Kant's Antinomies of Reason : their origin and their resolution

KANT'S ANTINOMIES OF REASON Their Origin and Their Resolution Victoria S. Wike

UNIVERSITY PRESS OF AMERICA

Copyright © 1982 by University Press of America, Inc. P.O. Box 19101, Washington, DC. 20036

All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America ISBN (Perfect): 0-8191-2346-3 ISBN (Cloth): 0-8191-2345-5

m Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 81-43867

To my mother, father, and Ed

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION

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Chapter I.

KANT'S USE OF THE TERM "ANTINOMY" IN THE THREE CRITIQUES

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1. The Transcendental Framework of the Antinomies 2. The Logical Framework of the Antinomies II.

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THE ORIGIN AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE FOUR THEORETICAL ANTINOMIES

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1. The Historical Origin of the Antinomies 2. The Conceptual Origin of the Antinomies 3. The Structure of the Antinomies: Some Structural Problems Raised by the Fourth Antinomy . . . . 4. The Structure of the Antinomies in Al-Azm's Terms 5. The So-Called Identity of the Third and Fourth Antinomies . . III.

THE RESOLUTION OF THE FOUR THEORETICAL ANTINOMIES 1. The Resolution in Terms of Reason's General Mistake . . . \ 2. The Resolution in Terms of Reason's Conformity to the Understanding 3. The Resolution in Terms of the Mathematical/Dynamical Distinction

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THE ORIGIN AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE PRACTICAL ANTINOMY 1. The Conceptual Origin of the Antinomy 2. The Structure of the Antinomy v

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112 122

TABLE OF CONTENTS

(Continued)

Chapter V.

Page THE RESOLUTION OF THE PRACTICAL ANTINOMY 1. The Structural Resolution of the Practical Antinomy 2. The Resolution of the Practical Antinomy as It Relates to the Resolution of the Theoretical Antinomies

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CONCLUSION

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149 161

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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INTRODUCTION Kant says in the Preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason that the critique to follow has both a negative and a positive value.1 The negative value of the critique is the warning that theoretical reason must never venture beyond the limits of experience. The positive value of the critique is that it makes possible the employment of practical reason by restricting the employment of theoretical reason to one part of the real.2 if theoretical reason is restricted to the sensible world and if the sensible world is not coextensive with the real, then practical reason may function in that part of the real order outside the sensible world. Theoretical reason is limited to the sensible world, and this sensible world is said to be one part of the real. The first Critique thus has the positive task of revealing how theoretical reason employs its negative idea of this realm outside the sensible. If the employment of theoretical reason is restricted to the sensible world which is only a part of the real, then it follows that theoretical reason may postulate an idea concerning the nature of this nonsensible part of the real. It is to this positive value of the Critique that this investigation will turn. The positive result of the first Critique is the designation of the realms of theoretical and practical reason and the suggestion that the sensible and the supersensible realms can be bridged. This investigation focuses on revealing the positive functions of the first Critique insofar as they become evident in the comparison of the antinomies of reason. The investigation proceeds to analyze and compare the antinomies of theoretical and practical reason with the aim of revealing, in addition to their similarities and differences, the positive way in which the theoretical antinomies serve to ground the origin and the resolution of the practical antinomy. A preliminary attempt is made in Chapter One to develop a definition for the Kantian "antinomy" in light of the antinomies present in the first three Critiques. However, in Chapters Two through Five, discussion centers strictly on the antinomies of theoretical and practical reason, and little attention is paid to other sections of the Critiques which may or may not prove to be relevant to the antinomy sections. For example, the section on the Ideal is virtually ignored although its subject matter certainly links it to the fourth antinomy of theoretical reason. vii

Two specific factors lend an element of necessity to the investigation of the origin and the resolution of the antinomies of reason. First, there are indications that Kant himself considers the antinomy of pure reason to be the cornerstone of his critical project. Kant emphasizes in the following two passages (the first from the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics and the second from a letter to Christian Garve in 1798) that the antinomy of pure reason plays a central role in leading both Kant and future readers to a critique of reason. Kant says: I therefore would be pleased to have the critical reader to devote to this antinomy of pure reason his chief attention, because nature itself seems to have established it with a view to stagger reason in its daring pretensions and to force it to self-examination.3 It was not the investigation of the existence of God, immortality, and so on, but rather the antinomy of pure reason —"the world has a beginning; it has no beginning, and so on," right up to the 4th . . . —that is what first aroused me from my dogmatic slumber and drove me to the critique of reason itself, in order to resolve the scandal of ostensible 4contradiction of reason with itself. Thus, Kant directs attention toward the antinomy of pure reason, and it is because of the prominence he accords to the antinomy that this investigation is made necessary and important. This investigation is not the first to have specified the prominent place accorded to the antinomy in the critique of reason. Commentators as diverse as Frederick Van de Pitte, Justus Hartnack, Gottfried Martin, and H. J. de Vleeschauwer have agreed on the centrality and the importance of the antinomy in Kant's critical project.5 Yet, the following investigation intends not only to acknowledge the importance of the antinomy of reason but also to discover what justifies the prominent role accorded to the antinomy in the critique of reason. In light of what Kant and his commentators say about the prominence of the antinomy of reason, it is crucial to compare this antinomy of theoretical reason to that viii

of practical reason and to determine whether or not the former plays a role in the development of the latter. Second, a recent book on the origin of the antinomies by Sadik Al-Azm has given to the present investigation an element of necessity. Al-Azm contends that the four theoretical antinomies owe their origin to the Leibniz-Clarke debate.6 Al-Azm claims that the theses of the antinomies represent Clarke's Newtonian position while the antitheses represent Leibniz's position. Al-Azm documents the similarities between the arguments present in the antinomies and those in the Leibniz-Clarke debate in order to support his conclusion which is that the origin of the arguments in the antinomies is the historical Leibniz-Clarke correspondence. In short, Al-Azm locates the origin of the antinomies in an historical debate, and he implies that the antinomies are best understood as restatements of this historical debate. This work by Al-Azm makes necessary an investigation of the kind offered here for two reasons. In the first place, Al-Azm's discussion focuses on only one aspect of the antinomies and on only one type of antinomy. He considers the origin of the antinomies of theoretical reason. This investigation has a wider task, and hence it is more complete. It will consider the origin and the resolution of the antinomies of theoretical and practical reason. In the second place, Al-Azm gives an historical account of the antinomies. The investigation to follow will offer a systematic account of the antinomies. This project differs from Al-Azm's in that it attempts to account for the origin and the resolution of the antinomies within Kant's systematic critique. There is no reason to assume that an historical account of the antinomies invalidates or excludes a systematic account. In fact, just the opposite is true. It is because Al-Azm has indicated that the antinomies have an historical origin that an investigation of this kind is required to determine whether they also have a systematic origin. The danger in Al-Azm's position lies in his implicit claim that the antinomies are best understood in light of their historical predecessors. On the contrary, the following chapters suggest that a perfectly consistent and perhaps a more complete analysis of the antinomies can be given in terms of Kant's systematic. Several other commentators, namely Martin G. Kalin and Jonathan Bennett, refer explicitly to Al-Azm and to the danger which is inherent in his account that IX

removes the antinomies from the context of Kant's critical project.7 In sum, this investigation will explore the relationship between the antinomies of theoretical and practical reason with a view toward revealing how theoretical reason functions in a positive way to ground practical reason. At least the following six points will be argued for in the subsequent chapters. First, it will be shown that the theoretical and practical antinomies share a common point of origin. The origin of both the theoretical and practical antinomies is located in an ambiguity characteristic of their highest objects. Second, the ambiguity typical of the objects of theoretical and practical reason is eliminated prior to the practical antinomy. Thus, even though the objects of the theoretical and practical antinomies have a similar ambiguity, this ambiguity does not serve to structure the theoretical and practical antinomies in analogous ways. Third, the structures of the theoretical and the practical antinomies are decidedly unsimilar. The theoretical antinomies involve contradictory assertions and apagogical proofs supporting the assertions. The practical antinomy involves neither contradictory assertions nor apagogical proofs. Fourth, the fourth theoretical antinomy is shown to be unique in several ways. Its assertions are not strict contradictories, it raises the possibility of a highest object "outside" the world, and in its resolution the too large/too small designations are reversed. Fifth, the resolution of the practical antinomy requires two steps, and this implies that the practical antinomy can be treated as an antinomy within an antinomy. Finally, the discussion concerning the origin and the resolution of the antinomies of reason points to the following conclusion: The practical antinomy builds on, advances from, and is facilitated by the concerns raised in the theoretical antinomies. Theoretical reason accounts for the origin of the practical antinomy, proposes a task for practical reason, and makes possible the resolution of the practical antinomy .

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ENDNOTES Bxxiv; translation by Norman Kemp Smith, Critique of Pure Reason (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965). 2 Bxxiv-v; translation by Kemp Smith. 3Kants Gesammelte Schriften (Königlich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften; hereafter referred to as KGS), IV (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1911), 341; a revision of the Carus translation by Lewis White Beck, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1950), p. 88. 4 KGS, XII (Berlin and Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter, 1922), 257-8; translation by Arnulf Zweig, Kant. Philosophical Correspondence 1759-99 (Chicago: The university of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 252. 5 See Frederick Van de Pitte, Kant as Philosophical Anthropologist (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), pp. 46-7; Justus Hartnack, Immanuel Kant. An Explanation of His Theory of Knowledge and Moral Philosophy (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1974), pp. 14-6; Gottfried Martin, Kant's Metaphysics and Theory of Science, trans. P. G. Lucas (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1961), p. 42; and H. J. de Vleeschauwer, "Les antinomies kantiennes et la Clavis universalis d'Arthur Collier," Mind, 47 (1938), 303-5. Sadik J. Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the Antinomies (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 3, 53, 86, 119. 7 See Martin G. K a l m , "Idealism against Realism in Kant's Third Antinomy," Kant-Studien, 69 (1978), 162; and Jonathan Bennett, Kant's Dialectic (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp. 6, 119.

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CHAPTER I KANT'S USE OF THE TERM "ANTINOMY" IN THE THREE CRITIQUES The first issue concerns what can be said in general about Kant's use of the term "antinomy." It was suggested in the Introduction that the antinomies played a significant role in the development of critical philosophy. Kant believed that by means of the antinomies, the critical reader would be led to investigate the ultimate foundation of all knowledge.1 It is clear then that Kant intended the antinomies to be a focal point around which other problems relating to the proper employment of pure reason could be raised. In spite of the importance that Kant accords to the antinomies, the serious reader will discover that Kant has left no systematic analysis of the antinomies. That is, there seems to be no precise definition determinative for all the antinomies discussed by Kant. The antinomies may represent a crucial juncture in the development of the Kantian system, but there is no "theory of the antinomy" just as there is no "formula" characteristic of all antinomies. The fact that Kant gives no precise definition of "antinomy" seems to indicate one of two things. First, Kant's treatment of antinomies may be vague and defy definition because it is used merely as an organizing device in his architectonic plan. Perhaps Kant discovered some natural antinomies inherent in the theoretical employment of reason and then molded other problems (i.e., in the second and third Critiques) into the pattern of antinomies in order to satisfy his desire for systematization. This possibility is discussed by Alexis Philonenko with regard to the antinomy of teleological judgment.^ Philonenko says that some people (one of whom is Hegel)3 consider the teleological antinomy to be superfluous due to its similarity to the third antinomy of theoretical reason. Lewis White Beck holds a similar position with regard to the practical antinomy. He claims that the practical antinomy is "devised and artificial".and that it is not an antinomy "in any strict sense." The problem of course is to discover what an antinomy in a strict sense might be and what characterizes it. Second, Kant's treatment of antinomies may be 1

vague because antinomies have to do with man's attempt to comprehend the nature of totality and this attempt is grounded in dialectical illusion. It may be that a definition of "antinomy" is elusive precisely because man's faculties of reason and judgment (in the third Critique) are constantly subject to dialectical illusions. Perhaps there is no one paradigm antinomy due to the fact that reason and judgment are susceptible to dialectical errors which result in various types of apparent conflicts. Again, in this case, the problem is to discover what is meant by "totality" and to determine why the attempt to comprehend totality is characterized by dialectical illusion. Various attempts have been made to formulate a definition of "antinomy" from the evidence present in one or all of the three Critiques. Four such proposed definitions will be cited here. First is Kuno Fischer's definition of a Kantian antinomy. An antinomy consists of two judgments, which predicate the same thing of a concept, and so are similar in content but related as affirmative and negative contradictories. The affirmation is the the thesis, the contradictory negation the antithesis, of the antinomy. And in order that these two propositions should constitute a real antinomy, they must not only be asserted, but proved, and indeed with equal clearness and upon equally strong grounds. If the proofs are either omitted, or not perfectly equivalent, we have no antinomy in the strict sense.5 Fischer suggests that two features characterize an antinomy: strict contradiction between its propositions and equally strong proofs for each proposition. A second early Kant commentator says the following about the antinomies. Edward Caird in his discussion of the antinomy of aesthetical judgment states that here as in the case of the theoretical antinomies solved in the Critique of Pure Reason, and the practical antinomies solved in the Critique of Practical Reason, the apparent contradic2

tion has a value as making us "look beyond the sensible and seek in the supersensible the point of union for all our faculties of a priori determination. "6 Caird emphasizes two features of the Kantian antinomies : their nature as apparent contradictions and their effect of making man look beyond the sensible to the supersensible. The more recent Kant commentators also point to characteristics of the Kantian antinomies. One of them, Alexis Philonenko, says the following about what defines an antinomy. An antinomy is a contradiction and not only a divergence of opinions. In order for there to be an antinomy there must be two propositions and, in addition, each proposition must be supported by the proof of the absurdity of the opposite proposition.7 Heinz Heimsoeth also offers a relatively recent interpretation of the Kantian antinomies. Heimsoeth points to three features of the antinomies. First, he says: "Antinomy" appears throughout the Critique in the singular. It is a question of a condition . . . of our reason in its syllogisms (plural) directed at the world.8 Heimsoeth observes that in the first Critique antinomy is treated as a singular since it has to do with a "condition" of reason in its attempt at cosmological knowledge. According to Heimsoeth, there is an important sense in which the antinomies are in fact one antinomy. Secondly, Heimsoeth refers to "the antinomy in its fourfold conflict (Widerstreit)."9 Heimsoeth states that the antinomy reveals itself as four conflicts. It is of significance that Heimsoeth calls the antinomies "conflicts" whereas Fischer, Caird, and Philonenko all state that the antinomies must manifest contradictions. Finally, Heimsoeth points to the apagogical character of the proofs in the antinomies. He says: "Again, the proofs of both parts of the assertion are of apagogical character."10 The 3

proofs of both sides of the antinomies are apagogical by nature, and therefore Heimsoeth, like Fischer and Philonenko, recognizes that one of the criteria for an antinomy lies in the nature of its proof. Thus, Fischer, Caird, and Philonenko center their proposed definitions of the Kantian "antinomy" on the contradiction between propositions. Fischer, Philonenko, and Heimsoeth call attention to the nature of the proofs employed by the propositions of an antinomy. In the course of this chapter it will be shown that neither of these two factors operates as a universal criterion for the antinomies in Kant's three Critiques. Yet, these two characteristics, as well as several others, play a part in the definition of "antinomy," however indeterminable that part. The point here is not to discover why Kant left no determinative definiton of antinomy. Rather, attention must be focused on what Kant says about the antinomies. In spite of the differences that exist among the antinomies, there are also similarities, and it is to these similarities that this investigation turns in order to understand the place of the antinomy in Kant's critical writings. In the following sections, the discussion about the nature of antinomy will be limited to Kant's three Critiques. It is true that antinomies appear in other places in Kant's work (in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone), but my claims about the general nature of antinomies are grounded only in the three Critiques. Also, many of the points that are raised in this chapter will be dealt with in greater detail and with specific reference to the first two Critiques in later chapters. The discussion on the nature of antinomy will be divided into two sections. The first will deal with transcendental aspects of the antinomies and the second will deal with logical aspects of the antinomies. The Transcendental Framework of the Antinomies" The transcendental framework of the antinomies refers to those aspects of the antinomies concerned with the possibility and the employment of a priori knowledge. The antinomies play a part in the critique of reason because they concern themselves with the transcendental employment of reason. The 4

antinomies deal not with empirical objects or rules of experience but with transcendental ideas and concepts which characterize reason and reflective judgment. Thus, those aspects of antinomies which will be discussed here are those which locate the antinomies within the transcendental domain of Kant's critical philosophy. The first point of similarity among the antinomies from a transcendental perspective is that all antinomies are grounded in dialectical illusion. Even a superficial view of the antinomies reveals that the antinomies in the three Critiques appear in sections entitled "Dialectic." Kant defines dialectic as the "logic of illusion."H The antinomies thus have in common this illusion which characterizes the transcendental dialectic. Kant defines transcendental illusion as follows: there are fundamental rules and maxims for the employment of our reason . . . and . . . these have all the appearance of being objective principles. We therefore take the subjective necessity of a connection of our concepts . . . for an objective necessity in the determination of things in themselves. This is an illusion.12 In other words, the antinomies, which appear in sections entitled "Dialectic," are characterized by this confusion between subjective principles and objective principles. The antinomies are grounded in an illusion which means that they have to' do with a confusion between the subjective necessity of a connection of concepts and the objective necessity of the determination of things in themselves. Kant further states that the transcendental illusion is "a natural and inevitable illusion, "13 an<ä thus the antinomies resting on this illusion can never expect to be finally resolved and eliminated. Insofar as the antinomies exhibit this illusion it will be unclear whether their assertions are providing subjective rules or whether they are determining objects. Kant seems to suggest in the Critique of Pure Reason that it is the transcendental illusion which grounds or explains the possibility of antinomies. In the Critique of Practical Reason, there is a slightly 5

different interpretation of the relationship between transcendental illusion and antinomies. Kant says: But the illusion would never be noticed as deceptive if it were not betrayed by a conflict of reason with itself in applying to appearances its principle of presupposing the unconditioned for every conditioned thing. In this passage, it is stated that the conflict of reason with itself is what leads to the recognition of the deceptiveness of the illusion. Until the antinomies exhibit the conflicts which result from the transcendental illusion, the real deceptive nature of the illusion is not evident. Thus, the task of the transcendental dialectic becomes clear only after the antinomies have revealed the types of conflict caused by the illusion. According to this passage, the antinomies revealed the nature of the transcendental illusion. The Critique of Practical Reason implies that it is the conflict of reason with itself that makes evident the dialectical illusion. On the other hand, the Critique of Pure Reason seems to indicate that the antinomies are merely one result or one manifestation of the transcendental illusion. A graphic indication of the difference of perspective in the two Critiques can be seen in the content of their sections on "Dialectic." The first Critique, in its section on "Dialectic," deals with three types of dialectical inferences: the Paralogisms, the Antinomies, and the Ideal. It is clear from the structure of the first Critique's "Dialectic" that the antinomies illustrate one type of transcendental illusion. However, in the corresponding section on "Dialectic" in the second Critique, there is an antinomy, but there are no analogous references to the paralogisms or the Ideal. Apparently, the dialectic of practical reason has neither paralogisms nor an Ideal. (It does of course have postulates, and the question remains as to what relation the postulates may have to the paralogisms and to the Ideal.) Consequently, the dialectic of the second Critique does not refer to its antinomy as one example of transcendental illusion but rather as that which first uncovered or illuminated transcendental illusion. In any case, the point is not to discover whether the antinomies or the transcendental illusion came first. The close connection between the antinomies and the 6

transcendental illusion is sufficient to establish a common ground for the antinomies in Kant's three Critiques. A further similarity among the antinomies follows from this close connection between the antinomies and the transcendental illusion. Because the antinomies are characterized by illusion, they involve a confusion between subjective and objective principles. This means that the transcendental illusion and the antinomies in turn make necessary a division between the realm of experience (in which subjective principles apply) and the realm outside experience (in which objective principles apply). That is, the attempt to avoid the transcendental illusion by distinguishing between subjective and objective principles (as happens in the solutions to the antinomies) brings with it an attempt to distinguish between the realm of experience and the realm outside experience. Thus, the antinomies also share the common trait of attempting to distinguish between a realm of experience and a realm outside experience. A second and related point of comparison among the antinomies has to do with the nature of their assertions. From a transcendental perspective, the nature of the assertions in the antinomies can be investigated with a view toward discovering whether they have a regulative or a constitutive employment. Again, the hope is to find some ground of similarity which is common to and typical of all antinomies in the three Critiques. Kant refers to the claims made by the assertions in the theoretical antinomies as "cosmical concepts" (Weltbegriffe).15 These cosmical concepts are concerned with the world of appearances, yet they "carry the synthesis to a degree which transcends all possible experience."16 As such, the claims of the cosmological ideas do not involve a determination of objects in the world of sense. Kant says that transcendental assertions, including those made in the theoretical antinomies, "lay claim to insight into what is beyond the field of all possible experiences."! Thus, the assertions made in the theoretical antinomies have regulative and not constitutive import. Kant further describes these assertions as "pseudorational "18 because they extend the principles of understanding beyond the limits of experience. As such, their task is to postulate a rule for the 7

synthesis of experience. They can never formulate a principle constitutive for the synthesis of experience into a whole. Thus, the claims made in the theoretical antinomies function only as regulative ideas (postulating a rule for the synthesis of experience) and never as constitutive principles (enabling the concept of the sensible world to extend beyond all possible experience).19 The nature of the assertions in the antinomy of practical reason seems to contrast with the regulative nature of the assertions in the theoretical antinomies. The assertions in the practical antinomy intend to be more than regulative maxims or subjective principles. Indeed, the claims made in the practical antinomy are meant to function as the determining ground of the will. This contrast between the nature of the assertions in the first two Critiques is further elaborated by Stephan Körner. Korner points out that for Kant, transcendental ideas have a non-regulative employment only in practical reason.20 Thus, it is crucial to observe that the assertions in the theoretical antinomies have regulative import and that those in the practical antinomy have a non-regulative import. The purpose of the antinomy in the second Critique is to establish the practical possibility of the highest good. Kant states that the maxims of virtue and the maxims of happiness jointly make possible the highest good.21 The point of the antinomy is to discover what relationship between these maxims provides a principle for practical reason and insures the concept of the highest good. Kant states that in practical principles a natural and necessary connection between the consciousness of morality and the expectation of proportionate happiness as its consequence may be thought at least possible.22 Therefore, the assertions of the practical antinomy contain principles about the relationship between maxims. These assertions intend to be objective or constitutive in a way unlike the assertions of the theoretical antinomies. The principles that propose a relationship between the maxims of virtue and happiness have the express purpose of revealing how the maxim of virtue has objective reality, and consequently how a practical principle can be constitutive of experience. 8

The nature of the assertions in the antinomies of judgment again appears to have regulative rather than constitutive import. That is, the assertions made in the antinomies of judgment function as subjective rules for the employment of judgment and not as constitutive principles that are determinative of experience. In the solution to the antinomy of aesthetical judgment Kant says: It is absolutely impossible to give a definite objective principle of taste in accordance with which its judgments could be derived, examined, and established, for then the judgment would not be one of taste at all. The subjective principle, viz. the indefinite idea of the supersensible in us, can only be put forward as the sole key to the puzzle of this faculty whose sources are hidden from us.2 3 Thus, the assertions made in the antinomy of aesthetical judgment are properly subjective principles. Or, as Kant later refers to the claims of the aesthetical antinomy, they are merely reflective aesthetical judgments.24 Similarly, the assertions in the antinomy of teleological judgment are considered to be maxims rather than constitutive principles.25 The reflective judgment has its own maxims and they serve as subjective principles for reflecting upon objects. These maxims that reflective judgment employs are not objective and can provide no ground for the cognition of objects. The assertions in the teleological antinomy clearly function as subjective rules for the employment of judgment, and insofar as they are subjective, they are more analogous to regulative than to constitutive principles. This conclusion is challenged however by Leroy Loemker who claims that reflective judgment is more constitutive than regulative in its employment.26 On the contrary, it is maintained here that reflective judgment is more correctly compared to regulative principles in that it provides subjective rules for reflecting on objects and nowhere provides a constitutive determination of objects. Thus, no criteria for "antinomy" can be found by considering the nature of the assertions in the antinomies. The assertions of the antinomies in 9

theoretical reason, aesthetical judgment, and teleological judgment function as subjective principles or as regulative maxims for the employment of reason or judgment. However, the assertions of the practical antinomy intend to be objective or constitutive in a way unlike the assertions of other antinomies. A third and final possible point of similarity among transcendental aspects of the antinomies concerns the subject matter around which the antinomies develop. The subject matter of the antinomies seems to be the nature of totality. If it can be shown that the antinomies in the three Critiques arise from some ambiguity which lies in the concept of totality, then it may be possible to establish this ambiguity as a criterion for all antinomies. The nature of the subject matter which gives rise to the antinomies will be considered only briefly here since it will be discussed in greater detail with regard to the theoretical and practical antinomies in later chapters. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant states that transcendental ideas "will determine according to principles how understanding is to be employed in dealing with experience in its totality."27 The function of the ideas of reason is to establish how the understanding is to deal with the totality of experience which is beyond the grasp of its concepts. Kant says that the business of reason is "to ascend from the conditioned synthesis, to which understanding always remains restricted, to the unconditioned, which understanding can never reach."2° H. W. Cassirer sums up this aspect of the nature of reason in his commentary on Kant's first Critique. He states that the nature of reason is characterized by its search for totality which "never ends except at the absolutely unconditioned."29 The assertions in the theoretical antinomies are transcendental ideas, and as such, their task is to effect a transition from the conditioned to the unconditioned. The ideas of reason have as their main object the unconditioned which lies beyond the concepts of the understanding. The theoretical antinomies thus have as their subject matter the unconditioned or the totality of experience. As Kant says: All these questions [i.e., antinomies] refer to an object which can be found nowhere save in our thoughts, namely, 10

to the absolutely unconditioned totality of the synthesis of appearances.30 Thus, the theoretical antinomies have to do with the nature of totality which seems to involve some kind of relationship between the sensible realm and the supersensible realm. The subject matter of theoretical reason in the section called "Transcendental Dialectic" is the nature of the unconditioned. jSince practical reason represents only another possible employment of pure reason,' it probably follows that practical reason too in its~dialectic has the unconditioned as its subject matter. It was shown that the object of practical reason in its antinomy is to make possible the concept of the highest good.31 it remains only to discover what similarities exist between the subject matter of the theoretical antinomies (i.e., the unconditioned) and the subject matter of the practical antinomy (i.e., the highest good). Kant provides a clear comparison between the objects of theoretical and practical reason in the following passage. How to solve that natural dialectic and to avoid the error arising from an otherwise natural illusion in the speculative use of pure reason can be found in detail in the critical examination of that faculty. But reason in its practical use is not a bit better off. As pure practical reason it likewise seeks the unconditioned for the practically conditioned . . . and this unconditioned is not only sought as the determining ground of the will but . . . is also sought as the unconditioned totality of the object of the pure practical reason, under the name of the highest good.32 Therefore, both theoretical and practical reason in their dialectical employments have as their subject matter unconditioned totality. Consequently, the theoretical and practical antinomies have in common this transcendental object known as unconditioned totality. Finally, the last question to consider is whether 11

the antinomies of judgment also have as their transcendental subject matter the nature of totality. The antinomy of aesthetical judgment rests on an ambiguity in the definition of the term "concept."33 The antinomy is resolved when it is pointed out that the concept to which judgments of taste refer is a transcendental concept of the supersensible which cannot be theoretically determined. Judgments of taste are grounded in this transcendental concept, and by means of it they claim universal validity. That is, because of the concept on which judgments of taste are based, these judgments claim to be universally valid. This concept which accords to judgments of taste their universality is defined as follows: "Such a concept is the mere pure rational concept of the supersensible which underlies the object (and also the subject judging it)."34 Thus, judgments of taste depend on a transcendental concept of the supersensible. More specifically, it follows that the subject matter of the antinomy of aesthetical judgment is the concept of the supersensible as a ground for objects. The antinomy has to do with totality insofar as its concept makes claims about "the subjective purposiveness of nature for the judgment" and "the supersensible substrate of humanity."35 Central to the antinomy of aesthetical judgment is this transcendental concept of the supersensible nature of objects. Thus, the aesthetical antinomy too has as its subject matter the nature of totality. The antinomy of teleological judgment involves a conflict between maxims of the reflective judgment. This is significant because the reflective judgment can reflect upon objects but it has no law to which it can subsume objects. 36 so, the conflict in the antinomy reveals the two attempts of reflective judgment to provide maxims for reflection upon objects. It is clear from the beginning that these maxims of reflective judgment are not objective laws for the cognition of objects but rather are attempts to guide reflection upon a class of objects. The teleological antinomy thus concerns the attempts of reflective judgment to provide maxims for the comprehension and ordering of objects.37 The teleological antinomy has to do with rules for the subjective ordering of nature. Reflective judgment must provide maxims by means of which the whole of experience and of nature can be dealt with. Kant says that reflective judgment must "serve as its own principle in order to investigate and search into the phenomena of nature in accordance with a law."38 12

In sum, the teleological antinomy also has as its transcendental object the nature of totality. The antinomy involves the attempts of reflective judgment to account for nature in its totality, and this it does by searching for an unconditioned by means of which the conditioned may be comprehended. So, the antinomy of teleological judgment, like the other antinomies, concentrates its real efforts on dealing with the unconditioned or totality. With regard to the three transcendental aspects of the antinomies just discussed, the following conclusions can be drawn. All the antinomies in the three Critiques are characterized by dialectical illusion. This means that they involve a confusion between what is subjective and what is objective. As a result of the attempt made in the antinomies to distinguish subjective principles from objective principles, a further distinction is drawn between the realm of experience and the realm outside experience. Antinomy, as Kant uses it, involves dialectical illusion and the consequent dichotomies between subjective and objective, and between the sensible realm and the supersensible realm. However, no such similarity is found among the nature of the assertions in the three Critiques. The claims made by theoretical reason, aesthetical judgment, and teleological judgment in their antinomies are apparently more regulative in nature than constitutive. None of the assertions made in the antinomies of theoretical reason, aesthetical judgment, or teleological judgment claim to be constitutive of objects or experience. On the other hand, the assertions in the practical antinomy do intend to have a kind of constitutive employment in the determination of the will. Finally, a further point of similarity among the antinomies is found in the nature of their transcendental subject matter. The antinomies in the three Critiques develop as ways of attempting to account for totality. At issue in all of the antinomies is the problem of how reason or reflective judgment can deal with the unconditioned or totality. The next section will be a consideration of other possible points of similarity among the antinomies. The three points dealt with so far refer to transcendental aspects of the antinomies. The three points

13

to be considered now refer to logical aspects of the antinomies. The Logical Framework of the Antinomies The logical framework of the antinomies refers to the logical or structural nature of the antinomies. There are three such structural characteristics which although are not definitive of antinomies are at least typical of antinomies. The first structural point of comparison among the antinomies has to do with the formulation of the assertions in the antinomies. That is, there seems to be at least some similarity among the ways in which the statements of the antinomies confront one another. Kant states in the first Critique that: antithetic may be taken as meaning . . . the conflict of the doctrines of seemingly dogmatic knowledge (thesis cum antithesi) in which no one assertion can establish superiority over another. 39 So, the antithetic of pure reason and its consequent antinomies refer to conflicts between doctrines of reason. Kant in fact entitles the sections on the antinomies of theoretical reason "First Conflict of the Transcendental Ideas," "Second Conflict of the Transcendental Ideas," etc. The term "antinomy" thus specifies a conflict between two assertions which appear to be equally tenable. It is important to consider in more detail the logical nature of the conflict between the assertions of the antinomies. If, as Kant says, antithetic refers to a conflict between apparently dogmatic assertions, then all the antinomies in the three Critiques may be expected to exhibit this conflict. In the Critique of Pure Reason, the four antinomies are stated as follows: One (A426-7/B454-5) Thesis: The world has a beginning in time, and is also limited as regards space. Antithesis:

The world has no beginning, and no limits in space; it is infinite as regards both time and space. 14

Two (A434-5/B462-3) Thesis: Every composite substance in the world is made up of simple parts and nothing anywhere exists save the simple or what is composed of the simple. Antithesis:

No composite thing in-the world is made up of simple parts, and there nowhere exists in the world anything simple.

Three (A444-5/B472-3) Thesis: Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only causality from which the appearances of the world can one and all be derived. To explain these appearances it is necessary to assume that there is also another causality, that of freedom. Antithesis:

There is no freedom; everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with laws of nature.

Four (A452-3/B480-1) Thesis: There belongs to the world, either as its part or as its cause, a being that is absolutely necessary. Antithesis:

An absolutely necessary being nowhere exists in the world, nor does it exist outside the world as its cause.

