KANT'S CRITICAL RELIGION
Examining a broad range of Kant's philosophical writings, this book presents a fresh interpret...
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KANT'S CRITICAL RELIGION
Examining a broad range of Kant's philosophical writings, this book presents a fresh interpretation of Kant's views on theology, religion and religious experience. Applying the new 'perspectival' method of interpreting Kant expounded in Palmquist's earlier work, Kant's Critical Religion makes a substantial contribution to Kant-studies. The book is divided into four parts Kant's systematic foundations for interpreting religion; his Critical theology; his Critical religion; his Critical mysticism. Palmquist defends a number of innovative theses, including how: religious and theological themes form the backbone of Kant's mature philosophical System; Kant's treatment of organized religion provides the basis for a living and symbolic form of religious practice, compatible with the core teachings of Christianity; and the claims of mystics and others to have 'experiences of God' are philosophically justifiable provided they are viewed solely from a judicial standpoint. Presenting Kant as a sympathetic reformer of religion in general and of Christianity in particular, this book explores the development of Kant's Critical philosophy, provides a detailed examination of an extensive range of secondary literature, assesses numerous interpretations and controversies surrounding his work, and looks at the implications for contemporary theological and philosophical debates.
Dedicated to Daniel Stephen whose awesome birth, coming on the same day as the acceptance letter for my first publication, helped me put my scholarly calling in its proper perspective; as firstborn, you are always one step ahead... May God be your only judge!
Kant's Critical Religion Volume Two of Kant's System of Perspectives
STEPHEN R. PALMQUIST
Ashgate Aldershot • Burlington USA • Singapore • Sydney
P.3 © Stephen R. Palmquist 2000 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Published by Ashgate Publishing Ltd Gower House Croft Road Aldershot Hants GUI 1 3HR England
338495
Ashgate Publishing Company 131 Main Street Burlington, VT 05401-5600 USA
B2799.R4 P35 2000
0020229749
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Palmquist, Stephen Kant's critical religion. - (Kant's system of perspectives ;v.2) 1. Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 2. Religion - Philosophy I. Title 210.97 Library of Congress Control Number: 92-33937
Printed and bound by Athenaeum f'tess, Ltd., Gateshead, Tyne & Wear.
LIBRARY
Kant's critical religion / Stephen R. Pali
Ashgate website: http://www.ashgate.com
ISBN 0 7546 1333 X
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Table of Contents List of Figures List of Tables Note on References
ix xi xiii
PART ONE: THE SYSTEMATIC FOUNDATIONS OF KANT'S SYSTEM I. Kant's Theocentric Metaphysics 1. Kant: Destroyer or Preserver of Metaphysics? 2. Metaphysics in Kant's Philosophical Writings 3. The Theocentric Orientation of Kant's Philosophy 4. The Scope of This Volume
2 5 7 13
II. Kant's Dreams of a Critical Mysticism 1. The Traditional Myth of Kant's'Awakening' 2. Kant's Criticism of Swedenborg's Mystical Dreams 3. Kant's Four Major 'Awakenings' 4. The Dream of a System of Critical Philosophy
17 21 32 41
III. Kant's Critical Philosophy: An Overview of KSP1 1. The General Structure of Kant's System 44 2. The Epistemological Underpinnings of the Critical Philosophy . . . 48 3. The Structural Elements of Kant's Three Systems 54 4. God and Religion in the Context of Kant's Metaphysics 61
PART TWO: KANT'S PERSPECTIVAL FOUNDATION FOR CRITICAL THEOLOGY IV. Theistic Alternatives to Proving God's Existence: Kant's 'Appropriation' of Lampe's God 1. The Problem of Transcendental Theology 2. Hypothetical Theology. God as a Regulative Idea 3. Physicotheology: Judicial Evidence for the God-Hypothesis . . . . 4. Moral Theology: The Ultimate Rationale for Theistic Belief . . . .
64 68 73 75
V. Symbolic Theology and the Nature of God 1. God's Transcendence: Human Reason vs. Divine'Reason' 2. Philosophical Theology and the Symbolic Immanence of God . . . 3. Reason's Theological Need: Architectonic Perspectives on the Perspectiveless Ground of Being 4. God's Trinitarian Nature: Holiness, Benevolence, and Justice . .
96 106
VI. Religion as the Synthesis of Theology and Morality 1. Kant's Reductionism: Explanatory or Eliminative? 2. Prolegomena to Kant's System of Religion 3. A Preview of Kant's System of Religion 4. Raising Morality to the Status of Religion
114 117 128 135
86 90
vi
KANT'S CRITICAL RELIGION
PART THREE: KANT'S PERSPECTIVAL FOUNDATION VII. Kant's System of Religious Perspectives 1. The Four Stages of Religion in General 2. The Conditions of Religion in the Moral Individual (-) A. Radical Evil (-) B. Conversion to the Good (+-) 3. The Conditions of Religion in the Moral Community (+) A. The Founding of a Church (-+) B. Service of God (++) 4. An Analytic Summary and a Synthetic Model VIII. Christianity as the Universal Religion 1. Kant's Copernican Perspective on Religion 2. Kant's Assessment of Biblical Religion A. The Creation Story and the Fall of Adam B. The Gospel Story and the Nature of Jesus 3. Kant's Assessment of Christian Tradition A. The Universal Church and its Scriptures B. Serving God: Clergy vs. Conscience 4. The Harmony between Systemic and Systemr.m IX. A Kantian System of Biblical Theology 1. The Biblical Theology of a Kantian Christian 2. Christian Practice: The Greatest Commandment A. Worship and the Love of God B. Fellowship and the Love of Human Beings 3. Christian Belief: Preaching and Teaching the Word A. Evangelism and the Gospel of the Kingdom B. Doctrine and the Authority of God's Revealed Word . . . . 4. A Christian Critique of Kant's Critical Religion
FOR CRITICAL
140 149 160 165 175 183 189 202 207 216 229 235 246 251 258 267 275 283
MYSTICISM
X. Reason's Birth in Immediate Experience 1. Mysticism and Religious Experience 2. Kant's Apparent Rejection of Mysticism 3. Kant's Disclosure of Critical Mysticism 4. Meditative Metaphors and the Shaping of a Mystical World View
298 300 307 317
XI. The Tantalizing 'Gap' in Kant's System 1. Forster's Riddle: What Prompted Kant to Write Kt9? 2. The Tantalizing Content of Kt9 3. Kt9 as the Grand Synthesis of Kant's System 4. What was'Tantalizing'about Kant's Final Dream?
324 329 334 343
Table of Contents
vii
XII. Transition to the End of All Philosophy 1. Kant's Return to Immediate Experience: The Three Transitions. . 2. God: The Categorical Imperative as Philosophy's Moral End . . . 3. The World: Matter's Living Force as Philosophy's Technical End 4. The Ideal Human: Christ as Philosophy's Highest Religious End
348 356 367 374
AI. The Story of Kant's Critical Religion
388
AIL Kant, Swedenborg, and Kantian Mystics 1. Kantian Mystics—Old and New 2. Laywine's Account of Swedenborg's Influence on Kant 3. Florschiitz's Account of Swedenborg's Influence on Kant . . . . 4. Johnson's Account of Kant on Swedenborg in Kt25
393 395 399 400
AIII. Further Reflections on KSP1 1. Three New Maps of Kant's System 2. Responses and Rejoinders to Critics of KSP1 3. Textual Review of Kant's Conception of Architectonic 4. Minor Corrections to KSP1
402 404 412 419
ATV. How To Be a Theist without Proving that God Exists 1. Kant's Critique of the Traditional Theoretical Arguments 2. Recent Attempts to Revive the Ontological Argument 3. Clarifications of the Nature and Status of Kant's Moral Argument 4. Kant's Alleged Atheism: Can a 'Fiction' Replace All Theoretical Proofs?
434
AV. Jesus and Kant: Four Perspectives on Moral Judgment 1. A Model for Kant-Based Dialogue between Philosophers and Theologians 2. The Transcendental and the Logical Perspectives 3. The Empirical and the Hypothetical Perspectives 4. An Analytic Map of the Four Perspectives on Moral Judgment . .
440 443 445 449
420 429 432
AVI. Faith in the Face of Evil: Kant's Solutions to Five Standard Theological Problems 1. Critical Theodicy and the Problem of Evil 453 2. Critical Soteriology and the Problem of Atonement for Sins . . . 458 3. Critical Eschatology and the Problem of Assurance 464 4. Critical Redemption and the Problem of Good Works 468 AVII. The Four Parerga: Reason's Need for Divine Assistance 1. Workings of Grace (Gnadenwirkungen) 2. Miracles (Wunderri) 3. Mysteries (Geheimnissen) 4. Means of Grace (Gnadenmitteln)
472 474 478 479
viii
KANT'S CRITICAL RELIGION
AVIII. Kant's Critical Hermeneutic of Prayer 1. Prayer in Perspective: The Copernican Revolution in Religion . . 483 2. The Moral'Spirit'of Transcendental Prayer 485 3. The Paradoxical 'Letter' of Empirical Prayer 488 4. Contemplation and Critique: A Framework for Assessing Prayer . 493 AIX. Kantian Christianity: 95 Theses and a Critical Catechism 1. Kantian Christianity as a Catholic-Protestant Synthesis 2. Kant's 95 Theses for Religious Reformation 3. A Catechism Based on Kant's Critical Religion
498 499 502
Bibliography Introductory Note Part One: Kant's Works (Kt) I. Primary Systematic Works II. Other Publications and Lectures 1. The Theoretical Standpoint 2. The Practical Standpoint A. Ethics and Politics B. Philosophy of Education 3. The Judicial Standpoint A. Philosophy of Nature B. Philosophical Anthropology HI. Unpublished Writings 1. Letters 2. Handwritten Notes and Essays 3. Reconstructions of Lectures IV. Collections of Translations Part Two: Other Sources
516 517 517 518 518 520 520 521 521 521 523 524 524 524 525 525 529
Glossary of Technical Terms Relating to Kant's Theology and Philosophy of Religion
542
Index of Citations, Names, and Selected Subjects Scripture Citations Kt (Kant Text) Citations Names and Other Sources Cited Selected Subjects
547 550 551 558
List of Figures 111.1 The Standard 2LAR Cross 111.2 The Standard 1LSR Triangle 111.3 The Standard 12CR Circle 111.4 Kant's Four Reflective Perspectives on Experience 111.5 Kant's Six Object-Terms, Progressing Synthetically 111.6 Schematic Analysis of Systemt 111.7 Schematic Analysis of Systemp 111.8 The Three Revolutions of Kant's Critical Philosophy
47 47 48 51 53 58 59 60
IV.l Three Types of Teleological Proof
75
V.I Possible Sources of Physical Ends V.2 Four Basic Types of Theological Disposition V.3 The Transcendence and Immanence of God in Relation to Kant's Three Ideas of Reason V.4 God's Nature and the Types of Rational Theology V.5 God's Three Moral Attributes V.6 Theological and Religious Errors
98 99 102 104 109 110
VI. 1 The Standpoints of the Three Critiques VI.2 Theology, Morality, and Religion
122 126
VII.l VII.2 VII.3 VII.4 VII.5 VII.6 VII.7 VII.8
Kant's Two Experiments in Kt8 The Four Stages in Kant's System of Religion The Four Parerga to Universal Religion The Three Aspects of Human Nature as Corrupted by the Evil Propensity The Archetypal Characteristics of the Invisible Church Origin of Kant's Definition of Religion in Stage Three Schematic Analysis of Systemr Kant's Circle of Religion
VIII. 1 Three Aspects of the Religious'Person' VIII.2 Schematic Analysis of the Illusory Version of Systemic VIII.3 The Circle of Christian Religion as Speculative
143 .145 148 153 171 177 185 187 196 236 237
IX. 1 Systemr.m and Systemr.s as the 'Pillars' Supporting the Systemic 'Bridge' IX.2 Four Cornerstones of Biblical Theology IX.3 The Empirical Perspective on Religion and Morality
247 250 286
X. 1 Four Basic Metaphors of Critical Mysticism
322
XI. 1 Kant's Four Divisions of Metaphysics XI.2 General Metaphysics as Filling a Synthetic Gap
335 345
x
KANT'S CRITICAL RELIGION
XII. 1 The Original Synthesis of Ideas in Immediate Experience XII.2 The Unity of Transcendental Philosophy in Kt9
354 375
AIII.l Three Intersecting Circles as a 3LAR AIII.2 The Standpoint-Perspective Relation
402 403
AIII.3 An Architectonic Justification for Kt7's Two Parts
404
AIV.l The Four Types of Theoretical Argument for God's Existence . . 421 AV.l The Four Moral Principles as a 2LAR AVI. 1: Three Types of Evil as Challenges to God's Nature AVI.2 Time-Frames for the Difficulties as Correlated to Kant's Trinity of Divine Attributes AVII.l Parerga as Rational By-Products of Moral Religion AVII.2 The Four Means of Grace
451 453 467 472 480
AIX.l Kantian Christianity as a Catholic-Protestant Synthesis
498
Unlabeled diagrams in footnotes: noteVII.3 note XII.8
141 351
List of Tables 111.1 Basic Perspectival Relations in Systemt 111.2 Basic Perspectival Relations in Systemp
55 57
VII. 1 Analysis of the Table of Contents of Kt8 VII.2 Basic Perspectival Relations in System,-
144 146
XI. 1 Methods and Standpoints in Kant's System XI.2 A Comparison between the Three Books of Metaphysics AVI.l Nine Types of Failed Theodicy AVI.2 Standard Solutions to Kant's'Difficulties'
337 342 456 467
Note on References Most of the nearly six hundred footnotes and nine appendices in this book can be briefly skimmed or even skipped by readers who are not interested in examining the finer points of Kant-interpretation. There would be far more footnotes, were it not for the fact that I normally include abbreviated references in the main text. (References are included in the footnotes when they are accompanied by nonessential material such as quotations or critical comments relating to technical points of interpretation.) Each reference begins with a letter-number abbreviation, usually consisting of the first two letters of the author's surname and the last two numbers of the publication year, as listed in the Bibliography. Where relevant, this abbreviation is followed by a colon and the specific page number(s) from the text being cited. When a reference is to the same work as that of the reference immediately preceding in within the same paragraph of text, only the page numbers are cited. Part One of the Bibliography lists Kant's works. The number designating each book is preceded by 'Kt'. The logic governing the order of the Kt num¬ bering is explained in volume one of this series, Kant's System of Perspectives (abbreviated KSP1) [see II.4 and III.4, especially Fig. II. 1 and Fig. III.9]. The book that forms the logical starting-point of Kant's System, his Critique of Pure Reason, is referred to as 'Ktl'. Page numbers in references to Ktl cite the second German edition ('B'), except when preceded by 'A' to denote material unique to the first edition. Page numbers for Kant's other works (aside from Ktl) correspond to the Berlin Academy edition, or 'Akademie Ausgabe' (listed as AA in Part Two of the Bibliography), and are followed in curved brackets by the pagination of the English translation whenever that translation does not specify the German pagination in its margins or if the translation used is not the one specified as standard in the Bibliography. (The texts used for Kt35 and Kt70 are not included as such in AA, so only the translator's pagination is given, in brackets.) For translations of works not written by Kant, only the English pagination is cited (without curved brackets). Any deviations from these norms are specified in the corresponding Bibliographical entry. Such textual references should simply be skipped over by anyone not interested in following up on the nuances being addressed. To minimize the obtrusiveness of such references, I use these abbreviations: A alt. cf.
= Appendix in this book or KSP1 (when prefixed to an upper case roman numeral); or, material unique to the first edition of Ktl, as mentioned above = translation altered = compare (when a comparison is not being made explicitly in the text, this usually indicates a reference to an opposing argument or opinion)
xiv Ch. e.a. e.g. f Fig. Figs. i.e. n q.a. q.i. s.a. s.e. t.b. viz.,
KANT'S CRITICAL RELIGION = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
Chapter emphasis added for example and following (pages) Figure Figures that is (normally used to restate the point in other words) note quoted above (i.e., earlier in the same section, unless specified otherwise) quoted in see also (usually indicates another text citing the same or similar view) see especially (usually indicates the best of numerous relevant references) translator's brackets (indicates that comments added to a quote are not mine) namely (used to specify the precise item(s) being referred to) text omitted from a quote where the last word quoted does not end a sentence text omitted from a quote where the last word quoted does end a sentence .' the quoted sentence ends at this point (i.e., punctuation after a quote always comes outside the close quote mark, unless the punctuation mark is part of the source text) ['...'] = imbedded in a quote to designate text that is being quoted from the immediate context of the main quotation, usually having a direct grammatical connection
Quotes reproduce the exact wording of the original, with the following two exceptions: (1) changes in translation are sometimes made, but only when the rationale is explained in the text (as with the term 'perspective', discussed in KSP1:II.3) or when the abbreviation 'alt.' appears after the page number; and (2) italics and capitalizations are occasionally omitted if their original purpose is obscured by the brevity of the quote. When quoting from works in foreign languages for which no translation is cited in the Bibliography, translations are either my own, or else are taken from some other secondary source (which is then specified in brackets after the page number of the original reference). More important than the footnotes are the nine Appendices. They deal with topics that would significantly interrupt or belabour the main argument if included in the main text, so I have grouped them together at the end of the book, even though each corresponds most closely to the chapter that bears the same number. Readers who wish to be thorough may prefer to read each corresponding Appendix before going on to the next chapter. Appendix I, for example, consists of what would normally appear in the Preface and Acknowledgments. I relegated these to an appendix in order to encourage readers to enter as directly as possible into the arguments of the main text, consulting this and other appendices only as time and interest allows. Any readers who would prefer to read about the background of this book before reading the book itself should turn to Appendix I now.
In the universal silence of nature and in the calm of the senses the immortal spirit's hidden faculty of knowledge speaks an ineffable language and gives [us] undeveloped concepts, which are indeed felt, but do not let themselves be described. — Immanuel Kant, Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens
THE SYSTEMATIC FOUNDATIONS OF KANT'S SYSTEM 'Come now, let us reason together', says the LORD. [Is. 1:18a] See to it that no one takes you captive through hollow and deceptive philosophy, which depends on human tradition and the basic principles of this world rather than on Christ.... Therefore do not let anyone judge you by what you eat or drink, or with regard to a religious festival, a New Moon celebration or a Sabbath day. These are a shadow of the things that were to come; the reality, however, is found in Christ. Do not let anyone who delights in false humility and the worship of angels disqualify you for the prize. Such a person goes into great detail about what he has seen, and his unspiritual mind puffs him up with idle notions. He has lost connection with the Head, from whom the whole body, supported and held together by its ligaments and sinews, grows as God causes it to grow. [Col. 2:8,16-9] As concerns metaphysics, it seems as if we had become perplexed in the inves¬ tigation of metaphysical truths. A kind of indifferentism is shown toward this science, as one seems to take honor in speaking contemptuously of metaphysical investigations ... And yet, metaphysics is actually the true philosophy! Our age is the age of criticism, and it remains to be seen what will come of the critical attempts of our time in respect to philosophy and to metaphysics in particular. [KtlO:32-33(37)]
Chapter I Kant's Theocentric Metaphysics God, freedom, and immortality of the soul are the problems at whose solution all the apparatus of metaphysics aims as its ultimate purpose. [Kt7:473]
1. Kant: Destroyer or Preserver of Metaphysics? Does Kant's Critical philosophy destroy the possibility of theology? Is his System of Perspectives1 meant to undermine the legitimacy of theological reflec¬ tion, or to limit our knowledge of God to a merely negative path by abolishing its metaphysical foundation? Is there any alternative to the view that regards Kant as aiming to undermine organized religion by reducing religious beliefs and actions to nothing but morality in disguise? Does Kant substitute for metaphysics a positivistic theory of scientific knowledge that denies ordinary religious believers any hope of experiencing the transcendent? An interpreter's answers to such questions will inevitably depend to a large extent on prior as¬ sumptions relating to what one regards as Kant's main purpose in constructing his entire philosophical System. For this reason, a trustworthy interpretation of what I shall call Kant's 'Critical religion' must be built on the foundation of a prior understanding of his 'Critical philosophy' [see KSP1]. Unfortunately, such questions have been answered all too often in ways that go directly against Kant's own expressed intentions. Many theologians, especially since Ritschl and the 'back to Kant' movement, have tended to give affirmative answers, interpreting Kant 'as an antimetaphysical moralist'.2 On the basis of the 'fact-value' distinction that Kant's philosophy appears to support, such neo-Kantians believed that if theology (like any other form of speculation) is to survive, it must cut all ties with metaphysics and perhaps even, following Barth's lead, with philosophy as a whole. Whatever view of the relation between theology and philosophy a person holds, anyone who interprets Kant in this way is sure to agree with Cupitt that 'we [theologians] 1. The meaning of this phrase will be reviewed briefly in III. 1. below. For a more detailed account, see the first two chapters of the first volume [hereafter KSP1] in the series that adopts this phrase as its title, of which the present book is volume two [s.e. KSP1:1-11,55-65]. 2. Ba72:655. Chapman discusses this tradition in some detail. In a section entitled 'Back to Kant' [Ch92:480-3] he reports that Troeltsch immersed himself in the study of Kant' [480], that Ritschl called Kant the 'first to perceive the supreme importance for ethics of the "Kingdom of God" as an association of men bound together by virtue' [q.i. 481], and that even Barth 'leamt at Berne that "all God's ways begin with Kant and if possible must end there".' During this period of German theology [493] 'Kant... became an unlikely target and an unlikely weapon in the most violent theological polemics.' His philosophy 'was a natural apologetic resource' [508]. Because Kant had profoundly influenced various nineteenth century theologians who in tum directly influenced such thinkers, Green [Gg93:14] calls Kant 'the "grandfather" of... the ecumenical liberalism of the twentieth century.' MacKinnon surveys Kant's similar influence on British theologians in Ma90a.
/. Kant's Theocentric Metaphysics
3
who live after Kant must walk the negative way.'3 Collins adopts this position in Co60a:183 when he portrays Kant as 'destroying every philosophy of God' and as arguing: 'Natural theology has no possibility of providing us with true knowledge about God and should be abandoned.' And Green echoes the sentiments of many Christian readers of Kant when he mockingly exclaims: 'Professor Kant, the destroyer of supernaturalist orthodoxy, has revealed himself to be the apologist for a new, true Christianity! '4 Philosophers too have often agreed in assessing the Critique of Pure Reason [Ktl], at least, as 'the most thorough and devastating of all anti-metaphysical writings' [Wa63b:38], thus making Kant 'the most tremendous disintegrating force of modern times' [BaO3:xvi; s.a. xvii]. Shortly after the publication of the first Critique, Mendelssohn labeled Kant the 'all destroyer', and since then many have followed him in regarding Kant as 'the arch-destroyer in the realm of thought', putting forward 'destructive, world-annihilating thoughts' [He59:109]. Gilson extends this judgment to the whole of Kant's philosophy, maintaining that 'Kant ... had no metaphysical interests of his own' [Gi37:310]. Since 'a new philosophical cycle was to begin' [220] with Kant's thoroughgoing 'rejection of metaphysics' [229], Gilson regards any of Kant's theories or statements that border on the metaphysical as superfluous Cu82:57; s.a. Ma75:141. As we shall see, this common interpretation of Kant's philosophy as having only negative theological implications is a direct result of the tendency to over-emphasize his theoretical philosophy, especially the first half of Ktl. Hart typifies this when he says 'Kant freely admits that there is something theological in his theory of sensibility; that is to say, it is a negative doctrine of the noumenon' [Ha90b:242]. What this ignores is that the positive meaning denied to noumenal reality in Ktl is given new life in Kt4. Gg93:ll. The mocking tone of Green's comment is evident from the context. Green states at the outset [2] that he believes 'historic Christianity cannot survive' the interpretation of religion presented in Kt8; its 'sacrificing of the essential "positivity" of the gospel' is 'a price that the church should refuse to pay.' The question this raises is whether Kant's philosophy of religion might actually point us to an interpretation of Christianity that really is truer or more promising than what orthodox theologians often defend. Green admits [12] that Kant's 'interpreters have not always appreciated the extent to which it is precisely the Christian faith for which he thinks he has made room.' But this allusion to Kant's famous claim that the Critical philosophy will 'make room fox faith' [Ktl:xxx] is taken grossly out of context [see KSPl:V.l-4], rendering it ironically mis¬ leading. For as we shall see in Part Three, Kt8 defines 'faith' as an historical religious tradition based on a set of revealed theoretical truths, as opposed to 'religion' as the pure practical (moral) core of a person's disposition towards God. As such, what Kant is doing in Kt8 is to put aside (i.e., put limitations on) faith in order to make room for religion'. That is, his goal is to bring out the true Christian religion that lies within the historical Christian faith. My argument, both here and more fully in KSP4, will be that thq church need not 'pay the price', if it understands Kant's arguments properly; for Kant's position is that at this stage in human history pure and empirical religions ought to work hand in hand. Thus I shall attempt to realize the potential Despland affirms when he says [De73:252] Kant's 'philosophy of religion ... could be presented as a Christian philosophy... Kant's thought, in spite of the fact that it does not claim to be a Christian philosophy ... is the one philosophy that best approximates it.' Earlier Despland rightly calls Kant 'one of the founders of philosophy of religion in the modern sense' [12] and commends the applicability of his system to anyone interested in the abiding philosophi¬ cal problems relating to religion and religious issues.
4
PART ONE: SYSTEMATIC FOUNDATIONS
nonessentials that he merely borrowed from 'hearsay' .5 Findlay sums up this tendency rather concisely: 'It is usual nowadays to think of Kant as some sort of incipient positivist, always verging towards a belief in the total nonsignificance of ideas lacking all empirical illustration' [Fi76:3]. Not all philosophers and theologians, however, interpret Kant's intentions so negatively. Findlay himself goes on to say that, even though 'Kant's theory of knowledge... has aspects that can with justice be called "positivist", it is not at all positivist in its account of the necessary underpinnings of such knowl¬ edge' [Fi81:5]; 'Kant's theory of knowledge cannot, therefore, be called posi¬ tivist, though it is quite right to see something like positivism in his account of what we can effectively know' [9]. Barth agrees that it is wrong to view Kant as 'a kind of super-sceptic', or as the 'all-annihilating one'; for his Criticism is always intended as 'an affirmation of reason.... Kant both has and demands an almost unconditional faith in reason' [Ba72:270-l; cf. Wo78:16]. Indeed, 'it would have surprised Kant', says Paulsen, 'to hear that he had destroyed meta¬ physics. Certainly nothing was further from his intention than that.'6 England adds that Kant denies 'only the validity of a certain type of metaphysics' [En29: 207], for 'what is really implied in the critical position is... the substitution of an immanent metaphysics for the older transcendent metaphysics' [113-4; s.a. 208-9]. And Wood goes so far as to suggest that 'Kant himself was in many ways ... an "existentialist" theologian' !7 5. Gi37:310. This view was popularized in Germany by Vaihinger [Va81], and in Britain by Kemp Smith [Ke23], both of whom 'take a Kantian doctrine to be "critical" in proportion as it involves a rejection of the metaphysics of Kant's rationalist predecessors' [Wo78:59]. I demonstrated the inadequacy of this anti-metaphysical interpretive method throughout KSP1, especially in Part Four. 6. PaO2:241; s.a. De94:173. After summarizing five common ways of (mis)interpreting Kant [PaO2: 114-8], Paulsen settles on the one that best elucidates the constructive character of Kant's System, particularly with respect to the validity of believing in a 'supersensuous world' of human souls [119-20]. In Chapter II we shall focus in more detail on Kant's interest in the latter theme. 7. Wo78:150. Along these lines, Collins calls Kant's 'moral-religious' rationale for believing in God 'an existential ... truth' [Co67:209n] and Davidovich points out that 'Kant anticipates existentialist thought that finds in sin the mark of the individual' [Da93a:35]. In Wo70:2 Wood portrays 'the critical philosophy itself as a religious outlook, a profound conception of the human condition as a whole, and of man's proper response to that condition.' After voicing his agreement with this position [Mi79:21-2], Michalson adds [49] that Ktl 'is the foundational step in a religious philosophy, rather than a self-contained epistemological program.' Later [166-7], in dialogue with Yovel, he affirms that 'God' plays 'the key metaphysical role... in Kant's philosophy.' (Unfortunately, Yovel interprets this role in an overly anthropocentric way: 'At most, God helps us to help ourselves' [Yo68:103].) Agreeing that '[a] religious outlook is doubtless present' in Kant's Critical philosophy, McCarthy traces this emphasis back to the German theologian, Hermann Noack [Mc86:57]. Like Wood, he claims that Kant (especially in Kt8) 'anticipated Bultmann and demythologization..., as well as Tillich's existential interpreta¬ tion of Christianity.... Kant believed that he was uncovering the deeper truths of Christian doctrine' [69]. Many other writers aver similar views. Paulsen [Pa02:339] says Kant's moral theory 'stands in close connection with ... the original spirit of true Christianity.' Ward likewise regards Kant's ethics, at least, as 'deeply religious' [Wa72:167]. Quoting Ward [Cr94:134-5], Crosby makes this
/. Kant's Theocentric Metaphysics
5
Numerous of Kant's own comments can be construed as defending a positivism of some sort. For example, he urges us 'to believe that we have ap¬ proximated to completeness in the empirical employment of [a] principle only in proportion as we are in a position to verify such unity in empirical fashion' [Ktl:720, e.a.]. If this is positivism, however, it is far from straightforward; for he continues with the caveat: 'a completeness which is never, of course, at¬ tainable.' Moreover, when Kant turns away from such empirical considera¬ tions, his position becomes explicitly nonpositivistic. For example, he argues against skepticism in the same way one could argue against the use of the (unverifiable) principle of verification as the basis of positivism. To assert 'that there is and can be no a priori knowledge at all', chides Kant, 'would be like proving by reason that there is no such thing as reason' [Kt4:12]. The fre¬ quency of such comments in Kant's writings casts a shadow of incredulity upon any skeptical or anti-metaphysical interpretation. But in order to pass from this negative conclusion, that Kant was not attempting to destroy metaphysics, to its positive counterpart, that he was actually attempting to preserve a form of metaphysics, we must take a brief look at the way Kant himself portrayed the role of metaphysics in his major philosophical writings. 2. Metaphysics in Kant's Philosophical Writings A popular myth concerning Kant's development, which helps breed the above-mentioned misconceptions about his true attitude towards metaphysics and theology, is that he started out as a typical Wolffian rationalist, and only began formulating his 'Critical' principles after being jarred by Hume out of his rationalist complacency. Yet a careful and open-minded reading of Kant's early view even more specific, claiming 'Kant's moral theory is deeply influenced by Christianity' [118]. He traces '[f]our fundamental themes' that reveal just how extensively Kant's moral theory is 'rooted in religious presuppositions'. Crosby has a number of interesting insights, in spite of his unfortunate neglect of the Copernican character of Kant's thinking. But his overall argument, that the existence of historical influences or developments is sufficient to prove that the theory itself is not 'pure', is grossly misplaced. Kant never claims to have created his theory out of thin air, with¬ out any influences. His rebuttal would be that the truth or falsity of his assertions is based not on these influences, but on the logical and/or transcendental arguments he marshals in their support. In Ku85 Kuehn offers a thorough critique of the position supported by Wood in Wo70 and Wo78, by Ward in Wa72, and by Walsh in Wa63a and Wa75:229-241, all of whom 'consider Kant's "moral arguments" as "an integral part of the critical philosophy'" [Ku85:155, quoting Wo70:9]. Kuehn claims 'it is highly misleading to say that Kant wanted to justify a "personal" faith' [Ku85:168]. His main worry is that by 'interpreting Kant's rational faith as a personal commitment ..., they turn Kant's enterprise, which consisted in showing the rationality of religious faith, upside down' [169]. However, neither of these extremes on its own does full justice to Kant's intentions, which were indeed to justify a kind of personal faith, but to do so not by appealing to its existential baselessness, but by demonstrating how it is based on impersonal (i.e., objective, rational) grounds. (Kuehn's interpretation of the specific purpose of Kant's moral argument suffers from some unfortunate difficulties, to be discussed further in note IV. 15.)
6
PART ONE: SYSTEMATIC FOUNDATIONS
(so-called 'pre-Critical') works8 yields quite a different impression: 'From the beginning he made no attempt to hide his dislike of the compact mass of Wolffian doctrine' [V162:3]; instead, his lifelong goal was to discover and follow 'the correct philosophical method and by means of it to construct an eternal meta¬ physics' [2; s.a. Go71:63]. One of the many examples of a text that supports such a view comes in Ktl5:71(229), where Kant announces (in 1763) that he has 'sought in vain from others' for an adequate philosophical method to replace 'the imitation (or rather the aping) of the mathematician', which 'has on the slippery ground of metaphysic occasioned a multitude of... false steps'. Moreover, as we shall see in II.2, by 1766 (fifteen years before the publication of Ktl) Kant shows an awareness (in Ktl8) of the crucial difference between 'speculative' and 'Critical' metaphysics, and announces his intention to concen¬ trate his attention on the latter. His philosophical 'panacea', then, 'was not discovered by a sudden stroke of intuitive genius but [was] allowed slowly and painfully to reach ripe elaboration' [V162:3; s.a. Ma55 and Wa72]. Kant expresses his true attitude towards metaphysics quite clearly in a number of explicit statements throughout his writings, a typical example being the quote given at the beginning of this chapter. In an equally explicit passage written in 1766, he confesses [Ktl8:367-8(112-13); cf. Ktl:878]: Metaphysics, with which it is my fate to be in love, although only rarely can I boast of any favours from her, offers two advantages. The first is that it serves to solve the tasks which the questioning mind sets itself when by means of reason it I inquires into the hidden qualities of things. But here the result only too often falls below expectation... The other advantage is more adapted to human reason, and consists in recognizing whether the task be within the limits of our knowledge and in stating its relation to the conceptions derived from experience, for these must always be the founda¬ tion of all our judgments. In so far metaphysics is the science of the boundaries of human reason. And... this use of metaphysics ... is at the same time the least known and the most important, and... is obtained only late and by long experience.
In a letter written at about the same time, Kant reveals a similar position: I am far from regarding metaphysics itself, objectively considered, to be trivial or dispensable; in fact I have been convinced for some time now that I understand its nature and its proper place in human knowledge and that the true and lasting wel¬ fare of the human race depends on it... [AA10:67(Zw67:55)].
The significance of this early stage in Kant's development, and the nature and extent of Hume's influence, will be discussed further in II. 1-4. For now it will suffice to say that Kant saw Ktl not as a denial of his love of metaphysics, but as its truest and most secure foundation. For in a letter written just after its 8. I shall explain my reasons for avoiding the common phrase 'pre-Critical' in II. 1.
/. Kant's Theocentric Metaphysics
7
publication in 1781, he claims Ktl 'includes the metaphysics of metaphysics.'9 These are just a few of the many passages where Kant quite clearly views his contribution to metaphysics in terms of neither positivistic empiricism nor strict 'rationalism';10 instead, he sees himself as offering—to borrow one of his own favorite expressions—'a third thing'. A label often used to denote his synthesis between empiricism and rationalism is the easily misunderstood title, 'transcendental idealism'. But since this phrase properly refers to just one of his many philosophical doctrines [see KSPl:173n], I have suggested an alter¬ native title in §11.3 of KSP1. Interpreting Kant's philosophy as a 'System of Perspectives' enables us to account for the potentially confusing recurrence of both rationalist and empiricist (as well as both metaphysical and anti-metaphys¬ ical) elements in his writings. This in turn enables us to see how Kant's System 'restores metaphysics' [Ak91:70]; as Akhutin observes, 'it turns metaphysics into philosophy.' And Kant himself [Kt69:281] says the third (highest) stage of progress in metaphysics (i.e., the practical, as it passes beyond the dogmatic and the skeptical) corresponds to Critical theology surpassing ontology and cosmology. Exploring Kant's metaphysical idea of God in this volume will thus give us ample reason to affirm Akhutin's appraisal [Ak91:70]: 'It was not meta¬ physics that Kant is striving to eliminate, but the metaphysical idol of reason.' 3. The Theocentric Orientation of Kant's Philosophy If Kant is neither a straightforward positivist nor a traditional rationalist, the question yet remains how he intends his philosophy to relate to theology. As far as methodology and terminology are concerned, Barth is largely correct to say Kant is 'purely a philosopher and his philosophy is not in the least dressed in the garb of theology.'11 Indeed, as Sykes points out, 'the whole 9. AA10:252(Zw67:95). This claim does not contradict Kant's assertion in a later letter (1783) that Ktl 'is not at all metaphysics ..., but a whole new science..., the critique of an a priori judging rea¬ son' [10.318(102)]. The latter can be regarded as Kant's explanation of what the phrase 'meta¬ physics of metaphysics' actually means. In Kt69:316 Kant explains that metaphysics proper is 'the science of proceeding from knowledge of the sensible to that of the supersensible.' The same order is, in fact, adopted in Ktl, from the Aesthetic to the Dialectic; the difference is that the Dialectic concludes not with knowledge of the supersensible, but with an explanation of why such knowledge is impossible from the theoretical standpoint [see KSP1:VII.3.B]. 10. See e.g., Om06:188 and Ba72:345. Barth notes that for Kant such 'rationalism' refers only to 'practical reason' [281]. But even taken in its practical sense such a lat?el is misleading, since (as we shall see) it highlights only one side of Kant's philosophical interest. ! ' • Ba72:339. For this reason, Werkmeister's apparent attempt to hide the theological orientation of Kant's philosophy cannot succeed. Although Kant studied in the theology faculty at the University of Konigsberg, Werkmeister says 'he was interested primarily in the humanities' [We80:l, e.a.j, quoting Borowski (Kant's official biographer) as saying: 'Theological investigations of whatever kind... did not interest him.' The latter fact, however, is irrelevant to the point I shall make about Kant's philosophy. I regard Kant not as a closet theologian, but rather as a philosopher who constructed a System with a basically theocentric orientation. It does not follow from a person's
8
PART ONE: SYSTEMATIC FOUNDATIONS
object of [Part I of Kt65] is to demonstrate the necessity of an institutionalized rivalry between theology and philosophy' [Sy82:100]. But 'theology' in such contexts refers for Kant only to what is more accurately called 'biblical studies' or 'revealed theology' [see Kt8:8-11(7-10)]—disciplines Kant himself never practiced. Yet if the meaning of'theology' is widened to include any serious, scholarly study of God, religion, and related subjects, his philosophy can be seen in many respects to be 'theocentric' in orientation. 'Theocentric' here does not mean Kant requires human knowledge of God to serve as the basis of or center for all other types of knowledge. On the contrary, it means the problems surrounding our understanding of the nature and reality of God serve as the central driving force of his philosophy.12 Prior to Kant most philosophers used theology—especially the implications of God's existence (which many believed they could prove)—to bridge gaps they could not bridge by purely philosophical means. Two obvious examples are Descartes' assumption that God's existence guarantees that, 'regarding lack of interest in reading theology as such that the person is therefore not interested in doing philosophy in a theocentric way. Along these lines, Loades aptly acknowledges Kant's 'sensitive appreciation of the Lutheran tradition' [L081:298]; for 'although in some ways a humanist par excellence, Kant was far from hostile to religious belief.' Indeed, his philosophy presents 'one of the forms of theism compatible with humanism.' Alluding to a famous quote from Goethe [see note VI.25, below], she adds [306] that, even in his humanism, Kant's 'philosopher's cloak bears the stains if not the stench of theism.' Shortly before completing the manuscript for this volume I came across a recent book that appears to defend precisely the point rejected above. Using the term 'closet theologian' in the very subtitle, Galbraith argues that Kant's approach in Kt8 should be regarded as that of a theologian rather than a philosopher [Ga96:62-7]. My position is that Kant never intends to be a biblical the¬ ologian, inside or outside of his 'closet'; but if 'theologian' includes what he calls a.philosophical theologian, then Kant adopts this Perspective openly in Kt8. So Galbraith's claim is misleading for two reasons: she downplays Kant's all-important qualifying term, 'philosophical'; and her term 'closet' wrongly implies that Kant was hiding or covering up his true intentions. Nevertheless, she is correct to assert that Kant's 'preoccupation... with belief in God went far beyond his moral argu¬ ments' to the point of 'actively engaging in theology' [Ga96:xiii-xiv], that in Kt8 he was to a large extent 'advocating his own theology' as 'an apologist for belief in God' [xv] and as himself 'a believer' [e.g., 51], and that in Kt9 'God... becomes the key to his entire philosophy' [vi]. One goal of the present book is to put meat on the bones of such claims, while showing that Kant's theo¬ centric orientation does not prevent his philosophy from remaining thoroughly philosophical. 12. Manolesco observes that 'God was [Kant's] major problem'—a problem he seems to have been 'destined' by his very name (i.e., Immanuel, meaning 'God with us') to carry with him throughout his life [Ma69:28]. Manolesco continues: 'Even in historical philosophy Kant had no doubt that this concept of God was indispensable as the ultimate ground of all reality' and that we are 'compelled to posit a real object corresponding to the Idea.' We shall see the extent to which this is the case in the fourth volume of this series, Kant's Critical Politics [KSP4]. MacKinnon reaches a similar conclusion, claiming Kant was aware 'of the need of Christian faith always to be theocentric' [Ma90a:358]. If Despland is correct to say 'Kant believed himself to be a Christian' [De73:246; s.a. 251-2], or McCarthy, that 'Kant would personally consider himself a Christian' [Mc82:204] or White, that 'Kant's starting point is within the Christian tradition' [Wh90:4]—and I believe each is entirely accurate—then MacKinnon's comment implies that Kant's own world view was theocentric. I have gone one step further than MacKinnon, though, by claiming not just Kant's view of Christianity, but his entire System to be theocentric.
/. Kant's Theocentric Metaphysics
9
objects which are clearly and distinctly represented..., I can never be deceived' [De70:4.119], and Berkeley's theory that objects not currently being perceived by any human subject can be said to persist only insofar as they are being perceived by God. Kant, however, flatly rejects such approaches: To have recourse to God... in explaining the arrangements of nature and their changes is... a complete confession that one has come to the end of his philoso¬ phy, since he is compelled to assume something of which in itself he otherwise has no concept in order to conceive of the possibility of something he sees before his very eyes. [Kt4:138]
This removal of the concept of God from its traditional place in the 'gaps' of philosophical inquiry is commonly interpreted as an example of Kant's positivistic and anti-theological disposition. What tends to be ignored by such inter¬ preters is that Kant replaces this traditional assumption with that of his famous, or infamous, concepts of the 'thing in itself [see KSP1:VI.2] and 'noumenon' [see note 1.3, above]. He has a number of reasons for doing so [see KSP1: V.l-4], among them being the preservation of the integrity of philosophy and the protection of theology from its skeptical and agnostic critics.13 For he regards the thing in itself as the unknowable question mark of philosophical inquiry [see KSP1:AV]; God is freed to play a far more important and determinant role [s.e. Chs. V-VI, below]. In one sense, as we shall see, God transcends even the thing in itself, and so, for Kant, is radically unknowable. But in another, equally important sense, God is immanent; indeed, this rich concept of 'a living God' [Ktl:661] forms the very heart of Kant's entire philosophical project. In other words, a real (though mysterious) God—not just an 'idea' of reason—is the central focus towards which every strand in Kant's System points.14 The interplay between these two aspects of his concept of God constitutes a valuable contribution to philosophical theology, for which he has rarely, if ever, been given full credit. 13. A widely accepted caricature of Kant sees him as an agnostic deist, concerned only with a fanciful concept of God as nothing but an abstract idea of reason, a concept that is then criticized as dry, theologically uninteresting (or even repugnant), and scientifically untenable. Several scholars, most notably Wood, Collins, and Despland, have done much to dispel this misconception. Wood interprets Kant's theology as 'rich, precise, philosophically sophisticated' [Wo78:151; s.a. Wo70:164]. Despland asserts that 'Kant's doctrine of God... is the most important part of his doctrinal metaphysics' [De73:135]. Although in Co67 Collins retracts his own previous assess¬ ment of Kant's theology as entirely destructive [see Co60a:183], even in Co60a he had suggested that Kant's 'preoccupation with the problem of God' [166] results in the fact that 'his stand on God partly determined his philosophical position at any given stage' in his development [162]. By placing Kant's theology in its proper philosophical context I shall attempt in the present volume to further this recent trend by eradicating once and for all the mistaken caricature mentioned above. 14. This will be argued more fully in Part Four, below. For now, it is sufficient to note with approval Rossi's point [Ro89:370] that Kant's philosophy of religion deals with issues that are 'central to the unity and the coherence of the overall Kantian critical project.'
10
PART ONE: SYSTEMATIC FOUNDATIONS
Although it is true that Kant always writes primarily as a philosopher, it is also true that 'the Critical philosophy left his basic beliefs untouched' [Wa72: 143; s.a. PaO2:263] and that the three 'ideas' guiding his entire philosophical endeavor—viz., 'God, freedom, and immortality' [e.g., Ktl:xxx; Kt4:3-4; Kt7:473]—are all primarily theocentric in their orientation. Thus it should come as no surprise that the concept of God 'was constantly recurring throughout the various stages of [Kant's] intellectual development' [He57:13; s.a. En29:2089]. The inordinate attention interpreters usually give to the arguments in Ktl's Transcendental Analytic ironically veils the fact that Kant intends the book 'to clear the way for a positive account of what he regards as the correct theology for human beings' [Ax89:310]. Even Heine, who views Ktl as 'the sword that slew deism in Germany' [He59:107], agrees that Kant's criticism of the tradi¬ tional proofs for the existence of God 'forms one of the main points of [Ktl]' and that we ought to 'recognise everywhere visible in [Ktl] his polemic against these proofs' [He59:115-6]. Unfortunately, he believes Kant was trying to prove that 'this ideal... being, hitherto called God, is a mere fiction' [115]—a view I shall reject in Part Two, and throughout this volume. Wood is one of the few interpreters prior to 1989 (Pa89 being an early synopsis of the approach taken here) to acknowledge and develop the construc¬ tive, theocentric tenor of Kant's philosophy [see notes 1.7,13], He says:
.
Kant is fundamentally unable to conceive of the human situation except theistically... For Kant's real aim is not to destroy theology, but to replace a dogmatic theology with a Critical one: to transform rational theology from a complacent speculative science into a critical examination of the inevitable but perpetually insoluble problems of human reason, and a vehicle for the expression of our moral aspirations under the guidance of an autonomous reason. [Wo78:17]
He claims, quite rightly, that 'there is widespread misunderstanding of Kant's ideas' concerning his Criticism of the proofs for God's existence [10; see below, Ch.IV and AV.1-3]. Moreover, Kant's Lectures on Philosophical Theology [Kt26] show, according to Wood, 'that [even] the traditional theology was to a large extent compatible with Kant's critical philosophy' [Wo78:149]. Indeed, Kant's concern for and influence on theology was extensive: not only does Barth credit him with having 'understood what the idea of a Church was' and as having also 'understood what grace was' [Ba72:339], but Sykes regards him 'as one of those who prepared the way for the fragile advances of the Second Vatican Council' [Sy82:103]—three theological accomplishments of no small merit!15 15. Perhaps it is not without reason that Niebuhr calls Kant 'that philosopher who is most Protestant of all philosophers' [Ni70:116; s.a. Cr94:128; Wo70:127-8]—though I would add that, despite his reputation as 'the philosopher of Protestantism' [Ch92:481; Gg93:l; Ma9Oa:35O], Kant could also
/. Kant's Theocentric Metaphysics
11
Kant himself openly and repeatedly affirms the theocentric orientation in his understanding of metaphysics. In 1763 he upholds 'THERE IS A GOD' as 'the most important of all our cognitions'—so important that it is in no danger of being refuted by metaphysical speculation [Ktl5:65(219)]. In a 1770 letter to his friend Lambert, Kant explains that the purpose for fixing the principles and limits of knowledge is 'so that these principles could not be confusedly applied to objects of pure reason' [AA10:94(Zw67:59)]. That these 'objects' are the ideas of God, freedom, and immortality is repeatedly stressed by Kant: 'Meta¬ physics has as the proper object of its enquiries three ideas only: God, freedom, and immortality' [Ktl:395n]; 'metaphysics has engaged so many heads up till now and will continue to engage them not in order to extend natural knowledge ..., but in order to attain to a knowledge of what lies entirely beyond all the boundaries of experience, namely, God, freedom, and immortality' [Kt3:477]. And he emphasizes the theocentric orientation of all metaphysics even more explicitly as late as Kt69:292: 'The supersensible in the world (the spiritual nature of the soul) and out of the world (God), hence immortality and theology, are the ultimate ends towards which metaphysics is directed.' Kant also makes it clear in numerous places that his own task is ultimately constructive with respect to theology and religion, just as it is for metaphysics in general. His famous claim 'to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith' [Ktl:xxx] certainly implies something of this sort, especially when it is seen in context [see KSPl:V.l]. For a large portion of the second edition Pref¬ ace to Ktl is devoted to clarifying that 'all objections to morality and religion' have been 'for ever silenced' by this Critique of reason's powers.16Elsewhere be regarded as the most Catholic of all philosophers! (The relevance of Catholic theology to Kant is affirmed in Gg93:2 and Ma90a:351.) As we shall see in Part Three, his protest against false religion is more radical than that of most Protestants, yet his affirmation of the universality (i.e., 'catholicity') of all true religion is more unreserved than that of most Catholics. 16- Ktl:xxxi; s.a. 781-2. Kant makes a similar remark to Herz as early as 1773, when he confides: 'I reveal to no one but you: the hope that by means of this work [i.e., Ktl] philosophy will be given a durable form, a different and—for religion and morality—more favorable turn' |AA10:137(Zw67:78); s.a. En29:79]. Earlier still, in the preface to Kt43, Kant reveals the importance he placed on the consistency of his own ideas with religion when he stresses his confidence in the 'harmony... between my system [of cosmogony] and religion' [222(82)]. An emphasis on the centrality of the 'ideas of reason' (especially God) might appear to contradict a remark Kant makes in a famous letter to Garve (1798): 'It was not the investigation of the existence of God, immortality, and so on, but rather the antinomy of pure reason... that... first aroused me from my dogmatic slumber and drove me to the critique of reason itself, in order to resolve the scandal of ostensible contradiction of reason with itself [AA12:255(Zw67:99n)]. But if we remember that Kant is here making an assertion about his own historical development, not about the essential nature of metaphysics or of his own philosophy, then the discrepancy disappears. The antinomies may have been the historical occasion for Kant conceiving of the idea °f a Critique of reason, but when he finally carries it out, he does so by directing the focus of the System itself to the task of understanding the proper place of the three (theologically oriented) ideas of reason. It is relevant to note here that in a much earlier letter to Garve (1783) Kant explains
12
PART ONE: SYSTEMATIC FOUNDATIONS
in Ktl he explains that theology, morals, and religion, which correspond to these three ideas, respectively, are 'the highest ends of our existence' [395n; s.a. 494,656]. And in the last few pages of the Critique he concludes that, 'although metaphysics cannot be the foundation of religion, it must always continue to be a bulwark of it', and that a Critical metaphysics 'prevents the devastations of [speculation]... in the field of morals as well as in that of reli¬ gion' [877]. His Critique of Practical Reason [Kt4] continues the task of insuring against 'the possibility of making theology merely a magic lantern of phantoms' [141]. His seminal doctrine of the primacy of practical reason17 represents the culmination of this line of thinking: an anthropocentric System would give primacy to theoretical reason, treating human knowledge as its central feature; Kant denies such knowledge only in the sense of rejecting its centrality, because his System puts the theocentric faith of practical reason in its place. Even at the end of his life, Kant was intent on emphasizing the theocentric orientation of his philosophy: 'The highest level of the transcendental philosophy... lies in this twofold task: 1. What is God? 2. Is there a God?' [Kt9:22.63(Su71:119)]. Moreover, if Kant's own testimony is not evidence enough, 'his friend and biographer, Jachmann' informs us, as Greene notes, 'that, in private conversations with his friends "the philosopher and the man spoke out in undeniable testimony to an inner feeling and a genuine conviction [of God's existence]"; and that "in the true sense of the word he was a wor¬ shipper of God.'"18 This interpretation goes directly against the view that has prevailed among most English-speaking readers of Kant, that Kant's System is anthropocentric. This myth's long life has been largely the result of Greene's seminal defense of that the solution to the problem of the antinomies 'consists in this: that all objects that are given to us can be interpreted in two ways: on the one hand, as appearances; on the other hand, as things in themselves' [AA10:320n(Zw67:103n)]. In other words, the key he discovered entailed the proper implementation of what I have called Kant's 'principle of perspective' [see KSPl:II.l]. 17. Kt4:119-121. Paulsen portrays this 'doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason' as 'the copingstone of the Kantian philosophy' [PaO2:341]. Although the importance of this doctrine is well recognized in the literature, few commentators realize it is not so much an absolute doctrine as an expression of the principle by which the judicial standpoint adjudicates conflicts between the other two. The judicial standpoint, as we saw in KSP1:AII, just is the standpoint of Critique as such; it 'is the keystone of the architectonic' [Fe90:106]. In issues where a potential conflict arises between the practical and theoretical standpoints, the doctrine of 'primacy' stipulates that the practical standpoint is to be given more weight than the theoretical. But it does so without compromising the fact that the judicial is the middle way that characterizes all Critique. 'Practical reason has primacy over theoretical', therefore, means 'an explanation directed towards our moral experience carries more weight than an explanation directed towards speculation' [cf. Fig. IX.2 of KSP1], 18. Gr34:lxxvii-lxxviii (Greene's brackets). Copleston's description of 'transcendent metaphysics' as 'the expression of a religious quest' [Co74:9] applies equally well to Kant's nontranscendent, Crifica/metaphysics. Foras we shall see in X.2-3, 'Kant was a profoundly religious man' [Ra63:vii; s.a. Re88:2]. Reardon adds 'in his own moralistic way' [2], but Axelsen [Ax89:312] clarifies: 'Kant always saw his philosophical task as fostering faith, not merely as identifying the demands of duty.'
/. Kant's Theocentric Metaphysics
13
such a position in his introductory essay to the standard translation of Kt8. In stressing Kant's supposed 'absolute insistence upon the reduction of true reli¬ gion to morality'—an interpretation we shall have reason to reject in Chapter VI and throughout Part Three—Greene characterizes Kant's 'whole religious theory... [as] anthropocentric, not theocentric' [Gr34:lxxvi]. But what Greene takes as evidence of an anti-theocentric approach to religion is best conceived as being a Critical response to both the anthropocentric and the theocentric ap¬ proaches taken by most previous philosophers. Allison rightly points out that Kant's rejection of 'transcendental realism' in Ktl amounts to a rejection of a 'theocentric model of knowledge' [A185:27; s.a. A176]. Kant's epistemology, in other words, is admittedly anthropocentric: what we can know is limited to the phenomenal realm of human experience.19 In this sense alone is Gulyga right to say [Gu87:61] 'man is at the centre of Kant's philosophical interests.' Yet Kant's epistemology is only meant to prepare the way for a proper (hypo¬ thetical/practical) approach to theological issues. In each Critique the traditional way of being theocentric or anthropocentric is rejected in favor of a limited anthropocentricity that leaves room for a proper theocentricity. In this sense, we could qualify the foregoing arguments by saying the overall orientation of Kant's System is Critically theocentric—i.e., it balances the purely anthropo¬ centric and theocentric approaches to philosophy with an approach that does justice to both.20 4. The Scope of This Volume We can now offer a tentative answer to the question posed at the outset of this chapter: Kant destroys not so much the possibility of theology as that of the one-sided rationalist spirit of the Enlightenment, in the midst of which he him¬ self was nurtured. His genius is to have done this without going to the opposite extreme of embracing positivism. In the process of working out his 'Critical' approach, he proposes numerous theories that are highly relevant to theologians and philosophers of religion. Unfortunately, many of these are imbedded so deeply within the intricacies of his philosophy that they are easily neglected or misunderstood. On the basis of the systematic analysis of the architectonic form and content of Kant's Critical philosophy completed in the first volume of this 19. Michalson is correct to say Kant's epistemology is neither theistic nor atheistic [Mi79:40-l]. 20 U n f o r t u n a t e l y> h e d o e s n o t acknowledge that Kant's metaphysics is theistic none the less. "• In KSP1:X.2 I expressed this balance by saying Kant's metaphysics is theocentric even though The Critical philosophy on its own .. is anthropocentric' This could be misleading, because the theocentric focus actually takes precedence in the Dialectic of each Critique, not only in the properly metaphysical works. It is still appropriate, however, inasmuch as the Dialectic is the section of each Critique that deals explicitly with the metaphysical ideas.
14
PART ONE: SYSTEMATIC FOUNDATIONS
series, we are now prepared to investigate in detail the most important of his System's religious and theological implications. To help readers recognize the systematic connection between the remaining chapters, I shall conclude this first chapter with a summary of this volume.21 Part One sets the stage for the entire study in three distinct ways. Here in the first chapter we have demonstrated that, despite common assumptions to the contrary, Kant's mature philosophy (or 'System of Perspectives') has a radical¬ ly theocentric orientation, promoted by the three metaphysical ideas. Chapter II takes a close look at Kant's early (and often neglected) book, Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, Illustrated by Dreams of Metaphysics [Ktl8], arguing that it fore¬ shadows with amazing accuracy some of the most basic tenets of the Critical philosophy. Its treatment of mystical visions ('dreams') directly parallels the treatment of metaphysical speculation in Ktl. A detailed overview of this text will not only reveal some rather surprising influences on Kant's thinking, but will also provide an indispensable context for interpreting the religious and theological orientation of his mature System in terms of his long-held interest in constructing a legitimate philosophical foundation for mystical experience. The third chapter then takes a step back and reviews the fundamental elements and metaphysical implications of Critical philosophy, as set forth in KSP1. (Those who have recently read KSP1 may therefore wish to skip Chapter III.) Part Two examines three key aspects of Kant's Critical theology: his reasons for believing in God's existence; symbolic ways to understand God's nature; and the relationship between theology and morality. Chapter IV explains the problem of transcendental theology (namely, that there is no way to prove God actually exists) and how Kant attempts to solve it. The first Critique introduces the regulative employment of the idea of God to demonstrate how this notion can be useful even though its objective validity cannot be absolutely confirmed. The third Critique presents physicotheology as providing empirical evidence for the God-hypothesis—evidence that is compelling, provided we do not pretend it constitutes an irrefutable theoretical proof. And the second Critique gives the ultimate rationale for belief in God: preserving the role of morality for properlyfunctioning human relationships necessitates a God-postulate. The next chapter begins with a description of God's transcendence, in light of the Kantian 2 1 . The architectonic structure of the chapters constituting the present volume is intended to correspond, more or less directly, to that of the chapters in KSP1. In both cases Chapter I is introductory, Chapter II presents some groundbreaking textual analysis, Chapter III outlines the architectonic plan, Chapter IV sets up the basic conceptual framework, Chapter V examines what results for those who take a step of faith, Chapter VI foreshadows Part Three by showing the relation between some of its central terms, Chapters VII-IX detail the elements of the system(s), and Chapters X-XII discuss metaphysical/mystical implications of the first nine chapters.
/. Kant's Theocentric Metaphysics
15
opposition between human reason and divine understanding (or 'intellectual intuition'). An account of the symbolic nature of all descriptions of God is followed by a series of suggestions as to how Kant thinks we should form theological and moral models of God's nature, once we are committed to believing in God's existence. Chapter VI raises the question as to whether Kant's well known emphasis on the centrality of morality for all genuine religion constitutes a total reduction of religion to morality. This common view is shown to be incorrect: Kant's own statements clearly indicate that he regards genuine empirical religion as a synthesis between morality and theology; morality on its own does not suffice and must therefore be raised to the level of religion by integrating it with a Critical theology. Part Three examines Kant's system of religion, as laid out in his Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason [Kt8] from three points of view. Chapter VII summarizes Kant's rational system of religious perspectives (systemr) in terms of a twelve-step argument that follows the same architectonic form as the first two Critiques [see Part Three of KSP1]. Each of the four 'Books' estab¬ lishes one of the four 'stages' in Kant's argument: radical evil, conversion to the good, founding of a church, and service of God. Chapter VIII shows how Kant regards Christianity as the best historical manifestation of the universal reli¬ gion of reason established by systemr. Kant's interpretations often provide richly symbolic ways of interpreting the Old Testament's creation story, the New Testament's gospel, and numerous church doctrines and rituals. Rather than being reductionistic, system,- leaves a space for something outside the boundaries of human reason. Following a hint Kant gives in the Preface to Kt8, Chapter IX takes up the Perspective of the biblical theologian: the Greatest Commandment and the Great Commission are used to construct a systematic biblical theology that is surprisingly consistent with Kant's general approach to theology and religion. The one crucial element that still seems to be missing from Kant's System up to this point, rendering it apparently inadequate for use in the context of any real, lived religion, is a place for religious experience. The task of demonstrating that Kant's System of Perspectives actually provides the means of solving this final problem is taken up in Part Four. After some initial reflections on the nature of mysticism and religious experience, Chapter X explains why most interpreters believe Kant rejects even the possi¬ bility of mystical experience. As long as mystical experiences are not regarded as conveying empirical knowledge, and as long as they do result in an im¬ provement or strengthening of the person's moral outlook, a refined or 'Critical' form of mysticism can be seen to fit quite comfortably into Kant's System. A wealth of textual evidence is amassed to show that, in fact, Kant was no
16
PART ONE: SYSTEMATIC FOUNDATIONS
stranger to mystical ideas and metaphors. Chapter XI enters into a debate over the issue of what Kant meant when he wrote, towards the end of his life, that a 'gap' still remained in his System. In contrast to a rather unlikely conjecture made by Forster, I defend the view that Kant's final, unfinished book (Opus Postumum [Kt9]) was intended to be the 'Grand Synthesis' of his metaphysical works, and that the gap was 'tantalizing' precisely because of its mystical char¬ acter. The final chapter examines the textual evidence for interpreting Kt9 as an extended defense of the Critical mysticism that Kant's entire System was de¬ voted to developing. Kant's treatment of our immediate awareness of the cate¬ gorical imperative as the 'voice of God' in our hearts and his corresponding treatment of ether or the caloric as an invisible 'hand of God' in nature reveal the purpose of Kt9 to be that of establishing the twofold foundation of Critical mysticism, culminating in the ideal God-man (i.e., Christ) as the final philo¬ sophical justification for a religious and theological outlook on life. The purpose of this first sequel to KSP1, then, is to replace the typical in¬ terpretation of Kant's theology and philosophy of religion as an austere, deistic agnosticism and moral reductionism with a more accurate interpretation, reveal¬ ing aricherand more viable, theocentric System. My hope is to unveil the heart of what Cassirer aptly calls 'the critical philosophy's new theoretical [i.e., philosophical] perspective on the world and on life' [Ca81:38]. After gaining a new appreciation for the crucial role religious experience has in authenticating, or 'bringing home', the reality of the Kantian God, who otherwise risks being merely an idea in our mind, we shall examine in a series of nine Appendices various finer points of detailed interpretation. However, the last two, on prayer (AVIII) and Kantian Christianity (AIX), should be of more general interest. My conviction in writing this book is that the theocentric orientation of Kant's philosophy not only serves the crucial philosophical role of unifying, and in a sense even completing, his System, but also provides philosophers and theologians with a rich and practicable framework for structuring our thought. The important task of bringing together the philosophical and theological strands in Kant's System [cf. AV, below] will be facilitated throughout the book by the use of geometrical figures as 'models' [see KSP1:I.2 and 111.3]; for they convey a clear and precise picture of what might be called a spiritual guiding-thread running through every aspect of his philosophy [cf. Ma68:24 and Kt7:389], forming the very heart of the System. When their significance is grasped, philosophers and theologians alike should agree that Kant's System of Perspectives, far from being philosophically inconsistent or theologically aversive, establishes a context that is satisfactory for both and can therefore serve as common ground for interdisciplinary dialogue.
Chapter II Kant's Dreams of a Critical Mysticism Human reason was not given strong enough wings to part clouds so high above us, clouds which withhold from our eyes the secrets of the other world. [Ktl8:373(121)]
1. The Traditional Myth of Kant's 'Awakening' Kant's life is traditionally portrayed as falling into two rather distinct peri¬ ods. The years prior to 1770 form the 'pre-Critical' period, while those from 1770 onwards form the 'Critical' period. The turning-point is placed in the year 1770 because this is when Kant wrote the Inaugural Dissertation for his newly gained position as Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of Konigsberg. In this work, entitled On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World [Ktl9], he proposed for the first time that space and time should be regarded as 'forms of intuition' that human subjects read into experience, rather than as self-subsisting attributes of nature that we read out from the objects we experience. The typical 'textbook' account of Kant's life usually declares that the 'pre-Critical' Kant was a Leibnizian dogmatist, trained in the school of Wolffian rationalism, and was interested as much in natural science as in philosophy, but that sometime around 1770 Kant was suddenly 'awakened' from his 'dogmatic slumbers' by his reflection on David Hume's philosophy.1 Some commentators, such as Kuehn [Ku83:191], go so far as to say not only that 'Kant and Hume aim at the very same thing', but that 'all the specific doctrines of Kant's critical enterprise are intimately bound up with Hume's influence on Kant.' Although it is difficult to determine the exact nature and date of this dra¬ matic awakening, there is no doubt that Kant was familiar with Hume's ideas by the early 1760s; indeed, so the story goes, in 1766 he published a book that adopts Hume's empiricist standpoint almost completely.2 This book, entitled 1. The latter is based on Kant's own account of the matter in Kt2:260(8): 'I openly confess my rec¬ ollection of David Hume was the very thing which many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy a quite new direction.' 2. Beck suggests that 'Kant had probably read Hume before 1760, but only much later (1772?) did he begin to follow "a new direction" under Hume's influence' [Kt2:(8n)]. Beck defends his position in Be69:465-7 [s.a. Wo60:117-23]. In Ktl9 and as late as 1772, in a letter to Marcus Herz, Kant shows no awareness that Hume's skepticism challenges his own conception of causality as an intellectual principle. The supposed reason is that Kant was familiar only with Hume's Enquiry (1748), with its relatively modest skepticism, until he read Beattie's Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth (1772), which contains translations of long passages from the more radically skeptical text of Hume's Treatise (1738). In Be87:405-8 Beck confirms his acceptance of this explanation despite more recent conjectures that Kant's friend, Hamann, who translated part of the Treatise in 1771, may have shown his translation to Kant as early as 1768. Paulsen affirms that Kant 'did not receive the impetus to his work [i.e., Ktl8] from the English writers, and especially from Hume's epistemological investigations' [PaO2:87-8]. The
18
PART ONE: SYSTEMATIC FOUNDATIONS
Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, Illustrated by Dreams of Metaphysics [Ktl8], is typical¬ ly interpreted as a minor work of an exceedingly skeptical nature, and of rela¬ tively little importance in understanding Kant's mature thought. This 'strangest and most tortured of Kant's writings' [Wa72:34] is, at best, a stage he passed out of as quickly as he passed into it, and at worst, an embarrassment for Kant and Kant scholars alike. The embarrassment could come not only as a result of the rather unorthodox subject-matter (visions and other mystical experiences), but because of the flippant attitude Kant adopts from time to time throughout the book [see note 11.13]. Indeed, regardless of how we interpret the philo¬ sophical content of this book, the psychological disposition of its author, who had recently entered his fifth decade, would appear to be that of a man in the midst of what we might nowadays call a mid-life crisis.3 The traditional account contains at least as much error as truth. While it is true that Kant never mentions his mature theory of the transcendental ideality of space and time before 1770, it is not true that he owes the theory to Hume (whose theory of space and time bears little resemblance to Kant's). Nor is it legitimate to equate this doctrine (expounded in its official form in the Aesthetic of Ktl) with the term 'Critical', as is implied by the dating of the Critical period from 1770. On the contrary, Kant associates his 'new method of thought, namely, that we can know a priori of things only what we ourselves put into them', not with the Critical method, but with the new 'Copernican' insight he believes will enable him to revolutionize philosophy [Ktl:xvi-xviii]. His de¬ scription and use of criticism as a philosophical method is quite distinct from its application to problems in metaphysics by means of the Copernican hypothesis. Thus, when Kant instructed the editor of his minor writings to ignore all those written before 1770 [see Se00:x], he was not defining the starting point of his application of the Critical method, but rather that of his application of the Copernican hypothesis to the task of constructing a new philosophical System. influence of Hume, he argues, came mainly in the early 1770s 'as furnishing an incentive to turn towards his original [i.e., Kant's own unique] position' [93-4], and to a lesser extent, just prior to the writing of Ktl9 in 1770 [97-99]. This supports the view I shall defend in II.3, that Hume's 'awakening' refers primarily to the change from Ktl9 to Ktl. Both these suggestions account only for Kant's recognition of the need for a more adequate defense of the philosophical principle of causality. They say nothing positive about the source of what I take to be the two most fundamental aspects of Kant's mature philosophical System: his Critical method and his 'Copernican' assumption. Moreover, they also fail to account for the unique (Humean?) character of Ktl8. In II.3, I shall propose an alternative explanation of Kant's development, which makes up for these and other inadequacies of the traditional view. 3. This conjecture is supported not only by Kant's age (early 40s), but also by his cynical dissatisfac¬ tion with the status quo. Manolesco treats 'Kant's sudden hatred for speculative metaphysics' as 'a deep psychological change due to unrequited love, not by metaphysics but by Swedenborg himself for not replying to Kant's queries [Ma69:14-5; cf. Bu84:71-3]. Moreover, Kant was involved in at least two failed love affairs at around this time [K152:39-41; Wa01:44-5; s.e. Gu87:54-5].
//. Kant's Dreams of a Critical Mysticism
19
If we must divide his life into two periods at 1770, we should therefore avoid using the term 'pre-CriticaT (as others have advised, but without giving a vi¬ able alternative [Be92:36; De94:174]) and refer instead to the 'pre-Copernican' and 'Copernican' periods. Adopting this new label will protect us from making inconsistent statements such as Gulick's [Gu94:99], implicitly conflating these two forms of revolution: 'Kant's self-designated Copernican revolution ush¬ ered in his critical period.' Since Kant exhibited 'Critical' tendencies through¬ out his life, his mature years should be named the 'Copernican' period. Before we proceed it is crucial to have a thorough understanding of Kant's mature conception of 'criticism' or 'critique' (Kritik), as elaborated in Ktl. In the first edition Preface, Kant describes his era as 'the age of criticism', during which reason accords 'sincere respect... only to that which has been able to sustain the test of free and open examination' [Ktl:Axin]. But this enlightened 'habit of thought' can be trusted only if it submits to its own 'tribunal' of criticism [Axi-xii]. Thus 'the subject-matter of our critical enquiry' (i.e., of the entire Critical philosophy) is reason itself [Axiv], and its 'first task' is 'to discover the sources and conditions of the possibility of such criticism' [Axxi]. This means the questions addressed to reason cannot be answered by means of a dogmatic and visionary insistence upon knowledge... that can be catered for only through magical devices, in which I am no adept. Such ways of answering them are, indeed, not within the intention of the natural constitution of our reason; and ... it is the duty of philosophy to counteract their deceptive influence, no matter what prized and cherished dreams may have to be disowned.4
Instead, only by first examining 'the very nature of knowledge itself can we answer reason's questions in such a way as to provide solutions to the prob¬ lems of metaphysics [Axiii-xiv]. In the second edition Preface Kant not only describes more fully the subject-matter of the particular type of critique he plans to engage in, but also explains more clearly the nature of the Critical method. Metaphysics will be 'purified by criticism and established once for all': the purification is 'merely negative, warning us that we must never venture with speculative reason be¬ yond the limits of experience'; but the establishment is positive inasmuch as it 4- Ktl:Axiii, e.a. The emphasized words indicate that Kant was still mindful of his earlier work in Ktl8, which, as will become apparent in this chapter, adopts the same point of view expressed in this quote. In fact, Kant uses terms referring to this sleeping/dreaming/awakening metaphor 27 times in Ktl [see Pa87a:34,109,347], most of which echo quite clearly the attitudes adopted in Ktl8. The most significant references are Ktl:Axiii,503,519-21,785,792 [but s.a. Axin, xxxvi,l, A112,217,247,278,A376-7,A380,A390,434,452,479,652,808]. Such texts should not, however, be taken as evidence that Kant was completely against all mysticism. Rather, they restate the same problem posed in Ktl8—viz., how one's 'cherished dreams' can be preserved, if not by dogma and/or magic. Kant's solution will be examined most fully in Part Four of this volume.
20
PART ONE: SYSTEMATIC FOUNDATIONS
'removes an obstacle which stands in the way of the employment of practical reason' [Ktl:xxiv-xxv]. In other words, the scope of reason's speculative (i.e., theoretical) standpoint is narrowed by tying it to sensibility, but this frees meta¬ physics to be established on the firmer foundation of reason's practical stand¬ point—i.e., on morality [xxv]. The Critical method, therefore, is intended to establish limits, but to do so for both negative and positive purposes. The for¬ mer can be seen when Kant refers to 'our critical distinction between two modes of representation, the sensible and the intellectual' and immediately adds 'and of the resulting limitation ...';5 likewise, he argues that noncontradictory doctrines of freedom and morality are 'possible only in so far as criticism ... has limited all that we can theoretically know to mere appearances' [xxix]. The positive benefit of such limitations is that they enable us to avoid 'dogmatism' (defined here as 'the preconception that it is possible to make headway in meta¬ physics without a previous criticism of pure reason'), which 'is the source of all that [skeptical] unbelief... which wars against morality' [xxx]. Indeed, Kant goes so far as to say that 'all objections to morality and religion will be for ever silenced' [xxxi], because his critique will 'sever the root of materialism, fatal¬ ism, atheism, free-thinking, fanaticism, and superstition... as well as of ideal¬ ism and scepticism' [xxxiv]. Throughout the rest of Ktl Kant repeats many of these same claims about the nature of criticism in its special, philosophical form. In most of their occur¬ rences the words 'critical', 'criticism', and 'critique' are used in close connec¬ tion with some mention of the limitations of knowledge.6 The only interesting exception is that on several occasions he adds that criticism serves as a middle way between the opposite extremes of dogmatism and skepticism [Ktl:22-3, A388-9,784-5,789,797]. Indeed, this epitomizes Kant's association of the Critical method with synthesis, which he claims always takes the triadic form of '(1) a condition, (2) a conditioned, (3) the concept arising from the union of the conditioned with its condition' [Kt7:197n]. And of course, the most basic example of his use of this pattern is his exposition of the Critical philosophy in the form of three Critiques. This brief analysis of Kant's understanding of the Critical method reveals that he never associates it directly with the Copernican hypothesis, but instead, with several key distinctions. The Critical method is, for Kant, the method of striking a middle way between two extremes ('a third step', as he calls it in Ktl:789 [s.a. 177,194,196,264,315,760-1,794]). It operates by trying to 5. Ktl:xxviii. These two modes of representation are similar, though not identical, to the distinction I make between 'immediate experience' and 'reflective knowledge' in KSPl:IV.l [s.a. III.2, below]. 6. See e.g., Ktl:352,A395. Pa87a:86 lists 168 occurrences of these three words in Ktl.
//. Kant's Dreams of a Critical Mysticism
21
locate the boundary between what can be known (and proved) and what can never be known (yet remains possible)—the boundary line being defined in terms of 'the limits of all possible experience' [e.g., 121]. Thus it is closely associated with 'the distinction between the transcendental and the empirical' [81], as well as with that between speculative (theoretical) and practical (moral) 'employments of reason', or standpoints.1 Although certain apparently skeptical claims have to be made on the way, the ultimate purpose of criticism for Kant is positive: to provide a means of constructing the foundation for metaphysics upon solid (nonspeculative, moral) grounds. A careful reading of Kant's works reveals that traces of this Critical way of doing philosophy are evident throughout most of his writings, from the earliest essays on metaphysics and natural philosophy to the latest essays on religion, political history, and other subjects.8 Indeed, the fact that he uses this method to develop and expound the implications of his Copernican hypothesis is what gives lasting value to the theories that arise out of it, and not vice versa. There is no need to provide here a thoroughgoing proof of the ubiquity of the Critical method in Kant's writings [but see KSP1:32,39 and passim]. Instead I shall concentrate on Ktl8 because, in proportion to its importance, it is the most neglected and/or misunderstood book in the corpus of Kant's writings. The next section sketches the contents of this book, after which I shall draw attention in II.3 to its Critical character and discuss its role in Kant's discovery of the Copernican hypothesis. Finally, I shall offer some brief suggestions in II.4 as to the relation between Ktl8 and Kant's mature System of Perspectives. This will prepare the way for a proper understanding of Kant's views not only on theology and religion (Parts Two and Three), but also on mystical experi¬ ence itself. In Part Four I shall therefore return to this theme and consider in more detail the possibility of viewing Kant's entire System as the elaboration of a 'Critical mysticism', first envisaged in Ktl8 and (nearly) brought to full fruition in Kant's last, uncompleted work, Kt9. 2. Kant's Criticism of Swedenborg's Mystical Dreams In Ktl8 Kant examines the nature and possibility of mystical visions, paying special attention to the claims of a Swedish writer and accomplished 1- Indeed, as I have argued throughout KSP1, the making of such perspectival distinctions is the key task of the Critical philosopher [s.e. KSPlrII.1]. 8. In the earlier works, of course, the traces are evident retrospectively even though Kant himself would not yet have been conscious of the significance of the naturally Critical tendencies of his way of thinking. In fact, becoming conscious of what was already there seems to be one of the im¬ plications of his much-used metaphor of sleeping/dreaming/awakening [see note II.4]. Otherwise a metaphor such as 'coming alive' or 'giving birth' would have been more appropriate.
22
PART ONE: SYSTEMATIC FOUNDATIONS
scientist named Emanuel Swedenborg.9 Kant examines these visions not only to explore the limits of his own commitment to a belief in the spirit world,10 but also (and more importantly) in order to draw attention to the dangers of specu¬ lative metaphysics by comparing it with fanatical mysticism. This analogy, present as it is in the very title of the work, will prove to be of utmost im¬ portance in understanding how Ktl8 relates to the later development of Kant's System. As noted earlier, Ktl8 is commonly interpreted as evidence of a radically empiricist stage in Kant's development, where he is supposedly adopting something of a Humean position. But his actual intention, as we shall see, is to encourage a Critical attitude: while he comes down hard on the misuse of reason by spirit-seers and metaphysicians when they regard their respective dreams 'as a source of knowledge' [see Se00:146], he expresses quite clearly his own dream that a properly balanced approach to both mysticism and meta¬ physics will someday emerge.11 A detailed examination of Ktl8 can therefore provide some helpful clues as to Kant's motivations for constructing the Critical philosophy itself. The mystical experiences considered in Ktl8 are not experiences of the presence of God (i.e., 'of infinite spirit which is originator and preserver of the universe' [Ktl8:321n(44n)]), but experiences of lower spiritual beings, who are supposed to be able to communicate with earthly beings in visions and ap¬ paritions. Although Kant ridicules those who have such experiences at several points in Ktl8, he reveals his private view of such experiences in two impor¬ tant letters. In a letter to Charlotte von Knoblock (dated 10 August, probably 1763) he admits he 'always considered it to be most in agreement with sound 9. Swedenborg (1688-1772) was not only the founder of crystallography, but also made significant advances in a wide range of scientific, technological, and economic fields. For an account of such accomplishments, see F193b:I.l.l and La93:57-8. 10. Kant's interest in the spirit world is almost always neglected, if not outright denied, by Kant scholars nowadays. Yet throughout his life he repeatedly affirmed a belief in its reality. Even in Ktl he uses 'spirit' and its cognates 16 times [Pa87a:353}, affirming his commitment to a surprisingly Platonic view of the eternality of the human spirit [Ktl:8O7-8]: 'we can propound a transcendental hypothesis, namely, that all life is, strictly speaking, intelligible only, is not subject to changes of time, and neither begins in birth nor ends in death; that this life is an appearance only, that is, a sensible representation of the purely spiritual life, and that the whole sensible world is a mere picture which in our present mode of knowledge hovers before us, and like a dream has in itself no objective reality; that if we could intuit ourselves and things as they are, we should see ourselves in a world of spiritual beings, our sole and true community with which has not begun through birth and will not cease through bodily death—both birth and death being mere appearances.' 11. The subtle difference between this and the usual interpretation can be illustrated by quoting Werkmeister's claims that in Ktl8 Kant concludes 'that metaphysics ought to abandon its dogmatic speculations about God, the life hereafter, and similar topics' [We80:64]. This is correct, provided we understand (as Werkmeister himself hints elsewhere [cf. note 11.13]) that abandoning dogmatic speculation does not entail altogether abandoning belief in God, etc., as is assumed by those who regard Ktl8 as the work of a skeptic. Kant abandons speculation not in order to swing over to the skepticism of unbelief, but in order to make room for a Critical reformation of his beliefs.
//. Kant's Dreams of a Critical Mysticism
23
reason to incline to the negative side..., until the report concerning Swedenborg came to my notice.'12 After recounting several impressive stories, Kant tells how Swedenborg was once able to describe in precise detail a fire that 'had just broken out in Stockholm', even though he was fifty miles away in Goteborg [SeOO:158]. He says this 'occurrence appears to me to have the greatest weight of proof, and to place the assertion respecting Swedenborg's extraordi¬ nary gift beyond all possibility of doubt.' In a subsequent letter (8 April 1766) to Mendelssohn [q.i. 162] Kant explains that he clothed his thoughts with ridicule in Ktl8 in order to avoid being ridiculed by other philosophers for paying attention to mystical visions (hardly taken seriously by most philoso¬ phers in the Enlightenment [see Ktl8:353-4(91-2)]). He admits: the attitude of my own mind is inconsistent and, so far as these stories are con¬ cerned, I cannot help having a slight inclination for things of this kind, and indeed, as regards their reasonableness, I cannot help cherishing an opinion that there is some validity in these experiences in spite of all the absurdities involved in the stories about them...
Elsewhere in the same letter he draws a Critical conclusion: 'Neither the pos¬ sibility nor the impossibility of this kind of thing can be proved, and if some¬ one attacked Swedenborg's dreams as impossible, I should undertake to defend them.'13 Clearly, Kant believed something significant is happening in such 12. Se00:155. On the dating of this letter, see SeOO:16O, Br53:117-8 and Ra63:74. 13. Cited in Ra63:74. A good summary of the first three visions Swedenborg made public, each mentioned in Kant's letters, is given in La93:60-l. Kant's tendency in Ktl8 to ridicule views towards which he was in fact sympathetic may be what led him to suggest this book be excluded from his collected minor writings [see SeO0:x; Ma69:7]. Paulsen admits that the 'spiritology' in Ktl8 'is not intended [by Kant] to be entirely without seriousness', inasmuch as it foreshadows the important 'two worlds' doctrine later propounded in Ktl [PaO2:84]. Later he relates this to 'Kant's Platonism', already evident in Ktl8: 'an ethical and religious view of the world on the basis of objective idealism' [310]. Mendelssohn captures the strangeness of Kant's mood in Ktl8 when he writes in a book review [q.i. We80:43]: 'The jesting profundity with which this little work has been written leaves the reader at times in doubt as to whether Mr. Kant intended to make metaphysics ridiculous or spiritism (Geisterseherei) plausible.' The answer, as we shall see, is both and neither: making uncritical approaches to both issues look ridiculous prepares the way for the Critical method to reveal the plausibility of both. For Ktl8 adopts an entirely Critical method, and so first poses the problem (though somewhat obscurely) that is to be solved by Kant's mature philosophical System. That Kant is intentionally using Swedenborg's visions as a test case for the application of his well-formed Critical method, before launching into its application to all of metaphysics, is indicated in his 1766 letter to Mendelssohn [q.i. Ma69:154-9], where he calls attention to the 'important conclusions which are meant to determine in a strict manner the methodology of [the new metaphysics]', and then invites Mendelssohn to use this new (Critical) method 'to draw up a new master plan for this science' [1567, e.a.]. See also La93:72-100 and We80:44,84 for similar views of the prefiguring role of Ktl8. Werkmeister [We80:45] quotes Borowski's biography of Kant as saying 'the attentive reader found already here [in Ktl 8] the seeds of the Critique of Pure Reason and of that which Kant gave us later.' Unfortunately, he gives no details as to just which aspects of Ktl8 constitute these 'seeds'. After using the same metaphor (Ktl8 'contains... many of the seeds of Kant's Critical Philosophy' [Ma69:13]), Manolesco lists some examples [17-8]: Kant's 'theory of spirits is almost an exact replica, expressed in philosophical language, of Swedenborg's own thesis ... Swedenborgian
24
PART ONE: SYSTEMATIC FOUNDATIONS
experiences—significant enough to merit a comparison with the tasks of meta¬ physics, 'the dream science itself [AA10:67(Zw67:55)], to which he admits to being hopelessly 'in love' [see 1.2, above]. The problem this set for him was to describe 'just what kind of a thing that is about which these people think they understand so much' [Ktl8: 319(41)]. In the Preface to Ktl8 Kant hints at the Critical nature of his inquiry by asking two opposing questions, but offering a 'third way out': he asks (1) 'Shall [the philosopher] wholly deny the truth of all the apparitions [eye¬ witnesses] tell about?'; or (2) 'Shall he, on the other hand, admit even one of these stories?'; and he answers that (3) the philosopher should 'hold on to the useful'.14 The treatise itself consists of seven chapters, grouped in two parts: Part One contains four 'dogmatic' chapters and Part Two contains three 'historical' chapters. The correspondence between these two parts and the structure of the System he was soon to begin elaborating is evident by the fact that Part One ends with a chapter on 'Theoretical Conclusions' and Part Two ends with a chapter on 'Practical Conclusions' [348(85),368(115)], thus fore¬ shadowing the division between the first and second Critiques. The theoretical part begins in Chapter One, under the heading 'A compli¬ cated metaphysical knot which can be untied or cut according to choice' [Ktl8:319(41)], by discussing what a spirit is or might be. Kant confesses: I do not know if there are spirits, yea, what is more, I do not even know what the word 'spirit' signifies. But, as I have often used it myself, and have heard others using it, something must be understood by it, be this something mere fancy or reality. [Ktl8:320(42)]
To this rather Wittgensteinian remark he adds that 'the conception of spiritual nature cannot be drawn from experience', though its 'hidden sense' can be drawn 'out of its obscurity through a comparison of sundry cases of applica¬ tion' [320n(42-3n)]. He then argues that a spirit must be conceived as a simple, immaterial being, possessing reason as an internal quality [320-1(43-5)]. After considering some of the difficulties associated with this concept, he adopts an entirely Critical position: "The possibility of the existence of immaterial beings doctrines ... provided him with fundamental metaphysical starting points for his later views on the soul, on the dualism of mind and matter, on his conception of noumena and phenomena, on inner sense and its connection with the unity of apperception.' Such parallels are discussed in II.3. 14. Ktl8:317-8(38). McCarthy makes the interesting suggestion in Mc82 that Kant's mature philoso¬ phy replaces 'Christus' (Latin for 'anointed') with 'Crestus' (Latin for 'useful'). If so, Kant's third point can be regarded as a foretaste of what is to come. We must be keep in mind, however, that 'useful' for Kant means 'useful in bringing about goodness'; it is not a sudden leaning towards utili¬ tarianism [cf. Kt25:29.846(204)]. McCarthy shows his implicit awareness of the moral aspect of the Kantian 'useful' when he says his (like Kant's) concern is with 'the role of Jesus the (morally) "Useful"' [Mc82:192]. What McCarthy seems to ignore is that the 'Crestus' need not exclude the 'Cristus'; as we shall see in Part Three, both can (and should) work together as complements.
//. Kant's Dreams of a Critical Mysticism
25
can... be supposed without fear of its being disproved, but also without hope of proving it by reason' [323(46-7), e.a.]. If one assumes 'that the soul of man is a spirit', even though this cannot be proved, then the problem arises as to how it is connected with the body [324-5(48-9)]. Kant rejects the Cartesian focus on a mechanism in the brain in favor of 'common experience':15 Nobody... is conscious of occupying a separate place in his body, but only of that place which he occupies as a man in regard to the world around him. I would, therefore, keep to common experience, and would say, provisionally, where I sense, there I am. I am just as immediately in the tips of my fingers, as in my head. It is myself who suffers in the heel and whose heart beats in affection.16
The chapter concludes with the confession 'that I am very much inclined to as¬ sert the existence of immaterial natures in the world, and to put my soul into that class of beings' [327(52)]. Although he concedes that the various questions concerned with such a belief are 'above my intelligence' [328(54)], he does suggest in Ktl8:327n(52-3n) that 'Whatever in the world contains a principle of life, seems to be of immaterial nature. For all life rests on the inner capacity [cf. freedom in Kt4] to determine one's self by one's own will power.' After confirming the metaphysical possibility of (and his personal belief in) spirits, Kant presents in Chapter Two 'a fragment of secret philosophy aiming to establish communion with the spirit-world' [Ktl8:329(55)]. He begins by positing an 'immaterial world' that is conceived 'as a great whole, an immea¬ surable but unknown gradation of beings and active natures by which alone the dead matter of the corporeal world is endued with life.'17 As a member of both 15. Kant notes in Ktl8:325n(5On) that this 'prevalent opinion which assigns to the soul its seat in the brain, seems to originate mainly in the fact, that we feel distinctly how, in deep meditation, the nerves of the brain are taxed. But if this conclusion is right it would prove also other abodes of the soul. In anxiety or joy the sensation seems to have its seat in the heart. Many affections, yea most of them, manifest themselves most strongly in the diaphragm. Pity moves the intestines, and other instincts manifest their origin in other organs.' Here we see a good example of Kant's awareness of and concern for the condition of his own body. Unfortunately, interpreters tend to excuse this con¬ cern as stemming merely from his eccentric ideas about how he could maintain his own health through sheer will power and self-determination [see e.g., Kt51 and Part III of Kt65]. Yet it seems also to reveal the importance he placed on fostering a meditative awareness of his immediate experience: philosophy for Kant is ultimately not an abstract function of the mind or brain, but a discipline in which the whole body participates as well. !6. Ktl8:324-5(48-9); s.a. AA28:146-7 and La93:52,159. Laywine makes a good case in La93 for viewing soul-body interaction as the chief philosophical concern around which most of Kant's preCopernican writings revolved. She argues that, prior to Ktl 8 Kant was (at least implicitly) committed to a theory of 'physical influx', whereby the soul has quasi-material characteristics, such as impenetrability, and that in the process of grappling with Swedenborg's vulgar version of the same view, Kant recognized the need to give it up. I summarize and assess La93 in AH.2. 17. Ktl8:33O(57). 'The relation [of these 'incorporeal substances'] by means of things corporeal is consequently to be regarded as accidental' [330(56-7)]. Since an 'undoubted characteristic of life' is 'free movement' (including growth), Kant suggests that both plants and animals may also have an immaterial nature [330(57)]. In order to show the close connection between plants and animals Kant mentions Boerhaave's view: "The animal is a plant which has its roots in the stomach (inside).'
26
PART ONE: SYSTEMATIC FOUNDATIONS
the material and the immaterial world, a human being 'forms a personal unit' [332(60)]. Kant conjectures that purely immaterial beings may 'flow into the souls of men as into beings of their own nature, and... are actually at all times in mutual intercourse with them', though the results of such intercourse cannot ordinarily 'be communicated to the other purely spiritual beings', nor 'be trans¬ ferred into the consciousness of men' [333(61)]. As evidence for such a com¬ munion of spirits, Kant examines the nature of morality. Using one of his favorite geometrical metaphors (that of intersecting lines), he says in Ktl8: 334-5(63): 'The point to which the lines of direction of our impulses converge is ... not only in ourselves, but... in the will of others outside of ourselves.' The fact that our actions are motivated not only by selfishness, but also by duty and benevolence, reveals that 'we are dependent upon the rule of the will ofalV [335(64)]; and 'the sensation of this dependence'—i.e., our 'sense of morali¬ ty'—suggests that 'the community of all thinking beings' is governed by 'a moral unity, and a systematic constitution according to purely spiritual laws.' Thus, 'because the morality of an action concerns the inner state of the spirit', its effect can be fully realized not in the empirical world, but 'only in the im¬ mediate communion of spirits' [336(65)]. In reply to the possible objection that, given this view of the spirit-world, 'the scarcity of apparitions' seems 'extraordinary', Kant stresses that 'the con¬ ceptions of the one world are not ideas associated with those of the other world'; so even if we have a 'clear and perspicuous' spiritual conception, this cannot be regarded as 'an object of actual [i.e., material] sight and experi¬ ence.'18 However, he freely admits that a person, being both material and im¬ material, can become He then opines the converse is also true: 'The plant is an animal which has its stomach in the root (outside).' But he warns that 'such conjectures... have the ridicule of fashion against them, as being dusty antiquated fancies'; 'the appeal to immaterial principles is a subterfuge of bad philosophy', so he will 'not... use any of these considerations as evidence' [331(58)]. 18. Ktl8:337-8(67-9). Kant conjectures that the spiritual conceptions that arise in the deepest, dreamless sleep 'may be clearer and broader than even the clearest in the waking state. This is to be expected of such an active being as the soul when the external senses are so completely at rest. For man, at such times is not sensible of his body.' When dreaming, by contrast, a person 'perceives to a certain degree clearly, and weaves the actions of his spirit into the impressions of the external senses.' Unfortunately, Kant does not acknowledge the importance of this connective function of dreams, so instead of regarding them as revealing profound symbols of spiritual conceptions (as Jung, using Kant as his philosophical springboard, has since suggested [see AII.l)), he ridicules them as being 'only wild and absurd chimeras' [338n(68n)]. Du Prel develops an elaborate theory of 'somnambulism' (including hypnotism) based explicitly on Kant's philosophy [see e.g., Du89: l.xxvi,5-7,62,71, etc.; s.a. note II. 1]. He also agrees with Kant on many specific points [see e.g., 1.57-8]. For example, in Du89:1.44 he says: 'With the deepening of sleep must diminish the confusion of the dream.' In arguing for 'the scientific importance of dream', he claims this clarity can be explained best by assuming that in deepest sleep the center of control changes from the brain (the focus of consciousness) to the solar plexus (the focus of the unconscious), and that the more control exercised by the latter, the more significant the dream will be [1.27-44,68-9].
//. Kant's Dreams of a Critical Mysticism
27
conscious of the influences of the spirit-world even in this life. For spiritual ideas ... stir up those pictures which are related to them and awake analogous ideas of our senses. These, it is true, would not be spiritual conceptions themselves, but yet their symbols.... Thus it is not improbable that spiritual sensations can pass over into consciousness if they act upon correlated ideas of the senses. [338-9(69-70)]
Even 'our higher concepts of reason' need to 'clothe themselves' in, 'as it were, a bodily garment to make themselves clear', as when 'the geometrician represents time by a line' [339(69-70)]. An actual apparition, which might 'indicate a disease, because it presupposes an altered balance of the nerves', is unusual because it is based not on a simple analogy, but on 'a delusion of the imagination', in which 'a true spiritual influence' is perceived in imagined 'pictures... which assume the appearance of sensations' [340(71)]. Kant warns that in an apparition 'delusion is mingled with truth', so it tends to deceive 'in spite of the fact that such chimeras may be based upon a true spiritual influence' [340(71-2), e.a.]. In truly Critical fashion Kant now adopts the opposite perspective in Chapter Three, presenting an 'Antikabala'—that is, 'a fragment of common philosophy aiming to abolish communion with the spirit-world' [Ktl8:342 (74)]. Here Kant first states the analogy between metaphysicians ('reasondreamers') and visionaries ('sensation-dreamers'): in both cases the dreamer imagines a private world 'which no other healthy man sees', yet 'both are selfcreated pictures which nevertheless deceive the senses as if they were true objects' [342-3(75)]. In order to help such dreamers 'wake up, i.e., open their eyes to such a view as does not exclude conformity with other people's com¬ mon sense' [342(74)], he proposes an alternative description of what is hap¬ pening in an apparition. The problem is to explain how visionaries 'place the phantoms of their imagination outside of themselves, and even put them in re¬ lation to their body, which they sense through their external senses' [343-4 (77)]. He suggests that in external sensation 'our soul locates the perceived object at the point where the different lines, indicating the direction of the impression, meet', whereas in a vision this 'focus imaginarius' is located not outside of the body but 'inside of the brain' [344-5(77-9)]. The difference between the fantasy of a sane person [see 346n(81n)] arid the delusions of an insane person is that only the latter 'places mere objects of his imagination outside of himself, and considers them to be real and present objects' [346 (80)]. So 'the disease of the visionary concerns not so much the reason, as a deception of the senses' [347(82)]. Kant concludes that this simpler interpre¬ tation 'renders entirely superfluous the deep conjectures of the preceding chapter... Indeed, from this perspective, there was no need of going back as
28
PART ONE: SYSTEMATIC FOUNDATIONS
far as to metaphysics'.19 The fourth and final chapter of Part One presents the 'theoretical conclu¬ sion from the whole of the consideration of the first part' [Ktl8:348(85)]. Kant begins with a penetrating description of his own method of philosophizing (i.e., the Critical method), according to which 'the partiality of the scales of reason' is always checked by letting 'the merchandise and the weights ex¬ change pans' [348-9(85)]. He uses this metaphor to make two points. First, it suggests the importance of being willing to give up all prejudices [349(85-6)]: I now have nothing at heart; nothing is venerable to me but what enters by the path of sincerity into a quiet mind open to all reasons ... Whenever I meet with something instructive, I appropriate it.... Formerly, I viewed common sense only from the standpoint of my own; now I put myself into the position of a foreign reason outside myself, and observe my judgments, together with their most secret causes, from the standpoint of others.
Kant's exposition in Ktl8 exemplifies this Critical (perspectival) shift by op¬ posing the merchandise of his own prejudices concerning the spirit-world (Chapter Two) with the dead weight of a reductionist explanation (Chapter Three). The second point of the analogy is, however, the crucial one: we must recognize that 'The scale of reason is not quite impartial' and so move the mer¬ chandise from the speculative pan to the pan 'bearing the inscription "Hope of the Future"' (i.e., from the standpoint of the first Critique to that of the third [cf. KSPl:37n,307]), where 'even those light reasons... outweigh the specula¬ tions of greater weight on the other side' [Kt 18:349(86)]. Here at the threshold of his mature philosophical System, then, Kant stresses the overriding importance of what I call the 'judicial' standpoint [see note 1.17]: 'This is the only inaccuracy [of the scales of reason] which I cannot easily remove, and which, in fact, I never want to remove' [349-50(86)]. On this basis Kant concludes that, even though 'in the scale of speculation they seem to consist of nothing but air', the dreams of spirit-seers (and meta¬ physicians!) 'have appreciable weight only in the scale of hope' [Ktl8:350(867)]. While admitting 'that I do not understand a single thing about the whole matter' of how the immaterial can interact with the material, he claims 'that this study... exhausts all philosophical knowledge about [spiritual] beings... in the 19. Ktl8:347-8(82-3), The concluding paragraph of Chapter Three, containing these comments, also includes some harsh ridicule of those who adopt the perspective of Chapter Two. He suggests, for instance, that although visionaries are not necessarily insane, 'insanity [is] a likely consequence of such communion.... Therefore, I do not at all blame the reader, if, instead of regarding the spiritseers as half-dwellers in another world [the view Kant himself seems to prefer], he, without further ceremony, dispatches them as candidates for the hospital' [348(83)]. No doubt this is one of the embarrassing remarks in Ktl8 that led Kant to suggest in later life that it be excluded from his collected minor works [see SeOO.x].
