations that took place prior to the miscarriage of the child, no repeated sexual relations being necessary]. May we then say that this rifutes the position qf R. Simeon b. Laqish? Y. R. Simeon b. Laqish will say to you, "This is the sense qf the statement: He who marries his deceased

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childless brother's widow and she turns out to be pregnant, 10, her co-wife should not remarry, lest the offspring not turn out to be viable, and sexual relations with a pregnant woman are not classified as valid sexual relations, and the rite of removing the shoe performed with her is not classified as a valid rite of removing the shoe. And if you should say, 'well, follow the rule governing the majority of women, and the majority of women produce perfectly healthy offspring,' still it is the fact that an offspring exempts the cowives from the levirate connection only when it is actually born." Z. Said R. Eleazar, "Well, how is it possible that there should be such a ruling as that which R. Simeon b. Laqish has laid down, and yet we have not learned it as a Tannaite formulation in our Mishnah?" He went forth and took a close look, and found the following, which we have learned in the Mishnah: A wom.an whose husband and co-wife went overseas and they cam.e and said to her, "Your husband has died," should not rem.arry [without the rite of rem.oving the shoe or enter into levirate Inarriage, until she ascertains whether her co-wife is pregnant [M. 16: IA-B]. Now it is easy to understand why she should not enter into levirate marriage, lest the offspring be viable, so the levir would violate the Torah's prohibition against marrying a brother's wife. But why should she not peiform the rite qf removing the shoe? Now there is no problem in understanding why she should not peiform the rile qf removing the shoe within the nine months after the husband's death, and not contract a marriage in that same period, on account qf doubt [as to whether the offspring is viable; if it is, the rite and the levirate marriage would be invalid; the exemption is brought into force by the actual birth). "But why should she not perform the rite of removing the shoe within the nine months of the husband's death and enter into marriage after nine months?" [Slotki: this should be permitted by Y ohanan in any event: if the rival had been pregnant and miscarried or had not been pregnant at all, the rite of re~oving the shoe was valid; if a viable child had been born, the exemption took effect at

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his birth, and the subsequent marriage would be lawful; since the rule forbids the rite of removal and marriage even after nine months unless definite information about the rival has been received, it must be assumed to repre-sent the view of Simeon b. Laqish, who deems the rite of removal invalid wherever the child is not viable and the ceremony took place during pregnancy.] AA. But even in accord with your position [the rite of removal is forbidden because the co-wife may have been pregnant when the rite took place (Slotki)], let her perform the rite of removal and then marry after nine months [when there will be no doubt on the pregnancy; why wait to find out whether the co-wife has been pregnant at all]? So this passage must be excluded .from consideration, for Abbayye and Bar Abba and R. Hinena bar Abbayye all maintained, "It is possible that the offspring of the co-wife might be viable, and you would then make it necessary to proclaim concerning her with regard to the priesthood [that the rite of removal was unnecessary and therefore null, so she remains eligible to the priesthood]." BB. So make it necessary to issue such a proclamation! C C. There may be someone who witnessed the rite of removing the shoe but did not hear about the proclamation and so would imagine that a woman who has performed the rite of removing the shoe may marry a priest [which is not the case]. DD. Said to him Abbayye, "Now has it been said, 'She should not carry out the rite of removing the shoe nor enter into levirate marriage'? VVhat is stated is, 'She shall not be married nor enter into levirate marriage' that is, without the rite of removing the shoe. But if the rite of removing the shoe was carried out [even within the nine months of the death if the husband), she would be permitted to marry at the end of the period" [Slotki: and the passage affords no support to Simeon b. Laqish]. EE. It has been taught on Tannaite authority in accord with the position of R. Simeon b. Laqish: He who carries out the rite of

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removing the shoe with a pregnant woman, who subsequently miscarried --she has to enter into the rite of removing the shoe with one of the other brothers. 2. A. Said Raba, "The decided law accords with the position of R. Simeon b. Laqish in three matters." The first is the one that we have just now been discussing. B. "The second is in accord with that which we have learned in the Mishnah: He who divides his estate am.ong his sons by a verbal [ donation], [and] gave a larger portion to one and a sm.aller portion to another, or treated the firstborn as equivalent to all the others-his statem.ent is valid. But if he had said, "By reason of an inheritance [the aforestated arrangem.ents are m.ade]," he has said nothing whatsoever. [If] he had written, whether at the beginning, m.iddle, or end, [that these things are handed over] as a gift, his statem.ent is valid [M. B.B.8:5E-J]. [36B] And said R. Simeon b. Laqish, "Title is not transferred unless he said, 'Let Mr. X and Mr. Y inherit such-and-such a field, which I have assigned to them as a gift, so that they may inherit them.' " C. "And the third is in line with that which we have learned in the Mishnah: He who writes over his property to his son [to take effect] after his death-the father cannot sell the property, because it is written over to the son, and the son cannot sell the property, because it is [yet] in the

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dorn.ain of the father. [If] the father sold [it], the property is sold until he dies. If the son sold the property, the purchaser has no right whatever in the property until the father dies. The father harvests the crops and gives the usufruct to anyone whoIn he wants. And whatever he left already harvested-Io, it belongs to his heirs [M. B.B. 8:7]. And it has been stated: if the son sold the property in the lifetime of the father and died in the lifetime of the fathe~ R. Y ohanan said, "The purchaser has not acquired the property." R. Simeon h. Laqish said, "The purchaser has acquired the property." R. Yohanan said, "The purchaser has not acquired the property," fir the right to the usufruct [such as the step father in our case had] is tantamount in law to the right to the substance of the estate, [so that when the son sold the estate during the lifetime of the father, he sold something that he did not own) [R. Simeon h. Laqish said, "The purchaser has acquired the property," for the right to the uszifruct [such as the step father in our case had] is not tantamount in law to the right to the substance of the estate, so that when the son sold the estate dun'ng the lifetime of the father, he sold something that he did own."

The first initiative takes place at 1.E-F, the second at Gff. In the former, each party gets to amplifY his position, in the latter, the anonymous voice articulates the principle at issue, and each of the choices is then worked out in detail and in balance. Then each party is given the opportunity to object to the position of the other, with an

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appropriate rejoinder. Even when we have new versions of the several statements, these exhibit that same proportion and balance. When T -U then introduce a new perspective, the two positions once more are carefully balanced. And so throughout. All of this captures our admiration, but none of it falls into the category of an argument that moves out of its original framework, and, viewed whole, the composition falls into the category of a syllogism, brilliandy executed.

VI.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DIALECTICAL ARGUMENT IN THE GEMARA

What then is at stake in the dialectical argument? I see three complementary results. All of them, in my view, prove commensurate to the effort required to follow these protracted, sometimes tedious disquisitions. First, we test every allegation by a counter-proposition, so serving the cause of truth through challenge and constant checking for flaws in an argument. Second, we survey the entire range of possibilities, which leaves no doubts about the cogency of our conclusion. And that means, we move out of our original case, guided by its generative principle to new cases altogether. Third, quite to the point, by the give and take of argument, we ourselves are enabled to go through the thought processes set forth in the subde markings that yield our reconstruction of the argument. We not only review what people say, but how they think: the processes of reasoning that have yielded a given conclusion. Sages and disciples become party to the modes of thought; in the dialectical argument, they are required to replicate the thought-processes themselves. Let me give a single example of the power of the dialectical argument to expose the steps in thinking that lead from one end to another: principle to ruling, or ruling to principle. In the present instance, the only one we require to see a perfecdy routine and obvious procedure, we mean to prove the point that if people are permitted to obstruct the public way, if damage was done by them, they are liable to pay compensation. First, we are going to prove that general point on the basis of a single case. Then we shall proceed to show how a variety of authorities, dealing with diverse cases, sustain the same principle.

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III

TALMUD BABA MESIA IO:S/O-x

o.

He who brings out his manure to the public domainP. while one party pitches it out, the other party must be bringing it in to m.anure his field. Q. They do not soak clay in the public domain, R. and they do not make bricks. S. And they knead clay in the public way, T. but not bricks. U. He who builds in the public wayV. while one party brings stones, the builder must make use of them. in the public way. w. And if one has inflicted injury, he must pay for the datnages he has caused. x. Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel says, "Also: He may prepare for doing his work [on site in the public way] for thirty days [before the actual work of building]."

We begin with the comparison of the rule before us with another Tannaite position on the same issue, asking whether an unattributed, therefore authoritative, rule stands for or opposes the position of a given authority; we should hope to prove that the named authority concurs. So one fundamental initiative in showing how many cases express a single principle-the concrete demonstration of the unity of the law-is to find out whether diverse, important authorities concur on the principle, each ruling in a distinctive case; or whether a single authority is consistent in ruling in accord with the principle at hand, as in what follows: 1.1 A. May we say that our Mishnah-paragraph does not accord with the view if R. Judah? For it has been taught on Tannaite authority: B. R. Judah says, "At the titne of fertilizing the fields, a man may take out his manure and pile it up at the door of his house in the public way so that it will be pulverized by the feet of :man and beast, for a period of thirty days. For it was on that very stipulation that Joshua caused the Israelites to inherit the land" [T. B.M.

11:8E-H]. C. You may even maintain that he concurs with the Mishnah's rule [that while one party pitches it out, the other party must be bringing it in to manure his field]. R. Judah concedes that if one has caused damage, he is liable to pay compensation.

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In line with the position just now proposed, then Judah will turn out to rule every which way on the same matter. And that is not an acceptable upshot. D. But has it not been taught in the Mishnah: If the store-keeper had left his latnp outside the store-keeper is liable [if the fiaDle caused a fire]. R. Judah said, "In the case of a laDlp for Hanukkah, he is exem.pt" [M. B.Q. 6:6E-F], because he has acted under authority. Now surely that must mean, under the authority of the court [and that shows that one is not responsible for damage caused by his property in the public domain if it was there under the authority of the court]!

The dialectic now intervenes. We have made a proposal. Isn't it a good one? Of course not, were we to give up so quickly, we should gain nothing: E. No, what it means obligations.

lS,

on the authority

of carrying

out one's religious

By now, the reader is able to predict the next step: "but isn't the contrary more reasonable?" Here is how we raise the objection. F. But has it not been taught on Tannaite authority: G. in the case of all those concerning whom they have said, "They are permitted to obstruct the public way," if there was damage done, one is liable to pay compensation. But R. Judah declares one exempt from having to pay compensation. H. So it is better to take the view that our Mishnah-paragraph does not concur with the position of R. Judah. I

The point of interest has been introduced: whether those permitted to obstruct the public way must pay compensation for damages they may cause in so doing. Here is where we find a variety of cases that yield a single principle:

2. A. Said Abayye, "R. Judah, Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel, and R. Simeon (

all take the position that in the case of all those concerning whom they have said, 'They are permitted to obstruct the public way,' if there was damage done, one is liable to pay compensation." B. "As to R. Judah, the matter is just as we have now stated it."

Simeon h. Gamaliel and Simeon now draw us to unrelated cases: C. "As to Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel, we have learned in the Mishnah: Rabban Sim.eon b. Gam.a1iel says, 'Also: He Dlay prepare for doing his work [on site in the public way] for thirty days [before the actual work of building].' "

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D. "As to R. Simeon, we have learned in the Mishnah: A person should not set up an oven in a roolD. unless there is a space of four cubits above it. If he was setting it up in the upper story, there has to be a layer of plaster unde~ it three handbreadths thick, and in the case of a stove, a handbreadth thick. And if it did dalD.age, the owner of the oven has to pay for the damage. R. SilD.eon says, 'All of these lD.easures have been stated only so that if the object did damage, the owner is exempt from paying cOlD.pensation if the stated measures have been observed' [M. B.B. 2:2A-F]."

We see then that the demonstration of the unity of the law and the issue of who stands, or does not stand, behind a given rule, go together. When we ask about who does or does not stand behind a rule, we ask about the principle of a case, which leads us downward to a premise, and we forthwith point to how that same premise underlies a different principle yielding a case-so how can X hold the view he does, if that is his premise, since at a different case he makes a point with a principle that rests on a contradictory premise. The Mishnah and the Talmud are comparable to the moraine left by the last ice age, fields studded with boulders. For the Talmud, reference is made to those many disputes that litter the pages and impede progress. That explains why much of the Talmud is taken up with not only sorting out disputes, but also showing their rationality, meaning, reasonable people have perfectly valid reasons for disagreeing about a given point, since both parties share the same premises but apply them differently; or they really do not differ at all, since one party deals with one set of circumstances, the other with a different set of circumstances.

VII.

THE

LAw

BEHIND THE

LAws

When we speak of philosophy in everyday life, we mean, the quest for the rationality and order-the reason for things-in the here and now. In the context of norms, we refer to the transformation of law into jurisprudence, in the setting of natural science, we mean the movement from observation to natural history. The dialectical argument proves the ideal medium for the assertion, through sustained demonstration alone, of the union of laws in law. Specifically, if all we know is laws, then we want to find out what is at stake in them? Accordingly, the true issues of the law emerge from the detailed rulings

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of the laws. Generalization takes a variety of forms, some yielding a broader framework into which to locate a case, others a proposition of consequence. Let me give an obvious and familiar instance of what is to be done. Here is an example of a case that yields a principle:

TALMUD BABA MESIA TO

9:11

A. (1) A day worker collects his wage any titne of the night. B. (2) And a night worker collects his wage any titne of the day. c. (3) A worker by the hour collects his wage any titne of the night or day. 1.1 A. Our rabbis have taught on Tannaite authoriry: B. How on the basis of Scripture do we know, A day worker collects his wage any titne of the night? C. "[You shall not oppress your neighbor or rob him.] The' wages of a hired seIVant shall not remain with you all night until the morning" (Lev. 19: 13). D. And how on the basis of Scripture do we know, and a night worker collects his wage any titn.e of the day? E. "[You shall not oppress a hired servant who is poor and needy] ... you shall give him his hire on the day on which he earns it, before the sun goes down" (Dt. 23:14-15). F. Might I say that the reverse is the case [the night worker must be paid during the night that he does the work) in line with Lev. 19:13) and the day worker by day) in line with Dt. 23:15J? G. Wages are to be paid only at the end of the work [so the fee is not payable until the work has been done].

What do .we learn from this passage? Specifically, two points.