It is evident that these four theoretical antinomies reflect the antithetic defined by Kant because the assertions in the antinomies stand in clear conflict with one another. However, even more can be said about the nature of the conflict revealed in these four antinomies of theoretical reason. In symbolic terms, the antinomies of theoretical reason seem to illustrate a contradiction between X and not-X, rather than a mere conflict. The theses and antitheses of the antinomies not only represent conflicting assertions but contradictory assertions. The antitheses function as the explicit denials of the theses. If the thesis of any one of the four antinomies were labeled "X" then the antithesis of that same antinomy would be labeled "not-X."40 The conclusion of this consideration of the logical structure of the assertions in the theoretical antinomies seems to be that in this case "antinomy" 15

refers to a strict type of conflict, i.e., a contradiction. At one point Kant does use the term "contradiction" 41(Widerspruch) rather than "conflict" (Widerstreit). He says: however it [reason] may endeavour to establish its principle of unconditioned unity, and though it indeed does so with great though illusory appearance of success, it soon falls into such contradictions that it is constrained, in this cosmological field, to desist from any such pretensions.42 As a rule though, Kant uses the term "conflict" to apply to the relationship that exists between the assertions of an antinomy. In the second Critique, reason is again burdened with an antinomy. Since practical and theoretical reason refer to two employments of pure reason, it follows that practical reason like theoretical reason will be characterized by an antinomy. Kant speaks again of the "conflict of reason with itself."43 However, the assertions in the antinomy of practical reason are not labeled "thesis" and "antithesis" as they were in the theoretical antinomies. Instead, Kant calls the conflicting assertions in the practical antinomy "propositions." These names for the assertions reveal a significant difference between the logical formulations of the assertions in the theoretical and practical antinomies. The antinomy of practical reason is stated as follows: "the desire for happiness must be the motive to maxims of virtue, or the maxim of virtue must be the efficient cause of happiness."44 it becomes immediately clear that Kant is justified in calling the assertions of the theoretical antinomies "thesis" and "antithesis" and the assertions of the practical antinomy "propositions." The practical antinomy concerns a conflict between two propositions each of which asserts a causal relation. This type of conflict stands in stark contrast to the conflict evidenced in the theoretical antinomies. The assertions of the practical antinomy state a causal connection (ex., striving for happiness produces a ground for a virtuous disposition). The assertions of the theoretical antinomies make a statement of fact (ex., the world has a beginning in time, and is also limited as 16

regards space). Two assertions of causal connection do not stand in the same type of conflict with one another as do two statements of fact which contradict each other. The propositions of the practical antinomy do not stand to each other in a logical relationship of X and not-X. The assertions of the practical antinomy in no way illustrate the contradictoriness revealed by the assertions in the theoretical antinomies. Furthermore, the assertions in the practical antinomy do not even refer to the same type of causality. The first proposition states that "the desire for happiness must be the motive (Bewegursache) to maxims of virtue." The second states that "the maxim of virtue must be the efficient cause (wirkende Ursache) of happiness." Kant is talking about two different types of causal connection. No real conflict is present between two propositions'one of which asserts that the desire for happiness is the moving cause (Bewegursache) of virtue and the other of which asserts that virtue is the efficient cause (wirkende Ursache) of happiness. No contradiction exists between two propositions each of which asserts a different type of causality. These types of causality will be considered in more detail in Chapter Four. For now, it is indeed questionable whether there is any conflict at all between the propositions of the practical antinomy but at least it can be concluded that the type of conflict evidenced in the practical antinomy is essentially different from that found in the theoretical antinomies. In the Critique of Judgment, Kant formulates and discusses two antinomies. These antinomies of the faculty of judgment also exhibit in their logical framework the conflict between assertions which is typical of antinomies. The antinomy of taste in the "Dialectic of the Aesthetical Judgment" is stated as follows: Thesis: Antithesis:

The judgment of taste is not based upon concepts. . . . The judgment of taste is based on concepts. . . .45

The first point to be noticed in the logical 17

formulation of the assertions in the antinomy is that they are referred to as "thesis" and "antithesis." This would suggest that the antinomy of taste bears an affinity to the theoretical antinomies, whose assertions are also designated as theses and antitheses. The affinity between the antinomy of taste and the theoretical antinomies is further strengthened by the type of conflict apparent in both kinds of antinomies. As suggested earlier, the theoretical antinomies are characterized by assertions which not only conflict but in fact contradict each other. The same is true of the antinomy of taste. Like the assertions in the theoretical antinomies, the assertions in the antinomy of taste can be logically symbolized by X and not-X. Apparently then, the conflict present in the antinomy of taste is not only the type of conflict which is required by the nature of "antinomy" in general, but it is a contradiction between statements of fact. The second point of significance with regard to the type of conflict present in the antinomy of taste has to do with how Kant himself talks about the antinomy. In the section on the solution to the an- ( tinomy, Kant refers to the dilemma posed by the antinomy of taste as both a conflict and a contradiction. He states: "We can do nothing more than remove this conflict (Widerstreit) between the claims and counterclaims of taste."46 Furthermore, he says: But all contradiction (Widerspruch) disappears if I say: the judgment of taste is based on a concept . . . from which, however, nothing can be known and proved in respect of the object.47 It is of interest that the antinomy of taste, like the theoretical antinomies, involves a logical contradiction between assertions and not a mere conflict. Finally, the antinomy of reflective judgment, in "The Dialectic of Teleological Judgment," is stated in the following way: Proposition:

Counterproposition:

All production of material things and their forms must be judged to be possible according to merely mechanical laws. Some products of material 18

nature cannot be judged to be possible according to merely mechanical laws.48 This antinomy is described as a conflict between maxims of the reflective judgment. Reflective judgment proceeds on the basis of these two maxims which as Kant says, "seem not to be capable of existing together."49 Again, it is evident that this antinomy is characterized by a conflict between its assertions which is typical of antinomies. The issue becomes more complicated if the question is whether the type of opposition between the assertions in the antinomy is a strict contradiction or not. Kant claims that as maxims _for the reflective ,.. judgment these propositions involve no contradiction. He states that the propositions would contradict each other only if they were considered to be objective principles for the determinant judgment. HOwever, it seems that this discussion of Kant's leads already to the solution to the antinomy and away from the formulation of the conflict between assertions. Kant's claim that the maxims involve no contradiction is certainly true in light of the resolution of the antinomy which finds the maxims to be compatible. But that does not preclude the possibility that the propositions of the antinomy may originally stand in a relationship of apparent contradiction. In fact, the propositions in the antinomy do appear to contradict each other. The maxims of the reflective judgment not only oppose or conflict with one another but contradict one another. They are contradictories of the logical form "All S is P" and "Some S is not P" ("Not [All S is P]"). This logical contradiction between the assertions in the teleological antinomy is attested to by Alexis Philonenko and by D. J. Siewert in their analyses of the teleological antinomy.51 Thus, this first point of comparison among the antinomies in Kant's three Critiques has shown that antinomies are characterized by a conflict between assertions. The two propositions in an antinomy stand in some type of conflict with one another. In addition, certain antinomies (i.e., those in the first and third Critiques) exhibit a strict type of conflict, a contradiction, between their assertions. A second possible structural point of similarity among the antinomies in the three Critiques concerns the type of proof employed by the assertions in the 19

antinomies. Kant describes in "The Discipline of Pure Reason" a certain proof procedure which may be typical of the proofs employed by the propositions in the antinomies . It can be shown that to a certain extent, all antinomies are alike insofar as their propositions rely on the apagogic mode of proof. Before discussing the antinomies, it will be helpful to consider how Kant defines an apagogic proof. The third rule peculiar to pure reason, in so far as it is to be subjected to a discipline in respect of transcendental proofs, is that its proofs must never be apagogical, but always ostensive.52 The reason why apagogical proofs should not be employed in transcendental enterprises is because in those enterprises the subjective presents itself as objective. Apagogical proofs are acceptable "only in those sciences where it is impossible mistakenly to substitute what is subjective in our representations for what is objective."* Kant further distinguishes apagogic from ostensive proofs in his Logic. He says: The first mode of conclusion according to which the consequence can only be a negative and indirectly sufficient criterion of the truth of a cognition, is called in logic, the apagogic mode (modus t o l l e n s ) . . . . With the other, the positive and direct mode of conclusion (modus ponens), the difficulty enters that the totality of consequences cannot be cognized apodeictically.54 Apagogic proof is thus linked to modus tollens and the ostensive or direct proof method is linked to modus ponens. For the purposes of this investigation, all discussion of the ostensive type of proof will be ignored. Kant de'fines modus tollens or the apagogical proof method as a type of reasoning that advances from consequences to their grounds. He states: For if even a single false consequence can be drawn from a proposition, the proposition is itself false. Instead, then, as in an ostensive proof, of re20

viewing the whole series of grounds that can lead us to the truth of a proposition, by means of a complete insight into its possibility, we require only to show that a single one of the consequences resulting from its opposite is false, in order to prove that this opposite is itself false, and that the proposition which we had to prove is therefore true.55 In other words, in an apagogical proof, the truth of an assertion is shown by assuming the opposite assertion to be true, showing that a false consequence results from this opposite assertion and that therefore it must be false, and thus concluding that the original proposition must be true. One observation must be made concerning Kant's use of the term modus tollens to refer to the apagogical or indirect form of proof. Kant's identification of modus tollens with apagogical proofs raises a certain problem for present-day students of logic. The identification of modus tollens with apagogical proofs does reinforce the logical nature of the proofs. That is, the proofs arrive at the truth of a proposition by showing that the opposite proposition must be false since a false consequence follows from it. However, Kant does not restrict apagogical proofs to what are presently called "modus tollens proofs." Another type of proof which is presumably apagogical but is not a modus tollens proof is the reductio ad absurdum proof. A reductio ad absurdum proof is apagogical because the truth of a proposition is shown by revealing that the opposite proposition is false since a false (here, a contradictory) consequence results from it. It is crucial to recognize that by apagogical proof Kant means a negative and indirect proof and thus that the proofs in the antinomies may be shown to be apagogical whether or not they are modus tollens proofs. Several of Kant's commentators have claimed that the apagogical form of proof is typical of the four theoretical antinomies. Justus Hartnack56 and A. C. Ewing5 7 both refer to the indirect method of proof as typical of the theoretical antinomies without however labeling the proof procedure apagogical. Edward Caird also remarks on the method of proof in the theoretical antinomies, and he specifically states that each of 21

the antinomies is "demonstrated apagogically on both sides."58 on the other hand, Jonathan Bennett acknowledges the indirect proof procedure in the antinomies (by referring to the reductio ad absurdum proofs in the antinomies) but he fails to recognize the importance of these proofs as a criterion for "antinomy."59 Bennett refers to the "useless and confusing reductio ad absurdum form"60 of the argument in the second antinomy as if the form of the proof were somehow distinct from the sense of the antinomy. This investigation suggests however that the real sense or intent of the antinomies is revealed in the apagogical form of their proofs rather than in the validity or invalidity of the arguments in the proofs. It is crucial to see, contrary to Bennett's claim, that the indirect, apagogical form of proof utilized in the theoretical antinomies is central to the classification of these conflicts as antinomies. The antinomies in Kant's three Critiques must be considered in order to discover if this apagogical form of proof does indeed characterize the proofs of the assertions in the antinomies. In the first Critique, the theses and antitheses of the four antinomies 61 do employ apagogical proofs with one qualification. In the first three antinomies, the truth of the thesis is proved by assuming the antithesis to be true and discovering that a false or impossible consequence follows from it (and similarly for proving the antithesis, the thesis is assumed to be true but found to have a false or impossible consequence). From the falsity of the antithesis it is concluded that the thesis must be true (and similarly, the falsity of the thesis proves the truth of the antithesis). For example, in the first antinomy, the thesis states: "The world has a beginning in time, and is also limited as regards space." The proof of this thesis proceeds in two parts. The first part begins with the assumption: "If we assume that the world has no beginning in time" and the second part begins: "let us again assume the opposite, namely, that the world is an infinite given whole of coexisting things."62 The proof of the thesis is carried out by assuming the truth of the antithesis and finding it to lead to impossible consequences. The qualification arises due to the proof patterns in the fourth theoretical antinomy. The antithesis of the fourth antinomy clearly employs an apagogical proof, but the thesis of the antinomy seems to depend not on an apagogical proof but on the cosmological 22

argument.bJ The proof of the existence of a necessary being is carried out as a direct and not as an apagogical proof. Kuno Fischer states that the64proof of the thesis of the fourth antinomy is direct and I. S. Narski, who is interested in the antinomies as predecessors of Hegelian and Marxist dialectics, also recognizes that the 6proof of the thesis of the fourth antinomy is direct. ^ Yet, contrary to these claims, it can be shown that an apagogical proof plays a part in the proof of the fourth antinomy's thesis. Fischer seems to be correct in maintaining that the proof of the thesis of the fourth antinomy proceeds in a fashion unlike the proofs in the other theses and antitheses. The attempt made in the thesis to prove "there belongs to the world, either as its part or as its cause, a being that is absolutely necessary" does not begin with the assumption of the opposite proposition. Fischer concludes that the proof of the thesis is therefore direct.66 It is true that the proof of the existence of an absolutely necessary being is accomplished by the use of the cosmological argument, i.e., a direct proof. But the thesis must also prove that this absolutely necessary being belongs to the sensible world. This proof is carried out in an apagogical fashion. To show that the necessary being exists in the sensible world, the thesis begins by assuming the opposite: "For if it existed outside that world."6' From this opposite proposition an impossible consequence follows, and therefore the truth of the original proposition is proven apagogically. Thus, the thesis of the fourth antinomy is distinguished from the theses and antitheses of the other antinomies because it uses a direct proof. But, it is like the other theses and antitheses insofar as it too employs an apagogical proof. The uniqueness of the fourth antinomy will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter Two. Two different types of logical proofs which both classify as apagogical proofs can be illustrated by diagramming the proofs of the first and third theoretical antinomies. The first and third antinomies are chosen here as representatives of the two types of cosmological ideas Kant calls mathematical and dynamical. The following diagrams are to be treated as merely useful exercises which suggest what Kant means by apagogical proofs. In the proof of the first antinomy, both thesis 23

and antithesis seem to illustrate what is today called a modus to11ens proof. Both thesis and antithesis proceed in two parts as follows: Antinomy 1; Thesis (A426,8/B454,6) 1. ^ There is a beginning in time -t- There has been an infinite series. 2. \i There is a beginning in time. (MT) 1. The world is finite and The world exlimited ists in an empty space. 2. °» The world exists in an ["The relation empty space. of the world to empty space is nothing."] .".3. ^ The world is finite and limited (MT) Note:

Bracketed statements are literal statements of steps in the proofs.

The proof structure of the third antinomy reveals a slightly different pattern. The thesis of the third antinomy arrives at its conclusion by showing that a false consequent results from assuming the antithesis to be true. Yet, it exhibits not a modus toliens proof pattern, but rather what is today called a reductio ad absurdum or a proof by contradiction. The false consequent that follows from the antithesis is a logical contradiction. The thesis of the third antinomy shows that in apagogical proofs, an assumption is proved false when either a false consequent or a logical contradiction follows from it. The antithesis of the third antinomy however seems to exhibit a strict 24

modus tollens proof pattern. diagrammed as follows:

The third antinomy can be

Antinomy 3: Thesis (A444,6/B472,4) T~. ^ There is freedom -*• ^ P (P=Things have first beginnings.) 2. "u There is freedom -»• P 3. ^ There is freedom -»• % P & P .'.4. There is freedom. (reductio ad absurdum) Antinomy 3: Antithesis (A445,7/B473,5) 1. There is freedom -»• Freedom has an absolute beginning. 2. Every beginning presupposes a not yet acting cause. [Law of Causality] . ' . 3 . "v» There i s freedom. ["Freedom i s an empty thought entity."] (modus tollens) Note:

Bracketed statements are literal statements of steps in the proofs. ( These diagrams of the proofs of the first and third antinomies in the Critique of Pure Reason serve two functions. First, they add additional evidence to support the claim that the theses and antitheses of the theoretical antinomies employ apagogical proofs. The diagrams reveal how a proposition in an antinomy proves itself to be true by showing that the opposite proposition has a false consequence. Second, the diagrams support the earlier claim that there may be more than one type of apagogical proof. The diagrams indicate that there are at least two ways in which a proposition is proved true by showing its opposite to result in a false consequence. This difference between types of apagogical proofs may or may not be significant, but for present purposes, it is enough to have noted the potential problem arising from Kant's identification of modus tollens and apagogical proofs. In the second Critique, it is more difficult to specify where an apagogical proof characterizes the antinomy. The difficulty arises because of a difference in structure between the practical and the theoretical antinomies. The theoretical antinomies involve a straightforward conflict between two propositions both of which are supported by apagogical proofs. The practical antinomy apparently concerns a similar conflict between two propositions, but in fact it concerns the establishment of the concept of the highest 25

good. The practical antinomy proposes that if there is a concept of the highest good then virtue and happiness must be combined in one of two ways. These two possible ways of combining virtue and happiness are manifested in the two propositions of the practical antinomy. If it is remembered that the real goal of the practical antinomy is to discover whether there is or is not a concept of the highest good which is possible in a practical way, then there will be no temptation to look for the apagogical proof in a place where it is not. That is, the modus tollens proof which is employed in the practical antinomy does not appear in the proofs for the two propositions "the desire for happiness must be the motive to maxims of virtue" and "the maxim of virtue must be the efficient cause of happiness." If the practical antinomy followed the pattern set by the theoretical antinomies, one would expect to find that each of the two propositions proves itself to be true on the basis of an apagogical proof. Instead, both of the propositions in the practical antinomy are said to be impossible for reasons clearly stated. A modus tollens proof appears only if it is recognized that the antinomy concerns the conditional: "If there is a concept of the highest good, then either striving for happiness produces a ground for virtue or virtue produces happiness." Both sides of the disjunction are said to be impossible, and thus by modus tollens, the conclusion is reached that there is no concept of the highest good. Or, as Kant says, from the fact that no necessary connection between happiness and virtue can be expected, we can conclude to the "impossibility of the highest good."68 Obviously, the practical antinomy is not left with the impossibility of the highest good as its final conclusion. Yet, this seems to be the step where the modus tollens proof procedure is utilized. Again, the question can be raised: In what way is this proof an apagogical proof? Insofar as a modus tollens proof is apagogical, this proof in the practical antinomy is apagogical. However, according to Kant's definition of apagogical proof, the modus tollens in the practical antinomy does not qualify as an apagogical proof. An apagogical proof involves proving a proposition to be true by showing that the opposite proposition is false. In this case, the modus tollens does not begin by assuming the opposite proposition to be true, nor does it go on to show the falsity of the opposite 26

proposition, nor does it conclude to the truth of the original proposition. In light of these facts, it would seem that the modus tollens proof employed in the practical antinomy is not analogous to the apagogical proofs evident in the theoretical antinomies. The antinomies in the Critique of Judgment must now be considered with regard to the form of their proofs. The first antinomy, that of aesthetical judgment, seems to contain an abbreviated form of apagogical proof right in the statement of the antinomy. The statement of the antinomy of taste reads in full: Thesis.

Antithesis.

The judgment of taste is not based upon concepts, for otherwise it would admit of controversy (would be determinable by proofs). The judgment of taste is based on concepts, for otherwise, despite its diversity, we could not quarrel about it (we could not claim for our judgment the- necessary assent of others).69

Both thesis and antithesis seem to employ an indirect apagogical proof. The proof of both proceeds from a negative assumption introduced by the word "otherwise." For example, the reason why the judgment of taste is not based upon concepts is because if_ it were based upon concepts, it would be determinable by proofs. The argument is completed by the unspoken but understood statement "The judgment of taste is not determinable by proofs." Hence, the conclusion by modus tollens: "The judgment of taste is not based upon concepts." Here, there is a modus tollens proof which is employed apagogically. That is, the truth of the thesis is proven by assuming the antithesis and showing it to have a false consequence. The same method is also employed in the antithesis. The apagogical form of proof is thus illustrated in the antinomy of taste whose propositions are proved by disproving their opposites. In the antinomy of teleological judgment, there seems to be one indication of an apagogical proof that gives evidence for the first maxim. The first maxim states: "All production of material things and their forms must be judged to be possible according to merely mechanical laws."70 Kant says this means that 27

men must always reflect on material things according to the principle of mechanism "because unless this lies at the basis of investigation, there can be no proper knowledge of nature at all."73- in other words, the first maxim is true for reflective judgment because if_ this maxim were not true for reflective judgment, then there would be no proper knowledge of nature. This represents, it seems, another abbreviated type of apagogical proof. "Unless" functions here as "otherwise" functioned in the antinomy of taste. This first maxim in the teleological antinomy must be true because the opposite maxim would result in a false consequence. There is no analogous apagogical proof in the justification for the second maxim of teleological judgment. Alexis Philonenko claims that the teleological antinomy does not employ apagogical proofs.72 He acknowledges that it is possible to imagine or design an apagogical proof for the first maxim of the teleological antinomy. But he says there can be no apagogical proof of the second maxim because it would require a refutation of the transcendental analytic.73 This accords fairly well with the previously stated claim that an abbreviated apagogical proof is present in the proof of the first maxim but that no such proof is found for the second maxim. This analysis of the role that apagogical proofs play in the antinomies has shown that although the proofs are typical of many antinomies, they do not provide a universal criterion for antinomies. Apagogical proofs are clearly employed by the propositions in the theoretical antinomies, and they are less clearly employed by the propositions in the antinomies of judgment. The practical antinomy seems not to involve an apagogical proof as Kant strictly defines it. (However, there is a modus tollens proof that proceeds from "the concept of the highest good is possible" to the conclusion "the concept of the highest good is impossible.") Thus, apagogical proofs may be characteristic of most antinomies but they are in no way determinative of antinomies. A third and final structural point of comparison among the antinomies in the three Critiques has to do with their types of resolutions. By considering the ways in which the conflict between propositions is resolved in the antinomies, it is possible to discover another characteristic typical of antinomies. 28

Specifically, Kant indicates that the apagogical form of proof has a direct bearing on the types of resolutions possible to the antinomies. The fact that the antinomies (most of the antinomies) have incorrectly employed apagogical proofs as evidence for their propositions indicates that their resolutions will also be characterized by this transcendental error. To reiterate, Kant states that apagogical proofs should never be employed to justify synthetic propositions, nor should they be employed in transcendental enterprises.74 i n realms where the subjective and objective are easily confused, it is never proper to use an apagogical proof. Kant says that within the domain of dialectical illusion where the subjective presents itself as objective, it can never be permissable, so far as synthetic propositions are concerned, to justify assertions by disproving their opposite. For either this refutation is nothing but the mere representation of the conflict of the opposite opinion with the subjective conditions under which alone anything can be conceived by our reason, which does not in the least contribute to the disproof of the thing itself . . . or else both parties, those who adopt the affirmative no less than those who adopt the negative position, have been deceived by transcendental illusion, and base their assertions upon an impossible concept of the object. 75 This passage serves to specifically link the antinomies with the apagogical form of proof. Kant indicates that two types of resolutions are possible in a conflict which employs apagogical proofs. Either, due to a confusion between subjective and objective, no disproof of the thing itself is achieved; or, due to transcendental illusion, the conflict rests on an impossible concept of the object. As an example of the former case, Kant states that although the proof of a necessary supreme being is impossible on subjective grounds, the possibility of such a being in itself cannot be denied.76 (This refers to the fourth theoretical antinomy.) As an example of the latter case, Kant states that if one assumes the sensible world is given in itself, then it is false that it 29

must be either infinite in space or finite and limited. 11 (This refers to the first theoretical antinomy.) In other words, where apagogical proofs characterize a conflict (in transcendental enterprises), two types of resolutions are possible: either, both sides of the conflict are true (since the conflict is based on a subjective/objective confusion and no disproof of the object is achieved); or, both sides of the conflict are false (since the conflict is based on an impossible concept of the object at issue). Now, the next task is to consider briefly how the resolutions to the antinomies relate to the two types of resolutions possible to conflicts involving apagogical proofs, iKant already indicates that the resolution to the fourth theoretical antinomy is of the type where no disproof of the object is achieved, and thus both sides of the conflict are true. In addition, the first theoretical antinomy rests on an impossible concept of the object, and thus both sides of the conflict are false. The resolutions of the antinomies must be systematically considered with the express purpose of relating them to the following two resolutions typical of conflicts involving apagogical proofs. 1.

No disproof of the object is achieved due to a confusion between subjective and objective (i.e., both assertions in the conflict are true).

2.

The conflict is based on an impossible concept of the object (i.e., both assertions in the conflict are false).

The solutions to the antinomies of theoretical reason can best be discussed here with reference to the nature of their assertions as mathematical or dynamical ideas.78 Kant indicates that the first two antinomies of theoretical reason have to do with mathematical ideas since their only object is the object as appearance.79 The last two antinomies of theoretical reason involve dynamical ideas which allow for a condition of appearances outside the series of the appearances.80 Kant says that with the dynamical ideas we arrive at a conclusion altogether different from any that was possible 30

in the case of the mathematical antinomy. In it we were obliged to denounce both the opposed dialectical assertions as false. In the dynamical series . . . [we are] able to obtain satisfaction for understanding on the one hand and for reason on the other.81 Kant goes on to conclude that for the dynamical ideas, both the conflicting propositions of reason can be true.82 In short, this means that the mathematical antinomies (Antinomies 1 and 2) are resolved when both their conflicting assertions are seen to be false whereas the dynamical antinomies (Antinomies 3 and 4) are resolved when both their assertions are seen to be true. The theoretical antinomies thus illustrate clearly the two types of resolutions typical of conflicts involving apagogical proofs. Antinomies 1 and 2 are solved by the second type of resolution and Antinomies 3 and 4 manifest the first type of resolution. The solution to the antinomy of practical reason states that the proposition "striving for happiness produces a ground for a virtuous disposition" is absolutely false but that the proposition "a virtuous disposition necessarily produces happiness" is only conditionally false.83 The only point of interest here in the resolution of the practical antinomy is whether or not it illustrates one of the types of resolutions typical of conflicts involving apagogical proofs. Since the practical antinomy is resolved when one proposition is found to be absolutely false while the other proposition is conditionally false, it might be claimed that the antinomy manifests the second type of resolution (wherein both assertions in the conflict are false since they rest on an impossible concept). Yet, this identification of the resolution of the practical antinomy with the second type of resolution possible to conflicts involving apagogical proofs would be mistaken for two reasons. First, strictly speaking, the solution of the practical antinomy does not manifest the type of resolution in which both assertions are seen to be false. The assertions in the practical antinomy are found to be absolutely false and conditionally false. The latter is then made true for practical purposes by additional considerations in order to insure the concept of the highest 31

good. Second, there is no reason to expect the resolution of the practical antinomy to be molded to one of the types suggested by the apagogical form of proof. As stated earlier, the assertions of the practical antinomy, unlike the assertions of the other antinomies, do not seem to employ apagogical proofs. Therefore, what sets the practical antinomy apart from the other antinomies is the absence of apagogical proofs which in turn necessitates a different type of resolution to the antinomy. Finally, the solutions to the antinomies of judgment exhibit one of the types of resolutions possible to conflicts involving apagogical proofs. In the antinomy of aesthetical judgment, the conflict is resolved when "the two apparently contradictory principles are reconciled—both can be true, which is sufficient."85 The solution to the antinomy of taste thus illustrates the first type of resolution typical of conflicts involving apagogical proofs. Nothing can be known about the object due to the confusion between subjective and objective conditions, and so both assertions can be true with regard to different realms. The antinomy of teleological judgment is resolved in a similar way. If it is remembered that the two maxims (all production of material things and their forms must be judged to be possible according to merely mechanical laws; some products of material nature cannot be judged to be possible according to merely mechanical laws) are reflective and not determinative, then there is no contradiction at all. The antinomy is solved when it is seen that both assertions in the conflict can be true. Thus, the antinomy of teleological judgment corresponds to the first type of resolution typical of conflicts involving apagogical proofs. The first type of resolution characterizes those antinomies where a confusion between subjective and objective is present. This confusion is revealed in the teleological antinomy in the following way: All appearance of an antinomy between the maxims of the proper physical (mechanical) and the teleological (technical) methods of explanation rests therefore on this that we confuse a fundamental proposition of the reflective with one of the determinant j udgment.8 6 32

In sum, the purpose of this section on the resolutions of the antinomies has been to suggest another possible point of similarity among the antinomies. Indeed, the apagogical nature of the proofs in the antinomies indicates two types of resolutions: both assertions were seen to be true, or both assertions were seen to be false. As could be expected, those antinomies employing apagogical proofs (the theoretical antinomies and the antinomies of judgment) manifest one of the two types of resolutions. The practical antinomy which apparently does not employ apagogical proofs also fails to exhibit a resolution corresponding to one of the two types given. Consequently, although similarities exist between the resolutions to the antinomies, again there appears to be no criterion determinative of antinomies. This brings to a close the consideration of Kant's use of the term "antinomy" in the three Critiques. The discussion centered on six characteristics of the antinomies that appear in the three Critiques. A short summary may prove helpful. First, three transcendental aspects of the antinomies were discussed in order to discover what role they play in the defining of antinomies. One transcendental aspect of the antinomies that was found to be typical of all the antinomies is that they manifest dialectical illusion. All the antinomies are grounded in a dialectical confusion between subjective and objective principles. All the antinomies reveal what Kant calls a natural and unavoidable illusion.87 A further aspect typical of the antinomies is their attempt to distinguish the sensible from the supersensible. The resolutions of the antinomies aim at the distinguishing of subjective and objective principles, and this implies a further but related distinguishing in the antinomies between the sensible and the supersensible realms. The second transcendental aspect of the antinomies that was discussed had to do with the nature of the claims made in the antinomies. It was found that no general statement can be made about the nature of the assertions in the antinomies. The assertions in the antinomies of theoretical reason, aesthetical judgment, and teleological judgment function as regulative principles whereas the assertions in the antinomy of practical reason are meant to have a type of constitutive employment. 33

The third transcendental aspect of the antinomies considered here had to do with their subject matter. It was shown that all the antinomies have as their transcendental subject matter the unconditioned or totality. The antinomies in the three Critiques have in common and can be defined by the object of their concern which is the unconditioned totality of appearances. Second, three logical or structural aspects of the antinomies were considered in order to discover their roles in the defining of antinomies. One logical aspect common to and typical of all antinomies is a conflict between assertions. The two assertions involved in an antinomy stand to one another in some type of conflict. The second logical aspect of an antinomy was not found to be universally characteristic of all the antinomies. The antinomies of theoretical reason, aesthetical judgment, and teleological judgment employ apagogical proofs to some degree. The antinomy of practical reason does not in a strict sense employ apagogical proofs. Thus, the appearance of an apagogical proof cannot be said to be a logical criterion for antinomies. The third logical aspect of antinomies involved a consideration of the type of resolution possible to the antinomies. It was shown that the apagogical form of proof has a direct bearing on the types of resolutions possible in the antinomies. Those antinomies employing apagogical proofs are resolved in one of two ways: both assertions are seen to be true, or both assertions are seen to be false. The practical antinomy, which was found not to employ apagogical proofs, also does not conform to one of these two types of resolutions. In short, the attempt to discover a logical criterion for "antinomy" in the types of resolutions utilized in the antinomies was unsuccessful. One conclusion that may be reached from this analysis of the antinomies is that the practical antinomy occupies a rather unique position. In every case where dissimilarity was found, the dissimilarity arose in the practical antinomy. Those three aspects which were not found to be characteristics typical of all antinomies failed to be universal characteristics because of the uniqueness of the practical antinomy.88 The purposes of this chapter have been the following : to provide an introduction to Kant's 34

antinomies, to suggest by means of an analysis of the antinomies that Kant offers no simple definition of "antinomy," and finally, to consider similarities between the antinomies which may point to possible criteria of antinomies. Ultimately, an attempt has been made to follow up Kant's discussion of the antinomies and to formulate in general terms that to which "antinomy" refers.

35

ENDNOTES Kants Gesammelte Schriften (Königlich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften; hereafter referred to as KGS), IV (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1911), 341; a revision of the Carus translation by Lewis White Beck, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1950), p. 88. 2 Alexis Philonenko, "L'antmomie du jugement teleologique chez Kant," Revue de Mätaphysique et de Morale, 82 (1977), 13-37. 3 Philonenko, p. 13. 4 Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 247. 5 Kuno Fischer, A Commentary on Kant's Critick of the Pure Reason, trans. Kuno Fischer (1866; rpt. New York: Garland Publishers, 1976), p. 206. Edward Caird, The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant (Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons, 1889), II, 447. 7 Philonenko, p. 20. My translation from the French. Q

Heinz Heimsoeth, Transzendentale Dialektik. Ein Kommentar zu Kants Kritik d. reinen Vernunft, II (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967), 199. My translation from the German. g Heimsoeth, p. 215. My translation from the German. Heimsoeth, p. 223. German.

My translation from the

A293/B349; translation by Norman Kemp Smith, Critique of Pure Reason (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965). Kant's use of the term "dialectic" is a peculiar one and it is to be clearly distinguished from other meanings of "dialectic." Plato, for instance, refers to dialectic as the method of the philosopher or as logic or philosophy itself (The Republic). Dialectic for Hegel refers primarily to "negative dialectic," 36

that is, to the internal movement of sublation (aufhebung) which characterizes every moment of the Absolute (Preface, The Phenomenology of Mind). 12

A297/B353; translation by Kemp Smith.