//. Kant's Dreams of a Critical Mysticism
29
negative sense, by fixing with assurance the limits of our knowledge' [349-50 (88-9)]. The assumed spiritual principle of life 'can never be thought of in a positive way, because for this purpose no data can be found in the whole of our sensations' .20 He is therefore constrained by ignorance to 'deny the truth of the various ghost stories', yet he maintains 'a certain faith in the whole of them taken together.'21 As I have argued in KSPl:V.l, this subordination of specu¬ lative knowledge to practical faith is the key to the justification of the Copernican Perspective itself. Thus, when Kant concludes Part One by saying 'this whole matter of spirits' will 'not concern me any more', because 'I hope to be able to apply to better advantage my small reasoning powers upon other subjects' [352(90)], he may be hinting that he is already beginning to formulate a plan for constructing a System of Perspectives based on Critical reasoning. Having promised not to philosophize on spirits any longer, Kant recounts in the first chapter of the second ('historical') part three stories concerning the spiritual powers of Swedenborg, 'the truth of which the reader is recommended to investigate as he likes' [Ktl8:353(91)]. He claims 'absolute indifference to the kind or unkind judgment of the reader', admitting that in any case 'stories of this kind will have... only secret believers, while publicly they are rejected by the prevalent fashion of disbelief [353-4(92)]. In the second chapter of Part Two Kant provides a summary of Swedenborg's own explanation of his 'ecstatic journey through the world of spirits' [Ktl8:357(98)] and notes its similarity to 'the adventure which, in the fore¬ going [i.e., in Part One], we have undertaken in the balloon of metaphysics' [360(102)]. The position Swedenborg develops 'resembles so uncommonly the philosophical creation of my own brain', Kant explains, that he feels the need to 'declare... that in regard to the alleged examples I mean no joke' [359(100)]. To cover up his own interest in Swedenborg's work, Kant ridicules his 'hero' for writing an eight-volume work 'utterly empty of the last drop of reason' [359-60(101)]—a good example of the occasional harsh or frivolous statements that later embarrassed him [see note II. 13]. The extract turns out to be so close to the views Kant had expounded in Chapter Two of Part One that he concludes his summary by reassuring the reader that 'I have not substituted my own fancies for those of our author, but have offered his views in a faithful extract 20, Ktl8:351-2(89). This position has an obvious affinity with the doctrines of the positive and nega¬ tive noumenon developed in Ktl [see KSP1:VI.3]. 21. Ktl8:351(88). Thus, Kant notes [350n(87-8n)] that our speculative ignorance 'does not at all invalidate the confidence that the conceptions thence evolved [i.e., from hope] are right.' For ex¬ ample, the 'inner perception* that death is 'only a transformation' leads 'to that point to which rea¬ son itself would lead us if it were more enlightened, and of a greater scope.' Kant is saying our immediate experience can provide existential certainty for a position that cannot be proved theo¬ retically. This existential certainty is grounded in what Kant calls 'rational faith' [see note IV.15].
30
PART ONE: SYSTEMATIC FOUNDATIONS
to the comfortable and economic reader who does not care to sacrifice seven pounds [closer to seven hundred these days!] for a little curiosity' [366(111)]. The chapter ends with an apology for leading the reader 'by a tiresome roundabout way to the same point of ignorance from which he started', but adds that 'I have wasted my time that I might gain it. I have deceived the reader so that I might be of use to him' [Ktl8:367-8(112-3)]. After confessing his unrequited love of metaphysics, Kant insists that metaphysics as a rational inquiry 'into the hidden qualities of things' (i.e., speculative metaphysics) must be clearly distinguished from 'metaphysics [as] the science of the boundaries of human reason' (i.e., Critical metaphysics) [368(114)]: Before... we had flown on the butterfly-wings of metaphysics, and there conversed with spiritual beings. Now ... we find ourselves again on the ground of experience and common sense. Happy, if we look at it as the place allotted to us, which we can leave with impunity, and which contains everything to satisfy us as long as we hold fast to the useful.
:
'
Far from indicating a temporary conversion from dogmatic rationalism to skep¬ tical empiricism, as is usually assumed about Ktl8, this passage, interpreted in its proper context, reveals that Kant already has a clear conception of the Critical method, and is nurturing the seed that was to grow into his complete philosophical System. Any doubt about the Critical character of Ktl8 is dispelled by the 'practical conclusion from the whole treatise' given in the final chapter of Part Two [368(115)]. Kant begins by distinguishing between what science can under¬ stand to achieve knowledge and what reason needs to understand to achieve wisdom—a distinction that pervades the entirety of his mature System. By de¬ termining what is impossible to know, science can establish 'the limits set to human reason by nature', so that 'even metaphysics will become... the com¬ panion of wisdom' [368(115-6)]. He then introduces (what I call) the principle of perspective as the guiding principle of this new way of philosophizing: once philosophy 'judges its own proceedings, and... knows not only objects, but their relation to man's reason*, thus establishing the perspective from which the object is viewed, 'then ... the boundary stones are laid which in future never allow investigation to wander beyond its proper district' [368-9(116), e.a.]. This is followed by a warning against the failure to distinguish between philo¬ sophical relations (i.e., those known by reflection) and 'fundamental relations' (i.e., those that 'must be taken from experience alone')—the distinction that forms the basis for all other Critical distinctions.22 That Kant is here referring to 22. For a fuller explanation of this fundamental distinction between immediate experience (which, as such, produces no knowledge) and the various reflective forms of experience (which do produce
//. Kant's Dreams of a Critical Mysticism
31
immediate experience, not to empirical knowledge, is evident when he says 'I know that will and understanding move my body, but I can never reduce by analysis this phenomenon, as a simple [immediate] experience, to another experience, and can, therefore, indeed recognize it, but not understand it' [369 (117)]. He reaffirms that our powers of reflection provide 'good reason to conceive of an incorporeal and constant being'; but because our immediate ex¬ perience as earthly beings relating to other earthly beings depends on 'corporeal laws', we can never know for certain what 'spiritual' laws would hold if we were 'to think... without connection with a body' [370-1(117-8)]. The possi¬ bility of establishing 'new fundamental relations of cause and effect'—i.e., of having an immediate experience not of corporeal nature but of spiritual nature— 'can never... be ascertained'; the 'creative genius or... chimera, whichever you like to call it', which invents such spiritual (later called noumenal) causality cannot establish knowledge (much less scientific 'proof') precisely because the 'pretended experiences' are not governed by corporeal (later called a priori) laws, which alone are required for a knowledge-claim to be 'unanimously accepted by men' [371-2(118-9)]. This final chapter of Ktl8 ends with a concise (and entirely Critical) explanation of the positive aspect of this otherwise negative conclusion. The fact that 'philosophic knowledge is impossible in the case under consideration' need cause no concern (neither for the metaphysician nor for the mystic) as long as we recognize that 'such knowledge is dispensable and unnecessary', because reason does not need to know such things [372(120)]. "The vanity of science' fools us into believing that 'a proof from experience of the existence of such things' is required. 'But true wisdom is the companion of simplicity, and as, with the latter, the heart rules the understanding, it generally renders unnec¬ essary the great preparations of scholars, and its aims do not need such means as can never be at the command of all men.' The true philosophy, which Kant always believed would confirm common sense and therefore would be attain¬ able for everyone (unlike a speculative dependence on theoretical proofs or mystical apparitions, each available to only a few individuals), should be based on 'immediate moral precepts'—that is, on a 'moral faith' that 'guides [the 'righteous soul'] to his true aims' [372-3(120-1)]. Thus he concludes [373 (121)] by defending the position later elaborated in his practical and religious systems, that it is more appropriate 'to base the expectation of a future world upon the sentiment of a good soul, than, conversely, to base the soul's good conduct upon the hope of another world.' knowledge), see KSPl:IV.l and the summary of that section, given in III.2, below.
32
PART ONE: SYSTEMATIC FOUNDATIONS
3. Kant's Four Major 'Awakenings' In the preceding section we have seen that all the main characteristics of Kant's Critical method, together with anticipations of several of his mature doctrines and distinctions, are present in Ktl8. The method of choosing the middle path between two extremes is exemplified by Kant's advice in the Pref¬ ace to 'hold on to the useful'—though this is not exactly how he would later describe his Critical means of steering between the extremes of dogmatism and skepticism [but cf. note II. 14, above]. The Critical distinction between the theo¬ retical and the practical, whose most obvious application is to the distinction between the first two Critiques, is foreshadowed by the conclusions to the two parts of Ktl8, the first being theoretical and the second, practical. The attitude expressed in the first chapter, that 'spirits' are theoretically possible but can never be proved to exist, is reminiscent of the hypothetical perspective adopted in the Dialectic of Ktl, where all 'ideas of reason' are treated similarly.23 Even the second chapter, where Kant is letting his metaphysical imagina¬ tion run wild, contains an interesting parallel: Kant's suggestion that the inner state of spirits is primarily important in its connection with morality is entirely consistent with his later decision to regard morality as the proper foundation for metaphysics. (The same point is emphasized in the last chapter, where the true basis for belief in spirits is said to rest on morality rather than speculation.) And the skepticism Kant adopts in Chapter Three is not unlike the version he sometimes adopts in the Dialectic of Ktl (in both cases as a temporary measure to guard against unwarranted speculation).24 The subordination of the theoret¬ ical (i.e., speculative) to the practical and the judicial [see note 1.13], as hinted by Kant's expressed preference for the 'useful', is forcefully emphasized by his reference to the 'scales of reason' in the fourth chapter. His use of this analogy to emphasize the philosophical legitimacy of hope for the future in spite of our theoretical ignorance foreshadows both Kt7 and Kt8.25 Throughout Part 23. This emphasis on the useful in Ktl8 may have arisen to some extent out of Kant's Wolffian education. For Wolff himself stressed the importance of 'the useful' [see e.g., Co60b:l 12]. Kant did not abandon this emphasis in his mature writings, but rather transformed it into the hypothetical perspective in systemt and into the practical standpoint of his overall System. In the final chapter of Ktl 8 the same strategy is employed to address the issue of the possibil¬ ity of a spiritual influence on the body: such influences are possible but cannot be proved because they are not governed by corporeal laws. This is directly parallel to Kant's mature attitude towards 'noumenal causality', which cannot be regarded as knowable because it does not fall under the a priori principles of the possibility of experience. 24. Indeed, Kant even uses the analogy of awakening in the skeptical chapter of Ktl 8 [342(74), q.a. in II.2], thus indicating that in 1766 he was already thinking of skepticism as a useful tool for stimulating philosophers to reconsider their dogmatism. This fact, as we shall see later in this section, raises serious questions about the traditional view that Kant's 'awakening' by Hume did not happen until 1768, or perhaps even 1772 [see note II.2]. 25. Moreover, Kant uses the same analogy in Ktl:795, where he refers to 'the assay-balance of
//. Kant's Dreams of a Critical Mysticism
33
One, and again in the second chapter of Part Two, Kant describes his new view of the first and foremost task of metaphysics in exactly the same terms as he would use some fifteen years later in Ktl: metaphysics must begin as a negative science concerned with establishing the limits of knowledge. And in the book's final chapter we meet not only the distinction between immediate experience and reflective knowledge, which is so crucial to Kant's System [see note 11.22], but also the equally important notion that reason does not need to have a theoretical understanding of mystical experiences (or metaphysical proposi¬ tions), as long as we take into consideration the common moral awareness of all human beings. If Kant was in full possession of the Critical method by 1766, why, it might be asked, did he take fifteen more years to write Ktl? This is particularly perplexing in light of the fact that after 1781 Kant published at least one major work nearly every year until 1798. The typical explanation of Kant's develop¬ ment renders this problem slightly less difficult, because the 'Critical awaken¬ ing' is regarded as not happening until the late 1760s or early 1770s. On this view Kant had a great deal of trouble formulating his ideas for Ktl, yet after it was completed he suddenly realized the need for a second Critique, and after that, the need for a third. However, the fact that Kant could apply all the Critical tools in 1766 to write Ktl 8 makes it very difficult to believe that he would fumble around for fifteen more years, and then suddenly turn into a pro¬ lific genius. Rather, it suggests Kant may well have wanted to have the basic (architectonic) plan for his entire System more or less complete in his mind be¬ fore even starting the long task of committing it to paper. The need for a fifteen year gap (including his long 'silent decade') between Ktl8 and Ktl becomes more understandable if we regard Kant as formulating in his mind during this time not just Ktl, but his entire System—though obviously, the details con¬ cerning the precise form it would take had not entirely crystallized by 1781.26 The traditional view fails to take account of the fact that writers do not always say everything they know about their plans for future undertakings, and also ignores the importance of Kant's emphasis on establishing and maintaining criticism' [s.a. Ktl:617,811]. And he uses the corresponding metaphor of 'weighing' two oppos¬ ing arguments in Ktl:A388-9,615,617,665,778, as well as in Kt4:76. 26. As early as 1764 Kant recognized a special relationship between metaphysics, moral philosophy, and philosophy of religion [see Kt57:246n(63n)]. In June of 1771 Kant affirmed in a letter to Marcus Herz that his project would have to address the topics of metaphysics, morality, and aes¬ thetics. And his letter to Herz in February 1772 shows he already conceived of his task as including work on 'the principles of feeling, taste, and power of judgement' in addition to its theoretical and moral aspects [AA10:124(Zw67:71)]. Although he apparently had not yet decided to devote a separate Critique to each subject, he had already thought of the title 'Critique of Pure Reason' [10.126(73)]. For a concise summary of the importance of these two letters, see Co60b:203-7.
34
PART ONE: SYSHHEMATHE FDUNBA11ONS
specific architectonic patterns.27
" ; ;
- ;; v
;
•.;
The one aspect of Kant's transcendental philosophy that is conspicuously absent in Ktl8 is the cornerstone of the whole System, the Copernican hypoth¬ esis (i.e., the assumption that a posteriori objectivity is based on a priori subjectivity, rather than vice versa [see KSPl:III.l]). And this had begun to dawn on him by 1770, when he wrote Ktl9, where he regards time and space as 'forms of intuition' not inherent in the object itself. Thus the crucial question is: if 'criticism' was the original distinguishing character of Kant's life-long philosophical method, what was the source of the sudden insight he later called his 'Copernican' hypothesis? Copleston conjectures that the new insight might have come as a result of his reading of the Clarke-Leibniz Correspondence, newly published in 1768 [Co60:196]. Others would cite Hume as responsible for all such major changes in Kant's position [see e.g., note II.2]. What has long been ignored in English Kant-scholarship is the significant extent to which some of the details of the Critical philosophy, not the least being the Coperni¬ can hypothesis itself, actually correspond to the ideas developed by Swedenborg. Kant himself acknowledges this correspondence to some extent in Ktl8, but repeatedly emphasizes that the ideas he presents as his own were developed independently of his acquaintance with Swedenborg's writings [Ktl8:359 (100),360(102),366(lll)]. However, the extent of the parallels between his subsequent theories (especially those in Ktl9) and Swedenborg's is sufficient to merit the assumption that, in spite of his ridicule in Ktl8, Kant actually adopted much of Swedenborg's 'nonsense' [360(101)] into his own thinking [357-8(98-9); cf. SeOO: 24-7,31-3]! A good example of the similarity between Kant's mature views and Swe¬ denborg's ideas is brought out in Kant's summary of Swedenborg's position, highlighting the distinction between a thing's true or 'inner' meaning and its outer manifestation. How closely this coincides with the position Kant eventu¬ ally defends in his writings on religion becomes quite clear in Ktl8:364(108) when he says: 'This inner meaning... is the origin of all the new interpretations which [Swedenborg] would make of the Scripture. For this inner meaning, the internal sense, i.e., the symbolic relation of all things told there to the spiritworld, is, as he fancies, the kernel of its value, the rest only the shell.' As we shall see in VI.2, Kant uses precisely the same analogy in his own investigation of 'pure religion' in Kt8, except that the 'inner meaning' is derived from practical reflection (the Critical mode of dreaming?) rather than from visionary 'dreams' about the spirit-world. 27. I examine the details of the architectonic structure of Kant's System in KSPl:III.3-4. A brief summary of those sections is given in III. 1, below [s.a. AIII.l].
//. Kant's Dreams of a Critical Mysticism
35
A more detailed examination of Swedenborg's epistemological distinctions would reveal numerous other corresponding theories. For example, the Copernican assumption itself, which marks the main difference between Ktl8 and Ktl9, has its roots at least partially in Swedenborg. For, as Vaihinger puts it, the relationship of Kant's 'transcendental subject... to the Spiritual Ego of Swedenborg is unmistakable' [q.i. SeOO:25]; indeed Kant may well have taken his 'doctrine of two worlds from Swedenborg direct' [24; s.a. 12-4]. Thus there are good grounds for regarding Swedenborg's 'spiritual' perspective as the mystical equivalent of Kant's transcendental perspective in metaphysics. Such a perspectival relationship is hinted at by Sewall in SeOO:22-3: 'Neither of the two great system builders asks the support of the other.... As Kant was necessarily critical, this being the office [or Perspective] of the pure reason itself, so was Swedenborg dogmatical, this being the office [or Perspective] of experience.' Sewall appends to the 1900 translation of Ktl8 various extractsfromSwe¬ denborg's writings,28 revealing that Swedenborg's ideas often anticipate (from his own mystical perspective), and therefore may have influenced, many of the key ideas Kant develops in his transcendental philosophy. The roots of Kant's transcendental idealism can be seen in Swedenborg's spiritual idealism: 'spaces and times... are in the spiritual world appearances' [SeOO:124]; 'in heaven ob¬ jects similar to those which exist in our [empirical] world... are appearances' [125]; 'appearances are the first things out of which the human mind forms its understanding' [126]. The roots of Kant's view of the intelligible substratum of nature are also evident: 'nothing in nature exists or subsists, butfroma spiritual origin, or by means of it' [131]; 'nature serves as a covering for that which is spiritual' [132]; 'there exists a spiritual world, which is... interior... to the nat¬ ural world, therefore all that belongs to the spiritual world is cause, and all that belongs to the natural world is effect' [132]; 'causes are things prior, and ef¬ fects are things posterior; and things prior cannot be seen from things posterior, but things posterior can be seen from things prior. This is order' [133]. Even views similar to Kant's 'analogies of experience' in Ktl are devel¬ oped by Swedenborg: 'Material things... arefixed,because, however the states of men change, they continue permanent' [SeOO:125]; "The reason that nothing in nature exists but from a spiritual origin or principle is, that no effect is pro¬ duced without a cause' [132]. The parallels extend beyond the theoretical to the practical and judicial standpoints as well: 'the will is the very nature itself or disposition of the man' [138]; 'heaven is ... within man' [135]. Moreover, 28. Sewall translates these extracts in SeOO:123-54 (Appendix I in Ktl8).
36
PART ONE: SYSTEMATIC FOUNDATIONS
Kant's criticism of mystical visionaries as wrongly taking imagined symbols to be real sensations cannot be charged against Swedenborg, who warns: 'So long as man lives in the world he knows nothing of the opening of these degrees within him, because he is then in the natural degree...; and the spiritual degree... communicates with the natural degree, not by continuity but by correspondences and communication by correspondences is not sensibly felt' [135; s.a. 141]. Of course, Kant's use of such ideas often differs in important respects from Swedenborg's, as when Kant argues for the importance of phenomenal causality as being the only significant causality from the standpoint of knowl¬ edge. Nevertheless, given the fact that before reading Swedenborg he did not write about such matters, whereas afterwards such 'Copernican' ideas occupied a central place in his writings, it is hardly possible to doubt that Swedenborg had a significant influence on Kant's mature thinking. I am not claiming that Kant owes his recognition of the importance of the Copernican hypothesis to Swedenborg alone, but only that his influence has been much neglected, and merits further exploration.29 If Swedenborg did exercise an important influence on Kant, then why does Kant seem to give Hume all the credit, for instance, in the oft-quoted pas¬ sage from the Introduction to Kt2 [see note II.l]? Swedenborg was far from being a philosopher, so perhaps Kant did not feel constrained to acknowledge his influence—indeed, 'felt embarrassed' might be a more appropriate expres¬ sion, since Swedenborg's reputation was hardly respectable among Enlighten¬ ment philosophers. Kant's request that his writings prior to 1770 not be includ¬ ed in his collected minor writings [see note 11.13] would therefore reflect his desire to protect his reputation from too close an association with the likes of Swedenborg. In any case, Kant's claim that the ideas he expresses in Ktl8 predate his reading of Swedenborg leaves open the possibility that Swedenborg stimulated him to think through his own ideas more carefully, and in the process to adopt some of Swedenborg's ideas, or at least to use them as a stimulus to focus and clarify his own. Does the Kt2 passage therefore represent a false 'confession'? By no means. But in order to understand that passage properly, and so to give an accurate answer to the question of the relative influence of Hume and Sweden¬ borg on Kant, it will be necessary to distinguish between four aspects of Kant's development that are often conflated:
29. Laywine makes significant headway in this direction in La93 [cf. note 11.16], though she reaches some rather questionable conclusions. For a detailed discussion of her interpretation, see AII.2.
//. Kant's Dreams of a Critical Mysticism
37
(1) The general Critical method of finding the limits that define the 'middle way' between unthinking acceptance of the status quo (dogmatism) and unbelieving doubt as to the validity of the entire tradition (skepticism). (2) The general Copernican insight that the most fundamental aspects of human knowledge (the ones making it objective) have their source in the human subject as a priori forms, not vice versa. (That is, time, space, etc., are not absolute realities rooted in the object, as philosophers had previously assumed.) This, of course, was the seed that (when fertilized by the Critical method) gave rise to the entire System of 'transcendental philosophy'.30 (3) The particular application of (1) to itself (i.e., reason's criticism of reason itself). (4) The particular application of (2) to the problem of the necessary connection between a cause and its effect.
As stated above in II. 1, we can see (1) operating in varying degrees in almost all of Kant's writings [see note II.8]. Indeed, his lifelong acceptance of (1) is clearly the intellectual background against which alone his great philosophical achievements could have been made (and as such, is the source of his genius). Although his ability to make conscious use of this method certainly developed gradually during his career, receiving its first full-fledged application in Ktl8, neither Swedenborg (the dogmatist) nor Hume (the skeptic) can be given the credit for this. The Critical method is not something Kant learned from these (or any other) philosophers, but is rather the natural Tao through which Kant read, and in reading, transformed, their ideas.31 If anyone is to be thanked, it 30. This distinction between Kant's Critical method and the transcendental orientation of his phi¬ losophy is often ignored by Kant-scholars, who tend to conflate the terms by talking about Kant's 'transcendental method'—a phrase Kant himself never uses. This type of interpretive error lies be¬ hind Ernst Cassirer's claim that in Ktl 'Kant is presenting a completely novel type of thinking, one in opposition to his own past and to the philosophy of the Age of Enlightenment' [Ca81: 141]. This notion of a complete 'opposition' between Kant's past (wherein he is portrayed as being unknowingly duped by his dogmatic upbringing) and his Critical outlook (which is supposed to have sprung as suddenly as the ringing of an alarm clock from his reading of Hume) typifies the mythical account of Kant's development against which I am arguing in this chapter. In Ktl Kant is not negating his past, but pressing it to its proper limit; he is separating the wheat from the chaff of his own background and of his Age [see e.g., Ktl:Axin] by bringing into full view the Critical method that had characterized his way of thinking from the start of his career. One exception to the above is J. Fang, who calls attention in Fa67:112-3 to the mistake of regarding Kant's method as transcendental. He also recognizes the importance of distinguishing between the Critical method and the transcendental character of Kant's mature philosophy: the 'critical method' is already 'partially revealed' (i.e., applied) in 177Q, but 'concerns itself with "limits" alone... and not yet with "sources'", as it does in its transcendental application [118-9]. With intimations of Einstein, he then suggests [121] that 'the special critical method of 1768-69, viz., "to determine the validity and bounds of intuitive principles", had to be generalized, and when it was finally "broadened", the general critical method was to discover and justify ... the sources, the extent, and the limits of the human faculty of knowledge or metaphysic in general—the main task of the Critique.' Unfortunately, Fang does not work out in any detail the significance of this distinction (which relates more to Kant's gradual application of his Copernican insight than to the Critical method as such), nor does he mention Ktl8 as relevant to the development of Kant's Critical method. 3 ' - This implies that the traditional view of Ktl8 as a temporary excursion into Humean skepticism [see II. 1] is entirely unjustified, based as it is on a shallow reading of the text and a neglect of the
38
PART ONE: SYSTEMATIC FOUNDATIONS
! should be his parents, and in particular, his mother.32 • » Kant's recognition of (4) as one of the crucial questions to be answered by his new philosophical System, is, by contrast, clearly traceable to Hume's in¬ fluence. In fact, his discussion of Hume's impact on his development in Kt2: 260(8) undoubtedly refers primarily (if not solely) to this narrow sense of 'awakening': Kant is probably telling us nothing more than that his 'recollec¬ tion' of Hume helped him recognize that causality cannot be treated as a purely intellectual principle (as he had done in Ktl9), but must be justified (if at all) in some other way (viz., as a transcendental form of knowing, just as were space and time in Ktl9). The fact that Kant uses the term 'recollection' indicates a fairly late date (probably 1772 [see note II.2]) for this dramatic event. For Kant is suggesting that (4) came to him as a result of remembering the skepticism of Hume ('the first spark of light') that had begun influencing his thinking about ten years before. However, if Kant's famous 'awakening' is only a dramatized account of his discovery of (4), then such references to Hume do not answer the more fundamental question, the answer to which we have been seeking here: Where did Kant get the idea of using (2) as the basic insight for solving all such philosophical problems? Kant's discovery of (2) came in several fairly well-defined steps, mostly from 1768 to 1772. Prior to 1768 there is little (if any) trace of such an idea. Between 1768 and 1772 he applied the insight to intuitions but not to concepts. In 1772 he realized that concepts too must be regarded from this Copernican (Transcendental) Perspective. As a result of this somewhat unsettling discovery (unsettling because in early 1772 he believed he was within a few months of completing Ktl), he spent nine more years (from 1772 to 1781) working out in his mind the thoroughgoing implications of this insight for his entire philosophical System. It is plain enough to see how Hume's ideas could have caused the final (and crucial) change in the extent of Kant's application of (2) in 1772, because Hume employs some of his most powerful arguments to support his skepticism regarding the a priori basis of the idea of necessary connection. Kant's realization in 1772 of the full force of these arguments awakened him to an awareness of the incomplete nature of his application of (2) in Ktl9, and gave him the idea of applying (2) to concepts as well as to intuitions. But where did (2) come from in the first place? It could not have come
ubiquity of the Critical method in Kant's writings. Hume's influence on Kant in the early 1760s was only one of many influencing factors acting together as grist for the Critical mill. Interestingly, neither Hume nor Swedenborg is included in Werkmeister's description of 'the complexus of ideas which is the basis for all further development of Kant's philosophy' [We8O:15]. 32. Kant's biographers consistently report the strong influence he felt his mother had on his general personal and intellectual development. Her influence is discussed further in X.4.
//. Kant's Dreams of a Critical Mysticism
39
from Hume, inasmuch as nothing like it appears in Hume's doctrines of space and time (or anywhere else in Hume's works). Hume's explanation for our belief in all such 'objective facts' is always to reduce them to logic and/or an empirical kind of subjectivity (as he does in the final paragraph of his Inquiry); he never so much as hints at the possibility of any third way, such as is given by Kant's theory of transcendental subjectivity. There are, to my knowledge, only two likely explanations, both of which probably worked together to awaken Kant to his Copernican insight sometime between 1766 and 1768. The first is his reading of Swedenborg's writings, especially his massive work, Arcana Coelestia, which he read in 1766, just before writing Ktl8 [see Ktl8: 318(39) and Se00:14n]; and the second is his reading of the Clarke-Leibniz Correspondence,33 together with his consequent discovery of the antinomies of reason [see below]. If this account of Kant's development during these porten¬ tous years is correct, then Kant's description of (4) as an awakening from dogmatic slumber is a somewhat over-dramatized account, whose purpose is not to emphasize a sudden break from lifelong dogmatism [cf. note 11.31], but only to explain how Hume saved him from settling for the half-baked form of (2) that he had originally distilled from the ideas of two thinkers whom he re¬ garded as dogmatists (Leibniz and Swedenborg). Thus, if we look at the overall picture, we see that Hume's influence has, in fact, been overrated; it fulfills only one specific role in Kant's long process of development. This interpretation of Kant's development gives rise to two further ques¬ tions regarding Kant's use of his sleeping/dreaming/awakening metaphor. For he uses it not only in relation to Hume's influence, but also in many other con¬ texts. In a letter to Garve (21 September 1798), for instance, he confides that his discovery (c.1768) of 'the antinomy of pure reason... is what first aroused me from my dogmatic slumber and drove me to the critique of reason itself ,34 How can this account of Kant's 'awakening' be made compatible with his (better known) references to Hume? Although interpreters have often struggled with this question, the answer seems obvious once we distinguish between the four aspects of Kant's development listed above. Kant's comments must refer to different experiences of awakening: the awakening by Hume refers to (4), while that for which the antimony is responsible refers to (3). Accordingly, 33. In fact, the influence of Swedenborg is quite compatible with the influence of Leibniz. For Swe¬ denborg himself studied Descartes, Leibniz, and Wolff, much as Kant did in his early years [see Jo67:47]. (In §335.7 and §696 of The True Christian Religion Swedenborg even describes his visions of Aristotle, Descartes and Leibniz, together with nine of their followers, among whom was Wolff.) Thus, Kant's reading of Swedenborg may well have worked together with his reading of the Clarke-Leibniz Correspondence to point him towards the Copernican hypothesis. 34. AA12:255(Zw67:252). See note II.4 for a list of references to the this metaphor in Ktl.
40
PART ONE: SYSTEMATIC FOUNDATIONS
Kant says the antinomy showed him the need for a critique of reason, whereas he says Hume's stimulus gave a 'new direction' [Kt2:260(8)] to his speculative research (thus implying he had already begun working on that critique). The tendency to regard these as referring to the same experience arises only because he uses the same metaphor to describe both developments. The second question arises once we recognize the obviously close connec¬ tion between Kant's metaphor of being awoken from sleep and the metaphor of dreaming that permeates the entirety of Ktl8 (even its title). Whether Kant's awakening really happened only in 1768 (via the antinomies) or only in 1772 (via Hume's skepticism)—or even at both times—Kant's comments would seem to imply that Ktl8 itself dates from the period of 'dogmatic slumber' from which he only later awoke. Yet even those who do not fully appreciate the Critical elements in Ktl8 agree that it is not the work of a sleeping dogmatist! So how could Kant's metaphor apply to anything that happened after he wrote this book? Without presuming to give the final answer to this difficult question, I shall venture to offer a plausible suggestion, based on the account of Kant's development given above. Criticism is the middle path between dogmatism and skepticism. It is the tool Kant believed he could use to preserve the truth and value of both methods and yet do away with the errors into which each inevitably falls. The Critical mind will therefore always allow itself to be 'tempted', as it were, by the two extremes it ultimately seeks to overcome; but in the process of becoming more and more refined, it will appear at one moment to be more dogmatic and at another to be more skeptical (just as we observed Kant's mind to be in the text of Ktl8). In other words, the Critical method does not do away with skeptic¬ ism and dogmatism, so much as use them as opposing forces to guide its insight further along the spiral path towards the central point of pure critique. Now, in order to stay healthy a human being needs both sleep and waking; and in the same way, we could develop Kant's analogy one step further by saying the healthy (Critical) philosopher needs regular doses of both dogmatism and skepticism. Skepticism functions like an alarm clock to remind philosophers when it is time to stop their dogmatic dreaming and return to the normal waking life of criticism. The Critical philosopher will naturally have many experiences of this type, just as a normal person is often surprised to wake up in the middle of a dream, yet will dream again the next night. Thus, the confusion caused by Kant's various references to his awakening from dogmatic slumbers may be best explained by regarding each as equally legitimate and equally important milestones in his development. We have seen that Hume's influence was never such as to convert Kant to
II. Kant's Dreams of a Critical Mysticism
41
skepticism, but served only as 'the first spark of light' [Kt2:260(8)] to kindle his awareness of the need to reflect on the rationality of his cherished beliefs. This limited view of the influence of Hume on Kant comes out quite clearly in almost all Kant's references to Hume or skepticism. In Ktl:785, for example, Kant again uses his favorite metaphor to describe the relation between dogma¬ tism, skepticism, and criticism: 'At best [skepticism] is merely a means of awakening [reason] from its dogmatic dreams, and of inducing it to enter upon a more careful examination of its own position.' Kant's attempt in Ktl8 to ex¬ amine mysticism and metaphysics with a Critical eye should therefore be re¬ garded as resulting from one of his first major awakenings (perhaps largely as a result of his initial reading of Hume, probably in the early 1760s). Ironically, although he disagreed with the dogmatic use to which Swedenborg put his ideas, Kant seems to have recognized in them some valuable hypotheses that could be purified in the refining fire of criticism. The antinomies awoke him (in 1768) to the realization that reason's Critical method must be applied not only to objects of possible knowledge (such as mystical experiences and metaphysi¬ cal theories), but also to reason itself. And just when he thought he was on the verge of perfecting this self-criticism of reason (in 1772), Hume awoke him once again to the realization that his Copernican insight must be used to limit not only intuition but also the concepts arising out of human understanding. We can conclude, therefore, that although Hume was instrumental in awakening Kant to the limits of dogmatism, Swedenborg's speculations were responsible in a more direct way for the initial formation of his Copernican hypothesis. 4. The Dream of a System of Critical Philosophy A clear understanding of the influence of Swedenborg on Kant, and of the function of Kt 18 as a Critical prolegomenon to Kant's mature System of tran¬ scendental critique, makes it not so surprising to hear Sewall say mystics 'from Jung-Stilling to Du Prel' have always 'claimed Kant as being of their number' [SeOO: 16-7,32]. Indeed, Du Prel stresses Kant's positive attitude towards Swedenborg [Du89:2.195-8,243,290], and argues that in Ktl8 'Kant ... declared Mysticism possible, supposing man to be "a member at once of the visible and of the invisible world'" [2.302]. He even suggests that 'Kant would confess to-day [i.e., in the 1880s] that hundreds of such facts [based on mysti¬ cal experience and extra-sensory powers] are proved' [2.198]. This is probably going too far, but so is Vaihinger's conclusion [q.i. SeOO: 19] that 'Kant's world of experience... excludes all invasion of the regular system of nature by uncontrollable "spirits"; and the whole system of modern mysticism, so far as he holds fast to his fundamental principles, Kant is "bound to forcibly reject."'
42
PART ONE: SYSTEMATIC FOUNDATIONS
Kant is forced to reject mysticism only as a component of his theoretical system (i.e., Ktl); the other systems nevertheless remain open to nontheoretical inter¬ pretations of mystical experiences. Sewall reflects Kant's purposes more accu¬ rately in Se00:20-l: The great mission of Kant was to establish ... [that reason] can neither create a knowledge of the spiritual world, nor can it deny the possibility of such a world. It can affirm indeed the rationality of such a conception, but the reality of it does not come within its domain as pure reason.
As Vaihinger himself admits elsewhere, Kant's apparent rejection of mysticism therefore 'refers only to the practices (of spiritism), and to the Mysticism of the Feelings; it does not apply to the rational belief of Kant in the "corpus mysticum of the intelligible world.'" 35 Kant therefore has two distinct, though closely related, purposes in Ktl8. The first is to reject uncritical (speculative or fanatical) forms of mysticism, not in order to overthrow all mysticism, but in order to replace it with a refined, Critical version, directed towards our experience of this world and our reflection on it from various perspectives. This perspectival element in Kant's mysticism is hinted at by Vaihinger [q.i. Se00:15,18] when he says Kant believes: The other world is ... not another place, but only another view of even this world.... [It] is not a world of other things, but of the same things seen differently by us.... But the wildly fermenting must of the Swedenborgian Mysticism becomes with Kant clarified and settled into the noble, mild, and yet strong wine of criticism.
Unfortunately, the general mystical thrust of Kant's System of Perspectives has been grossly neglected by almost all English-speaking Kant-scholars.36 In Part Four of this volume I shall attempt to set right this neglect by examining the extent to which Kant's critique of mysticism in Ktl8 paves the way for a fullblooded 'Critical mysticism'. Kant's second purpose in clearing from the path of metaphysics the ob¬ structions created by the speculative claims of mystical experiences is to prepare the way for his own attempt to provide a metaphysical System that could do for 35. Q.i. SeOO:25. Kant affirms his belief in the notion of a 'corpus mysticum' at several points even in Ktl, as when he says that 'if we could intuit ourselves and things as they are, we should see ourselves in a world of spiritual natures, our sole and true community' [Ktl:836; s.a. A393-4]. Kant's lifelong belief in a spirit-world is demonstrated by Manolesco in Ma69. 36. SeOO:x {sic; page number should read 'ix') lists several works written between 1889 and 1895 that do focus on Kant's mystical tendencies. The most significant of these is Du Prel's Kant's Vorlesungen iiber Psychologie (1889), which contains an introduction entitled 'Kant's mystische Weltanschauung'. Se00:13-4n translates the following passage from pp.vii-viii of that work: '"Dreams"..,, has been interpreted as a daring venture of Kant's genius in making sport of supersti¬ tion; the accent has been laid on Kant's negations, and his affirmative utterances have been over¬ looked. The "Lectures on Psychology" now show ... that these utterances were very seriously intended; for the affirmative portions of the "Dreams" agree very thoroughly with the lengthier exposition of the "Psychology", and the wavering attitude of Kant is here no longer perceptible.'
//. Kant's Dreams of a Critical Mysticism
43
metaphysics what Ktl8 does for mystical visions.37 For the Critical dream envisaged in Ktl8 was to serve as a seed planted in his reason, which eventually matured into the tree of Critical philosophy; and only when this tree finally bears fruit does the mystical seed that gave birth to the System appear once again (i.e., in Kt9). Accordingly, Kant's Critical labors can be regarded as an attempt to build a rational System that preserves the true mystical dream, thus putting mysticism in its proper place, at the center of metaphysics. In this sense, at least, Kant would agree with Du Prel [Du89:1.70] when he says: 'It is ... dream, not waking, which is the door of metaphysic, so far as the latter deals with man.'
37. I have intentionally presented this as the second purpose, because the text of Ktl8 clearly regards it as such. Nearly all interpreters read into the text their own exclusive interest in Kant's metaphysics, and thereby treat the whole topic of mystical visions as a mere (perhaps ill-chosen) illustration. How easy it is to forget that even the title specifies the main topic as focusing on visionary dreams, and explicitly regards metaphysics as a secondary illustration. Gerding is an exception. He stresses that Kant is dealing with what we now call parapsychological phenomena ('psi'). However, he takes Ktl8 as a 'fundamental denial of psi' [Ge94:141], claiming 'Kant explicitly states that psi phenomena cannot exist.' But this is too strong. Kant's conclusion is that we cannot form such experiences into a science: he openly admits that psi do exist as immediate experiences; the problem is that we cannot understand them. Gerding goes so far as to claim that for Kant 'psi cannot even be hypothetical' [144] and that 'Kant does not allow psi to be even possible.' He suggests we could avoid excluding psi from transcendental philosophy by tracing them to 'an unknown capacity of the human mind' [144-5], but this renders them uninformative: 'Psi information from a transcendent world therefore is not possible.' He defends his position by arguing that a case of ESP, for example, 'has to be verifiable for living human beings' in order to be regarded as genuine [145]. This still leaves the process unknowable: we can know that something happens without knowing how it happens. He thus concludes: 'the Kantian tran¬ scendental philosophy does not exclude paranormal phenomena when they are interpreted as anomalous phenomena, which happen to living human beings.' What Gerding fails to recognize is that a perspectival interpretation of Ktl8 enables us to see this as precisely Kant's own view! The error is to think Kant himself did not recognize that psi can be mysterious yet entirely possible.
Chapter ffl Kant's Critical Philosophy: An Overview of KSP1 If a theory has in itself stability, the stresses and strains which may at first have seemed very threatening to it serve only, in the course of time, to smooth away its inequalities; and if men of impartiality, insight, and true popularity devote them¬ selves to its exposition, it may also, in a short time, secure for itself the necessary elegance of statement. [Ktl:xliv]
1. The General Structure of Kant's System Kant's System of Perspectives is a four volume work that aims to provide a thoroughgoing, architectonically-informed interpretation of Kant's Critical philosophy and its metaphysical implications. Though the first volume [KSP1] was originally published under the title that properly belongs to the entire work, that volume should have been (and in any subsequent editions, will be) entitled Kant's Critical Philosophy. In this chapter I shall provide a brief overview (and slight revision) of the contents of that volume, devoting one section each to the description of its four main parts. Any reader who is well acquainted with the contents of KSP1, and who is in no need of a reminder of the approach to interpreting Kant established therein, can safely skip this chapter and proceed immediately with Part Two.1 Part One of KSP1 sets forth a number of fundamental guidelines for inter¬ preting Kant's philosophy. The first is that we must be careful to attend to its systematic nature. Kant, like so many other philosophers of his day, set out intentionally to construct a philosophical system, rather than merely to defend a number of independent theses. For this reason, his arguments are bound to be misunderstood unless the interpreter constantly keeps one eye, as it were, on the validity of the argument, and the other on its context within the system. As components of a system, Kant's arguments often cannot (and hence, should not be expected to) retain their force if they are removed from their context. The second fundamental interpretive guideline, as suggested by the title of the present four-volume project, is that Kant's philosophy is organized not merely into a single system composed of one set of arguments, but into a com¬ plex System of systems,2 each of whose structure is determined by a set of 1. Such readers may first wish to consult All. 1-4, below, where I respond to various critics and provide some important supplementary material. On the other hand, readers in need of a more basic intro¬ duction to Kant's Critical philosophy than that provided in KSP1 may wish to consult PaOOa [s.e. Lectures 8, 9, 11, 21, 22, 29, 32 and 33]. 2. Throughout this volume, as in KSP1, the 'S' in 'System' is capitalized when the word refers to this overall, higher-level structure, but not when it refers to one of the subordinate systems within the System. The same is true for the higher-level (e.g., Copernican) 'Perspective' as compared to the lower-level 'perspectives'—except that the name 'System of Perspectives' is also capitalized.
///. Kant's Critical Philosophy: An Overview of KSP1 interrelated perspectives. Indeed, the 'principle of perspective', as I call it in KSP 1:11.1, can be regarded as the single idea that governs the whole structure of Kant's System. This principle is 'the universal rule that the truth is always relative to some perspective', where 'perspective' refers to 'the systematic context into which an object (e.g., a philosophical question) is placed by virtue of the method of reflection assumed by the subject' [KSP1:28,3O]. Because of the pervasiveness of this principle in Kant's System, his writing often contains claims which, when taken out of context, directly contradict claims clearly advanced elsewhere. Such apparent contradictions are nearly always due to dif¬ ferences in the perspective adopted, rather than to an outright change in Kant's own views.3 Although Kant himself does not actually use the word 'perspective', he does use a variety of terms that can be taken as equivalent to this term. A search through Ktl reveals that in this book alone Kant uses well over 500 'perspectival equivalents' [see KSP1:II.3]. When these many occurrences of the notion of a perspective are translated as such,4 the extent to which Kant's System is a System of Perspectives becomes clear. The principle of perspective operates on three distinct levels in Kant's System. The first and most general level is the overall Transcendental (or Copernican) Perspective. Kant's whole System requires the assumption, patterned after Copernicus' revolution in astronomy, that knowledge is in one sense determined by the subject rather than the object [see KSPl:III.l]. I distinguish this type of Perspective from all others by capitalizing the 'P' [see note III.2, above]. The second level of perspectives defines the general subject-matter (or 'standpoint', as I call it) for each of the three systems that constitute Kant's System. The three Critiques (along with their supporting works) adopt, respectively, the theoretical, the practical, and 3. By no means is it my intention to suggest that Kant's ideas did not continually develop throughout his lifetime; rather, KSP1 operates on the assumption that in most cases those developments can best be regarded not so much as radical changes, but as the emergence of new levels of thought or application, following upon the previously attained levels as an organic process of growth. My point is to reject the tendency of some interpreters to treat Kant's development as a mere fumbling about with an array of different and often contradictory ideas, with nothing but a fabricated architectonic to keep them together. 4. In KSP1, and throughout this volume as well, I adopt just such a practice, by substituting 'per¬ spective' for the translator's word(s) whenever Kant's text contains one of these perspectival equivalents. This nicely highlights the extent to which Kant used perspectival terminology. The drawback, however, is that, because Kant himself did not use these perspectival equivalents as technical terms, replacing them with a single technical term can give the impression that the word 'perspective' is being used in too many (often nontechnical) ways. In KSP1:II.3, for example, quotes are given where Kant refers to the 'epistemological perspective', the 'conceptual perspec¬ tive', the 'speculative perspective', and the 'human perspective', none of which (as such) play a constitutive role in Kant's System. The reader should keep in mind, therefore, that any ambiguity in the use of 'perspective' in quotes from Kant is due to this convention, rather than to any ambigu¬ ity inherent in the technical meaning of 'perspective' as established in KSP1.
45
46
PART ONE: SYSTEMATIC FOUNDATIONS
the judicial standpoints.5 And on the third level there arises a set of four per¬ spectives that operate, in turn, within each of the three systems. These perspec¬ tives, the transcendental, logical, empirical, and hypothetical, each serve as the point of view from which one 'stage' of Kant's argument is constructed. (The relationships between the three standpoints and the four perspectives is discussed further in AIII.l.) After a brief look at the nature of the Copernican Perspective and at the divisions present in the tables of contents to the three Critiques, KSP1.III proposes a logical apparatus for clarifying Kant's arguments and 'mapping' them onto a set of simple geometrical figures. No argument in Kant's System of Perspectives depends for its validity upon this apparatus or the accom¬ panying geometrical maps; on the contrary, the latter are intended mainly as heuristic devices to aid in the explanation and clarification of arguments and in¬ terpretations that are worked out independently. This system of mapping logical relations onto geometrical figures is called 'the geometry of logic' and has been thoroughly explained elsewhere [see Pa92a, Pa98, and PaOOa]. For our present purposes, the following brief summary will suffice. The geometry of logic begins by distinguishing between analytic and syn¬ thetic forms of relation. Analytic relations are always twofold, while synthetic relations are threefold. The first-level analytic relation (abbreviated 1LAR) merely distinguishes positivity (+) from negativity (-) and maps this simple relation onto the opposite poles of a line segment. Applying a second analytic division to each side of a 1LAR generates a second-level analytic relation (2LAR), consisting of four possible 'components':6 —, +-, -+, and ++. These can be mapped onto two intersecting line segments, as shown in Figure III. 1. The rules for constructing all such 'standard' maps are to a large extent arbi¬ trary (or rather, conventional, inasmuch as they are based on traditional cor¬ relations). Arrows point away from 'pure' (i.e., like-termed) components and 5. The focus of these standpoints is on what 'is' (cf. 'What can I know?'), what 'ought to be' (cf. 'What ought I to do?'), and what 'should be regarded as being' (cf. 'What may I hope?') true, respectively [Wi90:34; cf. Ktl:832-3; KtlO:25; Kt66:227-8; AAll:414(Zw67:205)]. As noted in KSP1:317 and Pa00a:50-l, Kant's fourth question, 'What is man?' [e.g., KtlO:25(29)] is supposed to encompass the other three. A better version of this question, however—one that matches the form of the other questions far better—is 'Who am I?' Kant's version may be more appropriate for anthropology, but mine is better for psychology [see Pa97]. An important point to recall for our purposes here in KSP2 is that for Kant this third standpoint, the standpoint of hope, is the Critical standpoint itself [see KSP1:AII and note 1.17, above]. Fendt aptly expresses its importance when he says [Fe90:202]: 'Hope is the passion driving the critical project.' 6. A 'term' is any individual + or -, whereas a 'component' is a set of terms that together label one discrete part of a diagram. Each component consists of the same number of terms as the level (e.g., first-level components have one term, second-level components have two terms, etc.), and the number of different components for analytic relations is always 2", where n refers to the number of terms (as well as to the level).
///. Kant's Critical Philosophy: Alt Overview of KSP1
towards 'impure' (i.e., mixed-termed) components. The + labels positions above and/or to the left of an opposing position, while the - labels positions below and/or to the right. Synthetic relations require a third term to represent the synthesis of + and -. The mathematical connotations of the letter 'x' make it a very appropriate symbol for this purpose. The geometrical figure that best repre¬ sents such threefold relations is a tri¬ Figure II I.I: angle, with either its three sides or its Standard 2LAR Cross The three vertices each representing one component, as shown in Figure III.2. The double-headed arrow represents the direct opposition between the + and - components, whereas the single-headed arrows represent the flow from the two basic analytic components to the new, synthetic component that arises out of their synthetic relation. Because of the nature of synthetic and analytic relations, most of Kant's favorite distinctions are either threefold or fourfold. (Kant himself acknowl¬ edges this in Kt7:197n.) The most interesting of all his distinctions, however, is twelvefold. He uses the same twelvefold (3x4) pattern to structure the famous table of categories in Ktl as he does to structure several other similar tables, both in Ktl and elsewhere. I call this important pattern a 'twelvefold com¬ pound relation' (12CR), because it combines analytic and synthetic forms of relation by putting four lLSRs to¬ gether in the form of a 2LAR. The structure of this relation can be depicted in terms of the geometry of logic by dividing a circle into four quadrants, and plotting the com¬ ponents equidistantly along the cir¬ cumference, as shown in Figure III.3. The 12CR circle can be used as a handy map not only for clarifying the relations between the various terms Figure HI 2' The used in any of Kant's categorial
(twelvefold) tables, but also for the
Standard
1LSR
Triangle
*8
PART ONEE SYSTEMATIC FOUNDATIONS
step-by-step progression of the basic 'elements' (cf. 'components') in each of the three systems in Kant's System. This, at any rate, is the claim I make in KSPl:III.3-4 and later substantiate in Part Three of KSP1. It will come into —X play again here in KSP2, when we set out to interpret the structure of Kt8's basic argument. When used as a map of systematic progression, Figure III.3 should be read clockwise, starting +-X from the - quadrant ('stage one' of the Figure III.3: system's overall argument) and work¬ The Standard 12CR Circle ing around to the ++ quadrant ('stage four'). The 1LSR that makes up each stage is then referred to as composing the three 'steps' in that stage of the system's development. These three steps all follow the same basic pattern, which Kant often refers to as 'matter' (-), 'form' (+), and 'synthesis' (x), respectively. In addition to explaining some basic distinctions to which Kant applies the above logical patterns, KSP1:III uses a different form of a 12CR (three crosses, arranged in a triangle) to show the relationship between the nine books whose primary purpose was to construct different 'wings' of the System. Each system has a Critique, a supporting work applying the analytic method to the same (or a very similar) subject-matter, and a work developing the implications of the Critique in question for its corresponding branch of metaphysics. This structural relationship between Kant's major works is used to determine the numbering for Ktl-KtlO and, by extension, all Kt entries in the Bibliography. Readers who have not read the first volume may therefore wish to consult Figure III.9 [KSP1:1O1] just to see how this referencing system has been derived. Keeping this pattern in mind will become very important in Chapters XI and XII, when we look more closely at the nature and purpose of Kt9. 2. The Epistemological Underpinnings of the Critical Philosophy Part Two of KSP1 applies the guidelines established in Part One to the task of interpreting Kant's most basic epistemological distinctions, those forming the very backbone of his entire System. Only those distinctions that are both essential to the Critical philosophy and able to be discussed separately from a detailed account of their specific role(s) in the structure of the System
///. Kant's Critical Philosophy: An Overview ofKSPl
49
are included here. A prior understanding of each of these distinctions is neces¬ sary in order to avoid misinterpreting not only the details of Kant's System of Critical philosophy (discussed in KSP1, Part Three), but also his application of that philosophy to metaphysics as such (discussed in KSP2-KSP4). For this reason, any readers who, after reading this section, require a more detailed treat¬ ment of any of the distinctions summarized herein are advised to go (back) to the relevant section(s) of KSP1 before proceeding any further in this volume. Chapter IV begins by defining the most general technical terms Kant uses to distinguish between various sorts of 'knowledge' and 'experience'. A good way to understand the relation between these two terms is to distinguish be¬ tween 'immediate' and 'mediate' experience, where the former is (or at least, can be) one stage in the process of gaining knowledge (akin to what Kant more often calls 'possible experience'), while the latter is a synonym for empirical knowledge itself. 'Empirical knowledge is experience' [Ktl: 165-6] in the sense that it is an originally immediate, intuitive awareness of objects that is mediated by concepts. 'Immediate experience', by contrast, 'refers to an indeterminate, nonreflective encounter of subject and object in the ordinary world' [KSP1: 138]. All the other distinctions examined in Chapter IV relate primarily to the 'knowledge' (mediate experience) side of this distinction; but the immediate experience side will turn out to play a very important role in our assessment of the religious implications of Kant's Critical philosophy [s.e. X.2, below]. After a brief explanation of the difference between 'pure' (sensation-inde¬ pendent) and 'impure' (sensation-dependent) kinds of knowledge, two key secondary distinctions are discussed at length. The first is virtually coextensive with, though not identical to, the pure-impure distinction: 'a priori' knowledge is knowledge the validity of which can be determined independently of any ref¬ erence to particular experience(s), whereas 'a posteriori' knowledge requires such an appeal to experience(s) in order for its validity to be verified. The 'analytic-synthetic' distinction, by contrast, defines the difference between propositions whose truth is rooted entirely in their logico-linguistic structure and those whose truth depends on some fact that must be given in intuition be¬ fore the proposition's truth can be known. Among the numerous other ways of making the latter distinction is to say that, whereas the predicate of an analytic proposition is 'contained in' the subject, that of a synthetic proposition 'goes beyond' the subject. By combining these two secondary distinctions, four possible kinds of knowledge can be discerned, forming a 2LAR. Kant dismisses one of these, the analytic a posteriori, as obviously nonsensical, inasmuch as there is no need to appeal to experience to test the validity of propositions that are known to be true
50
PART ONE: SYSTEMATIC FOUNDATIONS
by logic alone. I argue, by contrast, that there is a definite place for such a classification, provided we give analyticity a sufficiently broad definition. The analytic a priori is more clearly delineated by Kant: it includes any judgment which, given some previously understood meaning for the terms involved, can be reduced to a logical tautology. Synthetic a priori knowledge is by far the most important for Kant, at least within his Critical philosophy. Such knowl¬ edge is valid independently of any particular experience (a priori) [Ktl:171-2], yet it also supplies new information about the concepts involved (synthetic)— information not deducible by means of formal logic. Finally, synthetic a posteriori knowledge is the least troublesome (but also, for Kant, the least philosophically interesting) of the four classes of knowledge. It is formed by a judgment whose validity is grounded in facts derived from experience (a poste¬ riori), and whose predicate has intuitive content that is not logically implied by the conventional meaning of the word(s) in the subject (synthetic). These four types of knowledge, as it turns out, arise directly out of the four kinds of reflection, or 'perspectives', that establish the basic 'stages' in each of Kant's three systems. As summarized in KSP1:138-9:
-,
To adopt an empirical perspective is to reflect on what 'is true' about one's experi¬ ence without taking note of the distinction between the subject and object of ; knowledge; its goal is to reach synthetic a posteriori knowledge. To adopt a tran¬ scendental perspective involves distinguishing clearly between the subject and ob¬ ject in order to reflect on the subjective conditions which 'must be true' in order for it to be possible for a subject to experience an object; its goal is to reach synthetic a priori knowledge. To adopt a logical perspective involves abstracting completely ,.; from the subject-object distinction in order to reflect on what 'must be true' be¬ cause the logical laws of thought require it to be so; its goal is to reach analytic a priori knowledge. To adopt a speculative perspective involves distinguishing be¬ tween the subject and object, but ignoring the role of the subject, in a fallacious at¬ tempt to reach synthetic a priori knowledge of the thing in itself, even though such , knowledge extends beyond the limits set by transcendental reflection. The hypo¬ thetical perspective replaces the speculative perspective by distinguishing properly between the subject and object as in transcendental reflection, and then reflecting on what we can reasonably treat 'as if true' about both transcendent reality and experi¬ ence in light of the requirements of systematic unity in systemt...; Kant vaguely suggests its goal is to reach the synthetic a priori, but I have argued that he really means its goal is to reach analytic a posteriori belief.
These four perspectives, along with their accompanying methods of reflection, relate together as a perfect 2LAR, as shown in Figure III.4. Having established these fundamental epistemological distinctions in Chap¬ ter IV, KSP1:V then deals with the foremost 'meta-CriticaP question: what is Kant's justification for treating the 'thing in itself as the radically unknowable
///. Kimi's Critical Philosophy: An Overview ofKSPl
51
The hypothetical perspective
rspec tive
60 «
o>
experience^
2
a transcendental reflection
e •g -5
u 'flectio
s:
1
O 1
ca « u P
^•a «c
(synl of wr
empirical reflection
> immediate
i
pene
o
t is ii
rica
a
(synth
"a & V
'a?
o S
nde
'§
§
: trai
/ledge
mm
a.
1
fpothei r eflecti
>ers ectivi
(analytic a posteriori belief as if it is in the object)
H H
>
The logical perspective (analytic a priori knowledge of what must be for thought)
Figure III.4: Kant's Four Reflective Perspectives on Experience starting point of his System,7 and so for engaging in transcendental reflection? Kant himself devotes precious little attention to this question of how Critical philosophy itself is possible. But he does make a number of rather elusive statements about 'faith' that may be related to this issue. Kant's theory of 'rational faith' is typically regarded as applying solely to his practical philoso¬ phy, even though his most famous statement—'I have... found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room fox faith' [Ktl:xxx]—appears strategi¬ cally near the end of the Preface to the first Critique. With this in mind, I ex¬ plore the possibility of interpreting Kant's doctrine of rational faith not only as a moral tool used for the systematic justification of the metaphysical ideas of God, freedom, and immortality, but also as a theoretical tool, required in order to open the door to the entire Critical philosophy. This view of faith can help reveal the inadequacies of a purely epistemological interpretation of Kant's doctrine of the thing in itself (as defended, for instance, by Allison). In order for such an interpretation to hold, its proponents '• That the thing in itself must be regarded as unknowable in order to be truly 'Kantian' is argued in AV.1-4 of KSP1. Some possible misunderstandings of the view of faith defended in KSP1:V are clarified in AIII.2, below.
52
PART ONE: SYSTEMATIC FOUNDATIONS ,
must virtually ignore a number of explicitly ontological statements Kant makes about the thing in itself, such as when he regards it as the 'non-sensible cause' of appearances [e.g., Ktl:334]. Without neglecting the merits of an epistemological interpretation, an emphasis on the role of faith in Kant's theoretical system, as the tool for opening up a 'transcendent space' outside the field of appearances, can explain how such ontological statements can coexist with Kant's treatment of the thing in itself as a special 'way of considering' ap¬ pearances. Such transcendental faith is required, I argue, in order to defeat the skeptic's need to resort to empirical faith in the reality of the external world. Transcendental faith would be unnecessary, of course, if it were possible to construct a valid transcendental argument for the necessity of presupposing an unknowable thing in itself at the beginning of one's inquiries. In KSP1 :V.3 I therefore explore this possibility, rejecting it as a mistaken use of transcenden¬ tal arguments. Instead, the theoretical (and so also, the practical) aspect of Kantian faith ought to be regarded as Kant's concession to the skeptic. As with all Critical philosophizing, Kant does not merely reject the skeptic's point of view, but incorporates it into a higher standpoint that makes sense out of both it and its opposite (in this case, dogmatic insistence on the knowability of ultimate reality). Chapter V concludes with a discussion of how theoretical faith as the starting point of Kant's System differs from practical faith as the goal it aims to fulfill. The epistemological considerations of Part Two come to a head in Chapter VI, wherein the principle of perspective is applied to Kant's theory of the 'object' of knowledge, in hopes of clarifying two ambiguous sets of terms that often stand in the way of a clear understanding of Ktl, and so also of his entire System. The terms 'thing in itself, 'transcendental object', and 'appearance' denote three distinct ways of viewing the object from the transcendental per¬ spective, while 'positive noumenon', 'negative noumenon', and 'phenomenon' denote three distinct ways of viewing the same object from the empirical per¬ spective. The former perspective is concerned with our knowledge of 'objects in general', while the latter is concerned more with our knowledge of particular objects. After explaining how these object-terms and their corresponding per¬ spectives relate to the major divisions of Kt 1, KSP1:VI elucidates the distinctive meaning of each term in some detail. The progression of Kant's argument in Ktl goes from the most abstract transcendental object-term (thing in itself) to the most concrete (appearance), then moves from the most concrete empirical objectterm (phenomenon) to the most abstract (positive noumenon) [see Fig. III.5]. The transcendental perspective begins by viewing an object as if it were not an object at all, but a mere 'thing' that has not yet been affected by any of
///. Kant's Critical Philosophy: An Overview ofKSPl 1A. The thing in itself
| IB. The positive noumenon
2A. The transcendental object
' 2B. The negative noumenon
I
S3
\
I I 3A. The appearance A. The transcendental perspective
•—>-3B. The phenomenon i
B. The empirical perspective
Figure III. 5: Kant's Six Object-Terms, Progressing
Synthetically
the subjective conditions that make knowledge possible. This is the root mean¬ ing of the infamous 'thing in itself, and explains why it must be regarded as unknowable. From there the transcendental perspective progresses to the bare recognition that things must become objects in order to be known by us. The precise transcendental conditions for becoming objects are not yet taken into consideration, but only the fact that there must be a 'something in general=x' [e.g., Ktl:A104]. This is what I call Kant's 'doorway' concept, the notion of the 'transcendental object'. Once the transcendental conditions (time and space) are taken into consideration, the object can be regarded as appearing to the sub¬ ject, and the possibility of conscious awareness (and eventually, knowledge) of the object first arises. This is the basic meaning of Kant's term, 'appearance', though there are several other subordinate meanings as well [see KSP1:174-8]. The empirical perspective takes over right where the transcendental per¬ spective leaves off, by considering the status of the ordinary objects we experi¬ ence in the world. But now, Kant views the objects not in terms of the general conditions that make them possible, but in terms of already known objects of experience, called 'phenomena'. The key difference between the appearance and the phenomenon is that only the latter has come under the limiting condi¬ tions of the categories.8 Phenomena, in other words, are know objects, where¬ as appearances are one of the main ingredients that make up such objective knowledge. From this point, Kant now begins to abstract from known objects (phenomena) in the hope of determining whether or not it is possible to obtain a Having said this, it is important to note that Kant does not always follow his own technical def¬ initions. Particularly in this case, he often uses the term 'appearance' where we would expect the term 'phenomenon' to be used. At least part of the reason for this, no doubt, is that for Kant the transcendental perspective takes precedence over all other perspectives.
54
PART ONE: SYSTEMATIC FOUNDATIONS
purely intellectual knowledge of objects. Removing the conditions of appearing (time and space) from the phenomenon, without removing the categorial condi¬ tions (causality, etc.), yields the notion of a 'noumenon'. Kant uses this new notion to explain the difference between a proper and an improper view of pure, intellectual knowledge. The 'negative noumenon' corresponds to the transcen¬ dental object and is a mere limiting concept: it shows us the boundary beyond which our reason cannot establish knowledge. Provided our claims to establish intellectual knowledge relate only to the boundary (i.e., only to the transcen¬ dental conditions of knowing), they are justified. But if we attempt to establish knowledge of the 'positive noumenon', we inevitably fall into illusion (as Kant demonstrates in the Dialectic). Thus, just as the thing in itself is defined as un¬ knowable from the start, the positive noumenon must be regarded as an empty concept, unable to be grasped by any human being searching for theoretical knowledge. KSP1:VI.4 concludes Part Two by providing two versions of a summary of the relationship between the six object-terms described above: one progress¬ ing synthetically, and treating the transcendental perspective as primary; the other progressing analytically, and treating the empirical perspective as pri¬ mary. Since Kant's own emphasis in Ktl is very much on the transcendental perspective, I have reproduced here only the diagram used to depict the former summary [see Fig. III.5]. Part Two closes with an attempt to unite these two summaries in a single map and with a consideration of how Kant's actual in¬ consistencies affect my interpretation of his six object-terms. 3. The Structural Elements of Kant's Three Systems Part Three uses the abstract interpretive framework established in Parts One and Two to construct a concrete, detailed account of the elements of the three Critical systems themselves. Each of the three chapters traces, as far as possible, the step-by-step argument presented in the 'Doctrine of Elements' (or equivalent) section(s) of one of the Critiques. In each case, the exposition proves to be divisible into four main parts (or 'stages'), each governed by a distinct faculty of reason (and its corresponding perspective), and each elabo¬ rated in terms of a three-step argument. Rather than going into the details of each step here, it will suffice merely to describe the four stages in each system, and then reproduce the summaries of the twelve steps, along with the analytic maps, given at the end of each chapter.9 Readers who seek more detail should 9. Kt7 is an exception here, inasmuch as it contains no 'Doctrine of Elements', and so also, no discernible twelve-step argument [see KSP1:IX.4J. Appendix IX of KSP1 suggests some possible solutions to this problem. See also VII. 1-4, below, where Kt8 will be interpreted in such a way as
///. Kant's Critical Philosophy: An Overview of KSP1
55
refer to the text of KSP1. .-.,.•, Ktl [s.a. Kt2] propounds a system based on the theoretical standpoint (the standpoint that takes the logical perspective as its 'governing' perspective). Its short-range goal is epistemological: to establish the necessary conditions for the possibility of empirical knowledge. This goal is accomplished in the Aesthetic and the Analytic. Its long-range goal, however, is metaphysical and is hardly even addressed until the Dialectic: to explain why theoretical knowledge of metaphysical realities (especially the ideas of God, freedom, and immortality) is impossible and how a proper understanding of the nature and purpose of em¬ pirical knowledge can provide an adequate means of coping with our necessary ignorance. Table VII. 1 in KSP1, reproduced here as Table III. 1, provides a comprehensive summary of the relationship between Kant's four fundamental perspectives, the section of Ktl where it is primarily applied, the transcendental forms (or conditions) established therein, the faculty governing those forms (and defining the perspective), and the empirical function normally associated with that faculty.
Table IJI.l: Basic Perspectival Relations in Systemt governing faculty stage section in Ktl perspective (transcendental form) (empirical function) no. sensibility Aesthetic transcen¬ I (sensing) dental (space and time) understanding Analytic of Concepts II logical (thinking) (categories) Analytic of Principles judgment III empirical (principles) (knowing) reason hypo¬ Dialectic rv thetical (inferring/believing) (ideas) KSP1:VII.4 provides the following summary of the four stages in sys¬ , progressing analytically (from the final step, backwards to the initial step): Stage four. The hypothetical perspective (++) is concerned with viewing an experience (a posteriori) as if it is contained (analytically) in a regulative idea of an unconditioned object. Practical belief (x), the legitimate goal of reason's unifying influence on experience, arises as a result of such hypothetical reasoning. (Speculative reasoning, the illegitimate alternative to hypothetical reasoning, is be¬ lieved by speculative metaphysicians to yield synthetic a priori knowledge through ,; a direct apprehension of the unconditioned object, by means of a constitutive idea.) The idea (+), which is the formal aspect of inferring reason, provides a way of see- ' ing the empirical world as a rational unified whole; such unity is inferred to exist on the basis of an idea of the whole. The material aspect (-) is the object as to suggest Kant may have been attempting to make up for the systematic inadequacies of Kt7.
56
PART ONE: SYSTEMATIC FOUNDATIONS
unconditioned (and thus, as such, unknown), which itself arises out of the application of the schematism of reason to items of empirical knowledge. In this way reason guides and limits the understanding (stage two) in its formation of judgments (stage three). Stage three. The empirical perspective (-+) is concerned with the real objects (synthetic) presented to us in experience (a posteriori). Empirical knowledge of an object (x) is attained by judging its negatively noumenal (i.e., independently permanent) character. (Speculative reasoning requires the object to be viewed here as a positive noumenon.) Such a judgment is 'objectively valid' in virtue of its con¬ formity to the principles of pure understanding, through which the object first comes to be determined as a phenomenon (+) in space and time. The principles are applicable only to objects which have been schematized—i.e., only to those cate¬ gorized appearances which have been synthesized according to the imagination's inner determination of time. The schematized object (-) can therefore be analyzed into its conceptual (stage two) and its intuitive (stage one) components. Stage two. The logical perspective (+-) is concerned with the conceptual form (analytic) of an object as abstracted completely from experience (a priori). Self-con¬ scious thought (x) arises out of the imposition of the bare T (pure apperception) onto the various concepts a person forms on the basis of his or her experience. These concepts (+) are formed through categorial conception, in which pure cate¬ gories are applied to conscious perceptions (-). The latter, in turn, are produced as a result of the imagination's transcendental synthesis of the sensations presented to it by sensibility (stage one). Stage one. The transcendental perspective (--) concerns that which must hold true of an intuited object (synthetic) before it can be processed (a priori) by the syn¬ thetic functions of the understanding in stages two and three. The object at this point is therefore merely a sensation (x), which is to say, it is a manifold of ap¬ pearances (+) received by the senses. An appearance is an object represented to the inner and/or outer sense through the function of pure spatio-temporal intuition. If it is an appearance of something real, it will be related in this way to the transcen¬ dental object. The transcendental object (-) is the general and totally undetermined original representation of the thing in itself. And the thing in itself (0) is the un¬ represented and thus unknowable form of an object of experience, considered apart from the conditions which enable us to experience it. We can have no knowledge » of it, because there is no perspective from which we can view it as such.
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The '+', '-', and 'x' terms included in this summary refer to the logical status of the step or stage under consideration, according to the principles of the geometry of logic, outlined in KSPl:III.3-4. Chapter VIII applies the same principles to interpret Kt4 [s.a. Kt5], where¬ in Kant constructs a system based on the practical standpoint (the standpoint that takes the hypothetical perspective as its governing perspective). Its shortrange goal is ethical: to establish the necessary conditions for the possibility of moral actions. This goal is accomplished in the three chapters of the Analytic. Its long-range goal, however, is (like that of systemt) metaphysical and does not come into full view until the Dialectic: to explain how practical knowledge
///. Kant's Critical Philosophy: An Overview ofKSPl
57
Table HI.2: Basic Perspectival Relations in Systenip governing faculty section in Kt4 stage perspective (transcendental form) (empirical function) no. free will Analytic Chapter I transcen¬ I (choosing maxims) (practical freedom) dental moral law Analytic Chapter II logical II (humanizing) (categories of freedom) moral judgment Analytic Chapter HI III empirical (acting) (imperatives) Dialectic final end hypo¬ IV (practical postulates) (idealizing) thetical of metaphysical ideas is not only possible, but necessary, because of how intimately bound up they are with the nature and purpose of moral action. Table VIII. 1 in KSP1, reproduced above as Table III.2, provides a comprehensive summary of the architectonic structure of the four stages of system p —one that exactly parallels the summary given above for systemt. KSP1: VII.4 provides the following summary of the four stages in system p , likewise running directly parallel to the one given for systemt: Stage four. The hypothetical perspective (++) in systemp aims to establish the ultimate purpose, or 'final end', of moral action. This end, called the 'highest good' (x), can be conceived to be possible only by setting before oneself an ideal¬ ized 'realm of ends', in which perfect virtue (-) is combined with happiness (+) proportional to each person's virtue. Because humans are not only intellectual but also sensible beings, they do not always act virtuously; and when they do, they are not always rewarded with happiness. We who do not yet live in the ideal realm must therefore adopt a moral faith to postulate the reality of a God who, as a righ¬ teous judge, will insure happiness for the virtuous, and an immortal life in which human beings can gradually attain perfect virtue. Stage three. The empirical perspective (-+) deals with the actual realization of moral action. The real experience of moral action is called duty (x), and it results from a practical judgment impelling us to follow some unconditional rule for ac¬ tion (+). The agent is obligated to obey such rules because they are commanded by the 'categorical imperative', which is the moral law viewed from the empirical per¬ spective. The autonomous choice to obey (-), which signals an agent's adoption of this imperative, is motivated by a feeling of respect for the moral law. (This pro¬ vides an interest in obeying the law which counteracts the agent's natural interest in pursuing happiness through the heteronomous choice to fulfill sensuous inclina¬ tions.) Such respect functions as a schema, synthesizing the moral law (stage two) with free will (stage one). Stage two. The logical perspective (+-) deals with the conceptual form of moral actions, as expressed in the moral law. Because the moral law legislates through human reason, the 'we' of humanity must be regarded as an end in itself, so that all moral ends will be personal ends (x). A personal end can be adopted only
58
PART ONE: SYSTEMATIC FOUNDATIONS by someone who can understand the concepts of good and evil (+), as determined by the categories of freedom. The categorial conception of freedom (and so also personhood itself) requires the capacity to universalize a maxim of the will (stage one) in order to produce a moral principle (-). Stage one. The transcendental perspective (--) concerns that which must hold true of an object of desire in order for it to produce material for a moral action. A maxim (x) is the subjective rule of action which results from an agent's choice of an end (i.e., a possible object) from among the manifold of desires (+). The latter arises when the fact of practical freedom is imposed upon a good will (-). This wholly undetermined concept of a 'good will' can be regarded as the original mani¬ festation of a moral agent's transcendent disposition (0), which is the ultimate basis of the agent's desire to act.
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///. Kant's Critical Philosophy: An Overview of KSP1
59
The analytic maps of systemt and systemp, given in KSP 1:239,285, are repro¬ duced on this and the previous page, for easy reference and comparison. Chapter IX concludes KSPl's Part Three with an application, as far as possible, of the same principles of interpretation to Kt7. The problem is that the third Critique is far less systematic, far less carefully structured according to Kant's architectonic plan, than the first two [see note III.9, above]. Part of the reason for this, no doubt, is that the standpoint it assumes, the judicial stand¬ point, takes the empirical perspective as its governing perspective (the transcen¬ dental perspective being the governing perspective for the entire Copernican Perspective [see KSP1:III.4]). Another factor is that Kt7 is the only Critique divided into two distinct halves. (I offer a new explanation of the architectonic OS
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60
PART ONE: SYSTEMATIC FOUNDATIONS supersensible reality
Figure III.8: The Three Revolutions of Kant's Critical Philosophy basis for this division in AIII.l.) The first half of Kt7 uses the notion of 'subjective finality' to examine the rational conditions under which judgments of beauty (and later, sublimity) are made. Appealing to paradoxical notions such as 'disinterested delight' and 'subjective universality', Kant seeks to es¬ tablish a moral source for such judgments, even though they relate to sensible (and thereby apparently theoretical) objects. The second half, by contrast, achieves such a synthesis by placing more emphasis on the theoretical: the no¬ tion of 'objective finality' is used to examine the rational conditions under which natural objects can be viewed as purposeful ends, or 'organisms'. Part Three ends with an attempt to draw together the systematic relations between all three Critiques. KSP1:VII and VIII use the standard 12CR map [see Fig. III.3, above] as a basis for constructing similar maps of systemt and systemp [see KSP1:242,287], which I have not included here. On the basis of these maps, and in the knowledge that the third Critique is meant to serve as a bridge between the first two, the connection between Kant's three Critiques can be pictured as a spiral [see Fig. III.8]. If we regard each revolution as repre¬ senting a twelve-step system, this map can serve, in an admittedly fanciful way,
///. Kant's Critical Philosophy: An Overview of KSPl
61
as a single picture displaying the architectonic (36-fold) structure of Kant's Critical philosophy—or to use Kant's own words, it can serve as an 'idea of the whole' [Ktl:xliv]. 4. God and Religion in the Context of Kant's Metaphysics Just as each system in Kant's System appears to be complete once step nine has been fully established, so also KSPl appears to be complete at the end of Chapter IX. In other words, just as the elements of empirical knowledge are, strictly speaking, fully elaborated by the end of stage three in systemt and those of moral action, by the end of stage three in systemp, so also the elements of Kant's Critical philosophy as such are fully described by the end of Part Three in KSPl. The fourth stage in each system explains the rational purpose for what has been established in step nine. In the same way, Part Four of KSPl lays bare the purpose of the Critical philosophy in the context of Kant's overall System, explaining the relationship between critique and metaphysics proper. Part Four of KSPl begins by introducing a new, comprehensive way of mapping the entirety of Kant's System. Figure X.I combines features of a number of previous maps, including those representing the two forms of 12CR [see KSPl, Figs. III.6 and III.9], mainly in order to show the complex rela¬ tionship between the Critical philosophy (i.e., the systems elaborated in the three Critiques) and the other aspects ('wings') of the System. This rather fan¬ ciful, four-spiral diagram is the only map in KSPl that is introduced before the elaboration of the ideas it is meant to clarify. The reason for this is quite simple: Part Four is not intended to present any polished arguments, but only to offer up, as it were, a series of heuristic 'ideas' to be elaborated more fully in the three proposed sequels to KSPl. With this in mind, it is clear that a detailed summary of Part Four is not necessary here. Instead, I shall merely point out that each of its three chapters centers on one of Kant's three main ideas of reason—God, freedom, and im¬ mortality, respectively—and that one discrete area of metaphysical 'application' of Critical principles is connected to each idea. Kant's critique of the idea of God gives rise to numerous metaphysical implications regarding religion; his critique of the idea of freedom raises issues relating to the corresponding idea of 'the world', thus paving the way for a metaphysics of science; and his critique of the idea of immortality likewise raises issues relating to the corresponding idea of 'the soul', thus paving the way for a metaphysics of mankind's political history.10 The present, second volume of Kant's System of Perspectives, takes 10. This threefold division can help make sense out of a number of Kant's other distinctions as well. For instance, in Kt65:28(45), he refers to 'clergymen, legal officials, and doctors' as 'the business-
62
PART ONE: SYSTEMATIC FOUMJATTOMS. .tj-
up the first of these three metaphysical themes.'•' : »5> .-:;.'/-: - ,! As suggested in the foregoing summary (and even more so in Chapter X of KSP1), Kant's Critical Religion is concerned not only with religion as such, but with every aspect of Kant's understanding of God. Indeed, it could just as well be entitled Kant's Metaphysics of God. Parts Two through Four of this volume will examine three different aspects of this topic. (The logical relation between these three parts is, incidentally, exactly the same as the logical relation between the three Critiques, though this does not imply that the topics dis¬ cussed therein will necessarily be more closely related to that Critique than to the other two.) First, Part Two will examine Kant's theology, with special attention being paid to his views on the possibility of proving that God exists, on the nature of God, and on the relation between theology and morality. Part Three will examine Kant's view of religion as such, with special attention being given to interpreting how Kt8 constitutes a metaphysical system of religion,11 and how this system relates to Christianity. And Part Four will examine the extent to which Kant actually achieved his goal of developing a Critical mysti¬ cism, as hinted in Ktl8 and explicated in Chapter II, above. Having already laid the groundwork here in Part One for an examination of these three manifestations of the first and foremost metaphysical idea, let us now proceed to look in more detail at how Kant's mature System of Perspectives provides us with a balanced and healthy approach to theology, religion, and religious experience.12
men of the higher faculties' (namely, theology, law, and medicine). These three professions correspond to the metaphysical investigations of religion, politics, and science, respectively. Taken together with the lower faculty (philosophy), this list therefore corresponds exactly (except for the order) to the four volumes of KSP. 11. It is worth pointing out here the difference between referring to Kant's view of religion, etc., as 'Critical' and regarding Kt8 as Kant's 'fourth Critique'. In one sense, the latter is a tempting suggestion: for as we shall see in Part Three, Kt8 follows the twelve-step pattern of the first and second Critiques far better than the third Critique does. This is one reason I suggest in VI.2 that Kant may have intended it not as a fourth Critique—as if his architectonic required such—but as a substitute for the third Critique. However, this too could be misleading, because, as suggested above, religion is for Kant primarily a subject for metaphysics rather than for critique as such. Kant never intended to write a Critique of Religion, any more than he intended to write a Critique of Science or a Critique of Political History. Rather, his essays on these subjects reflect his interest in developing positive metaphysical views thereof—informed by the boundary conditions set out in the Critical philosophy. This is what is meant by entitling a series of books on Kant's meta¬ physics 'Critical Religion', 'Critical Science', and 'Critical Polities'. 12. The textual data for this study come from relevant comments and arguments found throughout most of Kant's writings. The main texts, however, are the three Critiques (the Dialectics), Kt8, Kt9, Ktl5, Ktl7, Ktl8, Kt25, Kt26, Kt35, Kt64, Kt65 (Part One), and Kant's correspondence [Zw67].
KANT'S PERSPECTIVAL FOUNDATION FOR CRITICAL THEOLOGY The fools says in his heart, "There is no God.' They are corrupt, their deeds are vile; there is no one who does good. [Ps. 14:1]
•
Where is the wise man? Where is the scholar? Where is the philosopher of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world? For since in the wisdom of God the world through its wisdom did not know him, God was pleased through the foolishness of what was preached to save those who believe.... For the foolishness of God is wiser than man's wisdom, and the weakness of God is stronger than man's strength.... We do, however, speak a message of wisdom among the mature, but not the wisdom of this age or of the rulers of this age, who are coming to nothing. No, we speak of God's secret wisdom, a wisdom that has been hidden ... —but God has revealed it to us by his Spirit. This is what we speak, not in words taught us by human wisdom but in words taught by the Spirit, expressing spiritual truths in spiritual words. [1 Cor. 1:20-1,25; 2:6-7a,10a,13] ... the inscrutable wisdom through which we exist is not less worthy of veneration in respect to what it denies us than in [respect to] what it has granted [Kt4:148].
Chapter IV Theistic Alternatives to Proving God's Existence: Kant's 'Appropriation' of Lampe's God It is absolutely necessary to convince one's self of the existence of God; but it is not just so necessary that it should be demonstrated. [Ktl 5:163(366)]
1. The Problem of Transcendental Theology Having completed (in Chapter III) our review of the systematic founda¬ tions of Kant's Critical philosophy and examined (in Chapter II) the extent to which the seeds of those foundations were already present in Ktl 8, let us now turn back to the question posed at the outset of Chapter I. Does Kant's System of Perspectives destroy the possibility of theology? We have already proceeded far enough into this study to recognize that the answer must be 'yes and no': Kant's System precludes a certain type of theology, just as it precludes a certain type of metaphysics—viz., any type that ignores the principle of perspective. But it does so only in order to replace such one-sided theology (or metaphysics) with one that takes full account of the difficulties caused by the inherent finitude (and ignorance) characteristic of the human situation. Our examination, here in Part Two, of just how Kant goes about developing this new Critical theology within the framework established by his philosophical principles will be divided into three parts. First, the present chapter will expound Kant's views on the question of God's existence and the extent to which that existence can be proved. Chapter V will then investigate Kant's most basic theoretical assump¬ tions about the nature of God, and explain how this gives rise to certain specific types of 'symbolic' theology. Finally, in preparation for Part Three's thorough¬ going interpretation of Kant system of religion, Chapter VI will set forth Kant's view of the general relationship between theology, morality, and religion. Nowhere more than in assessing Kant's theology is the interpreter likely to be led astray by the misleading caricatures of Kant that have gained popularity down through the years. Indeed, it would be difficult to find a philosopher who has suffered more injustices at the hands of his commentators (friends and foes alike) than Kant. The problem is that various anecdotes are often used surreptitiously to twist Kant's own explicit claims about what he was attempting to accomplish, so that when his writings are read with these stories in mind, misunderstanding is almost inevitable. As an example, we need only think of the tale of the citizens of Konigsberg who became so familiar with Kant's rigid schedule that they used to set their clocks by his daily comings and
IV. Theistic Alternatives to Proving God's Existence goings.1 This may or may not be true; the point is that, unless this anecdote is recounted with a certain degree of skepticism, it is likely to encourage a preju¬ dice whereby the reader of Kant assumes at the beginning that Kant's writings are filled with the unreasonably rigid and formalistic ravings of someone out of touch with the unpredictable passions that punctuate the life of an ordinary person. In other words, such stories are in danger of creating an image of Kant that may have little or no justification in the text. One could cite other examples, such as the story of how Kant, when serving as university rector, would lead the procession of senate members up to the cathedral each Sunday, only to desert it at the door [see e.g., BaO3:lxixn], or Russell's quip that Kant's response to being 'awakened' by Hume was merely to invent a transcendental 'soporific' to help him fall asleep again [Ru46:731; but cf. II.3, above]. In this chapter I shall demonstrate the falsity of a myth that has arisen out of one such anecdote. The myth is that Kant's Critical philosophy simply carries on the Enlightenment project by rejecting the common religious person's belief in God in favor of the typical agnostic deism of his century. The anecdote I am thinking of suggests that, whereas in the first Critique Kant threw God out the 'front door' (of the house of philosophy), in the second Critique he let God in again through the back door [see Ra63:vii]. Along these lines Heinrich Heine suggested in 1882 that Kant's reason for committing such a dishonorable act of trickery must have been that he felt sorry for his poor servant, Lampe, who had faithfully served him for all those years and whose faith in God had been jeopardized by the critique of transcendental theology in Ktl. Kant, unable to bear his servant's suffering at the thought that his master had killed God, revived God 'half ironically' in Kt4 in the form of the moral proof for God's existence.2 'Old Lampe must have a God', Kant is supposed to have thought, lest the servant be unable to continue performing his daily chores. (The absurdity of Heine's conjectures reaches its height when he suggests that Kant may have developed his moral proof 'not merely for the sake of old Lampe, but through fear of the police' [He59:276-7]!) Before demonstrating how mistaken such caricatures are, before explaining why Kant's God is not simply an after¬ thought, a mere 'appropriation' of the God of Lampe or any other 'common 1- E.g., HA52:vi; Da93c:323; Wa90:12. Bax puts this story in context by quoting at length from Jachmann [BaO3:xxv-xxvi]: the extreme regularity of Kant's passing applied mainly to his daily visits to the home of his close friend Green, an Englishman who rigorously imposed a punctual schedule on Kant. Gulyga's account corroborates this [Gu87:53]: 'One could set one's watch when Kant left Green's house.' It happened each evening 'at seven on the dot.' 2. He59:119. Nuyen and Davidovich both mention this story with explicit disapproval [Nu94:121; Da93a:25], whereas Hicks sees some symbolic value in it [Hi74:381]. After citing Erdmann's support for a similarly skeptical view of the seriousness of Kant's claim to believe in God, Kroner provides some good arguments against such a position [Kr56:38-4O].
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PART TWO: CRITICAL THEOLOGY
A
man', I shall briefly explain the problem that was supposedly disturbing Lampe in thefirstplace. Kant devotes the first half of Ktl (i.e., three of the four stages in his theo¬ retical system) to the task of solving the problem of how synthetic a priori judgments are possible. In solving this epistemological problem Kant demon¬ strates how transcendental knowledge (i.e., knowledge of the synthetic a priori conditions for the possibility of experience) is possible only when its applica¬ tion is confined to the realm of empirical knowledge (i.e., to experience). He argues that space, time, and the twelve categories form the transcendental boundary line between what we can and cannot know. This 'solution' itself, however, calls attention to an even more significant problem: what is the status of that which lies outside the boundary of possible empirical knowledge? Kant reveals as early as Ktl:xxix-xxxi that this metaphysical problem—viz., how to verify the fundamental human ideas of 'God, freedom, and immortality', upon which he believes all religion and morality depend—constitutes the deepest and most urgent form of the 'transcendental problem'. It should therefore come as no surprise when he devotes all of the largest section of Ktl, the Transcendental Dialectic (i.e., the fourth stage in systemj to the task of solving this ubiquitous perplexity of human reason.3 According to Kant our ideas of God, freedom, and immortality inevitably arise in the human mind as a result of our attempts to unify and systematize our empirical knowledge. In other words, reason naturally seeks for something beyond the limits of empirical knowledge to supply unity and coherence to the diversity of facts that fall within that boundary. The problem is that the transcendental conditions enabling us to gain knowledge in the empirical world are unable to perform their function with respect to such ideas, because the ideas abstract from all sensible content, whereas the transcendental conditions (space, time, and the categories) all require such content. As is well known, Kant devotes considerable effort in the Dialectic to the task of pointing out the implications of this transcendental problem for rational psychology (with its proofs of the immortality of the soul), rational cosmology (with its proofs of transcendental freedom), and rational theology (with its proofs of the existence of God). Interpreters often assume Kant is seeking to demonstrate the total uselessness of all such 'speculative' disciplines, especially 3. Gulick regards 'the notion of Ideas' [Gu94:105] as 'one of Kant's great but most unnoticed con¬ tributions to Western culture.' He rightly observes that the ideas have a 'mysterious power'. Cooke [Co88:317], by contrast, characterizes Kant's treatment of the ideas as 'a kind of facile retreat to agnosticism when the metaphysics becomes troublesome.' But the recognition of ignorance is not a 'retreat' in philosophy [see Part I of PaOOa], but a bold leap forward—even if it be a leap of faith.
IV. Theistic Alternatives to Proving God's Existence when it comes to theology, where he offers his radical criticism of the three traditional proofs for the existence of God. Since Kant's division and negative assessment of these proofs has become common knowledge among philoso¬ phers of religion, I shall here give only a brief review of his arguments. (For a more detailed treatment of Kant's objections to the traditional proofs and of some recent attempts to overcome them, see AIV.1-3.) Kant divides all theoretical proofs for God's existence into three basic types: the ontological type tries to prove the existence of God from the mere concept of a necessary being; the cosmological type argues from the nature of the world in general to the necessity of God's existence; and the physicotheological (or 'teleological') type argues from the nature of specific things in the world (such as designs or purposes) to the need for a God as their creator. Ontological arguments fail, according to Kant, because they mistakenly treat 'existence' as a real predicate that adds some new content when ascribed to a concept; but in fact, the concept of 'a hundred dollars', for instance, is the same, whether it refers to an imaginary hundred dollars or to a real hundred dollars in my pocket. In other words, we must go outside our concepts and appeal to intuitions (i.e., sensible experiences) in order to establish the existence of anything. Cosmological arguments fail because they wrongly assume that laws applying to objects within the world, such as the law of causality, also apply to the world as a whole. We cannot be sure, however, that something must have caused the world to exist, since the world as a whole can never be presented to us as a sensible intuition. Physicotheological arguments are the best of the three types, in Kant's opinion; but the most they can ever prove is that there is a designing power greater than human beings. They can never prove the existence of a necessary being who actually created the material world. In general, all three types of proof fail for the same reason: they all attempt to gain knowledge of the existence of an object that is necessarily beyond the transcendental limitations of our knowledge, because it can never be experienced by us in terms of intuitions that conform to our concepts. This assessment is the 'front door' out of which Kant is supposed to have banished God from the realm of the reasonable. Yet Kant himself thinks this very criticism of the traditional proofs serves a beneficial function in relation to theology and religion. He explicitly states that the failure of the traditional proofs does not settle the issue of God's existence, but poses one of the most important problems for Critical philosophy to solve. Whereas some theologians fear that the demise of traditional rational theology at Kant's hands would have a detrimental effect on the ordinary religious believer, Kant's rejection of such a 'sophisticated' conjecture is clear and to the point:
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68
PART TWO: CRITICAL THEOLOGY In religion the knowledge of God is properly based on faith alone.... [So] it is not necessary for this belief [i.e., in God] to be susceptible of logical proof.... [For] sophistication is the error of refusing to accept any religion not based on a theology which can be apprehended by our reason.... Sophistication in religious matters is a dangerous thing; our reasoning powers are limited and reason can err and we cannot prove everything. A speculative basis is a very weak foundation for religion... [Kt35:(86-7); cf. Kt7:480-l; s.a. Pa02:207-8].
;
The problem, then, is to discover the proper foundation to substitute for the false one offered by speculation. s What is not so well known is that Kant's philosophical System not only as poses this problem, but offers at least four distinct ways of solving it. Thus, even though Kant begins his theology on an essentially negative note, believing he has been able 'to discover the fallacy in any attempt [to prove God's existence theoretically], and so to nullify its claims' [Ktl:667], he nevertheless devotes considerable effort to the task of showing how an honest recognition of the limitations of human reason leaves ample room for drawing affirmative theological conclusions concerning God's existence and nature. In what follows I shall examine each of these affirmations in turn, with a view towards ascertaining Kant's true attitude towards theology.4 This examination will enable us to assess in FV.4 the common claim that these affirmations are in fact merely an appropriation of something foreign into an essentially negative theological position. This, in turn, will prepare us to examine more respectfully in Chapter V Kant's surprisingly affirmative claims about God's nature. 2. Hypothetical Theology: God as a Regulative Idea Kant believes it is important for us to form some judgment on the question of God's existence despite the transcendental limitations imposed on human knowledge. He explains there is 'a real need associated with reason itself [that] makes judging necessary even if ignorance with respect to the details required for judging limits us' [Kt20:136-7]: because we cannot know God as an object of empirical knowledge, we must first 'test the concept [of God]... to see if it is free of contradictions' and then examine the 'relation' between our idea of God and the objects we do experience.5 Kant's rejection of the traditional 4. In PaO2:265 Paulsen refers briefly, and in the same order, to the three theological affirmations on which the following three sections will focus: Kant's 'transcendental theology' on its own 'leads to deism'; his 'physico-theology advances a step further' and 'establishes theism'; his 'moral theology' then serves as the 'crowning-stone' of the theological foundation for Critical religion. 5. Kant continues by explaining that 'the right of a need of reason enters as the right of a subjective ground to presuppose or assume something which it may not pretend to know on objective grounds' [Kt2O:137]. From the theoretical standpoint, this 'need of reason' to 'assume the existence of God' is 'conditional': the assumption only 'needs' to be made 'when we wish to judge concerning the first cause of all contingent things, particularly in the organization of ends actually
IV. Theistic Alternatives to Proving God's Existence proofs is actually designed to fulfill the first of these tasks. It does so by demonstrating that belief in God is not logically contradictory, since God's existence, regarded as a constitutive part of the world, can never be proved or disproved, on the grounds that a conceptualizable intuition of God is in principle impossible. The second task is fulfilled in a lengthy Appendix to the Dialectic [Ktl:671-732], where Kant offers an alternative explanation of the epistemological status of the idea of God—an explanation that is often not treated very seriously by commentators. Kant's first theological affirmation provides an explanation for a commonly experienced paradox, which Kant expresses in Ktl:643 by asking: 'Why are we constrained to assume that some one among existing things is in itself necessary, and yet at the same time to shrink back from the existence of such a being as from an abyss?' Dialectical illusion results only if we try to subdue one of these natural tendencies. Those who try to prove God's existence theoretically are suppressing the latter, while those who categorically deny God's existence are suppressing the former. If the truth that lies behind both tendencies is grasped, however, both errors can be avoided. The situation giving rise to this paradox is that 'I can never complete the regress to the conditions of existence save by assuming a necessary being, and yet am never in a position to begin [such a regress] with such a being' [643-4]. Recognizing the 'merely heuristic and regulative' character of the princi¬ ples underlying each side of this paradox can make the two sides compatible: The one [principle] prescribes that we are to philosophise about nature as if there were a necessary first ground for all that belongs to existence—solely, however, for the purpose of bringing systematic unity into our knowledge, by always pursuing such an idea, as an imagined ultimate ground. The other warns us not to regard any determination whatsoever of existing things as such an ultimate ground ... [Ktl:644-5, e.a.].
Whereas all theoretical arguments about the existence of God are bound to fail in their attempt to establish knowledge of God as a real object (an 'ideal'), these two principles suggest that the concept of God can have a valid use as long as it is regarded, less ambitiously, as an idea of reason. Rather than reviewing the general character of this regulative employment of the ideas [see KSP1:IV.3 and V.4], I shall now proceed directly to a discussion of its implications for our theoretical understanding of the concept of God. present in the world' [139]. But from the practical standpoint, 'the need is unconditional; here we are compelled to presuppose the existence of God not just if we wish to judge but because we must judge' [139]. As Paulsen puts it in PaO2:264: 'The existence of God is the most certain element in [Kant's] metaphysic; an irresistible need of our reason forces it upon us.' The significance of this notion of a 'need of reason' will be considered in more detail in V.3.
69
$0
PART TWO: CRITICAL THEOLOGY
A theoretical discussion of God's existence and attributes, Kant argues, cannot be based 'upon the knowledge of such a being but upon its idea only' [Ktl:729, e.a.]. From the standpoint of theoretical reason our idea of God is postulated only problematically (since we cannot reach it through any of the concepts of the understanding) in order that we may view all connection of the ':-, things of the world of sense as if they had their ground in [it]... In thus proceeding, our sole purpose is to secure systematic unity... [709].
In such usage God is 'an idea which reason is constrained to form as the regulative principle of its investigation of nature' [725]. As such, it is used as a principle for viewing empirical objects from a hypothetical, not an empirical, perspective. (The latter would be a 'constitutive' use of the idea in reference to the world.) Kant explains the proper use of an idea as follows [707]: I think to myself merely the relation of a being, in itself completely unknown to me, to the greatest possible systematic unity of the universe, solely for the purpose of using [this idea] as a schema of the regulative principle of the greatest possible empirical employment of my reason.
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The main purpose of Kant's treatment of the idea of God in Ktl is to establish the right to use this theoretical concept from other, nontheoretical standpoints [see note IV.5]. His criticism of the traditional proofs does this by demonstrating that, although the concept cannot be instantiated in experience, it is at least not self-contradictory. The function of this concept as a regulative idea can therefore be put forward as a reasonable hypothesis (i.e., as plausible, though not provable), even from the standpoint of theoretical reason.6 Far from being an afterthought, this theory is at the core of Kant's theological concern.7 By establishing peace in systemt, the regulative use of the idea of God directs our attention forward to the other Critical standpoints in anticipation of a more complete justification for belief in God. This affirmation of the benefits of the regulative employment of our idea of 6. 'Hypotheses', Kant urges in Ktl:805, are 'permissible only as weapons of war, and only for the purpose of defending a right, not in order to establish it.' They can be invaluable tools, when used 'in self-defence', in order to nullify 'the sophistical arguments by which our opponent professes to invalidate this assertion [of God's existence]' [804-5]. Yet they cannot be used dogmatically, since the skeptic can also produce opposing hypotheses. Since theoretical reason 'does not ... favour either of the two parties', hypotheses can be used 'only in polemical fashion.' So a proper view of hypotheses limits dogmatists by refusing them knowledge, while yet limiting skeptics by upholding the right to believe. These warring parties, Kant explains, both 'lie in ourselves'; and the task of criticism is to remove 'the root of these disturbances' in order to 'establish a permanent peace' [805-6], Once we recognize that hypotheses, 'although they are but leaden weapons', are required 'for our complete equipment' in fulfilling this purpose, we will see that there is 'nothing to fear in all this, but much to hope for; namely, that we may gain for ourselves a possession which can never again be contested.' 7. As Despland points out in De73:146: 'The unique strength of criticism is that "rational" is not restricted in meaning to cognitive. The Ideas of reason can be thought rationally without being objectified into possible objects of knowledge.'
IV. Theistic Alternatives to Proving God's Existence
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God is frequently rejected prematurely by Kant's critics. One of the most common criticisms is that science (especially since Darwin) simply has no use for postulating 'the idea of God... as a heuristic device in the empirical study of nature' [Wo78:145]. This criticism is based, however, on a complete misunder¬ standing of the perspective from which Kant is speaking; he never intends the ideas to be used as regulative principles from an empirical perspective, such as that adopted by most natural scientists in their everyday work; for he insists that 'just because it is a mere idea, [the idea of God] is altogether incapable... of enlarging our knowledge in regard to what exists' [Ktl:630-l]. Hence it cannot serve as the constitutive 'ground of the systematic order of the world'.8 Instead, the ideas are to function regulatively only in the context of reason's special hypothetical perspective. To think otherwise is to ignore the fact that metaphysics 'does not need the ideas for the purposes of natural science, but in order to pass beyond nature' [Ktl:395n]. In other words, these regulative principles concern how 'to philosophise about nature' [644, q.a.], not how to investigate nature scientifically. For Kant harshly condemns the latter approach: To have recourse to God... in explaining the [physical] arrangements of nature and their changes is ... a complete confession that one has come to the end of his philosophy [i.e., 'natural philosophy', or science], since he is compelled to assume something of which in itself he otherwise has no concept in order to conceive the possibility of something he sees before his very eyes.9 8. Ktl:709; cf. 724-5. This function is fulfilled on the material side by the thing in itself [see Fig. III.5] and on the formal side by reason's architectonic forms [see III. 1; s.a. Ktl:723-4]. The misunderstanding at issue here is perpetrated by many interpreters who are otherwise well-disposed towards Kant. Wisnefske, for example, states that the regulative use of the idea of God is 'of great importance for the execution of scientific enterprises' [Wi90:30-31]. Unfortunate¬ ly, he neither explains how this usage works nor cites actual texts where Kant supports such a view. 9. Kt4:138; see also Kt26:997(25-6). This seems at first to apply equally to Kant's own assumption of the thing in itself, which he does believe to be philosophically sound. However, he is speaking here from an empirical perspective, in the context of which the thing in itself, as positive noumenon, is indeed superfluous [see Fig. III.5]; Kant's use of the thing in itself does not fall under this criticism because it assumes the transcendental perspective. Hence, when we read Kant warning us that 'a presumptuous readiness to appeal to supernatural explanations is a pillow for a lazy understanding' [Ktl9:418(We26:45)J, we must be careful not to interpret this too broadly, as Webb does when he says this claim means that 'the assumption of the supernatural is excluded on "critical" principles' [45]. For as we have seen, Kant actually encourages such an assumption in the appropriate circumstances, as long as it is put forward without a presumptuous attitude (i.e., as long as it is regarded as a theoretical hypothesis rather than a claim of dogmatic knowledge). If Kant's advice in such passages is that supernatural explanations are always inappropriate, then why does he himself appeal to the God-hypothesis throughout his writings [see 1.3]? Rather, his message is that we must be careful to use them wisely—i.e., in such a way that they do not prevent us from relentlessly seeking natural explanations wherever possible. He makes this point explicitly in a much neglected 1785 essay on the moon [Kt53:76]: calling upon 'the immediate Divine disposi¬ tion as a ground of explanation... must indeed, when nature on the whole is in question, close our inquiry'; yet for anything short of such a universal (hence, philosophical) outlook, 'we are not [thereby] freed from the obligation to search [for a ground] among the causes of the world... and to follow their chain according to laws known to us, as long as its [causal links] are connected.' More
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PART TWO: CRITICAL THEOLOGY
Just as the regulative use of an idea assumes it not to have 'creative power', but to 'have practical power..., and form the basis of the possible perfection of certain actions' [Ktl:597], so also such regulative usage implies nothing about how we are to go about gathering empirical knowledge, but only about how we are to structure our beliefs about the source of the ultimate unity of that knowl¬ edge. Much as a vision of the 'not yet' can act as a powerful force pulling us forward towards the realization of a hope [see e.g., Pa93], the idea motivates us to search for systematic unity in our philosophical explanations.10 Another frequent complaint against Kant's plea that we be satisfied with regarding God as a regulative idea is made by those theologians who are (as Kant says with respect to certain moral philosophers of his day) 'dedicated to the omnipotence of theoretical reason' [Kt6:378]. Kant continues: the discomfort they feel at not being able to explain what lies entirely beyond the sphere of physiological explanation [e.g., the idea of God] provokes them to a general call to arms, as it were, to withstand that Idea, no matter how exalting this very prerogative of man—his capacity for such an Idea—may be.