...... '

1. Scripture yields the rule at hand; 2. Scripture also imposes limits on the formation of the law; but one generalization, that the law of the Mishnah derives from the source of Scripture . And, if we take a small step beyond, of course, we learn that the two parts of the Torah are one. The hermeneutics instructs us to ask, how on the basis of Scripture do we know. . .? Its premise then is that Scripture forms the basis for rules not expressed with verses of the written Torah. The theological principle conveyed in the hermeneutics expressed in the case is that the Torah is one and encom-

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passes both the oral and the written parts; the oral part derives its truths from the written part. Now if I had to identify the single most important theological point that the Talmud and other writings that use dialectics sets forth, it is that the laws yield law, the truth exhibits integrity, all of the partsthe details, principles, and premises-holding together in a coherent manner. To understand how generalizations are attained, however, we cannot deal only with generalizations. So we turn to a specific problem of category-formation, namely, in the transfer of property, whether or not we distinguish between a sale and a gift. That is, in both, instances property is transferred. But the conditions of transfer clearly differ; in the one case there is a quid pro quo, in the other, not. Now does that distinction make a difference? The answer to that question will have implications for a variety of concrete cases, e.g., transfers of property in a dowry, divisions of inheritances and estates, the required documents and procedures for effecting trans-fer of title, and the like. If, then, we know the correct category-formation-the same or not the same category-we form a generalization that will draw together numerous otherwise unrelated cases and (more to the point) rules. One way to accomplish the goal is to identify the issue behind a dispute, which leads us from the dispute to the principle that is established and confirmed by a dispute on details, e.g., whether or not the principle applies, and, if it does, how it does. In this way we affirm the unity of the law by establishing that all parties to a dispute really agree on the same point; then the dispute itself underlines the law's coherence:

TALMUD BABA BATRA

1:3

A. He whose [land] surrounds that of his fellow on three sides, B. and who tnade a fence on the first, second, and third sidesC. they do not require [the other party to share in the expense of building the walls]. D. R. Yose says, "If he built a fence on the fourth side, they assign to hitn [his share in the case of] all [three other fences]."

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In the follomng dispute, we ask what is subject to dispute between the two named authorities, B-C. 2. A. It has been stated: B. R. Huna said, "All is proportional to the actual cost of building the fence [Simon: which will vary according to the materials used by the one who builds the fence J." C. Hiyya bar Rab said, "All is proportionate to the cost of a cheap fence made of sticks [since that is all that is absolutely necessary] ."

To find the issue, we revert to our Mishnah-rule. The opinions therein guide the disputing parties. Each then has to account for what is subject to dispute in the Mishnah-paragraph. Then the point is, the Mishnah's dispute is not only rational, but it also rests upon a shared premise, affirmed by all parties. That is the power of D. D. We have learned in the Mishnah: He whose [land] surrounds that of his fellow on three sides, and who m.ade a fence on the first, second, and third sides-they do not require [the other party to share in the expense of building the walls]. Lo, if he fences the fourth side too, he must contribute to the cost of the entire fence. But then note what follows: R. Y ose says, "IT he built a fence on the fourth side, they assign to hiIIl [his share in the case of] all [three other fences]." Now there is no problem from the perspective if R. Huna, who has said, "All is proportional to the actual cost of building the fence [Simon: which will vary according to the materials used by the one who builds the fence]." Then we can identijj what is at issue between the first authority and R. rose. Specifically, the initial authority takes the view that we proportion the costs to what they would be if a cheap fence if sticks was built, but not to what the fence-builder actually spent, and R. rose maintains that under all circumstances, the division is proportional to actual costs. But from the perspective if Hiyya bar Rab, who has said, "All is proportionate to the cost of a cheap fence made of sticks [since that is all that is absolutely necessary]," what can be the dijference between the ruling ,; if the initial Tannaite authority and that if R. rose? ff, ofter all, he does not pay him even the cost if building a cheap fence, what in the world is he supposed to pay off as his share?

We now revert to the dialectics, but a different kind. Here we raise a variety of possibilities, not as challenges and responses in a sequence, but as freestanding choices; the same goal is at hand, the opportunity to examine every possibility. But the result is different: not a final solution but four suitable ones, yielding the notion that a single

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117

principle governs a variety of cases. That explains why we now have a set of four answers, all of them converging on the same principle: E.

ifyou

want, I shall say that what is at issue between them is the fee to be paid for a watchman. The initial authority holds that he pays the cost if a watchman, not the charge if building a cheap fence, and R. rose says that he has to pay the cost if building a cheap fince. F. But ifyou prefer, I may say that at issue between them is the first, second, and third sides, in which instance the initial Tannaite authority has the other pay only the cost if fincing the fourth side, not the first three, and R. rose maintains he has to pay his share if the cost iffincing the first three sides too. G. And ifyou prefer, I shall maintain that at issue between them is whether the fence has to be built by the owner of the surrounding fields or the owner if the enclosed field if the latter pays the cost if the whole. The initial Tannaite authority says that the consideration that leads the owner if the enclosed field to have to contribute at all is that he went ahead and built the fourth fence, so he has to pay his share if the cost if the whole; but if the owner if the surrounding fields is the one who went· ahead and did it, the other has to pay on!J the share of the fourth fence. For his part, R. rose takes the position that there is no distinction between who took the initiative in building the fourth fence, whether the owner if the enclosed field or the owner if the surrounding field. In either case the former has to pay the latter his share of the whole. R. There are those who say, in respect to this last statement, that at issue between them is whether the fourth fence has to be built by the owner if the enclosed field or the surrounding fields so that the former has to contribute his share. The initial Tannaite authority holds that, even if the owner if the surrounding fields makes the fourth fence, the other has to contribute to the cost, and R. rose maintains that if the owner if the enclosed field takes it on himself to build the fourth fence, he has to pay his share if the cost if the whole, because through his action he has shown that he .wants the fince, but if the owner of the surrounding fields builds the fourth side, the other pays not a penny [since he can say he never wanted a fence to begin with}.

The premise of E is that the owner of the land on the inside has a choice as to the means of guarding his field; but he of course bears responsibility for the matter. F agrees that he bears responsibility for his side, but adds that he also is responsible for the sides from which he enjoys benefit. And of course G concurs that the owner of the inner field is responsible to protect his own property. H takes the same view. What we have accomplished is, first, to lay a foundation in rationality for the dispute of the Mishnah-paragraph, and, further, demonstrate that all parties to the dispute affirm the responsibility to

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pay one's share of that from which one benefits. Justice means, no free lunch.

VIII. THE

UNITY OF THE

LAw

In what follows, the unity of the law extends from agreements behind disputes to a more fundamental matter: identifying the single principle behind many and diverse cases. What do diverse cases have in common? Along these same lines, that same hermeneutics wants us to show how diverse authorities concur on the same principle, dealing with diverse cases; how where there "is a dispute, the dispute represents schism vs. consensus, with the weight of argument and evidence favoring consensus; where we have a choice between interpreting an opinion as schismatic and as coherent with established rule, we try to show it is not schismatic; and so on and so forth. All of these commonplace activities pursue a single goal, which is to limit the range of schism and expand the range of consensus, both in political, personal terms of authority, and, more to the point, in the framework of case and principle. If I had to identify a single hermeneutical principle-that is, defining melody-that governs throughout, it is, the quest for harmony, consensus, unity, and above all, the rationality of dispute: reasonable disagreement about the pertinence or relevance of established, universally-affirmed principles. Here is a fine instance of the working of the hermeneutics that tells us to read the texts as a single coherent statement, episodic and unrelated cases as statements of a single principle. The principle is: it is forbidden for someone to derive uncompensated benefit from somebody else's property. That self-evidently valid principle of equity"thou shalt not steal" writ small-then emerges from a variety of cases; the cases are read as illustrative. The upshot of demonstrating "that fact is to prove a much-desired goal. The law of the Torah" here, the written Torah, one of the ten commandments no less!contains within itself the laws of everyday life. So one thing yields many things; the law is coherence in God's mind, and retains that coherence as it expands to encompass the here and the now of the social order. The details as always are picayune, the logic practical, the reasoning concrete and applied; but the stakes prove cosmic in a very exact sense of the word.

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119

The problem involves a two-story house, owned by the resident of the lower story. The house has fallen down. The tenant, upstairs, has no where to live. The landlord, downstairs, does not rebUild the house. The tenant has the right to rebuild the downstairs part of the house and to live there as long as the landlord does not complete the rebuilding of the house and also refund to the tenant the cost of rebuilding the part that the tenant -has reconstructed for himsel£ Judah rejects this ruling, and, in doing so, invokes a general principle, by no means limited to the case at hand. Then the Bavli will wish to show how this governing principle pertains elsewhere.

MISHNAH-TRACTATE BABA MEsIA AND TALMUD BABA MEsIA

10:3

117A-B

A. A house and an upper story belonging to two people which fell downB. [if] the resident of the upper story told the householder [of the lower story] to rebuild, C. but he does not want to rebuild, D. 10, the resident of the upper story rebuilds the lower story and lives there, E. until the other party com.pensates him. for what he has spent. F. R. Judah says, "Also: [if so,] this one is [then] living in his fellow's [housing]. [So in the end] he will have to pay him. rent. G. "But the resident of the upper story builds both the house and the upper rooIIl., H. "and he puts a roof on the upper story, I. "and he lives in the lower story, J. "until the other party com.pensates him. for what he has spent."

At issue is a principle, which settles the case at hand. It is whether or not one may gratuitously derive benefit from someone else's property. We shall now show that Judah repeatedly takes that position in a variety of diverse cases: 1.1 A. [117B] Said R. Yohanan, "In three passages R. Judah has rep'eated for us the rule that it is forbidden. for someone to derive benefit from somebody else's property. The first is in the Mishnah passage at hand. The next is in that which we have learned in the Mishnah."

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The case that is now introduced involves an error in dyeing wooL The premise of the rulings is that dyeing always enhances the value of the wool, whether it is dyed of one color or some other. On that basis, the following is quite clear: B. He who gave wool to a dyer to dye it red, and he dyed it black, or to dye it black, and he dyed it redc. R. Meir says, "The dyer pays hitn. back the value of his wool." D. And R. Judah says, "IT the increase in value is greater than the outlay for the process of dyeing, the owner pays hitn. back for the outlay for. the process of dyeing. And if the outlay for the process of dyeing is greater than the increase in the value of the wool, the owner pays him. [the dyer] only the increase in the value of the wool" [M. B.Q.

9:4G-K]. . E. And what is the third? It is as we have learned in the Mishnah: F. He who paid part of a debt that he owed and deposited the bond that has been written as evidence covering the retn.aining sum. with a third party, and said to him., "IT I have not given you what I still· owe the lender between now and such-and-such a date, give the creditor his bond of indebtedness," if the titn.e cam.e and he has not paid, G. R. Yose says, "He should hand it over." H. And R. Judah says, "He should not hand it over" [M. B.B.

lO:5A-E] I. Ji1!hy [does it follow that Judah holds that it is forbidden for someone to derive benefit from somebody's else's property]? Perhaps when R. Judah takes the position that he does here~ .it is onlY because there is blackening if the walls. ]. [Freedman: the new house loses its newness because the tenant is living there, so the house owner is sustaining a loss, and that is why the tenant has to pay rent]; K. as to the case of the dyer who was supposed to dye the wool red but dyed it black, the reason is that he has violated his instructions, and we have learned in the Mishnah: L. Whoever changes [the original tertns of the agreem.ent]his hand is on the bottotn. [M. B.M. 6:2E-F]. [That is to say, the decision must favor the other party, the claim of the one who has changed the original terms being subordinated.] M. And as to the third case, the one who has paid part of his debt, here we deal with an enticement, and we irifer from this case that R. Judah takes the position that in the case if a come-on~ there is no transfer if title.

Yohanan's observation serves the purpose of showing how several unrelated cases of the Mishnah really make the same point: you shall not steaL The voice of the Talmud-that is to say, the dialectics itself-then contributes an objection and its resolution, making Y oha-

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nan's statement plausible and compelling, not merely an observation that mayor may not be so. An ideal way of demonstrating the unity of the law is to expose the abstract premise of a concrete rule, and that without regard to the number of discrete cases that establish the same rule. Here is a case in which the theological principle, a stipulation made not be made contrary to what is written in the Torah, is shown to form the premise of a concrete case; then the case once more merely illustrates the principle of the Torah, which delivers its messages in just this way, through exemplary cases. Item 2.A commences with a common attributive formula, said x. .. said y. . .. This bears the meaning, said x in the name of y (and on his authority). Judah is then the tradent of the opinion or ruling, and Samuel the original source. Such an attributive formula may encompass three or more names and is common in both Talmuds. 2. A. And said R. Judah said Samuel, "He who says to his fellow, '. . . on the stipulation that the advent of the Seventh Year will not abrogate the debts'-the Seventh Year nonetheless abrogates those debts." B. May one then propose that Samuel takes the view that that stipulation represents an agreement made contrary to what is written in the Torah, and, as we know, any stipulation contrary to what is written in the Torah is a null stipulation? But lo, it has been stated: C. He who says to his fellow, "[I make this sale to you] on the stipulation that you may not lay claim of fraud [by reason of variation from true value] against me"D. Rab said, "He nonetheless may lay claim of fraud [by reason of variation from true value] against him." E. Samuel said, "He may not lay claim of fraud [by reason of variation from true value] against him." F. 1.0, it has been stated in that connection: said R. Anan, "The matter has been explained to me such that Samuel said, 'He who says to his fellow, "[I make this sale to you] on the stipulation that you may not lay claim of fraud [by reason of variation from true value] against me"-he has no claim of fraud against him. [If he said,] ". . . on the stipulation that in the transaction itself, there is no aspect of fraud," 10, he has a claim of fraud against him.'" G. Here too, the same distinction pertains. If the stipulation was, "on condition that you do not abrogate the debt to me in the Sabbatical Year," then the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate the debt. But if the language was, "on condition that the Sabbatical Year itself does not abrogate the debt, the Sabbatical Year does abrogate the debt." Talmud to Makkot 1: lL-N, 1:2, 1:3/1.2

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What is at stake in this issue is of course not only jurisprudential principles but theological truth, concerning the power of language. In the Torah, language is enchanted; it serves, after all, for the principal medium of the divine self-manifestation: in words, sentences,. paragraphs, a book: the Torah. So what one says fOnTIS the found~tion of effective reality: it makes things happen, not only records what has happened. But what happens if one makes a statement that ordinarily would prove effective, but the contents of the statement contradict the law of the Torah? Then such a stipulation is null. Why? Because the Torah is what makes language work, and if the Torah is contradicted, then the language is no more effective-changing the world to which it refers, the rules or conditions or order of existence-than it would be if the rules of grammar were violated. Just as, in such a case, the sentence would be gibberish and not convey meaning, so in the case at hand, the sentence is senseless and null.

IX.

THE TRIUMPH OF THE GEMARA'S DIALECTICS: TURNING A LIST INTO A SERIES

The Mishnah's adaptation of the methods of natural history (science) to the analysis of the data of everyday life produced lists, in a vast composition of Listenwissenschaft. The logical next step is taken in the Gemara. For here we turn to the Gemara's utilization of the dialectical method of philosophy for the transformation of lists into series, for the movement outward from well-organized cases and the law governing them toward the principle of law that extends beyond the near-horizon. Here a vast composite works in detail on accumulating evidence in behalf of a single, unarticulated but always stipulated, proposition. The point of the sustained and broad-ranging discussion, never expressed, is everywhere paramount. I give an abbreviated version of the opening units, focusing solely on the dialectical composite I identify as the superlative dialectical argument of the entire Gemara. 43 The question that is pursued through the entire discourse is, When do cases form a series? What we shall see is a systematic analysis 43 I give a full repertoire of the dialectical arguments of the Bavli in my Talmudic Dialectics, and readers may test my judgment against the data.