13

A298/B354; translation by Kemp Smith.

14

K G S , V (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1913), 107; translation by Lewis White Beck, Critique of Practical Reason (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1956), p. 111. 15

A420/B447; translation by Kemp Smith.

16

A420/B447; translation by Kemp Smith.

17

A425/B453; translation by Kemp Smith.

18

A422/B450; translation by Kemp Smith.

19 See the section entitled "The Regulative Principle of Pure Reason in its Application to the Cosmological Ideas." A508/B536; translation by Kemp Smith. 20 Stephan Korner, "Kant's Conception of Freedom," Proceedings of the British Academy, 53 (1967), 212. 21 K G S , V, 112; Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 117. 22 KGS, V, 119; translation by Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 123. 23 K G S , V, 341; translation by J. H. Bernard, Critique of Judgment (New York: Hafner, 1968), p. 186. 24

K G S , V, 341; Bernard, p. 186.

25

K G S , V, 385; Bernard, p. 232.

Leroy E. Loemker, "The Metaphysical Status of Regulative Maxims in Leibniz and Kant," Southern Journal of Philosophy, 11 (1973), 143. 27

A321/B378; translation by Kemp Smith. A333/B390; translation by Kemp Smith.

37

29 Heinrich Walter Cassirer, Kant's First An Appraisal of the Permanent Significance of Critique of Pure Reason (1954; rpt. London: and Unwin, 1968), p. 240. 30 A481/B509; translation by Kemp Smith. bracketed material is mine.

Critique. Kant's G. Allen The

KGS, V, 114; Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 118. 3? KGS, V, 10 8; translation by Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 112. 33 KGS, V, 339; Bernard, p. 184. 34 KGS, V, 340; translation by Bernard, p. 185. KGS, V, 340; translation by Bernard, p. 185. 36

K G S , V, 385; Bernard, p. 232. 37 The teleological antinomy does not aim at a theoretical comprehension or a determinant ordering but at a reflective and principled ordering of nature. KGS, V, 386; translation by Bernard, p. 233. 39 A420/B448; translation by Kemp Smith. 40 A problem arises in the fourth antinomy which will be discussed later on pages 53-6 2 . Briefly, the antithesis apparently denies more than is claimed by the thesis. 41 "Widerspruch" as opposed by "Widerstreit"; A407/B433 as opposed to A420/B448. 42 A407/B433; translation by Kemp Smith. KGS, V, 107; translation by Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 111. 44 KGS, V, 113; translation by Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 117-8. KGS, V, 338; translation by Bernard, pp. 183-4. KGS, V, 341; translation by Bernard, p. 186. 38

47 KGS, V, 340; translation by Bernard, p. 185. KGS, V, 387; translation by Bernard, p. 234. KGS, V, 387; translation by Bernard, p. 233. 50

K G S , V, 387; Bernard, p. 234. See Philonenko, p. 2 3 and Donald J. Siewert, "Dialectic of Teleological Judgment," Akten des 4. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses Mainz 6-10 April 1974, Teil II.1, ed. Gerhard Funke (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1974), 454. 52

A789/B817; translation by Kemp Smith.

53

A791/B819; translation by Kemp Smith.

54 KGS, IX (Berlin and Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1923), 52; translation by Robert S. Hartman and Wolfgang Schwarz, Logic (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1974), p. 58. 55

A791/B819; translation by Kemp Smith.

Justus Hartnack, Immanuel Kant. An Explanation of His Theory of Knowledge and Moral Philosophy (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1974), p. 21. 57 A. C. Swing, A Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (Chicago: university of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 209. 58 Caird, p. 45. 59 Jonathan Bennett, Kant's Dialectic (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp. 163-4, 184. 60 Bennett, p. 163. This point is developed by Kuno Fischer in A Commentary on Kant's Critick of the Pure Reason, pp. 209-18. Fischer states that all of the proofs of the contradictory propositions in the antinomies are apagogical with one exception. The proof of the thesis of the fourth antinomy is direct. A426/B454; translation by Kemp Smith.

39

63

A456/B484; translation by Kemp Smith.

64

Fischer, p. 218.

65 I. S. Narski, "Kants Antinomien und die Logik der Erkenntnis," Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 22 (1974), 333. 66 Fischer, p. 218. 57

A452/B480; translation by Kemp Smith.

68 K G S , V, 114; translation by Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 118. 69 KGS, V, 338-9; translation by Bernard, pp.

183-4. KGS, V, 387; translation by Bernard, p. 234. KGS, V, 387; translation by Bernard, p. 234. 72

Philonenko, p. 23. 73 Philonenko, p. 21. A792/B820; translation by Kemp Smith. 75

A792/B820; translation by Kemp Smith.

76

A792/B820; translation by Kemp Smith.

77

A793/B821; translation by Kemp Smith. 78 The resolutions will be discussed more fully in

Chapter Three. 79

A529/B557; translation by Kemp Smith.

80

A531/B559; translation by Kemp Smith.

81

A5 31/B559; translation by Kemp Smith.

A532/B560; translation by Kemp Smith. K G S , V, 114; Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 119. 84 These considerations will be discussed in Chapter Five. See KGS, V, 114-5; Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 119. 40 83

°KGS, V, 341; translation by Bernard, p. 186. 86

KGS, V, 389; translation by Bernard, p. 236.

87

A298/B354; translation by Kemp Smith. 88 This apparent uniqueness of the practical antinomy will be considered in more detail in Chapters Four and Five.

41

42

CHAPTER II THE ORIGIN AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE FOUR THEORETICAL ANTINOMIES The discussion will now center on a consideration of the origin of the four antinomies in the Critique of Pure Reason. The consideration of that which gives rise to the theoretical antinomies is crucial for several reasons. First, it is of importance to establish that there is some one problem or difficulty at the heart of the four antinomies. If indeed the four theoretical antinomies share a common origin, then some justification can be accorded to Kant's reference to the four antinomies as "The Antinomy of Pure Reason."^ ipne f o u r antinomies can legitimately be referred to as "the antinomy of pure reason" if there is found to be one antithetic that grounds them all. If a common origin or ground for the antinomies can be found then it would also provide the basis for an objection to Jonathan Bennett's claim that Kant was unjustified in titling the chapter "The Antinomy" rather than "The Antinomies" of pure reason. Bennett claims that "this alleged 'conflict or antinomy of the laws of pure reason' is a mirage."3 This chapter will attempt to dispel Bennett's objection by elaborating the common origin of the four antinomies of theoretical reason. Second, it is of interest to locate the origin of the theoretical antinomies because it is possible that the origin may provide help in understanding the structure of the antinomies. That is, the structure of the antinomies should be explicable in terms of the antithetic or the problem which gives rise to the antinomies. Even if each of the four antinomies has a different point of origin, the structure of each antinomy should be illuminated by knowledge of its origin. This chapter will point out that the theoretical antinomies in fact share a common origin which in turn makes comprehensible the structure of the antinomies. Third, it is crucial to locate the origin of the theoretical antinomies because of what this origin may imply about the nature of reason in general. In other words, if this chapter can successfully discover the common origin of the theoretical antinomies, then a larger question about the nature of reason may be raised. Specifically, if the antinomies of theoretical reason arise from a single point of origin, does this 43

illuminate in any way the origin of the antinomy of practical reason? Does the locating of the origin of the theoretical antinomies in a single problem have any application to the practical antinomy? These questions will be dealt with in Chapter IV, but for now, the point is that the origin of the theoretical antinomies is of interest because of what it may imply about antinomies of reason in general. This chapter will proceed to discuss the origin and the structure of the four theoretical antinomies in the following five Sections. Section One will present the views of two of Kant's commentators who claim that the origin of the theoretical antinomies is located in an historical debate. Section Two will establish that the origin of the theoretical antinomies can be found in the idea of the unconditioned. Section Three will discuss a further problem raised by the idea of the unconditioned that is not explicitly dealt with by Kant. Section Four will illustrate the problem raised in Section Three by means of the particular terminological conventions employed by Sadik Al-Azm. Finally, Section Five will attempt to respond to several of Kant's commentators who contend that the third and the fourth theoretical antinomies are identical. The Historical Origin of the Antinomies The /claim that the origin of the antinomies of theoretical reason is found in an historical problem has been put forth most recently by Sadik Al-Azm in his book entitled The Origin of Kant's Arguments in the Antinomies.4 The thesis of Al-Azm's book is that the origin of the arguments in the antinomies can be traced to the historical debate between Leibniz and Clarke. Al-Azm believes and carefully elaborates his claim that the theses of the four theoretical antinomies reflect the Newtonian position espoused by Clarke and the antitheses reflect the position advanced by Leibniz.5 This is essentially the same claim that AlAzm earlier proposed in an article that dealt with the first antinomy of theoretical reason.6 In the course of his book, Al-Azm attempts to trace the arguments in the antinomies back to the specific problems and issues that were discussed in the historical Leibniz-Clarke correspondence. Some of AlAzm' s statements about the origins of the antinomies will be cited here in order to indicate the thoroughly historical grounding that he wishes to accord to the 44

antinomies. He claims with regard to the thesis of the second theoretical antinomy that "the idea of this argument comes directly from the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence. "7 Considering the third antinomy, Al-Azm states that the thesis is a "restatement" of the position expounded by Clarke." Similarly, the antithesis of the third antinomy is said by Al-Azm to be "identical" with Leibniz's doctrine of universal determinism.9 Again, later on, when Al-Azm is discussing the third antinomy, he speaks of the thesis in which Kant "reformulates "10 Clarke's position and of the antithesis which "espouses"11 Leibniz's interpretation of the law of sufficient reason. As a final example of Al-Azm's orientation toward the problem of the origin of the antinomies, there is his claim that the thesis of the fourth antinomy is a "restatement" of an idea implicit in Newtonian cosmology.12 The first point to be made with regard to AlAzm' s attempt to historically ground the antinomies is that this attempt is not an original one. His book is not the first to have claimed that the arguments in the antinomies owe their origin to specific historical problems. At least one previous Kant commentator (Gottfried Martin) has also located the origin of the antinomies in historical problems and specifically in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence. However, Martin's thesis iL in several senses more limited than that of Al-Azm. First, Martin speaks directly about the historical foundations of only the first two antinomies of theoretical reason. He says with regard to the second antinomy that "Kant's actual starting-point was probably again the correspondence between Leibniz and Clarke in the first instance."13 Speaking of the first two antinomies, Martin says: The Antinomies are a systematic formulation of this long historical development, in which the particular reference to the controversy between Leibniz and Newton should not be overlooked.14 Second, Martin's approach to the apparent historical origin of the arguments in the antinomies is essentially different than that of Al-Azm. Al-Azm's thesis seems to be that Kant's antinomies are mere restatements of the historic Leibniz-Clarke dialogue. Al-Azm maintains not only that the antinomies may be understood from this reference to their historical 45

roots, but, in addition, that the antinomies are best understood as re-presentations of these historical debates. Apparently, Al-Azm wishes to assert the strongest thesis possible: The antinomies have their origin in an historical debate and the proper way to understand the antinomies is to see them as restatements of this historical debate. On the other hand, Martin develops a weaker thesis from his historical grounding of the antinomies. Martin recognizes the historical roots of the antinomies, but he does not consider the antinomies to be merely a duplication of the historical Leibniz-Clarke debate. He claims: We can see therefore in the first Antinomy how the Kantian proofs rest on elevating the trains of thought that were historically present into a pure systematic form. If we were to consider the other three Antinomies from the same point of view we should be able to continue to bring out the same connection between the systematic and the historical aspects.15 Martin seems to assert that although the antinomies have clear historical roots, they have somehow been systematized in Kant's critique of reason. Al-Azm and Martin suggest two different ways of considering the historical roots of the Kantian antinomies. Al-Azm implies that the antinomies can be best understood by reference to their historical origins while Martin claims only that the historical origins of the antinomies are relevant to the comprehension of the antinomies. It is not one of the purposes of this investigation to deny or refute these attempts to historically locate the origins of the antinomies. Yet, it is not out of order to raise an objection against the strongest form (Al-Azm) of this historical argument. Indeed, W. H. Walsh echoes Martin's position and in so doing, he offers an alternative to Al-Azm's merely historical grounding of the antinomies. Walsh, like Martin, recognizes the historical roots of the Kantian antinomies without however identifying those historical predecessors with the statements in the antinomies. Walsh states:

46 /

Mr. Sadik Al-Azm, has argued not only that the antinomies were suggested to Kant by reflection on the LeibnizClarke correspondence, but further that the positions represented in the formal statement of the antinomy in section 2 of Kant's chapter are those taken in the correspondence by Newton . . . and Leibniz respectively. . . . It could be, however, that what began as an argument between Newton and Leibniz was later seen by Kant in a very different light, as a result of developments which were not envisaged when the original conflict was set out. My own inclination is to say that this is indeed so. 16 Neither Martin nor Walsh attempt to disprove the historical grounding of the antinomies offered by Al-Azm. Yet, both point to the narrowness of this historical perspective, and consequently, both lend support to the aim of this chapter which is to locate an origin for the antinomies intrinsic to Kant's own systematic. It reamins to be seen if an origin for the antinomies can be found intrinsic to the systematic of Kant's critique. It is this intrinsic origin of the antinomies that the following section will discuss. In sum, it may be that the debate between thesis and antithesis in the antinomies reflects the historical Clarke-Leibniz controversy, but the fact remains that the origin of the debate may be better explained in terms intrinsic to Kant's system. The Conceptual Origin of the Antinomies The task of this section is to show that the origin of the four theoretical antinomies can be located in a problem intrinsic to Kant's systematic, namely, in the problem of the unconditioned.17 one of the positions advanced here is that it is more correct and more helpful for an understanding of Kant to search for the ground of the antinomies within the systematic critique in which the antinomies develop. Indeed, Kant is primarily interested in the theoretical antinomies not as historical problems but as conflicts typical of reason in general. The theoretical antinomies play a part in the critique of reason because they illustrate characteristic conflicts of reason caused by dialectical error. The origin of these antinomies 47

thus cannot be merely historical. It must be possible to discover something about the nature of reason itself which gives rise to these antinomial conflicts. The theoretical antinomies must be grounded in an ambiguity or a conflict typical of theoretical reason itself. The position defended here is that Kant clearly locates the origin of the theoretical antinomies in the transcendental idea of "the unconditioned."18 Kant appears sometimes to use the term "the unconditioned" side by side with the term "absolute totality." In fact, Nathan Rotenstreich claims that "Kant introduced his most significant innovation: he identified the unconditioned with totality, or to put it more cautiously, with totalities."19 Lothar Schäfer also suggests that in the antinomies totality refers to the unconditioned whole of appearances.20 But Kant himself says : reason demands on the side of the conditions . . . absolute totality, and in so doing converts the category into a transcendental idea. For only by carrying the empirical synthesis as far as the unconditioned is it enabled to render it absolutely complete.21 Reason apparently seeks absolute totality (a category) but in the process of its search it is satisfied only with the unconditioned (a transcendental idea) . Reason desires to find in the world absolute totality, but it can discover only the idea of the unconditioned. Kant further distinguishes between the terms in the following way: the unconditioned is necessarily contained in the absolute totality of the regressive synthesis of the manifold in the (field of) appearance.22 Reason, says Kant, starts from the idea of absolute totality although what it really has in view is the unconditioned. Thus, the object or the goal toward which reason aims is the unconditioned. Kant states again at A416/B443 that what reason is really seeking is the unconditioned. Nevertheless, it may be that the difficulty reason has in distinguishing between the category of absolute totality and the idea of the unconditioned is responsible for or gives rise to the ambiguity present in the definition of the 48

unconditioned.23 That is, the two definitions of the unconditioned that Kant specifies may reflect reason's difficulty in distinguishing between the category of totality and the idea of the unconditioned. The object of theoretical reason is said to be the unconditioned. The question still remains how this object of reason functions as the ground or the origin of the antinomies. The claim here is that the antinomies of theoretical reason have their origin in an ambiguity present in the definition of the unconditioned. The antinomies arise because there is an ambiguity in the object or goal of reason. That is, there are antinomies because reason employs two different definitions of its object, the unconditioned. Kant does not refer to these two definitions of the unconditioned as an "ambiguity" in reason's object. But since the unconditioned can have two definitions between which reason is unable to decide, it can be said that the idea of the unconditioned is ambiguous. The antinomies owe their origin to this ambiguity in the definition of the object of reason. Kant specifies the problem involved in defining the object of reason as follows: This unconditioned may be conceived in either of two ways. It may be viewed as consisting of the entire series in which all the members without exception are conditioned and only the totality of them is absolutely unconditioned. This regress is to be entitled infinite. Or alternatively, the absolutely unconditioned is only a part of the series— a part to which the other members are subordinated, and which does not 2 itself stand under any other condition. ^ Kant suggests that the unconditioned may be defined either as the sum total of all conditions or as a part to which all other parts are subordinated.25 More concisely, the unconditioned refers either to the infinite series of conditions or to a highest condition. Thus, the object of reason is characterized by two meanings: the unconditioned is either an infinite, complete series, or a part of the series to which all other parts are subordinated. Still, it has not been shown that these two definitions of the unconditioned function as the ground 49

for the antinomies. Before considering the antinomies and their relation to the meanings of the unconditioned, it must be pointed out that Kant himself links these two senses of the unconditioned to the problems in the antinomies. Shortly after Kant distinguishes the two meanings of the unconditioned, he refers to the problems yet to arise. He says: On the second view [that the unconditioned is a part of the series], there is a first member of the series which in respect of past time is entitled, the beginning of the world, in respect of space, the limit of the world, in respect of the parts of a given limited whole, the simple, in respect of causes, absolute self-activity (freedom), in respect of the existence of alterable things, natural necessity.26 Clearly, Kant has identified the second meaning of the unconditioned with the theses of the four theoretical antinomies. If reason considers the unconditioned in its sense as a highest condition, then reason asserts the theses of the antinomies. Completing the comparison, it would seem to follow that if reason considers the first sense of the unconditioned (as an infinite, complete series), it would be led to assert the antitheses of the four antinomies. The theoretical antinomies were stated on pages 14-15 just as they appear in Kant's first Critique. The following summary of the antinomies may help reveal how the origin of the antinomies can be accounted for by referring to the two definitions of the unconditioned. One Thesis:

The world has a beginning in time, and a limit in space.

Antithesis: Two Thesis:

The world has no beginning in time, and no limits in space.

Every composite substance in the world is made up of simple parts.

Antithesis:

No composite thing in the world is made up of simple parts. 50

I

Three Thesis:

There is freedom.

Antithesis:

There is no freedom.

Four Thesis:

There belongs to the world an absolutely necessary being. Antithesis: An absolutely necessary being exists neither in the world nor outside the world. Reason's object, the unconditioned, has as its two meanings: an infinite, completed series, or a part of the series to which all other parts are subordinated. The theses of the antinomies maintain that there is a part of the series to which all other parts are subordinated. For the theses, the series of conditions is not an infinite series because the world has a beginning in time and is limited in space, there are simple parts, there is freedom, and there is a necessary being. The antitheses of the antinomies assert that the series of conditions is given and infinite. Thus, for the antitheses, there is no highest part of the series because the world is infinite in time and space, there are no simple parts, there is no freedom, and there is no necessary being. Therefore, there is a close connection between the ambiguity present in the definition of reason's object and the arguments in the antinomies. Stated more strongly, the claim here is that within the Kantian system it can be said that the two definitions of the unconditioned give rise to the conflicts present in the theoretical antinomies. At the bottom of the four theoretical antinomies rests the question: Is the unconditioned the totality of an infinite series or is it a part of the series to which all other parts are subordinated? The origin of these theoretical conflicts can be traced back to a confusion between the two different meanings of the object of reason. Several of Kant's commentators have referred to the connection between the idea of the unconditioned and the antinomies. Allen Wood gives an account of the relationship between the unconditioned and the antinomies that best accords with the account given here. He specifies the two senses of the unconditioned as a thing beginning the series and as the infinite series itself, and he further claims that the first sense of the unconditioned favors the thesis of each antinomy 51

while the second sense favors each antithesis.27 Edward Caird also points to the two senses of the unconditioned when he states: "The 'unconditioned totality of phenomenal synthesis' must consist either in a finite or infinite series, in a series which has, or one which has not, a beginning."28 As an example of the former case, Caird refers to the theses of the four theoretical antinomies.29 Two other commentators connect the problem of the unconditioned to certain of the four antinomies without however generalizing the relationship to apply to all the antinomies. F. E. England says with regard to the third and fourth antinomies that the thesis in each case requires a first cause or necessary being whereas the antithesis in each case claims that since the series is infinite, no first cause can be reached. 30 Similarly, L. W. Beck applies the two definitions of the unconditioned to the thesis and antithesis of the third antinomy as a way of explaining the conflict at issue.31 Finally, Jonathan Bennett suggests a relationship between the idea of the unconditioned and the antinomies which seems to be essentially mistaken. Bennett refers to the principle of reason that requires the series of conditions to extend to the unconditioned, and he goes on to comment that: [It seems to be the] principle that every series of conditions terminates in something unconditioned. . . . Furthermore it relates to the antinomies in a most peculiar way; for instead of being the source of each antinomal impasse, the principle is surely at most the source of the thesis in each antinomy —i.e., of the view that the relevant series terminates.3 2 If Bennett were right that the unconditioned refers to something that terminates the series, then he would be correct that reason's search for the unconditioned grounds only the theses of the antinomies. Bennett is apparently not aware of the ambiguity that characterizes the definition of the unconditioned. Consequently, he has mistakenly concluded that the problem of the unconditioned grounds only the theses of the antinomies. The exposition previously given in this section facilitates a correction of Bennett's error. The unconditioned does not refer univocally to a 52

highest part that terminates the series. It also refers to an infinite, completed series. Therefore, the problem of the unconditioned gives rise not only to the theses of the antinomies but also to the antitheses. The origin of the antinomies can be traced to the problem of the unconditioned in the first Critique. The Structure of the Antinomies: Some Structural Problems Raised by the Fourth Antinomy The structure of the four theoretical antinomies must be considered in light of their origin in the idea of the unconditioned. It was established in the last section that the arguments in the antinomies can be seen to arise from the ambiguity present in the idea of the unconditioned. The positions asserted by the theses and the antitheses can be understood as reflections of the two definitions of the unconditioned. The structure of the antinomies can be at least initially explained as a conflict between two conceptions of the unconditioned. In this section, further discussion will be added to the consideration of the structure of the antinomies. It is not sufficient to conclude that the structure of the antinomies reflects the conflict between two senses of the unconditioned. Already in the first chapter it was noticed that the fourth antinomy differs in a significant way from the other antinomies.33 An allusion was made to a problem that arises in the labeling of the logical structure of the antinomies. In Chapter I, the logical structure of the theoretical antinomies was said to be adequately represented by "X" and "not-X."34 It was noted, however, that this relationship between the thesis and the antithesis of the fourth antinomy is strained due to the fact that the antithesis seems to deny more than what is claimed by the thesis. Attention must now be focused on this problem regarding the structure of the fourth antinomy. If there is this point of uniqueness about the structure of the fourth antinomy, a question arises concerning its relation to the idea of the unconditioned. That is, assuming that the structure of the fourth antinomy differs in some respect from the structure of the other antinomies, how does that difference affect what was seen to be the common origin of the antinomies? If the structure of the fourth antinomy is unique, can the antinomy still be said to arise from the idea of the unconditioned? This investigation 53

finds the answer to be "yes." It will be shown here that the uniqueness of the fourth antinomy indicates not a unique point of origin but a problem in the idea of the unconditioned that Kant does not consider. In other words, the structural uniqueness of the fourth antinomy points to a complexity in the idea of the unconditioned not treated by Kant. Earlier sections have explicated the two senses of the unconditioned as: the complete, infinite series and a part of the series to which all other parts are subordinated.35 The theses of the antinomies were seen to be reflections of the latter definition while the antitheses were illustrations of the former definition. 36 This explanation would be perfectly adequate to the structure of the fourth antinomy i_f_ the antinomy stated: Thesis: Antithesis:

There is an absolutely necessary being. There is no absolutely necessary being (but only an infinite series).

In fact, however, the structure of the fourth antinomy is considerably more complex. The fourth antinomy states: Thesis:

There belongs to the world, either as its part or as its cause, a being that is absolutely necessary.

Antithesis: An absolutely necessary being nowhere exists in the world, nor does it exist outside the world as its cause. (A452-3/B480-1) Two major problems arise in the structure of this antinomy. The first has to do with Kant's use of the term "cause" (Ursache) in both thesis and antithesis. "Cause" seems to be used in different ways by the thesis and the antithesis, and thus this term serves to hide the real conflict at issue. In the thesis, it is asserted that there belongs to the world, either as its part or its cause, an absolutely necessary being. The possibility arises that Kant is using "part" and "cause" interchangeably to refer to a member of the series to which all other members are subordinated (i.e., to refer to the second definition of the unconditioned) . If so, then the thesis of the fourth antinomy is analogous to the theses of the other 54

antinomies in that its object is the unconditioned in its sense as a part of the series to which all other parts are subordinated. However, the proof of the thesis restates the thesis in the following way: Something absolutely necessary is therefore contained in the world itself, whether this something be the whole series of alterations in the world or a part of the series. ' It seems therefore that "part" and "cause" are not synonymous in the thesis but in fact refer to the two definitions of the unconditioned. "Part" and "cause" are employed in the thesis to refer respectively to a member of the series to which all other members are subordinated and to the completed, infinite series itself. The antithesis of the fourth antinomy states that an absolutely necessary being does not exist in the world, nor does it exist outside the world as its cause. Here, "cause" refers clearly to a member of the series to which all other members are subordinated (i.e., to the second definition of the unconditioned). In the proof of the antithesis, "cause" is described as "the highest member in the series of the causes of changes in the world."38 In the antithesis, "cause" is used specifically to refer to the highest member (outside the world) of the series of causes of changes (in the world). Thus, the term "cause" that appears in the thesis and antithesis of the fourth antinomy is employed in different senses. In the thesis, "cause" refers to the completed, infinite series. In the antithesis, it refers to a highest member outside the world of the series of changes in the world. The second problem that arises in the structure of the fourth antinomy has to do with the phrases "in the world" and "outside the world." In Kant's treatment of the idea of the unconditioned, no mention is made of the distinction between "in the world" and "outside the world." The first three antinomies concern a straightforward conflict between the senses of the unconditioned.39 in the fourth antinomy, the senses of the unconditioned seem to be further complicated by the distinction between what is "in the world" and what is "outside the world." The issue here is to discover what effect this distinction

I

between what is "in the world" and what is "outside the world" has on the ambiguity between senses of the unconditioned which gives rise to the antinomies. The fourth antinomy, in its new formulation, seems to be: Thesis:

Antithesis:

There is in the world, as a part of the series to which all other parts are subordinated or as the infinite series itself, an absolutely necessary being. There is no absolutely necessary being in the world, nor does it exist outside the world as a part of the series to which all other parts are subordinated.

It is evident that one earlier observation is correct. The antithesis of the fourth antinomy differs from the previous three antitheses in that it denies more than the thesis claims.40 The fourth antinomy is not perfectly symbolized by the logical terms "X" and "not-X" because the antithesis ("not-X") also denies Y (where Y = there is an absolutely necessary being which exists outside the world as a part of the series to which all other parts are subordinated) . Stated more clearly, a difficulty arises in the fourth antinomy due to the use of the phrases "in the world" and "outside the world." The conflict in the antinomies is no longer a simple conflict between the two senses of the unconditioned. The addition of the phrases "in the world" and "outside the world" creates further ways of defining the unconditioned, and consequently makes possible a distinction between three senses of the unconditioned. The first three antinomies concern the debate whether the unconditioned is a part of the series to which all other parts are subordinated (theses) or the complete, infinite series itself (antitheses). In the fourth antinomy, three possibilities are raised. The unconditioned (in the form of an absolutely necessary being) may be: a part of the series to which all other parts are subordinated in the world, a part of the series to which all other parts are subordinated outside the world, or the infinite series itself in the world. (The fourth logical possibility, i.e., the infinite series outside the world, is presumably ignored because it is a logical contradiction. The infinite series refers to the 56

world of appearances, and as such, it cannot be outside the world.) Thus, the addition of the phrases "in the world" and "outside the world" to the fourth antinomy results in the developing of three definitions of the unconditioned. The fourth antinomy makes explicit the differences between two types of highest members of the series: one in the world and one outside the world. The question arises now as to whether the first three antinomies can be interpreted in a way to take account of these three definitions of the unconditioned. Can it be presumed that the distinction that is explicit in the fourth antinomy is implicit in the first three antinomies? The answer appears to be a qualified "no." Certainly, it would be a misrepresentation to suggest that Kant intended for the theses of the first three antinomies to implicitly raise the possibility of a highest member of the series outside the world. The idea of a highest member of the series outside the world is a transcendental idea, and if reason in the antinomies made claims about this idea, the antinomies would lose their cosmological character. The subject matter of the antinomies themselves reveals that the distinciton between a part of the series in the world and a part of the series outside the world is probably not present in the first three antinomies. Especially with regard to the first two antinomies (which are mathematical antinomies), it is incorrect to suggest that the theses may implicitly refer to a part of the series outside the world. The theses of the first two antinomies state essentially: One Thesis:

The world has a beginning and a limit.

Two Thesis:

There are simple parts.

