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‘A brilliantly executed presentation of a case for a new and fruitful way of perceiving Kant’s Critical project.’ John Llewelyn, Reader in Philosophy, University of Edinburgh
Cover design: Cathy Sprent
KANT’S AESTHETIC EPISTEMOLOGY FORM AND WORLD
KANT’S AESTHETIC
EPISTEMOLOGY FORM AND WORLD
Fiona Hughes
Drawing on resources from both
the Analytical and Continental traditions, Fiona Hughes argues that a comprehension of Kant’s aesthetics is necessary for grasping the scope and force of his epistemology. She draws on phenomenological and aesthetic resources to bring out the continuing relevance of Kant’s project. One of the difficulties faced in reading The Critique of Pure Reason is finding a way of reading the text as one continuous discussion. This book offers a reading at each stage of Kant’s epistemological argument, showing how various elements of Kant’s argument, often thought of as extraneous or indefensible, can be integrated.
FIONA HUGHES
Cover image: Ian Hamilton Finlay, Little Sparta Photograph by Andrew Lawson
KANT’S AESTHETIC EPISTEMOLOGY
Fiona Hughes is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Essex. She is the author of published articles on Kant and aesthetics and on Nietzsche, aesthetics and hermeneutics. She is currently writing a book on aesthetics and the arts.
This incisive study, arguing for the centrality of aesthetics in philosophy, and within experience in general, challenges a blind spot in the AngloAmerican tradition of philosophy and will contribute to a growing interest in the general significance of aesthetic culture.
Edinburgh University Press 22 George Square Edinburgh EH8 9LF www.eup.ed.ac.uk ISBN 978 0 7486 2122 4
Edinburgh
Fiona Hughes
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology
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‘Music . . . is not an expression of what life is, but an expression of what life could be, or what it could become.’ Daniel Barenboim. Reith Lectures 2006
In memory of George Elder Davie (1912–2007), student of Kemp Smith and scholar of the Scottish (and Irish) Enlightenment.
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KANT’S AESTHETIC EPISTEMOLOGY
FORM AND WORLD 2 Fiona Hughes
Edinburgh University Press
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© Fiona Hughes, 2007 Edinburgh University Press Ltd 22 George Square, Edinburgh
Typeset in Sabon by Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Manchester, and printed and bound in Great Britain by Biddles Ltd, King’s Lynn, Norfolk A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978 0 7486 2122 4 (hardback)
The right of Fiona Hughes to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
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Contents
Acknowledgements References to Kant’s Works
vi viii
Introduction
1
1
The Centrality of the Problem of Formalism
8
2
Formalism and the Circle of Representation
49
3
Formal Idealism and the Aesthetic Condition of Experience
86
4
The Deep Structure of Synthesis
112
5
The Completion of the Subjective Deduction in the Deductions of the Critique of Judgement
169
A Priori Knowledge as the Anticipation of a Material Given and the Need for a Spatial Schematism
207
Empirical Systematicity and its Relation to Aesthetic Judgement
248
Aesthetic Judgement’s Exemplary Exhibition of Cognition
277
6
7
8
Afterword
311
Bibliography
316
Author/subject index
321
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Acknowledgements
This project has been a long time in gestation and I owe many thanks to particular people and the creative milieu in a number of different institutions. My acknowledgements have to reach back at least as far as my days as an undergraduate at the University of Edinburgh and to a circle of friends. Later, at the University of Oxford I gained another informal research group, some philosophers like Sally (Sarah) Gibbons, some not. My supervisor, Michael Rosen, was unfailingly helpful. At Oxford I found further resources to help me situate my philosophical interests within a more general framework. The motivation to do so – traces of which I hope are still visible at the margins of this book – arose in great measure from the intellectual culture in Edinburgh and the influence of George Davie’s The Democratic Intellect. From my appointment at Essex as a new lecturer, I had the great fortune to expand my horizons through exposure to the style of thinking of the philosophical art historian, Michael Podro, who became a true colleague and friend. For many years, we ran joint seminars together and if the students enjoyed them and learnt as much as I did, I am satisfied. Over the years, my students at Essex – mainly in the philosophy department, but also those working in other disciplines – have been an ongoing source of inspiration. I am particularly grateful to a number of people who gave their valuable time to read and comment on parts or the whole of my manuscript. Needless to say, any remaining problems are my own, not theirs. These include Neil Cox, Douglas Burnham, Sebastian Gardner, Dana MacFarlane, Wayne Martin and Michael Podro. I want to especially thank John Llewelyn. He has been an inspiration and a great support since my Edinburgh days. I cannot adequately capture his scrupulous attention to detail, combined with unstinting generosity – not only in reading my manuscript, but also in philosophy and in life in general. Other friends helped on specific points and kept my spirits up when the going was tough. In 2003 the Arts and Humanities Research Board (now AHRC) awarded me a Research Leave Scheme Grant allowing one term’s vi
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Acknowledgements leave from teaching. In conjunction with sabbatical leave from the University of Essex, this allowed me to complete a first draft of my manuscript. Many individual members of staff at Edinburgh University Press have been very helpful. I must mention, in particular, Jackie Jones and Carol Macdonald, my editors, who, without fail, have been both constructive and insightful. I am grateful to Nicola Gray, whose perceptive interventions were extremely helpful in the preparation of my manuscript for publication, and to James Corby for preparing the index. I would also like to especially acknowledge here the great support given me by my mother and also by my father, when he was alive. From early on, they both were prepared to make many sacrifices in support of my education. Finally, thanks to John Walshe, who gives so much encouragement and, refreshingly, not necessarily in ways I might expect!
vii
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References to Kant’s Works
All references to Kant’s works are to Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften herausgeben von der Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften [Berlin 1902– ], commonly referred to as the ‘Akademieausgabe’ [ AA from now on]. When necessary I offer my own translations. Otherwise, I make use of the following standard versions in English: [1781 and 1787] (1933, 2nd edn) Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp Smith, London and Basingstoke: Macmillan [ CPR]. Page references to the first edition of 1781 are preceded by A, while those to the second edition of 1787 are preceded by B. Material is reprinted by permission of Macmillan Publishers Ltd. The A edition appears in Volume IV of the Akademie edition, while Volume III comprises the B edition. [1790] (1987) Critique of Judgment, trans., W. Pluhar, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett. All references to this text are preceded by AA. Material is reprinted by permission of Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. All rights reserved. The main text appears in Volume V of the Akademie edition. An alternative, unpublished version of the Introduction, commonly referred to as the ‘First Introduction’ appears in Volume XX. References to the earlier and longer version will be distinguished by a prime mark, for example, AA 191′. Other translations referred to: (2004) Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, ed. M. Friedman, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (1963) On History, ed. L. W. Beck, Indianapolis, IN: BobbsMerrill for ‘Perpetual Peace’ and ‘The End of All Things’. (1991) Political Writings, ed. H. S. Reiss, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
viii
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Introduction
In ‘Little Sparta’, a garden in the Pentland hills outside of Edinburgh, two planks stretch across a stream. On each is inscribed: ‘That which joins and that which divides is one and the same.’ The inscription on one faces that on the other. At first sight we see a bridge, but then we see two planks divided from one another; looking again we see the two planks as one structure, realising that each bears the same inscription. The inscription stretching the length of each plank takes time to read and there is no one perspective from which both can be apprehended. Our realisation of the similarity of the two planks is only achieved through a process of recognition, for after an initial impression of unity, they appear as disrupting one another. Our aesthetic response is of unity achieved only through a process linking two distinct components. Much more could be said about this contemporary artwork by the Scottish artist Ian Hamilton Finlay, his use of a fragment from Heraclitus and the relation in which the work stands to the philosophical ideas that follow. In general my point is that through an aesthetic presentation – in this case, visual – a train of thought is instigated. What we see makes us think, and what we think makes us look further, in turn making us think more. While a whole philosophical treatise may, and indeed will in what follows, attempt to express a thought, this artwork quickly and effortlessly brings us into the centre of a complex set of associations. We are led in by what we see, just as we might be led across the stream by the bridge. We find that we are already in the midst of a way of seeing the world and of orienting ourselves within its perspective. Both artworks and aesthetic experiences of nature have the capacity to bring about such an insight, which counts as a form of reflection on the world and our place in it. This, I believe, is what Kant discovered in his Critique of Aesthetic Judgement. More specifically, I will argue in what follows that he came to the conclusion that a harmonious combination of mental capacities, characteristic of aesthetic judgement, allows for a reflection on a more general cooperation that is necessary for any experience whatsoever. 1
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology Finlay’s work is particularly pertinent to establishing this role for aesthetics, for the cooperation of orientations in question is not one of bland uniformity. We are complex beings bound to the world by a sensory or aesthetic capacity to take things in, namely, receptivity. But we are also able to stand back from our environment in a reflective stance. That which joins aesthetic receptivity with reflection is a third capacity, Kant tells us, imagination. Imagination makes possible a unification of what is ineliminably different – that is, our capacity to be affected and our capacity to reflect on the world. The mediating faculty does not achieve this by eliminating the distinctiveness of the two faculties, but by finding a process that allows for a relation between one side of our disposition and the other, just as the bridge at ‘Little Sparta’ makes possible a crossing from one side of the stream to the other. In the philosophical case under consideration in this book, imagination effects a crossing by making possible synthesis, a process of connecting something given to our senses with a concept that aims to make sense of it. I will argue that aesthetic phenomena allow us to reflect on the process of synthesis that is the condition for subjects such as ourselves having access to an external world, which is ours, as our environment, but is not in our possession. This complex relation is also expressed in Finlay’s heraclitean reflection. The relation in which aesthetic receptivity stands to reflection is thus one that occurs across a gap. Synthesis in general and aesthetic harmony, in particular, are not in plainsong; their harmony is not uniform. The unity that is a result of synthesis and the harmony characteristic of aesthetic judgement both have difference as a constitutive moment, just like the bridge at ‘Little Sparta’. Unity and harmony are constructed out of distinctive ways in which we relate to the world and yet these orientations could not prevail in isolation from one another. We can only be receptive and we can only be reflective insofar as we are both at one and the same time. The background problem, out of which the particular arguments in this book emerge, is one of the place of aesthetics within philosophical practice and its relevance for experience in general. The way in which this problem is viewed can be captured as giving rise to two responses. In – for want of a better title – the Continental idiom of practising philosophy, it is widely accepted that aesthetics shares philosophy’s project and has no small part to play within it. Meanwhile – and, again, for want of a better expression, for there are many different types of philosophical analysis – in Analytical philosophy we find more of a hesitation in granting a central role to aesthetics. 2
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Introduction Aesthetics or the philosophy of the arts is practised seriously and to great local effect, but there is little confidence that aesthetics is anything more than a regional activity, secondary to the more essential sub-disciplines of epistemology, philosophy of mind and moral philosophy. The disciplinary constitution of the aesthetic is sometimes reinforced by a more general suspicion that aesthetic appreciation is, after all, an optional activity and may even be a distraction from the central questions of philosophy and of life. While I do not pretend that I will be able to answer this general problem of the status of aesthetics in one book on Kant’s epistemology and aesthetics, I do hope to make some progress by establishing the importance he gave to the relation between aesthetic judgement and epistemology. Many other writers on Kant – a number of whom I will discuss – have made significant progress in uncovering the role played by aesthetic judgement within his philosophical system as a whole; however, I believe that, as yet, there is no convincing account of how the systematic link between cognitive and aesthetic judgement might be defended in a thoroughgoing fashion. My hope is that this work will help secure the commitment to aesthetics held by many Continental philosophers. Meanwhile, the way in which I pursue my account of the link between epistemology and aesthetics may persuade some of an Analytical persuasion to venture onto the bridge. Ian Hamilton Finlay’s visual metaphor is useful here, for there is no middle ground and no well-established territories on either side. ‘Analytical philosophy’ is a plurality of practices and so too is ‘Continental philosophy’. We fool ourselves to think that one well-defined practice opposes another. But what we can hope for is that there may be crossings or mediations of the stream. In a heraclitean frame of mind, I am inclined to think that the different ways of engaging in philosophy occur on the bridge, while philosophy is the stream. Why is it important to establish a role for aesthetics? I believe it is because aesthetics allows for an insight into the plural constitution of our experience in general and that once we lose sight of this, dogmatism threatens. If aesthetics does this – something I will argue through my interpretation of Kant in this book – it does so indirectly in the course of a preoccupation with an aesthetic phenomenon or event. I will argue that the indirectness of the reflection is a necessary one. There are two ways in which the term ‘aesthetic’ will be used in this book. The first sense is the common one of a pleasurable experience arising from the senses – be the event artistic or natural – and giving rise to a judgement of taste. The second is a more primary one 3
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology referring to any sensory experience whatsoever. In this book I will seek to show how, for Kant, the two senses of aesthetics are necessarily intertwined. The second sense of ‘aesthetic’, which figures directly in the title of this book, marks the status of knowledge from Kant’s point of view.1 Knowledge emerges in space and time, these being the context within which any sensory affect arises. Knowledge requires not only concepts, but also sensory or aesthetic givens, which he calls intuitions. I will argue that the wider ramifications of this stance, which is well known in the philosophical world at least, is that knowledge arises as a project undertaken over time and across space. Knowledge is not simply a fait accompli, but a process that marks any achievement that is reached.2 I will further argue that Kant comes to the view that aesthetic judgement – that is, ‘aesthetic’ in the first or common sense of the word – has the power to reveal this deeper truth about knowledge. The picture that emerges is one of a subject bearing certain broadly mental capacities with which he or she is able to take up and make sense of an environment or world of objects. I thus argue that the attention Kant pays to what he calls the ‘faculties’ or subjective capacities is not a hindrance for his intent of establishing the possibility of objective knowledge, but rather the means by which he achieves it. The engagement with Kant that emerges in the pages that follow is at times closely textual, but it is not a work in pure descriptive interpretation. I read Kant because he can help me make sense of problems that exist outside of the technical content that he himself developed. I believe that Kant also viewed philosophy in this way and that is why he has a continuing fascination for us. Although it is impossible to read Kant without entering into a series of technical debates about competing interpretations, the problem is institutionally elaborated, not institutionally constituted. In what follows, I will give an overview of what may be expected. I will not enter into the details of my arguments; there will be time enough for that later. Although my goal is to establish the importance of Kant’s aesthetics for his epistemology, my initial investigations are focused strictly on his theory of knowledge. More specifically, I begin by situating the problems I will address in later chapters within the context of the very rich interpretative reception of Kant’s epistemology that has developed over the last forty or so years. In later chapters I will argue that Kant’s aesthetic formalism – despite it often being the subject of criticism – provides resources for establishing the character of his less familiar formalist account of knowledge. 4
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Introduction Chapters 1 and 2 establish the centrality of cognitive formalism for both critics and defenders of Kant’s epistemology alike. A critical assessment of some of the major contributions to current debates provides a backdrop against which I will situate my own account of Kantian formalism. In Chapter 1 I am concerned with the way in which Kant has been accused of ‘impositionalism’, that is, the position that the mind imposes form or order on the world. The problem that seems to ensue is that, according to this view, knowledge would be not so much of things in the world, but rather a merely subjective projection of mind’s own structures. I examine how this criticism emerges from the readings of Robert Pippin, Paul Guyer, Dieter Henrich and Peter Strawson. In Chapter 2 I turn to some of Kant’s major defenders – namely, Gerd Buchdahl, Henry Allison and Béatrice Longuenesse – and show how they have argued that formalism does not lead to a subjective status for knowledge. While suggesting the beginnings of a way of defending Kant against the charge of impositionalism, I argue, nonetheless, that his defenders have not supplied an account of formalism that convincingly rebuts this charge. In Chapter 3 I begin my interpretation of formalism, starting from Kant’s own distinction between formal and material idealism. I suggest that the commitment to a material correlate of formal idealism is to be found in the initial paragraphs of the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’. This is the material dimension of the aesthetic or sensory side of the dualist project. In Chapter 4 I turn to the reflective or conceptual side of dualism, as the condition of the possibility of synthesis. I argue that synthesis arises as a cooperation of a plurality of faculties and offer the ‘Transcendental Deduction’, in both its editions, as case studies. I conclude that only aesthetic judgement reveals the deep structure of the cooperative structure of synthesis within experience. In Chapter 5 I reassess the importance of the subjective deduction, first mentioned in the Preface to the A edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. I argue that the subjective deduction is the necessary corollary of the objective deduction of the categories and that the full account of the subjective side of cognition can only be found in certain passages in the Critique of Judgement. Establishing the relation between knowledge and aesthetic judgement cannot be achieved in a linear fashion. Just because the relation is reciprocal, there is no singular point of origin out of which the other term can be deduced. In Chapter 6 I turn back to the cognitive side of the relation, looking in more detail at the objective deduction, which 5
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology was addressed in nuce in Chapter 4. Having established the role of synthetic process in the preceding chapters, I argue that knowledge arises out of a process of subjective anticipation of a material given in experience. In Chapter 7 I take up the question of the purposiveness or systematicity of nature, introduced by Kant in the Critique of Judgement. The latter addition is important because, as I will show, it is necessary for empirical cognition. I argue that we can make sense of Kant’s claims that there is a link between systematicity and aesthetic judgements, once we distinguish between two levels at which purposiveness operates, while, at the same time, recognising that it combines a subjective and an objective orientation. I conclude that aesthetic judgements are exemplary for a general purposiveness of nature. In Chapter 8 I fine-tune this account, characterising the exemplarity of aesthetic judgements as contrastive or, as I call it, ‘contrapuntal’. Aesthetic judgement is not in any sense cognitive; nevertheless, in our aesthetic appreciation of artworks and of nature we are able to engage in an implicit reflection on the relation in which we stand to the world. This relation of subject and object is the fundamental engagement out of which knowledge emerges. In my Afterword I make some suggestions as to how I would further explore the relation in which the harmony characteristic of aesthetic judgements stands to the Kantian sublime. I return to Ian Hamilton Finlay’s heraclitean work at ‘Little Sparta’ to explain why, although the sublime has not been directly addressed in the body of this book, it still has a necessary role to play. The harmony of the faculties arises across difference; thus, the possibility of disruption is always already implicit. The beautiful marks a moment when the senses make sense of something in the world, while the sublime arises when the senses fail us. The beautiful is singular and, thus, indirectly reveals the fragility of our sensory grasp of the world or the possibility that sense might break down. The beautiful and the sublime cannot be articulated or experienced without the trace of the other.
Notes 1.
Throughout this book I will refer to ‘knowledge’ rather than to ‘cognition’, which is the more accurate translation of Erkenntnis. Kant’s project in the Critique of Pure Reason is to establish the possibility of objectively valid cognition, which would qualify as knowledge. He is not concerned with cognitions such as opinions or beliefs. So although 6
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Introduction
2.
Erkenntnis has a much broader range than ‘knowledge’, I think it is justifiable to use a term that is more intuitive and requires less qualification than the more technical ‘cognition’. My primary concern will be to establish the anticipatory status of formal, a priori cognition.
7
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1
The Centrality of the Problem of Formalism
What is the nature of Kant’s epistemological formalism, as his critics see it? I will argue that there are several versions, but that in all cases the criticism of formalism amounts to the charge that the outcomes of Kant’s method are ultimately subjective. Critics of Kant claim that his insistence that the form of experience arises from our minds, finally makes the empirical world of objects dependent on a form of subjectivity. If our minds introduce the form of experience, so the argument goes, then the objects we experience are only objects ‘for us’ and there is no access to a genuinely extra-mental world. In replying to this in later chapters I will argue that Kant’s formalism is an attempt to systematically link the subjective and objective conditions of experience. So while Kant’s critics are right to link formalism with a turn to the subject, they are telling only one side of the story. The project of the Copernican revolution is exactly that of showing how the turn to the subject will secure the possibility of knowledge of an objective world. But the full version of this project does not involve reducing objectivity to the subjective conditions of experience, which are necessary and not sufficient. Later I take up the problem of the empirical applicability of the subjective forms of thought by emphasising the aesthetic dimension of Kant’s critical turn. In this chapter I will show how formalism has been seen as a central issue for Kant’s epistemology. All of the authors I examine in this chapter conclude that Kant’s position is a formalist one. Paul Guyer and Peter Strawson argue that formalism results in the position that mind imposes order on objects.1 This is the thesis that is referred to as ‘impositionalism’. Robert Pippin and Dieter Henrich resist this conclusion, although I will show that ultimately both fail to provide a sufficiently robust defence of Kant’s position. Paul Guyer has been the most robust defender of the view that Kant’s epistemology portrays mental formative activity as an imposition on matter. As I will discuss in detail later, Guyer distinguishes between two models of the relation between mind and the material given. If the conformity between mind and reality is always already 8
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The Centrality of the Problem of Formalism guaranteed – a thesis to which he believes Kant is committed – then this can only be explained by: the mind’s ability to impose its rules on a pliable or formless material, or at the very least on a material any intrinsic form of which is inaccessible to the mind and can be replaced by a form of the mind’s own making.2
Guyer contrasts this to the view that: it is possible to think that we can know in advance of successful experience what objects must be like if we are to experience them but that we have no special power to make objects be like that, thus to make experience possible.3
Thus the impositionalist interpretation of Kant attributes to him the view that mind imposes form on a material given and that this results in our being able to produce the objects of experience.4 Now why should attributing impositionalism to Kant lead to difficulties in his account of knowledge? Although none of the interpreters discussed in this chapter would deny that the subject plays a necessary constitutive role in knowledge acquisition, the worry is that, from the perspective of the formalist method, the subject is faced only with our own mental structure, in the absence of any real encounter with an object. Robert Pippin’s Kant’s Formalism, which I discuss in the first section of this chapter (pp. 10–17), still counts as seminal for this debate. His critical, but sympathetic and subtle, reconstruction of Kant’s epistemology sets the standard for subsequent discussions. His eventual rejection of Kant’s project arises from the latter’s aim of establishing an a priori framework for knowledge that relies on a questionable account of pure intuition. An important aspect of his account is the claim that reflective judgement amounts to a mental projection that reinforces the subjectivist status of Kant’s epistemological project. Paul Guyer, whom I discuss in the second section (pp. 17–25), is, in general, critical of the formalist dimension of Kant’s method. However in his assessment of the latter’s epistemology, his criticism is, more precisely, of Kant’s ‘impositionalism’. Guyer’s aim is to rehabilitate a non-formalist core ultimately to be found only in certain manuscripts not prepared for publication by Kant. His view is that Kant often resorts to arguing that the mind imposes form on reality. In contrast to this, Guyer aims to unearth a ‘realist’ Kant who eschews the assumptions of transcendental idealism and is committed to the 9
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology independent existence of an extra-mental world accessed by a causal perceptual process. Like Pippin’s, this criticism amounts to the charge that Kant’s formalism leads him into an unwarranted subjectivism vis à vis knowledge. Dieter Henrich, whom I discuss in the third section (pp. 25–35), has been hugely influential in the reception of Kant both in the German and English speaking worlds. His reconstructive argument has greatly encouraged Guyer and others for whom the absolute Cartesian certainty of Henrich’s starting place entails impositionalism. It is for this reason that I include a discussion of Henrich at this stage of my account, even though he defends Kant and denies that his interpretation entails impositionalism. An earlier critique of Kant’s formalism is to be found in the work of Strawson, whom I discuss in the final section. He sees the dominant problem with Kant’s approach as his dependence on ‘faculty talk’. Instead of focusing exclusively on the objective empirical contents of experience, Kant repeatedly expresses his position in terms of the relations between mental capacities. The danger is that the critique of knowledge falls into psychologism. Importantly, Strawson also accuses Kant of impositionalism. The supposed problem, once again, is that Kant’s formalism – now specifically the claim that experience is dependent on certain formal mental capacities – results in knowledge arising from the mind enforcing its patterns onto reality. In the course of this chapter we will see that formalism takes on a specific shape for each of these authors. Interestingly, all of them, except Strawson, entertain the possibility that there may be an alternative version of formalism that does not fall into the impositionalist trap.