Such scholars reject the notion of God as an idea not because it is incoherent, but because it does not provide what they are looking for: viz., certain knowl¬ edge of God's existence and nature." Because Kant says, for example, that 'this Idea proceeds entirely from our own reason and we ourselves make it' [443], they disregard his many other claims to believe in a real, living God, as will be said about the relation between science and the God-hypothesis in KSP3. 10. Kant describes a 'hypothesis' in Kt4:126 as 'a ground of explanation'. As such, a proper under¬ standing of his theory of the regulative use of the idea of God from the hypothetical perspective reveals it to be remarkably similar to modern attempts to defend God's existence as the best 'explanatory hypothesis' [see e.g., No73:441]. There are differences, of course, such as that the modern versions, while perhaps benefiting from their freedom from Kant's rather difficult and oldfashioned terminology, often suffer unnecessarily by mixing different perspectives uncritically (e.g., by treating rigorous logical argumentation as the primary, if not the only, tool available to defend or refute such hypotheses). The two approaches are alike, however, to the extent that they both attempt a theoretical defense of God's existence not on the basis that the God-hypothesis enables us to provide a better scientific explanation of the available data, but rather on the basis that the available data point beyond themselves to something that can best be explained philosophically in terms of the God-hypothesis. Thus in both cases the theoretical argument, when properly constructed, assumes a hypothetical rather than an empirical perspective. 11. A contemporary example is Hart, who uses Husserl's philosophical approach to argue that the idea of God is not only regulative but 'also has a constitutive function' [Ha90b:222; s.a. 234-5,238, 241]. If we define 'constitutive idea' [234] as something 'providing determination immanent to what is experienced, then the divine may be considered also a constitutive principle.' But not everything immanent is constitutive. Kant could agree with the Husserlian view expressed here, if only the term 'determined' were removed. Hart goes on to explain [238] how Husserl attempts to verify through 'theological meditation' that 'the divine idea plays a constitutive function.' Hart finally explains that here 'constitutive' refers not to 'theoretical determination', as it would for Kant, but to 'the production of goals' [241]. Yet the latter is a defining feature of what Kant calls 'regulative'; so the Hart-Husserl proposal does not improve on Kant, but merely redefines his terms. This will become especially evident in Part Four [s.e. XII.2,4], when we see that Kant him¬ self allows for a kind of theological meditation without claiming it constitutes knowledge of God.
IV. Theistic Alternatives to Proving God's Existence
73
in traditional theism.12 Such a premature rejection of his position fails to recognize that, as in virtually every other aspect of his System, Kant often gives different answers to the same question when different perspectives are assumed. Hence, viewing 'God' from the theoretical standpoint as an idea constructed by human beings does not prevent us from adopting some other standpoint in order to affirm that a real, transcendent God actually exists.13 3. Physicotheology: Judicial Evidence for the God-Hypothesis Kant's theory concerning the regulative idea of God is actually the least substantial of his various ways of affirming the rationality of theology; for 'the conception of a Deity... can never be evolved merely according to principles of reason's theoretical standpoint' [Kt7:400]. So in addition to his defense of a transcendental theology from the hypothetical perspective, he develops his own type of natural theology in the second and third Critiques. KSP1:VIII.3.B and IX.3.B already touch on these versions of natural theology. A more thorough examination of Kant's moral and physicotheological arguments for God's exis¬ tence will testify to therichnessand depth of his theology, while confirming the ubiquity of this 'guiding-thread' in his System [cf. Kt7:389 and 1.4, above]. Despite his rejection of the physicotheological proof in Ktl [see AIV.l], Kant affirms it in Kt7, yet without nullifying the limitations he has previously placed on it. For the standpoint used to assess the proof in Kt7 is judicial rather than theoretical. The same theoretical concept (God) is still under consideration. From the outset, however, Kant is now aiming to establish not theoretical knowledge, but only an experience-based (i.e., existential) justification of a practical belief. Even in Ktl Kant explicitly allows for such a usage: he argues that we are 'undoubtedly' permitted, if not required, 'to assume a wise and om¬ nipotent Author of the world', as long as we realize such an assumption does not in any way 'extend our knowledge beyond the field of experience' [725-6]. In Kt26:1004(32-3) he develops this claim further: Physicotheology ... can enlighten and give intuitive appeal to our concepts of God. But it cannot have any determinate concept of God. For only reason can represent completeness and totality. In physicotheology I see God's power. But can I say determinately, this is omnipotence or the highest degree of power?
The implicit answer, of course, is 'no'. Although it has a constructive role to play, physicotheology on its own is 'unable to... serve as the foundation of a theology which is itself in turn to form the basis of religion' [Ktl: 65 6]. Instead, 12. The issue of Kant's theism will be discussed in more detail in IV.4 and in AIV.4. 13. For a thorough critique of the opposite conclusion, that Kant's God is a mere 'philosophical fiction' that can be equated with reason itself, see AIV.4.
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PART TWO: CRITICAL THEOLOGY
Kant intends it to point the way outward from experience to moral activity, where theology has a more secure foundation. Kant argues in Kt7:389 that empirical reflection on 'the clearly manifest nexus of things according to final causes' requires us to conceive of 'a worldcause acting according to ends, that is, an intelligent cause—however rash and undemonstrable a principle this might be for the determinant judgment.' As we saw in KSP1:IX.3.B, he bases this conclusion on the specific phenomenon of finality (or 'purposiveness') in our experience of the world: the nature of our faculty of reason is such that without an Author and Governor of the world, who is also a moral Lawgiver, we are wholly unable to render intelligible to ourselves the possibility of a finality, related to the moral law, and its Object, such as exists in this final end. [455]
In particular Kant emphasizes that 'the end for which nature itself exists' is humanity, and that 'it is upon the definite idea of this end that the definite conception of such a supreme intelligent World-Cause, and, consequently, the possibility of a theology, depend' [437]. Viewed from the judicial standpoint of Kt7 rather than the theoretical standpoint of Ktl, this argument is, as Wood points out in Wo70:174, directed not so much to theoretical philosophers as to ordinary people: 'the ordinary man "sees" nature as the work of God, and discerns in it—what no amount of empirical evidence [in systemt] could have demonstrated—the signs of a divine and morally purposive creation' [176]. If viewed solely from the standpoint of Kt7, physicotheology is quite limited, for experience 'can never lift us above nature to the end of its real existence or thus raise us to a definite conception of such a higher Intelligence' [Kt7:438; s.a. Kt26:1009(38)]. That is, 'physical teleology urges us to go in quest of a theology. But it can never produce one' [Kt7:440]; thus 'physico-theology... is of no use to theology except as a prepa¬ ration or propaedeutic and is only sufficient for this purpose when supple¬ mented by a further principle on which it can rely' [442]. Physicotheology fails in Ktl not because it is physicotheological, but because its 'further principle' is provided by the speculative (ontological and cosmological) arguments; it suc¬ ceeds in Kt7 by basing itself on the moral argument: 'underlying our procedure [in physicotheology] is an idea of a Supreme Being, which rests on an entirely different standpoint [than the judicial], namely the practical' [438]. Understanding the relationships between the various proofs is complicated by the fact that each type of proof can be expressed in either a teleological or a nonteleological way, as suggested by Figure IV. 1:
IV. Theistic Alternatives to Proving @&d?sj&dstence
75v
physicotheological proofs
Kant's moral proof
Figure IV. 1: Three Types of Teleological Proof The proofs Kant prefers usually tend to be teleological. The best example, his special moral proof, will occupy our attention for the remainder of this chapter. The moral theology that is founded on that proof is the goal towards which a proper (nonspeculative) physicotheology moves. Kant sums up the preparatory function of proofs that fall into the latter classification when, in constructing an imaginary 'moral catechism' [Kt6:480], he has the pupil end by saying [482]: For we see in the works of nature, which we can judge, a wisdom so widespread and profound that we can explain it to ourselves only by the ineffably great art of a creator of the world. And from this we have cause, when we turn to the moral order ... to expect there a rule no less wise.
4. Moral Theology: The Ultimate Rationale for Theistic Belief Kant's moral argument for the existence of God is the only aspect of his solution to the problem of transcendental theology that has been duly recog¬ nized by commentators. In its simplest form, his argument is fairly straight¬ forward. After arguing that the highest good consists of the distribution of hap¬ piness to each person in proportion to his or her virtue [see KSP1:VIII.3.B], Kant points out that, given the nature of human virtue (viz., that it often requires us to deny our own happiness in order to obey the voice of duty), humanity on its own is unlikely to bring into being this ideal end of morality. Yet if the end or purpose of morality proves to be unattainable, moral action itself will be irrational. Hence, anyone who wishes to regard moral action as rational is con¬ strained to postulate something that would make it possible to understand how the highest good could become a reality. As is well known, Kant argues that the immortality of the soul and the existence of God are the two postulates that can save morality from the abyss of meaninglessness.
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PART TWO: CRITICAL THEOLOGY
Although Kant's basic argument is familiar enough, its intended force is easy to misunderstand, especially for those who fail to take into consideration the different perspectives and standpoints in Kant's System. In the first place, Kant's moral argument is not actually part of his philosophy of religion, as is typically assumed by those who write on the latter subject. At most, it serves as a preface to religion. For the postulate of God performs its function exclusively within the final stage of Kant's practical {moral) system, where it suggests that rational moral agents are, in fact, acting as if God exists whenever they act morally, whether or not they claim to believe in God. In other words, God's existence, though not theoretically provable, is nevertheless a necessary assumption for any moral agent who wishes to conceive of the highest good as being realizable (and therefore, of moral action as being ultimately rational). But secondly, this does not make the postulates, as Friedman claims [Fr86b: 517], 'conditions of the possibility of moral choosing.' Of the three Kantian ideas, only freedom has this status; God and immortality are conditions not of moral choosing, but of regarding morally good choice as a rational activity. What then are the specific implications of Kant's moral argument for the theologian's attempt to prove the existence of God? Kant's argument, as summarized in Kt7:446, is that every moral agent needs a moral Intelligence; because he exists for an end, and this end demands a Being that has formed both him and the world [i.e., both freedom and nature] with that end in view.... Hence ... there is in our moral habits of thought a foundation for... form[ing] a representation depicting a pure moral need for the real existence of a Being, whereby our morality gains in strength or even obtains—at least on the side of our representation—an extension of area, that is to say, is given a new object for its exercise.
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The resulting concept of 'a moral Legislator' has no theoretical value; yet, Kant continues, the source of this disposition is unmistakable. It is the original bent of our nature, as a subjective principle, that will not let us be satisfied, in our review of the world, with the finality which it derives through natural causes, but leads us to introduce into it an underlying supreme Cause governing nature according to moral laws. —In addition ... we feel ourselves urged by the moral law to strive after a universal highest end, while yet we feel ourselves, and all nature too, incapable of its attainment.... Thus we have a pure moral ground derived from practical reason , for admitting this Cause (since we may do so without contradiction), if for no bet¬ ter reason, in order that we may not run the risk of regarding such striving as quite idle in its effects, and of allowing it to flag in consequence.
After presenting his moral argument for the existence of God in Kt4, Kant asks: 'Is our knowledge really widened in such a way by pure practical reason, and is that which was transcendent for speculative reason immanent in practical
IV. Theistic Alternatives to Proving God's Existence
11
reason? Certainly, but only from a practical standpoint' [133]. Earlier, he warns against assuming that the conclusions of his practical system merely 'serve to fill out gaps in the critical system of speculative reason' [7]. Kant does on a few occasions make reckless remarks, such as that 'a faith in God built on this [moral] foundation is as certain as a mathematical demonstration' [Kt26:1011(40)]. (He should at least have added that there is a crucial perspectival difference between the type of certainty we have in each case [see note IV. 14].) Such remarks should not, however, be given priority over his many other, more carefully worded comments regarding the perspectival struc¬ ture of his System. For example, he says 'no one will be able to boast that he knows that there is a God [i.e., from the theoretical standpoint] ... No, my conviction is not logical but moral certainty'.14 Thus Wood insists 'it would be a great mistake to see in the God of Kant's moral faith no more than an abstract, metaphysical idea. For Kant moral faith in God is, in it[s] most profound and personal signification, the moral man's trust in God.'15 14. Ktl:857. This balanced statement guards against the error Kim makes in portraying Kant's posi¬ tion in Ki88:365: 'Faith is belief chosen in the total absence of evidence.' Kant is not asking us to believe without evidence, but to believe on the basis of moral evidence. Kim's erroneous statement is made on the grounds that 'postulating' something means 'the willing of the reality of the possible that is "implied" by the moral law ' [364]. But this is accurate only if 'implied by' means 'made necessary in order to preserve the rational integrity of the moral law—a necessity Kant sees as a very real kind of evidence, not as a mere wish in the absence of anything real. Odero does a good job of making this point in Od91:269, where he emphasizes 'the cognitive value of faith.' He argues that for Kant 'I believe in God' means 'I know (theoretically) that I know (practically).' That is, faith relies on theoretical certainty at one level, but only as certainty of my own subjective state, not as objective certainty that God exists. Because faith in God is 'assertorical', Odero concludes we can legitimately 'use the term religious knowledge' [270; cf. KSP1:V]. Despite Kant's concerted effort to distinguish moral from theoretical arguments, some com¬ mentators fail to appreciate the difference. Cooke, for example, confesses [Co88:321] 'it is hard to see... how the approach to God by way of practical reason can really be anything else than an argument of theoretical reason... Ultimately Kant came to see this himself, since he finally came to abandon not only the moral theology of [Ktl], but also the subsequently modified version of [Kt4].' Cooke is referring here to the new arguments Kant advances in Kt9; but as we shall see in XII.2, the fact that Kant does not repeat his former arguments in Kt9 does not mean he has aban¬ doned them, but only that he has modulated to a new standpoint. 15. Wo70:161; s.a. Da93c:340. Unfortunately, in interpreting the underlying connotations of Kant's moral argument, many interpreters make the very mistake Wood is warning against here. Webb, for example, claims Kant's moral argument 'certainly is in no way calculated to express the religious man's conviction of the reality of the object of his worship' [We26:66]. If 'the religious man's conviction' here refers to the tendency of some believers to base their faith on uncritical claims to possess theoretical knowledge, then of course Webb is correct, since the argument is directed to 'the moral man'. But the words 'in no way' are misleading, since Kant does intend his argument not only to be compatible with a religious standpoint [see VI.2], but also to provide a rational founda¬ tion for a fuller conception of the God of religion, as expounded in Kt8 [see Part Three, below]. An earlier elaboration of the position Wood defends is given by Walsh, who insists the con¬ clusions of a moral proof 'will represent convictions rather than truths' [Wa63a:267]. He explains [269] that, 'when we take ['moral action'] for what it is we see that the moral agent is, in the very fact of acting, committed to belief in God.' Thus he concludes [284]: 'the real point is that the agent's belief shows itself in his acts.' This is not an intellectual conclusion drawn from evidence
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PART TWO: CRITICAL THEOLOGY
Kant's moral argument, therefore, is not to be regarded as 'an incontrover¬ tible proof, along the lines attempted by the traditional theoretical arguments [Ktl:665]. Kant himself writes in Kt7:450-l: This moral argument is not intended to supply an objectively valid proof of the existence of God. It is not meant to demonstrate to the sceptic that there is a God, but that he must adopt the assumption of this proposition as a maxim of his practical reason, if he wishes to think in a manner consistent with morality.
As a practical 'presupposition' of our moral activity, it 'cannot be brought to a higher degree of certainty than the acknowledgment that it is the most reasonable opinion for us men' [Kt4:142]. Accordingly, Kant describes it as a 'doctrinal belief [Ktl:853], which means it is, 'from an objective perspective, an expres¬ sion of modesty, and yet at the same time, from a subjective perspective, an ex¬ pression of the firmness of our confidence' [855]. Those who accept this prac¬ tical postulate and decide to believe in God must resolve within themselves 'not [to] give up this belief [Kt4:143]. This resolution is the 'back door' through which Kant supposedly appropriated his faithful servant's belief in God.16 [270], but a 'commitment to a practical attitude.' Walsh observes 'striking similarities between the case Kant puts up in [Ktl] for the need to assume God... and the case he deploys in his moral theol¬ ogy for practical belief in God: in both, commitment to God is connected directly with commitment to action' [276], Claiming immortality to be irrelevant, Walsh argues that God's help, if it is going to come, 'must be given here and now' [277]. That Kant is sharing a conviction is indicated by his confession in Ktl:856 that he 'inevitably' believes there is a God [Wa63a:277-8]. Likewise, in §86 of Kt7 'Kant maintains that the occurrence of certain moral feelings is bound up with affirma¬ tion of God's existence.' As a result, Kant fails to provide 'anything like a satisfactory account' of how the moral postulate actually can help 'the man who has moral doubts' [278]. Walsh thus finds Kant's moral proof to be 'at best unconvincing' and hardly distinguishable 'from the speculative arguments' [280]. 'There is a God' expresses for Kant 'a formula internal to a moral attitude', not 'a proposition' as such [284], Kuehn criticizes the view defended by Wood and Walsh, claiming that by depicting Kant's rational faith as a 'personal and subjective' conviction, they unwittingly make it nonrational [Ku85:157n]. Wood in particular, he argues [158n], 'relies on a very un-Kantian use of "rational."' As he rightly insists, Kant's concern in the moral argument [159] is 'with the practical situation in general. But this transcends all that is merely personal.' Kuehn goes so far as to say Walsh's reference to an '"irremovable personal dimension" in its status must be a myth.' Kuehn believes the problem lies in a failure to distinguish between Kant's defense of the postulate of God (in stage four of systemp) and his use of other forms of moral argument in Kt26 and other writings [Ku85: 159-61]. While this is correct, Kuehn wrongly assumes that because the former takes the form of a deduction, it must be 'theoretical' rather than 'practical' [161n]: 'it is not part of moral discourse itself.' This ignores the fact that stage four in each of Kant's systems examines issues that go beyond the given topic in its most narrowly conceived form. Kuehn's repeated claim that Kant's argument is not merely 'a piece of practical thinking' [160,162] is also misleading, since for Kant 'practical' involves more than just what leads to moral action. Fortunately, Kuehn eventually refines his claim, portraying the argument as 'transcendental'—quite correctly, given the broad sense of this term described in KSPl:IV.l. He concludes that the true purpose of the moral postulate of God's existence is to guarantee that the idea of God will be meaningful [166-7], by showing 'that "God" must "have" an object', even though we cannot have theoretical knowledge of it. This (the lack of an intuition of God) is the reason faith is necessary [167]. In the end, Kuehn defends a position that is ironically close to that of Walsh and Wood: 'Rational faith involves a decision.' 16. Anyone who still expects a theoretically valid argument is bound to regard such a conclusion as
IV. Theistic Alternatives to Proving God's Existence Yet Kant himself claims theology can 'better fulfil [its] final objective purpose' if it accepts the conclusions established by moral theology and supported by physicotheology, especially the conclusion that theology should be 'founded on the moral principle, namely that of freedom, and adapted, therefore, to reason's practical standpoint' [Kt7:479]. The limitation of basing theology on practical rather than theoretical reason is that its conclusions are now 'of immanent use only' [Kt 1:847]: [Moral theology] enables us to fulfil our vocation in this present world by showing us how to adapt ourselves to the system of all ends [i.e., to the practical standpoint], and by warning us against the fanaticism, and indeed the impiety, of abandoning the guidance of a morally legislative reason in the right conduct of our lives, in order to derive guidance directly from the idea of the Supreme Being [i.e., from the theoretical standpoint]. For we should then be making a transcendental employment of moral theology; and that, like a transcendent use of pure specula¬ tion, must pervert and frustrate the ultimate ends of reason.
Once its purely immanent use is understood, the myth that views Kant's moral postulates as merely 'a side gesture, [pointing] beyond the limits which he himself had drawn', is immediately seen to be invalid [see CaO9:47O]. A fair assessment of his theological position reveals that, if indeed he has opened the back door to let God into the house, this is only because he recognizes that God belongs in the house: short-term guests normally enter and exit only through the front door; the back door is typically reserved for residents and close friends! As MacKinnon points out in Ma75:133, throughout Kant's treatment of God and religion, he often 'tries to do justice to what at a first reading he seems to dismiss out of hand.' Keeping in mind Kant's reliance on the principle of perspective enables us to understand and appreciate the sincerity and reason¬ ableness of such attempts. Rather than taking too seriously Heine's 'back door' anecdote, we can therefore suggest a more appropriate version of the story: perhaps Kant invented the moral argument in order to protect his faithful ser¬ vant (and all others who humbly recognize, with Kant, the universal limits of 'common human understanding' [see e.g., Ktl:xxxii]) from the misuse he knew many philosophers would make of his rejection of theoretical arguments for God in Ktl. In other words, the moral proof explains not to Lampe (who had no need of a formal proof), but to Kant's fellow intellectuals—some of whom may have made snide remarks attacking the servant's simple faith during
rather tenuous. Thus Bax, having boiled the moral argument down to a form of wish-fulfillment [BaO3:lxix], claims to detect 'a lack of sincerity, though possibly an unconscious one.' Given Kant's explicit emphasis on the importance of sincerity [see note VIII.4], however, the only un¬ conscious material revealed by such criticisms is the critic's own lack of awareness of or apprecia¬ tion for Kant's principle of perspective.
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PART TWO: CRITICAL THEOLOGY
]
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the regular luncheons at Kant's home—why Lampe and all other human beings have nothing to fear from the limitations of theoretical reason. Regarded in this way, the anecdote actually highlights a crucial point in interpreting Kant's Critical theology: the moral proof of God's existence is in no sense intended to satisfy the requirements of the theoretical standpoint; rather it directs our attention away from the theoretical, away from scientific knowledge, and towards the practical standpoint; for the latter serves as the only context in which the concept of God can be rationally justified.17 Kant states this plainly in Kt26:1009-10(39): Thus all speculation depends ... on the transcendental concept [of an absolutely necessary being]. But if we posit that it is not correct, would we then have to give up the knowledge of God? Not at all. For then we would only lack the scientific knowledge that God exists. But a great field would still remain to us, and this would be the belief or faith that God exists. This faith we will derive a priori from moral principles. Hence if... we raise doubts about these speculative proofs ... we will not thereby undermine faith in God. Rather, we will clear the road for practical i. proofs. We are merely throwing out the false presumptions of human reason when it tries from itself to demonstrate the existence of God with apodictic certainty. But from moral principles we will assume a faith in God as the principle of every religion. In Kt7:482 he deliberates with equal clarity, explaining that the moral proof 'satisfies the moral side of our nature', yet without making a transcendent use of the categories in a futile attempt to know 'the intrinsic, and for us inscrutable, nature of God'. 18
17. As Webb puts it in We26:68, 'Kant... definitely denies that the knowledge of God, the Object of religion, falls primarily or properly within the spheres of Physics [cf. systemj] or Metaphysics [cf. systemt]. It is only ... to be reached by starting ... from the consciousness of duty or moral obligation [cf. systemp].' Along these lines, Kant distinguishes between the moral argument as 'an argument tear' iiv6pamov valid for all men as rational [i.e., moral] beings in general', and 'the theoretical-dogmatic argument mr' aXrideiav' [Kt69:306]. The former is sufficient for us because faith in God 'springs from the moral disposition itself' [Kt4:146]; any attempt to root it in theoretical knowledge must therefore be erroneous, as Lenk rightly argues [Le89:98-100]. A typical criticism of Kant's moral theology is advanced by Mansel in Ma58:201: 'But by an inconsistency scarcely to be paralleled in the history of philosophy, the author of this comprehensive criticism attempted to deduce a partial conclusion from universal premises, and to exempt the speculations of moral and religious thought from the relative character with which, upon his own principles, all products of human consciousness were necessarily invested.' Not only does Mansel ignore Kant's denials that his moral proof functions like a theoretical deduction, but he also wrongly regards systemt as requiring a total relativism, which was quite foreign to Kant's intent. Mansel bases his argument on a mistaken interpretation of both the idea of God in systemt and the moral law in systemp, as 'not merely facts of human consciousness ..., but absolute, transcendental realities ...'. Kant's position would be inconsistent only if he claimed the reality of God could be proved theoretically as a knowable fact; but as we shall see, his treatment of morality (and religion [see VI.2]) does not seek to 'exempt' certain classes from a set of rules that are elsewhere claimed to be absolute, but rather views each type of 'human consciousness' from its proper standpoint. 18. Byrne argues against Kant's moral proof in By79:337: 'If knowledge of God is impossible then
IV. Theistic Alternatives to Proving God's Existence
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When we examine in Chapter V Kant's various symbolic accounts of God's nature,19 we must keep in mind that he is not contradicting his own theoretical principles by suggesting that we can know God's attributes after all. Rather, he is urging that, despite our inherent ignorance of God's essence, as necessitated by the perspectival nature of human rationality, it is legitimate for practical purposes to describe God, as long as we recognize the dependence of such descriptions on our own perspectives, and so use the resulting 'knowl¬ edge' only as an aid in coping with our earthly existence, especially with respect to our moral activity. One of the main purposes of Ktl is to prepare the way for such a theology by replacing the positive noumenon with the negative noumenon [see KSP1:V.3 and VII.3.A]—i.e., by replacing the rationalist belief in a speculative realm transcending the phenomenal world with the Critical belief in a practical realm revealed in and through moral experience. Any attempt to grasp God must therefore be given up and replaced by a willingness to be grasped by God. Kant suggests in Kt7:444 that 'all transcendental attributes [of God],... attributes that are presupposed in relation to such a final end, will have to be re¬ garded as belonging to the Original Being. —In this way moral teleology sup¬ plements the deficiency of physical teleology, and for the first time establishes a [moral] theology.' 20 Thus the moral theology towards which the physical one cannot have grounds for believing or thinking that God exists.' Byrne reaches this conclusion, however, only by presupposing an epistemology quite foreign to Kant, whereby knowledge is identified with justified belief [336; cf. KSP1:AV.3]. For Kant, unfcnowability by no means implies unfftm/fcability. Thus, he distinguishes between knowledge and belief by explaining that the evidence for a judgment one believes is true must be 'subjectively sufficient', but 'objectively insufficient', whereas the evidence for a judgment one knows is true must be 'sufficient both subjec¬ tively and objectively' [Ktl:85O]. For Kant, the relevant 'subjective' grounds are, of course, moral. Oakes argues against the common assumption that anyone who believes knowledge of God is possible must reject Kant's doctrine of the unknowability of noumena [Oa73:31]. He argues that Kant is wrong to construe 'all religious epistemology as necessarily a quest for noumenal knowing' [32], because our knowledge of God is, in fact, phenomenal [33]: 'any sensible experience of God ... must be construed as providing knowledge which is partial or perspectival, i.e., knowledge solely from the vantage point of a finite knower.' Kant would, of course, agree that all knowledge is perspectival, but argue that our 'sensible experience' is never a direct experience of God, in the way that our empirical knowledge is a direct experience (i.e., intuition and conception) of empirical objects. Rather, the religious person regards some experiences as coming from God by means of the God-hypothesis, which can never yield actual knowledge of a phenomenon called 'God'. Never¬ theless, Kant's treatment of the experience of God is not far removed from that of Oakes, except that Kant never regards such experiences as capable of producing knowledge [see V.4 and X.2; s.e. note X.10]. ' 9. Kant offers the theologian a number of different means of coping with the realities of human igno¬ rance, in the form of analogical models for God's nature. These models, though rarely appreciated by commentators, represent a balanced and realistic view of some basic theological issues. 20. 'Moral teleology' is the title Kant gives his moral proof in Kt7 to show its structural parallel to teleology proper (i.e., physical teleology). Each is teleological insofar as it concerns the purpose or final end that must be posited in order to explain a certain type of experience (viz., of either a moral or a physical end). Beck's criticism of the moral proof on this account [Be60:275] is
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teleology of Kt7 directs our attention provides the only adequate philosophical basis for a belief in the existence of God, and so for a regulative use of the idea of God in theoretical contexts [see Kt 1:664], by supplying not knowledge but 'a conviction of the existence of a supreme being—a conviction which bases itself on moral laws' [660n]. With this foundation, our concept of God 'meets the joint requirements alike of insight into nature and moral wisdom—and no objection of the least substance can be brought against the possibility of such an idea' [Kt7:462]. Having vindicated the existence of God as a legitimate object of belief, we can now conclude by stepping back and briefly assessing the character of Kant's own attitude towards such belief. Even those who are not fooled by the 'myth of appropriation' typically characterize Kant's theology as primarily negative. Thus, Cupitt says Kant has 'a non-cognitive philosophy of religion which leaves the believer to be sus¬ tained in a harsh world by nothing but pure moral faith'.21 But in fact, Kant's theological and religious views are not so 'bleak and austere' as is often assumed. On the contrary, such an assumption, like most misinterpretations of Kant, rests on a failure to understand how the principle of perspective operates in his System. It is true that his practical postulates as such are not much help in facing the harsh realities of human existence, but they are not primarily intended to fulfill such an existential function. Kant offers us instead a variety of other tools to help us cope with reality. We shall see in V.2-4, for instance, that Kant allows for a significant use of analogies and symbolism in constructing models of God's nature. The most significant example, though, concerns Kant's view of God as participating in the moral realm in order to relate on a personal level with human beings—a concern that will come into full view only in XII.2-4. Nevertheless, the foregoing account of Kant's solution to the problem of transcendental theology has, I hope, made abundantly clear that Kant's theology is not merely that of a deist, as is so often assumed [see notes IV.4,22,24], but is the rational framework for a theism that has rarely been appreciated by his in¬ terpreters. This misunderstanding is due in part to the fact that theologians and philosophers of religion often place Kant with those who argue 'that God is
therefore correct, but irrelevant, since this type of teleology is clearly distinguishable from that in systemj proper [cf. Wo70:135]. Figure IV.l expresses this distinction in pictorial form. 21. Cu82:64. Likewise, Goldmann [Go71:201] says Kant believes in '[a] transcendent superhuman God who has only practical and moral reality but who lacks independent moral existence...—a more unreal God could scarcely be imagined.' Such a comment is grossly unfair, however, since Kant never dogmatically proclaims that God has no such independent existence, but only warns that we can never hope to grasp it as an item of empirical knowledge [cf. note IV.9],
IV. Theistic Alternatives to Proving God's Existence
83
utterly unknowable', and that therefore 'theology is a useless effort'.22 The lat¬ ter conclusion does seem to follow naturally from the deistic assumption that God is utterly unknowable, an assumption Kant apparently adopts in his denial of our ability to intuit God or prove God's existence. This interpretation, how¬ ever, reflects a rather limited acquaintance with Kant's writings. Even in the Preface to Kt8 Kant says with no hint of irony that the philosopher and the theologian should see themselves not as rivals, out to destroy each other, but as co-workers, mutual friends, and companions [Kt8:7-10; cf. AV, below]. Kant defines theology as 'the system of our knowledge of the highest be¬ ing'; it 'does not refer to the sum total of all possible knowledge of God, but only to what human reason meets with in God' [Kt26:995(23); cf. Ktl:659]. The 'knowledge of everything in God', which Kant calls 'theologia archetype?, is unattainable for human beings, while 'that part of God which lies in human nature', the knowledge of which he calls 'theologia ectypa', is attainable.23 Within the latter he distinguishes between deism and theism: 'Those who accept only a transcendental theology [i.e., knowledge of God based on the theoretical standpoint] are called deists; those who also admit a natural theology [i.e., knowledge of God based on the practical or judicial standpoints] are called theists' [Ktl:659; s.a. 660-1; Kt26:1001(29-30)]. Kant therefore believes the dis¬ tinction between a theist and a deist concerns not only one's theoretical stand¬ point, but also one's particular (moral and judicial) experiences of the God such theories are intended to describe. Deists, then, are those who, after reflecting logically and/or transcendentally on the concept of God, come up with a posi¬ tive answer to the question of God's existence. Theists are open to these two perspectives, but regard them as only secondary to the more basic use of empir¬ ical and/or hypothetical perspectives in developing a theoretical affirmation of God. Only from the latter two perspectives can God be regarded not just as 'an original being or supreme cause' (as in deism), but also as 'a supreme being who through understanding and freedom is the Author of all things'. Thus, 22
- Ja84:l; cf. 42-3. For instance, Goldmann writes: 'Kant rejected all positive religion' [Go71:194]. Or, as Luik puts it in Lu83:345, 'there is quite literally no Kantian theology, no religious knowledge for Kant.' Luik makes this assertion in the process of rejecting Wiebe's claim that for Kant '"knowledge" of God can be had', though only if it is 'inferred' from 'moral data' [Wi80:531], Although Luik's position would be correct as a description of Kant's theoretical standpoint, it ignores the fact that for Kant the practical and judicial standpoints have primacy [see note 1.17]; for they can each produce (at least in a symbolic sense) a kind of knowledge of their own. Thus, when Kant claims 'all our knowledge of God is merely symbolic', he contrasts his own position with 'Deism', since the latter 'furnishes no knowledge [of God] whatsoever' [Kt7:353]. 23 - Kt26:995(23). In a 1796 essay Kant makes a similar distinction, between Plato's view of 'archetypes (ideas)' as intuitions that originate in 'the Divine understanding' but can be 'named directly' by human beings, and his own belief that 'our intuition of these divine ideas ... is distributed to us but indirectly, as the copies (ectypa)..." [Kt23:391(164-5)].
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Kant asserts 'that the deist believes in a God, the theist in a living God...' P-4 Kant demonstrates in numerous ways that he is, given the above definitions, a thoroughly theistic philosopher. Not the least of the reasons for regarding Kant as a theist is that, as we have seen, he replaces the deist's reliance on the theoretical standpoint with a theology firmly rooted in the practical standpoint. Thus he confesses [Ktl:856]: 'I inevitably believe in the existence of God..., and I am certain that nothing can shake this belief, since my moral principles would thereby be themselves overthrown, and I cannot disdain them without becoming abhorrent in my own eyes.' Ironically, the very criticism of the traditional theoretical arguments for God's existence on which Kant grounds his Critical theology, though it was designed to pave the way for a practical theism, is (as illustrated in Appendix IV) often the basis on which Kant is misinterpreted as being himself a deist! Kant is indeed acutely aware of the problems posed to theological knowl¬ edge by human ignorance: 'Both in theology and in religion, but particularly in theology, we are handicapped by ignorance' [Kt35:(85)]. Sometimes even when we think we have knowledge, Kant tells us, we actually have 'no concept at all' of God [Kt26:996(24)]. As Wood points out, however, this does not make him a deist [Wo70:155,164], for he means by this that 'our concept of God is an idea of reason' [Wo78:79], rather than a concept that arises out of abstraction from appearances. Thus, 'the "minimum" theology it is necessary to have is a belief that God is at least possible' [Wo70:31]. Kant holds that 'we cannot intuit God, but can only believe in him' [Kt35:(99)] and that 'in order to believe in God it is not necessary to know for certain that God exists' [(81)]. He believes the ideas of 'God, freedom, and the immortality of the soul are the problems to whose solution, as their ultimate goal, all the laborious prepara¬ tions of metaphysics are directed' [Kt7:473]. His System, moreover, is intend¬ ed to solve these problems once and for all by developing a theistic philosophy that rejects the false foundations offered by theoretical reason. Hence, in a choice between atheism, deism, anthropomorphism, and theism, Kant unequiv¬ ocally favors theism.25 24. Ktl:660-l. That Kant's own position is theistic is demonstrated in AIV.4. A former student of mine, Patrick Woo Pak Chuen, once pointed out in this connection that part of Kant's reason for regarding the physicotheological argument as superior to the ontological and cosmological arguments is that only the former, with its concept of God as the 'author' or 'architect' of the world, requires God to be alive. This astute observation suggests how wrong Vossenkuhl is to say [Vo88:180]: 'Kant argues as a deist. He does not believe in a personal God who revealed himself to mankind through the scriptures.' Kant's belief in a personal God will be discussed in XII.2, and his belief in revelation, in VIII.3.A. 25. See V.3 (especially Figure V.2) for a further discussion of this distinction. It should be noted, however, that Kant reveals his dissatisfaction with the theoretical implications philosophers often
IV. Theistic Alternatives to Proving God's Existence
85
Because Kant's theology guards against what might be called 'gnostic' errors (such as anthropomorphism) into which dogmatic theologians and philosophers of religion repeatedly fall, he is branded an agnostic. And because his theology likewise takes seriously the objections advanced by the atheist, he is branded a deist. Yet a perspectival interpretation reveals that his response to the problem of transcendental theology is that of neither a deist nor an agnostic, but a theist in a quite profound sense of the word. Ironically, the same scholars who label Kant as a deist or an agnostic sometimes call themselves theists because of their affirmative response to the traditional arguments of speculative theology. Yet for Kant this is not sufficient: no one can claim to be a theist merely on the strength of logical ingenuity, for theism depends on a belief in a God who is manifested as 'a living God' in our immediate experience, whereas the ontological and cosmological arguments portray God 'wholly separate from any experience' [Kt26:1001(30)]. If anyone is a deist, then, it is not Kant, who believes in a God whose existence and true nature are purposefully hidden from us, who leaves us with only enough evidence to make a reasoned step of faith, after which we are able to understand God's nature with sufficient clarity, though only in terms of our finite human perspectives [see V.l-4]; rather it is those who put all their trust in the powers of theoretical reason and toil endlessly and in vain to attain knowledge that is not to be had by us mortals. The religious implications of Kant's theism are not always entirely consistent with orthodox Christianity, as we shall see in Part Three, yet they are also not as inconsistent as is often assumed.26 For, although it is couched in the difficult terminology of a highly complex philosophical System, Kant's theism is not significantly different (in its general intent, at least) from the theism expressed by the writer of 2 Cor. 4:7 when he proclaims that 'the transcendent power [fj vxepfioXri i^g Swa^ecog] belongs to God and not to us'.
impute to theism, by warning in Kt7:395 that even theism 'is absolutely incapable of authorizing us to make any objective assertion.' Along these lines, Paulsen provides a glimpse of the quasimystical side of Kant—a side that will come into full view in Part Four—when he says [Pa02:261]: 'Kant takes sides with theism, or at least with a form of theism that diverges decidedly from anthropomorphism, and approximates to pantheism.' Carus, for instance, claims Kant's philosophy, carrying 'the eggshells of agnosticism on its back' [Ca02:238], leaves the question of God and religion 'in the state in which he had found it', thus 'leaving the problem unsolved' [240]. The present study (especially Part Three) can be regarded as an extended attempt to demonstrate how thoroughly mistaken such an assessment is.
Chapter V Symbolic Theology and the Nature of God ... our knowledge is only a shadow in comparison with the greatness of God, and our powers are far transcended by him. [Ktl8:26]
1. God's Transcendence: Human Reason vs. Divine 'Reason' Kant's view of God's nature is, to a large extent, patterned after his view of human nature. Virtually everything he says about the former has a correlate of one sort or another in the latter. Some interpreters have regarded this fact as evidence that Kant's God is nothing more than a mental construct, a 'philo¬ sophical fiction' that is not meant to have any real existence—a view I refute in AIV.4. Such a position fails to recognize that the correspondence between Kant's views of human and divine nature follows directly from his view that '[h]uman reason is by nature architectonic' [Ktl:502]: everything we think about is inevitably influenced by the same patterning structures that are inextricably embedded in the mind. The correspondences must not be taken to imply that God is nothing but a projection of human nature, any more than the correspondence between the impressions of our senses and the external objects affecting those senses can be properly taken as evidence that the latter are mere projections constructed out of the former [see KSPl:VI.l-4]. From the theoretical standpoint, human nature is characterized primarily by the dual powers of sensible intuition and conceptual understanding, the two 'stems' that come together to form empirical knowledge.1 Since our theoretical standpoint is wholly incapable of conveying, on its own, the least bit of empirical knowledge about God, we should not be surprised that one of Kant's few definite theoretical statements about God's nature is that we must regard God's reasoning capacity as being characterized by exactly the opposite powers. That is, instead of having an understanding that processes concepts, God must be described, quite paradoxically, as having an intuitive understanding [see e.g., Ktl:145]; and instead of having an intuition governed by sensibility, God must be regarded as having the equally paradoxical power of intellectual intuition. Although Kant sometimes calls these powers 'rational' and regards God as the very source of reason itself, all such language is meta¬ phorical, for terms such as 'reason', as Kant points out in Kt26:1053(87) are Ktl:29; s.a. KSP1:VII.2. Walsh [Wa90:49] makes the interesting suggestion that when Kant says these two stems 'perhaps spring from a common, but to us unknown, root', he may be thinking of the divine intellect (see below). Since we have no literal knowledge of the latter, however, Kant is very careful never to claim such an order of connection. Rather, everything we 'know' about God's nature is only derivable by comparison with human nature.
V. Symbolic Theology and the Nature of God 'beneath the dignity of the divine nature.' Mindful of this point (to be expanded in V.2), let us look more closely at these two aspects of divine 'reason'. Intuitive understanding is the power 'in which through self-consciousness all the manifold would eo ipso be given' [Ktl:135]. Rather than having to intuit an object, form a concept on the basis of such intuitions, and synthesize the two in a judgment, an intuitive understanding would be able to create a real object in the very act of thinking about it. As Paton suggests, there would therefore be in the divine understanding 'no difference between thought and action, since its thinking would be essentially creative of reality' [Pa67:101; cf. Ktl:138-9]. In the words of Davidovich [Da93b:130], 'what it decides becomes reality.' Likewise, there would be no difference between intuition and conception, since '[a]n intuitive understanding... would intuit the whole as such' [En29:188], with its intuition being 'at the same time the creation of the object intuited' [A185:27; s.a. Kt7:407-10]. Such an attribution entails that God's theoretical nature is ultimately inscrutable to us, for although we can form a logically possible concept of an 'intuitive understanding', we cannot comprehend its real possibility. Thus, Kant says 'we cannot form the least conception of any other possible understanding [than our own], either of such as is itself intuitive or of any that may possess an underlying mode of sensible intuition which is differ¬ ent in kind from that in space and time.'2 Accordingly, he never attempts to develop this view in detail, since it is really just his way of insuring that we must conceive of God as not being limited by the same conditions of sensible intuition to which human reason is bound. To grasp the full meaning of the paradoxical term 'intuitive understanding' —i.e., to know what it refers to—would require us to possess the power Kant calls 'intellectual intuition'. The latter refers to an intuition rooted not in the transcendental object, represented to us in the form of appearances (as is the case with ordinary human knowing [see KSP1:VI.2 and VII.2.A]), but in a purely intelligible thing that cannot be represented at all as a sensible object. Kant insists that God 'can never be an object of intuition to us' [Ktl:71]; for 'such intellectual intuition seems to belong solely to the primordial being, and can never be ascribed to a dependent being' [72]. To do,so, it would have to 2. Ktl:139; s.a. Kt69:267; Go89:163-4. As Paulsen suggests in PaO2:151-2, mathematics is the closest thing we have to God's way of knowing: '[God] determines reality by his thought.... In mathematics, the human understanding also by its own self-activity creates the objects of its knowledge; hence... there is no unknowable element left over, no distinction between appearance and thing-in-itself.... The divine intellect... bears the same relation to things that the human does to geometrical triangles and circles.' This is one of the reasons I believe geometrical figures are so useful in clarifying reason's architectonic structure: they provide human reason with the closest possible access to the kind of 'reason' employed by the ultimate 'architect' [cf. note IV.24].
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'give us the existence of its object' in the act of intuition itself [72]—a charac¬ teristic of the object that for human subjects is always provided by the givenness of the unknowable thing in itself (or the undetermined transcendental object). An intellectual intuition of, for instance, one's own self, would provide immediate knowledge of the self, rather than merely sensations of the state of one's self as an appearance in space and time [158-9; cf. 309]. One of the implications of this theory is that we must regard God as being outside the limits of space and time. When Kant says that 'in God no temporal sequence is thinkable' [Kt8:50n(45n)], he is not trying to place limits on God, but is merely accentuating the fact that, when human beings form the concept of God, we must do so by negating the limits of our own rational capacity. By setting up space and time as transcendental conditions for all human knowl¬ edge, the Aesthetic section of Ktl, as Paulsen puts it [Pa02:160], protects 'the conceivability of the objects of theology and pneumatology against the demand for their constructability in space and time.' (Paulsen's reference to 'pneuma¬ tology' accurately reflects the deep concern Kant had with spirits [see II. 1-4] and rightly suggests that his development of a Critical theology will parallel his treatment of that issue in Ktl8.) This is why, as we shall see in V.2, all our language about God must be regarded as symbolic. Another implication is that God must experience truth in a way that is rad¬ ically different from the way we come to know truth. As Hart suggests [Ha90b: 241]: 'Things are not true [for God] because the divine mind corresponds to them, but they are true because they are generated products of the divine mind.' In attempting to explain the epistemological status of divine knowing, Hart advances the following view: 'For Kant's God, the knowledge of the world cannot be a posteriori, because this would tie the divine to sensibility' [245]. Likewise, God's knowledge cannot be merely logical (analytic a priori). "Thus presumably for Kant's God there is no distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori.' But this amounts to little more than giving up any attempt to classify. In one sense, this may be the wisest approach. An option Hart does not consider, however, is that divine knowing could have an analytic a posteri¬ ori status. In that case, we could regard our own access to the analytic a posteriori—e.g., the power of language in general and naming in particular [see Pa87d], as well as the power of moral insight [KSP1:IV.3]—as an 'image' or 'spark' of God's creative intellect in us. We would need intellectual intuition to have knowledge of a positive noumenon[Ktl:307];butas we saw in KSP1:VI.3, Kant regards this as impossible for us: 'such a type of intuition, intellectual intuition, forms no part whatsoever of our faculty of knowledge' [Ktl:308]. This does not mean that Kant regards
V. Symbolic Theology and the Nature of God such intuition as wholly impossible for humans, as is generally assumed. For the mistake Kant is warning against is not believing we possess something like intellectual intuition, but interpreting that mysterious human power as a function of the theoretical standpoint. Thus, Kant's description of the human will reveals that the true form of this power is manifested only from the practical standpoint: 'The faculty of desire is the faculty such a [living] being has of causing, through its ideas, the reality of the objects of these ideas' [Kt4:9n]. Based on this definition, so similar as it is to that of intellectual intuition, Kant proceeds to replace the illegitimate theoretical power of intellectual intuition with the legitimate practical power of human freedom, which he believes can adequately fulfill all the functions often wrongly attributed to the former.3 Intellectual intuition really amounts to the same thing as intuitive under¬ standing, only viewed from different perspectives: both refer to 'an understand¬ ing which should know its object, not discursively through the categories [nor intuitively through space and time], but intuitively in a non-sensible intuition' [Ktl:311-2]. Viewed from the logical perspective, it is called 'intuitive under¬ standing' ; viewed from the transcendental perspective, it is called 'intellectual intuition'. In both cases Kant presents such descriptions of God as nothing more than a regulative hypothesis suggesting how we might conceive of a being whose nature transcends our own and of which 'we cannot in the least represent to ourselves the [real] possibility' [311]—a being whose faculties of intuition and conception are not distinct, mutually-restrictive faculties, but are combined in a single faculty that creates whatever it thinks and thinks whatever it creates.4 Kant describes God along these lines as early as Ktl 1:219: 'God does not require the process of reasoning because, since all things are crystal clear to his gaze, one act of representation puts before his intelligence which things are identical and which are not, and he has no need of analysis as the darkened night of our intelligence necessarily has.' 3. One of the leading contemporary Chinese interpreters of Kant, Mou Tsung-san, uses Kant's rejection of intellectual intuition as one of the key points in his attempt to demonstrate how the Confucian philosophical tradition can complement and complete the inadequacies of the Western (i.e., Kantian) philosophical tradition. He claims Kant was wrong to reject intellectual intuition, and takes Confucius' concept of 'li' (a rational principle of insight into proper action) as proof enough that intellectual intuition is a real human power. Though Mou's views have generated quite a following in Chinese circles, they are based on an unfortunate misreading of Kant's theory. For not only does Confucius never defend what Kant means by 'intellectual intuition' (i.e., a way of gaining theoretical knowledge merely by thinking), but Kant's own theory of practical reason and its freedom of volition serve virtually the same function as Confucius' 'li'. Confucius and Kant are closer than Mou wishes to admit, a fact that does not bode well for his overall project of showing the superiority of Confucius over Kant. For a fuller discussion of Mou's view of Kant, see Pa95a. 4- Along these lines Hicks says God's intellectual intuition has 'no separation of perception and conception' [Hi74:383]; it is 'an absolute subjective spontaneity of intellect, indeterminate in itself and the source of all determination.' S.a. Kr56:81-3.
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Some commentators regard this theory of intuitive understanding, or intel¬ lectual intuition, as 'Kant's conception of God in its profoundest form' [Gr34: xlix; s.a. Hi74:383]. But it actually just skims the surface of his theology. For Kant himself regarded this basic attribute, the radical transcendence of God's nature, not as the culmination of all theological knowledge, but as its starting point: it creates the primary theoretical problem for theology—our ignorance of God's existence [see IV.1]—a problem to be solved only gradually as Kant weaves his theological guiding-thread through his entire System. A related question is: how are we to carry on any theological pursuits if God's nature is fundamentally paradoxical? The bulk of this chapter will be devoted to expounding Kant's answer to this question, and in so doing, the theoretical depths of his rich concept of God will begin to unfold before our eyes. 2. Philosophical Theology and the Symbolic Immanence of God Kant limits the scope of his theological reflection to 'philosophical' or 'rational' as opposed to 'revealed' theology. He never denies the legitimacy of the latter, but regards it as lying outside the boundaries of the Critical philoso¬ pher's proper field of inquiry.5 The former, by contrast, is intimately connected with each major division of Kant's System. Rational theology is a philosophical investigation of how extensively we can see God manifested logically in sys¬ tem^ hypothetically in systemp, and empirically in system^ We must be care¬ ful, therefore, not to treat Kant's theological conclusions as if they apply equally to revealed as to rational theology. To do so would be to commit a category mistake, for it would require us to neglect Kant's careful distinction between the Perspectives of the philosophical theologian and the biblical theologian.6 Clearly, Kant saw philosophy and theology as complementary pursuits, with the former preparing the way for the latter. But what about the relationship between these disciplines and religion? Religion on its own, Kant holds, 'stands in no need of any speculative study of God' [Kt35:(82)]: 'Speculation concerning God ... does not appertain to the sphere of religion, for religion must be practical. Theology, indeed, can contain speculative elements, but to 5. Cf. Figs. VI.2 and VIII. 1. We shall examine the philosophical basis for believing in a given body of revealed Scripture in VIH.3.A. Here we should note that the faith needed to justify one's initial acceptance of a given canon as God's unique revelation is in certain respects comparable to the faith in the thing in itself that is needed to enter Kant's theoretical system [see KSPl:V.l-4]. 6. Cf. VIII. 1 and IX. 1, below, and KSP1:II.4. Ultimately, Kant wants his philosophy of religion to be universally applicable, so he tends to avoid taking a stand on theological doctrines and positions that are specific to one tradition. The value of much of his Critical theology cannot be properly assessed unless this is kept constantly in mind. Yet when it comes to his appraisal of overall religious traditions, as we shall see in Chapter VIII, Kant leaves no doubt that he believes Christianity to be superior to other religious faiths.
V. Symbolic Theology and the Nature of God religion these must remain foreign' [(93)]. (Kant's 'criterion', incidentally, for judging 'whether a particular question is religious or speculative' is: 'if, what¬ ever the answer, it will make no difference to our actions, the question is not religious but speculative' [(93-4)].) The proper task of theology is 'a practical one' [Kt26:996(24)]: 'it should not make us more learned, but better, wiser, and more upright.' For the only reason it has any 'speculative interest' at all is 'that our reason always needs a highest in order to measure and determine the less high according to it.' When it is properly pursued, therefore, theology be¬ comes 'a motive for ethics'—although this does not mean 'the principle of ethical determination [i.e., the moral law] is theological', for 'it cannot be that' [Kt35:(39)]. 'We need theology', Kant concludes, 'solely on behalf of religion, that is to say, our practical or, in other words, moral standpoint, and need it as a subjective requirement' [Kt7:482]. So theology for Kant depends on philoso¬ phy for its theoretical justification and on religion for its practical justification.7 This view of the relationship between philosophy, theology, and religion does not serve as a constitutive element for any of the systems in Kant's Critical philosophy. Nevertheless, understanding his general assumptions on these matters will help us comprehend the religious and theological implications he believes ought to be drawn from his System. Thus our main focus here in Part Two is on the philosophical or 'speculative' (i.e., theoretical) foundation for theological reflection laid by Kant's System. Despite his negative assess¬ ment of the traditional arguments for God's existence [see IV.l and AIV.l], we saw in IV.2-3 that his overall aim is positive: to provide reasons for believing without establishing any knowledge of God's existence. The proposition 'there is a God', Kant tells us at the very outset of his ear¬ liest excursion into theology, is 'the most important of all our cognitions' [Ktl5:65(219)]. He goes on to explain that 'the natural human understanding' does not depend in any way on metaphysical arguments for its 'insights' into God, but instead 'conduces] us directly to the true and useful, so far as we stand in the utmost need of them.' This respect for the common understanding over against the 'false art' of philosophical speculation is an attitude that re¬ mained with Kant throughout his life,8 though this continuity is often over'• See VI. 1. Since theology therefore forms a link between philosophy and religion, it is not surprising that those who think Kant has no positive theology also tend to misunderstand the relationship between his philosophy and his views on religion. But as Despland says in De73:339, 'it is not wise to divorce Kant's philosophy from his religion, as many of the neo-Kantians did.' This is true not only because doing so wreaks havoc with Kant's view of religion, but also because it makes it impossible to appreciate how religious experience, as we shall see in Part Four, forms the consummation of Kant's entire System of Perspectives. o. See e.g., Ktl:859. In comparing Kant's theology in Ktl with that in his early works, Schmucker argues in Sc72:495-50O 'that the fundamental theses of Kant's specific critique of transcendental
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looked by those who limit their attention to his more mature criticism of rational theology. Such neglect inevitably results in a misunderstanding of Kant's reasons for taking such an apparently negative theological stance. Kant found it necessary, before he could say anything affirmative about our theoretical understanding of God, to destroy once and for all what he re¬ garded as dangerously misleading illusions about how far human beings can go in establishing conclusions about God's existence. If God is to remain God (i.e., if our idea of God is to be appropriate and meaningful), we must regard the question of God's existence, at least when viewed from a theoretical standpoint, as essentially a transcendent uncertainty. To bring our concept of God down to the level of potentially conclusive theoretical arguments is to reduce God to an object of categorial thought, to regard God as an appearance among other appearances, and in the long run, as a potential object of scientific observation. Kant's belief in a legitimate regulative use of the concept of God as an idea of reason [see IV.2] takes the place of past philosophers' tendency to portray this concept as a potentially constitutive item of theoretical knowledge. This regulative use of the idea of God sets the stage for what Kant regards as the only legitimate way of understanding God's immanence? for it requires our language about God always to be interpreted symbolically. A 'symbol', Kant explains, expresses a concept 'without employing a direct intuition for the purpose, but only drawing upon an analogy with one'.10 Such symbolic theology go back partly even to... 1755, partly at least to [the mid-1760s]... and therefore must be considered, in their substance, as ... independent of the principles of Transcendental Analytic and Aesthetic' Treash gives a good explanation in Tr79:23-7 of the similarities and differences be¬ tween the theological positions Kant defends in Ktl5 and in Ktl. He concludes that, 'although [Ktl5's] positive conception of God as the ground of all possibility is preserved [in Ktl], the dogmatic [i.e., ontological, as opposed to transcendental] foundation upon which that conclusion rests is rejected.' The details of Kant's 'possibility proof are discussed in AIV.l. Although it is proper to see a fundamental consistency in Kant's religious and theological outlook throughout most of his writings (a consistency I assume throughout this volume), this must not be taken as a reason for regarding such views as essentially unrelated to the rest of his philosophical System. On the contrary, as the present study demonstrates, Kant constructed his System partly in order to provide a philosophical structure for clarifying and defending those very (lifelong) beliefs. 9. Greene claims in Gr34:lxvi-lxvii that, throughout 'the productive years of his life' (i.e., prior to working on Kt9), Kant 'had always looked upon the idea of divine immanence with profound dis¬ trust.' This can hardly be substantiated by a careful look at the evidence [see X.2-3]. That Kant was critical of casual claims to have experienced God is indisputable; but this does not mean he saw no use whatsoever for the notion of an immanent God. If my interpretation in this chapter is correct, then Kant's tendency in Kt9 to acknowledge 'only a God in me, around me, over me' [21.145] need not be regarded as a radical reversal or a surprising change of mind, so much as an attempt to make explicit what was implicit in his System from the beginning. 10. Kt7:352. Morrison rightly points out [Mo94:108] that Kant's symbolic interpretation of Christian doctrines and practices in Kt8 can be regarded as 'a precursor of Paul Tillich's method of theological symbolization.' McCarthy also recognizes the importance of symbols for Kant [Mc82: 198], especially when interpreting the Bible [200]; but his worry that Kant's 'agnostic drift' at
V. Symbolic Theology and the Nature of God
93
analogies can provide, as he notes in Kt2:358n, 'a notion of the relation of things which absolutely are unknown to me.' To illustrate this, Kant cites the 'perfect similarity' between God's love for humanity and the love of parents for their children [358; s.a. Lo81:305]. As Gulick [Gu94:106] puts it, 'we crave sensible representations for each Idea, such as the Idea of God.' The idea's transcendent nature demands that we regard such representations as 'symbols related to the Idea through analogy.... The symbol represents what the Idea is for us, not what it is in itself.' Calling such representations 'regulative' does not decrease their value, but heightens it; for '[i]deas ... guide our life. They organize our thought' [106-7]. In Kt8:65n(58n) Kant treats the use of analogy in symbolic language as a form of schematism: 'we must always resort to some analogy to natural existences to render supersensible qualities intelligible to ourselves.... Such is the schematism of analogy, with which (as a means of explanation) we cannot dispense.'11 In Kt69: 279-80 he compares 'schematism', requiring a direct con¬ nection between intuition and concept, with 'symbolization', requiring an indirect connection. He says, 'although I can have no properly theoretical cognition of the nonsensible, e.g. God, I can have knowledge by analogy and, to be sure, knowledge that it is necessary for reason to think.' That the latter might refer to the categories is suggested by Ess and Gulick when they call the categories 'analogical equivocals' [Es94:94]. Likewise, Kt4 and Kt7 are tied together by 'the notion of beauty as an analogical symbol of the good'. times 'seems ready to dissolve God into a symbol' [Mc86:217] is unfounded, once we recognize that Kant does not intend his theological symbols to 'dissolve' anything (except perhaps religious illusions), but to empower practical reason by showing it's genuine symbolic home in religion. Along these lines, Galbraith applies Jaspers' term, 'ciphers of transcendence' [Ga96:7], to Kant's practice of 'referring] to God only in ways which do not bring God down to the human level' In defense of the analogous or metaphorical character of such attempts to speak about God, Copleston says, in a thoroughly Kantian tone, that a 'recognition of the fact that in being used to refer to and speak of God our language undergoes strains and stresses can serve to remind us that it is God of whom we are speaking, a God whom we can represent with the aid of analogies but who cannot be taken by storm and imprisoned within the web of our concepts' [Co74:66]. 11. S.a. Ktl:222-4,692-4,725-9; Kt2:357-6O; Ktl8:339; AA18:439,503; Co67:186n. In Es94:93 Ess and Gulick list eight past treatments of Kant's understanding of analogy. They argue [91] 'that Kant artfully used the notion of analogy to avoid inconsistency both in speaking about things in themselves and the transcendental Idea of God.' This is possible because the use of analogy is essentially perspectival: it involves 'a complex sort of meaning which allows the same term to function in different ways when referring to different domains of entities.' Later [94] they add: 'One must use analogy to interpret events at one level in terms appropriate to another level.' Pelegrinis discusses the 'logic of analogy' in relation to both Kant and Wittgenstein [Pe80: 151-60]. Although his interest is not in Kant's theology, but in the analogical character of the categorical imperative, his view helps explain how we can use theological analogies even though we are unable to prove God's existence. In Pe80:162 he says 'in using an analogy in philosophy what we are required to do is not to give information or proof of the existence of something to which we apply the analogy, but to give the rule or rules in accordance with which we use the term to which we apply the analogy.'
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'
As applied to our idea of God, Kant's view [Es94:96] is that
?
we think of the object of the theological idea... as an analogon of a real thing... Kant implies that we think in the Idea only the relation (Verhdltnis) between God and appearances, as analogous to the relation (Verhdltnis) between cause and effect ... Analogy used in this way... [is] a qualitative equality between relations...
Ess and Gulick continue [97]: using 'analogy in the form of a proportion ... allows for predicating the categories of objects of the transcendental Ideas without thereby violating Kant's original restriction of the categories to objects presented in sensible intuition.' For here 'we are encouraged to think and act as if God exists.' A genuine misuse of the categories would conclude that we know God exists. This 'focus on relation in analogy makes analogy ... crucial to the architectonic intentions and unity of the Kantian system.' What this boils down to is that the talk of analogy is one manifestation of Kant's principle of perspective. As usual in Kant-studies, 'the interpreters' allegations of inconsis¬ tency ... stem from a collective failure to recognize Kant's use of analogy and analogical proportion' [98]—or at least, to recognize it as an application of the principle of perspective. Kant's most positive contribution to rational theology thus consists, as we shall see in the remainder of this chapter, in his construction of various rational, analogical models for God's nature. Concerning these Kant reminds us that all our knowledge of God is merely symbolic; and one who takes it, with the prop¬ erties of understanding, will, and so forth, which only evidence their objective real¬ ity in beings of this world, to be schematic, falls into anthropomorphism, just as, if he abandons every intuitive element, he falls into Deism which furnishes no knowledge whatsoever—not even from a practical standpoint. [Kt7:353]
His theistic alternative is that 'a knowledge of God and His existence, that is to say a theology, is possible by means of attributes and determinations of this causality merely conceived in Him according to analogy, and this knowledge has all requisite reality from a practical standpoint' [484-5; cf. Ktl7:297(282)]. By 1766 Kant already believed 'it is incumbent upon man to judge of the divine will only from the harmony which he actually perceives in the world, or which, by the rule of analogy, according to the order of nature, he may sup¬ pose to be in it' [Ktl8:337(67)]. Two years earlier Kant had claimed in Ktl7:297(282): 'In all cases where an analogy to contingency is not present, metaphysical knowledge of God can be very certain.' As examples he cites God's relation to space and time: 'God is... in no place, but He is present to all things in all places where they are. Similarly,... with respect to Him nothing is future or past.' Kant warns, however, that our judgments regarding God's ways, i.e., God's actions towards us human beings, 'can have either certainty
V. Symbolic Theology and the Nature dfGod only by approximation or certainty which is moral.' ' ; •= r Kant's special brand of theism can be called a 'symbolic-regulative anthro¬ pomorphism', in contrast to the usual, 'dogmatic-constitutive anthropomor¬ phism' of conventional theism.12 Although the former should always point to some practical (moral) meaning, Kant admits: 'Anthropomorphism ... in the theoretical representation of God and His being ... [is] harmless enough (as long as it does not influence concepts of duty)' [Kt8:168(156)]. Here, as Despland points out, 'Kant's dissent from deism' is especially apparent [De73: 151]: his 'radical discovery of man as a symbol-using animal' marks 'a major breakthrough in philosophy of religion' [155], for symbols serve as the 'unifying concept' of the various aspects of his philosophy of religion [260; s.a. 150-1]—a view we will have occasion to elaborate and confirm time and again throughout the remainder of this book [s.e. Part Three]. Thus, even though religious symbols must always have a moral element for Kant, Loades is quite right to say Kant's 'symbolic anthropomorphism... was expressed in terms... of hope' [Lo81:307]. Many theologians think of Kant's theology first and foremost, if not exclusively, in terms of his criticism of the three traditional arguments for the existence of God. Since his arguments are relatively clear and have been thor¬ oughly described by all too many scholars, my detailed account of Kant's posi¬ tion is relegated to AIV.l, where his claims are shown in each case to be based on perspectival reasoning. Downplaying this most famous aspect of his doctrine of God allows us to highlight the less known, but for Kant far more elemental, aspects of his position. Chapter IVs scrutiny of Kant's reasons for affirming the existence of a living God prepared the way for our initial look at the nature of God's mysterious 'reasoning' power in V.I. Our recognition here in V.2 of the thoroughly symbolic nature of philosophical theology has now prepared the way for a more detailed account of the architectonic structure of Kant's conception of God's attributes. Only by attending in this way to his thoroughly systematic treatment of the concept of God can the richness and depth of Kant's symbolic theology be adequately evinced.
12. Co67:120; cf. Fig. V.2, below; s.a. Ktl:668-9,725,728; Kt2:356-60; AA18:439,503; Kt26:1089 (128-9). Collins elaborates [Co67:120-1]: 'Even though we cannot directly apprehend God in His own nature, we can still study the relational presence of God in man's moral life and the experienced world.... Kant asks us to acknowledge symbolic anthropomorphism, not as our dire fate but as the fitting expression of our human situation in reality, whenever we engage in the search for God.' As such, 'anthropomorphism' describes 'how man carries on his ordinary reflections concerning God and achieves practical relationships with Him.' Collins adds [125]: 'The Kantian way of analogy is ... a distinctive religious searching out of the order of nature and human experience for the meanings which manifest God's free, purposive mind and personal agency.'
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3. Reason's Theological Need: Architectonic Perspectives on the Perspectiveless Ground of Being Why should we even bother forming the concept of God, if in the end we have to admit that our conceptions are merely symbolic? The key to answering this question lies in what Kant calls the 'need of reason' [see note IV.5]. As we saw in IV.2, we must hypothetically posit 'a self-subsistent, original, creative reason' as the 'single, highest and all-sufficient ground' of 'the sum of all appearances', because we need some such creative and unifying force to 'guide our reason's empirical perspective in securing its greatest possible extension' [Ktl:700-l, alt.]. This need is not a mere psychological weakness, but a logical force compelling us to establish architectonic connections between the other¬ wise chaotic aggregate of our empirical knowledge. In order to reach the point of highest unity, reason needs to exhibit a self-creative power, and it does this by imposing predetermined logical patterns onto the raw material presented to it. Reason's need is further intensified in systemp, where it must postulate God and immortality in order to explain how the highest good is possible. And as Michalson tantalizingly suggests, the 'need of reason' is ultimately 'an aesthetic ... ideal' [Mi79:180]. By this he means reason's greatest need is to see human life as ultimately meaningful.13 The fact that each of Kant's Critical standpoints directs us to a need of reason suggests that an essential task of Kantian critique may be the discovery of what reason does and does not need. Kant hints at this as early as 1766, when he distinguishes in Ktl8:369(115) between the scientist (the voice of knowledge by means of understanding) who exclaims 'How many things there are which I do not understand!' and the philosopher (the voice of wisdom by means of reason) who exclaims 'How many things there are which I do not need!' Along these lines, Despland aptly conveys this essential characteristic of 13. See Mi79:162. Kuehn likewise observes that Kant calls something a 'need of reason' in order to establish that it 'can be meaningful even if it is impossible to point to anything in experience which corresponds to it' [Ku85:166]—though Kuehn unfortunately thinks such needs are purely conceptual in nature. For further comments on his interpretation, see note IV.15. The grounding of reason in the judicial standpoint is also suggested by Kant's practice of calling reason an 'organ' [e.g., Ktl:xxxvi]. Organisms, phenomena that exhibit a natural purpose and a self-creative power, are one of the main topics of Kt7 [see KSP1:IX.3.A]. This confirms Despland's point [De73:65], that the needs of reason are not 'psychological incentives' that 'may be needed by weak and pathologically affected men; [they are] part and parcel of the moral condition of responsible men.' Thus Kant calls the practical postulates 'an absolutely necessary need' [Kt4:143]. As we shall see in Part Three, the need of reason that provides ultimate meaning for the judicial standpoint (and so corresponds to the three regulative ideas hypothesized by the theoretical standpoint and the two postulates posited by the practical standpoint) is for an historical faith to fill in the gaps left by a purely rational religion. Accordingly, Kant explicitly states in Kt65:9 [s.a. Kt8:192(180)] that 'revelation is useful in making up the theoretical deficiency which our pure rational belief admits it has ... and helps ... to satisfy a rational need.'
V. Symbolic Theology and the Nature of God Kantian reason when, in commenting on Kt20, he says [De73:35]: 'Reasons themselves are in conflict with each other. Reason is not science. It is a need. It is lack of knowledge passionately fighting for knowledge. (The traditional opposition faith-reason is undercut.)' In light of our discussion in KSPl:V.l-4 of the role of faith in justifying the transcendent starting-point of Kant's entire System, we can take this one step further and say that for Kant reason's highest need (and thus in a sense, reason itself) is faith!14 As demonstrated in KSP1:IV.3, both the hypothetical perspective and the practical standpoint (when viewed theoretically) are best described as having the status of analytic a posteriori belief. In AIV.l, below, the same status is accorded to Kant's so-called 'possibility proof, which as we shall see, forms the basis for Kant's conception of God's nature. To this we can now add that when Kant appeals to reason's need(s) he is also using a form of argument that is both analytic and yet a posteriori. It is analytic because it arises through a purely logical process of reasoning; it is a posteriori because it directs us, as we shall see, to something intimately bound up with our immediate experience— though not in such a way as to produce knowledge, as in synthetic forms of a posteriority. Kant's failure to provide us with a technical term that accurately conveys this paradoxical status may be largely responsible for the tendency interpreters have had to regard his refutations of the traditional arguments as implying that his rational theology is entirely negative and 'deistic', empty of anything that would offer support to a living faith. This groundless charge is refuted in AIV.4. The remainder of this chapter will further confirm the conclusions drawn there: we shall ponder several of Kant's positive suggestions as to how human beings can and do conceive of God's nature, even though God's existence is in and of itself unknowable. This section will focus mainly on God's theoretical attributes and how they relate to certain basic theological types. This will prepare us to look more closely in V.4 at God's moral nature. England [En29:183] claims that 'Kant did not so much as make the attempt 14. I regard this as the essence of Kant's contribution to the age-old theological controversy over the relationship between faith and reason. In Wo70:251-4 Wood says Kant's contribution to this perennial debate was to forge a middle path between the speculative and 'irrationalist' approaches. He assesses Kant's philosophy as being truly compatible 'with the genuine and valid conception of man's condition which biblical faith contains' [252]. Wood concludes [254] that 'critical selfknowledge reveals not only that faith and reason are compatible with each other, but that for a being both finite and rational, faith and reason require each other.' As Kant himself puts it in Kt8: 10(9), 'a religion which rashly declares war on reason will not be able to hold out in the long run against it.' This is precisely because genuine faith is ultimately one with reason! Akhutin [Ak91: 74] affirms that 'faith makes reason itself reasonable, and believing reason gives meaning to, and makes rational and whole, all of a person's life.' Through faith, reason 'restores its chastity.'
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to fashion an adequate conception of the intelligent originator of nature.' Likewise, Odero [Od91:267] reads Kant as saying 'we do not know what God is.' Yet, as we have seen and shall see, Kant has plenty to offer to the theologian in the way of tools to cope with the realities of human ignorance. Once we believe that God exists, architectonic reason gives us clear guidelines as to how our concept of God is to be formed [see e.g., Es94:90-l]. These Kant presents in the form of symbolic models of God's nature which, far from being entirely negative and empty, offer a balanced and realistic way of responding to some long-standing theological issues.15 These models, though rarely appreciated by commentators—perhaps because of their dependence on architectonic patterns—constitute an important aspect of Kant's systematic understanding of our theoretical conception of God's nature. Together with Kant's 'symbolic understanding of Christian materials' in Kt8, they enable Kant 'to make a genuine advance beyond the deists' [Mc86:69; s.a. AIV.4]. Kant's dissatisfaction with traditional models of God's nature is evident in Kt7:392-5, where he criticizes the four ways of systematically explaining the existence of finality in nature. As usual, he categorizes the possibilities in terms of a 2LAR: philosophers posit either 'a living God' (theism), 'a lifeless matter' theism (++) (God, living)
hylozoism (-+) (matter, living) .
materialism (--) (matter, lifeless)
/ deism (+-) (God, lifeless)
Figure V.I: Possible Sources of Physical Ends 15. Hicks' assessment, that Kant's architectonic descriptions of God's nature are 'a quite traditional theistic conception of God ... as a determinate being' [Hi74:382-3, e.a.], fails to appreciate the radically symbolic nature all such positive accounts have for Kant. The same can be said for Wood's claim in Wo92:398 that 'Kant's conception of God belongs squarely in the scholastic-rationalist tradition. God is the supremely perfect being, extra-mundane, immutable, timelessly eternal. He is also living, knowing, and willing: omniscient, omnipotent, supremely holy, just, and beneficent.' While passages can be found wherein Kant ascribes these attributes to God, his interpretation of what such attribution entails is highly original.
V. Symbolic Theology and the Nature of God (materialism), 'a lifeless God' (deism), or 'a living matter' (hylozoism) [392, 392n]. As shown in Figure V. 1, he groups these in pairs under a 1LAR between 'idealism' and 'realism' of physical ends, so they can be arranged (according to the model of the cross established in KSP1:III.3 [see Fig.III.l, above]). The two subordinate lLARs that give rise to this 2LAR are first, a distinction between God (+) and the material world (-), and second, a distinction between living (+) and lifeless (-) conceptions of God/matter. Because the speculative perspective in systemt is unable 'to demonstrate the existence of a supreme being' [Ktl:667], there can be no theoretical knowl¬ edge that theism is true. But this should not be taken to imply that 'the concept of "God" has no theoretical application.'16 For as we have seen, a hypothetical application of purely logical distinctions can be 'of very great value in correcting any knowledge of this being which may be derived from other sources [e.g., natural, moral, or revealed theology], in making it consistent with itself and with every intelligible perspective' [667-8]. So even though Kant's criticism of the traditional arguments appears at first to have wholly negative implications for theists, Kant stresses that it also has the beneficial effect of guarding against 'all counter-assertions [to theism], whether atheistic, deistic, or anthropomorphic' theism (++) (God, living)
atheism (--) (no God> u f e l e s s )
anthropomorphism (-+) (no God, living) "
4* deism (+-) (God, lifeless)
Figure V.2: Four Basic Types of Theological Disposition Da93b:46. Davidovich defends her view as follows [47]: '"God" is merely the object of a regulative idea. The claim "God exists"... has nothing to do with the way the world is.' But Kant would never express his position in such a skeptical way. First, as we saw in IV.2-4, Kant does not justify belief in God's existence solely by appealing to regulative ideas; moral and especially judicial reasons for belief are closely related to 'the way the world is.' Second, the idea of God is irrelevant only to our knowledge of the world; Kant is careful to allow that the world may be the way it is because of a hidden influence God has on it. (This is depicted by the vertical line in Figure V.3.) Davidovich replaces Kant's humble Critical Perspective with a proud claim to negative knowledge.
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[668-9]. Here, as elsewhere [e.g., Kt2:356-7], Kant is thinking in terms of a similar 2LAR between four basic types of theological disposition. If we compare this map with that in Figure V.I, we can see an obvious correlation between materialism and atheism and between hylozoism and anthropo¬ morphism. Just as the materialist believes there is no life in matter, the atheist believes there is no God in reality. And just as hylozoism views matter as a living organism, anthropomorphism views God as existing in a human (hence, in a 'no God') form. With this alteration (replacing the notion of material ends in Figure V.I with that of religious belief), the best way of grouping these terms into two pairs is to distinguish between religious (+) and nonreligious (-) ways of believing in God. Kant accounts for the different views of God defended by different philosophers as a direct result of the fact that 'each considered the world from a different perspective' [Kt26:1008(37)]. Of these four types of religious belief, Kant favors theism [see AIV.4 and note IV.24]. But he reveals his dissatis¬ faction with the theoretical implications philosophers and theologians often impute to theism, by warning that even theism 'is absolutely incapable of authorizing us to make any objective assertion.'17 The correspondence between Figures V.I and III.4 suggests that none of these four views should enjoy a claim to absolute validity; each refers to a theory that results from emphasizing one perspective to the exclusion of the others. As we saw in more detail in IV.2, Kant defends the idea of God, when viewed as a regulative principle, as being philosophically useful even though it is empirically unattainable [see Ktl:643-4]. Aside from emphasizing that the regulative use of ideas is not empirical but hypothetical [cf. KSP1:VII.3.B], this also has clear implications for what form our conception of God should actually take. First of all it implies that, since 'we can never reach ['the greatest possible unity among appearances'] within this world,... we must regard the absolutely necessary being as being outside the world' [645]. But it is not im¬ mediately apparent just what type of transcendence Kant is thinking of here, or how it differs from that of the ideal (i.e., God as hypostatized object), or of the thing in itself. So let us look briefly at the relationships between these notions. 17. Kt7:395. Ig81:759-60 expresses Kant's position as follows: 'If the irreducible is matter [= the transcendental perspective] it lands us in materialism, if it is the psyche [= the empirical perspec¬ tive] it means psychologism, if it is Theos' [= the speculative perspective] it means Platonic idealism, if it is logic [= the logical perspective] it means panlogicism. But Kant rejects all these extremes and never attempts to account for the ultimate unity behind everything...'. 'Never' is a bit too strong, however, unless 'accounts for' is taken to mean 'develops a theoretically constitutive proof of. For Kant is not only committed to a belief in such an underlying unity [see IV.4], but also has some forceful suggestions as to how we might conceive of it.
V. Symbolic Theology and the Nature of God The thing in itself transcends all our perspectives; it is perspectiveless and passive [see Fig. III.5]. Likewise, Kant says God's wisdom is 'independent of all perspectives'.18 Despite this similarity, the thing in itself and the idea of God play significantly different roles in Kant's System. Recall the two versions of systemt discussed in KSP 1:235-45. In the speculative version the thing in itself is the inner 'ground' of all our experience, while God, as an ideal object, is the 'ultimate reality' that transcends the limited sphere of human reality. In the proper, hypothetical version of systemt [see Fig. III.6], by contrast, the situation is just the reverse: the thing in itself is now transcendent in the sense that it fills the 'space' outside the 'circle' of our possible knowledge, while God, regarded now as an idea of reason, is transcendent in the sense of pointing beyond systemt towards the inward ground of immediate experience. Perhaps the best alternative would be to regard God in a more radical sense, as transcending the whole 'plane' of our world—i.e., as standing out¬ side both the thing in itself and our subject-object world of perspectival knowl¬ edge. According to this notion, God transcends the very distinction between transcendence and immanence. The characterization of God as the 'Ground of Being' is best interpreted within this context. God is not the Ground of Being only in the sense that the thing in itself is the transcendent ground of the transcendental object and its appearance, nor only in the sense that the idea points towards the immanent ground of immediate experience; rather, as Source of both transcendence and immanence, the 'Ground' of this world must 18. Ktl5:126n(31On). Hicks' reminder, that 'sensory experience is ever incomplete and perspectival' [Hi74:382], points directly to God's perspectiveless, or perhaps omni-perspectival, nature. This difference between human and divine reasoning is probably the key factor giving rise to our inability to construct an adequate theology without paradox. Unfortunately, Hicks himself does not seem to appreciate this fact. Instead, he claims the view of God as having intellectual intuition 'is incongruous with Kant's conceptions of God as... Ens Realissimum', because the latter refers to a being with the highest degree of determination, whereas the former concept is wholly indetermi¬ nate. Yet this is a paradox that ought to be expected by anyone in a perspectival state; for Kant to adopt both views is like saying God is both perspectiveless and omni-perspectival. Ironically, Cooke claims to 'find no evidence' in Ktl of any concept of God 'other than that of a very powerful and benevolent finite agent' [Co88:319, e.a.], except in the discussion of 'the ens realissimum' (the very doctrine Hicks thinks is most determinate). Cdoke claims 'Kant is quite clear in rejecting the whole process of forming this concept as a dialectical illusion.' But Kant re¬ jects this concept only as a way of gaining knowledge of God; as a way of forming the concept, he accepts it as the necessary starting point! Cooke admits that Kant does 'sometimes... use the lan¬ guage of Infinitude' [323]; yet he claims Kant 'is thinking of God as finite', as 'a timeless agent along side other timeless agents [i.e., human noumenal selves].' Unfortunately, Cooke never de¬ fends this claim throughout his entire article. It is merely a groundless assumption. As we have seen, the fact that humans are also sensuous makes us temporal and finite in a way that is entirely different from God. Cooke thinks Kant's preference for the physicotheological argument is evi¬ dence that Kant's 'thinking required only the concept of a finite designer.' Yet Kant explicitly cites this as the reason that argument is inadequate: it does not prove enough to provide us with a concept of God as perspectiveless/omni-perspectival—i.e., infinite.
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participate in both and yet remain ultimately distinct from either. That is, God has a single, all-encompassing Perspective that not only includes the logically original perspectivelessness of the thing in itself, but also encompasses both the original human Perspective of immediate experience, and all the intermediate perspectives that give rise to Kant's System of Perspectives. Such a view is implied by Kant when he says: Just as it would therefore be contradictory to say God is the creator of appearances, it is also contradictory to say that He, as the Creator, is the cause of actions in the world of sense, as these are appearances; yet at the same time He is the cause of the existence of the acting beings (as noumena). [Kt4:102; s.a. Gu87:16]
If we press this analogy to its limits, viewing God in this radically transcendent sense helps us understand how God can 'be in a position' to see into the very depths of our hearts (i.e., to be immanent), yet also to apprehend the true reality of the things that make up the material of our world (i.e., to be transcendent).19 This Kantian way of viewing the paradoxical coexistence of God's immanence and transcendence can be appropriately depicted as follows: the moral God (+) :
the immortal human soul (x) (aware of God's presence, yet unable to prove God exists)
the world (-) (the thing in itself)
Figure V.3: The Transcendence and Immanence of God in Relation to Kant's Three Ideas of Reason That this is not just a reconstruction of a view Kant himself never elaborated, but is an accurate model of the position he actually held, will become more clear 19. Indeed, more and more theologians are coming to realize that 'transcendence and immanence [should] be seen as mutually enriching concepts rather than mutually destructive' [Ja84:101]. Thus, Hart writes almost as if he is commenting on Figure V.3 (and even more so, Figure XII.2): 'God is analogously the pole of the world as the world is the pole of things and as things are the pole of aspects/perspectives and as these are the pole of the "flow" of inner-time consciousness. And yet this transcendence ... is totally different because the divine is also absolutely immanent to consciousness' [Ha90b:233].
V. Symbolic Theology and the Nature of God
103
in Chapters XI-XII, when we examine the final (uncompleted) work in Kant's System [i.e., Kt9].20 For now, let it suffice to say that transcendence without immanence would yield an irrelevant (if not meaningless) doctrine of God, whereas immanence without transcendence would be too presumptuous (if not outright idolatrous). After Kant, the theological issue ought never again be debated in the form, 'Is God transcendent or immanent?', but rather in the more modest and meaningful form, 'Is there an immanent-and-transcendent God, or isn't there?' And to this latter question, Kant's philosophy provides the basis for answering with a resounding 'yes, I believe there is such a God!' The radically transcendent aspect of God's nature seems to be what Kant is thinking of in suggesting that God is 'outside the world'.21 For he proceeds to say this view of God frees us to derive the appearances of the world and their existences from other appearances, with unfailing confidence, just as if there were no necessary being, while yet we are also free to strive unceasingly towards the completeness of that derivation, just as if such a being were presupposed as an ultimate ground. [Ktl:646-7]
Kt26:993(22) makes this point rather more concisely: 'The world depends on a supreme being, but the things in the world all mutually depend on one another.' This 'assumption' that 'God as the Universal Primordial Being is the cause... of the existence of substance... can never be given up', Kant insists, for it is the basis of all theology [Kt4:100]. So for Kant, God cannot be identified with the world or with our ideas (i.e., our idea of God is in no sense constitutive of the world), yet theistic belief yields ample evidence of God's participation in 20. Laywine interprets Ktl9 as conveying a very similar view: 'Kant makes space and time play the role of God in the sensible realm', resulting in 'a peculiar analogy between space and God' [La93: 112]—i.e., the sensible world is to space and time as the intelligible world (cf. morality) is to God. Later [145] she adds that the Critical philosophy completes Ktl9's task 'by making our understand¬ ing God's vicegerent in the sensible world.' Gulick observes a similarly profound role for God in Ktl9 [Gu94:101]: 'One principle underlies and connects together the Ideas of the intelligible world: God.' 21. Ktl:645, q.a. Despland describes Kant's view along these lines in De73:145: 'God is a free transcendent being who cannot be reduced to an object that is known and analysed or knowable and analysable.' This view of God has a close affinity with Tillich's theory of the 'God above God' [Ti52:18O-3]. As Hicks puts it [Hi74:383], Kant's 'indeterminate' way of conceiving God (i.e., his theory of the dual nature of divine reasoning, discussed in V.I) views God as 'Absolute Subject'. Like Tillich's 'Ground of Being', Kant's theory suggests that 'God is not even Being, for to be is to be determinate; God is purely a power of free intellectual productivity.' Recognizing the close connection between Kant and Tillich enables us to appreciate how effectively Kant combines the fundamental presuppositions of what many would regard as the two most influential God-concepts of twentieth century theology: Tillich's 'God above God' and Barth's 'living God'. Unfortunately, Tillich himself does not always recognize how much Kant's theology coincides with his own. For instance, in Ti51:1.230 he criticizes Kant's moral proof on the following grounds: "The experience of an unconditional element in man's encounter with reality is used for the establishment of an unconditional being ... within reality.' Yet this reduction of Kant's God to the 'God below God' cannot be justified by Kant's own text. On the contrary, as we shall see in Part Four, Kant has a far more sophisticated view of the nature of our immediate experience of unconditioned reality.
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both (i.e., by means of a regulative employment of the idea of God) [see IV.2]. If God is radically transcendent, yet morally immanent, then what is the best way of going about constructing a theoretical model of God's nature? The importance of one of Kant's favorite models is obscured in Kt 1 by the fact that he first introduces it in its illusory employment, as a fourfold representation of the 'object of the ideal of reason' [606]. According to the 'possibility proof',22 God is the most real being, the ens realissimum, but can also be described as 'the primordial being (ens originarium)', 'the highest being (ens summum)', and 'the being ofallbeings (ens entium)' [606-7]. Kant makes a parallel division in Kt26:1000(28-9) between three types of 'rational theology': '(a) transcendentalem, (b) naturalem, and (c) moralem.' The first, divisible into cosmotheology and ontotheology [1003(31)], he describes in terms of the ens originarium and the ens summum. The second refers to physicotheology, and concerns itself with God as ens intelligentia [highest intelligence]' [1000(29), t.b.]. And the third refers to moral theology, treating God 'as the summum bonum, as the highest good.' Each of the four characterizations in such divisions of rational theology corresponds to one of Kant's four reflective perspectives and can therefore be readily plotted onto a 2LAR cross (the former example being given in brackets where it differs from the latter) [cf. Fig. AIV.l; s.e. note AIV.3]: moral theology (++) summum bonum (ens realissimum)
natural theology (-+) i l i ens intelligentia , (ens entium)
cosmotheology (--) ens onginanum '
ontotheology (+-) ens summum
Figure V.4: God's Nature and the Types of Rational Theology Illusion arises not from the mere positing of such a fourfold description of God's nature, but only from regarding these terms 'as signifying the objective 22. For the details of this, Kant's own original theoretical proof of God's existence, see AIV.l.
V. Symbolic Theology and the Nature of God relation of an actual object to other things' [Kt 1:607]. Their proper purpose is not to yield knowledge of an ideal object, but to clarify the relation between our idea of God and our faculty of conception [607]: 'We are left entirely without knowledge as to the existence of a being of such outstanding pre-eminence.' Although the theoretical arguments used to justify these ways of conceiving God's nature are not sufficient to establish objective knowledge, we have seen 'that there are in the idea of reason obligations which are completely valid' [617], even from the standpoint of systemt. Since 'we know nothing that is better and more convincing' than these arguments, and since 'the natural bent of the common understanding' is towards 'monotheism' (even in predomi¬ nantly polytheistic cultures) [617-8], Kant believes they do serve the important purpose of encouraging and/or clarifying our rational belief. Especially when it is seen as a supplement to 'a moral theology..., transcendental theology, which before was problematic only, will prove itself indispensable in determining the concept of this supreme being and in constantly testing reason' [669]. It will provide us with 'knowledge of God, though only from a practical stand¬ point.'23 Thus, although he says the best way to avoid theological errors is 'by leaving dogmatic judgments severely alone' [Kt35:(85)]—i.e., 'by not under¬ taking to judge where [one] does not know as much as is required for definitive judgment' [Kt20:136]—Kant himself nevertheless does make some rather bold statements about God's nature [see e.g., note AIV.6]. He does so because he believes we do know enough about the structure of reason's logical perspective to be able to construct architectonic models of what the divine nature must be like if God exists.24 Such models fulfill the function not of providing conviction, but of helping us know what to believe, once we are convinced. Kant's main reason for arguing, even in Ktl, that God is best thought of as the ens realissimum, is that this aspect of God's nature fulfills an otherwise unsatisfiable need of reason. Human reason 'seek[s] a resting-place in the regress from the conditioned, which is given, to the unconditioned' [Ktl:612]. The idea of God, as the most real being, provides this place of rest. This does not mean, as Peccorini claims [Pe72:58-65], that Kant thinks he has a theoretically justifiable argument that proves God's existence to be necessary. Rather, in claiming 'that God has necessary existence', Kant 'is much more 3. Kt4:137. As we shall see in Chapters VI-VIII, Kant always appeals to the practical as the stand¬ point that makes religious and theological language rationally meaningful. One of innumerable examples is the following reference to the ideas of heaven and hell: 'Made available to us by the legislative reason itself, these Ideas are to be regarded ... from a practical standpoint' [Kt31:332]. 4. Thus Kant says the statement 'God is omnipotent' proposes 'a logical reference only' [Ktl5:74 (233)]. Later he claims the word 'alsufficiency' has the most 'logical accuracy' as a description of God, though the word 'infinity' is more 'beautiful and... aesthetical' [154(354)].
105
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interested in knowing what God is than in knowing that God is.'25 Moreover, he is careful to point out that the conclusion remains hypothetical. For justification he appeals not to philosophical argument but to common experience [Ktl:612]: "This is the course which our human reason, by its very nature, leads all of us, even the least reflective, to adopt, though not everyone continues to pursue it. It begins not with concepts, but with common experience, and thus bases itself on something actually existing.' As we shall see in Part Four, this appeal to immediate experience is far more important to Kant than has generally been recognized: only by resting in the perspectiveless can we bridge the perspectival gap between the contingent and the necessary.26 4. God's Trinitarian Nature: Holiness, Benevolence, and Justice We have now seen that Kant suggests several ways of conceiving of the attributes of God—i.e., ways of regarding God that are tied to the form of our finite, perspectival nature. Another example comes in Ktl5:83-7(248-54), where Kant lists the predicates describing God according to the following 2LAR: 'The necessary Being' (1) 'is One', (2) 'is simple', (3) 'is immutable and eternal', and (4) 'comprehendeth the highest Reality.' But he warns us that this is not a 'determinate exposition of the conception of God', but only 'the analysis' of the concept [89(256)]. Later, in Kt4:140, he claims that, as long as we regard 'the concept of God [as] one which belongs originally not to physics, i.e., to speculative reason, but to morals', we can say God 'must be omniscient, ... omnipotent, and similarly omnipresent, eternal, etc' The perspectival basis of such attributions is brought out in Kt7:484, where Kant relates them to our cognitive faculties: ... we are obliged to conceive the eternity of God as an existence in all time, be¬ cause we can form no other conception of mere existence than that of... duration. Similarly we have to conceive the divine omnipotence as an existence in all places ... All this we do without, however, being at liberty to ascribe any of these thought-forms to God as something cognized in Him.... [Just because] I seek to conceive a supersensible being (God) as Intelligence... I have no right whatsoever to flatter myself that I am in a position to ascribe intelligence to that being and thereby to cognize it by one of its attributes. For in that case I must omit all the above conditions under which I know an intelligence [e.g., the categories]. 25. La93:112. Though Laywine is here commenting on several of Kant's pre-Copernican works, her statement has a broader application; indeed, a nearly identical statement appears in Kt9:22.129. 26. As Kant says in Kt61:57: "The reasonable use of experience has its limits. It can indeed teach us that something is constituted in such or such a way, but never that it absolutely cannot be anything else; nor can analogy fill this immense void between the contingent and the necessary.' The point here is that neither empirical (constitutive) knowledge nor hypothetical (regulative) supplements to that knowledge can bridge the ultimate gap in Kant's System. For the gap arises whenever we step outside the immediacy of our experience and reflect upon it rationally [see KSPl:IV.l].
V. Symbolic Theology and the Nature of God Because God actually transcends all our perspectives, such attributions cannot be taken as literal descriptions of, so to speak, God's very essence [see Kt7:465]. As Ward puts it: 'The question whether God in himself is like the model is meaningless', for such models have no absolute theoretical signifi¬ cance [Wa72:82]. 'Practical reason', explains Kant, 'gives significance... to the theoretical concept of a First Being. This significance is given from a practical standpoint' [Kt4:133]. Accordingly, Kant is careful to emphasize the subjective character of any such list of divine attributes: ... these attributes of the Supreme Being can only be conceived by us on analogy. ... [They] enable us to conceive a Supreme Being, not to cognize it or to predicate them of it in a more or less theoretical manner.... Yet the object which we have in view in employing them is not that we wish to determine the nature of the Being by reference to them—a nature which is inaccessible to us—but rather that we seek to use them for determining our own selves and our will.... [For] this being ... transcends all our cognitive faculties... But, once the question [of God's nature] touches practical matters, a regulative principle... then becomes also constitutive. In other words it is practically determinant... [Kt7:456-7; s.a. 481]
As he further elaborates in Kt8:139(130-l), the only reason 'we must conceive and comprehend all the [theoretical] attributes of the divine nature', such as 'unchangeableness, omniscience, omnipotence, etc.', is that these 'are requisite to the carrying out of the divine will' with regard to God's moral attributes. As Hart explains, 'the function of assigning special attribution to God ... is the edifying determination of our self and our wills.'27 The basic structure of Kant's System of Perspectives provides a frame¬ work for interpreting his account of God's moral nature [cf. Fig. VI. 1, below]. 'God', Kant tells us, 'is the only holy, the only blessed, and the only wise being' [Kt4:131n]. These attributes define not God's absolute nature, but the three essential ways we have of interpreting how God relates to us: 'He is thus the holy lawgiver (and creator), the beneficent ruler (and sustainer), and the just judge'.28 Each attribute describes the moral aspect of how one of Kant's three Critical systems relates to its transcendent ground. God's holiness relates solely to systemp; it is the supreme attribute because reason is essentially practical. Just as practical reason is a creative power, God's creative lawgiving sets in motion both the moral law and the natural law that determines the course of the phe¬ nomenal world. Holiness sets God apart from us, because we are tempted by our interests [see note Vffl.30 of KSP1, and Kt5:414n], whereas God has 27. Ha90b:241. Hart adds the parenthetical comment: 'For Kant this is also the function of prayer'—a point I shall confirm at length in Appendix VIII. 28. Kt4:131n; cf. Kt26:1001(29). In Kt8:139(131) Kant correlates these same three attributes with God's nature as 'Creator of heaven and earth', 'Preserver of the human race', and 'Administrator of His own holy laws', respectively.
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access to the moral law as it is in itself. Blessedness describes the character of a being who is capable of sustaining us by satisfying our inclinations, yet without ever contradicting the moral law. As we shall see in VII.2.A, this is something human beings are not capable of doing. Our need to regard God as a beneficent ruler thus arises out of the limitations systemt puts on systemp. Philosophically, God's rule is manifested first, as the gift of free will, making moral action possible, and then as the gift of happiness, making life mean¬ ingful.29 Finally, wisdom also sets God apart from us, beings whose existential judgments (cf. systemj) are always limited by our own ignorance; this attribute gives God the right to be the judge of all rational/personal beings. Moral Theology alone, unlike any of the other three types of theology specified in Figure V.4, can produce a concept of God that 'is religiously satis¬ factory', because, as Despland observes in De73:144: 'To make God into a cause, a mechanic, or an artist is to make him like us. To make him holy, good, and just is to make him unlike us.' Thus, Kant points out in Kt64:193n that 'the conception of God, that shall befitfor religion... must be a conception of him as a moral Being;... the proof of the existence of such a Being can be no other than a moral one.' He then repeats the same 'three attributes of the supreme wisdom of the Author of the world': 'holiness, as legislator'; 'good¬ ness, as governor'; and 'justice, as judge' [194]. Kant insists [194-5n] these three attributes 'constitute the moral conception of God', for their number can¬ not be changed, '[n]or can their order be altered.' This is because his moral concept of God is architectonic, directly corresponding to the 1LSR structure of his three Critical systems [see Fig. V.5].30 As such, God's just judgment can be regarded as the synthetic component in the divine nature, providing a bridge that links the opposing characteristics of God's holiness as lawgiver and God's goodness as governor of all human beings. The positive (though symbolic) models of God's nature supplied by Kant's Critical theology are supplemented by other models that guard against innumer¬ able errors in both theology and religion. Kant outlines one of these in Kt7:459: 29. Theologically, God's benevolence is called grace, and is manifested first as the gift of life itself, then as the preservation of life, and finally as the restoration of life after death. The exact means of conceiving how this happens cannot be determined philosophically, according to Kant, but must be left up to each religious tradition's revelation (i.e., theoretical knowledge, specially imparted by God). This further confirms the second attribute's correlation with systemi. Kant's views on revelation will be examined in Part Three [s.e. VIII. 1 and VIII.3.A]. 30. Cf. Fig. VI. 1, below; s.a. Figs. III.5 and III.9 in KSP1. Although he does not make this point explicitly, Raschke implies that each of the three main aspects of Kant's construction of a rational theology corresponds directly to one of his three philosophical systems, by labeling three successive sections of his discussion of Kant's concept of God as follows: 'God as World Cause' [Ra75:104-8], 'God as Supreme Will' [108-11], and 'God as Moral Purposer' [111-6].