These two theses are mathematical in nature, that is, they refer to objects of intuition and do not allow the appearance of heterogeneous conditions. Clearly, the first two theses, which do refer to the unconditioned as a part of the series, do not and cannot have in mind a part of the series outside the world. Therefore, the distinction between a part of the series in the world and a part of the series outside the world is not implicitly present in the first two antinomies, since they cannot have as their object a part of the series outside the world. 57

A qualified "no" was given above because of the possibility that the distinction raised in the fourth antinomy may be implicit in the third antinomy. In fact, the distinction between what is in the world and what is outside the world is first 41 mentioned in the Observation on the Third Antinomy. The antithesis asserts that Lf_ a transcendental power of freedom were allowed, it would 42 have to be outside the world and not inside the world. The antithesis thus claims that the thesis ought properly to refer to a part of the series outside the world. This mention of the distinction between a part in the world and a part outside the world suggests that the third antinomy implicitly involves the distinction that is developed in the fourth antinomy. The third antinomy like the fourth is dynamical in nature, and thus both allow the possibility of heterogeneous conditions (conditions outside the world). To an extent, it is possible to interpret the third antinomy as implicitly containing the problems of the fourth in light of its reference to the distinction between a part in the world and a part outside the world. Consequently, the three definitions of the unconditioned that are raised in the fourth antinomy do not appear in the first two antinomies and are only hinted at in the third antinomy. If the possibility of a part of the series outside the world is ignored in the first three antinomies , then the modal character of the fourth antinomy is clearly evident. Kant claims that the fourth antinomy is related to the fourth category, i.e., modality. 4 ^ One thing this means is that the fourth antinomy adds no new information to the content of our ideas but determines the relation of these ideas to our faculties of knowledge.44 The category of modality, and consequently the fourth antinomy, determines what is possible, what is real, and what is necessary with regard to the world as a whole. The object of a modal category or principle is the world as a whole and the relationship that our faculties of knowledge may have to the world. With this in mind, the antinomies can be interpreted in the following way. The theses of the first three antinomies assert there is an unconditioned as a part of the series to which all other parts are subordinated. The antitheses of the first three antinomies assert there is an unconditioned as the whole, infinite series. The thesis of the fourth antinomy sums up that the unconditioned as a necessary being is either a part of the series or the whole, 58

infinite series. The antithesis denies that there is an unconditioned as a necessary being in any of its senses. Kant says that principles of modality "restrict all categories to their merely empirical employment, and do not approve or allow their transcendental employment. "45 The same is true of the fourth antinomy in its role as a modal category. The thesis of the fourth antinomy must restrict the idea of the necessary being to its empirical employment. Thus, the thesis of the fourth antinomy is prevented from raising the possibility of a part of the series outside the world because of its modal character. The thesis asserts that the idea of the necessary being can be related to our faculties of knowledge only as a necessary being in the world. The antithesis however denies that a necessary being in any of its senses can be related to our faculties of knowledge. (Still, the symmetry of the fourth antinomy is shattered by the denial made in the antithesis that does not correspond to any claim made in the thesis.) One reason can be suggested for why the antithesis raises the possibility of a part of the series outside the world. Speaking within the limits of Kant's architectonic, the possibility of a necessary being outside the world facilitates the transition from the Antinomies to the Ideal. Kant says, in the Observation on the Fourth Antinomy, that the thesis must leave undecided whether the necessary being is a thing distinct from the world, for to establish the necessary being as a thing distinct from the world would be transcendent philosophy.46 The antinomies are cosmological precisely because they do not seek to establish an unconditioned outside the world. Yet, they provide a transition to the Ideal which does treat this transcendent concept of a necessary being outside the world.47 The antinomies direct attention toward the Ideal in that they raise the possibility of a necessary being outside the world, and they point toward a transcendent philosophy. Thus, one reason why the antithesis explicitly mentions a necessary being outside the world is to provide a transition to the Ideal. (Admittedly, this justification for the denial in the antithesis that does not correspond to any claim in the thesis is at best a limited account of the antinomy because this account treats the antinomy only in terms of its position within Kant's architectonic plan.) 59

Briefly, the goal of this section has been to consider what effect the ambiguity of the idea of the unconditioned has on the structure of the antinomies. The claim was made that the structure of the antinomies can be understood in terms of the ambiguities present in the idea of the unconditioned. Specifically, the structure of the fourth antinomy reveals three senses of the unconditioned which in turn function as a framework in which the structure of the antinomies can be interpreted. Finally, two of Kant's commentators discuss the fourth antinomy without, however, recognizing its uniqueness or its significance. Justus Hartnack summarizes the fourth theoretical antinomy in the following way: The thesis maintains that there is a being that necessarily exists either as a part of the world or as its cause. The antithesis denies that such a being can exist.4 8 In light of the previous discussion of the fourth antinomy, Hartnack's summary of the antinomy is seen to be a vast oversimplification. Hartnack has effectively omitted the difficult aspects of the antinomy. He has ignored the fact that the antithesis is not merely the logical contradiction of the thesis but that it adds a denial ("nor does it exist outside the world as its cause") which corresponds to no claim made by the thesis. In the thesis, Hartnack apparently applies the phrase "in the world" only to the necessary being as "part" while Kant clearly means "in the world" to refer to both the necessary being as "part" and as "cause." Hartnack's later discussion of the fourth antinomy is certainly subject to this error of ignoring what the antithesis claims about a necessary being "outside the world." He says that since the antithesis holds only for the empirical world, it is only of that world that we can affirm with certainty that there can be no necessary existence. This does not exclude (but neither does it prove or make probable) that there exists a nonempirical and necessary condition of the uncompleted and uncompletable series of the empirically conditioned.^ 60

In fact, the antithesis of the fourth antinomy does mention and exclude the possibility of a necessary being "outside" the world. The antithesis considers and rejects the idea that the necessary being might be a part of the series to which all other parts are subordinated "outside" the world. Thus, Hartnack has misunderstood the structure of the fourth antinomy. He has failed to see that in the fourth antinomy the idea of the unconditioned explicitly refers to two types of parts: a part of the series "in" the world and a part of the series "outside" the world. Edward Caird recognizes the uniqueness of the fourth antinomy but fails to realize its significance. Caird says of the fourth antinomy: The parallelism between thesis and antithesis would have been more complete, if Kant had not introduced under the former the proof that the necessary being must be in the world. Overlooking this irregularity, the sum of the argument for the thesis is, that there must be a necessary being iri or out of the world . . . and the sum of the argument for the antithesis is, that there can be a necessary being neither iii nor out of the world.50 Caird notices the lack of symmetry between thesis and antithesis, and he attempts to correct it by adding to the thesis the claim that the necessary being may be "outside" the world. This addition to the thesis of the antinomy violates the sense of the antinomy. The "irregularity" in the structure of the fourth antinomy cannot be "corrected" without changing the sense of the original antinomy. Several points of significance are raised by the thesis' failure to include the possibility of a necessary being "outside" the world. First, the structure of the four antinomies cannot be adequately understood as a simple conflict between two senses of the unconditioned. As the fourth antinomy shows, there are in fact three definitions of the unconditioned which play a part in the origin and development of the antinomies. Second, it was suggested in Chapter One that the thesis of the fourth antinomy is the only thesis or antithesis to employ a direct proof. In a sense then, it is the only argument which is operating 61

correctly, i.e., avoiding the use of apagogical proofs. Third, it is of significance to recall that the fourth antinomy is patterned on the category of modality within Kant's systematic. As such, the fourth antinomy is to provide no new content for the idea of the unconditioned. It is to consider the relation of this idea to our faculties of knowledge. The thesis of the fourth antinomy does not and cannot make claims about a necessary being "outside" the world for that would be to surpass its modal function and to advance to transcendent philosophy. Thus, Caird's rewriting of the fourth antinomy cannot be textually supported. It would perhaps be more helpful for understanding the structure of the antinomies to rewrite the fourth antinomy by leaving out the denial in the antithesis of a necessary being "outside" the world, but that would be to destroy the link between the Antinomies and the Ideal in Kant's architectonic. Either rewriting of the antinomy violates the structure of the antinomy as Kant presents it. The Structure of the Antinomies in Al-Azm's Terms The last section dealt with the structure of the four theoretical antinomies and their relation to the idea of the unconditioned. It was shown that contrary to Kant's claim, the idea of the unconditioned has three distinct senses. All three senses of the unconditioned appear in the arguments of the antinomies, although the three senses are only explicitly defined in the fourth antinomy. The origin of the antinomies can be located in the idea of the unconditioned, even though the uniqueness of the fourth antinomy raises a question about the type of conflict implicitly present in the other antinomies. The attempt was made in the last section to explain the uniqueness of the fourth antinomy in the following two ways. First, it may be that the three senses of the unconditioned that are explicit in the fourth antinomy are implicit in the third antinomy. In this case, the fourth antinomy does not raise a new problem but only makes explicit an implicit problem. Second, it may be that the modal character of the fourth antinomy is responsible for the lack of symmetry in that antinomy. Perhaps the peculiar structure of the fourth antinomy is necessitated by its function as a modal conflict between cosmological ideas. In this section, Sadik Al-Azm's discussion of the fourth antinomy will be brought forward as a further illustra62

tion of the uniqueness and significance of the fourth theoretical antinomy. The consideration will center on Al-Azm's account of the fourth antinomy as it appears in his book The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the Antinomies. AlAzm's discussion of the fourth antinomy will be developed in the following three steps. First, it will be seen that Al-Azm notes the lack of symmetry between the thesis and the antithesis of the fourth antinomy and that he enumerates the three senses of the unconditioned that are raised by the fourth antinomy. Second, the structure of the fourth antinomy will be discussed using Al-Azm's terms as a "cosmological" and not a "theological" argument. Third, Al-Azm's distinction between cosmological arguments and theological arguments will be used to suggest yet another way of describing the structure of the four theoretical antinomies. It is clear in Al-Azm's discussion of the fourth antinomy that he recognizes three meanings of "a necessary being" that occur in the fourth antinomy. AlAzm does not specifically relate these three definitions of "a necessary being" to the idea of the unconditioned, because Al-Azm has not located the origin of the antinomies in this idea. For Al-Azm, it is not crucial to relate the structure of the fourth antinomy (its three senses of "a necessary being") to the origin of the fourth antinomy (in the Leibniz-Clarke debate). For the present investigation, it is crucial to observe that the structure of the fourth antinomy (its three senses of "a necessary being") is due entirely to the origin of the fourth antinomy (in the three senses of the unconditioned). The advantage of this method as opposed to Al-Azm's is that the structure of all four antinomies can be graphically explained as resulting from a single ambiguity (in the idea of the unconditioned). Al-Azm summarizes the proof of the thesis of the fourth antinomy as follows: Some analysis of the final conclusion is needed here. It seems to be saying that 'something absolutely necessary is contained in the world' and that this can have two senses: (a) that the series of alterations forming the world is 'necessary' as a whole; (b) that at 63

least one item of the series is necessary and the remaining items are causally dependent on it.51 Clearly, the two senses of "a necessary being" in the thesis correspond to the two definitions of the unconditioned that Kant gives at A417/B445 (except for the addition in the thesis of the phrase "in the world"). What Al-Azm specifies as two senses of "a necessary being" function also as two senses of the idea of the unconditioned. Al-Azm states that the proof of the antithesis of the fourth antinomy proceeds in two parts: The first part demonstrates that "an absolutely necessary being nowhere exists in the world.' I shall call this part (P3). The second part demonstrates that an absolutely necessary being nowhere exists 'outside the world as its cause.' This I shall call (P4).52 Thus, Al-Azm observes that the antithesis denies both that an absolutely necessary being exists "in the world" and that it exists "outside the world as its cause." From this, Al-Azm concludes: Now P4 in the proof of the antithesis is a refutation of the claim of those Newtonians who want to hold (as good Christians) that the necessary being exists outside the world. P4 is not immediately directed to any explicit claim made by the thesis itself, for the thesis insists that the necessary being is in the world.53 Al-Azm notes that the antithesis includes a denial that does not correspond to any claim made by the thesis. The antithesis raises the possibility (and rejects it) of a necessary being outside the world. Thus, three senses of "a necessary being" become explicit in the fourth antinomy and that means similarly that three senses of the unconditioned are suggested. Al-Azm confirms the description of the conflict and the structural uniqueness of the fourth antinomy that was offered in the last section. The second part of Al-Azm's discussion of the 64

fourth antinomy has to do with its nature as a "cosmological" argument. Al-Azm states that "Kant's concern in the fourth antinomy is with a cosmological and not a theological problem."54 Consequently, the "main concern, then, is with a cosmological and not a theological unconditioned."55 it is here that Al-Azm implies that what is at issue in the fourth antinomy is not solely the absolutely necessary being but the unconditioned. This justifies the previous identification of the three senses of the necessary being with the three senses of the unconditioned. Al-Azm defines theological arguments as arguments which deal with an unconditioned which is not a part of the phenomenal world but is separate from it.56 i n contrast, the arguments of the fourth antinomy (which are cosmological, according to Al-Azm) treat the unconditioned under consideration as a part of the phenomenal world and not separate from it.57 Al-Azm further distinguishes between "pure" and "impure" forms of the cosmological argument. He says, "The pure form does not settle, strictly speaking,the question of whether the necessary being is a part of the world or distinct from it."58 Presumably then, the impure form of the cosmological argument does settle the question whether the necessary being is a part of the world or distinct from it. Al-Azm claims that the thesis of the fourth antinomy utilizes the impure form of the cosmological argument, which leads to the conclusion that the necessary being is a part of the world and not distinct from it.59 The issue now is: Of what significance are these distinctions made by Al-Azm? It would appear that they are of most significance if they can function as names for the different senses of the unconditioned. That is, these types of arguments (theological, pure cosmological, and impure cosmological) deal with different senses of the unconditioned. The object of a theological argument is an unconditioned which is outside the world. The object of a pure form of the cosmological argument is an unconditioned which is either in the world or outside the world. Finally, the object of an impure form of the cosmological argument is an unconditioned which is in the world. This distinction between three types of arguments does enable Al-Azm to reveal the cosmological nature of the fourth antinomy. He states that the thesis of the fourth antinomy is an impure form of the cosmo65

logical argument (for it, the unconditioned is in the world). The antithesis can be described as a pure form of the cosmological argument in that it makes no attempt to decide whether the unconditioned is in the world or outside the world. The antithesis denies the existence of both types of unconditioned. A positive result of distinguishing between these types of arguments is that Al-Azm is capable of explaining the cosmological nature of the fourth antinomy. Al-Azm indicates, by means of these types of arguments, how the fourth antinomy (which raises the possibility of an unconditioned outside the world) remains cosmological in the sense Kant intends the antinomies to be cosmological. However, the introduction of these types of arguments serves in a way to mask the real conflict in the fourth antinomy. Part of the difficulty is due to the overlapping definitions of the three types of arguments. That is, a theological unconditioned is an unconditioned outside the world, a cosmological unconditioned in its pure form is an unconditioned that is either in the world or outside the world, and a cosmological unconditioned in its impure form is an unconditioned in the world. The cosmological unconditioned in its pure form seems to be merely a disjunction between the cosmological unconditioned in its impure form and the theological unconditioned. In other words, the pure form of the cosmological argument leaves open the question whether the unconditioned is a cosmological unconditioned in its impure form or a theological unconditioned. The problem still confronting Al-Azm is why an argument is called cosmological in its pure form when it concerns an unconditioned which may be either cosmological in its impure form or theological (i.e., when the unconditioned may be either in the world or outside the world). Finally, these types of arguments distinguished by Al-Azm facilitate a description of the structure of all four of the theoretical antinomies. Since Al-Azm does at one point refer to the object of a theological argument as a theological unconditioned, it seems legitimate to apply his distinction of the types of arguments to the unconditioned objects of the theoretical antinomies. In short, since this distinction between types of cosmological and theological arguments aids in understanding the fourth antinomy, then perhaps it can also aid in understanding the first three antinomies. 66

Al-Azm himself does not apply this framework concerning types of arguments to the arguments in the first three antinomies. If this framework is applied to the arguments in the antinomies, it becomes clear that the arguments in the antitheses are the most difficult to explain. The easiest representation of the structure of the four antinomies would be: One Thesis: Pure cosmological argument Antithesis: Pure cosmological argument Two Thesis: Pure cosmological argument Antithesis: Pure cosmological argument Three Thesis: Pure cosmological argument Antithesis: Pure cosmological argument Four Thesis: Impure cosmological argument Antithesis: Pure cosmological argument Presumably, Al-Azm would structure the types of arguments in the antinomies in this way if he had carried his distinction through to all the antinomies. This representation is certainly helpful in revealing the cosmological nature of the antinomies. It also reveals to some extent the uniqueness of the fourth antinomy. With regard to the first three antinomies, the diagram seems to correctly show that the question whether the unconditioned is in the world or outside the world has not been decided or even raised. Yet, at least two problems appear to be covered over by this diagram of the arguments in the antinomies. First, as previously mentioned, the antithesis of the fourth antinomy specifies that no necessary being exists in the world or outside the world as its cause. It is peculiar that the argument in the fourth antithesis is a pure form of the cosmological argument, even though what it denies is the existence of both a cosmological unconditioned (in its impure form) and a theological unconditioned. It would seem that the uniqueness of the fourth antithesis in raising explicit mention of a theological unconditioned is overlooked by calling it a pure form of the cosmological argument.

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Second, it seems probably mistaken to refer to the antitheses of the first three antinomies as pure forms of the cosmological argument. A pure form of the cosmological argument is one in which it is left undecided whether the unconditioned is in the world or outside the world. Technically, it is true that the antitheses leave it undecided whether the unconditioned is in the world or outside the world. In fact, the antitheses do not even consider the question relating to the location of the unconditioned. However, the unconditioned referred to in the first three antitheses is the idea of a completed, infinite series. As previously discussed, the unconditioned in this sense as the infinite series cannot be outside the world because that would involve a logical contradiction.60 For all practical purposes, the unconditioned as a completed, infinite series (i.e., the unconditioned of the first three antitheses) is an unconditioned in the world. While it is true that the arguments in the antitheses leave open the question of the location of the unconditioned, it is also the case that the unconditioned they refer to can only be in the world. (The same is essentially true of the theses of the first three antinomies. Technically, the first three theses leave it undecided whether the unconditioned is in the world or outside the world, but practically speaking the theses can only refer to an unconditioned in the world, with the possible exception of the third antinomy's thesis. )*>1 in a sense then, the first three antitheses (and theses) may more adequately be called impure forms of the cosmological argument. Thus, Al-Azm's attempt to describe the structure of the fourth antinomy in terms of the type of argument it uses has mixed results. Certainly, Al-Azm's reference to cosmological and theological arguments may prove helpful in defining the nature of the object around which the conflict in the antinomies develops. Al-Azm has at least noted the significance of the phrases "in the world" and "outside the world" and he has alluded to the structural uniqueness of the fourth antinomy. Beyond that, his distinction of the three types of arguments proves to be not very illuminating with regard to the four theoretical antinomies as a whole. The distinction appears to create difficulties of its own without resolving the difficulties already present in the antinomies. Consequently, Al-Azm's discussion of the fourth antinomy is most helpful in its statement of the conflict and least helpful in its creation of new terminology to explain the conflict. 68

The So-Called Identity of the Third and Fourth Antinomies In this final section of Chapter Two, discussion will center on the third and fourth theoretical antinomies. So far, the object of this chapter has been to suggest a framework for understanding the origin and the structure of the theoretical antinomies. With this end in mind, discussion centered on the idea of the unconditioned and the problems raised by the peculiar structure of the fourth antinomy. This section will attempt to respond to a complaint often raised against the Kantian antinomies, namely, that the third and fourth antinomies are identical. This objection that the third and fourth antinomies are identical is voiced by Norman Kemp Smith and Jonathan Bennett and it is to their claims that this section will respond. Norman Kemp Smith says: That the proofs of the fourth antinomy are identical with those of the third is due to the fact that Kant, under the stress of his architectonic, is striving to construct four antinomies while only three are really distinguishable. The third and fourth antinomies coincide as formulations of the problem whether or not the conditioned implies, and originates in, the unconditioned. The precise determination of this unconditioned, whether as free causality or as a necessary being, or in any other way, is a further problem, and does not properly fall within the scope of the cosmological inquiries, which are alone in place in this dividion of the Critique.°2 One way of responding to Kemp Smith's charge that the third and fourth antinomies are identical formulations of the same problem is to acknowledge that there is some truth to his claim. The problem that the third and fourth antinomies formulate, as Kemp Smith sees it, seems to be whether or not the conditioned implies the unconditioned. Kemp Smith maintains that the determination of this unconditioned is outside the scope of the antinomies, but the problem for the antinomies is the debate whether there is an unconditioned. If this is a correct assessment of Kemp 69

Smith's definition of the problem, then Kemp Smith is right that the third and fourth antinomies coincide as statements of the same problem. In fact, he would be correct in concluding that all four antinomies are formulations of the issue whether or not there is an unconditioned. Kemp Smith is correct insofar as all the antinomies are formulations of this search for the unconditioned. However, an objection can be made to Kemp Smith's claim that the determination of the unconditioned lies outside the scope of the antinomies. By this, he implies that the problem at the heart of the antinomies is not the definition of the unconditioned but only the question whether or not the conditioned requires the unconditioned. Kemp Smith is essentially correct thafT the determination of the unconditioned lies beyond the scope of reason in the antinomies. But, he is wrong in inferring that because the definition of the unconditioned lies beyond the scope of the antinomies that the antinomies cannot have as their object this definition. The antinomies are characterized by dialectical illusion, and thus there is nothing to prevent the antinomies from treating a problem that lies beyond their scope. In other words, Kemp Smith's statement of the problem grounding the third and fourth antinomies does not go far enough. In fact, as Kant points out, the problem in the antinomies arises from an ambiguity in the definition of the unconditioned. Since the antinomies concern not just whether there is an unconditioned but also what defines the unconditioned, the third and fourth antinomies can be distinguished by their attempts to define the unconditioned. Jonathan Bennett reiterates Kemp Smith's basic claim that the third and fourth antinomies are identical. Bennett says about the fourth antinomy that "what seems to emerge is virtually a re-run of the third antinomy."63 He claims that "the fourth antinomy adds nothing useful to the third."^4 In fact, however, several points can be raised which suggest a clear distinction between the third and fourth antinomies. These points will be discussed here in order to reveal the error in Kemp Smith's and Bennett's positions. First, a specific difference between the third and fourth antinomies has already been indicated in their definitions of the unconditioned. Briefly, it was shown that the fourth antinomy raised the possibility of three types of unconditioned whereas the first three 70

antinomies made explicit only two types of unconditioned. The fourth antinomy is unique in that it distinguishes between a highest member of the series outside the world and a highest member of the series in the world. This distinction is not present in the third antinomy. In addition, Friedrich Grimmlinger apparently alludes to this difference between the third and the fourth antinomies when he distinguishes between the ontological problem of the third antinomy and the theological problem of the fourth antinomy.65 In a sense, however, the Observation on the Third Antinomy alludes to this distinction between a part of the series in the world and a part of the series outside the world. Insofar as this distinction is implicit in the third antinomy, it can be said that the third and fourth antinomies are similar but not identical. The Observation on the antithesis of the third antinomy states that if_ a transcendental power of freedom were allowed, it would have to exist outside ' the world and not in the world.66 Thus, the antithesis attempts to locate the force of the thesis' claim in a highest member of the series outside the world. It seems clear that the thesis intends to refer indirectly to both a highest member of the series in the world and a highest member outside the world.67 This similarity between the third and fourth antinomies (in raising the idea of a highest member of the series outside the world) can apparently be explained by the nature of the antinomies themselves. The third and fourth antinomies are dynamical, and as such, they allow the appearance of heterogeneous conditions. ° The significance of the dynamical nature of the third and fourth antinomies will be fully discussed in Chapter Three. For the moment, the dynamical character of the third and fourth antinomies is sufficient to explain the similarity of the antinomies. This similarity between the antinomies does not negate the previously mentioned difference between them. The structure of the fourth antinomy is unique and not identical to the third antinomy in that it explicitly discusses the possibility of a highest member of the series outside the world. Second, an important reason for distinguishing between the third and fourth antinomies will become evident in Chapter Five. That is, the resolution of the antinomy of practical reason requires both the third and fourth antinomies. The establishment of the concept of the highest good that is achieved by the resolution of the practical antinomy depends on both 71

the possibility of transcendental freedom and the possibility of a necessary being. The third and fourth antinomies cannot be said to be identical because both are required for the resolution of the practical antinomy. Thus, the claims made by Kemp Smith and Bennett that the third and fourth antinomies are identical seem to result from an oversimplification of the problems at issue. It is true that the third and fourth antinomies are similar in that both are dynamical in nature. It does not however follow that these antinomies are identical. At least two reasons justify the attempt to distinguish between the third and the fourth antinomies. One reason is the uniqueness of the structure of the fourth antinomy and the second reason is that both the third and the fourth antinomies play a crucial role in the resolution of the practical antinomy. This concludes Chapter Two and the discussion of the origin and the structure of the theoretical antinomies. The most significant point made by this chapter, with regard to what is yet to come, is that the origin of the theoretical antinomies can be located in the idea of the unconditioned.

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ENDNOTES A408/B4 35; translation by Norman Kemp Smith, Critique of Pure Reason (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965). 2 Jonathan Bennett, Kant's Dialectic (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 115. Bennett, p. 115. 4 Sadik J. Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the Antinomies (London: Oxford University Press, 1972). Al-Azm, p. 3. Sadik J. Al-Azm, "Absolute Space and Kant's First Antinomy of Pure Reason," Kant-Studien, 59 (1968), 151-2. 7 Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the Antinomies, p. 53. o

Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the Antinomies, p. 94. g Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the Antinomies, p. 87. Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the Antinomies, p. 96. Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the Antinomies, p. 108. 12 Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the Antinomies, p. 119. 13 Gottfried Martin, Kant's Metaphysics and Theory of Science, trans. P. G. Lucas (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1961), p. 47. 14 Martin, p. 48. 15

Martin, p. 50.

16 W . H. Walsh, Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1975), pp. 197-8.

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17 Heinz Heimsoeth, Transzendentale Dialektik. Ein Kommentar zu Kants Kritik d. reinen Vernunft, II (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967), 215. He claims: "The cause of' the antinomy entanglement is . . . that the claim for unity in the mere idea (for example, the size of the world) ends in the unconditioned." My translation from the German. 18 Walsh, p. 205. Walsh says: "The true source of the contradictions lies in a premise to which both parties to the conflict make continuous appeal, a premise which contains latent contradictions. . . . The principle of Sufficient Reason is just such a premise." 19 Nathan Rotenstreich, Experience and Its Systematization: Studies in Kant (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), p. 53. 20 Lothar Schafer, "Zur 'regulativen Funktion1 der Kantischen Antinomien," Synthese, 23 (1971-2), 108. 21

A409/B436; translation by Kemp Smith.

22

A417/B444; translation by Kemp Smith. 23 See A417/B445; translation by Kemp Smith and the discussion in subsequent paragraphs. A417/B445; translation by Kemp Smith. 25 See Rotenstreich's claim on page 61 that the unconditioned is identified with totality and that "totality, within the realm of the cosmological ideas, ' because of its very partiality, has the meaning of the sum of a series." A418/B446; translation by Kemp Smith. I supplied the bracketed material. 27 Allen W. Wood, "Kant's dialectic," Canadien Journal of Philosophy, 5 (1975), 611. 28 Edward Caird, The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant (Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons, 1889), II, 40. 29 Caird, p. 42. Frederick Ernest England, Kant's Conception of God (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1929), p. 129. 74

31 Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 183-4. 32 Jonathan Bennett, Kant's Dialectic (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 280. The bracketed material is mine. 33 See Chapter One, footnote 40. 34 See pages 14-5. See pages 47-53. 36

See pages 49-51.

37

A454/B4 82; translation by Kemp Smith.

38 A453-5/B481-3; translation by Kemp Smith. 39 See, however, P. F. Strawson's claim that the theses of the third and fourth antinomies have to do with an unconditioned which is either the whole series or a part to which all other parts are subordinated. Their antitheses then deny that there is an unconditioned. P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1966), p. 210. 40

See Chapter One, footnote 40. 41

A448-51/B476-9; translation by Kemp Smith.

42

A451/B479; translation by Kemp Smith. A74/B99-100; translation by Kemp Smith. A415/B442-3; translation by Kemp Smith. 44 A219/B266, 43

45

A219/B266-7; translation by Kemp Smith.

AC

A456/B484; translation by Kemp Smith. 47

A571/B599; translation by Kemp Smith.

48 Justus Hartnack, Kant's Theory of Knowledge (New York:

Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1967), p. 118. 49

Hartnack, p. 130. 75

50

Caird, p. 49.

Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the Antinomies, p. 126. 52 Al-Azm, Antinomies, p. Al-Azm, Antinomies, p.

The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the 131. The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the 136.

Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the Antinomies, p. 113. Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the Antinomies, p. 113. Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the Antinomies, p. 113. 57 Al-Azm, Antinomies, p. 58 Al-Azm, Antinomies, p. 59 Al-Azm,

The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the 113. The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the 114. The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the

Antinomies, p. 114. See pages 56-7. See pages 58-9. r j

Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), pp. 496-7. 63 Bennett, p. 241. 64 Bennett, p. 241. Friedrich Grimmlinger, "Die ontologische Bedeutung der 3. und 4. Antinomie in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft," Wiener Jahrbuch für Philosophie, 4 (1971), 99, 125. A451/B479; translation by Kemp Smith, Critique of Pure Reason

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A448-50/B476-8; translation by Kemp Smith, Critique of Pure Reason. 68 A530/B558; translation by Kemp Smith, Critique of Pure Reason.

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CHAPTER III THE RESOLUTION OF THE FOUR THEORETICAL ANTINOMIES In this chapter the discussion will center on Kant's explanation of the resolution of the four theoretical antinomies. The analysis of the resolution of the antinomies is significant for two reasons. First, it is crucial to the aims of this investigation that this second aspect of the antinomies (i.e., their resolution) be considered. The project of this inquiry is to analyze the antinomies of theoretical and practical reason with the goal of illuminating their relationship. The two central features of the antinomies are their origin and their resolution, and consequently, the discussion of the solution to the theoretical antinomies plays a major role in enabling a comparison between the theoretical and the practical antinomies to be made. Second, the analysis of the resolution of the theoretical antinomies is significant because it has not been previously treated in Sadik Al-Azm's work on the antinomies. Kant states clearly that it is necessary to discover a solution to the transcendental problems of reason. He claims that: transcendental philosophy is unique . . . in that no question which concerns an object given to pure reason can be insoluble for this same human reason. Furthermore, Kant says that "the only questions to which we have the right to demand a sufficient answer bearing on the constitution of the object . . . are the cosmological."2 That is, the questions raised in the antinomies pertaining to the object of reason (i.e., the unconditioned) are cosmological ideas, and as such, they must be capable of being resolved. Kant's claim is that the cosmological questions or antinomies must be resolved since the object of these questions is an object in idea and is neither an object in itself nor an object of a possible experience. The answer to the cosmological questions must therefore lie in the idea itself.^ In other words, since the object of the antinomies is merely an object in idea, it must be that the resolution to the antinomies can be accomplished in the idea. Kant says: 79

All these questions (antinomies) refer to an object which can be found nowhere save in our thoughts, namely, to the absolutely unconditioned totality of the synthesis of appearances. . . . Since such an object is nowhere to be met with outside our idea, it is not possible for it to be given. The cause of failure we must seek in our idea itself.4 The conflicts present in the antinomies are thus to be blamed on the idea of the absolutely unconditioned totality.5 The failure of the cosmological questions is due to the nature of their object. The object of the cosmological questions can never be given in a possible experience, and consequently, the conflicts that result from treating the idea of the absolutely unconditioned totality as an object must be resolved in the idea of this object. Kant concludes that the resolution of the antinomies cannot be accomplished in experience but only in the idea.^ The resolution of the theoretical antinomies is thus closely connected with the origin of the theoretical antinomies in the idea of the unconditioned. The origin and the resolution of the antinomies do not require separate considerations but are in fact part of the same problem. The peculiar unity and the cohesiveness of the antinomies is revealed when it is shown that both their origin and their resolution are tied to the idea of the unconditioned. In accordance with Kant's claim that the resolution of the antinomies must be found in the idea of the unconditioned, this chapter will consider how the resolution can be accomplished in the idea. The three sections will discuss the resolution of the antinomies from different perspectives. In essence, each of the three sections to follow reflects a way of talking about the problem in the idea of the unconditioned which gives rise to the conflicts in the antinomies. Section One reveals how the antinomies are resolved by pointing to reason's general mistake in the idea of the unconditioned. Reason mistakenly treats the idea of the unconditioned as an object in itself and by removing this false assumption the antinomies can be resolved. Section Two shows that the conflict of reason can be resolved by considering the relationship of reason's idea to the understanding. By recalling the true relationship between reason and the understanding. 80

the antinomies can be solved. Section Three considers Kant's distinction between mathematical and dynamical ideas. This distinction between the two types of cosmological ideas provides another framework in which the resolution of the antinomies can be explained. The Resolution in Terms of Reason's General Mistake - One of the ways that Kant resolves the conflicts in the antinomies is by pointing out reason's general mistake in formulating cosmological ideas. Kant calls this the "Critical Solution" to the cosmological conflicts typical of reason.7 The "critical solution" of the antinomies provides a clear account of reason's basic error in its cosmological ideas, but it does not account for or explain the specific solutions to the antinomies given later on by Kant. That is, the "critical solution" of the antinomies resolves all four antinomies by locating an error committed by reason. This type of solution does not explain why the resolution of the first two antinomies (both sides are false) is later shown to be essentially different from the resolution of the last two antinomies (both sides are true). For an account of this difference between the resolutions of the antinomies, Kant depends on the mathematical/dynamical distinction. Thus, it appears that neither of these explanations of the solution to the antinomies is sufficient by itself, but rather, a full account of the antinomies requires both explanations. Therefore, this explanation of the resolution of the antinomies in terms of reason's general mistake offers a partial account of the solution to the antinomies . Kant's "critical solution" is closely tied to the structure of the antinomies and it involves a reconsideration of the type of conflict characteristic of the antinomies. In the first chapter of this investigation, the claim was made that the conflict evidenced by the theoretical antinomies was one of logical contradiction. 8 For example, the thesis of the third antinomy states "There is freedom" and the antithesis states "There is no freedom."9 The diagrams in Chapter I revealed the logical contradiction characteristic of the antinomies. Kant's "critical solution" must show why this logical contradiction is in fact not a real contradiction. The "critical solution" to the antinomies involves identifying a mistake made by reason which allows the 81

apparent contradictions in the antinomies to arise. Kant locates the error of reason by challenging the apparent contradiction between thesis and antithesis. Kant claims that in fact thesis and antithesis do not stand to one another as contradictories (analytical opposites) but as dialectical opposites.1° Thesis and antithesis are not logically contradictory because they are based on an inadmissible assumption of reason, namely, that the sum of all appearances is a thing-initself. H Because the antinomies are grounded in this mistaken assumption of reason, they can be resolved by recognizing that reason's regress from the conditioned to the complete series of conditions and to the unconditioned is a regulative rule and not a constitutive principle.12 it remains now to consider in more detail Kant's development of this "critical solution" to the antinomies. There seem to be two steps in the "critical solution" of the antinomies. The first step is essentially negative, and it involves pointing out reason's general mistake and, in so doing, eliminating the contradictoriness between thesis and antithesis. The second step restates in a positive way the task and the function of reason once it is relieved of its misdirected task in the antinomies. Kant begins the explanation of reason's general mistake in the antinomies by denying the apparent contradictoriness of the antinomies. He claims: If we regard the two propositions, that the world is infinite in magnitude and that it is finite in magnitude, as contradictory opposites, we are assuming that the world, the complete series of appearances, is a thing in itself. . . . I f , however, I reject this assumption . . . and deny that the world is a thing in itself, the contradictory opposition of the two assertions is converted into a merely dialectical opposition.13 If the thesis and antithesis were contradictory opposites, then one would have to be true and the other false. But if thesis and antithesis are based on an inadmissible condition and so are dialectical opposites, then both may be false.14 As contradictory opposites, thesis and antithesis assume that the series of appearances is either infinite or finite. As 82