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123

of the proposition that that which is derived on the basis of a verbal analogy does [or does not] in turn go and impart a lesson by means of a verbal analogy; and other principles of the construction of a series.

BAVLI TO MISHNAH-TRACTATE ZEBAHIM

5:1-2

5:1 A. What is the place [in which the act of sacrifice] of aniIllal offerings [takes place]? B. Most Holy Things [the whole offering, sin offering, and guilt offering]-the act of slaughtering theIll is carried out at the north [side of the altar]. IV.1 A. [Supply: Most Holy Things (. . . guilt offering)-the act of slaughtering theIll is carried out at the north side of the altar].

How on the basis of Scripture do we know the law that the Mishnah has stated without a proof-text. B. How on the basis oj Scripture do we know that the guilt qffering has to be prepared at the north side oj the altar? C. As it is written, "In the place in which they kill the burnt offering shall they kill the guilt offering" (Lev. 7: 1). D. So we have found that the act oj slaughter oj the guilt offering must take place at the northern side oj the altar. How on the basis oj Scripture do we know that the collecting oj the blood also must take place there? E. "And the blood thereof shall be dashed" (Lev. 7:2). F. So the receiving oj the blood must also be in the north. How about the location oj the one who receives the blood? G. 17zat is indicated by the use oj the accusative particle et [which extends the law to the one who receives the blood} in the verse, "And the blood thereof shall be dashed" (Lev. 7:2). H. So we have found that that is the recommended manner oj carrying out the rite. But how do we know that it is indispensable to the proper performance oj the rite that matters be done in this way? 1. 17zere is another verse that is wnOtten in this same connection: "And he shall kill the he lamb in the place where they kill the sin offering and the burnt offering" (Lev. 14: 13) [repeating the rule in regard to another guilt offering shows that it is indispensable to the proper carrying out of the rite] ° 2. A. But does the cited verse real!J serve the stated purpose in particular? Sure!J it serves another purpose altogether) as has been taught on Tannaite authori!y: B. If a matter was covered by an encompassing rule but then

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C. D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

1.

J. K.

was singled out for some innovative purpose, you have not got the right to restore the matter to the rubric of the encompassing rule unless Scripture itself explicidy does so. How so? "And he shall kill the lamb in the place where they kill the sin offering and the burnt offering, in the holy place; for the guilt offering, like the sin offering, belongs to the priest; it is most holy" (Lev. 14: 13)Now what need does Scripture have to state, "for the guilt offering, like the sin offering"? [Freedman: for if it is to teach that it is slaughtered in the north, that follows from the first half of the verse; if it teaches that sprinkling of the blood and eating the meat follow the rules of the sin offering, that is superfluous, since it is covered by the general regulations on s == guilt offerings given at Lev. 7: 1-1 OJ . And why does Scripture state, "for the guilt offering, like the sin offering"? The reason is that the guilt offering presented by the person healed of the skin ailment was singled out for the innovative purpose of indicating the following: In regard to the thumb of the hand, big toe of the foot, and right ear, you might have thought that the rite does not require the presentation of the blood of the offering and the parts to be burned up on the altar. Scripture therefore states, "for the guilt offering, like the sin offering," to show that just as the sin offering's blood and sacrificial parts have to be presented on the altar, so the blood and sacrificial parts of the guilt offering presented by the person healed of the skin ailment have to be presented on the altar. !f [you claim that the purpose of the verse is as stated and not to teach that doing the rite at the north is indispensable, as originally proposed,] then Scripture should have stated only the rule governing the rite for the one healed .from the skin ailment but not the earlier version of the rule. Qyite so-if we take the view that when something becomes the subject of a new law, it cannot then be covered by an encompassing rule that otherwise would apply, [49B] while the encompassing rule still can be derived .from that special case. But if we take the view that when something becomes the subject if a new law, then it cannot be covered by an encompassing rule that otherwise would apply, and the encompassing rule also cannot be derived .from that special place, then the law [Lev. 7:1-10, indicating that the guilt offering must be killed in the north] is needed for its own purpose! Since Scripture has restored the matter to the rubric if the encompassing rule explicitly, that restoration has taken place. Said Mar Zutra b. R. Mari to Rabina, "But wiry not say, when

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L.

3. A. B.

C.

125

Scripture restored the matter to the rubric oj the encompassing rule, that was solely in regard to having to present the blood and the sacrificial parts on the altar, since the priest is necessary to perfOrm that rite. But as to slaughtering the animal, which does not have to be done by a priest, that does not have to be done at the northern side of the altar?" [He said to him,] ''If so, Scripture should say simply, 'for it is like the sin offering.' Ji1!7zy say, 'or the guilt offering, like the sin offering'? It is to teach, let it be like other guilt offerings [that must be slaughtered at the northern side of the altar}." JlVhy must a verbal analogy [for the burnt offering] be drawn to both a sin offering and also a guilt offering? Said Rabina, ('Both are necessary. If a verbal analogy had been drawn to a sin offering but not to a burnt offering, I should have reached this conclusion: from what source did we derive the rule that a sin offering is slaughtered at the north side of the altar? It is on the basis of the analogy to the burnt offering. The consequence is that a rule that has been derived by analogy in tum generates another rule through analogy [so to avoid such a circulariry, Scripture adds the matter of the burnt offering, to prove that that is not the case)." Said Mar Zutra b. R. Mari to Rabina, (~en draw the analogy to the burnt offering and omit rqerence to a verbal analogy to the sin offering altogether!"

Now we come to one of the great moments of our chapter: the truly dialectical question, that is generated by the dialectical mode of thought. What we want to know, stated narrowly, is the limits of verbal analogy. To explain what is at issue, we have to proceed in a moving argument, hence, the issue is the dialectics of analogy. Specifically: I have two items, A and B. I claim that B is like A, therefore the rule governing A applies also to B. Here is where we try to find out how a list becomes a series. To understand what is in play, we recall the simple syllogism, A = B, B = C, therefore C = A. But what about a case in which, while A = B, we can show that C "# A. Specifically, we turn forward, to C. C is not analogous to A; there are no points of congruence or (in the exegetical formulation that our authors use) verbal intersection. But C is like B. And the reason for the congruence is extrinsic and formal, not intrinsic and substantive (such as the original syllogism posits). C is like B because there is an analogy by reason of verbal intersection (the same word being used by the Torah in reference to C and B.) The question is, may I apply to C, by reason of the verbal (extrinsic, formal) intersection between C and B, the lesson that I have learned in regard to B only by reason of B's similari~ by

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reason if substantive congruence~ not verbal intersection~ to A? This wonderful problem-the interplay of substantive and formal points of comparison or similarity (or identity)-is formulated (as best as I can translate the Hebrew/Aramaic) as, "can a conclusion that is derived on the basis of a verbal analogy go and impart a lesson by reason of analogy to a third item?" This issue is going to occupy us for quite some time, and before us unfolds what I offer as the finest dialectical argument in the Bavli: 44 D. [He said to him,] "Then I might reach the conclusion that [elsewhere] what is derived on the basis of a verbal analogy turns around and imparts a lesson by means of a verbal analogy [and there would be nothing in the text to show the contrary (Freedman)). And ifyou should say, then draw the analogy to a sin offering, I would reply: Scripture prefers to draw the analogy to what is primary rather than to what is secondary [and the sin offering is the primary source of the law, since that is where the requirement that the rite take place at the north is specified, and the sin offering is derivative of the burnt offering]. That is why the analogy is drawn to the sin offering and also to the burnt offering, bearing the sense that that· which is derived on the basis of a verbal analogy does not in tum go and impart a lesson by means of a verbal analogy." 4 . A. Raba said, "[Ihe proposition that that which is derived on the basis of a verbal analogy does not in tum go and impart a lesson by means of a verbal analogy] derives from the following proof: B. "It is written, 'As is taken off from the ox of the sacrifice of peace offerings' (Lev. 4:10) [namely, the sacrificial parts of the anointed priest's bullock brought for a sin offeringJnow for what purpose is this detail given? hat the lobe of the liver and the two kidneys are to be burned on the altar [as is the case with those of the sin offering], that fact is specified in the body of the verse itself. But the purpose is to intimate that the burning of the lobe of the liver and the two kidneys of the he goats brought as sin offerings for idolatry are to be den'ved by analogy from the bullock of the community brought on account of an inadvertent sin. That law is not explicitly stated in the passage on the bullock that is brought for an inadvertent sin, but is derived from the rule governing the bullock of the anointed priest. 'As is taken off' is required so that it might be treated as something written in that very passage [on the bullock of inadvertence, being superfluous in its own contextj, not as something derived on the basis of a verbal analogy does not in tum go and impart a lesson by means of a verbal analogy." C. Said R. Pappa to Raba, "Then let Scripture inscribe the rule in 44 That judgment rests upon my Talmudic Dialectics: 7jpes and Form, where I survey the entire repertoire of dialectical arguments that conform to my definition of the same.

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that very passage, and not trouble to draw a verbal analogy to the bullock qf the anointed priest at all.)) D. "If the rule had been inscribed in its own context and. not been presented by means qf a verbal analogy to the bullock qf the anointed priest, I might have said that that which is derived on the basis qf a verbal analogy does in tum go and impart a lesson by means qf a verbal analogy. And ifyou should objec~ '7hen let Scripture present the rule by analogy without making it explicit,' I could answer that Scripture prifers to make an explicit statement in the proper context rather than to present a law through a verbal analogy. Scripture therefore inscribed the matter in the passage dealing with the anointed . pn'est and established the analogy so as to demonstrate that that which is derived on the basis of a verbal analogy does not in tum go and impart a lesson by means qf a verbal analogy."

My claim that this chapter is systematic and orderly, composed with a broader program in mind and not narrowly limited to the exegesis of phrases of the Mishnah read in sequence, is now demonstrated by what is to follow. We have proven one point. It bears a consequence. We go on to the consequence. The mode of thought is dialectical not only in form, but also in substance: if A, then B. If B, then what about C? But we see that matters are not only continued, but also refined. It is one thing to have shown that if B is like A, and C, unlike A, is rendered comparable to B by a verbal analogy, then may I take the next step and draw into the framework of Band C, joined by verbal analogy and assigned a common rule by B's congruentanalogy to A, also D, E, F, and G, that is, other classes of things joined to C by verbal analogy-but not necessarily the same verbal analogy that has joined C to B? That indeed is the obvious next step to be taken, and it is now taken. 5. A. Now it is a fact that that which is derived on the basis of a verbal analogy does in turn go and impart a lesson by means of a verbal analogy, demonstrated whether in the manner qf Raba or in the manner qf Rabina. B. Is it the rule, however, that that which is derived on the basis qf a verbal analogy may in tum go and impart a lesson by means qf an argument on the basis of congruence? [Freedman: Thus the law stated in A is applied to B by analogy. Can that law then be applied to C because of congruence between Band C?J C. [Indeed it can.J Come and take note: R. Nathan b. Abetolomos says, "How on the basis of Scripture do we know that when there is a spreading of disease-signs [of Lev. 13-14J in clothing, [if it covers the entire garmentJ, it is ruled to be clean? The words 'baldness on the back of the head'

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and 'baldness on the front of the head' are stated in respect to man, and 'baldness on the back' and 'baldness on the front' are mentioned in connection with clothing. Just as is in the fanner case, if the baldness spread throughout the whole, the man is clean, so here too, if the baldness spread throughout the whole, the garment is clean." D. And in that context how do we know the rule [that that which spreads and covers the whole head is clean, since Lev. 13: 12-13 refers to what is on the skin, not the head? And furthermore, the symptoms differ (Freedman)]? Because it is written, "And if the skin ailment. . . cover all the skin ... from his head even to his feet" (Lev. 13: 12)so the head is treated as analogous to the feet. Just as if the feet have all turned white, the ailment have spread over the whole of the body, the man is clean, so here too when it spreads over the whole of the head and beard, he is clean. [Thus we derive the rule by a verbal analogy that the specified marks covering the whole head are clean, and then the same rule is applied to the garments by the argument resting on congruence, as stated at C (Freedman)]. E. [To the contrary,] said R. Yohanan, "Throughout the Torah we infer one rule from another that has itself been derived by inference, except for the matter of consecration, in which we do not derive a rule from another that has itself been inferred." F. Now if it were the foct that we did so, then let the reference to "north" not be stated in the context if the guilt offering at all, and it could be inferred .from the rule governing sin offerings, by means if the argument based on the congruence if the language, "It is most Holy" [which is stated in the setting if the sin offering at Lev. 7: 18 and the built offering at Lev. 7:1]/ Does that not bear the implication that that which is derived on the basis of a verbal analogy may not in tum go and impart a lesson by means if an argument on the basis oj congruence? G. But perhaps the reason that we do not learn the lesson at that passage is that there is an ample refUtation: the reason that the sin offering has to be offered in the north is that it achieves atonement for those who are liable to the penalty if extirpation? H. ,Still, in context, there is nonetheless a supeifluous reference to "most Holy'~ [at Num. 18:9]. [Freedman: Since this is superfluous, an argument from congruence is plausible, even though the guilt offering is dissimilar to the sin offering; that we do not do so proves that in the case of sacrifices that which is derived on the basis of a verbal analogy may not in tum go and impart a lesson by means of an argument on the basis of congruence.]