I Pippin’s Critique of Kant’s Formalism Robert Pippin’s Kant’s Theory of Form offers a thoroughgoing and systematic account of Kant’s epistemological project. While Pippin is critical of Kant’s formalism for resulting in a merely subjective legitimation of knowledge, he nevertheless resists interpretations that accuse Kant of impositionalism, the thesis that order arises in experience due to the imposition of mental forms. Kant, as interpreted by Pippin, fails to fulfil his deepest held undertaking to achieve a formal epistemology applicable to empirical experience, despite his commitment to ‘empirical guidedness’, that is, 10
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The Centrality of the Problem of Formalism the thesis that the forms of experience must be applied to empirical matter.5 Following the transcendental turn, empirical matter guides experience strictly in accordance with rules we introduce ourselves.6 Consequently, Kant’s position, which combines transcendental idealism with empirical realism, can only be ‘a comprehensive attempt to determine what can count as experience of objective reality “for us” ’.7 While Kant’s idealism is, Pippin believes, defensible, his formalism is ultimately subjectivist. From the outset Pippin disagrees with those critics for whom Kant’s epistemology amounts to the view that the subject projects or imposes form or structure onto a material world that, in itself, has no potential meaning. After the transcendental turn, matter can only have meaning in relation to conceptual form, but at the same time concepts are only meaningful insofar as they apply to something given in experience. This is the force of Pippin’s concern with empirical guidedness, which explains why Pippin finds himself in opposition to Norman Kemp Smith, Hans Vaihinger and others who he considers have too mentalist an interpretation of Kant.8 For Kemp Smith, consciousness confers meaning and indeed the objects of consciousness are, strictly speaking, other mental states.9 In particular, necessity and universality are ‘imposed by the mind’.10 Vaihinger insists that the mind projects order on the world.11 In contrast, Pippin is committed to the view that, for Kant, extra-mental reality is not simply the passive recipient of projections on the part of the subject. The world is given to us, admittedly in an indeterminate and indirect way. It is indeterminate because it is given only in sensation and indirect because sensations without concepts are blind.12 For Pippin, this conclusion is necessarily drawn from Kant’s dualism. Pippin is equally critical of Guyer’s impositionalist interpretation, which he sees as rooted in what he calls a literal interpretation of pure a priori synthesis. Guyer concludes that the latter is responsible for the subjectivism of Kant’s formalist position. Pippin’s reply is restricted to consideration of an article published in 1980, which sets the scene for Guyer’s systematic interpretation of Kant published as Kant and the Claims of Knowledge seven years later.13 Pippin argues that although Kant seems to commit himself to an independent synthesis prior to empirical synthesis, this is misleading.14 In contrast, Pippin reads Kant’s use of the a priori as an adverb.15 The point Pippin makes is that to talk of an a priori synthesis is not to talk of a synthesis that literally comes before experience, but rather of a synthesis that is independent of experience and yet serves as a ground for 11
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology our knowledge of it. Elsewhere Pippin further counters the challenge to Kant’s formalism saying that to assert that the unity of apperception is ‘formal’ means to assert merely that judgement, cognitive activity or experience are only possible if the contents of consciousness are brought to a unity.16 He also stresses that formal talk refers to the activity of mind and not to some special non-material object.17 Pippin agrees with Guyer that the way in which we ultimately understand what Kant means by a priori synthesis depends on how we understand the idea of ‘mind-imposed unity’.18 If we read the latter phrase literally then we are inevitably led to interpret a priori synthesis as an independent act occurring prior to empirical experience. But if we adopt Pippin’s adverbial reading, we need only interpret the a priori as the formal condition of any empirical experience and not as a distinctive act.19 We will see, however, that Pippin retains worries about the status of a priori formal intuition. Pippin argues that the impositionalist interpretation cannot be right because Kant does not simply claim that the categories of the understanding – the most pure concepts with which we operate in unifying any object of experience – establish how an object appears for us, but says that any object that appears for us must appear under certain formal conceptual conditions.20 This is the notion of ‘comprehensiveness’ and is the key to Pippin’s rejection of the impositionalist reading. Kant starts by trying to establish our understanding of the general structure of reality, but he also shows that this is the only way in which experience could be understood by human subjects. He thus establishes the necessity of the formal structure we in fact adopt. ‘This formal unity is not imposed; it just is the only type of unity we could understand in our experience.’21 Pippin thus distinguishes between a merely subjective imposition of the structure or form of reality and a comprehensive account that would establish the necessity of this formal structure for our experience. In the end Pippin’s judgement is that the comprehensiveness claim is not made good, thus undermining Kant’s commitment to empirical guidedness. But the fact that Kant aims at the latter goal counts as the major reason for Pippin’s opposition to readings like Guyer’s. Importantly, in his defence of Kant, Pippin contrasts ideas and concepts insisting that the latter are not subjectively imposed.22 However, if concepts are to qualify as empirically guided, then this must be discoverable in their empirical application. Even if a priori concepts are not subjective, this will count for little if empirical concepts are. The aim of empirical guidedness will fail, if empirical concepts turn out to 12
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The Centrality of the Problem of Formalism be instances of subjective projection and this is just what Pippin concludes, as I will discuss below. Pippin also disagrees with those interpreters for whom Kant’s major failing is his insistence on the role of subjective faculties. His argument here is principally addressed to Strawson’s critique of Kant’s idiom of the faculties. For Strawson, Kant’s supposed psychologism amounts to the claim that the mind imposes form on matter.23 While Pippin concurs that Kant’s position is ultimately subjectivist, he insists that it is a concern with the ‘activity of the subject’ and does not amount to psychologism.24 In making this argument he insists that faculty talk is best understood as a consideration of ‘forms of our conceiving’.25 However a suspicion of Kant’s faculty talk reemerges in his discussion of a priori intuition, especially with reference to ‘The Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding’.26 Now, despite the distance at which Pippin stands to Guyer and to Strawson he nevertheless concludes that Kant falls into a subjectivism that should be ruled out by his commitment to empirical guidedness. How does this come about? The crux of Pippin’s critique of Kant is the latter’s formalism, which he believes counts as an ‘independent analysis of the “rules” for knowledge, prior to and divorced from experience of all kinds’.27 The aim of achieving comprehensiveness and therefore of avoiding impositionalism fails because Kant attempts to secure the legitimacy of claims to knowledge and their applicability to experience within the sphere of subjectivity alone. His objective of comprehensiveness, that is, of showing that knowledge is not simply for us but reveals the necessary conditions of all possible objects of experience, depends on achieving formal comprehensiveness as we have seen.28 Pippin does not immediately conclude that the formality of this move entails impositionalism. Indeed, on the contrary, he says that the formal status of the comprehensiveness claim means ‘not just that we impose’ order, but that this is the only possible ordering.29 However the distinction between subjective and objective ordering that this claim to comprehensiveness implies is not delivered: ‘Just how are we to understand this notion of a subjective unity of consciousness “depending” on, being “derivable” from, or being “grounded” in an objective unity?’30 Pippin’s adverbial defence of Kant’s talk of a priori synthesis is, as we have already seen, that it amounts to the claim that there are certain epistemic conditions for experience. This, he holds, should not be read as evidence of either impositionalism or psychologism, but rather reveals the formal, methodological or meta-level status of 13
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology Kant’s project.31 But the solution Pippin offers us now turns out to be problematic: how do we get from a comprehensive system of the subjective conditions of experience to securing the application of those epistemic conditions in empirical experience? As he puts it in an earlier pithy statement ‘If that formal idealism is to be successful, we must be able to understand its connection with this “material” or empirical realism . . .’.32 Elsewhere he says that if Kant is to avoid constructivism, by which he means subjectivism or impositionalism, he needs a ‘less metaphorical interpretation’ of the relation between the forms of experience and ‘empirically apprehended “matter” ’.33 The epistemic solution has reintroduced subjectivism by the back door. Pippin believes that Kant’s theory of judgement could have provided a solution to the problem. In the ‘Schematism’ Kant tries to escape from a strictly formal level of analysis, but fails due to his continuing to operate at an a priori level.34 It is his reliance on ‘his even more obscure theory of pure intuition (which itself stresses all over again a more constructivist theory of phenomenal unity)’ that undermines the potential for eventually achieving an adequate account of empirical guidedness through the strategy of comprehensiveness.35 Thus an attempt at showing how the epistemic subjective forms of experience genuinely grasp material reality, a problem that was promised specific attention in the ‘Schematism’, falls back into subjectivism by relying on an unexplained claim that our subjective power of intuition is capable of constructing reality. Pippin believes that the ‘Schematism’ chapter is further flawed insofar as it reveals a ‘serious instability in the understanding/sensibility distinction so very essential to the Critique’.36 While, as I have already mentioned, formalism does not necessarily entail impositionalism in Pippin’s eyes and indeed signals Kant’s intent of providing an alternative to the latter, a priori formalism is finally the problem. Thus Pippin says that for Kant ‘the homogeneity of the manifold is just due somehow to the demand of thought’.37 In other words it would appear in the end that the charge of impositionalism is correct. Combination of sensory input comes from thought alone and there is no effective empirical guidedness from the side of sense. He then immediately goes on to say: ‘And, if transcendental philosophy is to remain formal and a priori, it is hard to see how the situation could be otherwise.’38 A formalism that was not a priori might avoid the fate of impositionalism, but Kant’s version cannot do so on Pippin’s reckoning: 14
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The Centrality of the Problem of Formalism Once Kant argued for the ‘spontaneous’ nature of the understanding, and the indeterminate nature of the material of sensibility, we naturally wanted to know ‘by what right’ the understanding can so spontaneously, a priori, and with certainty and authority of necessity, legislate, and we are here to receive Kant’s unique answer: that the ‘ground’ or basis for this legislation rests in the requirements for a unified, self-identical subject.39
Pippin adds that the unity of the subject must be understood formally.40 Formalism ultimately situates the claimed legitimacy of the categories in subjectivity and, more precisely, in the unified selfidentical subject.41 It would appear that the distinction between concepts, which are not subjective and ideas, which are, has collapsed.42 Empirical guidedness turns out to be a straw man, insofar as it only arises in accordance with formal structures that we introduce a priori. One of the most important questions that Pippin raises is that of the legitimation or ground of empirical concepts. This point is central to his assessment of Kant’s success in establishing empirical guidedness.43 If empirical concepts cannot be shown to arise at least in part from conditions in extra-mental reality, then their fate is no better than that of pure a priori concepts. We have already seen that Pippin distinguishes concepts from ideas on the grounds that the former are not subjectively imposed while ideas are. However we have also seen that, on Pippin’s reading, while Kant intended to avoid the conclusion that concepts impose form on matter, he finally did not succeed in this aim. Thus, concepts can, in the end, do nothing other than subjectively impose a priori form on the external world. The remaining question is whether empirical concepts have a ground independent of pure concepts. Pippin considers various options; most importantly, for our discussion, that reflective judgement provides the ground for empirical concepts. In the Critique of Judgement Kant introduces a distinction between determining judgement that subsumes a particular instance or intuition under a universal rule, principle or law and reflective judgement that seeks a rule or concept for a given particular.44 Kant argues in the Introductions to the third Critique that reflective judgement provides the principle necessary for the systematic employment of empirical judgement and, arguably, also for empirical concepts.45 But the problem, as Pippin sees it, is that reflective judgement is a development of the regulative use of ideas in the Critique of Pure Reason. As such, reflective judgement, like regulative ideas, is projected by the mind onto nature. Pippin thus rejects the possibility that reflective judgement might be the sought-for autonomous ground of 15
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology empirical concepts, as it is simply too subjective to render it capable of securing the necessary reference to objectivity. ‘While the most general explanation for our association of markers into concepts, species, and so forth, it [reflective judgement] is also the furthest removed from any connection with any “objective” or empirically based origin.’46 Thus, Kant’s account of reflective judgement could, or even should, have given us the means for understanding how empirical concepts (and, we might add, perhaps even indirectly pure a priori ones) are capable of being empirically guided. This, however, is impossible because reflective judgement is a subjective projection. Both in his book and in a roughly contemporary article, Pippin does not argue for the premise that secures this conclusion, citing only Buchdahl in defence of it.47 In order to show how far Pippin’s final verdict lies from his initial defence of Kant, I must cite him again at some length: In sum, however much Kant intends to avoid the ‘imposition’ interpretation, it is still the case that, to use his own favourite metaphor for his formalism, reason legislates to nature, or even commands to nature, so formally, so independently of any ‘material’ reflection about nature, that the very possibility of ‘obedience’ to such laws, or the role of reason’s ‘subjects’ in formulating them seem considerations much too abstractly excluded. It is not incidental, I would suggest, that something of the same problem can be said to emerge in Kant’s moral, aesthetic, and teleological formalism.48
So while Pippin does not state that Kant’s position is impositionalist, it is clear that, in Pippin’s view, Kant ultimately falls into this trap. Pippin goes on to say that Kant would have needed ‘a more complicated account of the relation between form and a perhaps metaphysical “content” than his transcendental methodology allows . . .’.49 Pippin’s own alternative, he admits, is only glimpsed at the margins of his critique of Kant. The principal elements of his own position are a comprehensiveness that does not fall back into subjectivism;50 an account of subjectivity that is not indeterminate;51 and a theory that looks for its confirmation within actuality.52 These features suggest a broadly Hegelian programme, especially when combined with Pippin’s contrast between idealism and formalism. Pippin admits the limitations of his own alternative to Kant: Admittedly, of course, the idea of ‘breaking down’ Kant’s sensibility/ understanding dualism, or ‘opening the door’ to a fuller explanation of the 16
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The Centrality of the Problem of Formalism substantive or metaphysical foundation for pure intuition, concept, schema, and idea, or even just recognizing the necessity for a substantive account of the subject which thinks rather than just the rules of its thinking, are all fairly abstract conclusions to draw from the problems presented here.53
I will answer Pippin’s critique by supplying an alternative account of formalism. We will then be in a position to recognise that Kant is closer to Pippin than Pippin’s interpretation of Kant would suggest. I will argue that Kant’s conception of a formal system does not necessarily fall back into subjectivism and that his account of the ‘activity’ of the subject is less rigid than Pippin assumes. I will show how form arises in anticipation of matter and this allows us to construe empirical guidedness as more than an empty promise. I will not, however, argue that Kant offered a more substantive metaphysical foundation for the thinking subject. That would be to go beyond formal idealism towards the absolute idealism of Hegel. The account of the subject offered here will, rather, situate the formal framework for thought within the empirical world.
II Guyer’s critique of impositionalism Guyer believes that he can uncover within Kant’s writings an alternative to his official position. Guyer has great sympathy for this unofficial position, which he believes counts as a transcendental theory of experience. It is to be found in unpublished manuscripts and in a nascent form in the ‘Refutation of Idealism’ in the Critique of Pure Reason.54 While the unofficial position avoids metaphysical dogmatism, the official one does not and counts as impositionalist. Guyer’s extensive analysis of Kant’s epistemological project appeared in his book Kant and the Claims of Knowledge.55 Its core distinction was established in his earlier article to which, as we saw in the last section, Pippin responded.56 Central to Guyer’s reading of Kant’s epistemology is a distinction between two orders of necessity. He expresses the first as follows: a conditional necessity would arise were Kant claiming that if I experience an object, this requires that I am in fact aware of regularity among my representations of it.57 All this necessitates is, if I am to experience an object, it must in fact be of such a form as to be accessible to my means of grasping it cognitively.58 In contrast, absolute necessity would be required if experience of an object entails awareness of a necessary regularity among my representations of it.59 The absolute necessity of this condition can only be ensured if the mind 17
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology imposes this form.60 This is contrasted to what Guyer considers a distinctive metaphysical view of the relation between mind and reality where the conditions of the possibility of experience restrict rather than produce what can be experienced.61 Guyer reassesses the so-called overlooked alternative discussed in the nineteenth century by Adolf Trendelenburg: Kant assumes that space and time must be features either of our representations or of objects but not both, rather than that space and time may be either properties of objects or both necessary constraints on our perception of objects and genuine features of the objects we do succeed in perceiving.62
Guyer argues that, from Kant’s perspective, space and time could not be features of both subjectivity and of objects, because in the latter case they would not deliver the absolute necessity that is required. Only if space and time are subjective can they give rise to certain knowledge of appearances in space and time. Thus, the alternative was not so much overlooked as excluded by Kant.63 I will now sketch Guyer’s argument as presented in his earlier article before examining in more detail some of its principal claims.64 He contends that Kant is committed to an a priori synthesis of objects in all cases of knowledge, not just in mathematics.65 This a priori synthesis amounts to constitution, insofar as it imposes order on the manifold of empirical intuition.66 Anticipating attempts to interpret the priority of synthesis as the claim that all empirical manifolds are merely constrained by certain a priori conditions, Guyer identifies further passages to support his reading that a pure a priori synthesis precedes empirical syntheses. If empirical syntheses were simply constrained by a priori rules, then we would have the conditional necessity of Guyer’s preferred transcendental theory of experience. This would mean that our minds were restricted to a certain range of accessible objects. In contrast to this, he finds that Kant is committed to there being a prior pure synthesis that produces its own objects by imposing form upon matter. This counts as impositionalism and is a consequence of attributing certainty to the transcendental unity of apperception. He goes on to argue that Kant’s thesis that we are certain about the unity of apperception can only be construed as a synthetic and empirical claim, not analytical and a priori as Kant suggests, and, finally, that it rests on a conflation of consciousness and self-consciousness.67 Guyer’s alternative strategy is to argue that Kant could have proposed a transcendental, but not a priori formal theory. 18
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The Centrality of the Problem of Formalism Despite my disagreement with Guyer’s diagnosis of the identity of the ‘official’ Kant, my interpretation shares some features with Guyer’s unofficial transcendental theory of experience, being one in which mind is responsive to an external world not of its own making. In this regard, I would agree with Guyer that there is no necessary conflict between formal idealism and a version of realism. The difference between our positions is that I do not believe we have to divest Kant of transcendental idealism and most of his published works in order to be able to establish this. In later chapters I will show that there is a way of reading the a priori and formalism that illuminates the relationship between mind and object, showing their necessary relation without attributing impositionalism to Kant. Guyer admits that there are passages that could be interpreted according to a more modest interpretation of the activity of the mind. These would be in line with what in his book he calls conditional necessity. In his article he describes this tendency thus: ‘the purely hypothetical and analytic assertion that if the ascription of a representation to an identical self is possible, then it must also be possible to connect that representation to others ascribed to that self by a certain kind of synthesis’.68 But there are other passages that he believes cannot be so interpreted. These commit Kant to the absolute necessity of transcendental apperception and amount to the ‘thoroughly existential and synthetic claim that all of one’s representations can be ascribed to oneself’.69 Only this position requires a theory of imposition. Is there really a clear distinction between these two sorts of passages? Guyer supplies three examples of passages that, he concedes, commit Kant only to the claim that a priori syntheses bear conditional necessity. The first example Guyer says is concerned with a priori synthesis of the pure intuitions of mathematics, which he concedes implies no imposition on experiential objects as such.70 Meanwhile, the second and third examples are concerned with experience yet do not commit Kant to an imposition of pure synthesis. The second passage Guyer cites claims that appearances ‘must stand under a priori rules of their synthetic unity’,71 while in the third Kant says that appearances ‘are subjected to a priori conditions, with which their synthesis . . . must thoroughly accord’.72 Guyer is ready to concede that such passages do not suggest that there is a pure synthesis prior to empirical syntheses, but rather that certain a priori constraints govern the latter. However he insists that there is plenty of evidence for the stronger claim for absolute rather than conditional necessity. He begins with 19
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology the synthesis of reproduction that Kant says counts as one of the ‘transcendental actions of the mind’ and is ‘grounded prior to all experience’.73 Guyer then refers to another passage from the first edition of the ‘Transcendental Deduction’, or A ‘Deduction’ as opposed to the second edition or B ‘Deduction’. Here Kant says that apperception is the source of all synthetic unity and that it presupposes a productive synthesis of imagination, which is ‘prior to apperception’ and is ‘the ground of all cognition’.74 Guyer sees this as compelling evidence for Kant’s commitment to a pure synthesis prior to any empirical synthesis. Finally Guyer turns to a passage from the B ‘Deduction’ where we are told that the synthetic unity of the manifold ‘precedes a priori all my determinate thought’.75 He does not comment on the complex relation between the faculties that emerges in the second of these passages. He is intent simply on insisting that Kant is committed to certain pure operations of the mind that are prior to all experience.76 What exactly does Guyer mean by prior in these cases? He clearly does not mean temporally prior. Nor can he mean apperception is simply logically prior, for if he did there would be no reason to make the distinction between passages that express a restriction on our mental activity and those that supposedly express an imposition of form on matter. Logical priority would only entail that apperception was a necessary condition for the possibility of experience of objects, as we have already seen in our discussion of Pippin’s adverbial reading. This would be quite consistent with Guyer’s preferred conditional necessity and would not entail that apperception was the sufficient condition of that experience, insofar as it imposed form on appearances. For Guyer the priority at issue is synonymous with absolute necessity. This is the real crux of the matter and lies beneath what Pippin calls Guyer’s literal reading of the priority claim. A pure synthesis is prior in the sense that apperception produces its own objects by imposing forms on nature. Thus mind produces forms that are not only necessary, but also sufficient conditions for the order of nature. Is Guyer’s literal reading of the priority of pure synthesis proven by the textual references he supplies, or is it rather that his independent conviction that Kant is committed to impositionalism leads him to read these passages as literally as possible? The latter view is encouraged by the next move in Guyer’s argument. He says that even were the passages initially discussed in his article inconclusive, it cannot be doubted that Kant is committed to the view that the mind 20
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The Centrality of the Problem of Formalism constitutes ‘the objective affinity of nature as underlying all particular empirical investigation’.77 After all, Kant has said that it is we who introduce order and regularity into appearances or nature.78 How, asks Kant, ‘should we be able to get such a unity started a priori, if subjective grounds of such unity were not contained in the original sources of cognition in our minds?’79 Admittedly, Kant’s account at this stage of the first edition ‘Deduction’ raises some problems. How, crucially, is he sure that the unity achieved will be an ‘a priori certain unity of the connection of appearances’?80 Moreover, the statement that this certainty is somehow contained in the original sources of cognition seems to support Guyer’s belief that Kant is committed to an absolute necessity imposed transcendentally by the faculties on appearances and ultimately on matter. Guyer thinks that the evidence is incontrovertible and that we must read Kant as an impositionalist. This leads him to miss a possibility latent in the passages just mentioned. Might there not be a tacit distinction between the subjective and objective grounds of the same unity? If this suggestion is taken up, then Kant may only be committed to the view that the subjective conditions of cognition supply necessary, though insufficient, conditions of the formal structure of nature. The subjective grounds would then only ‘get things started’ [auf die Bahn bringen]: they initiate unity, but they do not achieve it.81 The grounds of necessary unity are contained in our minds only in an initial fashion. The original German offers some potential support for my suggestion. The crucial two sentences read: For this unity of nature should [soll] be a necessary, that is an a priori certain unity of the connection of appearances. How should we be able to get an a priori synthetic unity started [auf die Bahn bringen literally means ‘to bring onto the track’82], if there were not subjective grounds of such unity a priori in our original cognitive powers and if these subjective powers were not objectively valid insofar as they are the grounds of the possibility of knowing any object whatsoever in experience.83
The modal verb sollen suggests a task, even an epistemic duty. Kemp Smith translates ‘soll’ as ‘has to be’. This expression also bears a future connotation, although it can be mistaken for a simple statement of necessity. The modal verb soll could also be translated as ‘is to be’, resulting in the claim that the unity of appearances ‘is to be’ constructed as the result of a project. Thus it would not be contained already, other than in principle, in the initiating conditions, that is, in 21
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology the power of synthesis. And although translating ‘auf die Bahn bringen’ by ‘to establish’, as Kemp Smith does, is accurate, this English expression eliminates the future nuance of the German phrase, which could suggest a task that is only just beginning. Focusing on the future orientation in Kant’s expression allows us to reassess the status of the immediately preceding claim that ‘the order and regularity in the appearances, which we entitle nature,we ourselves introduce [bringen wir selbst hinein]’.84 While we introduce order, we may not construct or impose it. So when Kant says that ‘[t]he synthesis of the manifold through pure imagination, the unity of all representations in relation to original apperception, precede[s] all empirical knowledge [gehen aller empirischen Erkenntnis vor]’, the priority in question need only be the initiating condition of necessity.85 While the hints afforded by the text support, but are not conclusive as to the correctness of my interpretative suggestion, they should at least make us pause for thought before concluding that the priority that Kant seeks to establish entails that the mind imposes order on empirical matter. And if this is so, these passages need not commit Kant to impositionalism, although they certainly aim to secure more than a merely conditional or factual coincidence between mind and objects. Guyer’s suspicion is that the only way such an a priori certain unity could be achieved would be if the mind were capable of imposing its own necessary structures on objects. At this stage I will simply sketch a possible alternative solution, which I will develop in greater detail in later chapters. The key here is to distinguish between two possible levels at which nature may be unified. When Kant says that there should be an a priori certain unity of appearances, he may mean that there must be an a priori framework that guarantees the possibility of connection among empirical appearances. While the framework is certain at the a priori level, this does not entail that there is such certainty with regard to empirical experience. We will see later that in both editions of the ‘Deduction’ Kant insists that the categories do not fully determine empirical laws and thus reveals that there is a gap between the a priori framework and empirical nature.86 If I am right, Kant is only committed to certainty at the transcendental level as a framework for the possibility of experience, while at the empirical level, certainty is an ongoing project rather than a fait accompli. Are there significant developments in the arguments Guyer presents in his later book? At the outset of his later account Guyer fails to mention that Kant’s supposed problem arises from a confusion 22
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The Centrality of the Problem of Formalism between consciousness and self-consciousness, but otherwise his argument is the same.87 [Kant] simply assumes that we know certain propositions as universal and necessary truths; he then argues that such claims to knowledge of necessary truth can be explained only by our antecedent possession of certain conceptions and capacities which we must, in turn, be able to impose upon a reality which does not itself, even contingently, conform to these conditions . . . 88
Toward the end of the book he reconstructs the ‘error’ in three stages. Once again Kant is found to have presupposed the validity of a claim to knowledge of a universal and necessary truth. Second, we are told that ordinary experience can never justify such a claim, which must therefore have an a priori basis. Third, Kant concludes that only certain forms of intuition, concepts or principles of judgement could satisfy this requirement.89 This is a more nuanced account than was provided in the earlier article, but the nub is still the same: namely, Kant assumes that we are capable of a priori certainty about the unity of appearances and the only way this can be explained is to posit an a priori capacity or synthesis that produces such certainty by projecting its unity onto the manifold in apprehension. This claim is nothing other than the impositionalist thesis. In Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, Guyer declines to answer critics of his earlier article and presents instead a more detailed account of Kant’s argument.90 Following an analysis of Kant’s arguments in which he attempts to deduce the validity of the categories starting from concepts of the object or of judgement, he now returns to the argumentative territory of his earlier account in analysing those arguments that start from the self: [H]e discovered what he thought was a simple but powerful argument from what he took to be our a priori knowledge of the necessary unity or identity of the self throughout all of our experiences to the need for an a priori synthesis of the manifold of intuition, conducted in accord with a priori concepts.91
Thus the certainty a subject has in its identity throughout experience entails that it must be able to achieve an equally certain synthesis of the manifold of apprehension.92 It does so, as we have already seen in his earlier article, by imposing the forms of intuition onto that manifold in accordance with the categories. Guyer goes on to say that this ‘supplement[s] his [i.e. Kant’s] in any case considerable confidence in the deduction of the categories from 23
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology the conceptions of object and judgement’.93 So it sounds as if this ‘powerful’ argument is not an alternative to those other strategies, but rather complementary to them. Yet in what follows it becomes clear that, just as Guyer held in his earlier article, what he considers to be a new argument is, in his opinion, Kant’s primary one. The linchpin of Guyer’s argument is once again Kant’s claim that ‘the understanding is itself the source of the laws of nature’.94 This is what convinces Guyer that Kant’s position must be that ‘the mind can impose an “affinity” on all appearances’ for only this secures Kant’s conclusion that they must be ‘associable in themselves and subjected to universal rules of thoroughgoing connection’.95 This, he thinks, is ‘the only possible explanation of the premise of this new argument, the assumption that unity of apperception is a priori certain or guaranteed to obtain under all possible circumstances’.96 Thus only if there is an a priori synthesis that unifies all experiences, can the unity of apperception in which we are already confident be validated. The unity apperception introduces into experience is, moreover, an absolute necessity. This is so because our minds are capable of synthesising or determining all appearances that arise for us. I have argued that Guyer’s evidence for claiming that Kant is committed to the absolute necessity of apperception is not conclusive. He certainly has evidence that Kant holds that the transcendental unity of apperception is a necessary condition of any empirical knowledge, but does he have the further proof that the latter arises from a pure a priori synthesis that imposes form on matter? In 1987 Guyer’s evidence is similar to that presented in his earlier article. He still insists that it is Kant’s ‘unequivocal view that we can impose our categories on any data of sensibility whatever’.97 In other words, we simply must read Kant’s statements about a priori synthesis literally, because the passages and the argument would not bear any other interpretation. For Guyer, this is the crux of transcendental idealism, for it is only the transcendental ideality of space – that is, its status as a mental form – that ensures the transcendental affinity of order among objects qua appearances necessary for the certainty to which he believes Kant is committed.98 Interestingly, in 1987 Guyer does not oppose what he calls formal idealism, which he identifies with Kant’s mature position.99 The latter is ‘compatible with a realistic interpretation of the intended conclusion of the refutation of idealism’.100 What he objects to is the interpretation of form as imposed on objects of experience. This interpretation entails that transcendental idealism counts not as a doctrine 24
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The Centrality of the Problem of Formalism of epistemological modesty pace Henry Allison, but rather as a metaphysical dogma.101 Hence Guyer is opposed to the formalism correlative to transcendental idealism, which he takes to be the thesis that form is imposed on objects by the mind. He remarks that Kant’s mature position commits him only to the ideal status of the forms and not of the existence of the objects of intuition.102 I hope to have shown in a provisional way that even in the admittedly difficult territory of the ‘Transcendental Deduction’ there is no conclusive reason why Kant should be consigned to impositionalism. Objects have an ideal dimension insofar as they are formed, but this does not necessarily entail that form is imposed on matter. I have suggested that Kant’s formalism can be seen as the initiation of order through the synthetic activity of our subjective cognitive faculties. In later chapters I build on this suggestion.