dialectical opposites, thesis and antithesis recognize that the series of appearances may be neither infinite nor finite since the series is not a thing in itself apart from the empirical regress of appearances. Reason's mistake therefore is treating its object, i.e., the complete series of appearances, as a thing in itself rather than the supposed end result of the empirical regress of appearances. In terms more compatible with previous chapters, reason's error in the antinomies arises from mistakenly treating the idea of the unconditioned as a thing in itself. Kant states specifically that this "critical solution" or the antinomies resolves all four antinomies. He maintains: What we have said here of the first cosmological idea . . . applies also to all the others. The series of conditions is only to be met with in the regressive synthesis itself, not in the (field of) appearance viewed as a thing given in and by itself, prior to all regress.15 Thus, it cannot be claimed that Kant is referring in this "critical solution" of the antinomies only to the first two antinomies. W. H. Walsh, in his article "The Structure of Kant's Antinomies," recognizes that formally what goes for the first two antinomies must go for the other two as well: on the supposition that the world of the senses is the only world and that it exists absolutely, both parties to the conflict must be dismissed. 16 Kant negates the apparent contradiction between thesis and antithesis by naming them dialectical opposites. He resolves the antinomies by showing that dialectical opposites rest on a mistaken assumption, and as such, both sides can be seen to be false. Even though Kant later resolves the antinomies in a different way, it is clear that Kant is here referring to all four antinomies. In the section on mathematical and dynamical ideas, Kant resolves Antinomies 1 and 2 by showing both sides to be false, and he resolves Antinomies 3 and 4 by showing both sides to be true. In this "critical solution," all four antinomies 83

are resolved by revealing their two sides to be false since they are based on an inadmissible assumption of reason. There is no real conflict between these two types of resolutions although they differ. Both types of resolutions reflect possible Kantian solutions to the conflicts in the antinomies. In terms of a distinction previously discussed (inside the world/outside the world), both resolutions can be correct. It is true that all the antinomies are resolved when reason stops treating the series of appearances as a thing in itself. Both sides of the antinomies are false since they treat the series of appearances (i.e., an empirical series) as a thing in itself. If the emphasis is placed on reason's attempt toconsider an empirical series (or some part of the series) as a thing in itself, then all the antinomies can be resolved in the same way on the basis of this error. However, if the emphasis is placed on the uniqueness of the third and fourth antinomies in raising the possibility of a member of the series "outside the series," then a different resolution may be suggested. Insofar as the third and fourth antinomies refer not merely to the series of appearances but to a member of the series "outside the series," they state more than can be resolved by the "critical solution." The "critical solution" concerns solely the error of treating the series of appearances (or some part of the series) as a thing in itself. Since the third and fourth antinomies also raise the possibility of a member of the series "outside the series," they are subject to another type of resolution (in addition to the "critical solution"). Thus, there is no real conflict between the various types of solutions to the antinomies. The "critical solution" resolves the antinomies in terms of a mistaken assumption on the part of reason. The specific mention of a member "outside the series" in the third and fourth antinomies apparently necessitates a further resolution of the antinomies in terms of their nature as mathematical or dynamical ideas. Kant concludes this first and essentially negative step in the "critical solution" with the following statement: Thus the antinomy of pure reason in its cosmological ideas vanishes when it is shown that it is merely dialectical, and that it is a conflict due to an illusion which arises from our applying 84

to appearances that representations . . lute totality which condition of things

exist only in our . that idea of absoholds only as a in themselves.17

Kant's claim that the resolution of the antinomies depends on dissolving the apparent contradictoriness of their assertions is restated in other terms by Kuno Fischer. Fischer states that the logical enigma of the antinomies is easily solved. He says: "Their oppositions are only contradictory under a false condition; in reality they are contrary. They do not exclude, but include, a middle course."18 Fischer's explanation of what is accomplished by the "critical solution" is that the apparent contradictions in the antinomies are reduced to contraries, and as such, both sides can be false. The second step in the "critical solution" of the antinomies is to state in positive terms the task and function of reason so that the recurrence of the antinomies can be prevented. Since reason's general mistake in the antinomies is treating its object as a thing in itself, it follows that reason's attempt to define and determine its object must be restricted. Reason's proper task is not the determining of its object as a thing in itself but the continuing extension of the regress from the conditioned to the unconditioned. Kant states that the principle of reason "is thus properly only a rule, prescribing a regress in the series of the conditions of given appearances."19 In short, reason's advance to the unconditioned is only a regulative rule for the extension of experience, and it is not a constitutive principle for the extension of concepts beyond the world of possible experience. Reason cannot reveal what the unconditioned is but only how the empirical regress tpward the idea of this object is to be carried out.20 Thus, reason's correct task is to continue the empirical regress toward the unconditioned without ever presuming to have reached the unconditioned. Kant makes a further point about the nature of reason's empirical regress and this point can be mentioned here although it is tangential to the subject at issue. He says that when the whole is given in empirical intuition, the regress in the series of its inner conditions proceeds in infinitum; but when a member only of 85

the series is given, starting from which the regress has to proceed to absolute totality, the regress is onlv of indeterminate character (in indefinitum).21 This distinction between types of empirical regress is significant because the first antinomy (dealing with the magnitude of the world) is said to involve a regress in indefinitum while the second antinomy (dealing with the division of a whole) involves a regress in infinitum.22 By means of this distinction Kant indicates that when reason prescribes a rule for the carrying out of an empirical regress, it is not limited to a single, univocal rule. Kant claims that reason's idea of abolute totality can do no more than prescribe a rule to the regressive synthesis in the series of conditions; and in accordance with this rule the synthesis must proceed from the conditioned, through all subordinate conditions, up to the unconditioned. Yet it can never reach this goal, for the absolutely unconditioned is not to be met with in experience.23 In addition, he concludes: What therefore alone remains to us is the validity of the principle of reason as a rule for the continuation and magnitude of a possible experience; its invalidity as a constitutive principle of appearances (viewed as things) in themselves has been sufficiently demons trated.2 4 These two passages summarize both reason's mistake in the antinomies and reason's proper task. Reason's mistake was in treating its idea of the unconditioned as an object in itself subject to definition by a constitutive principle. In fact, reason's regress toward the unconditioned is only a regulative rule for the extension of experience and reason can never reach its presumed object, i.e., the unconditioned. The antinomies are resolved when it is shown that reason's attempt to define the unconditioned is completely unfounded. Reason's enterprise in the antinomies was to 86

define its highest object and this attempt takes reason beyond its proper scope. The "critical solution" of the antinomies points out that reason's endeavor to define the unconditioned is misguided and thus that the antinomies reflect reason's misinterpretation of its task. The identification of reason's mistake (in assuming it is able to define the unconditioned) facilitates the "critical" resolution of the antinomies. Both sides of the antinomies are false because in both cases reason has attempted to define the unconditioned which in fact takes reason beyond its proper task. The Resolution in Terms of Reason's Conformity to the Understanding Reason will again be treated in this section in light of the proper scope of its task. The resolution of the antinomies can be explained in terms of reason's proper relationship to the understanding. The relation between reason and the understanding provides a basis for evaluating the error present in reason's idea of the unconditioned. It will be shown here that the resolution of the antinomies is possible because of the fact that reason's idea of the unconditioned fails to correspond to any concept of the understanding. Kant claims that reason's task in the employment of its ideas is not to contribute to the knowledge of objects. Reason's goal is not to aid the understanding in its knowledge of empirical objects. Reason functions not as a partner of the understanding but as a guide for the understanding. In fact, Kant says that since the unity of reason in mere ideas "involves a synthesis according to rules, it must conform to the understanding."25 The ideas of reason contribute nothing to the understanding's determination of objects, but they can determine how the understanding is to be employed in dealing with experience in its totality. Kant concludes that even if the transcendental ideas cannot determine any object, they may yet, in a fundamental and unobserved fashion, be of service to the understanding as a canon for its extended and consistent employment.^6 The ideas of reason thus guide the continued employment of the understanding. 87

With this in mind, reason's proper task in the antinomies cannot be to define the unconditioned except insofar as this idea is a possible object of experience, an object for the understanding. Reason's aim is not to constitute objects, and thus if the idea of the unconditioned cannot be an object for the understanding then reason has surpassed its proper task of guiding the employment of the understanding. Reason has presumably erred in the antinomies if it claims to have defined the object of its idea rather than to have provided a rule for the regressive synthesis of the series of conditions (to be carried out by the understanding). It is clear then that the point to be made in this section is essentially the same as that made in the last section. Both of these sections suggest that the error in the idea of the unconditioned makes possible the resolution of the antinomies. In both of these sections, the antinomies are resolved by specifying the mistake in reason's idea of the unconditioned. Both of these resolutions point out that the object of the cosmological ideas is an impossible object since it cannot be an object of a possible experience. Because the object is only the object of an idea, it has no validity as an object of a possible experience. Thus, the resolutions presented in these two sections state that^the antinomies are resolved when it is revealed that they are based on the idea of an impossible and empty object, i The resolutions expounded in this and the previous section are similar in that both ground the solution to the antinomies in the mistaken idea of the unconditioned. Yet, the resolution to be discussed in this section differs from the previous resolution because of the unique way it points to the error in the idea of the unconditioned. Although the conclusion here is the same as that in Section One, the reasons for drawing the conclusion are basically different. The "critical solution" to the antinomies set forth in Section One showed the falsity of the idea of the unconditioned by destroying the apparent contradictoriness of the antinomies. Reason's false assumption about the idea of the unconditioned was revealed by eliminating the contradictoriness of the antinomies and by specifying 88

reason's proper task. In this section, the falsity of the object of reason will be shown in terms of reason's proper relation to the understanding. Both methods of resolving the antinomies point to the error in the idea of the unconditioned. Yet, the "critical solution" accomplishes the resolution by showing that there is no contradiction due to reason's false assumption about the nature of its object. The solution set forth in this section accomplishes the resolution by exposing the error in the idea of the unconditioned in terms of reason's proper relation to the, understanding. The antinomies concern reason's attempt to define its object.; Since reason is said to function as a guide for the understanding, it is possible to consider how the understanding views the object of reason. This discussion will reveal that the relationship between reason and the understanding is in a sense violated by reason's attempt to define its object, and thus reason's project in the antinomies surpasses its proper function. Both sides of the antinomies must be false since the object of reason's idea cannot be an object of a possible experience (i.e., cannot be an object of the understanding) . Kant states clearly that the error in the antinomies is located in reason's idea of the unconditioned which violates the proper relationship between reason and the understanding./ In light of reason's true relation to the understanding, the idea of the unconditioned must be dismissed as proposing an impossible object. Kant says: If therefore, in dealing with a cosmological idea, I were able to appreciate beforehand that whatever view may be taken of the unconditioned in the successive synthesis of appearances , it must either be too large or too small for any concept of the understanding, I should be in a position to understand that since the cosmological idea has no bearing save upon an object of experience which has to be in conformity with a possible concept of the understanding, it must be entirely empty and without meaning; for its 89

object, view it as we may, cannot be made to agree with it.27 In short, the idea of the unconditioned that reason offers in the antinomies is either too large or too small for any concept of the understanding. Reason cannot properly define objects, and thus if its idea of the unconditioned corresponds to no concept of the understanding, then the idea must be rejected as meaningless. The antinomies are resolved when it is shown that the idea on which they are grounded is either too large or too small for any concept of the understanding. As Kant states, "the fault lies with the idea, in being too large or too small for that 2to which it is directed, namely, possible experience." ^ Kant's assertion that the idea of the unconditioned is too large or too small for a concept of the understanding is not merely stated in such general terms. In this resolution of the antinomies, Kant is not content to point out that reason's basic error is the failure of its idea to correspond to a concept of the understanding. Instead, reason's idea is shown to be too large and too small for the understanding in its claims in the antinomies. This explicit illustration of reason's failure in the antinomies raises an apparently insoluble problem. At best, the problem raised by identifying reason's idea as too large or too small for the understanding serves to emphasize the uniqueness of the fourth antinomy. Each antinomy is treated separately by Kant in terms of how it reveals that reason's idea is too large or too small for the understanding. In the first antinomy, the claim of the thesis that the world has a beginning and is limited in space is too small for the concept of the understanding.^9 This idea of a finite and limited world is too small for the understanding because it suggests the world is limited by something and the law of the empirical employment of the understanding requires the regress to continue to this higher condition. The antithesis of the first antinomy claims that the world has no beginning and is unlimited in space. This idea of reason is too large for any concept of the understanding because it implies an infinite regress which in turn is too large for any possible empirical concept. 90

The second and third antinomies follow the same pattern. The theses of the second and the third antinomies, like that of the first antinomy, make claims about the idea of the unconditioned which are too small for any empirical concept of the understanding. In the first three theses of the antinomies, reason defines the idea of the unconditioned in a way which prematurely cuts off the empirical regress in the series of conditions. The antithesis of the second and the third antinomies, like that of the first antinomy, suggest that the unconditioned involves an infinite regress, and as such, the idea of this unconditioned is too ,large for any concept of the understanding. In the antitheses of the first three antinomies, the regress of conditions is said to be infinite and this infinite regress is too large to be the object of any concept of the understanding. Briefly, Kant suggests that the first three antinomies fail because the idea contained in the theses is too small to be a concept of the understanding and the idea contained in the antitheses is too large to be a concept of the understanding. The difficulty that arises with regard to this resolution of the antinomies has to do with the fourth antinomy. The pattern so far established (in the first three antinomies) is that the cosmological idea in the thesis is too small to be a concept and the cosmological idea in the antithesis is too large to be a concept. The fourth antinomy proceeds in the following way. The claim of the thesis that there is a necessary being in the world is said to be too large for a concept of the understanding. The claim of the antithesis that there is no necessary being is said to be too small for any concept. As Kant says: If we admit an absolutely necessary being . . . we set it in a time infinitely remote from any given point of time. . . . But such an existence is then too large for our empirical concept. . . . If, again,we hold that everything belonging to the world (whether as conditioned or as condition) is contingent, any and every given existence is too small for our concept.30 Thus, the fourth antinomy is resolved when its thesis is shown to be too large to be a concept and its antithesis is shown to be too small to be a concept. 91

The fourth antinomy is distinct from the other three. In the first three antinomies, the idea in the thesis is too small to be a concept whereas the idea in the antithesis is too large to be a concept. In the fourth antinomy, the idea in the thesis is too large to be a concept while the idea in the antithesis is too small to be a concept. The fourth antinomy is shown to be the reverse of the previous three. That is, the idea of the unconditioned in the fourth antinomy manifests a relationship to the understanding unlike the relations illustrated in the first three antinomies . it is true that all four antinomies are resolved when reason's idea is shown to correspond to no concept. Yet, it is undeniably more difficult to draw any general conclusions about reason's relation to the understanding due to the peculiarity evidenced by the fourth antinomy. Some attempt must be made to account for why the claims of the fourth antinomy are too large (thesis) and too small (antithesis) for the understanding whereas the claims of the first three antinomies are too small (theses) and too large (antitheses) for the understanding. Kant himself does not notice or comment on this apparent uniqueness of the fourth antinomy. Kant's commentators are similarly of no help in illuminating the reversal of the too small/too large designations in the fourth antinomy. Heinz Heimsoeth, in his discussion of this section of the first Critique, does not mention that in the fourth antinomy the too small/ too large designations are reversed.31 Jonathan Bennett observes that the too small/too large designations are reversed in the case of the fourth antinomy but he offers no possible explanation of why this is the case.32 Norman Kemp Smith, in his discussion of this section of the first Critique, omits mention of the fourth antinomy so that the problem at issue cannot even be raised.33 T. D. Weldon summarizes the point of the too large/too small distinction but he does 4not specifically relate it to each of the antinomies. Again, for Weldon, the problem that the fourth antinomy precipitates cannot even be raised. For this investigation the fact that the fourth antinomy relates to the understanding in a different way than do the first three antinomies is a point of structural interest but has no effect on the topics in question. Even though there seems to be no systematic way to account for the uniqueness of the fourth antinomy, two substantial conclusions follow from this discussion. First, unlike many commentaries on the 92

antinomies, this account has at least raised the problem of the fourth antinomy. The apparent inconsistency in Kant's discussion of the antinomies as being too large or too small for the understanding is revealed in the fourth antinomy. Although the position of the fourth antinomy within this framework of the solution to the antinomies cannot be explained, it does significantly reinforce the uniqueness of the fourth antinomy as discussed in Chapter Two.35 i n Chapter Two, it was suggested that the fourth antinomy occupies a unique position in that its structure does not reveal strict contradiction and in that it explicitly raises the possibility of a necessary being "outside the world." The suggestion that the fourth antinomy is unique is supported by this section that resolves the antinomies in terms of the too large/too small designations. Since the claims of the fourth antinomy are related to the understanding in a different way than the claims of the other three antinomies are related to the understanding, the uniqueness of the fourth antinomy must be treated as a point well established. A second accomplishment of this section has been to explain the resolution of the antinomies in terms of reason's conformity to the understanding. Regardless of the particular problem raised by the fourth antinomy, Kant's discussion of this solution to the antinomies remains of interest. The too large/too small distinction provides a way of explaining reason's error in the antinomies. Both sides of the antinomies are false because reason's mistaken idea of the unconditioned leads reason into an improper relation to the understanding. This section thus serves to emphasize and confirm the resolution to the antinomies offered in Section One. Both of these sections describe a resolution to the antinomies in which all the claims of the antinomies are false since they rest on an error inherent in reason's idea of the unconditioned. The Resolution in Terms of the Mathematical/Dynamical Distinction The resolution of the antinomies in terms of the matheitiatical/dynamical distinction is the third type of solution to be suggested by Kant. The first two ways of resolving the antinomies have in common the claim that both sides of all the antinomies are false. The first solution to the antinomies eliminates the 93

apparent contradiction between assertions by pointing to the error in reason's idea of the unconditioned. Both sides of the antinomies are false because of reason's mistaken idea of the unconditioned. Similarly, the second solution to the antinomies shows that reason in its idea of the unconditioned stands in an improper relation to the understanding. Reason's idea of the unconditioned, which is the object of the antinomies, is either too large or too small for any concept of the understanding. Again, both sides of the antinomies are false since in them reason does not stand in conformity with the understanding. The third resolution of the antinomies will be shown here to be essentially different from the previous two solutions. Unlike the first two resolutions, this solution in terms of the mathematical/dynamical distinction will not reveal both sides of all the antinomies to be false. Before turning to this resolution of the antinomies in terms of the mathematical/dynamical distinction, it is possible to question how Kant accounts for the difference between this resolution and the previous two. How does Kant explain the fact that he gives two basically different solutions to the antinomies? (See, however, D. P. Dryer's claim that Kant's only solution to the antinomies is that both thesis and antithesis are false.)36 It is of interest to consider why there are two different resolutions to the antinomies, namely, one which shows both sides to be false and one which shows that both sides are false in Antinomies 1 and 2 but that both sides are true in Antinomies 3 and 4. For the moment, it is only necessary to consider Kant's own explanation for why these two types of solutions both offer viable resolutions for the antinomies in spite of their difference. At the end of this section, further attention will be paid to the attempts of Kant's commentators to account for the two types of solutions. Kant himself recognizes that the statement of a resolution in terms of the mathematical/ dynamical distinction presents a second way of resolving the conflicts in the antinomies. Kant apparently reconciles these two types of solutions to the antinomies without denigrating either. The first type of solution (both sides are false) resolves the antinomies under the assumption that the conditions are homogeneous with (stand in the world with) the conditioned. The second type of solution (both sides are false in Antinomies 1 and 2 and both sides are true in Antinomies 3 and 4) resolves the antinomies under the assumption that the conditions may not be homogeneous with (stand in the world with) the conditioned. 94

Two different solutions to the antinomies are evident depending on the nature of the conditions for any given conditioned. Kant explains the two types of solutions in the following passages. In representing the antinomy of pure reason, through all the transcendental ideas, in tabular form, and in showing that the ground of this conflict and the only means of removing it is by declaring both the opposed assertions to be false, we have represented the conditions as, in all cases, standing to the conditioned in relations of space and time. . . . On this view all the dialectical representations of totality, in the series of conditions for a given conditioned, are throughout of the same character. . . . Thus arose the difficulty . . . that reason made the series either too long or too short for the understanding.37 Hitherto it has not been necessary to take account of this distinction [between a mathematical and a dynamical synthesis of appearances]; for just as we have been conforming to conditions within the (field of) appearance, so in the two mathematical-transcendental ideas the only object we have had in mind is object as appearance. But now that we are proceeding to consider how far dynamical concepts of the understanding are adequate to the idea of reason, the distinction becomes of importance, and opens up to us an entirely new view of the suit in which reason is implicated.3 8 The distinction between mathematical and dynamical ideas gives rise to a new way of resolving the conflicts in the antinomies. Kant claims that the first type of solution to the antinomies implicitly assumes that the unconditioned stands in space and time like the conditioned. The first type of solution correctly shows both sides to be false in that the unconditioned treated as appearance is either too large or too small for the understanding. In simpler terms, in the first 95

solution, both ideas of reason are false due to their inability to conform to the understanding. The two types of solutions to the antinomies are accounted for by Kant in terms of the nature of the conditions in their regressive series. Kant says that the first type of solution considered the unconditioned to be homogeneous with the conditioned whereas the distinction between mathematical and dynamical ideas makes possible the second solution wherein the unconditioned may be heterogeneous with the conditioned. The first solution applies to the antinomies insofar äs they assume that the world of appearances is the only world. If the world of appearances is treated as the world in itself, then the regress of conditions can arrive only at an unconditioned which itself appears in space and time. On the other hand, the mathematical/dynamical distinction allows for the possibility of an unconditioned "outside" the series of appearances. Kant concludes that both types of solutions operate in such a way as to resolve the antinomies. Both sides of the antinomies are false if the unconditioned must be an appearance because, as such, it would be too large or too small for the understanding. The second solution claims that both sides of the dynamical antinomies may be true since they allow the unconditioned to be "outside" the empirical series. More specifically, Kant grounds these two types of solutions in his earlier discussion of the principles of the understanding. The principles of the understanding are either mathematical or dynamical. The dynamical antinomies which correspond to the dynamical principles have two resolutions due to the ambiguity of their object as defined by the dynamical principles. The principles of the understanding fall into two groups: the mathematical (concerned with the intuition of appearances) and the dynamical (concerned with the existence of appearances). Kant says that the latter do not contain "that 39immediate evidence which is peculiar to the former." The mathematical principles "allow of intuitive certainty" while the dynamical principles allow only a "discursive certainty."40 The mathematical principles (i.e., the axioms and the anticipations) have to do with the possibility of appearances . The axioms and the anticipations are principles which can bring into being or constitute a priori intuition. The dynamical principles (i.e., the analogies and the postulates) have to do with the possibility of experience and they are unable to 96

constitute experience by bringing into being the existence of appearances. Thus, the mathematical principles are constitutive while the dynamical principles are only regulative.41 The point is that mathematical principles are able to provide rules for the constitution of empirical appearances. Dynamical principles can provide rules for the synthesis or the unity of experience. The dynamical principles attempt to order and connect empirical appearances so that their existence falls under the\ rules of experience. Clearly, the mathematical and the dynamical principles are distinguishable in terms of their functions. The mathematical principles constitute appearances and the dynamical principles regulate the existence of appearances under rules for the possibility of experience. The significance of this discussion in the Analytic of mathematical and dynamical principles is that it accounts for the two types of solutions Kant later offers for the antinomies.^ The principles of the understanding obviously correspond to the theoretical antinomies in that the mathematical/dynamical distinction is characteristic of both. Even more, the principles of the understanding indicate why the dynamical antinomies are subject to two different resolutions. The reason why the dynamical antinomies can be resolved in two different ways (both sides false or both sides true) is that the nature of its object is not necessarily sensible.; The mathematical principles concern the constitution Jof empirical appearances, and consequently, the mathematical antinomies can treat only an object of a sensible intuition. The dynamical principles on the other hand provide rules for the combining of appearances and these rules may or may not be limited to the sensible world. As Kant says, the dynamical principles do not enable us to "anticipate the features" through which one empirical intuition is distinguished from other intuitions. ^ The analogies and the postulates do not determine objects but rather regulate their relations to each other and to our faculties of knowledge. Neither the analogies nor the postulates are restricted to the sensible world in the way that the mathematical principles are. Kant says about the analogies: The principles can therefore have no other purpose save that of being the conditions of the unity of empirical 97

knowledge in the synthesis of appearances . But such unity can be thought only in the schema of the pure concept of the understanding.44 The schema, as Kant previously showed, is both intellectual and sensible.45 A transcendental schema must be both homogeneous with the nonsensible concept of the understanding and homogeneous with sensible appearances. If the unity of experience which is to be accomplished by the dynamical principles can be thought only in a schema, it is clear that the dynamical principles are not limited to the sensible world. The dynamical principles in providing rules for experience depend on transcendental schema, and in so doing, they affirm the existence of an intellectual, nonsensible world. Similarly, since the dynamical principles have to do with rules for experience, they cannot determine the nature of objects which again opens the way for the idea of nonsensible objects. The dynamical principles indicate that the understanding can think a noumenal realm. They need this nonsensible realm to make possible the proposing of rules for the connection of appearances. The two solutions to the dynamical antinomies arise from the fact that the dynamical principles make it possible to think both a sensible and a nonsensible world. Neither the dynamical principles nor the dynamical antinomies can determine the nature of objects. Thus, the two solutions to the dynamical antinomies take into account the possibility of both sensible and nonsensible objects. If the object of the dynamical antinomies is sensible, their resolution proceeds like the resolution of the mathematical antinomies (both sides false). If the object of the dynamical antinomies is nonsensible, their resolution is achieved by showing both sides to be true. The two resolutions typical of the dynamical antinomies can be explained by the fact that their counterparts, the dynamical principles, do not exclude from consideration the noumenal realm. Another manner of describing the way Kant reconciles these two types of solutions to the antinomies is to consider reason's proper task. In the first solution, reason is shown to be in error due to its lack of conformity to the understanding. Reason by restricting its idea of the unconditioned to the world of appearances satisfies neither itself nor the understanding. But in the second solution, where reason envisions the possibility of an unconditioned "outside" 98

the empirical series, both reason and the understanding can be satisfied. The second type of solution perhaps suggests that reason has a task independent from that of the understanding. Reason is in error when it treats the object of its idea as an object of a possible appearance. Yet, reason does not err when it proposes the possibility of an unconditioned "outside" the realm of appearances. These two solutions may reflect to some extent two tasks of reason. Within the realm of the sensible, reason must conform its ideas to concepts of the understanding. Within the realm of the supersensible where the understanding has no jurisdiction, reason can postulate an unconditioned for the empirical series. Thus, the two solutions to the antinomies are both correct in that each focuses on a different task of the faculty of reason. Kant's explanation of the resolution of the antinomies in terms of the mathematical/dynamical distinction proceeds straightforwardly and has been adequately discussed by many commentators.46 The real significance of this resolution, at least for the present project, concerns its relationship to the other resolutions and its ability to shed light on the practical antinomy. This resolution of the antinomies will be reviewed here for the purpose of showing that the practical antinomy builds on and advances from these solutions to the theoretical conflicts. Kant distinguishes between the mathematical and the dynamical ideas of reason on the basis of the table of categories.47 The first two antinomies concern the mathematical connection of the series of appearances in which only homogeneous or sensible conditions are admissible. The last two antinomies concern the dynamical connection of the series of appearances, and in this case, heterogeneous or purely intelligible conditions can be allowed. Kant says: Inasmuch as the dynamical ideas allow of a condition of appearances outside the series of the appearances, that is, a condition which is not itself appearance, we arrive at a conclusion altogether different from any that was possible in the case of the mathematical antinomy. ° In other terms, the dynamical antinomies are distinguished from the mathematical antinomies because they raise the possibility of a condition "outside" the 99

world of appearances. The mathematical antinomies treat the unconditioned as itself in space and time whereas the dynamical antinomies locate the unconditioned in the intelligible world. The significance of this distinction between the mathematical and the dynamical ideas is that it makes possible a resolution of the antinomies based on this distinction. Since the mathematical ideas allow only homogeneous conditions in the regress toward the unconditioned, all attempts to define the unconditioned are false since the unconditioned itself would necessarily be in space and time, i.e., would be conditioned. The mathematical antinomies are resolved when it is shown that by allowing only homogeneous conditions in the regress of conditions, all their attempts to define the unconditioned are false since in fact, they define only a further conditioned. The dynamical antinomies allow the possibility of heterogeneous conditions, and thus their attempts to define the unconditioned can both be admitted as true. The dynamical antinomies are resolved by allowing the possibility of an intelligible unconditioned. The last two antinomies explicitly recognize two realms of experience, and so both sides of the dynamical antinomies can be true. The first two antinomies are restricted to the realm of sensible appearances and consequently both sides of the mathematical antinomies represent false attempts to define the unconditioned. Therefore, by distinguishing between the mathematical or dynamical nature of the antinomies, Kant specifies a type of resolution for the antinomies. The mathematical antinomies will fail at any attempt to define the unconditioned because they consider the unconditioned to be homogeneous with other sensible conditions . The dynamical antinomies have the advantage of giving a positive sense to the idea of a nonsensible, heterogeneous condition, and thus both sides of these antinomies can be true if applied to different realms. This resolution of the antinomies asserts that both sides of Antinomies 1 and 2 are false and both sides of Antinomies 3 and 4 are true. In all cases, the antinomies are resolved by showing that there is no real contradiction between the claims of the theses and the antitheses. Following this review of the solution to the antinomies in terms of their nature as mathematical or dynamical ideas, it remains to reconsider how the three types of solutions discussed in this chapter can 100

be reconciled. This chapter has discussed in its three sections the three ways that Kant describes the resolution of the theoretical antinomies. It has been suggested earlier that the first two solutions can be easily reconciled. Both resolutions solve the antinomies by pointing to a mistake in reason's idea of the unconditioned which leads to a lack of conformity between reason and the understanding. Both the first two solutions showed the antinomies to be resolved when both thesis and antithesis were seen to be false. The difficulty arises in determining how these resolutions (which find both sides of the antinomies to be false) can be made compatible with the third type of resolution (which finds both sides of the dynamical antinomies to be true). In the beginning of this section, Kant's recognition of these two different types of solutions was pointed out. Kant apparently sees no conflict between the two types of resolutions, and consequently, he does not proceed to denounce one resolution in favor of the other. Kant implies that both ways of resolving the antinomies are correct. The first solution gives an account of reason's basic error in terms of which all the antinomies are based on an improper assumption and so all their claims are false. The second solution takes into account an additional consideration concerning the types of conditions that can appear in the regress of the series of conditions. This additional consideration enables Kant to show that some of the claims in the antinomies can be true. In short, Kant finds that the two types of resolutions do not conflict but rather that they explain the antinomies with different considerations in mind. Kant's commentators have proposed several ways of accounting for these two different types of solutions to the antinomies. Heinz Heimsoeth, for example, points to these two types of resolutions and says that the antinomies are "of the same type" with regard to their transcendental object but that they are "of an entirely different type" with regard to their mathematical or dynamical nature.49 As a way of concluding this chapter on the resolution of the theoretical antinomies , the views of several commentators will be presented. In addition to suggesting how these commentators reconcile the two types of solutions to the antinomies, it is important to mention what effect the two solutions to the antinomies have on the project of this inquiry. Specifically, the second type of resolution, which emphasizes the mathematical/dynamical 101

distinction, will be shown to be of importance in providing a basis for the linking of the sensible and supersensible realms which is accomplished in the practical antinomy. Graham Bird, in his book called Kant's Theory of Knowledge, discusses the solution of the third antinomy insofar as it contrasts with the solutions of the previous two antinomies. Bird claims that Kant asserts in the first two antinomies "that both thesis and antithesis may be regarded as false."50 But, in the third antinomy, Bird says that Kant "is prepared to say not that both thesis and antithesis are false, but that they may both be true."51 Bird's assessment of what occurs in the resolution of the antinomies is correct if the only type of resolution possible is that in terms of the mathematical/dynamical distinction. This chapter has consistently argued that several types of resolutions are offered by Kant. Bird therefore is incorrect in concluding that Kant is not prepared to say in the third antinomy that both thesis and antithesis are false. In terms of the first type of solution to the antinomies, Kant does in fact state that both the thesis and the antithesis of the third antinomy are false. Bird's error apparently arises from his failure to recognize the first type of solution to the antinomies which finds both sides are false. Bird locates the resolution of the antinomies in their nature as mathematical or dynamical ideas and he ignores the first type of solution to the antinomies. Thus, because Bird recognizes only one type of solution to the antinomies, he is not confronted with the problem of reconciling what are in fact two types of solutions to the antinomies. C. D. Broad's discussion of the resolution of the antinomies appears to be no more correct than Bird's discussion, but it has the advantage of at least mentioning the two types of solutions offered by Kant. Broad claims, in his book Kant. An Introduction, that Kant could have given a solution of the third antinomy on the same lines as his solution of the first two. . . . Kant took the other type of solution instead of this one because of his interest in ethics.52 Broad is claiming that Kant "could have" resolved the third antinomy (and by implication, the fourth antinomy) by showing both sides to be false. Instead, says 102