V. Symbolic Theology and the Nature of God
109
holy lawgiver (+) (systenip)
just judge (x) (systemj)
good governor (-) (systemt)
Figure V.5: God's Three Moral Attributes The fact that, in respect of all our ideas of the supersensible, reason is restricted to the conditions of its practical standpoint is of obvious use in connexion with the idea of God. It prevents theology from losing itself in the clouds of THEOSOPHY, i.e. in transcendent conceptions [of God] that confuse reason, or from sinking into the depths of DEMONOLOGY, i.e. an anthropomorphic mode of representing the Supreme Being. Also it keeps religion from falling into theurgy, which is a fanati¬ cal delusion that a feeling can be communicated to us from other supersensible beings and that we in turn can influence them, or into idolatry, which is a supersti¬ tious delusion that one can make oneself acceptable to the Supreme Being by other means than that of having the moral law at heart.31
,
He describes these errors in terms of a 2LAR, with the four components being grouped into pairs according to the distinction between theological errors and religious errors, as shown in Figure V.6. The two lLARs constituting this 2LAR are first, the distinction between primarily conceptual (+) and nonconceptual (-) errors, and second, the distinction between theological (+) and religious (-) ones. Each type of error results from treating the theoretical standpoint as a sufficient means of grasping God's nature, leading to a neglect of the practical standpoint and a total failure to appreciate the symbolic character of all our language about God. The best way to avoid such theological and religious errors is to recognize that, because human beings 'cannot affect God in any way' [Kt35:(104)], any attempt at manipulating God (as we do with things in the world that are 31. Elsewhere Kant describes theosophy as 'knowledge of a divine nature that is inaccessible' [Kt69:305]. And in Kt23:401n(180n) he adds: 'Theophany makes of Plato's idea an idol...; whereas theology... erects an ideal... '.
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theosophy (++) (conceptual, theological)
theurgy (-) • (nonconceptual, religious)
demonology (-+) (nonconceptual, -
idolatry (+-) (conceptual, religious)
Figure V.6: Theological and Religious Errors theoretically knowable) is futile. Instead, our response to God must be condi¬ tioned by God's three moral attributes [(97)]: 'Our bearing towards God must be characterized by reverence, love and fear—reverence for Him as a holy lawgiver, love for His beneficent rule, and fear of Him as a just judge.' The first two responses function as polar opposites32 that insure equilibrium in our religious outlook (i.e., they encourage us to strike a happy medium between keeping a safe distance from God's awesome majesty and coming as close as possible to enjoy God's fascinating love), while the third guards against the moral laziness that might set in if a person ever feels too far from or too close to God. Thus Kant utilizes the same threefold model in his recommendations on the theological education of children: The thought of God should fill man with reverence every time he speaks His name, and he should therefore seldom use it, and never frivolously. The child must learn to feel respect for God as the master of his life and of the whole world; further, as the protector of man; and, finally, as his judge. [Kt39:495(216)]
This account of God's moral nature brings us full circle. Before reflecting on Kant's view of God's transcendence in V.I, we noted that divine 'reason' must be conceived as proceeding in a way that is opposite to human reason. We then explored how God's immanence can be understood through various types 32. See notes IX.20-21. Kant describes God's second moral attribute in terms of giving unmerited love [see e.g., Kt8:145-7(136-7)]. We must keep in mind, therefore, that the word 'good' in the designation 'good ruler' refers to God's kind-hearted disposition (i.e., good will) towards us, not to a dispassionate notion of moral perfection. The latter is related more to justice than to goodness. Collins [Co67:154] summarizes Kant's position in the form of a helpful table listing the three types of human powers, divine attributes, and religious responses.
V. Symbolic Theology and the Nature of God of symbolism. We now conclude by observing that God's immanent nature is also defined as being opposite to human nature. The main difference comes with the first moral attribute: being holy means God is never tempted by inclinations, whereas we are not only tempted, but inevitably yield at times [see VII.2.A]. This means the most we can hope to attain is virtue. 'For God as Holy Will' [Hi74:383], by contrast, 'there is no tension between the form of the good according to the moral law and the material content of desire.' Just as viewing the nature of the divine intellect as intellectual intuition and intuitive understand¬ ing means God's 'knowledge' is not bound by sensible intuition and categorial understanding,33 so also viewing the nature of divine will as holy means God's 'action' is not bound by interest and inclination, as is the human will.34 The practical aspect of the divine nature, like the theoretical, must be conceived in 33. See Ktl:139,145-6. In Da93b:105-8 Davidovich describes this aspect of Kant's view of God in terms of 'an archetypal intellect'. She makes the interesting point that there is no need for a third aspect of divine 'reason', to correspond to the judicial standpoint, because everything God thinks is already fully formed. Unlike God, we humans need teleological explanations to compensate for our ignorance of supersensible reality. To this insight we can add the fact that our understanding and intuition are opposed to each other, thus requiring judgment in order to be united, whereas God's rational powers must be presumed to be already fully synthesized in their original state. Davidovich later adds the interesting suggestion that in Kt7 Kant flirts with the possibility that human nature itself may have access to a form of 'Intuitive Reason' [Da93b:126]: wherever 'the "is"/"ought" dichotomy dissolves' or the 'gap between the ideal and the real' is overcome, as Kant repeatedly attempts in Kt7, 'an Intuitive Reason' seems to be present. To this suggestion I would add that these are also the very points where Kant would regard us as coming closest to having an immediate experience of God. This is why Kant ends Kt7 with an Appendix on theology. 34. One of Kant's clearest descriptions of this 'transcendental conception of God' comes in a footnote to a 1796 essay [Kt23:399-401(178-80)] and is worth quoting at length: 'The transcendental conception of God, as the most real Being, cannot, abstract as it is, be avoided in philosophy; for it... [purifies] all the concrete that may afterwards come into the applied theology and doctrine of religion.... If I ['conceive God as the ... aggregate of all realities']..., I therefore attribute to him perhaps an understanding, or even a will..., as realities. But an understanding, which I know, is a faculty of thinking, that is ... not without limitation of the subject. Therefore a Divine understand¬ ing is not to be assumed as a faculty of thinking. But I have not the smallest conception of another understanding, which is a faculty of intuition; consequently the conception of an [intuitive] under¬ standing ... is totally devoid of sense. — In like manner, ... I have not the smallest conception... of a will [which is not limited by interest in)... the succeeding of his volition, which therefore does not depend upon the existence of the external object.... — But when I form to myself a conception of the ens realissimum as the ground of all reality, I say, God is the being who compriseth the ground of all that is in the world for which we men have need to assume an understanding... [and] a free will in order to render intelligible to ourselves the possibility of ['the existence of all mundane beings']. Here now, what the nature of the Supreme Being is (objectively), may be totally inscrutable and placed quite beyond the standpoint of all theoretical cognition possible for us, and yet (subjectively) reality from a practical standpoint... remain[s] to these conceptions; relatively to which an analogy only of the Divine understanding and will with those of man and his practical reason may be assumed... From the moral law ... and from the theory of the nature of things in themselves, proceeds now the conception of God, to form which for ourselves practical pure reason necessitates.' This passage not only gives us a good indication of how Kant develops his concep¬ tion of God, it also reveals how extensively his theology depends on the principle of perspective. Moreover, the final sentence clearly states the twofold roots of Kant's conception of God, which, as we shall see in X.3-4, is also reflected in his own religious experience [s.e. Fig. X.I].
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terms of a negation of human nature: 'An interest is present only in a dependent will which is not of itself always in accord with reason'; so 'in the divine will we cannot conceive of an interest.'35 Kant explains further that 'no imperatives hold for the divine will', because God has no genuinely moral choices to make: 'according to its own subjective constitution, [God's will] can be determined to act only through the conception of the good.' This characteristic, as we saw in KSP1:VIII.3.B and XII.4, is what qualifies God to serve as the 'sovereign' in the 'realm of ends'.36 Temple thinks 'holiness represents a call to be inhuman' [Te94:116] and would entail denying our 'animal nature—our feelings, desires, and sympa¬ thies'—in short, 'the eradication of everything that is distinctively human.' But this is not Kant's view (nor is it authentically Christian). For a person to be holy involves becoming not inhuman, but divine-human. And this does not re¬ quire the 'eradication' of our animal nature, but its transformation. Happiness and inclination are not absent from the highest good, but transformed to a higher level. Temple comes closest to this when he says [117] 'Kant... takes the holy will to be a vision of something more than human.' Unfortunately, his entire article never even mentions God as the only genuinely holy being [see e.g., Kt5:414]; he totally misses Kant's point, that holiness is inextricably tied to being religious—i.e., being in relationship with a holy God. Such a relation¬ ship is possible, as we shall see in Part Three, only because an image of divine holiness, what Kant calls the 'archetype' (the ideal internal image that is perfectly reflected in the life of Jesus), exists in every person [see VII.2.B]. Hicks accuses Kant of failing to synthesize the two opposite approaches he has for conceiving God [Hi74:385]—viz., the 'indeterminate' concept of God as an 'Absolute Subject', whose powers of reasoning and willing are opposite 35. Kt5:414n. Temple expresses Kant's view as follows [Te94:113]: 'A good will struggles to uphold the moral law in the face of contrary inclinations.... The holy will, by contrast, needs none of this. It has no contrary inclinations.' Temple says Kant treats both of these as moral ideals for humans; but he complains that they are 'incompatible' [108-9], inasmuch as 'virtue is morality in conflict while holiness is morality without conflict' [115). He rightly rejects the notion of a gradual transition occurring from one to the other, whereby 'as virtue more and more predominates ... conflict begins to disappear and virtue gradually approaches to something like holiness.' This attempted solution wrongly construes a qualitative distinction (a difference of type) to be a quanti¬ tative one (a difference of degree). A more appropriate solution is to see them as referring to two different standpoints, those of systemp and systemr. Morality aims at virtue; religion, by taking God into consideration, aims at holiness. The latter is the higher aim, but is not possible without divine assistance [see e.g., Kt35:10]. The former can be approximated, but cannot be perfected, without being transformed into the latter through a religious conversion. Thus a person cannot become holy through good life-conduct; but if a person's disposition has been transformed by coming into relation with a holy will, then progress towards virtue in the person's conduct will be evident as a by-product. This will be discussed further in VII.2.A, VIII.2.A, and AVI.4. 36. See e.g., Kt5:434. This sovereignty, and how it serves as the model for the ideal forms of human politics, will be one of the main topics of KSP4.
V. Symbolic Theology and the Nature of God to ours, and the 'determinate' (traditional) concept of God as an 'Absolute Object',37 who can be known according to a specific set of attributes. He criticizes Kant for 'remaining unnervingly naive, even cheerful, about the ironies his thought spawned.' But as I have demonstrated in this chapter, these two aspects of Kant's views on God's nature are in fact like two sides of the single coin of his symbolic theology. Moreover, when we return to these two notions in XII.4, we shall find that in Kt9 Kant does attempt a synthesis: the Absolute Subject (God) and the Absolute Object (the World) are synthesized in the bearer of freedom (Christ, the ideal God-Man), who is thereby capable of combining the opposites of holiness and virtue. Kant's Critical theology not only helps elucidate how best to understand the idea of God, an idea that determines the whole course of his System, but as we saw in IV.2-4, it also demonstrates how belief in that God is theoretically possible (systemt), judicially actual (system^ and practically necessary (systenip). Nevertheless, theology as such cannot bridge the final gap in his System, as shown in Figure III.8. For that, an actual (immediate) experience, rather than merely a rational theory, is required. With this in mind we shall therefore consider in the next chapter how Kant relates his theology to what motivates most theologians, namely, religion. This in turn will prepare us to look in more detail at Kant's conception of religion in general [see Part Three] and of religious experience in particular [see Part Four].
37. This may be an appropriate expression for the traditional way of forming a theological concept of God's nature, but for Kant's symbolic theology it is highly inappropriate. Kant explicitly cautions against taking any of his descriptions of God's attributes as referring to anything absolute. As we shall see in XII.3, Kant himself would interpret this term as a reference to the idea of the world. A better description of the paradox Hicks is commenting on is given by Wood in Wo78:93: 'on the one hand, Kant... strenuously insisted on a concept of God so precisely determined from the moral and metaphysical view as an ontologically perfect intelligent volitional agent possessed of supreme holiness, benevolence, and justice; while on the other hand he was so anxious to render this concept as empty, vague, and indefinite as possible by placing it beyond the power of our faculties to comprehend.' Kant can be excused, according to Wood, on the grounds that this paradox is virtually the norm throughout the entire western tradition of rational theology. As a result, Wood overlooks the true uniqueness of Kant's position, its synthesis of these opposing standpoints (the theoretical and the practical) by means of the principle of perspective. When thought and knowl¬ edge are Kant's main concern, he follows the 'negative' path; but when action and experience are at issue, a 'positive' or 'affirmative' theology takes its place through symbolic descriptions of God's nature. Theologians who have come after Kant have not formulated their negative and positive theologies in precisely the same terms as Kant; but they have in many cases followed the general epistemological and systematic framework he established.
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Chapter VI Religion as the Synthesis of Theology and Morality Morality thus leads ineluctably to religion, through which it extends itself to the idea of a powerful moral Lawgiver, outside of mankind, for Whose will that is the final end (of creation) which at the same time can and ought to be man's final end. [Kt8:3-6(3-6), e.a.]
1. Kant's Reductionism: Explanatory or Eliminative? In the course of examining Kant's views on the existence and nature of God in the first two chapters here in Part Two, we have had ample opportunity to witness Kant's tendency to solve theological problems by relating them to morality. Before beginning our in-depth investigation of Kant's theory of reli¬ gion in Part Three, let us therefore pause to consider Kant's reasons for adopt¬ ing such a strategy. The most commonly accepted explanation is to portray Kant as a reductionist, seeking to demonstrate the uselessness of all theology and religion by showing how everything genuine in them boils down to moral¬ ity. Kant's religion, so the story goes, is purely a religion of good works in which even the notion of a real God is ultimately dispensable. But does Kant reduce theology and religion to morality? Before answering this question, we must clarify just what it means to 'reduce' one idea or way of thinking to another. What would it mean for someone to 'reduce religion to morality'? Reductionism can be understood in either a loose or a strict sense, which we can call 'explanatory' and 'eliminative' reductionism, respectively.1 In the loose sense reductionism means explaining everything relevant to a given field of inquiry in terms of a single, all-pervasive factor outside that field, which is necessary to a proper understanding of that field. For example, proponents of a double aspect theory of the relationship between brain states and mental states might argue that every mental state is directly correlated to some brain state; yet this would not require them to treat the two types of states as identical, or to advocate the actual description of all mental states in terms of brain states. Strict, eliminative reductionists, by contrast, believe one special way of ex¬ plaining something is not only necessary, but self-sufficient, so that it can ac¬ tually replace, or explain away all other possible explanations. Proponents of strict reductionism would argue that all talk of mental states is pointless, since nothing but brain states exists or has any value. If we accept this distinction between explanatory and eliminative forms of 1. I am grateful to an anonymous Kant-Studien referee for suggesting the terms 'explanatory' and 'eliminative', and for offering numerous criticisms of a previous version of this chapter, without which the present version would be considerably less clear.
VI. Religion as the Synthesis of Theology and Morality
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reductionism, then the question occupying our attention can be rephrased in two ways: loosely, Does Kant regard morality as the single explanatory factor in terms of which all that is necessary to religion can be explained! and strictly, Does Kant believe religion can be 'explained away' as nothing but a special form of morality! In other words, does Kant think morality is necessary for all true religion, and if so, does he also think it is sufficient! To many readers of Kant his motives seem so obvious that they never bother even to pose such questions. Kant clearly does reduce religion to morality (in both senses), so the story goes, for he consistently defines religion as 'the recognition of all duties as divine commands' [Kt8:153(142); see below, note VI. 18]. Does this not require us to regard religion as nothing but a special way of looking at human duties—i.e., at morality! Indeed, we need go no further than the title of Kant's most important book on religion, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone [Kt8], to see that he assumes right from the start that religion can and ought to be viewed only within a narrow set of rational limits—a reduction if ever there was one! Likewise, if we open the book itself, we find that on the first few pages of the first edition Preface Kant tells us morality is not based on religion; rather, religion is based on morality. And throughout the rest of the book, he repeatedly passes judgment on religious beliefs and practices by asking about their value for the moral improvement of the religious believer. We should not be surprised, therefore, to find interpreters as prestigious as Cassirer, whose study of Kant's life and works is usually quite trustworthy, assuming an affirmative answer to the question at issue without supporting his view with any textual evidence: ... the Kantian system does not in general recognize the philosophy of religion as a fully independent member of the system, as a way of looking at things that is id¬ iosyncratic and rests on autonomous and independent assumptions [i.e., on its own distinct standpoint].... [Instead,] the substance of his philosophy of religion comprises for him only a confirmation of and a corollary of the substance of his ethics. Religion 'within the limits of reason alone' ... has no essential content other than that of pure morality. The conversion of pure rational religion into pure ethics is required...2
Moreover, it is not uncommon, especially in brief summaries of Kant's philos¬ ophy of religion, to read explicit statements of an even more dogmatic kind, such as Kroner's claim that for Kant 'religious life is nothing but a special mode of moral life' [Kr56:35], Crichlow's conviction that 'Kant used every 2. Ca81:381-2,385, e.a. Webb expresses the same idea more succinctly when he describes Kant's theory of religion as 'an appendix to Ethics' [We26:62].
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argument [in the second part of Kt8] to show that religion was the same thing as morality' [Cr96:95], Baillie's view that 'Kant's religion remained to the end a mere legalistic moralism' with 'an eighteenth-century Legislator' attached [Ba39:159], Walsh's interpretation of Kant's 'religious attitude' as 'a way of representing morality, not a way of going beyond it',3 Vossenkuhl's insistence that 'the systematic precondition of [Kant's] notion of rational religious belief is 'that true religion is nothing but morality',4 or Edwards' proclamation: 'we have in Kant the complete reduction of religion to morality.'5 However, if we put aside this long tradition and examine Kant's own claims with an open mind, we shall find this traditional, unequivocally affirmative 3. Wa67:322. Earlier Walsh had already tacitly bought into the reductionist interpretation by interpreting Kant as holding that '[r]eligious discourse is legitimate and meaningful because it is internal to moral discourse' [Wa63a:282]. But as we shall see in VII.1, Kant puts these two in the opposite order [s.e. Fig. VII.1]: moral discourse is and must be internal to religious discourse in order for the latter to be rationally justifiable. Walsh seems to have been misled by the fact that the postulates are internal to Kant's moral system; but on their own they do not constitute 'religious discourse'. As we shall see below, religious discourse happens only when we step outside the realm of the explicitly moral and view our moral disposition from the perspective of divine command. 4. Vo88:179. Ironically, Vossenkuhl expresses serious doubts as to whether Kant really succeeds in fulfilling this aim, yet never considers the possibility that this may not have been his aim at all! 5. Ed79:46, e.a; s.a. Mi89:259. Edwards bases his reductionist summary of Kant's position only on the title of Kt8 and on Kant's definition of religion. He assumes Kant 'shared with the rationalists of his century the conviction that reason alone is sufficient for all religious knowledge'; so he infers that, because Kant regards morality as 'the essence of "true religion'", it must also be true that 'nothing else really matters' for Kant [Ed79:46]. As a result, he concludes his discussion with a (completely unjustified) summary of Kant's view, implying it should be relegated to the scrap heap: 'With a mere definition of religion Kant believes he has shown that no "true religion" contains a belief that God really exists ..., that no "true religion" contains a reliable and self-authenticating revelation, and that no "true religion" makes a place for prayer, ritual, or any other expression of unique duties to God' [52], Not only does Edwards fail to recognize that Kant does preserve a neces¬ sary space for such elements in all true religion [see Part Three], but he also completely ignores the fact that Kant supports each of his claims with arguments (not mere definitions) [see note VI.22]. Another typical example of a blatantly reductionist interpretation of Kant's theory of reli¬ gion can be found in Kw83:95-118. Kwan repeatedly adds words like 'nothing but', 'only', or 'just' to Kant's own words to make them appear to defend eliminative reductionism [s.e. 110-1], when nothing in Kant's text indicates that this is his intention. Kwan sets up an absolute dichotomy between an historical fact and its symbolic meaning, as if no event could be both at once! Thus, in discussing the 'symbolic meaning' of Kant's idea of 'Chrisms', he says 'God or Christus ... is just a human fiction, a projection, an idea or an Ideal' [111]. He concludes by saying that for Kant 'No God will tell us if we are really on our way toward a pure rational faith ... Only the human conscience' [112]. But this misses Kant's point, which, as we shall see, is that if God tells us anything, it must be through (or at least, consistent with) such rational channels as the conscience. Smart likewise finds fault with 'Kant's exposition of religion' on the grounds that 'in essence [Kant] reduces [religion] to morality' [Sm69:5.15]. Summarizing this common (mis)interpretation of Kant's philosophy of religion, Smart later claims [5.37] that 'Kant, in taking it for granted that the First Cause lies beyond all possible experience, ruled out the validity of revelatory experience. For him, science and morality exhausted the avenues of knowledge: there is no 'third' way, the way of religion as such.' Yet, Kant's general philosophical method was always to search for just such a third way [see II.2], and as we shall see in this chapter, his theory of religion was no exception. Moreover, we shall see in X.2 that Kant did not rule out altogether the possibility of experiencing God, but only that such an experience can ever attain the status of 'experience' in the technical theoretical sense of 'empirical knowledge' [see KSP1:IV.3 and VII.3.A].
VI. Religion as the Synthesis of Theology and Morality answer to our initial question to be unfaithful to his true intentions. Sadly, it comes so close to a proper understanding of the points Kant was actually trying to make, that its subtle distortions have remained virtually unchallenged.6 In order to reveal these distortions, let us first take a close look at the three most obvious sources that seem at first to support the traditional myth of eliminative reductionism: the title of Kt8, its first edition Preface, and Kant's definition of religion. For a proper understanding of these is indispensable if we are to understand Kant's intentions. We can then take a general overview in VI.3 of the content of Kt8. In Part Three we shall do a more thorough examination of the details of the religious system expounded therein; but the preliminary overview in this chapter will provide us with enough evidence to make a fair assessment in VI.4 of the extent to which Kant's Critical theology reduces religion to morality. 2. Prolegomena to Kant's System of Religion There are two common assumptions about the title of Kt8 (Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blofien Vernunfi) which, when made, virtually de¬ termine in advance that Kant's views will be interpreted strictly, in terms of eliminative reductionism. Yet both of these assumptions are utterly opposed to Kant's expressed intentions. The first assumption is that Grenzen refers to a strict limitation placed on religion by reason—a limitation establishing an abso¬ lute barrier that cannot in any way be overcome. Kant explains, however, that Grenzen must not be regarded in such a strict or one-sided way: 'Bounds [Grenzen]... always presuppose a space outside a certain definite place and in¬ closing it; limits [Schranken] do not require this, but are mere negations which affect a quantity so far as it is not absolutely complete.'7 Despite his reputation 6. One notable exception is Rossi, who says [Ro89:369] 'Kant... does not hold that religion is either identical with or reducible to morality.' But he does not defend or develop this view in detail. Moreover, a few years later he explicitly defends a form of eliminative reductionism [Ro93:57]: 'The "moral" ... determines the function of religion ... [l]t is only a short step to religion's marginalization and eventual reductive elimination; ... religion will become increasingly periph¬ eral ... and will... find itself being reductively purified or transformed into (a form of) morality.' But as we shall see, this is a fundamental misuse of Kant's meaning of the term 'religion'. Had Rossi written this about 'historical faith', then his comment would be accurate. But for Kant, religion— and that means morality interpreted as God-given (not morality in and of itself)—is destined to be¬ come more and more central to human culture and to the fulfillment of morality's true purpose, not more and more peripheral [see Pa94b and KSP4]. Fortunately, Rossi admits that certain 'elements of Kant's thought... run counter to such a reductive program for religion' [Ro93:57], and concludes by suggesting we reconsider the appropriateness of the reductive paradigm [58]. McCarthy [Mc86:96] agrees that 'religion in the end' is not 'totally reduced to morality" by Kant [s.a. 90-1]; as we shall see, 'his definition of religion ... points beyond morality to include the recognition of... the divine being ... Thus Kant's definition of religion really points to an essential difference between morality and religion, namely, God-consciousness...'. 7. Kt2:352. The English words 'limit' and 'boundary' have similar connotations, especially in light
117
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to the contrary, which developed largely as a result of the unfortunate 'patchwork' interpretations of his work, Kant is usually very careful to give precise meanings to the terms he uses, and then to stick by those meanings. So we should give serious consideration to the implications this passage has for the title of Kant's book. If Kant had wanted to say reason imposes limits upon religion that must not be surpassed, then he would surely have used the term Schranken. His use of Grenzen indicates that he has in mind a boundary (like a fence dividing two portions of land), on either side of which we can find legit¬ imate (though different) aspects of one and the same territory (viz., religion). On one side we find what is rationally necessary and on the other, what is em¬ pirically real. Kant's title, then, does not reveal a desire to force all aspects of religion into a single, rational mold; rather, it reflects his favorite perspectival distinction between the transcendental and the empirical, and announces his intent to examine (as usual) one side of a fundamentally two-sided reality.8 The second assumption regarding the title of Kant's book concerns the proper interpretation of the phrase blofien Vernunft, which has traditionally been rendered into English either as 'Reason Alone' or as 'Mere Reason'. The former choice, adopted by Greene and Hudson in their standard translation of Kt8, would clearly imply self-sufficiency, and hence a tendency towards strict reductionism on Kant's part. Yet, such a translation not only stretches the literal meaning of blofien, but it neglects an important nuance in the original. This common German word can mean either 'mere' (thus indicating that something more is possible and perhaps even required for full satisfaction) or 'naked'. Greene and Hudson were certainly aware of this dual meaning, since the text itself actually uses 'naked reason' as the translation for blofien Vernunft at several points [see e.g., Kt8:10(9)]; nevertheless, they suppressed this implica¬ tion entirely in their translation of the title.9 Perhaps their reason was that, if Kant had wanted to use 'naked' in his title, he probably would have used the more explicit word, nackt. With this in mind, however, a third alternative arises that does not seem to have occurred to any of Kt8's translators. An English word that parallels the dual meaning of blofien almost exactly is 'bare': just like blofien, it can mean either 'mere' or 'naked'.10 of the mathematical use of the word 'limit'. When a mathematical function approaches its limit, there is no point in asking (absurdly) how that function operates on the 'other side' of its limit. As far as the function is concerned, there simply is no other side. 8. Kant's distinction between the 'natural' and the 'naturalistic' in Kt65:44-5 likewise implies that he views Christianity as a religion based in reason, yet not limited to reason. 9. In the Preface to their translation, Greene and Hudson do refer to the fact that John Richardson's 1799 English translation of Kt8 uses 'Naked Reason' in the title [GH34:cxxxv]. Richardson's full title is "The Religion within the Sphere of Naked Reason'. 10. Another possibility would be 'unaided', since 'blofien Vernunft' does indicate that Kant wishes to
VI. Religion as the Synthesis of Theology and Morality
119
When these two mistaken assumptions are brought to light, a more accu¬ rate translation comes into view: Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason is the best English translation of what Kant himself intended to say in the title of Kt8. That Kant's use of blofien was an intentional, though covert, way of referring to nakedness can be clearly seen by taking note of the fact that in the text itself Kant makes use on several occasions of the analogy of 'the religion of reason' being like a naked body that can be rendered presentable, or socially acceptable, only by dressing it in some type of clothing [see e.g., Kt8:195 (183); s.a. Kt65:53]. If Kant had not wanted to hint at such an analogy in his title, he almost certainly would have used a more technical term, such as reinen ('pure'), to refer to the inner or 'invisible' aspects of all true religion. Similarly, that Kant's use of Grenzen is meant to imply territorial boundaries, rather than absolute limits, is also suggested by other, related metaphors, such as when he considers what happens when one side 'trespasses' on the other side's property, or "imports something' from the other side for use within 'its own economy', or 'declares war on' the other side [see e.g., Kt8:9-10(9),13(12)]. The 'double aspect' (i.e., dual perspective) character of Kant's system of religion is also made clear by several other analogies used from time to time in Kt8. Kant consistently refers to 'the pure religion of reason' not as itself consti¬ tuting everything necessary for true religion, but rather as providing us with its necessary core or 'kernel'. He never regards other (i.e., nonmoral) aspects of religion as identical to false religion; rather, they become false only when the religious person fails to recognize them as the 'shell' or 'vehicle' (i.e., as the means) through which the 'kernel' or 'canon' (i.e., the end) of religion can be promoted, and as a result detaches them from their proper grounding in moral¬ ity [Kt8:123n(113n),135n(126n); Kt65:36-7]. All these analogies imply that, as we shall see in more detail in VI.3, Kant is thinking not about exclusiveness, but about the proper priority between two necessary elements. Kant gives these two elements a number of different names, such as 'faith' and 'pure religion' as the two aspects of 'religion'. (These two senses of 'religion' must be kept in mind if we are to avoid misunderstanding Kant's view; so we shall return to them again shortly.) Indeed, just as each of Kant's three Critiques is designed not to establish a system of metaphysics itself, but to prepare the foundation upon which to construct the building of metaphysics, so also the title of Kt8 ought to remind us that this book is designed more as the Critical (transcen¬ dental) prolegomenon to real (empirical) religion, than as an attempt to replace examine the rational nature of religion unaided by divine revelation. However, this choice is less literal, and considerably less colorful than 'bare'. Kant was very fond of such, often rather fanciful, metaphors, so a good translation should convey such nuances as faithfully as possible.
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all empirical manifestations of religion with a 'pure' alternative. On its own, of course, a proper understanding of the title of Kt8 does not constitute a conclusive argument on the basis of which we could answer the question at issue here. Rather, it only provides us with hints that may or may not shed new light on the text itself. Let us therefore turn our attention now to the beginning of the first Preface, where Kant seems at first sight to be portray¬ ing religion as just a footnote or appendage to morality. In the first few paragraphs of this Preface [Kt8:3-6(3-6), e.a.], he asserts: ... morality... stands in need neither of the idea of another Being over [mankind], for him to apprehend his duty, nor of an incentive other than the law itself... Hence for its own sake morality does not need religion at all...; ... it is self-suffi¬ cient.... But although for its own sake morality needs no representation of an end which must precede the determining of the will, it is quite possible that it is neces¬ sarily related to such an end, taken not as the ground, but as the inevitable conse¬ quence of maxims adopted as conformable to that end.... Morality thus leads ineluctably to religion, through which it extends itself to the idea of a powerful moral Lawgiver, outside of mankind, for Whose will that is the final end (of cre¬ ation) which at the same time can and ought to be man's final end.
Three key points arise out of this passage. Each of these leads to eliminative reductionism if it is just slightly misinterpreted. In what follows, therefore, I shall attempt to explain not only what Kant is trying to say in each case, but also how his words are misconstrued by a strict reductionist interpretation. First, Kant is saying that even though morality is logically, or perhaps transcendentally, self-sufficient (i.e., even though no reference to religion is needed to explain what morality is), morality is nevertheless ideologically in¬ complete (i.e., its ultimate purpose cannot be realized by remaining merely within its own bounds). Just as the foundation of a building is 'complete' in the sense that it can stand all on its own, and does not depend on any other structure in order to maintain its inner integrity, and yet its purpose is not complete until an actual building is constructed upon it, so also the nature of moral action can be understood apart from any reference to religion, and yet the purpose of morality in general, as well as the actual fulfillment of the task morality presents to us, cannot be understood without stepping beyond the exclusively moral standpoint to adopt a new, religious standpoint, based on the moral. This point is sure to be misunderstood if we fail to take special note of Kant's distinction between the 'ground' and 'consequence' (or 'end') of morality. When Kant says morality 'leads to religion', he does not mean religion can therefore be explained away in terms of morality; on the contrary, he means religion as such fulfills a necessary function. As far as its 'ground' is concerned, morality is 'self-sufficient': all we need is our own (human)
VI. Religion as the Synthesis of Theology and Morality practical reason. But as far as its 'consequence' is concerned, we must look beyond mere morality in hopes of finding some third thing to bridge the gap between the theoretical and the practical. That 'third thing', in Kt8, is religion. The common view that for Kant true religion is entirely humanistic (an¬ thropocentric) [see 1.3] neglects the fact that in this passage he says morality necessarily 'extends itself, or points beyond itself, to the idea of a God. The words 'final end (of creation)' undoubtedly refer to humanity.11 However, the second point arising out of this passage is that an entirely anthropocentric philosophy is not the type that best serves the interests of humanity. Rather, the purpose of morality (which is anthropocentric) will best be fulfilled by viewing morality in terms of something outside mankind. Within Kant's moral system, the idea of God had to be introduced as a postulate just to conceive of the possibility of reaching the goal of establishing the highest good. Now he is saying the only way morality can fulfill its purpose is to regard this possibility (i.e., the postulate of the existence of God) as an actuality. In other words, only if we treat our moral experience as if it were guided by a divine Being who shares with us a common goal do we have any hope of completing the task morality sets for us. This extension of religion beyond morality into the realm of empirical reality is implied when Kant says [Kt35:(81)]: 'Religion and morality go hand in hand.... Morality as such is ideal, but religion imbues it with vigour, beauty, and reality.' Once the teleological function of Kt8 is fully appreciated, a third point can be drawn out of the passage quoted from the first Preface: the function of Kt8 in Kant's philosophical System is related most closely to the function of the third Critique (viz., to synthesize the theoretical and practical aspects of the first two Critiques), not to that of the second. The relationships between the stand¬ points of the three Critiques can be mapped onto a 1SLR triangle [see Fig. III.2]. The traditional reductionistic interpretation of Kt8 identifies its standpoint with that of Kt4. This is, admittedly, consistent with the emphasis throughout Kt8 on the priority of practical over theoretical reason.12 Yet, as we shall see in 11. In Kt7:435, Kant says 'man is the final end of creation.' 12. For example, Kant says in Kt8:12(ll) that the 'pure rational system of religion ..., though not from the theoretical standpoint... may yet, from the morally practical standpoint, be self-sufficient and adequate for genuine religion, which, indeed, as a rational concept a priori (remaining after everything empirical has been taken away), obtains only from this [practical] standpoint.' True enough, purereligion does in a sense correspond to the practical standpoint in Figure VI. 1; but what happens when 'everything empirical' is added again, as Kant clearly intends it to be in systemr? Along these lines Webb lists three 'truths which lie at the heart of Kant's thought' on religion: (1) 'the implicit rationality of Religion' [We26:202]; (2) 'the implicitly ethical character of Religion' [205]; and (3) 'the ethical or ethically rational character of the Christian religion, as the feature distinctive of it among the religions of the world' [206]. While these are all true of systemr, they do not necessarily indicate that it should be merely identified with systemp.
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practical (Kt4)
judicial (Kt7)
theoretical (Ktl)
Figure VI. 1: The Standpoints of the Three Critiques Parts Three and Four, Kant is also very concerned with assessing the validity of religious experience in general, and with determining the extent to which various kinds of historical faith can serve as adequate vehicles for pure religion. In both cases, he attempts to synthesize practical and theoretical standpoints—a function associated most closely with the judicial standpoint.13 His philosophy of religion remains 'within the bounds of bare reason' only in the sense that this synthesis always gives primacy to the practical in relation to the theoretical. But this is equally true of all three Critiques! If we see Kt8 as an attempt to show how in the universal experience of religion the practical and theoretical standpoints are inextricably intertwined (as was already briefly suggested in KSP1:III.4 [s.e. Fig. III.9]), then it becomes clear that Kt8 not only plays a constitutive role in Kant's System of Perspectives, but, given its more system¬ atic organization [see e.g., Figs. VII.7-8, below], could have effectively replaced Kt7 as a Critique of Religious Judgment.u 13. See KSPl:IX.l and note 1.17, above. Michalson, neglecting the perspectival nature of Kant's philosophy, thereby blinds himself to the many synthetic elements in Kant's System, leading him to claim that 'Kant's transcendental idealism has no systematic way of integrating the moral and the temporal' [Mi89:263]. By contrast, Davidovich bases the whole approach of her recent book on the sort of assumption I am making, that these synthetic elements represent the System's true goal: 'Kant's search for unity culminates in religion' [Da93b:69]. 'The problem of the unity of Reason', as she puts it [55], 'finds its solution in... a religious domain of reason.' Like so many critics, Barth accepts a reductionist reading of Kt8 [Ba72:305], causing him to overlook the judicial nature of Kantian religion. He reveals more about his own interpretive bias than he does about Kant's appreciation for living, empirical religion when he critically asks [314]: 'Do we live only in the interlacing of idea and action which seems to be Kant's single preoccupation ...?' He proceeds to ask whether Kant may have 'overlooked the most decisive, the deepest and most comprehensive possibility open to mankind' [315]. A perspectival interpretation that gives proper attention to Kant's whole System leaves ample room, as we shall see in Chapter IX, for just the kind of God-encounter that Barth believed to be missing from Kant's philosophy. 14. Davidovich acknowledges the close connection between Kt7 and Kt8 [Da93a:20], claiming the
VI. Religion as the Synthesis of Theology and Morality This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that both Kt8 and Kt7 try to answer the third in a set of questions that Kant says defines '[a]ll the interests of my reason': the first two questions, 'What can I know?' and 'What ought I to do?', are synthesized by the third, 'What may I hope?'15 Indeed, I believe part of Kant's reason for writing Kt8 when he did was that he realized Kt7, published three years earlier, does not provide a sufficient answer to the question of human hope. The questions relating to human hope are associated much more naturally with religion than with aesthetics or teleology (the subjects of Kt7). Moreover, as we shall see in Chapter VII, Kt8 fits more closely than the third Critique does into the systematic patterns established in the first two Critiques [cf. KSP1:IX.1,4]—yet another good reason for regarding Kt8 as intimately bound up with the Critical wing of his System. A careful examination of Kant's various definitions of religion will not only support the above suggestion as to the proper place of Kt8 in Kant's System, but will provide the context for a proper understanding of Kant's 'official' definition in Kt8. In his Lectures on Education Kant defines religion as 'the [moral] law in us, so far as it is imprinted upon us by a legislator and a judge; it
latter 'brings to completion the task of the Critical investigation.' McCarthy [Mc86:61] calls attention to the same connection, noting that Kt7's Appendix 'foreshadows the containment of a "purposeful Christianity" in a larger system of religious/moral purposes in [Kt8].' But he stresses that Kt8 'is not a "fourth critique'"; instead, it belongs more to the metaphysical development of Kant's System [Mc86:63-4]. Nevertheless, he does admit [105n]: 'The ties [in Kt8] to the Third Critique remains an area worthy of more extended study.' My point in suggesting this alternative title for Kt8 is not that it could be a fourth Critique [cf. note III. 11], but that it could replace Kt7 as the third Critique, with Kt7 then being regarded as a supporting work (like Kt2 and Kt5) that does not attempt to follow the twelvefold structure Kant imposes on each of his systems. To those who accuse Kt8 of being unsystematic, Davidovich [Da93a:20] responds that Kt8 'provides Kant's most systematic statement on the human condition.... Only when we read this book from the perspective of [Kt7] rather than as an addendum to [Kt4], does the full import of [Kt8] as a reflective examina¬ tion of the innermost human aspirations for the individual and society become apparent.' 15. Ktl:832-3. Elsewhere Kant adds that all three questions can be summed up in a fourth question, 'What is man?' [see note III.5]. He clearly explains the synthetic relation between the three questions in Ktl:833: 'The first question is merely speculative' (i.e., theoretical); the second 'is purely practical'; and the third 'is at once practical and theoretical'. And in a 1793 letter to Staudlin [AAll:414(Zw67:205)] he explicitly states that Kt8's task is 'to complete the third part of my plan.' Religion is therefore based on an intimate connection between theory and practice, 'a connection in which the practice determines the theory and not the theory the practice' [We26:17] —as is required by Kant's doctrine of the primacy of practical reason [see KSP1:VIII.4]. The result, as we shall see in Part Three, is that Kant always regards religion first and foremost in terms of actions and morality, and only secondarily as a set of creeds or doctrine. In light of our emphasis on the theocentric character of Kant's philosophy [see 1.3], it is worth noting that each of his three famous questions corresponds to one of 'the three ideas of pure reason, God, freedom, and immortality', all of which join together 'to form a religion' [Kt7:474]. God is the idea that motivates us to ask about possible knowledge; freedom is the idea that motivates us to ask about our duty; and immortality is the idea that motivates us to ask about human hope. In Kt8:157(145), Kant relates each of these ideas explicitly to religion, adding that, because of its close connection with them, '[n]atural religion ... is [itself] a pure practical idea of reason'.
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is morality applied to the knowledge of God [i.e., to theology].'16 Conversely, he claims elsewhere that 'religion is nothing but the application of theology to morality' [Kt26:997(26)]. These two statements would contradict each other for anyone who views religion as simply identical to, or a sub-category of, morality. For Kant, though, the statements are actually suggesting that morality and theology are the two complementary opposites which, when combined in a synthetic unity, give rise to religion. This is why Kant can say both that 'moral¬ ity leads inevitably to religion' [Kt8:8n(7n)] and that 'theology also leads direct¬ ly to religion':17 each leads to religion, because each is incomplete on its own, just as each of the first two Critiques can be said to lead to the third Critique. The religion towards which they lead must therefore clothe the 'bare' body of pure moral religion with some theoretical clothing, in the form of an 'historical' or 'revealed' religion, also called an 'ecclesiastical faith' [see e.g., Kt8:102-3 (94), 162(151)]. A real (i.e., empirical) religion that can do this without distort¬ ing the priority of the 'pure religious faith' at its core can qualify for what Kant calls 'the universal religion of mankind' [Kt8:155(143)]. (I shall argue in Chapter VIII that Kant viewed Christianity as the prime example of the latter.) If we turn now to Kant's standard definition of religion, the error lying behind the strict reductionist interpretation can easily be exposed. The fact that he intends his definition to extend morality beyond its own boundaries to the¬ ology, and then beyond both to a new, distinctively religious standpoint, be¬ comes especially obvious if we look at the context in which Kant proposes his definition, where it is used to clarify the difference between revealed and natural religion: Religion is (subjectively regarded) the recognition of all duties as divine com¬ mands. 18 That religion in which I must know in advance that something is a 16. Kt39:494(214). See also Kt35:(81): 'Religion is the application of the moral laws to the knowl¬ edge of God, and not the origin of morals.... All religion assumes morality, and morality cannot, therefore, be derived from religion.' 17. Kt7:481. Kant makes a similar remark in Kt35:(78-9): 'Religion is morality applied to God. It is ethics applied to theology.... Accordingly, religion is the combination of ethics and theology ...'. However, he insists in Kt39:493(211) that, even though 'the concepts of religion always pre¬ suppose a theology', in religious education 'one must not begin with theology.... Morality must precede, theology follow, and then we have religion' [494-5(215)]. Thus there is a strict parallel between morality and theology in their relation to religion: Kant explains in Kt65:36 that 'theology' is 'the sum of certain teachings regarded as divine revelation', whereas 'religion' is 'the sum of all our duties regarded as divine commands'. The latter is echoed again in Kt7:460, where religion is defined as 'morality in relation to God as Lawgiver'. 18. Kant repeats this definition of religion throughout his systematic writings, including the first Critique [Ktl:846-7], the second Critique [Kt4:129], and the third Critique [Kt7:481]. See also Kt6:440,443,487; Kt8:103-4(95); Kt65:36; and AA10:179(Zw67:84). In Kt8:110(100) Kant says 'the performance of all human duties as divine commands... constitutes the essence of all religion.' Kant's aim in the passage quoted in the main text is, in the words of Collins, 'to avoid both a reductive rationalism and a reductive supernaturalism' [Co67:180; s.a. 164-5], In Kt9 Kant reverses
VI. Religion as the Synthesis of Theology and Morality
125
divine command in order to recognize it as my duty, is the revealed religion...; in ••••}'• contrast, that religion in which I must first know that something is my duty before I can accept it as a divine injunction is the natural religion. [Kt8:153-4(142-3)]
In revealed religion, then, morality conforms to theology, while in natural reli¬ gion theology conforms to morality [see Kt7:460 and Kt39:477(184)]. Kant goes on to distinguish between two types of natural religion, only the first of which would be reductionist in the strict sense. He contrasts the 'naturalist', who 'denies the reality of all supernatural divine revelation' with the 'pure rationalist', who 'recognizes revelation, but asserts that to know and accept it as real is not a necessary requisite to religion' [Kt8:154-5(143)]. Although in the first paragraph of this section [Kt8:153-5(142-3)] Kant never advocates any of these views, in the next paragraph he describes the po¬ sition of the pure rationalist (which does not entail eliminative reductionism) in a way that clearly implies his support for it. The pure rationalist, it seems, has read the first Critique\ For he 'must... restrict himself within the limits of hu¬ man insight', yet without dogmatising, as does the naturalist (and the strict re¬ ductionist). He then contrasts his position19 with 'pure supernaturalism', which tends towards a rather different form of strict reductionism: its proponent 'holds that belief in [revelation] is necessary to the universal religion', because human duties are nothing but God's revealed will. For Kant, 'the question at issue' is whether the pure rationalist or the pure supernaturalist position is cor¬ rect—i.e., whether divine revelation is to be regarded 'as necessary and sufficient, or as merely incidental, to the unique true religion.'20 After making this 'subjective' distinction between different ways of con¬ ceiving of the 'inner possibility' of religion, Kant makes another, 'objective' this formula to produce a definition of God: 'A Being for whom all human duties are likewise his commands, is God' [21.17(223)]. Green [Gg93:6] claims that Kant's emphasis on the word 'as' in the quoted passage is misleadingly left out by Green and Hudson. However, the German text [AA6] shows no such emphasis. Green then misleadingly takes the 'as' to indicate equivalency. As we shall see in VII. 1, it actually indicates the concentric relation between two unequal parts. Neglecting this, Green [11] thinks Kant is arguing for 'an essential identity between Christian doctrine and "religion within the limits of reason alone.'" But such an absolute reductionism would be untenable; as we shall see, the 'as' in Kant's definition requires compatibility, not identity. 19. That pure rationalism is Kant's position is further suggested by the fact that he repeatedly refers to his own task as that of discerning the nature of the 'religion of pure reason' [see e.g., Kt8:110 (100)]. Moreover, Kant 'recognizes revelation' in the sense that he devotes a whole section of Book Three [109-14(100-5)] to the task of discerning the 'authentic' principle for interpreting any document that purports to be revealed by God [see VIII.3.A]. 20. Kt8:155(143); see Kt65:37. The former position, Kant says in Kt65:36, is taken up by the 'biblical theologian', who is 'versed in the Scriptures with regard to ecclesiastical faith'; the latter is taken up by the 'rational theologian', who is 'versed in reason with regard to religious faith'. Chapters VIII and IX will examine Christianity from these two Perspectives (in reverse order): pure rational religion, supported by philosophical theology, on the one hand, and revealed religion, supported by biblical theology, on the other.
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distinction, in terms of the 'characteristics [of a religion] which make it capable of being sharedwidely with others' [Kt8:155(143)]. The main characteristic of 'the natural religion' is that '(once it has arisen) everyone can be convinced [of its truth] through his own reason', whereas that of 'a learned religion' is that 'one can convince others only through the agency of learning (in and through which they must be guided).' Only the former can qualify as 'the universal religion', because only it can be spread to everyone, regardless of educational status. He points out, however, that a religion such as Christianity might be 'objectively a natural religion, though subjectively one that has been revealed'21 —a claim we shall examine more fully in Chapter VIII. Seen in its proper context, Kant's definition of religion suggests the following 1SLR between theology, morality, and religion: morality (+) (natural religion)
true empirical religion (x) (universal religion)
theology (-) (revealed religion)
Figure VI.2: Theology, Morality, and Religion A 'revealed' religion is one that takes theology (or some form of revelation) as its sole basis, rejecting the need for any special aid from reason. A 'natural' religion takes morality (or some manifestation of reason) as its sole basis, rejecting the need for any special aid from revelation. In truly Critical fashion, Kant rejects both extremes (the former being too dogmatic, the latter being too skeptical) in favor of a more moderate view that combines them, forming the idea of an empirical religion that accepts the possibility of both natural religion 21. Kt8:156(144). That Kant himself genuinely believed this to be true is indicated by his contention, in a 1789 letter to Jacobi [AAll:74(Zw67:158)], that 'if the gospel had not previously instructed us in the universal moral laws, in their total purity, our reason would not yet have discovered them so completely; yet once we are in possession of them, we can convince anyone of their correctness and validity using reason alone.' This clearly demonstrates that Kant's statement about morality not needing religion [Kt8:3(3)] is transcendental, not empirical.
VI. Religion as the Synthesis of Theology and Morality (objectively) and revealed religion (subjectively). Only if objective priority is given to the former (i.e., only if it is not regarded as a 'learned' religion) can an empirical religion be considered as a candidate for a truly universal religion. Kant lends further support to this interpretation in Kt35:(83-4) when he explains that 'supernatural religion is not opposed to natural religion, but com¬ pletes it. Natural religion is true but incomplete.' It is incomplete because 'true religion', though essentially inner, always involves some outward expression: ... there is no such thing as an outer religion. All [true] religion is entirely a matter of disposition; all outward action is either a means to or an expression of the reli¬ gion within us: no outward act can be a religious act; acts of religion are within us, because true religion is purely a matter of disposition. [(82-83), e.a.]
Kant is here emphasizing the radically pure, or transcendental character of his special Critical Perspective on religion: just as Ktl (systemt) lays the transcen¬ dental foundation for empirical knowledge and Kt4 (systemp) lays the transcen¬ dental foundation for moral action, so also Kt8 (system,-) lays the transcendental foundation for real (empirical) religion. However, the fact that the inner dispo¬ sition must be primary does not mean it can stand on its own. On the contrary, only an empirical religion that combines the outer and the inner in the proper way can be universal. Accordingly, Kant leaves no doubt as to his position on the inadequacy of a merely inner religion [Kt35:(102)]: A pure religion... consists] solely in dispositions which are directed towards God and imply morality. A mixed religion, in so far as it appeals to the senses, is one which is merely a means to morality. But as man is sensuous and the religious ap¬ peal to the senses has its uses, it can be said that man can have no pure religion.
This makes it easier to understand why, in spite of his emphasis on the primacy of true 'inner' religion, Kant does not use the phrase lreinen Vernunft' in the title of Kt8. Once Kant's perspectival distinction between theology, morality, and reli¬ gion is clearly understood, his insistence that morality is the primary basis of religion, while theology is secondary, can be recognized as a rather straightfor¬ ward application of his general insistence on the 'primacy of practical reason': in Kant's System practical action always takes precedence over theoretical beliefs [see Kt4:119-21]. This is why he rejects all theoretical arguments for the existence of God, yet claims his moral argument is 'the only one needful for religion' [Kt7:474], so that 'the only theology of reason which is possible is one that is based upon moral laws' [664]. However, it is a grave mistake to treat Kant's moral argument for the existence of God as part of his theory of religion, as is so often done by those who view the latter as a mere footnote to his moral philosophy [see notes VI.2-5]. Not only does he never repeat the
127
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moral argument as such in Kt8, but as we shall see, he supplies new arguments that go beyond the mere postulate of God, guaranteed by the former. The faith that is the proper domain of theology is added to the knowledge that arises out of our moral nature in order to give rise to religion, in which the reality of God plays a role it never could in the moral system on its own. And the result is that the ultimate fulfillment of the moral law itself becomes possible: 'In religion all our morality ought to reach its fulfilment in respect of its object' [Kt35:(78-9)]. This perspectival interpretation of Kant's definition of religion puts it in a new light. When Kant says religion is the recognition of duties as divine com¬ mands, he is not secretly thinking: 'But we enlightened folk all know that they are actually nothing but human duties in disguise.' Rather, he is implying that the only way to make sense out of the universal human experience of inwardly compelling duty, and the only way to imagine how the enormous task it pre¬ sents to us can be fulfilled, given the factual reality of 'radical evil in human nature' [Kt8:19-44(15-39)], is to view these duties as if they are commanded by God (though, of course, their ultimate source can never be a matter of theoretical knowledge). This is why he says we must view our duties as divine (not just human) commands: we must view them as being connected (via the moral law within us) to a higher Power outside us (though not outside reason, lest they be heteronomous) or we will never be able to achieve their fulfillment. This fulfillment, according to Kant, is the heart and the hope of true religion.22 3. A Preview of Kant's System of Religion If the foregoing interpretation is correct, then the usual assumption, that Kt8 simply restates and expands the essentials of Kant's theory of morality in Kt4, is profoundly mistaken. Instead, Kt8 ought to be viewed as itself a transcendental Critique of Religion [see note VI. 14]—i.e., as an attempt to delineate the boundary between true religion and false religion by setting forth 22. Edwards argues that Kant's definition of religion renders invalid everything else he says about religion simply because it is a 'persuasive' definition (i.e., one that merely stipulates the 'true' or 'real' character of something in order to alter, weaken, or reinforce some 'attitudes and values' [Ed79:42]). As a result, Edwards completely ignores the fact that Kt8 is filled with arguments to support Kant's many claims, and that Kant presents his official definition not at the beginning of his exposition, but near the end! Moreover, the definition of a 'persuasive' definition, which Edwards borrows from St44:210, is itself a persuasive definition, since Edwards uses it to cast doubt upon the legitimacy of such definitions, and to divert our attention to supposedly true (i.e., 'descriptive') definitions. So this distinction between types of definition ends up casting doubt upon its own validity (at least, as long as one believes, with Edwards, that the only 'true' definition is a descriptive one)! For Kant, by contrast, to allow only descriptive definitions into the philoso¬ phy of religion would be tantamount to giving up everything distinctively philosophical in this discipline. What Edwards ignores is that a transcendental definition can be nondescriptive without being 'emotive'.
VI. Religion as the Synthesis of Theology and Morality
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the necessary conditions for the possibility of religious experience. And this is, indeed, precisely what Kant does. When he explains this in the Preface to the second edition of Kt8, he adds that his experiment will actually be twofold: first, to discover the rational conditions for the possibility of religion; and sec¬ ond, to test one particular religious faith, viz., Christianity, to see how closely it conforms to these conditions.23 Chapters VII and VIII will examine and assess the success of these two experiments in turn. As a final preparation for our detailed analysis of Kt8, though, let us take a general look at the book's overall structure.24 This will enable us to determine more precisely in VI.4 the extent to which Kant's rational system of religion is or is not reductive. Kt8 is divided into four 'Books', each of which develops one 'stage' (as I call it) in Kant's systematic exposition of the nature of religion. The primary task of the first stage is to answer the question: Is human nature originally good or evil? Kant's answer is (as usual) that it depends on what perspective the questioner adopts. If the question refers to the potential that resides in every human being as a 'living' (animal), 'rational' (human), and 'accountable' (per¬ sonal) being, then we must regard human nature as originally good, because these characteristics naturally 'enjoin the observance of the [moral] law' [Kt8: 26-8(21-3)]. However, if the question refers to the actual state of every human person in their first (and subsequent) moral act(s), then we cannot avoid the conclusion that an original ('radical') evil exists in human nature. This con¬ clusion is necessary not only if we base our judgment on 'what we know of man through experience' [32(27)]; in addition, 'it must be apprehended a priori through the concept of evil' [35(31)]. Thus, Kant concludes, 'we may presup¬ pose evil to be subjectively necessary to every man, even the best' [32(27)]. Kant's argument in stage one has not always been appreciated by his crit¬ ics, who would rather gloss over it in order to emphasize the 'good bits' (i.e., Kant's stress on moral goodness).25 Yet this two-sided answer to the question 23. Friedman [Fr86b:519] is probably alluding to these two experiments when he says that in Kt8 'Kant gives us both religion within the bounds of reason and reason within the bounds of religion, for while reason is the court of final judgment, religion is the source of this vision and the determiner of its limits.' The twofold nature of Kant's task in Kt8 will become more clear in VII.l. 24. The following sketch of Kant's religious system is a summary of the main points discussed in VII.2-3. Readers who, after reading VI.3, are not interested in a more detailed account of Kt8's first experiment may therefore wish to skip those lengthy sections of Chapter VII. 25. Ernst Cassirer discusses the negative reaction to Kant's doctrine of radical evil by his contem¬ poraries in Ca81:391-2. He explains, for example, that 'Goethe ... remarked bitterly in a letter to Herder that Kant has disgracefully "slobbered on" his philosopher's cloak "with the blot of radical evil, so that even Christ would be enticed to kiss its hem".' (Kant's actual views on the issue of Jesus's divine/perfect nature will be discussed in VIII.2.B.) To the likes of Goethe, as McCarthy rightly observes [Mc86:67], Kt8's doctrine of radical evil 'may have suggested intellectual treason.' Indeed, this impression has extended well beyond Kant's own day: 'Kant's doctrine of radical evil is a continual sense of embarrassment for philosophers' [Sc93:87n]. Cassirer's son,
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of human nature is as crucial to Kant's theory of religion as freedom is to his theory of morality, and as time and space are to his theory of knowledge. Kant is arguing, as we shall see in VII.2-3, that religion itself would not be possible if it were not true that human nature contains within it an intrinsically good pur¬ pose, and that the same human nature is nevertheless infected with an irre¬ sistible tendency towards evil. This tension sets the problem that all religion tries to solve; so without these two conditions, religion would never have ap¬ peared. Morality alone is insufficient because evil is inevitable for every human being. If evil were not inevitable, then we could realize the goal of becoming well-pleasing to God merely by remaining in the pure (moral) part of Kant's System. But in his religious system Kant insists right at the outset that we must recognize our inability to reach the goal in this way: we need more than mere morality, because nobody is perfect. We are all corrupted by radical evil. The second stage in Kant's religious system responds to the initial limiting conditions set out in stage one by examining 'the conflict of the good with the evil principle for sovereignty over man' [Kt8:57(50)]. The question Kant is trying to answer in Book Two is: How can an evil person become good? The answer interpreters have traditionally assumed Kant to be giving is that a person becomes good by acting in a good way, by obeying the moral law. This, once again, is a subtle misconstrual of the solution Kant actually offers. How does an evil heart become a good heart? Kant's initial answer is: For despite the fall, the injunction that we ought to become better men resounds unabatedly in our souls; hence this must be within our power, even though what we are able to do is in itself inadequate and though we thereby only render ourselves susceptible of higher, and for us inscrutable, assistance.... But if a man is to become not merely legally, but morally, a good man (pleasing to God),... this cannot be brought about through gradual reformation so long as the basis of the maxims [i.e., the 'heart'] remains impure, but must be effected through a revolution in the man's disposition... [Kt8:45-7(40-3)j.
Kant is here making two main points. The first is that, no matter how good we are, we cannot be good enough to please God (i.e., to fulfill the moral law) in every one of our actions. 'What we are able to do is in itself inadequate'! Then what is the importance of morality at all? Kant says that by acting morally we render ourselves susceptible of 'higher and, for us [i.e., for bare reason] inscrutable assistance'. Another (more conventionally religious) way of saying Heinrich Walter, himself claims [Ca88:76] that in his theory of radical evil 'Kant has departed to a marked extent from the position he previously occupied.' But the difference between Kant's treatment of moral issues in Kt4 and Kt5, as compared to that in Kt8, is due to a change in standpoint, not to a rejection or revision of the position previously adopted. Barth is correct to observe that radical evil seems to disturb the neatness Kant's System had maintained up to that point [Ba72:296-7]; but that it nevertheless belongs to systemr will be demonstrated in VII.2.A.
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the same thing is that grace is a necessary condition of becoming good. Kant supports this position explicitly in Kt8:75-6(70): 26 Here, then, is that surplus... over and above the profit from good works, and it is "v itself a profit which is reckoned to us by grace. That what in our earthly life... is ever only a becoming (namely, becoming a man well-pleasing to God) should be credited to us exactly as if we were already in full possession of it—to this we have no legal claim... Thus the decree is always one of grace alone...
Such a manifestation of grace occurs as a part of the conversion experience of the religious believer: even though we are not fully good, we are regarded as good by God. Kant almost seems to be defending the Lutheran position that salvation is by grace alone, not by works\ This is slightly misleading, how¬ ever, because he does not actually say 'not by works'; rather, he says both works and grace are necessary. Good works are necessary from the moral standpoint of practical reason; and grace is necessary from the nonmoral standpoint of theoretical reason. Kant's view is that, if salvation is going to happen, both of these requirements must be met. The question this raises is: What is the proper order"? From one point of view, grace must come first, because there is no way a person can erase the evil deeds he or she has already done, and the first moral (i.e., freely chosen) action performed by every person is evil [see notes VIII. 16,17]. God must take the initiative. But how does this happen? Kant says bare reason cannot answer this question. All we can do is recognize the space left open by reason, which needs to be filled. Filling this space is not an optional extra, intended only for those who need a crutch; rather, it must be filled in some way by God's grace if a person is to become well-pleasing to God. Naked reason cannot tell us exactly how this will happen. Only faith, as a complement to the inadequacy of our theoretical reason, can pave the way for such a disclosure. Kant's theory of this 'space' is expressed primarily in terms of what he calls the 'archetype of perfect humanity'. The grace of God, from the point of view of bare reason, can only be regarded as an archetype. By 'archetype' Kant means every human being possesses, as it were, an inner 'space', ready and waiting to be filled by the grace of God. But nothing in our reason can guarantee the actual filling of that space. The problem, Kant says, is that we are not able to see clearly into the depths of the human heart—not even our own heart. So there is no way we can know for sure whether or not God has actually manifested his grace to us, or whether we have accepted it completely 26. Anyone who believes Kant is merely preaching a religion of good works must answer to his clear statements to the contrary, such as can be found in this and numerous other Kt8 passages! For a detailed discussion of Kant's doctrines of atonement and grace, see AVI.2-4.
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[see e.g., Kt8:51(46),67-9(61-2)]. We cannot tell for sure whether the 'space' we have in our reason has actually been filled. So what can we do? Kant says what we must do is to adopt what he calls 'practical faith'. In a nutshell, Kant's notion of practical faith says this: Try your best, and trust that God will do the rest. That is, do your moral duty as often as you can, follow the moral law in your heart, but never fool yourself into believing that this alone will save you, because you will always fall short. Kant stresses this idea time after time;27 and yet, whenever he says it, strict reductionist inter¬ preters sweep his comments off to one side and surmise 'Well, he must have been trying to please the governmental authorities of the established church, who were threatening to censor his work.28 He couldn't have believed thatV Yet this kind of selective interpretation is unjustified, particularly at this point, where he is expounding the very heart of his entire philosophical System. We can therefore summarize Kant's argument in stage two as follows. Kant is saying that, although we can never make ourselves worthy to be ac¬ cepted by God, we can make ourselves worthy to be made acceptable by God. This is the proper relationship, according to Kant, between good works and grace.29 Doing good works—trying to live a good life—is the rational basis upon which we can conceive of ourselves as having received God's grace. For our moral action is based on the same disposition through which we open our¬ selves up to the possibility of having our immoral deeds covered up by God. Up to this point Kant's religious system has been concerned only with the salvation of the individual believer. But in stage three he argues that 'the victory 27. See e.g., Kt8:45(40-l),52(47),67n(61n),71-6(65-71),97-8(89),100-l(92),l 16-20(106-11),171-2 (159-60),173(161). 28. See note VIII.4. Vossenkuhl [Vo88:181] is a good example of someone who regards the threat of censorship as the main explanation for the cautious approach Kant takes in Kt8. Kt8 was published just as the new king (Frederick William II) was tightening his grip on academia through a program of strict religious censorship. The idea of some interpreters, that in Kt8 Kant sometimes softens his real views, or writes with a twist of irony, in hopes of appeasing the authorities, is not only an unfounded insult to Kant's integrity, but would also indicate a pro¬ found inability on Kant's part to judge what would actually offend the authorities! For Kant was severely reprimanded for the views he expressed in Kt8, which were interpreted as being subversive to the established church's interpretation of Christianity. He responded by loyally promising the king he would never again publish or speak publicly on the subject of religion during his reign. After the king's death, Kant promptly resumed his public stance on religion, since his vow referred only to his duty as a servant of that particular king—a fortunate decision indeed for posterity, since Kt65 provides an invaluable inside look at Kant's own understanding of how Kt8 ought to be interpreted. He explains and defends this decision in Kt65:5-ll, and includes an explicit statement [Kt65:9-10] indicating the religious seriousness with which he composed his writings: 'I always pictured this judge [viz., the voice of God speaking through the conscience] as standing at my side to keep me not only from error that corrupts the soul, but even from any careless expression that might give offense.' 29. For a more complete statement of Kant's solution to the traditional problem of the conflict between faith and works, see AVI.4.
VI. Religion as the Synthesis of Theology and Morality of the good over the evil principle, and the founding of a kingdom of God on earth' [Kt8:93(85)] can occur only in the context of a community. Therefore, the questions to be answered in Book Three all revolve around the issue of the nature and justification of such a community, regarded as a necessarily religious institution. Why do we need such a community? Because when a converted person lives in close proximity to other people—even if these others are also trying to live good lives—they will inevitably have a corrupting in¬ fluence on each other. The radical evil in their nature as human beings will still corrupt the goodness of the individual's deeds, giving rise to inter-personal conflicts such as jealousy, selfishness, etc. [Kt8:93-4(85-6)]. For this reason, people seeking to live a good life need to join together in the form of what Kant calls an 'ethical commonwealth'. In other words, we need to come together and make an agreement to cooperate, based on moral laws [95-8(87-9)]. The strict reductionist interpretation of Kant stops at this point: it says the ethical commonwealth is Kant's description of how the unity of pure moral re¬ ligion can come about. But Kant himself actually says the ethical common¬ wealth on its own is an insufficient basis for the realization of true religion. Why? Because the people who unite together in this way must work according to the additional assumption that the same Being, or the same transcendent Power, is at the root of their internally prescribed moral commands. In other words, they must believe there is a God who guides all the members of such a group in harmony with each other. On the basis of this argument (to be exam¬ ined in more detail in VII.3.A), Kant concludes that the ethical commonwealth will be effective only when it is viewed as an invisible 'People of God' who come together under the idea of a church. Each member can then be regarded as receiving in his or her own heart individual guidance from God. Ultimately, the level of cooperation between the people joined together in such a community will therefore be determined by the extent to which each person receives guid¬ ance from the same divine Being. Yet this need to rely on God for the final realization of the highest human good does not release human beings from re¬ sponsibility. On the contrary, as we shall see in VII.3.A, Kant stresses that the true church must have a definite (archetypal) form through human organization. Kant concludes his system of religion in stage four by asking how we can determine whether or not a particular aspect of an empirical religion is genuine. In order to distinguish between false religion and true religion, he offers the following principle: I take the following proposition to be a principle requiring no proof: Whatever, over and above good life-conduct, man fancies that he can do to become well-pleas¬ ing to God is mere religious illusion and pseudo-service of God. I say, what man
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PART TWO: CRITICAL THEOLOGY believes that he can do; for here it is not denied that beyond all that we can do there may be something in the mysteries of the highest wisdom that God alone can do to transform us into men well-pleasing to Him.... But is there not also perhaps a dizzying illusion of virtue...? No! The disposition of virtue occupies itself with something real which of itself is well-pleasing to God and which harmonizes with the world's highest good. True, an illusion of self-sufficiency may attach itself thereto, an illusion of regarding oneself as measuring up to the idea of one's holy duty; but this is merely contingent. [Kt8:170-3(158-161)]
Passages such as this have typically been interpreted along the lines of strict (eliminative) reductionism: Kant is believed to be saying that nothing besides morality counts, so we can throw away everything else. But this is not what he says! On the contrary, he explicitly states that we can never hope to behave well enough to 'measure up' completely to the required standard. He is arguing that anything completely detached from morality is not part of true religion. Nevertheless, elsewhere in Book IV he explains that there is a proper place for nonmoral aspects of religion, for aspects of our empirical religion that are accepted by faith, but are not in themselves morally good or bad. These do have a proper place as long as we keep them attached to morality, as long as there is a definite connection between such nonmoral religious activities or beliefs and the moral core of religion. Thus Kant's principle entails that nonmoral religious activity can be a legitimate part of the true (universal) religion only if it serves as a means for deepening or quickening a person's moral disposition. The error Kant's principle is guarding against is not that of admitting nonmoral aspects into an empirical religion; rather it is that of reversing the priority of the moral over the nonmoral, by viewing the latter not merely as the means to a moral end, but as themselves the objective condition for God's acceptance. Hence whoever assigns priority to obedience to statutory laws, requiring a revela¬ tion, as being necessary to religion, and regards 'this obedience not merely as a means to the moral disposition but as the objective condition of becoming imme¬ diately well-pleasing to God, and whoever thus places endeavor toward a good course of life below this historical faith (instead of requiring the latter, which can be well-pleasing to God only conditionally, to adapt itself to the former, which alone is intrinsically well-pleasing to Him)—whoever does this transforms the ser¬ vice of God into a mete fetishism and practises a pseudo-service which is subver¬ sive to all endeavors toward true religion. So much depends, when we wish to unite two good things, upon the order in which they are united! True enlighten¬ ment lies in this very distinction; therein the service of God becomes first and foremost a free and hence a moral service. [Kt8:178-9(166-7)]
Here Kant is not equating nonmoral activities to false religion, and moral ac¬ tivities to true religion, as the strict reductionist interpretation would have it. Rather, he is describing true religion as the combination of these two elements in their proper order. From our point of view as human beings, morality is the
VI. Religion as the Synthesis of Theology and Morality
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first basis, the foundation of our building of religion, whereas faith and nonmoral religious activities constitute the building itself. False religion is the belief that some theoretical (i.e., nonmoral) belief or idea is the basis, the foundation, and that morality just comes as an extra, secondary element—or maybe even not at all. But if the priorities are right, then both the moral and the nonmoral can cooperate as proper elements in true religion. 4. Raising Morality to the Status of Religion This more balanced way of interpreting Kant's intentions provides a good basis for making an accurate initial evaluation of the extent to which his two experiments succeed. We shall see in the next two chapters that both are far more successful than strict reductionists would lead us to believe. For the answers Kant gives to the wide range of questions occupying his attention in Kt8 go far beyond the simple idea that religion is just morality in disguise. A brief look at three issues of special importance can serve as a tantalizing preview of the implications the perspectival interpretation of Kant's Critical theology given here in Part Two has for Kant's philosophy of religion. Kant's views concerning the divinity of Jesus, the efficacy of prayer, and the authority of the Bible as a divine revelation have typically been taken to be contrary, if not hostile, to the traditional Christian doctrines. Although Kant certainly does not defend the orthodox views, the strict reductionist interpretation has blinded many readers to the fact that he also does not deny the validity of such doctrines, but rather offers a new, more moderate explanation of their validity. In each case, his explanations of such doctrines promote (what I shall call) a 'liberating conservatism' and 'conserving liberalism' (in opposition of the usual extremes of an exclusively conservative or liberal interpretation of Christian doctrine) [see VIII.4]. A careful examination of the first issue reveals that Kant never denies Jesus' divinity [see AVI.2]. On the contrary, he explicitly requires that this question be left open, to be decided by faith, not bare reason [Kt8:63-4(57-8)]; nevertheless, he clearly outlines a 'space' for such a divine nature in his theory of the 'personified idea [i.e. the 'archetype'] of the good principle' in all human persons [60-2(57-8)], and he even hints that Jesus' divinity could be inter¬ preted in terms of his 'disposition', in which 'the ideal of goodness' was 'displayed incarnate' [65-6(59); s.a. 128-9(119-20)]. Kant's criticism of the traditional view is directed primarily to those who emphasize Jesus' divinity to such an extent that his humanity (and thus his ability to serve as an example to all human beings) is neglected [63-4(57-8)]; but he also guards against the opposite extreme of dogmatically denying Jesus' divinity altogether.
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Likewise, Kant never claims that prayer is merely an ineffective illusion that should be eliminated from true religion.30 On the contrary, he insists that the 'spirit' of prayer lies at the very heart of all true religion; for prayer serves to 'fan into flame the cinders of morality in the inner recesses of the heart' [Kt35:(99)]. His criticism of prayer as it is commonly practiced is that an emphasis on the 'letter' (i.e., on the words that are the uttered) can often lead a person to hold the false belief that the uttering of such words is, in itself, pleasing to God [Kt8:194-8(182-6)]. All nonmoral religious activities are treated in a similar way: they lead to false religion only if regarded as a direct way of serving God [103-6(94-7)]; if they are treated as an indirect type of service, intended 'to induce in us a moral disposition' [Kt35:(99)], then they are not only valid, but can be vital to true religion [Kt8:192(180-1)]. The profound implications of this interpretive principle for understanding the role of nonmoral religious activities is brought out most fully in Appendix VIII, where the specific issue of prayer is examined in great detail. Finally, Kant never intends to deny the reliability of the Bible as a divinely revealed guideline for the faith and practice of the true church.31 On the con¬ trary, he stresses that some text is necessary, and that this text (i.e., the Bible) has proven its value by repeatedly serving as a vehicle for awakening people to true religion [Kt8:106-7(97-8)]; moreover, he carefully explains how its moral content can assure us of its divinely revealed character [112(102-3)]. His criti¬ cism of the common belief in divine revelation is directed mainly against those who regard rational belief in the theology contained in a particular book as the necessary condition for pleasing God, so that 'learning' and 'scholarship', rather than practical faith and good life-conduct, inevitably come to be regarded as the most important elements in religion |j 112-4(103-5)]. Although our more exhaustive study of the way Kant defends this and each of the above doctrines will reveal some clear differences between his views and the views of both conservative and liberal theologians [see VIII.2.B-3.B], his position is never¬ theless remarkably compatible with that of many open-minded Christians. Our general overview of Kt8 has given us plenty of evidence for concluding 30. A typical example of the many commentators who misunderstand this point is MacKinnon, who refers to Kant's 'rejection of prayer as unworthy of the responsible human individual' [Ma90a: 354]. McCarthy's position in Mc86:95 sounds the same at first, but turns out to be more accurate. He says prayer and other acts of worship 'are all worthless in making one well-pleasing to God.' This seems to ignore their legitimate role as indirect ways of serving God [see AVII.1,4 and AVIII.l]. But McCarthy is at least partially aware of this qualification to his previous claim: 'prayer can awaken the disposition to goodness, while it cannot obtain grace.' 31. Loades [L081:304], for example, claims Kant 'eliminates ecclesiastical claims to the possession of revealed truth.' But as we have seen, his reduction is not eliminative, but explanatory. He therefore does not intend to eliminate revelation, but to bind it necessarily to morality.
VI. Religion as the Synthesis of Theology and Morality that Kant does insist on maintaining a necessary connection between morality and religion, so in this loose, explanatory sense, he does indeed reduce everything religious to the level of morality. In other words, morality clearly is for Kant the pure (and hence, necessary) core of all true religion. But as we have seen throughout this chapter, this is because he recognizes that only if morality is raised to the status of religion will it be able to fulfill its own goals! Far from requiring the elimination of all nonmoral elements, Kant's approach rather guarantees their potential value by rooting them in the only human soil capable of enabling nonmoral religious beliefs and practices to grow and flour¬ ish. In the eliminative sense, then, MacKinnon is right to say in Ma75:132 that 'Kant's philosophy of religion is very far from reductionist.' My strategy in answering the question posed at the outset of this chapter (viz., 'does Kant reduce theology and religion to morality?') has been to focus primarily on religion. Morality enables us to explain religion, but not to elimi¬ nate it. As we saw in VI.2, religion for Kant is the synthesis of morality and theology. With this in mind, we can readily apply the same reasoning to Kant's view of theology. Like morality, theology can have an explanatory relation to religion, but never to the point of eliminating it. In relation to morality, theology likewise has a clearly secondary status. Yet even here we cannot say Kant in¬ tends to eliminate all theology, merely replacing it with morality. For if theology were eliminated, then religion itself (the synthesis of morality and theology) would be rendered impossible. Moreover, we have seen throughout Part Two that Kant himself develops quite an elaborate theology of his own—hardly what we would expect from someone who was trying to eliminate or destroy all theology! Far from eliminating all religion and theology, Kant's views on the central role of morality in these disciplines are so affirming that they could be com¬ pared with those of the biblical writers themselves, thus giving rise to another, parallel question: Did Jesus and the writers of the Bible reduce religion (or theology) to morality! A definitive answer to this question is, of course, beyond the scope of this book. Nevertheless, as we shall see in more detail in Chapters VIII and IX, numerous aspects of Kant's theory have close parallels in Christianity. For now, it will therefore suffice to point out, as an example, that Kant's view of religion is essentially the same as that of the prophet who asks:32
3
2 . Micah 6:6-8, e.a. Quoted from New American Standard Bible (Carol Stream, 111.: Creation House Inc., 1960).
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PART TWO: CRITICAL THEOLOGY With what shall I come to the Lord and bow myself before the God on high? Shall I come to Him with burnt offerings, with yearling calves? Does the Lord take de¬ light in thousands of rams, in ten thousand rivers of oil? Shall I present my first¬ born for my rebellious acts, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul? He has told you, O man, what is good; and what does the Lord require of you but to do justice, to love kindness, and to walk humbly with your God?
PART THREE KANT'S PERSPECTIVAL FOUNDATION FOR CRITICAL RELIGION 'Though your sins are like scarlet, they shall be as white as snow; though they are red as crimson, they shall be like wool. If you are willing and obedient, you will eat the best from the land; but if you resist and rebel, you will be devoured by the sword.' For the mouth of the LORD has spoken. [Is. l:18b-20] ... everyone who does what is right has been born of [God]. [1 Jn. 2:29] The sublime, yet never wholly attainable, idea of an ethical commonwealth dwindles markedly under men's hands.... How indeed can one expect something perfectly straight to be formed out of such crooked wood? [Kt8:100(91-2)]
Chapter VII Kant's System of Religious Perspectives ... to have religion is a duty of man to himself. [Kt6:444]
1. The Four Stages of Religion in General As a result of the highly abstract character of much of Kant's theology, both in its positive and negative aspects [cf. IV.2-4 and AIV.1-3], there is a general consensus among those who have any opinion on the matter that 'Kant's God is, most aggressively, the God of the philosophers.'1 It is a mis¬ take, however, to infer from Kant's Critical theology (especially from the philosophical concept of God developed in the three Critiques) that his God is nothing but an abstract philosophical concept. On the contrary, Kant's purpose in developing his Critical theology was to a large extent to defend the legitimacy of his fervent belief in the God of his youth, and to separate the genuine ele¬ ments of his parents' Pietist tradition from the unnecessary trappings that tended to obscure its true value [see e.g., Kt8:132n(123n)]. Webb fully appre¬ ciates this point: 'Not only did Kant... always believe in the existence of God as a real Being...; but also..., he envisaged the God, in whom he never ceased to believe, after the fashion of the theism current in his youth.'2 Thus it is wrong to interpret Kant's personal lack of participation in organized religion as a denial of the value of religion in general, or of Christianity in particular. To 1. Wo78:60; s.a. Vo88:180. Likewise, Guyer claims that in Kt8 and Kt65 'Kant argued firmly for the primacy of philosophy over religion' [Gu92a:4]. But as we saw in Chapter VI, Kant holds such a view of the relation between philosophy (as the guardian of practical reason) and theology (as the attempt to apply theoretical reason to gain knowledge of God), but would not make such a bold claim about religion, which is the synthesis of morality and theology. Thus Friedman [Fr86b:518] claims that 'Kant's attempt to move to religion from morality reveals that religion is for him the teacher of the mind ..., while philosophy is the handmaiden.' McCarthy's view is still more accurate [Mc86:98]: Kant's God 'is not the traditional God of Christian theologians or of philosophers. For ...he is a living God, the judge of human hearts', and wills 'creation's moral goodness', yet without 'intervening in the process.' As we shall see in VIII.3.A and AVII.2, the latter claim is open to considerable doubt, since Kant does leave room for God's grace and very occasional miracles. In any case, more detailed accounts of Kant's position on the relation between philosophy and theology are given in VI.2 and note VII.3. 2. We26:49-50; s.a. De73:255. Greene's description [Gr34:xii-xxii] of the religious climate of Kant's youth, as characterized on one side by a demand for 'correct ceremonial and orthodox belief [xii], and on the other by a pietistic revolution demanding 'that justification and rebirth be actually experienced' [xiii], helps to explain why (as we shall see) Kant reacted against these established traditions—especially the former. For, as Webb points out in We26:20, 'the effects of Pietism in Kant's conception of religion' are clearly evident in his emphasis on the moral law, individualism, conversion, and radical evil, as well as in 'his obvious familiarity with the Bible' [20]; 'in all these features of his mind and character we trace the result of his religious education in Pietistic surroundings.' Kant was far from being uncritical of his tradition, however. For instance, he rejects any form of Pietism that is based on 'the principle of a passive attitude toward a godliness which is to be awaited from a power above' [Kt8:184n(173n); s.a. Kt65:55-7; but cf. Kt8:24n(19n)].
VII. Systemr
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do so would be as inappropriate as to interpret his avoidance of the services of doctors and lawyers as an outright rejection of medicine and government. Instead, all of these can be explained in terms of his tendency to carry individ¬ ualism to an extreme: 'Every man his own doctor, every man his own lawyer, every man his own priest,—that was the ideal of Kant' .3 Kant's theology is bound to give the impression of total abstraction to those who fail to recognize that its main purpose is 'to form the basis of reli¬ gion' [Ktl:656]. This might seem at first sight to pose an insurmountable problem, however, in light of his conviction that all attempts to prove the exis¬ tence of God theoretically 'are altogether fruitless and by their very nature null and void' and 'do not lead to any theology whatsoever' [664]. Nevertheless, as we saw in IV.2-4, Kant avoids this problem by arguing that 'the mere possibil¬ ity of such a being [viz., God] is sufficient to produce religion in man' [Kt26: 998(27)]. For 'in religion ... no assertorial knowledge is required (even of God's existence)'; the only requirement is 'an assertorial faith' [Kt8:1534n(142n)]. As long as we keep in mind the primacy of practical reason, the limitations of theoretical reason will not be a valid excuse for living as though God does not exist, because a practical faith in God carries us 'farther into the heart of reality than the purely speculative or scientific reason could ever take us' [We26:69]. Although Kant's concern for the autonomy of morality leads him to emphasize that 'morality does not need religion at all... either to know
3. Wa01:47. In Kt65:21-2 Kant discusses the relationship between the four 'faculties' that constitute a university. He describes them in terms of a 2LAR, consisting of a 'lower' faculty (philosophy), which has no power to influence people directly (--), and three 'higher' faculties (law, medicine, and theology), which do have varying degrees of theology (++) influence. This division can be mapped onto the cross as shown on the diagram to the left. Because philosophy has no direct influ¬ ence on ordinary people, but only an indirect influence through the agency of the three higher faculties, Kant argues that philosomedicine _ _ _ _ _ philosophy phers should have the right to publish their ("") views freely: government censorship should pertain only to scholars in the higher facul¬ ties. In Kt65:30 Kant connects the three higher faculties to the three principle desires of ordinary people: 'being happy after death, law (+-) having their possessions guaranteed by pub¬ lic laws ..., and finally,... looking forward to ...health and a long life'. The philosopher suggests that in order for these wishes to be fulfilled, one should 'live righteously, commit no injustice, and, by being moderate in his pleasures and patient in his illnesses, rely primarily on the self-help of nature.' Unwilling to accept such strict demands, most people look to the clergyman, the lawyer, and the physician for miraculous help, even though they have 'been a scoundrel all [their]life,... broken the law, ... and abused [their] physical powers' [30].
142
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what duty is or to impel the performance of duty',4 he would also admit that 'without faith in God', as Webb puts it, the moral law 'must seem to b e . . . a voice crying in the wilderness of an alien world, its presence wherein must remain an inexplicable and baffling mystery' [We26:86; see e.g., Kt4:129-30; Kt7:474]. The main aim of Kant's Critical theology, therefore, is to provide the basis for a philosophically sound account of religion. In this chapter, we shall begin our discussion of Kant's Critical religion proper—i.e., as the topic of Part Three, rather than the topic of this entire second volume of Kant's System of Perspectives. My goal will be to demon¬ strate how a recognition of the theocentric and perspectival character of Kant's Critical philosophy [see Part One], together with an appreciation of Kant's true attitude towards God and theology [see Part Two], can shed new light on the implications of his critique of religion, as it is laid out primarily in his two books on religion, Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason [Kt8] and The Conflict of the Faculties [Kt65], but also in scattered comments throughout his lectures [especially Kt26 and Kt35] and other writings. I shall begin in this section by continuing Chapter VI's discussion of the place of religion in Kant's System, focusing in particular on the structure of Kt8 and on the interplay be¬ tween pure (or 'transcendental') and empirical religion. The remainder of this chapter will then examine in detail the systematic contents (i.e., what Kant could have called the 'transcendental elements') of religion, as set forth in Kt8. (These sections will apply to Kant's system of religious perspectives the same architectonic mapping principles outlined in KSP1:III.3 and VII. 1 for systemt and systemp: each stage will be analyzed in terms of a three-step, synthetic ar¬ gument, with the four stages related to each other as a 2LAR.51 shall therefore Kt8:3-4(3). This position is verified by experience: we need not look far to find examples of nonreligious people who are highly moral. Kant goes even further, however, when he says 'no one, not even God, can be the author of the laws of morality' [Kt35:(51)], even though from a religious standpoint such laws can 'be regarded as divine commandments' [(52)]. The former is implied by Kant's strict distinction between theology (-) and morality (+) [see Fig. VI.2]; the latter does not require the religious person to believe a falsehood, but merely to adopt the properly religious standpoint (x), where theology and morality are synthesized. Thus, as Kant puts it in Kt35:(81): 'All religion assumes morality, and morality cannot, therefore, be derived from religion.' This claim, initially made in KSP1:96, is substantiated here in VII.2-3. Collins does not use the term 'analytic' in the technical sense spelled out in KSP1:III.3 when he appears to express the opposite view by saying Kant's procedure in Kt8 'is to make an analytic inspection of religion as an experienced, complex reality among men' [Co67:155] and 'to focus analytically upon that general meaning for religion which is conveyed by some given revelational religion' [156]. The phrases 'as an experienced ...reality' and 'by some given [revelation]' suggest that by 'analytic' Collins means Kant is constructing a system of transcendental elements that ground something em¬ pirical—and this is just what Kant describes as synthetic a priori. This may be what Despland has in mind when he says Kt8's approach 'is not merely descriptive and analytical' [De73:246]. As I suggested in note 111.25 of KSP1, Despland is right to deny that Kt8 is a fourth Critique and also to deny that it belongs to the metaphysical wing of Kant's System [158]. Cassirer seems to be ex-
VII. Systemr
143
adopt the convention of referring to the religious system as 'system/.) Follow¬ ing the synopsis of Kant's argument given in VI.3, I shall present in VII.2 a detailed account of Kant's treatment of the nature of and conflict between good and evil. His views on the church and its service of God will be the subject of VII.3. Finally, I shall conclude in VII.4 with a summary of this architectonic, perspectival interpretation of systemr. By focusing in this chapter on outlining the transcendental elements of system,-, we shall be limiting our attention to the first of the two 'experiments' Kant refers to in the Preface to the second edition of Kt8 [see VI.3]. These two experiments actually correspond directly to the nature of pure and empirical re¬ ligion, respectively. The first experiment, Kant says in Kt8:12(11), concerns the 'narrower' sphere identified as 'the pure religion of reason', and aims at constructing a 'pure rational system of religion.' The second, by contrast, con¬ cerns 'the wider sphere of faith', and aims at assessing one particular empirical religion by 'startfing] from some alleged revelation or other and.. .examining] in a fragmentary manner this revela¬ tion, as an historical system, in the Experiment Two. light of moral concepts'. Kant sug¬ Assess one example of a gests the image of 'concentric circles' as a good model for picturing the rela¬ Experiment One: tionship between these two experi¬ Find the elements ments. Following this suggestion gives of pure rational us the map in Figure VII. 1. After (= moral) religion completing our examination of the first experiment here in Chapter VII, we real, empirical religion shall turn in Chapter VIII to the (viz., Christianity) second, in which Kant tests the applicability of his theory by using it to Figure VII. 1: Kant's Two assess the rationality of the Christian Experiments in Kt8 pressing the latter opinion when he refers to Kt8 as one of Kant's 'pedagogical works' [Ca81:387], but he never defends this claim in any way. * My view [cf. KSP1:IH.4] is that Kt8 and Kt7 are obviously meant to work together in answer¬ ing the judicial question of hope, in the same way that Ktl and Kt2 answer the theoretical question of knowledge and Kt4 and Kt5, the practical question of moral action. The fact that Kt8 is so obviously written in the twelvefold, synthetic form of a Critique may be due to the fact that Kt7 fails to exhibit this architectonic form [see KSPl:IX.l]. Kt8 makes up for this, but could not be named 'Critique of...', because there is no room in Kant's System for a fourth Critique and a third Critique had already been published. As suggested in note VI. 14, the best way to reconstruct Kant's System would be to regard Kt8 as the third Critique and Kt7 as its analytical supporting work. In any case, the two 'experiments' in Kt8 (see below in main text) can be regarded as directly parallel to the two types of judgment in Kt7—one moving from the rational to the factual, the other from the factual to the rational [cf. Fig. AIII.3],
PART THREE: CRITICAL RELIGION
144
religion. Part Three will then conclude with a chapter adopting the Perspective of the biblical theologian in order to provide a Christian response to Kant's views on religion in general and on Christianity in particular. The outline of Kt8, as shown in Table VII. 1, is simpler than that of most other books in Kant's System of Perspectives [cf. KSP1:III.2], with only nine different divisions (not counting the untitled introductions, the 'General Obser¬ vations' appended to each Book, and the numbered paragraphs within a few of the subsections). Its most important feature for our purposes is the initial two¬ fold division of Books Two through Four. In each case the first section/divi¬ sion/part relates more closely to the first experiment, while the main task of the second section/division/part is to perform the second experiment. Book One was initially published on its own as a journal article, so its format does not match that of the other Books; discussion of the two experiments is mixed throughout all four of the numbered sections. Another architectonically significant feature of Table VII. 1 is its division of the main text into four 'Books'. As we have seen, the first book deals with 'the
Table VII. 1: Analysis of the Table of Contents to Kt8 Prefaces (two editions) Book Two Book Three
Divisions Book Four
4
(Introduction) • i l l III IV I General Observation (Introduction) Section One -Section Two ABC General Observation (Introduction) Division One—I—Division Two I II III IV V VIVII General Observation
Frequency of Divisions:
2!s S i s
Is
4
1
1 3
(Introduction) Part One- -Part Two (Introduction) -I Section One—*—Section Two (Introduction) 12 3 4 General Observation
VII. Systemr
indwelling' of 'radical evil in human nature' [Kt8:19(15)]; the second, with 'the conflict of the good with the evil principle for sovereignty over man' [57(50)]; the third, with 'the victory of the good over the evil principle' [9 (85)]; and the fourth, with 'service and pseudo-service under the sovereignty of the good principle' [151(139)]. Regarding these as four stages in a systematic critique of religion enables us to correlate each with one of Kant's _ ,
,
„. ,
,
..
145
IV. True I I. Radical Evil service (--) ofGod(++)' I
III. Victory i II. Conflict of good over of good with
„
„
'. ' „
The Four Stages in Kant's
four perspectives6 and map them onto
_
,
System of Religion
,
* • i
u
•
° „ ,. .
J J the quadrants of a circle, as shown in ° Figure VII.2. The two lLARs that combine to make up this 2LAR are dis¬ tinctions between (1) the relatively passive (-) functions of 'indwelling' or
6. Cf. Fig. III.4. Neglecting this correspondence between Books and perspectives, McCarthy [Mc86:59] claims that Kt8 does not present us with 'a complete religious system or philosophy of religion.' He rightly rejects the view that Kt8 'adds nothing to Kant's philosophy' and is 'not formally a part' of it; yet proceeds to affirm [60] that Kant's 'philosophy of religion is not a part of the Critical Philosophy as such'. The latter is true in the narrowest and most obvious sense, in that Kt8 is not presented explicitly as a Critique [cf. note VI.14]; but this does not decrease its signifi¬ cance for Kant's System of Perspectives as a whole. A similar neglect of perspectives leads Flesher [F188:119] to conclude that 'Kant completely fails to reveal a clear argument in Religion. In addition, the work has no climax.' But this is no more true of Kt8 than it is of Kant's three Critiques. Once we recognize the hypothetical perspec¬ tive as the climax of Kant's architectonic style, its presence in Kt8 becomes as clear as its presence in Ktl and Kt4 [see KSPl:VII.l,VIII.l]. Nevertheless, Flesher does agree that 'we must treat Reli¬ gion as a system' [121]. Thus, he rightly argues [128] 'that Kant's argument and the structure he gives to Religion complement each other.' But Flesher's analysis of this structure does not go deep enough. He merely distinguishes between Book One, on evil, and Books Two to Four, on society's response to evil [123]. He thinks Kant's animality-humanity distinction corresponds to the indivi¬ dual-society distinction [128], inasmuch as Kant relates our humanity to 'the opinion of others'. Flesher's claim, however, that the 'two solutions' to the problem of evil (the individual and the so¬ cial) come in Book One and Books Two through Four, respectively, is incorrect. Book One does not explain how an individual 'can overcome evil', as he claims. Rather, the struggle with evil be¬ gins only in Book Two, with society entering into the picture in Book Three [see note VII.15]. Perhaps the grossest example of an interpreter who mistakes his own inability to see system¬ atic connections for a problem in the text itself is Michalson. In Mi93:41, to single out but one instance, he complains about Kant's tendency in Kt8 to inject 'unruly notions that wreak havoc with philosophical principles he has established elsewhere or that appear starkly incompatible with other positions taken within the Religion itself.' This 'instability', he adds, is 'a virtual leit¬ motif designed to frustrate.' Later, he concludes: 'the book is a mess' [51]; 'taken as a collection of philosophical arguments about religion, [Kt8] is apparently a failure.' My goal here in Part Three is to demonstrate how thoroughly incorrect such a conclusion is. The 'mess' is caused not by Kant's inattention to supposedly blatant self-contradictions, but by the interpreter's neglect of the principle of perspective, and his resulting inability to see architectonic interconnections.
PART THREE: CRITICAL RELIGION
146
'victory' 7 and the more active (+) functions of 'conflict' or 'service', for the first term, and (2) the focus of Kant's attention on either the individual (-) or social (+) requirements of religion, for the second term. The next two sections of this chapter are related according to the latter distinction,8 while the twofold subdivision of each of those two sections is based on the former distinction. With this in mind, we can now summarize (partially in anticipation) the basic perspectival organization of systemr in a tabular form similar to the one used in KSPl:VII.l for systemt) and in KSPl:VIII.l for system p [see Table VII.2]. Of all the books in Kant's entire System, none fits more naturally into the fourfold pattern of Kant's architectonic than Kt8, with its neat division into four 'Books'. Labeling the four perspectives in system r is somewhat more tenuous than for systemt, where Kant repeatedly uses the terms 'transcenden¬ tal', 'logical', 'empirical', and 'hypothetical' in the corresponding sections of Ktl. In Kt8, by contrast, these terms rarely occur anywhere, so it would be difficult to assign perspectives based on word usage [cf. Table VI. 1 of KSP1]. Instead, I shall try to demonstrate that, in spite of Kant's lack of concern for using the same terminology, there is ample evidence that he adopts the same four
Table VII.2: Basic Perspectival Relations in Systemr Book perspective inKt8 (goal of stage) I II III
rv
key rational element equivalent part of Ktl (unexplainable gap) (Ktl's formal element) Aesthetic good predisposition transcendental (origin of radical evil) (pure intuitions) (evil heart) logical archetype of perfection Analytic of Concepts (method of divine aid) (categorial conception) (good heart) Analytic of Principles empirical ethical commonwealth (pure principles) (God's Kingdom) (divine government) Dialectic hypothetical service by doing duties (inference via ideas) (pleasing God) (revealed statutes)
Just as the initial stage of religious development involves a passive receptivity to evil, at least in comparison to the active struggle experienced in stage two, so also the church's role in the final victory over evil (stage three) is passive in relation to the active service performed in stage four. Despland agrees that 'the passage' to Book Three from Book Two 'is a change of point of view: from the individual to mankind' [De73:203; s.a. Mi79:120]. But he then says this 'led to a pro¬ found renovation of many aspects of Kant's thinking' [De73:204, e.a.], thus neglecting that Kant probably had such a perspectival shift in mind all along. See note VII. 15 for further clarification. Michalson makes the same observation, calling the individual-social transition 'a subtle yet potentially powerful tension' [Mi93:42]. But he, too, fails to see these as complementary perspec¬ tives, suggesting instead that the social view of salvation 'somehow supersedes the individual aspect'. Yet the revolutionary account of salvation, where having a good disposition saves us, could be true for the individual at the same time the evolutionary account, where God projects the path of gradual progress into an indefinite future, is true for our social interactions. Unfortunately, instead of viewing these as two perspectives, Michalson concludes [45] that 'the evolutionary imagery apparently compromises Kant's ethical rigorism.'
VII. Systemr
147
perspectives in Kt8 as he did in Ktl and Kt4. The 'gaps' listed in brackets in the third column of Table VII.2 are elements reason compels us to include in systemr, yet (as we shall see) they surpass reason's ability to explain.9 Their explanation—and therefore the viability of systemr—requires some definite (material) input from an historical tradition. The key element bare reason can fully explain in each stage is specified in the same column, above each 'gap'. Before beginning our analysis of system,-, it is important to note that Kant appends a 'General Observation' to each book in Kt8. The first of these (originally published separately along with Book One) sketches the solution to the problem of evil-heartedness that is then developed in more detail in Book Two. Near the end of the first General Observation, though, Kant introduces four by-products, or 'parerga to religion within the limits of pure religion' [Kt8:52(47)]. These 'morally transcendent ideas' [52(47)] tend to arise in his¬ torical religions, because of their empirical character, but can actually be coun¬ terproductive to the purposes of pure religion if emphasized too strongly. He proceeds to discuss the first of these parerga, rather briefly, and then devotes the bulk of the other three General Observations to the task of discussing the other three in turn. Because Kant himself separates his main discussion of these topics from the rest of his text, I too shall make such a distinction: the four par¬ erga will be examined in detail in Appendix VII. At this point, it will suffice merely to give a brief, systematic description of each. In the order of the four books to which they correspond, the four 'morally transcendent ideas' Kant sees arising out of religion are: (1) 'workings of grace', 9. Reason supplies the formal elements in Kant's systems. Kant clarifies how this applies to religion in Kt6:487: 'The formal aspect of all religion ...belongs to philosophic morals ... But ...the material aspect of religion, the sum of duties to.. .God, that is, the service to be performed for him .. .[can] be known by us only empirically, not a priori, and would therefore belong only to revealed religion. [These duties] would therefore also have to assume the existence of such a Being, not merely the Idea of Him for practical purposes, and to assume it ...as something that could be set forth as given directly (or indirectly) in experience.' Kant does not say this material aspect is false or even dispensable; he just says reason cannot supply it. The material aspect must be revealed. As a product of historical faith, it can thus serve as a vehicle for the formal aspect. Kant expresses much the same point when he distinguishes historical faith from rational religion by saying the former is 'built not upon bare concepts of reason but upon facts v [Kt8:163(151); s.a. Kt20:1412n]. This difference will be a crucial point to remember when we discuss the biblical theologian's Perspective in IX.2-3 and Kant's own commitment to Critical mysticism in Part Four. Failing to see the strategic purpose of these 'gaps' in Kant's argument, as paving the way for his second experiment, Michalson [Mi89:263] regards Kt8's 'use of biblical imagery [as] a tacit and provocative admission that a full account of salvation (or moral regeneration) exceeds the limits of his own philosophy.' It exceeds the limits of pure religion, as established by systemr, but only in order to make room for historical faith! Michalson thinks [263] the 'turn to narrative in Kant's account of both the fall and moral regeneration marks the limit of the critical philosophy's ability to account for its own content.' While this is true, it is not unintentional. As Michalson himself states [264]: 'Divine aid is a supplement that enables us to complete the moral task associated with the demand to overcome radical evil.'