III Henrich’s Cartesian Certainty – A Basis for Impositionalism? While Dieter Henrich, one of Kant’s most influential contemporary German interpreters, ultimately aims to defend Kant against the charge of impositionalism, Kant’s critics have found encouragement in the interpretation he offers in Identity and Objectivity.103 Guyer, in particular, relies on Henrich’s reading, something I will establish by an examination of a review written by Guyer just before his publication of the article considered in the previous section of this chapter.104 Thus, while it may seem odd to include Henrich among Kant’s critics, it is helpful to include a discussion of his highly reconstructive reading at this point. Guyer’s view that for Kant apperception is apodeictically certain reveals his debt to Henrich, for whom apperception counts as a sort of Cartesian awareness of what he calls the numerical identity of the self.105 Against this Allison argues that knowledge requires only the awareness of ‘the “fact” that this identity must be presupposed as a necessary condition of knowledge’, in other words, it requires only ‘the necessity of a possibility’, that is, the possibility of being aware of numerical identity ‘but not its actuality or necessity’.106 As Allison also puts it: ‘The consciousness of this act . . . is . . . the consciousness of the form of thinking’.107 Importantly he says that Kant’s account is ‘a formal model or schema for the analysis of the understanding and its “logical” activities’ and concludes: ‘As such, it is neither a bit of introspective psychology nor an idealistic ontological 25
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology thesis concerning the manner in which the mind “creates” the phenomenal world by imposing its forms upon the given sensible data.’108 Despite the apparent difference between Allison’s formal reading and Henrich’s Cartesian reading of apperception, we will see later in this section that the contrast is quite hard to draw.109 Henrich argues that, for Kant, the certainty that we have in the numerical identity of the self depends on our ability to employ certain forms of judgement. Guyer agrees with this entailment and the consequent denial of an immediate certainty of self in detachment from our judgemental capacity. However, while Henrich argues that Kant is not, or at least should not be, committed to ‘constitution-theoretic talk’ – that is, to impositionalism – Guyer argues that the latter is a necessary corollary of Henrich’s correct diagnosis of the basic premise of Kant’s deduction, namely, certainty about numerical identity: In fact, we could be certain a priori that we will be conscious of our continuing identity so long as we are conscious of any representations at all only if we can always process or force our representations to conform to the conditions of our consciousness of identity, which is, I take it, the gist of any theory of constitution.110
So whereas Henrich believes that Kant only slips into impositionalism because of an unnecessary confusion, Guyer insists that it is the unavoidable corollary of the certainty of apperception.111 It is because the numerical identity of the self can be established only if it is discovered in all appearances, that the former as the transcendental identity of apperception must impose unity on the latter. Therefore impositionalism leads on directly from Henrich’s insistence on the certainty of apperception. Significantly, Guyer’s core distinction is first aired in response to Henrich’s interpretation. The theory of constitution arises from what Guyer calls Henrich’s key argument, that is, ‘that we know a priori that we will be conscious of our numerical identity in whatever representations we will have’ in contrast to the weaker claim that ‘we can be conscious of our identity in any given sequence of representations only if they conform to the necessary conditions for our consciousness of identity’.112 This is the by now familiar distinction between absolute and conditional necessity.113 As we saw, Guyer concludes that Kant’s impositionalism arises from a confusion between consciousness and self-consciousness.114 Henrich’s insistence that the legitimacy of the categories requires a priori knowledge of the self – and not just, as Allison argues, 26
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The Centrality of the Problem of Formalism consciousness of the form of thinking – once again is a point d’appui for Guyer’s critique.115 It appears that Henrich has set the stakes too high. He concludes that the presupposition of Kant’s thought is ‘wholly original’, ‘highly productive’ and ‘exceptionally convincing’ and sums it up thus: ‘one sees in the notion of the ego [im Ich-Gedanken] a consciousness which demonstrates the highest degree of certainty and which is, so to speak, a priori superior to everything.’116 It is not possible to enter into a detailed reconstruction and assessment of Henrich’s argument here. Nevertheless we must consider the way in which Henrich rejects the impositionalist conclusion Guyer draws from his Cartesian premise. Henrich’s rejection of impositionalism emerges principally from the important distinction he draws between the identity of selfconsciousness and the identity of the act.117 In Henrich’s view, Kant’s tendency to focus on the act serves as an ‘unfavourable influence’ on the development of his proof.118 Henrich interprets this development in Kant’s account as entailing that the act of the mind ‘subjects appearances to rules’ and concludes that this commits Kant to a thesis of ‘real constitution’ rather than simply logical derivation.119 Henrich is referring to the passage from the first edition of the ‘Deduction’ where Kant famously states: For the mind could never think its identity in the manifoldness of its representations, and indeed think this identity a priori, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its act which subjects all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity and thereby renders possible its connection according to a priori rules.120
Henrich comments that this implies a distinction between particular acts of synthesis and the act of synthesis itself that generates the a priori rules necessary for any synthesis whatsoever.121 His concern is that Kant suggests that we can move directly from the identity of the subject to the act of synthesis and this in turn suggests that the self ‘subjects appearances to rules’.122 I am not convinced that it is necessary to make the distinction Henrich suggests, as I read this passage as a not yet well-formulated expression of Kant’s view that the transcendental synthesis of apperception entails some awareness of its own activity. If so, Kant may not be guilty of falling into impositionalism as charged. In my view the real problem lies not in Kant’s focus on the act of apperception, but rather in the speed with which he thinks he can 27
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology move from a priori synthesis to empirical determination. Kant is not clear about the level at which his argument operates. This is evident not only in the sentence Henrich holds up for criticism, where he already talks about empirical apprehension, but in the preceding one where Kant claims that the ‘Deduction’ achieves the determination of objects, without making clear whether he is talking about empirical objects or an object ‘in general’, that is, the conditions of possibility for objectivity.123 There is, however, a way of decelerating his claim. We can take it to imply that the synthesis of apprehension ultimately falls within the general framework of transcendental unity, but not that the latter imposes form on empirical objects, there being further conditions of empirical unity yet to be established. Nevertheless, it seems probable that at the time of writing the first edition ‘Deduction’ Kant thought he could conclude his argument much more quickly than turned out to be the case.124 Henrich responds to the tendency in Kant’s position associated with the talk of an ‘act’ and which we can identify as impositionalist, as follows: Now the subject is certainly the agent [Akteur] of a number of activities. It can invariably reflect upon itself and initiate syntheses. . . . it still does not always follow that it is in the subject and its acts that the ground must be sought of all the conditions without which the concept of the subject cannot be thought and without which the subject could have no knowledge of itself.125
It is crucial here that not only self-knowledge, which would imply empirical intuition, but also the very thought of the concept of the subject, the ‘I’, may require conditions beyond the subject. In an earlier passage Henrich insists that it is not the case that the subject autonomously guarantees its own unity through its activity of synthesis.126 This is because ‘the continuance of its activity’ is not dependent on itself.127 What other grounds are there for the conditions of self-consciousness and self-knowledge? One promising suggestion may be found in a yet earlier passage where he explains why Kant’s commitment to the subject’s dependence on what is given to it in intuition, results in the fact that he could not have adopted Leibniz’s strict conception of identity.128 Drawing out Henrich’s general position in this way allows us to clarify his distinction between real constitution and logical derivation. The first of these would amount to the position that appearances are directly extracted from subjectivity. The second would coincide with the more complex thought that while the 28
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The Centrality of the Problem of Formalism transcendental unity of apperception is the ground of the connection between subject and world, self-consciousness necessarily stands in relation to a given and ultimately to objects in the world. What Henrich means by logical derivation is clarified by the distinction he draws between numerical identity and the simplicity of the subject. The deduction of the categories – that is, the proof of their legitimacy for all appearances – only succeeds through a ‘complex proof-procedure . . . which must make reference first to the identity of the subject, but then, necessarily to its simplicity as well’.129 Henrich’s view is that Kant tends to concentrate on simplicity at the expense of identity. This is what leads Kant to move so quickly from ‘the subject as a principle of identity to the assumption of a priori rules which apply to all apprehensions’.130 A more mediated relation between subject and rules is required if Kant is not to fall into a theory of ‘real constitution’. This supports my suggestion that Henrich is committed to the subject’s numerical identity arising from a mediate relation to objectivity. For, surely, the rules are ones that put the subject in a necessary relation to the possibility of experiencing objects. However, Henrich’s analysis remains oriented towards subjectivity. Moreover, as we will see, he undermines his commitment to objectivity, which I do not doubt he holds, by insisting that the rules that secure numerical identity are pre-temporal. Henrich’s commitment to the link between apperception and objectivity thus remains problematic. These passages reveal that, for Henrich, impositionalism is avoided principally insofar as Kant establishes complexity within subjectivity. Self-consciousness is certain strictly in the sense that it is underived from any other consciousness.131 This entails only that selfconsciousness is the ineliminable starting point or origin of all knowledge, but not that it contains the sufficient conditions of the latter. The crux of Guyer’s dissatisfaction with Henrich’s account and, at the same time, its productivity for his own attribution of impositionalism to Kant, lies at the other pole of the subject–object relation. This is the implication that we can know a priori that all our representations will be synthesisable under rules that are the conditions of transition between different states of the subject.132 The problem, Guyer’s argument goes, is that this commits Kant to absolute necessity, that is, to the position that anything we experience is necessarily conditioned by rules that arise from self-consciousness. But the question here is surely, how maximal or minimal is the condition? Is the claim that the categories provide the broad framework within which 29
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology experience is possible, or that they determine the shape or form of any empirical experience whatsoever? Given that Guyer argues that Henrich’s position entails impositionalism, he clearly believes that Henrich is committed to the latter of these two options. In attributing a commitment to absolute necessity to Kant as interpreted by Henrich, Guyer represents Henrich’s position as entailing that ‘all of our representations can be known a priori to be subject to synthesis into a “nature” or world of objects themselves completely interrelated by these rules’.133 In the first passage referred to by Guyer, Henrich states that all objects are subject to universal laws insofar as they belong to nature, while in the second he claims ‘It is in relation to this manifoldness of fundamental forms of judgement that the collective unity of objects in One Nature must be thought’.134 In the latter passage Henrich is explicitly concerned with the question of objectivity, however there is no reason to think that he is talking about empirical objectivity. The nature he has in view in both passages is surely that of the most general order of things in relation to the transcendental unity of apperception. Nature at this level is not yet equivalent to the system of empirical nature. This leaves open the possibility that while nature in general is subject to a priori synthesis, empirical nature in its particular detail is not. Were Henrich speaking of nature at the empirical level, this would follow, but we need not conclude that he is doing so when he has made no mention of the empirical. My suggestion gains additional plausibility from Henrich’s insistence that the subject is the underivable starting place for any knowledge, not its sole condition and from his claim that it is not necessary to read Kant as committed to impositionalism. Nevertheless, a statement of the limitations of the argument of the ‘Transcendental Deduction’ is sorely missing in Henrich’s account. My suggested defence of his account in the face of Guyer’s critique entails attributing to him the position that the ‘Transcendental Deduction’ is only the beginning of the project of legitimating the categories and will be supplemented by further arguments showing how they apply to empirical objects. His insistence on the ‘Deduction’ as the sole locus of legitimation for the categories tells against such an extension of his account. As Karl Ameriks reports an observation by Ralph Walker, Henrich’s reading of the ‘Deduction’ may establish nothing more than the necessary application of categories to ‘a blue qualia (sic) that is square’.135 And without an account of the broader epistemological project within which the ‘Deduction’ arises, Guyer’s interpretation is far from unreasonable. 30
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The Centrality of the Problem of Formalism But, what of Henrich’s relationship to formalism? The point at which Henrich most clearly adopts a formalist position comes in the course of a discussion of the way in which the mind ‘can ascertain its identity solely in view of a regulated synthesis’.136 Henrich favours moderate numerical identity in contrast to Leibniz’s strict identity. Moderate numerical identity allows for a change in the states of a thing.137 Henrich argues that it must be possible to know something about transitions taking place under the subject’s identity conditions ‘without being able, in this knowledge, to refer to any definite transitions in which the subject has found itself’.138 What Henrich means is that there is a formal knowledge of transitions or changes prior to any identification of change in the subject at the empirical level. The functions governed by the categories count as modes of transition which: ‘must be constant, because it is only in this way that they are suitable for rendering possible, independently of all experience and in unconditional universality, the knowledge of the subject’s identity, which is at all times possible.’139 Henrich concludes that knowledge of such modes of transition or functions is a necessary condition of the subject’s a priori awareness of itself as identical. Thus self-certainty will only be confirmed as apodeictic insofar as it can be guaranteed that it perseveres throughout such modes of transition. This process is not to be understood as empirical, but rather as prior to experience.140 Henrich next considers the objection that too much may have been derived from a ‘completely formal principle’ and that the mere thought of a sequence of thoughts in time would suffice.141 The objection under consideration is that the temporality of consciousness would be sufficient for establishing the numerical identity of the self. Henrich replies that the transitions he is analysing are prior to temporality and count as analogous to rules of logical derivation.142 It might appear that Henrich’s method is formalist in the particular sense that it is modelled on logic. Yet we have already seen that logical derivation implies a complex derivation of numerical identity as opposed to the claim that knowledge is simply entailed in the subject per se.143 Moreover, Henrich distances himself from ‘a theory of purely formal principles of knowledge (which can also be called a logical theory of experience)’.144 He insists on the need to combine the logical and the real trajectories of Kant’s argument, instead of choosing between them as, he claims, the latter’s commentators have done.145 It is only by combining both dimensions in Kant that the 31
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology categories can be grounded and, significantly, Henrich suggests that this will entail a formal element: Starting from the fundamental notion of the spontaneous and reflectively acting subject, one can ground the validity of necessary rules for all appearances only by means of the other basic notion of the formal and a priori principle of subject identity.146
There are therefore two basic notions: the real one of the consciousness of the ‘I think’, and the formal or logical one of the numerical identity of the subject over time. This reveals that Henrich’s position is a hybrid one, combining form with the particularity or reality of the Cartesian subject. But it is only numerical identity that secures the validity of the categories. Interestingly, this shows his commitment, once again, to the view that the capacity for self-reflection is not merely formal, as Allison would have it, but also real. This is but one of the many complexities of the position he adopts. The interest of this for my own account is the way in which his, admittedly underdeveloped, account of formalism challenges the prevalent equation between the latter and logicism or mere subjectivism. In a later article, Henrich distances himself from logical formalism such as the neo-Kantian project to establish ‘a merely formal property of thoughts which can itself never become an instance of consciousness’ in contrast to an actual thought of self-identity.147 The position he favours insists once again that, although formal, self-consciousness is a ‘real act’ of consciousness.148 But this is not to say that it is actual at all times: ‘it is always possible for self-consciousness to become actual, it does not have to be actual’.149 The form of consciousness is constant and I can be certain of it a priori. The fact that I achieve this level of self-consciousness is, however, not known a priori.150 It is now clear that Henrich’s Cartesian certainty is the formal, but not merely formal, possibility that I can be conscious of my identity in relation to any representation. How great a distance, then, is there between Allison’s account of formal possibility and Henrich’s Cartesian position? We have seen that in Henrich’s account of the apodeictic certainty of apperception, he insists that a Cartesian reflection must be possible on at least some occasions. Allison, we have seen, states that what is at issue is in no sense introspective, being only a form of thought. But it is arguable that self-reflection on the activity of thinking is not introspection. And now it seems that Henrich would be happy with Allison’s claim for the necessity of a possibility of such self-consciousness, for, as we have 32
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The Centrality of the Problem of Formalism just seen, the former holds that we are a priori certain only of the form of consciousness. Henrich insists that actual self-consciousness cannot remain a mere possibility and must be capable of actualisation. But does not Allison’s claim for the necessity of a possibility commit him to the same position? To say this is surely to say more than that only a formal awareness is possible and to commit to the actualisation of that form as a possibility. A fine distinction remains and it seems to be one of emphasis: while Henrich insists the actualisation of the possibility must be possible, Allison says only that the possibility and ‘not its actuality or necessity’ is necessary.151 The final distinction is not as clear-cut as Allison seems to think and is very difficult to pin down, but we can say that, for Henrich, consciousness is referenced to self-consciousness more explicitly than it is for Allison. An assessment of the structure of Henrich’s Cartesianism goes beyond the scope of this discussion. Nevertheless, we have seen that the formal moment in Henrich’s approach aims to establish a set of rules prior to experience and to time. In my opinion this is where the real problem lies. The formal Cartesian status of apperception may not in itself lead to impositionalism, but a-temporal a priori rules appear to do so. While the subject’s identity can only be established in relation to a range of possible judgements, this occurs prior to any actual application within experience. Now in a sense, from a Kantian position, this is uncontroversial. The categories are the formal framework for experience and as such are prior to any actual experience. But the question is: is this a set of, in principle, formal moves that will only be fully worked out in relation to experience, or are they fully formed prior to any application? Their being a priori leaves open both options, but in the second case the order in intuition is imposed. There are two ways in which we can develop the idea that the rules operate in principle. In the first case, the categories, although a-temporal, require temporal schematisation if their full objective validity is to be established.152 But this would mean that the forms as presented in the ‘Transcendental Deduction’ are only provisionally stated. Henrich’s insistence on the primacy of the ‘Deduction’ does not suggest he would wish to adopt this strategy. A stronger position would involve arguing that even apperception stands in some relation to temporality, which is fine-tuned in the ‘Schematism’ and ‘Principles’ chapters of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Thus the categories, while a priori, are temporal at a formal level and are only the first stage of the determination of the rules for the unity of apprehension. It is clear that Henrich would not want to accept that apperception is in any sense 33
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology temporal, so this option is definitely not open to him. Once again, it would appear that the additional moves that Henrich could make in order to avoid impositionalism are not ones he could or would take. But is Henrich’s insistence on the pre-temporal status of the rules that express the possible modifications of numerical identity, in effect the categories, not wholly faithful to Kant? After all, is it not the case that, for Kant, apperception is distinct from temporality? It would not be possible to supply a thorough answer to this complicated question here, but I will provide a sketch developing the second interpretative option just mentioned. The transcendental unity of apperception is the form of thought and thus is peculiarly linked to the understanding. However, apperception is a synthetic unity and what it synthesises is the manifold in intuition. All intuition, without exception, is temporal. Thus apperception is the exercise of the understanding in relation to intuition. The initial condition of apperception lies on the intellectual side of dualism, which taken in abstraction from the activity of synthesis counts as a-temporal. But this initial condition initiates a synthesis that is necessarily temporal. The transcendental unity of apperception is the synthetic unity of the temporal achieved by the understanding. This synthesis operates at a formal level and thus entails no empirical time consciousness, but it counts as the form of temporality that necessarily precedes any particular temporal determination.153 We can conceive of a version of this account more closely modelled on Henrich’s interpretation. Self-certainty is only achieved in relation to a number of rules that govern appearances, including, ultimately, empirical ones. These rules are nothing other than the rules for synthesis of the manifold of intuition. Certainty attaching to apperception thus arises only in relation to a synthesis that necessarily has intuition as one of its terms. In effect, as in my original account of this version, apperception entails the exercise of understanding on intuition. The certainty of apperception cannot be established in detachment from this synthesis. It is neither Henrich’s intention, nor is it a necessary corollary of his Cartesian interpretation of Kant, that his account results in impositionalism. We have seen, however, that insufficient attention to the levels at which Kant is concerned with nature encourage interpretations such as Guyer’s. I have argued, nevertheless, that the real danger of impositionalism derives from Henrich’s insistence that experience is based on an a-temporal a priori set of rules. Apperception is thus set outside or at the limits of the spatio-temporal world. In a more recent 34
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The Centrality of the Problem of Formalism publication he goes so far as to suggest a reciprocal relation between subject and world: ‘But the source from which a world originates is equally dependent on that world.’154 Both mind and world are cooriginary, yet Henrich does not sufficiently develop the object pole of the subject–object relation. The result has been that his Cartesian position has been able to serve as a basis for impositionalist readings of Kant despite Henrich’s strong intentions to the contrary.
IV Strawson’s critique of transcendental psychology I now turn to consider the interpretation of Peter Strawson, whose Bounds of Sense (1966) has been so influential within the Englishspeaking world. The distinctive contribution of his interpretation is his diagnosis of faculty talk as characteristic of Kant’s formalism and as the source of the latter’s ‘impositionalism’. For Strawson, impositionalism and formalism are inextricably entwined. Kant’s epistemology rests on the distinction between a world of appearances and a world of things in themselves, while his account of our knowledge of the world of appearances depends on a metaphysics of mind, that is, a faculty theory. The latter is what Strawson calls ‘the idiom of the faculties’.155 According to Strawson, it is the second thesis that does all the argumentative work. It is because Kant insists that the world is only accessible to us through the apparatus of the faculties that he relies on a ‘two-worlds’ metaphysics. Strawson adopts an approach that has become common within Anglo-American approaches to Kant and other systematic thinkers. Some supposed kernel of critical philosophy is defended, while an array of other, apparently central, theses are rejected. A general suspicion of ‘systematicity’ supports this approach. Strawson intends to retain Kant’s commitment to ‘the principle of significance’. This is the maxim that ‘there can be no legitimate, or even meaningful, employment of ideas or concepts which does not relate them to empirical or experiential conditions of their application’.156 According to this principle, transcendent metaphysics is rejected because of its lack of empirical significance. It is therefore replaced by a transcendental ‘investigation of that limiting framework of ideas and principles the use and application of which are essential to empirical knowledge, and which are implicit in any coherent conception of experience which we can form’.157 Strawson claims that empiricism is in broad agreement with the principle of significance and with its rejection of transcendent metaphysics. 35
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology However Strawson believes that the search for an a priori framework leads Kant to straddle the boundary that he has shown to be impassable. Operating at an a priori level would entail exercising reason beyond the bounds of sense, thus entering into the transcendent metaphysical area Kant himself proscribed. While Strawson maintains that Kant does not slip back into a traditional form of transcendent metaphysics, he claims that a new and equally illicit metaphysical position emerges as ‘transcendental psychology’. If there is no transcendent beyond, there is instead a transcendent mind that imposes structures on nature. This runs very much against the grain of Strawson’s own empiricism: Is it not, after all, easy to read the very formulation of the programme – ‘the determination of the fundamental general structure of any conception of experience such as we can make intelligible to ourselves’ – in such a way as to suggest the Kantian-seeming thought that any necessary limits we find in such a conception are limits imposed by our capacities?158
Strawson’s impositionalist conclusion arises from failing to distinguish two ways in which subjectivity could enter into Kant’s argument. Subjective forms could count as necessary conditions of determination – this is in fact what Kant holds and it is a highly defensible position – or they could be the necessary and sufficient conditions of determination.159 I have suggested in my response to Guyer that Kant’s claim is that mind initiates order, but not that the latter is imposed. According to Strawson, Transcendental Idealism necessarily entails the stronger claim. He concludes that this is not just a possible reading of Kant, but the one he favours.160 Kant’s mistake, in Strawson’s eyes, is to make experience wholly dependent on the exercise of mental faculties that impose limits or forms. Thus this interpretation, which started by distinguishing the transcendent from the transcendental, ends up accusing Kant of muddying the divide. The transcendental faculties that impose form or limitation on matter have become the new transcendent and reopen a ‘two-worlds’ ontology despite the Copernican turn, which sought to eliminate all objects not capable of being experienced by us. As Strawson crucially remarks: ‘The doctrine is not merely that we can have no knowledge of a supersensible reality. The doctrine is that reality is supersensible and that we can have no knowledge of it.’161 Strawson sums up the supposed difficulty thus: The doctrine of transcendental idealism, and the associated picture of the receiving and ordering apparatus of the mind producing nature as we 36
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The Centrality of the Problem of Formalism know it out of the unknowable reality of things as they are in themselves, are undoubtedly the chief obstacles to a sympathetic understanding of the Critique.162
He proceeds to consider, briefly, that there may be other ‘weakened interpretations of these doctrines’. Maybe this talk of faculties is only an expository device or ‘a device for presenting an analytical or conceptual inquiry in a form readily grasped by the picture-loving imagination’.163 He dismisses both options as imputing a ‘half-conscious irony’ foreign to Kant.164 One cannot but agree that Kant must have intended more than expository clarity by such an intricate device. And although unconscious irony cannot be ruled out, half-conscious irony indeed seems alien to the generally sober tone of the Critique. Another possibility is that the faculty idiom does some real transcendental work in Kant’s account. Strawson’s lack of sympathy with Kant’s systematic project is transparent in the ‘General Review’ of The Bounds of Sense, where ‘the story of synthesis’ is rejected on the basis that ‘we can claim no empirical knowledge of its truth’.165 He goes on to raise the very pertinent issue of what resources this leaves for addressing the question: ‘when we speak of the necessary unity of experiences, what are the items so unified, and in what does their necessity consist?’166 His answer is as follows: First, the unified items are just the experiences reported in our ordinary reports of what we see, feel, hear, etc. . . . Second, the unity of these experiences under the rules embodied in the concepts of objects is just what is exemplified in the general coherence and consistency of our ordinary descriptions of what we see, hear, feel, etc. The employability of such concepts as these, hence the objectivity of experience in general, is necessarily bound up with the fulfilment of this requirement of consistency or unity.167
According to this view, the necessary unity within experience does not imply a priori forms generated by a spontaneous mind. Rather, our ordinary language descriptions pick out the structure of experience, which is now to be understood as amounting to its ‘coherence and consistency’. As Strawson later remarks, ‘no high doctrine’ – that is, theory of a priori form – is necessary.168 Kant’s insistence that only a transcendental form of experience will vindicate claims to validity within empirical experience, has been replaced with the claim that empirical experience itself – or at least our ordinary linguistic descriptions of it – exhibits its validity insofar as it is consistent and coherent. We no 37
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology longer find a transcendental theory of knowledge but, rather, empirical coherentism. I agree with Strawson that dualism and faculty talk are two sides of one coin, but I understand both of these and the relation in which they stand to one another in a quite different fashion. I will argue in what follows that Kant’s commitment to an investigation of the internal complexity of mind does not entail his giving up on a commitment to the empirical significance of those structures. Kant transformed the ‘faculty talk’ already current in the philosophical vocabulary.169 His faculty talk allows him to express a new model of reason as a dynamic interaction between a plurality of mental capacities or orientations. It also allows him to present experience as an ongoing task, rather than as a fait accompli. Subjective conditions initiate the task of knowledge, but they do not complete it. This positive account of ‘faculty talk’ distinguishes my position not only from those such as Strawson and Guyer who criticise it, but also from others like Allison, Pippin and Buchdahl who seek to replace it with a wholly logical concern with ‘epistemic conditions’. In the same vein, I take issue with Strawson’s understanding of Kant’s concern for limits.170 While Strawson follows Locke’s stricture that philosophy should practise a hygiene of self-regulation, the Copernican revolution introduces a radical reinterpretation of the role of limit in philosophy.171 Locke’s version expresses a pragmatic interest and intellectual modesty, whereas Kant moves the discussion to a metaphysical level insofar as he is concerned with limits as conditions of possibility for physis or nature.172 Where Strawson thinks that limits should only be abstracted from experience, Kant holds that limits are necessary conditions for the possibility of experience and thus count as a priori. Transcendental Idealism insists that empirical realism will only be secured if we are able to think the possibility of experience, not just its actuality. This entails thinking of limits in a more radical way than is allowed by a Lockean economy and leads to a fundamental disagreement about the role of form in experience. The a priori framework is the limit beyond which knowledge is impossible, but it is also the condition of the possibility of knowledge and experience. Our subjective cognitive faculties are the condition for any experience whatsoever and as such count as the limiting framework of that experience. However, as I have already suggested and will argue in what follows, these conditions initiate and do not impose order on nature. 38
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The Centrality of the Problem of Formalism Strawson’s critique of ‘faculty talk’ still has a significant influence on how Kant is read, despite the ways in which contemporary commentators distance themselves from his interpretation. It is likely that it is because of the way in which the ‘idiom of the faculties’ has been tainted that Kant’s supporters try to avoid the issue if at all possible. Meanwhile we have found that his critics return to Kant’s talk of the faculties. We have seen that Pippin rejects Strawson’s critique, preferring a metaphysically neutral reading over a psychological one. Pippin’s analysis of Kant’s supposed failure focuses on the latter’s aim of establishing an ‘independent analysis of knowing’ and not on faculty talk per se. However, it is faculty-talk that prevents Kant from escaping impositionalism via the theory of judgement. The reliance on an ‘obscure theory of pure intuition’ undermines the project of achieving a theory of knowledge that is comprehensive and at the same time ‘empirically guided’.173 And while Guyer seeks to distance his account from Strawson’s, I have suggested that his distinction between absolute and conditional necessity is more reliant on a concern with the ‘idiom of the faculties’ than he admits. Passages Guyer relies on for establishing Kant’s commitment to the absolute necessity refer to the faculties, while others that Guyer concedes display only a conditional necessity use the more neutral terminology of ‘conditions’. While Guyer’s criticism of Kant here is not in direct lineage with Strawson’s, it is nevertheless Kant’s concern with the internal structure of the mind and its status as a ground for experience that leads, in both their views, to impositionalism.