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What follows simply proceeds to the logically next question: we have now linked B to C via a verbal analogy. C stands in relationship to other classes of things, but not for the same reason that it stands in relationship to B, that is, through other than verbal analogical relationships. It forms a relationship a fortiori, for instance, with D, E, and F. If something applies to C, the lesser, it surely should apply to D, the greater. So now we want to know the permissible grounds for drawing relationships-comparisons and contrasts-of classes of things. The deeper issue of comparative-contrasting thinking is now right on the surface: what constitutes the proper basis for establishing the plausibility of comparison and contrast anyhow? We obviously do not want to compare things that do not bear comparison because they are not species of the same genus, but distinct genera. But then on what basis do we move from species to species and uncover the genera of which they form a part (if they do form a part)? Is it only verbal correspondence or intersection, as has been implicit to this point? Or are there more abstract bases for the same work of genusconstruction (in our language: category-formation and re-formation)? This simple issue is going to keep us busy from here to nearly the end of the chapter, because there is a rich repertoire of principles that establish of discrete data classes of data and that then link one class to another. The first was, we recall, deriving a rule by analogy and then moving on to transmit the rule to classes linked by not analogy but rather verbal intersection. We proceed to the next problem, which is, whether or not a rule shown to apply to two or more classes of things linked by verbal analogy may then be applied to further classes of things that relate to the foregoing by not verbal analogy but a relationship a fortiori. 6. A. That which is learned by a verbal analogy may in turn go and impart a rule by an argument a flrtion'. B. [50A] That is in line with that which the Tannaite authority of the household of R. Ishmael set forth. 7. A. Can that which is learned by verbal analogy established may in turn go and impart a rule by an analogy based on the congruence of other shared traits [but not verbal ones in context]? [This mode of argument depends not on verbal analogy supplied by Scripture but an analogy drawn from similarity of the traits of two· subjects.] B. Said R. Jeremiah, "Let Scripture omit reftrence to slaughtering the guilt offering at the north of the altar, and that rule can have been iriferred by appeal to an analogy based on the congruence of other

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shared traits [but not verbal ones in context} .from the nile governing a sin offering. [Both offerings expiate sin. So the rule governing the one will pertain to the other.])) C. "So why has Scripture stated that law? Is it not to indicate that that which is learned by verbal analogy established may not in turn go and impart a rule by an analogy based on the congruence of other shared traits [but not verbal ones in context?]?" D. But in accord with your reasonin£ let the rule be iriferred by an analogy based on the congruence oj other shared traits [but not verbal ones in context) .from the one governing a burnt qffering! [The rule is explicitly stated in that context, and the intennediate analogy based on verbal similarities is not required at all (Freedman).] E. So why is it not iriferred in that way? F. It is because one may present the following challenge: the distinguishing trait of the burnt offering is indeed that it is turned to ashes on the altar! [That is not the case of the guilt offering.] G. In riference to the sin qffering) one may also present a challenge) namely: the distinguishing trait of the sin offering is that it expiates sins that bear the sanction of extirpation. H. While) therefore) admittedly one cannot learn the rule on a one to one basis) why not derive the rule by imputing to the third classffication the law governing two other classifications oj sacrifice [so that Scripture can have intimated that slaughter at the north is required for two if the three classifications) and by an argument based on the congruent if other shared traits, we should derive the nile governing the third if the three]? I. From which two if the three can the nile have been derived for the third? If Scripture had not written the rule in connection with the burnt offerin£ you might have derived the nile for that classification .from the one covering the sin offering and the guilt offering. J. Not at all) for the distinguishing trait oj these is that they iffect atonement [which is not accomplished by the burnt offering]. K. Then let Scripture not state the rule in connection with the sin ojJerin£ and derive it .from the other two. L. Not at all, for the distinguishing trait if these is that they require male animals [which is not the case if the sin offerin~ which is a female}. M. Then let Scripture not state the rule in connection with the guilt offerin£ and derive it from the other two. N. Not at all) for the distinguishing trait if these is that they may be brought as much in behalf if the communi!y as in behalf oj an individual. [A guilt offering is presented only by an individual.]

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Not surprisingly, we now move forward once more-but by taking a step backward. We have shown that we may move from a class of things joined to another through analogy based on congruence, that is, from A to B, onward to other classes of things joined to the foregoing by verbal analogy or intersection, that is, from B to C and beyond. But can we then move from C, linked to be via verbal analogy, to D, linked to C, but not to A or B, by congruence, e.g., comparable and shared traits of a salient order? The issue then, is may we move forward to further classes of things by moving "backward," to a principle of linkage of classes that has served to bring us to this point, in other words, reversing the course of principles of linkage? What our framers then want to know is a very logical question: are there fixed rules that govern the order or sequence by which we move from one class of things to another, so that, if we propose to link classes of things, we can move only from A to B by one principle (comparison and contrast of salient traits), and from B to C by a necessarily consequent and always second principle (verbal intersection); then we may move (by this theory) from C to D only by verbal intersection but not by appeal to congruence. Why not? Because, after all, if C is linked to B only by verbal intersection but not by congruence, bearing no relationship to A at all, then how claim thatD stands in a series begun at A, if it has neither verbal connection, nor, as a matter of fact, congruence to link it to anything in the series. Is then a series substantive, in that we ask that there be some "natural logic" holding the parts together, a "natural logic" that derives from the sequence of operative principles of comparison and con trast? Or is a series merely formal, in that if we can link D to C in one way but D to A in no ways, D still has been shown, in the course of argument but not by the reason or internal logic of the argument, to relate to A at all? This enormously engaging question dictates everything that is coming, and I do not have to repeat the point, since there is no grasping a line from here to nearly the end of the chapter if we do not understand that what our sages are trying to find out is whether a series is a series because of its external form alone or because of its internal, inherent traits as well. If I were a mathematician, I could appeal to the issue of whether the symbolic representation of, e.g., spatial relations is limited by tests out there, as Euclid supposed, so that we move from data to symbol, or may there be a symbolic representation of "things" for which there

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is no "out there" there, as non-Euclidean geometries claim. But I am not a mathematician. 8. A. Can a rule that is derived by analogy based on the congruence of other shared traits [but not verbal ones in context] turn around and teach a lesson through an analogy based on verbal analogy? B. Said R. Pappa, "'This is the law of the sacrifice of peace qfferings ... if he offers it for a thanksgiving qfforing' (Lev. 7:11ff.): in this verse we learn the rule that fonds for the purchase qf an animal offered for a thanksgiving offering may derive from money exchanged for produce in the status of second tithe, since we find, in point qffoct, that peace offerings thernseloes [into the class qf which the cited verse assimilates thanksgiving offerings} may be purchased from money exchanged for produce in the status qf second tithe." C. And how do we know, as a matter offact, that that peace offerings themselves [into the class of which the cited verse assimilates thanksgiving offerings} may be purchased from money exchanged for produce in the status of second tithe? D. The reason is that the word "there" is written in the context of both a beast purchased for use as a peace offering and also second tithe, [at Dt. 27:7 and Dt. 14:23, respectively}. [It follows that the rule governing the peace offering derives from an argument based on an analogy established through verbal congruence, and that rule is then applied to a thanksgiving offering by an analogy based on other than verbal congruence.] . E. Said Mar Zutra b. R. Mari to Rabina, "But tithe of grain is in the status if unconsecrated food in general [but the issue at hand addresses tithe of the corral, which is in the status of Holy 7hings}!" F. He said to him, "Who has claimed that that to which a rule is transferred [by means of the exegetical principle at hand] must be in the class of Holy Things and that that from which a rule is transferred likewise must be in the class of Holy Things?" 9. A. Can a rule that is derived by an analogy based on the congruence of other shared traits [but not verbal ones in context] turn around and teach a lesson through an analogy based on the congruence of [other] shared traits? B. Said Rami bar Hama, "It has been taught on Tannaite authority: C. '" "Of fine flour soaked" (Lev. 7: 12)-this teaches that the soaked cake [one that is made of boiled flour] must be made of fine flour. D. '''How do we know the rule that applies to the ordinary unleavened cakes [hallot]? E. "'Scripture in both contexts [speaking of the cakes that are soaked as well as the unleavened ones] speaks of hallot.

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F. "'How do we know that the same rule applies to thin wafers? G. "'Because Scripture in both contexts speaks of unleavened bread.'" [Freedman: Thus we first learn by an analogy based on shared traits that the ordinary unleavened cakes must be made of fine flour, and then by a further such argument we learn from the ordinary unleavened cakes that the thin wafers likewise must be of fine flour.] H. Said to him Rabina (Wow do you know that he derives the rule governing unleavened cakes from the one governing ordinary unleavened cakes? Perhaps he derives the rule from the law governing oven baked cakes [Lev. 2:4) [without appeal to the analogy that has been drawn here}?JJ 1. Rather, said Raba, "It has been taught on Tannaite authority: J. '" "And its innards and its dung, even the whole bullock shall he carry forth outside of the camp" (Lev. 4: 11)this teaches that they carry it out whole. K. "'Might one suppose that they burn it whole? L. "'Here we find a reference to "its head and its legs," and elsewhere [Lev. 1:8-9, 12-13] we find reference also to "its head and its legs." Just as in that other case, this is done only after cutting up the beast, so here too it means only after cutting up the beast. M. "'If so, then just as there this is after flaying the hide, so here too is it to be after flaying the hide? Scripture states, "and its innards and its dung."'" N. JiVhat conclusion is supposed to be drawn here? O. Said R. Pappa, 'just as its dung is kept within the innards, so the meat must be held within the hide." P. And so too it has been taught on Tannaite authority: Q Rabbi says, "Here [with reference to the bullock and he goat of the Day of Atonement] we find a reference to 'hide and meat and dung,' [50B] and elsewhere, we find a reference to hide and meat and dung [in connection with the bullock of the anointed priest]. Just as there, the beast was burned only after being cut up, but without flaying the hide, so here too the beast was burned only after being cut up, but without flaying the hide." [Thus the result of one such argument is transferred to another case by another such argument (Freedman)]. 10. A. Can a rule that is derived by an analogy based on the congruence of other shared traits [but not verbal ones in context] go and teach a lesson through an argument a fortiori? B. Indeed so, by reason of an argument a fortiori: J

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c.

If an argument deriving from an analogy based on verbal congruence, which cannot go and, by an argument based on verbal congruence, impart its rule to some other class-as has been shown by either Raba's or Rabina's demo.nstration-nonetheless can go and by an argument a fortiori impart its rule to some other class-as has been shown

by the Tannaite authority

of the

household

of R.

Ishmael-then

a rule that is derived by an argument based on analogy based on other than verbal congruence, which can for its part go and impart its lesson by an argument based on an analogy resting on verbal congruity-as has been shown by R. Pappa--surely can in turn teach its lesson by an argument a fortiori to yet another case!

D. 1hat position poses no problems to one who takes the view that R. Pappa's case has been made. But for one who takes the view that R. Pappa's case has not been made, what is to be said? E. Rather, this is an argument a fortiori in favor of the same point:

F. If an argument deriving from an analogy based on verbal congruence, which cannot go and, by an argument based on verbal congruence, impart its rule to some other class-as has been shown by either Raba's or Rabina's demonstration--nonetheless can go and by an argument a fortiori impart its rule to some other class-as has been shown

by the Tannaite authority

of the

household

of R.

Ishmael-then

a rule that is derived by an argument based on analogy based on other than verbal congruence, which can for its part go and impart its lesson by an argument based on an analogy resting on verbal congruity which is like itself-as has been shown by Rami bar Hama---surely can in turn teach its lesson by an argument a fortiori to yet another case! 11. A. Can a rule that is derived by an analogy based on the congruence of other shared traits [but not verbal ones in context] go and teach a lesson through an argument constructed by analogy based on the congruence of other shared traits among two or more classifications of things?

B. That question must stand. 12. A. Can a rule derived by an argument a fortiori go and teach a rule established through analogy of verbal usage? B. The affirmative derives from an argument a fortiori: C. If an argument deriving from an analogy based on points of other than verbal congruence, which cannot go and, by an argument based on verbal congruence, impart its rule to some other class-as has been shown by either R. Pappa's demonstration,-then a rule that is derived by an argument a fortiori, which can be derived by an argument based on the shared verbal traits of two things,-

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as has been shown by the Tannaite authority if the house if R. Ishmael--surely should be able to impart its rule to

D.

E. 13. A.

B. C.

14. A.

B. C.

D.

E.

another classification of things by reason of an argument based on a verbal analogy! nat position poses no problems to one who takes the view that R. Pappa's case has been made. But for one who takes the view that R. Pappa's case has not been made, what is to be said? ne question then must stand. Can a rule that is derived by an argument a fortiori go and teach a lesson through an argument based on the congruence of other shared traits [but not verbal ones in context]? The affirmative derives from an argument a fortiori: If an argument deriving from an analogy based on points of other than verbal congruence, which cannot be derived from an argument based on verbal congruence, impart its rule to some other class-as has been shown by R. Yohanan's demonstration,-can go and teach a lesson by an argument based on an analogy established through other than verbal traits, as has been shown by Rami bar Hama-a rule based on an argument a fortiori, which can be derived by an argument based on an analogy resting on verbal coincidence, surely should be able to impart its rule to another classification of things by reason of an argument based on an other than verbal analogy! Can a rule based on an argument a fortiori turn around and teach a lesson through an argument based on an argument a fortiori? Indeed so, and the affirmative derives from an argument a fortiori: If an argument deriving from an analogy based on points of other than verbal congruence, which cannot be derived from an argument based on verbal congruence, impart its rule to some other class-as has been shown by R. Yohanan's demonstration,-can go and teach a lesson by an argument a fortiori, as we have just pointed out, then an argument that can be derived from an analogy based on verbal congruence-as has been shown by the Tannaite authority of the household if R. Ishmael-surely should be able to impart its rule by an argument a fortiori! But would this then would represent what we are talking about, namely, a rule deriving from an argument a fortiori that has been applied to another case by means of an argument a fortiori? Surely this is nothing more than a secondary derivation produced by an argument a fortiori! Rather, argue in the following way:

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F. Indeed- SO, and the affirmative derives from an argument a fortiori: G. if an argument based on an analogy of a verbal character cannot be derived from another such argument based on an analogy between two classes of things that rests upon a verbal congruence-in accordance with the proofs if either Raba or Rabina-nonetheless can then go and impart its lesson by an argument a fortiori-in accordance with the proof of the Tannaite authority of the household of R. Ishmael-then an argument a fortiori, which can serve to transfer a lesson originally learned through an argument based upon verbal congruence, in accordance with the proif if the Tannaite authority if the household of R. Ishmaelsurely should be able to impart its lesson to yet another classification of things through an argument a fortiori. H. And this does represent what we are talking about, namely, a rule deriving from an argument a fortiori that has been applied to another case by means of an argument a fortiori. 15. A. Can a rule based on an argument a fortiori turn around and teach a rule through an argument constructed on the basis of shared traits of an other-than-verbal character among two classifications of things? B. Said R. Jeremiah, "Come and take note: [If] one pinched off the neck and [the bird] turned out to be terefah-R. Meir says, "It does not iIIlpart uncleanness of the gullet [since slaughtering a beast is wholly equivalent to pinching the neck of a bird]." R. Judah says, "It does iIIlpart uncleanness of the gullet." [Birds and beasts in no way are cOIIlparable; neither slaughtering an unconsecrated clean bird nor pinching the neck of a consecrated one will exeIIlpt :£rOIn uncleanness a bird which turns out to be terefah.] Said R. Meir, "It is an argurn.ent a fortiori: now if in the case of the carrion of a beast, which im.parts uncleanness through contact and through carrying, proper slaughter renders clean :£rOIIl its uncleanness that which was terefah, [in the case of] the carrion of fowl, which to begin with does not iDlpart uncleanness through contact- and through carrying, it should logically follow that its proper slaughter should render clean :£rOIIl its uncleanness that which was terefah. Just as we find that its proper slaughter [in the case of a bird or beast] renders it valid for eating [51 A] and renders it clean :£rOIIl

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B. C.

D.

E. F.

G.