148
PART THREE: CRITICAL RELIGION
or 'imagined inward experience', leading to 'fanaticism'; (2) 'miracles', or 'alleged external experience', leading to 'superstition'; (3) 'mysteries', or 'a supposed enlightening of the understanding with regard to the supernatural', leading to 'illumination'; and (4) 'means of grace', or 'hazardous attempts to operate upon the supernatural', leading to 'thaumaturgy' [Kt8:53(48)]. These distinctions can be mapped according to the same 2LAR pattern as the four books themselves: thaumaturgy: means of grace (++) (external understanding)
illumination: mysteries (-+) (internal understanding)
fanaticism: • workings of grace (--) (internal experience)
superstition: miracles (+-) (external experience)
Figure VII.3: The Four Parerga to Universal Religion The two lLARs that compose this 2LAR distinguish between internal (-) and external (+) and between experiencing God's presence (-) and understanding God's nature (+). ('Internal understanding' here means rational knowledge of a mystery; 'external understanding' means using such knowledge 'to bring about ... an effect' on God [194(182)].) That Kt8 is organized according to such architectonic patterns10 comes as no surprise, if, as I suggest in KSP1:96, this book constitutes part of Kant's philosophical System. To view it as such—i.e., as an alternative, or comple¬ ment, to Kt7 [see notes III. 11 and VI. 14]—involves the assumption that its standpoint is judicial rather than practical (as Kant's emphasis on morality seems at first to indicate [see VI. 1-2]). As such, Kant's critique of religion 10. Kant introduces a similar pattern in Kt35:(85-9O) to denote 'on the one hand sophistication and su¬ perstition, and on the other fanaticism and blasphemy' [(86)] as the four main 'errors of religion'; but he also discusses 'practical atheism' (godlessness), 'piety', and 'bigotry' as equally erroneous approaches to religion [(103)]. His purpose in discussing these is not to scoff at religious people, but to encourage them to correct 'their religious outlook' [(89)]. Elsewhere he lists four 'extrava¬ gancies' of religion: 'credulity, superstition, fanaticism, and indifferentism' [Kt57:250(69)]. Although the content in both of these cases differs from that shown in Figure VII.3, Kant is always careful to follow the same 2LAR pattern when making such distinctions.
VII. Systemr
149
should turn out to be a philosophical account of the necessary conditions for religious experience—i.e., for making religious judgments (just as Kt7 is all about the experiences of beauty and purposiveness that arise out of our aesthetic and teleological judgments). The extent to which this is the case will be discussed in Chapter VIII,11 and the role of religious experience as such (i.e., apart from its formal manifestation in specific organized religious traditions) will be the main topic of Part Four. Our task in this chapter, however, is the more limited one of describing and interpreting the systematic elements of pure religion, as set forth in Kt8. 2. The Conditions of Religion in the Moral Individual (-) A. Radical Evil (--) Kant begins Book One of Kt8 by examining the issue of whether human beings are good or evil by nature.12 First he samples the views of those who ar¬ gue that human nature develops from good to bad, and of those who argue for the more optimistic, bad-to-good development. Then he briefly considers two ways of settling for 'a middle ground', whereby 'man as a species is neither good nor bad, or ... [alternatively, is] partly good, partly bad' [20(16)]. From the empirical perspective of our actual behavior, one or the other of the latter solutions might seem plausible.'3 Kant clarifies, however, that the question he is interested in is not empirical but transcendental: it concerns not 'actions that are evil (contrary to law)' or good, but rather the maxims that are used as the basis for such actions [20(16)]. These maxims must have some 'ultimate 11. A forward-looking glance through the elements of system, reveals that experiences such as sin, conversion, church organization, worship, etc., occupy the center of Kant's attention, while the task of interpreting theoretical doctrines in practical terms is always secondary. In discussing Kant's theory of conversion, Webb goes so far as to say it 'can hardly perhaps be completely understood from within by any one to whom that experience is utterly strange or alien' [We26:60]. As we shall see in VIII.4, this is one reason Kant's approach to religion can provide a viable alternative for those nowadays who were brought up in a fundamentalist tradition—perhaps the closest modern equivalent to the Pietism of Kant's youth. 12. Kant is careful to explain that the term 'nature' here does not mean 'the opposite of freedom', but rather refers to a person's innate 'character', based as it is on 'the subjective ground of the exercise (under objective moral laws) of man's freedom in general' [Kt8:20-21(16-17)]. Because our charac¬ ter is so inextricably connected to our own freedom, Kant never tires of insisting that we are responsible for our own actions (whether good or evil) even if their fundamental ground is innate [e.g., 21n(17-8n)]. ' 3 . Kt8:22(18),25n(20n),39n(34n). Kant interprets the word 'nature' from this perspective in Kt39: 492(210): after posing the question 'whether man is by nature morally good or bad', he answers that mankind 'is neither; for he is by nature [i.e., in systemt] not a moral being at all; he becomes a moral being only when his reason raises itself to the concepts of duty and of law [i.e., only in systemp]. It can be said, however, that [in systemr] he has originally impulses for all vices ..., although his reason impels him in the opposite direction at the same time.' This passage does not contradict the parallel passages in Kt8, provided we recognize that Kant is merely acknowledging the different standpoints from which human nature can be examined.
150
PART THREE: CRITICAL RELIGION
ground' that is 'inscrutable to us', and so 'cannot be a fact revealed in experi¬ ence' [21-2(17)]. This ground, or 'disposition',14 is 'innate' ('antecedent to every use of freedom in experience'), so it must be 'either morally good or morally eviV [22(17)] and not a mixture of the two. Resolving the problem of whether human nature is essentially good or evil is Kant's way of 'distinguishing man from other possible rational beings' [Kt8: 21(17)]. Before beginning to elaborate his solution, Kant makes one further clarification: his use of the generic term 'man' refers to 'the entire race', not to 'the single individual';15 this means the question of whether or not there might be some exception(s) is a matter that 'can only be proved [by evidence from] anthropological research' [25(21)]. (This will prove to be a crucial point when we consider Kant's view of Jesus in VIII.2.B.) Kant's full solution to the problem of mankind's innate moral character occupies the entirety of Book One, and defines the basic elements in stage one of systemr. A proper understanding of Kantvs solution requires a clear awareness of his subtle distinction between a 'disposition' (the timeless ground of a person's maxims at any given point of time) and a 'predisposition' (the timeless ground of a person's maxims at the very outset of life, before any moral actions have been performed). For, after introducing the main problem of Book One and establishing that the good or evil disposition is the true topic under considera¬ tion, Kant ends up devoting the first numbered subsection to the discussion not of our disposition but of three aspects of our predisposition. The latter therefore marks the actual starting-point of systemr, with the positing of an 'original predisposition to good in human nature' [Kt8:26(21)]. Kant finds evidence for this good predisposition in the three basic voli¬ tional aspects of human nature: our animality, humanity, and personality. The fact that we are animals means we are 'living' beings, who engage in physi¬ cal forms of self-love; the fact that we are humans means we are 'rational' be¬ ings, who possess 'a self-love which is physical and yet compares'; and the 14. Kt8:25(20). For a discussion of Kant's use of the term 'disposition' (Gesinnung) in systemp, see KSP1:VIII.2.A. The disposition is the transcendent root of the maxims an individual uses to make moral decisions. As such, Kant calls it 'the essential element in religion' [Kt7:481]. 15. This does not contradict my claim in VI.3 and VII. 1 that Books One and Two focus on the individual nature of mankind, and Books Three and Four on the social nature [s.a. note VII.8]. Another way of expressing the same distinction, taking Kant's clarification into account, would be to say that the first half of Kt8 examines the elements of human nature that determine the private religion of each individual member of the human race, while the second half examines the elements that determine the public religion of the same. In light of Kant's clarification, Flesher may be right to say [F188: 123] Kant's use of the terms 'evil principle' and 'good principle' refer to 'the universalization of the predisposition's problems.' But he goes too far when he adds: 'The Evil Principle is not a diffi¬ culty for mankind as individuals but for mankind as a whole.' Surely it is both! That evil is a universal problem means it requires a universal solution—i.e., one involving an ideal individual.
I
VII. Systenir
151
fact that we are persons means we are 'accountable' beings, who have 'the ca¬ pacity for respect for the moral law'.16 That Kant includes self-love as a natural source of the first two components of our good predisposition indicates that Treloar is mistaken to say [Tr89:345] 'the evil act creates a state of self-love.' The reverse is actually the case: our natural tendency towards self-love exists for a good purpose, yet makes us susceptible to committing evil acts. Thus, although various forms of vice can be 'grafted' onto our animality and humanity, Kant argues that all three aspects testify to the good purpose human nature has. 'All of these predispositions are not only good in negative fashion (in that they do not contradict the moral law); they are also predispositions toward good (they enjoin the observance of the [moral] law). They are original, for they are bound up with the possibility of human nature' [28(23)]. As 'constituent elements' in human nature, they are 'necessary'. Towards the end of Book One, Kant explains that the predisposition to good means a person's 'original' situation (i.e., before any actions are per¬ formed in time, at the very outset of systemr) is characterized by 'a state of in¬ nocence' [Kt8:41(36)]. This provides a person with the potential to do good, not only in the first temporal act, but in any and every moral act throughout life: 'every [evil] action must be regarded as though the individual had fallen directly from a state of innocence.' As long as the action is freely performed, 'it can and must always be judged as an original use of his will.' We can therefore sum¬ marize the first step (using the apparatus introduced in KSPl:VII.l) as follows: I. good original . potential to predisposition (0)
innocence
do good (—)
The — component is especially appropriate because this part of Kant's theory has no positive content; it merely establishes human nature's pure potential, be¬ fore anything actual happens. Its function is much the same as the transcen¬ dental object in step one of systemt and the good will in step one of systemp. The second and third steps in systemr are introduced and defended together in §§II-IV of Book One. The topics of these sections are (respectively) the nature, influence, and origin of what Kant calls 'the propensity to evil in human nature' [Kt8:28(23)]. First he distinguishes between our 'propensity' [Hang] and our 'predisposition' [Anlage]: whereas the latter is a necessary part of what
6
- Kt8:26-8(21-3). These three aspects can be regarded as Kant's complete list of the elements of human nature, for their logical relationship corresponds directly to the architectonic relationship between the three Critiques: Ktl examines our humanity (rationality), Kt4 our personality (accountability), and Kt7 our animality (living feeling). That Kant says he has limited his attention to the volitional aspects [28(23)] indicates that these three elements also have other implications for cognition and aesthetic feeling.
152
PART THREE: CRITICAL RELIGION
it means to be human and consists in the potential to obey the moral law, the former is a self-imposed tendency to disobey the moral law. Hence, the human propensity, as 'the subjective ground of the possibility of an inclination', is evil and yet 'belongfs] universally to mankind (... as part of the character of the race)' . n Though we cannot be praised for our predisposition to good, we can be blamed for our propensity to evil, even though it is in a sense 'natural', because the evil propensity is 'brought by man upon himself .x% In other words, our good predisposition is an analytic constituent of what it means to posit the subject 'man', whereas our evil propensity is a predicate that is synthetically added to that concept: 'the proposition, Man is evil ...by nature, means... that evil can be predicated of man as a species; not that such a quality can be inferred from the concept of his species' [32(27)]. The bulk of §11 is devoted to a description of the 'three distinct degrees' of this 'capacity for evil' in human nature [Kt8:29(24); s.a. 37(32-3)]. Although Kant does not explicitly draw attention to the parallels, these degrees are directly related (as corruptions) to the three aspects of human nature introduced in
17. Kt8:28-9(23-4); s.a. We26:103. In Tr89 Treloar ignores Kant's distinction between predispo¬ sition, propensity, and disposition. He grossly misrepresents Kant's position by consistently referring to evil as a 'predisposition' [see e.g., 335]. After committing the same mistake in Se74:612, Seigfried claims to have found a 'contradiction' in Kant' position: 'every person has to be both good and evil but can never be both good and evil.' A little perspectival salve quickly heals this hermeneutic wound: the former ('has to be both') refers to our potential state, due to the conflict between the good pre disposition and the initially evil rf/sposition; the latter ('can never be both') refers to our actual state at any given point in time. The 'contradiction' Scharf claims to detect in Kant's account, whereby evil is somehow both 'predetermined' (i.e., inevitable) and yet 'freely elected' [Sc93:71] can be resolved in much the same way. Scharf complains that 'if there is a natural propensity to evil, then the free exercise of one's will...seems to be preempted' [81]. 'This means that the supposedly autonomous will ...is bent in the direction of evil before any choice has been made' [83]. But this totally ignores Kant's emphasis on our original innocence; the propensity first arises when our first evil choice is made, not before or after. Neglecting this point, Scharf goes on to the claim [83] that 'Kant has created a vicious circle for both God and humanity ...: Both need to act first, and both must wait for the other to make the first move.... God cannot dispense unmerited grace, and humans are in no position to merit grace.' Yet neither of these claims accurately represents Kant's position. Scharf s false assumption is that when we are under the influence of radical evil, we are unable to do any good; but this is not Kant's view. There is no vicious circle because Kant makes no such extreme assump¬ tions. Scharf completely neglects the significance of perspectives—in this case, the all-important difference between a perspective-bound being and one who is beyond all perspectives. 'Kant sees the dilemma but apparently knows no way out. Rather, ...he vacillates between human and divine agency' [84]. Kant's point, however, is precisely that reason knows no way out, other than by appealing to religion and the explanations provided by historical faith(s). Scharf totally overlooks Kant's strategy of uncovering the gaps in reason's ability to make us moral. See also note VII.30. 18. Kt8:29(24). Unlike original moral goodness, moral evil 'can be imputed to man', because it 'consists] in maxims of the will which are contrary to the [moral] law' [32(27)]. Because 'the source of evil cannot be in an object determining the will', but only 'in a maxim', and so also in an evil disposition as its 'ultimate ground (inscrutable to us)', Kant stresses that 'nature is not to bear the blame (if [a person's character] is evil) or take the credit (if it is good)': 'man himself is its author' [21(17); s.a. 43(38)].
VII. Systemr
153
impurity, corrupting humanity (+) (self-love rooted in understanding)
wickedness, corrupting personality (x) (self-love rooted in judgment)
frailty, corrupting animality (-) (self-love rooted in sensibility)
Figure VII. 4: The Three Aspects of Human Nature as Corrupted by the Evil Propensity connection with the good predisposition [see Fig. VII.4], as well as to the faculties that operate in the first three stages of systemt. The corruption of our animality (the exclusively physical side of our self-love, stemming from our sensibility) plagues us with 'frailty' (i.e., difficulty in resisting temptation), so that we sometimes follow our inclinations even when they oppose a good maxim we have previously set for ourselves. The corruption of our humanity (the side of our self-love that is also rational, stemming from our understand¬ ing) causes us to act with 'impurity' (i.e., doing good for the wrong reasons), so that we sometimes perform objectively good actions only because they also satisfy our inclinations. And the corruption of our personality (the properly moral side of our nature, stemming from our judgment) fills us with 'wicked¬ ness' (i.e., the will to do evil), so that our will 'reverses the ethical order [of priority] among the incentives of a free will'.19 The first two forms of corruption can and do occur even within a person who has a good disposition (or 'heart'); but the third is a corruption of the moral disposition itself, so that 'the man is hence designated as evil.'20 19. Kt8:30(25), t.b. Allison rightly stresses [A196:175] that this account regards the motivation for evil as being rooted in our will, not in our inclinations: our choice to 'incorporate' the latter into our maxims is a choice against following the moral law. Thus, 'evil must be rooted in a free choice against the law (a kind of inner voting in favor of inclination)'. 20. Kt8:30(25). A former student of mine, Susanna Lam Oi Chi, once suggested that, if we reserve Kant's phrase 'positive evil' [22-3n(18n)] for the third degree of evil, then the first two degrees could be called 'negative evil'. This would fit well with the placement of these terms on Figure VII.4, though Kant himself does not develop his theory in this way. Kant makes a similar distinction in Kt64:256-7(193-4) between three types of evil in
154
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Kant's goal is to prove that in some sense, 'the propensity to evil in man¬ kind is universal' [Kt8:30(25)], 'that it is woven into human nature.' Before doing so, he clarifies that the evil in each degree of our evil propensity lies 'solely in what.. .touches the ultimate ground of the adoption or the observance of our maxims [i.e., what touches the disposition], and not in what touches sensibility'.21 In order to make this point, he finds it necessary to distinguish general, or 'contrary-to-end' (Zweckwidrige): (1) 'The absolute contrary-to-end' (i.e., moral evil); (2) 'The conditional contrary-to-end' (i.e., natural evil); and (3) 'the disproportion of crimes and punishments' (i.e., injustice). His doctrine of radical evil in Kt8 has to do primarily with moral evil, though the others are indirectly related [cf. Fig. VII.4]. Natural evil is rooted in the physical world, just as frailty is, and injustice is rooted in rational comparisons, just as impurity is. For more on the problems associated with these latter two forms of evil, see AVI.l. A fourth type of corruption that Kant does not mention is self-deception, corresponding to the faculty of reason. (This idea was brought to my attention by Jeanine Grenberg in a discussion carried out on the Kant-L e-mail discussion group in May, 1995.) Self-deception occurs whenever we act on a maxim we believe to be good, but further reflection reveals our reasoning processes to be defective. Either the maxim itself cannot pass the test of the categorical imperative, or we discover that (contrary to our original opinion), our action was, in fact, based on some other, corrupt maxim. This fourth source of moral evil should not be confused with the three sources Kant discusses. Determining whether or not actions based on self-deceptive maxims are morally evil requires us first to specify the standpoint under consideration. A major goal of Kt4 is to help us learn to discover such self-deceptions, so from its practical standpoint, such actions must be declared to be just as evil as those in which the maxim is known to be bad. Book One of Kt8 assumes, by contrast, that we are not self-deceived, and investigates the consequences of intention¬ ally breaking the moral law. Were Kant to consider from this standpoint how to classify a person who does an evil deed while genuinely believing it is good, I think he would be inclined to recommend not so much confession, as the need to bone up on one's philosophy! In fact, Book Four is all about just such cases of religiously-motivated self-deception, where religious people do the wrong thing while genuinely believing it is right. As we shall see in VII.3.B, Kant does not accuse such people of being frail, impure, or wicked; rather, he treats them as being unenlightened. Allison [A196:170] claims that 'self-deception in the overall Kantian account of evil ...plays an absolutely crucial role at all levels.' This is true, but only in the sense that 'self-deception is already for Kant ...the major mechanism that human beings make use of to evade their responsi¬ bility'—for example, in the form of an 'inner lie' [179]. Along these lines, Allison points out that, in testing maxims for universalizability, 'virtually any maxim, if suitably formulated, can be made to pass the test.' This is not a weakness of Kant's theory, but evidence of the fact 'that it is precisely the testing of maxims that provides the major occasion for self-deception' [180]. Maximtesting, however, is a function of systemp, not systemr. So Allison's position, while correct, does not negate the claim that Kant is not addressing the issue of self-deception here in stage one. 2 1 . Kt8:32(27); s.a. 83(78). A few pages later [34-5(30)] Kant again warns against grounding evil 'in man's sensuous nature', adding that it is also not grounded in 'the morally legislative reason', which would make us 'a devilish being', but only in 'the will' as such. In other words, the evil propensity has its true 'home' only in the 'x' position of Figure VII.4; the '+' and '-' degrees of evil are but by-products of the corruption of the will itself. This view of evil is directly parallel to the view of 'error' defended in Kant's theoretical writings, wherein error is blamed not on sensibili¬ ty but on judgment. Sensibility is blamed only when it exercises something like an unconscious influence (perhaps corresponding to 'frailty'), as when Kant says in KtlO:59 that error arises from 'the unnoticed influence of sensibility upon the understanding, or, more exactly, upon judgment.' The extent of Kant's rejection of the view that associates sensibility with evil [see e.g., Kt65:23] can be seen by noting that sensibility occupies the same position in relation to the other faculties of the mind as philosophy does in relation to the other faculties of the university [cf. note 3, above, and Fig. III.10 of KSP1]! Moreover, the ~ position shared by both philosophy and sensibility on their respective maps is also the position of the transcendental perspective in
VII. Systemr
155
between two fundamentally different sorts of 'act': the 'formal' act 'whereby the supreme maxim... is adopted by the will' [31(26)]; and the 'material' act 'whereby the actions themselves ... are performed in accordance with the maxim.' The former is timeless (elsewhere called 'noumenal'), while the latter occurs in time (and is 'phenomenal').22 The act of adopting an evil 'supreme maxim' therefore functions in much the same way as the pure intuitions of time and space do in systemt: just as the latter are actively imposed on the sensible data by a faculty that is essentially passive (sensibility being the faculty of 'receptivity' [see KSP1:VII.2.A]), so also the former must be actively chosen even though we are essentially passive recipients of the 'indwelling' of radical evil. As such, it constitutes the second (formal) step in stage one of system,-. The hypothesis being put forward for proof is that this noumenal act produces an evil propensity in all members of the human race. The coexistence of the good predisposition and the evil propensity in human nature is, as we shall see, the tension out of which religion arises. So Kant's proof that mankind's propensity really is universally evil is of crucial importance. He develops this proof in §111 of Book One [Kt8:32(27-8)], point¬ ing out first that the act that produces the evil propensity must be, paradoxically, both 'contingent' (so that each individual person remains responsible for evil [s.a. 41(38)]) and yet 'universal' (so that the need for religion applies to everyone). This is possible only if we regard the act postulated in step two as 'radical', meaning that it corrupts 'the ultimate subjective ground of all maxims' (i.e., the disposition) [32(27-8); s.a. note VII.24]. That human evil is radical is a fact Kant thinks 'need not be formally proved in view of the multitude of crying examples which experience of the actions of men puts before our eyes' [32-3(28)]. Nevertheless, after calling attention to 'a long melancholy litany of indictments against humanity' [33(28)] that can serve as an empirical relation to the other three perspectives [see above, Fig. III.4]. These architectonic correlations should help us appreciate why Kant repeatedly emphasizes that the transcendental philosopher's 'home' lies close to the 'shores' of sensible experience, rather than in the 'stormy ocean' of speculation [see e.g., Ktl:294-5]—the latter corresponding to the ++ position on the 2LAR map. 22. In Kt8:39n(34n), for instance, Kant says the choice that gives rise to pur evil disposition should be regarded as an 'intelligible act, [which] precedes all experience'. The propensity to evil', he explains elsewhere, 'is intelligible action, cognizable by means of pure reason alone, apart from every temporal condition' [31(26-7)]. The problems surrounding this notion of a 'noumenal act' have already been discussed in KSP1:284,4O7,412-5. For our present purposes, it is sufficient to keep in mind that such comments need not be taken as evidence that Kant is defending a literal form of action that is somehow 'timeless' [see KSPl:VIII.l], Rather than accusing Kant of holding this 'absurd conclusion' [see e.g., Se74:611], we should heed Kant's clear reminder that 'as sensuous beings we can work against the law, or for its behoof, only in the appearance of the intellectual principle' [Kt8:17On(158n)]. All talk of the noumenal basis of our actual spatio-temporal actions must therefore be regarded as a metaphorical way of emphasizing the nonempirical source of some transcendental element in the system.
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'confirmation' [39n(34n)], he does attempt to provide such a proof, in order to show that our evil character 'must be apprehended a priori through the concept of evil, so far as evil is possible under laws of freedom' [35(31)]. Unfortunately, Kant's formal 'proof of the universality of the evil propensity turns out to be little more than a restatement of his account of what it means to be evil.23 As Figure VII.4 shows, human nature is such that all per¬ sons possess both moral incentives (based on respect for the moral law, aimed at virtue) and amoral incentives (based on self-love, aimed at happiness). Either self-love or the moral law must be adopted 'as the supreme condition of the satisfaction of the [other]' [36(31-2)]. Human evil therefore normally consists not in basing one's maxim solely on an incentive of self-love, but rather on the subtle 'subordination' of the moral incentive to the amoral incentive. That is, the moral character of a person's disposition (or 'heart') depends entirely on 'which of the two incentives he makes the condition of the other.' For this rea¬ son, Kant explains, a person need not be wicked in order to be regarded as having 'an evil heart': 'Such a heart may coexist with a will which in general is good', but is plagued by either 'frailty' or 'impurity' [37(32); s.a. 29(24)]. This 'a priori proof really amounts to an important, though subtle, supplement to (or realization of) step two: the propensity to evil is now regarded (posited, really) as necessarily 'radical' and as establishing the material limiting condition for the realization of universal religion (thus completing stage one of systemr) in the form of an evil heart. A better a priori proof can be constructed more directly out of Kant's definition of evil, as follows. All human beings start out with a predisposition to good (as previously proved). If this predisposition were the only basic element of human nature, then nobody could be praised for obeying the moral law, since there would not be any other real option. The will would not be truly free. According to Kant, evil 'is original, or prior to all the good a man may do'; every human person's moral development 'started from evil' [Kt8:72(66)]. This is true not merely because radical evil dwells in us, but because each individual inevitably succumbs to its tempting influence, 'for otherwise the 23. Kant tries to excuse himself in a footnote attached to the last sentence in §111, by saying the 'special proof of the universality of evil 'is to be found in the preceding section rather than in this one' [Kt8:39n(34n)], even though just a few pages earlier [35(31)] he had clearly announced his in¬ tention to provide the a priori alternative to the 'experiential proofs' in the last half of §111. The last paragraph of the section does contain a semblance of an argument, however, based on two quotations. In essence the argument (presented only in a hypothetical form) is that 'there is no virtue for which some temptation cannot be found capable of overthrowing it', and that the success of such temptations is ultimately a matter of their intensity, so every person will inevitably be faced with situations wherein they cannot resist giving in to the incentive of self-love. For a better proof, see note VIII.17.
VII. Systenir
157
beginning of evil would not have its source in freedom' [41(37)]. The will becomes free only when a person chooses to step outside of this basic (good) predisposition, and explore the other (evil) side of the boundary. Every human person's first moral act (i.e., the first free act he or she can be held accountable for) must therefore be an evil act. There must be a ground for such a choice in human nature; this ground is the evil propensity. Kant's a priori proof (even in its reconstructed form) leaves open the question of where this mysterious 'radical evil' comes from, so Kant makes this the main topic of §IV of Book One.24 He devotes most of his attention to the task of assessing the biblical account of evil's origin [see below, VIII.2.A]. In the course of doing so, he explains that to seek for the 'origin' of evil is to look for the 'first cause' of a given effect, and that, because the propensity to evil is rooted in our rational disposition, not in any temporal action(s) as such, this cause will turn out to be 'an origin in reason', not 'an origin in time' [Kt8: 39(34)]. 'To seek the temporal origin of free acts as such... is thus a contradic¬ tion.'25 Kant's point is that we must not downplay the extent of our responsi¬ bility for evil by blaming it on the details of our temporal situation. To say evil is radical is to say our responsibility for it originates with our own free, rational (hence, noumenal) choice. Beyond this, Kant confesses that any more detailed account of evil's origin would need to appeal to something temporal. In other words, as far as system,- is concerned, the rational origin ...of the propensity to evil, remains inscrutable to us ... Evil 24. 'This evil is radical, because it corrupts the ground of all maxims' [Kt8:37(32)]—i.e., the dis¬ position. Although the term 'radical evil' appears in the title of Book One, Kant mentions it only a few times in the main text itself. Nevertheless, it should not be regarded as a mere synonym for the evil propensity. Rather, it is Kant's technical name for the mysterious noumenal origin of our propensity to evil. Naming it in this way does not actually explain it, so much as indicate the extent of our ignorance of its origin. In De73:169-72 Despland traces the development of Kant's views on evil as a positive force, from his optimism in Ktl3 to his rejection of Leibniz in Kt64. Galbraith [Ga96:100] says Kant calls evil 'radical because we choose to do it through freewill, not because it belongs to us by nature.' She is right to regard evil as resulting from our free choice; but this is not why Kant calls it 'radical'. The latter refers to the fact that our initial choice to act on an evil maxim strikes at the root of our good predisposition. Allison's account in A196: 170 is more accurate: 'Radical evil does not refer...to a particularly great or deeply rooted demonic evil. It refers rather to the root of all moral evil, whatever its extent.' As an illustration of evil, he takes Arendt's report of the attitude of a Nazi war criminal, Eichmann [172], whom Arendt assesses as having 'a total incapacity to look at things from the other's point of view.' Allison adds that 'one might characterize [this] as an incapacity even to recognize that the other has a point of view' [172]. Interestingly, Arendt sees this as a 'failure of [aesthetic] judgment', or 'an inability to imag¬ ine' [172-3], thus suggesting that thinking perspectivally is an essential function of the judicial (and so also, the religious) standpoint. Radical evil thus boils down to a neglect of the very stand¬ point that makes perspectival thinking possible, with Critical religion as its obvious solution. 25. Kt8:4O(35). Kant relates this point to the issue of how to interpret the traditional doctrine of original sin: regarded as an explanation of our 'inheritance' of sin, it is 'the most inept' of all ex¬ planations of the origin of evil. Nevertheless, as we shall see in VIII.2.A, Kant's overall assess¬ ment of the biblical doctrine is not entirely negative.
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PART THREE: CRITICAL RELIGION could have sprung only from the morally-evil...; and yet the original predisposi¬ tion ... is a predisposition to good; there is then for us no conceivable ground from which the moral evil in us could originally have come ... [43(38)].
Here Kant is admitting that bare reason cannot elucidate everything that calls for explanation in its account of what makes human beings need religion. In so doing, he opens up the first of four important 'spaces' (one in each stage of systemr) that a true religion must fill with historical, tradition-bound content. This now puts us in a position to summarize Kant's argument in §§II-IV of Book One in terms of the second and third steps of system,.. The systematic content of his presentation is, admittedly, not as clear as we might hope. Nev¬ ertheless, if we look back over the basic arguments presented in these sections, we can formulate out of them two steps that are directly parallel to the corre¬ sponding steps of systemt and systemp. Step two in systemt, the formal (—1-) condition, is where the pure intuitions of space and time convert the undeter¬ mined transcendental object into a manifold of appearances; in systemp, this is where practical freedom converts the will into a manifold of desires. In both cases these elements serve to define the basic transcendental limits that must be placed on any material that enters the system. Step two of systemr should there¬ fore be identified as that whereby the mystery of radical evil somehow pro¬ duces in all human beings a propensity to evil: II. potential to do good (—)
radical evil
propensity to evil (—1-)
Radical evil is a mystery not unlike the mysteries of pure intuition and freedom, both of which Kant regards as basic facts of human nature that must simply be acknowledged, and cannot be proved or explained by reason. Radical evil con¬ verts our potential for good into virtually the opposite: the propensity to evil, which serves as the 'raw material' for any religion, in much the same way appearances do for empirical knowledge, or desires for moral action. Step three, as the synthesis of the first two (represented, as usual, by the —x component), can be expressed in terms of equally direct parallels. In systemt the goal of stage one (intuitive sensibility) is realized when the function of sensation produces sensations out of appearances. In systemp stage one's (free will's) goal is realized when a person sets up a maxim by choosing an end. Step three of the first (material) stage in systemr (radical evil) follows the latter quite closely: the choice of an evil maxim as supreme realizes the human propensity for evil by producing an evil heart: III. propensity to evil (—1-)
act of choosing an . evil supreme maxim
an evil heart (—x)
,
...„..•
VII. Systemr
,5
159
Just as empirical knowledge cannot be obtained without being based on sensi¬ ble intuition, and moral actions cannot be performed without a person freely choosing a maxim of one sort or another, so the need for religion would never even arise were it not for the fact that human beings choose, at the very outset of their moral development, a maxim that corrupts their disposition and spoils their potential to adhere perfectly to the moral law (i.e., to realize the ideals set forth in systemp). Throughout Kt8 Kant repeatedly emphasizes that the only way to release oneself from the blame imputed because of one's evil heart is to become a morally good person. He alludes to the possibility of divine assistance, but consistently presents it as something we must not count on as an excuse for not having a change of heart.26 For the 'indwelling' of evil in an (originally good) heart is what first gives rise to our sense of duty;27 yet 'grace stands in direct contradiction' to the 'absolute necessity' required by 'the idea of duty' [Kt8: 23n(19n)]. Even an outwardly good life, without a change of heart, is not sufficient to meet the demands of the moral law: 'The empirical character is then good, but the intelligible character [i.e., the disposition] is still evil' [37(32)]. What is required is a radical conversion of one's disposition. Such a conver¬ sion must be possible, since 'the moral law commands that we ought now to be better men' (and 'ought' implies 'can'28); yet Kant admits that the requirement 26. See e.g., Kt8:44-5(40-l); s.a. 76(71),83(78). 'The concept of divine aid', as Michalson interprets it [Mi89:265-6], 'is properly and morally used if we invoke it when we find ourselves at the limits of our moral efforts... The appeal to divine aid, then, has roughly the same status as the postulates of the immortality of the soul and the existence of God.' While his initial statement is quite astute, the comparison that follows is not systematically correct. Divine aid functions not as a 'necessary hypothesis' [266] for religion, as the postulates do in systemp, but as a logically necessary element. For without it, one does not have religion, any more than one has knowledge without concepts, because the very God-concept would then be rendered useless. The postulates do not define the logic of morality, but its teleological purpose. As we shall see in VII.3.B, the closest equivalent to the latter in systemr would be worship, rituals, and other acts of religious service as indirect yet historically necessary ways of achieving religion's purpose (i.e., pleasing God). 27. See Pa67:171. Because the original predisposition to good is not a choice, but merely part of our nature as human beings, we are not responsible for its presence in us—that is, it does not make us actually good. Nevertheless, we are responsible to this predisposition (as manifested in the form of the moral law), once we stray from it and choose to do evil. Thus Kant says [Kt35:(3O)] 'men can be placed under obligation because their [originally good] will is evil.' By contrast, God's will is entirely holy, so 'the concept of duty does not apply' [Kt32:350n; s.a. Kt4:84; Pa67:52-3]. 28. White points out that Luther denies that '"ought" implies "can"' [Wh90:14-5], perhaps the most fundamental premise of systemp. This, he claims, is the root of much of Kant's disagreement with Luther [57]: 'Suppose we do not know what is right. Suppose we have warped or corrupted views of the good life. These suppositions.. .Kant simply rules out of court, but they are the question with which Luther begins.' But does Kant rule them out completely? Surely his doctrine of radical evil attempts to deal with them. White is not distinguishing properly between systemp and systemr. Thus he claims [58]: 'One obvious fact about the Bible which Kant signally omitted ...is ...it confronts us with natural man as "blinded".' But as we shall see, Kant does appreciate this aspect of the Bible. What separates him from Luther is that he also sees another strain that runs throughout the Bible, ignored by Luther: that we ourselves are responsible to respond properly to this
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to adopt such an unchangeable 'new ground (the new heart)' contradicts 'the postulate of the innate corruption of man' [50-1(46); s.a. 66-7(60)], at least as far as 'our insight into [its] possibility.. .is concerned.' For evil is 'inextirpable by human powers'.29 To establish how conversion nevertheless comes about is the purpose of the second stage in systemr. The only hope provided in stage one is to recall that the innocence of the first step (-) is contained in the synthesis of the third step (x), just as much as is radical evil (+), so that even in a person with an evil heart, 'a seed of goodness still remains' [45(41)]. 'For man, there¬ fore, who despite a corrupted heart yet possesses a good will, there remains hope of a return to the good from which he has strayed.'30 B. Conversion to the Good (+-) The change in perspective between the first and second books of Kt8 is most evident in Kant's attitude towards redemption. In Book One, as we have seen, the role of any supernatural influence in conversion is downplayed. Its purpose, as the material stage in systemr, is to establish the limitations evil situation. White thinks Kant's position requires us [59] to make the 'incredible assumption that we are infallible in moral matters, that we always know what is the right thing to be done.' Instead, White argues, I should admit 'that I am simply unable to do what is right because I have radical misconceptions of what my duty is.' Yet from the standpoint of systemr, this is no problem for Kant. For he fully admits that we cannot even see clearly into our own motivations. Systemp defines moral duty precisely to prepare us for our radical ignorance of what it is in each situation! In Kt8 Kant hints that sometimes we just have to guess and hope we have properly assessed our duty. I believe these two positions can therefore be reconciled by regarding Luther's position as historically correct, and therefore true for historical faith, while Kant's systemp position is rationally correct, and therefore true for pure moral religion. Kant would fully agree that the histori¬ cal 'ought' alone cannot give a person a significant degree of confidence that he or she can carry out a given duty. A perspectival approach thus overcomes the conflict between Kant and Luther. 29. Kt8:37(32). Galbraith [Ga96:83] interprets this statement to mean 'humans will always be open to a disposition to evil, not that we cannot overcome this disposition.' That is, even a person whose disposition has been converted to good (see stage two) will still be open to the influence of evil (see stage three). Unfortunately, Galbraith seems unaware of Kant's concerted effort in Book Two to delineate the formal requirements that must be followed by any faith-based solution to the problem of evil, for she adds 'no clue is given [in Kt8] as to how we can overcome the evil in our nature.' 30. Kt8:44(39). After pointing out that Luther believed 'you could not isolate within Man a faculty or part that was and remained exempt from corruption' [Wh90:47], White alleges: 'This is, of course, precisely what Kant does'. But this is misleading. Kant affirms only a seed of goodness, not a fullfledged 'faculty' or even a well-developed 'part' of human nature. Just as for Luther, this remains no more than an undeveloped potential until divine assistance is given. Kant's account of the fall from innocence into evil as giving rise to the need for salvation can be regarded as the theological equivalent of the philosophical 'fall' from ignorance, through the mediating stage of wonder, to wisdom as a form of renewed ignorance [see PaOOa]. The final sen¬ tence of Book One is also reminiscent of the myth of Pandora's Box. That all manner of evils are released into the world by the opening of the box is well known; but an aspect of the myth that is often neglected is that hope lies at the bottom. So also Book One is best known for opening up the 'Pandora's Box' of radical evil; what we must not forget is that it ends by reminding us that hope also lies therein. McCarthy expresses this point rather poetically in Mc86:71: 'hope ...honeys the rim of the cup of duty and cuts short the danger of despairing of ever being well-pleasing to God.' On the significance of hope in Kt8, see VI.2 and AVI.3.
J
VII. Systemr
161
imposes on any human attempt to realize the good predisposition. This tran¬ scendental perspective is replaced in Book Two by something along the lines of a logical perspective—that is, by a set of formal conditions which, when applied to the limitations of the first stage, enable us to understand how the de¬ sired result (a good heart, leading to salvation) is possible. Each of the three steps in stage two will therefore have +- as thefirsttwo terms in the expression that symbolizes its function. The cornerstone of the new perspective in stage two is the 'ideal of moral perfection' that exists in every human person as an 'archetype' and 'can give us power.'31 Because radical evil makes us unworthy even to possess such an 'ideal of a humanity pleasing to God', it is 'appropriate to say that this arche¬ type came down to us from heaven and has assumed our humanity' [Kt8:61 (54-5)]. For the purposes of pure religion, no prior empirical instantiation of this archetype is required: From the practical standpoint this idea is completely real in its own right, for it re¬ sides in our morally-legislative reason.... We need...no empirical example to make the idea of a person morally well-pleasing to God our archetype; this idea as an archetype is already present in our reason. [62(55-6)]
Given the evil heart that arises out of stage one, there is no purely rational ex¬ planation for the presence of this archetype of a perfect person within us, other than to assume it is an inscrutable gift from some higher moral power.32 For al¬ though the archetype, as 'a perfectly valid ideal for all men, at all times and in all worlds', is universal, our attainment of it 'will ever remain a righteousness not our own' [66(59)]. Without this gift as a starting point (-), conversion would be impossible. Hence this fourth step can be summarized as: IV. an evil heart (—x)
inscrutable assistance . from a higher power
the archetype of a perfect person (+~)
As the very word 'archetype' implies, however, this 'divine man within us' 31. Kt8:61(54); s.a. Kt35:(98). Kant develops an early form of this theory in Ktl9:396, where he refers to God as the 'exemplar' of 'noumenal perfection'. As the fourth step, the archetype's role in system r can be compared to that of imagination in the fourth step of systemt. Just as the latter empowers the mind to form concepts out of representations that were formerly mere intuitions, the former empowers the heart to form good maxims despite being (formerly) dominated by evil. 32. Scharf rejects Kant's appeal to such an inscrutable 'mystery' as insufficient 'if Kant wants to have his religion remain within the limits of reason alone' [Sc93:84-5]. 'Kant's project ...fails because humans are not the only actors' [87n]. But this objection fizzles once we recognize the theocentric orientation of his entire System [see 1.3] and give up the strict reductionist paradigm for interpreting Kt8 [see VI.4]. Kant's appeal to inscrutability is necessary and appropriate as long as he remains within reason's limits. The criterion of 'success' for his project was never to explain this mystery from the standpoint of rational religion alone, but rather to establish its necessity in order to identify the problems a good historical faith must solve. As we saw in IV. 1,4, the living God of religious faith is welcomed into the 'house' of Kant's System as a legitimate resident (perhaps even as its 'owner'), not secretly admitted just to please the unenlightened.
162
PART THREE: CRITICAL RELIGION
does serve as the ideal model 'for the complete determination of the copy'— i.e., as the 'standard for our actions'—once we adopt the judicial standpoint of universal religion [Ktl:597; cf. VI.2, above]. On its own the positing of the archetype of a perfect person does not over¬ come an evil heart. 'For only a faith in the practical validity of that idea which lies in our reason [i.e., in the archetype] has moral worth' [Kt8:63(56)]. Bor¬ rowing a biblical phrase for the description of this archetype, Kant goes so far as to say: 'Man may... hope to become acceptable to God (and so be saved) through a practical faith in this Son of God [62(55)]. This practical faith en¬ ables a person actively to turn away from the evil heart within and obey the moral law. It does not depend on our awareness of any specific empirical examples because: each man ought really to furnish an example of this idea in his own person; to this end does the archetype reside always in the reason: and this, just because no exam¬ ple in outer experience is adequate to it; for outer experience does not disclose the inner nature of the disposition but merely allows of an inference about it though not one of strict certainty. [63(56-7)]
Practical faith, therefore, is more than just a declaration of repentance [see e.g., Wa72:148]; it gives rise to moral maxims as a sign of one's repentance. Thus, Kant says 'the first really good act that a man can perform is to forsake the evil .. .in his perverted maxim' [Kt8:58n(51n)]. The positive rejection of evil (+) in this fifth step of system,- can therefore be expressed in the following way: V. the archetype of a perfect person (+-)
practical faith
,.
a good maxim (+-+)
Once we have glimpsed the archetype of perfection and incorporated it into a good maxim, a 'conversion', or change of heart, is all that is necessary before we enter 'upon the road of endless progress towards holiness' [Kt8:46-7(42)]. For we have now recognized the corrupting influence of radical evil within us. Thus Kant says: 'Every man must guard against moral self-conceit, against be¬ lieving himself morally good and having a favourable opinion of himself. This feeling of moral self-sufficiency is self-deception; it is an incurable hallucina¬ tion' [Kt35:(246); s.a. Kt8:68(62)]. It is 'incurable', that is, if one believes the appearance of virtue in one's empirical character, which can be 'won little by little', is sufficient, without 'a change of heart' [47(42)]. For 'the moral out¬ come of the combat' between good and evil that leads to conversion 'is really not the conquering of the evil principle... but merely the breaking of its power to hold, against their will, those who have so long been its subjects' [82-3(77); s.a. 93(85)}. This moral breakthrough requires 'virtue in its intelligible character', which
VII. Systemr
163
cannot be brought about through gradual reformation so long as the basis of the maxims remains impure, but must be effected through a revolution in the man's disposition ... He can become a new man only by a kind of rebirth, as it were a new creation..., and a change of heart. ... That is, if a man reverses, by a single unchangeable decision, that highest ground of his maxims whereby he was an evil man..., he is, so far as his principle and cast of mind are concerned, a subject susceptible of goodness... For Him who penetrates to the intelligible ground of the heart..., i.e., for God, this amounts to his being actually a good man (pleasing to Him)... [47-8(43); s.a. Wa72:147-8].
Like the fall it reverses, such an immediate conversion from evil to good is inexplicable from the standpoint of pure rational religion, except to say that it seems to require some form of divine assistance [see We26:111,120]. The attitude of humility inherent in this account of the change of heart is to be maintained even after conversion, for the sixth step requires us to seek to make ourselves worthy of God's assistance by actively resolving to do our duty. By this Kant does not mean to suggest (a view too often imputed to him) that we are actually capable of making ourselves acceptable to God; on the con¬ trary, he is saying we have the responsibility to make ourselves worthy of be¬ ing made by God to be acceptable to him. For our obedience to God (via the moral law) 'must be the effect of our own action and not... of a foreign influ¬ ence in the presence of which we are passive' [Kt8:108]. 'Granted that some supernatural cooperation may be necessary to his becoming good..., man must first make himself worthy to receive it, and must lay hold of this aid' [44(40); s.a. 45(40-1)]. Yet in this context, 'worthiness always has a merely negative meaning..., that is, the moral receptivity for such goodness' [146n(137n)]. So our active attempt to obey God is our way of demonstrating our passive accep¬ tance of God's acceptance. And without such a demonstration, our acceptance of God's acceptance would mean nothing at all. It would be 'empty', like a concept without an intuition in systemt; likewise, moral activity without an awareness of its religious implications would be 'blind', like an intuition with¬ out a concept [see Ktl :75]. 'We have been converted', Kant declares in Kt35:(245), 'if, no matter how long we may live, we firmly determine to live in virtue.' This change of heart, which restores in us a good disposition, or a 'good heart', should not be viewed as a recovery of what was lost—'respect for the moral law we have never been able to lose'—but as 'the establishment of the purity of this law as the supreme ground of all our maxims' [Kt8:46(42)]. It will inevitably be accompanied by considerable pain, inasmuch as it involves the reawakening and/or intensification of our conscience [73(67)]. This pain can be regarded as a kind of punishment for the past evil we have perpetrated [see AVI.2]. As the
164
PART THREE: CRITICAL RELIGION
synthetic (x) condition of the second (formal) stage of systemr, we can therefore summarize this sixth step as: VI. a good painful conversion ^ a good maxim (+-+) (change of heart) heart (+-x) Since 'conforming our course of life to the holiness of the law, is impos¬ sible of execution in any given time', Kant suggests that God will judge our 'moral constitution' not by our actions but by our disposition [Kt8:66(60)]. That is, the 'endless progress of our goodness towards conformity to the law ... [will be] judged by Him who knows the heart, through a purely intellectual intuition [see V.I], as a completed whole, because of the disposition, super¬ sensible in its nature, from which this progress itself is derived.'33 This Divine Perspective, however, cannot be adopted by human beings, so no amount of introspection can provide a person with 'assurance concerning such a revolu¬ tion ...; for the deeps of the heart are inscrutable to [us]' [51(46); s.a. 67-8(61), 190-1(179)]. We must always 'guard against a relapse' [77(71); s.a. 97(88)]. This is because our 'empirical self-knowledge ... yields no immediate insight into the disposition but merely permits of an estimate based upon our actions' [75-6(70); s.a. Wa72:148]. Only an awareness of our moral progress justifies us in hoping for supernatural assistance (in the form of being judged by our disposition rather than by our actual deeds). Kant hastens to add, however, that, although theoretical certainty concerning the nature of our disposition 'is neither possible to man, nor ... morally beneficial', the presence of a good disposition 'creates in us, though only indirectly, a confidence in its own permanence and stability' [Kt8:71(65); s.a. 76(70) and AVI.3, below]. Well over half of Section One in Book Two of Kt8 presents Kant's solu¬ tions to three 'difficulties' that arise out of his view of the role of conversion in pure religion. These difficulties loosely correspond to the traditional Christian doctrines of sanctification, assurance of salvation at the final judgment, and 33. Kt8:67(60-l); s.a. 171(159),174(162),178(166); Kt65:43-4; Wa72:157; We26:120. Kant de¬ scribes practical faith in this divine forgiveness in Kt35:(95-6) as 'trust in God that He will supply our deficiency in things beyond our power, provided we have done all within our power.... [It con¬ sists] in saying: "I will myself do all I can, and if I then leave myself in God's hands, He will strengthen my weaknesses and make up my shortcomings as He knows best."' Fendt claims [Fe90:117] that such an appeal to divine assistance (grace) on Kant's part 'becomes oxymoronic, paradoxical, self-contradictory.' His main reason is that, 'if we are inadequate, then it is clearly not in our power.' But Fendt's 'it' is equivocal. For us 'to become better men' [Kt8:45(40-l); q.i. Fe90: 117] is possible and (Kant argues) adequate for becoming worthy of God's assistance; this is in our power. What is not in our power is to supplement what is still lacking in order for God to be pleased. This is the role God's grace must fulfill in Kant's system. McCarthy correctly describes Kant's concept of grace in Mc86:76-8, but misleadingly refers to it as 'a small supersensible supplement' [78]. To Kant, however, the size of the supplement is irrelevant; the key point is that some supplement is necessary and has a genuinely saving effect. See AVI.4 for further details.
VII. Systemr
165
atonement, respectively. They do not function directly as elements in systemr, but serve instead to clarify the implications of each of the three steps in stage two; I therefore examine them separately in AVI.2-3. Likewise, Section Two of Book Two, which is devoted entirely to Kant's second experiment (that of as¬ sessing the extent to which the historical tradition of Christianity is compatible with systemr), will be discussed in VIII.2.B. For our present purposes, we shall turn our attention to Kant's systematic treatment of how we are to deal with and finally overcome the influence evil still has over us, even after we experience a change of heart. That is the topic of stage three in systemr. 3. The Conditions of Religion in the Moral Community (+) A. The Founding of a Church (-+) Although the change of heart required by stage two of system,- serves as an effective solution to the problem of personal evil within an individual's life history, it does not do away entirely with the potentially destructive influence of evil. For the very notion of virtue 'presupposes the presence of an enemy' [Kt8:57(50)]) . As the titles of Books Two and Three suggest, having a good heart prepares a person to do combat with evil, but the question still remains how 'the victory of the good over the evil principle' [93(85), e.a.] is to be won. One of the deepest insights contained in systemr comes to the fore at this point: a philosophically sound approach to religion must not deny or ignore or explain away the reality of evil, nor should a religious person expect that being religious will provide a 'quick fix' to the problem; the struggle with evil has a purpose that is integral to the religious life. As we enter stage three of Kant's religious system, we must therefore keep in mind that, although we are now investigating what happens to a person after conversion, the grace and faith of stage two do not erase the effects of evil, but transform it. For the religious person has now taken up a life-long challenge of self-improvement, intent on learning just what it means to be human in the face of the daily struggle between the competing forces of good and evil. This continuing influence of evil, Kant points out in the introduction to Book Three, comes primarily through human relationships: a 'morally welldisposed man' is continually 'exposed.. .to the assaults of the evil principle' not because of his own gross nature, so far as he is here a separate individual, but because of mankind to whom he is related and bound.... Envy, the lust for power, greed, and the malignant inclinations bound up with these, besiege his nature... ay soon as he is among men. [93-4(85)]
This passage marks a crucial change in perspective: whereas Books One and Two treated religion as a phenomenon influencing 'man' as an individual
166
PART THREE: CRITICAL RELIGION
representative of the human race, Books Three and Four will examine the social elements of religion [see notes VII.7-8]. (The logical apparatus represents this shift as a change from - to + in the second term of each component.) The only way to counteract the potentially destructive influence of society, Kant argues, is to form 'a union of men under moral laws', which he calls 'an ethical commonwealth' [Kt8:94(86)]. Without uniting in this way, an individual (whether good-hearted or evil-hearted) remains in 'the ethical state of nature... in which the good principle.. .is continually attacked by the evil which is found in him and also in everyone else' [96-7(88)]. This concern for establishing a context for the expression of the good heart in the real world of experience in¬ dicates that Kant is adopting, here in stage three, an empirical religious per¬ spective.34 Thus the function of each step of this stage will be symbolized with an expression beginning with the two terms -+ [cf. Fig. VII.2]. Just as the seventh step in systemt provides a schema, or sensible concept, in the context of which empirical knowledge can be realized, so also the sev¬ enth step here in systemr provides a 'schema... of an invisible kingdom of God on earth' [Kt8:131(122)] in the form of a visible, ethical commonwealth, through which the victory of the good principle can be realized. That is, ... the sovereignty of the good principle is attainable ... only through the estab¬ lishment and spread of a society in accordance with, and for the sake of, the laws of virtue, a society whose task and duty it is rationally to impress these laws in all their scope upon the entire human race. [94(86)]
Kant is careful to add that, although the idea of such a commonwealth 'possesses a thoroughly well-grounded objective reality in human reason ..., subjectively, we can never hope that man's good will will lead mankind to de¬ cide to work with unanimity towards this goal.'35 Elsewhere he tends to be less pessimistic, as when he says 'we do not know whether, as such, it lies in our power or not' [98(89)]. But in either case this first step in the empirical stage of systemt establishes the material (-) goal that everyone with a good heart (yet still in the state of nature) has a duty to strive for. It can be summarized in this way:
34. See e.g., Kt8:110(100),l 15(105). As Collins aptly points out [Co67:184], this perspectival shift implies that the question generating the religious (judicial) standpoint 'concerns not only what / may hope by myself but, more determinately and incisively, what we may hope together, as fellow men and bearers of the tendency toward personality.' In a similar vein McCarthy suggests [Mc86: 71] that 'the ethical commonwealth .. .is a development ...of...the implicitly social [i.e., universal] character of the moral law itself 35. Kt8:95(86); s.a. 100(91). Despland is right to say [De73:208]: 'The notion of an ethical common¬ wealth.. .presents salvation as occurring in a community and through a community.' But this does not mean salvation comes from the community. The ethical commonwealth sets the stage for us to be able to receive God's saving grace, but fails on its own. It is the problem, not the solution.
VII. Systemr VII. a good heart (+-x) (state of nature)
,;*, )
religious schematism. (via laws of virtue)
167 an ethical commonwealth (-+-)
Kant contrasts 'an ethical commonwealth', based on laws of virtue, with 'a political commonwealth', based on 'laws of coercion' [Kt8:94-5(86-7)]. The two may well exist simultaneously, but they must remain distinct. For 'the very concept of ['an ethical commonwealth'] involves freedom from coercion.' 36 Since moral and legal duties have a common root in practical reason, the consti¬ tution of an ethical commonwealth 'shall contain nothing which contradicts the duty of its members as citizens of the state—although when the ethical pledge is of the genuine sort the political limitation need cause no anxiety' [96(88)]. Re¬ ligion and politics, then, should not be intermixed, but the laws they enforce should be compatible. (Kant's political theory will be discussed thoroughly in KSP4. For a briefer treatment of its relation to religion, see Pa94b.) The next step rests on what can be called Kant's 'religious argument' for the existence of God (though, of course, such an argument should not be re¬ garded as a theoretically valid proof). By explicating a few of Kant's underly¬ ing assumptions, we can express his brief argument more formally37 as follows: 1. The highest good: The true end of human life on earth is to realize the highest good, by seeking to be worthy of happiness through obedience to the moral law. Working towards this goal is a human duty. 2. Radical evil: Human beings on their own seem to be incapable of achieving the highest good, because of the radical corruption in the heart of each individual. At best, all we can say is that 'we do not know whether...it lies in our power or not.' 3. Ethical commonwealth: No organization based on externally legislated rules (i.e., no 'political commonwealth') can achieve this goal, because the moral law can be
•, .
36. Kt8:95(87). Thus Kant asserts [102(93)]: 'An ethical commonwealth... really [i.e., ideally] h a s . . . nothing resembling a political constitution.' Indeed, he exclaims [96(87)]: 'woe to the legislator who wishes to establish through force a polity directed to ethical ends!' This warning highlights the fundamentally paradoxical nature of the very idea under consideration: a 'commonwealth' is an implicitly political, externally-legislated system of human organization; yet 'ethical' implies an essentially non-political, internally-legislated system. I introduced the notion of a 'non-political political system' as applied to biblical theology in Pa93 and will elaborate on Kant's philosophi¬ cal use of this notion in KSP4. 37. The argument appears in Book Three, Division One, §11, at Kt8:97-99(88-91). Wood acknowledges that Kant's arguments in support of 'faith in a divine grace' [Wo92:403] can be regarded as supple¬ menting his moral argument, but does not call attention to this passage. Lenk identifies a 'sociomorphic' argument for God in the passage [Le89:103], but leaves it undeveloped. Peters develops a formalized version of the argument [Pe93:101-2], but without acknowledging the way it lends support for belief in God. Instead, he interprets it as an attempt to encourage hope in the possibili¬ ty of an ethical commonwealth becoming real and regards the introduction of the idea of God as a dispensable element [106,157-61]. Yet this totally ignores the argument's progression from the assumption of an ethical commonwealth to the need for belief in God. Without the latter, the argu¬ ment would be powerless to convince anyone of the reality of anything! Moreover, Peters thinks Kant introduces the idea of God in order to guarantee the possibility of moral progress [e.g., 161]. But Kant's view is that partial progress is not ultimately meaningful if the full realization of the final goal is impossible; belief in God is needed to guarantee the latter, not merely partial progress.
168
PART THREE: CRITICAL RELIGION
legislated only internally—i.e., through an 'ethical commonwealth'. 4. 'Ought' implies 'can': Anything reason calls us to do (i.e., any human duty) must be possible; if it seems impossible, we are justified in making assumptions that will enable us to conceive of its possibility.38 5. Divine assistance: The only way39 to conceive of a human organization that could succeed in becoming an ethical commonwealth (i.e., in promoting the highest good as 'a social goal') is to presuppose the assistance of 'a higher moral Being through whose universal dispensation the forces of separate individuals, insufficient in themselves, are united for a common end.' This Being legislates the moral law internally to all individuals, thus insuring the harmony of their diverse actions. 6. God exists. In order to work towards the fulfillment of the highest good, we must therefore presuppose that God exists as a gracious moral lawgiver, and that to obey the moral law is to please God. That is, the ethical commonwealth can succeed only if it takes a religious form.
Kant's version of this argument occupies little more than a few sentences. Nevertheless, it marks an important turning-point in his discussion. For without it, his view of religion would be thoroughly anthropocentric (as it is typically assumed to be [see 1.3]); but with it, the equally theocentric emphasis of his view of religion becomes apparent. The title of §111, the section immediately following the paragraph that de¬ velops the foregoing argument, is itself a concise restatement of the argument's conclusion: 'The Concept of an Ethical Commonwealth is [i.e., must be viewed as] the Concept of a People of God under Ethical Laws' [Kt8:98(90]. Kant's main aim in this section is to explain what the notion of a 'highest lawgiver of an ethical commonwealth' must involve. Such a being must be someone with respect to whom all true duties...must be represented as at the same time his commands; he must therefore also be 'one who knows the heart' [see Luke 16:15; Acts 1:24; 15:8]... Hence an ethical commonwealth can be thought of only as a people under divine commands, i.e., as a people of God [see 1 Pet. 2:10], and in¬ deed under laws of virtue. [99(90-1)]
This emphasis on the need for God to govern the ethical commonwealth could give the impression that human beings are not responsible for its founding and successful implementation. To guard against this misunderstanding, Kant de¬ votes §IV to the task of explaining how 'Human Organization' (as the title, 38. Kant does not specify this step in his argument explicitly. However, it is a maxim that he repeats over and over again in Kt4, Kt8, and elsewhere. In Kt8:41(36), for instance, he says that in every moral act it 'must be within his [a moral agent's] power' 'to better himself.' 39. Divine assistance is the only way (or in Kant's words, 'this duty will require the presupposition of [divine assistance]' [Kt8:98(89), e.a.]) because the only other option is to suppose that an ethical commonwealth can succeed when based entirely on human organization. Yet if the people them¬ selves are regarded as the source of the ethical laws, the commonwealth would be essentially politi¬ cal, not ethical [98(90); s.a. note VII.36]. Rossi makes a similar point when he says Kant's claim that the 'complete attainment' of goodness 'lies beyond human capacities' [Ro89:371] 'helps open up a "logical space" for an affirmation of God on the basis of "moral faith".'
!
VII. Systemr
i
169
once again, puts it) must also play a role in all true religion in order for 'The Idea of a People of God [to] be Realized' [Kt8:100(91)]. Human organization on its own could never be sufficient, he reminds us [100(92)], for '[h]ow indeed can one expect something perfectly straight to be framed out of such crooked wood?' He continues: 'To found a moral people of God is ... a task whose consummation can be looked for not from men but only from God Himself; because we do not know exactly how God will choose to do this, however, each good-hearted person 'must... proceed as though everything depended upon him' .40 Resolving this paradox between human responsibility and divine assis¬ tance is Kant's main aim in §IV. As the title itself suggests, the material of an ethical commonwealth in the form of a people of God 'can be realized (through
40. Kt8:100-1(92), e.a. Michalson is therefore correct to say 'the recovery from radical evil' must take place through 'a divine/human alliance' [Mi93:45]. But he thinks this raises numerous 'philosoph¬ ical puzzles and obscurities' [46]. For example, in Books Two and Three 'the cooperative role played by God is gradually displaced by other moral agents.' The 'community' assumes the 'soteriological function that is assigned to God in Books I and II.' That this might be a change of perspective rather than an inconsistency never occurs to Michalson. Moreover, he never says what would be wrong with such a transition of responsibility. It seems quite compatible with the notion that human beings are God's children. As we grow up, God gives us more and more responsibility to fend for ourselves. Michalson complains, however, that this 'does not really solve the problem of radical evil' [46]; it 'simply changes the subject.' It 'begs the question of individual moral regener¬ ation', inasmuch as [47] 'God's grace assumes the form of other rational beings.' That no question is begged here becomes obvious, once we realize Kant is dealing with different issues. Moreover, even in Book Three Kant insists there will inevitably be something God alone can do to make up for our insufficiency, whether individual or social. Michalson rejects such a claim as incoherent [48-9] on the grounds that 'the "phenomenal" moral agent is playing a kind of "catch-up" with the noumenal agent... The equivocation here is palpable.' (See Mi90:103-6 for a similar argument.) But no such monstrosity is assumed in Kant's text, any more than our empirical intuitions have to 'catch up' with our pure intuition of space and time in systemt. What gradually improves over time is our own self-awareness—our knowledge of our disposition, not the disposition itself. Michalson's misrepresentation of Book Three (especially §111) reaches its height when he claims [Mi93:50] that Kant 'supplements—and possibly trumps—his appeals to an inscrutable divine grace with appeals to the community of moral agents.' Yet Kant never comes close to saying the community can do it all; he affirms only that we must act as if we must do so, in order to avoid moral laziness. That Kant is here 'caught between heaven and earth' [50] is a offense he would surely admit, for this is the true human situation! (Rossi aptly expresses this point by saying that for Kant 'the unique status that human beings have in the cosmos' is precisely that we 'stand in that breach between the "sensible" and the "intelligible," because we are the juncture' [Ro93:62].) The supposed inconsistencies Michalson so diligently enumerates reveal Kant's integrity, not his philosophical ineptitude. Thus, Michalson cleverly alleges [51] that both of Kant's supposedly inconsistent views in Kt8 'appear to supersede his own postulate of the immortality of the soul in [Kt4].' This is because in Kant's account of the individual's struggle with evil we no longer need duration, and in his account of the community's victory the kingdom is established on earth, not in heaven. Both these objections, however, are easily overcome. In the former case, an individual's salvation remains a future reality for Kant, so immortality is still needed in order for us to reap the benefits of having held on to our good disposition. And in the latter, without duration, there would be no experience of reward; a postulate of a new kind of phenomenal realm (i.e., heaven on earth) is still needed, in order for the noumenal ideal to take effect.
170
PART THREE: CRITICAL RELIGION
human organization) only in the form of a church' .41 Kant resolves the paradox by distinguishing between the 'church invisible' and the 'visible church': An ethical commonwealth under divine moral legislation is a church which, so far as it is not an object of possible experience [cf. the 'negative noumenon' in step nine of systemt], is called the church invisible (...the archetype of what is to be es¬ tablished by men). The visible church is the actual union of men into a whole which ...exhibits the (moral) kingdom of God on earth so far as it can be brought to pass by men. [101(92)]
Kant then describes a set of archetypal principles of the invisible church, which any visible church must adopt in order to be 'true' (i.e., in order to make God's kingdom real on earth). These principles follow the same 2LAR pattern as Kant's famous table of categories, just as the principles in step eight of systemt [see KSP1, Fig. III.4]. They are: (1) its quantity is 'Universality, and hence its numerical oneness.. .with respect to its fundamental intention'; (2) its 'quality' is 'purity, union under no motivating forces other than moral ones'; (3) its 'relation', both 'of its members to one another, and... of the church to political power', is determined by 'the principle of freedom'; and (4) its 'modality' is 'the unchangeableness of its constitution', i.e., of certain 'settled principles' that are 'laid down, as it were, out of a book of laws, for guid¬ ance'.42 The form of the true (universal) church, then, can be mapped onto the cross as shown in Figure VII.5. The two lLARs that give rise to this 2LAR can be identified as distinguishing between characteristics concerned with laws 4 1 . Kt8:100(91). Flesher misleadingly refers to this as an 'identification' [F188:124-5], saying 'Kant calls [the 'ethical commonwealth'] a church.' Yet the two are far from being identical concepts: they are as distinct as democracy is from theocracy [see Pa93]! Flesher does correctly describe the church as 'an evolutionary body' [125], adding that it plays out the necessary, though 'uneasy marriage of the pure religion of reason and ecclesiastical faith.' As we shall see, this is a mutually complementary arrangement: reason on its own cannot make religion real; it needs the help of faith; historical faiths on their own are illegitimate; they need reason as a guiding light. McCarthy makes a similar blunder [Mc86:98], claiming Kant's 'church has become destined to dissolve into the ethical commonwealth.' This would be true if Kant were a strict reductionist. But it simply cannot be supported by the text. For Kant argues that the ethical commonwealth must be raised to the status of becoming a church in order to succeed! Neglecting the architectonic flow of Kt8, especially the implications of Kant's 'religious argument', McCarthy wrongly concludes [85] 'that the idea of an ethical commonwealth does not lead to the idea of a revelation-based church.' As we shall see in VIH.3.A, however, Kant believes the best visible church is 'revelationbased'. McCarthy likewise claims [86] 'the idea of an ethical commonwealth leads ultimately back only to itself.' What it lead to in the flow of Kant's text is the church, and ultimately to the king¬ dom of God on earth [see Pa94b]. McCarthy's claim assumes that the ethical commonwealth is iden¬ tical to the kingdom of God—yet they are very different for Kant: the former is a mere idea that can be made concrete only by interpreting it religiously, in terms of the latter. McCarthy states Kant's view more accurately when he says the church serves an 'intermediate' role between these two [86]. 42. Kt8:101-2(93). The correspondence between Kant's four principles (especially the first two) and the Nicene Creed's affirmation of 'one holy catholic and apostolic Church' may be more than coincidental. Kant's 'freedom' may be intended as a more realistic version of 'catholic' (meaning _while__lunchangeableness' generalizes the continuity implied by 'apostolic'. Peters dh
VII. Systemr
171
unchangeableness of principles (++) (laws, external)
universality of - intention (-) (freedom, internal)
freedom in relationships (-+) -^ (freedom, external)
2> purity of motivation (+-) (laws, internal)
Figure VII. 5: The Archetypal Characteristics of the Invisible Church (+) or freedom (-) on the one hand, and between their external (+) or internal (-) manifestations on the other. Taken together, §§II-IV describe the eighth and ninth steps in systemr. Just as step eight of systemt introduces the principles of pure understanding as the key element in stage three that makes empirical knowledge possible, so also step eight in systemr introduces the principles of divine government that make a true church possible. These principles provide the form (+) enabling us to re¬ gard an ethical commonwealth as a People of God (i.e., an invisible church). The argument of this step can therefore be expressed as: VIE. an ethical commonwealth (-+-)
archetypal principles of divine government'
a People of God (-++) (invisible church)
The third step in stage three, as usual, synthesizes (x) or realizes, the two preceding steps. Step nine, then, requires some form of human organization— i.e., a 'public covenant' [Kt8:105(96)] working in harmony with the archetypal principles of the invisible church to establish a true visible church. As this hap¬ pens more and more, God's kingdom is gradually manifested on earth. In sum: IX. a People of God (-++) human organization of^ the kingdom of (invisible church) a true visible church God on earth (-+x)
The kingdom of God does for mankind here in systemr what moral action (i.e., virtue) does for individuals in step nine of systemp.43 The empirical perspective 43. Davidovich alludes to this parallel in Da93a:25. Similarly, Crosby notes a 'close connection ... between the kingdom of ends and the Kingdom of God' [Cr94:126]. What he fails to see is that the
172
PART THREE: CRITICAL RELIGION
of systemr thus concludes in step nine by making 'empirical faith', also known as 'historical ecclesiastical faith', a necessary element of genuine religion.44 In the remainder of Book Three (i.e., §§V-VII of Division One, and all of Division Two) Kant discusses a variety of issues relating to how the elements established here in stage three are to be applied in a real, historical religion.45 former applies only to systemp; in Kt8 Kant is dealing with the latter. The former becomes transformed into the latter through religion. 44. Kt8:109-10(100). Despland notes that Kant makes 'repeated attacks on the disjunction of reason and history, and reason appears ...as ...dependent on the community' [De73:222]. He uses the concentric circles metaphor [see above, Fig. VII. 1] to give an excellent account of why Kant 'oscillat[es] between the view that sees reason as the educator of history and that which sees history as the educator of reason' [242]. For Kant, reason is 'the force that draws and attracts', yet 'revela¬ tion and grace [are] the dynamic realities that move man along this progressive path.' Michalson considers the possibility that 'the religion of reason is not necessarily opposed to historical religion' [Mi79:52], but as a direct consequence of his lack of appreciation for Kant's principle of perspective, he is never able to account for the intrinsic 'tension' [126] between the two. Explicitly contrasting his view with Despland's, Michalson responds to this 'unresolved tension in Kant's religious thought' [130] by repeatedly appealing to the 'standards' set in Ktl, Kt4, and Kt5 in order to interpret Kt8—i.e., by insisting [131] that for Kant 'our moral and religious life is intelligible only in terms of a timeless noumenal realm.' Yet this uncritical conflation of standpoints, the source of most of Michalson's confusion, does not come from Kant but from the false set of hermeneutic assumptions being imposed on the text. Thus Michalson portrays Kant as being 'forced' into an irrational position of 'incorporating] the historical aspects of religion into his religious philosophy' [132], when in fact this incorporation is but a natural outcome of the judicial standpoint Kant adopts in Kt8. Likewise neglecting the compatibility Kant sees between reason and history [see KSP4], Davidovich accuses Kant of having a 'deep bias against organized religion' [Da93b:121] and as¬ serts [122] that historical religion is 'the greatest possible threat to the autonomy of morality and, by implication, to the cultural progress of humanity.' While there is some truth in these comments, they ignore far more important points that are fundamental to systemr: despite Kant's personal preference not to attend church regularly [see notes VIII.31 and 49], he makes human organization a necessary element in all true religion; and along with the risk of wrongly believing historical religion can replace pure religion comes the greatest possible benefit of religion, that humanity, through its historical struggle with the reality of evil, will finally come of age. One-sided comments such as Davidovich's tend to shroud Kant's rightful standing as a reformer. 45. The extent of Kant's emphasis in these sections on the realization of rational religion in history makes it rather surprising that McCarthy would assert [Mc82:200]: 'Kant makes no references to the possible intention of the New Testament writers to narrate events which in some sense might be historical.' Perhaps this is simply because Kant saw no need to mention what everyone takes for granted! We must keep in mind, after all, that in appealing to Scripture Kant is exemplifying his own principle of moral interpretation, and that in his defense of this approach to interpretation, Kant freely admits that historical scholarship does have a legitimate role—just not a primary religious one. Moreover, McCarthy himself accurately reports Kant's view that 'the actual and historical church' reflects the 'true church' [Mc86:87] only 'to the extent that it recognizes itself as transitional and as the imperfect vehicle of pure religion.' This acknowledgment that the true church can (and must) be historical does not mean 'the church.. .cannot, according to Kant, serve as the basis of a universal church.' It can, provided we recognize it as a temporary and imperfect basis [see Pa94b]. McCarthy continues [88]: 'The Christian church is thus certainly not the vehicle of salvation history but simply a distinguished passenger.... [T]he Christian church itself eventually needs to be saved.' This is potentially misleading, for 'vehicle' is precisely the term Kant uses to describe the true historical church! Kant allows there to be more than one vehicle, so no visible church can claim to be exclusive, unless (as Kant himself argues [see VIII.2-3] it alone fits the 'passenger' (reason). As such, the church needs to be 'saved' only in the sense of continuing its movement gradually away from historical particularity and towards rational universality.
VII. Systemr
-\ •
173
We shall examine these issues in detail in VIII.3.A. For now it will suffice to point out that the perspectival difference between the first two stages and the last two stages is brought out forcefully by Kant in Kt8:104-5(95-6), where he gives two distinct answers to the question 'How does God wish to be honored?' For the first two stages, wherein this question is 'answered in a way universally valid for each man, regarded merely as man [i.e., as a solitary individual],.. .the legislation of His will ought to be solely moral; for statutory legislation (which presupposes a revelation) can be regarded merely as contingent...'. But in the third and fourth stages, when we regard ourselves as obliged to behave not merely as men but also as citi¬ zens in a divine state on earth... under the name of a church, then the question ... appears to be unanswerable by reason alone and to require statutory legislation of which we become cognizant only through revelation, i.e., an historical faith...
As we saw in step eight, this dependence on God and on a divine revelation plays 'a significant role', but not merely 'in the distant past', as McCarthy claims [Mc86:100]; for it is actually an element in system,-. Nevertheless, from the philosopher's (Copernican) Perspective as such, this requirement remains empty:46 like radical evil and the assistance-giving archetype in the first two stages, the details of the divine organization of the church must be 'filled in' by some historical tradition. It would be 'presumptuous', therefore, to regard our dependence on revelation as an excuse 'to take the laws constituting the basis and form of any church as divine statutory laws... in order to save ourselves the trouble of still further improving the church's form': rather, 'it is the divine will that we should ourselves carry into effect' the church's form by learning from past mistakes [105(96)]. The members of a church must humbly accept this task as 'entirely committed to them alone'. Kant is not denying that God will guide human organizers in this task. On the contrary, he warns that 'it 46. Kant's philosophically correct recognition of ignorance with respect to the details of divine revelation is likely to bewilder any interpreter who does not recognize its perspectival context. Thus Wisnefske [Wi9O:149n] asks: 'What can it mean for something to be revealed about which we have no notion at all? How do we know it is the revelation of God if we have no sense of what it is for there to be a God? Revelation seems to indicate that something* vaguely known becomes known.' Kant's response would be that, as we saw in V.l-4, we do have a notion of God and that it can be known with a high degree of clarity if regarded as a practical symbol. What reason cannot give us is an intuition that corresponds to this idea. That this can be given only through experience is the central tenet of Kant's Critical mysticism [see Part Four]. In order to be considered valid by reason, a claim to revelation must therefore either be consistent with practical reason or else must be regarded hypothetically, as a symbolic representation of an essentially unknowable truth. Hicks accuses Kant's attempt to 'return to theistic piety and grace' of being 'both untenable and self-defeating' [Hi74:386]; as long as he attempts to do it 'without revelation', it is 'tantamount to the regaining of lost innocence.' We can now see how unfair this is. First, Kant does allow for the necessity of revelation. Second, his hope is not for a return to Eden, but for a move forward to a new (Critical) innocence, requiring the cooperative participation of God's grace.
174
PART THREE: CRITICAL RELIGION
would be as great self-conceit to deny peremptorily that the way in which a church is organized may perhaps be a special divine arrangement, if, so far as we can see, it is completely harmonious with the moral religion' [105(96)]. As hinted by the fourth characteristic for the organization of any true church (i.e., its unchangeable modality), Kant emphasizes the importance of a church treating a scripture as 'an object of esteem', and as more important than tradi¬ tion [Kt8:107(97)]. Along these lines he says [107(98)]: A holy book arouses the greatest respect even among those (indeed, most of all among those) who do not read it... [Yet] it has never been possible to destroy a faith grounded in scripture ..., whereas the faith established upon tradition ... has promptly met its downfall when the state was overthrown. How fortunate, when such a book, fallen into men's hands, contains, along with its statutes, or laws of faith, the purest moral doctrine of religion in its completeness... [B]ecause of the difficulty of rendering intelligible according to natural laws the origin of such en¬ lightenment of the human race as proceeds from it, such a book can command an esteem like that accorded to revelation.
Kant's discussion of the proper method of interpreting scripture will be discussed in VIII.3.A. Here it is sufficient to clarify the perspective from which he believes a revealed scripture must be viewed. He explains in Kt8:109(100) that 'a church dispenses with the most important mark of truth, namely, a right¬ ful claim to universality, when it bases itself upon a revealed faith.... Yet be¬ cause of the natural need and desire of all men for something sensibly tenable ..., some historical ecclesiastical faith or other... must be utilized.' In other words, the revealed scriptures used by 'such an empirical faith' [110(100)] should never be viewed as an end in themselves, but only as a means to the end of establishing a truly religious faith, even though (the historical record [e.g., the Bible].. .may itself be a miracle (a supersensible revelation)' [85(79)]. The simultaneous need for both universality (--) and unchangeableness (++) [see Fig. VII.5], despite their direct opposition, is conveyed in Kt8:l 12(103): The authority of Scripture, as the most worthy instrument, and at present the only instrument in the most enlightened portion of the world, for the union of all men into one church, constitutes the ecclesiastical faith, which,... cannot be neglected, because no doctrine based on reason alone seems to the people qualified to serve as an unchangeable norm.
Hare rightly notes that Kant is 'an agnostic about supernatural revelation', but only 'in the narrow sense that... the claim to have received supernatural revelation cannot be known to be true, in Kant's restricted sense of "knowl¬ edge."... It no more follows that we should not believe in supernatural revelation than that we should not believe in God.'47 47. Ha94:140. Despland expresses a similar view in De73:220 [s.a. 225]: 'The possibility of [special
'
^ ,'•'•'
VII. Systemr
!
175
As long as 'an historical faith ..., having become ecclesiastical, enhances the principle of a continual approach to pure religious faith,... [it] can at any time be called the true church' [Kt8:115(106); s.a. 153(140)]. Kant looks for¬ ward to a gradual development from an emphasis on ecclesiastical faith to a recognition of the primacy of religious faith [121-2(112-3)]: ... religion will gradually be freed from all empirical determining grounds and from all statutes which rest on history and which through the agency of ecclesiastical faith provisionally unite men for the requirements of the good; and thus at last the pure religion of reason will rule over all, 'so that God may be all in all' [1 Cor. 15:28].... All this is not to be expected from an external revolution ... The basis for the transition to that new order of affairs must lie in the principle that the pure religion of reason is a continually occurring divine (though not empirical) revelation for all men.
Kant describes his eschatological hope in the eventual 'sovereignty of pure religious faith' as 'the coming of the kingdom of God' [115(105); cf. AVI.3]. Steps eight and nine of systemr require both that 'God himself must be the founder of His kingdom' and yet that human beings be 'the creators of the or¬ ganization' [152 (140)]. Thus, the culmination of this process is 'a beautiful ideal... which we cannot conceive as a culmination in experience, but can merely anticipate, i.e., prepare for, in continual progress and approximation toward the highest good possible on earth ,..'48 This is the task—the proper use of revelation as a practical tool for bringing us closer to the kingdom of God— that Kant sets for the true {visible) church here in the third stage of system,-. The fourth stage will show us how best to fulfill such a task. B. Service of God (++) The fourth stage in systemr establishes the conditions under which the church, as given in step nine, can serve God, despite the limitations of earthly existence. Here the ultimate goal of religion—viz., to make humanity wellrevelation] is not to be denied, but the use of the idea must be modest.' As we shall see in VIH.2.B, the same can be said for Kant's view of the claim that Jesus is God incarnate. This perspectival way of interpreting Kant stands in marked contrast to the more negative interpretations so often adopted in the past. Barth, for example, thinks '[a]nyone who speaks of revelation is bursting the religion of reason asunder', to the extent that Kant's 'philosophy of religion cannot therefore speak of revelation' [Ba72:284]; likewise, he claims that for Kant 'there is certainly ...no sugges¬ tion that this Word [i.e., the archetype] might by any chance have become flesh.' Fendt assumes the same position without argument: 'Kant stands against both Incarnation and Revelation' [Fe90:206]. We shall see the full extent of how wrong such views are in VIII.2.B and VIII.3.A. 48. This same theme is echoed in a number of Kant's secondary writings on politics, history, and human nature [e.g., Kt31, Kt32, Kt60-Kt63]. The relation of these works to each other and to reli¬ gion (especially stage three of systemr) will be examined in KSP4. A first attempt to expound Kant's theory of the political history of mankind can be found in Pa94b, where I argue that Kant's view of the culmination of history has a close affinity to 'theocracy'—a theology of politics I have described primarily from the Perspective of the biblical theologian in Pa93.
176
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pleasing to God—is realized in much the same way as rational inference realizes the ultimate goal of systemt [see KSP1:VII.3.B]. Accordingly, we can regard Book Four of Kt8 as developing the implications of the hypothetical perspective of systemr, so that ++ will be the first two terms in the expression symbolizing the function of each of the three steps therein. And just as Kant presents both a proper (hypothetical) and an improper (speculative) perspective in stage four of systemt, so also here in stage four of systemr he deals with both 'the service of God' and 'the pseudo-service of God'.49 In what follows we shall therefore examine both ways of completing systemr. Kant begins his account of the true service of God with a description of what religion essentially is. Since the definitions set out in this passage apply throughout systemr, and serve as the backbone of his entire approach, I outlined his views in VI.2-3. His reason for saving this apparently introductory material until the beginning of Book Four, rather than supplying it at the outset of Kt8, is that religion as such first becomes a reality at the end of stage three. The radical evil in human nature, the change of heart in an individual, and the bonding together of such individuals as members of a church, all prepare the way for the expression of true religion in stage four; on their own the earlier stages would not suffice to compose a religious standpoint. The visible church, as a vehicle for universal religion, provides the context wherein truly religious people (i.e., those who have experienced a conversion to agood heart) can serve God; but the service itself comes here in stage four. Thus, after neatly summarizing the main points of the first three stages in Kt8:162(151), Kant says 'to become convinced of all this is part of religion.' The tenth step—like the 'unconditioned' object in step ten of systemt— presents the 'idea of the whole', towards which all previous steps have led; for systemr it is the determination to regard 'all duties as divine commands', and in so doing to realize the purpose of the church as an arena for authentic religious practice [Kt8:153(142)]. No revelation is presupposed in this first manifesta¬ tion of religion, so it is at this point a natural religion. Since Kant's definition of religion has already been fully discussed [see VI.2], it will suffice here merely to summarize this material (-) step in the fourth stage as: X. the kingdom of God on earth (-+x)
duties viewed as divine commands
^
a natural religion (++-)
That the definition of religion constituting this tenth step is based directly on the 49. Kt8:153-67(142-55) and 167-90(156-78), respectively. On systemt, see KSPl:129-40,235-43. Despland's view of Book Four as 'a kind of appendix' [De73:185; s.a. note VII.51, below] ignores its crucial role in completing the system.
VII. Systemr
177
Ethical Commonwealth (a humanly organized society obeying universal duties)
Kingdom of God (a humanly organized, divinely guided church)
Religion (church members serving God)
People of God (a divinely organized society obeying God's commands)
Figure VI1.6: Origin of Kant's Definition of Religion in Stage Three three steps of stage three is evident from Figure VII.6, where the opposition between duties and divine commands is transcended by the true church, thus giving rise to the form of religion Kant calls 'a pure rational faith' [162(151)]. As we saw in VI.2, religion in Kant's view can be 'objectively a natural religion, though subjectively one that has been revealed' [Kt8:156(144)]. Whereas step ten (as the material step in stage four) views religion in the former way, step eleven (as the formal step) views it in the latter way. In accordance with his choice of a second 'experiment' at the outset of Kt8 [see VII. 1], Kant chooses Christianity 'as the medium for the elucidation of our idea of revealed religion' [Kt8:156(144)], and 'the New Testament,... as the source of the Christian doctrine' [157(145)]. Most of the details of this part of his argument will therefore be examined in the corresponding section of the next chapter [VIII.3.B] rather than here. For the purposes of his first experiment, it is suf¬ ficient to point out that the concept of revelation 'is a pure concept of reason' [156(144)], just as are the 'ideas' in step eleven of systemt. By hypothetically imposing the concept of revelation onto a set of scriptures, an empirical religion (e.g., Christianity) can be regarded not just 'as a faith freely assented to by ev¬ eryone' (i.e., 'a pure rational faith'), but also 'as a faith which is commanded' (i.e., ' a revealed faith').50 Kant argues in Kt8:163(151-2) that both of these are 50. Kt8:162(151). This process is a good example of what I have elsewhere called the 'analytic a posteriori' [see e.g., KSPl:134-9,237-9,251-2,367-8; Pa00a:76-7]. A pre-formed concept
178
PART THREE: CRITICAL RELIGION
necessary, for pure religion (being on its own confined within the limits of practical reason) is naked, and must be clothed with revelation: ... where the Christian teaching is built not upon bare concepts of reason [i.e., not on these alone] but upon facts, it is no longer called merely the Christian religion, but the Christian faith... In the Christian church neither of these can be separated from the other as adequate in itself; the ['moral faith'] is indispensable to the ['historical faith'] because the Christian faith is a religious faith, and the [latter] is indispensable to the [former] because it is a learned faith.
Revelation, along with (secondarily) the scholarly learning needed to pre¬ serve and interpret the historical record, is the form (+) that clothes the material (-) of natural religion. This will be as true for any historical faith that deserves to be called a 'religion' as it is for Christianity. This eleventh step, then, is: XI. a natural religion (++-)
revelation (and scholarship)
.
a revealed religion (+++)
This step requires that 'the revealed doctrine... must be cherished and cultivated as merely a means, but a most precious means, of making this doctrine [of 'natural religion'] comprehensible, even to the ignorant' [Kt8:165(152-3)]. The twelfth and final step of systemr synthesizes (x) natural and revealed religion in their proper order, so that 'the object and end of all religion (which .. .is conduct pleasing to God)' [Kt65:56] can be realized through 'the true ser¬ vice of the church under the dominion of the good principle' [Kt8:165(153)]. This involves on the one hand regarding all human duties as divine commands, and on the other regarding the statutory laws of the true church, which is itself 'steadily approximating to pure rational faith', as also divinely revealed [153 (140)]. The former represents the direct (material) service of God, while the latter represents the indirect (formal) service of God: ... when [people] fulfil their duties to man (themselves and others) they are, by these very acts, performing God's commands and are therefore in all their actions and abstentions.. .perpetually in the service of God, and... it is absolutely impos¬ sible to serve God more directly in any other way (since they can affect and have influence upon earthly beings alone, and not upon God). [103(94)]
The indirect service of God, ordained by statutory divine laws, should serve as a motivating force to encourage and clarify the 'disposition of virtue... which of itself is well-pleasing to God' [173(161)]. Kant elaborates on the proper way of uniting these two forms of service when he explains that 'actions which have no moral value in themselves will have to be accepted as well-pleasing to ('revelation') is used to define analytically, or determine in advance, the nature of something (a set of texts) that is met only a posteriori, in experience. Describing revelation in this way is not meant to detract from its legitimacy, but only to describe what is happening when a person adopts an hypothetical belief in its status as revealed.
VII. Systemr
-
179
Him only so far as they serve as a means to the furtherance of what, in the way of conduct, is immediately good' [177(165)]. Keeping in mind the secondary role of all nonmoral actions or beliefs, we can summarize this final step as: XII. a revealed religion (+++)
true (dutiful) service of God
.
humanity as wellpleasing to God (++x)
Just as systemt begins by presupposing an unknowable thing in itself (0) and ends with hypothetical belief in a noumenal reality (++x) [see KSP1:VII.3.B], so also systemr, as we have now seen, begins by presupposing an unknowable good predisposition (0) and ends with hypothetical belief in a revelation of God's ultimate acceptance of our conduct as well-pleasing (i.e., good).51 Kant devotes considerable effort in Book Four to the task of determining how we can identify what is not true service of God. The speculative perspec¬ tive on religion produces 'religious illusion' [Kt8:168(156)], in which 'the moral order is wholly reversed' by the supposition that 'revealed faith is to pre¬ cede religion'[165(153)]: Belief in propositions of which the unlearned can assure themselves neither through reason nor through Scripture (inasmuch as the latter would first have to be authenticated [by scholars]) would here be made an absolute duty ... A church founded upon this latter principle does not really have servants..., but commanding high officials... They transform, in this way, the service of the church ... into a , domination of its members ... 5 2
Such 'allegiance to the historical and statutory element of ecclesiastical faith as alone bringing salvation' gives rise to 'the pseudo-service of the church' [153(141); s.a. 171(159)], which is the 'pretended honoring of God through
51. As Vossenkuhl correctly observes, 'the ideal of a new man pleasing to God' is systemr's 'analogue to the "supreme good'" in systemp [Vo88:185]. This suggests how wrong Flesher [F188:126; s.a. note VII.49, above] is to regard Book Four as constituting 'little more than an appendix to Book Three.' As in systemt and systemp, the fourth stage here supplies the true aim for the entire endeavor. That aim is to serve God, and only in Book Four does Kant tell us clearly how this is to be done. As such, Book Four of Kt8 fulfills a role equivalent to the Dialectic sections of Ktl and Kt4. 52. Kt8:165(153). Concerning such an insistence on propositional assent, Kant asks in Kt8:172(15960): 'Who, indeed, is now the unbeliever? Is it he who trusts, without knowing how that for which he hopes will come to pass; or he who absolutely insists on knowing the way in which man is released from evil and, if he cannot know this, gives up all hope of the release?' Obviously, Kant's answer is that the latter person, by adopting the speculative perspective on matters of religious belief, has unwittingly declared a profound lack of faith. To this we can add that, given Kant's understanding of the terms 'deism' and 'theism' [see IV.4], those who ignore natural religion and base the entirety of their doctrinal beliefs on supposedly theoretical knowledge gleaned from a particular set of holy scriptures, assumed to be God's unique and final revelation to humanity, are in fact more like deists than theists. They know God not as a living 'voice' [see X.3-4] but only through the dead letter of a revelation set in stone, a revelation as complete as the deists' proverbial 'clock': once wound up (written down by human authors), it requires no further intervention from God.
180
PART THREE: CRITICAL RELIGION
which we work directly counter to the service demanded by God Himself.'53 To illustrate the difference between true and false service, we can imagine ourselves ordering a meal at our favorite restaurant. Waiter A fills the order with the food that was requested, but never smiles or engages in friendly conversa¬ tion. Waiter B is all smiles and chats at length about everything under the sun, but ends up letting the food go cold and bringing someone else's order to the table. A friendly attitude would obviously be a welcomed supplement to good service, but on its own it is insufficient. In this example waiter A performs 'true service', despite being unfriendly, whereas waiter B performs 'pseudo-service' by allowing the supplement (friendliness) to stand in the way of performing good service (delivering hot food to the correct table). Kant seems to have such situations in mind in Kt8:153(141), when he defines pseudo-service as the persuasion that some one can be served by deeds which in fact frustrate the very ends of him who is being served. This occurs... when that which is of value only indirectly, as a means of complying with the will of a superior, is proclaimed to be, and is substituted for, what would make us directly well-pleasing to him.
All forms of ecclesiastical faith are 'alike in worth (or rather worthlessness)' when they take on the character of pseudo-service, because 'there is no essential difference among the ways of serving Him', once the relation of ser¬ vice to morality is taken away [Kt8:172(160)]. Kant's criticism of 'penances, castigations, pilgrimages, and the like' is not that such acts constitute pseudoservice as such, but that they become pseudo-service when people perform them 'because they.. .testify... to unbounded (though not moral) subjection to [God's] will. The more useless such self-castigations are and the less they are designed for the general moral improvement of the man, the holier they seem to be' [169(157)]. In such cases, 'however few the imposed observances, so long as these are laid down as unconditionally necessary the faith remains a fetishfaith through which the masses are ruled and robbed of their moral freedom by subservience to a church (not to religion).'54 Kant's guiding principle in stage four is: 'Whatever, over and above good life-conduct, man fancies that he can do to become well-pleasing to God is mere religious illusion' [Kt8:170(158)]. As we saw in VI.3, the common view that this basic hypothesis reduces religion entirely to 'good life-conduct' is untenable; such an interpretation contradicts Kant's emphasis elsewhere on the 53. Kt8:168(156). By contrast, true service is inherently paradoxical [Kt39:450-l(124)]: 'God ...com¬ mands that we practise virtue for its own inherent worth, and not merely because He demands it.' 54. Kt8:180(168); s.a. note AVII.17. 'To claim universal validity for a dogma... involves a contradic¬ tion: ...no mere statute can be universally valid', because it is not a priori, but empirical [Kt65:49]. Kant defines 'orthodoxy' as 'the view that belief in dogma is sufficient for religion' [60] and 'sectarianism' as the view that such belief is 'essential' [50].
VII. Systenir
181
importance of statutory laws as significant vehicles for true religion. The con¬ tradiction is easily resolved, however, by understanding the words 'over and above' to mean 'instead of rather than 'in addition to'. Kant's complaint is not against honoring God in nonmoral ways in addition to moral ways, but only against those who allow the former to take the place of the latter.55 The ten¬ dency of interpreters to misunderstand such principles is (as usual) Kant's own fault. For in his earnest attempt to emphasize the primacy of the moral in God's eyes, he sometimes makes assertions which, taken in themselves, do seem to imply an extreme reductionism. A few examples will illustrate this point: All these observances [of public divine worship] are at bottom morally indifferent actions; yet, just because they are to be performed merely for His sake, they are held to be all the more pleasing to Him. [106(97)] There are no special duties to God in a universal religion, for God can receive noth¬ ing from us; we cannot act for Him, nor yet upon Him. [154n(142n)] ... we can do no more than our duty with respect to God... [Kt39:491(207)]. ... the cause of all ceremonies is ['unbelief in natural religion']. Men think that ceremonies can take the place of morality, and they seek to win God over by nonmoral actions. [Kt35:(92)] The only thing that matters in religion is deeds... [Kt65:41].
Such strong statements serve to stress the importance of the perspectival shift Kant is suggesting, away from focus on the outward form of religion and towards a focus on its inner reality. The mistake is to conclude from their ap¬ parent one-sidedness that Kant finds no place whatsoever for such 'morally indifferent actions'. True, he does not wish to regard them as duties, nor even as deeds in the moral sense of the word. Nevertheless, he recognizes that they can play a very important (indeed, necessary) supporting role to the main character in stage four (viz., moral conduct), so long as they do not usurp the lead role. For example, when he criticizes the person who defends a primary emphasis on statutory laws by charging that 'when he says that he also gives his heart to God he means by this not the disposition to a course of life wellpleasing to Him but the heart-felt wish that those sacrifices may be accepted in lieu of that disposition' [Kt8:172(160)], Kant is not claiming all worshippers of God commit this error, as interpreters so often assume [see e.g., Cr96:99], but only those who do not adopt a 'moral disposition'. For 'everything depends... 55. Kant states this explicitly at the end of the section where he discusses this principle: 'ecclesiastical faith...must contain within itself, along with the statutory articles ..., still another principle, of setting up the religion of good life-conduct as the real end' [Kt8:174(163), e.a.]. See AVIII.l for a more detailed discussion of this point. The idea that we should eventually 'dispense with the statutory articles' is not something Kant regards as a realistic, short-term goal; it is rather an ideal, a long-term task that is not likely to be fully accomplished in the foreseeable future [see Pa94b].
182
PART THREE: CRITICAL RELIGION
upon whether we rely on the moral disposition alone..., or on pious playthings and on inaction' [173(161), e.a.]. Even superstition 'is only contingently ob¬ jectionable', since it is actually 'allied to reason' when used to help a person 'to work against the obstacles in the way of a disposition well-pleasing to God' [174(163)]. Ecclesiastical ceremonies, as we shall see in AVII.4 and AVIII.l4, are not objectionable at all if they are viewed from the proper perspective. Kant describes 'devotion' as 'the frame of mind ... attuned to acquiring dispositions dedicated to God' [Kt8:170(158)]. As such it is a necessary part of service to God. (Only when 'we ascribe to the frame of mind ... the worth belonging to those dispositions themselves' does devotion become pseudoservice, for only in this case is it 'a procedure which has no moral value in it¬ self'.56 Greene misrepresents Kant's position, therefore, when he says 'Kant's absolute insistence upon the reduction of true religion to morality ... rendered him incapable of appreciating true religious devotion' [Gr34:lxxvi].) Kant read¬ ily admits that a person with an 'active disposition to good life-conduct' can properly use devotional exercises 'to make himself worthy of the supplementa¬ tion of his impotence through supernatural assistance' [178(166); s.a. note VII.33]; for in so doing 'he is counting on something supernatural to supple¬ ment his natural impotence, yet not on what is effected by man... but on what is received, on what he can hope for but can not bring to pass.' What Kant rejects is any attempt 'through natural acts' to 'conjure up divine assistance' [178(166)]. The difference has entirely to do with the perspective assumed, for as Kant exclaims in Kt8:179(167): 'So much depends, when we wish to unite two good things, upon the order in which they are united! True enlightenment lies in this very distinction [between direct and indirect service]; therein the service of God becomes first and foremost a free and hence a moral service.' Kant expresses the same point in another way when he argues that 'the doctrine of godliness' should be subordinate to 'the doctrine of virtue', since the former 'can merely serve as a means of strengthening' the latter [Kt8:183 (171)]. Thus he warns [185(173)]: When reverence for God is put first, with virtue therefore subordinated to it, this object [of reverence] becomes an idol, that is, He is thought of as a Being whom we may hope to please not through morally upright conduct on earth but through adoration and ingratiation; and religion is then idolatry. But godliness is not a
56. Kt8:169-70(157-8). Kant expresses this rather forcefully in Kt35:(89): 'Devoutness is an indirect relation of the heart to God, which seeks to express itself in action and to make the knowledge of God work effectually upon the will. It is not an activity, but a method of securing readiness in ac¬ tion. It is action, the putting into practice of the moral law, the doing of what God wills us to do, that constitutes true religion.... [DJevotional exercises are meant for the purpose of acquiring the habit of doing good... Devotion as a separate pursuit, as an occupation in itself, has no point.'
v
VII. Systemr
\
183
surrogate for virtue, whereby we may dispense with the latter; rather is it virtue's • consummation, enabling us to be crowned with the hope of the ultimate , , achievement of all our good ends.
It is important to note that 'put first' in this context means "relied upon as the end goal', not 'chronologically prior'. For a devout attitude may well (and often does) come before a virtuous act, without nullifying its goodness. Kant's point is that reverence as an end in itself, without leading to good life-conduct, is idolatry. 'True reverence consists in acting according to God's will' [Kt39: 495(216)]. In light of all these ways Kant has of emphasizing the importance of putting moral and nonmoral actions in the right order, we can now see that the false version of systemr (corresponding to systemt's speculative perspective) merely reverses the priority of steps ten and eleven. In other words, revelation and its statutory laws are regarded as being most important, with the fulfillment of human duties (defined now not in moral terms, but in terms of the 'right' interpretation of scripture) having a secondary significance. Since many of the statutes are bound to be nonmoral (e.g., devotional), the service that results is false, and the end result is no longer universal, but is limited in its extent to the devotees of the historical tradition in question. We can therefore summarize the three steps that compose the 'pseudo-service' version of stage four as follows: Xs. the kingdom of God on earth (-+x) Ms. a revealed religion (++-) XIIs. a learned religion (+++)
divine revelation right teaching (and scholarship)
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t
,
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the devotees as unknowingly displeasing to God (++x)
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4. An Analytic Summary and a Synthetic Model Without recognizing Kant's dependence on the principle of perspective, interpreters are bound to regard his treatment of religion in books such as Kt8, Kt35, and Part I of Kt65 as filled with contradictions. As we have seen and shall see even more clearly in the following chapter, doctrines often appear to be rejected and then accepted even within the same passage. But with a clear awareness of the principle of perspective as our interpretive guide, we have been able to interpret the first of the two 'experiments' that constitute Kant's Critical religion (viz., his construction of a system of religious perspectives) as a balanced approach to understanding religion. Of at least equal importance is the extent to which it will enable us to see the thoroughly constructive inten¬ tions of his second experiment (viz., his assessment of historical religion in
184
PART THREE: CRITICAL RELIGION
general and of Christianity in particular); indeed, I shall argue in Chapter VIII that Kant actually presents Christianity as the one true expression of universal religion. Likewise, the transcendent ideas that arise in each stage of systemr, though sometimes magnified by interpreters to a place of primary importance [see e.g., De73:215-36], can now be seen in their proper role as potentially healthy 'by-products' (parerga) of the actual system. Appendix VII demon¬ strates that Kant's intention in discussing them is not to reject them outright, but merely to prevent the spread of disease throughout an otherwise healthy religious system—the disease arising only when the by-products are mistakenly regarded as religion's main source of nourishment. The most decisive advantage of this way of interpreting system,- is that, by replacing the typical reductionistic interpretation [see VI. 1-4] with one that adopts the Copernican Perspective [see KSPl:61-8], we can now see how thoroughly Kt8 follows the architectonic pattern set in Ktl for the entire Critical philosophy. Kant's Copernican Perspective on religion reverses the usual priority given to the external expression of religion over its internal core. Just as Copernicus suggested that the earth actually revolves around the sun even though the sun appears to revolve around the earth, and just as Kant argues in Ktl that objects conform (transcendentally) to the subject even though the subject appears to conform (empirically) to the object, so also Kant argues in Kt8 that historical religious traditions conform to pure moral religion, even though morality appears to arise out of just such traditions—or at least, this Copernican Perspective must hold true in order for any historical tradition to serve as a vehicle for universal religion. What is crucial for system,- is that religious people read a truly religious disposition into the outward observances of their tradition (which are to be viewed as pleasing God only indirectly, not directly, as they may seem to do), just as in systemt the subject reads various a priori forms into the object (which is to be viewed as a representation, not as a thing in itself, as it may seem to be).57 Now that we have completed our descriptive account of system,-, it will be helpful to provide an analytic summary of its twelve steps, following the same procedure used in KSP1:VII.4 for systemt and in KSP1:VIII.4 for systemp [see below, Figs. VII.7-8]. (The same qualifications apply to my account of the twelve steps of systemr as were expressed in KSP1:VII.4 with regard to systemt: Kant lays out the four main stages in his systems quite clear¬ ly, but the exact identification of the three steps within each stage is open to 57. This analogy between systemt and systemr is implied by Kant in Kt8:168n(156n) when, as a preparation for explaining religious illusions, he defines illusion in general as 'the deception of regarding the mere representation of a thing as equivalent to the thing in itself.'