Broad, Kant employs a different type of resolution and shows that both sides of the dynamical antinomies are true. Broad may be correct that Kant's reason for developing the second type of solution to the antinomies is his interest in ethics. It will later be suggested that the second resolution which allows both claims of the dynamical antinomies to be true makes possible the bridging of the sensible and supersensible realms which is carried out by practical reason. Broad fails to see that Kant not only could have but did offer the same type of solution to the third antinomy as he did to the previous two. Again, the issue of reconciling the two types of solutions to the antinomies is not a problem for Broad since he fails to recognize that two different types of solutions are in fact suggested for the dynamical antinomies. A third way of dealing with the problem of reconciling the two types of solutions to the antinomies is proposed by Norman Kemp Smith. Kemp Smith's position has several advantages not found in Bird's or Broad's positions. First, Kemp Smith clearly acknowledges the presence of two different types of solutions to the antinomies. Second, Kemp Smith recognizes that Kant himself was aware of the two types of resolutions to the antinomies. Finally, this means that the problem of reconciling these two types of resolutions is a real problem for Kemp Smith. Thus, regardless of Kemp Smith's conclusion about how the solutions are reconciled, his recognition of the problem at issue reflects the concerns of this chapter. Kemp Smith explains the appearance of the two types of solutions to the antinomies as manifestations of two different periods in Kant's critical thinking.53 Kemp Smith maintains that the move from the first type of solution (where both sides are false) to the second (where both sides can be true in the dynamical antinomies) reflects the move from Kant's early theory to his later Idealistic theory.54 Kemp Smith explains that the two types of solutions illustrate the development from Kant's early theory where reason has only an empirical function to the later idealistic theory where reason enables man to realize his noumenal affinities. While it may be impossible to confirm Kemp Smith's historical approach to the problem of the two types of resolutions, still his claim about the two functions of reason may prove valuable. It was suggested earlier that the two types of solutions to the antinomies can be viewed as proposing different tasks for the faculty of reason.55 Kemp Smith may be correct that the two 10 3

types of resolutions of the antinomies propose different tasks or reason. Kemp Smith then reconciles the two types of solutions (and similarly, the two tasks of reason) by claiming that they represent stages in the development of Kant's position. Regardless of Kemp Smith's claim that the two types of solutions to the antinomies reflect stages in the development of Kant's thought, it is fruitful to observe that the two types of solutions imply different tasks for reason. It is possible that Kant envisioned these two tasks for reason simultaneously and not as historical stages. The possibility that these two types of resolutions of the antinomies are compatible and reconcilable seems to accord best with what Kant himself says about the solutions to the antinomies. This chapter has attempted to dispel the notion that any one type of solution to the antinomies precludes any other. In spite of the apparent conflict between the two types of solutions, there seems to be no inherent reason why the two resolutions cannot stand together. The advantages derived from this attempt include the following. This attempt accords well with Kant's own position which found no reason to discard one type of resolution in favor of the other. Next, the two types of resolutions elaborate two tasks of reason which again do not preclude each other. Also, this attempt requires that the reader neither ignore one type of solution (Bird, Broad) nor construct the notion that the types of solutions represent stages in an historical development (Kemp Smith). Finally, one further point can be emphasized as giving grounds for Kant's elaboration of two types of solutions to the antinomies. The first solution adequately resolves the conflict in the cosmological ideas which are directed "exclusively to the unconditioned in the appearances."56 insofar as the ideas concern an unconditioned "in the world," the first type of resolution, which points to reason's general mistake, suffices to reconcile the conflicting claims in the antinomies. Yet, in respect of the difference between the mathematical and the dynamical "cosmical concepts" (Weltbegriffe), Kant states that the latter are in a certain sense transcendent. He says that it is possible to call the first two concepts cosmical in the narrower sense, as referring 104

to the world of the great and the small, and the other two transcendent concepts of nature. " That is, in light of the differences between the cosmological ideas, the first two antinomies refer to the world of appearances while the last two antinomies transcend the world of appearances. It seems to follow that Kant recognizes both the similarities and the differences between the four antinomies. The first type of solution to the antinomies resolves the conflicts in terms of what the antinomies share, namely, reason's mistaken idea of the unconditioned. The second type of solution to the antinomies resolves the conflicts in terms of how the antinomies differ, namely, whether the conditions can be "in the world" or "outside the world." Thus, two solutions are available for the antinomies: one which emphasizes their similarities and one which stresses their differences. Before turning to the consideration of the practical antinomy, it is important to note again the role that the second type of solution to the antinomies plays in this investigation. The attempt will be made here to understand practical reason as advancing from the concerns raised by theoretical reason. Presumably, the practical antinomy accomplishes the bridging of the sensible realm (happiness) and the supersensible realm (virtue). The theoretical antinomies function either as"a negative or as a positive propaedeutic to the practical antinomy. Possibly, the two types of solutions to the antinomies can be seen in this light. The first type of resolution of the antinomies finds both sides in the conflict to be false, and consequently, nothing positive can be said about reason's idea of the unconditioned. The second type of resolution acknowledges the possibility of heterogeneous conditions for the dynamical ideas and so allows for something positive to be postulated about reason's idea of the unconditioned. In short, the second type of resolution for the antinomies is necessary in that it makes a connection between the sensible and the supersensible not impossible. It functions as a positive propaedeutic to practical reason. The project of the practical antinomy in causally linking the sensible and the supersensible has been made theoretically possible by the second resolution of the antinomies, which eliminated the apparent conflict between the sensible and the supersensible.

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ENDNOTES A477/B505; translation by Norman Kemp Smith, Critique of Pure Reason (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965). 2

A478/B506; translation by Kemp Smith.

3

A479/B506; translation by Kemp Smith.

4

A481-2/B509-10; translation by Kemp Smith. 5 Note that Kant again seems to use the terms "the unconditioned" and "totality" ambiguously. He later refers to the object of a cosmological idea as "the unconditioned" (A486/B514) and it is this term which I employ consistently. 6

A484/B512; translation by Kemp Smith.

7 See the section entitled "Critical Solution of the Cosmological Conflict of Reason with Itself," A497/B525; translation by Kemp Smith. Q

See pages 15-6. q See page 15. 10

A504/B532; translation by Kemp Smith.

l:L

A506/B534; translation by Kemp Smith.

12

A497-8/B526; translation by Kemp Smith.

13

A504-5/B532-3; translation by Kemp Smith. A504/B5 32; translation by Kemp Smith.

15

A505/B533; translation by Kemp Smith. W . H. Walsh, "The Structure of Kant's Antinomies," Proceedings of the 1974 Ottawa Kant Congress, ed. Pierre Laberge (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1976), p. 86. 16

17

A506/B534; translation by Kemp Smith.

18 Kuno Fischer, A Commentary on Kant's Critick of 106

the Pure Reason, trans. Kuno Fischer (1866; rpt.New York: Garland Publishers, 1976), p. 233. 19

A508-9/B536-7; translation by Kemp Smith.

20

A510/B538; translation by Kemp Smith. 21 A512/B540; translation by Kemp Smith. 22

A520-4/B548-52; translation by Kemp Smith.

23

A510/B538; translation by Kemp Smith.

24

A516/B544; translation by Kemp Smith.

25

A422/B450; translation by Kemp Smith.

26

A329/B385; translation by Kemp Smith.

27

A486/B514; translation by Kemp Smith.

28

A489/B517; translation by Kemp Smith. A486-7/B514-5; translation by Kemp Smith.

30

A488-9/B516-7; translation by Kemp Smith. 31 Heinz Heimsoeth, Transzendentale Dialektik. Ein Kommentar zu Kants Kritik d. reinen Vernunft, II (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967), 284-6. 32 Jonathan Bennett, Kant's Dialectic (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 116. 33 Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), pp. 501-3. T. D. Weldon, Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 206. 35 See pages 53-62. 3 fi

D. P. Dryer, "Bennett's Account of the Transcendental Dialectic," Dialogue, 15 (1976), 130-1. 37

A528-9/B556-7; translation by Kemp Smith, Critique of Pure Reason.

107

A529/B557; translation by Kemp Smith, Critique of Pure Reason. A161/B200; translation by Kemp Smith, Critique of Pure Reason. 40 A161-2/B201; translation by Kemp Smith, Critique of Pure Reason. 41 Kant says at A179/B221-2: "These first principles [the mathematical] may therefore be called constitutive. It stands quite otherwise with those principles [the dynamical] which seek to bring the existence of appearances under rules a priori. For since existence cannot be constructed, the principles can apply only to the relations of existence, and can yield only regulative principles."

42 Heinz Röttges, in "Kants Auflösung der Freiheitsantinomie," Kant-Studien, 65 (1974), 33-49, apparently emphasizes the difference between the mathematical and the dynamical antinomies in order to question the validity of the latter. In discussing the resolutions of the first three antinomies, Röttges says that if the third antinomy were resolved like the previous two (both sides false), fatal consequences would result since Kant's theoretical and practical philosophy would in principle be negated. Röttges ignores the fact that Kant does offer for the third antinomy, as one type of resolution, a resolution which finds both sides to be false. In addition, Röttges suggests that the mathematical/dynamical distinction drawn at B200 is not systematic but only has the nature of a remark. Thus he fails to see that the mathematical/dynamical distinction utilized by Kant in the resolution of the antinomies is securely rooted in the principles of the understanding (i.e., in the systematic ground of the critical project). A178/B221; translation by Kemp Smith, Critique of Pure Reason. A181/B223-4; translation by Kemp Smith, Critique of Pure Reason. 45 A138/B177; translation by Kemp Smith, Critique of Pure Reason. 46 See, for example: W. Michael Hoffman, "An Interpretation of Kant's Solution to the Third 108

Antinomy," Southern Journal of Philosophy, 13 (1975), 176-7; Fischer, pp. 236-9; A. C. Ewing, A Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 225-6; and Edward Caird, The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant (Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons, 1889),. II, 59-62. 47 A529/B557; translation by Kemp Smith, Critique of Pure Reason. 48 A531/B559; translation by Kemp Smith, Critique of Pure Reason. 49 Heimsoeth, p. 329. Graham Bird, Kant's Theory of Knowledge. An Outline of One Central Argument in the "Critique of Pure Reason" (New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1962), p. 198. 51

Bird, p. 198.

52 C. D. Broad, Kant. An Introduction, ed. C. Lewy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 273. Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," pp. 506, 511-2. 54 Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," pp. 511-2. 55 See pages 98-9. A419/B447; translation by Kemp Smith, Critique of Pure Reason. 57 A420/B448; translation by Kemp Smith, Critique of Pure Reason.

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CHAPTER IV THE ORIGIN AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE PRACTICAL ANTINOMY In Chapter Two, it was shown that the antinomies of theoretical reason could be seen to arise from an ambiguity surrounding the object of theoretical reason.! Since Kant treats theoretical reason and practical reason as two employments of pure reason, it seems likely that the antinomy of practical reason has close parallels with the antinomies of theoretical reason. In the second chapter, the discussion centered on the conceptual origin of the theoretical antinomies and the effect this origin had on the structuring of the antinomies. It was revealed that the origin of the theoretical antinomies in the idea of the unconditioned could be used to account for the structure of the theoretical antinomies. This chapter will begin from a presumed similarity between the theoretical antinomies and the practical antinomy. After all, Kant begins the dialectic of pure practical reason with the statement: In both its speculative and its practical employment, pure reason always has its dialectic, for it demands the absolute totality of conditions for a given conditioned thing.2 Both theoretical and practical reason are characterized by this demand for the totality of conditions. Chapter Two revealed that this demand for the totality of conditions becomes for theoretical reason the search for an unconditioned. The question which this chapter will consider is: With regard to origin and structure, is the practical antinomy patterned on or a reflection of the theoretical antinomies? Thus, Chapter Four begins as an attempt to substantiate the presumed similarity between the theoretical antinomies and the practical antinomy. Certainly, it is helpful to begin to discuss the practical antinomy from the perspective of its presumed similarity to the theoretical antinomies if only to satisfy Kant's desire for a systematic architectonic. Probably a sympathetic reader of Kant also desires unity or at least consistency in the dialectics of pure reason. Consequently, this investigation 111

approaches the practical antinomy with the expectation that the origin and the structure of the antinomy will have obvious parallels to the theoretical antinomies. Section One will discuss the conceptual origin of the practical antinomy and the way that this origin is similar to and different from the conceptual origin of the theoretical antinomies. Section Two will consider the structure of the practical antinomy and its similarity to and difference from the structure of the theoretical antinomies. One general observation that will be suggested in this chapter is that the initial similarity between the practical and theoretical antinomies is lost in the course of the development of the practical antinomy. That is, the apparent similarity between the origins of the theoretical and practical antinomies gives way to a dissimilarity between their structures and finally to a complete dissimilarity between the resolutions of the two types of antinomies (see Chapter Five). These similarities and dissimilarities will become evident in what follows. The Conceptual Origin of the Antinomy As previously stated, the origin of the theoretical antinomies was found to lie in the idea of the unconditioned. The theoretical antinomies arise out of an ambiguity in the object of theoretical reason. Kant clearly suggests that the problems which underlie the dialectics of theoretical and practical reason are identical. He claims that in the dialectics of theoretical and practical reason an unavoidable illusion arises from the application of the rational idea of the totality of conditions (and thus of the unconditioned ) to appearances as if they were things-in-themselves.3 Pure reason both theoretical and practical seems to err in its application of the idea of the totality of conditions or the idea of the unconditioned. Now, practical reason is characterized in its dialectic by the misapplication of its idea of totality or of the unconditioned. Is the object of practical reason the same "idea of the unconditioned" that is the object of theoretical reason? The answer is "yes" in spite of some terminological differences which prevent an easy comparison of the objects of 112

theoretical and practical reason. L. W. Beck also corroborates this early impression that the object of both theoretical and practical reason is the unconditioned. He claims: Both theoretical and practical reason have a dialectic and on the same grounds, viz. as reason they seek the unconditioned for all that is conditioned. . . . Dialectic is the exposure of the illusion that the unconditioned, as required by reason, is an object of some definite and specific cognition. 4 Thus, Beck states that due to the nature of dialectic (in Kant's sense), both theoretical and practical reason, in their dialectical employments, have the unconditioned as their object. Kant says that practical reason "seeks the unconditioned for the practically conditioned" and one way that this unconditioned is sought is "as the unconditioned totality of the object of the pure practical reason, under the name of the highest good."5 Thus, practical reason seeks the unconditioned totality of its object and this unconditioned totality is called the highest good. But, a problem arises with the use of the term "unconditioned totality." It was suggested in Chapter Two that confusion occurs concerning the use of the terms "absolute totality" and "the unconditioned." Theoretical reason in its professed search for totality (a category) actually aims at the unconditioned (a transcendental idea). In practical reason, the unconditioned is sought as the unconditioned totality (called the highest good) of the practically conditioned. Klaus Düsing specifies that the highest good, which is the essential object of finite moral will, is the idea of unconditioned totality.6 Chapter Two suggested that the ambiguity in the definition of the unconditioned may be a result of theoretical reason's difficulty in distinguishing between totality and the unconditioned. Similarly, since practical reason searches for the unconditioned as an unconditioned totality (i.e., a highest good), it may be that practical reason too is unable to distinguish between totality and the unconditioned and thus that it is also subject to an ambiguity in its definition of the unconditioned. If this reference to an "unconditioned totality" implies that practical reason is confusing and not distinguishing between the category 113

of totality and the idea of the unconditioned, then practical reason, like theoretical reason, is probably characterized by an ambiguity in its definition of the unconditioned. Before considering whether an ambiguity does in fact arise in practical reason, it is important to note several features of the dialectic of practical reason. First, practical reason seeks the unconditioned just as theoretical reason in its dialectic seeks the unconditioned. Second, the unconditioned totality which practial reason aims at is also called by practical reason the highest good. Theoretical reason refers to the goal of its inquiry as the unconditioned and practical reason names the object of its inquiry the highest good. Both types of reason have in mind the idea of the unconditioned. Third, a further parallel can be drawn between the ways that theoretical and practical reason operate in their search for the unconditioned. It was suggested in Chapter Two that the antinomies of theoretical reason could be understood as a conflict between two definitions of the unconditioned. Kant refers in the second Critique to "the dialectic of pure practical reason in its definition of the concept of the highest good."7 It follows that the dialectic of practical reason (and consequently, the practical antinomy) concerns the definition of the highest good. In sum, both theoretical and practical reason seek the unconditioned and both of their dialectical employments concern the definition of this unconditioned. In order to carry out the parallel between the dialectics of theoretical and practical reason, it is crucial to explicate the ambiguity characteristic of practical reason. Two factors point to the presence of such an ambiguity in practical reason. First, the term "unconditioned totality" is employed to refer to that which practical reason seeks. This term itself implies that practical reason, like theoretical reason, fails to clearly distinguish between absolute totality and the unconditioned. Second, since the dialectic of practical reason, like that of theoretical reason, concerns the definition of the unconditioned (i.e., the highest good), it may be that practical reason, like theoretical reason, discovers an ambiguity in the meaning of this unconditioned. It was seen that the ambiguity in the definition of the unconditioned gives rise to the theoretical antinomies, and thus it is possible that a similar ambiguity in 114

the definition of the highest good may give rise to the practical antinomy. Kant does indeed specify an ambiguity present in practical reason's concept of the highest good. It is of interest that Kant explicitly refers to the two definitions of the highest good as an ambiguity whereas, 'in the first Critique, the two definitions of the unconditioned were not referred to as an ambiguity by Kant. Kant says: The concept of the "highest" contains an ambiguity which, if not attended to, can occasion unnecessary disputes. The "highest" can mean the "supreme" (supremum) or the "perfect" (consummatum). The former is the unconditional condition, i.e., the condition which is subordinate to no other (originarium); the latter is that whole which is no part of a yet larger whole of the same kind (perfectissimum).8 Evidently, the highest good can have two meanings: a supreme good (an unconditional condition which is subordinate to no other condition) or a perfect good (a whole which is not part of any larger whole of the same kind). It is also evident that these two senses of the highest good are exact correlates to the two senses of the unconditioned present in the first Critique. The highest good can refer either to a highest, unconditional condition or to the whole which is not part of a larger whole of the same kind. The unconditioned in the first Critique can refer either to a part to which all other parts are subordinated or to the entire completed series. The unconditioned, which is the object of both theoretical and practical reason, exhibits the same ambiguity in both its theoretical and its practical employments. Theoretical and practical reason thus appear to share this ambiguity in the definition of the unconditioned. Reason's object is either: a highest part to which all other parts are subordinated or the whole completed series. For theoretical reason, the unconditioned can be either a highest member of the series or the whole series itself. Analogously, for practical reason, the highest good (i.e., the unconditioned) can be either a supreme good or a perfect good. 115

This apparent link between the definitions of the unconditioned employed by theoretical and practical reason has not escaped the notice of W. H. Walsh. Walsh claims that Kant's case for the connection of moral reason with theoretical reason rests on the notion of the unconditioned.^ Walsh observes that the unconditioned is central to both theoretical and practical reason, but he concludes that in fact the unconditioned is employed in different ways by theoretical and by practical reason. He states that we are "bamboozled by the mysterious phrase 'the unconditioned'" and that we believe there is similarity when in reality there is difference. Walsh concentrates on the contrasts he finds between the unconditioned of theoretical reason and the unconditioned of practical reason. Two of the contrasts Walsh points out are :•'-•'• 1. To reach the unconditioned is set as a task to theoretical reason, a task which we know from the first can never be fully accomplished. Morality, by contrast issues its commands as unconditionally binding.12 2. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant is interested in the unconditioned as a possible entity or existent; the necessity which concerns him here is the necessity of a necessary being. But in his moral philosophy any such notion is set aside as strictly subsidiary, and the only necessity in question is that supposed to attach to a moral command.^ Walsh's claim is that although the unconditioned appears to function as a notion common to both theoretical and practical reason, in fact, it refers to completely different objects in these two employments of reason. According to Walsh, the unconditioned of theoretical reason is a possible object at which reason aims. On the other hand, the unconditioned of practical reason is achieved by reason in the issuing of moral commands. In light of what has been said earlier about the unconditioned, an objection can be made to Walsh's claims. Walsh makes a mistake in identifying the unconditioned of practical reason with the unconditionally

ity of moral imperatives. As Kant himself states, the dialectics of theoretical and practical reason both attempt to apply the idea of the unconditioned to the world of appearances. Practical reason seeks the unconditioned for the practically conditioned and it calls this unconditioned the highest good. Thus, the unconditioned in practical reason also refers to a possible object at which practical reason aims. Walsh mistakenly concentrates on the unconditionality attached to moral imperatives and ignores the unconditioned that is present in the concept of the highest good. It is this latter unconditioned inherent in the object of moral reason that is identical to the unconditioned which is the object of theoretical reason. It is of significance that the highest good is the object of practical reason but it is not the determining ground of the will.14 N 0 object can be the determining ground of the will- The moral law alone is the ground for making the highest good the object of the will. Both the moral law and the highest good are thus unconditioned but in different respects. Therefore, Walsh's claim that the unconditioned of theoretical reason differs from the unconditioned of practical reason is based on a false comparison. The unconditioned is treated identically by theoretiical and practical reason if the comparison locates the practically unconditioned in the highest good and not in the moral law.15 It remains to be seen how the ambiguity in the definition of the highest good plays a part in the grounding of the practical antinomy. The issue now concerns how the practical antinomy arises out of this ambiguity in the definition of the highest good. Kant states the antinomy of practical reason in the following way: "the desire for happiness must be the motive to maxims of virtue, or the maxim of virtue must be the efficient cause of happiness."16 The antinomy has to do with a relationship between the maxims of virtue and happiness. If>the ambiguity in the definition of the highest good gives rise to the practical antinomy, then there, must be some way of connecting the two definitions of the highest good with the explicit subject matter of the antinomy which is the relationship between the maxims of virtue and happiness. Kant clearly suggests how the two definitions of the highest good-^are connected with the subject matter of the antinomy, and thus he implies that a confusion about the idea of the unconditioned lies at 117

the base of the practical antinomy. The highest good can refer either to a supreme good (a condition subordinate to no other) or to a perfect good (a whole not part of a larger whole of the same kind). Kant claims that the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason has shown that virtue is the supreme good but that this does not imply that virtue is the entire and perfect good as the object of the faculty of desire of rational finite beings. For this, happiness is also required.1' Kant says that virtue is the supreme good while virtue and happiness together are the perfect good. The first definition of the highest good (i.e., the supreme good) refers to virtue whereas the second definition of the highest good (i.e., the perfect good) requires both virtue and happiness. After Kant identifies virtue with the supreme good and virtue and happiness with the perfect good, a change seems to occur with regard to the use made of the term "the highest good." Up until this point, the highest good has been seen to be ambiguous and to refer to either a supreme or a perfect good. After Kant indicates that for rational finite beings both virtue and happiness are required for the perfect good, the term "the highest good" applies no longer to the supreme good but only to the perfect good. Kant says: Inasmuch as virtue and happiness together constitute the possession of the highest good for one person . . . the highest good means the whole, the perfect good, wherein virtue is always the supreme good.m In other words, once the supreme good is identified as virtue and the perfect good is identified as virtue and happiness together, the highest good is seen to properly refer to the perfect good. Several crucial observations can be made here as a result of the identifying of the supreme good with virtue and of the perfect good with virtue and happiness. First, the supreme good is apparently contained in the perfect good. Kant states that the highest good means the perfect good wherein virtue is 118

the supreme good.19 The perfect good is not distinct from the supreme good but in fact contains the supreme good. Second, since the perfect good involves both virtue and happiness, its form is necessarily one of combination or synthesis.20 That is, the concept of the perfect good must make clear the connection (which Kant says must be causal connection) between virtue and happiness. Third and most important, the ambiguity in the concept of the highest good is resolved prior to the exposition of the antinomy of practical reason. The highest good can mean either the supreme or the perfect good, but Kant claims that for finite rational beings, the highest good means the perfect good. In a sense then, the ambiguity in the concept of the highest good is the result of an error rather than indicative of an unresolvable confusion. For finite rational beings, the two senses of the highest good are soon shown to refer to an inadequate definition of the highest good (the supreme good, i.e., virtue) and an adequate definition of the highest good (the perfect good, i.e., virtue and happiness). In a way, the ambiguity in the idea of the unconditioned which constitutes the theoretical antinomies is eliminated prior to the exposition of the practical antinomy. A question remains concerning why the ambiguity in the idea of the highest good is able to be eliminated prior to the practical antinomy. The highest good in the dialectic of practical reason is said to be the perfect good and not the supreme good. Why is the supreme good (virtue) inadequate for the concept of the highest good? Two reasons why virtue is not treated as the highest good can be proposed. As Kant mentions, virtue has been discussed in the Analytic and has been shown to be the supreme good. In other words, the possibility that virtue is the highest good for practical reason has already been considered in the Analytic. Virtue is defined there as the unending progress of practical reason's maxims toward its model which is the concept of holiness.21 Virtue, insofar as it is the emulation of the concept of holiness, is the object of practical reason. Kant says later in the Analytic that "morality, subjectively passing over into holiness, would cease to be virtue. "22 virtue then is the object of practical reason because by means of it the practical subject recognizes himself as a member of a moral realm and as an imitation of the holy will. Consequently, the pos119

sibility that virtue is the highest good for practical reason has been dealt with in the Analytic. But it is not enough to claim that the ambiguity in the concept of the highest good is eliminated prior to the antinomy because one side of the ambiguity was considered in the Analytic. The reason why the supreme good is not the highest good cannot be merely that the supreme good was already dealt with in the Analytic. Surely the ambiguity is not eliminated solely because the supreme good and the perfect good are considered in different sections of the second Critique. There must be found some further explanation of why virtue is not treated as the highest good in the dialectic of practical reason. The crucial reason why the ambiguity in the concept of the highest good is able to be resolved prior to the antinomy is that virtue is not sufficient by itself to be the highest object for finite rational creatures. Kant points already in the Analytic to certain characteristics of practical finite beings which make it impossible for them to focus on virtue alone as their object. Kant says that holiness is an ideal which finite rational beings should strive to imitate. If a being, through the exercise of virtue, could ever attain to this ideal (which he cannot), then he would be free from desires that conflict with the moral law. Creatures, says Kant, can never attain holiness because creatures are never wholly free from desires and inclinations that have physical causes.23 Thus, virtue, as the emulation of holiness, ignores the inescapability of man's desires and inclinations. Virtue, as man's attempt to imitate holiness, inadequately represents practical reason's highest object because it ignores the desires and inclinations typical of practical beings. In short, virtue by itself is not the highest good since it fails to take into account the desires and inclinations characteristic of practical beings. Thus, virtue is not the highest good and the ambiguity in the concept of the highest good is resolved prior to the antinomy because virtue does not adequately account for the nature of the object of finite, rational, and practical beings. A further point of interest is that the ambiguity in the object of practical reason is not structurally analogous to the ambiguity in the object of theoretical reason. In theoretical reason, the two definitions of the unconditioned are independent of each 120

other. In practical reason, the two senses of the highest good are not mutually exclusive. For theoretical reason, the ambiguity occurs between two senses of the unconditioned both of which are self-subsisting. Practical reason contains an ambiguity between two senses of the highest good: one of which is inadequate to the concept of the highest good and one of which is adequate to the concept of the highest good. Specifically, in theoretical reason, the ambiguity in the idea of the unconditioned concerns a highest member and an infinite series. In practical reason, the ambiguity in the concept of the highest good concerns virtue and a necessary connection between virtue and happiness. The ambiguity characteristic of practical reason is not a "real" ambiguity in that its two definitions of the highest good do not stand independently and exclusively apart. The ambiguity typical of theoretical and practical reason was seen to involve a contrast between a highest member and a completed whole. Yet, when it is clear that practical reason includes the highest member (virtue) in the whole (virtue and happiness), then it is evident that there are no further parallels between the structures of the ambiguities in the two employments of reason. It is possible to ask whether the ambiguity in the concept of the highest good can account for the origin of the practical antinomy. Certainly it does not explain the origin of the practical antinomy in the way that the ambiguity in the idea of the unconditioned explains the origin of the theoretical antinomies. Still, the ambiguity in the concept of the highest good does function as the conceptual origin of the practical antinomy, and it does make intelligible the resulting structure of the antinomy. The antinomy, which concerns the connection between virtue and happiness, is made necessary by the ambiguity in the concept of the highest good. The ambiguity is resolved when the perfect good is shown to be the highest good for finite rational beings who are practical, and the antinomy arises because of the need to determine the connection between virtue and happiness in the highest good. The practical antinomy does have to do with the definition of the highest good but its work can begin only after the initial ambiguity in the concept of the highest good is resolved. The following section will consider the structure of the practical antinomy. In particular, it will show how the structure of the antinomy is intelligible 121

in terms of the ambiguity in the concept of the highest good which gives rise to the antinomy. The practical antinomy will again be discussed in comparison to the theoretical antinomies but this time from the point of view of structure. The Structure of the Antinomy The structure of the practical antinomy is related in an integral way to the origin of the antinomy. The structure of the antinomy is determined by the conflict which gives rise to the antinomy. In a sense then, the structure of any antinomy can be seen as a result of that which caused the antinomy to arise. By comparing the structures of the theoretical antinomies and the practical antinomy, certain observations can be made regarding the ambiguities which give rise to the antinomies. The structure of the practical antinomy will be shown to be completely unlike the structure of the theoretical antinomies. This section will first discuss the structural differences between the theoretical and the practical antinomies in terms of how the ambiguity which grounds both types of antinomies can enable them to exhibit such different structures. Secondly, this section will consider several other structural points of comparison between the theoretical and the practical antinomies which indicate the structural uniqueness of the practical antinomy. Kant states the practical antinomy concisely: "the desire for happiness must be the motive to maxims of virtue, or the maxim of virtue must be the efficient cause of happiness."24 He later restates the two propositions in the antinomy as follows: "striving for happiness produces a ground for a virtuous disposition . . . [or] a virtuous disposition necessarily produces happiness."25 clearly, the practical antinomy is structured as a conflict between two propositions each of which asserts a causal connection between virtue and happiness. The last section revealed that virtue and happiness become the subject matter of the antinomy because of the ambiguity in the concept of the highest good. The two senses of the highest good were defined as the supreme good (virtue) and the perfect good (virtue and happiness). For finite rational beings who are practical only the perfect good adequately reflects the concept of the highest good, and consequently, practical reason is left with the problem of defining the synthetic 122

connection between virtue and happiness in the concept of the highest good. Thus, the structure of the practical antinomy, as a conflict between two statements of causal connection, can be seen to directly follow from the ambiguity present in the concept of the highest good. It was suggested in the previous section that the same ambiguity in the idea of the unconditioned grounds the theoretical and the practical antinomies. At the origin of both types of antinomies lies a confusion in the idea of the unconditioned (called by practical reason "the highest good"). If the theoretical and practical antinomies share this common origin, then it is natural to assume that their structures will be similar. Since the structures of the two types of antinomies are singularly unalike, it is crucial to discuss their different structures with a view toward explaining how the shared origin of the antinomies results in such different structures. As Chapter Two revealed, the structure of the theoretical antinomies can be understood as a reflection of the two senses of the unconditioned which appear in what is here called the "ambiguity" of theoretical reason. The theoretical antinomies in their most basic form concern a conflict between the two senses of the unconditioned. The theses assert one definition of the unconditioned (the unconditioned is a highest member) and the antitheses assert the other definition of the unconditioned (the unconditioned is an infinite series). No such parallel is found in the practical antinomy. The two senses of the highest good do not account for the structure of the practical antinomy in the way that the two senses of the unconditioned ground the structure of the theoretical antinomies. The practical antinomy is not a simple conflict between a thesis claiming one definition of the highest good (the highest good is virtue; originarium) and an antithesis claiming the other definition of the highest good (the highest good is virtue and happiness; perfectissimum). Obviously, the ambiguity in the idea of the highest good grounds the structure of the practical antinomy in a way completely unlike the way the ambiguity in the idea of the unconditioned grounds the structure of the theoretical antinomies. There is one feature of the ambiguity in the concept of the highest good which seems to explain why 123

the structure of the practical antinomy differs from the structure of the theoretical antinomies. As the previous section showed, the two senses of the highest good are not mutually exclusive in the way that the two senses of the unconditioned seem to be. Theoretical reason sets these two definitions of the unconditioned in contrast to one another as if the two are incompatible. Practical reason suggests that the two definitions of the highest good are neither mutually exclusive (the perfect good contains the supreme good) nor do they stand in contrast to one * another (since one definition is inadequate and the other is adequate). In short, the ambiguity in the idea of the unconditioned serves a different purpose in theoretical reason than it does in practical reason. The theoretical antinomies owe their structure directly to the contrast between two types of unconditioned. The practical antinomy owes its structure not directly to the ambiguity between two types of the highest good but to reason's attempt to explicate the nature of the adequate sense of the highest good. Briefly stated, there is one extra step in the dialectic of practical reason which does not occur in the dialectic of theoretical reason. For practical reason, there is a step between the ambiguity in the object of practical reason and the antinomy. This extra step allows for a judgment to be made about the ambiguity. Theoretical reason, by contrast, proceeds from the ambiguity in the idea of the unconditioned straight to the antinomies which illustrate the contrasts between the two senses of the unconditioned. Practical reason begins with the same ambiguity that characterizes theoretical reason. But because practical reason judges the senses of the highest good not to be mutually exclusive and not to stand in contrast to one another, the structure of the practical antinomy arises from a different source. The extra step that occurs between the ambiguity in the object of practical reason and the practical antinomy seems to be the addition of the phrase "the object of the faculty of desire of rational finite beings." It appears to be this qualification which enables practical reason to judge that the highest good in fact refers to the perfect good and not to the supreme good.26 The ambiguity in the object of practical reason is resolved when it is pointed out that 124