137

its uncleanness in the case of terefah, so proper pinching of the neck, which renders it valid for eating, should render it clean frOID. its uncleanness in the case of terefah." R. Yose says, "It is sufficient that it [the slaughtering of the bird] be equivalent -to the carrion of a beast: its [a beast's or a bird's] slaughtering renders clean [what is terefah], but the pinching of the neck [of a bird does] not [render clean what is terefah]" [M. Zeb. 7 :6]. [The language 'just as we find" then represents an argument based on shared traits of two distinct classifications of things, and so we see that a rule derived by an argument a fortiori then through such an argument based on shared traits is transferred to another class of things altogether.]" But that is not so. For even if we concede that that is the case there, then still the rule derives from the act if slaughter if unconsecrated beasts [Freedman}. Can a rule derived by an argument based on shared traits of an other than verbal character shared among two classes of things then turn around and teach a lesson by an argument based on an analogy of a verbal character, an analogy not of a verbal character, an argument a fortiori, or an argument based on shared traits? Solve at least one of those problems by appeal to the following: On what account have they said that if blood of an offering is left overnight on the altar, it is fit? Because if the sacrificial parts are kept overnight on the altar, they are fit. And why if the sacrificial parts are kept overnight on the altar are they fit? Because if the meat of the offering is kept overnight on the altar it is fit. [Freedman: thus the rule governing the sacrificial parts is derived by an appeal to an argument based on shared traits of an other than verbal character shared among two classes of things, and that rule in turn is applied to the case of the blood by another such argument based on shared traits of an other than verbal character shared among two classes of things] . What about the rule governing meat that is taken outside of the Temple court? [If such meat is put up on the altar, it is not removed therefrom. Why so?] Because meat that has been taken out of the holy place is suitable for a high place. What about the rule governing unclean meat? [If such meat is put up on the altar, it is not removed therefrom. Why so?] Since meat that is unclean is subject to a remission of

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H.

1.

J.

K.

L.

M.

N.

the prohibition affecting it in the case of an offering made in behalf of the entire community. What about the rule governing the sacrificial parts of a burnt offering that the officiating priest subjected to the intention of being burned after the proper time? [If such meat is put up on the altar, it is not removed therefrom. Why so?] Since the sprinkling of the blood is effective and propitiates in making such meat refuse by reason of the improper intentionality [we leave the sacrificial portions on the altar once they have been put there]. What about the rule governing the sacrificial parts of a burnt offering that the officiating priest subjected to the intention of being eaten outside of the proper place? [If such meat is put up on the altar, it is not removed therefrom. Why so?] Since sacrificial meat in that class is treated as analogous to sacrificial meat that has been subjected to an improper intentionality in respect to eating the meat outside of the proper time. What about the rule governing the sacrificial parts of a burnt offering the blood of which unfit priests have received and tossed, when such unfit persons are eligible for an act of service in behalf of the community ... ? [This question is not answered.] [Reverting to C-E:] Now can an analogy be drawn concerning something that has been disposed of in the proper manner for something that has not been disposed of in the proper manner? [If the sacrificial parts are kept over night, they are not taken off the altar, and therefore the meat kept overnight is fit; but the meat may be kept overnight, while the sacrificial parts may not. So too when the Temple stood, the flesh might not be taken outside, but where there was no Temple and only high places, the case is scarcely analogous!] The Tannaite authority for this rule derives it from the augmentative sense, extending the rule,. deriving from the formulation, "This is the Torah of the burnt offering" (Lev. 6:2). [Freedman: the verse teaches that all burnt offerings, even with the defects catalogued here, are subject to the same rule and do not get removed from the altar once they have been put there; the arguments given cannot be sustained but still support that proposition.]

The simple order of the whole, that allows the answer to one question to precipitate the consequent and necessary next question. I need hardly review what our authors have made so clear through their own exposition. I cannot imagine anybody's not seeing that a sus-

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tained methodological inquiry is taking place at the very surface of discourse on the bloody rite of the Temple! V.I A. The remnants of their blood did one pour out on the western base of the outer altar. If he did not place [the remnants of the blood at the stated location], he did not itnpair [atonell1.ent]:

B. What is the Scripture basis for this rule? C. Scripture has said, "And all the remaining blood of the bullock shall he pour out at the base of the altar of the burnt offering which is at the door of the tent of meeting" (Lev. 4:7). D. 77zat speaks of the first altar that one meets [as you enter from the door, and that is the western base).

The range of exegetical principles-argument a fortiori, argument based on analogy established through shared verbal choices, argument based on analogy established through other than shared verbal choices, analogy based on the congruence of other shared traits [but not verbal ones in contextJ-is entirely systematic, with each exegetical technique compared to all of the others. What we have accomplished it to take lists and transform them into series, yielding consequences beyond the limits of the data, and even of the general principles, of the original lists.

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DIALECTICS AND THE INTELLECTUAL DYNAMICS OF THE GEMARA

The main consequence for the Gemara of formation through dialectical arguments is simply stated. It is the power of that mode of the representation of thought to show us-as no other mode of writing (without abstract symbols) can show-not only the result but the workings of the logical mind. By following dialectical arguments, we ourselves enter into those same thought processes, and our minds then are formed in the model of rigorous and sustained, systematic argument. The reason is simply stated. When we follow a proposal and its refutation, the consequence thereof, and the result of that, we ourselves form partners to the logical tensions and their resolutions; we are given an opening into the discourse that lies before us. As soon as matters turn not upon tradition, to which we mayor may not have access, but reason, specifically, challenge and response, proposal and counter-proposal, "maybe matters are just the opposite?" we find an open door before us.

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For these are not matters of fact but of reasoned judgment, and the answer, "well, that's my opinion," in its "traditional form," namely, that is what Rabbi X has said so that must be so, finds no hearing. Moving from facts to reasoning, propositions to the process of counterargument, the challenge resting on the mind's own movement, its power of manipulating facts one way rather than some other and of identifying the governing logic of a fact-that process invites the reader's or the listener's participation. The author of a dialectical composite presents a problem with its internal tensions in logic and offers a solution to the problem and a resolution of the logical conflicts. What is at stake in the capacity of the framer of a composite, or even the author of a composition, to move this way and that, always in a continuous path, but often in a crooked one? The dialectical argument opens the possibility of reaching out from one thing to something else, and the path's wandering is part of the reason. It is not because people have lost sight of their starting point or their goal in the end, but because they want to encompass, in the analytical argument as it gets underway, as broad and comprehensive a range of cases and rules as they can. The movement from point to point in reference to a single point that accurately describes the dialectical argument reaches a goal of abstraction. At the point at which we leave behind the specificities of not only cases but laws, sages carry the argument upward to the law that governs many cases, the premises that undergird many rules, and still higher to the principles that infuse diverse premises; then the principles that generate other, unrelated premises, which, in turn, come to expression in other, stillless intersecting cases. The meandering course of argument comes to an end when we have shown how things cohere that we did not even imagine were contiguous at all. The dialectical argument forms the means to an end. The distinctive character of the Gemara's particular kind of dialectical argument is dictated by the purpose for which dialectics is invoked. Specifically, the goal of all argument is to show in discrete detail the ultimate unity, harmony, proportion, and perfection of the law-not of the Mishnah as a document but of all the law of the same standing as that presented by the Mishnah. 45 The hermeneutics of dialectics aims at making manifest how to read the laws in such a way as to 45 In its quest for transcendence through synthesis, the Gemara's dialectic may be alleged to form a precursor of Hegel's. But that is for philosophers to decide.

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discern that many things really say one thing. The variations on the theme then take the form of detailed expositions of this and that. Then our task is to move backward from result to the reasoning process that has yielded said result: through regression from stage to stage to identify within the -case not only the principles of law that produce that result, but the processes of reasoning that link the principles to the case at hand. And, when we accomplish our infinite regression, we move from the workings of literature to its religious character and theological goal: it is to know God in heaven, represented, on earth, by the unity of the law, the integrity of the Torah.

CHAPTER FOUR

HOW THE TALMUD WORKS When people not only pronounce opinions but exchange ideas, each empowers the other. The participants offer their own views for the criticism of the other. But they also implicitly accept the judgment of the other upon their original pronouncements. Dialectics constitutes a form of mutual empowerment effected through shared rationality. Communities of intellect take shape, imparting to the social order a component of thought and enriching it with the possibilities of change through persuasion, not the legitimate coercion, only, of politics. The Gemara put forth for holy Israel a source of reasoned community that for all time would make of holy Israel a preserve of contentious argument in a world of inarticulate force. Its dialectics civilized Israel, the holy community, and, the theologians would add, Israel then conformed to the model and the image of the God who created all being through reasoned speech. Through the centuries from the formal closure of the Talmud, in about 600 C.E. [= A.D.], the Talmud formed the single authoritative writing of Judaism, the source of the theology and the law that defined the faith and the community of holy Israel, God's first love, wherever they might be located. Enriched by commentaries, responsa, and law codes over· the centuries, the Talmud defined the practical affairs of the community of Judaism. But because of its particular character, as the script for a sustained analytical argument, the Talmud further shaped the minds of those who mastered its modes of thought and, because of its profound sensibility, the document further imparted to those who responded to its teachings a character of . intellectual refinement and personal responsibility, an alertness to the meaning of word and deed alike. No wonder, then, that the master of Talmudic learning, the disciple of sages in its native category, has defined the virtuous life for Judaic faithful, down to our own time. Because of its power to impart form and structure to the mind of holy Israel, its capacity to define the good and holy way of life for those who wished to be Israel, God's people, the Talmud enjoyed complete success in that various world to which its compilers or authors entrusted their work. Not many books can compete.

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The most important question about the Talmud concerns not what it says but how it works, meaning, why the Talmud has exercised the amazing power that it has wielded over the life of holy Israel, God's people, for the whole of its history. Mter all, how many documents compare? Here is a. piece of writing that' faced a particular group of people and from its appearance to our own time defined for that group everything that really mattered: questions of order, questions of truth, questions of meaning, questions of purpose. Individuals devoted their lives to the study of this writing, but more important, the entire society of Judaism-that is, the community formed by the Torah-found in the Talmud those modes of thought and inquiry, those media of order and value, that guided the formation of public affairs and private life as well. The Talmud is a public, political, anonymous, collective, social statement; its compilers intended to define the life of the public polity by forming the kingdom of God in the here and now that the ,Torah, beginning with the Pentateuch, had recorded as God's will for Israel, the holy people. That is the context in which we ask what we need to know about a piece of writing-this piece of writin~to explain for ourselves how the writing works, meaning two things: how does it do its work, and why does it work? If the compilers put together two stories, what message have they formulated through making that particular connection? If they have take as self-evident the coherence of a given set of propositions, what has instructed them on why things fit together so well-and in this way, rather than in that way? That is to say, how people make connections and draw conclusions from those connections is the key to how they see the world, their modes of thought. What people find self-evident defines the source of truth and meaning that governs for them. And the Talmud will express that profound principle of the analysis of a culture in so many words when it perceives an incongruity and says, "Now, who ever mentioned that?" What does subject A have to do with subject X? The upshot will be a point of disharmony that requires attention, and in the harmonization of incongruity much new truth emerges. And there is a deeper dimension still. A piece of writing holds together because of a logic of coherence, which the writer and the reader share, and which the writer uses to show the reader why one thing follows from another, and how two things hold together. In a composite such as the Talmud, the issue of coherence surfaces everywhere. In following the unfolding of an argument, knowing precisely

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where we stand, understanding how one thing follows from some other and inexorably leads us onward to a further conclusion-these are precisely the elements that generate the power of the document. If you are ever studying a passage of the Talmud and ask yourself what one thing has to do with another, you may take comfort in the fact that you have asked the one question that you must ask-and must answer if you are to make sense of things. The Talmud as a whole is cogent, doing some few things over and over again; it conforms to a few simple rules of rhetoric, including choice of languages for discrete purposes, and that fact attests to the coherent viewpoint of the authorship at the end-the people who put it all together as we have it-because it speaks, over all, in a single way, in a uniform voice. The Talmud is not merely an encyclopaedia of information, but a sustained, remarkably protracted, uniform inquiry into the logical traits of passages of the Mishnah or of Scripture. It is not a chaotic mishmash, it is not disorganized, nor is it over all just a compilation of this, that, and the other thing. Quite to the contrary, an outline of the Talmud,I beginning to end, shows that the Talmud moves from main points to subsidiary ones, follows a coherent program of argument, presents information in a generally coherent way for a clear, propositional purpose, and, in all, can be followed in the same way we follow other writings. First of all, the outline demonstrates, the Talmud does some few things, and does them over and over again in the same order: first this, then that. Most of the Talmud deals with the exegesis and amplification of the Mishnah's rules or of passages of Scripture. That 1 The Talmud oj Babylonia. A Complete Outline. Atlanta, 1995: Scholars Press for USF Academic Commentary Series. I.A Tractate Berakhot and the Division oj Appointed Times. Berakhot, Shabbat, and Ernbin. I.B Tractate Berakhot and the Division oj Appointed Times. Pesahim through Hagigah. II.A. The Division oj Women. Tebamot through Ketubot ILB. The Division oj Women. Nedarim through Qjddushin lILA The Division oj Damages. Baba Qgmma through . Baba Batra III.B The Division oj Damages. Sanhedrin through Horayot IV.A The Division oj Holy Things and Tractate Niddah. Zebahim through Hullin IV.B The Division oj Holy Things and Tractate Niddah. Bekhorot through Niddah. Note also: The Talmud oj The Land oj Israel. An Outline oj the Second, 7hird, and Fourth Divisions. Atlanta, 1995-1996: Scholars Press for South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism. I.A Tractate Berakhot and the Division oj Appointed Times. Berakhot and Shabbat I.B Tractate Berakhot and the Division oj Appointed Times. Ernbin, Toma, and Besah I.e Tractate Berakhot and the Division oj Appointed Times. Pesahim and Sukkah I.D Tractate Berakhot and the Division oj Appointed Times. Taanit, MegiUah, Rosh Hashanah, Hagigah, and Moed Qgtan II.A. The Division oj Women. Tebamot to Nedan'm II.B. The Division oj Women. Nazir to Sotah III.A The Division oj Damages and Tractate Niddah. Baba Q.amma, Baba Mesia, Baba Batra, Horayot, and Niddah lII.B The Division oj Damages and Tractate Niddah. Sanhedrin, Makkot, Shebuot, and Abodah Zarah.