VII. Systemr
185
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186
PART THREE: CRITICAL RELIGION
how humanity can become well-pleasing to God. We can work towards the accomplishment of this goal only by serving God through good life-conduct (x). Because human beings are sensible creatures, their service in most cases needs to be guided by the statutes of a revealed faith, which presupposes both a scriptural revelation and scholars to interpret it (+). More important, however, is the pure inner disposition of natural religion, which requires us to regard all duties hypothetically, as divine commands (-). The latter must be given priority (as the material) and the former treated as secondary (as the form), lest false service of God through empty ceremonies (or other nonmoral actions) result. Stage three. Religion's empirical perspective (-+) requires some histori¬ cal context to be used for putting into practice our service of God. Ultimately, this context will take the form of the 'kingdom of God' on earth (x). This can be realized only as a humanly organized community (a 'visible church') grad¬ ually corresponds more and more to the archetypal pattern of the invisible church. This pattern consists of four organizational categories (unity of inten¬ tion, purity of motivation, freedom of relationships, and unchangeableness of principles) that define an ethical commonwealth to be a people of God (+). An ethical commonwealth is a community of individuals who agree to adopt laws of virtue (-) as a schematism to counteract the tendency of good-hearted people (stage two) to allow evil (stage one) to influence their social relationships. Stage two. The logical perspective (+-) in religion defines the basic requirement for individual membership in the church. Each member of a true church must have undergone a conversion (x)—i.e., a painful experience of facing the evil heart that characterizes every human being until it undergoes a radical change, with a good maxim replacing the 'inverted' maxim in the supreme ground of that person's disposition. This comes about through practical faith in the archetype of a perfect person (+) that resides within every human individual. We can be confident such a conversion has actually taken place only by observing our progress in adopting good maxims more and more often. Ultimately, however, the very existence of this archetype is a sign that inscrutable assistance is available from God (-) for the otherwise impossible task of overcoming our evil heart. Stage one. The transcendental perspective (--) explains why conversion (and ultimately, religion itself) is necessary. Conversion is required by the fact that every person's heart is corrupted, at the very outset of their moral develop¬ ment, by adopting an inverted (hence, evil) maxim into their disposition (x). Reason cannot explain the presence of this universal propensity to be evilhearted, except to say that it is present as a 'radical' constituent of human nature (+). Considered apart from the influence of this radical evil, human persons
VII. Systemr
; / s
187
would all have an unobstructed potential to do good. In other words, the original state of every human being, as determined by human nature as such, is one of innocence (-), for human nature provides each person with a good predisposition. The synthetic version of this same summary can now be given, by map¬ ping these twelve steps onto a broken circle, just as in KSP1, Figures VII.5 and VIII.2: a good predisposition humanity as well-pleasing to God~~'^'^P° t e n t i a l t 0 d o S ood a revealed religion j ^ x n I ,Il\ fc\ •& i "^ \ propensity to evil a natural religiony A 1 ^ \ \ S~ •%. A
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Figure VII.8: Kant's Circle of Religion Before moving on to examine Kant's second experiment, it will be helpful to conclude this account of his first experiment with a brief reminder of the four important 'gaps' systemr leaves open.59 A good historical religion will be one that can fill these gaps in a rational way—i.e., without contradicting or in any way detracting from the significance of the moral law. Each gap defines a 'space' in systemr that Kant believes reason on its own is powerless to fill, yet is compelled to assume, lest the highest good be rendered impossible to attain. As we saw in VII.2.A, Kant never explains the origin of 'radical evil' (step two), but merely sets it up as a sign of the inscrutability of evil's true origin. The solution to the problem of personal evil, as elaborated in stage two, also rests on an inscrutable element in the system: the notion that there is a higher 59. See Table VII.2. These four key aspects of systemr suggest that Kant's philosophy of religion is a 'God of the gaps' theory. This is true in a special, practical sense. But it is not true in the ordinary sense of this phrase, where the 'gaps' refer to our ignorance in matters of empirical, scientific truth, which we are supposedly able to fill in with theological 'knowledge'. Kant has no sympathy for such an approach. Rather, the gaps in question here relate only to our practical reason, and are filled only hypothetically and only for elements about which bare reason leaves us necessarily ignorant. The same two qualifications would have to hold for any attempt to fill any gaps in our theoretical knowledge with a theological content: our ignorance must be necessary; and our theological claims must be made only hypothetically.
188
PART THREE: CRITICAL RELIGION
moral Being who will assist us in our moral weakness, thus making practical faith (step five) effective. Stage three leaves a space for God to guide human beings in building an ethico-spiritual kingdom on earth that will genuinely reflect the archetypal principles of the invisible church (step eight). And stage four leaves open a space for a revelation (together with its subsequent historical tradition) that will fill in the gaps in the natural religion provided by bare reason (step eleven). Taken together, these four spaces or gaps define the four types of 'clothing' that a good historical religion must provide in order to complement the naked body of pure moral religion.
Chapter VIII Christianity as the Universal Religion I have evidenced my great respect for Christianity in many ways ... Its best and most lasting eulogy is its harmony, which I demonstrated in [Kt8], with the purest moral belief of religion. For it is by this, and not by historical scholarship, that Christianity, so often debased, has always been restored; and only by this can it again be restored when, in the future, it continues to meet a similar fate. [Kt65:9]
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1. Kant's Copernican Perspective on Religion One of the best ways to guard against the common tendency to commit a long string of interpretive errors, by reading into Kant's writings a largely (if not entirely) negative attitude towards empirical religions, is to recall the metaphor Kant himself introduces at the outset of constructing his System. In the second edition Preface to Ktl, Kant appeals to Copernicus' revolution in astronomy as an example for philosophers to follow. As we saw in KSP1 :III. 1, Kant describes his Copernican revolution in philosophy primarily in terms of systemt, yet its influence spreads throughout his entire System of Perspectives. In theoretical philosophy, let us recall, the Copernican Perspective enables us to accept the revolutionary notion that the character of our knowledge depends on the subject when the subject-object relation is viewed from the transcendental perspective, even though the common-sense notion that the object determines the character of our knowledge remains valid, whenever we adopt the empirical perspective. That is, the Copernican character of Kant's fundamental philosoph¬ ical Perspective is what gives him the ability to accept the appearance of things as a legitimate way of viewing the world, while nevertheless explaining the deep (properly philosophical) structure of those appearances in terms that seem, paradoxically, to uphold exactly the opposite view. Those who fail to grasp this essential aspect of Kant's thought are likely to find it difficult to comprehend how Kant's 'transcendental idealism' can also be an 'empirical realism'. The difficulty resolves itself, however, once we recog¬ nize that each label refers properly to a discrete perspective adopted by the hu¬ man mind. What is often not appreciated is that Kant's Copernican Perspective operates throughout his System, not only in systemt. As we come now to the task of assessing the implications of the second experiment in Kt8—that of testing the applicability of system,- to one historical religion, Christianity [cf. VII. 1]—we must therefore keep Kant's established (Copernican) strategy at the forefront of our minds. What Kant says about 'pure rational religion' deter¬ mines a distinct Transcendental Perspective on religion. Just as in systemt, many of the arguments and conclusions in systemr cannot simply be carried
190
PART THREE: CRITICAL RELIGION
over to the Empirical Perspective, as applying directly to historical religions as such. The purpose of a 'transcendentally ideal' system of religion is not to deny the validity of an 'empirically real' interpretation of the living faith of ordinary believers, but to legitimate it, philosophically. Fortunately, we need not look far in the text of Kt8 to find evidence of how Kant applies this Copernican Perspective to religion. One of the most significant passages, we have already cited in VI.3 and VII. 1: Kant compares the ideal relationship between rational (i.e., transcendental) and historical (i.e., empirical) religion to 'concentric circles' in Kt8:12(ll) [see Fig. VII.1]. His reason for doing so is to emphasize that empirical religion should conform to the transcendental conditions for religion.1 Thus, Kant normally reserves the term 'religion' for those historical traditions that do successfully live up to the transcendental conditions. In order to distinguish the pure religious 'core' from the historical tradition(s) as such, he refers to the latter as 'faith(s)'. In so doing, he does not intend to deny the validity of historical traditions, nor even to downplay their significance, but merely to distinguish between the properly philosophical and nonphilosophical Perspectives on religion. The 'Copernican' aspect of the metaphor consists in Kant's reversal of the order most religious people would assign to the two circles: instead of viewing historical faith as the core and moral action as the secondary element, Kant views the latter as the core and locates the former on the periphery. In the first edition Preface to Kt8, Kant offers us a different, but equally instructive, explanation of his Copernican Perspective on religion. He begins by rehearsing some of the key conclusions of his practical writings: Indeed, Kant explicitly says his second experiment is designed to prove 'that reason can be found to be not only compatible with Scripture but also at one with it, so that he who follows one... will not fail to conform to the other' [Kt8:13(l 1)]. In Kant's opinion, as Gregor explains in Gm79:xiii, 'the experiment was successful. As he would later explain ..., this book in no way disparaged Christianity, but, on the contrary, established its credentials as divine revelation in the only way this can be established, by demonstrating its consistency with pure moral religion.' This view is adopted by numerous other commentators [see e.g., notes 1.4,12], including Willich, one of the first to publish an interpretation of Kant in English, who says the principles in Kt8 'are perfectly consistent with' those of 'the Christian Religion' [Wi98:115]. Exploring the extent of this consistency is the main purpose of this and the following chapter. Green erroneously [Gg93:3] portrays Kant's second experiment as an attempt at '"depositivizing" Christian teachings', where 'positive' refers to religion based on revealed facts [4]. He warns that 'Christian theologians ... ought to be particularly wary of such a project.' Green sees 'polemical thrusts against positive religion' [5] throughout Kt8: 'Kant wants to reinterpret historic Christian faith by purging it of its positivity.' Yet Kant's goal is far more modest than this: to declare philosophic ignorance in response to any speculative claims to positive knowledge, thus shifting the basis of faith's certainty from theoretical to moral grounds. He does this without dog¬ matically denying the possibility that such theoretical speculations could be positively (factually) true. On a potentially more accurate note, Green says Kant 'urges that historical issues be bracketed' [8]. If 'bracketed' means 'not denied, but put in abeyance', then Green is quite right here.
VIII. Systemic
':•"'' v r'l
191
So far as morality is based on the conception of man as a free agent who ... binds himself through his reason to unconditional laws, it stands in need neither of the , idea of another Being over him [i.e., God]..., nor of an incentive other than the law itself [i.e., happiness]... Hence for its own sake morality does not need reli¬ gion at all...; by virtue of practical reason it is self-sufficient. [Kt8:3(3)]
The strict reductionist interpretation of Kant's views on religion stops here, declaring once and for all that Kant's aim is to eliminate empirical religion [see VI. 1]. Yet this overlooks the fact that Kant begins the second paragraph of the same Preface with an important (Copernican) qualification: But although for its own sake [i.e., in the first three stages of systemp] morality needs no representation of an end which must precede the determining of the will, it is quite possible that it [morality] is necessarily related to such an end [e.g., God and/or happiness], taken not as the ground but as the [sum of] inevitable conse¬ quences of maxims adopted as conformable to that end. [4(4)]
Here Kant is reminding us that, even in systemp, two 'ends' (viz., God and a form of immortality that guarantees a proper degree of happiness) had to be postulated in order to answer 'the question, What is to result from this right conduct of ours?' [5(4)]. He then goes on to argue that such ends are not just 'quite possible', but are indeed necessary, if we wish to conceive of the highest good as realizable [see KSP1:VIII.3.B]. This position is 'Copernican' in the sense that, like the aforementioned con¬ centric circles metaphor, it reverses the order of priority most people (whether philosophers or not) would assign to religion and morality. Whereas nearly everyone would be inclined to say our understanding of morality arises out of our religious tradition, Kant insists that, for the purposes of transcendental phi¬ losophy, 'this idea [viz., God] arises out of morality and is not its basis' [Kt8:5 (5)]. Kant's reason for arguing in this way becomes clear in the third paragraph, which must be blatantly overlooked by anyone who wishes to adopt the reduc¬ tionist interpretation of Kt8: 'Morality thus leads ineluctably to religion, through which it extends itself to the idea of a powerful moral Lawgiver, outside of mankind' [6(5-6), e.a.]. In a long footnote attached to this sentence, Kant removes all doubt about the transcendental character of his inquiry in Kt8 by clarifying that the proposition "There is a God... is a synthetic a priori proposi¬ tion' and then asking the standard question of all transcendental philosophy: 'But how is such a proposition a priori possible?'2 After a lengthy summary of 2. Kt8:6n(5-6n). By neglecting the transcendence of religion over morality, those who support a reductionist interpretation end up portraying Kant as a virtual unbeliever. For example, Kwan [Kw84:285] sees Kant as viewing 'our own practical reason ... [as] the ultimate object of our worship.' But such an extreme humanism would be tantamount to idolatry, neglecting as it does the very limitations of reason Kant's Critical philosophy sets out to establish. As we shall see in XII.2, when Kant occasionally equates God with 'Reason', he is speaking of the latter as a power
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'[t]he key to the solution of this problem', Kant concludes by reiterating the same point [8n(7n)]: "That is, morality leads inevitably to religion.' In the remainder of the first edition Preface Kant contrasts the Perspective of the 'philosophical theologian' with that of the 'biblical theologian', arguing that only the latter should be subject to government censorship (as the current king of Prussia had recently instated [see note VI.28]). Philosophical theology, by contrast, 'must have complete freedom to expand as far as its science reach¬ es' [Kt8:9(8)]. At first, this topic seems to bear little relation to the topic of the first half of the Preface. But a clear recognition of the Copemican character of Kant's approach reveals a close connection after all. The biblical theologian is a person whose proper tools are revelation and faith, whereas the philosopher must use reason and argument, even when dealing with the same religious and theological issues (or biblical texts) as the former. This distinction is directly parallel to that between the Empirical and Transcendental Perspectives. Kant, of course, is writing primarily to his fellow philosophers, so the views he has just expressed in the first part of the Preface represent what is required for those who adopt the Transcendental Perspective. Far from denying the validity of the opposing view, this philosophical Perspective is meant to provide the rational foundation for the ordinary (Empirical) way of looking at the same issues. This explains why Kant adopts such an accommodating attitude towards the biblical theologian.3 He is not merely trying to please the king's censors, as some have assumed;4 he is seriously proposing that, as long as biblical theolothat transcends the individual and is therefore in an important sense not 'our own' [s.a. AIV.4]. 3. Barth, having taken on board the reductionist paradigm [see note VI. 13], is forced to regard this part of Kant's exposition as less than sincere: 'It is only necessary to take quite seriously what Kant said half in mockery, in order to hear something very significant' [Ba72:312]. Barth is referring here to the view that biblical theologians should take a stand independently of the philosopher, using revelation as 'the point of departure* without 'wrapping [theology] up in the mantle of philosophy' [307]. What we have seen is that, stripped of the reductionist bias, Kant's comments no longer need to be passed off as clever jesting; instead they can be taken at face value as promoting a healthy dialogue between philosophers and theologians [see IX.l], not merely the strategy of turning a cold shoulder that Barth tended to adopt towards philosophy [see AV.l]. Some interpreters, such as White, merely overlook Kant's accommodating attitude. In dis¬ cussing Kt65 [Wh90:56], for example, he refers to 'Kant's general attack on the possibility of a revealed theology, which if correct would be far more subversive of traditional Christianity than his more famous refutation of natural theology in [Ktl].' But as we saw in VII.3.A, Kant is far from rejecting revealed theology—to say nothing of its very possibility! What he rejects is any philosophical attempt to moor a system of religion on revealed props. And as we shall see in Chapter IX, the fact that Kant never attempts to construct a biblical theology per se does not mean a Kantian biblical theology is a contradiction in terms. 4. Green [Gg93:5], for example, makes the totally unjustified allegation that Kant 'may have had political motives for disguising the theological implications of his argument.' Michalson likewise affirms Troeltsch's view that in Kt8 'Kant keeps one wary eye on the Prussian censor' [Mi93:52n], and as a result, 'some of the complexities [of interpreting Kt8] can be attributed to purely prudential considerations'. So also Walsh finds it 'hard to take ... quite seriously' Kant's claim 'that he had not thought of criticizing Christianity in writing [Kt8]' [Wa67:322; cf. note VIII.45, below]. Along
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gians do not 'rashly [declare] war on reason' [Kt8:10(9)], but use reason while staying within their own 'province' (just as philosophers might use a scriptural text without adopting the Bible's own Perspective), the conflict between this Perspective and the philosophical is normal and healthy. (The nature of this conflict is the main topic of Kt65 [see note VII.3, above].) In a 1793 letter Kant confirms that Kt8 was written as an aid to the biblical theologian [AA11:415 the same lines, Cassirer suggests Kant may have purposefully included 'much vagueness and many instances of camouflage in his expression' [Ca81:387] in order to hide his true views from the authorities. The problem with such claims is that, if this was indeed Kant's strategy, he failed miserably, since the book was censored anyway! But even more problematic is that such double¬ speak would go directly against Kant's numerous explicit calls for sincerity in religious matters [see e.g., AVI.l and note VIII.45]. A view similar to Cassirer's, that Kant's private religious views were quite different from those he publicly professed, is well refuted in De73:101-7. McCarthy also agrees that Kant's presentation of 'a positive view of Christianity' is not 'a ploy to please the censor" [Mc82:204]. The negative reaction of the king's religious censors to Kt8 when it first appeared, resulting in Kant's promise not to lecture or publish anything else on religion under the king's reign [see Kt65:10], is well known. What must not be ignored is that after the king's death, Kant explains the purpose of his book in much the same way as he had explained it in the Preface to Kt8 (thus indicat¬ ing the Kt8 explanation was not merely an attempt to appease the government) [Kt65:6n]: 'My purpose in formulating this title [i.e., that of Kt8] was to prevent a misinterpretation to the effect that the treatise deals with religion from mere reason (without revelation). That would be claiming too much, since reason's teachings could still come from men who are supernaturally inspired. The title indicates that I intended, rather, to set forth as a coherent whole everything in the Bible... that can also be recognized by mere reason.' In a 1793 letter to Staudlin [q.i. Ra63:259] Kant adds that in writing Kt8 'I was guided by my appreciation and true respect for the Christian religion, but also by the exigencies of a becoming candour, not to conceal anything but to represent truthfully, how a combination of religion with the purest practical Reason appears to me possible.' In light of Kant's distinction in Kt2:352 between Grenzen (bounds) and Schranken (limits), discussed in VI.2 [s.e. note VI.7], we can now add that the use of Grenzen in the title of Kt8 suggests Kant intends to put reason in its proper place in order to make room for revelation [cf. Ktl:xxx]! Regardless of what Kant might say about his openness to revelation, some commentators simply refuse to take him at his word. Michalson's doubts, for example, are based on the supposi¬ tion that Kant's epistemology simply leaves no room for divine-human communication. He argues that, although 'Kant does not simply dismiss the possibility of a divine revelation' [Mi79:vi], his general 'theory of religion', being based on 'the phenomenal-noumenal dichotomy' [64], 'works against the possibility that a divine revelation could ever be a meaningful Or recognizable part of that theory.' With a different interpretation of Kant's epistemology to work with (such as that proposed in KSP1), this problem evaporates: Kant's perspectival distinctions become the very source of meaningful interpretation [see VIII.3.A] rather than an obstruction. A small but growing rank of Kant scholars is using the perspectival method of interpreting Kant to show how his affirmative statements about Christianity can be taken quite seriously [see e.g., FiOO]. Hare follows this trend in Ha96, arguing [38; s.a. 39n] that 'Kant is not a deist about special revelation.' A careful and unbiased look at Kant's writings [48] reveals no 'good evidence that [Kant] rejected belief in supernatural revelation.' As a 'pure rationalist', Kant believes special revelation is not objectively necessary for religious belief; yet it may be a subjectively necessary supplement to the pure moral religion, because human beings are not purely rational agents [45n]. At a 1991 conference of Christian scholars Hare presented an early version of part of Ha96. His approach, though on the right track, seemed to lack a clear appreciation of Kant's principle of perspective, so afterwards I shared with him in some detail my approach to interpreting Kant. In early 1995 I sent him offprints of Pa92b and Pa92c. While reading Ha96 I was pleased to find Hare adopting (especially in Ch.2) many of the same positions defended in those articles. However, he seems to have reached his conclusions independently, since he never refers to my work, and still lacks some clarity in applying the principle of perspective. For a detailed review, see PaOOb.
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(Zw67:205)]: 'By assessing his doctrines from the point of view [i.e., Perspec¬ tive] of rational grounds, he shall be armed against any future attack.' Thus, Kant encourages biblical theologians to 'be at one with the philosopher' or else 'to refute him', provided they do not carelessly 'mix the two' Perspectives, be¬ cause 'the sciences derive pure benefit from separation' [Kt8:10(10)]. Recognizing the Copernican emphasis of Kt8's two Prefaces helps us appreciate more fully how system,- presents a balanced religious standpoint that has essentially affirmative implications for Christianity.5 We saw in VI.2 and I affirm this in spite of the fact that Heine pokes fun at those Christians in Kant's own day 'who went so far in their wilful blindness as to persuade themselves that Kant was in secret alliance with them' [He59:121]. My argument here is that the alliance, properly understood, is hardly a secret. As Green acknowledges [Gg93:l], Kt8 is 'a work of theological apologetics that makes bold claims on behalf of the Christian religion.' But whereas Green regards Kant's mixture of 'Christian orthodoxy and Enlightened modernity' as 'unstable' [3], I shall argue that, with the aid of a perspectival interpretation, Kant can be regarded as establishing quite a stable synthesis. McCarthy [Mc82:198] likewise observes of Kt8 that '[traditional Christian categories ... seem to guide the work.' A Copernican (perspectival) interpretation of Kant's two experiments makes it evident that this does not just 'seem' to be, but actually is a key aspect of Kant's core strategy. Yet McCarthy warns against the view that Kant's 'central interest [in Kt8] was to provide a philosophical rationale for Christianity and its Christ' [Mc86:72], calling this 'a misrepresen¬ tation', inasmuch as Kt8 'has the far more ambitious goal of scrutinizing all religion from the standpoint of moral reason'. Accordingly, McCarthy criticizes Kant for not 'break[ing] the hold of European Christianity upon him' [72], claiming that 'Christianity and its Christ figure more prominently than they otherwise would or ought.' He regards Kt8's 'Christian cultural backdrop' and its resulting emphasis on 'Christian doctrines, symbols and forms' as 'limitations of the work as philosophy of religion' [73]. 'Kant's repeated singling out of Christianity and Christ', he insists [83], 'are ... unjustified by his method of inquiry.' Christianity is 'the one subject matter that is constantly referred to but never systematically addressed' [69]. Kant's concentric circles metaphor [see Fig. VII.l] suggests that he does intend to address it, though as we shall see, he does not do so as systematically as in the case of the first experiment. In fact, both McCarthy's view and the view he rejects have an element of truth: Kant's repeated appeal to Christian ideas is not merely an unjustified cultural accident, but is a conscious effort to test the reliability of his tradition in light of systemt. The 'misrepresentation' is to regard one extreme as Kant's exclusive concern, as McCarthy does. My response to McCarthy's complaint that Kant's 'interest in Christianity under¬ lies his philosophical inquiry into religion' [83] is that Kt8 is a work of philosophical theology not a work in what we now regard as 'philosophy of religion' [see note I.I 1] and that the validity of the conclusions is always based on argument, not on tradition. The common allegation that Kant derives his theories from Christianity is therefore quite mistaken. Crosby appears to fall into the latter trap in Cr94:134, though he earlier describes Kant's position, quite correctly, as being 'that the Christian religion ... happily accords with a view of morality for which he has found independent justification' [121, e.a.]. If the justification really is independent, then the (quite real) fact that 'scriptural teachings' and other influences from his Christian upbringing 'molded' Kant's thinking [125] turns out to be irrelevant. Crosby argues that 'Kant does not take account of the possibility that seeming eternal self-evidency in a principle may be culturally induced' [131]. In fact, Kant does take this into account, in the very first paragraph of Ktl:l! But as he also explains, right at the outset of his Critical philosophy, the fact that we learn everything through experience (a posteriori) does not prevent some of what we learn from having an independent, a priori justification [see Pa87d]. In spite of his above-quoted acknowledgment of Kant's position, Crosby himself does not take seriously the possibility that a culturally induced principle may also have an independent validity on purely rational grounds. Rather than making Christians more suspicious of Kant, Crosby's able demonstration that Kant's philosophy was influenced by many Christian ideas ought to encourage a more sympathetic reading. Nothing in Crosby's argument proves that any of Kant's ideas 'follow from' [126] his Christian upbringing in
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VII. 1 that system,- takes into account all three standpoints in the System: it upholds the importance of theoretical knowledge (theology), but puts strict limitations on its interpretation, so that practical reason (morality) always has priority in determining the meaning of religious doctrines and practices; yet both of these standpoints are subordinate, as far as religious experience is con¬ cerned, to the judicial standpoint [see note 1.17]. As we shall see in Part Four, the latter alone can provide the basis for a devout person's personal relationship with the Being towards whom obedience to the moral law is directed and with regard to whom all doctrines are symbolically interpreted. This triadic relation¬ ship [cf. De73: 244-5] can be elucidated by depicting the distinction between the three aspects of system,- in terms of the clothing metaphor implied by the title of Kt8 [VI.2; s.e. Fig.VI.2], as shown in Figure VIII. 1. Our examination of system,- in Chapter VII focused mainly on the bare elements of pure religion; given its emphasis on religion's moral core, we can now refer to this 'first experiment' as systemr.m.6 In opposition to this aspect of any philosophical sense; despite their similarities, the two are logically independent. In claiming that Kt8 has a 'dramatic, rather than systematic, nature' [Mc86:70] McCarthy is once again ignoring the work's dual focus. Only the portions of the book that address the second experiment can be characterized as 'dramatic'. This is quite appropriate, since the outer circle of Figure VII. 1 represents historical faith, as opposed to rational (systematic) faith. What McCarthy misses is that the latter (i.e., the inner circle) is very systematic indeed, as we saw in Chapter VII. He thinks it is 'highly significant' and 'striking' that Kant uses 'religious terms ... [that] are closely allied with Christianity' [85]. But to anyone who understands Kant's intention to defend two Perspectives this is not striking at all. It is only to be expected, since his second experiment would be impossible without doing so. Troeltsch aptly captures the dual focus of Kt8 when he says Kt8 'does not... look to an unconditional religion of reason, but rather to a transformation and approximation of the faith of the Church to the religion of reason' [q.i. Ch92:492]. Green's claim, that Kant's goal is 'to rescue Christian doctrine from the paralysis of supernaturalist orthodoxy' [Gg93:7], is therefore correct, as long as we understand that in providing a rational interpretation of the traditional doctrines Kant is not categorically denying a supernatural component in religion. McCarthy also complains about the 'arbitrariness' of 'Kant's evaluation and exclusive choice of Christianity' [Mc82:200]. Kant himself initially presents his choice as arbitrary in Kt8:12(ll), apparently focusing on Christianity merely because it is his own tradition. McCarthy goes on to warn against assuming too hastily that Kant intends to endorse Christianity, for Kt8 negates 'many of the familiar trappings of Christianity' [Mc82:203]. Indeed [Mc86:91], 'Kant takes pains to point out Christianity's failings.' McCarthy thus emphasizes [Mc82:204; Mc86:72,102; s.a. 87]: 'Christian faith is indispensable in the attainment of the triumph of the good.... But for Kant, Christianity is not the culmination of religion; it is only its historical beginning.' This is correct, as long as we regard 'Christianity' as an historical faith. Like Luther, Kant does indeed strip away many of the trappings of Christianity. Only in this sense is Kant's approach properly labeled as 'subversive' [Wh90:56; Cr96:99]. But his aim in taking such an approach is not to overthrow Christianity, but to promote a purer conception of the true spirit of Christianity. As Crichlow rightly observes [99], Kant's subversive 'polemic against institutions that oppress the human spirit ... is like Jesus' attack on the religious authorities of His day and for virtually the same reasons.' Even McCarthy admits [Mc86:89], though not with approval, that for Kant 'Christianity is ... emphatically the only moral religion and it thus has a unique status.' 6. The affinity of Kant's first experiment with systemp explains why so many readers have thought Kt8 reduces religion to morality. It ties the core of religion to morality; but it does so not in order to eliminate other religious standpoints, but rather in order to raise morality to the only standpoint
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the 'naked body' (system ,-_„,) (moral obedience through pure religion)
the well-dressed 'person' (system r.<3 (universal historical manifestation in the Christian religion)
the 'garments' (system,-.^ (theoretical doctrines in revealed Scripture)
Figure VIII. 1: Three Aspects of the Religious 'Person' religion is the biblical theologian's focus on the theoretical/doctrinal 'garments' of religion; given its emphasis on a revealed scripture, we can refer to it as systemr.s.7 This aspect will be the focus of our attention in Chapter IX. Here in Chapter VIII, our examination of Kant's second experiment focuses on his assessment of Christianity as the historical religion that best synthesizes the naked body of religion with a set of revealed 'garments'; we can therefore refer to this aspect of Kant's Critical religion as systemicBy depicting systemic as having a primarily synthetic character in relation to systemr.m and system r . s , this map highlights both the general nonreductionist method of Kt8 [see VI. 1-4] and its specific aim of authenticating the validity of Christianity as the universal religion of mankind.8 Although Wood is correct to that enables us to fulfill the mandate of this moral core [see VI.4]. 7. The word 'opposition' here should be interpreted as referring to partnership in creative dialogue, not to enemies that are out to destroy each other [see IX.l and A V.I]. Only in this sense can com¬ ments such as Cassirer's be rendered plausible [Ca81:387]: 'Kant stood in opposition to traditional religion ... no differently from the way he opposes traditional metaphysics.' The comparison is valid as long as we remember that Kant opposed traditional metaphysics in order to transform it, not in order to destroy it [see 1.1-2]. 8. See e.g., Cr96:92. As Kant argues in Kt31:337-9, Christianity is 'worthy of love' only when adopted freely; it cannot be forced and remain 'lovable'. As long as its adherents bear this in mind, 'Christianity is destined to be the universal religion of the world' [339; q.i. Ca81:393]. Hare agrees that Kant means this quite seriously [Ha96:47]. But Despland denies any validity for Kant's assertions regarding the uniqueness of Christianity [e.g., Kt8:124-5(115-6)] on the grounds that they contradict his affirmations elsewhere [e.g., 136-7(127),184(172)] of the value of other religious traditions [De73:331]. He points out that Kant merely claims 'to start from some alleged revelation or other' [Kt8:12(ll)], not from the one and only true revelation. But there is no such contradiction in Kant's usage. The word 'alleged' merely indicates that the second experiment is an
VIII. Systemr.c
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say Kant 'thought that theology, along with morality, becomes corrupted when it bases itself on empirical principles, and that when men draw their God from nature or experience rather than from pure [practical] reason they are more likely to serve him by empty ceremonies than by rational and morally upright conduct' [Wo78:82], this must therefore be taken to imply not that the judicial standpoint is abandoned in Kt8, but rather that it is set on the proper foundation of the primacy of practical reason (just as was system^ in Kt7).9 Kant's foremost concern in Kt8, aside from establishing the elements of pure rational religion, is to determine the extent to which 'Christianity, as found in the Bible, is composed of... the canon of religion', so that this 'ecclesiastical faith' can provide an appropriate 'vehicle' for 'pure religious faith' [Kt65:36-7; s.a. Kt8:123n(113n),135n(126n)]. That is, even though Christianity presents to the believer (subjectively) a set of divine commandments that are therefore to be regarded as duties, it can nevertheless act as a vehicle for true (universal) religion, as long as these commandments can also be viewed objectively (i.e., from the philosopher's Copernican Perspective) as capable of being justified rationally as duties in and of themselves.10 In such a case, Kant views natural religion and revealed religion not as contradicting, but as complementing each other. This he confirms in Kt35:(83-4): Natural religion employs that knowledge of God of which man's reason is capable and it is bound up with morality; supernatural religion contains much that is calcu¬ lated to make up for man's deficiencies.... [Supernatural religion is not opposed to natural religion, but completes it. Natural religion is true but incomplete.
experiment, and that Kant could just as well have chosen some other religious tradition for this purpose [cf. Co67:156-7 and Si60:xciii]. Kant's conclusion (that Christianity qualifies as the universal religion) is therefore a confirmation of the initial allegation. Whether or not other traditions could legitimately make the same claim (to be a realization of the unique universal religion) is left as an open question. 9. See note 1.17. It is perhaps difficult for us theoretically-minded products of the twentieth century to believe, even at the dawn of a new millennium, that the author of so great a theoretical work as Ktl did not intend it to occupy the primary place in his System; but this undoubtedly was Kant's opinion [see KSP1:VIII.4]. Indeed, reason itself is defined as practical (as the autonomous power of enforcing principles), so its theoretical employment is clearly secondary. That this was not just an abstract idea for Kant, but a maxim he put to constant use, is exemplified when he asks rhetorically in Kt8:80n(75n): 'of what use is all this theory... when it suffices from the practical standpoint to place before us as a pattern this idea [of the virgin birth of Jesus] taken as a symbol...?' 10. See e.g., Kt8:152(140). Webb fails to take into account this perspectival aspect of Kant's theory when he says 'it is only because a duty is perceived by us to be such on its own account that we are justified in regarding it as commanded by God; we cannot in any other way become aware that God has commanded something' [We26:68, e.a.]. Comments such as Ward makes in Wa72:65, that Kant 'does not have much place for revealed religion in his scheme', are equally misleading. Revelation is a viable option for Kant, but not one the philosophical theologian, as such, is permitted to use. It lies outside the boundary of natural religion in much the same way practical reason lies outside the boundary of theoretical reason: each requires a different standpoint for its legitimate use; but from the standpoint of universal (empirical) religion, both are valid.
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Kant believes his critique of religion can analyze the nature of religion without contradicting 'the literal meaning of the popular faith' precisely be¬ cause, 'earlier by far than this faith, the predisposition to the moral religion lay hidden in human reason' [Kt8:111(102)]. And for this same reason (viz., the inner hiddenness of pure religion), revelation can serve an important role by bringing to fruition the essential 'kernel' of pure religious faith within each per¬ son [see Wo70:193-4]. Thus Kant explains in Kt65:8-9 that in Kt8 he views 'revelation [as] useful in making up the theoretical deficiency which our pure rational belief admits it has (in the questions, for example, of the origin of evil, the conversion from evil to good, man's assurance that he has become good, etc.) and helps ... to satisfy a rational need.' In VII.2-3 we have already seen how the deficiencies of natural religion give rise to the need for revelation. The four 'gaps' left by system,- (in all three of its manifestations) are listed in Table VII.2. In this Chapter we shall come to see how Kant portrays the Christian religion (or systemic) as filling these gaps with a revealed content (or systemr.s) that adequately meets the needs of natural religion (or system r . m ) without contradicting any of its fundamental precepts. The outward manifestation of religion in its imperfect, historical form is just as necessary for the realization of universal religion as empirical judgments are for the realization of the categories in theoretical knowledge, or as virtuous actions are for the realization of the moral law in practical activity. Religious ac¬ tivity is real from the empirical perspective, but ideal from the transcendental perspective: 'the idea of the objective unity of the religion of reason ... is an idea of reason which we cannot represent through any intuition adequate to it, but which, as a practical regulative principle, does have objective reality' [Kt8:123n(l 14n)]. Thus, even though 'ecclesiastical faith... naturally precedes pure religious faith' [106(97)], 'this order ought to be reversed' when consid¬ ered philosophically [106n(97n)]. This reversal is Kant's Copernican Perspec¬ tive on religion; yet it does not deny the derivative validity of the 'natural' order (i.e., the legitimacy of religion's empirical manifestation, which can be regarded as primary when viewed from the Empirical Perspective). The perspectival character of Kant's understanding of religion is further evident in his claim that 'there is only one (true) religion; but there can be faiths of several kinds.' 11 This is because 'ecclesiastical faith ... appeals to [the] 11. Kt8:107(98); s.a. Kt65:48,52. Concerning supposed 'differences of... religion', Kant notes that 'such differences do not exist in religion, there being only one religion valid for all men and in all ages. These can, therefore, be nothing else than accidental vehicles of religion' [Kt32:367n]. Again, in Kt39:496(217) he advises: 'One should... guard against children estimating men accord¬ ing to their religious practices; for, in spite of its varieties, there is, after all, everywhere unity of religion.' By this, of course, Kant does not mean all religious practices are the same; rather, he
u
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senses, whereas religion is hidden within and has to do with moral disposi¬ tions' [Kt8:108(99)]. On this basis he suggests: 'If we take what is universal in religion and so is common to all religions [i.e., if we adopt a truly religious dis¬ position] ..., then there is no reason why every individual should not follow the religion of his forefathers' [Kt35:(l 10)]. This raises the question whether every accidental vehicle of religion is equally suited to promote the universal essence of all religion. Kant clearly recognizes that there are important differences;12 indeed, this is what gives rise to the need for a philosophy of religion. Because of its accidental character, each faith must 'be able to cease; whereby is indicated merely the inner stability of the pure moral faith' [Kt8: 135n(126n); s.a. 174(163)]. Nevertheless, 'it remains true once for all that a statutory ecclesiastical faith is associated with pure religious faith as its vehicle' [106(97)]. Wood expresses Kant's position here with admirable clarity: 'Kant does not intend that ecclesiastical faith ... shall be abolished by progress. Rather, it is to come to an understanding of itself as a vehicle for pure religious faith, so better to serve the pure faith which is its essence' [Wo70:196; s.a. Kt65:29]. Along these lines Kant distinguishes between 'merely statutory' and 'purely moral laws': 'the concept of the Deity really arises solely from consciousness of [the latter]..., through which the will of God is primordially engraved in our hearts'; nevertheless, 'divine statutory laws' can 'comprise the means to its furtherance and spread' [Kt8:104(95); s.a. Kt65:49]. means the religious practices of every truly religious person are, when viewed objectively, all grounded in the same truly religious disposition. As he puts it in Kt65:36: 'there is only one reli¬ gion. Although there are indeed different varieties of belief in divine revelation and its statutory teachings, which cannot spring from reason—that is, different forms in which the divine will is represented sensibly so as to give it influence on our minds—there are not different religions.' Galbraith, neglecting the perspectival basis of this distinction, passes it off without any ar¬ gument as a mere product of the Enlightenment [Ga96:170]: 'Kant's belief that there could be a re¬ ligious essence independent of its historical and cultural setting was simply mistaken.' Yet Kant held no such belief, if 'independent' means absolutely nonhistorical. Kant's position is that pure religion is independent of any particular cultural setting; some setting or other is always needed. 12. In Kant's account of religious history, for example, Judaism stands in direct opposition to Christianity [Kt8:124-7(115-8); s.a. 162(150)]. He describes the former (rather one-sidedly) as a religion that 'attaches prime importance to mechanical worship' and is therefore of less value to universal religion than a polytheism in which the gods 'bestow their good pleasure only upon the man who cherishes virtue with all his heart' [127(118)]. In general, Kant divides empirical religions 'into those which are endeavors to win favor (mere worship) and moral religions, i.e., religions of good life-conduct' [51(47)]; but this division is more aptly applied to individual attitudes, since most traditions can be interpreted either way [see 175-6(163-4); s.a. note VIII.ll]. Kant discusses differences in religious sects in Kt65:48-53, proposing a 2LAR between four types of sectarian movements [51]: (1) 'separatists' (--), based on 'a mere separation from the church'; (2) 'schismatics' (+-), based on 'a public rift regarding the form of the church'; (3) 'sec¬ tarians' (-+), based on 'a union of dissenters from certain doctrines' (i.e., concerning the content of the church); and (4) 'syncretists', based on a false attempt 'to satisfy everyone by melting down the different creeds.' His aim is to clarify that, although the empirical vehicle is secondary, 'religion cannot be indifferent to the character of its vehicle which we adopt in our dogma' [51, e.a.].
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Kant's discussion in Kt65 of the conflict between the philosophy faculty and the 'higher' faculties of theology, law, and medicine [see note VII.3] makes it very clear that both the empirical and transcendental elements in religion are necessary for the realization of universal religion. Kant does not expect clergy to give up their belief in the authority of Scripture any more than he expects lawyers to ignore the 'law of the land', or physicians to transgress 'medical regulations' [23]. All he asks is that, when these 'businessmen' of the higher faculties [18] appeal to reason to justify their positions, they recognize the change in Perspective that is involved, and allow philosophers to criticize their views. Thus he says in Kt65:23: So the biblical theologian ... draws his teachings not from reason but from the Bible; the professor of law gets his, not from natural law, but from the law of the land; and the professor of medicine does not draw his method of therapy as practiced on the public from the physiology of the human body but from medical regula¬ tions. As soon as one of these faculties presumes to mix with its teachings some¬ thing it treats as derived from reason [i.e., as pure], it... encroaches on the territory of the philosophy faculty, which mercilessly strips from it all the shining plumes that were protected by the government and deals with it on a footing of equality and freedom. The higher faculties must, therefore, take great care not to enter into mis¬ alliance with the lower faculty, but must keep it at a respectful distance, so that the dignity of their statutes will not be damaged by the free play of reason.
In this way reason functions as a corrective to revelation, 'making it con¬ sistent with itself and with every perspective from which it can be regarded' [Ktl:668]. Nevertheless, philosophers have no business publicizing their criti¬ cisms to laymen, but only to theologians, whose responsibility it is to interpret revelation in such a way that it is as consistent as possible with reason. Clerics then take their lead from theologians. If a conflict between philosophers and theologians should remain unresolved, the duty of clerics is to side with the theologians' interpretation of revelation. 'To refuse to obey an external and supreme will on the grounds that it allegedly does not conform with reason would be absurd' [Kt65:25], for this would be to confuse the Copernican Perspective of the philosopher with what might be called the Divine Perspective of the theologian. Kant's hope, however, is that the natural conflict between the Perspectives of the philosopher and the theologian will be of lasting benefit for both empirical and transcendental religion.13 As Gregor explains in Gm79: xxviii: 'Genuine peace among the faculties can come only if the ecclesiastical faith and the law of the land are purified to the point where they are completely 13. For example, Kant expresses as early as 1763 his wish that, 'when revelation gives account that an event of the world is an extraordinary divine destiny [e.g., a miracle], the temerity of philosophers were moderated in displaying their physical insights; for they do no service at all to religion' [Ktl5:120n(302n)]. See AVII.2 for more on Kant's view of miracles.
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consistent with a priori principles of reason and can be regarded as applications of them.' In IV.4 we saw that it is a mistake to regard Kant as a deist [ s s,. note IV.24]. Equally mistaken is the claim that Kant merely 'reduced Christianity to a sym¬ bolic expression of man's sense of moral duty' [Ho75:29, e.a.; cf. VI.4]. Admittedly, he does argue that from the Copernican Perspective Christianity must be viewed as a vehicle for expressing an inner religious disposition; but he never treats this as a defect, especially since it is not the only valid way of regarding it. As we have seen, Kant held that it is at the very least possible to regard Christianity as both subjectively revealed and objectively natural. He says in Kt6:488 that his critique of religion 'is not... derived from mere reason but is based also on the teachings of history and revelation and considers only the consistency of pure practical reason with these (that is, shows that there is no contradiction between them).' That Kant's personal opinion was that revela¬ tion is more than just possible is reflected by the fact that he 'so often and so insistently call[s] himself a Christian" [Go71:194]. One passage wherein he implicitly refers to his own Christian belief also says much about the impor¬ tance of a Critical attitude towards such belief: 'I have always... recommended to other believers a conscientious sincerity in not professing or obtruding on others, as articles of faith, more than they themselves are sure of [Kt65:9, e.a.]. Likewise, he says in Kt31:337 that in itself 'Christianity has something worthy of love about it', but not when it is 'armed with dictatorial authority in¬ stead of its gentle spirit' [339]. The traditional interpretation of Kant, whereby he is portrayed as viewing Christianity merely negatively, as the religion 'which least overstepped the bounds of reason' [Go71:194], is therefore quite untenable; its longevity is due primarily to the failure of interpreters to be as broad-minded as Kant himself. Kant's own Critical view is that Christianity 'effected a thoroughgoing revolution in doctrines of faith' [Kt8:127(118)], so that of all the 'different varieties of belief in divine revelation... Christianity, as far as we know, is the most adequate' [Kt65:36]. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a thoroughgoing explana¬ tion of just how Kant sets out to demonstrate the adequacy of the Christian religion. In VIII.2-3 we shall work our way once again through the four Books of Kt8, this time paying special attention to Kant's second experiment. Books One and Two correspond, as we shall see, to the Old and New Testament, respectively.14 Books Three and Four likewise correspond to early church One of the interesting features of Kt8 is Kant's extensive use of biblical texts, either as direct quotations or in the form of innuendoes. In Kt8:43-4n(39n) he distinguishes between historicallybased 'exegesis' and his own approach to interpreting the Bible [s.a. 109-14(100-5)]; the latter, as
202
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history and traditional forms of Christian worship. After examining a variety of themes in these four areas, I shall conclude in VIII.4 with a summary showing how Christianity constitutes a system that closely corresponds to systemr.m. Having attained a balanced understanding of Kant's view of Christianity (as systemic), we shall then be prepared to take a step back and offer in Chapter IX an assessment of Kant's position from the Perspective of the biblical theologian, and in so doing, to propose a systemr.s. 2. Kant's Assessment of Biblical Religion A. The Creation Story and the Fall of Adam As in all Kantian systems, the first stage in systemic adopts the transcen¬ dental perspective [see VII.2.A]. In carrying out his second experiment, Kant applies the rational elements obtained in this first stage explicitly to the biblical account of the creation and fall, as told in the first three chapters of Genesis [see Kt8:39-44(34-9)]. His aim is to arrive at a rational explanation of the 'pure' meaning of the essential points raised in the biblical text, so that the extent of their compatibility with systemr.m can be properly assessed. His treatment of the biblical account suggests (as we shall see) the following basic cor¬ respondences with the elements of stage one: the creation of Adam and Eve in the image of God corresponds to Kant's theory of the good predisposition; their original habitation in the Garden of Eden symbolizes the original inno¬ cence of every human being; their fall into sin through the influence of an exter¬ nal source of temptation, the serpent, illustrates the propensity of every human being to adopt evil maxims (i.e., maxims that give priority to incentives that are external to systemp), due to the mysterious intervention of radical evil; and their consequent expulsion from Eden corresponds to the concluding element in stage one, the adoption of an evil heart. Recognizing these parallels makes it all the more important to understand that Kant is not attempting to explain away the biblical account (in the manner of eliminative reductionism [see VI. 1]), nor even to pass judgment on its historical status. On the contrary, he goes out of his way to draw attention to the many correlations between systemr.m and the biblical narrative, stressing that here, as throughout systemr.m, his account 'agrees well with... the Scriptures' [41(36)]. For as we saw in VIII. 1, the explication of such symbolic correlations is one of Kt8's two main purposes. The most important issues in Book One relating to Kant's second experi¬ ment all revolve around the relationship between radical evil and the biblical account of the origin of sin. What has misled many interpreters of Kt8 is that we shall see in VIII.3.A, might be dubbed 'moral eisegesis' [Pa00a:130].
VIII. Systemic
v;,y,
203
Kant consistently guards against the belief that a merely historical account can provide a sufficient explanation of any stage in the development of pure re¬ ligion. Nowhere is this more evident than in his treatment of the 'origin' of good and evil. Kant argues that 'it is ... a contradiction to seek the temporal origin of man's character' [Kt8:40(35)], because that character has its 'origin in reason' [39(34)]. The transcendental perspective must be adopted in order to discern the true origin of good and evil in the human disposition; no account of actual events in time will suffice, though such empirical accounts may well serve as symbols, pointing to their transcendental basis. Thus, for example, Kant says the claim 'Man is created good' [cf. Genesis 1:31] means 'the origi¬ nal [prejdisposition in man is good', not that 'he is already actually good' [44(40)]. The biblical account of the original goodness of human nature is to be interpreted, then, as a symbolic representation of the universal goodness of the human predisposition, as demonstrated by rational arguments completely inde¬ pendent of any revelation [see VII.2.A]. Kant is not dogmatically claiming that the biblical account is historically untrue; rather, he merely insists that the ques¬ tion of its historicity is irrelevant to the determination of how appropriately the narrative describes the rational origin of goodness in human nature, as estab¬ lished in stage one of systemr.m. Because the first three chapters of Genesis clearly regard human nature as originally good, while at the same time avoiding the inference that this godly 'image' makes us actually good, Kant's assess¬ ment of their symbolic religious value is essentially positive. In examining the origin of evil Kant likewise treats the doctrine of original sin 'not as a revealed dogma, but as an implication of our own experience'; in¬ terpreted in terms of the rational need to posit radical evil as the mysterious source of our propensity to evil, this traditional doctrine serves as 'the founda¬ tion of [Kant's] whole theory of the nature and function of religion in human life' [We26:92-3]. Goldmann makes a similar point: 'The doctrine of radical evil is not a foreign body in Kant's philosophy. It is not only justified but even necessary for the coherence of the system. It is certainly not a concession to the Christian religion.'15 If any concession is involved, Christians (or anyone who believes in original sin) are the ones who may need to make a concession to the 15. Go71:145; s.a. De73:185-6. In the very different context of Freudian psychology, Lear appeals to something like radical evil as necessary for the process of psychological growth [Le90:203]: 'Every individual must, at some level of his soul, feel that he has committed a crime.' That Lear then goes on to relate this explicitly to Adam's sin [204] does not mean he is grafting a Christian doctrine onto his psychology any more than radical evil does this for Kant's philosophy. This comparison should highlight the error in Treloar's claim that Kant's treatment of evil in Book One of Kt8 has an 'obvious psychological emphasis' [Tr89:337]. Whereas Lear's Freudian observation is genuinely psychological, Kant's emphasis is transcendental. Only by neglecting this can Treloar claim that Kant's 'merely psychological approach... really makes things too simple.'
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requirements of pure rational religion. For the only way to confirm the validity of this doctrine without merely presupposing it as divine revelation (i.e., with¬ out adopting the Perspective of the biblical theologian) is to demonstrate the role it plays in pure rational religion. Kant readily allows that theologians, as such, can legitimately base their doctrines on the Empirical Perspective of the Scriptures, provided they recognize that when they begin to discuss the pure meaning of such biblical accounts, they are adopting the philosopher's Tran¬ scendental Perspective [Kt8:40n(35-6n)]. Once this is acknowledged, Kant's (secondary) aim in this first stage of systemic becomes evident: to show how the first few chapters of Genesis, properly interpreted, can serve as an adequate vehicle for symbolizing the transcendental elements of universal religion. Adam and Eve's blissful pre-fall state corresponds in Kant's mind to the good predisposition in systemr.m; but at the fall, he tells us, 'this happiness vanished like a dream' [Kt8:19(15)]. Kant's metaphor here implies that the fall can be regarded as a fall into consciousness, for he then adds that the post-fall age is 'as old as history',16 presumably because the writing or even telling of history presupposes consciousness. As we saw in Chapter II, Kant had made extensive use of the metaphor of 'dreaming' in Ktl8 to pave the way for his own attempt to replace traditional (dreamlike) metaphysics with his own Critical (awakened, or enlightened) alternative. Now he uses the same metaphor in a way that suggests the good predisposition ceases to function actively at the moment a person 'wakes up' morally, which happens as soon as the first conscious moral choice is made. Whether Kant would regard this as a plausible account of the how the first person 'awoke' from the state of primeval moral 'sleep' is unclear from the text, and (in view of his attitude towards seeking temporal origins) irrelevant. What is clear is that he regards the biblical account of the first beginnings of human (moral) history as a profound symbol of how each of us develops as an individual. For example, he says 'the rational origin of [every] evil... action must be regarded as though the individual had fallen into it directly from a state of innocence' [41(36)]. The story of the fall can therefore be regarded as an appropriate symbolic description of what happens 16. McCarthy [Mc86:56n] says 'Kant nowhere seems to entertain the possibility of a higher purpose served by fall into sin.' Perhaps not explicitly. But he does seem to allude to it here, in a way that would make his view of moral evil closely parallel to his view of God's inscrutable purpose in allowing natural evil [see AVI.l]. Indeed, this view of the fall was later developed more explicitly by German idealists such as Schelling [e.g., Sc78:589-91; cf. Ti74:51,107-8]. Kant himself de¬ scribes the biblical fall in Kt63:115 as a fall from animality into humanity. This implies that human personality had just begun to develop at that point, thus suggesting the enticing possibility that the full awakening of personality may have been completed in the person of Jesus, the 'last Adam' [1 Cor. 15:45]. This suggestion, and with it a clearer understanding of the role evil plays in human history, will be developed further in KSP4.
:
VIII. Systemr.c
;
205
every time a person transgresses the moral law. In Kt8:42-3(38) Kant further suggests that when considering our own moral history, 'the explanation of evil in terms of its beginning in time' must always go back to 'the causes of each deliberate transgression in a previous period of our lives, far back to that period wherein the use of reason had not yet developed, and thus back to a propensity to evil (as a natural ground) which is therefore called innate...'. Kant is here referring to our early childhood, when each person inevitably (by virtue of a natural propensity) makes an unconscious evil choice and thereby attains a level of consciousness adequate for moral responsibility.17 He then stresses his oft-repeated claim that the fall into evil is a moral act for which each individual is 'to be held responsible'. The biblical account (set as it is in the Garden of Eden) aptly symbolizes the initial (noumenal) act whereby we choose to adopt self-love as our supreme maxim; but that it can also symbolize the 'contingent' (phenomenal) act whereby we first choose to do something evil is a possibility Kant leaves open. Resolving this issue, however, is not of much significance to the success of Kant's second experi¬ ment. What is significant is to recognize that the biblical account, while not de¬ termining the course of Kant's argument in constructing systemr.m (inasmuch as the arguments presented in VII.2.A did not rely in any way on anything drawn from the Bible), nevertheless turns out to be a profoundly symbolic expression of essentially the same point: that human nature as we know it is a corruption of an originally good state. Kant's account of evil in Book One [s.e. Kt8:32-9(27-34)] rejects the classical view of evil as 'a mere absence ... of goodness' [22-3n(18n); s.a. We26:94]; it is this to be sure, but it is also a 'positive' force in its own right, 17. Although Kant does not explicitly state this position, a strong case can be made to support it. When I sketched my interpretation of Book One in an email message posted to the Kant-L discus¬ sion group on 28 May 1995, a lengthy debate ensued, most notably with Hugh Chandler. Among the positions I defended over the three weeks of the debate were the following: Kant's view of evil in Kt26 is not necessarily incompatible with that in Kt8, as is often claimed; Kt8 represents not a revision of Kant's view of evil, but a perspectival development of the Kt26 view; both texts are consistent with the view that evil is transcendentally inevitable and yet empirically contingent; although evil is an internal phenomenon for which the person perpetrating the evil act can be blamed; and Kant is willing to consider the possibility that evil's rational origin is somehow mys¬ teriously external to the individual agent. Given the fact that 'perfection' means an overcoming of evil, rather than total innocence with respect to evil, it must include both the + and the - aspects in order to be truly 'complete' [cf. Heb. 5:8-11]. Nevertheless, Kant does refer uncritically to Jesus' claim to possess 'an original innocence' as a result of not being 'involved in the bargain with the evil principle' [Kt8:80(74)]. Scharf asks [Sc93:89n]: 'How can the element of free choice come into play once evil is governing our volition?' Kant's question, by contrast, would be: 'How could it be otherwise?! For our first choice must be one of disobedience, otherwise we have not (or cannot be sure we have) made our own choice. Scharf agrees with Michalson's claim that Kant 'has no systematic way of integrating the moral and the temporal' [Mi89:263; q.i. Sc93:90n]. But see note VI.13.
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capable of taking over and corrupting a person's good predisposition. 'Between a good and an evil disposition... there is therefore no middle ground' [Kt8:23n (18n)]. Accordingly, Kant notes with approval the tendency in Christianity to distinguish between moral good and evil 'not as heaven from earth but as heaven from hell; he commends it as 'philosophically correct in meaning', since there are no 'gradual steps' between a good and an evil disposition [60n(53n)]. Kant's account of these religious symbols is examined more fully in AVI.3. Another aspect of Kant's attempt to assess the validity of the biblical ac¬ count in terms of systemr.m is his definition of 'sin'. In place of traditional defi¬ nitions (e.g., sin as separation from God), Kant simply regards it as moral evil viewed from the religious standpoint. Thus he defines sin as 'the transgressing of the moral law [viewed] as a divine command' [Kt8:42(37); s.a. 72(66)], reiterating throughout Kt8 that this involves a reversal in the proper order of our incentives, 'whereby [our will] makes lower incentives supreme among its maxims' [43(38)]. In this way Kant insures that the accountability for sin remains squarely on the shoulders of the person who breaks the moral law. The vulgar, temporal account of original sin that 'describes [evil] as descending to us as an inheritance from our first parents' is 'inept' [40(35)]. Once the irra¬ tionality of 'passing the buck' through a temporal interpretation of original sin is exposed, the rational value of the doctrine, as paving the way for some meaningful self-reflection, can be appreciated: it forces us to recognize the in¬ fluence of radical evil in our own reason, and in so doing, beckons us to 'direct our attention to the actual evil of given actions' in order to find in ourselves the origin of the evil deeds we have committed [40(35)]. In spite of Kant's harsh rejection of the inheritance account of original sin, his strong desire to justify the Genesis narrative through symbolic interpretation leads him to make room even for this otherwise 'inept' view. For in the con¬ cluding paragraph of Book One, after reminding us of the 'inscrutable' nature of 'the propensity to evil' [Kt8:43-4(38-9)], Kant points out that 'the Bible expresses [this inconceivability] in the historical narrative' by locating the first origin of evil 'not in man, but in a spirit of an originally loftier destiny.' Since our evil disposition is rooted not in our natural inclinations, but in our own rational choice—i.e., since 'the human mind has no immediate inclination to wickedness, but is only indirectly [i.e., mediately] wicked' [Kt35:(220); s.a. We26:109]—it is permissible in Kant's opinion to trace the origin of evil back to a pre-existing spiritual source, such as that suggested by the biblical account of Satan.18 For Kant this conjecture 'has purely negative significance', as 18. Kt8:59-60(52),78-84(73-8); s.a. Wa72:146-7; We26:109-10. Despite Kant's openness here,
VIII. Systemic
"' I
207
Webb points out, inasmuch as 'it in no way enlarges our knowledge of super¬ sensible reality' [We26:185]. Its chief advantage is that it 'completely avoids the confusion of the Evil Principle with mere natural inclination' [117], as is re¬ quired by Kant's definition of sin. The presence in us of inclinations is not something worthy of blame (any more than we can be accused of error simply because objects appear to us in space and time!); for the moral failings that result from choices we make on the basis of inclinations, however, we must bear full responsibility [see Wa72:145]. Once again Kant has confirmed the meaningfulness and symbolic value of the biblical narrative. Although a literal interpretation of the inheritance view of original sin is too morally debilitating to countenance (taking away, as it does, our freedom and therefore our ultimate responsibility for the evil choices we make), the depth of Kant's appreciation of the symbolic meaning of the text is seen in his view that, as Webb puts it, 'the propensity to evil is no less deeply rooted in our nature than if we had inherited it' [We26:113]. In other words, Kant is not even asking us to give up the inheritance interpretation, but rather to change the perspective from which we view it: instead of viewing the doctrine of original sin from the empirical perspective, as a literal account of the tempo¬ ral origin of evil, we are to view it from the transcendental perspective, as a symbolic expression of a profoundly rational religious truth. The Genesis nar¬ rative therefore qualifies as the first stage in systemic; it not only provides us with a strikingly vivid description of the first stage of systemr.m, by depicting humanity 'as having fallen into evil only through seduction, and hence as being not basically corrupt' [Kt8:44(39)], but it also points the reader forward to the hope [cf. Gen. 3:15] 'of a return to the good from which he has strayed.' B. The Gospel Story and the Nature of Jesus The second stage in systemr.m adopts, as usual in Kant's System of Perspectives, the logical perspective. Just as the logical perspective in systemt establishes a conceptual framework through which knowledge can be gained in spite of the transcendental limitations of space and time, so also in systemr.m this second stage establishes the basic religious concepts [see VII.2.B] that Despland [De73:192] claims 'Kant's position on radical evil ... run[s] counter to orthodox Christian doctrine, and its idea of total depravity.' Assuming this Calvinist doctrine to be the only option for an orthodox interpretation of original sin is itself open to question. But for our purposes a more important problem with Despland's statement is that it ignores the possibility that Kant's aim may have been to confirm the rational truth behind the doctrine of total depravity, by arguing that reason itself leads us to conclude that we all start out with a fundamentally evil heart. The advantage of Kant's account over many so-called orthodox interpretations of total depravity is that Kant balances it with a biblically sound confirmation of the reality in human beings of an image of God, regarded rationally as the original predisposition to good.
208
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enable us to respond effectively to the transcendental limitations imposed on us by evil in stage one. In other words, just as the categories 'save' the possibility of empirical knowledge from the limiting conditions of sensibility, so also the 'gospel' of faith in the archetype of perfect humanity saves the possibility of pleasing God from the limiting conditions of radical evil.19 In the Christian tra¬ dition, the New Testament accounts of the incarnation, life, death, and resur¬ rection of Jesus as the 'last Adam' furnish an effective conceptual structure whereby human persons can counteract the problem of sin that has plagued mankind ever since the 'first Adam' [see Rom. 5:14; 1 Cor. 15:22,45]. Kant's examination of the compatibility between the Christian Gospel and stage two of systemr.m occurs mainly in Book Two of Kt8, though the General Observation appended to Book One provides a number of helpful preparatory suggestions. In the first of Kt8's four General Observations Kant focuses mainly on the nature of 'the original predisposition to good' and how it can be restored to its rightful place as the governor of the human disposition, despite the fact that this place is inevitably usurped by evil at the very outset of every person's moral development. After declaring that 'Man is created good' (a point at which systemr.m confirms the view of human nature expressed in Genesis 1:26-31) and granting 'that some supernatural cooperation may be necessary' in order for a person actually to become good, Kant stresses that 'man must first make him¬ self worthy to receive' such divine aid [Kt8:44(40)]. In so doing, we do not make ourselves good, but 'only render ourselves susceptible of higher, and for us inscrutable, assistance' [45(40-1)]. His use of the biblical metaphor of a fruit-bearing tree [cf. Matt. 3:10; 7:17-19; 12:38] suggests that the problem of how the human 'tree' (disposition) becomes evil even though it was originally predetermined to be good, and the subsequent problem of how that evil 'tree' becomes good again, are the two key issues in the first half of systemr.m. As I argued in VII.2, systemr_m as such cannot solve these problems, but merely acknowledges their existence as rational 'gaps' needing to be filled by the symbols presented in some particular religious tradition [see Table VII.2]. By exposing the 'naked body' of religion, systemr.m highlights the need for some historical revelation to provide 'clothing' that can make religion 'decent'. Whereas Kant's doctrine of radical evil draws attention to the first mystery that must be explained by any true empirical religion, his doctrine of the 19. This parallelism does not imply that sensibility is to be blamed for our evil nature. Kant firmly re¬ jects this position: 'what works against this adoption ['of genuinely moral principles'] is not so much the sensuous nature, which so often receives the blame, as it is a certain self-incurred perver¬ sity ... which can be overcome only through the idea of moral goodness in its entire purity, togeth¬ er with the consciousness that this idea really belongs to our original disposition' [Kt8:83(78)J.
VIII. Systemr.c
> ;r '
209
'archetype' 20 highlights the second mystery. Expanding on Kant's own 'clothing' metaphor [see VI.2], we could say that if the incomprehensibility of radical evil gives rise to religion's need for a set of comfortable 'undergar¬ ments' to explain evil's origin, then the incomprehensibility of the archetype (including its relation to the originally good predisposition) gives rise to its need for a suitable pair of 'trousers' to explain how evil can be overcome. Taken together, these two elements constitute the necessary conditions for the possibility of religion: just as knowledge would be 'blind' without concepts and 'empty' without intuitions [Ktl:75], so also religion would be ineffectual without a capacity in human nature to receive divine aid (i.e., the archetype) 20. See VII.2.B. In the first General Observation Kant does not yet use the term 'archetype'; he refers instead to the original predisposition as 'announcing] a divine origin' by virtue of its 'incompre¬ hensibility' [Kt8:5O(45); cf. 64(57)]. In elucidating the implications of this predisposition, he alludes to several biblical parallels. His suggestion that the change from an evil to a good disposition must come about through a revolutionary 'rebirth', 'a new creation', is supported by cross-references to John 3:5 and Genesis 1:2 [Kt8:47(43)]. (He could also have referred to St. Paul's use of such terms [e.g., 2 Cor. 5:17 and Gal. 6:15].) Likewise, Kant's claim that the predisposition raises us 'so far above these needs [i.e., those relating to our inclinations] ...that we count them all as nothing' [49(44), e.a.] is a clear allusion to Paul's use of the phrase 'I count all things but loss' [Phil. 3:7-8 (KJV)]. The fact that the object of Paul's awe is 'Jesus Christ', whereas that of Kant's is 'the original moral predisposition' should not be regarded as an anti-Christian reduction; for it is actually Kant's attempt to provide a rational 'space' wherein the symbols of Pauline faith can be confirmed as philosophically justifiable. Kant's attraction to Pauline theology is particularly noticeable in his frequent adoption of the distinction between the letter and the spirit of the law [e.g., Kt8:30(25-6),37(33),39(34)]. Kant in¬ terprets the 'spirit' in terms of a willingness to obey the moral law without incentives external to the law itself, and the 'letter' in terms of conduct that conforms to the moral law even though the person's internal motivations are actually grounded in a nonmoral maxim. Paraphrasing Romans 14:23, he even defines 'sin' in terms of anything that stems from something other than this moral 'spirit'. On this basis Kant can conceive of the 'empirical character' being 'good' [37(32)], even though 'the intelligible character is still evil.' Likewise, Kant's claim that, 'when moral worth is in question, it is not a matter of actions which one sees but of their inner principles which one does not see' [Kt5:407] alludes to Jesus' reminder that 'God sees not as man sees, for man looks at the outward appearance, but the LORD looks at the heart' [1 Sam. 16:7 (NASB)]. Apparently not impressed by such allusions, McCarthy remarks [Mc86:8O-l] that the 'per¬ sonification of... atonement [in Part Two of Kt8]... does not clarify Kant's philosophical teaching at all; it rather confuses it.' This charge is open to doubt, especially for the Christian reader who is fully aware of Kant's Copernican strategy. But even if it were true, it would not have deterred Kant from using such metaphors as 'Son of God', for the main purpose of the archetype in systemr-m is to call attention to a need of reason that reason on its own cannot satisfy. Moreover, by personi¬ fying the archetype, Kant fulfills an important part of his task: to establish that traditional Christian terms do have a rational-symbolic meaning. Symbols are not meant to clarify our understanding, but to deepen our experience. McCarthy seems to be at least partially aware of this when he acknowledges [81]: 'Kant does not exclude the notion [of atonement], and even finds it serviceable, so long as practical reason interprets and controls it.... He is open to the idea of atonement, even vicarious atonement, as a supplement to an individual's moral struggle but never as a substitute for it.... Belief in atonement may be practical, and may even be regarded as necessary to understand salvation, but to be saved one needs to do good works and does not need to think or believe atonement.' While this may be Kant's view [see AVI.2-4], we should not ignore the practical benefits of understanding how atonement works. A proper (faith-based) understanding can do much to bolster our hope and may thereby encourage us to persist in doing our duty.
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and pointless without the threat posed to human nature by radical evil. In Book Two itself, Kant develops at great length the connection between the archetype and several Christian doctrines relating to Jesus' vicarious atone¬ ment. Although Kant never uses the names 'Jesus' or 'Christ' in Kt8,21 the nature of Jesus as the Christ is undoubtedly his main concern in assessing how well Christianity 'fits' with stage two of systemr_m. There are several other important issues, to be sure; but they all revolve around the question of what role Jesus ought to play in a Christian's religious self-understanding. In order to highlight the applicability of Kant's arguments to the Christian view of Jesus, I shall henceforth freely interpolate his name into my account of Kant's position. This should not be taken to imply that Kant was referring exclusively to Jesus in such passages—though sometimes he certainly is—but only that Jesus is one (and, in light of Kant's intent to focus on Christianity, usually the most prominent) religious figure to whom his comments apply. He discusses the relevant issues more systematically in Section One, so I shall begin here with a brief account of Section Two, where Kant examines 'the Christian portion' of the Bible [Kt8:78(73)]. Section Two of Book Two is mainly a descriptive synopsis of the biblical narrative, with special emphasis on the conflict between Satan and Jesus. After a brief account of how Satan, as 'a being of a higher order—a spirit', acquired 'dominion over spiritual natures' and thereby set up a 'kingdom of evil' [Kt8: 78-9(73-4)], Kant explains how the 'Jewish theocracy', with its civil constitu¬ tion prescribing 'partly ethical' and 'partly... burdensome' observances, 'did no substantial injury to the realm of darkness'. Into this context came 'a person whose wisdom was purer even than that of previous philosophers, as pure as though it had descended from heaven' [80(74)]. Proclaiming himself as innocent with respect to Adam's original 'bargain with the evil principle', Jesus refused to bargain even when Satan 'offered to make [him] deputy-governor of his entire kingdom' [80-1(74-5)]. In response to Jesus' attempt to stir up 'a public revolution (in religion) through the overthrow of a ceremonial faith, 2 1 . Instead of using his name, Kant always refers to Jesus by means of allusions and indirect descrip¬ tions, such as 'a godly-minded teacher' [Kt8:65(59)], 'the Master' [81n(76n)], or '[t]he Teacher of the Gospel' [128(119)]. I interpret this as a sign of deep respect for both the man and his teachings. Orthodox Jews, of course, believe the name of God should never be spoken. Despland emphasizes Kant's 'reverence' for Jesus, viewed as 'a liberating figure who exer¬ cises saving power over his disciples, and gives fresh power to their freedom' [De73:199]. In support of this interpretation, he quotes from an unpublished note [AA23:108], where Kant says Jesus' example 'so elevates my soul that it animates it and causes the frailty of my nature to disappear.' Davidovich likewise interprets a quote from Kt65:43(75) as saying that grace 'is the hope that good will develop in us' and is 'awakened... by the example of humanity as pleasing to God in His Son' [Da93a:40n].
;•..::. VIII. Systemr.c
i,;
211
which crowded out the moral disposition' [81n(76n)], Satan imposed all manner of sufferings upon him, resulting eventually in his death. Jesus' will¬ ingness to 'give up his life', however, was itself 'a manifestation of the good principle, that is, of humanity in its moral perfection, and an example for everyone to follow' [81-2(76-7)]. Outwardly, the revolution failed; 'the moral outcome of the combat' between Jesus and Satan, therefore, was 'really not the conquering of the evil principle... but merely the breaking of its power to hold, against their will, those who have so long been its subjects' [82-3(77)]. Yet in the long run, Jesus' obedience opens up a new, 'moral dominion' to all those who wish to follow him in forsaking the rule of the evil principle.22 Kant's purpose in devoting a whole section to 'this vivid mode of representa¬ tion' [Kt8:83(78)] is not to ridicule those who believe it is true, nor to eliminate its significance by reducing it to its moral core, as Collins claims [Co67:176-7]. Rather, it is to confirm its suitability to serve as a symbolic vehicle for true religion: 'for practical purposes, its spirit and rational meaning have been valid and binding for the whole world and for all time'. In other words, provided the believer draws from the Bible a conviction 'that there exists absolutely no salvation... apart from the sincerest adoption of genuinely moral principles into his disposition' [83(78)], a belief in Christian doctrine can be fully supported by Kant as a manifestation of universal religion. When believers recognize how 'Scripture... harmonizes with the most holy teachings of reason' [83(78)], they will avoid the tendency to use Jesus as an excuse for moral laziness, seeing instead the need to join with Jesus to become 'sons of God' [John 1:12; q.i. 82 (77)]. For a more systematic account of how Christian doctrine must be inter¬ preted in order to foster this goal, let us turn now to examine Section One. One of the most fundamental characteristics of Jesus in Christian doctrine, his perfection, seems at first to be ruled out by Kant's theory of the universal human propensity to evil. We saw in VII.2.A, however, that Kant explicitly al¬ lows for the possibility that anthropological research might turn up an exception to the rule of human beings having an evil propensity. His reason for specify¬ ing this limitation on our empirical knowledge of evil may well be to make room for the Christian belief in Jesus' sinlessness [see 2 Cor. 5:21; 1 Pet. 2:22; 1 John 3:5]. The conjecture that Kant views Jesus as a man without any propensity to evil draws some support from his qualified defense of the virgin birth: 'To conceive the possibility of a person free from innate propensity to evil by having him born of a virgin mother is an idea of reason accommodating 22. Throughout Book Three Kant refers to this 'dominion' as the 'kingdom of God'. Here religion merges with politics, so a fuller discussion of this important concept will be given in KSP4.
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itself to an instinct which is hard to explain, yet which cannot be disowned, and is moral, too.'23 The reason it is 'hard to explain', presumably, is that in order to be a genuine moral example, Jesus must have suffered the effects of radical evil just as everyone does; how this could be the case without his actually succumbing to the evil propensity and thus starting out with an evil disposition is not an issue Kant addresses [but see note VIII. 16]. In any case, Subsection B of Section One is largely devoted to a discussion of what it could mean for a human being to be an incarnation of God. The bottom line, as required by systemr.m> is that 'each man ought really to furnish an example of this idea [i.e., the archetype] in his own person' [Kt8:63(56)], so whatever Christians believe about the nature of Jesus, it must not prevent them from being Christlike (i.e., aiming at perfection) themselves. To this end, Kant provides a two-paragraph sketch of the minimum ratio¬ nal requirements for a properly religious interpretation of Jesus' nature—or for that matter, of any person who is set up as a religious ideal. First, he argues that even if 'a truly godly-minded man' gives us the best possible 'example of a man well-pleasing to God' [Kt8:63(57)], 'we should have no cause for sup¬ posing him other than a man naturally begotten.' While admitting that a person such as Jesus 'might be a man supernaturally begotten' (thus leaving open a theoretical space for the traditional Christian doctrine), Kant opines that such an hypothesis 'can in no way benefit us practically' because the archetype within us is already of 'supernatural origin' [64(57)]. Here, despite appearances to the contrary, Kant is not dogmatically denying the divinity of Jesus; rather, he is emphasizing that we must not lose sight of Jesus' humanity, because if we elevate him 'above all the frailties of human nature', then 'such a divine person could no longer be held up as an example' [64(57)]. By making 'all transgres¬ sion on his part utterly impossible', this would certainly 'hinder the adoption of the idea of such a person [i.e., the archetype] for our imitation.' Kant's point in this paragraph is not to encourage us to accept or reject any religious doctrine, but rather to encourage those who do accept it to interpret it in such a way that it does not conflict with the minimum requirements of true religion, as laid out in systemr.ro. That Kant's position here is not dogmatic, but hermeneutic, is clearly seen in the last part of the paragraph: after warning against the dangers of emphasizing Jesus' divinity to the exclusion of his hu¬ manity, he adds that the doctrine of divine self-emptying [see Phil. 2:5-8] is a 'thought [that] must attune our hearts to admiration, love, and gratitude' [Kt8: 23. Kt8:80n(74n). Kant goes on to qualify this statement by noting that, taken as a theoretical dogma, the virgin birth is a 'confused view', concerning which 'a decision ...is not at all necessary from the practical standpoint' [80n(75n)]. His approval is based only on its power as 'a symbol'.
VIII. Systemr.c
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64(58)]. Moreover, in the lengthy footnote appended to the last sentence, he points out that John 3:16 ('For God so loved the world...') has a legitimately religious, symbolic interpretation that helps 'us comprehend the degree of God's love for the human race', noting that we 'cannot dispense' with such analogies, even though an overly literal, anthropomorphic interpretation 'has... most injurious consequences' for moral religion [65n(58n)j. Any doubt that Kant is willing to countenance the possibility that Jesus really is the Son of God should be dispelled by the last paragraph in Subsection B. Whereas the foregoing paragraph warned against an overemphasis on Jesus' divinity that would eclipse his humanity, Kant now acknowledges that there is, in fact, a legitimate moral interpretation of the former doctrine. Even though Jesus must be regarded (from the theoretical standpoint) as 'completely human', he 'might... truthfully speak of himself, from the hypothetical perspective, as if he were an incarnation of perfect, divine goodness. 'In speaking thus he would be alluding only to his disposition' [Kt8:66(59)]. Any theological defense of the doctrine of Jesus' divinity must therefore be a hypothetical claim that points away from the theoretical standpoint to the practical standpoint. Far from denying the possibility of Jesus' divinity, Kant is attempting to provide an interpretation of this doctrine that renders it morally admissible. If Jesus is (theoretically) an ordinary man who (practically) has God's own disposition within him, then he can still serve as an example for our own moral selfimprovement; for we (as potential sons of God) have just as much access to the archetype as did Jesus (who himself had to learn obedience and be made perfect in order to become the savior [Heb. 5:8-11]). As Kant later explains, 'in the appearance of the God-Man [on earth], it is not that in him which strikes the senses and can be known through experience, but rather the archetype, lying in our reason, that we attribute to him ... which is really the object of saving faith'.24 Thus Kant explicitly acknowledges the transcendent origin of the archetype as a form of divine assistance (i.e., grace): alluding to Philippians 3:9 [s.a. Rom. 10:3], he points out that our attainment of a 'pure moral disposition ... will ever remain a righteousness not our own'.25 These explanations of how God's grace must be interpreted from a 24. Kt8:119(110). Scharf accurately portrays Kant's view as being that Jesus can be called 'savior' insofar as 'he revealed the possibility of authentic humanity' [Sc93:79-80]. But Kant would not dogmatically claim that this excludes other, more literal interpretations of Jesus' saving work. 25. Kt8:66(59). In Kt35:(85) Kant makes this transcendent origin even more explicit: by working through the archetype, 'God is the pattern of moral perfection'. Nevertheless, Green [Gg93:9] interprets 'the "Son of God" in Kant's religion [as] merely a name for the archetype of the morally perfect disposition.' Kant himself, however, never makes such a dogmatic use of the reductionistic word 'merely'. Rather, he intentionally leaves open a space for those who wish to raise systemr-m to the status of systemr-c by supplementing rational religion with Christian faith.
w 214
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practical standpoint are not, of course, sufficient to establish the actual divinity of Jesus—only faith in a divine revelation could do that. But they are misinter¬ preted when taken as discounting the significance of Jesus' historical character altogether, as when Ward [Wa72:151] interprets Kant as maintaining: 'Whether Jesus ever existed or not is beside the point; he is the "archetype of the pure moral disposition", which all men must imitate in themselves.' This typical way of misreading the text results from a lack of attention to the principle of per¬ spective. "The archetype lies in the understanding' [Kt35:(109-10)] and must therefore be viewed from the logical perspective of systemr.m; but 'the Example set before us in the Gospels' is presented from the empirical perspective. Kant can say that 'experience provides not a single example of honesty, of righteous¬ ness, or of virtue' [(109)], because these are 'universal principles' when re¬ garded from the logical perspective of stage two; yet in the next breath he can affirm: 'There are, indeed, examples of righteousness, of virtue, and even of holiness' [(110)], insofar as these are viewed from the empirical perspective. The same is true for the archetype: 'Our archetype is not a pattern [i.e., an empirical example] which we must reproduce, but a rule [i.e., a logical concept] to which we should conform' [(98)]. Empirical individuals 'can only be judged good or bad by reference to universal principles' [(109)], so the fact that Kant explains the adequacy of Jesus' example in terms of his realization of the archetype is not meant to render his historical existence irrelevant, but to authenticate his life as worthy of imitation—so much so that his disposition can be regarded as divine. What Kant is aiming to do here is to show that our knowledge of Jesus' humanity leaves open a space for faith in his divinity. In Kt8:119(109-10) he explicitly states that rational faith 'in the Son of God' within us (i.e., in the archetype) and empirical 'faith in the God-Man' as an historical person (i.e., in Jesus) do not 'so differ that to begin with one, or the other, would be to enter upon opposing paths': they both represent 'the archetype now as found in God and proceeding from Him, and now, as found in us, but in both instances as the gauge for our course of life.' This confirms Norburn's conjecture in No73:431 that Kant's philosophy of religion 'may serve even today as a vindication of Belief and as a necessary preface to Christology.' More will be said on Kant's Christology in IX.4. For now it is enough to point out that, insofar as Kant intends his theory of the archetype to be a philosophical foun¬ dation for a sympathetic biblical theologian's Christology, Galbraith is simply expecting too much when she complains that 'what Kant calls the Son of God
VIII. Systemr.c
?
... does not really amount to christology in the normal sense at all.'26 . Once Kant has confirmed that the Christian doctrine of Jesus' double nature can serve as a legitimate symbolic vehicle for expressing the rational meaning of the archetype of perfect humanity, he turns his attention in Subsec¬ tion C to three 'difficulties' that threaten to obstruct its 'realization in us' [Kt8: 66(60)]. Without some way of solving these problems, Kant's surprisingly accommodating view, that religious conversion requires divine assistance through the agency of the archetype, would end up not being much of a 'gospel' after all. These difficulties, as shown in the detailed discussion in AVI.2-3, correspond directly to three traditional Christian doctrines: sanctification, assurance of salvation at thefinaljudgment, and atonement for sin (i.e., justifi¬ cation). Sanctification is the process whereby believers grow more and more 'perfect' or 'holy' [Matt. 5:48; q.i. 66(60)]; believing God judges our disposi26. Ga96:147. Galbraith devotes most of her fourth chapter [137-79] to an examination of Kant's theology of Jesus. For the most part, her treatment of the issues is thorough and well-balanced. She recognizes, for example, that 'Kant is not ruling out the possibility of divine incarnation', but is only denying its 'practical use' [146]. Citing the views of Murdoch, Reardon, and Macquarrie, she says past interpreters have generally thought Kant's view of Jesus is inadequate for Christian theology because it shows too much favoritism to Jesus' divine nature [139-40; s.a. 162]—a bias I have not found to be common to most interpreters of Kant's philosophy of religion. Galbraith's own position is much closer to the interpretation I have found to be typical: she argues that 'Jesus' value' for Kant [152] 'is bound to his being solely human.' For if Jesus 'were in some sense a God, he would not be such an important person' [153]. With this in mind, she compares Kant's approach to that of John Hick in The Myth of God Incarnate [155]. But this is all very misleading. Kant only requires Jesus to be human, never to be solely human, as Galbraith claims. The Bible clearly teaches that all followers of Christ are 'sons of God', with Jesus being the firstborn 'Son of God'—though many Christians admittedly ignore this. By connecting Jesus' divinity to his disposition, Kant is attempting to justify this biblical teaching, thus insuring that Jesus is regarded as someone who can 'sympathize with our weaknesses* as 'one who has been tempted in every way' [Heb. 4:15]; for both in the Bible and in Kant Jesus' dual nature is portrayed not as making him essentially different from all other human beings, but as something all human beings can participate in. That is, assigning a divine nature to Jesus poses no problem for Kant, provided we also regard all human beings as partaking (perhaps through him) in this divine nature, in the form of the predisposition to good. Galbraith shows some awareness of this point [Ga96:153], but protests [151] that for Kant '[t]he good principle does not begin with Jesus, it has been a part of human nature since the very beginning.' What she is forgetting is that in Christian theology, Jesus too has been with humanity from the very beginning [see e.g., Jn. 1:1; 2 Tim. 1:9]! So once again, Kant is merely revealing the depth of his attempt to confirm the rationality of Christian teaching. The one difference between Jesus and other human beings that Kant seems to allow as a theoretical possibility (but not one that can be either confirmed or denied by philosophers) is that Jesus may have remained sinless throughout his earthly life [cf. Heb. 4:15 and Kt8:80(74)]. But Galbraith thinks that when Kant makes such apparent concessions, he is merely making use of 'mythological language' to tell 'a story' [148] that 'is not literally true.' If that were the case, then his position would bear remarkable resemblance to that of Hick. But Kant would never make the dogmatic statement that the story has no historical truth. Rather, he consistently remains agnos¬ tic: its literal truth is not the point at issue, but rather, its symbolic value; and this can be affirmed whether or not the story has a factual basis. In this and other respects Galbraith frequently neglects the Copernican character of Kant's argument [e.g., 149-50], which allows historical examples to have priority from the Empirical Perspective, provided their character matches the requirements of the archetype as established with priority from the philosopher's Transcendental Perspective.
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tion encourages proponents of Critical religion to face various life challenges boldly, in an effort to make progress towards a realization of goodness. Assurance is the confidence believers have that they cannot become 'unsaved', because their eternal destiny is determined; the Kantian Christian, aware of the dangers of self-deception and overconfidence [see e.g., Matt. 25:31-46], treats this as a rational hope based on an awareness of the real moral progress they have made. And atonement explains how God can forgive a person's preconversion sins; Kant claims the just punishment for the 'old man's' sins falls on the inner archetype of the 'new man' (embodied by Jesus) and is experienced as the pain of conscience during conversion, a form of vicarious suffering. Kant's solutions to these three difficulties relating to the 'realization' of the gospel (i.e., of Jesus' archetypal nature in each person) may not amount to a defense of the traditional Christian doctrines [see Table AVI.2]. But taken together, they do provide an impressive confirmation of how these doctrines, as found in systemr_c, are compatible with systemr.m. Sanctification is now conceivable in spite of the paradoxical fact that the perfection it aims at can never be fully reached. Assurance of a favorable outcome at the final judgment can now be upheld as a form of moral/spiritual confidence, without risking an overly literal interpretation that would weaken a person's moral resolve. And atonement (as a consequence of God's forgiveness) can now be accepted without requiring it to contravene the standards of divine justice. This is not to say that Kant proves the Christian gospel is true. That is not his purpose. Rather, he accomplishes the negative task of making a hermeneutic space wherein the Christian 'symbols of faith' (Glaubensymbols) [cf. 69n(63n)] can be accepted as legitimate regulative solutions to the universal human problems of imperfection, insecurity, and insufficiency, yet without contradicting the minimum requirements of rational religion. 3. Kant's Assessment of Christian Tradition A. The Universal Church and its Scriptures Stage three in each of the systems in Kant's System of Perspectives adopts the empirical perspective, and systemr_c is no exception. In the first two Critiques this stage is where empirical knowledge and moral action, respective¬ ly, are first established. Likewise, as we saw in VII.3.A, Book Three of Kt8 is where Kantfirstintroduces the social elements that make religion an empirically real phenomenon. The main focus of his second experiment in Book Three is on the historical development of church tradition,27 with special attention given to 27. Recognizing the true extent of Kant's focus on such historical development in Kt8 requires us to
VIII. Systemr.c
«"
217
the nature and proper function of its scriptures. Like Book Two, Book Three is divided into two parts, with the first constructing one of the stages in systemr.m and the second providing a corresponding 'historical account' [124(115)], based on Christianity. Kant's views on the essential nature of the church have already been covered extensively in VII.3.A, so our main focus here will be on his view of Scripture. Let us begin, though, with an overview of his account of the history of Christianity, as given in Book Three's second division. Kant begins 'Division Two' by alluding to Christianity's status as the universal religion of mankind. He states that 'the church universal commences to fashion itself into an ethical state of God' at that point in time when 'ecclesiastical faith... publicly recognizes its dependence upon the qualifying conditions of ['pure religious faith']' [Kt8:124(115)]. He then explicitly names Christianity as the ecclesiastical faith whose 'succession of different types of belief constitutes the 'universal historical account' of the true church. Because his goal is to establish the essential unity of this diverse tradition, he insists on excluding its accidental Jewish roots from the history of those who uphold the call into question Walsh's contention that 'Kant sets aside the historical elements in Christianity as having no importance in themselves' [Wa67:322; cf. notes VII.44-45]. We shall see in this sec¬ tion (and even more so, in KSP4) that 'no importance' is a gross exaggeration, unless we are careful to understand the qualification 'in themselves' as meaning that the genuine importance historical elements do have is tied to their ability to serve as adequate symbols of pure moral religion. The problem with a comment such as Walsh's (coming as it does in a major encyclopedia article) is that the average reader tends to read it as an outright denial of any significance for anything historical. Referring to Kt8:80(74-5), McCarthy notes [Mc86:82n] that 'Kant allows for the possibility of one born without the propensity to evil and offers some unintentionally amusing speculations on how such can be understood.' Unfortunately, McCarthy gives us no clue as to what makes Kant's position so 'amusing'. Perhaps he thinks Kant was writing insincerely, since he elsewhere interprets Kant as arguing that, in order to be morally useful 'Jesus must be human and exclusively so (that is, of one nature only). A divine nature would render him "useless"' [101; Mc82:199], 'A superhuman Son of God would simply be ... "useless"' [201]. Yet McCarthy offers no textual evidence for such an extreme interpretation. His overly dogmatic claim would be accurate only if 'superhuman' meant nonhuman, not if it means (as in Christian tradition) divine-and-human. For Jesus ceases to be a morally useful example only if we view his nature as exclusively divine. A dual nature is a viable option for Kant and for the Kantian Christian. As we have seen, Kant provides quite a serious suggestion as to how Jesus' divinity might be conceived. His bottom line would be that, if we can still regard Jesus as the supreme example and can believe in the possibility of following that example, then reason has no power to prevent us from believing in Jesus' divinity. Ignoring Kant's openness, McCarthy claims Kant reduces Jesus to an 'inspiring symbol of the battle of good against evil... Jesus incarnates a humanity risen above radical evil.... Kant concedes to Jesus a practically indispensable role' [Mc86:101; Mc82:199-200]. For Kant, nothing more should be required of a philosopher*. But the fact that Kant views Jesus as a symbol does not mean he is only a symbol. In spite of his insistence elsewhere that Kant's philosophy of religion is not reductionistic, McCarthy here (as elsewhere) interprets it as if it is, even referring at one point to Kant's 'reduction of Christianity and its Christ to the horizon of practical reason' [Mc86:101; but cf. VI.4]. Jesus is a source of hope because in him 'the good principle ... has been actualized ... to a new degree' [Mc82:202]. Believing this is all Kant allows Jesus to be, McCarthy laments [203]: 'If this is moral theism, it is without an incarnate theos.' Yet this totally misrepresents Kant's theology; if anything, Kant allows for many incarnations of God—each one of us ought to exemplify in ourselves a divine-human union, by following in Jesus' footsteps.
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ideal of the 'universal church'; for the Jewish faith, he claims, lacks the 'unity of principle' characteristic of Christianity [124-5(115-6)]. Having made this highly debatable claim, Kant proceeds to examine in detail three aspects of 'the Jewish faith' that make it 'not a religion at all but merely a union of a number of people... under purely political laws, and not... a church' [Kt8:125(116)]. 'First, all its commands... relate merely to external acts', while 'making absolutely no claims upon ... conscience' [125-6(116)]. Even 'the Ten Commandments', though 'valid as ethical commands ... are directed to absolutely nothing but outer observance.' Second, it 'involves no belief in a future life'—a belief Kant thinks 'automatically obtrudes itself upon everyone' who is in touch with 'the universal moral predisposition' that lies at the foundation of all true religion [126(117)]. And third, it adopts an exclusiveness, based on a sense of racial superiority, that renders the very idea of a 'universal church' inapplicable. Kant admits that individual Jews might develop 'some sort of religious faith' as an adjunct to their basic 'statutory belief';28 but such an inner moral conversion is strictly optional when serving a God who 'attaches prime importance to mechanical worship.'29 The accuracy of Kant's caricature of Judaism, somewhat unfairly called 'venomous' by Crichlow [Cr96:93], is open to considerable doubt, since some passages from the Old Testament do encourage an inwardly-focused moral disposition [see e.g., Jer. 31:33]. This, together with the fact that the New Testament contains some passages that appear to recommend nonmoral, statutory observances as inherently pleasing to God, suggests that Kant must intend his comments on Judaism and Christianity to be taken more in terms of ideal types or tendencies (the 'inner spirit' of each) than as a rigorous interpretation of their respective Scriptures. That he uses 'Judaism' as a 'straw man' is clear in several passages, as when he ironically puts the following challenge to Christians into the mouth of his Jewish contemporary, Mendelssohn [see note VIII.28]: 'First wholly remove Judaism itself out of your own religion...; we can then take your proposal [that Christianity is su¬ perior] under advisement' [Kt8:166n(154n); s.a. Kt65:48]. Nevertheless, some Jewish scholars do openly acknowledge the accuracy of Kant's interpretation of 28. Kant may be thinking here of Mendelssohn, his Jewish friend and fellow philosophical theolo¬ gian, to whom he writes in a 1783 letter [AA10:325(Zw67:108)]: 'You have managed to unite with your religion a degree of freedom of thought that one would hardly have thought possible and of which no other religion can boast. ' Indeed, he adds, 'every religion should have unrestricted freedom of thought, so that... mankind will finally be united with regard to the essential point of religion.' 29. Kt8:126-7(117-8). Kant goes so far as to say that some forms of polytheism would be better than Judaism, if the many gods all agreed 'to bestow their good pleasure only upon the man who cherishes virtue with all his heart'.
VIII. Systemr.c
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Judaism. Weiler, for example, insists 'Kant was right on mark' in portraying Jewish religion as regarding the authority of religious statutes as superior to that of any moral criteria.30 Later he clarifies that this does not mean there is no emphasis on the inner life in Judaism, but only that a person's primary focus must be on the external: too much attention to 'a religious mood' or 'a devotional spirit' is discouraged [We88:292-3]. By 'completely forsaking' this statute-based31 form of worship, Christian¬ ity 'effected a thoroughgoing revolution in doctrines of faith', thus 'introducing a purely moral religion' that 'was to comprise a religion valid for the world and not [just] for one single people' [Kt8:127(118)]. The attempts of many Chris¬ tians 'to join Judaism and Christianity with a connecting strand' are justifiable only as a means of converting Jews 'without offending [their] prejudices.' Kant himself softens his stand slightly by admitting that in Jesus' day 'Judaism ... was already interfused... with a religious faith', thanks to the influence of 'foreign (Greek) wisdom' [127-8(118)]. Into this context Jesus came, declar¬ ing 'that moral faith... is the only saving faith.' In both his actions and his words, he gave 'an example conforming to the archetype of a humanity alone pleasing to God' [128(119-20)]. After dying a 'meritorious death', he left be¬ hind 'the memory of his merit, teaching, and example', which were eventually recorded in the 'holy book' that became the basis of a new 'historical faith' (Christianity) [128-9(119-20)]. Kant describes what happened in this highly cautious way (i.e., without assuming the truth of any Christian dogmas) be¬ cause his whole book (including the second experiment) must remain 'within the bounds of bare reason' [128n(119n)]. This should not be taken to imply that he is thereby rejecting the 'miracles and mysteries' that 'find a place' in the Bible; for he adopts this mode of expression only because verifying such matters is the task of historical 'scholarship', not philosophy.32 30. We88:171,270-5; cf. Pa93:151-8. Sokol So86:431 says this view is explicitly defended in the Talmud (Berakot 33b): God's purpose in giving laws 'was merely to promulgate... decrees, so as to demand obedience from man solely on account of the divine origin of the decree.' Sokol argues [436]: 'If God is omnipotent, then He can create obligations'-both moral and amoral ones. Hence, although 'moral obligation [lies] at the root of divine obligation, ... [the latter] is binding independently of moral obligation.' There may be a 'purely religious' form of divine command as well. What Sokol does not realize is that Kant does not necessarily disagree. His claim would be that such a command cannot be immoral, and that it ought to enhance morality, if we are to have any way of assessing it rationally. 31. Kant defines 'statutes' in Kt65:36 as 'laws proceeding from another person's act of choice.' 32. Kt8:129(120). Thus Kant adds in a footnote that the Gospel accounts of Jesus' 'resurrection and ascension', as 'secret records' of what 'took place before the eyes only of his intimates', cannot be included in the 'public' (universal rational) history of the Christian faith [128n(119n)]. This should not be interpreted as a denial of their validity. For Kant himself suggests that these events can symbolize 'the commencement of another life and entrance into... the society of all the good.' His reason for passing over them is based not on their miraculous nature, but on the negative
220
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Because Christianity, regarded 'as an historical faith, bases itself upon books', it requires 'a learned public' in order to be disseminated—a vehicle not required by pure religious faith as such [Kt8:129(120)], but by the realities of the human situation [103(94),135n(126n)]. The first generation of Christians, however, did not have access to such learning, and the Roman historians of the time did not pay attention to the movement until its second generation [12930(121-2); s.a. 167(155)], so we are unable to assess how authentically the first Christians put Jesus' moral religion into practice. What we can assess is whether 'Christendom, from the time that it became a learned public itself, has realized its true nature as 'a moral religion'. With this in mind, Kant uses a onesentence paragraph (spanning more than a page!) to catalog the various ills that have beset the history of Christianity ('fanaticism', 'superstition', credal divi¬ sions, state-run churches, church-run states, religious wars, and 'bloodthirsty hatred against... colleagues in one and the same universal Christendom socalled') and to diagnose the disease: 'the root... lies hidden in the basic princi¬ ple of a despotically commanding ecclesiastical faith' that opposes 'Christiani¬ ty's first intention' of founding 'a universal world-religion' based on 'pure religious faith' [130-1(121-2)]. In spite of this dismal and rather one-sided picture of church history (show¬ ing, incidentally, that many of Kant's references to 'Judaism' and 'Christianity' must be taken as ideal types rather than as historical descriptions, since in the latter respect Christians fare no better than Jews), Kant turns now to an opti¬ mistic expression of hope in 'the present [age]' (i.e., the Enlightenment). By freeing reason from the arbitrary fetters of 'the expositors', 'true reverers of religion' are now sowing 'in Christendom', claims Kant, 'the seed of the true religious faith' [Kt8:131-2(122)]. To support this claim, he sets out two basic principles of exegesis, intended for use by anyone who wishes to interpret Scripture in such a way as to bring the Christian church closer to the ideal of a universal religion. We shall examine these two hermeneutic principles later in this section. Kant devotes the remainder of his discussion of the universal history of religion to some reflections on how 'guidance by Providence' in the future will bring 'the kingdom of heaven... ever nearer' [Kt8:134(124)]. Since this topic implications of an overly literal interpretation: such stories might encourage people to believe material bodies are necessary for personal existence. 'In contrast, the hypothesis of the spirituality of rational world-beings ... is more congenial to reason', for it enables us to avoid the notions of 'a matter which thinks' and of the need for 'a certain lump of matter' to accompany us 'through eternity' [128-9n(119n)]. Kant apparently has no objection to the belief that Jesus is alive now as a spiritual being; his criticism here is directed against any view that makes materiality a condition of such eternal life.