the search is for "the object of the faculty of desire of rational finite beings."27 The ambiguity in the object of practical reason can be eliminated if the object is restricted to an object for the faculty of desire in rational finite beings. Consequently, the two senses of the highest good do not stand in conflict to each other because the restriction that the object of practical reason be an object of desire for rational finite beings makes one sense of the highest good inadequate. Because the object of practical reason must be an object for the faculty of desire in rational finite beings, there are no longer two possible senses of the highest good but only one adequate definition and one inadequate definition. Thus, it appears to be the addition of the phrase "the object of the faculty of desire of rational finite beings" that eliminates the ambiguity in the object of practical reason prior to the practical antinomy. Clearly, the structure of the theoretical antinomies illustrates the contrast between the two senses of the unconditioned. ^The structure of the practical antinomy reflects two ways of interpreting the adequate sense of the highest good. That is, practical reason drops the sense of the highest good as supreme good (originarium) because of its inadequacy as a practical object for rational finite beings. The object of practical reason is the perfect good which involves a necessary connection between virtue and happiness. The practical antinomy develops as two apparently conflicting ways of interpreting the necessary connection between virtue and happiness. The practical antinomy debates between two different ways of understanding the causal connection between virtue and happiness (i.e., either happiness produces a ground for virtue or virtue necessarily produces happiness). Two points need to be reiterated after this attempt to account for the different structures of the theoretical and practical antinomies. First, the fact that the structure of the practical antinomy differs from the structure of the theoretical antinomies does not negate the earlier claim that they have a common origin. Both theoretical and practical reason are characterized by an ambiguity which is stated in nearly identical terms in the dialectics of theoretical and practical reason. This ambiguity between senses of the unconditioned is typical of both theoretical and practical reason and functions as that which gives rise to their antinomies. In both theoretical and 125

practical reason, it is this ambiguity in the idea of the unconditioned which is the motivating force behind the conflicts of reason with itself. Second, this common point of origin of the antinomies appears to be their strongest point of similarity. At the beginning of this chapter it was suggested that apart from their common point of origin, the theoretical and practical antinomies are essentially different. Already it is clear that practical reason resolves the ambiguity in its object in a way that theoretical reason does not. The ambiguity typical of theoretical and practical reason grounds the structure of the theoretical antinomies in a much more direct way than ip grounds the structure of the practical antinomy. Thus, it would be incorrect to infer too great a degree of similarity between the theoretical and practical antinomies on the basis of their shared origin. Several additional observations can be made concerning the structure of the practical antinomy. First, one obvious fact about the structure of the practical antinomy is that it is not stated in the form of a logical contradiction. The antinomy reads: "the desire for happiness must be the motive to maxims of virtue, or the maxim of virtue must be the efficient cause of happiness."28 Certainly the statements "the desire for happiness must be the motive of virtue" and "virtue must be the efficient cause of happiness" do not stand in logical contradiction to one another. In Chapter One, it was shown that the structure of the theoretical antinomies in their simplest form could be labeled "X" and "not-X."29 These logical labels cannot be applied to the two propositions in the practical antinomy since the two propositions do not stand to one another as "X" and "not-X." There is no logical contradiction between the statements "the desire for happiness produces a ground for virtue" and "virtue necessarily produces happiness." One reason why there is no logical contradiction between the two propositions in the practical antinomy is that the propositions both assert positive causal connection. Both of the propositions in the practical antinomy claim that a certain causal relationship exists between virtue and happiness. The goal of the antinomy is to discover what type of causal relationship links virtue and happiness. Thus, the two propositions in the antinomy assert a causal connection between virtue and happiness. The two propositions are not logically contradictory because one is the 126

inverse of the other. One proposition states that "happiness produces a ground for virtue." The inverse proposition states that "virtue necessarily produces happiness." ^f_ the propositions in the practical antinomy were logically contradictory, they would appear in one of the two following forms: Happiness produces a ground for virtue, or happiness does not produce a ground for virtue. Virtue necessarily produces happiness, or virtue does not necessarily produce happiness. But the practical antinomy states neither of these two conflicts. The practical antinomy involves no logical contradiction because there is no logical conflict between its claims that happiness produces virtue and virtue necessarily produces happiness. Kant however does believe that the practical antinomy exhibits the "conflict of a practical reason with itself."30 He refers to "the self-contradictions of pure practical reason"31 that must be resolved in the dialectic of practical reason. Although the propositions in the practical antinomy are not logically contradictory in the way that the claims of the theoretical antinomies are, they are contradictory, says Kant, in a certain sense. Kant's reason for calling the conflict of practical reason an "antinomy" can be traced to his claim that the practical antinomy exhibits a type of contradiction. The structure of the theoretical antinomies in their simplest form can be labeled "X or ^X." The theoretical antinomies form a strict disjunction in which one term is the negation of the other. The structure of the practical antinomy is "(H •+ V) or (V •+ H) " where H = happiness and V = virtue. The practical antinomy too is stated as a disjunction but this time, the members of the disjunction are not logically contradictory. The theoretical antinomies manifest the strong "or" in that both disjuncts apparently cannot be true. If "X" is true, then "%X" is false; and if "X" isl, false, then "MC" must be true (and similarly with 'vX") . The practical antinomy, however, seems to utilize the weak "or." The two disjuncts may not exhaust all the possibilities and there is no logical reason why both cannot be true. In this 127

case, if one of the disjuncts is true, it is impossible to conclude anything about the truth or falsity of the other disjunct. Yet, if one disjunct is false, the truth of the other can be stated with certainty. Now, what is of significance about the disjunctions in the theoretical and practical antinomies is the way they manifest contradiction. Kant says in his Logic that disjunctive judgments have a peculiar character. He says: The members of a disjunction are altogether problematic judgments of which nothing else is thought but that they, taken together, are equal to the sphere of the whole as parts of the sphere of a cognition. . . . In one of these problematic judgments must be contained the truth . . . because outside of these judgments the sphere of cognition under the given conditions comprises nothing else, and one is opposed to the other; consequently, there can be true neither anything else outside them, nor more than one among them.JZ

,

It seems therefore that Kant does not recognize the weak sense of "or" that characterizes the practical antinomy. Kant implies that a disjunctive judgment is subject to the principle of excluded middle. He claims that a disjunctive judgment includes as its members opposite judgments which together form a^whole. Only one of these opposite judgments in a disjunctive judgment can be true. Thus, Kant characterizes disjunctive judgments in such a way as to require the operation of the principle of excluded middle. Consequently, both the theoretical and the practical antinomies are disjunctions, and as such, they both imply the principle of excluded middle. Kant specifically links disjunctive syllogisms with the principle of excluded middle in section §78 of the Logic. The two opposite disjuncts in the theoretical antinomies serve to define a whole and only one of the two can be true. It is immediately evident that "X" and "^x" are opposite judgments which "together occupy the whole sphere of the knowledge in question."33 The theoretical antinomies illustrate a logical contradiction between mutually exclusive propositions.

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Kant's belief is that the disjunction in the practical antinomy reveals a similar type of contradiction between two mutually exclusive propositions. He states in the section prior to the practical antinomy that virtue and happiness constitute the highest good and that the relation between the two is one of causal connection. On these grounds, the disjuncts in the antinomy (H •+ V) and (V -»• H) together represent the whole sphere of the knowledge in question. Because the principle of excluded middle seems to function in all disjunctions, the two disjuncts in the practical antinomy represent the whole sphere of knowledge of the highest good and one (but only one) of them must be true. Thus, the propositions in the practical antinomy do not seem to be logically contradictory in the same way that the propositions in the theoretical antinomies are logically contradictory. Without the addition of the principle of excluded middle, the practical antinomy appears not to be contradictory. Nevertheless, it is clear that within Kant's discussion of disjunctive judgments, both the theoretical and the practical antinomies manifest contradictoriness in that only one of two mutually exclusive propositions can be true. L. W. Beck notes that the propositions in the practical antinomy are not contradictory, and from this, he concludes that the practical antinomy is not an antinomy "in any strict sense."34 Beck claims that in spite of his [Kant's] statement that he is concerned with the "selfcontradiction of pure practical reason," the two propositions are not contradictories. 35 Beck correctly observes that there is no strict logical contradiction between the propositions in the / practical antinomy. But he fails to notice that with the addition of the principle of excluded middle, Kant is able to show that of the two mutually exclusive propositions, one (but only one) is true. As for Beck's further claim that the practical antinomy cannot strictly be called an antinomy, it has been argued in Chapter One that the practical antinomy is unique. If by antinomy "in a strict sense" Beck means a strict logical contradiction of reason with itself, then surely, the practical antinomy does not qualify as an antinomy. (Beck does point to two other peculiarities of the practical antinomy in order to 129

justify his conclusion that the practical antinomy is, not an antinomy in the strict sense. These other points will be considered in Chapter Five.) A second observation about the practical antinomy provides a second reason for why there is no strict logical contradiction between the two propositions in the practical antinomy. Not only are the two propositions in the antinomy asserting causal connection but they are asserting different types of causal connection. That is, the practical antinomy does not state: happiness produces virtue or virtue produces happiness. Instead it states: i the desire for happiness must be the motive to (die Bewegursache) maxims of virtue, or the maxim of virtue must be the efficient cause of (die wirkende Ursache) happiness.36 The causality that the practical antinomy is concerned with is not a univocal causality. The propositions in the practical antinomy claim that the desire for happiness must be the moving cause of virtue or virtue must be the efficient cause of happiness. There is no contradiction between these propositions because one asserts that the desire for happiness exerts moving causality while the other asserts that the maxim of virtue exerts efficient causality. There seems to be no contradiction and in fact no conflict at all between the statements "the desire for happiness must be the Bewegursache of virtue" and "the maxim of vir»* tue must be the wirkende Ursache of happiness." To this extent, there is no conflict of reason with itself. The disparity can be noted in two features of the practical antinomy. First, there is the difference already alluded to between "Bewegursache" and "wirkende Ursache." It is certainly of significance that Kant employs two different words to talk about the causality in the antinomy. Kant must have intended to refer to different types of causality because of the fact that he chose two different words to refer to that causality. Kant has shattered the obvious parallelism of the practical antinomy by choosing to employ two different words for the causality in question. Now, the reason for the employment of these two terms for causality unfortunately escapes the English reader. "Bewegursache" and "wirkende Ursache" both translate, 130

into the more or less equivalent English words "moving cause" and "efficient cause." Although the particular difference between these two terms is apparently lost, still the fact that Kant has employed two terms to refer to the causality in the practical antinomy means that two different types of causality may be present in the practical antinomy. (Neither Eisler's Kantlexicon^ 1 nor Mellin's Encyclopädisches Wörterbuch Der Kritischen Philosophie^ make any mention of the distinction between "Bewegursache" and "wirkende Ursache.") The second factor which may destroy the parallelism of the practical antinomy is the reference to the "desire" for happiness and to the "maxim" of virtue. A question arises as to whether the "desire" for happiness is an appropriate correlate to the "maxim" of virtue. Assume for a moment that "Bewegursache" and "wirkende Ursache" are synonymous terms meaning efficient cause. The two statements of the antinomy would then read: the desire for happiness must be the efficient cause of the maxims of virtue, or the maxim of virtue must be the efficient cause of happiness. It can be asked whether the "desire for happiness" and the "maxim of virtue" are efficient causes in any analogous way. Does the "desire for happiness" have the same kind of acting force or moving causality that the "maxim of virtue" has? Surely, it is not selfevident that a "desire" and a "maxim" can act in analogous ways as efficient causes. It is at least questionable whether the desire for happiness can act as an efficient cause in the same way that the maxim of virtue acts as an efficient cause. Kant may intend the "desire" for happiness and the "maxim" of virtue to refer to comparable practical principles. In the Critique of Practical Reason, the desire for happiness is identified with subjective grounds of determination and it is set in contrast to the practical law.39 Kant similarly defines a maxim as a subjective practical principle and opposes it to the practical law which is an objective practical principle.40 It may be that the "desire" for happiness and the "maxim" of virtue are analogous subjective practical principles, and as such, both evidence the same type of causal efficacy. Nevertheless, the explicit statement of the practical antinomy does not make clear the relation between a "desire" and a "maxim." Because of this failure, there may be a

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possible disparity between the types of causality provided by each. A related fact about the practical antinomy has to do with what is said about happiness. The antinomy states: the desire for happiness must be the motive to maxims of virtue, or the maxim of virtue must be the efficient cause of happiness (my emphasis). Either the desire for happiness causes the maxim of virtue or the maxim of virtue causes happiness. Again, the statement of the practical antinomy reveals the lack of conflict between its two statements since one speaks of the desire for happiness and the other speaks of happiness. These two features of the practical antinomy illustrate the difficulty involved in trying to interpret the structure of the practical antinomy. Both types of difference, that between "Bewegursache" and "wirkende Ursache" and that between "the desire for happiness" and the "maxim of virtue," suggest that the practical antinomy is not a simple conflict between two propositions. Consequently, the structure of the practical antinomy is revealed to be unlike the structure of the theoretical antinomies in that there is no conflict of reason with itself. As a final point, certain conclusions follow from this comparison of the theoretical and the practical antinomies. From the point of view of structure, it may be argued that the practical antinomy can be understood as a development of the theoretical antinomies.~""v' In their simplest form, the theoretical antinomies are structured as a debate between two different definitions of the unconditioned. Theoretical reason when confronted with these two definitions of its highest object determines that it is in conflict with itself. The antinomies are structured as contradictions which reflect the fact that theoretical reason is in conflict with itself. The suggestion here is» that it is possible to interpret the practical antinomy as a development of the theoretical antinomies. In a sense, the practical antinomy develops out of the problems raised by the theoretical antinomies. Even more, the practical antinomy represents a more highly evolved antinomy, and as such, it can be seen as a further application of the issues first raised in the theoretical antinomies. Briefly stated, the practical antinomy does 132

not mirror the theoretical antinomies because it instead builds on the theoretical antinomies. The claim here is that the practical antinomy makes an advance over the theoretical antinomies. In concrete terms, the advance occurs due to the additional consideration that the object of the highest good must be an object for "the faculty of desire of rational finite beings." Practical reason with the addition of this practical limitation redirects reason's search for the unconditioned. Theoretical reason has abstractly considered that to which the definition of the unconditioned may apply. Practical reason by adding a practical limit (that the object must be an object for the faculty of desire of rational finite beings) effectively redirects the concerns of the theoretical antinomies and concentrates on a possible relationship between the two definitions of the unconditioned. Practical reason limits the ideas of the unconditioned to ideas that are practically possible for finite rational beings. By doing so, the notion of the unconditioned becomes more concretely developed by the practical antinomy than it was by the theoretical antinomies. Because the unconditioned need not be either a highest member or a whole series (as the resolutions of the theoretical antinomies show) it may be a relationship between the two (as the practical antinomy considers). In more ordinary terms, the practical antinomy can be understood as an advance over the theoretical antinomies because it considers the possible relation between definitions previously thought to be mutually exclusive. Theoretical reason began from the assumption that the two definitions of the unconditioned were incompatible and in fact contradictory. The resolutions of the third and fourth theoretical antinomies show that the two definitions of the unconditioned can both be true. The two definitions of the unconditioned are only apparent contradictories. The third and fourth theoretical antinomies resolve this apparent contradiction by assigning one sense of the unconditioned to the noumenal world and the other sense of the unconditioned to the phenomenal world. The only way that theoretical reason can acknowledge or explain its two senses of the unconditioned is by assigning them to different worlds. Now, practical reason discovers a more satisfactory solution to the problem of the relationship 133

between the two senses of the unconditioned. The task of practical reason, understood as a continuation of the task of theoretical reason, is to reconcile these two definitions of the unconditioned. Speaking anthropomorphically, practical reason has "learned" from theoretical reason that the definitions of the unconditioned are not contradictory but neither can they be brought together "in one world" by theoretical reason. Practical reason in its antinomy finds that it can bring together the two senses of the unconditioned for practically rational, finite beinas. With the addition of this practical limitation (that the object must be an object for the faculty of desire of rational finite beings), practical reason can accomplish what theoretical reason was unable to accomplish, namely, the reconciling of reason's two ideas of its highest object. The practical antinomy shows that the two senses of the unconditioned can be related to each other in the practical world for practically rational, finite beings. It is this relating of the two senses of the unconditioned in the practical world that represents practical reason's "advance" over theoretical reason. The claim made here is that in this light the practical antinomy can be understood as building on the conclusions of the theoretical antinomies. The antinomy of practical reason could not occur systematically before the antinomies of theoretical reason because it arises as a development and as a further application of the conflicts which are first of all theoretical.

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ENDNOTES Recall that Kant himself does not refer to the two definitions of the unconditioned as constituting an ambiguity. See pages 48-9. 1

2 Kants Gesammelte Schriften (Königlich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften; hereafter referred to as KGS), V (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1913), 106-7; translation by Lewis White Beck, Critique of Practical Reason (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1956), p. 111. 3

KGS, V, 107; translation by Beck, p. 111.

4

Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 239. KGS, V, 108; translation by Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 112. Klaus Düsing, "Das Problem des höchsten Gutes in Kants praktischer Philosophie," Kant-Studien, 62 (1971), 32. KGS, V, 109; translation by Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 113. o

KGS, V, 110; translation by Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 114. q W. H. Walsh, "Kant's Concept of Practical Reason," Practical Reason, ed. S. Körner (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 201. 10

Walsh, p. 201.

The enumeration that follows is mine not Walsh's. 12

Walsh, p. 200.

13

Walsh, p. 201.

14

K G S , V, 109; Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 113. W. T. Jones notes that Kant uses the uncondi135

tioned in the second Critique to refer both to the object of practical reason and to the necessity attaching to moral commands. Jones says, in Morality and Freedom in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 70, that: "Kant unfortunately and quite unnecessarily uses the same expressions to describe the unconditioned character of this [necessary] end that he uses to describe the categorical form which some acts have." Jones too would recognize that Walsh's discussion of the unconditioned is based on a false comparison. KGS, V, 113; translation by Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 117-8. KGS, V, 110; translation by Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 114. 18 K G S , V, 110-1; translation by Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 115.

KGS; V, 110-1; Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 115. 20 K G S , V, 112-3; Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 117.

21

. . KGS, V, 32; Beck, Critique of Practical Reason,

p. 33. 22 KGS, V, 84; translation by Beck, Critique of ^ Practical Reason, p. 87. 23 .. KGS, V, 84; Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 86. 24 KGS, V, 113; translation by Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 117-8. 25 KGS, V, 114; translation by Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 119. 26 K G S , V, 110-1; Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 115. 27 KGS, V, 110; Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 114. 28 KGS, V, 113; translation by Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 117-8. 136

29 See pages 14-5. 30 KGS, V, 115;_translation by Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 119. KGS, V, 109; translation by Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 113. 32 K G S , IX (Berlin and Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1923), 107; translation by Robert S. Hartman and Wolfgang Schwarz, Logic (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1974), p. 113. •5-3

A73/B99; translation by Norman Kemp Smith, Critique of Pure Reason (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965). 34 Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, p. 247. 35 Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, p. 247. 36 K G S , V, 113; translation by Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 117-8. 37 Rudolf Eisler, Kant-lexikon; Nachschlagewerk zu Kants sämtlichen Schriften, Briefen und handschriftlichem Nachlass (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1961). 38 Georg Samuel Albert Mellin, Encyclopädisches Wörtenbuch Der Kritischen Philosophie, V, Part 2 (180 3; rpt. Bruxelles: Culture et Civilisation, 1968), and I, Part 2 (1798; rpt. Bruxelles: Culture et Civilisation, 1968). 39 p. 24 KGS, V, 25; Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, 40 KGS, V, 19; Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, 17.

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^v

138

CHAPTER V THE RESOLUTION OF THE PRACTICAL ANTINOMY The goals of this chapter are twofold. In the first place, the structural resolution of the practical antinomy must be stated and then compared to the resolution of the theoretical antinomies. By diagramming the structure of the practical antinomy in its logical form, the nature of its resolution can be revealed. The diagram of the structure of the practical antinomy shows both what is required for the resolution of the practical antinomy and how this resolution compares to the resolution of the theoretical antinomies. The explicit point to be made by this chapter is that the resolution of the practical antinomy is unique; that is, it is unlike any of the types of solutions to the theoretical antinomies. Yet, the very possibility of the resolution of the practical antinomy depends on the prior resolution of the theoretical antinomies. The primary aim of this chapter is to focus attention on the relationship between the resolutions of the theoretical and the practical antinomies. In the second place, this chapter supports a more far-reaching claim about the nature of the relationship between the theoretical and the practical antinomies. This comparison of the solutions to the theoretical and practical antinomies is of significance both in itself and for what it may imply about the relation between theoretical and practical reason. The antinomies provide the location for an extensive consideration of the relationship between theoretical and practical reason. The implicit goal of this chapter is to suggest that the antinomies and their respective resolutions make intelligible the relation between theoretical reason and practical reason. This comparison of the resolutions of the theoretical and practical antinomies shows that to an extent the practical antinomy depends on the theoretical antinomies. The practical antinomy's indebtedness to the theoretical antinomies may reflect a similar indebtedness on the part of practical reason to theoretical reason. In short, the comparison of the theoretical and practical antinomies reveals a certain harmonious relationship between theoretical and practical reason. In any case, the resolution of the practical antinomy is

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grounded in and requires the prior resolution of the theoretical antinomies. The present concern is to analyze the resolution of the practical antinomy. To this end, the chapter will proceed in two sections. The first section entitled "The Structural Resolution of the Practical Antinomy" includes a diagram showing how the resolution of the practical antinomy is accomplished. It describes the resolution of the practical antinomy and points to the factors that make the resolution possible. The second section is entitled "The Resolution of the Practical Antinomy as it relates to the Resolution of the Theoretical Antinomies." In this section, the conclusion will be reached that the resolution of the practical antinomy is both unlike the resolution of the theoretical antinomies and dependent on the prior resolution of the theoretical antinomies. The Structural Resolution of the Practical Antinomy The practical antinomy was shown in Chapter Four to have as its origin the attempt to define the highest good. The highest good, which is the object of practical reason, is said to be the synthetic connection of virtue and happiness.! The antinomy arises as an attempt to determine precisely what type of synthetic connection is possible between virtue and happiness. The goal of the practical antinomy is thus not solely to resolve the conflict between its two propositions (striving for happiness produces virtue or virtue produces happiness) but also to discover which proposition insures that the highest good is a possible object for practical reason. Practical reason's "interest" in this antinomy is more than just the desire to eliminate the self-contradiction of its propositions. Practical reason intends to determine in the resolution of its antinomy the proper definition of the highest good. What is here being called practical reason's "interest" in the antinomy is significant because of the way it structures the resolution of the antinomy. Kant speaks in the second Critique of the interest of practical reason as equivalent to "moral interest."2 Moral interest is an interest in obedience to the law. This interest in obedience to the law does not conflict with what is here called practical reason's 140

"interest" in the resolution of its antinomy. Moral interest is practical reason's desire to carry out the moral law. What is here called practical reason's "interest" in the antinomy is practical reason's desire to establish an object for the moral law. Practical reason is not indifferent to the resolution of its antinomy since the resolution will determine whether or not the highest good is a possible object for practical reason. The moral law which commands that the highest good be furthered has been shown to be a fact of experience in the Analytic.3 Therefore, if the practical antinomy cannot be solved in such a way as to make the highest good a possible object, then the moral law (and practical reason's claim to objective reality) will be shown to be false. However, it may be suggested that practical reason's "interest" in the antinomy has no effect on the structuring of the practical antinomy since the structure of the practical antinomy resembles the structure of the mathematical antinomies of theoretical reason. Practical reason claims that if^ the highest good is a practical object then happiness causes virtue or virtue causes happiness. The mathematical antinomies of theoretical reason can be interpreted as claiming that _if_ the unconditioned is a theoretical object then it is the highest member of the series or it is the infinite series as a whole. The practical antinomy is resolved when both sides are shown to be impossible (unmöglich)4 and the mathematical antinomies are similarly resolved when both sides are shown to be false.5 Thus far, the resolution of the practical antinomy seems to be proceeding analogously to the resolution of the mathematical antinomies. The difference lies in the fact that practical reason is not satisfied with this conclusion that the highest good is not a practical object. Practical reason is already convinced prior to the antinomy that the highest good (the object of the moral law) must be a possible practical object, and thus the resolution which finds both definitions of the highest good to be impossible must be amended by further considerations. In short, the "interest" of practical reason requires that one side of the antinomy not be absolutely false. In contrast, theoretical reason is satisfied when both sides of the mathematical antinomies are said to be false. Theoretical reason has no "interest" in trying to confirm that the idea of the unconditioned is a possible theoretical object by adding further considerations. The resolution of the practical antinomy can

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be expected to proceed in an unusual way because of practical reason's underlying "interest" in establishing the highest good as the object of the moral law and of practical reason. As Kant says, theoretical reason's only interest consists in the knowledge of objects while practical reason's interest lies "in the determination of the will with respect to the final and perfect end."6 The interest of practical reason is said to have primacy over the interest of theoretical reason.? This interest of practical reason cannot be satisfied unless the highest good is shown to be a possible practical object. Another indication of the peculiar structure of the resolution of the practical antinomy is that the section in which both sides of the antinomy are said to be impossible is not the section called the "Critical Resolution of the Antinomy of Practical Reason."8 Apparently, the initial solving of the antinomy by showing both sides to be impossible is not an adequate resolution of the antinomy because it has not made the highest good a possible practical object. Nevertheless, this consideration of the solution to the practical antinomy will include both of the stages in the resolving of the antinomy. A final clue to the uniqueness of the resolution of the practical antinomy is given in the German text. Kant uses the phrase "kritische Entscheidung" to refer to the critical solution of the theoretical antinmies.9 Yet, he uses the phrase "kritische Aufhebung" to refer to the critical resolution of the practical antinomy.I" The difference between "Entscheidung" and "Aufhebung" may be reflected in the differences between the resolutions offered for the theoretical and the practical antinomies.H The resolving of the practical antinomy seems to begin in the following way at V, 113-4 (not yet called the Critical Resolution of the antinomy). The following diagram is employed as an aid for clarifying the structure of the solution to the antinomy and not as the complete logical formalization of the antinomy's structure.

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C = concept of the highest good H = happiness V = virtue 1. C •+ ( [H -i- V] v [V •* H] ) 2. (H ->- V) -• (p & ^p) 3 . M H -* V) 4 . (V -> H) ->-(p & ^ p ) 5 . M V •*• H) 6 . M [H -* V] V [V ->• H] ) 7 . -VC

MT MT Conj., MT

DM

Yet, C In ordinary terms, this diagram summarizes the solution of the practical antinomy insofar as both sides of the antinomy are said to be impossible (unmöglich) and false (falsch). Both sides of the antinomy ( [H ->• V] and [V -»- H] ) are false because they result in false or contradictory consequents. In spite of what the diagram seems to suggest, the contradictions that follow from (H •*• V) and (V •*• H) are not identical. (H -»• V) is false because if it were true it would contradict the moral law. (V •*• H) is false because if it were true it would contradict the laws of the sensible world. If neither type of causal connection is possible then the highest good is impossible. Finally, if the highest good is impossible then the moral law is an empty illusion. However, the Analytic has proven the fact of the moral law, 12 an< j that the object of the moral law is the highest good,13 a n d that virtue and happiness together constitute the highest good.l 4 In order to satisfy the "interest" of practical reason, the resolution of the antinomy is reconsidered with the goal of making possible the concept of the highest good. Kant does not state in the section "The Antinomy of Practical Reason" that the concept of the highest good is a possible practical object. That is, the structure of the solution diagrammed here reflects the explicit structure of the resolution except for the last step (Yet, C) which is an implicit part of the proof. In this section, Kant is speaking hypothetically of "C" but it is implicitly clear that "C" is to be the result of the resolution in order to insure the validity of the moral law. Thus although this first solution to the practical antinomy shows that "C" is an impossible concept, the critical resolution of the antinomy must dispel the apparent falseness 143

of both sides of the antinomy to guarantee the possibility of "C." The resolution is in a sense a twostep resolution. First, the apparent contradiction between the propositions in the antinomy is eliminated by showing both propositions to be false. (This first step is identical to the resolution of the mathematical antinomies of theoretical reason.) Second, the apparent falsity of the two propositions in the antinomy is eliminated to insure the practical possibility of the concept of the highest good. These two steps in the resolution of the practical antinomy indicate that the practical antinomy is in effect an antinomy within an antinomy. The "real" practical antinomy that is finally subject to a critical resolution is a modified version of what is stated to be the practical antinomy. There are two steps in the resolution of the antinomy because there are in fact two versions of the practical antinomy. The practical antinomy is first stated in the following way: C •+( [H -»• V] v [V -»• H]) . "C" is a hypothetical here; its truth or falsity is not known. The conflict between the claims (H •* V) and (V -*- H) is resolved when both sides are shown to be false. The modified version of the practical antinomy (which Kant apparently considers to be the "real" practical antinomy) formulates the antinomy in the same way but treats "C" not as a hypothetical but as a true statement. The conflict between (H -*• V) and (V -»• H) in this modified version of the antinomy is solved by means of the critical resolution which finds (V -+ H) to be true in a certain sense. Thus, the distinction between these two steps in the resolution of the practical antinomy makes possible a similar distinction between two versions of the practical antinomy and therefore supports the claim that the practical antinomy is an antinomy within an antinomy. There must be some considerations which make it possible for practical reason to achieve in its critical resolution what it was unable to achieve in the first step of its solution. Some factors apparently enable practical reason to move beyond the proof of the impossibility of "C." The discovery of these additional considerations will indicate the extent to which practical reason is indebted to theoretical reason. The second attempt to resolve the practical antinomy (i.e., the critical resolution) can effectively guarantee the possibility of "C" due to these factors it brings to bear on the antinomy. 144