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is to say, every sustained discussion begins with a passage of the Mishnah, which will be read with great sensitivity. The rules of reading the Mishnah are few and strong. Wherever we turn, that labor of exegesis and amplification, without differentiation in topics or tractates, conforms to a small number of rules in inquiry, repeatedly phrased, implicitly or explicitly, in a few simple rhetorical forms or patterns. We will be told the meanings of words and phrases, but more than information, we will be asked to participate in a sustained inquiry into the scriptural foundations, in the written Torah, of the Mishnah's rule, which are received as oral Torah. We further will be told that the implicit governing principle of a rule before us intersects with the inferred governing principle of some other, on a different subject, and these have to be compared, contrasted, harmonized, or differentiated. All of this is exhilarating and empowers us to join in the analysis and argument. True, the Talmud is made up of diverse materials. Its compilers used ready-made writing as well as making up their own compositions. But once we outline some pages, from the very beginning to the very end of the discussion of a given paragraph of the Mishnah, we can see what was essential to the purpose of the .Talmud's compilers, and what served a subsidiary purpose, for instance, of just giving us information on a topic at hand. So we will find a proposition, demonstrated at some length, followed by an appendix of topically interesting material, which is not party to the argument but which is useful and illuminating. Once we understand how things are put together and why a given passage is included, we see the document as coherent, purposeful, and quite reasonable in its inclusions and juxtapositions-anything but that mess that people tell us it is. Weare able to identifY the types of compositions and large-scale composites of which the Talmud's framers made use, which allows us systematically to study the classifications of those types, e.g., Mishnah-commentary, other-than-Mishnah-commentary, to take the two most obvious classifications of all. Not by a repertoire of examples but by a complete catalogue of all items, therefore, we know precisely what types of materials are used, in what proportions, in what contexts, for what purposes, and the like. Generalizations, accompanied by reasonably accurate statements of the numbers and proportions of exemplary data, take a probative role in all study of the character and definition of the Talmud. Talmudists share the conviction that here they study the record of God's revelation, that is,

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God's self-manifestation. Here in their theology, therefore, they learn the logic of God, how God thinks, those patterns of reason that govern in the creation of the world. From the wording of the Torah, they work our way back to the processes of thought, the rules of coherent analysis, that yielded that wording. The Talmud throughout speaks in a single, uniform voice, and that voice is unique in the context of Rabbinic compilations of late antiquity. Now there can be no further argument on that point; the evidence of the uniformity of discourse is spread out in stupefYing detail. Why does it matter, and what is at stake in this-worldly terms? In fact, the difference it makes is fundamental: is the Talmud, Judaism's foundation-document after Scripture, the Talmud, organized or disorganized, purposive or random, systematic or chaotic? Many accounts of the character of the Talmud as a piece of writing describe the document as unsystematic. Some describe the document as disorganized, others as exhibiting no well-established program that accounts for why a given passage appears where it does and not somewhere else. The regnant theory of the document, along these lines, holds that it developed through a sedimentary process of agglutination and conglomeration. But a better-informed view shows that the opposite is the fact. Why do many Talmudists describe the document as incoherent? The reason is two fold. First, modes of study focus on details, for in the yeshiva world, which is the sole venue for authentic and sustained learning in this writing, people study words and phrases, concentrating on the exegesis of sentences. They turn from a sentence and its declaration to the topic of the sentence, and so move into the commentaries, which discuss the substance of matters, rather than the cogency of a large-scale Talmudic argument. The nature of jurisprudence requires just this kind of phrase-by-phrase study, but such study hardly will produce on the student the impression of a large: scale, sustained argument. There is a second, formal pro blem that impedes even the most logical disciple of the Talmud from following its structure and order, and that has to do with a technical limitation that affects all books coming to us from ancient times. To understand the problem, we begin with the present. When we are composing an argument, we will subordinate, in footnotes, bits and pieces of clarification, e.g., facts, meanings of words and phrases, that the reader will find useful, but that will greatly impede the exposition if left in the body of

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the text. So in the text we make our main point, and iIi footnotes we add supplementary information, even further thoughts. Not only so, but when we are writing a book, we may wish to take up an entire subject and present it in a systematic way, but we may also find that the subject does not allow for the systematic exposition of an important topic. Now what do we do? We simply write up the topical exposition and place it ihto an appendix. In that way the reader benefits from the information, but the progress of exposition flows unimpeded. But the technology of footnotes and appendices and the similar media by which writers in our own place and time protect the cogency of their presentation are the gift of movable type and printing and computers. 2 Since the Talmud's sages (like everyone else in antiquity) had to put everything together in interminable columns of undifferentiated words, without punctuation, without paragraphing, without signals of what is primary and what IS seco~dary, what we have demands a labor of differentiation. When we do that work, we see (now limiting ourselves to the Talmud) some well-demonstrated and incontrovertible facts. First, we may speak of a composition, not merely a compilation. That is because, first, the Talmud's authors or authorship follow a few rules, which we can easily discern, in order to say everything they wish. So the document is uniform and rhetorically cogent. The highly orderly and systematic character of the Talmud emerges, first of all, in the regularities of language. Second, the Talmud speaks through one voice, that voice of logic that with vast assurance reaches into our own minds and by asking the logical and urgent next question tells us what we should be thinking. So the Talmud's rhetoric seduces us into joining its analytical inquiry, always raising precisely the question that should trouble us (and that would trouble us if we knew all of the pertinent details as well as the Talmud does). The Talmud speaks about the Mishnah in essentially a single voice, 2 My The Talmud. An Academic Commentary (Atlanta, 1994-1996: Scholars Press for South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism) is executed mainly through graphics made possible by the computer; I signal my views on the place and role of every unit of thought by a simple medium of spatial organization and variation that, before computers would ,have been exceedingly difficult to execute, but, more likely, beyond my imagination. Now it is the simplest thing to signal language-variation (Hebrew / Aramaic, and what the difference means); sources as against the use of sources in an argument; what is primary in a composite and what is subordinate; a comment on a prior discussion; a comment on the comment; and onward up one page and down another.

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about fundamentally few things. Its mode of speech as much as of thought is uniform throughout. Diverse topics produce slight differentiation in modes of analysis. The same sorts of questions phrased in the same rhetoric-a moving, or dialectical, argument, composed of questions and answers-turn out to pertain equally well to every subject and problem. The fact that the Talmud speaks in a single voice supplies striking evidence that the Talmud is a coherent piece of writing. It is not a pastiche of sentences from here, there, and everywhere. It is a coherent statement, to be located at a particular place and time. That work was done toward the end of that long period of Mishnah-reception that began at the end of the second century and came to an end at the conclusion of the sixth century. A handful of remarkable geniuses did it all, taking over a heritage of writing of diverse compositions and forming out of them a coherent composite, capable of saying some few things about many things. The single governing fact is that in a given unit of discourse, the focus, the organizing principle, the generative interest-these are defined solely by the issue at hand. The argument moves from point to point, directed by the inner logic of argument itself. A single plane of discourse is established. All things are leveled out, so that the line of logic runs straight and true. Accordingly, a single conception of the framing and formation of the unit of discourse stands prior to the spelling out of issues. More fundamental still, what people in general wanted was not to create topical anthologies-to put together instances of what this one said about that issue-but to exhibit the logic of that issue, viewed under the aspect of eternity. Under sustained inquiry we always find a theoretical issue, freed of all temporal considerations and the contingencies of politics and circumstance. Once these elemental literary and structural facts make their -full impression, everything else falls into place as well. Arguments did not unfold over a long period of time, as one generation made its . points, to be followed by the additions and revisions of another generation, in a process of gradual increment and agglutination running on for two hundred years. That theory of the formation of literature cannot account for the unity, stunning force and dynamism, of the Talmud's dialectical arguments. To the contrary, someone (or small group) at the end determined to reconstruct, so as to expose, the naked logic of a problem. For this purpose, oftentimes, it was found useful to cite sayings or positions in hand from earlier times. But these inherited materials underwent a process of reshaping, and, more

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aptly, refocusing. Whatever the original words-and we need not doubt that at times we have them-the point of everything in hand was defined and determined by the people who made it all up at the end. The whole shows a plan and program. Theirs are the minds behind the whole. In the nature of things, they did their work at the end, not at the outset. In this regard, then, the Talmud is like the Mishnah in its fundamental literary traits, therefore also in its history. The Mishnah was formulated in its rigid, patterned language and carefully organized and enumerated groups of formal-substantive cognitive units, in the very processes in which it also was redacted. Otherwise the correspondences between redactional program and formal and patterned mode of articulation of ideas cannot be explained, short of invoking the notion of 'a literary miracle. The Talmud too underwent a process of redaction, in which fixed and final units of discourse were organized and put together. The probably-antecedent work of framing and formulating these units of discourse appears to have gone on at a single period, among a relatively small number of sages working within a uniform set of literary conventions, at roughly the same time, and in approximately the same way. The end-product, the Talmud, like the Mishnah, is uniform and stylistically coherent, generally consistent in modes of thought and speech, wherever we turn. That accounts for the single voice that leads us through the dialectical and argumentative analysis of the Talmud. That voice is ubiquitous and insistent. The upshot is that we may speak about "the Talmud," its voice, its purposes, its mode of constructing a view of the Israelite world. And that fact accounts for the impact of the Talmud upon the culture of Israel, the Jewish people, through the fifteen centuries since it reached closure. The reason is that, when we claim "the Talmud" speaks, just as in the yeshiva world people have always heard the Talmud speaking, we are right: the Talmud does speak, in a uniform, coherent voice. It does sustain and hold together an on-going conversation, into which we enter, which we may use our own minds to reconstruct and then to carry forward. The Talmud's power to persuade and compel, to impose its viewpoint everywhere and upon everything, to say some one thing about everything, .and to make a statement in each detail that proves consequential and formidablethat power affects us when we follow the Talmudic discourse ("sugya") from beginning to end and make sense of its sequence and flow.

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Talmudists with vast experience in the pages of the document know instinctively how things work, because the Talmud's writers and compilers teach by example and through detail. How did a document turn out to impart structure and order tp an· entire social order, wherever that order replicated itself a~ross time and change? The authors of the compositions and compilers of the composites of the Talmud of Babylonia accomplished a goal that surely transcended their ambition. They proposed to make sense of the law, to discover the correspondence between everyday life and the rationality of the Torah. But the document that they brought into being--the Mishnah and Gemara togethe:t-turned out to make the definitive statement of the Torah, oral and written, that the world calls 'judaism." From the closure of the Talmud to our own day, the sages of Judaism found in the Talmud the starting point for all inquiry, the court of appeal for all contended questions. The written part of the Torah that the world knows as the Hebrew Scriptures or "Old Testament" would reach holy Israel through the Talmud. The oral portion of the Torah, initially written down in the Mishnah, would enjoy no independent existence, but, like the written part, would find its authoritative reading and interpretation in the Talmud. Law, theology, and the exegesis of Scripture-all three constitutive components of the Torah-found their classical formulation in the Talmud. How, then, are we to find an explanation for the amazing success of the Talmud, which is to say, for its intellectual power? What is needed is a guide to not only how the principal normative documents of Rabbinic Judaism are to be read and reconstructed, but why they gained the remarkable influence that they exercised through the subsequent history of Judaism. Specifically, why did the Talmud work so well as to constitute one of history'S most influential documents in the formation of that social order its writers wished to define? For few writings out of any age command a hearing later on, and fewer still define the curriculum of a culture the way the Talmud does. The sayings of Confucius, the Gita, the Dialogues of Plato and the writings of Aristotle, the Bible and the Quran, the great traditions of mathematics and philosophy-these formations of intellect (human or divine, as the case may be) form the counterparts. And, among them, the Talmud is the least appreciated for the remarkable success attained by its writers. I do not investigate the after-life of the Talmud. That would amount

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to an exhaustive history of Judaism, which is contained in that afterlife . For the history of the paramount and normative Judaism that emerged from antiquity, Rabbinic or Talmudic Judaism, is ·written in the commentaries, codes, responsa, that nurtured the Talmud as a living and enduring presence in the life of holy Israel. To the Talmud people appealed for the final authority. Out of the Talmud, they approached Scripture itself. The Talmud formed the one whole and complete statement of the Torah, oral and written, that God revealed to Moses at Sinai, and it must follow, in the Judaism defined by that conviction about the dual media by which God's will reaches Israel, the Talmud stands as a testament to every age. And each generation, for its part, framed its response. The continuous, unitary, harmonious, and cumulative history of the paramount Judaism of all times then takes shape in the eternal encounter of Israel with God at Sinai: here, in the pages of the Talmud. But, moving from theological to secular language, we have to account in this-worldly terms too for the success of the Talmud. The premise of all that follows is that ideas make a difference. Within that premise I offer only a single proposition for further speculation and testing. It seems to me plausible to argue that, if ideas have power to perpetuate themselves and extend their own influence, then the recapitulation of principal ideas of science and philosophy within the setting of ordinary affairs ought to account for the enduring capacity of the Talmud to define the holy life of Israel, the people. The Talmud formed in concrete terms an infinitely detailed and concrete statement of the abstract rationality that the West in general deemed self-evident-that is, the matching rationalities of science and philosophy. So the Talmud served as the medium of inductive instruction in the universal modes of right thinking about workaday matters. Then to practice Judaism one entered into the disciplines of rationality that define the very ground of being for the West-the science and philosophy of Western civilization, formulated in Classical Greece and transmitted in Christian Rome. It was in that very same intellectual context that the Talmud shaped the intellection and rational intuition of Israel and so made of Israel not only a kingdom of priests and a holy people, but a nation of scientists and philosophers of the everyday. That is what this further hypothesis, demanding investigation in its own terms for medieval and modern times, would propose. Those historians of ideas in medieval and modern times interested in

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the interplay between religion and society, ideas and the people who hold them, may find that hypothesis worth further consideration. Let me spell out the hypothesis that I cannot here demonstrate. Sound explanation derives, I maintain, from the character of consciousness and conscience, the shape and structure of well-considered ideas, the coercive power of rationality. Politics, rather than intellectual power, accounts for only a brief moment of a document's privilege. For the institutions of political power come and go, none of them lasting very long. Politics defines an accident in the life of ideas, much as a university president marks an accident (possibly even a happy one!) in the life of a university. Politics does not constitute the essential of the explanation of t~e power of an idea or a mode of thought. Politics may be claimed to be necessary in the process of explanation, but, I would maintain, it never is sufficient. In the end, for a writing to enjoy long-term readership, long after the original political power and sponsorship have passed from the scene, the document's own resources, its power to demand attention and compel assent, take over. Take the Mishnah, for instance, which, people generally suppose, gained its privilege by reason of its sponsor (supposedly: author), Judah, the Patriarch. The Mishnah, however it originated, is alleged to have enjoyed the sponsorship of the governor of the Jews of the Land of Israel (a.k.a. Palestine) with Roman support. The same document, it appears from the Talmud, likewise was treated as authoritative by the governor of the Jews of the Babylonian satrapy of the Iranian empire, the exilarch. The Romans long since have gone their way, and Iranian rule of Babylonia (now part of Iraq) ended with the Muslim conquest of that region. But the Mishnah, whether with new political support or none at all, would command attention for long centuries to come. Hence when we know how a document works, we also approach the question of why, over time, that same document would continue to compel future generations to accept its authority. It is, then, an authority of sound thinking and persuasive argument, a power of intellect, that I propose to explain. 3 3 Those familiar with my inquiries from the early 1970s forward will find familiar that point of insistence upon unpacking the inner logical coherence of documents, their philosophical cogency (or lack of the same, in some cases), their integrity as intelligible and compelling statements. That point of insistence comes to expression in the documentary reading of the components of the Rabbinic canon, which I have formulated. In many ways, the present work moves along lines set forth twenty-

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I propose to explain that fact by appeal specifically to the intellectual power of the document, not its utter originality-the main outlines of the paramount modes of argument can be identified in the Tosefta and Sifra. Rather, I point to two considerations. The first is its fresh and strong utilization of available media of thought and argument. The second is its introduction of the power of balanced argument, the energy of well-regulated contention. The great achievements in the intellectual arts flow not from originality mainly, but from the power to put together in a compelling way what others may well know in a random manner. What attests to the power of the document and makes us want to know how, within its framework, the document dictates that we read it, is what happened to the Talmud but no other writing that reaches us from Judaic antiquity except for Scripture. Specifically, as we now realize, the Talmud was, and remains, the privileged document of Judaism, accorded the standing of the principal writing of the Torah (a.k.a., Judaism), beyond Scripture itself but governing the reading even of Scripture. The Talmud of Babylonia from the moment of its closure at about 600 C.E. [= A.D.] served as the textbook of Judaism. For Judaism today that same protean writing continues to provide the final and authoritative statement of the Torah revealed by God to Moses at Sinai. From it truth flows; to it doubts and dilemmas are referred. Its modes of thought govern, commentaries on it precipitate intellectual activity, decisions based upon its law and reached through the analytical argument dictated by its model, provoke reflection. It is the textbook for the holy Israel for whom its framers legislated. I propose to find in the power of Western philosophy embodied in its founding figures, Socrates-Plato and Aristotle, the answer to the question, how come? So should I like to move from how the Talmud works to why the Talmud matters. It is because I take for granted-as do intellectuals five years ago, when I began my commentary to the Mishnah that takes the form of my History rf the Mishnaic Law in forty-three volumes. A very brief introduction to the documentary method in Rabbinics, together with bibliography of my other works on the subject, is in the opening chapter of The Documentary Foundation oj Rabbinic Culture. Mopping Up ojter Debates with Gerald L. Bruns) S. J. D. Cohen) Arnold Maria Goldberg, Susan Handelman) Christine Hayes) James Kugel) Peter Schaqer; Eliezer Segal) E. P. Sanders) and Lawrence H. Schiffman. Atlanta, 1995: Scholars Press for South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism. I summarize the main lines of the results in my Introduction to Rabbinic Literature. N.Y., 1994: Doubleday. The Doubleday Anchor Reference Library. Religious Book Club Selection, 1994.