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of the coming of the 'kingdom of God on earth' is closely related, both here [134(125)] and in Division One, not only to religion but also (and perhaps more significantly) to political history, I shall defer a detailed discussion to KSP4. At this point it is enough to note that Kant believes the apocalyptic prophecy concerning 'the end of the world... may be interpreted as a symboli¬ cal representation intended merely to enliven hope and courage', since Jesus himself focused on the 'soul-elevating moral aspect' of the 'tribulations and sacrifices' associated with membership in the coming kingdom, without claim¬ ing to possess knowledge concerning details of the end [134-5(125)]. As such, the prophecies in the book of Revelation are 'a beautiful ideal of the moral world-epoch', towards the realization of which we ought continually to labor; when interpreted rationally, in terms of 'the introduction of true universal reli¬ gion', the elements of the Apocalypse 'can take on ... their right symbolic meaning' [136(126)]. That such symbolic interpretations are not intended to lower the status of the Christian faith, but to raise morality to the level of uni¬ versal religion [see VI.4], is evidenced not only by how readily Kant quotes Scripture with approval throughout Kt8, but also by the fact that he concludes Division Two by reminding his readers (with no apparent jest) of 'the necessity ... really to consider ourselves always as chosen citizens' in the kingdom of God [136(126)]. Keeping in mind this surprisingly affirmative conclusion of Division Two, as interpreted in light of Kant's Copernican Perspective on religion [see VIII. 1], can help us appreciate the fact that Kant's theory of the church in Division One of Book Three—his ideal of the universal People of God progressively realiz¬ ing the kingdom of God on earth—is not intended to do away with the real, empirical church, as is often supposed. Without the latter, pure religion would be 'bare' (i.e., 'naked' [bloss]), as the very title of Kt8 implies [see VI.2]. Along these lines, Kant elsewhere explicitly compares 'a church without a reli¬ gion' to 'garments without a man in them', and 'religion without a church' to 'a man without garments', warning that the latter 'is not well protected'.33 Rather 33. Kt65:53. Kant may have drawn his inspiration for this metaphor from the parable wherein Jesus compares the kingdom of heaven to a king who, having invited people off the streets to his son's wedding, throws one of them out because he is not wearing wedding clothes [Matt. 22:2-14]. For as the parable aptly illustrates, not all 'garments' are a suitable covering for religion's 'naked body'. The basic affinity between Kant's 'ideal' church and the biblical concept of a church as a family-like vehicle forthe expression of God's protection is evident in his claim [Kt8:102(93)] that the universal church is 'best' compared to 'a household (family) under a common, though invisible, moral Father, whose holy Son, knowing His will and yet standing in blood relation with all mem¬ bers of the household, takes His place in making His will better known to them; these accordingly honor the Father in Him and so enter with one another into a voluntary, universal, and enduring union of hearts.' Likewise, in his discussion of religious education in Kt39:494(213), Kant says: 'The best means for first making clear the idea of God is to employ the analogy of a father under
222
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than rejecting the Christian church, Kant is challenging it to develop and grow by patterning itself more effectively on the pure kernel of religious truth—a lifeline that is already available in the teachings of Jesus ('the Founder of the true church' [Kt8:179n(167n)]). All the trappings are allowed to remain, as long as they are viewed from the proper perspective, as rationally subordinate to pure religious truth. Kant says it is 'our duty' to subordinate historical faith to pure religious faith in this way [182(170)], for 'the moral believer is ever open to historical faith so far as he finds it furthering the vitality of his pure re¬ ligious disposition.' We can now see that one of the most important implications of Kant's doctrine of the church is that it encourages respect for Christianity even though church history is marred with all manner of evils. For, as we saw above, Kant regards these evils as arising not out of Christianity as such, but out of an unbalanced interpretation of Christianity by those who gave theoretical assent priority over practical assent. The lesson to be learned from the history of the Crusades, excommunications of 'heretics', witch-burnings, etc., is that the church will be a channel for covert evil as long as the theoretical standpoint (dogma) is valued more highly than the practical standpoint (morality). For the doctrinal differences that give rise to much destructive conflict 'cannot be avoided so long as we seek religion without and not within us' [Kt8:167(155)]. And this, Kant insists, is precisely the lesson taught by Christianity itself: 'Christianity's first intention was really no other than to introduce a pure reli¬ gious faith, over which no conflict of opinions can prevail' [131(122)]. Only when this perspectival shift inherent in Kant's Copernican Perspective is kept firmly in mind can we properly understand the implications of what he says in Division One concerning the role of the church and its Scripture. We can now see, for instance, that the contrast between the visible and invisible church is parallel to the contrast between ecclesiastical and religious faith [see VIII.l]. Thus Kant says in Kt8:102-3(94): 'Pure religious faith alone can found a universal church... Yet, by reason of a peculiar weakness of human nature, pure faith can never be relied on as much as it deserves, that is, a church cannot be established on it alone.' The 'weakness' he is here alluding to is one that he himself experienced. For he points out that 'a community of the faithful' will 'not automatically arise' merely on the basis of the agreement be¬ tween the 'free adherents' of pure religion, 'because in such a religion none of those who has seen the light believes himself to require, for his religious whose care we are placed; from this the transition to the idea of the unity of man, as in a family, can happily be made.'
VIII. Systemr.c
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:
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sentiments, fellowship with others' [158(146)]. The weakness of pure religion is that an overemphasis on it, to the exclusion of 'statutory ordinances', will actually hinder the continued growth of universal religion. The purpose of the visible church, as an arena for ecclesiastical faith designed primarily to promote pure religion, is to guard against such a tendency. Kant here appears to be criticizing, or at least pointing out the dangers of, his personal tendency to avoid an outward expression of his own pure religious faith. But his further stipulation, that a visible church becomes detrimental to pure religion when it is 'merely statutory' [158(146), e.a.], probably accounts for his preference not to attend church himself.34 Immediately after establishing the nature and status of the church in Divi¬ sion One [see VII.3.A], Kant concentrates on the topic of Scripture: Subsection V argues that historical faith 'is best Founded on a Holy Scripture' [Kt8:102 (94)], while Subsection VI establishes the proper priorities for interpreting Scrip¬ ture within a church. In the former section Kant first explains why the human condition makes historical faith necessary as a vehicle for pure religious faith. He then argues that in order for the former to convey the latter 'everywhere' (i.e., universally) and 'unchanged'—these being the first and fourth require¬ ments for a true church—a tradition alone (i.e., a set of rituals and other 'public observances') will not suffice: a scripture is also needed [106-7(97-8)]. The great 'respect' aroused by 'a holy book', due in part to the body of scholarly 'expositors' that inevitably forms around it, makes it virtually impossible 'to destroy a faith grounded in a scripture', whereas faiths without a scripture have
34. Kant's disinterest in attending church is depicted by several oft-repeated anecdotes that can cloud the reader's understanding of the doctrine of the church expounded in Kt8 [see IV. 1; K152:38]. The trappings of the church in Kant's day were evidently too accentuated, and its theology too firmly fixed on theoretical 'certainties', for him to accept it as a vehicle for his own religious experience. (Thus Hare conjectures [Ha96:48]: 'Kant may have refused to attend because he loved the doctrines, not because he rejected them.') How he made up for this omission will be discussed in Part Four. All too often Kant's interpreters allow his personal religious habits to eclipse their aware¬ ness of his systematic arguments regarding public worship. Walsh does this when he claims in Wa90:9 that 'Kant strongly disapproved' of 'the use of some kind of ceremonial and the conducting of one's religious life in public' Likewise, Cassirer says 'Kant delivers the most ruthless attacks upon certain essential features of the religious life, viz. adoration of God, private prayer, and public worship. All this strikes him as wholly unreasonable' [Ca88:8O]. He even warns against the danger of 'supposing] that Kant wishes to make concessions to religion where he really has no such intention.' But this warning is itself wholly misplaced, for as I demonstrate in VII.3.B, VIII.3.B, AVII.4 [s.e. note AVII.16], and AVIII.1-4, Kant's text (unlike his personal habits) exhibits a quali¬ fied approval of such religious actions as potentially reasonable. Even Despland's warning, though heading in the right direction, starts off on the wrong foot: Kant's 'abhorrence... for public exer¬ cises and common demonstrations of piety ... derive[s] from an intense respect for the privacy of other consciences, of which he repeatedly stated that only God can fathom' [De73:107]. Kant did not 'abhor' public worship as such, but only its misuse by those who regard it as intrinsically pleasing to God.
224
PART THREE: CRITICAL RELIGION
'promptly met [their] downfall when the state was overthrown.'35 Clearly al¬ luding to the Bible, Kant concludes that, because this particular scripture 'con¬ tains ... the purest moral doctrine of religion in its completeness' [107(98)], and because the extraordinary circumstances whereby it has 'fallen into men's hands' point to 'none other than a gracious Providence' as its 'source' [107n(98n)], it 'can command an esteem like that accorded to revelation.' To interpret this positive assessment of Scripture merely as a ploy to gain approval from the censors would be totally unfounded; for in other contexts, both public and private, Kant openly attests to his high regard for the Bible. Thus in Kt35:(74) he tells his students (c.1775-1781): 'The Gospels do not suffer even the least imperfection: they are stringent and pure and demand unre¬ lentingly compliance with the [moral] law.' In a late essay (1794) he explicitly approves of the failure of one person's 'rash' attempt at a 'public propounding of religion without the bible' [Kt55:321(87)]. Earlier, in a letter to Lavater (1775), he privately confesses: 'I respect the reports of the evangelists and apostles, and I put my humble trust in that means of reconciliation with God of which they have given us historical tidings' [AA10:169(Zw67:80-l)]. When he goes on to warn that 'what those men give us are only their reports', his purpose is not to detract from the Bible's significance, but to enhance it by en¬ couraging a proper (Critical) attention to the standpoint we adopt when reading it: 'considered as history, our New Testament writings can never be so es¬ teemed as to make us dare to have unlimited trust in every word of them, and especially if this were to weaken our attentiveness to the one necessary thing, namely, the moral faith of the Gospels' [170(81)]. In a follow-up letter Kant clarifies the importance of adopting the practical (moral) standpoint: 'no book, whatever its authority might be ... can substitute for the religion of con¬ science.... For although statutes may bring about the performance of rituals, they cannot beget inner convictions. Because of this presupposition, I seek in the Gospels not the ground of my faith but its fortification' [171(82)]. That Kant regards this standpoint as involving not a denial but a confirmation of the Bible's authority becomes clear in a 1789 letter to Jung-Stilling [23.494(131)]: 'it is quite right of you to seek in the Gospels the final satisfaction of your striving for a secure foundation of wisdom and hope, since [the Bible] is an ev¬ erlasting guide to true wisdom, one that not only agrees with the speculations of a perfected reason but sheds new light on the whole field surveyed by that 35. Kt8:107(98). Likewise, Kant later notes that 'a people which has a written religion (sacred books) never fuses together in one faith with a people ... possessing no such books but only rites' [136n (127n)]. This would be his explanation for how the Jewish nation managed to remain distinct for so long without a homeland or political state as a basis.
VIII. Systemic
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225
reason, illuminating what still remains opaque to it.' Such passages confirm Despland's claim [De73:222] that Kant views 'historical revelation [as] an edu¬ cator of reason.' Kant further clarifies this function in yet another letter, wherein he tells Fichte that 'the revelation of [nonmoral statutes] was given as an accommodation to our weakness, to provide a visible cloak for' the moral 'articles of faith prescribed by reason' [AAll:308(Zw67:187)]. This practically-focused, perspectivally-determined view of Scripture goes hand in hand with Kant's Copernican Perspective on religion. This Perspective requires Kant to reverse the common person's assumptions concerning the sources of religious life, as when he declares in Kt65:37 that 'the only way we can find eternal life in any Scripture whatsoever is by putting it there.' Kant be¬ lieves this reversal of emphasis comes directly from Christianity; indeed, he sees it as the essence of Jesus' revolutionary message. As long as 'Christianity' (or the name of any other religion) is taken to refer merely to an historical tradition (an ecclesiastical faith), its message thereby sows the seeds of its own destruction; in making a convert its adherents only produce 'twice as much a son of hell' as they themselves already are [Matt. 23:15]. But if the message itself is given priority, as Kant believes was Jesus' original intention, then the destruction of any given ecclesiastical form will not deter the progress of true, universal religion. For universal religion is the ideal of a perfect instantiation in the empirical world of the pure religious standpoint all people can adopt. The title of Subsection VI of Book Three's first division encapsulates the essence of Kant's biblical hermeneutics: 'Ecclesiastical Faith Has Pure Religious Faith as its Highest Interpreter' [Kt8:109(100)]. Kant presents three possible candidates for the highest principle of biblical interpretation, each corresponding to one of the basic Critical standpoints: historical scholarship (theoretical), moral symbolism (practical), and personal feeling (judicial). He rejects the latter in a single paragraph at the end of the subsection; but it is important to understand why. We cannot regard 'an inner feeling' as an alter¬ native to 'rational religion and Scriptural learning' in determining 'the true meaning of Scripture as well as its divine origin' [113(104)]; nevertheless, we certainly cannot deny... that the very impulse to good actions ..., which the man who reads Scripture... must feel, cannot but convince him of its divine nature ... [Yet this] moral feeling... is private to every individual...; therefore one cannot urge it as a touchstone for the genuineness of a revelation, for it teaches absolutely nothing, but is merely the way in which the subject is affected as regards pleasure or displeasure—and on this basis can be established no knowledge whatsoever. [113-4(104-5); s.a. Kt65:32-3] Kant is not denying that feeling plays an important role in helping us appreciate the 'divine nature' of Scripture; he is merely pointing out that theological
226
PART THREE: CRITICAL RELIGION
conclusions cannot rely on feeling, since it is a private matter. A 'philosophical' interpretation of Scripture is 'a thoroughgoing interpreta¬ tion of it in a sense agreeing with the universal practical rules of pure reason' ?6 Even if it is 'forced', such morally-based interpretation 'must be preferred to a literal interpretation which either contains nothing at all [helpful] to morality or else actually works counter to moral incentives' [Kt8:l 10(100-1); s.a. 43n (39n); Kt65:42]. The only alternative for the truly religious person would be 'to charge [Scripture] with error' [41; s.a. 63-4,66]. Moreover, 'absolutely no general agreement can be reached [in disputes 'over credal opinions on matters of faith'] without appeal to pure reason as the expositor [of Scripture]' [Kt8: 130(121)]—a point we shall consider further in VIII.4. In defending such an approach Kant points out that 'this has always been done' down through history [110(101)], and that Jesus himself intended his teaching to be taken in this way [159-62(147-51)]. Kant further defends this subordination of the historical to the religious (perhaps even less popular today than it was two centuries ago) in Kt65:42: ... faith merely in the sense of theoretical assent... is no part of [pure] religion because it neither makes nor gives proof of a better man... Yet these same propo¬ sitions can be considered essential requirements for expounding a certain ecclesiasti¬ cal faith.... However, the teacher should warn [the people] not to ascribe holiness to dogma itself but to pass over, without delay, to the religious faith it has intro¬ duced, [s.a. 46,65]
From the truly religious standpoint, 'Scriptural scholarship... settles no more than that there is nothing in the origin of Scripture to render impossible its ac¬ ceptance as direct divine revelation'—i.e., nothing immoral [Kt8:l 12-3(103)]. If it is not subordinated to religious faith, the resulting 'historical faith must finally become mere faith in Scriptural scholars and their insight' [114(105); s.a. Kt65:61]. But this is inadequate for universal religion because 'historical ecclesiastical doctrines... at best have in their favor only a probability discover¬ able by scholars' [Kt8:133(123)]. For those in the Judeo-Christian tradition, it leads to the unlikely implication that 'the salvation of mankind' hangs upon the contingent fact of 'there be[ing] scholars who are familiar with the Hebrew lan¬ guage' [167(155)]. Even more significant is that an exclusive emphasis on the theoretical standpoint leaves the divine origin of the Bible totally unverifiable: 'No historical account can verify the divine origin of such a writing. The proof can be derived only from its tested power to establish religion in the human
36. Kt8:l 10(100). A parallel discussion of the proper 'principles of Scriptural exegesis' appears in Kt65:38-44,65, where Kant insists they 'must be philosophical' [38]. In the following paragraphs, I shall intersperse relevant references to this text with my discussion of Kt8.
VIII. Sysiemr-c heart'[Kt65:64; s.a. 23,46].
-«
I •
Let us conclude our discussion of Kant's views on Scripture by examining the two hermeneutic principles proposed in Division Two of Book Three: The first is the principle of a reasonable modesty in pronouncements regarding all that goes by the name of revelation. For no one can deny the possibility that a scripture... may... be regarded as a genuinely divine revelation.... [O]ne can hardly expect a new revelation... Hence the most intelligent and most reasonable thing to do is from now on to use the book already at hand [the Bible] as the basis for eccle¬ siastical instruction and not to lessen its value through useless or mischievous attacks, yet meanwhile not forcing belief in it, as requisite to salvation, upon any man. The second principle is this: ... the sacred narrative... ought to have absolutely no [determining] influence on the adoption of moral maxims, and... must at all times be taught and expounded in the interest of morality ... [Kt8:132-3(122-3)] The bulk of Kant's treatment of the first principle is directed against the sup¬ posedly liberating tendencies of the Enlightenment, by maintaining that belief in some sort of vehicle for religious faith, some divine revelation, is healthy and should be preserved.37 The ironic tendency of liberals (usually biblical schol¬ ars!) to deny the authority of Scripture with 'useless or mischievous attacks' is not conducive to maintaining a strong religious faith. But he also criticizes the extreme conservative, who forces
belief in scriptural dogmas, as equally
destructive. For such an approach takes away the moral freedom of its adher¬ ents by imposing as laws of coercion what are meant to be laws of virtue.3* 37. Kant refers to his own belief in the 'divinity inspired' status of the Bible on numerous occasions [see e.g., Kt65:44,46,62]. In Kt65:65 he insists that 'the Bible deserves to be kept, put to moral use, and assigned to religion as its guide just as if it is a divine revelation.' This 'as i f should be regarded not as a 'nuance', cleverly designed to reduce revelation to nothing but its 'moral use', but rather as a straightforward confession that the impossibility of gaining theoretical certainty on such matters requires us (believer and unbeliever alike!) to adopt the hypothetical perspective. By employing such a strategy, Kant shows in Kt65:58 how the Bible can be used to correct the unhealthy tendencies of various ecclesiastical sects. That such correction is also part of his strategy in Kt8 is clearly indicated in an early draft of the Preface [AA20:438(De73:243)], where Kant says the book will effect (in Despland's words) 'a reunion of reason with revelation that will do honour to the latter and will be achieved with each defending its just and particular rights.' 38. See VII.3.A and Kt65:20,27. Davidovich neglects this subtle point when she argues that 'Kant should be seen, perhaps against his will, as the forefather of liberal theology' [Da93b:55]. On the one hand, we have seen that having a formative influence on the subsequent development of theology was in all likelihood not 'against his will'. Bax tells us [BaO3:lii] that after publishing Kt8 'Kant... was extremely anxious to establish a school of liberal theologians to carry out the work he had commenced.' On the other hand, Kant's influence should not be associated exclusively with liberal theology. Green quotes Hans Frei as claiming [Gg93:12] 'that Kant's thought was the crucial dividing point for Protestant theology in the nineteenth century. His thought was like a prism ... All paths led to Kant.' MacKinnon [Ma90a:359] names Gore, Scott-Holland, and T.H. Green as British theologians who were influenced by Kant and 'shared with [Forsyth an] appre¬ ciation of the manner in which experiential self-limitation was of the essence of the Incarnation.' (The point here is thoroughly Kantian: we symbolically participate in Christ's incarnation when we humbly accept our own self-limitations.) Forsyth 'was indebted to Kant for his insistence that the transcendent was to be encountered in and through the personal, moral lives of individual[s]' [356, e.a.]. This encounter will be the focus of our attention for much of Part Four. And in VIII.4 I
228
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The second principle restates two ideas Kant has already introduced: that morality is independent from religion [Kt8:3(3)] and that 'the highest principle of all Scriptural exegesis' is to treat 'the moral improvement of men' as 'the real end of all religion of reason' ,39 He expounds these ideas in numerous passages: For the final purpose even of reading these holy scriptures, or of investigating their content, is to make men better; the historical element, which contributes nothing to this end, is ... in itself quite indifferent, and we can do with it what we like. [Kt8:111(102); s.a. Kt65:40,47] Only a moral interpretation... is really an authentic one—that is, one given by the God within us... [48]. [Therefore] we must regard the credentials of the Bible as drawn from the pure springs of universal religion dwelling in every ordinary man... [63]. Its authenticity... can be better established by the effect its reading can produce in the hearts of men than by proofs based on critical examination of the teachings and tales it contains. [61] The God Who speaks through our own (morally practical) reason is an infallible interpreter of His words in the Scriptures, Whom everyone can understand. And it is quite impossible for there to be any other accredited interpreter of His words... [67].
As we have seen, Kant is not intending to do away with the 'Scriptural scholar¬ ship' that 'deals with the historical aspect of [a] religion' [Kt8:114(105)], but to put the historical (biblical) scholar in a proper, 'subordinated' place in relation to the 'Scriptural interpreter' (i.e., a preacher or other church member), whose task is to determine the rational (moral) meaning of the text [112(103)]. The foregoing, perspectival interpretation of Kant's views on the universal church and its Scripture reveals Kant to be far more sympathetic to Christianity than is often recognized. He obviously regards himself as a reformer rather than a destroyer of Christian tradition, very much in line with his attitude towards metaphysics in general [cf. 1.1-2 and AIX.l]. Like the best reformers, Kant does not mince his words when referring to those aspects of the tradition he re¬ gards as essentially idolatrous.40 But the reason behind his iconoclasm is to shall argue in more detail that Kant's position has both liberal and conservative strains. 39. Kt8:112(102); s.a. Kt65:41. See Wi73:74 for an example of a biblical theologian who laments the poverty of the historical-critical method and argues, like Kant, that personal transformation is the true purpose of biblical interpretation. Kant in general does not share the historical-critical scholar's assumption that the best inter¬ pretation is the one that comes closest to reflecting the author's original understanding. To justify his somewhat unusual interpretation of Plato in Ktl:370, for example, he says 'it is by no means unusual, upon comparing the thoughts which an author has expressed in regard to his subject... to find that we understand him better than he has understood himself. ' See also Kant's comment on Ulpian's formulas in Kt6:236. 40. After quoting from the Heidelberg Catechism, White insists Kant 'must clearly have been familiar ... with texts such as the Heidelberg Catechism with its formative influence on the pietist movement' [Wh90:2], so he was no doubt 'conscious of the extent to which he was putting forward positions that were in direct conflict with the theologians of the classical Reformation.' While this
VIII. Systemic
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produce a truer tradition—i.e., a systemic that can convey the genuine moral core of religion more directly to its members. This goal will become even more evident as we proceed now to the final part of our overview of Kant's second experiment. B. Serving God: Clergy vs. Conscience Like his theoretical and practical systems, Kant's religious system does not end at this point, even though stage three fully realizes the constituent elements of the object of inquiry (in this case, an empirical manifestation of a God's kingdom); instead, he always adds a fourth stage, wherein certain regulative elements are put forward from the hypothetical perspective,41 as guideposts for wise application. Book Four of Kt8, like Books Two and Three, is also di¬ vided into two main parts, the first adopting a more rational outlook to examine 'the service of God in religion in general' [153(142)] and the second probing the false expressions of such service typically manifested in the Christian tradi¬ tion. As with systemt, I interpreted stage four of systemr.m as consisting of two alternate endings [cf. VII.3.B and KSP1:VII.3.B], depending on whether one adopts the hypothetical or the speculative perspective (i.e., depending on whether priority is given to practical or theoretical reason, respectively). In systemr.m the first ending is taken mainly from Part One of Book Four, while the second is taken mainly from Part Two. Although some repetition of the content of our earlier discussion is therefore inevitable, my focus here shall be on those aspects of both parts that relate primarily to systemicAfter introducing some basic distinctions in Part One, Kant devotes two subsections to Christianity, viewing it first from the rational/moral standpoint of 'natural religion', then from the historical/theoretical standpoint of 'learned religion'. In Section One, he points out that, considered as a natural religion (i.e., as an instantiation of pure religious faith), Christianity is an ideal structure is true, it should not be used to conceal the fact that Kant's goal was to reform rather than destroy the tradition. Otherwise he surely would have avoided using such iconoclastic terms as 'idolatry', as he often does, to denounce those who reverse the true meaning of religion [see Kt8:169n(157n), 176(164),185(173), 199(187)]. 41 • Kant provides a two-sided illustration of the hypothetical perspective in the first footnote in Book Four. First he explains how his definition of religion (i.e., the hypothesis that duties can be viewed as if they were divine commands) implies that on all theoretical issues religion requires no knowledge, but only 'a problematical assumption (hypothesis)' and 'an assertorial faith' [Kt8:1534n(142n)]. In other words, the hypothetical belief that God's existence is possible is all that is needed for religion; all other requirements can be fulfilled by moral faith. Kant then points out that his definition also prevents statutory commands as such from being regarded as 'special duties to God' [154n(142n)]. Just as it focuses the attention of theoretical reason away from speculation and towards faith, the hypothetical perspective in systemr-m focuses the attention of practical reason away from nonmoral 'courtly obligations' and towards the human duties known to all mankind.
230
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consisting of 'a body of servants ..., but not officials' [Kt8:157(145)]. As free and equal members of 'an invisible church' that comprises 'all right-thinking people',42 these servants will 'not automatically' form themselves into a visible church; yet as we have seen, 'a factual basis [ein FactumY must be established if the invisible church is to become a reality in the world [158(146), alt.]. This happened, Kant hypothesizes ('Let us suppose ...'), when Jesus preached the principles of the 'universal religion of reason' and added to them 'certain statutes which provided forms and observances designed to serve as a means of bringing into existence a church founded upon those principles.' In so doing, he became 'the founder of the first true church' [159(147)]—i.e., the first visible church with dogmas and rituals designed primarily to be an expression of the invisible church (see below). To support this quasi-conservative claim, Kant carries out his most extensive effort at biblical interpretation, surveying the entire Gospel of Matthew for evidence of parallels between Jesus' teaching and the pure religion of reason [159-62(147-50)]. Having amassed an impressive display of parallels, Kant concludes that this (i.e., Christianity, as introduced by Jesus) 'is a complete religion' [162(150)]. Once Jesus had given universal religion this factual basis, subsequent gen¬ erations inevitably entrusted his message 'to the guardianship of the learned' [Kt8:162(151)]. At this point, as Kant explains in Section Two, 'the Christian religion1 becomes 'the Christian faith' [163(151)]. Ideally, these two forms of Christianity (the invisible/rational and the visible/historical) ought to be com¬ plementary. The integrity of the former can be preserved, however, only if the beliefs associated with the latter are 'not made a duty'; for when 'unconditional belief m revealed propositions (in themselves hidden from reason)' is made the basis of Christian faith, the freedom associated with all true (moral) religion is lost, being transformed into servitude {'servilis') to 'the small body of textual scholars (the clerics)' [164(152); s.a. 171(159)]. The genuine 'ministerium' characterizing each member of the true church (i.e., the ministry performed by dutiful servants of God, who receive 'orders directly from the supreme legisla¬ tor' [152(140)]) is thereby replaced by a false Hmperium' belonging to the elite church 'officiates' (i.e., a 'domination' exercised by 'commanding high offi¬ cials') [165(153); s.a. 152-3(140-1)]. After some reflections on the relationship between Judaism and Christianity, mainly reiterating themes from the previous 42. Kt8:152(140),176(164). These passages indicate how wrong McCarthy is to assert that for Kant 'modern philosophers are implicitly the priests of the pure moral religion to come' [Mc86:88]. Kant's explicit view is that there are no priests—or, if servants are regarded as priests, that all enlightened people are priests, in virtue of possessing the moral law. McCarthy's claim might be true if 'philosopher' is defined in an extremely broad way (e.g., as any enlightened person), but even then it would ignore Kant's deep respect for the common (moral, but unenlightened) person.
I H
VIII. Systemr.c
<
231
treatment of the same subject in Division Two of Book Three, Kant concludes this second section with a reminder [167(155)] that 'changes of faith' (such as those arising from scholarly disputes) 'cannot be avoided so long as we seek religion without and not within us.' Having acknowledged in Part One of Book Four the necessity of religion's 'factual basis' in history and scholarship, Kant casts his Critical eye on false forms of religious service in Part Two. The 'statutes' and 'ordinances' taught by biblical scholars and enforced by the clergy ought to be regarded as 'good' but 'arbitrary and contingent' appearances pointing us towards the reality of the moral law. When they are instead viewed as 'essential to the service of God', and so also as 'the highest condition of the divine approval', the inevitable result is 'pseudo-service' and 'religious illusion' [Kt8:168(156)]. As we saw in VII.3.B, this 'practical illusion' involves the mistaken belief that 'possessing a means to some end' is sufficient, and can 'take the place' of 'the possession of the end' .43 The first two of the four subsections constituting Part Two are devoted to establishing basic principles for distinguishing reality from illusion in our religious life. Since these sections relate mainly to Kant's first experi¬ ment and are dealt with elsewhere [VI.2-3 and VII.3.B], I shall here pass directly to the third and fourth subsections, where Christianity as such is more clearly the focus of Kant's attention. Subsection 3 presents a stinging critique of 'clericalism' as a false form of religious government. Kant first points out that the specific historical and statutory differences that inevitably exist between different traditions are far less significant than the basic perspectival difference between those who give prior¬ ity to historical faith (following the principle of religious illusion presented in Subsection 1) and those who give priority to good life-conduct (following the moral principle presented in Subsection 2). By taking their scripture and tradi¬ tion too literally, as conveying dogmatic knowledge, the former fall victim to all manner of illusions; the latter avoid this by interpreting their 'historical faith' as 'the symbolic representation, and the means of promotion, of a pure religious faith' [Kt8:176(164)]. The root cause of all such illusion is the devotees' 'inten¬ tion' to use compliance with nonmoral statutes as a way 'to manage to their own advantage the invisible Power which presides over the destiny of men', thus 'bringing about a supernatural effect through wholly natural [i.e., nonmoral] means' [176-7(164-5)]. Through intellectual assent to dogmas and/or active 43. Kt8:168n(156n). For example, possessing food is a good and legitimate means to the end of satisfying hunger. But if we let the food just sit in the cupboard without eating it, its true end or purpose will eventually be 'frustrated' [cf. 153(141)], once the food spoils or we die of starvation. Merely possessing the means does not obviate the need to employ it in order to realize the end.
232
PART THREE: CRITICAL RELIGION
participation in ceremonies and rituals, such a person believes 'that he works on God and uses Him as a means to bring about a result in the world' [177-8(1656)]. Kant does not object to the devotee who uses nonmoral observances 'as a means to the furthering of the moral disposition', believing that in so doing 'he is merely making himself capable of receiving' God's assistance; what he rejects is the idea that formulas, confessions, and 'churchly observances' can 'conjure up divine assistance', or 'produce it through natural acts' [178(166)]. Clericalism, as Kant sees it, is the tendency of church leaders to encourage members to fall into religious illusion—a tendency exacerbated by the common belief that compliance with statutory regulations is easier than obeying the moral law [Kt8:179n(167n)]. In hopes of divesting this illusion of its power, Kant repeatedly stresses that 'moral service' alone is 'free', because the 'divine commands' are thereby transmitted through the conscience of each individual, so that 'nothing is here forced upon him'; statutory divine commands are 'for a conscientious man a far heavier yoke', because (taken literally) they burden the conscience with requirements that cannot be internally verified [179(167)]. This, Kant claims, is what Jesus meant when he said his 'yoke is easy' and his 'burden is light' [Matt. 11:30]: a person's duties, though in one sense 'the hardest' of all responsibilities, are free of external burdens ('yokes'), for they are 'imposed on him by himself and through his own reason' [179n(167n)]. While admitting that churches vary greatly in how heavily they burden their members with statutory 'yokes', Kant reminds us that the basic question of 'worth or worthlessness rests on the nature of the principle which is supremely binding.' Regardless of the church's external political structure, if 'submission to precepts as a compulsory service' is given higher priority than 'free homage ... to the moral law' [180(168)], 'then, however few the imposed observances, ... the masses are ruled and robbed of their moral freedom by subservience to a church (not to religion).' In such cases, 'a clergy rules which believes that it can actually dispense with reason and even... with Scriptural learning, because it has authority' [180(168)]. Kant appends to this subsection some further reflections on the doctrines appropriate to the true church. Rooting the doctrine of salvation in an historical faith may be useful in converting the simple-minded, but 'the learned or wise of the world' are bound to find difficulties that render such a faith unsuitable to serve 'as the supreme condition of a universal faith alone leading to salvation'; this doctrine should instead be rooted in the 'practical knowledge' that is 'en¬ graved upon [each person's] heart' and effectively 'guides us to a pure religious faith' [Kt8:181-2(169-70)]. Only when we 'start off with this knowledge', let¬ ting 'the historical faith which harmonizes with it follow', 'does historical faith
VIII. Systemr.c
233
possess a pure moral worth, because here it is free and not coerced through any threat' [182(170)]. Kant then makes the same basic point by distinguishing be¬ tween the 'doctrine of godliness' (obeying statutes out of a fear and/or love of God) and the 'doctrine of virtue' (doing one's duty out of respect for the moral law). These two doctrines 'stand in necessary connection with one another' in such a way that one must be a means that leads to the other. Because the former assumes an idea of God that 'cannot subsist of itself in speculative reason', whereas the latter 'derives from the soul of man', Kant argues that in cate¬ chisms and sermons alike 'the doctrine of godliness' should be presented 'as a means of strengthening... the virtuous disposition' [182-3(170-1)]. Treating the former as an end in itself leads to a weakening of moral courage and 'transformfs] godliness into a fawning slavish subjection to a despotically command¬ ing might', thus reducing worship to a form of 'idolatry'; 'godliness' then serves as a mere 'surrogate for virtue' instead of as 'virtue's consummation'.44 Subsection 4 concludes Part Two of Book Four with a defense of what is arguably the most indispensable tenet relating to the practical implications of Kant's second experiment: that conscience (as opposed to clergy) is the most reliable guide in matters of faith [Kt8:185(173)]. Kant defines conscience as 'the moral faculty of judgment, passing judgment upon itself—a regulative function reminiscent of reason's regulation of theoretical judgment in stage four of systemt [see KSP1:VII.3.B], except that 'reason here judges itself [186 (174)]. Whereas '[t]he understanding', operating in stages two and three of systeirip, 'judges whether an action is really right or wrong', conscience operates in stage four of systemr_m (step ten) by postulating certainty of an action's moral status. Kant cites the 'inquisitor' who 'pass[es] judgment upon a socalled heretic' and 'condemns him to death' as an example of the danger of making an 'unconscientious' decision based on an 'historical and visionary faith' [186-7(174-5)]. In any such case where conscience suggests even the possibility that a choice based on a presumed revealed knowledge of God's will could be mistaken (i.e., contrary to the moral law), Kant believes a conscien¬ tious person should abstain from acting. With this in mind, Kant asks 'whether spiritual rulers Or teachers... should impose [their idea of 'revealed law'] upon the people as an article of faith' [Kt8:187(175)]. Since 'the absolute possibility of an error' is always present 44. Kt8:183-5(172-3). Such false godliness runs directly counter to the true purpose of 'the doctrine of atonement', which is to strengthen the 'courage to stand on one's own feet' [183-4(172)]. Like¬ wise, the Christian concept of 'piety' all too often encourages 'a passive attitude' that merely awaits help 'from a power above' [184n(173n)]. Kant regards such 'self-abnegation' as a form of false humility. True humility, by contrast, 'should bring about not contempt for oneself but rather the resolution ... to approach ever nearer to agreement with [the moral] law' [184-5n(172n)].
234
PART THREE: CRITICAL RELIGION
whenever a statement is based on one's 'interpretation' of Scripture, or even on 'previous classical exegesis', adherence to such a confession should be left to each person's conscience. When 'the clergyman' uses spiritual authority to require 'the confession of firm belief' before God in a theoretical statement 'of which he himself can never be wholly convinced', the resulting hypocrisy be¬ lies an 'insincerity' (or 'untruthfulness') that is nothing short of 'damnable'.45 Kant's cautious attitude towards church confessions is based not on an irrever¬ ent disregard for theological truth, but on an honest recognition of our theoreti¬ cal uncertainty on such matters. For the way of salvation 'may be so mysterious that God can reveal it to us at best in a symbolic representation in which only what is practical is comprehensible to us' [171(159)]. To withhold the freedom of conscience from church members on the principle that they 'are essentially unfit for freedom ... is to usurp the prerogatives of Divinity itself, which created men for freedom' [188n(176-7n)J. Kant firmly rejects the rationale often used by those who think such 'dishonesty in religious confessions' is 'expedient' (e.g., Pascal's 'wager', that everything is gained if it turns out to be right, while nothing is lost if it turns out to be wrong), condemning it as a hypocriti¬ cal 'violation of conscience' that is very likely to backfire [188-9(176-7)]. Although Book Four's second part includes only a few explicit references to Christianity, Kant's second experiment is clearly at the forefront of his mind throughout his discussion (especially in Subsections 3 and 4). For the struggle between clergy and conscience for jurisdiction over the freedom of the human soul is the issue that Christianity must confront if it is to succeed in realizing its destiny of becoming the vehicle through which universal religion is propagated to the entire human race. Further evidence that the Christian form of this strug¬ gle is Kant's main concern comes in the General Observation to Book Four, where he assesses the religious value of four rituals: two of the four (baptism and communion) are unique to the Christian tradition. (Kant's views on these rituals are examined in AVII.4 and AVIII.) We can therefore conclude our por¬ trayal of systemic by stressing that for Kant the essence of genuine Christian 45. Kt8:187(175-6). That this strongly-worded condemnation was directed, at least in part, against the king's censor is suggested by a comment Kant makes in a 1792 letter to Fichte [AAll:3O9(Zw67: 187)]: 'My unintentional non-belief is not an intentional un-belief. But you will have a hard time making this compromise attractive to a censor who, it would seem, has made the historical credo into an essential religious duty.' Kant's claim not to be criticizing Christianity as such [see note VIII.4] does not mean he is not criticizing specific misuses of the ideal. Kant makes a similar point earlier, when he says a dogmatic belief in a particular revelation, and the insistence that followers declare their assent to various confessions of faith, all too often have the effect of 'doing violence to [the believer's] conscience' [Kt8:171(159)]. The issues of damnation and sincerity (or 'truthfulness') are further developed in a pair of footnotes at the close of Part Two [189-90(178)].
i VIII. Systemr.c
•;
;
;
235
service lies in a conscientious commitment to identify and carry out one's personal duty, and that the cleric's true task is to foster a church environment wherein all members can freely explore whatever beliefs and actions are most likely to promote this moral end. A visible church that understands its purpose in these terms will be wholly consistent with systemr.m. 4. The Harmony between System,-.c and Systemr.m In the passage quoted at the beginning of this chapter, Kant claims that Kt8 demonstrates a lasting 'harmony' between 'Christianity' and 'the purest moral belief in religion' [Kt65:9]. We have now seen in detail just how far Kant goes in this direction, thanks to his application of the Copernican Perspective to re¬ ligion. The high degree of harmony between Kant's two experiments suggests a possibility we have not yet considered: since Christianity is chosen by Kant 'as the medium for the elucidation of our idea of revealed religion' [Kt8:156 (144)], could there be a direct correspondence between the architectonic form of systemr.m and that of the historical Christian faith, regarded as systemic? Kant's concentric circles metaphor certainly suggests such a similarity of form. As we saw in VII.2-4, systemr.m takes the same twelvefold form as systemt and systemp [cf. Fig. VII.6, above, and KSPl's Figs. VII.4 and VIII. 1]. Although my exposition of Kant's second experiment has not appealed directly to this twelvefold pattern, we can easily review its content with exactly such harmonic correlations in mind. This will confirm the suggestion made in VIII. 1 [s.e. Fig. VIII. 1] that Kant completes his second experiment by constructing 'systemic' (the Christian religious system). Constructing the remaining component in the triad, systemr.s (a philosophically enlightened system of biblical theology), will then be the task of Chapter IX. Systemic has two versions, one illusory and one genuine, with the differ¬ ences becoming apparent, as usual, only in stage four, depending on whether the speculative perspective or the hypothetical perspective is adopted. The following analytic summary of systemic includes both options and should be read with reference to Figures VIII.2-3, though for the purpose of contrast with Figures VII.7-8, these figures show only the illusory ('pseudo-service') version of stage four. This should not be construed to mean that Christian religion is necessarily illusory; this would be quite contrary to Kant's intention. Stage four. The speculative perspective (++) of systemr_c aims to estab¬ lish how salvation is possible, but inadvertently bases its assurance on a false way of serving God (x). Such pseudo-service tends to happen whenever revealed faith (-)—i.e., belief in the Bible as interpreted by theologians and cler¬ ics—is given priority over good life-conduct. This tends to cloud the believer's
236
PART THREE: CRITICAL RELIGION
conscience, causing nonmoral, church-prescribed actions to be regarded as the highest demonstration of one's unconditional devotion to God (+), in the hope that salvation will be given despite a lack of good life-conduct. Such devotional activities can be a legitimate part of genuine service to God, but only if they in¬ directly encourage moral action by strengthening a person's good disposition. Direct service of God involves living freely under the dictates of one's own S _.
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Figure VIII.2: Schematic Analysis of the Illusory Version of Systemr.c*
Vlll. Systemr.c
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(false) assurance of salvation actions devoted ,-^foi Adam and Eve created good solely to God?r | i>
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• g j ^ ' ^ ^ t h e y eat forbidden fruit I < ^ \
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Figure VIII.3: The Circle of Christian Religion as Speculative conscience, viewing moral commands from the hypothetical perspective, as divine commands. Only the latter version of stage four harmonizes well with systemr_m; but in the real world both versions typically coexist in the body of religious believers known as the Christian church. Stage three. Systemr_c's empirical perspective (-+) requires a church to be established as the historical context for learning and practicing how to serve God. Historically, this goal was first realized when the Roman Emperor, Constantine, converted to Christianity (x). Before that, individuals were called Christians (+) not on the basis of their membership in a state, but only if they had received the Holy Spirit as a personal guide. The first persons to have this experience were Jesus' original followers (-), who gathered together after his death and resurrection in order to support each other in the task of sharing the news of how they had been given new life (stage two) that saved them from their former state of corruption (stage one). Stage two. The logical perspective (+-) in systemic defines the basic requirement for an individual's membership in the church. Each member must have received the gift of new life (x) through faith in the saving power of Jesus' resurrection. This conversion must be based on a new hope of becoming good (+), as exemplified in Jesus' willingness to suffer and die. Although human reason is not capable of understanding Jesus' true nature, it does require us to believe Jesus was human (so that he can still be an example for us to fol¬ low), and permits us also to believe that he shared God's own disposition (-), as an expression of God's grace. Stage one. The transcendental perspective (--) explains why Jesus had to
238
PART THREE: CRITICAL RELIGION
come (and human beings had to be saved) in the first place. Salvation is re¬ quired because, just as in the story of the flood, each person's heart had become corrupted. This unfortunate process began when Adam and Eve were cast out of the garden of Eden, which happened as a consequence of their decision to eat the forbidden fruit (+). They made this decision because of the influence of Satan, disguised as a serpent. Before that, they had been given freedom to eat any of the good fruit in the garden (-), where they had been placed by God immediately after they were created in a state of original goodness. With this summary in mind, let us now return to the point raised near the end of VIII.3.A, that Kant's interpretation of religion has both liberal and con¬ servative aspects. I shall conclude this chapter by examining this dual emphasis in more detail, beginning with Kant's own response to liberal theologians of his day, as expressed in Kt65:44-5: I hear biblical theologians cry out in unison against the very idea of a philosophi¬ cal interpretation of Scripture. Philosophical exegesis, they say, aims primarily at a natural religion, not [at] Christianity. I reply that Christianity is the Idea of a religion, which must as such be based on reason and to this extent natural. But... in so far as the Bible... promotes moral precepts..., we can consider it the vehicle of religion and accept it, from this standpoint, as supernatural revelation. Now only a religion that makes it a principle not to admit supernatural revelation can be called naturalistic. So Christianity is not a naturalistic religion...
, i,,
In saying this, Kant is implicitly criticizing the liberals of his day, who overliberalized Christianity by reducing it to a natural religion (i.e., to an 'ecclesias¬ tical faith without the Bible' [60]); by contrast, Kant's philosophical interpreta¬ tion of the Bible tries to conserve its status as divine revelation by bringing out its symbolic meanings.46 This is because, given Kant's Copernican Perspective on religion, a text can be regarded as divine revelation only to the extent that we determine to read it as divine revelation—that is, to see in it the empirical unfolding of the pure religion that is in us a priori.47 46. McCarthy calls attention to this aspect of Kant's approach when he regards Goethe's reaction to Kant's 'reintroduction of radical evil' as evidence that Kant's position is itself 'radical' in a 'conservative sense' [Mc86:103]. 47. See e.g., Kt65:68. Thus Kant asks: 'is the teaching from God because it is in the Bible, or is it in the Bible because it is from God?' He answers: 'only the second proposition is acceptable' [65n]. Interpreting Kant's God as 'a construal of unaided reason' [Vo88:180], Vossenkuhl claims 'Kant rejects religion that is founded on supernatural revelation.' But as we have seen, Kant is not so explicit. Rather, he suspends belief in revelation, and he does so for an ultimately constructive purpose: rational religion should complement a belief in revealed religion. Mistaking Kant's defi¬ nition of religion for a reductionistic principle, Vossenkuhl thinks [182] it implies 'divine revela¬ tion has no point.' But we have seen this to be quite false. At the very least, Kant allows revelation to awaken reason to its own true potential. Vossenkuhl refers to texts such as Kt8:142(133) in defense of his further claim that Kant makes 'practical reason itself... an instance of revelation' [Vo88:188]. What he overlooks is that this means Kant does not deny all revelation. Rather, Kant's strategy is to explain how it works: a genuinely religious revelation must be internally legislated.
VIII. Systemr.c
•
'
239
Kant therefore calls 'the Biblical theologian' to 'be at one with the philoso¬ pher': each should respect the other as working towards a common goal, though the two Perspectives should not be carelessly mixed [Kt8:10(10)]. Thus Kant defends philosophical interpretation again in Kt8:83-4(78): An attempt such as the present... to discover in Scripture that sense which harmo¬ nizes with the most holy teachings of reason is not only allowable but must be deemed a duty. And we can remind ourselves of what the wise Teacher said to His disciples regarding someone who went his own way, by which, however, he was bound eventually to arrive at the same goal: 'Forbid him not; for he that is not against us is for us' [cf. Mark 9:39-49].
By calling the teachings of reason 'most holy' and the Teacher who first pro¬ moted them 'wise', Kant is not being disrespectful, but is merely drawing attention to the common objective of wisdom and holiness, of reason and religion, which is to live a life well-pleasing to God. Kant's hope is that the theologian will recognize this common goal, and hence 'feel honored' by the philosopher's corroboration [Kt65:45]. What is rarely acknowledged in treatments of Kant's philosophy of reli¬ gion is that he never intended to criticize or impose strenuous limitations upon the truly devout and sincerely religious person. In light of its synthetic, empirical role in Kant's overall System of Perspectives, we can now see that systemr (in both its pure and its historical aspects) should ultimately serve as an encouragement to such a person, since its main purpose is to analyze just what takes place in the experience of a truly religious individual. The criticism is rather directed against those whom Kant believes do impose severe limitations on common religious persons, and who, in so doing, actually deter their progress. His target is not Christ but the Pharisees, not St. Francis but St. Thomas,48 not the layman but the cleric, not the theology student but the theologian who seeks to indoctrinate. If we characterize those who force religious people into an unhealthy mold by discouraging them from thinking for themselves as either 'conserving conservatives' or 'liberalizing liberals', then Kant's alternative is both a 'liberalizing conservatism' and a 'conserving liberalism'—a revolution directly analogous to the replacement of empirical So it is obviously incorrect to say [190] 'I cannot know anything through revelation according to Kant's own standards of autonomous moral knowledge.' We surely can acquire moral knowledge by revelation, as long as it is legislated internally, not as a merely external statute. Even worse is the claim: 'Autonomy obliges us to reject any revealed belief as heteronomous.' Only a belief based on a supposedly objective revelation would be heteronomous. Yet another mix-up comes in Vo88: 189: 'God (not reason) did not reveal to us, Kant claims, why good and evil exist and how evil can be transformed into good.' Kant's actual view is that reason (not God) fails to reveal such myster¬ ies; it merely shows us the gap, so we know what to look for in an effective revelation. 48. Kroner confirms this when he opines [Kr61:193]: '[Kant's] philosophy was ... in some respects more in line with the gospel than [was] the Aristotelian speculation of Thomas Aquinas.'
240
PART THREE: CRITICAL RELIGION
idealism and transcendental realism with empirical realism and transcendental idealism in systemt [see KSP1, notes VI. 12,15]. Kant's conservatism is liberalizing because itfreesconservative Christians from the tendency to enclose God in a box defined by some theoretical formula; yet it does so without requiring that the doctrines that constitute orthodox Christianity be abandoned or even modified. Only one's way of looking at them (i.e., one's perspective) needs to change. Likewise, his liberalism is conserving in the sense that it preserves for the liberal theologian a living faith in spite of the liberal's tendency to deny its reality by over-dependence on the methods of historical/critical scholarship; yet, again, it does so without re¬ quiring that the methods on which liberal Christianity depends be abandoned or even modified. Once again, Kant requires only a change of perspective. The prime targets of Kant's criticism of what could be called 'conserving conservatism' are the clergy who tend to 'complain about irreligion, which they themselves have caused' [Kt65:80]. They cause it by dogmatically insisting on the necessity and sufficiency of the ecclesiastical shell of faith, which inevitably crushes the pearl of pure religion in the laity. What Kant says in Kt32:359 about certain Europeans who took slaves could well be taken as expressing the hypocrisy towards which all conserving conservatism tends: 'while they drink injustice like water, they regard themselves as the elect in point of orthodoxy.' Kant's regulative use of theoretical dogmas offers to the conservative liberation from the unhealthy situation caused by erroneous speculative certainty, yet without requiring that any cherished beliefs be abandoned (so long as they are regarded only as beliefs). Summarizing this balanced alternative, he says: In general, if we limited our judgment to regulative principles, which content themselves with their own possible application to the moral life, instead of aiming at constitutive principles of a knowledge of supersensible objects, insight into which, after all, is forever impossible to us, human wisdom would be better off in a great many ways, and there would be no breeding of a presumptive knowledge of that about which, in the last analysis, we know nothing at all—a groundless sophistry that glitters indeed for a time but only, as in the end becomes apparent, to the detriment of morality. [Kt8:71n(65n)]
This would liberate the conservative from the religion-killing tendency to insist on one and only one answer to every theoretical question, yet without requiring the abandonment of any orthodox beliefs. Webb's account of Kant's sugges¬ tion as to how best to avoid hypocrisy in our treatment of a doctrine that pre¬ cludes theoretical certainty is that 'we should neither profess our faith in it, nor reject it as certainly false' [We26:159]. This may have been Kant's personal
:
VIII. Systemic
241
habit,49 but his official stance does not deny the legitimacy of professing faith (as long as it does not obtrude on others [Kt65:9]), but only of claiming knowl¬ edge. To 'refrain from judging dogmatically' [Kt35:(85)] simply means our acceptance or rejection of such doctrines is a matter of faith. The liberalizing conservatism of Kt8 can in this way be regarded as another example of Kant's Critical attempt 'to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith' [Ktl:xxx]. The prime targets of Kant's criticism of what could be called 'liberalizing liberalism' are the biblical scholars who, as a result of viewing Scripture from the theoretical standpoint, tend to reject the whole notion of divine revelation. The danger is not so much in treating the Bible as a product of human creativ¬ ity, but in letting undue attention to its human origins obscure its pure religious message. The biblical theologian who does this 'mistakes the husk of religion for religion itself [Kt65:45]. When this happens, liberals may be tempted to liberate themselves from morality as well, especially if they formerly depended on Scripture alone, without considering its relation to the moral law, as the motivation for conserving a moral outlook. By contrast, a careful distinction between the Perspectives of the philosopher and the theologian [see 23-4] can actually enable a person to be both a liberal scholar and a conservative Christian at the same time without compromising one's integrity. Thus Kant explains in Kt38:38 how a clergyman is obliged to make his sermon... conform to the symbol of the church ... But as a scholar he has complete freedom, even the calling, to communicate to the public all his carefully tested and well-meaning thoughts on that which is erroneous in the symbol... In doing this there is nothing that could be laid as a burden on his conscience.... He thus extracts all practical uses for his congregation from statutes to which he himself would not subscribe with full conviction but to the enunciation of which he can very well pledge himself because it is not impos¬ sible that truth lies hidden in them, and, in any case, there is at least nothing in them contradictory to inner religion.
49. This might be inferred from Kant's lack of church attendance [but see note VIII.34], or from various agnostic statements, as when he refers in passing to the 'catechism, which in our youth we perceived to a hair and believed to understand thoroughly, but which, the older and the more considerate we grow, the less we understand' [Kt55:323(91)]. Statements such as this, however, should not be taken to imply a positive rejection of the doctrine in question, but rather a recognition of the proper role of faith: 'In religion the knowledge of God is properly based on faith alone' [Kt35:(86)]. Thus he is able to affirm in Kt8:14(13) that 'the matter [of Kt8] is contained, though in other words, in the most popular children's instruction and sermons, and is easily understood.' His criticism of creeds and catechisms is not so much that they are untrue, as that an improper emphasis on one's certainty of their truth tends to breed insincerity [see 19On(178n)]. Even scholars must admit that there is always the 'possibility of an error which has crept in through their interpretation or through previous classical exegeses' [187(175)]. Thus Kant suggests that before acknowledging assent in such cases one should consider the question: 'Do you really trust yourself to assert the truth of these dogmas in the sight of Him who knows the heart and at the risk of losing all that is valuable and holy to you?' [189(177); cf. Kt65:25].
242
PART THREE: CRITICAL RELIGION
The theologian's suspicion that the philosopher is 'philosophizing away all the teachings that must be considered real revelation and so taken literally' [Kt65: 38] is unfounded, once it is recognized that theoretical knowledge (according to systemt) is never able to settle anything about such matters, except whether or not they are self-contradictory. While it is true that, as Gregor says, Kant upholds in Kt65 'the right of the philosophy faculty to freedom of expression..., at the expense of the clergy and the biblical theologian' [Gm79:xxi], this should not be taken as a denial of their legitimacy; his intention is to put pastors and theologians in their proper place by divesting them of inappropriately utilized power, whose speculative source is unattainable by human beings in the first place. A good example of such an inappropriately speculative source of power is the doctrine of the inerrancy of the Bible. Conserving conservatives regard this in the most literal possible way, as a theoretical safeguard against error of any kind appearing in the text; since God wrote the Bible, using human authors only as agents, even the possibility of error must be denied. Liberalizing liberals, by contrast, simply discard such a notion as a superstitious illusion; regarding the Bible as a collection of works written solely by human authors, they insist the text must be treated no differently than any other historical documents. As we saw in VIII.3.A, Kant's position falls midway between these two: he liberates conser¬ vatives from the fruitless habit of defending the Bible against factual errors or inconsistencies that have no bearing whatsoever on the text's genuinely reli¬ gious message; yet he conserves the unique, God-breathed quality of the text's spiritual meaning, making it (when properly interpreted) infallible for guidance in matters of morality and spiritual growth. This interpretation of Kant's intentions once again confirms the inadequacy of the strict reductionist's view of the supposedly exclusive character of Kant's attitude towards moral religion [see VI. 1-4]. Ward, for example, claims to be expounding Kant's view when he says in Wa72:150-1: 'In so far as they make historical or factual assertions ..., religious doctrines are either superfluous, absurd or even inimical to true morality, since they may lead men to value theo¬ retical beliefs above moral efforts.' Similarly, Webb says 'the historic process itself has 'no philosophical significance' for Kant [We26:149]. While Kant is indeed deeply concerned to prevent theoretical beliefs from overshadowing practical ones, we have seen that he also values history and revealed doctrine as a (philosophically necessary) vehicle for pure religion: naked religion must be clothed if it is to succeed in being universal. Ward describes Kant's position more accurately, therefore, when he makes the more general statement that for Kant 'human history is itself the Divine sacrifice, since it is the incarnation of
VIII. Systemr.c
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practical reason in phenomenal nature' [Wa72:168]. What Ward fails to see is that this attitude is also apparent in Kant's open-mindedness towards (or at least, toleration of) ecclesiastical faith in general. Thus Kant urges that we ought not to mock at religious doctrines, which are only indirectly contrary to morality [i.e., insofar as they advocate the primacy of theoretical reason]; we ought to respect them; for let the religion [i.e., its ecclesiastical vehicle] be what it may, it is still worthy of our respect as a human discipline. Our conduct should tend not to schism but to unity in religion. [Kt35:(l 12)]
Kant's philosophy of religion, then, can be viewed as an Enlightened apologetic for the Christian religion, directed both to unenlightened believers who too readily accepted the tutelage of church authorities over their own inner religion and to his unbelieving co-workers in the Enlightenment who mistak¬ enly took this movement as one that leads people away from religion.50 One of his central concerns is to discover 'how to set about teaching [Christianity] so that it will really be present in the hearts of man' [Kt65:53]; and his verdict is that a person is justified in being religious not in spite of, but because of the principles laid down by the Critical philosophy. In particular, Kant's doctrine of the primacy of practical reason requires that 'the inner light' of true religion not be hidden 'under a bushel' of merely ecclesiastical faith [Kt8:201(189); see
50. Rossi points out that Kant's view of religion is 'by no means "typical" of... Enlightenment thought' [Ro93:57; s.a. Re88:l], for Kt8 appeals to 'elements' [Ro93:58] typically overlooked by interpreters that 'go counter to its putatively "enlightened" flow.' McCarthy likewise remarks that, with Rousseau, 'Kant may be justly credited with philosophically repelling the Enlightenment assault upon Christianity' [Mc82:192], by using their 'fundamentally positive evaluation of religion, of Christianity in particular' [Mc86:55]. Indeed, Kant's 'revalidation of the Christian church on the part of philosophy ... is self-consciously in contrast to the Enlightenment in general' [88-9]. For example [Mc82:199], 'Kant did not find [revelation] a threat to man's dignity, as the Enlightenment itself often did.' Likewise, 'Kant in part tries to save Jesus from the Aufklarer [i.e., the Enlightenment philosophers]' [199]—though McCarthy thinks he fails in this attempt and was mistaken to treat Christianity so seriously [see notes VIII.5,27]. That Kant's Critical System is primarily aimed at curbing the pretensions the Enlightenment, not at challenging the legitimacy of common, unphilosophical thinking, is ignored by those who assume he is merely furthering the Enlightenment project [e.g., Cr94:118; Mi89:260; Tr89:351]. Despland, however, provides ample evidence that this assumption is illegitimate. He reports on the work of Hermann Schmalenbach [De73:3], who 'established that Kant's personal religiousness is not rooted in the Enlightenment.' Later, he states that Kant's System is clearly 'distinct from the thought of the Enlightenment' [80], and specifies that Kant's 'discussion of radical evil ... amount[s] to a repudiation of his "enlightenment" past' [170]. Towards the end of his book [2534], he concludes that Kant 'sensed the enormous significance of... the Enlightenment, but did not simply board the new wagon.' Green affirms this view: 'If a naive optimism about human nature is a characteristic feature of Enlightenment anthropology, Kant clearly violates its spirit' with his doctrine of radical evil [Gg93:7]. And Loades adds that Kant's account of grace was 'extremely offensive to devotees of an enlightenment for whom theism was entirely redundant' [Lo81:307]. Von Schoenborn mentions a point of historical interest that may be of some significance in explaining why and/or how Kant departed from the mainstream in this way: of the philosophers involved in promoting the Enlightenment, 'everyone but Kant belonged' to 'the Masonic commu¬ nity' [Vo91:106; s.a. 103].
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Matt. 5:15]. (We shall examine in X.4 to what extent Kant himself lived out this religious impulse.) Perhaps we can blame, with Webb, 'the dryness of the presentation' in Kt8 for the failure of most interpreters to grasp 'the depth and earnestness of [Kant's] moral sentiment, inspired by which he teaches us that there is no getting around God, as it were, whether by knowledge or by ceremonial.'51 Whatever reason others have had for neglecting Kant's true aim, we must now recognize that he is highly Critical of those who regard Enlight¬ enment as a means of smothering the religious impulse in the depths of the human heart. Rather, the torch of Enlightenment should kindle a fire in one's heart as well as a light in one's mind [see Kt8:179(167)]. Thus we can agree wholeheartedly with Paton when he says: No doubt the moral and religious thought of different ages (including our own) tends to be cluttered up with a lot of extraneous and accidental nonsense; but it is the mark of a great thinker to set aside the nonsense, to get at the core of truth un¬ derneath... This is what Kant attempted to do [Pa67:197].
Kant's approach to religion not only provides a much-needed alternative to the extremes of liberalism and conservatism, but, by authenticating the status of Christianity as the true universal religion, paves the way for a balanced attitude towards evangelism. Thus Kant says in a section of Kt8 entitled 'the Christian religion as a natural religion': 'This religion possesses the prime essential of the true church, namely, the qualification for universality ... To spread i t . . . as a world religion..., there is needed, no doubt, a body of servants... of the invis¬ ible church, but not officials..., in other words, teachers but not dignitaries' [Kt8:157(145)]. Some critics assume Kant is referring here to the spread of his own interpretation of moral religion. Thus Klinke quotes Jachmann's report of how theologians who attended Kant's lectures on philosophical theology went out and 'spread the bright light of intelligent religious belief over the whole of his fatherland' [K152:35]. But I doubt that spreading a philosophical system is quite what Kant had in mind. The Critical evangelist works not by persuading unbelievers about doctri¬ nal truths that concern only ecclesiastical faith, but by living and encouraging others to live a life of devout service to the God of pure religion. The form of ecclesiastical faith adopted by the 'converts' of such an evangelist must be of less concern to the evangelist than the fact that a conversion, a true change of heart, has taken place and is beginning to work itself out in the form of good 5 1 . We26:115. As Moltmann [Mo74:38] aptly notes: 'In practicing the iconoclasm of the Second Commandment, Christian belief and critical Enlightenment share a common cause.' But his de¬ scription of 'Enlightenment' as 'the transition from particular Church beliefs to universal belief in reason' [29], does not apply as unreservedly to Kant as Moltmann claims; for the limits Kant places on reason are intended to call into question his Age's uncritical trust in reason.
VIII. Systemr.c
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life-conduct.52 Kant's own opinion is that 'of all the public religions which have ever existed, the Christian alone is moral' [Kt8:51-2(47)], so most con¬ verts should be able to find an ecclesiastical version of Christianity that can serve as a suitable vehicle. Indeed, 'the seed of the true religious faith... is now being publicly sown in Christendom' [131(122)], so this true form of Chris¬ tianity 'is directly valid for all men, the final revelation by which we must henceforth abide' [Kt65:49]. (Moreover, it 'has the merit of being compatible with the philosophy and all the wisdom of the ancients' [Kt68:953].) Perhaps we would not be going too far, therefore, to conclude that Kant's Critical religion is not only still relevant to both the scholar and the layperson, but also that it can be adopted as a reliable guidepost for the promotion of true Christianity as we enter the third millennium of the 'Christian era'.
52. Thus Kant's theory also provides a philosophical basis for ecumenism. It allows for 'different church sects, but not different religious sects' [see notes VIII.11-12] as long as the former agree on the centrality of promoting pure religion: 'Enlightened Catholics and Protestants, while still holding to their own dogmas, could thus look upon each other as brothers in the faith, while expecting and striving toward this [common religious] end' [Kt65:52; s.a. 61; cf. Kt8:109(100),173n(161n)]. Passages such as this cast considerable doubt on claims such as Crichlow's [Cr96:99], that 'most of [Kant's] anger was aimed at Catholicism.' Indeed, Luther had already taken care of critiquing unreformed Catholicism. Kant seems rather more intent on doing to Luther and Protestantism what Luther had already done to Erasmus and Catholicism [see AIX.l]. Or as Troeltsch puts it, 'Kant did for philosophy what Luther did for religion' [q.i. Ch92:481]. Kant conveys his views on the value of comparing ecclesiastical sects in Kt8:175n (163n): 'All deserve the same respect so far as their forms are the attempts of poor mortals to render perceptible to the senses the kingdom of God on earth, but also the same blame when they take the form of the representation of this idea (in a visible church) to be the thing itself.' This principle can be applied in the same way to the relationship between Jews and Christians [see notes VIII. 12, 29,30], or to any other world religions. Green has shown how this can be done in Gr78:125-246.
Chapter IX A Kantian System of Biblical Theology ... the sciences derive pure benefit from separation, so far as each first consti¬ tutes a whole by itself; and not until they are so constituted should the attempt be made to survey them in combination. Let the Biblical theologian, then, be at one with the philosopher, or let him believe himself to refute him, if only he hears him. [Kt8:10(10)]
'
1. The Biblical Theology of a Kantian Christian Immanuel Kant was not a biblical theologian. To portray him as such would be quite inappropriate. Throughout his many theological reflections he remains a philosopher through and through. Nevertheless, from the fact that Kant himself was not inclined to engage in biblical theology, it does not follow that a Kantian biblical theology cannot be constructed. Indeed, doing so seems quite feasible, in light of the fact that Kant explicitly acknowledges the potential compatibility between his philosophy of religion and a properly circumspect biblical theology [see Kt8:10(10), q.a.]. Such a project could, in fact, provide a much-needed 'pillar' to stand alongside the abstractions of systemr.m in order to support the living faith of orthodox Christian theologians—thus enabling Christians and Kantians to see eye to eye in hopes of becoming 'at one'. Just as Chapters VII-IX of KSP1 reflected the synthetic relationship between the three Critiques (with Kt7 serving as the bridge spanning the gulf between Ktl and Kt4), so also this chapter can be regarded as an attempt to fill in the missing link between systemr_m and systemic—establishing a sturdier theological partnership between the philosopher and the Christian than Kant himself was ever able (or inclined) to build. In Chapter VII we examined Kant's theology from the purely philosophical standpoint of his first 'experiment'. In Chapter VIII we then modulated to the second experiment, examining his theory of Christianity as the universal religion. The remaining task here in Part Three is therefore to determine how far a Kantian Christian (such as I purport to be) can go in constructing an enlightened biblical theology that is consistent with both of these standpoints, as depicted in Figure IX. 1. If successful, such a theology should provide an adequate basis both for ordinary Christians to come to a new and deeper understanding of their own living faith and for nonChristian philosophers to take a new look at a tradition they may have prematurely rejected as philosophically unsound. One of the first descriptions of Kant I ever heard was one made by a col¬ lege professor for whom I had much respect. After giving a general overview
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Kant's system of religious perspectives (Ch.VII) (for any religion, in general)
Universal (natural & learned) religion (Ch.Vffl) (Christianity as a religious faith)
Enlightened biblical theology (Ch.IX) (for Christian faith in particular)
Figure IX.I: Systemr.m and Systemr.s as the 'Pillars' Supporting the Systemr.c 'Bridge' of Kant's philosophy and its theological implications, he came out with the following bombshell: 'No single philosopher', he proclaimed, 'has done more damage to the Christian religion than Immanuel Kant.' This condemnation embedded itself in my memory like a steel beam being dropped from the clouds into a vat of wet cement. Fortunately, when I actually read Kant for myself several years later, the cement had not yet hardened. The present book, as the second volume of Kant's System of Perspectives, can be regarded as an attempt to extract that beam from the collective consciousness of contemporary philosophy of religion and replace it with an interpretive structure that accords more fully with Kant's own views. With this in mind, the foregoing eight chapters may be regarded to some extent as a refutation of that professor's (quite conventional) claim.1 For in one sense we have now completed our study of Kant's philosophy of religion, having demonstrated that it is far from being the antimetaphysical bombshell it has often been taken to be. However, in another sense, we have not yet fully answered the questions posed in the first paragraph of I.I. This is actually just as it should be. For the ninth step in Kant's architectonic logic (a pattern I am endeavoring to follow in the very outline of this work [see note 1.21]) always requires a shift into the empirical perspective before the topic under consid¬ eration can be regarded as fully explained as a concrete reality in human 1 • My intent to refute his claim was first announced in Pa89.
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experience. Likewise, just as the fourth stage (steps 10-12) in each of Kant's systems always modulates from the empirical to the hypothetical perspective in order to discern the goal or purpose of the reality established in step nine, so also Part Four of this volume will present a detailed examination of many hints Kant provides to the effect that the true aim of organized religion should be to breathe life into the hypothetical goal of making religious experience possible. What, then, has Kant left for the biblical theologian to say? Certainly not as much or in as dogmatic a tone as many biblical theologians in the past have believed their task demands. For the limits established by Kant's System of Perspectives require us to adopt a humble stance that is not always exemplified by biblical theologians who see themselves as expositors of God's revealed Word. With this in mind, I shall begin with a confession. When a new acquain¬ tance asks me whether or not I am a Christian, I sometimes answer 'I hope so' or 'I want to be, in my heart'. Such a response is not an attempt to dodge the question, nor should it be interpreted as a sad sign of the corrupting influence of philosophy on the firmness of my religious convictions.2 Rather, it represents the only kind of reply I believe is consistent with biblical principles: viewing 'Christian' as an ideal type rather than as a word describing member¬ ship in a particular historical faith, I express by such a reply my reluctance to claim to possess any special knowledge of the judgments of God concerning my life's conformity to that ideal.3 If pressed, I explain that I do participate in the activities of a local church and that I believe most of the dogmas Christians are 'supposed' to believe—though often with interpretations that are somewhat unconventional. In light of this confession, I hope it will not seem too presump¬ tuous of me to adopt in this chapter the Perspective of the biblical theologian, even though I am actually more of a philosopher at heart.4 The first point to be made is that the biblical theologian adopts a Perspec¬ tive that is clearly distinct from that of the Critical philosopher. Whereas Kant's Copernican Perspective on religion requires us to regard morality as the core of true religion and worship as an optional 'extra', the Perspective typically adopted by biblical writers assumes exactly the opposite order. This is, in fact, the main reason Kantian philosophy and biblical theology have been regarded 2. Actually, I developed this habit long before I began my formal study of Kant. Like most of the content of this chapter, I drew it from my prior understanding of what the Bible itself demands, and only later came to appreciate the consistency of that demand with Kant's System. 3. That such reluctance is consistent with biblical teaching is suggested by numerous passages, such as: ' "For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways," declares the LORD. "As the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than your thoughts.'" [Is. 55:8-9; s.a. 1 Sam. 16:7; Matt. 25:31-46; etc.]. 4. Although the nature of my books and articles make me a philosopher de facto, my higher education (one degree in Religious Studies and one in Theology) makes me a theologian de juris.
!
IX. Systemr.s
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by so many as irreconcilably opposed. However, once we recognize the perspectival nature of such an opposition, as suggested by Kant's own references to the two sides as neighboring 'province[s]', each with its own distinctive 'economy' [see Kt8:9-11(8-10)], the prospect of reconciling them becomes far more plausible. The key difference here is that the biblical theologian is not concerned with the rational justification of worship (for this is a philosophical issue that requires us to adopt Kant's Copernican Perspective), but with worship as a lived experience (thus assuming what I referred to as the 'Empirical Perspective' in KSP1:II.4—i.e., the 'ordinary', nonscientific way of viewing life adopted by a typical human being). Both are valid, each in its own context and to serve its own distinct purposes. Despite the need for philosophers to regard the speculative options posed in stage four of systemic as illegitimate, biblical theologians are therefore permitted to defend their legit¬ imacy, insofar as we concern ourselves with understanding the role of worship in our religious experience. The direct opposition between the overarching Perspective of the biblical theologian and that of the Critical philosopher does not render them incompatible, but merely calls attention to what Kant regards as a healthy 'conflict' [see VIII. 1] that can serve to keep both philosophers and theologians from adopting unbalanced positions.5 In accordance with the reversal assumed by the Perspective of the biblical theologian, we shall consider the basic elements of a biblical theology in the opposite order we would expect to see from Kant. Whereas systemr.m begins with individual evil and the struggle with good and proceeds from there to the need for a social organization that can provide the context for each person's religious service, the biblical theologian quite rightly begins with worship and fellowship and proceeds from there to the individual's beliefs and practices. With this in mind, I shall organize my exposition around a set of principles derived from two passages commonly regarded as among the most important teachings of Jesus: the twofold 'greatest commandment' (i.e., love God and love your fellow human beings) and the twofold 'great commission' (i.e., make disciples and teach them to obey God's commands). The standard texts for these basic principles of biblical theology are as follows:
5. See Kt65:22-4. In Ha96 Hare likewise tries to show that, although Kt8 consists largely of Kant's attempts to translate Christian doctrines into their equivalents for practical reason, 'Kant does not mean us to conclude that we should believe in the doctrines only in their translated form' [35]. Indeed, Hare is 'convinced that [Kant] continued to believe in the central doctrines he was brought up with' [38]. Yet he concludes that 'Kant's project fails at certain key points' [35]. This conclu¬ sion is due more to Hare's own lack of an adequately perspectival interpretation [see note VIII.4] than to inadequacies in Kant's own position. For a detailed summary of and response to Ha96, see PaOOb.
250
PART THREE: CRITICAL RELIGION The greatest commandment [Matt.22:35-40; s.a. Mk. 12:28-34; Lk. 10:25-8]: One of them, an expert in the law, tested him with this question: 'Teacher, which is the greatest commandment in the Law?' Jesus replied: ' "Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind." This is the first and greatest commandment. And the second is like it: "Love your neighbor as yourself." All the Law and the Prophets hang on these two commandments.' The great commission [Matt. 28:16-20]: Then the eleven disciples went to Galilee, to the mountain where Jesus had told them to go. When they saw him, they worshipped him; but some doubted. Then Jesus came to them and said, 'All authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me. Therefore go and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and teaching them to obey everything I have commanded you. And surely I am with you always, to the very end of the age.'
The outline for the next two sections will be based on the four principles that can be derived from these two passages of Scripture, as shown below: love God (individual, practice)
love human beings (communal, practice)
'X
teach/learn obedience (communal, belief)
baptize isciples (individual, belief)
Figure IX.2: Four Cornerstones of Biblical Theology Just as the greatest commandment contains within it a pair of equally important guidelines for Christian practice (to love God and others), so also the great commission sets out two basic focal points for Christian belief (making new converts and teaching them to obey God's word). Figure IX.2 therefore depicts the four resulting 'cornerstones' as a 2LAR, distinguishing each principle as either individual or communal in its focus. In the second and third sections of this chapter (each itself divided into two subsections, as is the case for each chapter in Part Three, both in this volume and in KSP1), we shall proceed counterclockwise around this map. This reversal of the direction we have used for the standard maps outlining Kant's various philosophical systems repre-
IX. Systemr.s
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sents the biblical theologian's quite appropriate need to adopt a Perspective that is opposite to the Copernican Perspective. A final word is in order before I begin elaborating the basic elements of a Kantian biblical theology based on this outline. The next two sections, unlike any others in this book, are addressed directly to Christian readers—especially to theologians, pastors, and educated lay leaders—who wish to gain a deeper or clearer understanding of how the Bible itself establishes a distinct Perspec¬ tive that is capable of holding its own even against such a formidable opponent (i.e., partner-in-dialogue) as Kant.6 In particular, IX.2-3 is for those who already regard the Bible as their most fundamental and reliable guide for living, yet find themselves unsure as to whether their biblical faith can be reconciled with a Kantian philosophical stance. I therefore recommend that non-Christian readers either skip now to IX.4, where I return to my normal practice of ad¬ dressing the general philosophical reader, or else read on with the understand¬ ing that by engaging in such voyeurism they run the risk of being converted.7 2. Christian Practice: The Greatest Commandment A. Worship and the Love of God How can we, as practicing Christians, formulate a biblical theology that remains rooted in our tradition (broadly conceived), yet conforms to the austere 6. I hope some day, should God grant me a sufficiently long life, to publish a more thorough and detailed elaboration of biblical theology than the one sketched here in IX.2-3, tentatively under the title: A Philosopher's Commentary on the Bible. Kant accepts the ordinary Christian's view that Christianity is to a large extent a tradition that is founded on a book, the Bible [Kt8:106-7(97-8)]. For this reason, even though many modern liberal theologians treat the Bible as nothing but an ordinary book, to be analyzed with the same tools used to analyze any other historical or literary documents, we can safely treat it as the sole authoritative source for constructing a biblical theology, without needing to worry that such a usage might conflict with Kant's Critical religion. In the next two sections I shall therefore treat the Bible more in the way the ordinary Christian treats it than in the way biblical scholars often treat it. In so doing I recognize that I shall inevitably run into numerous hermeneutical difficulties, most of which cannot be resolved in any definitive way at this point. Exegetical questions, especially those relating to the text's original language, authorship, historical background, authenticity of Jesus' reported words, etc., will not be raised. Such questions, though highly relevant to a proper theological analysis of any given text, are often so complex as to be virtually unmanageable in the context of a Christian's attempt to respond from within the tradition to a philosophical critique. Hence, the biblical text will be taken at 'face value', even though the best way to do this is, admittedly, never a matter of universal agreement among Christians. 7. I intend this comment not facetiously, but in all seriousness. Objections to religious faith are typically based on misconceptions or caricatures of what a particular religion or religious belief is actually like. While the convinced unbeliever will not find it difficult to find confirmations of such objections in most churches, this is no basis for rejecting the validity of an entire tradition. A tradition ought to be accepted or rejected on the basis of its highest exemplars, not on the basis of its worst perversions. Readers who already know that nothing will convince them to believe therefore might as well skip IX.2-3. These sections are intended for those who wish to understand Christianity from within; readers without religious commitments should read them only if they are willing to suspend their unbelief temporarily, hypothetically adopting a Christian Perspective.
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requirements set out by Kant's philosophical System (especially system r . m )? Perhaps the first and most important issue to tackle, before this question can be answered, is the problem of knowledge. Our tradition teaches us to affirm various truth-claims about God as if they constitute items of knowledge, with a level of certainty that justifies us in persuading others to do likewise; Kant claims, by contrast, that no religious truth can ever obtain the kind of objective certainty conveyed by the sciences. I suggest that, instead of immediately giving up all hope of reconciling these two Perspectives, we should first explore to what extent we can follow Kant's recommendations without giving up our core Christian beliefs. In this instance, the minimum requirement for remaining 'Kantian' is to be willing to 'deny knowledge in order to make room for faith' [Ktl:xxx]. With this in mind, let us resist the temptation to begin our theology with knowledge-claims and follow instead the Kantian conviction that practice has primacy over theory. Kant, it seems, would also want us to stipulate that religious knowledge-claims have and can only ever hope to have subjective certainty. Whether or not this is sufficient for Christian belief is a question we shall deal with in IX.3.A. For now let it suffice for us to follow Kant's proposal, innocent enough on the face of it, that we begin with issues relating to practice rather than knowledge. Jesus, in the first of the two passages quoted near the end of IX. 1, unam¬ biguously expresses the core principle for all Christian practice: in our every act and abstention our aim should be to love God. Whereas philosophical theology (at least, in Kant's version) begins with an assessment of the value of theoreti¬ cal arguments for and against God's existence, biblical theology cuts through such intellectual arguments, and focuses immediately on the heart. The fact that Kant does not do this does not make him anti-Christian; it is simply the proper result of the Perspective he adopts—philosophical rather than biblical theology. The question facing us, then, is: can a person consistently accept both the core Kantian agnosticism with respect to the power of theoretical argumentation [see AIV] and the core religious challenge to love God? I believe the answer is yes. An anti-Kantian Christian opponent might argue that loving God presupposes a belief in God's existence, which Kantian agnosticism disallows. But this is not fair to Kant. His negative assessment of the traditional proofs does not disallow belief in God [see IV.1-4]; it only disallows a person's claim to have empirical knowledge (on a level with science) that God exists. A biblical theology that begins with a humble affirmation of our need to love God—rather than with a proud affirmation of the truths contained in an inerrant Bible—need require nothing more than that a person be able to believe in God on the basis of a subjective conviction. And this requirement is not only
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consistent with Kant's philosophical theology; it is explicitly sanctioned therein [see e.g., Ktl:857]. The effect of making love of God the starting-point of one's theology (as Jesus himself apparently did) is to disarm all claims to a theology based on the cold calculations of confident knowledge-claims. Sadly, all too many Christian do begin their theology in the latter way, with dogmatic claims about the propositional revelation contained in the Bible. The problem with this approach is that, whereas it mimics the proof-hungry tendencies of pre-Kantian philosophical theology, it has little if any justification from within the Bible itself. It is, in fact, not a form of biblical theology at all, but a form of philosophical theology that directly conflicts with Kant's. Loving God, by contrast, is a theme that runs like a golden thread throughout the Bible, from beginning to end. As such, it forms the proper basis for a genuinely biblical theology, a basis that nicely complements Kant's philosophical reflections. Whenever we declare our love for another person, we make ourselves vul¬ nerable. To confess love is to risk rejection, to risk being put into an embarrass¬ ing situation, to be made out as the fool. When as Christians we proclaim our love for God, we should not expect the situation to be any different. If a person's love of God could be based on theoretical proofs that God exists, or on any other empirical evidence that justifies a knowledge-claim, then the element of risk that characterizes all love would be removed; a person's relationship with God under such conditions would be something less than pure love. An authentically biblical theology, by contrast, justifies the 'love God' principle by rejecting the tendency to regard it as a dogmatic command [Deut. 6:5], and placing it instead in the context of God's own commitment to love human beings.8 In other words, we should regard the 'love God' com¬ mand as posing a question to each human individual: are you willing to respond to God's love by entering into a relationship! The theological term that best describes the practice of proclaiming our love for God, as a response to God's initial outpouring of love to us, is worship [see e.g., Ex. 34:6-8]. In the Psalms, for example, God's love for us is consis¬ tently cited as a focal point for our worship,9 and our worship is a first indica¬ tion that we love God in response [Ps. 70:4]. Likewise, pur response to Jesus is to be one of love [Jn. 8:42; 16:27] because he is himself both the perfect hu¬ man recipient of God's love [2 Pet. 1:17] and the highest expression of divine love for us.10 As we shall see in IX.2.B, this leads directly to the second half 8. Deut. 7:9,12; s.a. 23:5; 1 Kgs. 8:23; 10:9; 2 Chr. 6:14; 9:8; Neh. 1:5; Joel 2:13; Zeph. 3:17; 1 Jn. 3:1. 9. See Ps. 48:9; 52:8-9; 59:17; 66:20; 69:13; 86:15; 98:3f; 136:1-26; 144:1-2. 10. See Jn. 3:16; 16:27; Rom. 5:8; 8:39; Gal. 2:20; Eph. 2:4-5; 3:17-9; 2 Ths. 2:16; Tit. 3:4-6.
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of the greatest commandment, that we are to let the love God has poured into our hearts through the infilling of the Holy Spirit [Rom. 5:5; 15:30] spill over into our relationships with each other: 'We love [each other] because he first loved us'.11 Jesus' own self-sacrifice, being the ultimate expression of God's love, is therefore an example of how we ought to treat each other [Eph. 5:1-2]. Worship is the true core of a biblical theology that can coexist with and even complement a Kantian philosophical theology. This may sound surprising at first, since Kant himself (i.e., Kant's philosophical theology) treats worship as a mere by-product of genuine rational religion. What is crucial to recall here is that, by treating it in this way, Kant is not at all intending to portray worship as essentially anti-religious. Whereas it is not to be regarded as an essential feature of our thought about (our rational conception of) God and religion, because of how easily an exclusive attention to worship can eclipse the moral outworking of the religious life, Kant does allow that it can have a very impor¬ tant enhancing effect on other, indispensable elements of rational religion. All the biblical theologian need add to this, in order to make it acceptable for Christians, is that what is an optional extra from the philosophical Perspective is the essential starting point from the biblical Perspective. This conflict need not be regarded as a contradiction that demands an exclusive choice; it can in¬ stead be regarded as a creative opposition, one wherein each side simultaneous¬ ly enhances the other side's desirability while protecting the religious person from going astray. Kant's tendency to downplay the role of worship and to warn against the possibility of it standing in the way of truly rational religious practice (i.e., good life-conduct) is directed towards a misuse of worship—worship taken as in itself well-pleasing to God. The Bible itself rejects this kind of over-emphasis on a perverted form of worship, based as it is on the notion that people can please God merely by uttering words of praise and adoration.12 Genuine wor¬ ship is a posture to be adopted throughout every moment of one's life, not just as a formal part of a 'worship service'—though church meetings should rightly begin with and be acts of worship. By taking into consideration the Bible's many admonitions regarding the dangers of false worship [see note IX. 12], 11. 1 Jn. 4:19; s.a. 4:7-5:3 and 1 Ths. 4:9; 1 Pet. 2:17. 12. The most obvious passage is Isaiah 29:13, later quoted by Jesus [Matt. 15:7-9; Mk. 7:6-8]. A similar caution regarding nonverbal worship (i.e., sacrificial offerings) comes in Hosea 6:6, which Jesus quotes on more than one occasion [see Matt. 9:13 and 12:7]. Numerous other passages also warn against various misuses of worship [see e.g., Col. 2:16-23 and Heb. 10:1-2]. The tradition that portrays Satan as having originally been the worship leader in heaven (based on a symbolic interpretation of passages such as Ez. 26:13) is not without significance here. For false worship or a false dependence on worship—paying lip service to God without actually doing God's will [see e.g., Matt. 21:28-31]—is the pseudo-religious fruit, if not the root, of all evil.
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theologians can promote a view of worship that will be less susceptible to misuse, while at the same time being fully compatible with Kant's conception of what constitutes genuine religious practice. Appendix VIII demonstrates how Kant's position leaves plenty of room for such a biblical theology of worship, by examining in detail Kant's philosophy of prayer—something most interpreters either ignore or grossly misinterpret. Putting worship and love of God at the center of our biblical theology raises a potential incompatibility between Kant and Christianity. Whereas Kant insists '[tjhere are no special duties to God',13 Christians tend to regard the greatest commandment and the great commission as among the most important of many biblical commands that define specific duties to God. The key to resolving this difficulty is to recognize that love cannot literally be commanded. To 'love' another merely out of duty, as an obedient response to being told that we must love, would not really be loving at all. 'Loving' God is a farce if we view it as a duty that must be fulfilled; genuine love is a freely chosen response of the heart to the love God has first demonstrated to us. The latter is an invita¬ tion to join in a committed relationship, not a command that must be obeyed. Our acceptance or rejection of the offer has nothing to do with our degree of moral goodness or badness; for devotion is not a moral issue, but a personal one—a desire to be with God. Jesus' response to the lawyer in Matthew 22 is therefore essentially (perhaps intentionally) paradoxical: the 'greatest command¬ ment' is the genuinely ultimate 'command' that cannot actually be commanded. This insight raises yet another potential difficulty for the Kantian Christian. I began this section by claiming a biblical theology that begins with love is thereby consistent with Kant's advice to give primacy to the practical over the theoretical. But if loving God is not to be regarded as a duty to God, or a moral command to be obeyed, then in what sense can we call this 'practical', given the fact that Kant associates this term directly with morality? As Christians, we can respond to this by pointing out that the Bible portrays love as intimately bound up with obedience to the moral laws God does command.14 Kant's philosophical theology shares a significant common emphasis with the Bible in this respect: both are acutely aware of the danger of performing nonmoral actions as an excuse for not fulfilling one's legitimate human duties. Just as 13. Kt8:154n(142n). Having no duties to God does not mean we can simply ignore God. Rather, it means the attention we give God must not be based on an attempt to 'repay' our debt [Re84:51]: 'Our relationship with God cannot be squared away, like a social obligation waiting to be satisfied.' In Kt6:486-91 Kant clarifies that religious duties to God (if any) lie beyond the bounds of reason. 14. Perhaps the most straightforward example comes in John 14:15, where Jesus says: 'If you love me, you will obey what I command.' See also Deut. 10:12; 11:1,13,22; 13:3-4; 19:9; 30:6,8,16; Josh. 22:5; Neh. 1:5; 9:32; Dan. 9:4; Hos. 12:6; Jn. 21:15-7; 2 Cor. 13:11; 1 Jn. 3:10; 5:3.
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Kant rejects the religious value of any nonmoral actions that fail to promote the moral core of rational religion [see VII.3.B and VIII.3.B], so also biblical writers condemn those who worship or profess to love God but do not govern justly, care about social problems, love other human beings, etc.15 Jesus' point in saying all other commands (duties) 'hinge' on the ultimate principle of love is that legalistic obedience, without love, is of no religious value. This seems quite compatible with Kant's conviction [see VI.4] that morality must be raised to the religious level (i.e., duties must be 'hinged' to an awareness of God) in order for our good life-conduct to be of any ultimate significance. The difference between Kantian and Christian theology at this point is merely one of emphasis. For Kant, concerned as he is with the rational justification of religion, the love of God as expressed in the performance of nonmoral actions directed towards God is strictly optional: it can be justified only if it promotes moral obedience. For biblical Christians, concerned as we are with living the life of religion, a genuine love of God is indispensable, while a rational justification of our faith is strictly optional. The common denominator here is that both Perspectives agree that a genuinely religious person must seek to obey the moral law, but that such obedience on its own is not self-sufficient. Kant writes little about love because his focus is properly on the rational, not on the mysterious. But he never denies that mystery has a legitimate role to play in human life, including religion. If there were a text in Kant's writings saying something like 'love of God is a farce and always does damage to a genuine religion' or a biblical text saying something like 'God has rejected you because you have not sung his praises loudly enough, read his Scripture thoroughly enough, or attended church regularly enough', then the task of this chapter would have to be given up as hopeless. But we find no such extreme claims in either case.16 Instead, both affirm the primacy of the practical for the religious believer, but from two different Perspectives: Kant as a rational requirement of the moral law; the Bible as a demonstration of our love of God. I see no reason for regarding these as mutually exclusive alternatives
15. See e.g., Ez. 33:12-6,31; Am. 5:21-4; Mic. 6:6-8; Matt. 25:31-46; and 1 Jn. 4:7-21. 16. Admittedly, the Bible's innumerable exhortations to worship God do typically promise blessings to those who comply and warn that those who worship false gods will be punished [see e.g., Deut. 8:19; 11:16; 30:17-8; 1 Kgs. 9:6-7]. However, whenever a reason is given for such punishments, it is always that evil practices result from false worship [e.g., Ex. 23:24,33; 34:14-6], including such moral atrocities as child sacrifice [Deut. 12:31]. Worship is encouraged because it leads directly to good life-conduct: the first commandment leads to the other nine. Thus, for example, Jehu is praised in 2 Kings 10:27-31 for putting a stop to Baal worship, yet he is still punished because he does not turn away from the sins that had arisen out of that worship. This illustrates the point I wish to make here: that we must interpret the Bible's exhortations to worship in light of its clear (Kantian!) warnings against regarding mere worship as pleasing to God.
'
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rather than complementary Perspectives. To place the practice of worship and prayer [see AVTfl] at the very center of our biblical theology does not require us, I believe, to deny Kant's claim that they are rationally peripheral. Rather, it simply requires us to recognize that Kant is adopting the philosopher's reflective Perspective in order to analyze and explain the purpose for being religious, whereas biblical writers expect us to adopt the believer's existential Perspective in order to learn how to be religious. To treat both of these Perspectives as legitimate does require some tolerance for paradox. Logically, we would expect worship either to be the center of true religion, or to be peripheral. Yet Christians know from experience that the power to become a better person comes as a gift—a gift of grace that can be received only by those who are willing to open up a spiritual channel to hear God's loving voice. So philosophically, Kant is right: prayer and worship can be destructive to true religion if used as an excuse to avoid one's responsibility for self-improvement, morality being the rational 'core' (or end) towards the realization of which such meditative disciplines ought to aim. Yet existentially, Christians are right: prayer and worship are essential elements in the central core of true religion, because without engaging in such spiritual disciplines, the voice of God cannot be heard (or at least, heard clearly) by the moral agent. By recognizing both of these Perspectives as valid, the Kantian Christian can treat spirituality and moral goodness as the two points that together form the central foci of true religion. This admittedly 'irrational' (or supra-rational) supplement to Kant's sys¬ tem of religion provides a means of solving what is potentially one of the most difficult problems for Kant's moral theory (and so also, for his philosophy of religion). Kant's practical system assumes we all have direct awareness of the moral law. Yet this 'fact' would be denied by many people nowadays, espe¬ cially nonreligious individuals. Many, if not most people simply do not have a clear sense of what their conscience is telling them when facing real moral choices. The reason for this, a Kantian Christian can respond, is that most people (even many religious believers) do not treat prayer and worship serious¬ ly enough to allow it to open up the channel of communication that makes possible a clear apprehension of the moral law. Kant sometimes writes as if thinking rationally is all that is needed in order to apprehend the moral law. But for most people, something more is needed. Kant does not seem to appreciate fully how much his early training in religious disciplines [see X.4] influenced his subsequent ability to have such easy access to this part of his rational capacity. The point is that people without a clear apprehension of the moral law need to put spiritual disciplines such as prayer and worship at the center of their
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religious life, so biblical theology properly begins at this point. The above considerations provide ample justification for concluding that, although a biblical theology (systemr.s) centered on worship (loving God) takes a starting point virtually opposite to Kant's version of systemr.m, the two are nevertheless highly complementary. In terms of the Copernican revolution we can, in fact, see these two Perspectives on theology as mutually solving various problems for each other that could otherwise prove to be insurmountable. We can now begin to see that, far from doing away with all biblical theology, systemr.m serves as its philosophical foundation, much as transcendental idealism serves as the philosophical foundation for empirical realism in systemt. With this in mind, let us therefore proceed to examine the compatibility between a Kantian outlook and the second aspect of Jesus' core theology. B. Fellowship and the Love of Human Beings Luke's version of the greatest commandment highlights the second half, 'Love your neighbor as yourself [Lk. 10:27] by having the conversation between Jesus and the 'expert in the law' [10:25] continue beyond Jesus' initial reply. When the lawyer asks 'And who is my neighbor?' [10:29], Jesus replies with the parable of the Good Samaritan [10:30-7]. The fact that Jesus chooses a Samaritan as the hero of the parable may suggest that he wishes to portray the 'love God' command not as a legalistic duty but as a free choice. (Samaritans had a different tradition regarding how and where God ought to be worshipped; if loving God were a duty whose performance could be legislated, as the Jews had tried to do, then a Samaritan could not be used as an example of genuine love.) The parable illustrates how one who genuinely loves God will break free from a narrow conception of one's duty to other human beings, to the point of treating an alien as one would normally treat one's neighbor or close friend [cf. Lev. 19:34]. This story provides a model of the self-sacrificial love required by the second basic component of a Kantian biblical theology. Helping others is important not only as a way of putting the 'love your neighbor' command into practice, but also as a way of showing love to God [Heb. 6:10]. When the love of God is in us, it fills us with the desire to 'share our lives' [1 Ths. 2:8], including our material possessions [1 Jn. 3:17], with others. Jesus himself says in John 13:35: '"By this all men will know that you are my disciples, if you love one another."' (The same sentiments are related in 1 John 4:7f.) Fellowship, regarded as love for all who genuinely love God (not only those who attend the same visible church), has such a high position in biblical theology because it provides empirical evidence of our love for God. In Christian tradition self-sacrificial love is made possible and demonstrated
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in its ideal form by the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. 'This is how we know what love is: Jesus Christ laid down his life for us. And we ought to lay down our lives for our brothers' [1 Jn. 3:16]. Worship at its highest is a created being's submission to a transcendent Creator who is mysteriously im¬ manent. Regarded as the Christ, Jesus is the ideal expression of this paradoxi¬ cal union of the creature and the Creator, of immanence and transcendence, of humanity and God. The mystical oneness of all creation in Christ, the Godman, makes him the link between the two parts of the greatest commandment. Kant, of course, was very careful not to include anything in his philosophical theology that could not be verified as universally valid for all rational beings, so he does not speak of Christ in such openly speculative ways. Nevertheless, we would be quite wrong to accuse Kant of being antagonistic towards faith in Christ as the way to a deeper understanding of how love is to be put into prac¬ tice in the church (which properly calls itself the invisible 'body of Christ'). On the contrary, we have already seen ample evidence of his deep respect towards Jesus, both as a teacher and as the embodiment of the archetype of perfect humanity [see VII.2.B and VIII.2.B]. This evidence will be confirmed at the end of this volume [XII.4], where we shall see Kant treating the idea of Christ, the God-man, as the highest principle of transcendental philosophy. For now it will suffice to note that Kant seems to have viewed Jesus not only as a 'wise Teacher' [Kt8:84 (78)], but as the perfect philosopher.17 For in the chapter on the nature of architectonic towards the end of Ktl Kant says [866-7] the genuine, 'cosmic' concept of philosophy (i.e., philosophy as relat¬ ing 'all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason') is 'personified and its archetype represented in the ideal philosopher.' The fact that Kant uses the same term here that he later uses when discussing the nature of Jesus in Book Two of Kt8 (i.e., 'archetype') suggests (albeit, obscurely) that he may be alluding to Jesus. Thus, he goes on to speak of 'the teacher in the ideal' [867], who 'nowhere exists', yet who sets the tasks for all other human intellectual pursuits and 'employs [scholars in other fields] as instruments, to further the essential ends of human reason.' Kant then argues that these ends, being 'the whole vocation of man', are the subject-matter of 'moral philosophy'. When we turn to his writings on moral philosophy, we discover that Kant regards se//-love as the primary threat to moral goodness [Kt4:22,36,73-5,85-6; Kt5:
17. Similarly, McCarthy [Mc86:82n] says 'for Kant Jesus is a superphilosopher rather than a god.' But the 'rather than' here is very misleading. Kant's position is that reason does not justify us in regarding Jesus as God, but it does not prevent us from doing so either. As Kantian Christians we are therefore permitted to view Jesus as both God and the perfect human philosopher, provided we distinguish carefully between the Perspectives appropriate to these two conclusions.