Conclusion In this chapter we have seen that all four interpreters considered present Kant’s position as formalist. The precise nature of the formalism attributed to him is varied, but in every case the latter is seen as resulting in the subjectivism of his epistemological project. Moreover for all of these authors, Kant’s project offers not just an investigation of the subjective necessary conditions of experience, but also the claim that its foundational ground lies in the subject alone. This leads Guyer and Strawson to conclude that Kant is impositionalist. While Pippin and Henrich resist this view, I have argued that their interpretations ultimately invite the conclusion that Kant’s formalism results in an overly subjective account of knowledge. 39
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Notes 1. For now I will leave open the ontological status of objects, which could be understood in a realist or phenomenalist manner. In what follows, I hope to establish that these are not the only options. 2. Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, p. 55. 3. Ibid., For an extended account of Guyer’s contrast between these two positions, see pp. 53–61 and my discussion below, pp. 17–18. 4. I will investigate how we might understand this claim in what follows. 5. Robert Pippin, Kant’s Theory of Form ( KTF), p. 223. See also pp. 29–30 on the notion of ‘guidedness’ and pp. 46–53. 6. Ibid., p. 51. 7. Ibid., p. 218. See also pp. 46 ff. on the problem of Angewiesenheit or guidedness and on ‘affection’. 8. Ibid., p. 219, n. 5. See Norman Kemp Smith, Commentary to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, and Hans Vaihinger, Kommentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. 9. This is the core of Kemp Smith’s phenomenalist reading of Kant, which is, he believes, equivalent to an objective idealism. 10. Kemp Smith, Commentary, p. xxxiii. 11. See, for instance, Vaihinger, The Philosophy of ‘As if’, pp. 30–1, where the categories are characterised as ‘analogical fictions’ that do not give rise to knowledge of reality. Interestingly, Pippin uncritically adopts Gerd Buchdahl’s characterisation of reflective judgement as a mental projection. Buchdahl’s account can be seen as a much more sophisticated reworking of Vaihinger’s interpretation. See discussion of Buchdahl in Chapter 2 (pp. 59–60). 12. See Pippin, KTF, pp. 34–5 on indeterminacy and pp. 29–30 on indirectness. 13. See Paul Guyer, ‘Kant on Apperception and A Priori Synthesis’; and Kant and the Claims of Knowledge. See Pippin, KTF, p. 102, n. 16. 14. Pippin, KTF, p. 102. 15. Ibid., p. 103. 16. Ibid., p. 219. 17. Ibid., p. 219. 18. Ibid., p. 102, n. 16. 19. See, for instance, Pippin, KTF, p. 100, n. 13, for the agreement in which Pippin stands to Melnick for whom ‘categories are the features objects must have if they are to be subject to our forms of thought’. Melnick uses the expression ‘epistemic concepts’ to capture the formal characteristic of the categories. Pippin refers to Melnick’s Kant’s Analogies of Experience, pp. 40 ff. especially p. 45. This account seems very close to Allison’s characterisation of the categories as epistemic conditions. See my discussion of Allison in the next chapter. The 40
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20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.
28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.
35. 36. 37.
38. 39.
categories provide the form of experience, rather than imposing form on the latter. See Pippin, KTF, p. 102: ‘The question the deduction will pose is thus not: Can we discover in the understanding (as birthplace) concepts which lie there (like seeds) prior to any actual experience? but: Can we identify and justify a use of concepts which establishes a relation to all possible objects of experience which does not justify that use by appeal to what we have experienced?’ See Pippin, KTF, p. 185. Ibid., p. 221. Ibid., pp. 209–10, n. 38. See also p. 221. See the final section of this chapter (pp. 35–9). See, for instance, Pippin’s statement that Kant has a ‘metaphysically neutral notion of intellectual activity’, KTF, p. 221. See also p. 76. Ibid., p. 92 (Pippin’s emphasis). Critique of Pure Reason, A 137–47, B 176–87. Pippin, KTF, p. 87. Pippin’s restriction of Kant’s project to a system of rules shows, I believe, his agreement with Allison’s reading of transcendental idealism as a theory of epistemic conditions. See Chapter 2 of this volume (pp. 62–3). However, as we will see later in this chapter, Pippin’s account is also reminiscent of Henrich’s reading of Kant, where pre-temporal rules provide a formal framework. Whereas both Allison and Henrich hold that a formalist interpretation secures the success of Kant’s epistemic project, Pippin believes that Kant’s formalism is the source of its failure. See also Pippin, KTF, pp. 154 ff. Ibid., p. 185. See ibid., p. 171. The methodological is equated with the formal ibid., p. 196. The latter is equated with a meta-level analysis on p. 217. Ibid., p. 25. Ibid., p. 223. Ibid., p. 142; see also pp. 221–2. Pippin also suggests that Kant’s theory of judgement could have provided a solution to the problem of applicability. I hope to show in what follows that judgement is indeed the clue to the possibility of applicability. Ibid., p. 222. Ibid., p. 222. In Chapter 4, pp. 113–16, I argue that dualism is less rigid than Pippin suggests and entails a plurality of the faculties. Ibid., p. 142 (Pippin’s emphasis). The tension in Pippin’s position is evident in the move between a rejection of ‘any simplistic resort to the imposition metaphor’ on p. 226 and his final diagnosis of Kant’s formalism on pp. 227–8. Ibid., p. 142. Ibid., p. 152. 41
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology 40. Ibid., p. 152. 41. This sounds very similar to Henrich’s interpretation as we will see below. 42. Pippin, KTF, pp. 209–10. See discussion earlier in this section, p. 12. 43. See especially ibid., pp. 143–50. 44. Critique of Judgment, AA 179. 45. See discussion of the systematic function of reflective judgement in Chapter 7, pp. 249–55. 46. Pippin, KTF, pp. 118–19 (my addition). See also p. 221. 47. Ibid., p. 118, n. 41. See also Pippin, ‘Kant on Empirical Concepts’, p. 15: ‘It is the subjective nature of this demand or ‘need’ for unity which, while it reveals how deeply connected Kant’s version of empirical knowledge is with his theory of reflective judgement, is of little help with our problem here.’ In both cases Pippin gives exactly the same reference to Buchdahl’s Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science, pp. 504–6. Interestingly, in later work, Pippin introduces a quite different interpretation of reflective judgement as involving an orientation to nature. See his ‘The Significance of Taste’, especially pp. 567–9. See also ‘Avoiding German Idealism’, especially pp. 987–8 and pp. 990–1. 48. Pippin, KTF, pp. 227–8. 49. Ibid., p. 228. 50. Ibid., p. 230: ‘The broad problem at stake in all such critical enterprises is how to determine in general proper “account-giving” in philosophy, and indeed in all knowledge or discourse. To make such a determination implies some sort of comprehensive perspective on what can or cannot be said, or known . . . I have suggested that, however important and interesting many of Kant’s reflections on the problem of form are, this comprehensiveness is not attained.’ 51. See ibid., pp. 5–6, n. 6, on Hegel. 52. Ibid., p. 212: ‘If we are in fact “called on” to make assumptions about experience, which assumptions can direct but whose terms transcend such experience, then which assumptions would seem to be much more a result of reflection on the actual, scientific questions asked in various contexts, than on the formal nature of human reason. If in fact this were true, then it would also follow that the more effective such “holistic” assumptions were, especially in increasing actual empirical knowledge, the more inclined we would be to treat such assumptions less as regulative maxims, and more as correct explanations of nature.’ 53. Ibid., p. 228. 54. See, for instance, Paul Guyer, ‘Kant on Apperception and A Priori Synthesis’, p. 211. 55. Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge ( KCK). 56. Guyer, ‘Kant on Apperception’; Pippin, KTF. 42
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The Centrality of the Problem of Formalism 57. Guyer, KCK, p. 123. 58. Ibid., p. 55: ‘he does not suggest that the mind is such that it can always ensure that experience is possible, but rather that it is so constituted that experience will be possible only if the objects of experience, as a matter of fact, conform to the requisite conditions’. 59. Ibid., p. 123. 60. Ibid., p. 55 (quoted on p. 9, this chapter). 61. Ibid., p. 55. 62. Ibid., p. 363. Guyer refers to the discussion of the debate between Trendelenburg and Kuno Fischer in Vaihinger, Kommentar (vol. 2, pp. 290–326), and in Kemp Smith, Commentary, pp. 113–14. 63. I agree with Guyer’s diagnosis that, for Kant, the fit between the spatiotemporal features of mind and of objects cannot be merely coincidental. However, this does not mean that form is imposed on nature, but rather that form supplies a structure necessary for any experience. This is only the beginning and not the conclusion of how order arises within experience. 64. See Karl Ameriks’ excellent account in ‘Kant and Guyer on Apperception’, in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 65. 65. Guyer, ‘Kant on Apperception’, p. 206. 66. Ibid., p. 206. 67. Ibid., p. 206. 68. Ibid., p. 208. 69. Ibid., p. 208. 70. Ibid., p. 206, A 99–100: ‘synthesis of apprehension must also be exercised a priori, that is, in respect of representations which are not empirical. For without it we should never have a priori the representations either of space or of time.’ Guyer notes in this article and at the outset of his book that the translations he uses are normally his own, although guided by Kemp Smith. I leave his translations unaltered in this section. 71. Ibid., p. 206. References are to A 99–100 and to A 110. 72. Ibid., p. 206. The reference is to A 113. 73. Ibid., p. 206. The reference is to A 101–2. 74. Ibid., p. 206. The reference is to A 117–18. 75. Ibid., p. 206. The reference is to Critique of Pure Reason ( CPR), B 134. The emphasis is Guyer’s. 76. This suggests that Guyer’s critique of Kant may be more indebted to Peter Strawson’s The Bounds of Sense than he suggests. See the discussion of Strawson’s critique of Kant’s use of an idiom of the faculties in the final section of this chapter. Guyer refers to Strawson at the outset of his article, seeking to distinguish his own position from the latter’s. See Guyer, ‘Kant on Apperception’, p. 205. In the final section, Guyer claims that ‘“transcendental psychology” may be removed from “what is living” in Kant’s philosophy’ (p. 211). 43
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology 77. Guyer, ‘Kant on Apperception’, p. 207. 78. Ibid., p. 207. Reference also to CPR, A 130. 79. Ibid., p. 207. The reference is to CPR, A 125. Guyer’s translation is slightly different from Kemp Smith’s. See also the discussion of A ‘Deduction’ in Chapter 4, pp. 121–32. 80. Guyer, ‘Kant on Apperception’, p. 207. 81. CPR, A 125. 82. Thus I agree with Guyer’s translation on this point. 83. CPR, A 125–6 (my translation). 84. Guyer, ‘Kant on Apperception’, p. 207. The reference is to CPR, A 125 (Guyer’s emphasis). 85. Ibid., p. 207. The reference is to A 130. 86. See discussion of the hierarchical nature of the full version of Kant’s deduction of the categories in Chapter 6 below. 87. Guyer, ‘Kant on Apperception’, p. 206. 88. Guyer, KCK, p. 6. 89. See ibid., p. 418, for Guyer’s analysis of the structure of Kant’s ‘transcendental deductions’ in contrast to ‘transcendental proofs’ understood more widely. 90. Ibid., p. 438, n. 2. 91. Ibid., p. 131. 92. As we will see in the next section (pp. 25–35), Guyer’s account of the identity of the self throughout experiences owes a debt to Henrich. 93. Guyer, KCK, p. 131 (my addition). Once again this is very close to Henrich as we will see in the following section (pp. 25–35). See Guyer, ‘Review of Identität und Objectivität’, p. 153, where he refers to pp. 16–53 of Henrich’s German edition. 94. CPR, A 127; cited in Guyer, KCK, p. 132. 95. CPR, A 122; see Guyer, KCK, p. 132. 96. Guyer, KCK, p. 132. 97. Ibid., p. 26. 98. In contrast Guyer asks why we shouldn’t rehabilitate ‘transcendental realism’ regarding space and time. See ibid., p. 349. 99. In Guyer’s view this is to be found principally in some unpublished remarks and in a letter written in 1792 to Beck and not in the CPR. It thus stands in contrast to what Guyer interprets as Kant’s official position. 100. Guyer, KCK, p. 415. 101. Ibid., p. 414. See discussion of Allison’s Kant’s Transcendental Idealism in Chapter 2, pp. 61–9. 102. Ibid., p. 414. 103. In this section I will principally discuss Henrich’s Identität und Objectivität. An English version, ‘Identity and Objectivity’, is to be found in Henrich, The Unity of Reason. 44
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The Centrality of the Problem of Formalism 104. See Guyer’s ‘Review of Identität und Objectivität’. 105. We will come back to what is meant by this particular kind of identity. See Henrich, ‘Identity and Objectivity’. See especially pp. 186–7 on numerical identity and Cartesian certainty (Identität und Objectivität: pp. 86–7). See also Henrich, ‘The Identity of the Subject in the Transcendental Deduction’, in Schaper and Vossenkuhl, Reading Kant, especially pp. 254 and 261–6 on ‘numerical identity’. 106. Henry Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism ( KTI) (1983), p. 140. (This discussion is omitted in the 2004 edition.) In a note, Allison says that Guyer criticises Henrich for his Cartesian reading of Kant (see p. 353, n. 23). But it is rather that Guyer criticises the Cartesian tendency in Kant and agrees with Henrich’s reading. See Guyer, ‘Review’, p. 162. Speaking of Henrich’s claim that, for Kant, we have a priori knowledge of numerical identity, Guyer states: ‘I have no doubt that Kant does subscribe to this argument’. Admittedly Guyer questions Henrich’s use of the term ‘Cartesian’. He suggests that to call the certainty of apperception ‘Cartesian’ is misleading as Descartes was referring to a singular starting point, whereas Henrich seeks to establish the foundation of a plurality of certain forms of judgement. Moreover, for Descartes the certainty of the Cogito does not imply certainty about the continuing existence of a thinking substance or of the conservation of finite substances, for the latter requires God. However, it is likely that Henrich uses the term ‘Cartesian’ in a way similar to Husserl, that is to express an apodeictic starting place, rather than to subscribe to Descartes’ wider metaphysics. See Husserl, Cartesian Meditations. See Chapter 2, pp. 61–9 below for an extended discussion of Allison. 107. Allison, KTI (1983), p. 144 (my emphasis). 108. Ibid., p. 144. 109. This is in part because (as we will see later), for Henrich, apperception is not only real but also formal. 110. Guyer, ‘Review’, p. 166. See also p. 167, where he says that absolute certainty entails ‘we can always force our future representations to conform to our categorial rules’. 111. See discussion of logical derivation and real constitution later in this section. 112. Guyer, ‘Review’, pp. 166–7. 113. Yet again Guyer refers to Kant’s account of the ‘affinity’ of nature as his trump card. See ‘Review’, p. 166, n. 12. The reference is to CPR, A 121–125. See my discussion of this in the previous section. 114. See discussion of Guyer’s article, ‘Kant on Apperception’, on p. 18. 115. See in particular Guyer’s discussion of Henrich’s insistence on the necessity of self-consciousness on pp. 163 and 164 of his ‘Review’. 45
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology 116. Henrich, ‘Identity and Objectivity’, p. 198; references to the German edition follow in brackets (p. 100). 117. Guyer does not discuss this specific argument in his ‘Review’. 118. Henrich, ‘Identity and Objectivity’, p. 201 (p. 103). 119. Ibid., p. 201 (p. 104). 120. CPR, A108. Cited by Henrich, ‘Identity and Objectivity’, pp. 199–200 (p. 102). 121. Henrich, ‘Identity and Objectivity’, p. 200 (p. 102). 122. Ibid., p. 201 (p. 104). 123. CPR, A 108: ‘The original and necessary consciousness of the identity of the self is thus at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts, that is, according to rules, which not only make them necessarily reproducible but also in so doing determine an object for their intuition, that is, the concept of something wherein they are necessarily interconnected’ (my emphasis). 124. See Chapter 6 on Kant’s discussion of special laws in the ‘Deduction’. 125. Henrich, ‘Identity and Objectivity’, p. 201 (p. 104). Note Henrich’s mention of the capacity of the subject to initiate synthesis. 126. Ibid., p. 186 (pp. 85–6). 127. Ibid., p. 186 (p. 85). 128. Ibid., p. 181: ‘for the states of the representing subject are dependent upon what is given to it in intuition’ (p. 79). 129. Ibid., p. 204 (p. 107). 130. Ibid., p. 203 (p. 106). 131. Ibid., p. 164 (pp. 58–9). 132. Guyer, ‘Review’, pp. 152–3. Guyer argues that it is Henrich’s commitment to the certainty of self-consciousness that leads to absolute necessity, but it is the conclusion of this entailment that really worries him. 133. Ibid., p. 153. Guyer refers to pp. 52 and 109 of the German edition. 134. The first passage is from Henrich, ‘Identity and Objectivity’, pp. 159–60 (p. 52). The second is from Ibid., p. 206 (p. 109). See Guyer’s ‘Review’, p. 153. 135. Karl Ameriks, ‘Recent Work on Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy’, p. 16. He refers to Ralph Walker, A Selective Bibliography on Kant, p. 195. 136. Henrich, ‘Identity and Objectivity’, p. 187 (p. 87). 137. See ibid., p. 180 (p. 78): ‘Particular things can remain the same throughout change in their states as long as several of their constitutive properties remain unchanged or as long as the thing in question endures through the continuous, but never total change of its states.’ In contrast, Leibniz’s strict numerical identity is committed to the view that ‘all states of substances are present in them from the beginning onward’ (p. 179 (p. 77)). This results in the theory of substances as monads. 46
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The Centrality of the Problem of Formalism 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147.
148. 149. 150.
151. 152. 153.
154.
155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166.
Ibid., p. 187 (p. 86). Ibid., p. 188 (p. 88). Ibid., p. 188 (p. 88). Ibid., p. 189 (p. 89). Ibid., p. 189 (p. 90). Ibid., p. 201 (pp. 103–4). See discussion on pp. 28–9. Ibid., p. 207 (p. 111). Ibid., pp. 207–8 (pp. 111–12). Ibid., p. 208 (p. 112). Henrich, ‘The Identity of the Subject in the Transcendental Deduction’, Section 6: ‘Identity as a Formal Property of Self-Consciousness’, in Schaper and Vossenkuhl, Reading Kant, pp. 266–70. See in particular p. 268. Ibid., p. 268. Ibid., p. 268. Ibid., p. 269. It should be noted that Henrich’s ‘fact’ is not the same as Allison’s. See Allison, KTI, p. 140, cited on p. 25 above. Whereas Henrich’s ‘fact’ would be a successful actualisation of form and would not count as a priori, Allison’s is the transcendental presupposition of a formal structure. Allison, KTI (1983), p. 140. See discussion on pp. 25–6 above. Chapter 6 is a working-through of this perspective. I present a version of this argument in my ‘Kant’s Phenomenological Reduction?’, where I argue that aesthetic judgement reveals the primary temporalisation and spatialisation necessary for any judgement (Hughes 2007). ‘The Moral Image of the World’, in Henrich, Aesthetic Judgement and the Moral Image of the World, p. 3. At the same point he also says ‘it can be shown that the unity of self-consciousness could not even be conceived unless that very unity functions as the point of departure for constituting a world of objects’. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, p. 30. Ibid., p. 16. Ibid., p. 18. Ibid., p. 44 (Strawson’s emphasis). See Chapter 5 on the subjective side of the deduction, and Chapter 4, pp. 116–19, on the status of faculty talk. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, p. 44. Ibid., p. 38. Ibid., p. 22 (my emphasis). Ibid., p. 22. Ibid., p. 22. Ibid., p. 32. Ibid., p. 32. 47
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology 167. Ibid., p. 32. 168. Ibid., p. 44. 169. For a related claim, see Henrich, ‘Kant’s Explanation of Aesthetic Judgment’, in Aesthetic Judgement and The Moral Image of the World. See especially pp. 32 and 54. 170. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, p. 44. 171. See John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding ‘Introduction’ pp. 46–7: ‘Our Business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our Conduct’. See also p. 44. 172. Kant was undoubtedly metaphysical in this sense, as is any philosophical position that goes beyond bare naturalism. If any version of transcendence is in question, metaphysics is at issue. But this is not to say that the projection of a transcendent or dogmatic position is necessary for metaphysics. If transcendence emerges within, or at least in relation to, experience, metaphysics can be critical or dualist and avoid dogmatism. 173. See discussion on Pippin, pp. 10–17 ff. above.
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2
Formalism and the Circle of Representation
The purpose of this chapter is to show how formalism is defended by some of Kant’s most important recent supporters. Gerd Buchdahl’s Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science, first published in 1969, set the scene for the riposte to the dominant Strawsonian critique of Kant, published three years previously in 1966.1 Henry Allison openly acknowledges his debt to Buchdahl, as does Pippin in his less sympathetic interpretation of Kant. Béatrice Longuenesse’s direct reference to Buchdahl is restricted to one critical note, but his influence can be indirectly traced through Allison.2 While in the accounts offered by Buchdahl, Allison and Longuenesse we will find more positive accounts of formalism than offered by Kant’s critics, I will nevertheless argue that we discover an emphasis on subjective structure at the expense of a convincing account of the relation between subjective form and the material given in experience. Both Buchdahl and Longuenesse, for all the many strengths of their interpretations, risk falling into what I call a circle of representation. Allison has a more convincing account of affection, but still fails to provide a sufficiently robust account of the material side of experience.