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and scholars in general at the commencement of their work-the principle that ideas bear social consequences. The ideas people hold both shape and also express the attitudes that animate their mind. Specifically, the kind of arguments they find compelling, the sort of language they find affecting, the modes of presenti~g problems and solving them that they find self-evidently valid, and the ways in which they make connections and draw conclusions-these matters of theory shape the structure of common practice. Conviction, formed in the crucible of intellect and argument, governs. Accordingly--so I assume as primary to all else-we may explain the culture of a group by appeal to formative modes of thought and authoritative propositions of unquestioned validity and truth, then we may ask: what intellectual qualities of the Talmud account for its power? And, it will follow, we may also raise the question, how does the Talmud, by reason of its distinctive program of thought-medium and message alike-bear relevance to the formation of culture even now? A brief reprise of the results of this book suffices to layout lines of inquiry. The Talmud works through modes of thought and argument that for the West in general form the foundations of science and philosophy, which are (in this context) natural history and analytical dialectics. What makes the Talmud special, the power of the Talmud in particular, lies in its translation into concrete and everyday matters of the two most powerful intellectual components of Western civilization from its roots to our own time, science and philosophy, to review: [1] Aristotle's principles of knowledge and [2J Socrates' (Plato's) principles of rational inquiry and argument. The modes of scientific inquiry of the one and of reasoned analysis of the other are translated by the Talmud into everyday terms, so that the experience of the everyday is turned into the academy for reasoned explanation of how things are: a book that turns concrete facts of the home and street into propositions of scientific interest and problems of philosophical inquiry. The Talmud turns the world into a class room, the holy people into clisciples, and culture into a concrete exemplification of abstract and reliable truth. Here is the source of the Talmud's power: its capacity to hold together its two components, a philosophical law code, the Mishnah, which, in concrete ways, inculcates the principles of natural history, those of rational classification that Aristotle stated in abstract form; and a commentary to the Mishnah, called the Gemara which, through the utilization of applied reason and practi-

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cal logic, forms a moving ("dialectical") and analytical argument about the working of those principles in concrete cases. Therein, we now see, lies the continuing importance of the moving argument. Its openendedness made it possible for successive generations to find themselves not merely invited, -but empowered, to join in the argument. So from age to coming age, Israel was to assume the disciplines of rational argument that the Talmud exemplifies. And the elite did, and ordinary folk honored those who did and imitated them. Then for what did 'jerusalem" come to stand, if not for Temple and priesthood in long centuries of transcendental mourning? 'jerusalem," which would stand for the full realization of the Torah's ideals in some place or other, came to mean, a town crowded with academies and peopled by disciples of our sages of blessed memory. And so, to realize the Torah in that profoundly intellectual sense, towns had to imitate Athens in the name of Jerusalem. So Talmudic Israel made itself into an academy without walls, an Athens beyond all boundaries of time and place, a new Jerusalem of rationality. In both aspects, therefore, the document serves as the medium of inductive instruction into the principles of science and philosophy that define the structure of the well-ordered society, and that is precisely what the document's writers-authors of its compositions, compilers of its composites-proposed to accomplish. Their very style forms a testament to the substance of their intent: let the talk go forward, let the argument begin.

BIBLIOGRAPHY For further reading on dialectics in Rabbinic literature, see my comparison of the two Talmuds in the seven volumes of The Bavli's Unique Voice. A Systematic Comparison qf the Talmud oj Babylonia and the Talmud qf the Land oj Israel. Of special relevance is Volume Seven. VVhat Is Unique about the Bavli in Context? An Answer Based on Inductive Description) Analysis, and Comparison. Note also my Invitation to the Talmud. A Teaching Book. Second edition, completely revised, San Francisco, 1984: Harper & Row; and, especially, the pair of theological works that identify dialectics as the key to the hermeneutics that forms the theological medium of the Judaism set forth in Rabbinic literature: Judaism States its 1heology: TIze Talmudic Re-Presentation (Atlanta, 1993: Scholars Press), and Judaism's Theological Voice: The Talmudic Melody (Chicago, 1995: University of Chicago Press). The place of dialectics in the two Talmuds is best assessed by consulting the outlines of both Talmuds side-by-side, which I have made. These allow us to see the proportion of dialectics in each document. The pertinent work is as follows: The Two Talmuds Compared. Atlanta, 1995-7: Scholars Press for South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism. I.A I.B I.e

I.D I.E I.F

I.G II. A ILB

Tractate Berakhot and the Division qf Appointed Times in the Talmud qf the Land qf Israel and the Talmud of Babylonia. Yerushalmi Tractate Berakhot Tractate Berakhot and the Division qf Appointed Times in the Talmud qf the Land qf Israel and the Talmud of Babylonia. Tractate Shabbat. Tractate Berakhot and the Division of Appointed Times in the Talmud qf the Land of Israel and the Talmud of Babylonia. Tractate Erubin Tractate Berakhot and the Division of Appointed Times in the Talmud qf the Land of Israel and the Talmud of Babylonia. Tractates Yoma and Sukkah Tractate Berakhot and the Division qf Appointed Times in the Talmud qf the Land of Israel and the Talmud of Babylonia. Tractate Pesahim Tractate Berakhot and the Division of Appointed Times in the Talmud qf the Land of Israel and the Talmud of Babylonia. Tractates Besah, Taanit, and Megillah Tractate Berakhot and the Division of Appointed Times in the Talmud qf the Land of Israel and the Talmud of Babylonia. Tractates Rosh Hashanah, Hagigah, and Moed Qgtan TIe Division of Women in the Talmud of the Land of Israel and the Talmud qf Babylonia. Tractates Tebamot and Ketubot. TIe Division of Women in the Talmud of the Land of Israel and the Talmud qf Babylonia. Tractates Nedarim, Nazir, and Sotah.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

II.C IlIA

IIIB

III.C III.D

157

The Division oj Women in the Talmud qf the Land of Israel and the Talmud qf Babylonia. Tractates Qiddushin and Gittin. The Division if Damages and Tractate Niddah in the Talmud qf the Land if Israel and the Talmud if Babylonia. Tractates Baba Qgmma and Baba Mesia The Division if Damages and Tractate Niddah in the Talmud qf the Land if Israel and the Talmud qf Babylonia. Baba Batra and Niddah. The Division qf Damages and Tractate Niddah. Sanhedrin and Makkot. The Division qf Damages and Tractate Niddah. Shebuot, Abodah Zarah, and Horayot.

I find it significant that in the index to Sternberger-Strack, there is no entry for "dialectic," and the topic addressed in its own terms, as a major category of the intellectual world ofJudaism, does not occur elsewhere, e.g., in Encyclopaedia Judaica. St~rnberger discusses "rabbinical hermeneutics," pp. 17-34, but this pertains to the "middot," or exegetical principles. See H. L. Strack and Gunther Sternberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash (Minneapolis, 1992: Fortress Press), translated by Markus Bockmuehl. General Introduction, pp. 1-118; on oral and written tradition, pp. 35-50. The other introductions in the English language that treat the Talmud ignore the dialectical argument altogether, as the following brief summary 'shows: John Bowker, The Targums and Rabbinic Literature. An Introduction to Jewish Interpretations qf Scripture (Cambridge, 1969: Cambridge University Press), pp. 40-93: a brief introduction to rabbinic literature; halakah and haggadah, Midrash and Mishnah, pp. 40-48; the transmission of Oral 'Torah, pp. 48-53; Rabbinic literature in general, pp. 53ff. Bowker also treats medieval Midrash-compilations; Megillat Ta 'anit; Seder 'Olam; Tanna debe Eliyyahu; etc.; Ryam Maccoby, EarlY Rabbinic Writings (Cambridge, 1988: Cambridge University Press). Cambridge Commentaries on Writings qf the Jewish and Christian World., 200 B. C. to A.D. 200. Edited by P. R. Ackroyd, A. R. C. Leaney, and J. W. Packer. Volume III. pp. 1-30: "a corporate literary effort, in which a large number of experts. . . is engaged in a common enterprise: the clarification of Scripture and the application of it to everyday life;" the oral Torah, pp. 3-5; canonicity, pp. 5-7; the style of Rabbinic writings, pp. 8-9; Pharisees and Sadducees, pp. 9-11; Pharisees and rabbis, pp. 11-16; historical background; halakhah and haggadah, pp. 16-22; haggadah and Midrash, pp. 22-25; Mishnah and Midrash, pp. 25-29; the Targums, pp. 29-30. Note also under "miscellaneous works," Maccoby discusses Seder Olarn and "the mystical literature," pp. 38-39; the main rabbinic figures, pp. 39-46; "the main ideas of the early Rabbinic literature," e.g., the nature of

158

BIBLIOGRAPHY

God, the covenant-people, the Land, the promise of a transformed world, pp. 46-48. General characterization (p. 48): "Thus the rabbinicalliterature, though wholly subordinating itself to Scripture, which it endeavors to 'search' and explicate, in fact contains great originality arising from the struggle to make biblical values actual in the times in which the rabbis found themselves." Maccoby treats in the rubric of Rabbinic literature the synagogue liturgy as well, pp. 204217; "history," pp. 218-229, gives samples of Megillat TaCanit and Seder cOlam Rabbah; Shmuel Safrai, editor; Peter j. Tomson, Executive Editor, The Literature of the Sages. First Part: Oral Tara, Halakha, Mishna, ToseJta, Talmud, External Tractates In the series, Compendia Rerum Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamentum. Section Two. The Literature oj the Jewish People in the Period of the Second Temple and the Talmud (Assen/Maastricht and Philadelphia, 1987: Van Gorcum and Fortress Press): "Halakhah" (general characteristics, origins of the halakhah, the origin of independent halakhah, sources of the halakha of the sages, stages in the history of Tannaitic halakhah), in Safrai, Literature qf the Sages, pp. 121210; "Oral Tora" (the scope of oral Tora, origin and nature of oral Tora, ways of literary creation, oral Tora and rabbinic literature, terminology of oral Torah, central religious concepts developed in oral Tora), in Safrai, Literature qf the Sages, pp. 35-120. This survey of the program of the several introductions leaves no doubt that none . addresses the critical component of the Talmudic literature, the source of its dynamism and the kind of writing that is unique to the Talmud. Ackrill, J. L., Aristotle the· Philosopher. Oxford, 1981: Oxford University Press. Adkins, A. W. H., From the Many to the One. A Study of Personalil)J and Views of Human Nature in the Context of Ancient Greek Sociel)J, Values, and Beliifs (Ithaca, 1970: Cornell University Press). Adorno, Theodor W., Negative Dialectics. Translated by E. B. Aston. New York, 1973: Seabury Press. Allan, D. j., 'The Philosophy of Aristotle (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press/Geoffrey Cumberlege, 1952). -Armstrong, A. H., "Platonism and Neoplatonism," Encyclopaedia Britannica (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975) 14:539-545. - - , "Plotinus," Encyclopaedia Britannica (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975) 14:573-4 - - , The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus. An AnalYtical and Historical Study (Amsterdam, 1967: Adolf M. Hakkert, Publisher). Armstrong, A. Hilary, Plotinian and Christian Studies (London, 1979: Variorum Reprints). Barnes, Jonathan, Aristotle's Posterior AnalYtics. Oxford, 1994. - - , Aristotle. Oxford, 1982: Oxford University Press. - - , ed., The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle. Cambridge, 1995: Cambridge University Press.

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- - , Malcolm Schofield, and Richard Sorabji, Articles on Aristotle. 2. Ethics and Politics. New York, 1977: St. Martin's Press. - - , Articles on Aristotle. 4. Psychology and Aesthetics. New York, 1978: St. Martin's Press. . Brehier, Emile, TIe History of Philosophy. TIe Hellenistic and Roman Age (Chicago and London, 1965: The University of Chicago Press). Translated by Wade Baskin. - - , TIe Philos.ophy of Plotinus. Translated by Joseph Thomas (Chicago, 1958: University of Chicago Press). Brickhouse, Thomas C., and Nicholas D. Smith, Plato)s Socrates. Oxford, 1994: Oxford University Press. Cherniss, Harold, Selected Papers (Leiden, 1977: E.]. Brill). Edited by Leonardo Tanln. Cornford, F. M., From Religion to Philosophy. A Study in the Origins oj Western Speculation. With a Foreword by Robert Ackerman. London, 1912: E. Arnold. Princeton, 1991: Princeton University Press. Crombie, 1. M., An Examination oj Plato)s Doctrines. II. Plato on Knowledge and Reality. London, 1963: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Dillon, J. M., and A. A. Long, eds., The Qyestion oj "Eclecticism. JJ Studies in Later Greek Philosophy (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1988: University of California Press). - - , the Qyestion of ''Eclecticism.'' Studies in Later Greek Philosophy (Los Angeles and Berkeley, 1988: University of California Press). Evans,]. D. G., Aristotle)s Concept of Dialectic. Cambridge, 1977: Cambridge University Press. Feldman, Louis H., "Philo," Encyclopaedia Britannica (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975) 14:245-247. Goodenough, Erwin R., An Introduction to Philo Judaeus. Second Edition (Lanham, 1986: University Press of America Brown Classics in Judaica). Guthrie, W. K. C., A History qf Greek Philosophy. III. The Fifth-Century Enlightenment. Cambridge, 1969: Cambridge University Press. - - , A History of Greek Philosophy. IV. Plato. The Man and his Dialogues: Earlier Period. Cambridge, 1975: Cambridge University Press. Hare, R. M., Jonathan Barnes, and Henry Chadwick. Founders qf Thought. Oxford, 1991: Oxford University Press. Irwin, Terence, A History qf Western Philosophy. 1. Classical Thought. Oxford, 1989: Oxford University Press. - - , Plato's Moral Theory. TIe Early and Middle Dialogues. Oxford, 1977: Clarendon Press. Jaeger, Werner, Aristotle. Fundamentals oj the History oj his Development. Translated by Richard Robinson. Second edition. Oxford, 1948: Clarendon. Katz, Joseph, The Philosophy oj Plotinus. Representative Books foom the Enneads. Selected and Translated with an Introduction (N.Y., 1950: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.). Kneale, M. and W. C., The Development qf Logic. Oxford, 1962: Oxford University Press. Lee, E. N., A. P. D. Mourelatos, and R. M. Rorty, eds., Exegesis and Argument. Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos.. Assen, 1973: Van Gorcum & Camp. B.V. Uoyd, G. E. R., Early Greek Science. Thales to Aristotle. New York, 1970: W. W. Norton & Co. - - , Greek Science after Aristotle. N.Y., 1973: EW. W. Norton Co. - - , Polarity and Analogy. Two Tjpes oj Argumentation in Early Greek Thought. Cambridge, 1966: Cambridge University Press. Mandelbaum, Irving ]., A History qf the Mishnaic Law qf Agriculture: Kilayim (Chico, 1980: Scholars Press for Brown Judaic Studies). . Merlan, P., "Greek Philosophy from Plato to Plotinus," in A. H. Armstrong, ed., The Cambridge History oj Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge, 1967: Cambridge University Press), pp. 14-136.