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401n,406-7,422], so his willingness to attribute such a high philosophical stature to Jesus, who both taught and epitomized self-giving love, should come as no surprise. Although Kant does not put much emphasis on love as a moral principle, he does occasionally call attention to the close connection between the categori¬ cal imperative and Jesus' love command.18 For instance, he says this 'kernel of all laws ... presents the moral disposition in its complete perfection,... as an ideal of holiness' or 'an archetype which we should strive to approach' [Kt4: 83]. But it can be viewed in this way only as long as we see it as a command (i.e., as 'practical love') and therefore (because inclinations cannot be com¬ manded) as not requiring 'love to God as inclination (pathological love)'. Insofar as love of God or neighbor is viewed as a sentimental feeling or affec¬ tion, Kant warns, actions based on love—'beautiful' though they may be [82]—lose their moral worth.19 Kant's most extensive treatment of love as a practical principle comes in Kt6, where he defines it in terms of 'benevolence' —i.e., our duty to work towards the happiness of others [393]—and carefully distinguishes it from love as a feeling.20 He draws an interesting analogy 18. SeeKt4:82-6; Kt5:399; Kt6:45O-2. Astudent once told Kant [Be63:x]: 'If Jesus could have heard your lectures on ethics, I think He would have said, "That is what I meant by the love of God."' Likewise, Paton defends Kant as having expressed, at least implicitly, the core meaning of the Christian doc¬ trine of 'agape' love [Pa67:196]: 'Kant is very much nearer to that original doctrine than is com¬ monly supposed.' Elsewhere [57n] Paton paraphrases the view Kant later develops in Kt31:388: 'the nature of love is necessary to make up for the imperfection of human nature and ... without the assistance of this motive we could not in fact count very much on the motive of duty. Perhaps Kant was mellowing with old age.' Perhaps. Or perhaps by 1794 the standpoint he was elaborating had shifted from the practical to the judicial. Thus he views 'love as the free reception of the will of an¬ other person into one's own maxims' [82]. That this definition goes beyond purely moral concerns becomes clear when we contrast it with Kant's earlier definition (from the late 1770s [Kt35:(36)]): 'To love God is to do as He commands with a willing heart.' And 'we love God', he later adds [(97)], 'only for His goodwill towards us.' From the practical standpoint, the important thing about loving God is that it encourages us to do our duty; from the judicial (religious) standpoint, the important thing is that our willing heart makes the experience wonderful. 19. After discussing this passage in Wh90:61-2, White calls Kant's account of love 'frankly silly' [64]. He prefers the (very similar) account in Kt6:450, where Kant interprets neighbor-love as 'the duty to make others' ends my own (provided only that these are not immoral).' In order to distance Christian love from Kant's interpretation in Kt4, White claims that in 1 Corinthians 13 Paul 'is clearly describing love in such terms that it does not lie in Man's power whether he loves or not' [Wh90:66]. But I disagree. Paul's whole aim is to encourage us to do just that, to 'put on love' [Col. 3:14]! White's key point [71] is that 'we have to do what Luther did and dethrone the concept of merit from the centre of our moral thinking.' He obviously thinks Kant failed to do this. Yet Kant specifically refers to the inappropriateness of attaching the concept of merit to moral actions in precisely those passages that warn against a sentimental interpretation of the love command [see Kt4:85,159]. Kant's counter-claim would be that Luther went too far, throwing out the 'baby' of worthiness to receive God's grace with the proverbial 'bathwater' of our inevitable lack of moral merit [cf. AVI.4]. Kant's position, by contrast, strikes a healthy balance: striving to obey the love command does not enable us to earn our way to heaven; but it does make us worthy to receive a divine gift to supplement what we are unable to do ourselves. 20. Kt6:401-2,448-52. WhenKantsays love as afeeling is 'beautiful' [e.g., Kt4:82], he is not speaking
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between the forces of attraction and repulsion in nature and the forces of love and respect in the moral realm.21 But he refers directly to the biblical command only in order to explain the 'as yourself clause: 'This does not mean that I am thereby under obligation to love myself (for this happens unavoidably ...); it means instead that lawgiving reason ... includes the whole species (and so myself as well) in its Idea of humanity' [451]. Only in Kt8 does Kant provide a text-based account of the correlation be¬ tween the biblical teachings on love and his own understanding of the moral law. Having made numerous passing references to the role of love in morality and/or religion22—as when, alluding to the biblical notion that joy is a fruit of love [Gal. 5:22; Phil. 2:2; Phlm. 7], he says 'a love for the good' is a key indi¬ cator of a good disposition and results in 'a joyous frame of mind' [Kt8:24n (19n)]—Kant devotes several pages of Book Four to an interpretation of Matthew's Gospel. When he comes to the love command [160(148)], he inter¬ prets the first part to mean '[p]erform your duty for no motive other than un¬ conditional esteem for duty itself and the second to mean 'further [everyone's] welfare from good-will that is immediate and not derived from motives of selfadvantage.' Earlier he had explained that the religious equivalent of the idea of 'loveof the [moral] law' is the 'article of faith, "God is love'" [146(136)]. Kant justifies this by relating it to the Trinity: God''s fatherly love approves of human facetiously. On the contrary, he is associating this form of love with the judicial standpoint. Thus, as Paton says, Kant believes 'actions which spring from such motives' as love can have 'a certain aesthetic value. It is, he says, very beautiful to do good to men out of love and sympathy' [Pa67:54]. Kant aptly describes this judicial standpoint on love when he contrasts 'human love' with 'sexual love' in Kt35:(163): 'Human love is good will, affection, promoting the happiness of others and finding joy in their happiness.' Later he adds [(192)]: 'Love is good-will from inclina¬ tion.' Insofar as it synthesizes the moral and judicial standpoints, love drives us close to the very heart of Kant's System. Whether love could actually supersede respect for duty as a motive for action is an issue that could give rise to considerable debate between philosophical and biblical theologians [see e.g., IX.3.B]. Kant comes down firmly on the side of respect when he claims that, if nobody ever performed acts of love but everyone was careful always to respect other people's rights, then 'there would be no [man-made] misery in the world' [Kt35:(194-5)]; if, on the other hand, everyone always acted out of love, nobody would care about rights, with the result that inclination would rule over reason 'and men would not trouble to earn but would rely on the charity of their fellows.' A thorough critique of this interesting yet shortsighted conclusion is beyond the scope of this volume, though I plan to include a fuller treatment of Kant's views on love in KSP4. For now, let it suffice to say that Kant has inappropriately conflated 'inclination' and 'feeling'. 2 1 . 'The principle of mutual love admonishes men constantly to come closer to one another; that of the respect they owe one another, to keep themselves at a distance from one another' [Kt6:449]. They can 'exist separately' [447], yet 'they are basically always united by the law into one duty, only in such away that now one duty andnow the other is the subject's principle, with the other joined to it as an accessory.' The same tension applies to our relation to God [488]. As Kant says in Kt31:337-8: 'without respect there is no true love.' (S.a. Ktl6:183-4 on 'love and lovelessness'.) 22. References to self-love are especially frequent in Kt8's Book One [see 26-7(22),30(26),36(31-2), 42(37),45(41),48(44)], for 'self-love ... is the very source of evil' [45(41)]. Love as a positive principle is mentioned and/or discussed at Kt8:6-7n(6-7n),24n(19n),45-6n(41n),60(54),64(58), 65n(58n),94(86),110n(101n),120(110),145-7(136-7),160-l(148),182(170),200(188).
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beings 'so far as they measure up to His holy law'; this moral ideal is realized in the person of the Son, who thereby becomes the recipient of God's love; and God makes this same love available to all human beings through the Holy Spirit, whose presence in the conscience wisely requires each person to agree with 'the condition of that approving love' (i.e., moral goodness). Towards the end of Kt8 Kant further clarifies his position by defining godliness, or 'love of God' as 'the disposition to obedience from one's own free choice and from approval of the law' [182(170)]. A potential problem for anyone who wishes to accept these moral transla¬ tions of the love command (or something like them) while remaining faithful to the Bible's own Perspective is that love is often regarded as an irrational force that cannot be neatly enclosed within the bounds of bare reason. Raising human love to a level above all moral duties/divine commands could therefore have the undesirable result of calling into question the supreme authority of the moral law. If, for example, loving one's neighbor were to involve a person in doing something that breaks the moral law—as Jesus himself was accused of doing [Matt. 12:1-14; Mk. 2:23-3:6; Lk. 6:1-11; Jn. 5:1-18]—then how could a Kantian condone a biblical theology based on such a principle? Before answer¬ ing this question, let's look more carefully at the biblical concept of love. A crucial feature of love, one that helps explain why it deserves a higher position in our biblical theology than the teaching of right doctrine, is that love brings with it understanding, not vice versa. Paul expresses this point most fully in Col. 2:2-4,8: My purpose is that they may be encouraged in heart and united in love, so that they may have the full riches of complete understanding, in order that they may know the mystery of God, namely, Christ, in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. I tell you this so that no one may deceive you by finesounding arguments.... See to it that no one takes you captive through hollow and deceptive philosophy, which depends on human tradition and the basic principles of this world rather than on Christ.
A theology based in this way on love is risky, in that it could be put into prac¬ tice in a way that would directly challenge the authority of the moral law. This possibility is made more likely by those who interpret Paul's emphasis on faith as an utter denial of the value of good works, thus totally rejecting our duty to respect the moral law. Paul himself, however, makes it very clear in other passages [e.g., Rom. 6:1-23; s.a. Js. 2:14-26] that the priority of faith does not negate the Christian's duty to be good, but rather enhances it all the more. A quite different problem is that many Christians have taken such passages in Paul's writings to imply that all philosophy is necessarily harmful and to be
•I ,;:.;:
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avoided.23 However, Paul's meaning cannot properly be construed as a rejection of all philosophy, for of all biblical writers, he is surely the most philosophical in his style and cogent in his argumentation. Paul's warnings refer only to deceptive arguments and boastful philosophies. In general, he is rejecting any argument or philosophy that places dogmatic adherence to doc¬ trines and religious traditions above the mystery of 'knowing' God through a loving relationship with Jesus the Christ. Ironically, the very people who refer to such passages as an excuse to ignore philosophy are often themselves guilty of doing what Paul is actually attacking: putting primary emphasis on doctrinal beliefs or conventions and as a result proudly defending their position to the extent that 'quarrels' [1 Cor. 1:10-16; 3:3; 2 Tim. 2:14,24] end up destroying the Christian 'fellowship' that Paul values so highly [1 Cor. 1:9]. Paul's point is not that philosophy—as the iove of wisdom', or even the enjoyment of a good argument (i.e., in the form of humble, truth-seeking dialogue)—is always bad. What is often neglected by those who quote his harsh words against 'man's wisdom' [1 Cor. 1:25], calling into question 'the philosopher of this age' [1:20], is that Paul himself admits in the same passage that, once we begin with the mystery of 'Jesus Christ and him crucified' [2:2], a new wisdom is imparted to us [2:7]: 'a wisdom that has been hidden and that God destined for our glory before time began.' Paul's attack is not against philosophy as such, but against the proud 'boasting' [1:29] that places knowledge above persons. His point is therefore quite compatible with Kant's emphasis on the primacy of practical reason. For Kant and Paul alike, philosophy is harmful only when it proudly oversteps its proper boundaries, but can be exceedingly useful once we recognize that knowing a person is a deeper and more profound human experience than knowing an abstract truth. Paul defends in numerous passages the paradoxical notion that we must come 'to know this love that surpasses knowledge' [Eph. 3:19, e.a.]. At one point he prays 'that your love may abound more and more in knowledge and depth of insight, so that you may be able to discern what is best and may be pure and blameless until the day of Christ' [Phil. 1:9-11]. Likewise, he restates Isaiah 64:4 in such a way that it expresses the same insight [1 Cor. 2:9-10]: 'However, as it is written: "No eye has seen, no ear has heard, no mind has conceived what God has prepared for those who love him"—but God has revealed it to us by his Spirit. The Spirit searches all things, even the deep things of God.' And in his famous hymn to love, Paul beautifully portrays the 23. In addition to the above-quoted passage [Col. 2:2-4,8], Christians who wish to deny the value of taking philosophy seriously commonly cite: 1 Cor. 1:18-30, 2 Tim. 2:23; and Tit. 3:9.
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permanence of love in relation to our limited human knowledge [1 Cor. 13:812], while reminding us that love will lead us to a future situation wherein 'I shall know fully, even as I am fully known.' In each passage, knowledge is treated as a gift given in response to a loving relationship, not as an abstract truth to be grasped by logical argumentation. In the course of discussing the issue of whether or not Christians should eat food sacrificed to idols, Paul says: 'We know that we all possess knowl¬ edge. Knowledge puffs up, but love builds up. The man who thinks he knows something does not yet know as he ought to know. But the man who loves God is known by God' [1 Cor. 8:1-3]. Here is perhaps the clearest expression of the Bible's consistent preference for love over knowledge. Although this passage, like some of those quoted above, refers to our love for God rather than to neighborly love, the point being made applies to both types. The reason a theology that begins with theoretical dogmas cannot regard itself as presenting an authentically biblical theology is that in this and numerous other passages the Bible itself warns that a religion based on knowledge-claims rather than on love is bound to result in a lack of neighborly love being manifested, between believers as well as between Christian and non-Christian.24 For as Paul goes on to argue, those who carelessly apply their newfound freedom (freedom from the compulsion to follow nonmoral 'holy laws' in order to please God) without first giving thought to the higher importance of loving their neighbor, stand in danger of 'becoming] a stumbling block to the weak' [1 Cor. 8:9]. And to do this is to neglect what Kant calls our 'duty to others'. All of this raises two questions for the Kantian Christian: Is love properly regarded as a manifestation of practical reason? and Is love indeed religion's primary principle? If love is a feeling, then it should be more closely associated with the judicial standpoint than with the practical. For Kant there is one (and only one) feeling that belongs properly to the practical standpoint: respect for the moral law. With this in mind, an interesting study for the Kantian biblical theologian would be to compare the function of respect in systemp to the function of love in systemr.s [cf. note IX.21]. Just as Kant portrays respect not as itself a duty, but as our primary motivation for obeying the moral law [see Pa86], so also we might regard love not as a moral command, but as the feeling that primarily motivates us to obey God and to be responsible members of the invisible church. Religion belongs properly to the judicial standpoint [see VI.2], so we can accept Kant's moral interpretation of love as benevolence 24. As suggested above [IX.2.A], the same is true about a person's desire to worship or love God: if one's heart is not set on love, then all one's efforts are 'in vain' [Matt. 15:8-9; Mk. 7:6-7].
:
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(i.e., doing good to others) without denying the equal legitimacy for religion of regarding love as a feeling of tender devotion to God and others. Notwithstanding the parallels between biblical love and Kantian respect, each supporting in its own way the primacy of love over knowledge,25 we must admit that love is one of Kant's weakest points. Though he has deep insight into the dangers of an inordinate self-love, his positive comments on what it means to love one's neighbor are disappointingly meager. Nevertheless, in attempting to come up with a fuller understanding of love, the biblical theolo¬ gian need not reject Kant's minimal notion that neighbor-love involves fulfilling one's duties to others out of respect for the moral law. Here biblical theology once again need not be regarded as contradicting Kant's philosophical theology; rather, it complements it by providing the church with a richer array of guidelines for practicing neighborly love. Likewise, systemr.m complements systemr.s by insuring that love not be applied in an immoral way. This answers the second question raised above, regarding the Kantian Christian's ability to accept the primacy of love: we can fully accept it as such for religion, provided we also accept the primacy of the moral law for morality. Poised in this position, biblical theologians can offer some constructive criticism to Kantian philosophical theologians: Kant's exclusively negative treatment of self-love neglects the psychological-spiritual fact that a moderate degree of self-love can be a healthy sign of personal growth. For the second principle contained in the greatest commandment is not simply that we love others, but that we love them as we love ourselves. Kant fails to distinguish clearly between self-love as a morally corrupt attention to one's own interests and self-love as a morally healthy appreciation for one's own character as a recipient of God's love. Kant does balance our duties to others with a corre¬ sponding set of duties to oneself; but his ever-present concern over the poten¬ tially detrimental effect of our inclinations prevents him from doing justice to the positive side of self-love. To construct a detailed theology of neighborly love would be out of place here. Instead, I shall cite just one more example of how biblical theology and Kantian theology can complement each other in carrying out such a task. Prob¬ ably the single most significant principle of neighborly love is the principle of 25. Perhaps the only fundamental difference between Paul's theology and Kant's on this issue is the type of knowledge they see as emerging from a loving/moral disposition; and this is a difference that can be explained easily enough by their respective emphasis on biblical and philosophical theology. Whereas Paul and other biblical writers see love as giving rise to a mysterious hidden knowledge, Kant's interest would be to pass from practical obedience to open (scientific) knowl¬ edge. Once again, these two Perspectives should be viewed not as mutually exclusive, but as complementing each other in a way that (if well received) can only be of benefit to both sides.
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not setting oneself up as the moral judge of one's neighbor. In AV.2-4 I argue that Jesus' maxim, 'Do not judge, or you too will be judged' [Matt. 7:1], can be regarded as a transcendental condition for the possibility of moral judgment. Without first assuming the former, a person cannot safely apply either Kant's categorical imperative or the 'love God and neighbor' command. Rather than rehearsing that argument here, I shall simply point out that it exemplifies the cooperation of biblical and philosophical theologies at its best. When Paul tells us in Romans 14 that we are to judge ourselves (not others) according to what the Holy Spirit, speaking through our conscience, tells us is right or wrong (not according to the traditions of our society—even the most sacred religious traditions26), he is giving both positive and negative instruction. First, he is encouraging believers to make full use of their freedom in Christ, without allowing others to dictate inappropriately what they should and should not do. The negative side of this is that we should not expect others to believe and act exactly as we believe and act, so those with a more liberal understanding of what freedom allows must not flaunt their freedom in front of those with a stricter (or more 'traditional') understanding of right and wrong. What Kant's philosophical theology can contribute here is a theoretical understanding of how it is possible that an issue as important as morality can be 'left up to the individual' in this way. First, Paul's positive point is obviously consistent with Kant's insistence on the autonomy of the will. In order to be moral, a choice must be genuinely self-determined, not determined by an external statute such as a law (religious or otherwise) written in a book some¬ where. Likewise, Paul's negative point is clearly in line with Kant's principle of respect for persons—i.e., for the autonomy of others. The sad fact is that precious few Christians actually live according to this biblical principle, in spite of the obvious importance it had for both Jesus and Paul. Instead, Christians tend to act as if Paul's words apply only to issues that are not clearly discussed in the Bible. The result is that many Christians do judge others, and all too often they do so with not a small sense of self-righteousness, on the grounds that their judgments are based on 'biblical principles'. The irony is that one such principle teaches us not to use the Bible in this unloving way [see e.g., Rom. 14:10-4]. Using Kantian theology as a complement to biblical theology 26. That in Romans 14 Paul selects as his two examples of morally 'borderline' cases the principles of keeping the Sabbath Day holy and of not eating meat sacrificed to idols is not without signi¬ ficance, for these were two of the most important religious laws in the Jewish tradition of his day. That they are of almost no significance to most Christians nowadays makes them poor illustrations for the point Paul was trying to make, which is that we ought to let each individual decide before God how and to what extent each religious law relates to them. Issues that would be similarly con¬ troversial today might be the ordination of women and homosexual marriage.
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can highlight this important point and support what biblical writers regarded as their core principles with reasons that are independent of the text itself. A proper understanding of this fundamental point in the biblical theology of neighborly love will likewise enable us to avoid a number of misconceptions regarding Kant's moral theory. A good example is the notion some interpreters have that the purpose of systemp is to provide a means for judging the rightness or wrongness of other people's moral choices and actions. A biblical theology of neighborly love can, as is demonstrated in Appendix V, effectively balance this tendency with a proper recognition that the categorical imperative is best used as a tool for increased se/f-awareness, rather than as a tool for telling other people what they should and should not do. Of course, there is much more to loving one's neighbor than simply not judging and not flaunting one's freedom to the detriment of others. My conviction is that in other areas, as diverse as being immersed in the mutual ecstasy of romantic love27 and showing sacrificial compassion to someone unable to return the favor, Kant's philosophical theology can also help us to see more clearly the most viable interpretations of biblical theology available to the serious, thinking Christian. 3. Christian Belief: Preaching and Teaching the Word A. Evangelism and the Gospel of the Kingdom Kant encapsulates the basic insight of his Copernican revolution in philosophy when he exclaims: 'So much depends, when we wish to unite two good things, upon the order in which they are united! True enlightenment lies in this very distinction' [Kt8:179(167)]. We saw in VII.3.B how Kant applies this insight to the distinction between a religious person's direct and indirect service of God. The same insight can now be applied in this chapter to our attempt to construct a biblical theology that is both orthodox and yet compatible with Critical theology and religion. The 'two good things' in this case are the greatest commandment and the great commission—or, in Kantian terms, practical action and theoretical belief. Giving primacy to the former is such a basic premise of Kant's System that we cannot hope to remain Kantian if we construct a biblical theology that starts with theoretical belief (i.e., doctrine).28 27. Green regards Kierkegaard's Either/Or as a 'transcendental deduction' of romantic love [Gr93: 91]. In particular Judge Williams' treatment of 'first love' as 'an absolute awakening, an absolute intuiting' is the development of a Kantian tradition [q.i. 93,95]. Thus, for example, Kierkegaard defends the validity of marriage by pointing out that 'duty is precisely the divine nourishment love needs' [q.i. 100]: 'Because they feel they ought to do so, the lovers know that they can preserve their love.' 28. With this in mind the criticism Wood raises in Wo89 against Kant's conception of moral faith (amounting to the charge that practical faith is immoral because it is not theoretically justifiable) is easily shown to be nothing more than a fundamental rejection of Kant's basic assumptions [see
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This is why our biblical theology began in IX.2 with the greatest command¬ ment and the practical issues arising from it. Kant explicitly condemns any effort to base philosophical theology on theoretical arguments [e.g., Ktl:656; Kt35:(86-7)] or biblical theology on re¬ vealed propositions [e.g., Kt8:164(152)] on the grounds that both are bad for religion. The trend among twentieth century fundamentalists to begin their theology with a declaration of theoretical belief in a divinely inspired Bible, taken as God's inerrant Word, and to build on this foundation an elaborate set of 'right doctrines', therefore stands in direct conflict with Kant's Critical approach.29 If 'biblical' theology is taken in this way to refer primarily to a set of theoretical beliefs derived from the Bible, rather than to the description of a biblical way of life, then it cannot hope to be Kantian. But this does not mean Kant or Kantian biblical theologians must reject revealed theology and prepositional belief altogether. On the contrary, when properly informed by the practical conditions of respect for the law—i.e., love of God and neighbor (via Christ, the God-man)—both the arguments [cf. IV.2-4] and revealed proposi¬ tions [cf. VIII.3.A] can find a proper place in theology. Being Kantian simply requires us to put the great commandment before the great commission. By the same token, a biblical theology that neglects theoretical beliefs alto¬ gether would be as mistaken as one that puts them on an unrealistic pedestal. Just because the great commission, with its dual emphasis on evangelism (preaching the word) and discipleship (teaching the word), does not come first does not mean we can ignore it. Respect for the moral law is no more selfsufficient for Kantian theology than loving God and neighbor is for biblical theology. In both cases, these are necessary starting-points; but if left to their own devices, they will not reach their intended goal. For Kant, this is an effect of radical evil, rendering our autonomous choices imperfect and giving rise to the need for a theoretical belief in divine aid; for the Bible, it is due to our sinful nature, rendering our attempts to obey God hypocritical if they are not based on a loving relationship. AIV.3]. Wood accuses Christians of involving themselves in 'a heteronomous state' whenever they 'take pleasure in believing' that their ability to accept Christian doctrines without any convincing epistemic justification is due to 'God's grace' [431]. He thinks God would not put people in such a morally 'degrading' situation [43 In], but would rather 'produce belief in them autonomously by providing them with clear and rationally convincing evidence for what he wants them to believe.' What Wood fails to consider is that some or even all of this evidence might be moral evidence, not evidence that would provide theoretical proof of God's existence or nature. In the end Wood's emphasis on the primacy of the theoretical amounts to the confession: 'I am not a Kantian!' 29. MacKinnon reports, by contrast, that Kant's categorical imperative taught many British theolo¬ gians in the past century 'the need for the devout to submit their aspirations to judgement at the bar of a common humanity—lest indeed they failed to see the Son of Man in the least of his brethren' [Ma9Oa:361]. Kantian 'evangelism', that is, taught them the value of sacrificial love.
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This point can best be illustrated by examining the harsh words Jesus speaks against the very people who seemed to be most successful at under¬ standing and obeying God's laws [Lk. 11:42]: 'Woe to you Pharisees, because you give God a tenth of your mint, rue and all other kinds of garden herbs, but you neglect justice and the love of God. You should have practiced the latter without leaving the former undone.' Here the point is that purely 'religious' (i.e., nonmoral) practices, performed without being grounded in love of God as expressed through a proper attention to our moral relations with other people (i.e., through 'justice'), is inverted and thus fails to achieve its intended result. In this passage Jesus goes on to chastise 'the experts in the law' [11:46] for *load[ing] people down with burdens they can hardly carry', yet 'not liftfing] one finger to help them.' Moreover, they are condemned for 'tak[ing] away the key to knowledge. You yourselves have not entered, and you have hindered those who were entering.' The problem Jesus is complaining about here is not false belief or even disobedience to God's commands, but an attempt to treat these as self-sufficient, without first using the 'key' of love to open up the door that makes obedience possible and right belief meaningful. The parallel passage in Matthew goes into even more detail. Jesus chastises both 'teachers of the law and Pharisees' for their hypocrisy in both evangelism and teaching [23:13,15]: You shut the kingdom of heaven in men's faces. You yourselves do not enter, nor will you let those enter who are trying to.... You travel over land and sea to win a single convert, and when he becomes one, you make him twice as much a son of hell as you are.
Although the Pharisees and lawyers appear to be doing good on the surface, they are actually working counter to God's true aims; they do not realize that the knowledge of how to enter God's kingdom comes only after a person makes a commitment to love God and others. By making the simple mistake of believing that an understanding of God's will can be obtained through study, argument, and outward obedience to the 'text', without first committing one's heart to God and others in loving relationship, they end up preaching and teaching a perverted form of religion that actually leads to the opposite of its intended result. With this in mind, let us therefore take a closer look at what proper (love-informed) evangelism and preaching would look like; in IX.3.B we shall then examine teaching and right doctrine in a similar way. Jesus' own method of evangelism (i.e., preaching of the 'good news') had two distinct elements. The first was his active ministry to the needs of the poor, the sick, and the outcast. He would go to anyone who had an unmet need, often people whose trouble had been blamed on their 'sin' or even their parents' sin,
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and meet that need in the name of God's love, often working miracles in the process. Much of this ministry he did without a great deal of public teaching to explain his actions. Indeed, he sometimes even asked those he healed to keep his identity a secret. When he did resort to the second element in his method of evangelism, explicit preaching, he made frequent use of parables and other sayings that tended to be shrouded in mystery and paradox. He used these to awaken his listeners to the presence of God's 'kingdom' among them. I have already examined in considerable detail the implications of a biblical theology of the kingdom, especially for political relationships, in Pa93. At this point it will therefore suffice merely to mention that the kingdom is for Jesus not a dogma or a creed but a spiritual reality that cuts through all earthly power-structures by ministering to each individual from within. It is available to anyone whose heart is open to God's love, regardless of how successful they have been at obeying the religious conventions of the day. For this reason, Jesus used miracles only to meet genuine needs, never merely to show off his power to those 'righteous' ones who required 'proof. In other words, Jesus evangelized by putting into practice the greatest commandment. Having deeply experienced the love of God in his own private worship, he knew how to see others as God saw them and love them as they needed to be loved. To those such as the Pharisees who put obedience to the law above the power of love, such a proclamation of 'good news' was nothing short of blasphemous heresy. The reason paradox and mystery are such important aspects of Jesus' preaching (and so also, of any authentic evangelism) is that they must be ex¬ perienced in order to be understood—and even then, they often surpass our cognitive ability. This point was made most forcefully by Kierkegaard, whose philosophical approach to Christianity depends much more on Kantian princi¬ ples than is often recognized [see Gr89]. Without straying into the details of Kierkegaard's views, we may observe that he fleshes out the Existential Per¬ spective that complements, in many important ways, the Critical Perspective Kant adopted. The latter always focuses on the issue of whether the practical or theoretical standpoint has priority in dealing with any given religious issue. In IX.2.A we already examined a good illustration of how the paradoxes of Christian religious experience can be compatible with Kantian theology. Although Kant relegated prayer and worship, and all otherritualisticpractices, to the sidelines of any true religion, regarding them as acceptable only if they help encourage a moral disposition, we saw that Christians need not disagree with this, provided we remember that in systemr.m Kant's 'practical vs. theoretical' concerns are quite distinct from the existential concerns of the worshipping religious believer. Kant is right to say moral improvement (i.e.,
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making the most of our membership in what he calls the 'kingdom of ends') is central and prayer is peripheral when it comes to the question of reaching the goal of the religious life (i.e., becoming 'well-pleasing to God'). Yet the religious believer who takes Jesus' method of ministry as the supreme example knows that, in the existential sense so aptly portrayed by Kierkegaard, prayer and worship are central to the religious life.10
A biblical theology of preaching and evangelism must focus not only on the presence of God's kingdom in our hearts, but also on the central message of the post-Gospel New Testament: the paradoxical mystery of sacrificial love supremely exemplified by 'Christ crucified' [1 Cor. 1:23-4]—'a stumbling block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles, but to those whom God has called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God.' This simple message directed to the heart, rather than some elaborate doctrinal edi¬ fice, was the core of all evangelism for the early church, from Peter's first recorded sermon onwards [Acts 2:36; s.a. 1 Cor. 2:2; Gal. 2:20-1; 3:1]. Why? First and foremost it is because Jesus' death and resurrection is the ultimate ex¬ pression of God's love for us: 'We love because he first loved us.'31 Entering into a loving relationship with the risen Christ enables us to fulfill both sides of the greatest commandment at once. In Christ we love both God and man; for just as Jesus tells us that in seeing him we see his heavenly father [Jn. 14:10, 20-1], so also he says that in loving our neighbor we love him [Matt. 25:3130. As should be obvious by now, I see Kant's System as presenting a profoundly Christian basis for a religious way of life. If, however, some readers find themselves unable to accept my arguments and conclusions as legitimate interpretations of Kant (as I believe they are), I would ask that they read my work (throughout this series on Kant's System of Perspectives, but especially here in this chapter) as a means of developing my own views on religion, using Kant's notoriously elastic philosophy as a vehicle. See KSPl:24n for a similar disclaimer. 3 1 . 1 Jn. 4:19. This point is made in so many passages that it would be pointless to attempt to list them all. Perhaps more important is to draw attention to something that is stated or implied in many of these passages and is fully compatible with Kant's theology, yet tends to be neglected by many Bible-thumping Christians. It is that Jesus' perfect, human-divine nature was not something metaphysically unique that was in him from the beginning, making him fundamentally unlike any other human being. Rather, as the language of Hebrews implies over and over, Jesus himself went through a process, much as we must do: Jesus became God's son [1:5], 'he learned obedience' [5:8], he was 'made perfect', and 'became the source of eternal salvation' [5:9; s.a. 7:28], Along the same lines, Acts 2:36 says God 'made this Jesus' into the 'Lord and Christ' by choosing to raise him from the dead [4:10]—something Jesus, as a human being, would have been powerless to do on his own. Thus Jesus is portrayed as the rejected 'stone' that 'has become the capstone' [4:11]. Such passages are compatible with Kant's theology in that they portray Jesus as going through a process of transformation just as we must do—a necessary condition, Kant argues, for treating Jesus as a example to imitate. Significantly, Hebrews uses much the same terminology when des¬ cribing the transformation of those who believe: we no longer need to depend on obedience to the Mosaic law [7:19], because Jesus 'has made perfect forever those who are being made holy' [10:14]; even the heroes of the Jewish faith are 'made perfect' by participating in Jesus' loving sacrifice [11:40; 12:23-4]; together 'we are receiving a kingdom that cannot be shaken' [12:28], a kingdom that is to be characterized first and foremost by 'loving each other as brothers' [13:1].
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46]. Moreover, the same image of crucifixion is also used as a symbol for the believer's duty to conquer his or her 'sinful nature' [Gal. 5:24-5], by dying to the 'world' [6:14]. The fact that Kant does not make 'Christ crucified' the centerpiece of systemr.m does not make the latter incompatible with biblical theology. On the contrary, as long as the biblical theologian agrees that this message ought to encourage believers to make a concerted effort to put aside evil deeds in favor of doing good (as Kantian theology requires), and as long as the Kantian theologian agrees that the notion of God making us perfect as a result of Jesus' self-sacrificial act (as biblical theology requires) is at least not contrary to genuine religious belief, then the two can end up working hand in hand without any irresolvable conflict. Kant's emphasis on the need to keep one's own heart (or 'disposition') in tune with moral goodness does not disallow a person from believing in the Gospel of Christ. And the Bible's emphasis on Jesus' death and resurrection does not prevent a person from insisting (with Kant) that we must 'work out [our] salvation with fear and trembling' [Phil. 2:12]. The key to recognizing the deep congruity between the two Perspectives is the recogni¬ tion that love makes us perfect [1 Jn. 4:18], not vice versa. One of the most common criticisms of Kant's philosophy of religion is that he presents a religion of good works that refuses 'to regard grace as entering constitutively into the moral life' [Wa72:149]. 'His God becomes a cosmic magistrate and policeman who sees to it that the good are given their deserts— an anthropomorphic conception, indeed, of the ultimate end of existence!' [Ha41:150]. Silber assumes this interpretation when he points out 'a genuine antimony' [Si60:cxxxiii] that supposedly arises out of Kant's position: 'In order to make sense of the idea of personal responsibility, Kant argued [in systemp] that freedom is absolute. Yet by holding that man's responsibility is absolute, he condemned man to an insufferable burden of guilt.' The problem, according to Silber, is that divine forgiveness 'is itself a violation of the moral law.' He therefore concludes: 'We cannot ignore the problem of forgiveness nor can we accept Kant's futile resolution of it' [cxxxiv]. If Kant really defends such a one-sided, anthropocentric conception of God, then the antinomy of forgiveness arising out of it is obviously nothing to preach about! But such views are read into the text of Kt8 by those who fail to see the perspectival difference between systemp and systemr [but cf. VI.2]. In the former system, as we saw in IV.4 [s.a. KSP1:VIII.3.B], Kant uses a moral argument for God's existence, whereby we must assume the existence of a loving (and forgiving) God in order to account for the rationality of moral activity. Despite Kant's repeated warning that 'reward... has no place in God's
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justice..., but only in His love and beneficence'32—a claim that can be selfconsistent only if understood in terms of the principle of perspective—critics such as Greene interpret Kant's moral argument as implying the conception of 'God as a "great Paymaster"' [Wo70:166-7] and assume this applies equally to systemr. Wood argues against this misinterpretation [169-70]: Kant does not look upon moral faith as an outlook in which man is to anticipate a great 'future reward'. Rather, trust in God's goodness is described as a reverent submission to God's will. Moral faith does not consist so much of our expectation of future happiness as an acceptance of present sufferings.... [It] does not 'explain away' or erase our suffer¬ ings, but gives us the hope and courage to be content and rationally to pursue a good world in spite of them.
As such, moral faith in divine forgiveness is the rational person's alterna¬ tive to existential despair. It does not violate the moral law as long as it is not used in systemp as a motive for action, and as long as it is not used in systemr as a way of avoiding a change of heart. Thus Kant says in an unpublished reflection [q.i. Bu08:233] that we need religion for encouragement (i.e., systemp needs system,-) because 'Human nature is incapable of an immediate moral purity; but when its purity is worked upon in a supernatural manner, fu¬ ture rewards have no longer the character of motives.' In its proper sense, then, divine forgiveness, as Webb explains, is for Kant 'not a work of grace, for which we have to wait...: it precedes conversion ... So far as the change is, even to the converted man himself, inscrutable, it can be represented, without detriment to morality, as due to the pardoning act of God.'33 This view of for¬ giveness is far from being a 'futile' contradiction that leaves us wallowing in guilt, as Silber supposes [Si60:cxxxiii-cxxxiv]; rather, it frees us to believe what would otherwise be irrational, that our good deeds serve as empirical evidence 32. Kt6:489; s.a. Kt8:161-2(149-50); Kt64:258n(195n). The perspective element in this warning is clearly evident in Kt35:(107): 'But since we know that God is good and benevolent, may we not expect that He will forgive our vices if we pray fervently to Him and implore His forgiveness? No. A benevolent judge is unthinkable. A judge must be just; a ruler can be benevolent.... But in view of man's moral infirmity, is there to be no help for him? Assuredly there is. He can place his hope in a benevolent ruler.' For a fuller discussion of the three standpoints from which Kant believes we can view God's nature, see V.4. 33. We26:114-5. Kant does find a place for an element of passivity in grace, as when he accounts for 'the incomprehensible moral disposition in us' in terms of 'a stimulus to good produced in us by God..., and so, as grace.... And grace can and should become more powerful than sin..., if only we let it act in us' [Kt65:43, e.a.]. However, he is careful to add that such transcendental passivity does not justify empirical passivity: 'we ourselves must work at developing that moral disposition' even though it 'does point to a divine source that reason can never reach...'. The same point is put succinctly in Kt35:(83): 'The divine will is the motive to action, not the ground of it.' Likewise, in Kt8:201(189) he insists that 'piety (a passive respect for the law of God)' must be combined with 'virtue (the application of one's own powers in discharging the duty which one respects)' in order to give rise to 'godliness (true religious disposition)'.
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of a divine gift (a change of heart), so that, even though we cannot achieve theoretical certainty or practical immunity, our burden of guilt is relieved.34 If Kant really does leave room for grace and divine forgiveness in his conception of religion, then this realization overcomes the greatest hurdle that would otherwise prevent the biblical theologian from embracing a Kantian philosophical theology. But is this rather meager space roomy enough to accommodate the robust position supported by most Christian theologians? It is one thing to affirm that some 'inscrutable' divine assistance is needed in order for a religious conversion to take place; but it is quite another to claim that the blood of Jesus Christ, the God-man, effected this divine act of grace once and for all at a particular point in time. Kant is usually interpreted as having little, if any, sympathy with the latter view. A thorough examination of this issue is beyond the scope of the present book, taking us as it does into the quite different area of Kant's approach to the political history of the human race. For now let it suffice for me to report that in a preliminary overview of Kant's treatment of this topic [Pa94b], I have given an affirmative answer. Kant's insistence on the priority of systemp over systemt, with his conse¬ quent refusal to accept anything but moral activity (not even doctrinal belief) as an ameliorating substitute for immorality, is surely an example of the consis¬ tency between Kantian and biblical theologies. The purpose of grace is not to enable people to continue living immorally (see Rom. 3:8), but to compensate on a supernatural scale for the inevitable failings in a life devoted to doing God's will (i.e., amoral life). Kant's 'gospel' (i.e., his doctrine of conversion) therefore typifies his Critical tendency to adopt 'a middle ground' between two extremes (humanity as both good and evil [Kt8:20(16); s.a. 39n(34n)]; salva¬ tion as based on both faith and good life-conduct [see 25n(20n)]), and in so doing confirms again the harmony between the Gospel message (systemr.s) and evangelism based on the purest religion of reason (systemr.m).35
34. Along these lines Webb says in We26:112-3 that 'as regards divine grace, . . . w e . . . cannot take it into account either theoretically or practically.' But he later adds [122]: 'From the empirical point of view the imputation to us of this new humanity is always a matter of grace.' Gibbs's complaint, that '[w]e cannot give ourselves forgiveness' [Gi89:333], misses the point: Kant is not saying we forgive ourselves; he is saying we give ourselves reason for believing we are forgiven! 35. Even without appealing to the principle of perspective, McCarthy observes that 'Kant's under¬ standing [of how 'wayward man' can become good]... occasionally seems to approach traditional Christian church teaching' [Mc86:55]. By taking Kant's principle fully into consideration, we have now come to recognize such 'occasional' tendencies (appearing as they do on nearly every page of Kt8) as a necessary and intentional function of systemr-m's attempt to pave the way for a healthy dialogue between philosophical and biblical theologians.
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B. Doctrine and the Authority of God's Revealed Word «y; The fourth and final principle of a biblical theology that is to be compatible with a Kantian philosophical theology is presented in the great commission as the need to make disciples. This involves teaching others (and, of course, first learning oneself) to hear and obey the word of God. As we have seen, Chris¬ tians who base their theology on the inerrancy of the Bible typically begin rather than end with this principle, treating 'Word of God' as a direct synonym for 'Bible'. Such a theological position, however, is not properly called 'biblical theology', inasmuch as the Bible itself provides little or no justification for pro¬ ceeding in this way. Most of this subsection will be devoted to the defense of four interconnected points that support this claim. First, the Bible never uses the phrase 'word of God' merely as a synonym for Scripture; rather, this phrase typically refers to a direct (spoken and/or heard) communication from God to one or more persons. Second, the Bible positively and repeatedly condemns the tendency many religious people have to focus their devotion on something external (such as a book), rather than on the spiritual reality we find within ourselves (as in a personal relationship, such as love). Third, and contrary to what many Christians assume, the Bible treats the learning of doctrine as less basic than loving God: ignorant but genuine worshippers are regarded more highly than those who know every doctrine but fail to give their hearts to God. Finally, Christian teaching in the ultimate sense is and can only be a form of learning through the inner guidance of the Holy Spirit. Turning now to the first and foremost of these four points, let us examine in more detail the biblical use of the phrase 'word of God'. In the Old Testa¬ ment this phrase occurs most often as a literal reference to words a prophet or some other inspired person believes God has spoken directly to them [e.g., 1 Kgs. 12:22; 1 Chr. 17:3; cf. Lk. 3:2]; as such it is synonymous with the stan¬ dard and far more frequently used phrase, 'word of the Lord', as a reference to prophetic messages. Occasionally, 'word of God' is used metaphorically to refer not to any specific words, but to God's eternal plan for humanity [Prov. 30:5; Is. 40:8]. The New Testament picks up the latter usage, especially in connection with preaching and teaching about that plan [e.g., Lk. 5:1; 8:11; Acts 4:31; 6:2,7; Col. 1:25,28; 1 Ths. 2:13], as fulfilled in Jesus the Christ, the 'living and enduring Word of God' [1 Pet. 1:23; s.a. Jn. 1:1; Rev. 19:13]. The New Testament's most frequent use of the phrase 'word of God' comes in the book of Acts, where it never refers back to the Jewish Scripture or any other written word(s). Instead, it consistently refers to the preached gospel of the kingdom of Jesus, the crucified and risen Christ [see e.g., Acts 8:12-4; 10:48-11:1]. The only New Testament passage that even comes close to
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identifying 'word of God' with the Bible is Matthew 15:6 [s.a. Mk. 7:13], where Jesus uses this phrase to refer to one of the ten commandments. But here Jesus calls it God's 'word' not because of its presence in Scripture, but rather because it is a command of God. The proper response to hearing God's word is always obedience [see e.g., Lk. 11:28]. John 10:35 might appear to be another exception, because 'word of God' and 'Scripture' come so close together. But the former clearly refers to prophecies, whereas the latter refers to the Bible's claim that prophets (those who hear God's word) are themselves 'gods' [cf. Ps. 82:6]—a point Jesus makes to explain how it is possible for him to call himself 'Son of God' without blaspheming. This first point relates directly to the other three. Thus, when Paul wishes to demonstrate the truth of his own preaching and teaching, he associates 'word of God' not with the external Scripture, but with the internal 'conscience' of each individual [2 Cor. 4:2]. Paul's identification of God's word as 'the sword of the Spirit' [Eph. 6:12] seems to be yet further evidence that it refers to personal relationship, not to the words on a printed page. The 'sword' in a Christian's spiritual 'armor', I would maintain, represents a well-sharpened conscience, not a thorough knowledge of Scripture [cf. 2 Tim. 2:15]. As such, the'word of God' is the other side of the coin of prayer [1 Tim. 4:5]. Surely this is confirmed by Hebrews 4:12: 'For the word of God is living and active. Sharper than any double-edged sword, it penetrates even to dividing soul and spirit, joints and marrow; it judges the thoughts and attitudes of the heart.' The conscience-piercing of God's word can and often does come to a person while reading Scripture, just as reciting liturgy can function as a genuine prayer of the heart. But in such cases the written word is only the vehicle, and is always in danger of hindering true spirituality if its external form becomes too important. Here we should pause to note the obvious compatibility between the way the Bible uses the phrase 'word of God' and the minimum criteria Kant lays down for systemr.m. When 'the word of God lives in [us]', it enables us to 'overcome the evil one' [1 Jn. 2:14]. This necessary connection between hearing God's word and sharpening one's conscience is an excellent example of the kind of necessary connection Kant requires to exist between the 'historical faith' a person chooses and the 'pure religious faith' it should en¬ gender. Christians who wish to follow an authentic biblical theology, rather than what Jesus calls the 'traditions of men',36 must therefore regard the 'word 36. Mk. 7:7-9. This includes any version of what is often called 'Christian tradition'. For, as I have argued in an unpublished conference paper that does not appeal to Kant (entitled 'How Is "Christian Tradition" Logically Possible?'), the only authentically Christian 'tradition' would be one that paradoxically negates the legitimacy of all tradition-bound religion.
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of God'—in a strikingly Kantian fashion—as the morally-awakening presence of Jesus' 'voice' in our conscience. Whereas a so-called 'biblical' theology that treats the words in the Bible as necessarily constituting the one revealed Word of God is not consistent with the stringent requirements of Kant's philosophical theology, a genuinely biblical biblical theology obviously is. This is a crucial difference, for it determines—modulating now to the third point—how Christian discipleship will be carried out. All too often new Chris¬ tians are taught a dry set of doctrines, the first and foremost being that the Bible, as God's inerrant Word, must be regarded more highly than any other earthly object. Scripture reading, along with regular prayer and church atten¬ dance, then become defining factors in what makes a person 'good'. What this view of discipleship tends to ignore is that scriptural texts must be interpreted in order to be understood. A biblical theology that claims to place the Bible in the highest position is therefore actually placing theologians and pastors in positions of highest power and authority, as the Bible's chief interpreters. If they do their job well, God's word (i.e., the deep truth of God's presence living within us) may be successfully communicated to individual believers in this way. But a more effective (because more authentic) biblical theology is one that is grounded, as is the Bible itself, on trust in God's ability to speak the word of truth, through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in each individual's conscience. A theologian or pastor is, at best, merely a means to this end. What, then, is so attractive about a biblical theology that begins with the Bible, if in fact the Bible itself does not support such a view? The advantage, surely, is that theoretical belief in a divinely revealed text provides a basis of objective certainty for whatever doctrinal edifice can be constructed out of a reliable interpretation of the text. This is an advantage, at least, for anyone who regards objective certainty as superior to a merely subjective certainty. But this raises the question already mentioned in IX.2.A of whether subjective certainty is sufficient for Christian belief. Kant's conviction is that subjective certainty is not only adequate for religious 'knowledge' (because it is no less certain than objective certainty, being grounded in practical rather than theoretical reason), but actually superior, inasmuch as grounding religion on objective certainty would be inappropriate. Objective certainty of religious truths, if it were possible, would transform religion into science, faith into knowledge, hope into entitlement, and (worst of all) love into legalism. Although this is not the place for a thoroughgoing demonstration, I believe the Bible adopts a Kantian (subjective) view of certainty far more consistently than its opposite.37 37. This is the basis of the Bible's call to humility. We are encouraged, to cite but one of myriad
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Jesus implicitly defends a subjectivist interpretation of religious truth when he prefaces his tirade against the Pharisees and teachers of the law, those objectivizers par excellence, with this liberating warning [Matt. 23:8-10]: But you are not to be called 'Rabbi,' for you have only one Master and you are all brothers. And do not call anyone on earth 'father,' for you have one Father, and he is in heaven. Nor are you to be called 'teacher,' for you have one Teacher, the Christ."
The effect of heeding this mandate (as Christians so rarely do) would be to make everyone equal before God, with the Holy Spirit as the common Teacher of all who are willing to be 'learners' together. This (touching on the last of the four points mentioned at the outset of this subsection) would transform the usual division between the 'experts' and the 'unlearned' into a nonhierarchical union of co-workers who see a close connection between learning and doing. Along these lines, the metaphorical contrast between the 'milk' and the 'solid food' of the gospel [1 Cor. 3:2] can be seen in a new, more authentic light: 'milk' is the gospel message as preached in an evangelistic setting (i.e., the initial awareness of the internal presence of God's kingdom, as manifested in Christ Jesus);38 'solid food' is the believer's consequent ability to learn directly from God's word (i.e., from the voice of one's own individual con¬ science, as informed by the Holy Spirit). Paul thus describes the latter's learn¬ ing method as follows: 'The spiritual man makes judgments about all things, but he himself is not subject to any man's judgment' [1 Cor. 2:15]. Likewise in Hebrews, those who still 'need milk, not solid food' [5:12] are the ones who have not yet learned 'the elementary truths of God's word' (i.e., the basic doctrines and practices of Christian faith [6:2]), whereas 'solid food is for the mature, who by constant use have trained themselves to distinguish good from evil' [5:14]. In other words, the spiritually mature are those who have learned to listen directly to the voice of God speaking through their own conscience. One of the most significant aspects of the Bible's subjectivist view of religious certainty is its view of Scripture as self-negating. That is, the Bible regards itself as divine revelation only insofar as it causes the reader to look away from (or beyond) the pages of the text. I have examined the political implications of this view in Pa93 [s.e. 52-9], so at this point I shall merely add that the core of the Bible's self-negating stance lies in its call to freedom. possible examples, to remember that our ways are not God's ways [Is. 55:8]. Whereas we prefer absolute certainty and knowledge before action, God demands the risk of action before knowledge. 38. That the core of this basic 'milk' teaching is love, as I have argued in IX.2, is suggested by 1 Peter 2:1-2: 'Therefore, rid yourselves of all malice and all deceit, hypocrisy, envy, and slander of every kind. Like newborn babies, crave pure spiritual milk..."—the milk of love being the antithesis of the foregoing unloving sentiments.
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Christian freedom—the radical freedom Christ and Paul proclaim in the New Testament—is a Gospel of release not only from our own inner bondages (the 'laws') that prevent us from developing into the kinds of individuals we are meant to be, but also from the captivating influence of religious and political leaders who seek to control the minds and hearts of those in their field of influence. This Gospel is entirely compatible with Kant's emphasis on the interiority of the moral law in each person's heart as the key to being released from the controlling influences of anything heteronomous (whether it be our own inclinations or the legalism imposed on us by someone else). Whereas being taught doctrine often has the effect of drying up a person's living faith, an approach to learning doctrine that encourages each individual to hear God's word in his or her own conscience will, ironically, be more likely to keep a person's faith alive. This is ironical because Kant is often regarded as a person with no concern for religious experience. Yet, by recognizing the consistency between his approach and a genuine biblical theology, we have come to the surprising realization that Kantian philosophical theology is more apt to assist us in accepting the Bible as a basis for religious experience than as a sourcebook for knowledge of God: Kant makes just such a point in Kt65:59: And so, between orthodoxy which has no soul and mysticism which kills reason, there is the teaching of the Bible, a faith which our reason can develop out of it- • < self. This teaching is the true religious doctrine, based on the criticism of practical reason, that works with divine power on all men's hearts.
As we shall see in Part Four, Kantian theology does not disallow all experience of God (as is often claimed), but merely seeks to find a middle path between doctrine-without-experience (orthodoxy) and experience-without-doctrine (mysticism). That path, Kant here tells us, can be found equally well in genuine biblical teaching (systemr.s) as in the teaching of Critical religion (systemr.m). As pointed out in both IX. 1 and IX.2.A, the Bible is not concerned with the philosophical justification of worship (personal religious experience of God), but rather with promoting the need for people to experience worship in their daily lives. A preacher who focuses on the former issue rather than the latter is actually not 'preaching the word' at all, but doing philosophy. Church¬ goers should be encouraged to learn the benefits of viewing such issues from a genuinely philosophical Perspective, and churches would do well to sponsor such educational programs for their members; but the sermon is not the proper occasion for such teaching on a regular basis. Sermons in general and evangelistic preaching in particular ought to be focused on the heart, encourag¬ ing love of God and neighbor as the first and foremost priority. If this first pri¬ ority is given its proper place, then powerful preaching and reliable teaching
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will be much more likely to follow as a matter of course. This applies just as much to the concerns of Kantian theologians as it does to the concerns of fundamentalist theologians. Whereas fundamentalists are typically concerned with convincing as many people as possible to make a conscious rational deci¬ sion to 'believe in Jesus' and to join in various church activities thereafter, Kant's concern is that preaching and teaching ought to encourage morally up¬ right behavior. A rightly ordered (biblical) teaching of Christian doctrine need not negate either of these concerns, but must paradoxically insist that they are subordinate to a proper emphasis on the mystery of giving one's heart in love. Two of the central features of biblical Christianity that ought to play a prominent role in preaching are mystery and paradox?9 They serve to draw attention away from head-knowledge and towards heart-knowledge. Because of his insistence that religion be rendered rational, Kant's deep respect for paradox and mystery is not always discernible. Nevertheless, systemr.m does have its own share of paradox and mystery: a good person somehow performs evil actions; an evil person somehow becomes good again; the mutually corrupting influence of people on each other somehow becomes a mutually uplifting influence through their joint participation in the church; etc. But when it comes to the deepest and most profound Christian paradoxes, such as a dead man coming back to life, or God becoming embodied in a particular historical personage, Kant treads with extreme caution. His reason kicks in and proposes a moral explanation that enables him to avoid facing the paradox head on. What we must recognize is that such a reaction is quite acceptable for a philosophical theologian, for whom reason is the proper guide. By refusing to deny the pos¬ sibility that both sides of the paradox are true, or that the mystery underlying the paradox contains some profound meaning, Kant's version of systemr.m leaves ample room for a compatible biblical counterpart here in systemr.s. Surely one of the most mysterious and paradoxical doctrines in all of Christian theology is the hypostatic union of God and man in Jesus: the claim that Jesus, being God's word manifested as 'flesh' [Jn. 1:14], became the Christ. I have already explained how Kant's views on this dual nature (i.e., Jesus the man also being Christ the God) can be compatible with an orthodox Christian view [VIII.2.B]. Let us therefore pass here directly to another aspect of the paradox of the biblical Jesus: his bodily resurrection. Kant expresses some reluctance to accept this doctrine as a legitimate part of systemic [see note VIII.32]. But biblical theologians nowadays have an advantage over those who 39. For a more wide-ranging discussion of the role of paradox and mystery in philosophy, see Part Four of PaOOa, especially Lecture 28.
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lived in Kant's time; for contemporary science (as we shall see in great detail in KSP3 [s.a. KSP1.XI]) no longer views nature in the exclusively mechanistic way that was taken for granted in Kant's day. With the advent of quantum physics and non-Euclidean geometries, along with other scientific revolutions, has come a new openness to and respect for the mystery that lies at the heart of the way things are. Biblical theologians can therefore interpret the doctrine of resurrection in a way that does not contravene the most advanced scientific theories. We are in a far better position to defend Paul's claim that in the afterlife God will give us 'spiritual bodies' to replace the physical bodies that inevitably die [1 Cor. 15:44]—a view that renders irrelevant Kant's concerns over the absurdity of carrying around 'a certain lump of matter' to accompany us 'through eternity' [Kt8:128-9n(119n); cf. note VIII.32]. For the spiritual (resurrected) body need not be physical in any ordinary sense of the word. Instead, we might just as well interpret it as an enigmatic manifestation of a higher-dimensional reality [see §34 of Pa97]. Another doctrinal issue that almost inevitably gives rise to paradox is the question of how God dispenses grace: do we choose our own eternal destiny or has God predestined each person to be either saved or condemned? When de¬ bating this issue, theologians typically stress one or the other of two responses found in the Bible: human beings determine their own salvation through their performance or neglect of some religious act (such as the act of believing in Jesus and/or the Gospel message); God is completely sovereign, deciding who will and will not be saved independently of any human act [cf. AVI.4]. That Kant not only encourages, but requires us to believe both should be good news for biblical theologians, because the Bible itself also affirms both extremes.40 The temptation in the face of such paradoxes is always to resolve the tension by affirming only one side or the other. But the theologian who uses Kant's system of religion as a rational guide will be encouraged to grasp the paradox, recognizing that both views must be upheld. Here, once again, we find that Kant's position is 'at one' with the Bible's—not because Kant naively assumes the Bible's authority, but because both Kant and the writers of the Bible ultimately appeal to the same Authority.
40. Any passage that states, or seems to state, that all we need to do is believe in order to be saved could be cited in support of the first response: see e.g., Jn. 6:28-9; Acts 15:11; 16:31; Rom. 3:22; 4:24; 10:9; 1 Tim. 1:16. Other passages clearly require more, such as love and obedience [e.g., 1 Jn. 3:23-4] or other forms of good life-conduct [e.g., Js. 2:14-25]. A sampling of verses that seem to support the second response is as follows: Deut. 7:6; Ps. 33:12; Acts 22:18; Rom. 8:29-30; Eph. 1:4-12; 1 Ths. 1:4; 2 Ths. 2:13; 1 Pet. 1:2; 2:9. The wealth of textual evidence for both views suggests that in this case, by insisting on 'cooperation' over against 'the asymmetry of the Lutheran concept of grace' [Ga96:79], Kant actually sticks closer to the Bible than Luther does!
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As a Kantian biblical theologian, therefore, I am able to confess with a clear conscience and an uncompromised intellect that the change of heart is an effect of God's grace; yet I believe God somehow does this while preserving both my free choice and my responsibility to act in a way consistent with a good disposition. As a Christian, I believe this because the Bible has informed my understanding of the nature and purposes of God's work in the world and my experience confirms what the Bible teaches. As a Kantian, I believe this because it is the only way I can both preserve God's sovereignty (i.e., God's ability to save anyone, even someone possessing no biblical knowledge what¬ soever) and yet conceive of the moral law being fulfilled in a human life. It is a genuinely Critical position on the issue of God's grace, inasmuch as it prevents me from falling into the extremes of either an overbearing fanaticism that misinterprets religious belief or worship as works that God requires or a lazy skepticism that rejects the value of religion altogether. Both extremes are per¬ versions that are attractive only to those with a low tolerance for paradox. Kant himself is far from being antagonistic to a conscientious use of Scrip¬ ture in working out one's own religious self-understanding. On the contrary, Kt8 is filled with allusions to and even direct quotations from the Bible. The fact that in most cases Kant has to stretch or even dismiss standard interpreta¬ tions of these passages in order to make them consistent with systemr.m should not cause us to neglect the possibility that in so doing his goal is to proceed in the manner that best reflects the Bible's own prescriptions. For Kant's use of biblical texts supports all four of the points that form the basis for the aspect of biblical theology I have defended in this subsection: he refuses to identify God's revealed word with the text of the Bible; he insists God's word comes to us in¬ ternally, not through external agents; he regards religious learning as a matter of the heart more than of the head; and he promotes a radical freedom that allows each person to learn autonomously, rather than being taught prescribed dogma. Recommending a biblical theology of revelation based on the living word of God within us, rather than on the literal written words of the biblical text as such, risks a significant loss in objectivity for theology. Christian theologians have traditionally regarded the chief function of revelation as being God's way of making known divine purposes to us human beings. If these purposes are recorded in a fixed, propositional form, biblical theologians have the potential to transform theology into a body of certain knowledge comparable to scientific fact. This, no doubt, is what makes biblical theologies based on an inerrant Bible so popular. The problem, as we have seen, is that the Bible itself simply does not support such an approach to theology. But this also raises a question for my approach: can an internally focused view of revelation as primarily
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subjective do justice to the believer's need to have confidence that a given knowledge-claim regarding God's purposes really is what God would want, not just a figment of the believer's own imagination or unconscious desires? To answer this question, we could begin by turning to Kant. The key fac¬ tor he would use to distinguish true and false claims to know God's purposes is whether what the believer claims God has made known encourages moral goodness or detracts from it. Most Christians would agree with this as far as it goes. A problem would arise, however, if, as in the story of Abraham, God were ever to command a person to do something that is morally wrong. Ironi¬ cally, the typical conservative Christian would side with Kant at this point and deny the possibility that this would happen, whereas biblical theologians who wish to remain faithful to the Bible's own examples of what happens when God's word is revealed and heeded would have to side with Kierkegaard, who famously regards Abraham as a 'knight of faith' precisely because of his willingness to break the moral law in order to obey God. This creates a dilemma that is far too complex to attempt to solve here. Instead, we can regard this as the key point where the philosophical and biblical theologians remain deadlocked in a 'conflict' [see VIII. 1], no matter how compatible their Perspec¬ tives may be in other respects. Putting this aspect last in our sketch of a systemr.s reflects the different Perspectives assumed by biblical and philosophical theologians: for us as Christians, knowing God's purposes is important, but only insofar as such knowledge arises out of our love for God and our fellow human beings. For Kant, by contrast, knowing that God's purposes must be moral ones is the first principle of his entire philosophical theology. The irony, once again, is that many Christians—theologians and laypersons alike—actually side with Kant in treating a prior knowledge of God's (revealed) purposes as the first and fore¬ most (if not sole) determining feature of genuine religion. But because they differ so widely in determining how to go about identifying those purposes, any hope of a healthy dialogue is relinquished. My goal here has been to en¬ courage biblical theologians to risk adopting a radically different (authentically biblical) Perspective by insisting on treating such knowledge as an outcome of love rather than as a first principle. This may appear to be a departure from Kant, until we recall Kant's view that biblical theologians ought to stand in a position of healthy conflict over against their philosophical counterparts. 4. A Christian Critique of Kant's Critical Religion We saw in VIII. 1 and IX. 1 that Kant makes an important distinction between the Perspectives of the philosopher and the biblical theologian with
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respect to how each is to interpret the meaning of religion. The philosopher's goal is to abstract from all empirical traditions and grasp the essential nature of 'pure religion', whereas the biblical theologian must acknowledge the authority of a given tradition and focus attention on the task of providing a fresh interpre¬ tation of that tradition for each new era. Chapter VII provided an account of Kant's philosophical interpretation of pure religion. Chapter VIII then showed how Kant, as a philosopher, views the prospects of Christianity as an empirical tradition that can help make pure religion a reality in the world. In IX.2-3 I have attempted to fill in the missing link [see Fig. IX. 1] by adopting the Per¬ spective of the biblical theologian and proposing a set of Christian fundamen¬ tals that is compatible with Kant's theology. The remaining task is to assess the adequacy of Kant's Critical religion from the Christian (biblical) Perspective as outlined above.*1 Can a Kantian biblical theology satisfy ordinary (nonphilosophical) Christian believers? If not, what changes in Kant's System would need to be made in order for them to assimilate and digest the legitimate aspects of Critical theology and religion while locating and confronting those aspects that could be destructive to a person's faith? Having observed throughout Part Three the potential for Christian theology to fill in various gaps in Kantian theology, we should begin here by noting the obvious fact that biblical theologians should not merely regard themselves as laborers in the service of philosophical theologians; rather, they have a distinctive role to play in challenging the philosopher's presuppositions and conclusions. I shall therefore conclude this chapter by critically assessing, as a biblical theologian, some key aspects of Kant's philosophy of religion. Christian readers of Kt8, even those who read it again in the light of the sympathetic interpretations I have been putting forward up to now, will almost inevitably come away with certain nagging doubts about the possibly negative effects adopting his philosophy of religion might have on their faith. Sorting out the significant doubts from the illusory ones is the task of this section. A potential problem, of course, is that there are almost as many different ways of understanding what a 'Christian' is as there are different Christians. For this reason, I shall adopt in this section a very general definition of what it 4 1 . I stress the last three words in order to acknowledge that on some interpretations Christian the¬ ology would have far more basic—indeed, irreconcilable—objections to Kant's System. In particu¬ lar, the so-called 'fundamentalist' approach to theology (whether Christian or otherwise) is so incompatible with Kantian philosophy as to render any attempt at fruitful dialogue virtually pointless. Fundamentalists would object to Kant's approach at nearly every turn, from his view of morality as transcendentally prior to religion to his claim that theology can have no theoretical foundation. This section should therefore not be construed as an attempt to critique Kant on the basis of every type of Christian theology, but only in terms of the moderate type presented in IX.23. My conviction is that the latter is a more authentic representation of the Bible's actual content.
:
;
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means to be a Christian, as first suggested in Pa89:65: A Christian is someone who: (1) has certain beliefs (e.g., about God and his creative power, about Christ and his redemptive power, and about the Spirit and its communicative power); who (2) seeks to obey God (e.g., by heeding the com¬ mands presented in the Bible along with those 'written on his heart'); and who (3) has some sort of immediate experience of God (e.g., in the form of a 'conversion,' a prayer life, or participation in religious ceremonies).
The biblical theology suggested in IX.2-3 is at least potentially 'Christian' on this definition, because it specifies appropriate beliefs, acts of obedience, and an experiential element. Whether a given reader actually judges it to be Christian will depend on which specific beliefs, actions, and experiences one regards as essential. By defining 'Christian' in this highly general way, leaving the specific content of what counts as 'normal' beliefs, actions, and experiences to be determined by each person and/or religious community, I hope to make my Christian critique of Kant applicable not only to professional theologians, but also (and perhaps even more so) to the ordinary layperson.42 One of the biggest dangers of upholding Kant's Copernican Perspective on religion without balancing it with the biblical theologian's Empirical Perspective is that this could lead to a misunderstanding of how religious beliefs (myths), actions (rituals), and experienced objects (symbols), actually operate.43 From the Perspective of the theologian (as a representative of the ordinary believer), there may be no direct connection between these three and morality as such. Kant's requirement that religious beliefs, actions, and experienced objects all be assessed in terms of their moral content is therefore highly problematic. The problem is this. Although some religious myths, rituals, and symbols may directly encourage us to do good (as shown by arrow B in Figure IX.3), they often have no direct or obvious moral content; instead, their direct effect is typi¬ cally on the believer's spirit (i.e., what Kant calls the 'disposition' or 'heart'),
42. For many professional theologians my comments in this section may seem somewhat naive. For my primary focus now is on the religion of the biblical theologians and philosophers, not on their theological arguments as such. As pointed out in VIII.4, many theologians (sometimes called 'liberals') have already given up much more of the traditional faith than Kant asks us to give up, while others (sometimes called 'conservatives') are not willing even to enter into serious dialogue with the likes of Kant, to say nothing of attempting to assimilate something of Kant's way of thinking into their own theology. Yet his median point of view is, I maintain, closer than either of these extremes to the faith many thinking Christians adopt. Moreover, it would be even more common were ordinary believers not so easily led into more extreme ways of thinking by a (religiously inauthentic) desire for the supposed security of theoretical knowledge. 43. The words 'myth', 'ritual', and 'symbol' correspond directly to the three aspects of the formal definition of 'Christian' quoted above from Pa89. I am using them here in their special theological sense, whereby they delineate not false or negative expressions, but beliefs, actions, and experi¬ enced objects (respectively) with a deep and mysterious meaning. Further discussion of this positive sense of 'myth' and 'symbol' can be found in PaOOa, especially Lectures 3 and 31.
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PART THREE: CRITICAL RELIGION religious beliefs, actions, and experienced objects
moral action
fe Q
\
spiritual growth (= heart/disposition)
Figure IX.3: The Empirical Perspective on Religion and Morality and this effect in turn empowers a person to behave in a morally good way (as shown by arrows A and C). So, for example, spending an hour engaged in in¬ tense worship might be criticized by a (short-sighted) Kantian as wasting valu¬ able time that could be spent doing morally good deeds. The Christian response is that if we devote all our time to doing good without ever insuring that our spirit is properly attuned, our efforts may end up backfiring—e.g., by being, at best, legally good but not morally good. What is difficult to grasp from an exclusively Kantian point of view, but is at the very heart of the Bible's message, is that the primary reason for worship¬ ping God is not to improve our moral disposition; this just happens as a sideeffect (arrow C, above). When challenged to provide a philosophically sound justification of our religious beliefs and actions, we may point to this sideeffect as fulfilling (what Kant calls) 'indirect service' of God; in this way the Kantian Perspective prevents the religious person from being lost in a form of worship that never engages with real-life problems. But if benefiting our moral life becomes the only reason we believe and act religiously, then the moral efficacy of these very beliefs and actions will paradoxically diminish. In other words, the biblical (Christian) and philosophical (Kantian) Perspectives are each more likely to succeed when they work together, in a creative tension, than when adherents of either Perspective view themselves as in no need of the other. This danger, therefore, does not represent a true incompatibility between Kantian philosophy and biblical theology. Christians and Kantians alike only stand to benefit from making room for the opposing Perspective. I have already demonstrated the vacuity of most common objections to Kantian theology (i.e., elsewhere in Part Three and in AVI-AVIII). The claim
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that his theology and philosophy of religion cannot be Christian because his God is merely a powerless philosophical 'idea', or because he leaves no room for pardoning grace by wrongly reducing religion to nothing but good works, or because he rejects the very possibility of miracles and divine revelation, or because prayer and worship play no part in his model of authentic religion—all these and other objections like them have been shown to be based on faulty interpretations, interpretations that for the most part ignore Kant's principle of perspective. The attentive reader will already see quite plainly that such objec¬ tions can no longer be used as an excuse to cast Kant's philosophy to one side. After pointing out a few more examples of such inadequate objections, we shall devote most of our attention in this section to a few key objections that do carry substantial weight for Christians who wish to treat Kant seriously. Cassirer, in his thoughtful consideration of the similarities and differences between Kant and the Apostle Paul, claims to find a significant opposition be¬ tween these two on the doctrinal issue of law versus grace [Ca88:47-48]. Kant, he claims, has a 'profound disagreement with everything St. Paul stands for' [47]: whereas Paul views law as coming by divine revelation, as causing 'the disintegration, and indeed annihilation, of the soul', and as producing slavery and impotence in those who rely on it, Kant portrays law as coming from 'man's own consciousness', as enabling those who follow it 'to transcend our merely natural selves', and 'the very instrument through which alone we can become free.' For Paul, freedom comes through Christ alone, whereas Kant argues that it also requires our own effort [48]. Such a strict dichotomy, how¬ ever, is not entirely fair, because Paul and Kant are using these terms in signifi¬ cantly different ways. In particular, Paul's rejection of law refers to the external law of Moses that he believes Christ transcended with the internal law of love—a law that bears close resemblance, as we saw in IX.2, to Kant's own conception of the moral law [s.a. AV.2-4]. Clearly, there is far more agreement here than Cassirer's misleading dichotomy suggests, especially if we keep in mind that the differences in emphasis between Paul and Kant are due largely to the fact that they intentionally adopt two opposing Perspectives. Another interesting but deceptive criticism comes from Sokol, who points out that 'the traditional theist... believes that God created man to serve His own purposes' [So86:435]. This means that, 'for the theist..., it is false that you are an end in yourself simpliciter, for with respect to God and His purposes, it seems more than likely that you are a means to some further, higher end.' This astute observation may well express the best position for a biblical theologian to adopt. Yet we would be mistaken to think this contradicts Kant's view of human persons as ends in themselves. For Kant, as a philosopher, is rightly
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concerned with the way humans view each other, while Sokol's 'theist' is adopting a position appropriate for the biblical theologian, concerned with the way God views human beings. The two can complement each other quite nicely, as long as we take the principle of perspective into consideration. The same can be said for Sokol's next point: 'From the religious point of view man's dignity is enhanced if it derives from nothing other than the dignity of God himself.' From the philosopher's purely human perspective, dignity comes from the presence in us of freedom and the moral law. Provided the biblical theologian does not deny this fact,44 Kant would welcome Sokol's view as properly raising moral dignity to a higher plane, that of the religious. A more common criticism of Kant's theology is that it shows Kant to be 'a Pelagian in the end' [Gg93:7]. A Pelagian is someone who believes human beings are capable of taking at least the first steps towards salvation without the assistance of divine grace—a view that was condemned as heresy by several popes and church councils during the first half of the fifth century, thanks in large part to St. Augustine's vigorous attacks against it. Kant admittedly comes very close to defending a Pelagian view.45 However, a careful look at his 44. Sokol himself appears to deny this at times, thereby risking the total breakdown of any dialogue with philosophical theologians. He criticizes Kant's moral philosophy on the basis of an undefined dichotomy between the 'theist' and the 'secular humanist' [So86:424], whereby Kant is assumed to fit solely into the latter category. As I have argued throughout this book [s.e., IV.4], however, Kant is very much a theist. Neglecting the principle of perspective, Sokol adopts an overly ex¬ treme version of the biblical theologian's Perspective [432]: 'divine laws can be binding even if they are not autonomously imposed for... even if they lack pure moral force, their divine force more than makes up for it.' He argues that God has the power to 'impose universal laws binding of their own accord' [430], even if some of them are not moral. Kant's argument, of course, is that this is impossible, if God is a moral God, because such legislation could only be external and therefore could not be genuinely universal. The only genuinely universal legislation must be internal and therefore moral. Sokol claims, by contrast, that for the true theist [432] 'there need not be any such thing as moral obligation! All human obligations can reduce to the religious.' Whether they are au¬ tonomous (internal) or heteronomous (external) doesn't matter, provided they are 'mandated by God.' But this leaves us with no ability to judge between the moral and the immoral, between hear¬ ing God properly and misunderstanding God's command. Sokol does claim that human motivation to be good can and ought to be 'simultaneously both moral and religious' [433]; what he fails to see is that Kant, who is not the anti-theist Sokol takes him to be, would actually agree with him on this point. The closest he comes to a position that could be compatible with Kant's is when he says [434] 'it may just be God's intent that we impose His moral laws upon ourselves autonomously.' 45. As Rossi puts it [Ro93:59], 'the Pelagian view [is] that grace is not necessary either to enable persons to move out of sin or to lead a moral life: human effort, unaided by divine or "supernatural" help, is sufficient in each case.' He thinks that, although Kant clearly acknowledges the need for divine assistance in Kt8, this marks a significant change from his previous position [Ro93:64]: 'Kant's accounts of moral life prior to Religion have a distinct "Pelagian" cast to them: each of us must—and so each of us can—overcome evil entirely by individual effort, unaided by any of the "outside" assistance which theology calls grace.' What Rossi does not recognize is that Kt8's position represents not a change of mind but a change of perspective. In his moral writings, Kant's aim is to identify what constitutes moral goodness; he does not commit himself one way or the other on the issue of how real evil affects our ability to fulfill the moral ideal. Perhaps the closest Kant comes to being a Pelagian in Kt8 is in his view of the afterlife as an opportunity for human
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doctrine of the archetype in Book Two of Kt8 reveals that he avoids it. The archetype is an unmerited gift of divine grace that must be present in a human being before any conversion from evil to good can begin. This is why 'man's moral growth of necessity begins not in the improvement of his practices but rather in the transforming of his cast of mind and in the grounding of a charac¬ ter' [Kt8:48(43), e.a.]. Kant says the motive force acting in 'the deeps of the heart' is 'inscrutable' [51(46)], so that human effort on its own cannot produce the change of heart. As we have seen [see e.g., note IX.40], his position is one of divine-human cooperation, wherein we must believe God has taken the first steps and will complete the work in the end, but we must act as if everything is up to us. No, Kant is not a Pelagian; but he is a thorn in the flesh of any theologian who denies that any human effort is ever needed for salvation. Green denounces 'Kant's Christian apologetic' as a form of 'theological accommodationism' [Gg93:15]—i.e., an attempt to translate the Bible's essen¬ tial message 'into the modern idiom.' This criticism again has an element of truth in it, inasmuch as Kant intentionally adopts the philosopher's Perspective. But 'the modern idiom' of Kant's day was surely the Enlightenment; and as we saw in VIII.4, Kant's Critical religion goes significantly against that movement. How then could he also be accommodating it? A better view is that he tries to clarify the purest, timeless truths of the Bible—the ones that are true quite apart from any historical tradition. This is actually the opposite of the type of accommodation Green describes. He claims all such attempts 'distort the very Christian message they seek to save.... [Intending to save the patient by exising a cancer, they set about removing the heart.' This may well be true of beings, freed from the restrictions of space and time, to experience indefinite moral progress. Scharf claims Kant's earlier, more 'positive anthropology', from Kt26, is more suitable than the approach in Kt8 itself for pursuing 'his stated aim,... religion within the limits of reason alone' [Sc93:72]. Kant's 'original' position was that 'humans are basically good but not (yet) perfect because they have to cultivate... their moral inclination' [73]. We have no need for God's salvation on this model: 'one can do without interventionist notions of grace, atonement, and forgiveness.' This position, based on 'moral evolution' [73], is 'Pelagian' and 'more conducive to [Kant's] Enlightenment-philosophical project' than the 'Augustinian' views of Kt8 [Sc93:74]. 'Logically, this [new position in Kt8] ought to be the death stroke to Kant's ethical system. Not only has it become questionable whether humans can succeed in doing the good, but they cannot even will the good. This is the meaning of radical human evil' [82]. All of this changes, however, once we adopt the interpretation of Kt8's aim defended in VI.2, expressed in terms of pursuing religion within the bounds of bare reason. Kant is not saying we 'cannot', but that we 'do not' become good apart from the boost religion gives to our moral impulse. Thus, Scharf s point about Kant's ethical theory 'dying' is ironically apt, since systemr must adopt an entirely new standpoint from that of systemp. The death of the ethical is not a contradiction; it is only an indication that we are now in the realm of religion. This enables us to regard Kt8 as Kant's mature attempt to account for both sides of the dilemma at hand: radical evil reflects the truth behind the Augustinian position, while Kant's theory of the evolution of the church in Book Three preserves the truth behind the Pelagian position. In this way, as we have already noted in VIII.4, Kant's position turns out not to be a naive defense of the 'Enlightenment' project, but a critique of the movement's biases.
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attempts at cultural accommodation; but such damage is precisely what Kant sets out to a void. If my explanation of this Christian 'heart' in IX.2-3 is correct, then Kant's surgical skills are far better than Green suggests. As usual, Green's assessment is not based on any argument or evidence. He merely states that any project 'like Kant's' is futile because it 'seek[s] to translate the essential content of the gospel into other terms' [15], just as 'a teacher trying to teach students Chinese by offering them texts in translation.' Yet this is a false comparison. What Kant does is just what any good language teacher does: he presents both sets of texts, showing their direct correlations, so that anyone familiar with only one 'language' can readily learn to communicate in the other as well. Contrary to Green's assumption, Kant is not trying to destroy the 'particular configuration of symbolic elements' that makes Christianity unique; rather, his goal is to enhance and deepen its meaning. What Bulgakov says about philosophy in general, that 'the history of philosophy may be depicted and interpreted as religious heresiology' [q.i. Ak91:76], is an especially apt description of the influence Kantian philosophy has had on Christian theology. Up to now, Kant has been adopted by liberal theologians time and again in their attempts to cast off the philosophical naivete of conservatism. To a certain extent, any attempt to put dogma in its proper place is bound to be regarded by the dogmatic traditionalists as the root of all heresy. But Kant's aim, as I have been arguing, is far more subtle. The time has come for open-minded conservative theologians to step forward and boldly take hold of the challenge Kant has presented them: resisting the temptation to dismiss new insights as 'heretical', to engage in a creative dialogue with Critically-minded philosophical theologians who would enjoy a good 'conflict' over biblical principles.46 One area where such a conflict might prove fruitful is over the issue of how God will judge us in the afterlife. MacKinnon [Ma90a:351] characterizes Kant's view of eternal reward and punishment as a 'highly sophisticated ... myth of ultimate vindication.... The element of sheer receptivity thought pivotal to the life of faith is lacking.' As he freely admits, 'Kant certainly displays an affirmative attitude towards the idea of divine assistance' [354]. Yet this is not enough for any biblical theologian who believes grace must be wholly independent of human agency [cf. note IX.40]. Without taking sides on this issue, let me simply point out that from Kant's Perspective, hope in benefiting from an arbitrary dispensation of God's favor seems not only irrational but 46. Firestone expresses this challenge as follows in an early draft of FiOO: 'So long as the transcenden¬ tal philosopher persists in Kantianizing the Evangel, the Christian theologian rightly responds by evangelizing the Kantian.' S.a. note VIII.4.
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morally dangerous, just as Kant's view seems overly cold and calculating from where the biblical theologian stands. My point is that the truth may lie more in the tension between these two positions than in either position on its own. With this example in mind, let us now examine a few of the more acute criticisms a biblical theologian might level against Kant's position, even on the sympathetic, nonreductionist interpretation I have been promoting. In so doing we shall follow the threefold definition of Christianity quoted near the begin¬ ning of this section and summarized at the top of Figure IX.3. At that point we already cleared up the most significant (apparent) inadequacy relating to the second part of the definition, obedient action. Concerning this second aspect of being a Christian, Kant is subject to little if any decisive criticism. The standard objection, that Kant supports a theology of 'salvation by works', we have al¬ ready seen to be incorrect [see AVI.4]. Any Christian who believes God cares at all how we act in this earthly life would have to agree that Kant's heart is in the right place at this point in his theology. Far from denying that we need grace, system,- is based on the assumption that we do need it—due to the corrupting influence of radical evil. That Christians are quite capable of fash¬ ioning a biblical theology that presents no insuperable conflicts with the moral aspect of Kantian theology has been shown in IX.2-3. For the remainder of this section I shall therefore point out two genuine problems, relating to belief and experience. In each case the inadequacy will provide us with a new challenge to bring to Kant's text as we approach Part Four. In the realm of belief, the major stumbling-block for most Christians who consider Kant's theology is his Christology. He never clearly expresses an un¬ ambiguous commitment to the necessity of Jesus' death and resurrection for redemption, nor does he openly confess his trust (if any) in Jesus as Savior and Lord. Most believers would say such commitment and trust constitutes the sine qua non of being a Christian in the first place. Kant's conviction that God exists and has many of the same characteristics orthodox Christians would associate with God the Father seems unproblematic by comparison. Even a belief in the Holy Spirit (which many Christians virtually ignore anyway) does not appear to be so severely lacking in Kant, especially since his view of the human conscience as God's way of communicating the moral law to us can easily be interpreted as making room for a Critical Pneumatology. Kant's weakness in the area of Christology is closely related to what is probably the most legitimate of the frequently raised objections to Kant's phi¬ losophy of religion: that it relegates history in general and any historical mani¬ festation of God in particular to the periphery of religion [but see note VIII.32]. For all but the most liberal Christian theologians, the Christ-event is worth
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believing only because it originally took place at a specific time and place and continues to be a radically historical event whenever it is repeated in the life of Christian believers. Whereas Kant always bases his conception of hope on moral-practical reasoning, the biblical theologian bases Christian hope on an historical person: Jesus Christ as revealed in Scripture. The direct result of Kant's attempt to ground hope outside of history is, as McCarthy (quoting Noack) points out, that 'the Christological centerpiece of Christian theology thus disappears'.47 This objection is valid if Christ is truly not central for Kant. As a rational system, nothing historical can be central to systemr.m. The ques¬ tion is: can a person who accepts Kant's philosophical theology a Iso regard the historical Jesus as central? I believe Kant's answer would be a resounding 'yes!'—though if he himself had such a belief, he admittedly kept it private. Could it be that Kant's meager Christology is more a result of his exceedingly high view of Jesus than of a view that is merely dismissive? Having already discussed Kant's view of Jesus' nature at some length [see VII.2.B and VIII.2.B], I shall not attempt to develop my interpretation further at this point. Suffice it to say that any serious Christian would have been far more comfortable with Kant if he had been less evasive on this crucial point. Although this must be admitted as a genuine inadequacy in Kant's theology, I believe Christian philosophers should take it as a challenge rather than as an excuse to discard Kant's System altogether. The challenge is to supply what Kant left undone: a clear and unambiguous Kantian Christology. Doing this is beyond our present scope; nevertheless, I shall argue in XII.4 that the symbol of Christ, the God-man, was, in fact, at the very heart of Kant's concern in the work that was to be the ultimate expression of his philosophical System [i.e., Kt9], where Christ is regarded as the 'highest idea' and 'end' of his entire philosophical System. In this (admittedly sketchy) way, Kant does at least provide us with a way forward even in Christology. Kant's reluctance to commit himself publicly on the issue of personal faith 47. Mc86:70-l; s.a. Mc82:199 and Ga96:v. Galbraith echoes the same view in Ga96:162: 'the centrepiece of Christian theology and its experience of God disappears in Kant's theology.' What she actually demonstrates, however, is only that this is the standard interpretation of Kant. What actually lies at the center of Kant's System remains undetermined [but see XII.4]. Galbraith is a good example of atheologian who charges Kant with aneglect of Christianity's radical historicity [Ga96:161]: Kant failed to realize that Jesus' teaching 'cannot... be divorced from the fact that his whole life was one lived consciously in the divine presence and in total re¬ sponse to divine purpose.' Therefore, she argues, '[a]ny Christian who believes that it is through the life and death of Jesus that humankind has been redeemed and brought into communion with God, must entertain a theology radically different from that of Kant.' True Christianity, she claims, must be based on a belief in the historical Jesus; yet 'true religion for Kant amounts to a way of life' [171]. My contention here has been that, armed with the principle of perspective, the philosophi¬ cally-minded Christian theologian is free to adopt both standpoints.
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in Christ may be partially explained by recalling his recommendation that reli¬ gious believers should not profess (e.g., in reciting a creed) anything they are not certain of [Kt8:167-90(175-8)], since thoughtless recitation can do more damage than good to a genuine religious disposition. Kant may have reasoned that, in view of the obviously speculative status of the traditional Christian claims about Jesus, he ought to heed his own advice by remaining silent. Kant's concern, to curtail the tendency many religious believers have (a la Pascal) to confess too much 'just to be safe', is well placed. However, he has gone too far if he really demands certainty before a believer expresses support for a given dogma. The very word 'creed' means belief, not knowledge. So instead of remaining silent in the corporate expression of creeds, skeptical believers would be better off speaking them freely as an expression of one's hypothetical belief. Thus, for example, when I proclaim with my fellow church members that '...he arose on the third day...', I am not claiming to know this as a sci¬ entifically verifiable fact, but am expressing a heart-felt conviction that some¬ thing real happened to Jesus that caused him to live after his body had died. Clergy would do well to learn from Kant not to impose specific beliefs on new believers before they are ready; but Kant admittedly went too far in the other direction in his effort to prevent creeds from being treated too lightly. Throughout Part Three, and especially in this and the previous chapter, I have argued that Kant's basic treatment of the relative importance of theory and practice in one's religious life is essentially consistent with a Christian outlook on life. Both Kant and the Bible consistently stress that doctrine and church traditions are made to serve the individual—i.e., to help us become better (more godly, or 'Christ-like') persons—not vice versa. To reverse this order of prior¬ ity and treat the former as ends in themselves, relegating moral improvement to the sidelines, would be to pervert the message of Christianity, just as Kant so forcefully argued. The belief-oriented deficiencies in Kant's theology are there¬ fore less cause for concern than is his relative silence on issues relating to religious experience. Worship, prayer, and church ritual are exceptions. But these he places into an 'optional' category [see AVII.4] that seems unacceptable to anyone for whom such religious activities have themselves proved to be, as suggested above, the motive power that makes possible the moral improvement that is the true end of religion. This charge, that Kant almost totally ignores the role of religious experi¬ ence, is probably the weightiest objection a Christian could raise against him.48 48. As Greene puts it in Gr34:lxxvi: "The crux of the matter is obviously Kant's inability to recognize a distinctive religious experience, which is akin to that moral experience which he himself describes in such detail, yet is not identical to it.' Likewise, McCarthy judges Kt8 to be 'themati-
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As we saw in IX.2.A, an open-hearted attitude of love to God is the key to a powerful, spiritually-attuned biblical theology. Kant's philosophy appears to leave a gaping hole here, giving us (at best) only meager hints concerning how such open-heartedness is to be achieved. His theory of the archetype of perfect humanity (step four of systemr.ra), for example, can be interpreted as implying that each person has a 'God-shaped hole' in his or her heart; but Kant makes no effort to enlighten us as to how this hole should be filled. What we must understand is that (contrary to conventional wisdom) this does not make systemr.m wrong, but merely incomplete. The point is that Christians who wish to adopt a biblical theology consistent with Kant's System, as exemplified in this chapter, have nothing to fear from embracing Kantian philosophy. On the contrary, Kant himself expresses the hope that theologians would come to recognize that the gaps in his philosophy of religion are there for them to fill in, so that the philosopher and theologian might be 'at one' [Kt8:10(10)]. The various passing comments Kant makes about fanaticism in general and mysticism in particular leave us with the distinct impression that he does not regard a sense of personal communion with God as a necessary component of genuine religion. Yet biblical theology leads us, as shown in IX.2.A, to the very opposite conclusion: that the most intimate possible communion, love, is the very starting point of genuine religion and ought therefore to be adopted as the guiding principle of all our actions. Likewise, an openness to miracles as evidence of God's power to influence human affairs is repeatedly affirmed throughout the Bible (though not without clear warnings against depending on miracles [e.g., Matt. 12:39; 16:4; Jn. 4:48]), yet significantly downplayed by Kant [see AVII.2]. Examining more closely Kant's actual view of religious experience will therefore be one of our primary tasks in Part Four. This suggests that many critics give this objection more weight than it deserves. In Mc86:69, for instance, McCarthy calls Kt8 'an unfinished philo¬ sophical theory of religion' on the grounds that 'Kant omits discussion of religious experience'. He goes on to argue [95n] that 'Kant's... facile assertion that human nature has no faculty for intuiting or communing with the divine is contested... by claims to self-validating mystical experience.' Later he adds: 'Experience of a personal God as the Holy seems absent altogether' [99]; 'Kant is no forerunner of Rudolph Otto....'49 The absence of a genuine discussion of religious experience is a serious shortcoming in Kant's philosophy of religion.' cally incomplete' [Mc82:198] because Kant 'refuses serious consideration of religious experience.' 49. That McCarthy mentions Otto here is not accidental. In Ot50 Otto constructs his philosophy of religion with the expressed purpose of filling the gap of religious experience left by Kant. For a discussion of Otto's views, see note XII.30 [s.a. Da93b:H9-220 and Pa00a:241-5].
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What McCarthy fails to consider is that Kant may not intend Kt8 to be a complete 'philosophy of religion' as we now know it. Kt8 is concerned mainly with the nature and purpose of organized religion, and mystical theology is traditionally kept utterly distinct from ecclesiology. Nevertheless, the point is well taken that Kant's argument would have been stronger if he had included, especially in the second and fourth stages of systemr.m, a clearer account of how individuals experience conversion and service of God. While it may be incontestable that Kant's 'failure to discuss religious experience is a serious flaw' [104], the harshness of McCarthy's critique hides the fact that the makings of a theory are there in Kant's texts, waiting to be reconstructed. I shall take up precisely this task in Part Four [s.a. AVIII], in the hope of ascer¬ taining whether or not Kant allows a legitimate place for such experience. On this crucial issue the theological viability of Kant's entire edifice stands or falls. Fortunately, not all theologians regard Kant as totally insensitive to issues relating to religious experience. In Ma90a:353 MacKinnon discusses the effect on Herbert Farmer's theology of 'the sustained influence of Kant's insistence on the most intimate response of the subject... It is in the secret places of the heart that the seat not only of morality, but of an authentic religious response, is to be found, and this response must be the subject's own.' That is, it must be a personal religious experience, as opposed to a mere intellectual belief in a set of learned theoretical dogmas. Walsh makes a similar observation: 'People some¬ times complain that Kant thought you could have religion without religious experience... But ... for him, the step from being in a moral to being in a religious frame of mind was a very short one.'50 Walsh goes on to compare Kant to Wittgenstein [Wa63a:280] in the sense that both philosophers 'tried to find a meaning for religious concepts on the basis of the immediate experience of moral obligation.' Unfortunately, Walsh does not provide any systematic justification for these suggestive hints. Another recent exception to the general tendency to ignore or misinterpret 50. Wa63a:279. Taking worship as the most typical form of religious experience, Rossi disagrees with such a claim. He rightly points out [Ro89:381] that 'a grasp of the truth of where we stand in rela¬ tion to God is at the core of worship'. But he then claims: 'Yet Kant's account of respect for the moral law... does not move us to offer allegiance to the source of the moral law within us.' But as I shall demonstrate in Part Four [s.e. XII.2], this is precisely Kant's intent. Of course, the biblical theologian is far better equipped to fulfill this task using biblical insights. Again, Rossi rightly sees that 'a readiness to acknowledge the truth of our creaturely finitude... invites us to rely on a power, that both is and is not our own'. Yet he thinks 'Kant's account of respect' only 'catches a glimmer' of what is possible here. 'Kant... is reluctant... to let respect for the inner presence of the moral law lead to the praise of God.' Kant is indeed cautious of the tendency religious people have to allow the latter to displace the former. But as long as these are kept in proper relation, he sees praise and worship as quite appropriate responses, even helpful 'clothing' for a true religious faith [see AVII.4].
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the role of religious experience in Kant's System comes in the writings of Davidovich: "The Kantian philosophy of religion', she affirms [Da93b:307; s.a. xvii], can be interpreted 'so that religious experience is essentially the highest possible insight of reason.' She calls attention to the close relationship between Kant and two of the most influential thinkers in twentieth century theology: Rudolph Otto and Paul Tillich [s.a. Le89:l 10]. Davidovich argues that all three support a 'constructivist' view of theology, whereby the theologian's task is not merely to read off the meaning of a religious scripture, but to construct a 'symbolic language' that can express 'religious consciousness' in a fresh way [Da93b:xii-xiv]. When viewed from the standpoint of Kt7, Kant's own con¬ struction can be regarded, she maintains, as 'a contemplative conception of re¬ ligion' [xi] that unifies 'all the constructions of reason' [xvii]. For in Kt7 Kant concludes 'that the unity of reason is established in a moment of contemplative thought about a moral designer of the universe' [xiv]. Davidovich sees this as a 'new interpretation' of religion on Kant's part and laments that Kant fails 'to expand his suggestive conception' in Kt8 and other later writings [xv]. Treating the highest good as the supreme unifying principle [49; cf. note XII.56], she mistakenly interprets 'Kant's official discussion of religion' in Kt8 as if it adopts the same standpoint as Kt4. Although many commentators have assumed such an identification, I have repeatedly argued [s.e. VI.2] that Kant himself did not. Davidovich's interpretation demonstrates that the tide is turning in Kantstudies.51 The time is now ripe to bring to full awareness the deep significance of religious experience for Kant's Critical System. That systemr.m leaves something to be desired in its treatment of the experiential dimension of religion seems beyond doubt. But this does not necessarily mean Kant himself failed to appreciate this dimension. What actually was Kant's own personal attitude towards religious experience? Did he have good reasons for downplaying its role in Kt8? And did he ever provide clues as to how this deeper dimension of religion as a love affair with God might be grafted onto his 'official' view of religion as a purely moral affair? By investigating such questions in detail, Part Four of this study will provide ample evidence that Kant's Critical religion actually delves far deeper into the true heart of religious experience than is normally recognized.
5 1 . Another good example is the work of Hare [see notes VIII.4 and IX.5], who claims in Ha96:35 'that Christians should find Kant compelling and helpful.' After noting the opposite tendency, 'especially in America', where 'Christians who know about Kant tend to think of him as the major philosophical source of the rot that has led to the decline of Christianity in the West in the last two hundred years'. Hare announces his own goal 'of seeing how close Kant is to the Christian tradition he grew up in.'
KANT'S PERSPECTIVAL FOUNDATION FOR CRITICAL MYSTICISM The heavens declare the glory of God; the skies proclaim the work of his hands. Day after day they pour forth speech; night after night they display knowledge. There is no speech or language where their voice is not heard.... In the heavens he has pitched a tent for the sun ... It rises at one end of the heavens and makes its circuit to the other; nothing is hidden from its heat. The law of the LORD is perfect, reviving the soul. The statutes of the LORD are trustworthy, making the wise simple. The precepts of the LORD are right, giving joy to the heart. The commands of the LORD are radiant, giving light to the eyes. [Ps. 19:1-8] Paul then stood up in the meeting of the Areopagus and said: 'Men of Athens! I see that in every way you are very religious.... Now what you worship as some¬ thing unknown I am going to proclaim to you. The God who made the world and everything in it is the Lord of heaven and earth and does not live in temples built by hands. And he is not served by human hands, as if he needed anything, because he himself gives all men life and breath and everything else.... God did this so that men would seek him and perhaps reach out for him and find him, though he is not far from each one of us. "For in him we live and move and have our being." As some of your own poets have said, "We are his offspring.'" [Acts 17:22-5,27-8] Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me. I do not merely conjecture them and seek them as though obscured in darkness or in the transcendent region beyond my horizon: I see them before me, and I associate them directly with the consciousness of my own existence. [Kt4:161-2]
Chapter X Reason's Birth in Immediate Experience The sum of all these contemplations leads us to a conception of the Supreme Being which, when men made of dust venture to look beyond the curtain that conceals from created eyes the mysteries of the Inscrutable, comprehends in itself every thing possible to be thought. God is all-sufficient. What exists, whether it be possible or actual, is but something, so far as it is given by Him. A human language may let the Infinite speak to himself thus, / am from eternity to eternity, besides me there is nothing, something is but so far as it is through me. This thought, the most sublime of any is yet much neglected ... [Ktl5:151(349)].
1. Mysticism and Religious Experience Chapter II examined the Critical character of Ktl8 and its role in preparing the way for Kant's Critical System. I argued that, far from being a 'pre-Critical' work, Ktl8 contains all the essential ingredients of the Critical method and that the only key element of Kant's mature thinking that is altogether missing, namely the famous 'Copernican' insight, is actually present in the works of Swedenborg, whose views Kant was critiquing in Ktl8.1 also suggested, but left undeveloped, the idea that Kant himself did not have an entirely negative opinion of mysticism, but rather hoped through his Critical philosophy to pro¬ vide a secure foundation not only for metaphysics, but for mysticism as well. The purpose of Part Four will be to defend this idea more thoroughly by demonstrating the extent to which a mystical world view can be seen operating throughout Kant's philosophical writings, but especially in those composing the System itself [see KSP 1:111.4]. I will begin in this section by distinguishing between several types of mystic, based on the type of religious experience regarded as 'mystical'. The next section will examine more thoroughly Kant's reasons for rejecting what he calls 'fanatical' mysticism. X.3 will then demon¬ strate that Kant himself develops a special Critical type of mysticism. And X.4 will conclude this chapter by examining various factors that shaped this world view, especially the systematic relationship between four of his favorite medi¬ tative metaphors. The final two chapters in this volume will then show how Critical mysticism served as a crucial motivating factor in Kant's last few years of life (especially while writing Kt9), to the extent that the ultimate 'need of reason' is paradoxically fulfilled by the mystical 'death' of reason itself. A good general definition of mysticism is suggested by Albert Schweitzer's description of the mystic as 'a human being looking upon the division between earthly and super-earthly, temporal and eternal, as transcended, and feeling himself, while still externally amid the earthly and temporal, to belong to the
X. Reason's Birth in Immediate Experience
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super-earthly and eternal.'1 From this at least three sorts of mysticism can be inferred, depending on how a person believes contact with the eternal can be established. First, the mystic might believe membership in a 'super-earthly' realm makes it possible to communicate with other spirits, especially those that are no longer tied to a body. This is the type of mysticism practiced by Swedenborg and condemned by Kant in Ktl8. Since we dealt with it fully in Chapter II, there is no need to consider it any further here. Another, more common alternative is for mystics to participate in some organized religion, seeking to express their eternal nature through traditional beliefs and rituals. This is indeed so common that such participants in organized religion usually do not think of themselves as mystics. As we saw in Part Three, Kant's Copernican Perspective on religion allows for the potential validity of this second sense of mysticism, whereby contact with the eternal is channeled through religious activities and beliefs. Kant's Critical religion condones such religious/mystical experience, based on the judicial standpoint, provided it promotes a rational (moral) discipline by clothing a pure religious disposition with good actions, thus rendering practitioners worthy of receiving God's grace. However, mystics (as well as many ordinary religious people who would not presume to adorn themselves with such a title) more often speak of mystical experience in a rather different way. The term 'mysticism' can be used to refer not to the reflective act of pleas¬ ing God through the overcoming of one's evil heart, as expressed in the moral actions of a group of believers banded together to form a church, but to a more direct form of communication or communion with a personal God. Mystical experience of this type usually takes place outside the bounds of organized religion. The suggestion that Kant admitted the validity of such immediate and personal religious experience, and encouraged its promotion as an important aspect of his System, is (if entertained at all) almost universally denied by his Sc31:l. Schweitzer distinguishes between 'primitive' mysticism, based on a 'magical act' leading to supposed oneness with God, and 'developed' mysticism, whereby this union 'takes place through an act of thinking' [1-2]. He argues that Paul the Apostle does not have 'the usual mentality of a mystic. The exoteric and the esoteric go hand in hand.... [For] mysticism is combined with a non-mystical conception of the world' [25]. Schweitzer's interpretation of Paul's mysticism of 'being in Christ' is strikingly similar to the interpretation of Kant's mysticism I will offer here in Part Four. Both forge a middle path between the extremes of magical and intellectual mysticism, and in so doing they avoid the greatest 'danger of all mysticism', which 'is that of becoming supra-ethical' [297]. In Sc51b Schweitzer makes a rather different distinction between two world views: a 'life affirmation' that 'is dualistic and doctrinaire' (i.e., ethical) and a 'life negation' that 'is monistic and mystical' [10]. Pegging Kant as 'dualistic', he places him along with most other western philosophers in the former class [12]. Schweitzer's ideal world view is a combination of the two basic types, in the form of '[t]he enlightened ignorance of ethical mysti¬ cism' [263], He admits that Kant exemplifies the ethical side of this ideal [264]; I shall demonstrate that his System is intended to make room for the monistic, mystical side as well.
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PART FOUR: CRITICAL MYSTICISM
interpreters. Nevertheless, my purpose here in Part Four will be to demonstrate that such a mystical feeling lies at the very heart of the Critical philosophy: it is as important to the System as birth and death are to an individual person, for it sets up the limits and in so doing establishes for the System its ultimate meaning. Webb calls attention to the traditional view that philosophy is 'the daughter of Religion, and starts upon her career with