I Buchdahl’s Reductive Formalism Buchdahl’s intricate and forceful interpretation of Kant has not often been given due attention. While his extensive discussion of Kant in Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science is regularly cited, it is not so often analysed or assessed. Nevertheless, Buchdahl’s interpretation of Kant has been of great importance for Pippin, as we saw in the previous chapter, and also for Allison, whom I will discuss in the following section. Buchdahl’s reading diagnoses a hierarchy of formal frameworks for experience in Kant’s epistemology. He argues that the categories of the understanding provide a provisional template for the derivation of methodological principles that establish how we should judge in empirical cases.3 The categories do not, however, automatically supply the content or even the form of empirical judgements.4 49
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology His later work, Kant and the Dynamics of Reason, develops this perspective and, in particular, the view that an approach inspired by Husserl’s phenomenological reduction allows for a new assessment of the status of Kant’s ontological commitments. I will concentrate exclusively on establishing the formalist status of Buchdahl’s interpretation and on showing how his version of formalism leads to a problem in the account he gives of extra-mental reality. Buchdahl insists that Kant’s critical project is not intended to secure the certainty of particular descriptions of the world, but only the formal conditions which first make possible the certainty of those propositions: We are no longer concerned with the question of the certainty of our knowledge of such and such a set of statements, but only of the formal conditions that have to be satisfied before questions of certainty can even be asked.5
This is critical philosophy’s transcendental turn to the conditions of the possibility of experience. Only once transcendental conditions have been established will it be possible to assess the validity of concrete propositions about experience. Despite widespread recognition that conditions of possibility are the trademark of the critical turn, there remains, in Buchdahl’s opinion, much confusion between and conflation of transcendental and empirical levels of analysis. One leading example of this is the assumption that in the analysis of causality in the Second Analogy, Kant is already referring to actual causal connection, rather than investigating the ground of the possibility of any causal connection.6 Kant’s focus, Buchdahl insists, is on the transcendental form of experience, although he prefers to refer to this as structure, and, in particular, as transcendental structure.7 In addition to the distinction between transcendental and empirical levels of experience, Buchdahl insists on further distinctions at the transcendental or formal level. In Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science, Buchdahl distinguishes between the categorical and regulative orders of experience.8 While the first coincides with the most general order of experience or phenomena, the second aims at establishing an order among the range of particular natural laws. Thus there are two orders of nature. The first arises from the understanding and its generation of categories, while the second arises only insofar as reason projects an orientating idea that makes possible order in empirical nature. Buchdahl argues that the second order is only loosely or analogously modelled on the first, which thus does not 50
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Formalism and the Circle of Representation provide the validating grounds of the former.9 While categorical principles are objective in the sense that, without them, the experience of objects would be impossible, regulative principles are only subjective in that they arise from an intervention on the part of the subject.10 The order among empirical laws of nature is a construct that facilitates the investigation of that world, particularly by science. In Kant and the Dynamics of Reason, Buchdahl distinguishes three levels of formal structure. These coincide with what he calls general, special and systems ontology. All three operate at the level of possibility, that is, they establish the possibility of a certain level of experiencing nature. General ontology investigates the possibility of nature in general, while special ontology is concerned with material (or physical) nature and systems ontology with ‘nature as an “ordered” system of objects and of the empirical laws that govern their behaviour’.11 The first coincides with the constitutive principles and the third with the regulative principles. The second denotes the territory of Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science and ‘investigates the possibility, and thus intelligibility, of the basic concepts and laws of Newtonian science’.12 The identification of this distinctive ontology reinforces Buchdahl’s point that the Critique of Pure Reason does not directly offer a foundation for Newtonian physics.13 In laying out the three levels at which nature can be ordered, I follow Buchdahl’s order of presentation. However it may be useful to remember that the hierarchical sequence from generality towards empirical application would, rather, be from general via systems to special ontology. Systems ontology provides the mediating principle that allows for the transition from general ontology to the construction of a formal structure for Newtonian physics. Primarily Buchdahl is concerned with the first and third levels of ontology, that is, with ‘the real possibility of objective cognition or experience in general’ and with ‘the problem of the validation of the methodological maxims and ideas of natural science’.14 As in his earlier work, the analysis of causality is a touchstone for the distinction between levels. General ontology establishes only that a concept of causality must be presupposed. Any actual causal connection can only count as contingent.15 Buchdahl goes so far as to say that the transcendental category of causation ‘might be quite compatible with the absence of a network of laws, or of any laws whatsoever’.16 Systems ontology alone is capable of establishing that experience as a whole is causally connected, but it only operates regulatively or subjectively, that is, from the point of view of the judging subject. 51
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology The methodological approach, which treats nature as a system of empirical laws, allows for the emergence of a further level of analysis of nature as material or physical. This is the level of special ontology, which, while it does not directly coincide with Newtonian physics, establishes the philosophical perspective from which the latter operates. Each level of possibility, or ontology, ultimately counts as formal. In general ontology the forms of space and time and the categories supply the framework of nature in general. In systems ontology this same framework indirectly supplies a form for empirical laws. The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science offers a further determination of what is ultimately the same form by establishing the basic concepts and laws of Newtonian science, focusing principally on the concept of force. Importantly, even at this level of analysis Kant is concerned not with empirical experience and only with its form. In analysing the formalist status of Buchdahl’s interpretation of Kant, it is illuminating to examine the relation the former draws between the transcendental and formal status of the frameworks under discussion. The following passage from his earlier work addresses what he later refers to as general ontology: [T]he ‘critical’ approach will (as already mentioned) formulate the ground of the possibility of an individual material thing as such in terms of transcendental structure, i.e. of construction in space and time, under the guidance of the categories: an essential requirement for the definition of the ‘reality of the data’ being that the formal framework should contain an a posteriori element, i.e., be anchored in an instance of actual experience of the completed object (qua ‘phenomenon’).17
A problem arises that will turn out to be crucial for Buchdahl’s formalist interpretation of Kant. Buchdahl claims that the formal framework must ‘contain’ or ‘be anchored in’ an a posteriori element. How could this be, if the qualifying characteristic of the transcendental level of analysis is that it operates strictly at an a priori level? Does this suggest that the formal framework and the transcendental structure are not equivalent? Moreover, is there not a contradiction between saying on the one hand that the formal framework contains the a posteriori while on the other hand it is anchored in the latter? The metaphors seem to push in two directions, suggesting contrary theses. We will see later that this tension arises from Buchdahl’s commitment to there being a balance between the framework and the contents of experience, that is, between the a priori and a posteriori. 52
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Formalism and the Circle of Representation I need to pre-empt the conclusion to my later discussion of this problem and Buchdahl’s solution, because his fashion of resolving the issue allows us to clarify the relation between transcendental structure and formal framework. Buchdahl rearticulates what was to have been a balance in a onesided manner, for he claims that the a posteriori is finally grounded in the a priori. Thus transcendental structure and formal framework are identical here – despite the fact that the latter contains the a posteriori – because, in the final analysis, the given arises from the spontaneous contribution of the subject.18 Clearly, though, this solution severely compromises any suggestion that the formal framework is anchored in or, in any meaningful sense, balanced by experience. Later I will look at Buchdahl’s account of the status of the given in more detail. Buchdahl is hesitant as to whether the second level of framework, i.e. that of the fundamental laws of the natural sciences, qualifies as transcendental. On occasion he signals ambivalence as to this and even as to its formal status: Particularly in the case of EC [Special Ontology] it is not so much any formal ‘validity’ that is in question, as whether the explication involved is fruitful, anchored in the general structure of physical experience. In the case of EC, the argument is only barely transcendental. . .19
Later he takes a negative position on the question saying that ‘in Kant’s technical terminology of this it is not something “transcendental” but an analysis in “special metaphysics” ’.20 We can conclude that special metaphysics provides a framework, but not necessarily a transcendental one and thus it may not be formal in the strong sense where the two terms are equivalent. The discussion preceding Buchdahl’s negative judgement on the transcendental status of special metaphysics reveals that the other two levels of framework do so qualify.21 This is also clear from the following more moderate contrast: [l]eaving it open whether Special Ontology is transcendental in quite the same way in which General Ontology is construed; unlike the case of Systems Ontology, where we found that there is a relatively clear-cut distinction between the employment of the methodological framework, as yielding the phenomenology of a scientific theory, and its employment as generating a Systems Ontology.22
This passage identifies the stakes in qualifying not only as formal but also transcendental. What is required is that there be a clear distinction 53
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology between the framework or form and the particular descriptions of the world founded on that framework. General and systems ontologies achieve this and thus count as transcendental. In contrast, Special Ontology lacks a sufficient gap between ontology or structure and phenomenology, that is, the range of experiences falling under that structure.23 Buchdahl’s criterion for transcendental status would bear much more examination, but we can sum it up quickly for our purposes by saying that only if a clear distinction is achieved between the a priori and the a posteriori can the former operate as the condition of the possibility of the latter. In Buchdahl’s account, form is equivalent to determination and matter is the determinable.24 Form and matter are two sides of the experiential world of appearance qua forms of intuition and empirical content. As such, they also function as the poles of what he calls the reduction of that appearance to its transcendental conditions. This aspect of Buchdahl’s approach is most developed in Kant and the Dynamics of Reason but is already latently present in Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science where he says that the notion of the object is ‘“bracketed” by virtue of the transcendental condition’.25 The Husserlian idea is that the transcendental conditions of the possibility of experience, which Buchdahl, unlike Husserl, calls its ontology, can be accessed by abstracting specific qualities from objects and returning to their transcendental or formal conditions. This strategy of reduction turns out, on Buchdahl’s reading, to be the crux of the critical turn in philosophy. The reduced aspect of form is captured in Husserlian terminology thus: ‘the noetic aspect of form is defined as “determination” [Bestimmung], “relation”, or again, as “copula”.’26 Thus form is an element – and, we will find, threatens to become the unique element – of the transcendental structure that emerges under reduction. Buchdahl goes so far as to say: ‘the ground of the world has become “transcendental form” ’.27 But Buchdahl is insistent that this strategy does not signal a subjective turn. The logical or grammatical reduction of the phenomenal world does not undermine the latter’s empirical reality. It is only its ontological status that is put in question, in that the transcendental method, as interpreted by Buchdahl, eschews reliance on an external ontological source for the being of objects. What is left is the mere ‘fact’ that objects are given to us in experience. Buchdahl refers to this by the German term Sachheit.28 Givenness, considered at the transcendental level, i.e. at the level of the possibility of experience, is nothing but the fact that there is something rather than nothing. 54
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Formalism and the Circle of Representation While there are causes within experience, there is no cause, no double affect, of experience. Talk of the given at the transcendental, as opposed to the uncritical, level is simply ‘Pickwickian’, that is, merely a form of speaking that arises from the internal logic of a technical discourse.29 In other words, we speak of and, perhaps, have to think of reality standing at the limits of experience, yet this image is misleading when we assume that there is something outside experience.30 The form of experience is reached by a reduction, but lived experience is re-attained through a construction that realises the form within a concrete experience. Realisation constructs a particular object through giving spatial and temporal form to matter. Thus the two sides of the reduction are repeated or realised at the empirical level. Buchdahl calls his method in general ‘Reduction-Realization Process’, and usually refers to it as RRP.31 Only what he calls ‘Transcendental Reflection’ can reduce experience to its transcendental ground and then progressively construct, that is, realise that ground at different levels of actuality.32 Matter is undifferentiated prior to its formal construction. Buchdahl concludes that there is only one object that is analysed or interpreted in many ways or at many different levels. Only realisation differentiates the singular transcendental object into a plurality of empirical objects. As I mentioned earlier Buchdahl is committed to the view that there is a balance between form and materiality.33 While this way of describing experience is intended to show that Kant’s transcendental project does not threaten the objective existence of objects, the account given by Buchdahl in both Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science and in Kant and the Dynamics of Reason is unlikely to convert the unconverted. Not only is the objective situated entirely within the immanent, it is ultimately given a subjective ground. For while Buchdahl distinguishes the subjective and objective trajectories within constitutive judgement, it turns out that the given or objective side ultimately comes from the subject: It follows further that the character of the ‘given’ as ‘objective’, i.e., as other-than-self, will likewise have to be construed as a contribution made a priori. The character of the object as being ‘other-than-self’ will have to be located, not in what is received, but in what is spontaneously contributed by the cognitive subject in the context of judging. We might describe this by saying that the ‘self’ is here regarded as the seat of the a priori, and of what is ‘other-than-self’: objectivity being located within the framework of possible experience, instead of residing in a realm that transcends experience.34 55
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology The given as objective is grounded in the spontaneity of the subject. If this is what balancing amounts to, it is very one-sided. While Buchdahl could have argued that what is other-than-self always stands in relation to the self, he goes a step further by saying the former is located in the contribution made by the subject. Moreover, he says this contribution is spontaneous, not receptive, and that there is no role for the given. The suspicion is strengthened that his initial insistence that there is no perspective beyond the world of the subject results in the subjectivisation of the object. However, might not Buchdahl simply be committed to the position that the form of the given comes from the subject? This would be quite uncontroversial for it is unquestionably Kant’s position that the form of sensibility is subjective. If this is right, Buchdahl’s argument is only that our ability to take up the given – and thus to refer to an object in the first place – requires the a priori capacity of intuition insofar as the latter introduces spatial and temporal form into the manifold of apprehension. And this would mean that he is simply not concerned with the extra-mental element of the given. But the problem is exactly one of omission. Buchdahl fails to adequately address the question of affection, or at least the side of it that, in passing, he refers to as ‘otherthan-self’.35 He concedes that what is passively received is one of the component elements of the given, but quickly resolves the element that is ‘other-than-self’ into a discussion of the a priori structure of the given, which he says ultimately derives from the self.36 Buchdahl is quite right to say that what is given is not simply passively received because of the formal element Kant discovers in intuition. However, his accounts of both receptivity and what is received by our power of intuition are inadequate.37 Givenness is reduced to the form of matter that can be realised or constructed as empirical objects. In Kant and the Dynamics of Reason there is independent and suggestive evidence that Buchdahl does not intend to adopt a subjectivist position. He argues that the transcendental object [Buchdahl’s abbreviation is To], which is arrived at in the reduction, ‘ “determines” what particular concrete empirical intuitions will come up a posteriori’.38 To, in one of the many varieties Buchdahl distinguishes, qualifies as a ‘boundary notion [Grenzbegriff] (Ton) which “limits sensibility”, and thereby allows the “problematic” possibility of something “positive beyond the circumference [Umfang] of sensibility” ’.39 Buchdahl is most concerned to counter the view that affection amounts to the causal affect of objects on us and his alternative is that To is the ground of appearances. For this reason he rejects Graham Bird’s interpretation 56
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Formalism and the Circle of Representation of the transcendental object as a logical myth.40 Affection [Affizierung] is best understood not as a causal relation, but as ‘ “being brought to” – or “being in” a state of conscious awareness’.41 These passages reveal that while the transcendental object does not causally influence us, no more is it a mere thought experiment. Admittedly Buchdahl says that Sachheit is ‘the merely conceptual aspect of the holding of a certain state of affairs; in particular, to the fact that such and such is the case’.42 But this does not mean that he considers experience as a logical construction. Instead he wants to emphasise the contingency of experience and the fact that it ‘involves a ‘finding’ as well as an ‘originating’; that there is a particular state of affairs rather than another is simply the case.43 This is not something that bears further reflection, but is the beginning point for all reflection. The ‘fact’ of experience does not render the latter subjective, but merely establishes that its contingency is not open to further analysis. Buchdahl’s intent of avoiding attributing to knowledge a merely subjective status is further evident in a comment he makes on Fichte: It may be of interest to note that this reading echoes the approach taken by Fichte already during Kant’s lifetime, except that we have sought to replace the Fichtean somewhat misleading emphasis on the ‘self’, the Ich, by the more neutral language of the process of reduction and realization.44
While he concedes his project is comparable with Fichtean idealism, Buchdahl seeks to establish the distinctiveness of their approaches. So what is it that is to be denied in Fichte’s approach? Buchdahl does not accept that experience in general arises from self-affection. This is particularly clear earlier in a harsher judgement on Fichte: If this is not an ‘external cause’, neither should it on any account be described as standing for the ‘affection of the self by the self – the disastrous Fichtean direction of post-Kantian idealism. The self does not ‘posit’ itself as an entity affecting itself; rather, it is our analysis of realization which posits the self (sensibility) as affected or determined, a concept intended to render nothing more than the aspect of ‘the given’ in the object of that analysis.45
Buchdahl wants to replace Fichte’s subjective idealism with language that establishes the logical or grammatical ground of experience in a neutral place between subject and object. It remains to be seen whether the turn to the logical subject and the ‘Reduction-Realization Process’ accessed only by transcendental reflection is as neutral as Buchdahl’s emphasis on balance would require. 57
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology In Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science Buchdahl discusses a ‘shift in the grammar of the Kantian “subjectivity” ’.46 There is ‘no reason to locate concepts, just because they are logical entities, in a realm of subjectivity’.47 Further the subjective is not to be equated with the psychological or empirical.48 This may seem rather confusing. Are concepts subjective or not? But as Buchdahl is about to make clear, what is at issue here is what he calls a sharpening of Kant’s use of subjectivity. What he means is that Kant’s range of reference is always subjective, where this term corresponds with experience in general in contrast to the thing-in-itself.49 We can therefore only make distinctions between different degrees of subjectivity within that broader horizon. In other words, Kant says that experience and the categories that provide order are subjective so as to emphasise that we are not concerned with a world beyond the bounds of possible access. Our world is always just that, the world that is accessible to us. Within our world, the subject has a greater or lesser role to play depending on the level of analysis. For instance, the projective role of reason involves a much more active and explicit role for the judging subject than does the relatively uncreative role of the understanding.50 On the face of it, this is a convincing representation of Kant’s transcendental or Copernican turn. Buchdahl’s aim, then, is to reappraise the relation in which subjectivity and objectivity stand to one another within the Kantian project. This will be of the greatest importance for, as he says: ‘[t]his “bringing together” of the “subjective” and the “objective”, of the “act” and what results from the act, is the very epitome of the Kantian method.’51 However the suspicion remains that what results is a rather subjective synthesis of subject and object, as the following passage suggests: This ‘sharpening’ of the Kantian meanings is graphically illustrated in putting Kant’s main point by saying that the ‘objectivity’ of the phenomenal object is not ‘objectively given’ but wrought ‘subjectively’. This at once makes it clear that the second ‘objectivity’ in this account no longer has a normal sense.52
Admittedly, Buchdahl simply says that the objectivity of the phenomenal object and not the phenomenal object per se is ‘wrought subjectively’. On the face of things this, once again, is a straightforward interpretation of Kant: for an object, strictly speaking, arises from the subsumption of an intuition under a concept of the understanding and thus entails the operation of our subjective faculties. But the 58
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Formalism and the Circle of Representation problem with Buchdahl’s position is, as previously remarked, one of omission. Buchdahl omits to mention that our intuition operates on something given in experience. This suggests that the given too – not just the forms of intuition – comes from the subject. The result is that subjectivity contains objectivity or the a posteriori within it, rather than what was at first presented as its equivalent, that the a priori is anchored in the latter. When we recall that one page earlier, Buchdahl has declared Pickwickian the status of the given, he is left with a very unbalanced account of the relation between the form and the matter of experience. What has happened to dualism? Certainly for Kant the forms of intuition are subjective, but they establish the possibility of our receptivity to something given in experience and, in the case of spatial form, something external. Buchdahl is, of course, right to insist that there is no absolute externality qua thing-in-itself. But it seems that the sharpening of subjectivity situates the limits and not just the form of experience within the subject. Such an interpretation, while offered in defence of Kant, opens the way for critiques such as Pippin’s. We have seen that the account given by Buchdahl in his earlier work of the balance within general ontology is, in his own terms, rather Pickwickian. But we have also seen that, especially in Kant and the Dynamics of Reason, Buchdahl seeks to establish distance between his position and subjectivism. We might hope that we will discover a more convincing account of objectivity in the contrast he draws in the later work between general and systems ontologies. There is no balance between the activity of reason and the empirical world into which it introduces order as a system of empirical laws. For this reason Buchdahl considers systems ontology to be subjective. In contrast, there is a balance between the categories of the understanding and the matter that is taken up and formed as an object: There is however a difference between the two cases. The categories of the understanding (e.g. causality) are valid only if they apply in the context of a sensory manifold; Kant calls this their ‘constitutive employment’. Only in this context is the notion of an ‘object’ admissible; only thus can the understanding ‘create’, so to speak, its object. For reason the case is different . . . nothing as such ‘corresponds’ to the theoretical frameworks of science; the ‘unity’ which such theories ‘mirror’, is not ‘given’ but – as Kant ceaselessly reiterates – only ‘projected’.53
The objectivity of general ontology arises from the fact that it is applied to the sensory given. However, as the use of the word creates 59
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology suggests, the understanding is spontaneous and does not merely mirror an already existing order. The latter claim is, of course, correct, but does not entail that the understanding creates order. In the end, Buchdahl’s distinction is difficult to pin down. While reason ‘projects’, understanding ‘injects’ order into nature at the most general level of its constitution. ‘The understanding is said to proceed “spontaneously”, so that the feature of “objectivity” which Kant seeks to define as “possible” is secured by showing it to be “selfwrought”.’54 Buchdahl insists that a balance between transcendental structure and a posteriori given qualifies general ontology as objective. Yet on examination there seems to be at best a difference of degree between an understanding that injects order and a reason that projects it.55 The way in which this plays into the hands of interpretations such as Pippin’s and indeed Guyer’s and Strawson’s is by now clear and becomes even more explicit when Buchdahl declares: As with the understanding, reason must not ‘borrow’ unity from what is presented to it, but instead ‘impose it’. The explanation of this procedure in both cases is the same: one can extract only as much with ‘apodeictic certainty’ from ‘the world’ as is injected into it by the spontaneous procedures of understanding and reason.56
In this passage ‘imposition’ can be substituted for both ‘injection’ and ‘projection’ and it would appear that the crucial distinction between understanding and reason collapses, leading us to conclude that not only reason, but also understanding, necessarily imposes form on matter. Despite Buchdahl’s talk of balance between the a priori and the a posteriori, the distinction between general ontology and systems ontology is in danger of disappearing. While it is clear that Buchdahl intends to secure a meaningful sense in which there is an objective element within constitutive judgement, it is not clear that he can achieve this within the perspective he develops. Buchdahl recognises the problem only too well. In Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science, Buchdahl remarks that it is very difficult to discover what Kant believes is ‘brought into being’ and what is ‘found’ or ‘given’.57 His response to this dilemma in Kant and the Dynamics of Reason is to conclude that: ‘the kantian world is entirely “enclosed” within its transcendental framework’.58 It would appear that, in the end, not even a Fichtean Anstoß sets experience in motion. Reinforcing Buchdahl’s failure to adequately address the given as 60
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Formalism and the Circle of Representation given is his resistance to the philosophical relevance of applicability. He denies that Kant is in any way motivated by the ‘empirical question whether what we observe to be the case . . . is in fact the case’.59 He says this can only count as trivial in contrast with his project of establishing the possibility of cognition of objects in general.60 Buchdahl is, of course, correct that Kant is not directly concerned with empirical validity, but what he underestimates is that the validity of the formal structure of objects in general will only be established once Kant has shown that the latter applies to empirical objects. Admittedly, he only ever addresses this question at a general level, but the formal framework must be shown to be the form of matter and this cannot be achieved if the latter is merely viewed in a Pickwickian fashion. Kant is committed to an extra-mental given, as I will argue in the next chapter, and unless he can show how the latter is taken up through the forms of experience, these will only count as logical forms and not as forms of experience.61 The fact that matter is empirical and that we are not affected by things-in-themselves, does not rule out that what is given in experience is genuinely external to the subject. Kant holds that we are affected by something given in experience and this is not merely a technical issue. Admittedly, the otherthan-self can only affect us insofar as we have a capacity to be affected, but Buchdahl focuses on that capacity at the expense of what affects us and, moreover, characterises the object as rooted in spontaneity rather than, equally, in receptivity. He thus denies that the question of affection is a genuine philosophical question. What we have found in our investigation of Buchdahl’s account is that he establishes a powerful formalist interpretation of Kant’s epistemology. This version of formalism establishes the need for a reciprocity or balance between form and matter. However we have also discovered that, in the last instance, the objective side of the balance achieved by his version of formalism falls back into a monism of form or subjectivity. This has encouraged Pippin and others in their critiques of Kant’s supposed subjectivism. It remains to be seen whether there is an alternative elaboration of formalism that does not end up in the same cul-de-sac.
II Allison’s Methodological Formalism Allison’s Kant’s Transcendental Idealism has transformed Kant studies in the English speaking world and beyond by rediscovering a Kant not covertly dependent on a hidden noumenal world of 61
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology things-in-themselves.62 Allison establishes the human focus of critical philosophy and shows how the latter is still of great interest for current debates on the ‘transcendental’ in general. Allison shares much with Buchdahl’s formalist reading, insisting that the a priori must be understood as the form of experience and not as a self-standing apparatus. In Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, Allison enters into neither analysis nor criticism of Buchdahl, simply appealing to his authority on a number of occasions.63 A notable similarity between their readings is the way in which they interpret the relation between the ‘Transcendental Deduction’ and the sections that follow on from it. For both, the full story of the legitimation of the categories for experience is only to be found in the ‘Analytic’ as a whole. Allison’s particular take on Kant’s epistemology is to insist that the transcendental turn uncovers the ‘epistemic conditions’ of experience. These provide the fundamental framework without which experience would not be possible. I will argue that although it may seem that Allison engages in what Pippin calls an ‘independent analysis of rules for knowing’, his commitments are more complex.64 Importantly, Allison does not adopt Buchdahl’s talk of imposition, an interpretation he ascribes to the ‘standard picture’ for which Kant counts as a phenomenalist.65 Allison favours an analysis of epistemic conditions rather than one of the conditions of the possibility of experience because of the way in which the former focuses attention on the conditions for knowledge in contrast to logical, psychological and ontological conditions.66 It is straightforward to establish that Allison’s epistemic conditions should be construed as formal in status. In an early section of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism entitled ‘Transcendental Idealism as Formal Idealism’, Allison remarks that Kant notes in at least two places that formal idealism is an appropriate alternative term for his approach.67 Allison goes on to say that Kant would have done better to have followed his own recommendation as this may have discouraged the phenomenalist standard picture that has been so prevalent in interpretations of Kant. He continues: ‘Kant’s formal idealism is “formal” in the sense that it is a theory about the nature and the scope of the conditions under which objects can be experienced or known by the human mind.’68 This short passage holds within it the most important elements of the formalist status of Allison’s interpretation. The Copernican turn is a formalist one to the epistemic conditions of experience and, as 62
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Formalism and the Circle of Representation such, necessarily turns our attention to the role of mind in experience. However, Allison insists that the mind is to be understood logically and not psychologically. At this stage of his argument the importance of the relation between form and mind is clear, while its specific nature is less so: . . . behind Kant’s formal idealism, lies a principle that is implicit in the Critique as a whole, but is nowhere made fully explicit: that whatever is necessary for the representation or experience of something as an object, that is, whatever is required for the recognition or picking out of what is ‘objective’ in our experience, must reflect the cognitive structure of the mind (its manner of representing) rather than the nature of the object as it is in itself.69
The question arises, what is meant by the claim that the objective reflects the structure of the mind? Is the object other than the mind or merely a reflection of it? Admittedly, as Allison says in this passage, the object is not in-itself, but this does not eliminate the possibility that the object is empirical and yet still external to the mind. The question is: in what way can objectivity be dependent on subjectivity without Kant’s account falling back into the trap of impositionalism? Later, Allison emphasises the centrality of mental form for his epistemic or methodological reading thus: Once again, then, the point is that the appeal to the formal, a priori conditions of human experience and their characterization as ‘epistemic’ are the defining features of Kant’s idealism. The position is idealistic because, as we have seen, it grants to these conditions the function of defining the meaning of ‘object’ or equivalently, of determining what can count as ‘objective’ for the human mind.70
Epistemic conditions are formal in status and establish the conditions of objectivity. It is thus that Allison insists on the indexing of objectivity to the mind, without falling into psychological introspection. Objectivity does not so much mirror subjectivity as depend on the latter for its conditions of possibility. Nevertheless, it is still not clear in what sense objectivity requires that there is something outside the subject. If it does not, then the spectre of impositionalism – with its attendant inattention to the affective or aesthetic side of experience – returns. Reinforcing the equivalence between forms and epistemic conditions, Allison tells us: ‘[c]orrelatively, “form” must be taken to mean condition, while “matter” means that which is conditioned or determined by the form’.71 Were there any doubt, he sums up his account 63
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology of the sensible conditions of experience thus: ‘[i]n the last analysis then, everything turns on Kant’s claim that the representation of space functions as a form or condition of human experience.’72 The epistemic conditions comprise the forms of intuition and the categories of the understanding. Distancing himself from orthodox interpretations – and, importantly, anticipating Longuenesse’s extended defence of the relevance of the ‘Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories’ for the Critique as a whole – Allison argues that this section counts as a genuine first step in Kant’s argument. The ‘Table of Judgements’ presents the ‘conditions of all human thought, for all such thought is judgemental, and they are the conditions of judgement’.73 Judgemental functions require certain concepts, but the objective or empirical reality of these concepts requires the ‘Transcendental Deduction’.74 Having thus rehabilitated the beginning of the ‘Analytic’, Allison continues to show how its full scope is necessary if Kant is to establish that the categories are the conditions not just of thought but also of experience. Two stages of the ‘Deduction’, the ‘Schematism’ and the ‘Principles’ chapters, are all necessary for this. While the ‘Schematism’ chapter establishes that a schema ‘furnishes a meaning condition for a corresponding pure concept’, the ‘Principles’ chapter establishes that the same schema provides ‘the conditions of the determination of appearances in time and thus of the possibility of experience’.75 The second Analogy and its transition from ‘the subjection of the perceptions to the rule to the subjection of the perceived event’ is the ‘culmination’ of the ‘Transcendental Analytic’.76 Allison follows Buchdahl in favouring the weak interpretation of this portion of the text, arguing that Kant’s intent is only to show that there is some antecedent condition in any succession that counts as an event and not the stronger claim that other such events will follow the same pattern.77 Thus concludes Allison’s consistently formalist and hierarchical reading of Kant’s epistemology as presented in the ‘Analytic’ of the first Critique. We have already seen the problems Buchdahl falls into through his insistence that the given has a merely Pickwickian status. Despite the temptation to conclude that Allison’s focus on epistemic conditions amounts to what Pippin calls ‘an exclusive, foundational concern with our “mode of knowledge” ’, there are reasons for suspecting that this is not Allison’s intention. 78 He contrasts his position to that of the phenomenalist interpretation, which he calls the standard picture, for which an appearance is equivalent to a mere representation.79 64
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Formalism and the Circle of Representation Empirical realism commits Kant, he argues, to the position that ‘our experience is not limited to the private domain of our own representations, but includes an encounter with “empirically real” spatiotemporal objects’.80 Explaining the significance of the Copernican Revolution’s insistence that objects must conform to our knowledge, he comments: ‘But the mind-dependent objects of philosophers such as Berkeley and Hume (ideas and impressions) can no more be said to “conform to our knowledge” than can a humanly inaccessible “object” such as Lockean real essence’.81 Allison’s point is that a merely ideal object would not conform to our knowledge, simply because it would already be internal to the latter. Epistemic conditions are the mental conditions that make the representation of an object possible, and thus render the latter knowable. Mind supplies the structure or form of objects, not their material or substance. Epistemic conditions are, thus, not intended as an independent alternative for, but rather make possible an intentional reference to objects. Nevertheless Allison’s relative inattention to the affective side of Kant’s project – a topic that Kant also insufficiently elaborated – has the result that the epistemic conditions seem to promise a neutral and self-standing apparatus. Objectivity is explicated wholly with reference to epistemic conditions. What is ‘“objective” in our experience, must reflect the cognitive structure of the mind (its manner of representing) rather than the nature of the object as it is in itself’.82 This is unquestionably true, for Kant holds that an object that can be known must conform to the structure arising from our minds. But although it sometimes sounds as if this is not only the necessary but also the sufficient condition of objectivity, I will show in the next chapter that Kant’s position is rather more complex. In the early stages of the original edition of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, there is no treatment of the material condition of objectivity. Allison’s view, quite simply, is that an object is whatever conforms to the mind’s conditions (both sensible and intellectual) for the representation of it as an object’.83 If matter has a necessary role to play in objectivity, he gives us little in the way of a clue as to what this would involve. However, in the final section of the first edition Allison discusses the question of affection in relation to the thing-in-itself and the transcendental object, while in the second edition he treats this topic in the revised first part of the book. 84 In both editions his account is based on a distinction between two levels at which affection can be approached within the transcendental perspective. 65
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology Empirically formed matter is the result of affection: it therefore cannot be also the latter’s cause or ground. To consider the ground of matter is to view it as not yet empirically formed, even though we cannot know or experience it as such.85 When we abstract from experience in this way, we are thinking of an indeterminate affect that gives rise to sensation insofar as it is taken up through sensibility. Allison concludes that it is justifiable to refer to these material conditions of human cognition methodologically as the ground or cause for the matter in experience.86 This establishes a distinction between empirical matter, which is always already formed, and its ground that counts as transcendental matter.87 We only think of the latter insofar as we abstract from the empirical character of an object and consider the empirical object as if it is unconditioned by the forms of space and time or the categories of the understanding. Allison argues that many of Kant’s discussions of the transcendental object can be understood as a treatment of the matter that is presupposed in any empirical object. But instead of treating matter in a transcendent fashion as a thing-in-itself, a transcendental approach allows Kant to consider what is only ever experienced in relation to epistemic conditions as if it were not constrained by the epistemic conditions that are characteristic of anything represented by us. This thought experiment, whereby matter is abstracted from empirical experience, makes use of the notion of the transcendental object.88 This development reinforces other evidence already mentioned above that Allison does not intend to merely provide an independent analysis of rules for knowing. A philosophical reconstruction of our affection by the object is expressed by reference either to the object considered as in itself or as the transcendental object.89 This means that affection can be recognised as the ‘necessary (material) condition of the possibility of experience, and in this sense as part of a “transcendental story” ’.90 Experience is only possible insofar as we are affected by something. It is therefore a necessary condition of a transcendental reconstruction of experience that the something in question is viewed as a ‘ “something in general = x” ’ that is, as the transcendental object.91 This account of affection makes a crucial adjustment to the significance of Allison’s account of epistemic conditions. In addition to the latter, which are mental in status, there is a necessary material condition. Matter must be given to us if experience is to be possible. While matter can be thought in abstraction from experience and is not reducible to epistemic conditions, it is nevertheless only known in rela66
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Formalism and the Circle of Representation tion to the latter. The material condition of experience always precedes any experience or reconstruction we can make of it. Nevertheless this does not render it extraneous to the transcendental system, but as Allison insists, makes it ‘a necessary condition of a transcendental account’.92 As we saw in the previous section, Buchdahl insists that Sachheit, or the fact that something is given, is a condition of experience. However he denies that this is of philosophical significance, saying that matter is only ever empirical. Allison would, of course, agree if this were taken to mean that we are only ever affected by appearing objects and not, indirectly or otherwise, by things in themselves. Nevertheless the advance in Allison’s account is that he is willing to concede the need for a philosophical consideration of the limits of experience. We must be able to transcendentally reflect on matter as given on the basis of a ground not conditioned by our sensibility. Recognition of this is not only philosophically possible, but necessary to a transcendental account. Nevertheless, Allison’s relative inattention to the role of affection, especially in the early chapters of the first edition of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, has encouraged the view that the a priori form of experience can be discussed without any reference to the affective side of experience. Even when he eventually addresses the material element in experience, it is treated as simply the other side of the formal story. This is particularly marked in the new edition where he describes the claim that matter has a transcendental ground as an ‘analytic claim’.93 Is there any sense in which form must anticipate matter or stand in a dynamic relation to the latter? Allison does not raise any of these questions. That Allison is committed to the material side of the transcendental story has been established, but as the material given is merely an analytic entailment of epistemic form, it is questionable as to whether he has, in fact, escaped the charge that he offers nothing but a reflection on ‘our mode of knowledge’. If he is to show how the latter intentionally grasps an object, he would have to provide more than a merely analytic account of the relation between form and matter. This would entail focusing on the way in which epistemic conditions take up the affective given. My suggestion will be that a deeper examination of the subjective faculties reveals how the subjective conditions of experience provide access to extra-mental objects.94 Allison, like Buchdahl before him, seeks to establish that the formal framework of experience is not psychological. However his determination to avoid any trace of 67
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology subjectivism, leads to a failure to adequately explore the subjective conditions that have now been established qua epistemic conditions as the conditions of objectivity. Allison rejects Strawson’s view that formalism is inextricable from Kant’s use of the idiom of the faculties. A methodological consideration of epistemic conditions is meant to avoid any suggestion of experience being ultimately grounded in a mental or psychological source. Allison clearly shares Buchahl’s view that it would be preferable to adopt a more neutral or logical vocabulary than Kant does. Nevertheless, Allison does not reject the value of faculty talk outright – his answer to the question of whether there is any justification for undertaking an examination of the subjective side of cognition being difficult to pin down. In Idealism and Freedom, which gathers together articles originally published between 1986 and 1995, Allison defends Kant’s transcendental psychology or the ‘subjective deduction’ as ‘part of the project of justifying or establishing the objective validity of the categories’.95 Arguing against Patricia Kitcher’s empirically oriented defence of ‘faculty talk’, Allison says that the subject of transcendental psychology is neither phenomenal nor noumenal, being rather, using an expression introduced by Gilbert Ryle, ‘systematically elusive’.96 This suggests that it may be defensible to appeal to faculty talk, albeit indeterminately. In another article where he discusses his teacher Aron Gurwitsch, Allison highlights what he sees as the negative results of focusing on the subjective apparatus of cognition. He argues just as strongly against the phenomenological orientation of Gurwitsch, as against the empirical materialism of Kitcher. His major disagreement with the former is that despite Gurwitsch’s recognition of the need to read the three stages of the A ‘Deduction’ methodologically – that is, as outlining three conditions of experience – he still tends on occasion to treat apprehension as if it were ‘a unique form of pre-conceptual awareness that does not involve the categories’.97 This would suggest a pre-conceptual order ‘ratified’ by the categories.98 Allison strongly contests this, saying that through the introduction of the rule of the category we are able to represent ‘a distinctive objective order through these perceptions, not an order of them’.99 Gurwitsch’s focus on the aesthetic component within Kant’s epistemology has, he thinks, severed what must stay in necessary conjunction, namely the intuitive and conceptual elements of cognition. A focus on the more subjectively oriented A ‘Deduction’ results in 68
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Formalism and the Circle of Representation the undermining of the methodological approach Gurwitsch established. While in these two quite differently oriented critiques Allison argues against taking faculty talk as substantive – that is, as referring to empirical mental entities or pure acts – he does not rule out that there is a valid way of talking about the faculties as formal. Indeed, his response to Kemp Smith’s charge that Kant confuses two conflicting notions of form suggests that he may be in favour of this.100 Allison draws our attention to an ambiguity in Kant’s talk of the form of intuition as implying both the ‘form of intuiting’ and the ‘form of the intuited’ and defends Kant’s suggestion that space as the form of intuiting outer objects is the subjective formal source of the manifold.101 Nevertheless Allison insists that the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ is principally concerned with the form of the intuited, or the objective side of the formal analysis of intuition. It has become clear that Allison need not merely offer ‘an exclusive, foundational concern with our “mode of knowledge” ’.102 However, just as his account of affection is underdeveloped as to the relation in which the formal conditions of experience stand to the material given, correspondingly he is relatively silent on how a subjective representation takes up an affect. While Allison’s account does not enclose us in a circle of representation, it also fails to explain how representations could stand for something other than themselves. Interestingly, it may be the relative inattention he pays to the subjective side of experience that results in the enduring suspicion that formalism somehow misses the extra-mental status of the object.