160

BlliLIOGRAPHY

Minio-Paluello, Lorenzo, "Aristotelianism," Encyclopaedia Britannica (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1975) 1: 1155-1161. Neusner, Jacob, Bavli That Might Have Been: The Tosifta's Theory if Mishnah-Commentary Compared with that if the Babylonian Talmud. Atlanta, 1990: Scholars Press for South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism. - - , Bavli's Intellectual Character. The Generative Problematic in Bavli Baba Qgmma Chapter One and Bavli Shabbat Chapter One. Atlanta, 1992: Scholars Press for South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism. - - , Bavli's Massive Miscellanies. The Problem if Agglutir.zative Discourse in the Talmud if Babylonia. Atlanta, 1992: Scholars Press for South florida Studies in the History of Judaism. - - , Bavli's One Statement. The Metapropositional Program if Babylonian Talmud Tractate Zebahim Chapters One and Five. Atlanta, 1991: Scholars Press for South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism. - - , Bavli's One Voice: Types and Forms if Analytical Discourse and their Fixed Order if Appearance. Atlanta, 1991: Scholars Press for South florida Studies in the History of Judaism. - - , Bavli's Primary Discourse. Mishnah Commentary, its Rhetorical Paradigms and their Theologt·cal Implications in the Talmud of Babylonia Tractate Moed Qgtan. Atlanta, 1992: Scholars Press for South florida Studies in the History of Judaism. - - , Bavli's Unique Voice. A Systematic Comparison of the Talmud of Babylonia and the Talmud of the Land of Israel. Atlanta, 1993: Scholars Press for South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism. Volume One. Bavli and Yerushalmi Qjddushin Chapter One Compared and Contrasted. Volume Two. Yerushalmi's, Bavli's, and Other Canonical Documents' Treatment if the Program oj Mishnah- Tractate Sukkah Chapters One, Two, and Four Compared and Contrasted. A Reprise and Revision if The Bavli and its Sources. Volume Three. Bavli and Yerushalmi to Selected Mishnah-Chapters in the Division of Moed. Erubin Chapter One, and Moed Qgtan Chapter Three. Volume Four. Bavli and Yerushalmi to Selected Mishnah-Chapters in the Division of Nashim. Gittin Chapter Five and Nedan·m Chapter One. And Niddah Chapter One. Volume Five. Bavli and Yerushalmi to Selected MishnahChapters in the Division of Neziqin. Baba Mesia Chapter One and Makkot Chapters One and Two. Volume Six. Bavli and Yerushalmi to a Miscellany of Mishnah-Chapters. Gittin Chapter One, Qjddushin Chapter Two, and Hagigah Chapter Three. Volume Seven. VVhat Is Unique about the Bavli in Context? An Answer Based on Inductive Description, Analysis, and Comparison. - - , Decoding the Talmud's Exegetical Program: From Detail to Principle in the Bavli's Qy,est Jor Generalization. Tractate Shabbat. Atlanta, 1992: Scholars Press for South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism. - - , Discourse oj the Bavli: Language, Literature, and Symbolism. Five Recent Findings. Atlanta, 1991: Scholars Press for South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism. - - , Form-Analytical Comparison in Rabbinic Judaism. Structure and Form in The Fathers and The Fathers According to Rabbi Nathan. Atlanta, 1992: Scholars Press for South florida Studies in the History of Judaism. - - - , How the Bavli Shaped Rabbinic Discourse. Atlanta, 1991: Scholars Press for South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism. - - , How to Study the Bavli: The Languages, Literatures, and Lessons of the Talmud if Babylonia. Atlanta, 1992: Scholars Press for South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism. - - , Judaism and Zoroastrianism at the _Dusk of Late Antiquity. How Two Ancient Faiths Wrote Down Their Great Traditions. Atlanta, 1993: Scholars Press for South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism. - - , Judaism as Philosophy. The Method and Message of the Mishnah. Columbia, 1991: University of South Carolina Press. - - , Law Behind the Laws. The Bavli's Essential Discourse. Atlanta, 1992: Scholars Press for South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism.

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, Philosophical Mishnah. Atlanta, 1989: Scholars Press for Brown Judaic Studies. Volume I. 17ze Initial Probe. Volume II. 17ze Tractates' Agenda. From Abodah Zarah to Moed Qgtan. Volume III. 17ze Tractates' Agenda. From Nazir to Zebahim. Volume IV. 17ze Repertoire. - - , Principal Parts of the Bavli's Discourse: A Final Taxonomy. Mishnah-Commentary, Sources, Traditions, and Agglutinative Miscellanies. Atlanta, 1992: Scholars Press for South florida Studies in the History of Judaism. - - , Rabbinic Judaism. The Documentary History of the Fonnative Age. Bethesda, 1994: CDL Press. - - , Rules of Composition of the Talmud of Babylonia. 17ze Cogency of the Bavli's Composite. Atlanta, 1991: Scholars Press for South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism. - - , Sources and Traditions. 1jpes of Composition in the Talmud of Babylonia. Atlanta, 1992: Scholars Press for South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism. - - , Talmudic Dialectics: Tjpes and Fonns. Atlanta, 1995: Scholars Press for South florida Studies in the History of Judaism. 1. Introduction. Tractate Berakhot and the Divisions of Appointed Times and Women. II. 17ze Divisions of Damages and Holy 17zings and Tractate Niddah. - - , Torah in the Talmud. A Taxonomy of the Uses of Scripture in the Talmuds. Tractate fLiddushin in the Talmud of Babylonia and the Talmud of the Land of Israel. I. Bavli Qjddushin Chapter One. II. Yerushalmi Ojddushin Chapter One. And a Comparison of the Uses of Scripture by the Two Talmuds. Atlanta, 1993: Scholars Press for South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism. - - , Translating the Classics ofJudaism. In 17zeory and in Practice. Atlanta, 1989: Scholars Press for Brown Judaic Studies. - - , Uniting the Dual Torah: Sifra and the Problem of the Mishnah. Cambridge and New York, 1989: Cambridge University Press. O'Brien, Elmer, 17ze Essential Plotinus. Representative Treatises from the Enneads Repr., 1975: Hackett Publishing Co., Inc. Owen, G. E. L., Logic, Science, and Dialectic. Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy. Ithaca, 1986: Cornell University Press. Owens, Joseph, A History of Ancient Western Philosopfry (N.Y., 1959: Appleton, Century, Crofts Inc.). Parker G. F., A Short History of Greek Philosopfry from Thales to Epicurus (London, 1967: Edward Arnold (Publishers) Ltd.). Patzig, G., Aristotle's Theory of the Syllogism. Dordrecht, 1968. Pickard-Cambridge, W. A., Topics. In Jonathan Barnes, ed., 17ze Complete Works of Aristotle. 17ze Revised Oiford Translation. Princeton, 1984: Princeton University Press. Bollingen Series LXXI. 2, pp. 167-278. Reale, Giovanni, A History of Ancient Philosophy. III. The Systems of the Hellenistic Age (Albany, 1985: State University of New York Press). Edited and translated from the third Italian edition by John R. Catano Reeve, C. D. C., Practices of Reason. Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Oxford, 1992: Clarendon. Rist, J. M., Plotinus: The Road to Reali!J (Cambridge, 1967: Cambridge University Press). Robin, Leon, Greek 17zought and the Origins of the Scientific Spirit. Translated by M. R. Dobie. New York, 1928. Reprinted: N.Y., 1967: Russell & Russell. Robinson, Richard, Plato's Earlier Dialectic. Second edition. Oxford, 1953: Clarendon. See also Vlastos, Gregory, editor, 17ze Philosopfry of Socrates. A Collection of Critical Essays. Notre Dame, 1980: University of Notre Dame Press. Ryle, Gilbert, Plato's Progress. Cambridge, 1966: Cambridge University Press. Sambursky, Samuel, and S. Pines, 17ze Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism (Jerusalem, 1971: Israel Academy of Arts and Sciences). - - , Pfrysics of the Stoics (London, 1959).

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JERUSALEM AND ATHENS-GENERAL INDEX Analytical argument as public character of thought 20-35 Zoroaster and Ohrmazd 28 Aqiba, on the alley-entry for carrying objects on the Sabbath 43-44 Argument analytical argument of the Talmud 9, 17, 19-62 compelling argument and clear thinking 1 philosophical modes of analytical argument 19-62 public character of argument in the Mishnah 49-53, and in the Tosefta 53-58 rules of discussion 44-49 Babylonian Talmud argument of challenge and response 6, 17 and dialectical argument 63-141 choice of dialectics as medium of thought 74-83 dialectics of the Gamara 83-88 example of a dialectical argument 88-95; and an other-than-dialectical argument 85-110 the law behind the law 113-18 logic and applied reason 1 modes of thought and analysis of the Talmud 1, 17; its intelligible patterns of rules of natural history 3 philosophical dialectics of the Bavli 63-73 rationality and order 113-18 reason and practical logic 1 unity of the law 18-22 Christianity, identifying theology along philosophical lines 11 recasting Gospels calling upon the voice of Athens to deliver the word of Jerusalem 11 Classical philosophy distinctive character of in Talmud 9

Cleanness and uncleanness y ohanan and Simeon b. Laqish in analytical argument 19, 35 Dialectics a chosen medium of thought for the Mishnah 74-83 example of a dialectical argument 88-95; and an other-than-dialectical argument 95-110 of the Gemara 2, 83-95 modes of analytical argument 20-21, 31-33 philosophical dialectics of the Bavli 63-73 rhetoric of dialectical argument in the Talmud 10 shaqla vetarya (give and take) in Bavli 63-141 Eleazar b. Arakh, dialectical argument on what is the straight path Eliezer, dialectical argument on what is the straight path 47-48 Gemara choice of dialectic argument in Bavli 74-95 intellectual dynamics of 139-41 relationship of an argument a fortiori 129-39 testing allegations by counter-proposition 110-13 Hillel, House of, on the alley-entry for carrying objects on the Sabbath 43-44 Joshua, dialectical argument on what is the straight path 47-48 Logic and applied reason lloyd, G.E.R., on analytical argument 24-25, 30, 46, 49,60

164

JERUSALEM AND ATHENS-GENERAL INDEX

Mishnah dialectics as medium of thought 74-83 public character of analytical argument 49-53 Natural history governing composition of Mishnah 2 rules of organizing intelligible patterns of Talmud 3, 17

o hrmazd

and Zoroaster in analytical argument 28 Owens, on dialectical argument in the Bavli 73

Rationality and self-evidence dictating character of Judaism 2 Talmudic rules for rational inquiry 5, 8, 17 Reason and practical logic 1 Rhetoric classical characteristics of Talmud 9 correct rhetoric and clear thinking 1 Robinson, Richard, on analytical argument 33-34, 71-72 Ryle, Gilbert, on analytical argument 39-41, 68-70 Self-evidence and rationality dictating character of Judaism 2 Shammai, House of, on the alley-entry for carrying objects on the Sabbath 43-44

Simeon b. Laqish analytical argument on cleanness and uncleanness 19, 35 on what is the straight path 47-48 Smith, Robin, on philosophical dialectics 63-64 Snell, Bruno, on analytical argument 47 Talmud, the authoritative writing of Judaism 142-55 Thought (thinking) challenge and response in Rabbinic literature 6, 17 clear thinking and correct rhetoric 1 modes of thought and analysis of Talmud 1, 17 public character of analytical argument 20-35 structure and system forming social order 2 Tosefta public character of analytical argument 53-58 Yohanan in analytical argument on cleanness and uncleanness 19, 35 Yose, dialectical argument on what is the straight path 48 Zoroaster and Ohrmazd in analytical argument 28

INDEX TO BIBLICAL AND TALMUDIC REFERENCES BIBLE Deuteronomy 4:2 12:7 14:23 23:14-15 23:15 31:19

51-52 132 132 114 114 38

Exodus 29:37 31 :1 34:27

49 38 35

Jeremiah 49:11

19

Leviticus 1:8-9 1: 12-13 2:4 4:7 4: 11 4:10 6:2 7:1 7:1-10 7:2 7:12 13:12 13: 12-13 13-13 14:13 19:13 22:32

133 133 133 139 133 126 50, 138 123, 128, 132 124 123 132 128 128 127 123-24 114 84-85

Numbers 2:14 6:21 9:2 18:9 28:2

57 85 57 128 57

Baba Batra 1:3 2:2 8:5 8:7 10:5

115-18 113 108 109 120

Baba Mesia 1:1-2 2:1 6:2 9: 11 10:3 10:5

88 61 120 114-15 119-22 III 120

Baba Qamma 6:6 9:4

12 120

Bekhorot 9:8

97

Erubin 1:2 4:7 6:3-4 16: 1

44 95 85-88 106

Sanhedrin 10: 1

28

Terumot 8:9-12

53

Zebahim 5: 1 5:1-2 7:6 8:10-11

123-39 123-39 137 52

TOSEFTA Baba Mesia 11 :8

III

Dema'i 8:13

97

MISHNAH Abot 2:8-9

48

166

INDEX TO BIBLICAL AND TALMUDIC REFERENCES

Miqvaot 1: 16-19

55

Pesahim 4:13-14

58

BABYLONIAN TALMUD

Baba Mesia 5B-6A 84a 117A-B

88 19 119-22

Erubin 50A 54b

96-97 38

Gittin 60b Makkot 1:1 1:2 1:3

121 121 121

Zebahim 5:1-2 9:1

123-39 50