The critical resolution of the practical antinomy which substantiates the "Yet, C" claim is described by Kant as follows: The first of the two propositions, viz., that striving for happiness produces a ground for a virtuous disposition, is absolutely false; the second, viz., that a virtuous disposition necessarily produces happiness, is not, however, absolutely false but false only in so far as this disposition is regarded as the form of causality in the world of sense. Consequently, it is false only if I assume existence in this world to be the only mode of existence of a rational being, and therefore it is only conditionally false.15 Thus, the claim that virtue produces happiness is only conditionally, not absolutely, false. "Virtue produces happiness" is conditionally false because it is false only in the sensible world. "Happiness produces virtue" is absolutely false because it conflicts with the moral law. If finite rational beings have a mode of existence in a world other than the sensible, then "virtue produces happiness" may be true in that other world. The establishing of the possibility of the highest good depends then on a distinction between a sensible and a nonsensible world. The concept of the highest good is a practical object because by postulating the existence of a nonsensible world, "virtue produces happiness" can be made true. As Kant says: we see ourselves obliged to seek at such distance—namely, in the context of an intelligible world—the possibility of the highest good.l° In short, the possibility of the highest good depends on reason's ability to distinguish between a sensible and a supersensible world. Thus, in one sense, the consideration which when added to the proof of the practical antinomy makes possible the highest good is the idea of an intelligible world. The antinomy is critically resolved when the idea of a nonsensible world makes one definition of the highest good possible. "Yet, C" is the result 145

of the critical resolution of the antinomy even though the proof structure of the antinomy shows "C" to be impossible in the world. The practical antinomy is resolved in a way that satisfies the "interest* of practical reason by the distinction between a sensible and an intelligible realm of experience. Kant says that "happiness produces virtue" is absolutely false but that "virtue produces happiness" is only conditionally false since if rational beings have a nonsensible mode of existence, then "virtue produces happiness" can be true.-*-' Kant speaks in an even more specific fashion about this idea of an intelligible world which insures the possibility of the highest good. Kant is concerned to show that the postulation of an intelligible world is not an arbitrary or an ungrounded assumption. In other words, the critical resolution of the antinomy includes a justification of the idea of an intelligible world. Since the idea of a nonsensible realm of experience guarantees the possibility of the highest good, it remains to ask what guarantees the possibility of this nonsensible realm of experience. In a sense then, the possibility of the highest good rests on this larger question concerning what grounds the possibility of an intelligible realm of experience. Kant says the following about what grounds the assumption of an intelligible world. But not only since I am justified in thinking of my existence as that of a noumenon in an intelligible world but also since I have in the moral law a pure intellectual determining ground of my causality (in the sensuous world), it is not impossible that the morality of intention should have a necessary relation as cause to happiness as an effect in the sensuous world; but this relation is indirect, mediated by an intelligible Author of nature.I" Kant points to several considerations that make possible the causal relation "virtue produces happiness" (and consequently that make possible the highest good). A restating of the above paragraph would read: "Virtue produces happiness" is not impossible since I can think myself as a noumenon, since the moral law shows a causal relation between the intelligible and 146

the sensible, and since an intelligible Author of nature mediates the "virtue produces happiness" relation. The three considerations which ground the possibility that virtue produces happiness are: the noumenal existence of rational beings, the fact of the moral law, and the existence of an intelligible Author of nature. The question remains as to what grounds these three considerations that guarantee the possibility of the highest good. Kant appeals to these three considerations as if they are established facts which can function in turn to establish the possibility of the highest good. Consequently, there must be grounds for introducing these three notions at this point. Kant appeals to noumenal existence, the moral law, and an intelligible Author of nature because their justification has been given in earlier parts of the critical system. These three notions can be used in the practical antinomy to insure the possibility of the highest good since the notions themselves have been guaranteed by previous arguments in the Critiques. Specifically, noumenal existence has been made possible in the third antinomy of theoretical reason. That antinomy showed that freedom and the laws of nature were both true if the intelligible world is distinguished from the sensible world. The third antinomy of theoretical reason made possible and grounded the notion of noumenal existence that appears in the resolution of the practical antinomy. Similarly, the moral law has been accounted for in the Analytic of Practical Reason. The moral law can function as a reason for concluding that "virtue produces happiness" is true because the moral law has been established in the Analytic as a fact of experience. Finally, an intelligible Author of nature has been made possible in the fourth antinomy and in the Ideal of theoretical reason. The fourth antinomy of theoretical reason makes possible the idea of a necessary being outside the world. Nothing in theoretical reason can prove the impossibility of this intelligible necessary being. Thus, again, these considerations (i.e., the moral law, and an intelligible Author of nature) that are brought forward to prove the possibility of the highest good have been previously justified by Kant. The three considerations which are necessary to 147

prove the possibility of the highest good have all been established in previous sections of the Critiques. It is of interest that the critical resolution of the practical antinomy depends to such a great extent on specific conclusions from earlier sections. Kant says that the critical resolution of the practical antinomy requires the postulation of an intelligible world.19 But more precisely, the resolution of the practical antinomy is shown to depend on the possibility of noumenal existence, of the moral law, and of an intelligible Author of nature. It is the third theoretical antinomy, the Analytic of Practical Reason, and the fourth theoretical antinomy and Ideal which serve respectively to prove the possibility of noumenal existence, the moral law, and an intelligible Author of nature. Then, noumenal existence, the moral law, and an intelligible Author of nature serve in turn to prove it is possible that "virtue produces happiness." Finally, since "virtue produces happiness" is true in a certain sense, the concept of the highest good is proven to be a possible practical object. The critical resolution of the practical antinomy rests on considerations from previous sections which confirm the possibility of an intelligible world. In sum, the resolution of the practical antinomy is structured in the following way. Kant first states that both sides of the antinomy ("happiness produces virtue" and "virtue produces happiness") are impossible, and thus, the highest good is impossible and the moral law is false. The diagram given previously in this section revealed the logical structure of this stage in the antinomy's resolution. Next, the critical resolution claimed that "happiness produces virtue" is absolutely false whereas "virtue produces happiness" is only conditionally false. On the assumption that sensible existence is not the only mode of existence, it may be true that "virtue produces happiness." This assumption of a supersensible world, which is necessary to make the highest good possible, is not an ungrounded supposition. Three considerations are offered which support practical reason's appeal to a supersensible world. Noumenal existence (made possible in the third theoretical antinomy) confirms the assumption of a supersensible world as do the moral law (proven in the Analytic of Practical Reason) and an intelligible Author of nature (made possible in the fourth theoretical antinomy). These three considerations confirm the notion of a supersensible world, and thus they strengthen the claim 148

that "virtue produces happiness" is only conditionally false and may be true. As Kant says: From this solution of the antinomy of practical pure reason, it follows that in practical principles a natural and necessary connection between the consciousness of morality and the expectation of proportionate happiness as its consequence may be thought at least possible, though it is by no means known or understood.20 The assumption of a supersensible world finds support from three considerations, and it in turn makes possible the "virtue produces happiness" connection. Finally, because it is possible that "virtue produces happiness," the concept of the highest good is made possible. This brings to an end the discussion of the structural aspects of the resolution of the practical antinomy. One point made here was that the proof showing both sides of the antinomy to be impossible represents a stage in the resolution of the antinomy. It is practical reason's "interest" in establishing the concept of the highest good that makes this first attempt to resolve the antinomy not satisfactory. Also, it was suggested here that the critical resolution of the antinomy depends to some extent on the third and fourth theoretical antinomies and on the Analytic of Practical Reason which offer support for practical reason's assumption of a supersensible world. The section to follow will consider in more detail how the resolution of the practical antinomy relates to the resolution of the theoretical antinomies. The Resolution of the Practical Antinomy as It Relates to the Resolution of the Theoretical Antinomies There are two major reasons for comparing the resolution of the practical antinomy to the resolution of the theoretical antinomies. One reason is to point out their similarities and differences. The resolution of the practical antinomy may be shown to be both similar to and different from the resolution of the theoretical antinomies. This comparing of the practical and theoretical resolutions makes it possible to judge whether or not the practical resolution is 149

unique. The second reason for comparing the resolutions of the practical and the theoretical antinomies is to reveal the role of the latter with regard to the former. The resolution of the theoretical antinomies plays a role in the resolving of the practical antinomy and this role can be revealed by a comparison of the two resolutions. Thus, the reasons for comparing the resolutions of the practical and the theoretical antinomies are to show their similarities and differences and to show what role the theoretical resolution plays in the practical resolution. Kant himself is interested in the relationship between the resolutions of the theoretical and the practical antinomies at least insofar as he notes a similarity between the two resolutions. He specifically compares the critical resolution of the practical antinomy to the resolution of the third theoretical antinomy. Kant says in the section called the "Critical Resolution of the Antinomy of Practical Reason": In the antinomy of pure speculative reason there is a similar conflict between natural necessity and freedom in the causation of events in the world. It was resolved by showing that there is no true conflict if the events and even the world in which they occur are regarded as only appearances (as they should b e ) . . . . It is just the same with the present antinomy of pure practical reason.21 Kant's point is that the third theoretical antinomy is resolved when a distinction is made between appearances and things in themselves. The third theoretical antinomy is resolved by showing that there is no true conflict between its claims if the distinction between phenomena and noumena is drawn. According to Kant, the resolution of the practical antinomy is just the same as the resolution of the third theoretical antinomy. The practical resolution is the same as the resolution of the third theoretical antinomy because both are accomplished by distinguishing between phenomena and noumena. Edward Caird reiterates Kant's point when he says of the practical antinomy:

150

It is an antinomy that can be solved, however, by the same distinction between phenomena and noumena which enabled us, in the Critique of Pure Reason, to get over the antinomy between natural necessity and freedom.22 Earlier discussions also substantiate Kant's claim that the resolution of the practical antinomy, like the resolution of the third theoretical antinomy, depends on separating the phenomenal from the noumenal (or the sensible from the supersensible)." Yet, several problems arise from this comparison which suggest that Kant may have oversimplified the relationship between the resolutions of the theoretical and the practical antinomies. One problem is why Kant chose to compare the practical resolution to the resolution of the third theoretical antinomy when in fact all the theoretical antinomies are solved by means of a distinction between appearances and things in themselves.24 The theoretical antinomies are resolved (all sides are false) when it is shown that they mistakenly treat their object as a thing in itself rather than as a possible appearance.25 Yet, the third and fourth antinomies also employ the phenomena/noumena distinction in a stronger sense as referring to realms of experience in which their conflicting claims can both be true. Perhaps Kant chose the resolution of the third antinomy because its claims were dynamical not mathematical. Assuming this to be the case, it can be asked how the resolution of the third antinomy is more like the resolution of the practical antinomy than is the resolution of the mathematical antinomies. Perhaps the resolution of the practical antinomy is just the same as the resolution of the third theoretical antinomy with regards to the truth or falsity of its claims. Another possibility is that the resolution of the practical antinomy is like the resolution of the third antinomy because the conflicting sides of the antinomy are assigned to different realms. All of these problems make it imperative to reconsider Kant's assertion that the resolution of the practical antinomy is just the same as the resolution of the third theoretical antinomy. The raising of these difficulties indicates that there may be more differ151

ences than similarities between the resolution of the practical antinomy and the resolution of the third theoretical antinomy. Specifically, since Kant chooses to compare the practical antinomy to the third theoretical antinomy, their similarities (and differences) must be considered in some detail. The problem is to determine why Kant identifies the resolution of the practical antinomy with the resolution of the third theoretical antinomy. One possibility is that the dynamical nature of the third antinomy makes its resolution a better pattern for the practical resolution than is the resolution of the mathematical antinomies. There are two characteristics typical of the resolution of the dynamical antinomies that may be reflected in the resolution of the practical antinomy. One factor typical of the resolution of the dynamical antinomies is that both thesis and antithesis are found to be true.2^ The third theoretical antinomy is resolved when both its conflicting claims are shown to be true. Clearly, it is not this point in the resolution of the third antinomy that leads Kant to say that the theoretical resolution functions as a pattern for the practical resolution. In the resolution of the practical antinomy it is not the case that both its conflicting claims are shown to be true. The critical resolution of the practical antinomy finds one side of the antinomy to be absolutely false and the other side to be conditionally false.27 To insure the possibility of the highest good, the resolution of the practical antinomy sees that the claim which is conditionally false is also true in a certain sense. Thus, the resolution of the practical antinomy ultimately shows that one of its claims is absolutely false and the other is true in a certain sense. In short, there is no similarity whatsoever between the resolutions of the dynamical antinomies and the practical antinomy with regard to the truth or falsity of their claims. There is only difference between the resolution of the third antinomy (both sides are true) and the resolution of the practical antinomy (one side is false, the other is true in a certain sense) in regard to the truth of their claims. Thus, Kant could not have been referring to this aspect of the resolution of the third antinomy when he stated that the practical antinomy's resolution was just like the third antinomy's resolution. 152

This point of difference between the resolution of the third antinomy and that of the practical antinomy has been noted by Victor Delbos. In his discussion of the practical antinomy, Delbos says: even though Kant works hard to present the solutions of these two antinomies [the third theoretical and the practical] as corresponding and symmetrical, in reality he institutes a new way of escaping from the conflict between the thesis and the antithesis.28 Delbos reiterates the conclusion of the previous paragraph. Although Kant claims there is similarity between the resolutions of the third theoretical and the practical antinomies, the similarity is not to be found in the way that their self-contradictory claims are reconciled. Kant in fact offers in the practical antinomy a new way of resolving the conflict between assertions. As Delbos suggests, it is only in the practical antinomy that the resolution is accomplished by revealing one claim to be false and the other to be true in a certain sense. (The resolution of the mathematical antinomies shows both claims to be false and the resolution of the dynamical antinomies shows both claims to be true.)^9 There is a second factor typical of the resolution of the dynamical antinomies (and so of the third antinomy) that may explain why Kant identified the practical antinomy's resolution with the third antinomy's resolution. The resolution of the dynamical antinomies is accomplished by assigning its selfcontradictory claims to different realms of experience. That is, the conflict between its assertions is eliminated by assigning one assertion to the realm of the sensible and the other to the realm of the supersensible.30 Perhaps it is this activity of assigning its self-contradictory claims to different realms of experience that makes the resolution of the third antinomy the pattern for the resolution of the practical antinomy. Yet, it seems that this characteristic of the solution to the third antinomy again points to its difference from rather than its similarity to the resolution of the practical antinomy. The resolution of the third antinomy uses the phenomena/noumena distinction in order to eliminate the conflict between 153

thesis and antithesis by assigning them to the distinguishable phenomenal and noumenal realms. There is no comparable step in the resolution of the practical antinomy. The solution to the practical antinomy does not employ the phenomena/noumena distinction in order to establish appropriate realms of experience for both its conflicting claims. In fact, the resolution of the practical antinomy shows that there is no realm of experience in which its claim "happiness produces virtue" can be true. Thus, the resolution of the practical antinomy is not like the resolution of the third antinomy in terms of the use to which it puts the phencmena/noumena distinction. The practical antinomy in its resolution uses the phenomena/noumena distinction to insure the possibility of its claim "virtue produces happiness." The third theoretical antinomy uses the phenomena/noumena distinction in its resolution to insure the possibility of both of its claims. Lewis White Beck also points to this difference between the resolution of the third antinomy and the resolution of the practical antinomy. Beck suggests that the analogy Kant draws between the two resolutions is not in fact achieved. Beck's criticism of Kant's analogy between the practical antinomy and the third antinomy is included in a statement containing his general objections to the practical antinomy. (Parts of this statement have been cited previously.)31 But it should be obvious that we do not have here an antinomy in any strict sense. First, in spite of his [Kant's] statement that he is concerned with the "self-contradiction of pure practical reason," the two propositions are not contradictories. Second, each does not have an independent warrant; one of them is false on its face. The whole antinomy is devised and artificial. Third, its resolution is not what one would expect from the proffered analogy to the third antinomy. For there the antithesis is vindicated in the phenomenal world and the thesis in the noumenal; here the thesis is not vindicated at all.32 All three of Beck's claims have been substantiated in the course of this investigation and together they give evidence for his conclusion that the 154

practical antinomy is not an antinomy in any strict sense. Certainly, the present difficulty in locating the similarity between the practical antinomy and the third antinomy lends support to Beck's claim that the practical antinomy is not in a strict sense an antinomy. Yet, Beck's conclusion can be put into perspective by recalling that it is Beck himself who enumerates these three criteria for a "strict" antinomy. Kant does not suggest that the theoretical antinomies or these three criteria function as standards for the practical antinomy. Beck fails to account in Kantian terms for why the practical antinomy is called an antinomy. This investigation explores in greater detail the relation between the theoretical and the practical antinomies with the purpose of giving an account of their similarities and differences in Kantian terms. The first possible reason why Kant chose to compare the practical resolution to the third antinomy's resolution was due to the latter's dynamical nature. Two factors characteristic of the resolution to the dynamical antinomies (i.e., both conflicting claims are true, the claims are assigned to different realms of experience) have been discussed here and shown to be not characteristic of the resolution of the practical antinomy. Kant's assertion that the practical resolution is just like the resolution of the third antinomy has been considerably weakened by the previous attempts to locate their points of similarity. One additional conclusion follows from these attempts to locate the similarity of the two resolutions in the dynamical nature of the third antinomy. Even if some similarity were found between the resolutions of the dynamical antinomies and the practical antinomy, nothing in particular would be proven about the third antinomy. At best the previous discussion could have revealed a similarity between the resolution of the dynamical antinomies and the resolution of the practical antinomy. It still would have suggested no reason why Kant chose the third antinomy's resolution rather than that of the fourth antinomy as the pattern for the practical antinomy's resolution. A second and more likely reason why Kant compared the resolution of the practical antinomy to the resolution of the third theoretical antinomy is that the phenomena/noumena distinction functions in both antinomies to insure freedom. The resolution of the practical antinomy is like the resolution of the third 155

theoretical antinomy in that it makes possible freedom. The resolution of the third antinomy validates in a sense the idea of transcendental freedom.33 Similarly, the solution of the practical antinomy affirms the possibility of the moral law and thus the existence of practical freedom. One factor that the resolutions do seem to have in common is the prominence they accord the idea of freedom. Kant apparently chose to compare the practical antinomy's resolution to the third antinomy's resolution not because of the latter's dynamical nature but because the latter's dynamical nature functions in a way that makes transcendental freedom logically possible. The practical resolution is like the third antinomy's resolution not merely because both employ the phenomena/noumena distinction. What sets the resolution of the third antinomy apart from the resolutions of the other theoretical antinomies is that it makes transcendental freedom possible. The practical resolution is just the same as the third antinomy's resolution in that both use the idea of a noumenal realm to make freedom possible. In spite of this point of similarity between the resolutions of the practical and the third theoretical antinomies, the fact remains that the differences outweigh the similarities. The resolution of the practical antinomy appears to be essentially different in kind from the resolution of the theoretical antinomies. What causes the differences between the two types of resolutions is apparently a difference in the status of their respective claims. The claims of the practical antinomy are not self-contradictory even though the conflict is eliminated by finding one claim to be false and the other to be true in a certain sense. The claims of the theoretical antinomies are logically self-contradictory although their conflict is eliminated by showing both claims to be false (in the dynamical antinomies, both claims can also be true). The solution to the practical antinomy employs the phenomena/noumena distinction in order to make one of its claims true. However, the solution to the dynamical antinomies uses the phenomena/noumena distinction to make both of its claims true. These differences between the resolutions of the theoretical and practical antinomies indicate clearly that the solving of the practical antinomy is not structurally analogous to the prior solving of the theoretical antinomies. The resolution of the practical antinomy is unique in that no structural analogue is present in the resolution of the theoretical antinomies. 156

This comparison of the resolution of the theoretical antinomies with the resolution of the practical antinomy makes possible a consideration of the importance of the former for the latter. It is not sufficient to show that the resolution of the practical antinomy is unique and does not structurally reflect the resolution of the theoretical antinomies. In spite of their lack of similarity, the resolution of the theoretical antinomies plays a role in facilitating the solution to the practical antinomy. (This role has been alluded to on pages 148-9.) The resolution of the practical antinomy depends on the prior resolution of the theoretical antinomies in the following two ways. First, the theoretical antinomies play an important role in the resolving of the practical antinomy because they suggest the possibility of linking the sensible and supersensible worlds. It is the dynamical antinomies which first raise the possibility of an unconditioned "outside" the world, and therefore certain assertions not true in the sensible world can be postulated as true in the supersensible world. The theoretical antinomies suggest that something which is false or impossible in the sensible world (i.e., there is freedom, there is a necessary being) may well be true or possible in the supersensible world. The resolution of the theoretical antinomies makes the nonsensible realm of experience accessible to the ideas of reason. By recognizing that reason has access to although it cannot know the supersensible world, the resolution of the theoretical antinomies makes possible the critical resolution of the practical antinomy. The practical antinomy first discovers that both its assertions are impossible in the sensible world. The critical resolution of the practical antinomy finds however that "virtue produces happiness" may be true in the supersensible world. Thus, the resolution of the theoretical antinomies sets a precedent in allowing reason access to the supersensible world, and the practical antinomy takes advantage of this precedent in order to resolve the conflict between its assertions. In the practical antinomy, the possibility of connecting happiness and virtue is realized because the theoretical antinomies have granted reason access to the supersensible. The theoretical antinomies play an important role for the practical antinomy since 157

their indication of reason's capabilities makes possible the linking of happiness and virtue. Second, the theoretical antinomies play an important role in the resolving of the practical antinomy because they confirm the reality of the highest good. That is, the theoretical antinomies not only make it possible that "virtue produces happiness" (by suggesting reason's access to the supersensible), they also confirm the reality that "virtue produces happiness" (by functioning as evidence for the reality of this connection). In a general way, the theoretical antinomies facilitate the resolution of the practical antinomy by suggesting reason's access to the supersensible. In a more specific way, the theoretical antinomies (at least the dynamical antinomies) offer evidence for the truth of the claim that "virtue produces happiness." "Virtue produces happiness" is true, says Kant, because it is justified by noumenal existence, the moral law, and an intelligible Author of nature.34 These three ideas of practical reason serve as support for the claim that virtue produces happiness. The ideas of noumenal existence and of an intelligible Author of nature arose and were made possible in the third and fourth theoretical antinomies. The reality of the concept of the highest good thus depends to a large extent on the evidence provided for it by the third and fourth theoretical antinomies. The resolution of the practical antinomy follows from and in a real sense depends on the dynamical antinomies because the latter make possible the connecting of happiness and virtue and insure the reality of that connection. Therefore, even though the resolution of the practical antinomy is unique (i.e., essentially different from the resolution of the theoretical antinomies), it is indebted to and dependent on the prior resolution of the theoretical antinomies.

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ENDNOTES Kants Gesammelte Schriften (Königlich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften; hereafter referred to as KGS), V (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1913), 113; translation by Lewis White Beck, Critique of Practical Reason (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1956), p. 117. 2

KGS, V, 79; Beck, p. 82.

3

KGS, V, 43, 47; Beck, pp. 44, 48.

4

KGS, V, 113; Beck, p. 118.

5 A529-30/B557-8; translation by Norman Kemp Smith, Critique of Pure Reason (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965). 6

KGS, V, 120; translation by Beck, p. 124.

7

KGS, V, 121; Beck, p. 126.

8

K G S , V, 1 1 3 - 4 ; Beck, pp. 117-8. A 4 9 7 / B 5 2 5 ; translation by Kemp Smith.

10

K G S , V , 1 1 4 ; translation by Beck, p . 118.

In the third C r i t i q u e , Kant uses yet another term to refer to the resolution of the aesthetic and teleological antinomies. At K G S , V, 339, 388, he calls the resolution an "Auflösung." 12 13

K G S , V, 47; Beck, p . 48.

K G S , V, 4 3; Beck, p . 45.

14 KGS,

V, 112;: Beck, p . 117.

v, 114;t v, 115;:

15

KGS,

16

KGS,

17

K G S , V, 114;; Beck, 119.

18

K G S , V, 114- -5; translation by Beck, p. 119.

translation by Beck, p . 119. translation by Beck, p. 119.

19 - ^ K G S , V, 115;; Beck, p . 119.

159

20

K G S , V, 118-9; translation by Beck, p. 123.

21

K G S , V, 114; translation by Beck, p. 118.

22 Edward Caird, The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant (Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons, 1889), II, 292. 23 See pages 145-6. 24 See pages 81-5. A505-6/B533-4; translation by Kemp Smith. See pages 99-100. 27

K G S , V, 114; Beck, p. 119. 28 Victor Delbos, La Philosophie Pratique de Kant, ed. Fdlix Alcan (Paris: Ancienne Librairie GermerBailliere et Cle., 1905), p. 476. It is my translation from the French. 29 See page 100. 30 See page 100. 31 See pages l, 129. 32 Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 247. 33 A533-41/B561-9; translation by Kemp Smith. 34 KGS, V, 114-5; Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 119.

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CHAPTER VI CONCLUSION To complete the investigation of the antinomies of theoretical and practical reason, attention must be focused on what this investigation has revealed. The detailed analyses of the origin, structure, and resolution of the antinomies have been carried out in order to shed light on the relationship between theoretical and practical reason. The analysis of the antinomies of theoretical and practical reason provides the occasion for a consideration of the relationship between theoretical and practical reason. Previous chapters have suggested that the antinomy section of the first Critique is of special importance. W. H. Walsh says: Taken at its author's estimate, the Antinomy chapter must count as the boldest, most provocative and most original in the whole of the first Critique.! These concluding pages will specify what grounds have been given in the course of this investigation for recognizing, as Kant apparently did, the significance of the antinomy chapter. In particular, the previous comparison of the theoretical and practical antinomies results in a specific conclusion about the relationship between theoretical and practical reason. It is clear that there is no conflict between the employments of theoretical and practical reason since, as Kant states, they are two employments of the same faculty.^ Thus, no matter what the task of the third Critique is to be (presumably, it is to mediate nature and freedom via purposiveness), its task need not concern the mediating of theoretical and practical reason. Furthermore, theoretical reason (and by extension, the Dialectic of the first Critique) is not merely a negative propadeutic to the next stage of the critical system, but instead, it is the positive foundation of that stage. Frederick Van de Pitte says that "the first Critique is the necessary step which makes possible [the] philosophy of the highest end."3 In other words, the first Critique (or more accurately. 161

theoretical reason) makes possible the second Critique (or, the constitutive functioning of practical reason). The aim of the subsequent pages is to substantiate the claim that the analysis of the antinomies has revealed the positive role played by theoretical reason in the critical system as it stands. One way that the discussion of the antinomies indicates the importance of theoretical reason is by showing that theoretical reason makes possible the discovery of the object and the task of practical reason. That is, theoretical reason first manifests its positive role in the critical system by suggesting that the object of reason (theoretical or practical) may be an unconditioned apart from the empirical series. Kant says in the Prolegomena that "our reason, as it were, sees in its surroundings a space for knowledge of things in themselves."4 Theoretical reason plays a role in the defining of the object of practical reason and because of this role, it can be said that theoretical reason facilitates the functioning of practical reason. The part that theoretical reason plays in formulating the task of practical reason is revealed by the following two features of theoretical reason in the antinomy chapter. First, the ambiguity which characterizes the object of theoretical reason also characterizes the object of practical reason.5 in a sense then, the ambiguity which grounds the theoretical antinomies can be used in an analogous way as a mode of explaining the origin of the practical antinomy.6 At least in the antinomy chapter, theoretical reason serves as a model for practical reason. The object of practical reason is like the object of theoretical reason in that both are subject to the same ambiguity which then gives rise to antinomies. Theoretical reason is significant in that the ambiguity characteristic of its object accounts for the origin of the practical antinomy and the difficulty in defining the object of practical reason. Thus, the importance of theoretical reason in the critical system is revealed by the fact that the ambiguity which grounds the origin of the theoretical antinomies similarly grounds the origin of the practical antinomy. Second, theoretical reason operates in its antinomies in a way that foreshadows the working of practical reason. In other words, the functioning of theoretical reason in the antinomies proposes or 162

suggests what is to be the realm of practical reason. In Chapter Three, it was claimed that the resolutions of the theoretical antinomies indicate two different tasks for theoretical reason.' One method of resolving the theoretical antinomies shows that theoretical reason falls into error because of its lack of conformity to the understanding.8 Consequently, theoretical reason's proper task must require the restricting of its ideas to the sensible world of the understanding. Yet, the other method of resolving the theoretical antinomies indicates that both reason and understanding can be satisfied when theoretical reason posits its ideas in the supersensible world.* Theoretical reason's task (in its dynamical ideas) does not apparently require the restriction of its ideas to the sensible world. These two tasks of theoretical reason, indicated by the resolutions of the theoretical antinomies, describe a negative and a positive task for theoretical reason. The claim that theoretical reason properly conforms to the understanding suggests a negative task for theoretical reason by limiting its employment to the confines of the understanding. The claim that theoretical reason has a possible employment outside the realm of the sensible suggests a positive task for theoretical reason by enabling it to posit the supersensible realm. The specification of this positive task for theoretical reason in the antinomies offers evidence for the positive role played by theoretical reason in the developing of the critical system. In effect, this positive task for theoretical reason grants reason access to the supersensible realm. Kant recognizes this positive task for theoretical reason when he states that theoretical reason presupposes the knowledge which is obtained by the understanding and which stands in immediate relation to experience, and seeks for the unity of this knowledge in accordance with ideas which go far beyond all possible experience.10 The recognition of theoretical reason's access to the supersensible realm is the first step toward acknowledging practical reason's legislating power in the supersensible realm. Theoretical reason in its positive employment posits the supersensible realm and by doing so, it makes possible practical reason's 163

legislation of the supersensible realm. Thus, the completion of the critical project is aided by theoretical reason in its antinomy chapter which makes possible the occupation of the supersensible realm by theoretical and practical reason. A second way that the discussion of the antinomies indicates the importance of theoretical reason is by showing that theoretical reason makes possible the resolution of the practical antinomy. Previous chapters have located two features characteristic of theoretical reason in its antinomy chapter that facilitate the resolution of the practical antinomy. These two traits of theoretical reason, which make possible the solving of the practical antinomy, indicate that theoretical reason plays a positive role in the carrying out of the critical project. The first feature of theoretical reason which functions in a way to facilitate the resolution of the practical antinomy is its idea of a supersensible realm. The fact that theoretical reason in its dynamical antinomies proposes the idea of a supersensible realm enables practical reason to use the idea of such a realm to solve its antinomy. The practical antinomy is resolved (and the highest object of practical reason is made possible) by means of the assumption of a supersensible (or intelligible) realm.H Kant states specifically that three considerations ground this assumption of a supersensible realm which is necessary for the resolution of the practical antinomy. 12 The three considerations which support the assumption of a supersensible realm are: thinking my existence as a noumenon, the moral law, and the idea of an intelligible Author of nature.13 Two of the three considerations which help make possible the solving of the practical antinomy (i.e., thinking my existence as a noumenon and the idea of an intelligible Author of nature) are ideas of theoretical reason brought forward in the theoretical antinomies. That is, the ideas of noumenal existence and of an intelligible Author of nature first arose as possible ideas in the third and fourth theoretical antinomies. One type of resolution of the dynamical antinomies showed that both these claims (and their opposing claims) can be said to be true.l4 These "true" cosmological ideas of the third and fourth antinomies are then carried over to the second Critique in order to offer evidence for the assumed reality of the super164

sensible realm. In short, two ideas of theoretical reason (noumenal existence, an Author of nature) are employed to help accomplish the critical resolution of the practical antinomy.15 Theoretical reason contributes in an explicit way to the resolving of the practical antinomy. The second feature of theoretical reason which functions in a way to facilitate the resolution of the practical antinomy is its suggestion that the sensible and the supersensible can be connected. One result of the solution to the dynamical antinomies of theoretical reason is the indication that no conflict exists between the empirical conditions of the sensible realm and an unconditioned in the supersensible realm.16 i n the dynamical antinomies, both thesis and antithesis can be said to be true and thus theoretical reason proposes that it is possible to relate the series of conditions in the sensible realm with an unconditioned in the supersensible realm. "Freedom" and "Laws of Nature" do not in fact conflict but represent the laws of causality of a being from two different points of view.17 Thus, the dynamical antinomies show that a relationship is possible between the sensible and the supersensible realms (i.e., they are not contradictory) and the practical antinomy proceeds to consider what type of relationship is possible. Chapters Four and Five indicated that the practical antinomy concerns the attempt to define the causal relationship between happiness (a good in the sensible world) and virtue (the supreme good in the intelligible world).18 It can be argued that practical reason's attempt in its antinomy to define the causal relationship between happiness and virtue arises from theoretical reason's claim that such a relationship between sensible conditions and a supersensible unconditioned is possible. Consequently, the resolution of the practical antinomy (that there is a relation between happiness and virtue) is a direct result of theoretical reason's indication in the dynamical antinomies that the sensible and the supersensible can be related. On the basis of what the previous chapters have revealed about the antinomies of theoretical and practical reason, it is apparent that there is no conflict between theoretical and practical reason and that the employment of theoretical reason makes possible the employment of practical reason. Theoretical reason 165

plays an important and often overlooked role in aiding practical reason to accomplish its tasks. Thus, contrary to Van de Pitte's claim, the first Critique is not merely a "ground-clearing operation."TS The first Critique does not function merely as a negative propadeutic to the second Critique since theoretical reason makes possible in a positive way the object of practical reason. This investigation also gives evidence which supports G. J. Warnock's claim that Kant's professed respect for practical reason should instead have been a respect for reason as a whole.20 Warnock says that the natural outcome of Kant's theory should have been a respect for reason as a whole.21 This investigation goes beyond Warnock by indicating why reason is deserving of respect. To the extent that theoretical reason aids in the defining of the object and the task of practical reason, it seems to be worthy of the respect that Warnock claims Kant reserves for practical reason. In spite of the fact that Kant specifies no "theory of the antinomy," this investigation showed that precise comparisons can be drawn among the antinomies and that certain conclusions follow from those comparisons. The attempt was made to develop some criteria for a Kantian antinomy and to carry out the analysis and comparison of the origin, structure, and resolution of the antinomies of theoretical and practical reason. Finally, the result of this analysis pointed to theoretical reason as that faculty which operates in a positive way to ground and to facilitate the functioning of practical reason.

166

ENDNOTES W. H. Walsh, Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1975), p. 196. 2 Kants Gesammelte Schriften (Königlich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften; hereafter referred to as KGS), V (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1913), 121; translation by Lewis White Beck, Critique of Practical Reason (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1956), p. 125. 3 Frederick Van de Pitte, Kant as Philosophical Anthropologist (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 38. 4

KGS, IV (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1911), 352; translation by Lewis White Beck, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1950) , p. 101. 5 A417/B445; translation by Norman Kemp Smith, Critique of Pure Reason (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965) and KGS, V, 110; translation by Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 114. See pages 112-8. 7 See pages 98-9. 8

A504-5/B532-3; translation by Kemp Smith.

Q

A530-1/B558-9; translation by Kemp Smith. A662/B690; translation by Kemp Smith. p. 119.

KGS, V, 115; Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, See also pages 145-6.

12 K G S , V, 114-5; Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 119. 13 K G S , V, 114-5; Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 119. 14

A531-2/B559-60; translation by Kemp Smith.

15

See pages 147-9.

167

A531/B559; translation by Kemp Smith. A538/B566; translation by Kemp Smith. 18 KGS, V, 110-1; Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 114-5. See also pages 117, 140. 19

Van de Pitte, p. 38. 20 G. J. Warnock, "The Primacy of Practical Reason," Proceedings of the British Academy, 52 (1966), 263. Warnock, p. 263.

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