III Longuenesse’s functionalist formalism: the appropriation of sense and imagination Béatrice Longuenesse’s Kant and the Capacity to Judge directly addresses the question of the relation between representations and the objects of representations. 103 Her claim that the ‘Table of Judgements’ in the Critique of Pure Reason offers a key for answering this question is an important and challenging addition to the recent literature. I will show how her account, focusing on the formal status of transcendental idealism, highlights what she calls the collaboration of the faculties necessary for knowledge. However, I will also argue that, despite her insistence on the dualist character of Kant’s project, the working through of her complex position finally puts at risk the affective side of dualism insofar as she insists that the 69
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology same function of understanding is the source both of the forms of understanding and of intuition. In ‘The Divisions of the Transcendental Logic and the Leading Thread’, Longuenesse rehearses the Leitmotiven of her earlier book.104 Her article gives a textual reading of the introductory passages of the ‘Transcendental Analytic’ where Kant presents the ‘Table of Judgements’ and claims that it is the ‘leading thread’ for the discovery of a priori categories governing our experience.105 Longuenesse argues that this often criticised claim, and the accompanying apparatus of logical judgement, is defensible if we read these passages as an analysis of the form of thought in general, a form that anticipates the categorial table. Longuenesse identifies the central role of form in transcendental idealism. From the outset she talks not only of ‘forms of sensibility’ but also of ‘forms of the understanding’.106 Whereas talk of intellectual capacities was already widespread, what is striking in Kant’s project is his transcending of the ‘quite standard empirical-psychological meaning’ of capacity.107 Indeed she insists that ‘the originality of Kant’s position lies in his attributing to each capacity a specific form, or mode of combination and ordering of representational data’.108 Instead of simply describing conventionally distinguished mental activities, Kant moves to the transcendental level insofar as he attributes to each capacity a specific way or mode of combining and ordering the elements of experience. Whereas intuition allows us to combine sensible data, understanding is the source of order among concepts. As Longuenesse expresses the situation, it is the collaboration between two kinds of forms that properly qualifies Kant’s logic as transcendental.109 Kant’s formalism is thus linked to faculty talk, which has been reidentified as transcendental rather than psychological. Longuenesse points out that Kant is operating with a quite different understanding of the relation between formal logic and psychology than would be the case in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, especially in the analytical tradition: Note that for Kant – contrary to the view of logic prevalent after Frege –the opposition between logic and psychology does not rest on the fact that the former has nothing to do with our mental activities. For Kant the opposition resides, rather, in the normative character of logic, as opposed to the descriptive character of empirical psychology. But even the normative character of logic is, in the end, the expression of the normative capacity of our minds . . .110 70
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Formalism and the Circle of Representation Faculty talk is normative in that it analyses how thought should operate, rather than describing how we in fact think. Thus there is no need to equate Kant’s position with faculty psychology. This is an important corrective not only to Strawson, but also to Guyer and Pippin, whom I have argued suggest indirectly that Kant’s faculty talk contributes to his supposed impositionalism. Longuenesse here takes up a theme that Allison and Buchdahl try to avoid. Longuenesse remarks on the particular alliance between form and general logic insofar as the latter ‘deals with the mere form of thought’.111 The form of thought is set in opposition to the matter or object of thought, that is, its content. Formal logic is concerned only with the combination of concepts regardless of their content – in contrast to transcendental logic, which is concerned with the content of thought, at least at its a priori level.112 Longuenesse’s account of the status of content is persuasive. She insists that transcendental logic is concerned with the way in which our mode of sensibility forms empirically given data and not with the mechanics of physical affect.113 Longuenesse also says that both transcendental and general logic are pure insofar as they ‘borrow nothing from psychology’.114 We can conclude that both levels of logic are concerned only with the normative dimension of thought insofar as they deal with the a priori form of thought. Form implies ‘universality insofar as by virtue of this form alone concepts can be combined’.115 Prima facie it seems difficult to link this statement with aesthetic form. Admittedly Longuenesse’s account echoes Kant’s view that aesthetic form is the condition of an intuition’s unification under a concept. But the directness with which she links form and conceptualisation risks losing sight of what Longuenesse herself has recognised as a collaboration between two forms. The relative bias toward conceptual form is further evidenced by the way in which she contrasts conceptual function to sensible affection, finally claiming that ‘form’ and ‘function’ are used interchangeably, distinguished only by the latter term capturing the process of which the former is the result.116 She is clearly right in attributing to Kant the view that function and conceptual form are equivalent terms. The question is: is sensible form distinct from function? If form and function are equivalent and function is distinct from affection, then where is the place in her account for the latter? The suspicion arises that not just affection as a mechanical or physical process, but affectivity per se has been moved outside the bounds of her 71
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology philosophical horizon. Agreed, the form of sensibility is a priori and thus is not given, being rather the form of the given. Its a priori status reveals that it arises from the subject, but Kant makes a distinction between the unifying forms of the understanding and the receptive forms of sensibility. The forms of intuition make possible our capacity for sensibility, although, admittedly, this is a peculiar ability to take in or receive. The distinction between the two forms of experience is constitutive of the possibility of experience. The link Longuenesse makes between function and form is explained by her chief thesis of synthesis speciosa. Longuenesse argues that the same function of understanding is the source for the forms of sensibility and for the categorical forms. The initial analysis of that general ability of understanding – Vermögen zu urteilen or the capacity to judge – is laid out in the ‘Table of Judgements’. Longuenesse could have claimed simply that the ‘Table of Judgements’ anticipates the ‘Table of Categories’ by laying out a sketch of the general form of thought necessary for any judgement.117 It would then have been possible to combine this with the claim that judgement requires a source independent from thought, that is, our capacity for taking up the sensible given. But Longuenesse wants to say that even the latter is governed by the Vermögen zu urteilen. ‘His goal is to argue that these same functions by means of which judgments are formed (by analysis of the sensible given), first guide synthesis of sensible manifolds, with a view to analysis.’118 Synthesis relies on imagination or sensibility, but ‘in order to subsume a sensible manifold under concepts, one first needs to combine it in such a way that it is recognizable under concepts’.119 This bringing to concepts presupposes a unity of synthesis. In Longuenesse’s Kant and the Capacity to Judge this leading idea is identified as the thesis of synthesis speciosa. The categories play a double role: first preparing the sensible given for determination by introducing unity, and then determining what they have already unified: the categories have a role to play ‘at each end’ of the activity of judging: as mere ‘logical functions of judgement’, they play a role in guiding reflection of the sensible given with a view to forming empirical concepts, and for this they must first also guide synthesis in view of reflection. But as concepts, they are applied only in judgements of experience.120
Elsewhere it emerges that the goal of applying the categories within judgements of experience is what first gives the analysis of the logical 72
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Formalism and the Circle of Representation functions of judgement its role as ‘guiding thread’. This is a functionalist argument. The application of the forms of thought as categories within experience legitimates the presupposition of them at the outset of Kant’s argument. Were this the whole story it would be persuasive and count as a helpful expansion of Allison’s assessment of the role played by the ‘Metaphysical Deduction’. However, as the passage just cited reveals, Longuenesse’s position is more radical than this, for she is committed to the view that the categories in their initial guise as logical functions of judgement guide not only thought but also sensibility. Double accounting for the role of the categories is the key to Longuenesse’s account. It is also the key to grasping how she risks reducing dualism to a monism of a broadened understanding where the original distinction between two forms is traced back to one form or function, that of thought or judgement in general.121 The form of intuition has been transformed from the basis of our affective access to objects in the world into a subsidiary part of the internal apparatus of representation. The standard reading is that conceptual synthesis alone achieves the unity characteristic of determining judgement or knowledge. Nevertheless, this unity is only achieved insofar as sensibility combines the given within the forms of space and time. ‘Synthesis of apprehension’ is a distinct, though not a discrete, necessary condition of the unification of a sensible given under a concept that qualifies as knowledge. This account does not entail a commitment to intuition achieving a unity prior to that of the understanding. The holding together achieved in intuition is a component in the process of unification only finally completed in a concept.122 The standard account also holds that the forms of intuition, in Allison’s sense of forms of the intuited, are indeterminate until they are explicitly unified or determined under a concept.123 Longuenesse disagrees with this position. Crucially, she holds that the intuitions of the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ are already unified. 124 Kant, she claims, rarely speaks of form as the mere capacity to receive representations, and, retrospectively, in Section 26, we discover that in the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ intuitions already qualify as formal intuitions, that is, they have content. What in the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ are called forms of intuition are in fact formal intuitions and arise from the pre-formation of sensibility by the understanding.125 The claim that forms of intuition arise from the Vermögen zu urteilen derives from Longuenesse’s reading of Section 26 in the 73
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology second part of the B ‘Deduction’. The second step there, as she reconstructs it, is that the forms of space and time ‘being themselves unified intuitions, are under the transcendental unity of apperception, which is the source of the categories’.126 Longuenesse goes on to explain an ambiguity in Kant’s position in that he claims both that space and time are determined by the understanding and that they are prior to concepts.127 She resolves this apparent paradox in the following way. The forms of space and time are prior to any determinate concept and to the categories in their second role as reflective universal representations, but they are not prior to the first exercise of understanding as synthesis speciosa, that is of a self-affection of the understanding on our sensibility. This is an ingenious way of explaining what might otherwise appear to be a non sequitur at B160. Despite its initial plausibility, I believe it purchases the consistency of Kant’s position at too great a price.128 Longuenesse cites another passage in support of her reading: The same function, which gives unity to the various representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of representations in an intuition . . . The same understanding . . . brings by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition a transcendental content to its representations.129
Longuenesse reads this passage as establishing that the same logical function gives unity to concepts in a judgement and to the synthesis of intuition.130 In a sense this is incontestable, while in another sense it is highly contestable. Most readers of the Critique would agree that insofar as a sensible given is determined as to its unity, synthesis by the understanding is necessary. Many interpreters, although not all, hold that this determined intuition is what Kant means when he talks of a formal intuition as opposed to a form of intuition, where the latter is a pure term and the former a hybrid one.131 But most would not agree that the fact that the unity or unification of intuition can be traced to the understanding means that the latter is the source of the form of intuition. Instead, the usual interpretation would be that the application of the unifying power of understanding to the independent capacity for sensibility gives rise to knowledge. And there could be no independent capacity for sensibility, should the form of the latter ultimately resolve into an activity of understanding. The problem as to the identity of the faculties reveals a substantive problem about Longuenesse’s characterisation of Kant’s account of experience. If the understanding – even in its broader sense as intellect 74
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Formalism and the Circle of Representation in general – is ultimately the source of the form of sensibility, then it is difficult to maintain that the latter is affected by something other than the mind. We would be very close to saying that the data of sensibility has its source in the mind itself. Of course, Longuenesse strictly says only that space and time as unified forms fall under the understanding. However, she gives no serious role to the forms of intuition prior to unification with the result that the logic of her argument is that intuition does not so much cooperate with understanding, as count as an outpost of the latter. While Longuenesse is right to stress that for Kant there is no absolute given, there is just as much danger in suggesting that there is nothing other than constructions of the mind.132 The issue here is not the mechanics of physical affect, which Longuenesse is quite right to exclude from Kant’s transcendental account, but rather the very possibility of an affective element at the experiential or phenomenological level. For this we need a faculty, namely intuition, as the ground of the possibility of affection. And we still need to know how representations relate to objects at this level. Longuenesse does not altogether omit affection from her discussion, but she does underplay its importance. She rightly insists that Kant rearticulates ‘the manner in which things are given to us’.133 There is no brute given in Kant’s account of sensibility, but only a given that is formed in space and time. Longuenesse characterises the situation as one of a ‘transformation’ from outer affect to intuition.134 It would appear that outer affect is the physical cause of an experience, but in order for it to count as anything for us, it must be taken up as a representation through the synthetic power of imagination. And is this not Kant’s position? Longuenesse has argued that the form of sensibility is an exercise of the understanding, not that the matter of experience is. She is committed not to internal realism but to indirect realism.135 The primacy afforded to the understanding is at the level of representation and not of the represented. But Longuenesse’s thesis of synthesis speciosa turns sensibility towards the internal system of representation, giving no account of our capacity for receptivity of the represented. This is particularly evident in the contrast she draws between the position she attributes to Allison and her own. While, for the former, what she calls the ‘“internalisation of the object to representation” would simply mean internalisation to the point of view of (human) representing subjects’, her own preferred position is that ‘objects “as” objects-of-representation are appearances “in us” ’. She concludes that ‘things do exist in themselves outside us, 75
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology but we perceive them only by means of states of consciousness’.136 Allison’s epistemically formalist reading has been replaced by a newly tuned version of what he calls ‘the standard picture’. Objects, as things-in-themselves, stand hidden behind representations. Under this description, representations cannot count as epistemic conditions, that is, as our modes of access to objects. A further problem arises for Longuenesse’s interpretation of Kant’s epistemology in relation to his account of aesthetic judgement. Although addressing this issue may seem to take us onto quite different terrain, Kant claims that aesthetic judgement reveals the conditions of ‘cognition in general’, a claim which entails that a successful interpretation of his epistemology must also be able to account for aesthetic judgement, as discussed in the Critique of Judgement.137 Consideration of this issue allows us to reconsider the first stage of Longuenesse’s argument, namely, the view that apprehension already entails the determining power of understanding. Longuenesse’s thesis of synthesis speciosa entails that understanding ‘appropriates’ imagination in contrast to the view that the latter is the mediator between sensation and intellect.138 She speaks of the imagination in this context and not of sensibility, for it is the former in its guise as productive imagination that generates the forms of intuition.139 She concedes that there is also an activity of imagination that is not appropriated by the understanding, but goes on to say that Kant is only marginally interested in this ‘merely sensible/ associative/ fictional activity of imagination’.140 What Kant is really interested in, she believes, is the rule-governed activity of imagination at the behest of the understanding exercised in the interests of a cognitive goal. But in the Critique of Judgement, Kant focuses on a free exercise of the imagination that is autonomous and most definitely not appropriated by the understanding. Aesthetic judgement arises as a ‘harmony of the cognitive powers’ in which the faculties of imagination and understanding combine with one another in the absence of a rule.141 Moreover he argues that the ‘free lawfulness’ of the imagination, that is, the latter faculty exercised beyond the legislative authority of the understanding, reveals the subjective conditions of all judgement or ‘cognition in general’.142 Thus the unappropriated imagination turns out to be far from marginal to Kant’s project and to his cognitive project in particular. Later I will take up the relation between appropriated and unappropriated imagination. For the moment, I simply want to show that if Kant’s characterisation of 76
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Formalism and the Circle of Representation imagination as ‘free’ in aesthetic judgement is later shown to be defensible, then Longuenesse’s account of synthesis speciosa is put in further question. The contribution of aesthetic judgement is marked by the fact that it displays a free harmony between imagination and understanding and that it does not give rise to cognition. This would not be possible if imagination were already appropriated by understanding. If imagination is always already directed by the Vermögen zu urteilen, then it is difficult to see how we could employ our imagination without being oriented towards a cognitive goal. 143 Judgement (urteilen) is, for Longuenesse, cognitive judgement. In later chapters of this book I will challenge this equation.144 From her perspective, aesthetic apprehension can only be a failed or, at least, a not yet achieved cognition. Allison also suggests that Longuenesse is wrong to characterise reflective judgement as ‘failing to reach determination under a concept’.145 Longuenesse’s account differs in many important respects from the impositionalist one: namely, in her sensitivity to the relations between the faculties, in her sympathy for formalism and her insistence on the reciprocity between matter and form, and in her subtle reading of understanding as involving different levels of operation – to name but a few. Nevertheless, the internalisation of the relation between mind and world effected by the thesis of synthesis speciosa indirectly brings about the same consequence as impositionalism. The understanding comes to be the source of order among all sensory data. In a sense she goes even further than impositionalism insofar as she makes sensibility not just the recipient of cognitive activity, but a colonised outpost of the latter. Longuenesse insists she is using the term ‘understanding’ in a broader sense than usual. The general capacity for judgement analysed in the ‘Table of Judgements’ is not simply that of the determining understanding. It is, rather, that of intellect in general, covering determinant judgement (‘understanding’ in a narrow sense), reason and judgement. This distinction, she thinks, will prevent her from falling into the trap allegedly fallen into by Kant himself, that is, of making the whole project of the first Critique subservient to determinant judgement or understanding in the restrictive sense.146 Longuenesse hopes to open up the breadth of intellect and the interconnections between different branches of it. One example of her success in this project is the way in which she has revealed the necessity for reflection within the scope of determining judgement.147 Nevertheless the synthesis speciosa argument does not so much 77
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology achieve her intended goal as put it at risk. While not all judgements are cognitive, they are all governed by the Vermögen zu urteilen, which sets a broadly cognitive end for experience.148 Longuenesse’s goal of identifying the full range of judgement could be attempted in another way, by contrasting between a narrower and wider sense of reason, where the latter includes the whole range of the three Critiques.149 Cognition would then be situated within the systematic framework of reason without necessitating that all judgement is cognitive. This would also allow for what I call a pluralist account of the faculties in which they express distinct orientations open to us in experience while only ever being experienced as cooperating within experience.
Conclusion I hope to have established in this chapter that Buchdahl, Allison and Longuenesse each offer a highly sophisticated defence of Kant’s formalism. In their subtly different accounts, they rebut the charge that Kant offers a merely subjective epistemology, resting on a questionable faculty psychology. However, I have also argued that, due to their inattention to the role played by affect within experience, they risk falling back into impositionalism. Buchdahl and Longuenesse, in particular, are in danger of suggesting that Kant is trapped in a circle of representation, while Allison gives an insufficiently dynamic account of the relation in which matter stands to form. In the next chapter I commence my own account in which the affective or aesthetic side of experience is shown to be necessary for formalist idealism. In later chapters and in contrast to Buchdahl and Allison in particular, I will argue that it will only be possible to establish that formalism escapes the charge of subjectivism once the subjective element in knowledge is given its proper due and revealed as a necessary part of the project of establishing objectivity.
Notes 1. Gerd Buchdahl, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science: The Classical Origins Descartes to Kant (= MPS). 2. See Béatrice Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge (= KCJ), p. 223, n. 21. It is also worth noting that Graham Bird published a quite alternative interpretation to that of Strawson in 1962. See his Kant’s Theory of Knowledge. Bird rejects the two worlds interpretation of Kant and should have been recognised as a viable alternative to Strawson. While Allison cites Bird favourably, he does not enter into a 78
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3. 4.
5. 6.
7. 8. 9. 10.
11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.
18. 19.
20. 21. 22.
detailed exchange with an account he considers to be close to his own, but from which he differs ‘on many issues’. See Allison, KTI, p. 333 n. 9; see also p. 334, n. 12. Buchdahl does not reference Bird in MPS and neither does Longuenesse. For illumination on how Buchdahl uses the term ‘methodological’, see MPS, pp. 511–12. My reconstruction of Kant’s broader epistemological argument in Chapters 6 and 7 is deeply influenced by what I call Buchdahl’s ‘hierarchical’ reading of Kant. Buchdahl, MPS, p. 483, n. 1. Buchdahl is comparing Kant’s position to that of his predecessors discussed in previous sections of MPS. For Buchdahl’s account of the Second Analogy, see MPS, pp. 648–51. For his account of the relation between transcendental and empirical analyses of causality and his critique of competing positions, including Strawson’s, see pp. 651–65. Buchdahl, MPS; see pp. 489, 490 and 494. For a discussion of the relation between these, see Buchdahl, MPS, pp. 501–2. Buchdahl, MPS, p. 501. For an extended discussion of the relation, see pp. 651–65. Buchdahl, MPS, pp. 592–3. See also his Kant and the Dynamics of Reason (= KDR), pp. 183–4. It is Buchdahl’s view that regulative principles are not needed for the empirical experience of an object, but only for the lawful relations between empirical objects. Contrast my account in Chapter 7, pp. 254–5. Buchdahl, KDR, p. 56. Ibid., p. 56. Ibid., p. 170. Ibid., p. 56. Ibid., p. 205. Ibid., p. 204. Buchdahl, MPS, p. 494. Note again that, for Buchdahl, general ontology establishes the conditions of possibility for an individual material thing. I will argue in Chapter 7 (pp. 249–55) that full determination of the possibility of a material empirical thing is not supplied by constitutive principles alone. Buchdahl, MPS, p. 629 (discussed below). Buchdahl, KDR, p. 34 (my addition). EC is Buchdahl’s abbreviation for Special Ontology. This stands for ‘Explicative Component’. See KDR, p. 25, Fig. 1.5. Ibid., p. 90. Ibid., p. 89. Ibid., p. 34. I explain the idea of a framework yielding a phenomenology below. Buchdahl calls this the process of realisation. 79
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29.
30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.
Ibid., p. 34. Ibid., p. 62. Buchdahl, MPS, p. 638. Buchdahl, KDR, p. 62. Buchdahl refers to CPR, A 266, B 322. Buchdahl, MPS, p. 632, n. 4. Buchdahl, KDR, p. 118. Kant uses the term at CPR, A 143, B 182, in the ‘Schematism’ in a discussion of the schema of reality and, in particular, the material component in things, which he equates with things in themselves, Sachheit and reality. Kemp Smith, who translates Sachheit as ‘thinghood’, inserts a ‘not’, negating the sense of the original as stated in the Akademische Ausgabe version of both editions. Buchdahl remarks that this mention of Dinge an sich refers to the sense of the latter phrase as Transcendental Object, or To. Compare Allison’s interpretation of transcendental object as the material dimension in the object discussed in the next section pp. 65–7. Buchdahl, MPS, p. 639. In the first chapter of Charles Dickens’ The Pickwick Papers a row develops between Mr Pickwick and another member of the Pickwick Club, a speculative debating society. Other members are horrified that one member should accuse the other of being a humbug, while the accuser refuses to withdraw this insult. Nevertheless, calm is restored when Mr Pickwick’s opponent clarifies that he used the term in its Pickwickian, not its common, sense. Clearly, to label something Pickwickian is to say that its usage is limited to a restricted technical discussion and is about as relevant to our everyday concerns as Mr Pickwick’s seminal dissertation entitled ‘Speculations on the Source of the Hampstead Ponds, with some Observations on the Theory of Tittlebats’ – or, as some might say, it is ‘merely academic’! I give a quite different account of the philosophical importance of affection in Chapter 3. Buchdahl, KDR, pp. 53–103, especially p. 66. Ibid., pp. 79 ff. Buchdahl frequently mentions a question of balance. See, for instance, MPS, pp. 608 and 618. Buchdahl, MPS, p. 629 (Buchdahl’s emphasis). Ibid., p. 629. Ibid., p. 629. See my insistence on the two-sided character of sensibility in Chapter 3, pp. 105–8. Buchdahl, KDR, p. 51. Ibid., p. 44. He refers to CPR, A 255, B 311. Ibid., p. 73. Buchdahl refers to Bird, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge, pp. 68–9 and pp. 76–81. Compare Allison’s account of the transcendental object discussed on pp. 65–7. 80
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64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72.
73. 74. 75. 76.
77. 78. 79. 80.
81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87.
p. 116; (1983), p. 231 on the second Analogy; and p. 234 on the importance of regulative principles. See Chapter 1 for a discussion of Pippin. Allison, KTI (1983), p. 4; (2004), pp. 38–42. Ibid., p. 11; (2004) p. 11. Ibid. (1983), p. 26. Allison refers to the appendix to the Prolegomena Ak. IV, 375, and to CPR, B 519. See (2004), p. 35. Allison, KTI, p. 26 (Allison’s emphasis); (2004), p. 35. Ibid. (1983), p. 27; (2004), p. 37. Ibid. (1983), p. 61. The Antinomies are given an extended treatment in the new edition, see pp. 357–95. Ibid. (1983), p. 106. Allison also recasts this argument radically in the 2004 edition, see pp. 122–8. Ibid. (1983), p. 111. Another passage important for establishing the formalist status of Allison’s interpretation is found on p. 106: ‘a form of appearance is a feature of the appearance in virtue of which its elements are viewed as ordered or related to one another in experience’. As noted above, this section is altered in the new edition. See (2004) pp. 122–8. Ibid. (1983), p. 122. For a revised account of ‘discursivity’ and the conceptual side of dualism, see (2004) Chapter 4, pp. 77–96. Ibid. (1983), p. 129; (2004), p. 156. Ibid. (1983), p. 195; (2004), p. 225. Ibid. (1983), pp. 226 and 216. Allison’s analysis of the Analogies is greatly extended in the new edition, where he endeavours to show the interconnectedness of all three principles of time determination. See (2004) pp. 229 ff. Ibid. (1983), pp. 230–1; (2004), pp. 255–6. Pippin, KTF, p. 23. See Chapter 1, p. 41. Allison, KTI (1983), pp. 5–6; (2004), pp. 4–6. Ibid. (1983), p. 7. See (2004), p. 14 ‘our intuition and, more generally, that of any finite cognizer, must be sensible, that is, receptive, resulting from an affection of the mind by objects’. Ibid. (1983), p. 30. For a revised version of the relation in which Kant stands to Berkeley, see (2004), pp. 38–42. Ibid. (1983), p. 27; (2004), p. 37. Ibid. (1983), p. 30. See (1983) Ch. 11, especially pp. 247–54. For the revised version in the new edition, see (2004), Ch. 3 pp. 50–73, especially pp. 64–73. Ibid. (1983), p. 250; see (2004), p. 67 ‘the object remains completely indeterminate’. Ibid. (1983), pp. 250–2; (2004), pp. 71–3. Ibid. (1983), p. 253. Allison prefers to refer to empirical matter and its transcendental ground, rather than transcendental matter. However, in 82
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89. 90. 91.
92. 93.
94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107.
both editions he notes that Kant employs the latter expression on occasion. See, for instance (2004), p. 72. Allison’s account of the transcendental significance of the transcendental object can be compared to Gerold Prauss’s interpretation of philosophy’s role in relation to the natural sciences. For both Allison and Prauss, transcendental reflection allows us to grasp what cannot be understood at the empirical level. Prauss describes transcendental philosophy as the ‘non-empirical science of the empirical’. See Prauss, Kant und das Problem der Dinge an sich, pp. 205–27 and in particular pp. 212–13. Allison, however, distinguishes his position from Prauss’s, which he sees as rendering unintelligible the very concept of a non-empirical affection. See Allison, KTI (1983), pp. 250 and 364, n. 26; (2004), pp. 68 and 461. Allison, KTI (1983), p. 249. For a revised discussion of these, see (2004) pp. 51–64. Ibid. (1983), p. 249; (2004), p. 67. Ibid. (1983), p. 250. In the new edition, the ground of matter is aligned with things in themselves, see (2004), p. 72. This, however, is quite consistent with Allison’s account of the relation in which the transcendental object stands to things in themselves. Ibid. (1983), p. 250 (Allison’s emphasis); (2004), p. 67. Ibid. (2004), p. 72. See also his claim on p. 73 that all talk about things as they are in themselves, noumena and the transcendental object, that is, the ground of matter, counts as technical. This sounds very like Buchdahl’s claim that the given is strictly ‘Pickwickian’ in status. See Chapter 5 and subsequent chapters. ‘On naturalizing Kant’s transcendental psychology’, in Allison, Idealism and Freedom, p. 58. Ibid., pp. 65–6. ‘Gurwitsch’s interpretation of Kant’, ibid., p. 74. This article was first published in Kant-Studien in 1992. Ibid., see pp. 72 and 77–8. Ibid., p. 78. Allison, KTI, p. 97. Ibid., p. 97. Pippin, KTF, p. 23. See Chapter 1, p. 13. Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge (= KCJ), p. 18. Longuenesse, ‘The Divisions of the Transcendental Logic and the Leading Thread (= ‘Leading Thread’). CPR, A 66, B 91, and A 67, B 92. Kemp Smith translates Leitfaden simply as ‘clue’. Longuenesse, ‘Leading Thread’, p. 131. Ibid., p. 131. 83
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology 108. Ibid., p. 133. In this and subsequent passages, the emphasis is Longuenesse’s. 109. Ibid., p 133. 110. Ibid., p. 135. 111. Ibid., p. 134. Her reference is to A 54, B 78. 112. Ibid., p. 136. 113. Ibid., p. 136. 114. Ibid., p. 135. 115. Ibid., p. 136. 116. Ibid., pp. 139 and 143. 117. This is Allison’s position, as we saw in the previous section. 118. Longuenesse, ‘Leading Thread’, p. 151. 119. Ibid., p. 152. 120. Longuenesse, KCJ, pp. 199–200, n. 3. See also p. 196. 121. Understanding is ‘broadened’ because it now includes imagination and is even the source of the forms of sensibility. See Longuenesse, KCJ, p. 63, where understanding is identified as ‘the unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of imagination’. 122. See my discussion of the conditions of unification of objects as presented in the A edition of the ‘Deduction’ in Chapter 4. 123. See, for instance, Allison, KTI, p. 97. 124. Longuenesse, KCJ, p. 221. Longuenesse compares her position to Heidegger’s. Indeed Heidegger already identifies the problem of the source of synthesis speciosa (see Heidegger’s Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics). But his solution is to deny that Kant subsumes imagination under understanding, preferring to construe the two faculties as standing in ‘the rich totality of a complex activity’. See especially pp. 67–8 (German edition p. 61). 125. Longuenesse, KCJ, p. 223. See also her interesting claim that the forms of intuition are really potential forms (p. 221). A very similar idea is to be found in Heidegger’s Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 149 (German edition p. 137) where he cites Kant’s statement that ‘space and time are the pre-formative forms [Formen der Vorbildung] in pure intuition’. He references Erdmann, Reflexionen II, 408, Kant’s Posthumous Works in Manuscript Form, Vol. V, No. 5934. 126. Longuenesse, KCJ, p. 214 (Longuenesse’s emphasis). 127. She is referring to Kant’s famous footnote at B 160–161. 128. I give an alternative reading of the crucial footnote at B 160–161 in Chapter 4. 129. Longuenesse, ‘Leading Thread’, p. 153. CPR, A79, B 105 (Longuenesse’s emphasis). 130. Longuenesse, ‘Leading Thread’, p. 153. 131. See Allison, KTI, p. 97. 132. Longuenesse, ‘Leading Thread’, p. 154: ‘so no object for a concept is 84
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133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143.
144. 145. 146.
147. 148. 149.
simply “given” ’. See, in this regard, the attack on the ‘myth of the given’ in John McDowell’s Mind and World. Longuenesse, KCJ, p. 213 (Longuenesse’s emphasis). Ibid., see pp. 213 and 220. Ibid., p. 20, n. 9. Ibid., p. 20, n. 9. For instance, Critique of Judgment, AA 218. See discussion in Chapter 5. Longuenesse, KCJ, p. 207. Ibid., p. 206. Ibid., p. 208. CJ, AA 218. CJ, AA 240, is a development of the account at AA 218. My account is in direct opposition to the interpretation offered by Avner Baz in ‘Kant’s Principle of Purposiveness and the Missing point of (Aesthetic) Judgements’, who relies on Longuenesse, among others, for his reading of Kant. See, in particular, Chapters 5 and 7. Allison, Kant’s Theory of Taste, pp. 353–4, n. 2. The reference is to Longuenesse, KCJ, p. 164, n. 47. See Longuenesse, KCJ, pp. 203–4, for a very interesting, acute critique of Heidegger’s reading of Kant. See also my discussion of Heidegger in Chapter 4. See, for instance, Longuenesse, KCJ, p. 112, n. 17. This is what encourages Baz’s reception of her interpretation. See Baz, ‘Kant’s Principle of Purposiveness’, p. 14. See discussion of the tripartite supersensible in the penultimate section of Chapter 8, pp. 299–302.
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Formal Idealism and the Aesthetic Condition of Experience
In the previous chapter I have identified a problem in the accounts given by some of Kant’s principal defenders of the relation between representations and objects. While Buchdahl, Allison and Longuenesse provide a robust defence of Kant’s formalism, each of their accounts fail to give an adequate account of the relation in which form stands to matter. I will now offer an alternative account of the relation between representation and material given. In the first section of this chapter, I discuss how Kant’s characterisation of his epistemological project as amounting to formal, as opposed to material, idealism reveals his commitment to an extramental world of objects. Only the form of experience is initiated by our minds. In the second section, I turn to Kant’s ‘Copernican revolution’, which has often been taken to be a corner stone of his commitment to the view that mind imposes order on the world. I suggest that it need not be read in this way, because of a limitation on the range of its scope and also because it comprises two stages, the first of which concerns our receptivity to an affect given in experience.1 Next I examine some of the passages in the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ that most invite an impositionalist reading and suggest an alternative perspective according to which representation is our mode of access to an extra-mental given. Having established this in principle in the third section, in the fourth I argue that the account of affectivity such a perspective would require is in fact provided in the opening paragraphs of the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’. In the fifth section I give a resumé of the complex identity of receptivity that has emerged. Sensibility is dual-faced: its mental component being the formal condition of our capacity to be affected by something given in experience. This is the first and crucial step in taking seriously the subjective dimension of Kant’s epistemology, while not falling into the impositionalist readings examined in Chapter 1 and insufficiently 86
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Formal Idealism and the Aesthetic Condition of Experience parried by those interpretations discussed in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, Kant did not provide an adequately forceful account of the affective side of sensibility, often leaving the impression that the a priori forms of intuition were not so much modes of receptivity, as that they actively shape matter. This would, however, be a curious result as sensibility is also frequently characterised by Kant as ‘passive’. In fact, the truth lies somewhere between these extremes in the receptive capacity to be open to something other than ourselves.2
I Transcendental Idealism as Formal Idealism: The Refutation of Material Idealism In a footnote Kant makes the following remark about transcendental idealism: ‘I have also, elsewhere, sometimes entitled it formal idealism, to distinguish it from material idealism, that is, from the usual type of idealism which doubts or denies the existence of outer things themselves.’3 The final phrase in this passage may appear to suggest that Kant here commits himself to the existence of things-in-themselves (Dinge an sich), that is, things regarded without any reference to human experience of them. However there is no mention of Dinge an sich, but only of außere Dinge selbst. The ontological status of these outer things is left open by the latter phrase and does not necessarily commit Kant to a two-worlds ontology of appearances and things-inthemselves.4 Kemp Smith omits the subsequent sentence: ‘In many cases it seems advisable to use this [i.e., ‘formal idealism’] rather than the latter expression [i.e., ‘transcendental idealism’], in order to avoid all misinterpretation.’5 At times even Kant seems to lose sight of this important advice. My intention is to rearticulate the formal status of transcendental idealism and show how we can defend the latter against the charges of impositionalism and subjectivism. Kant’s point in this crucial note is that, in contrast to his own position, material idealism ‘doubts or denies’ that there are independently existing objects. Who are Kant’s opponents here? Certainly he has within his sights Berkeley, who denied the external existence of objects and insisted that the latter are only ideas in the mind.6 Formal idealism, in contrast, does not deny the extra-mental existence of objects. But no more is it committed to the extra-experiential existence of things-in-themselves. It must be that ‘outer things themselves’ in the passage under consideration refers to objects independent of the mind, but nevertheless experienced by us. These ‘außere Dinge selbst’ are accessible to the mind, but are not projected by it. Formal 87
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology idealism preserves a crucial role for the mind as objects are only identified as such insofar as they have a certain structure or form, which is mind-dependent. Formal idealism is, however, contrasted from the material variety insofar as the former does not reduce all experience to the activity of mind. In the ‘Refutation of Idealism’, ‘material idealism’ refers not only to Berkeley but also to Descartes.7 Kant contrasts the dogmatic idealism of Berkeley to the problematic idealism of Descartes. The latter species of idealism is sceptical, or at least uncommitted as to the independent existence of extra-mental objects. It ‘doubts’ though does not ‘deny’ the existence of outer things. All that is certain is the Cogito. It is only with the additional premise of a beneficent deity that our certainty in the existence of external objects can be reasserted. In contrast, for Kant, any certainty that we have in our activity of thinking must be based not only on a concept but also on an intuition. In order to experience myself as thinking, I must do so over time. And, to experience myself as temporal, is to mark out my experience of self against a spatial experience of external objects. Thus, Kant concludes, we simply cannot maintain a certainty with regard to the self and be sceptical about the existence of external objects. We cannot have one without the other and it is clear that, for Kant, the only reasonable conclusion is that our common sense faith both in the existence of the thinking subject and in external objects is reliable.8 Formal idealism is thus distinguished both from the Berkeleian and Cartesian versions of material idealism insofar as it starts from a commitment to the existence of extra-mental objects. Something must be given to the mind if experience is to be possible.9 However we have seen in Chapter 1 that had Kant consistently talked of formal instead of transcendental idealism, his critics would have been no more convinced. It is the very formal status of his method that – for Pippin, Guyer and Strawson – results in the conclusion that he is committed to subjectivism or the imposition of mental structures on the external world. In contrast to what they see as a reduction of empirical experience to an order projected on that world by the form-giving mind, we could say in our terms, not theirs, that they insist on the aesthetic or the given.10 For each of them, Kant fails to account for what is outside the mind and slips back into a tooeasy model of ‘impositionalism’. Meanwhile the authors we examined in Chapter 2 admit the importance of mind in Kant’s method, while insisting that what is in question here is the logical and not the psychological activity of mind. 88
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Formal Idealism and the Aesthetic Condition of Experience Mind gives structure to objects, but it does not generate them. Thus far, the approaches taken by Buchdahl, Allison and Longuenesse tally with Kant’s distinction between formal and material idealism, as I have read it. As I have argued, however, none of these three commentators focuses sufficiently on the relation in which form stands to the affective side of experience. This is certainly not to say that they qualify as material idealists in either of Kant’s senses. They neither deny nor doubt the external existence of things. Rather, they start from the presupposition that the aesthetic dimension of experience is unproblematic, philosophically speaking.
II Why an impositionalist interpretation of the Copernican Revolution is not necessary It cannot be denied, however, that Kant’s presentation of his method at times invites the impositionalist reading developed by his critics. Famously, in the account of the Copernican revolution in philosophy, he says that there must be a reversal in the relation between knowledge and objects.11 In this passage Kant consistently uses Gegenstand rather than Object, suggesting strongly that he is concerned with the possible experience of extra-mental objects and not merely with constructions of thought. Indeed, no revolution would be necessary if he merely wanted to establish the possibility of access to the latter. If we are to attain anything worthy of the title of knowledge, then the latter cannot simply arise from the causal effect of objects on our minds. The status of the empiricist causal account of knowledge became explicit in Hume’s claim that causality is nothing other than a customary association of certain events we call causes with certain others we call effects.12 If this model were applied to the case of knowledge in general, there would be no necessary connection between object and representation and, as a result, our claims to knowledge would not qualify for the title. The link between representation and object that is sought cannot be derived from experience, which as Hume rightly concluded, gives us nothing but associative patterns. Kant’s alternative is to suggest that the only way of securing that our claims to knowledge do, in fact, grasp a necessary connection between object and representation is if the mind – or, more strictly, our cognitive capacity – introduces an a priori element. The reversal Kant achieves is not, however, that now the mind – or the a priori form arising from it – causes objects. Causal relations are to be understood strictly within the range of experience. Asking 89
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology the question as to the cause of experience is to pose an illicit, transcendent and ultimately vacuous question. A priori elements, we will see, provide the structure or form of experience and not the cause of the latter. Nevertheless, does this not mean that the mind imposes its own order on objects? We will see in our discussion of the structure of the ‘Analytic’ in Chapter 6 that this is a question that returns to haunt Kant at many levels.13 For now I intend to concentrate on evidence internal to Kant’s initial account of the Copernican revolution in order to show that at this early stage of his account, we need not leap to conclude that his position entails impositionalism. Having begun with the claim that objects must conform to knowledge, Kant proceeds to develop his insight at two levels. In effect, he separates out two conditions of knowledge, saying first that objects must conform to the faculty of intuitions: A similar experiment can be tried in metaphysics [i.e. similar to that of Copernicus’ reversal of the attribution of movement], as regards the intuition of objects [Gegenstand]. If intuition must conform to the constitution of the objects, I do not see how we could know anything of the latter a priori; but if the object (as object of the senses) must conform to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, I have no difficulty in conceiving such a possibility.14
This is the aesthetic condition of knowledge. Kant asserts that if we are to understand how we achieve knowledge of objects of the senses, then we should not construe those objects as the causes of our knowledge. It must rather be the case that the objects conform to our power of intuition. In the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ we will discover what Kant has in mind. If we are to come to attain knowledge of sensory objects, there must be something in us that allows the given in sensation to be taken up, that is, we must be capable of being receptive to that something. The second condition is that objects must conform to concepts: Since I cannot rest in these intuitions if they are to become known, but must relate them as representations to something as their object, and determine this latter through them, either I must assume that the concepts, by means of which I obtain this determination, conform to the object, or else assume that the objects, or what is the same thing, that the experience in which alone, as given objects, they can be known, conform to the concepts. In the former case, I am again in the same perplexity as to how I can know anything a priori in regard to the objects. In the latter case the outlook is more hopeful.15 90
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Formal Idealism and the Aesthetic Condition of Experience Knowledge, although not perhaps some lower level of consciousness, requires that we have not only an intuition, but also a concept. In the ‘Transcendental Deduction’ we learn that the forms of intuition are only the initial conditions of the combination of the sensible given which, in turn, facilitates its being unified by the concepts of the understanding.16 In the light of this, it is surprising that the second stage does not say that intuitions must conform to concepts. Intuitions give sensible content for concepts, while objects are the composite of intuitions and concepts. Yet in this passage Kant uses not only ‘object’ but also ‘experience’ as referring to the sensory given that has not yet been determined or unified by the understanding. Later I will suggest that Kant uses these terms in both a technical and a non-technical sense. Kant’s general point is that the extra-mental given in experience can only be taken up into consciousness and thus qualify as known by us insofar as we supply an a priori element that comes from mind alone. There are two elements of form, both aesthetic and conceptual, and they conjointly allow the unification of the sensory object under the rules of understanding so as to give rise to knowledge. Insofar as an object can be experienced – which for Kant is equivalent to its being knowable – then it must ultimately be subsumable under certain fundamental concepts that function as rules: For experience is itself a species of knowledge which involves understanding; and understanding has rules which I must presuppose as being in me prior to objects being given to me, and therefore as being a priori. They find expression in a priori concepts to which all objects of experience necessarily conform, and with which they must agree.17
This is the locus classicus of the impositionalist interpretation of Kant. Knowledge arises neither from our intuitions conforming to the constitution of objects, nor from our concepts conforming to objects. It can only arise insofar as objects conform to our concepts. The case seems to be clear. The mind introduces order into objects and it does so without any contribution from those objects. It seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that the mind imposes order on objects. Before considering that the impositionalist reading may simply be too quick, we should consider what Kant means by the term ‘object’ in the passage just cited. I have already noted that he uses the term indeterminately in anticipation of a later, more rigorous usage. But what in general does Kant intend by the term in this context? It would seem reasonable to assume that he is referring to experiential or empirical objects. We can establish this by a via negativa, for the force 91
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology of these passages is that objects fail to ground knowledge because they are empirical. A further illumination of the empirical status of objects comes later in the Preface in the course of a discussion of the limitation of knowledge in the interests of our practical or moral orientation. Kant makes the point that if our knowledge is of appearances and not of things-in-themselves, then a space is left open for the thought of the latter within the practical domain.18 We can never have knowledge of these speculative or moral entities, but we can have practical faith in them.19 By contrast, the objects of knowledge are appearances and thus empirical. In insisting that the objects that we know are ‘appearances’, Kant is saying that they must stand in relation to mind. They are objects that appear to us. Now insofar as they are marked by the representational relation in which they stand to mind, they share the formal structures characteristic of mind. Only insofar as they are formed by the structures introduced by our mental powers are they capable of counting as appearances. But to say as much is not to say that they are mere projections on the part of mind. They are syntheses of the material given, which arise from the unifying capacity of mind. Synthesis must still be effected on a given that precedes mental activity and as such synthesis is not a mere projection but rather arises from the intervention of mind within the material world. The form of objects, admittedly, arises from the mind alone, but only as conditions for synthesising the given. As I will argue in the next chapter, this synthesis arises as a cooperation of a plurality of different mental orientations in response to an extra-mental given. We now must consider a limitation on the Copernican Revolution, before moving on to insist on its full scope. The limitation is that Kant is here concerned only with the a priori element in knowledge. The ‘objects’ – be they things in themselves or appearances – would be incapable of supplying this dimension of knowledge. Things-in-themselves are alien to the cognitive process, while appearances count as the ‘undetermined object [Gegenstand] of an empirical intuition’.20 Neither is capable of supplying the element that makes possible the determining function characteristic of knowledge. Only an a priori element that arises from the mind makes possible determination or unification. But this a priori element is merely the form or structure of knowledge, that is, it provides only the initial conditions of knowledge and is not the latter’s sole source. Admittedly, Kant’s presentation of the Copernican revolution seems to suggest a less limited reading where knowledge arises from the mind alone. However, seen in conjunction 92
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Formal Idealism and the Aesthetic Condition of Experience with his characterisation of transcendental idealism as ‘formalist’, a differently nuanced interpretation becomes possible. The a priori forms supplied by the mind are the initiating conditions with respect to which any claim to knowledge must arise, but the a priori is operative – and indeed valid – only insofar as it is set in relation to what is given in experience. The empirical or a posteriori object arises from the combination of a priori and the given. The task of achieving empirical knowledge will require much more than the merely formal conditions, both aesthetic and conceptual.21 Recognising this limitation goes hand in hand with establishing the full scope of the Copernican revolution. If the structures introduced by mind are to bring about order in the extra-mental world, mind must be capable not only of unifying the given through concepts, but also of being receptive to what is given in experience. This is the first and aesthetic condition of knowledge that I identified above. Receptivity also has a formal structure, namely, the forms of intuition. But the forms of intuition allow us to take up something extramental. This hidden side of sensibility has often been underestimated, resulting in the view that the forms of intuition impose order rather than make possible our reception of or response to objects. Indeed, Kant’s statement that objects must conform to intuition seems to suggest just this. However, Kant’s account of sensibility is more complex, as I will argue later.22 For the moment I will simply claim that the first stage of the Copernican revolution would not be distinct from the second, if the forms of intuition were not receptive rather than spontaneous. And we will see that the defining characteristic of intuition is receptivity, that is, our capacity for taking in something given to us via our senses. If receptivity is a necessary component of knowledge, then it cannot simply be the case that mind imposes order on the world. Admittedly the concept brings unity into intuition, but both steps are necessary for knowledge to arise. This brings to mind another classical reference point in the Critique of Pure Reason: ‘Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.’23 Once we recognise the limitation of the Copernican Revolution to the a priori and its full range of reference, expressed in two stages, both aesthetic and conceptual, it is no longer necessary to read the passage as advocating impositionalism. Only the form of experiential objects comes from the mind and, moreover, aesthetic form is a capacity for receptivity to something given, not a projection on the world. Admittedly, it is possible to read the aesthetic side of 93
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology transcendental idealism as merely passive and not receptive in any meaningful sense, but I believe this should be resisted.24 The remainder of this work is devoted to bringing out how the formal structure of transcendental idealism makes possible access to the material but empirical given. There are at least three elements necessary for the cognition of an empirical object.25 First, something must be given to us in intuition; second, we must be receptive to what is given through the forms of intuition, space and time; and, third, an a priori concept is required for determination of the given. In his account of the Copernican revolution in philosophy, Kant has often been taken to be concerned only with the third element. And even though I have emphasised the necessity of recognising the second element in the first stage of the Copernican revolution, it must be admitted that at this stage of his discussion the first element is not positively addressed. This has the result that the complex structure of sensibility is not made fully evident, and, until it is, the distinctiveness of the aesthetic and conceptual dimensions of experience cannot be adequately grasped. Later in this chapter we will see that Kant pays more attention to the first element of knowledge at the outset of the ‘Trancendental Aesthetic’. It will then become more apparent that the three elements of knowledge are part of one complex story. The limitation of the Copernican Revolution to the a priori and its composition in two stages, both aesthetic and conceptual, has important implications for what Kant intends by ‘knowledge’. Insofar as knowledge has an aesthetic dimension, it is temporal and arises with regard to spatial objects. The conceptual dimension emerges as a task of determination of the determinable, that is, of appearances, which are identified as the undetermined.26 This means that while the Critique remains an examination of the a priori, it must also give some account of the way in which the latter provides the form of the a posteriori. Only the form of experience, or a priori knowledge, arises from the mind alone and even it must anticipate application to empirical instances. Empirical knowledge has an even more complex genesis.27 Were the impositionalist interpretation correct, the remainder of the Critique would merely be an exposition of the apparatus of mental projection. Contrary to this, I will argue that the Critique furnishes a lengthy argument for the complex operation necessary for the possibility of any concrete knowledge in the world. This is the reason why Kant has to develop his argument at a series of different levels.28 94
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Formal Idealism and the Aesthetic Condition of Experience Through the progressive development of his argument, Kant gradually approaches a point at which the a priori structures – which are, indeed, initiated by the mind – come to grasp the genuinely extramental. This process entails setting the initiating conditions, both conceptual and aesthetic, in relation to the affective condition of experience. The aesthetic forms are particularly crucial because they provide the point of access to an affective given. Without them the conceptual forms would have nothing to operate on. One common way of presenting the situation is to say that Kant aims to get beyond the polarities of the rationalist and empiricist worldviews and their concentration on thought or sensation, respectively. Kant’s alternative path is to establish the relation between thinking and sensing. In the next two chapters I will show how this relation arises as the activity of synthesis. Synthesis is the capacity to take up the sensory given through the introduction of formal structures. The Copernican revolution first uncovers this initiating condition of experience, while also revealing that mental activity has a dual structure, being both receptive and unifying. This puts in question the thesis that the mind projects an order onto an indifferent world. The alternative is that knowledge arises as a process of negotiation between mind and world. My account will not suggest that the world independently displays structural features that just happen to fit with the mind’s own order. This would be to revert to Trendelenburg’s overlooked alternative rehabilitated by Guyer.29 This would, in turn, destroy any claim that the mind provided an a priori structure for experience, because the conformity between mind and world would simply be contingent and not necessary. To say that there is a necessary connection between subjective representations and objects is to say that mind actually gets hold of what is given to it in experience. We do not reach the right conclusion by coincidence. The necessity characteristic of knowledge arises neither from a contingent nor a pre-established harmony between mind and world, but only from our ability to determine things through the use of our cognitive powers, that is, our faculties of understanding and intuition. The alternative I offer – both to the view that the mind imposes order on the world and to the position that there is a mere coincidence between mental order and order in the world – is that there is an ongoing dynamic between mind and world initiated at a formal level by the mind. But this will only be established by the full extent of Kant’s argument, of which the Copernican Revolution is merely the beginning. 95
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III An alternative to the circle of representation: representation as the mode of access to objects I have suggested that the mind initiates the possibility of knowledge insofar as it provides forms for experience. I have highlighted that the conceptual determination of objects is only possible insofar as we are capable of receptivity to something given in experience. This is the aesthetic dimension of Kant’s formal idealism. These two insights into Kant’s position have been extracted from his statement of the Copernican Revolution in philosophy. In this section I will argue that we can recognise the centrality, and indeed the necessity, of representation without falling into a circle of representation. My aim is not to try to return to the affect (or even the ‘double affect’) of a thing in itself. It is rather to reinstate the force of the affect of the appearing thing in Kant’s account. I have argued that while the ‘outer things themselves’ that Kant mentions in his contrast between formal and material idealism are not things in themselves, they are extra-mental entities.30 Their defining characteristic is that they are accessible to us, and in this sense are ‘for us’ or for the mind. Their status is not privatively subjective, but relational. The question is: how are we to account for the affect of a thing that is related to mind and yet extra-mental? Throughout the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’, Kant repeatedly insists that we encounter objects as representations for our minds. Crucial to this perspective is the claim that both time and space are modes of representation – that is, they are nothing if we abstract from ‘that mode of representation [Vorstellungsart] which is peculiar to us’.31 But I will argue that these claims are consistent with the position that the forms of intuition are modes of access to extra-mental things. Kant appears to go one step further when he says ‘what we call outer objects [Gegenstände] are nothing but mere representations [Vorstellungen] of our sensibility, the form of which is space . . .’32 This could sound as if what we call outer objects are merely subjective mental representations. Even this claim, however, is compatible with the view that we are affected by something extra-mental. Representations belong to sensibility insofar as the latter makes them possible, but representations arise from the affect on us of something other than our representations. This something other than ourselves, the source of the affect, can only affect us insofar as our consciousness represents things given in experience. Were this not the case, the object would count as a thing-in-itself. 96
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Formal Idealism and the Aesthetic Condition of Experience It might seem that Kant goes yet further when he says that form represents only what is ‘posited’ by the mind and thus is ‘nothing but the mode [Art] in which the mind is affected through its own activity (namely, through this positing of its representation), and so is affected by itself’.33 But in this case Kant is referring strictly to the formal conditions of experience, which do indeed arise from the mind. He need not be taken as suggesting that what is taken up within form – that is, representations in general or objects – are posited by the mind. Only form, which is our mode or style [Art] of being affected counts as self-affection. Admittedly, Kant’s account is misleading. It would have been better had he said that form is the dimension of our receptivity that comes from us. Nevertheless, this passage does not lead to material idealism. In yet another passage, Kant says that ‘all our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearance’.34 This, too, can be read in accordance with his formalist perspective. Representation can now be recognised as a necessary condition of our access to appearing objects, yet we really do access something extra-mental when we have a representation. In other words something does appear to us as a representation. So far I have parried what appears to be an invitation to an impositionalist reading in a number of passages in the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’. Now I turn to another passage where Kant appears to take the opposite tack, going so far as to suggest he may have reverted to transcendental realism. Late in the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’, Kant writes ‘Our mode of intuition is dependent upon the existence of the object [das Dasein des Objekts], and is therefore possible only if the subject’s faculty of representation is affected by that object’.35 Affect, it would appear, arises from the object, which sets the faculty of representation into action. This could count as a restoration of the causal account of affection against which the Copernican revolution was directed. Would this mean that things in themselves are the basis for our representations of things as appearances? It is thus not surprising that the interpreters discussed in the previous chapter emphasise the priority of representation over any talk of access to objects and restrict philosophical investigation of objects within the scope of what I have called the circle of representation. But Kant avoids transcendental realism just as much as he avoids empirical idealism. The last cited passage merely states that the appearing thing affects us insofar as it is accessible to us in experience and that the form of intuition is only exercised in conjunction with 97
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology such an affect. Now does this not lead to the danger raised by Allison and mentioned in the previous chapter, namely, that the empirical object, which is the result of affection, is conceived as the latter’s cause? We have seen that the problem can be avoided, as Allison suggests, once we recognise that the matter in the empirical object can be considered in philosophical reflection in abstraction from the epistemic conditions that are necessary for experience.36 We can thus maintain that it is the empirical object that affects us and that strictly speaking there is nothing other than empirical matter.37 An empirical object comprises a material and a formal component. The formal component establishes the possibility of introducing order into experience and arises from ourselves, thus counting as a priori. The material component is the given element in the empirical object. We only have access to this given insofar as we have capacities – both sensible and conceptual – for introducing order into matter. Matter requires form. However form is the form of matter. In explaining the material given we do not need to proliferate levels of matter, although we do need to distinguish different ways in which we consider it. When we consider an object as empirically formed, we view it as the result of a process whereby matter has been given a formal structure. The empirical object viewed in this way does not reveal the initial affect that first gave rise to that formative activity, because we are concerned with the object as formed matter. However, we can also view the same empirical object in respect of its constitutive elements, that is, as to its matter and its form, even though within experience these are never encountered discretely. From the vantage point of philosophical reflection, I consider the object as material, that is, I focus on the matter in the object. It is true that this matter has only affected me insofar as I am the bearer of formal capacities that give shape or figure to the material given, however there must also be matter that is formed and this matter is nowhere other than in the empirical object. The thought experiment I am engaged on is one in which I imagine what always occurs together as prised apart. The gain from doing so is that I am able to focus on the matter in the appearing object and do not need to conjecture a further transcendental matter beyond experience. The transcendental move involves reflecting in an alternative fashion on the experience with which we are already engaged. Kant’s transcendental turn is necessarily committed to a material given, and, at the same time, to the position that the latter can be viewed not only 98
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Formal Idealism and the Aesthetic Condition of Experience empirically but also from the standpoint of transcendental reflection that reveals the unformed element within experience. But so far, my account treats matter simply as accessible from the perspective of transcendental reflection. I have not addressed how empirical matter affects the subject. Empirical matter in the appearance has an affect on us, even though this only happens insofar as matter arises within a form, that is, as a representation. While Allison’s account suggests that matter is simply the obverse of form, a distinction between matter understood as result and as the event of affection will highlight the process through which matter is taken up by form and thus gives rise to an affect. While only formed entities can be known, transcendental philosophy must face the question of the limits of experience and it does so insofar as it addresses the point at which matter becomes accessible to us. The transcendental turn entails that this event of affection does not happen outside of experience, but rather at its limits. The event of the emergence of a thing for consciousness is usually simply assumed by us, even insofar as we are philosophers.38 Kant’s occupation of what could seem like opposing positions, at times insisting on the priority of mind, at others on the priority of the object, can now be explained. His general project is one of expressing the relation in which the formal structure initiated by mind stands to given objects in the world. His commitment to the relation between form and world is what leads him sometimes to emphasise one term and sometimes the other. Admittedly, the affect things have on us occurs at the limit of our powers of representation and hence of reflection. Nevertheless, this does not render the question of affect philosophically redundant. If Kant is to avoid material idealism he must show how it is that we can be in contact with real things and not just mental projections. How are we capable of being affected by something other than our own subjective impressions and yet only in the medium of our representations? He must show how our faculty of representation takes up something given in experience and does not simply generate the latter. What affects our power of representation will necessarily stand at the limit of our experience, but this is not to say that the object stands outside it in the way that a thing in itself would. Clearly the authors I examined in Chapter 2 do not think that the faculty of representation generates affect. However, by inadequately addressing the philosophical relevance of the question of affect, they invite the rejoinder of interpreters such as Pippin, Guyer and 99
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology Strawson for whom Kant’s account gives no convincing story as to how the mind encounters something extra-mental and for whom instead the mind imposes order on a neutral given. The stakes are high, because I do not want to revert to the position that experience arises out of an unknown something, ‘I know not what’. How are we to understand the claim that appearances are both merely for our power of representation and yet, at the same time, arise out of an affect on that power of representation? The model I will introduce in the next section is one in which there is a necessary relation between mind’s formative or representational power and the matter given in experience, that is the empirical matter, that could not even be recognised as such were there not a representational form in which to take it up. Correspondingly, mental formative activity would be incapable of initiating experience were it not prompted or affected by the material in appearance.
IV A reading of the initial paragraphs of the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ In the previous section I established a possible reading of passages in the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ where Kant appears most guilty of adopting an impositionalist position. But I now need to establish that Kant actually presents affection as a condition of representation. In this section I will show that Kant provides a model of affectivity in the initial paragraphs of the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ before he moves to his principal topic, the status and structure of the forms of intuition, which, as we have seen are modes of representation of appearances. Intuition is the means through which knowledge stands in immediate relation to objects.39 While an object, strictly understood, is the result of the determination of an intuition under a concept, Kant initially uses ‘object’ in a less technical sense to refer to something extramental given to our senses. The object in this context is the underdetermined given in intuition. I have already used this distinction to clarify the Copernican revolution. I will now show that my suggestion is supported by the initial account Kant gives in the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’. The relation to things through intuition is only possible insofar as the object is given to us.40 This can only occur insofar as ‘the mind is affected’.41 The mind can only be affected insofar as we have a capacity of receptivity. Sensibility is our capacity ‘for receiving [bekommen] representations through the manner in 100
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Formal Idealism and the Aesthetic Condition of Experience which we are affected by objects’.42 We can now draw together these claims. Sensibility is our capacity for being affected by objects and, for us, being affected entails that we have representations of objects. Sensibility is the capacity to take up affects as representations. This is confirmed when Kant goes on to say that sensibility ‘yields us intuitions’.43 But affection is the necessary condition of there being representations in the first place. Intuitions are representations and they arise from sensibility, our capacity to be affected. We can so far conclude from the first paragraph of the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ that our ability to be affected by objects is, at the same time, the initial condition of our representational capacity. Insofar as we are, through sensibility, capable of being affected by objects, we are capable of having intuitions of them, that is, of relating to them immediately. Intuitions are Vorstellungen, that is, they are modes of knowledge that allow an object, literally, to be placed before us (vorstellen). In having an intuition we stand in relation to things that are accessible to us. These things are appearing objects or appearances. In the second paragraph, Kant characterises an appearance as ‘the undetermined object of an empirical intuition’.44 We can now understand the implication of this characterisation. An appearance is an object that affects us through our capacity for sensibility. Our only access to the object is in a representation. At this stage of Kant’s argument, the appearance is undetermined simply because it affects us only as an intuition and has not yet been taken up by understanding, the capacity for determination of the given so as to achieve knowledge. The initial, non-technical sense of object refers us to our sensory awareness of what would, if it were determined by a concept, count as an object in the strict sense. In the first sentence of the ‘Aesthetic’ Kant says that all thought is finally directed to intuition, our ability to stand in immediate relation to objects.45 This reveals that it is not only the case, as McDowell says, that concepts ‘go all the way down’, but also that intuition goes all the way up.46 And it would appear that not all empirical intuitions are taken up in thought. In the ‘Transcendental Deduction’, Kant says that objects may appear to us without ‘their necessarily relating to functions of the understanding’.47 Now although this passage could be taken to suggest that we can have intuitions without their standing in any relation to concepts, it is not necessary to come to this conclusion. All Kant need say is, first, that intuition is a necessary and irreducible condition of an object in 101
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology the full sense of the term. Second, sensibility provides us with objects in a non-technical sense, that is, with appearances in intuition. Objects in this weaker sense count as representations, yet ones that are not determined by the faculty of understanding. However, Kant’s claim that intuitions are not necessarily connected to the functions of the understanding is misleading. He should have said that, insofar as our intuition is not intellectual and is necessarily combined with a capacity for conceptualisation, intuitions must necessarily relate to the possibility of determination under a concept. What is not necessary is that intuitions are in fact determined by a concept. This maintains his commitment to the dual necessity of intuitions and concepts for experience, without concluding that all intuitions give rise to cognition. Leaving open the possibility of indeterminate intuitions is important and not just insofar as it leaves a gap for underdetermined awareness in everyday life, without which Kant’s account of experience would be implausible. It also leaves a place for aesthetic judgements in which intuitions relate to concepts, but only indeterminately.48 It seems likely that the ambivalent nature of Kant’s account of the relation in which intuitions stand to concepts in the first Critique arises from his not yet having established the distinction between determinate and reflective judgement.49 At the most primitive level, an appearance is the representation of an object’s affect on us. It is empirical because the object is only ever that thing that affects us within the range of experience. This thing can only be accessed through our modes of knowledge, in this case the forms of intuition that give rise to representations. But representations would not arise if the object did not affect our sensibility. The relation between object (in the non-technical sense) and representation is a two-sided one. Without representation there would be no affect by the thing, without the affect by the thing there would be no representation. This account of the role of representation highlights the necessity of affect and thus does not fall back into the circle of representation. The conclusion is that an appearance is an object (in the looser sense) given in intuition and only accessible to us through our powers of representation. If that appearance were determined by a concept it would count as knowledge of an object (in the technical sense). In the second paragraph of the ‘Aesthetic’ Kant says that sensation is the effect (Wirkung) of an object upon the faculty of representation insofar as we are affected (affiziert) by it.50 The question is not here of the effect of some unknown cause, but rather of the affect that 102
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Formal Idealism and the Aesthetic Condition of Experience makes possible an empirical intuition.51 In the third paragraph, Kant develops his point by making a distinction within appearance between matter and form. Matter in an appearance is that which corresponds to sensation.52 Sensation is the empirical result of our capacity to be affected by an object. The form of appearance, in contrast, is that which allows the manifold, that is, the given, to be ordered in certain relations.53 The ordering of sensation cannot arise from the given itself, just because the latter is empirical. Order must arise from the mind, as only as a priori can its necessity be secured. Any appearing thing arises out of the conjunction of the material given, which is empirical and thus a posteriori, with the formally a priori. Matter is thus established as necessarily empirical. It is easy to conclude that this entails that the a posteriori is simply the after-effect of a priori form. But, as we saw in the previous section, there are two levels at which the matter necessary for intuition can be analysed. Matter experienced as one of the component parts of an appearance is viewed as the result of a process of formation. We only experience matter insofar as it is taken up by representation, that is, in relation to form. However this result arises out of two irreducible elements. Although we cannot experience matter in abstraction from form, we can think it. I suggested in the previous section that we can express the affect of matter as an event, in contrast to its result in sensation. Thinking matter as event allows us to consider the a posteriori in a different way. The matter of an appearance counts as a posteriori now in the sense that it is what is necessarily given as an affect. The a posteriori cannot come from the mind and must be given. This reveals an alternative nuance of the a posteriori, where the latter is not simply subsidiary to the a priori, but radically distinct from it. The radical sense of the a posteriori is that of the necessity of the givenness of matter within the empirical. Matter viewed in this way is the necessary complement of the a priori.54 Thus while sensation viewed as the material aspect of appearance counts as an effect or result, we can also think about affect as a necessary condition of experience or event. While we only ever experience the result or trace of this event – that is, some combination of form with matter – there would be no material given, were there not an initial event of affection.55 Matter is that in the appearing thing that sets our representational capacities to work. Neither the affective condition of representation nor its a priori form is temporally prior, so it is not that the object first exists and then has an affect on us. Rather, to view something as an object is to consider it as standing in an affective relation to us, that 103
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology is, as accessible to our representational powers. The affect and the representation arise in one and the same event as a relation between mind and world. This is the characteristic status of an appearance in contrast to a thing-in-itself that would not stand in any affective relation to the representational mind. To say that the object only exists as such insofar as it affects us and is capable of being taken up by our powers of representation may appear to fall back into material idealism, albeit of a new form. However, Kant is not committed to the position that we produce objects, but simply that we only attend to those that our subjective faculties are capable of taking up. This does not entail the existence of another category of objects we cannot access.56 Rather, we relate to objects as our environment; they are part of the world we also inhabit and it is only by treating them as such that we are capable of encountering and, on occasion, knowing them. The appearance, as we have seen, is a composite of form and matter, but Kant now goes on to focus exclusively on the formal side of intuition. This central emphasis of the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ has encouraged the impression that his account of mind is wholly constitutive and not receptive. Form counts as pure insofar as to achieve it we abstract all the features that arise from sensation, that is the material side of the appearance. These include impenetrability, hardness and colour.57 Additionally, we must abstract the features that arise from the understanding – for instance, substance, force and divisibility.58 What is left is characteristic only of pure intuition, that is, the aesthetic form of appearance, namely, extension and figure. Pure intuition, Kant says, ‘is to be found in the mind a priori as a mere form of sensibility’.59 This formal residue of every appearance is what Kant puts down to self-affection, as we saw in the previous section.60 Thus form cannot be derived from sensation; nevertheless, we have seen that there would be no appearance in the first place, were we not affected through sensibility by the object. Form is not imposed on the matter of sensation, but is the framework within which the latter is represented. An appearance arises from two sources, one extra-mental and the other mental. The appearance differs from the thing in itself and from the merely phenomenal illusion in that it is relational, that is, it arises from a relation between object and the mind. We have already seen in a provisional way in our discussion of the Copernican revolution that mind initiates the forms not only of intuition but also of understanding.61 Later we will 104
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Formal Idealism and the Aesthetic Condition of Experience see that the combination of a plurality of modes of knowledge or faculties is necessary for Kant’s account of experience. In the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’, Kant chiefly investigates the principles of a priori sensibility, that is, the aesthetic form of appearances, which he presently announces are only two, namely space and time.62 But the first few paragraphs of the Critique have revealed that these mental forms are only one side of the story of intuition and that appearances arise only insofar as we are affected, in a non-technical sense, by an empirical object. The forms of intuition are representational forms through which we take up what empirically affects us.
V The complex identity of receptivity In the first paragraph of the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ Kant identifies sensibility as ‘the capacity (receptivity) for receiving representations through the way in which we are affected by objects’.63 I have construed this as the view that we have representations only insofar as we are affected through our capacity of sensibility. This affect gives rise to a sensation. But, as we have also seen, this is only one side of the story of receptivity. Our intuitions – that is, our capacity to stand in an immediate relation to objects – also require an a priori element, that is, a form that makes possible the ordering of the manifold of matter. Receptivity arises out of an affect, but the latter can only count as such – that is, affect us – if it can also take on a certain order and this requires a pure intuition. The forms of intuition make possible that we take up something and hold it together in an empirical form.64 The aesthetic side of our experience is (philosophically) revealed as a point of contact between objects and mind.65 A full account of the structure of intuition must include not only its formal conditions, but also the way in which form makes possible access to a material given. Without this crucial move concealed in the initial paragraphs of the first Critique, Kant’s formal idealism would have fallen back into material idealism. The form of space makes possible that there are empirical spaces, that is, that these can be taken up by us as representations. In the first and third propositions of the ‘Metaphysical Exposition’ of space, Kant rules out that space counts as an empirical or general concept, respectively.66 Having entertained and rejected one possible account for the status of space, in the second proposition he claims that space is the pure intuition underlying all our outer intuitions.67 Space, as pure form of intuition, counts as the condition of the possibility of 105
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology appearances.68 Thus space and time as pure intuitions are the formal conditions that make possible that we have empirical intuitions, that is, that we can be affected by an object through sensibility so as to give rise to a sensation. But this is to say that pure intuitions are necessary but insufficient conditions of empirical spaces and times, not that they generate the latter. The necessity of form does not undermine the status of intuition as given. Rather, it reveals the complex structure of our receptivity necessary for taking up any affect. Form is simply the ordering process through which we take up the given. Intuition arises out of a material and a formal source; first, our sensibility as the capacity to be affected; and second, the pure intuitions of space and time. These are the two sides of our capacity of sensibility or receptivity, revealing how affection and the possibility of representation are inseparable from one another. Receptivity or sensibility is thus, on further investigation, twofold. It comprises, first, the capacity for being affected, which gives rise to the material element in intuitions, and, second, pure intuitions or forms. These are two sides of one coin. We could not be affected were we not capable of taking up the given within a form or order. In the next chapter we will examine how experience or knowledge arises out of a combination of understanding and intuition. We have now learnt that even the intuitive component of experience is not a simple event, being directed both toward the subject and toward an indeterminate object. It is because of this two-sided character of receptivity that Kant is not an impositionalist. It is also because of this that transcendental idealism qualifies as transcendental, that is, as a philosophical reflection on the conditions of experience. The conditions are ‘of’ experience with the genitive force of belonging to experience, in contrast to the suggestion that they are an independent set of rules applied to experience. The dually oriented structure of receptivity is what allows our minds to get a grip on the world. Admittedly, Kant’s failure to fully develop his account of the affective side of experience and, at the same time, adequately explain the complex structure of receptivity are responsible for many of the misunderstandings that have arisen. While Kant and his interpreters have tended to characterise sensibility as passive in contrast to the activity of the understanding, we can now see that this is misleading. Sensibility is a capacity, albeit a curious one insofar as it is the ability to receive what is given in experience. It is not active because it is the mode in which we are affected 106
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Formal Idealism and the Aesthetic Condition of Experience by things in the world. But no more is it merely passive, first and most obviously because it requires a formative ability. The second of these features has led many readers to conclude that sensibility does not really count as receptive. However, sensibility is a capacity to open ourselves to things in the world. This entails that we anticipate or prepare for the event of the material given, not that we create or impose the conditions of that event. Intuitive form is nothing other than the anticipation of the event of the affect of the material given.69 Kant’s account of sensibility shares some of the force of the phenomenologist’s notion of passive synthesis.70 The latter is a pre-reflective capacity to make sense of things in the world.71 Kantian sensibility is not pre-reflective, however, and is always combined with some level of reflection. Nevertheless there is a parallel insofar as both passive synthesis and receptivity inhabit a middle ground between activity and passivity.72 At this stage, I simply wish to establish the point of departure for the reading of the relation between form and matter that I will develop in later chapters, especially in Chapter 6 where I examine the overall structure of the objective deduction. In what sense has the approach adumbrated here escaped the circle of representation? I fully agree with Buchdahl, Allison and Longuenesse that any object we experience is a representation. But I also have some sympathy with the insistence by Pippin, Guyer and Strawson that our experience must be of empirical objects and not just of representations. My solution has been to argue that representations are our mode of access to things. It is not that we experience representations instead of things. It is rather that we experience things as representations, not through the latter but in them. The interpretation I have developed in this chapter allows me to suggest provisionally a way in which we might construe the relationship between empirical realism and transcendental idealism. The forms of experience are our modes of representation that give us access to an empirically real world. Transcendental idealism secures the empirical reality of the world and does not threaten it. No more is empirical realism a cheap substitute for transcendental realism, which, being incapable of proving its premises, cannot secure what it tantalisingly promises, namely, knowledge. It is not so much that Kant offers empirical realism because this is all that can be derived from transcendental idealism, as that transcendental idealism is the strategy he adopts to safeguard the empirical realism to which he is ultimately committed. Empirical realism is the only realism compatible with the 107
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Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology relation in which we stand to an extra-mental world, the form of which arises from our minds.
Notes 1. An affect is a sensory event, viewed as something that happens or is given to a receptive subject. 2. Or, in the case of temporal sensibility, to be aware of ourselves as other, that is, over time. 3. Added in the second edition of Critique of Pure Reason, at B 519. 4. In Chapter 6 we will see that Kant uses the expression ‘appearances themselves’, Erscheinungen selbst, at A 190, B 235, to express that appearances are capable of bearing objective validity. 5. B 519 (my additions). The German is: ‘In manchen Fällen scheint es ratsam zu sein, sich lieber dieser als der obgenannten Ausdrücke zu bedienen, um alle Mißdeutung zu verhüten’. 6. In the mind of God, though, not merely in our minds. See Berkeley ‘A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge’ in Philosophical Works ed. Ayers, pp. 116–17. 7. B 274. For a discussion of the systematic position of the ‘Refutation’ and its contribution to a possible spatial schematism, see Chapter 6, pp. 234–5. 8. Though both are defensible only within the context of experience and not as purely theoretical or conceptual theses. They require intuition and not just concepts. 9. My analysis of the early paragraphs of the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ later in this chapter will show that the position of the Refutation cannot be seen as a divergence from Kant’s main project. 10. Although not on the absolute given, as all three concede the need for reflective mediation of the given. 11. Preface to second edition of CPR, B xvi. Strictly, the reversal applies not only to objectively valid cognition or knowledge, but all cognition or Erkenntnisse. 12. See Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 11, on the role of fancy in relations of cause and effect. See also p. 86 on the role of belief or assent. 13. See, for instance, my discussion in Chapter 6, pp. 238–41 of the principle of hypothetical necessity, which is a precursor for the reflective principle of the systematicity of empirical nature. 14. B xvi/xvii (my additions). 15. B xvii. 16. See discussion of the first edition ‘Transcendental Deduction’ in Chapter 4, pp. 122–7. 17. B xvii. 18. B xxi. 108
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Formal Idealism and the Aesthetic Condition of Experience 19. See also B xxv/xxvi. In Chapter 2 we saw that there is a problematic role for things-in-themselves even within the epistemic domain insofar as thought of them facilitates a focus on undetermined matter. 20. A 20, B 34 (my addition). See discussion in following section. 21. See Chapters 6 and particularly Chapter 7, pp. 249–55. 22. See final section of this chapter, pp. 105–8. 23. A 51, B 75. 24. See final section of this chapter, pp. 105–8. 25. Later I will argue that these are not all that are necessary. See Chapter 7, pp. 249–55. 26. A 20, B 34. See my discussion of the initial paragraphs of the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ below. It will emerge that appearances may also count as the ‘not yet fully determined’ and not merely the ‘indeterminate’. 27. In the Preface to first edition of CPR, A xii, Kant characterises the task of the Critique thus: ‘I do not mean by this a critique of books and systems, but of the faculty of reason in general, in respect of all knowledge after which it may strive independently of all experience’. Clearly the last phrase refers to a priori knowledge. My argument will be that a priori knowledge must nevertheless anticipate the possibility of empirical knowledge, the full account of which requires more than the arguments of the Critique. 28. See Chapter 6 for a hierarchical reading of the ‘Transcendental Analytic’. 29. See Chapter 1, p. 18, for a discussion of Guyer. 30. B 519. 31. A 35, B 51. See also A 37, B 54. 32. A 30, B 45. 33. B 67/8. 34. A 42, B 59. 35. B 72. 36. See Chapter 2, pp. 65–7, on Allison’s reading of the transcendental significance of affection. 37. Gerold Prauss’s interpretation is in the same vein. He argues that affection is empirical; however, empirical affection cannot be grasped at the level of empirical experience nor by the empirical sciences. Only transcendental reflection can explain the empirical affect on a non-empirical subject in a ‘non-empirical science of the empirical’. See Prauss, Kant und das Problem der Dinge an sich, especially pp. 213–27. My own formalist account shares with Prauss the conviction that the subjective structure of the empirical is not empirical, but transcendental. 38. See Chapter 8, p. 304, where I argue that aesthetic apprehension makes possible a glimpse of the event as event. 39. A 19, B 33. 109
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48.
49.
50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55.
56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65.
A 19, B 33. A 19, B 33. A19, B 33 (my translation). A 19, B 33. A 20, B 34. A 19, B 33. McDowell, Mind and World. See, for instance, pp. 13 and 23, which seem to emphasise only the first of these relations. A 89, B 122; my translation of ‘ohne daß sie sich notwendig auf Funktionen des Verstandes beziehen müssen’. He reinforces this at A 89/90, B 122–3. See my discussion in Chapter 4, pp. 137–47, of B 160 where Kant appears to rule out the possibility of undetermined intuitions. See also Chapter 5, pp. 175–6, on the relation between aesthetic judgement and cognition in general. Sarah Gibbons holds a similar view. See Kant’s Theory of Imagination, p. 18, note 6, where she distinguishes between the possibility and the actuality of conceptualisation. This distinction is first introduced in the Critique of Judgment at AA 179. I first mentioned this in my discussion of Pippin in Chapter 1, p. 15. A 19/20, B 34: ‘the effect . . . so far as we are affected by it, is sensation’. A 20, B 34. A 20, B 34. A 20, B 34. In later chapters I will argue that a priori form anticipates instantiation in the a posteriori. See Chapter 6, pp. 221–9, and 7, pp. 249–55. But although matter is always experienced as in some sense formed, it is not necessarily experienced as determined by form. See the discussion of aesthetic form in Chapter 8. It is because in an aesthetic judgement form and matter stand in relation and yet are not unified in a cognition that the relation between form and matter is displayed. At least not epistemically. A 20/1, B 35. A 21, B 35. A 21, B35 (my translation). B 67/8. See discussion of forms of understanding in Chapter 4, pp. 113–16. A21–2, B 35–6. A 19, B 33 (my translation). See discussion of synthesis of apprehension in intuition in Chapter 4, pp. 122–4. Later I will argue that aesthetic judgement provides a phenomenological revelation of the aesthetic or sensible dimension of knowledge. 110
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Formal Idealism and the Aesthetic Condition of Experience 66. I will not discuss here the remainder of the content of the 3rd proposition, which taken in conjunction with the 4th establishes that space as a whole is the horizon of all particular spaces. See my ‘Kant’s Phenomenological Reduction?’ for the claim that the forms of intuition are best understood as horizons of sensory experience. 67. A 24, B 38. I will leave discussion of the ‘Transcendental Exposition’ until Chapter 4. 68. A 24, B 39. 69. See Chapter 6, pp. 221–9, where I bring out that the principles of understanding are anticipatory of a material given in space and time. 70. See Edmund Husserl, Analyses concerning passive and active synthesis, especially pp. 508–12, Hu 408–11. 71. Volume 11 of Husserl’s collected writings is devoted to this theme. A more accessible version is to be found in Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of ‘general synthesis’ in the Phenomenology of Perception. See, for instance, p. 428 (French edition, p. 489). See also Heidegger’s discussion of Sein lassen or ‘letting-be’ in Being and Time; for instance, H354. 72. This ground that is not a ground can be grasped through the trope of the middle voice, a notion that has been fruitfully explored by John Llewelyn. See, for instance, his ‘Heidegger’s Kant and the Middle Voice’, and the ‘Preface’ to The HypoCritical Imagination.
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4
The Deep Structure of Synthesis
In the previous chapter I examined the receptive condition of knowledge and its source in sensibility. This faculty is able to take up the object given in experience because of its introduction of intuitive forms into the manifold or empirical matter. I have claimed that there are three conditions for knowledge. First, there must be something given to us; second, we must be receptive to that given; and third, we must be capable of unifying the given un